diff --git "a/CASEDATA-8.json" "b/CASEDATA-8.json" deleted file mode 100644--- "a/CASEDATA-8.json" +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41602 +0,0 @@ -[ - { - "Case No.": "23367", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2012 3382 = 2012 SLD 3382 = (2012) 344 ITR 460 = (2012) 25 TAXMAN 126", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpVTk", - "Key Words:": "Section 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Bad debts - Assessment year 1995-96 - Deduction of bad and doubtful debts as claimed under section 36(1)(vii) is to be reduced to the extent provision for bad and doubtful debts has been made under section 36(1)(viia) [In favour of revenue]\nThe assessee was engaged in development of industrial estates and infrastructural facilities. It had created a provision for bad and doubtful debts under section 36(1)(viia) amounting to Rs. 19,77,535. Besides this, the assessee also claimed bad debts of Rs. 1.10 crore under section 36(1)(vii). The Assessing Officer disallowed provision made under section 36(1)(viia) and thereby reduced deduction of bad debts available to the assessee under section 36(1)(vii). The Tribunal held that the sum which was shown as provision during the year had to be disallowed in view of the proviso to section 36(1)(vii).\nHeld that the finding of the Tribunal was in conformity with the proviso to section 36(1)(vii) and section 36(2)(v) and, therefore, no interference was needed by the Court.", - "Court Name:": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Auction Rules, 1996=", - "Case #": "IT APPEAL NO. 67 OF 2004, NOVEMBER 23, 2010 ", - "Judge Name:": " ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Pankaj Jain for the Appellant. Yogesh Putney for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn.\nv.\nCommissioner of IncomE tax" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23368", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 87 = 2023 SLD 87 = 2023 PLD 98", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpVTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n \n-Ss. 3, 117, 135 172(2)(xiii)- Land Revenue Rules, 1968, Rr.67-A, 67-B-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10-Suit for declaration-Maintainability-Encroachment, dispute of-Civil Court or Revenue Authorities, jurisdiction of-Scope-Demarcation of agricultural land-Scope-Land of both the private parties were adjacent to each other and construction of bypass road by the Government resulted into dispute between them-Both the (private) parties filed separate suits for declaration, inter alia that the other respective party be declared as tress-passer/land-grabber and the respondent/Government be directed to forthwith carry out a survey and to demarcate the subject-property-Civil Court consolidated both suits, however, returned both the plaints under O. VII, R. 10 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for want of jurisdiction under S. 172 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967-Only the appellants challenged the impugned order before the High Court whereas the respondents (other private party ) supported the same-Validity-Pleadings of both the parties revealed that they had not challenged the property having been recorded in their respective names in the revenue record, but their main claim hinged on the controversy that some portion of their property fell in the construction of the road, therefore, the appellants through declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, had actually sought relief of new right of demarcation-In case of controversies between the parties with regard to demarcation of boundaries of agricultural land, Civil Court had no jurisdiction unless demarcation of area had already been conducted by the Revenue Authorities under the provision of S. 117 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 read with Rr. 67-A 67-B of the Land Revenue Rules, 1968-Through a declaration in civil matter claimed under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, a pre-existing right could be declared, but a new right could not be created by grant of a decree by the Civil Court-Where a claim of encroachment over his property was made by a person against the adjacent owner, his remedy laid before the Revenue Authorities for demarcation of land under Rr. 67-A 68-B of the Land Revenue Rules, 1968, and in the said respect, the Revenue Officer had ample powers under S. 117 of the Act 1967 to define the boundaries-In the present case, neither any demarcation took place prior to institution of the suit, nor the appellants had taken any step to the said effect-There was no dispute between the parties with regard to title of the properties recorded in the revenue record-Both properties were adjacent to each other and both parties had raised claim that portion of their property fell in the construction of road made by the Government without specifying the encroached area-Title documents relied upon by the appellant showed his ownership, which right had not been denied by the respondent-Pleadings of the parties made clear that matter of demarcation of boundaries of the agricultural land had been raised by the appellants which fell in the domain of Revenue Authorities and jurisdiction of Civil Court was explicitly barred under S. 172(2)(xiii) of the Land Revenue Act, 1967-No interference in the impugned order of returning the plaints was made out by the High Court-First regular appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nDirector Military Lands and Cantonment Quetta Cantt Quetta and others v. Aziz Ahmed and others 2023 SCMR 860 ref.\n \n(b) Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n \n-S. 3-Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI of 1887), S. 4(1)-West Punjab Alienation of Land Act (XIII of 1900), S. 2(3)-Land, definition of-Section 3 of the Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 (the Act 1967) excludes land not assessed to land revenue from operation of the Act 1967-Under Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 and under Land Reforms Regulations 1972, the term Land has been defined as land which is not occupied as the site of a town, village, factory or industrial establishment and is occupied or has been or can be let for agricultural purpose, allied or subservient to agriculture and includes the site of building and other structure on such land-Section 2(3) of the West Punjab Alienation of Land Act defines land as land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or let for agriculture purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture etc.\n \n(c) Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n \n-Ss. 3, 117, 135 172(2)(xiii)- Land Revenue Rules, 1968, Rr. 67-A 67-B-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42-Suit for declaration-Maintainability-Partition, demarcation of agricultural land and eviction of unauthorized land owner-Civil Court or Revenue Authorities, jurisdiction of-Scope-Subject of partition, demarcation and eviction of unauthorized land owner is regulated by S. 135 of Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 ( the Act 1967) read with Rr. 67-A 67-B of the Land Revenues Rules, 1968 (the Rules 1968)-Provisions of S. 117 of the Act 1967 authorizes Revenue Officer to define the limit of any estate or any land on application of any interested person and to define limit of boundaries for ascertaining whether or not any outsider has encroached the property of the applicant and as a result such proceedings, a land owner, if found in wrongful possession of land can be evicted on an application-Rule 67-B of the Rules 1968, provides a specific procedure for seeking eviction of an encroacher-In a matter of demarcation of boundaries of agriculture land, jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred under S. 172(2)(xiii) of the Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 (the Act 1967), but in case where a claim is laid for declaration, permanent injunction and possession of area demarcated by the Revenue Authorities and found encroached by someone, a suit must lie before Civil Court.\n \nMehram Khan and others v. Fateh Khan and others 1983 SCMR 366 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Land Revenue Act, 1967=3,117,135,172(2)(xiii)Specific Relief Act, 1877=42", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 38 of 2022, decided on 12th June, 2023, heard on: 6th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Ejaz Swati and Nazeer Ahmed Langove, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Rehan for Appellant.\nIlahi Bakhsh Mengal for Respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5.\nAbdul Zahir Kakar, D.A.G., Muhammad Zubair, Assistant Director, Survey of Pakistan and Munir Ahmed Sikandar, A.A.G. for Official Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BANDENAWAZ (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Director\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Deputy Director Ministry of Defence and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23369", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2010 2072 = 2010 SLD 2072 = 2010 PTR 40", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpVXo", - "Key Words:": "EDITOR’S NOTE\nAccording to the Tribunal, the legislature has introduced Chapter VIII in the scheme of new Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as a measure of anti tax avoidance having the broad objective of discouraging the trend of unfair transactions between associates. In this case (decided ex-parte on merit), as a result of audit, certain transactions which were alleged to be non-arms length were recharacterized through amendment of assessment under section 122(1), to retrieve loss of revenue.\nFACTS/HELD\n1. Brief facts of this appeal are that the taxpayer is a private limited company, engaged in the manufacturing and sale of pharmaceutical products.\n2. For the year 2004 under consideration the taxpayer filed return of income which was selected for audit under section 177(4) by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Audit Division, LTU, Karachi. Subsequently, pre-audit conference was held and on the basis of scrutiny of record and pre-audit conference, the Information Document Request (IDR) was issued.\n3. The requisite details/documents were furnished by the Taxpayer. The Primary Narrative Report (PNR) was issued on 16-6-2006, seeking reply from the taxpayer regarding additions of Rs.1.294m u/s. 108, Rs.140,122 u/s. 109 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for compliance on 23-06-2009. On the due date of compliance taxpayer furnished written reply vide letter dated 23-06-2006. The reply of the Taxpayer was not found satisfactory.\n4. The Taxation Officer, therefore, amended the deemed assessment order u/s. 122(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, whereby inter alia made additions referred above.\n5. The CIT(Appeals) confirmed the decision of the taxation officer, therefore second appeal was filed.\n6. At the time of hearing one Mr. Jaseem, appeared and verbally requested for adjournment of the case. The request of Mr. Jaseem was not accepted as neither he filed any power of attorney nor brought any such request on behalf of M/s. Zubairi Law Associates.\n7. Mr. Farrukh Ansari, the learned D.R. on the other hand supported the orders of the officers below. He submitted that the provisions of section 108 are applicable even in respect of the self generated funds. The proposed addition amounts to deemed income in your hand which would have been realized in an arms length transaction. The scope of the said section cannot be limited to the extent of business transaction.\n8. In the impugned case we find that appellant/taxpayer has shown receivable amounting to R.21,582 million which pertain to interest free loans/advances provided to Associates as defined u/s. 85(1) and (3) of the Ordinance. By this way the transaction actually serves the predetermined purpose acceptable to both the parties which resultantly has impact on the tax liability of both sides.\n9. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that providing of funds to the Associated concern by the taxpayer, without any interest thereon, has rightly been treated by the Taxation Officer as profit on debt and added under section 108(2) read with Rule 26 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002.\n10 The Tribunal calling for no interference in the CIT(Appeal’s) decision held that:\na. The legislature has introduced Chapter VIII in the scheme of new Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as a measure of anti tax avoidance.\nb. Providing funds to the Associated concern by the taxpayer, without any interest thereon, has rightly been treated by the Taxation Officer as profit on debt and added under section 108(2) read with Rule 26 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002. \nAppeal dismissed", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 314/KB of 2007 (Tax year 2004), heard on: 27th August, 2009, decided on: 30th September, 2009.", - "Judge Name:": " MRS. ZAREEN SALEEM ANSARI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER\nSYED MUHAMMAD FAROOQ SHAH, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Present at hearing: None for Appellant. Farrukh Ansari, D.R., for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23370", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2010 2072 = 2010 SLD 2072 = 2010 PTR 40", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpVXk", - "Key Words:": "EDITOR’S NOTE\nAccording to the Tribunal, the legislature has introduced Chapter VIII in the scheme of new Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as a measure of anti tax avoidance having the broad objective of discouraging the trend of unfair transactions between associates. In this case (decided ex-parte on merit), as a result of audit, certain transactions which were alleged to be non-arms length were recharacterized through amendment of assessment under section 122(1), to retrieve loss of revenue.\nFACTS/HELD\n1. Brief facts of this appeal are that the taxpayer is a private limited company, engaged in the manufacturing and sale of pharmaceutical products.\n2. For the year 2004 under consideration the taxpayer filed return of income which was selected for audit under section 177(4) by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Audit Division, LTU, Karachi. Subsequently, pre-audit conference was held and on the basis of scrutiny of record and pre-audit conference, the Information Document Request (IDR) was issued.\n3. The requisite details/documents were furnished by the Taxpayer. The Primary Narrative Report (PNR) was issued on 16-6-2006, seeking reply from the taxpayer regarding additions of Rs.1.294m u/s. 108, Rs.140,122 u/s. 109 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for compliance on 23-06-2009. On the due date of compliance taxpayer furnished written reply vide letter dated 23-06-2006. The reply of the Taxpayer was not found satisfactory.\n4. The Taxation Officer, therefore, amended the deemed assessment order u/s. 122(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, whereby inter alia made additions referred above.\n5. The CIT(Appeals) confirmed the decision of the taxation officer, therefore second appeal was filed.\n6. At the time of hearing one Mr. Jaseem, appeared and verbally requested for adjournment of the case. The request of Mr. Jaseem was not accepted as neither he filed any power of attorney nor brought any such request on behalf of M/s. Zubairi Law Associates.\n7. Mr. Farrukh Ansari, the learned D.R. on the other hand supported the orders of the officers below. He submitted that the provisions of section 108 are applicable even in respect of the self generated funds. The proposed addition amounts to deemed income in your hand which would have been realized in an arms length transaction. The scope of the said section cannot be limited to the extent of business transaction.\n8. In the impugned case we find that appellant/taxpayer has shown receivable amounting to R.21,582 million which pertain to interest free loans/advances provided to Associates as defined u/s. 85(1) and (3) of the Ordinance. By this way the transaction actually serves the predetermined purpose acceptable to both the parties which resultantly has impact on the tax liability of both sides.\n9. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that providing of funds to the Associated concern by the taxpayer, without any interest thereon, has rightly been treated by the Taxation Officer as profit on debt and added under section 108(2) read with Rule 26 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002.\n10 The Tribunal calling for no interference in the CIT(Appeal’s) decision held that:\na. The legislature has introduced Chapter VIII in the scheme of new Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as a measure of anti tax avoidance.\nb. Providing funds to the Associated concern by the taxpayer, without any interest thereon, has rightly been treated by the Taxation Officer as profit on debt and added under section 108(2) read with Rule 26 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002. \nAppeal dismissed", - "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 314/KB of 2007 (Tax year 2004), heard on: 27th August, 2009, decided on: 30th September, 2009.", - "Judge Name:": " MRS. ZAREEN SALEEM ANSARI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER\nSYED MUHAMMAD FAROOQ SHAH, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Present at hearing: None for Appellant. Farrukh Ansari, D.R., for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23371", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 88 = 2023 SLD 88 = 2023 TAX 297", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTc", - "Key Words:": "Limitation Act, 1908 - Condonation of Delay\nFacts:\nThe Collector of Customs filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan against three concurrent decisions. The petition was filed after an 11-day delay. The petitioner also sought the condonation of delay.\nArguments:\nPetitioners Argument:\nThe counsel for the petitioner argued that a court fee of Rs. 250 was payable, which caused the delay. Additionally, it was pointed out that the person responsible for the delay was not held accountable by the department.\nDecision:\nCondonation of Delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908:\nThe Court emphasized that if decisions are challenged, the appeal should be filed within the prescribed time limit. Delays should not be assumed to be condoned unless there is a valid reason to do so. In this case, the petitioner failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the 11-day delay in filing the appeal.\nDismissal of the Application:\nGiven the lack of a valid justification for the delay, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed. As a result, the petition for leave to appeal was also dismissed.\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court rejected the petition for condonation of delay and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The Court reiterated the importance of adhering to the statutory time limits for filing appeals, highlighting that delays must be accompanied by valid reasons for consideration.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4145 of 2022 decided on 06.02.2023, heard on: 06.02.2023\n(Against the judgment Dated 06.09.2022 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Customs Reference No. 21-P/2022)", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: Mr. Yousaf Ali, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC (E,C), CUSTOMS HOUSE, PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER\nVS\nZAIN UL ABIDIN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23372", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 89 = 2023 SLD 89 = 2023 TAX 299", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTY", - "Key Words:": "LAW REFORMS ORDINANCE, 1972\nSection: 3 - Intra Court Appeal - Sales Tax on Services - Adjustment of input tax - Disposal of the matter by High Court - Filing of civil petition by the petitioner before the Supreme Court without exhausting available remedy u/s 3 of the Act by way of filing intra court appeal - Maintainability\nFACTS\nThe matter was decided by the High Court - The petitioner filed civil petition in the Supreme Court for leave to appeal -\nARGUMENTS\nCounsel for the respondent raised an objection that the petitioner could not file petition in the Supreme Court before exhausting available remedy of filing an intra court appeal in the High Court - The counsel for the petitioner relied on Media Network Case decided by the Supreme Court and contended that petition is maintainable.\nDECISION\n(a) Right to file ICA before High Court - Filing of a petition before the Supreme Court by the petitioner after disposal of the matter by a single judge of High Court instead of availing remedy of filing ICA - Maintainability - It is settled law that where the right to file an ICA before the High Court under section 3 of the Ordinance exists, then a petition before this Court without exhausting the said remedy, and thereby circumventing the forum below, is ordinarily not maintainable. \n(b) Condition precedent for filing petition before Supreme Court - Such petitions, however, have been entertained by this Court only when certain exceptional circumstances exist, such as, where the matter involves important questions of law of great public importance having far-reaching consequences, questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and validity of provincial statutes, and substantial questions of law involving fundamental rights, coupled with the fact that the objection with regards to maintainability is taken at a belated stage before the Court. We note that no such exceptional circumstances exist in the matter at hand and the objection regarding maintainability of the petition was also duly raised at the first instance.\n(c) Reliance of the petitioner’s counsel on Media Network Case - Validity - Reliance on Media Network (supra) by the learned counsel for the petitioners is misconceived as in the said , this Court had noted that the objection as to maintainability was taken at a belated stage and important questions of law of great public importance having far-reaching consequences were involved in terms of selection of cases for audit under a Self-Assessment Scheme and policy guidelines issued by the Central Board of Revenue.\n(d) Maintainability - The present matter relates simply to adjustment of input tax with respect to services received by the respondent against the sales tax on services. Consequently, we find that the instant petition, having been filed without availing the remedy of an ICA before the High Court, is not maintainable. In the light of the above, the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is upheld and the instant petition is accordingly dismissed being not maintainable.\n[Case-law referred.]\nMs. Shazia Bilal, ASC, Syed Salauddin Gillani and Addl. Commissioner for the Petitioners. (through V.L. Karachi Registry)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3739 of 2019 decided on 20.01.2023, heard on: 20.01.2023\n(Against the order of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad Dated 26.07.2019 passed in WP No. 1228/2016)", - "Judge Name:": " MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE, SHAHID WAHEED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Shazia Bilal, ASC, Syed Salauddin Gillani and Addl. Commissioner for the Petitioners. (through V.L. Karachi Registry)\nMr. Jahanzeb Awan, ASC for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN, ISLAMABAD, OTHERS\nVS\nM/S HUB POWER COMPANY LTD, OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23373", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 90 = 2023 SLD 90 = 2023 TAX 302", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTU", - "Key Words:": "Import of Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) and Exemption from Customs Duties\nFacts: The respondents, importers of Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs), had cleared the vehicles through customs under a 50% exemption of duty and taxes in accordance with SRO 499(I)/2013, dated 12.06.2013. However, the Customs department later issued Show Cause Notices to the importers and their clearing agents, alleging evasion of duties and taxes. The Deputy Collector Customs (Adjudication) upheld the notices and imposed a recovery order along with penalties. The Collector of Customs (Appeals) dismissed the appeal, but the Appellate Tribunal accepted the importers appeal. The High Court dismissed the reference applications filed by the Customs department, leading them to challenge the High Courts decision in the Supreme Court of Pakistan.\nArguments:\nPetitioners Argument: The petitioners argued that the High Court wrongly held that SRO 499(I)/2013 applied to both new and used Hybrid Electric Vehicles. The petitioners contended that the Import Policy Order 2016 prohibited the import of used or old HEVs, and thus the exemption should not have applied.\nRespondents Argument: The respondents maintained that they were entitled to the exemption as per the terms of SRO 499(I)/2013, and any attempt to restrict this exemption by referring to subsequent circulars or policies was erroneous.\nDecision:\nExemption Entitlement under SRO 499(I)/2013: The Supreme Court held that the exemption of customs duty, sales tax, and withholding tax on the import of Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) as specified under SRO 499(I)/2013 was valid and could not be denied or circumvented based on a subsequent circular issued on 5.10.2018 by the Assistant Collector of Customs.\nEntitlement of Taxpayer: The Court emphasized that if a taxpayer is clearly entitled to an exemption under the notification, the department could not refuse the benefit of the exemption. The notifications intent was to benefit the taxpayer, and it should be construed in favor of the taxpayer.\nRationale Behind the Exemption: The exemption was introduced for environmental protection, as the use of Hybrid Electric Vehicles aligns with efforts to combat climate change. This initiative contributes to Pakistan’s Environmental Protection Act (PEPA), 1997, and promotes cleaner, more sustainable transportation options.\nNeed for Promotion of HEVs: The Court highlighted that the promotion of HEVs is a critical measure for addressing climate change and minimizing its negative impacts. Therefore, any interpretations that would restrict the existing exemptions and create unnecessary barriers were considered irrational and unjustified.\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, ruling in favor of the importers. It dismissed the leave to appeal filed by the petitioners (Customs department), confirming that the exemption for Hybrid Electric Vehicles under SRO 499(I)/2013 could not be denied or restricted based on later policies or circulars.\nCases Referred to:\nJamat-i-Islami Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2000 Supreme Court 111)\nGovernment of Pakistan and others v. Messrs. Hashwani Hotel LTD (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 68)\nPakistan through Chairman FBR and others v. Hazrat Hussain and others (2018 SCMR 939)\nMathuram Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 2000 SC 109)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(3A)Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1B),33(5)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=53,148", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No. 389, 696 to 742 of 2022 decided on 06.07.2022, heard on: 06.07.2022\n(Against the judgment Dated 01.12.2021 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in Custom Reference Nos.270-P to 317-P/2020)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CHIEF JUSTICE, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: Mr. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Sr. ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, PESHAWAR\nVS\nWASEEF ULLAH AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23374", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 91 = 2023 SLD 91 = 2023 TAX 317", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Amendment of Assessments under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\n________________________________________\nFacts:\nThe tax department amended the assessment of a taxpayer after receiving reliable information suggesting the concealment of income. The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal, but the Appellate Tribunal reversed the decision. The Commissioner then filed a reference application, which was dismissed by the High Court. The Commissioner sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nDepartments Argument:\nThe department argued that the amendment of the assessment was valid under Section 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, due to the suppression of income.\n•\nRespondents Argument:\nThe respondent contended that the department had misinterpreted the assessment. The Appellate Tribunal’s decision was correct, as the department’s approach was flawed.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nTax Charge under Section 111(1)(d):\nThe Supreme Court ruled that only specific income, such as production or sales income, can be taxed under Section 111(1)(d). The department’s categorization of “gross receipts” was incorrect and overly broad. The Court upheld the Appellate Tribunal’s view that such classification was artificial and could not be accepted.\n2.\nScope of Tax Charge:\nThe Court clarified that taxes should only be levied on income , not on gross receipts or gross income . An assessment must be based on genuine income, not just gross figures.\n3.\nApplication of Section 122(5):\nThe Court highlighted the distinction between Section 122(5) and Section 111(1)(d). Under Section 122(5), only net income (not gross sales or production) should be considered for assessment. In contrast, Section 111(1)(d) allows the entire gross amount to be taxed, which leads to higher tax liabilities.\n4.\nImproper Switching of Provisions:\nThe Court found that the departments switch from Section 122(5) (for net income) to Section 111(1)(d) (for gross receipts) was improper. The department had not calculated the net income and instead taxed gross receipts, resulting in an inflated tax liability.\n5.\nBurden of Proof on Tax Authorities:\nThe Supreme Court emphasized that the burden of proof rests with the tax authorities. They must provide valid justifications for their actions, which are subject to judicial scrutiny. The authorities must meet a high threshold of proof when making such assessments.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent, affirming the Appellate Tribunal’s decision. It dismissed the leave to appeal, stating that the actions of the tax authorities were improper and unjustifiable under the law. The Court emphasized that the tax authorities should assess income correctly, considering net income instead of gross receipts.\n________________________________________\nCases Referenced:\n•\nFawad Ahmad Mukhtar and others v Commissioner Inland Revenue and another (2022 SCMR 426)\n•\nWaris Meah v The State and another (PLD 1958 SC 157)\n•\nJibendra Kishore Achharya Chowdhury v Province of East Pakistan (PLD 1957 SC 9)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=23A,25,27,39,111,111(1),111(1)(d),111(4)(b),122,122(5),122(8),122(9),206,237", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No.648-L, 649-L and 650-L of 2021 decided on 31.05.2022, heard on: 31.05.2022\n(Against order Dated 26.01.2021 passed by the passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.Rs. No.4919, 4922 and 4923/2021.)", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN, JUSTICE, MUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE AND SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Shakeel, ASC Mr. Naeem Hassan, Secretary (Litigation), FBR for the Petitioners. (in all cases)\nSyed Mansoor Ali Bukhari, ASC for the Respondent. (in all cases)", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, (RTO) Lahore\nVs\nMIAN LIAQAT ALI PROPRIETOR, LIAQAT HOSPITAL, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23375", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 92 = 2023 SLD 92 = 2023 TAX 332", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUS8", - "Key Words:": "Import of Television Cameras and Equipment - Exemption Claim\nBackground:\nThe applicant imported television cameras and related equipment and sought an exemption from tax under SRO 593(I)/91 dated 30.06.1991. The consignment was released to the applicant based on an undertaking that the exemption certificate would be produced within 15 days. However, the applicant failed to submit the exemption certificate within the prescribed time.\nThe case proceeded through multiple forums:\nOrder-in-Original: The relevant authorities passed an order requiring the applicant to pay taxes, as the exemption certificate was not produced.\nAppeals: The applicant appealed the order, but the appeal was dismissed at the Appellate Tribunal level.\nReference to the High Court: The applicant filed a reference to the High Court, challenging the denial of the exemption.\nKey Issue:\nThe central issue was whether the applicant was entitled to exemption from taxes under clause (v) of SRO 593(I)/91 for the import of television cameras and equipment. Specifically, the exemption under the SRO applied to persons who import plant or machinery for execution of a contract with the Federal Government or a Provincial Government and required a certificate from the Government to qualify for the exemption.\nArguments:\nApplicant’s Argument: The applicant claimed they were entitled to the exemption based on SRO 593(I)/91, arguing that they were importing the equipment for a contract with the government and should therefore be exempt from taxes.\nRevenue’s Argument: The revenue authorities contended that the applicant failed to provide the exemption certificate and could not prove that the imported equipment was for the execution of a contract with the government, as required by the SRO.\nDecision:\nClause (v) of SRO 593(I)/91: The Court reviewed SRO 593(I)/91, which grants tax exemptions to persons importing plant or machinery for government contracts. However, the exemption is contingent on producing a government-issued certificate confirming the machinerys use for a government contract.\nFailure to Provide Evidence: Despite repeated queries, the applicant’s counsel failed to demonstrate that the imported equipment was for the execution of a government contract. Moreover, the applicant did not produce the required exemption certificate within the stipulated time.\nRuling: The Court found that the applicant did not meet the conditions set out in SRO 593(I)/91. The failure to produce the exemption certificate and the inability to prove the nature of the import for a government contract led the Court to rule against the applicant.\nThe High Court answered the reference in the negative, favoring the respondent department and against the applicant, meaning the applicant was not entitled to the exemption.\nConclusion:\nThe reference application was dismissed, and the decision of the lower forums was upheld. The applicant was not entitled to the tax exemption on the imported television cameras and equipment due to the failure to meet the conditions set forth in SRO 593(I)/91, specifically the lack of the required exemption certificate and proof of a government contract.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11", - "Case #": "SCRA 282 of 2010 decided on 30.01.2023, Date /s of hearing: 30.01.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ. ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Anwar Kashif Mumtaz, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi Assistant Attorney Sindh and Mr. Khaleeq Ahmed, Advocate for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TRANS WORLD INTERNATIONAL INC (TWI)\nVS\n-CUSTOMS, FEDERAL EXCISE, SALES TAX TRIBUNAL, OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23376", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 93 = 2023 SLD 93 = 2023 TAX 335", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUSs", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax on Disposal of Written-off Assets\nBackground:\nThe applicant, a taxpayer, was involved in the disposal of plant and machinery that had been written off. The Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) issued a show cause notice demanding why sales tax, along with default surcharge and penalties, should not be recovered from the applicant for the sale of these assets. The applicant contended that the assets in question had already been written off and therefore could not be considered taxable supplies under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe issue was contested through multiple forums:\nDCIR: Initially, the DCIR issued the show cause notice and created a demand for sales tax recovery, along with penalties and surcharges.\nIncome Tax Appellate Tribunal: The matter was remanded to the original forum for reconsideration.\nPost-remand Proceedings: The proceedings resulted in a ruling that the applicant was liable to pay the tax, default surcharge, and penalty.\nAppeal to Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-I): The applicants appeal was dismissed.\nAppeal to Income Tax Appellate Tribunal: The appeal was again dismissed.\nMain Issue:\nThe primary argument of the applicant was that since the plant and machinery had been written off, they could no longer be considered taxable supplies under Section 2(41) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Therefore, the recovery of sales tax on the disposal of these assets was unjustified.\nArguments:\nApplicant’s Argument: The applicant argued that since the assets were written off, they should not be treated as taxable supplies. Therefore, no sales tax should be levied on the disposal of such assets.\nRevenue’s Argument: The revenue authorities argued that the disposal of written-off assets was still considered a taxable supply under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The proceeds from the sale of these assets were recorded in the applicants own financial statements, and such transactions were taxable, regardless of whether the assets were written off.\nDecision:\nThe court ruled that even if the assets were written off, the sale of those assets still constituted a taxable supply under Section 2(41) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Sales Tax Act does not provide an exemption for the disposal of written-off or condemned assets. The applicant had recorded significant proceeds from the disposal of these assets in their financial statements for the years 2008 and 2009. These proceeds, amounting to Rs. 214,535,000 in 2008 and Rs. 165,946,000 in 2009, were clearly considered taxable supplies.\nThe Court concluded that the sale of written-off assets is still subject to sales tax, and therefore, the demand for sales tax, default surcharge, and penalties made by the DCIR was valid.\nConclusion:\nThe court answered the reference in the negative, ruling that the sale of written-off assets does indeed fall within the scope of taxable supplies under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Therefore, the recovery of sales tax along with penalties and surcharges was upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(41),11", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 30 of 2018 decided on 19.01.2023, heard on: 19.01.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE AND BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khurram M. Hashmi, Advocate for the applicant.\nMr. Babar Bilal, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23377", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 94 = 2023 SLD 94 = (2023) 127 TAX 338 = 2024 PTD 1335", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVFpUTk", - "Key Words:": "Summary of the Case on Sales Tax Exemption for Electricity Supply in FATA/PATA\nBackground:\nThe petitioners in this case are manufacturers who have established their businesses in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). They challenge the imposition of sales tax on the supply of electricity as outlined in Entry No. 152 of the Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Under Entry No. 151, industries in FATA/PATA were exempt from sales tax on the supply of electricity. However, Entry No. 152 removed this exemption for certain industries, specifically those established after May 31, 2018, and excluded industries like Ghee, Cooking Oil, and Steel industries from this exemption.\nThe petitioners argue that the new provisions discriminate against industries established after the cutoff date and violate their constitutional rights.\nKey Legal Issues:\nDiscrimination and Violation of Equality: The main contention is that Entry No. 152 discriminates against industries established after May 31, 2018, by denying them the exemption on electricity supply that was granted to earlier established industries.\nViolation of Constitutional Provisions: The petitioners argue that the imposition of this tax violates Articles 18 (freedom of trade) and 25 (equality before the law) of the Constitution of Pakistan.\nVires of Entry No. 152: The petitioners question the constitutionality of Entry No. 152, asserting that it is discriminatory and violates the principles of equality and fairness enshrined in the Constitution.\nArguments:\nFor the Petitioners: The petitioners counsel contended that while Entry No. 151 of the Sixth Schedule provided a general exemption for industries in FATA/PATA, Entry No. 152 arbitrarily withdrew this exemption for certain industries. Specifically, industries set up after May 31, 2018, including the Ghee, Cooking Oil, and Steel industries, were excluded from the exemption, which created an unequal and discriminatory situation.\nFor the Revenue Authorities: The counsel for the revenue authorities argued that fiscal statutes, such as the Sales Tax Act, are enacted by competent legislative bodies and cannot be struck down merely because the tax rate is considered high. They emphasized that it is within the legislature’s power to classify persons and properties differently for tax purposes.\nDecision:\nConstitutional Principles: The Court noted that under Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution, the legislature has the power to classify persons for tax purposes. However, such classifications must be fair and reasonable. The Court found that industries established after May 31, 2018, were similarly situated to those established earlier, and thus, treating them differently by denying them the electricity supply exemption created an unjust discrimination.\nDiscriminatory Taxation: The Court held that granting exemptions to one set of industries and denying them to another set—based solely on the date of establishment—violated the principles of equality and fairness. This type of classification was deemed arbitrary and discriminatory, failing the test of intelligible differentia required by the Constitution.\nVires of Entry No. 152: The Court declared that Entry No. 152 was ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the Constitution in so far as it distinguished between industries established before and after May 31, 2018. The Court held that the exemption on electricity supply should apply equally to all industries in FATA/PATA, except for the Steel, Ghee, and Cooking Oil industries.\nMaintainability of the Petition: The Court also addressed the objection that the petition was not maintainable as the companies, being juristic persons, could not claim discrimination. The Court ruled that the petition was maintainable as it was filed by natural persons (owners of industries), who had the standing to challenge the discriminatory legislation.\nConclusion:\nThe Court concluded that Entry No. 152 of the Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, was unconstitutional to the extent that it created an arbitrary distinction between industries based on their establishment date. It directed that the exemption from sales tax on electricity supply should apply to all industries in FATA/PATA, except for Steel, Ghee, and Cooking Oil industries, regardless of when they were established.\nThis decision reinforces the constitutional principles of equality and fairness, ensuring that similarly placed persons or entities are not treated differently without valid reason.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=13Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=18,25,199,247(3)", - "Case #": "W.P No.1343-P/2020 decided on 02.12.2022, heard on: 28.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": " LAL JAN KHATTAK, S.M. ATTIQUE SHAH AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ. ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate, for the petitioner.\nM/s. Sana Ullah, DAG and Amir Javed, Addl Attorney General, for the Federation.\nM/s. Ishtiaq Ahmad, Rehman Ullah and Zia-ur-Rehman Tajik, Advocates, for the respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S A.K TARIQ FOUNDRY, OTHERS\nVERSUS\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23378", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 539 = 2023 SLD 539 = 2023 CLD 297", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXI, Rr. 64, 65, 66, 67, 90-Proclamation of sales by public auction-Mode of making proclamation-Guiding principle in the scheme of Order XXI, C.P.C is to ensure appropriate publicity for Court auction sales so that a fair and reasonable price can be realized for the properties-Solitary underlying principle is that the properties must fetch the best possible price in the auction-Purpose and intention behind Rules 64 to 67 of Order XXI, C.P.C. stated.\nWhile attempting the sale of property of a debtor for execution and satisfaction of decree, wide publicity should be given to the proclamation of sale in order to fetch the highest and most handsome price for the property. Another purpose is to invite the maximum numbers of persons for participation in the auction proceedings through wide publications and the best course is the publication of auction notice in the vernacular newspapers to attract maximum participants. In todays advanced era of information technology and print and electronic media diversity and polarization, it seems to be totally illogical to avoid publication of proclamation in the newspapers and solely depend upon the beat of drum or other customary methods. Besides complying with other formalities, the publication of auction notice with the reserve price and other salient features must be published in the newspapers to attract the attention and participation of public at large, so that all interested persons may take part in the auction proceedings for submission of their bids before fall of the hammer which will maintain balance and will also protect the rights and liabilities of the parties. The fetching of fair market price through auction is not only in favour of decree holder to realize its debts but also in favour of debtor for discharging his debts, so while conducting an auction efforts should be made by the Executing Court that the provisions contained for proclamation and its publication should not be disregarded or unheeded to render such provisions redundant which have been incorporated by the legislature with logical purpose. The guiding principle or course of action triggering in the scheme of Order XXI, C.P.C is to ensure appropriate publicity for Court auction sales so that a fair and reasonable price can be realized for the properties. Solitary underlying principle is that the properties must fetch the best possible price in the auction and, in case of violation, the sale can be regarded as illegal under Rule 90 of Order XXI, C.P.C.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXI, Rr. 66, 67(2)-Proclamation of sales by public auction-Competitive bidding-Pre-requisites-At least two bidders-Publication of proclamation-According to the established norms and standards, the presence of at least two potential bidders is indispensable to carry out an auction in which competitive bidding is a key factor for free and transparent public auction-Furthermore Executing Court ought to order the publication of proclamation in at least one widely circulated daily newspaper.\nAuction is a form of sale of property to the highest bidder, usually as a result of competition between bidders who compete among themselves by offering competitive prices and the highest bid is normally approved, but according to the established norms and standards, the presence of at least two potential bidders is indispensable to carry out an auction in which competitive bidding is a key factor for free and transparent public auction. In the present case there was no competitive bidding conducted by the Courts auctioneers, nor any notice was published in the newspapers The sole bid was tendered by the decree holder bank which was accepted without considering whether the price offered matches the actual value of the property or not, nor anything was mentioned as to why publication of auction notice was not ordered to be published in the newspapers for information of general public or for inviting them to attend the auction on the given date. In the impugned the High Court rightly found that in order to ensure proper publicity, the Executing Court ought to have exercised the authority vested in it under Rule 67(2) of Order XXI, C.P.C. to order the publication of proclamation in at least one widely circulated daily newspaper and failure to do so had caused injustice to the debtors. Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=64,65,66,67,90", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2056 of 2022, decided on 4th October, 2022.\n(Against the judgment Dated 27.04.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in E.F.A. No.35845 of 2020), heard on: 4th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iftikhar Ullah Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SUMMIT BANK LIMITED, LAHORE-Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs M. M. BROTHERS, PROPRIETORSHIP CONCERN through Proprietor and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23379", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 540 = 2023 SLD 540 = 2023 CLD 307", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzU", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9(5), 10(1), 12, 22-Suit for recovery of Bank loan-Ex-parte decree, maintenance of-Absence from proceedings-Appellants/ defendants during pendency of their petition for leave to appear and defend the suit, absented themselves and were proceeded ex-parte-Banking Court declined to set aside ex-parte and decree under S. 12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Validity-Decree could only be set aside under S. 12 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, if it was passed for failure to file petition for leave to appear and defend the suit-Such application could be filed within a period of 21 days of the date of decree or where summons were not duly served, when defendant had knowledge of decree-High Court declined to set aside ex-parte and decree as application under S. 12 Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was not maintainable-Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\nM. Haleem and others v. H. Muhammad Nasim and others PLD 1969 SC 270; Messrs Ammar Rice Dealers and 2 others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2004 CLD 857; Mst. Tahira Yasmeen and others v. Muslim Commercial Bank and others 2005 CLD 927; Messrs Agrocare and others v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited 2011 CLD 990; Messrs Sahib Gas Ways through Partner and others v. The Bank of Punjab through Manager 2013 CLD 501 and Messrs Arbab Cotton Industries and Oil Mills through Managing Partner v. National Bank of Pakistan through Branch Manager 2017 CLD 1657 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9(5),10(1),12,22", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 46550 of 2019, heard on 7th November, 2022, heard on: 7th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Asif Iqbal and Haroon Farrukh for Appellants.\nAhsan Masood and Waqar Latif for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs MAKKAH TRADERS through Managing Partner and 3 others-Appellants\nVersus\nMCB BANK LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23380", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 541 = 2023 SLD 541 = 2023 CLD 313", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXIX, Rr. 1, 2-Interim injunction, grant of-Principles-Relief of injunction is discretionary and is to be granted by any court according to sound legal principles and ex-debito justice-Existence of prima facie case is to be judged or made out on the basis of material/evidence on record at the time of hearing of injunction application and such evidence of material should be of the nature that by considering the same, court should or ought to be of the view that plaintiff applying for injunction was in all probability likely to succeed in the suit by having a decision in his favour-Term prima facie case is not specifically defined in Civil Procedure Code, 1908 but consensus is that in order to satisfy about existence of prima facie case, pleadings must contain facts constituting existence of right of plaintiff and its infringement at the hands of opposite party-Balance of convenience is that if an injunction is not granted and suit is ultimately decided in favour of plaintiff, inconvenience caused to plaintiff would be greater than that would be caused to defendant, if the injunction is granted-Plaintiff was to show that inconvenience caused to him would be greater than that which may be caused to defendant-Irreparable loss is meant to be the loss, which is incapable of being calculated on the yardstick of money-Injunction is equitable remedy and accordingly is to conform to maxim of law of equity that he who seeks equity must do equity.\nAl-Tamash Medical Society v. Dr. Anwar Ye Bin Ju 2017 MLD 785; Shahzad Trade Links v. MTW Pak Assembling Industries Pvt. Ltd. 2016 CLC 83 and Sayyid Yousaf Hussain Shirzai v. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority and others 2010 MLD 1261 rel.\n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-\n-S. 14(5)(a)-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42, 54-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1, 2-Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework and Regulations 8, 9 of Prudential Regulations For Corporate/Commercial Banking/DFI, Cl. G-5(2)(3)(4)-Suit for declaration, injunction and recovery of damages-Interim injunction, refusal of-Shares of bank, acquiring of-Principle-Plaintiffs were aggrieved of public announcement regarding eligibility to acquire 51% shares of bank in question-Validity-Section 14(5)(a) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, clause G-5(2)(3)(4) of Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework and Regulations 8, 9 of Prudential Regulations For Corporate/Commercial Banking/DFI mandated that a person eager to acquire share of any company/bank had to undergo fit and proper test in advance before acquiring the same-Prior approval of State Bank of Pakistan was required for any change in existing sponsor shareholdings-Bank in question had to ensure to give prior intimation to State Bank of Pakistan before dealing with any investor and was to seek State Bank of Pakistans approval for allowing due diligence-Plaintiffs failed to make out prima facie case and in fact balance of convenience was in favour of defendants-No question of sustaining any irreparable injury was ascended to plaintiffs-High Court declined to grant interim injunction in favour of plaintiffs-Application was dismissed in circumstances.\n2019 YLR 345; PLD 2019 SC 43; PLD 2016 Sindh 50; PLD 2018 Sindh 222; 2010 MLD 1267; (1992) 1 SCC 719; 2013 CLC 454; PLD 2018 Lah. 198; 1998 MLD 362; PLD 1971 SC 376; PLD 1986 Kar. 574; Abu Dhabi Medical Devices Co. L.L.C. v. Federation of Pakistan 2010 CLC 1253; Taylor v. Salmon and Messrs Getz Pharma (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Novartis AG and others 2022 CLD 61 ref.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Technicalities-Scope-Prescriptions of statute are not mere technicalities and disregard thereof would render entire process into miscarriage of justice. [p. 324] C", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "Suit No. 311 of 2022, decided on 1st July, 2022. Dates of hearing: 7th and 8th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haider Waheed, Ahmed Masood, Zoha Sirhindi, Munim Masood, Muhammad Altaf, Agha Mustafa Durrani and Samil Malik Khan for Plaintiffs.\nIjaz Ahmed for Defendant No.2 along with Atifuddin, Legal Counsel of SBP.\nTariq Qureshi for Defendant No.3 along with Ghulam Akbar Lashari.\nJahanzeb Awan for Defendant No.4 along with Rashid Mahar, and Muhammad Usman Ahmed.\nWasiq Hussain Malik for Defendant No.6.\nRaza Mohsin Qizilbash, Director (Legal), SBP.\nMuhammad Akhtar Javed, Director Banking Policy Regulation Department, SBP.\nSyed Shahzad Akram, Attorney of Summit Bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ATIF AHMED and another-Plaintiffs\nVersus\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN (SECP) through Chairman and 5 others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23381", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 542 = 2023 SLD 542 = 2023 CLD 324", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYy8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 10, 22-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42, 54-Suit for declaration and injunction-Leave to defend the suit, non-decision of-Recovery of possession of leased vehicle-Appellant/Bank took over possession of vehicle leased to respondent/plaintiff-Banking Court without deciding application for leave to defend the suit passed decree in favour of respondent/plaintiff-Validity-Banking Court was obliged under S. 10(8)(9)(10), (11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to consider application for leave to defend and to accept or reject the same keeping in view of any question of law and facts requiring evidence was raised therein as well as if conditions given in S. 10(3)(4) and (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were fulfilled-Banking Court was required by law to examine application for leave to defend before proceeding to decide the suit-High Court set aside and decree and remanded the matter to Banking Court to decide application for leave to defend the suit afresh- Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nAbid Aziz Khan and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through Branch Manager 2007 CLD 997; Shahid Saleem v. Bank Al-Falah Limited 2019 CLD 181; PASSCO v. Omer Bilal Traders (Pvt.) Limited 2007 CLD 492; Bank of Punjab through Attorney v. Manzoor Qadir and another 2021 CLD 1037 and The Bank of Punjab through General Attorney v. Malik Umer Farooq 2014 CLD 198 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10,22Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 176 of 2021, heard on 24th January, 2022, heard on: 24th January, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR AND SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Basit Babar Chughtai for Appellants.\nSh. Zaheer ud Din Babar for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEEZAN BANK LIMITED and others-Appellants\nVersus\nSyed HASSAN MEHMOOD SHAH-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23382", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 543 = 2023 SLD 543 = 2023 CLD 329", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYys", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 10, 22-Suit for recovery of Bank loan-Leave to defend the suit, refusal of-Mandatory provisions, non-compliance of-Effect-Appellant/defendant was declined leave to defend the suit and suit was decreed in favour of respondent/plaintiff Bank-Validity-Borrower under S. 10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was to show in all fairness as to what amount he had availed of from a financial institution, payments so made by him to the financial institution and amount which was accepted to be his liability, to be finally paid to the Bank-Provision of S. 10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, carried penal consequences as well, which was that in the event of failure of a borrower to meet requirements of S. 10(3)(4), (5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 his leave to defend application would be rejected-High Court declined to interfere in and decree passed by Trial Court-Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=10,22", - "Case #": "F.A.B. No. 11-P with C.M. No. 354-P of 2022, decided on 8th September, 2022, heard on: 8th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " QAISER RASHID KHAN, CJ AND FAZAL SUBHAN, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Riaz-ud-Din Ahmad for Appellants.\nAlamzaib Khan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs KAMRAN FILLING STATION through Sole Proprietor and another-Appellants\nVersus\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED through President and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23383", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 544 = 2023 SLD 544 = 2023 CLD 333", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Affidavit-\n-Effect-In absence of any counter affidavit, contents of sworn affidavit is deemed to be admitted.\nAbida Parveen v. District Education Officer, Schools Elementary (Female) Mirpur and 4 others 2014 PLC (C.S.) 999; Muhammad Nawaz v. Mohsin Saleem 2016 MLD 1553; Iyaz-ul-Haq Chaudhary v. NIB Bank Limited through Authorized Attorney and 4 others 2016 CLD 1741; Muhammad Bachal v. IXth Additional District Judge, Hyderabad and another 2019 CLC Note 51; President of Pakistan through Chairman, P.W.R., Lahore v. Sarfraz Khan 1980 CLC 541; Muhammad Farooq M. Memon Advocate v. Government of Sindh through its Chief Secretary, Karachi 1986 CLC 1408; Messrs Holy Family Hospital through Administrator v. Government of Sindh and another 2009 PLC (C.S.) 824 and Quaid-e-Azam Medical College, Bahawalpur through Principal v. Muhammad Aslam and another 2009 YLR 1508 rel.\n(b) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-\n-Ss. 82-A, 82-B, 82-D, 82-E, 82-F-Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013), S. 9-Mal-administration-Proof-Valuables missing from locker-Non-holding of departmental inquiry-Petitioner Bank was aggrieved of order passed by Appellate Authority directing to make good the loss-Validity-Relationship of Bank and its customer was based on trust on the basis of which respondent complainant had put her valuable articles i.e. gold ornaments in locker-When respondent complainant informed petitioner Bank about missing of her valuable articles from locker, petitioner Bank instead of making its best efforts to redress her grievance, not only declined her application but also went one step further and contested her case before authorities-High Court did not appreciate conduct of petitioner Bank-Public opt to put their valuable articles in Bank lockers for security purpose and if their articles are misplaced from there and banks do not redress their grievance in such case of loss, the very foundation of banking system would collapse-Banking Mohtasib did not consider all material facts while dismissing her complaint whereas Appellate Authority rightly allowed representation of respondent complainant and directed petitioner-bank to compensate her as per instruction of State Bank of Pakistan contained in Circular No.5 dated 05-06-2007-Petitioner Bank failed to point out any illegality or material irregularity in order passed by Appellate Authority nor there was any jurisdictional defect-Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962=82-A,82-B,82-D,82-E,82-FFederal Ombudsmen Institutional Reform Act, 2013=9", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 77994 of 2021, heard on 10th January, 2023, heard on: 10th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " CH. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aiwan-e-Sadar, Islamabad and 2 others-Respondents\nM. Zaheer Asghar Bhatti, Aamir Aziz Khan and Maaz Sajjad for Petitioner.\nIjaz Rehmat Basra, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No. 1.\nCh. Muhammad Aslam for Respondent No. 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB BANK LIMITED through Authorized Attorney-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Director (Legal) Presidents Secretariat," - }, - { - "Case No.": "23384", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 545 = 2023 SLD 545 = 2023 CLD 338", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDYzg", - "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 52, 67-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1, 2-Registration of trade mark-Interim injunction, refusal of-Revocation proceedings, pendency of-Plaintiffs claimed that trade mark HAMZA was wrongly registered in favour of defendant as it was not registerable-Validity-Trademark of defendant was registered against which revocation proceedings were initiated and were sub judice-Plaintiffs did not contest proceedings before Registrar when trademark in question was in process of registration-Certificate of registration appended with counter affidavit of defendant had a disclaimer that registration of trademark would give no right to exclusive use of word HAMZA except substantially as shown on the label-With counter affidavit of defendant, it was also attached copyright registration in artistic word entitled HAMZA-Basic ingredients for grant of an injunctive relief were not present in the case of plaintiffs as it was defendant who was the holder of registered trademark and not the plaintiffs-Application was dismissed in circumstances.\nMessrs Ghulam Muhammad Dossul, Co. v. Messrs Vulcan Co. Ltd. and another 1984 SCMR 1024; Messrs Hub Pak Salt Refinery through Duly Authorized Partner v. National Foods (Pvt.) Limited 2008 CLD 190; Alle Nora Beauty Salon and Parlour through Partner and others v. Qurat-ul-Ain Munsoor and others 2016 CLD 1062; Messrs Master Textile Mills Ltd. through Duly Authorized Signatory v. Master Fabrics through Managing Partner and 5 others 2007 CLD 991; Dulda Foods (Private) Limited v. Messrs Shield Corporation Limited 2016 CLD 1864; Abdul Wasim v. Messrs Haico through Sole Proprietor Partner and 2 others 2002 CLD 1623; Nadeem and others v. Malik Ehsan Ulluh and others 2006 CLD 234; Messrs Ostindo International Austrailia v. Messrs Alfarid Corporation Limited and others Suit No.2270 of 2015 and Mehran Spice and Food Industries v. Muhammad Nudim Khan and others Suit No.2561 of 2015 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001=52,67Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "Suit No. 471 of 2022, decided on 19th July, 2022. Dates of hearing: 5th 14th and 25th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Amna Salman Ahmed along with Saifullah Sachwani and Muhammad Shaikh for Plaintiffs.\nMirza Mehmood Baig and Alizeh Mehak for Defendant No. 1.\nSalim Ghulam Husein along with Tajammul Haider, Assistant Registrar for Defendant No. 2.\nNemo for Defendants Nos. 3 and 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "EAST RICE COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. and others-Plaintiffs\nVersus\nMOON RICE CORPORATION and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23385", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 546 = 2023 SLD 546 = 2023 CLD 345", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDY3o", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 89, 90, 92-Suit for recovery of Bank loan-Execution of decree-Objection to auction-Right of legal heirs-Appellants were legal representatives of deceased -debtor who after confirmation of sale filed objections under O. XXI, R. 89, C.P.C. which were dismissed by Banking Court-Plea raised by appellants was that after death of -debtor sale could not have been confirmed without notice to legal heirs-Validity-Application under O. XXI, R. 90, C.P.C. was dismissed in the life time of deceased -debtor, who failed to exercise his right under O. XXI, R. 89, C.P.C., within permissible time by depositing amount as stipulated in O. XXI, R. 89(1)(a), (b), C.P.C. read with O. XXI, R. 92(2), C.P.C.-Deceased -debtor was left with no interest that could be affected or which could have been passed on to legal representatives-High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Banking Court-Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\nMuhammad Khalil v. Messrs Faisal M.B. Corporation and others 2019 SCMR 321 and Minor Smt. Shanti Devi v. Khandubala Dasi and others AIR 1961 Cal 336 distinguished.\nZakaria Ghani and 4 others v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon and 8 others 2016 CLD 480; Mir Wali Khan and another v. Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Muzaffargarh and another PLD 2003 SC 500; Muhammad Hussain v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, Hyderabad and another 2014 MLD 192; Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and another AIR 1967 (SC) 608 and R. Rajamma v. Avula Saraswathamma and others AIR 1973 (A.P.) 132 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=89,90,92", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 66967 of 2021, heard on 22nd November, 2022, heard on: 22nd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat, Advocate Supreme Court and Nadeem Irshad for Appellants.\nAshar Elahi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AKMAL AZIZ and 3 others-Appellants\nVersus\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23386", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 547 = 2023 SLD 547 = 2023 CLD 352", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDY3k", - "Key Words:": "Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance (IX of 1984)-\n-S. 10-A-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 200, 439-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 406, 420-Criminal breach of trust and cheating-Appreciation of evidence-Appeal against acquittal-Complainant Bank assailed passed by Trial Court whereby accused was acquitted of the charge-Validity-Complaint and statement recorded under S. 200, Cr.P.C. were couched in general terms so as to broadly mention that accused approached the Bank but did not disclose details of what transpired on relevant date in terms of identifying who was responsible for custody of documents and/or instrumental in their release-When accused approached complainant Bank for release of documents, he could not have demonstrated such urgency as to prevail upon complainant Banks functionaries to accede to release of documents without following necessary formalities by way of securing prior payment, as required under the Contract, or at least marking a lien over the account to be debited-Run of the mill customer of complainant Bank could scarcely have had such leverage as to prevail on its functionaries to make an accommodation of that nature, and neither the period of his banking relationship nor statement of account had suggested any special circumstances due to which accused would have been able to command such privilege-Presumption of double innocence had arisen in favour of acquitted accused and interference could be warranted only when decision to that effect was found to be capricious, arbitrary and perverse-High Court declined to interfere in of acquittal passed by Trial Court-Revision was dismissed in circumstances.\nState v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 2011 SC 554 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984=10-ACriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=200,439Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=406,420", - "Case #": "Criminal Revision Application No. 86 of 2015, decided on 13th August, 2021. Dates of hearing: 8th, 22nd April and 6th May, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " AHMED ALI M. SHAIKH, C.J. AND YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shaukat Hayat for Apllicant.\nKhaleeque Ahmed for Respondent No. 1.\nCh. Muhammad Waseem, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHURSHEED ANWAR HABIB-Applicant\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD AMIN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23387", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 548 = 2023 SLD 548 = 2023 CLD 359", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTc", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 66-Suit for recovery of Bank loan-Execution of decree-Objections to auction-Limitation-Plea of fraud-Change of time, place and date of auction-Judgment debtor assailed auction on the plea of fraud committed by Court Auctioneer-Validity-Banking Court instead of settling down terms and conditions of auction in the language of Court or granting specific approval as required under O. XXI, R. 66(1), C.P.C., the same was left at discretion of Court Auctioneer leading to manifold and major mistakes-Proclamation was published in two newspapers without fixing any reserved price of suit property-Publication reflected date of auction as 19-6-1999 at 10:00 a.m. and stipulated venue of auction at the site-Report of auction showed that auction was adjourned to 26-6-1999 and site venue was abruptly changed to the office of the decree-holder without fresh publication or proper circulation of change of date and venue-When auction was challenged on the ground of fraud in publication and conduct of sale, time could only run against victim upon gaining clear and definite knowledge of facts which had constituted fraud-High Court set aside order passed by Banking Court confirming sale through auction-Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\nBrig. (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Muhammad Hassan v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through Branch Manager and 3 others 2003 CLD 1693; Mst. Nadia Malik v. Messrs Makki Chemical Industries Pvt. Ltd. through Chief Executive and others 2011 CLD 1517; Siraj Ahmad through L.Rs v. Faysal Bank Limited and others 2018 CLD 233; National Bank of Pakistan and 117 others v. SAF Textile Mills Ltd. and another PLD 2014 SC 283; Zakaria Ghani and 4 others v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon and 8 others PLD 2016 SC 229; Mst. Manzoor Jahan Begum and others v. Haji Hussain Bakhsh PLD 1966 SC 375 and Nur Ahmed Chowdhury v. Ruhul Amin Chowdhury PLD 1961 Dacca 589 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=66", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 5 of 2016/BWP, heard on 26th January, 2022, heard on: 26th January, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR AND SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Tayyab Zameer Khan for Appellant.\nSyed Waseem Ahmad for Respondent No. 1/Bank.\nNadeem Iqbal Ch. for Respondents Nos. 8 to 11.\nRespondents Nos. 3, 4 and 7 ex parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. ALIA SHAMEEM-Appellant\nVersus\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23388", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 549 = 2023 SLD 549 = 2023 CLD 366", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTY", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 42, 54-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1, 2-Suit for declaration, injunction and recovery of damages-Interim injunction, grant of-Necessary ingredients-Proof-Plaintiff was a pharmaceutical company who had conferred rights upon defendant in respect of distribution of products in Pakistan and some of the products were registered in the name of defendant by issuance of registration letters-Plaintiff company claimed for transfer of earlier registered product in its favour from defendant-Validity-Principal operators informed Drug Regulatory Authority that plaintiff was their affiliated who terminated distribution agreement with defendant for distribution of products-Principal operator and plaintiff had a new agreement to distribute the products within the territory of Pakistan and four specific drugs were highlighted-Plaintiff was again authorized by foreign principal, which facts were communicated to Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan-In absence of any contract between foreign principal and defendant it was a matter of serious concern if defendant would continue to manufacture, market and sell product of foreign principal without its permission and authorization-Plaintiffs disclosed a prima facie case with balance of inconvenience and irreparable loss in their favour-High Court granted interim injunction to plaintiffs against defendant- Application was allowed in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "Suit No. 2707 of 2021, decided on 15th September, 2022, heard on: 8th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Sattar Pirzada and Mamoon N. Chaudhry for Plaintiffs.\nHaroon Dugal for Defendant No.1.\nHafiz Bilal Bin Akbar, Deputy Director Legal DRAP.\nQazi Ayazuddin, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs AGP LIMITED through Authorized Representative and another-Plaintiffs\nVersus\nMessrs GALAXY PHARMA (PRIVATE) LIMITED and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23389", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 550 = 2023 SLD 550 = 2023 CLD 555", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12-Specific performance, relief of-Scope and pre-requisites for claiming the relief of specific performance stated.\nThe relief of specific performance of a contract is discretionary, however the said discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably but can be invoked to promote fairness and equity. The person seeking specific performance has to put on show that he is geared up and fervent to perform his part of the contract, but the other side is circumventing or evading the execution of his obligations arising out of the contract. While deciding the suit for specific performance of a contract, the Court has to consider and come to a decision regarding whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, which is in fact substantiated by dint of the conduct or demeanor of the plaintiff before and after instituting the lawsuit. The equitable remedy rests on the discretion which is obviously exercised according to the well-established standards and philosophy of law and not whimsically or capriciously.\nMuhammad Jamil and others v. Muhammad Arif 2021 SCMR 1108 ref.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12-Suit for specific performance-Agreement to sell-Deposit of balance sale consideration in court-Rational for requiring the vendee to deposit balance sale consideration in Court explained.\nThe fundamental insightfulness of the Courts in directing the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance to deposit the sale consideration in Court in fact articulates that the vendee has the capacity to pay the sale consideration or balance sale consideration and is ready and willing to perform his obligations arising from the contract. An incessant readiness and willingness is a condition precedent for claiming relief of specific performance, which in unison also conveys the state of mind of the vendee, his capability to pay, keenness and commitment.\nMessrs Kuwait National Real Estate Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Messrs Educational Excellence Ltd. and another 2020 SCMR 171; Muhammad Jamil and others v. Muhammad Arif 2021 SCMR 1108; Hamood Mehmood v. Mst. Shabana Ishaque and others 2017 SCMR 2022; Sukhwinder Singh v. Jagroop Singh and others AIR 2020 SC 4865; Bhavyanath v. K.V. Balan (Dead) through L.Rs. (2020) 11 SCC 790 and P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan (MANU/SC/ 1309/2022) ref.\nIn the suit for specific performance of a contract to sell, the deposit of sale consideration in the Court may be ordered by the Court. In fact the deposit of the amount in Court, besides showing readiness and willingness, will also put on view the good faith and bona fide intention, subject to the final outcome of the suit on merits, that the vendee was not incapable of performing his part of the contract, at least in terms payment of sale consideration as per the covenant, if not violative of any other essential term of the contract which may debar the relief.\nThe deposit of the sale consideration or balance consideration in the Court is not an automatic requirement but there must be an order of the Court for deposit. While passing the order for deposit of sale consideration or balance sale consideration by the Trial Court, some reasonable time to deposit the money in Court should also be afforded for compliance of the order along with the consequences of non-compliance of the order with clarity in advance.\n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12-Suit for specific performance-Agreement to sell-Cheque for balance sale consideration provided to Court by vendee deposited in a profit bearing scheme on directions of the High Court-Legality-After filing the suit for specific performance, on directions of the Trial Court, the petitioner/vendee tendered a cheque in Trial Court along with the bank statement for substantiating the sufficiency of funds in the bank account and capacity to pay the remaining consideration-Trial Court handed over the cheque to the officer of the Court to retain it in safe custody rather than encashing the same-Respondents/ vendors filed a revision petition in the High which was disposed with the direction to the Trial Court to deposit the subject matter cheque in a profit bearing account so that, at the conclusion of the trial, either of the parties may seek the benefit of the amount deposited pursuant to Courts order-Plea of petitioner/buyer that the impugned order of High Court imposed a direction to the Trial Court for encashment of the cheque for the balance sale consideration solely at the instance of the vendors which was unjustified-Validity-While handing over the cheque to the officer of the Court the Trial Court ignored that a cheque remain valid for certain time, thereafter it loses its efficacy/validity-When a cheque runs out its time it becomes unacceptable to the banker unless it is revalidated and confirmed by the drawer-Mere submission of a cheque, even with the bank statement of a particular period, in Court without its encashment neither expressly means or denotes that the petitioner will surely maintain the equivalent balance in the bank account at all times, nor does it guarantee or represent that the cash flow of the equivalent amount will be maintained and reserved for payment if the suit is finally decreed by the Trial Court-Even otherwise, if the cheque is not presented for encashment and only retained in the custody of the Courts officer, it will become stale after six months, and thereafter nothing will remain in Court to decipher the readiness and willingness of the buyer with good faith to perform his part of the contractual obligation-Thus, there was no rhyme or reason, nor any commonsense explanation for retaining the cheque in the shelf or vault for its cosmetic value without its encashment to gauge the readiness and willingness of buyer in the suit for specific performance-No illegality or perversity was found in the impugned order passed by the High Court-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3989 of 2022, decided on 8th December, 2022.\n(Appeal against the judgment Dated 05.10.2022 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 60593 of 2022).\n heard on: 8th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Ishaq, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nHafeez Saeed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs DW PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED, LAHORE-Petitioner\nVersus\nBegum ANISA FAZL-I-MAHMOOD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23390", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 551 = 2023 SLD 551 = 2023 CLD 421", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497- Second/subsequent bail application, filing of-Maintainability-Another bail application on the same ground cannot be repeated before the same court; and, if a bail application is withdrawn during the subsistence of a ground on which bail is sought it cannot be taken again if the bail application was withdrawn.\nPLD 2014 SC 241 and PLD 2015 SC 41 ref.\n(b) Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976-\n-R. 166-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4(1), 4(2)(a), 10A-Criminal trial-Strikes by lawyers causing delay in conclusion of trial-Breach of Fundamental rights of accused-Accused person like any other has the inalienable right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law but if advocates strike and trials are postponed this constitutional right of the accused is negated-If the trial of a detained accused is delayed on account of strike(s), and subsequently, the accused is acquitted then the additional incarceration suffered by the accused would have been detrimental to his liberty-Prestige of the legal profession should not be undermined by advocates who strike for a lesser cause than to protect and defend the Constitution in the public interest.\nA detained accused must not be made to suffer because his advocate elects to strike or does so in solidarity with his colleagues. Duty of the Advocate is to appear in Court when a matter is called and make satisfactory alternative arrangements if he is unable to. An Advocate representing an accused must discharge his duty towards his client. If an advocate representing a detained accused does not attend court, he fails to perform his professional duty and breaks his clients trust. An accused person like any other has the inalienable right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law but if advocates strike and trials are postponed this constitutional right of the accused is negated. The Constitution also mandates that no action detrimental to the liberty of anyone be taken except in accordance with law therefore, if the trial of a detained accused is delayed on account of strike(s), and subsequently, the accused is acquitted then the additional incarceration suffered by the accused would have been detrimental to his liberty. Amongst the designated Fundamental Rights of an accused there is also the right to a fair trial and due process which rights are premised on proceeding with the trial of a detained accused. If an advocate strikes for a lesser cause than to protect and defend the Constitution in the public interest or for personal reason it would be appropriate to first return the professional fee received from the client. An Advocate should not strike at the expense of the client. At times a case is adjourned because the complaints advocate is not in attendance. The Court does not have to wait for the complainants advocate to attend court, much less adjourn a case due to his absence, because the State counsel, employed at taxpayers expense, is required to prosecute cases. Supreme Court directed that copy of present order be sent to all provincial bar councils and the Pakistan Bar Council, who would remind advocates of their professional duties and would ensure that the prestige of the legal profession is not undermined by advocates who strike for a lesser cause than to protect and defend the Constitution in the public interest.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4(1),4(2)(a),10A", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1496 of 2022, decided on 9th January, 2023.\n(Against the order Dated 24.10.2022 passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in Crl. Misc. No. 2448-B/2022).\n heard on: 5th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shakir Ali, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nCh. M. Sarwar Sidhu, Additional P.G. Punjab for the State.\nUsman Sharif Khosa, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAHBAZ AKMAL-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23391", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 552 = 2023 SLD 552 = 2023 CLD 426", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWS8", - "Key Words:": "Fundamental Rights-\n-Discrimination, freedom from-Voting rights-Minimum age for voting-Plea to lower minimum voting age from 18 years to 16 years-Provisions of the Electoral Act, 1993 and of the Local Electoral Act 2001 which provide for a minimum voting age of 18 years are inconsistent with the right in section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 to be free from discrimination on the basis of age; these inconsistencies have not been justified in terms of section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.\nAppellant was a lobby group advocating that the minimum voting age belowered from 18 years to 16 years. Appellant sought declarations that provisions setting minimum voting age at 18 years in Electoral Act, 1993 and Local Electoral Act, 2001 are inconsistent with right to freedom from discrimination on basis of age, protected by section 19 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (Bill of Rights).\nThe first question that emerges in the present case is regarding the interaction between sections 12 and 19 of the Bill of Rights. Section 12 of the Bill of Rights protects voting rights as are currently prescribed at age 18. Section 19 ensures freedom from discrimination per the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1993. The HRA includes age as a prohibited ground of discrimination. In terms of section 21(1)(i) of the HRA, discrimination on the basis of age commences at age 16. It was contended that because section 12 explicitly refers to age 18 in voting rights, this prevails over section 19. Section 12 guarantees the right to vote to those aged 18 and over, but it does not constitute a breach of that right to extend the qualification of voters and lower the voting age. Section 12 is not a barrier to the relief sought; it does not limit the interpretation of section 19, with each provision able to coexist.\nThe second question in the present case concerns whether or not the Electoral Act provisions limiting the minimum voting age to 18 years are a justified limit per Section 5 of the Bill of Rights. This requires that rights and freedoms protected in Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The limit of 18 years is not justified based on the material before the Court. Because of the explicit reference to age 16 through section 19, the present case was not comparable with similar cases arising in other jurisdictions such as in Canada, the UK or Australia. In addition, evidence presented to the Court, including expert evidence and Report of Childrens Commissioner, showed that 16 and 17 years old were suitably mature and competent to be able to vote. However the possibility was open that the limit (of 18 years) may be later justified in the presence of further evidence or argument.\nThe final question in the present case is whether the Court of Appeal was right to not make a declaration of inconsistency. Such a declaration would not be premature and the Supreme Court was not hampered in fulfilling its usual function by any particular complexity in the question at hand. Other factors supporting a declaration (of inconsistency) included the protection of fundamental rights of a minority group, the nature of a minority group meaning other avenues were likely to be less effective, provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the HRA specifying age 16 in relation to age discrimination.\nProvisions of the Electoral Act 1993 and of the Local Electoral Act, 2001 which provide for a minimum voting age of 18 years are inconsistent with the right in section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 to be free from discrimination on the basis of age; these inconsistencies have not been justified in terms of section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990. Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nPer K s J; partly dissenting (Minority view)\nThere is agreement with the majority view that the Local Electoral Act 2001 provisions dictating 18 as the voting age were inconsistent with section 19 of the Bill of Rights and that a declaration should be made in respect of that legislation. This was because section 12 of the Bill of Rights does not apply to that legislation. However, the provisions of the Electoral Act, 1993, setting a minimum voting age of 18 years in parliamentary elections, are not inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (Bill of Rights). Rather, the explicit right to vote in parliamentary elections at 18 years, affirmed by section 12 of the Bill of Rights (and prescribed in the Electoral Act), prevails over the generalised right to freedom from discrimination affirmed by section 19, meaning that a declaration could not be made in respect of the Electoral Act, 1993. Where tensions arose between rights within the Bill of Rights they should not be resolved through section 6, which requires Courts to interpret legislation as rights-consistent where possible. Instead, these sorts of tensions should be resolved through normal statutory interpretation, requiring interpretation of the text in light of its purpose. The internal inconsistency in the Bill of Rights between (1) the broad reach of section 19 in providing for a generic right to be free from discrimination on grounds of age (from age 16), limited only by what is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, and (2) the explicit reach of section 12 (consistent with the entrenched Electoral Act provisions) in making express provision for a right to vote from age 18, falls to be resolved by statutory interpretation of the Bill of Rights itself, discerning its meaning from the text in light of its purpose.\nThe difficulty in the present case is the conflict within the Bill of Rights, because if section 19 extends to voting, the prohibited discrimination is triggered from the age of 16. Yet section 12, explicitly affirms that right with effect from the age of 18 years in the case of parliamentary elections. And relatedly, 18 years is also the constitutionally-reserved minimum age for persons otherwise qualified to be registered as electors or to vote under the Electoral Act, 1993. Had Parliament intended to alter the temporal aspect of the right to vote, collectively affirmed by section 12 since 1990 and protected through entrenchment by the Electoral Act since 1956, it would have amended section 12 in 1993. It did not do so. Therefore, the better way of reading the two provisions together is that the explicit right to vote in parliamentary elections at 18 years, grounded in the constitutionally-entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act and affirmed by section 12 of the Bill of Rights, prevails over the generalised right to freedom from discrimination affirmed by section 19. Section 12 constitutes a limited and specific exception to the general right expressed in section 19.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of New Zealand", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Case No. [2022] NZSC 134, decided on 21st November, 2022, heard on: 12th July, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " WINKELMANN CJ, GLAZEBROOK, OREGAN, ELLEN FRANCE AND K S, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "J S McHerron, G K Edgeler, E B Moran and C M McCracken for Appellant.\nA M Powell and A P Lawson for Respondent.\nSolicitors:\nDLA Piper, Wellington for Appellant.\nCrown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent.\nPer Ellen France, J; Winkelmann, CJ, Glazebrook and ORegan, JJ agreeing; K s, J partly dissenting. (Majority view)", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAKE IT 16 INCORPORATED-Appellant\nVersus\nATTORNEY-GENERAL-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23392", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 553 = 2023 SLD 553 = 2023 CLD 459", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 185(3)-Interim orders passed by High Court impugned before the Supreme Court-Supreme Court normally does not interfere with the interim orders of the High Court except in exceptional circumstances.\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Energy (Power Division), Islamabad and others v. Shafiq ul Hassan and others 2021 PLC (C.S.) 292 and Dossani Travels Pvt. Ltd and others v. Messrs Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2014 SC 1 ref.\n(b) National Disaster Management Act (XXIV of 2010)-\n-Ss. 3(2)(p), 6, 8, 13, 18-Flood management in Province of Sindh-Citizens Committee in every Taluka of flood affected Division-Said Committees were constituted on orders of the High Court with the direction that such Committees be headed by a Civil Judge and that the said committees work under the supervision of the concerned District and Sessions Judge-Constitutionality-Role assigned to the judicial officers of overseeing the work of the executive by heading the Citizens Committees essentially meant that the judicial officers were performing executive functions which was against the principle of separation of powers-Inclusion of the members of the District Judiciary in the said Committees was not required given that there was an entire legal framework under the National Disaster Management Act, 2010.\nThe issue before the Court essentially is the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court while creating the citizens committees and placing judges from the District Judiciary on these committees to oversee the work, being done by the committees. The role assigned to the judicial officers of overseeing the work of the executive by heading the citizens committees essentially means that the judicial officers are performing executive functions which is against the principle of separation of powers. The Constitution does not contemplate assumption of functions by one organ that essentially belongs to another. Moreover planning and strategy, coordination, monitoring and implementation are the functions of the executive and is best left for them to fulfil their duty and obligations in this regard. Furthermore, the work of these committees is a fulltime job which will require the judicial officers to spend time on these committees which in turn take them away from their judicial work that is also not practical nor expedient.\nThe relevant law on the subject is the National Disaster Management Act, 2010 (the Act), which establishes a National Disaster Management Commission (Commission) for the purposes of policy making. This Commission not only lays down the policy on disaster management but also approves a National Plan and Guidelines to be followed by the Federal and Provincial authorities in the event of a natural disaster.\nFormation of the citizens committees by the High Court, in principle, was to facilitate relief efforts in different areas within the Province, however, the inclusion of the members of the District Judiciary was not required given that there is an entire legal framework under the Act to ensure relief work right down to the district level.\nSupreme Court modified the impugned orders of the High Court to the extent that the Citizens Committee shall no more be headed by a Civil Judge notified by the District Judge concerned and the citizens committee shall no more work under the supervision of the concerned District and Sessions Judge.\n(c) National Disaster Management Act (XXIV of 2010)-\n-Ss. 3(2)(p), 6, 8, 13, 18-Flood management in Province of Sindh-Citizens Committee in every Taluka of flood affected Division constituted on orders of the High Court-Participation of public and civil society in the National Disaster Management Authority (Authority), the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), the District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA), and the National Disaster Management Commission (Commission)-Significance and benefits-Community participation is not only necessary for planning disaster management but also for implementing and monitoring purposes as it gives people the right to participate in the decisions that affect their lives; this creates more awareness and a sense of ownership and responsibility which is required, particularly in disaster management so to enhance effectiveness and engage the people with their communities to provide rescue, relief and rehabilitation efforts-Importance of inclusion of civil society in disaster management stated.\nAs per the scheme of the National Disaster Management Act, 2010, members of the civil community which include volunteers, NGOs, doctors and others can be made part of the Provincial and District Management Authorities to help relief efforts.\nParticipation by the public in the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) and District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) and even at the National Disaster Management Commission (Commission) level ensures that the flood affectees are able to bring first hand their vulnerabilities and priorities, which results in a more measured response and proper allocation of resources where required. It also gives the National Disaster Management Authority (Authority) greater insight into the affected communities enabling them to work more effectively and produce better result. Community participation is not only necessary for planning disaster management but also for implementing and monitoring purposes as it gives people the right to participate in the decisions that affect their lives. This creates more awareness and a sense of ownership and responsibility which is required, particularly in disaster management so to enhance effectiveness and engage the people with their communities to provide rescue, relief and rehabilitation efforts. Hence, citizens participation in the PDMA and DDMA can improve coordination and response which will enable the government authorities to provide relief work in a more effective and efficient manner. It is fundamental to the composition of the Commission, the Authority, the PDMA and the DDMA that members of civil society are included in it.\nTo deal with the issue in hand, the Citizens Committees can work with DDMA to the extent of monitoring, coordination efforts and ensure that relief work reaches the affectees, who do not have sufficient assistance at the moment. The committees can also facilitate the PDMA and the DDMA of the Province in providing necessary information and data with reference to relief work and what is required which will improve the Authoritys coordination with affected areas and communication with affected areas especially due to the challenges of accessibility and communication failure. The Citizens Committee can, therefore, monitor the efforts of the PDMA and the DDMA which will not only lead to better results in the relief work but will also create awareness within the affectees as to the manner in which the relief effort is being carried out and will encourage them to participate. This participatory approach to a natural disaster humanizes the work of the authorities so that affectees are provided with real time relief that they need and not what the paperwork suggests.\nSupreme Court directed that the Citizens Committees shall oversee the work of the government authorities and provide necessary information and data to facilitate the work of the authorities; that the Citizens Committee itself shall not engage in directing or controlling the relief work being undertaken but shall participate in the process put in place by the DDMA to make it more effective and inclusive.\n(d) National Disaster Management Act (XXIV of 2010)-\n-Ss. 6, 8, Chapts. III, IV-National Policy Guideline on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters 2014 (Policy Guidelines)-Flood management in Province of Sindh-Inclusion of women in disaster management, importance of-Citizens Committee in every Taluka of flood affected Division constituted on orders of the High Court-National Policy Guideline on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters 2014 (Policy Guidelines) requires the participation of women in disaster management plan at all levels to ensure integration of the gender perspective-Importance of inclusion of women in disaster management stated.\nNational Policy Guideline on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters 2014 (Policy Guidelines)requires the participation of women in disaster management plan at all levels to ensure integration of the gender perspective. As per the Policy Guidelines, women are at a greater risk from natural disasters than men. They are vulnerable and victims in natural disasters but also play a significant role throughout the disaster management cycle, without being adequately recognized and included in the decision making. Therefore, in line with the policies formulated, it is imperative that the citizens committees include women, older persons and persons with disabilities so that the required response is ensured and provided and that the Policy Guidelines formulated be implemented real time. In this context, the affected areas require maternity and healthcare for women so there is an increased need for female doctors, trainers and caretakers to attend to the health concerns. Women are often subjected to gender-based violence and harassment in times of such calamities, therefore safety and security concerns are also of significance for which appropriate response is also required. In this context, although the framework exists, an effort must go into ensuring that it actually functions and fulfils its mandate. Accordingly, the Citizens Committee should ensure the representation of the vulnerable groups, particularly of women, in order to strengthen its perspective.\nSupreme Court directed that the Citizens Committees shall continue to operate with the given composition including that of vulnerable groups, particularly women for monitoring the relief work and provide necessary information to the District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) to improve their efforts.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J; Umar Ata Bandial, CJ and Ayesha A. Malik, J; agreeing (Majority view)\n(e) National Disaster Management Act (XXIV of 2010)-\n-Ss. 6(2)(g), 10(3)(a), 17(3)(b)-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9, 14-Climate change adaptation plan - Observations and directions recorded by the Supreme Court regarding importance of a climate change adaptation plan stated.\nIn view of the unprecedented damage (due to floods) and the likelihood of its recurrence, it is imperative that serious and practical efforts are undertaken for prevention and adaptation against such disasters induced by climate change. It is expected that existing policies or mechanisms catering to food insecurity etc. are mobilized as soon as possible and if no such policies or mechanisms exist, then the respective State functionaries should take urgent action to formulate such policies and create such mechanisms to prevent further exacerbation of the losses and damage already suffered due to the floods and for sustainable rehabilitation.\nClimate justice was an important consideration at the 27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) which concluded with a significant and positive development through the formation of a loss and damage fund for climate-vulnerable developing countries. Soon funds will be allocated to countries that have suffered loss and damage due to climate change. It is high time to develop a mechanism for the allocation of these funds and the identification of key adaptation infrastructural projects that will help build national climate resilience, especially against floods in the years to come. It is expected that the Ministry of Climate Change, Government of Pakistan shall drive this initiative and frame a policy and set up a mechanism to effectively and efficiently utilize such funds. It is therefore essential that these global funds are invested in building national climate resilience so that climate induced disasters can be minimized.\nClimate Change is perhaps the most serious threat to the fundamental rights of the people in Pakistan. In order to protect their right to life and above all their right to dignity under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution, a climate resilient adaptation plan including a detailed mechanism for utilization of financial support coming to Pakistan from the loss and damage fund, is the need of the hour. Having failed to learn from the past floods, as has become apparent from the magnitude of the destruction caused by the recent floods, it is pivotal that effective steps are taken to prevent such catastrophes in the future.\nHassan Akbar, A.G., Sindh (via video link from Karachi), Iqbal Memon, Commissioner Karachi and Maqsood Soomro (PDMA Sindh) (via video link from Karachi) for Petitioners.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)National Disaster Management Act, 2010=3(2)(p),6,8,13,18", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 943 to 954-K of 2022, decided on 21st October, 2022.\n(Against orders Dated 01.09.2022 and 06.09.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Bench at Sukkur and Circuit Court Larkana in C.Ps. Nos.D-1064, D-1068, D-1072, D-1075, D-1077, D-1080, D-1081, D-1083, D-1084, S-790, S-797 and S-792 of 2022), heard on: 21st October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J., SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Shabbir Sher, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.P. No. 943-K of 2022).\nNemo for Respondents (in remaining cases).\nFaisal Siddique, Advocate Supreme Court Amicus Curiae.\nPer Ayesha A. Malik, J; Umar Ata Bandial, CJ and Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. agreeing (Majority view)", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF SINDH through Chief Minister and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nSARTAJ HYDER and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23393", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 555 = 2023 SLD 555 = 2023 SCMR 478", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Incident took place at 10.00 a.m. in the morning whereas the matter was reported to the police at 10:30 a.m. on the same day while the inter se distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station was six kilometer-Such aspect clearly reflected that the matter was reported to Police promptly without there being any delay-As the occurrence has taken place in the broad daylight and the parties were known to each other, therefore, there was no chance of misidentification-Ocular account was furnished by the complainant and another witness, who were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defence but nothing favourable to the accused or adverse to the prosecution could be produced on record-Complainant was inmate of the house where the occurrence took place, therefore, his presence was natural-So far as the presence of the other witness was concerned, it was admitted position that at the relevant time, the wedding ceremony of the deceased lady was taking place and he being a close relative had come to complainants house to attend the ceremony-Medical evidence available on the record corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased was concerned-Counsel for the accused could not point out any reason as to why the complainant would falsely involved the accused in the present case and let off the real culprit-Substitution in such like cases was a rare phenomenon-Complainant would not prefer to spare the real culprit who murdered his daughter and falsely involve the accused, who was his son-in-law and maternal nephew, without any reason-Neither the defence seriously disputed the motive part of the prosecution story nor the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined on this aspect of the matter-Admittedly, the accused remained absconder for a period of about six months and the same was also a corroboratory piece of evidence against him-Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case, even if the recovery of weapon of offence was excluded from consideration, still there was ample evidence in the form of unimpeachable and trustworthy ocular account, medical evidence and motive to sustain conviction of the accused on the capital charge-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused and death sentence awarded to the accused was maintained.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Ocular account- Medical evidence-Preference-Where ocular evidence is found trustworthy and confidence inspiring, the same is given preference over medical evidence and the same alone is sufficient to sustain conviction of an accused.\nMuhammad Iqbal v. The State 1996 SCMR 908; Naeem Akhtar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 396; Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2010 SCMR 1025 and Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Minor discrepancies in ocular account and medical evidence-Not significant-Casual discrepancies and conflicts appearing in medical evidence and the ocular version are quite possible for variety of reasons-During occurrence when live shots are being fired, witnesses in a momentary glance make only tentative assessment of the distance between the deceased and the assailant and the points where such fire shots appeared to have landed and it becomes highly improbable to correctly mention the location of the fire shots with exactitude-Minor discrepancies, if any, in medical evidence relating to nature of injuries do not negate the direct evidence as witnesses are not supposed to give photo picture of ocular account-Even otherwise, conflict of ocular account with medical evidence being not material and not imprinting any dent in prosecution version would have no adverse effect on prosecution case.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Prosecution witnesses related to the deceased-Mere relationship of the prosecution witnesses with the deceased cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such witnesses especially when their relationship with the assailant is (also) close.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Minor discrepancies in evidence of witness-As long as the material aspects of the evidence have a ring of truth, courts should ignore minor discrepancies in the evidence-Test is whether the evidence of a witness inspires confidence-If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter, the defence can take advantage of the same-While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth-Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not affecting the material considerations of the prosecution case ought not to prompt the courts to reject evidence in its entirety-Such minor discrepancies which do not shake the salient features of the prosecution case should be ignored.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Death sentence-Recovery of weapon inconsequential due to no crime empties being recovered from crime scene-When ocular account is believed to be inspiring confidence and trustworthy, mere the fact that recovery (of weapon) is inconsequential by itself could not be a ground for imposing a lesser penalty than death sentence on the accused.\nMuhammad Aslam v. The State 2004 SCMR 872 and Muhammad Afzal v. The State 2003 SCMR 1678 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 865 of 2017, decided on 12th December, 2022.\n(Against the judgment Dated 17.11.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Murder Reference No. 10 of 2015 and Criminal Appeal No. 595-J of 2014), heard on: 12th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN, SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NASIR AHMED-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23394", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 556 = 2023 SLD 556 = 2023 SCMR 485", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWTg", - "Key Words:": "Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-First Sched., Art. 181-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115-Application for restoration of civil revision dismissed in default-Limitation period-Three years-Period of limitation for filing an application for restoration of a civil revision (dismissed in default) is three years under Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908- Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed with the Supreme Court expressing its concern that for applications for restoration of a suit and an appeal, the period of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1908 is 30 days, whereas the period for filing an application for restoration of a civil revision is three years; that the logic for such differentiation is not clear and may be taken up in some appropriate case for consideration.\nGhulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others PLD 2016 SC 712 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=181Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 3125 of 2020, decided on 19th January, 2023.\n(Against the order Dated 29.09.2020 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, passed in Civil Revision No. 160480 of 2018), heard on: 19th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Amir Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nM. Afzal Janjua, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. JAMEELA BIBI (DECEASED) through LRs-Petitioner\nVersus\nMst. FATIMA BIBI (DECEASED) through LRs-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23395", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 557 = 2023 SLD 557 = 2023 SCMR 487", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 302(c)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Incident took place at 9:00 p.m. whereas the matter was reported to the police on the same night at 01:20 a.m. while the inter se distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station was 25 kilometers-Such aspect of the case clearly reflected that the matter was reported to Police promptly without there being any delay-As the parties were related to each other, therefore, there was no chance of misidentification-Prosecution witnesses were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defence but nothing favourable to the accused persons or adverse to the prosecution could be produced on record-Said witnesses remained consistent on each and every material point, therefore, it could safely be concluded that the ocular account furnished by the prosecution was reliable, straightforward and confidence inspiring-Medical evidence available on the record was in line with the ocular account so far as the nature, locale, time and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased was concerned-Counsel for the accused persons could not point out any reason as to why the complainant would falsely involve the accused persons in the present case and let off the real culprit-Substitution in such like cases was a rare phenomenon-Since the occurrence took place at the spur of the moment, conviction of accused persons under section 302(b), P.P.C. was converted into one under section 302(c), P.P.C.-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and partly allowed.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Prosecution witnesses related to the deceased-Mere relationship of the prosecution witnesses with the deceased cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such witnesses.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Minor discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the eye-witnesses-Not significant-On account of lapse of memory owing to the intervening period, some minor discrepancies are inevitable and they may occur naturally-Accused cannot claim benefit of such minor discrepancies.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 302(c)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Conviction under section 302(b), P.P.C. converted into one under section 302(c), P.P.C.-Sentence, reduction in-Spur of the moment occurrence without any repetition of knife blows-Occurrence took place at the spur of the moment and there was no pre-meditation on the part of the accused persons-Admittedly, the occurrence took place in the house of the accused persons where the complainant party had brought a jirga for return of niece of the complainant, who was married with one of the accused against the will of her parents-Perusal of the record revealed that something happened immediately before the occurrence, which provoked the accused persons and they caused churri (knife) blows on the person of the deceased-Admittedly, both the accused persons did not repeat their act-Furthermore there was no deep rooted enmity between the parties-Taking a lenient view, the Supreme Court altered the conviction of accused persons from section 302(b), P.P.C. to section 302(c), P.P.C. and reduced their sentence of imprisonment for life to fourteen years rigorous imprisonment each-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and partly allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),302(c)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 355 of 2018, decided on 2nd January, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment Dated 22.02.2018 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 481 of 2012), heard on: 2nd January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN AND SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Sabahat Rizvi, Advocate Supreme Court (Via video link from Lahore) for Petitioners.\nMirza Muhammad Usman, D.P.G. Punjab for the State.\nAbdul Khaliq Safrani, Advocate Supreme Court (Via video link from Lahore) for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ABBAS and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23396", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 558 = 2023 SLD 558 = 2023 SCMR 493", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDWXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S. 11-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Land acquisition-Compensation, quantum of-Constitutional petition filed by land owners for compensation of acquired land-Maintainability-In the present case, after the remand of the case by the High Court to the Collector the subject matter squarely fell within the domain of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and afterwards the High Court should not have extended its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides adequate and comprehensive mechanism for the determination of the compensation amount and recourse to the judicial forums to the aggrieved and interested parties-In case of disputed facts, High Court cannot exercise its extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction.\nPakistan WAPDA Employees Pegham Union v. Member, National Industrial Relations Commission, Islamabad and others 2015 PLC 45; Fida Hussain v. Mst. Saiqa 2011 SCMR 1990 and Ahmad Developers v. Muhammad Saleh 2010 SCMR 1057 ref.\n(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S. 34-Land acquisition-Compound interest on compensation amount, payment of-Scope-Relevant starting date for the payment of compound interest on compensation amount, in terms of section 34 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the date of taking possession of the acquired land till the date of payment by Collector where normal statutory procedure has been observed-Compound interest would continue to accrue till such time that the entire compensation is paid in its entirety-Once the original amount has been deposited, the matter goes out of the penal consequences of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Sheikh Muhammad Ilyas Ahmed and others v. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 64 and Syeda Nasreen Zohra v. Government of the Punjab 2022 SCMR 890 rel.\n(c) Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003)-\n-S. 3-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 204(2)-Use of contempt jurisdiction by the High Court as a substitute of execution proceeding-Supreme Court observed that such practice was undesirable.\nSaeeda Sultan v. Liaqat Ali Orakzai PLD 2021 SC 671 and R.N. Dey and others v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others (2000) 4 SCC 400 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=11Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 819, 820 of 2017 and 939-L of 2015, decided on 21st August, 2022.\n(Against the Judgment Dated 26.01.2017 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.C.A. No. 616 of 2016, I.C.A. No. 617 of 2016 and Order Dated 30.3.2015 in I.C.A. No. 357 of 2009).   heard on: 21st September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Haris Azmat, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Ali, Dy. Dir.(L) and Hafiz Tanvir, G.M (M-II) for Petitioner.\nMalik Noor Muhammad Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY through Ghulam Mujtaba, G.M, Lahore-Petitioner\nVersus\nMAZHAR SIDDIQUE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23397", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 559 = 2023 SLD 559 = 2023 SCMR 501", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTc", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 185(3)-Interim orders passed by the High Court-Interference in such orders by the Supreme Court-Scope and exception-Settled policy of the Supreme Court is not to readily interfere in the interim orders passed by the High Court-Desirable course of action is that the court hearing the case finally decides the same before it is brought before the Supreme Court as piecemeal adjudication is not desirable-Only exception is when the interim relief granted by the High Court is arbitrary or unreasonable or reflects abuse of power or wanton exercise of discretion resulting in miscarriage of justice.\nMuhammad Sadiq v. Bashir Ahmad PLD 1966 SC 717; Multan Development Authority v. Muhammad Ramzan PLD 1989 SC 629; Salah-Ud-Din v. Mst. Zia Farhat 1996 SCMR 1528 and Federation of Pakistan v. Shafiq Ul Hassan 2020 SCMR 2119 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=18593)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 600 of 2020, decided on 26th January, 2023.\n(Against the order of Lahore High Court, Lahore Dated 04.02.2020 passed in W.P. No. 67 of 2020), heard on: 26th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. G.M. Choudhary, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ATTIQ UR REHMAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nSh. TAHIR MEHMOOD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23398", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 560 = 2023 SLD 560 = 2023 SCMR 503", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S. 19- Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 13(2)(a)- Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Ss. 48 & 153-Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) falling under PCT Code 87.03, import of-Exemption from customs duty, sales tax and with-holding tax-Federal Government, vide S.R.O. 499(I)/2013 dated 12-6-2013 (the S.R.O.), exempted customs duty, sales tax and with-holding tax on import of Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) falling under PCT Code 87.03-During the existence of the S.R.O., the Assistant Collector of Customs issued a Circular (the Circular) wherein a condition was sought to be imposed, beyond the purview of the original S.R.O., that the benefit of exemption of duties and taxes on the import of HEVs under the S.R.O. was only available to Fully Hybrid Vehicles which had larger batteries and a motor to drive the electric vehicle-Legality-Through the Circular, the Assistant Collector of Customs innovated a new criteria that the benefit in the original S.R.O. was only extended to the Fully Hybrid Vehicles which had larger batteries and a motor to drive the vehicles, but nothing was mentioned in this regard in the S.R.O. itself-Nothing was placed on record as to how the Assistant Collector of Customs, had any lawful authority to issue such Circular in order to make an amendment in the original S.R.O. whereby he added certain conditions under the guise of a so-called clarification which changed the complexion and substratum of the S.R.O. without any lawful authority-Both the Appellate Tribunal and High Court had rightly discarded the Circular which was unjustifiably and irrationally approved in the Appellate Order while describing the Circular as clarificatory in nature-In fact, the Federal government exempted duties on the import of HEVs falling under PCT Code 87.03 without any distinction of new or used hybrid vehicles, or large or small batteries, or with any specific qualification sine qua non for exemption-Anything which was being inferred extraneously or beyond the scope or tenor of the S.R.O. was not permissible under any rule of interpretation-Supreme Court observed that HEVs technology besides being fuel efficient, was also an alternative solution to cautiously concentrate on the issue of global warming; that the proper and futuristic use of this technology will not only improve and recuperate the atmosphere and ecosystem, but also alleviate destructive facets of climate change; that on the face of it, the exemption on the import of HEVs was logically issued for protection against climate change, and to minimize its adverse impact in the future, and it was also the need of the time and a pressing priority to promote and encourage HEVs more and more, rather than applying irrational interpretations resulting in unwarranted restrictions on the exemption already in field-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Interpretation of statutes-Statutory Regulatory Order (S.R.O) issued under a fiscal statute-S.R.O. requires purposive interpretation or construction which complements its effect to the purpose by following conscientious and exact meaning-S.R.Os are issued fundamentally in the aid of substantive principles of law set out in the parent legislation, and to give effect to administrative directions and instructions for the implementation of the law-If the words used are capable of one construction only, then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.\n(c) Taxation-Taxing statute-Exemption, benefit of-Burden of proof-Burden rests on the person who claims an exemption or concession to substantiate that he is entitled to the same.\n(d) Interpretation of statutes-Taxing statute-Exemption, benefit of-In a taxing statute, there is no leeway or probability of any intendment but the manner of interpretation should be such which undoubtedly or unmistakably comes into sight from the plain language of the notification with the conditions laid down in it, but with the caution that the benefits arising from a particular exemption should not be defeated or negated-In case of any ambiguity or mischief, the taxing statute should be construed in favour of the assessee-By and large, an exemption notification is interpreted rigidly, but when it is found that the assessee has satisfied the exemption conditions, a liberal construction should be made-If the tax-payer is entitled for exemption in plain terms of a notification, then the department could not deny the benefit of an exemption which was intended for the benefit of the taxpayer so it should be construed accordingly.\nN. S. Bindras interpretation of Statutes (Tenth Edition), page 1118 ref.\n(e) Taxation-Taxing statute-Exemption, benefit of-Substantial compliance, doctrine of-Said doctrine, though on one hand premeditated to avoid hardship, simultaneously safeguards the essential compliance of the prerequisites in which the exemption in tax or customs duty are invoked.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19Sales Tax Act, 1990=13(2)(a)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=48,153", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 389, 696 to 742 of 2022, decided on 6th July, 2022.   heard on: 6th July, 2022. (Against the judgment Dated 01.12.2021 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in Custom References Nos.270-P to 317-P of 2020)", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, PESHAWAR-Petitioner\nVs\nWASEEF ULLAH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23399", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 561 = 2023 SLD 561 = 2023 SCMR 518", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 9, 14, 18, 20, 22, 26, 27, 36, 37(a), 38(b), 38(d), Preamble-Constitutional protections for minorities and persons with disabilities (PWDs) stated.\nThe Preamble of the Constitution provides that it is the will of the people of Pakistan to establish an Order. The term will of the people of Pakistan is an inclusive term signifying all citizens irrespective of religion, caste, creed, race, sex, place of birth or personal abilities. Therefore, such a will is incomplete without including the will of the minorities and persons with disabilities (PWDs).\nThe word minorities signifies merely a statistical number, representing a class of people in the country who are Non-Muslims and in no manner does it imply that they are lesser citizens or in any manner less entitled to the fundamental rights under the Constitution.\nThe minimum right to dignity of the minorities and PWDs is that they ought to be considered equally with the rest of the majority of Muslims and the majority of persons with fuller abilities. Under the Constitution there is no distinction and therefore, the fundamental rights are fully available to the minorities and PWDs in the country as they are available to all other citizens of Pakistan.\nThe Constitution uplifts PWDs, gives them additional protection so that every effort (reasonable accommodation) is made to bring differently-abled persons at par with fully-abled persons. Similarly, it mandates that minorities are equal citizens of Pakistan and must be protected from all kinds and forms of discrimination. The Constitution, therefore, not only caters to minorities and PWDs as equal citizens of Pakistan, having equal rights and safeguards, it also provides extra protection to them.\nPeople with disabilities are segregated from community life and face discrimination due to pervasive attitudinal and systemic barriers that the law, policy and practice frameworks have failed to remove, such as inaccessible or unequal facilities of housing, transport and education, segregated settings, barriers in accessing justice and legal systems, and employment and health discrimination. The effects of such discrimination are further expounded when intersecting with sexism, ageism, racism and other forms of inequality.\nDisabled Peoples Organization Australia, Segregation of People with Disability is Discrimination and Must End, Position Paper (September, 2020). https://dpoa.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ Segregation-of-People-with Disability_Position-Paper.pdf ref.\nLower rates of employment are persistently observed for PWDs. Lower education levels coupled with discrimination, stigma, negative attitudes, inaccessible transport and workplaces, and limited availability of accommodations for PWDs, play a significant role in limiting job opportunities. Due to these reasons, PWDs are pushed backwards and depressed at the hands of an unfriendly and unaccommodating ecosystem, making them fall under the rubric of the backward and depressed classes, as recognized by the Constitution. Under the Constitution, it is the obligation of the State to attend to the legitimate interests of these classes. Legitimate interests are all those interests which can help PWDs actualize their fundamental rights under the Constitution and enable them to become effective members of the society.\nUN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Disability and Development Report - Realizing the Sustainable Development Goals by, for and with persons with disabilities (2018). https://social.un.org/ publications/UN-Flagship-Report-Disability-Final.pdf; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 and Muhammad Yousaf v. Chairman, FPSC PLD 2017 Lah. 406 ref.\nIn order to safeguard the rights of the minorities and PWDs and to provide equality of status and opportunities, the State has to endeavor to bridge the gap and ensure that the differently-abled persons and the Non-Muslim minority in our country get to enjoy their fundamental rights under the Constitution with the same fervour and force as enjoyed by the Muslim majority and majority of persons with fuller abilities.\n(b) Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981)-\n-S. 10-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14, 36-Persons With Disabilities (PWDs)-Minorities-Seats reserved for PWDs and minorities in the Combined Competitive Examination conducted by the Punjab Public Service Commission-Constitutional right of PWDs and minorities-Other than the general seats, the additional provision of quota for the PWDs and the minorities reaffirms the constitutional commitment-In case the seats reserved for PWDs and the Non-Muslim minority are not filled by PWDs and the non-Muslim minority in a particular year, it was not permissible to open and make the said seats available to general quota as it would offend constitutional values, fundamental rights and the Principles of Policy-Seats earmarked for minorities or PWDs must be retained and carried forward; this quota is their constitutional right and cannot be reversed or made available to other citizens-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused with the direction to respective governments that they shall ensure that the employment quota of the minorities is maintained at all levels and to strictly avoid discriminatory and demeaning advertisements (for posts) flouting the dignity and self-respect of the minorities.\n(c) Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981)-\n-S. 10-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 14-Persons With Disabilities (PWDs)-Combined Competitive Examination conducted by the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) - Use of the word disabled in advertisements for posts-Supreme Court directed that the word disabled has already been put to disuse in the reported as Malik Ubaidullah v. Government of Punjab and others (PLD 2020 SC 599) and, therefore, the PPSC shall ensure that the word disabled is not used and instead persons with disabilities or persons with different abilities is put to use-Supreme Court observed that it was hopeful that in the future these terms will be incorporated in the official correspondence as well as relevant notifications, including public advertisements, issued by the Government.\nPLD 2020 SC 599 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=9,14,18,20,22,26,27,36,37(a),38(b),38(d)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2045 of 2019, decided on 18th November, 2022.\n(Against the judgment of Lahore High Court, Lahore Dated 08.03.2019, passed in W.P. No. 20429 of 2016), heard on: 18th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in person.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUBARIK ALI BABAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nPUNJAB PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION through its Secretary and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23400", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 562 = 2023 SLD 562 = 2023 SCMR 277", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Incident took place at 6:30 p.m. and the matter was reported to the Police instantly and the FIR was lodged on the same day at 8:40 p.m. i.e. just after two hours of the occurrence-Keeping in view the inter se distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station i.e. 13.5 kilometers, the contention that the FIR was delayed had no force-Occurrence took place in the broad daylight whereas the parties were known to each other, therefore, there was no chance of misidentification-Although both witnesses of ocular account were not residents of the locality where the occurrence took place but they had reasonably explained their presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time by stating that they had come to the house of their maternal uncle in connection with the matter of their land-Defence side did not deny anywhere that the said witnesses had no land in the vicinity-Presence of the said witnesses in the house of their maternal uncle could not be termed as unnatural-Said prosecution witnesses were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defence but nothing favourable to the accused or adverse to the prosecution could be brought on record-Both of them remained consistent on each and every material point inasmuch as they made deposition according to the circumstances that surfaced in the case-Medical evidence available on the record further corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased was concerned-Injuries ascribed to the accused on the body of the deceased were found available by the doctor, who conducted postmortem examination-Counsel for the accused could not point out any plausible reason as to why the complainant would falsely involved the accused in the present case and let off the real culprit, who had committed murder of his real brother-Substitution in such like cases was otherwise a rare phenomenon-Sufficient evidence was available to sustain the conviction of the accused under section 302(b), P.P.C.-Appeal was dismissed.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Ocular evidence- Medical evidence-Preference-Where ocular evidence is found trustworthy and confidence inspiring, the same is given preference over medical evidence.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Prosecution witnesses related to the deceased-Mere relationship of the prosecution witnesses with the deceased cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such witnesses.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Minor discrepancies in prosecution case-Even if there are some minor discrepancies, which do not hamper the salient features of the prosecution case, the same should be ignored-Accused cannot claim benefit of such minor discrepancies.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Recovery of weapon of offence disbelieved and inconsequential-Sentence of imprisonment justified-Admittedly the crime empties and the weapon of offence were sent to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory together, which made the recovery doubtful-Such recovery was rightly disbelieved by the High Court-So far as the quantum of punishment was concerned, keeping in view the fact that recovery was disbelieved, the High Court had already taken a lenient view and converted the sentence of death into imprisonment for life to meet the ends of justice, hence, it left no room for the Supreme Court for further deliberation on such score-Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 75-L of 2021, decided on 15th November, 2022.\n(Against the judgment Dated 10.05.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 399-J/ 2012/BWP and Murder Reference No. 63/2012/BWP), heard on: 15th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN, MUNIB AKHTAR AND SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sheikh Sakhawat Ali, Advocate Supreme Court (Via video link from Lahore) for Appellant.\nMirza Muhammad Usman, D.P.G. for the State.\nMalik Muhammad Imtiaz Mahl, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMANULLAH-Appellant\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23401", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 563 = 2023 SLD 563 = 2023 SCMR 534", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 111(1)(d) & 122(5)-Concealment of business income from sales-Amendment of deemed assessment order-Words chargeable to tax as used at the end of sub-clause (i) of section 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 [the sub-clause (i)]-Said words applied to the whole of the sub-clause (i), i.e., also to the suppressed production and/or sales-If any amount can be brought within the scope of sub-clause (i) only if, and to the extent, that it is chargeable to tax (i.e., constitutes income properly so called), then production and sales must be given the same treatment-Thus, it is only production or sales chargeable to tax that can be brought within the ambit of clause (d) to section 111(1) of the Ordinance-Both under section 122(5) and section 111(1)(d) of the Ordinance, the taxpayer is exposed to the same tax liability in respect of the income that has escaped assessment, or been suppressed, i.e., he is liable to tax on the net amount, or income properly so called-Appeals were dismissed.\nWaris Meah v. The State and another PLD 1958 SC 157 and Jibendra Kishore Achharya Chowdhury v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1957 SC 9 ref.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 111(1)(d) & 122(5)-Concealment of business income from sales-Amendment of deemed assessment order-Words chargeable to tax as used at the end of sub-clause (i) of section 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 [the sub-clause (i)]-Said words applied to the whole of the sub-clause (i), i.e., also to the suppressed production and/or sales-Directions given by the Supreme Court to the Federal Board of Revenue to align sections 122(5) & 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 closely with the principles laid down in the case reported as Waris Meah v. The State and another PLD 1958 SC 157 stated.\nIn order to further align sections 122(5) and 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 closely with the principles laid down in the case reported as Waris Meah v. The State and another PLD 1958 SC 157, Supreme Court directed that the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), in exercise of its powers under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance) (whether under section 206 and/or section 237 or any other enabling provision), shall forthwith issue appropriate guidance and provide the necessary yardstick, measure, guidelines and standard to the tax authorities, consistent with the present judgment, inter alia as to when and how, and in which circumstances and against what taxpayers, action can be initiated under the first clause of section 122(5) on the one hand, or the two sub-clauses of clause (d) of section 111(1) of the Ordinance on the other; that in issuing such guidelines, the FBR must take into account, and appropriately incorporate therein, the following points:\n(i) If the tax authorities intend to take action against a person within the time period permissible under section 122, then such action must ordinarily be taken in terms of subsection (5) (or any other applicable subsection, as the case may be) thereof and in a manner compliant therewith, rather than under section 111(1)(d). If at all during the said period the designated Officer of Inland Revenue (OIR) nonetheless intends to proceed under the latter provision then clear reasons must be given why this is being done. In respect of such reasons to be given, the onus will lie on the tax authorities to justify such action and the threshold will be a high one. Furthermore, the reasons will be subject to judicial scrutiny in terms, inter alia, of the hierarchy of remedies provided by and under the Ordinance.\n(ii) If the tax authorities intend to take action under section 111(1)(d) against a person beyond or after the time period stipulated under section 122, and the taxpayer shows that the information on which such action is based was, or ought reasonably to be regarded either as being or such as could have been, in the knowledge of the tax authorities within the said time period, then the tax authorities will have to give reasons as to why action was not taken under section 122 - The reasons to be given by the OIR if the taxpayer meets the initial burden cast upon him will be subject to judicial scrutiny in terms, inter alia, of the hierarchy of remedies provided by and under the Ordinance.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1),111(1)(d),122,122(5),237", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 648-L, 649-L and 650-L of 2021, decided on 31st May, 2022, heard on: 31st May, 2022. (Against order Dated 26.01.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.Rs. Nos. 4919, 4922 and 4923 of 2021)", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Shakeel, Advocate Supreme Court, Naeem Hassan, Secretary (Litigation), FBR for Petitioner (in all cases).\nSyed Mansoor Ali Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, (RTO) LAHORE-Petitioner\n Vs\n MIAN LIAQAT ALI PROPRIETOR, LIAQAT HOSPITAL, HOUSE NO.6, STREET NO.6, LAL PUL, PANJ PIR ROAD, MUGHALPURA, LAHORE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23402", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 564 = 2023 SLD 564 = 2023 SCMR 549", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVSs", - "Key Words:": "Civil service-\n-Appointment-Eligibility criteria-Judicial review by Courts-Overqualified candidates-Autonomy, agency and free choice of the employing institution must be respected and be allowed to recruit according to the criteria advertised and anyone overqualified for the said post, if not entertained by the employing institution, the same being an institutional policy, the Court must refrain from interfering in the internal governance of institutions.\nWhile prescribing qualifications for a post and determining eligibility criteria, the employing institution is best suited to assess its needs based on the function and nature of the post; the aptitude or suitability to fulfill such requirements and the qualification required for the post. Where one of the policy decisions of the recruiting company is that a candidate must possess a specific qualification and anyone overqualified will not be inducted, this being an internal policy decision of the company, judicial review must tread warily and must not be extended to expand the ambit of the prescribed eligibility criteria.\nZahoor Ahmad Rather v. Imtiyaz Ahmad (2019) 2 SCC 404; Asaf Fasihuddin v. Government of Pakistan 2014 SCMR 676 and Abdul Hameed v. WAPDA 2021 SCMR 1230 ref.\nIn the absence of any such stipulation in the advertisement or the recruitment policy of the employing company, it is not possible for the Court to draw an inference that a higher qualification presupposes the acquisition of a lower qualification or that a candidate having a higher qualification is better suited for the post as opposed to a candidate possessing the requisite qualification that has been expressly prescribed in the advertisement according to the nature of the post and the requirement of the employer. It is not for the Court to examine the qualification and eligibility in a recruitment process. The Court, at best, can look into the legality of the recruitment process but cannot delve deeper into the design and need of the employing institution or second guess their selection criteria and job requirement. It is also not open to the Courts to embark upon comparing various degrees held by the applicants/candidates with the advertised qualifications and carry out the function of an employer by carrying out the comparison of the said qualifications. The power of judicial review by the Courts cannot be extended to determine equivalence or comparison of academic qualifications for a post or assume the role of a human resource department of an employing institution. It is a specific expert area and can be best resolved by the institution itself according to the suitability and requirements of a certain post as designed and desired by the employer. It is an area for which the Courts are not best suited.\nZahoor Ahmad Rather v. Imtiyaz Ahmad (2019) 2 SCC 404 and P.M. Latha v. State of Kerala (2003) 3 SCC 541 ref.\nFurthermore, inducting candidates possessing a higher qualification than the advertised criteria would also have a social impact as it would deprive people with lesser education of employment opportunities and encourage people with higher qualification. It will cause injustice to those applicants who possessed a lower prescribed qualification in the advertisement, because applicants with a higher qualification would seek automatic preference based on their qualification even when such qualification is not prescribed in the advertisement. It will also disrupt the working of the institution by having overqualified people and affect their hierarchy in the organization. The Court must take into account socio-economic perspectives in order to ensure that employment opportunities are created for at all tiers of the society.\nSakhawat Ali v. Deputy Commissioner/Chairman Recruitment Committee, Narowal, 1998 PLC (C.S.) 19 and Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. Imtiyaz Ahmad (2019) 2 SCC 404 ref.\nThe autonomy, agency and free choice of the employing institution must be respected and be allowed to recruit according to the criteria advertised and anyone overqualified for the said post, if not entertained by the employing institution, the same being an institutional policy, the Court must refrain from interfering in the internal governance of institutions.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4806 of 2019, decided on 7th December, 2022.\n(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Dated 21.11.2019, passed in I.C.A. No.1412 of 2016), heard on: 7th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Afnan Karim Kundi, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nMunawar-us-Salam, Advocate Supreme Court and M. Sohaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAQAS ASLAM and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nLAHORE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23403", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 565 = 2023 SLD 565 = 2023 SCMR 711", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTk", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 516-A-Superdari of vehicle-Registered owner of a vehicle is prima facie entitled to the temporary custody (superdari) of that vehicle unless the dispute as to the title to the vehicle is decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.\nPetitioner lodged an FIR for an offence under section 406, P.P.C. alleging therein that he handed over the subject car to a car dealer, for sale, who allegedly sold the car to respondent/alleged purchaser but did not pay the consideration amount to the petitioner nor was he returning his car to him. Thereafter, the petitioner, as well as, respondent (the alleged purchaser of the car) filed their respective applications for superdari of the said car, which was allowed by the Magistrate in favour of respondent.\nSindh Motor Vehicle Registration Authority (Authority) placed on record report along with documents, which disclosed that the petitioner was the registered owner of the vehicle and there was no application for transfer of ownership of the vehicle in the name of respondent. The original papers of the vehicle had been sent to the petitioner as per report of the Authority. The argument that respondent had in his possession the original registration book of the vehicle was not sufficient to show that he was the lawful purchaser of the vehicle because the very allegation of the petitioner was that he had given the car for sale to the car dealer, who had not paid the consideration amount of the vehicle to the petitioner and had thus committed criminal breach of trust, therefore, any sale made by the car dealer in favour of respondent without a valid transfer deed executed by the petitioner, the registered owner, was prima facie of no consequence in respect of transferring the ownership of the vehicle. A registered owner of the vehicle was prima facie entitled to the temporary custody (superdari) of that vehicle unless the dispute as to the title to the vehicle was decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.\nPetition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, with the direction that the vehicle shall be handed over on superdari to the petitioner, subject to his furnishing surety bonds in the sum of Rs.2,000,000/ - (rupees two millions) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=516-A", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 2337 of 2019, decided on 16th January, 2023.\n(Against the order of Lahore High Court, Multan Bench Dated 12.04.2019, passed in W.P. No. 1574 of 2019), heard on: 16th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nAftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Fozi Zafar, Additional A.G., Sindh for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR ALI-Petitioner\nVersus\nADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, KOT ADDU, DISTRICT MUZAFFARGARH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23404", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 566 = 2023 SLD 566 = 2023 SCMR 566", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Crime report was lodged after more than five hours of the occurrence-Distance between the place of occurrence and the police station was 21 kilometers-Nowhere in the entire evidence, the prosecution had explained the reason for the delay in reporting the matter to the police with such a delay-Delayed FIR showed dishonesty on the part of the complainant and that it was lodged with deliberation and consultation-Sole eye-witness of the occurrence stated that the accused allegedly decapitated the head of the deceased from the rest of his body, and that both the head and the body were separately picked up by the police-However, such stance of the witness was negated by the medical evidence and statement of investigating officer-Record showed that the accused was the grandson of the deceased and he was being brought up by the deceased-Appellant alleged that due to the apprehension that the deceased would transfer his whole property in the name of accused, his father i.e. the complainant committed murder of his deceased-father-When the accused had taken a specific stance and in support of the same had placed on record the relevant documents, the High Court ought to have taken into consideration the statement of the accused under section 342, Cr.P.C.-Except for his oral assertion the complainant did not produce any independent evidence to substantiate the motive part of the prosecution story, therefore the prosecution had failed to prove motive-So far as recovery of blood stained hatchet was concerned, the same was allegedly recovered on the pointation of accused from a thoroughfare, which was easily accessible to everyone, therefore, the same was inconsequential-Facts and circumstances of the present case were sufficient to cast a shadow of doubt on the prosecution case, which entitled the accused to the right of benefit of the doubt-Appeal was allowed and accused was acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Heinous offence-Mere heinousness of the offence, if not proved to the hilt, is not a ground to punish an accused.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Benefit of doubt-Scope-For the accused to be afforded the right of the benefit of the doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating uncertainty, and if there is only one doubt, the benefit of the same must go to the accused.\nMst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 and Abdul Jabbar v. State 2019 SCMR 129 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 297 of 2020, decided on 18th January, 2023.\n(Against the judgment Dated 27.06.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in Murder Reference No. 40/2013 and Criminal Appeal No. 338 of 2013), heard on: 18th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Kausar Irfan Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMIR MUHAMMAD KHAN-Appellant\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23405", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 567 = 2023 SLD 567 = 2023 SCMR 572", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Benami transaction-\n-Essential characteristics of a benami transaction stated.\nIn a benami transaction, there are three persons involved - the seller, the real owner, and the ostensible owner or benamidar, and, in the ordinary course of human conduct, it encompasses two different contracts, one is the contract, express or implied, between the ostensible owner and the purchaser (real owner) and it specifically mentions two things. First, the real owner expresses his desire or compulsion (also called motive) and obtains permission from the ostensible owner (Benamidar) to purchase the property in his name after paying the consideration amount to the seller, and second, it talks about the consent of the ostensible owner (Benamidar) that whenever the real owner demands, he will be bound to transfer the property to him. The other is a contract between the ostensible owner (Benamidar) and the seller of the property. Both such contracts, though differ from each other in their legal character and incidents, but complement each other to establish benami transaction, and thus, in cases of such transaction, the plaintiff must first state them, in detail, in his plaint, and then prove them by legal testimony, and failure to do so is fatal.\nSultan v. Nawab Mouladad PLD 1969 Kar. 221; Abdus Samad Khan v. Moulvi Abdullah 1989 CLC 1563 and Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Mrs. Nusrat Rasool and 4 others PLD 2008 SC 146 ref.\n(b) Benami transaction-\n-Proof-Burden of proof-Evidentiary requirements for proving a benami transaction stated.\nThe case of benami dispute is not one in which the authenticity of the document is in question, but in such cases the execution of the document is an admitted fact and the seeker only intends rectification of the document and wants that in it the name of the Benamidar be delated and instead his name be written. For such purposes not only direct oral evidence but also circumstances and surroundings of the case have to be considered. The burden of proof lies heavily on the person who claims against the tenor of the document or deed to show that the ostensible vendee (owner) was a mere name lender and the property was in fact purchased only for his benefit. Such burden would be discharged by satisfying the well-known criteria, i.e., (i) the source of purchase money relating to the transaction; (ii) possession of the property, (iii) the position of the parties and their relationship to one another, (iv) the circumstances, pecuniary or otherwise, of the alleged transferee, (v) the motive for the transaction, (vi) the custody and production of the title deed, and (vii) the previous and subsequent conduct of the parties. Each of the said stated circumstance, taken by itself, is of no particular value and affords no conclusive proof of the intention to transfer the ownership from one person to the other. But a combination of some or all of them and a proper weighing and appreciation of their value would go a long way towards indicating whether the ownership has been really transferred or where the real title lies.\nSince the very object of a benami transaction is secrecy, the evidence adduced in cases of such character should stand the test of strict scrutiny and satisfy the tests mentioned above. In other words, the evidence must be reliable and acceptable impelling the Court to take a view contrary to the recitals in the impugned document. The consideration of such evidence should be in a proper manner and in the right perspective.\nMina Kumari Bibi v. Bijoy Singh Dudhuria (1917) ILR 44 P.C. 662; Abdul Lajij Kazi v. Abdul Huq Kazi (1925) 28 CWN 62; Muhammad Sajjad Hussain v. Muhammad Anwar Hussain 1991 SCMR 703; Muhammad Siddiqi through Attorney v. Messrs T.J. Ibrahim and Company and others 2001 SCMR 1443; Abdul Majeed and others v. Amir Muhammad and others 2005 SCMR 577; Mst. Zohra Begum and 6 others v. Muhammad Ismail 2008 SCMR 143; Ghulam Murtaza v. Mst. Asia Bibi and others PLD 2010 SC 569 and Mst. Asia Bibi v. Dr. Asif Ali Khan and others PLD 2011 SC 829 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 801 of 2021, decided on 14th December, 2022.\n(On appeal against the judgment Dated 25.06.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, passed in C.R. No.08-D of 2013), heard on: 14th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Muhammad Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nRashid Mehmood Sindhu, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 12.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YOUSAF and others-Appellants\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD ISHAQ RANA (DECEASED) through LRs and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23406", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 568 = 2023 SLD 568 = 2023 SCMR 581", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDVXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 498, 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 440-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Trespassing onto a field and destroying a standing crop-Ad interim pre-arrest bail, confirmation of-Pending civil litigation between the parties-Possibility of false implication-Allegation against the accused persons was that they plowed and destroyed a standing crop from the land of the complainant and caused him a loss of Rs.125,000-However, it was the stance of the accused persons that they were the owners of the land in question where the occurrence took place; that they were in possession of requisite title documents and in-fact the complainant party was the aggressor-Admittedly a civil suit for declaration qua the land in question was still pending adjudication before the court of competent jurisdiction, which was filed about one year earlier to lodging of the present FIR-In view of such matter, the possibility of false implication just to pressurize the accused persons to gain ulterior motives could not be ruled out-Trial Court after recording of evidence would decide about the guilt of the accused persons and as to whether section 440, P.P.C. was applicable or not-Even otherwise, all the six accused persons had been ascribed the role of jointly causing a loss of Rs.125,000/- to the complainant-Case of the accused persons squarely fell within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into their guilt-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the accused persons was confirmed.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Pre-arrest bail-Merits of the case-While granting pre-arrest bail, the merits of the case can be touched upon by the Court.\nMiran Bux v. The State PLD 1989 SC 347; Sajid Hussain alias Joji v. The State PLD 2021 SC 898; Javed Iqbal v. The State 2022 SCMR 1424 and Muhammad Ijaz v. The State 2022 SCMR 1271 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498,497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=49440Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1442 of 2022, decided on 1st December, 2022.\n(On appeal against the order Dated 02.11.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Misc. No. 60863-B of 2022) heard on: 1st December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Mansoor, Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioners (Via video link from Lahore).\nMirza Muhammad Usman, D.P.G., Hassan Farooq, DSP and Sadiq, SI for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD TANVEER and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23407", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 569 = 2023 SLD 569 = 2023 SCMR 584", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Police Rules, 1934-R. 12.2(3)-Inspectors serving in (Punjab) Police-Seniority-Final seniority list of Inspectors will be reckoned from the date of confirmation of the officers and not from the date of appointment.\nRule 12.2(3) of the Police Rules, 1934 (the Rules) provides for two stages for determining the seniority, one is prior to the probationary period and is to be reckoned from the first appointment and the final seniority is settled from the date of confirmation which is once the period of probation is successfully completed. Period of probation is important as the officers have to undergo various courses (A, B, C and D) and qualify the same. Once police officer has successfully undergone the said courses he stands confirmed at the end of the probationary period. The seniority is once again settled, this being the final seniority from the date of confirmation. The said rule is, therefore, very clear that final seniority list of Inspectors will be reckoned from the date of confirmation of the officers and not from the date of appointment.\n \n1999 SCMR 1594; PLD 1985 SC 159 and Muhammed Yousaf and others v. Abdul Rashid and others 1996 SCMR 1297 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-Art. 185(3)- Leave refusing order of the Supreme Court-Precedential value-Leave-refusing order which neither decides any question of law nor enunciates any principle of law in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution does not constitute binding precedent-Impression that a leave-refusing order endorses the statements of law made in the impugned orders and thus enhances the status of those statements as that of the Supreme Court is fallacious-Such impression is based on inference drawn from the leave-refusing orders, while a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and cannot be cited as a precedent for a proposition that may be inferred from it.\nMuhammad Salman v. Naveed Anjum 2021 SCMR 1675; Tariq Badr v. NBP 2013 SCMR 314; Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213; SHCBA v. Federation PLD 2009 SC 879 and Khairpur Textile Mills v. NBP 2003 CLD 326 ref.\n(c) Police Order (22 of 2002)-Preamble-Police Rules, 1934-Service matters relating to police-Interference by Courts in limited circumstances only-Disputes, if any, amongst the police officers must first be resolved by the Inspector General of Police or his representatives-Only in case of any legal interpretation or blatant abuse of the process provided under the Police Order or Rules should the courts interfere in the working of the Police force so that the force can maintain its functioning, autonomy, independence and efficiency.\nIt is best if the Police force is allowed to be regulated by its statutory framework i.e. the Police Order, 2002 and the Police Rules which provide a complete code of internal governance. Disputes, if any, amongst the police officers must first be resolved by the Inspector General of Police or his representatives. Only in case of any legal interpretation or blatant abuse of the process provided under the Police Order or Rules should the courts interfere in the working of the Police force so that the force can maintain its functioning, autonomy, independence and efficiency which is essential for Police which is charged with the onerous responsibility of maintaining law and order and with the onerous obligation to protect the life and property of the citizens of the country. More than any other organization, it is imperative that the Police must function as a rule based organization which is fully autonomous and independent in regulating its internal governance. Strong and smart Police force requires organizational justice firmly entrenched in the institution so that its officers are assured that they work for an institution that firmly stands for rules, fairness, transparency and efficiency. This upholds the morale of the police officers, especially junior police officers who are required to undertake dangerous and strenuous assignments on a daily basis and also uplifts the institution by making it more vibrant and progressive.\nThe issues of posting, transfer and seniority must be settled within the department strictly in accordance with the Rules and only matters requiring legal interpretation may come up before the Courts. Several junior officers approaching the courts for redressal of their grievance reflects poorly on the internal governance of the Police department when the elaborate Police Rules and the Police Order provide for such eventualities in detail.\nSupreme Court observed that it was sanguine that in future the Police department will take charge of its internal governance strictly in accordance with law and will restore a Rule-based approach in addressing the grievances of the police officers so that courts are not unduly burdened.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-Arts. 4(1), 14(1), 18, 25, 37 & 38-Civil service-Organizational justice-Concept of organizational justice and its importance stated.\nOrganizational justice focuses on how employees judge the behavior of the organization and how this behavior is related to employees attitudes and behaviors regarding the organization. The employees are sensitive to decisions made on a day-to-day basis by their employers, both on the small and large scale, and will judge these decisions as unfair or fair. Decisions judged as unfair, lead to workplace deviance. Employees also believe procedures are fair when they are consistent, accurate, ethical, and lack bias. Organizational justice is concerned with all matters of workplace behaviour, from treatment by superiors to pay, access to training and gender equality. Ensuring organizational justice should be a priority for any organization - it can reduce the incidence of workplace deviance, absence, disengagement and counterproductive workplace behaviours and also encourage positive attributes like trust and progressive communication.\nDr. Annette Towler, The benefits of organizational justice and practical ways how to improve it CQNet ref.\nOrganizational justice stands firmly on the constitutional values and fundamental rights ensured to any person under the Constitution. The constitutional principle of social and economic justice read with due process and right to dignity, non-discrimination and right to a carry out a lawful profession and the right to livelihood are basic ingredients of organizational justice.\n(e) Police Order (22 of 2002)-Preamble-Police force-Promotion and career progression-Organizational justice-Importance of organizational justice in the police force stated.\nOrganizational justice is necessary for the police officers to perform their duties with complete commitment, dedication and fidelity, because they must perceive that the institution is fair and just towards them. Police officers who have such perceptions of fairness would demonstrate less cynicism towards the job and are also likely to have a more amiable attitude towards the public. Uncertainty in the promotion structure and delay in promotions weakens such perceptions of serving police officers, resulting in inefficiency, likelihood of misconduct and low morale, thereby, also adversely impacting the trust of the public in the police. Therefore, for an efficient and effective police force, it is necessary to ensure the provision of organizational justice in the police as an institution, especially with regards to career progression and promotion. As such, there must be no ambiguity in the promotion structure and any grievance with regards to career progression/promotion must be redressed expeditiously under the law.\nVolkov, M. The Importance of Organizational Justice, Corruption, Crime and Compliance , 2015; Wolfe, Scott E., Justin Nix, and Justin T. Pickett. The Measurement of Organizational Justice Matters: A Research Note , July 16, 2020 and Weimer, C. How would Organizational Justice Shape Police Officers Attitudes in the Workplace? , 2019 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Police Rules, 1934=12.2(3)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4(1),14(1),18,25,37,38,185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1172 to 1178, Civil Petitions Nos. 3789 to 3796, 2260-L to 2262-L and C.P. No. 3137-L of 2020 and C.M. Appeals Nos. 23 and 33 of 2021, decided on 2nd November, 2022, heard on: 2nd November, 2022. Civil Appeals Nos. 1172 to 1178 of 2020 and Civil Petitions Nos. 3789 to 3796, 2260-L to 2262-L and C.P. 3137-L of 2020\n(Against the judgment Dated 30.11.2018, passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeals Nos. 3780, 3779, 3852, 3778, 3425,\n3851 of 2015, 3160 o", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Bilal Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed R.H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record, Ch. Zulifqar Ali, Advocate Supreme Court (through V.L. Lahore Registry), Maqbool Hussain Sh. Advocate Supreme Court and Talaat Farooq Sh. Advocate Supreme Court (through V.L. Lahore Registry) for Appellants/Petitioners.\nSafdar Shaheen Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (in C.M.A. 8616 of 2022).\nMuddasar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Ramzan Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, M. Sharif Janjua, Advocate-on-Record, Kaleem Ilyas, Advocate Supreme Court, Raja Muhammad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents and Atta Muhammad-respondent-in-person.\nAshfaq Ahmad Kharral, Additional A.G. along with Kamran Adil, DIG (Legal), Sh. Asif, S.P., Amir Khalil Syed, S.P. and Kashif Butt, A.D. for the Government of Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed HAMMAD NABI and others-Appellants/Petitioners\nVersus\nINSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE PUNJAB, LAHORE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23408", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 570 = 2023 SLD 570 = 2023 SCMR 596", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Incident took place at 4.30 p.m. and matter was reported to the police and the FIR was lodged on the same day at 06.15 p.m. i.e. just after one hour and forty five minutes of the occurrence-Keeping in view the inter se distance between the place of occurrence and the police station i.e. 20 kilometer, the FIR was promptly lodged-Occurrence took place in the broad daylight whereas the parties were known to each other, therefore, there was no chance of misidentification-Ocular account was furnished by brother of the deceased i.e. the complainant and maternal uncle of the deceased-Both said witnesses were residents of the same locality where the occurrence took place, therefore, their presence at the place of occurrence on the fateful day and time was not unnatural-Prosecution witnesses were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defence but nothing favourable to the accused or adverse to the prosecution could be brought on record-Both witnesses remained consistent on each and every material point inasmuch as they made deposition according to the circumstances that surfaced in the case, therefore, it could safely be concluded that the ocular account furnished by the prosecution was reliable, straightforward and confidence inspiring-Medical evidence available on the record further corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased was concerned-Counsel for the accused could not paint out any plausible reason as to why the complainant had falsely involved the accused in the present case and let off the real culprit, who had committed murder of his real brother-Substitution in such like cases is a rare phenomenon-According to the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, the crime empties matched with the weapon recovered from the accused-In these circumstances, there was sufficient material available on record to sustain conviction of the accused-Conviction of accused under section 302(b), P.P.C was maintained-Appeal was partly allowed.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Ocular account and medical evidence-Preference-Where ocular evidence is found trustworthy and confidence inspiring, the same is given preference over medical evidence.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Prosecution witnesses related to the deceased-Mere relationship of the prosecution witnesses with the deceased cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such witnesses.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Minor discrepancies in prosecution case-Even if there are some minor discrepancies, the same should be ignored if they do not hamper the salient features of the prosecution case-As long as the material aspects of the evidence have a ring of truth, courts should ignore minor discrepancies in the evidence-Test is whether the evidence of a witness inspires confidence-If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter, the defence can take advantage of the same-While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth-Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not affecting the material considerations of the prosecution case ought not to prompt the courts to reject evidence in its entirety-Such minor discrepancies which do not shake the salient features of the prosecution case should be ignored.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Death sentence reduced to imprisonment for life-Motive not established-According to the prosecution, a quarrel took place between the accused and a servant of deceased-Deceased allegedly reprimanded the accused and due to this grudge, the accused committed the murder of deceased-Prosecution had also produced servant of the deceased, who in his statement deposed that the accused wanted him to work with him and asked him to leave the job of the deceased-Bare perusal of the statement of the servant revealed that the real motive of the accused was with the said servant, therefore, the actual motive to commit the murder of deceased remained shrouded in mystery-In these circumstances, the penalty of death awarded to the accused would be harsh-Consequently, while maintaining the conviction of the accused under section 302(b), P.P.C., his sentence of death was altered into imprisonment for life-Appeal was partly allowed.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Sentence, reduction in-Mitigating factors-Motive not established-If a specific motive has been alleged by the prosecution then it is duty of the prosecution to establish the said motive through cogent and confidence inspiring evidence-Otherwise, the said motive might be considered a mitigating circumstance in favour of an accused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2020, decided on 7th December, 2022.\n(Against the judgment Dated 21.10.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 38-J of 2010, Criminal Revision No. 56 of 2010 and Murder Reference No. 100 of 2010), heard on: 7th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nMirza Muhammad Usman, D.P.G. for the State.\nMuhammad Bashir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALI ASGHAR alias AKSAR-Appellant\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23409", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 571 = 2023 SLD 571 = 2023 SCMR 603", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 [since repealed]-\n-R. 6-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A-Inquiry proceedings-Right of accused to cross-examine witnesses deposing against him-Scope-Right of proper defence and cross-examination of witnesses by the accused is a vested right-Whether the evidence is trustworthy or inspires confidence could only be determined with the tool and measure of cross-examination-Possibility cannot be ruled out in the inquiry that a witness may raise untrue and dishonest allegations due to some animosity against the accused which cannot be accepted unless he undergoes the test of cross-examination which indeed helps to expose the truth and veracity of allegations-Not providing an ample opportunity of defence and depriving the accused from right of cross-examination of departmental representative who lead evidence and produced documents against the accused is against Article 10A of the Constitution.\nIn a regular inquiry, it is a precondition that than an evenhanded and fair opportunity be provided to the accused and if any witness is examined against him, then a fair opportunity should also be afforded to cross-examine the witnesses.\nRight of proper defence and cross-examination of witnesses by the accused is a vested right. Whether the evidence is trustworthy or inspires confidence could only be determined with the tool and measure of cross-examination. The possibility cannot be ruled out in the inquiry that the witness may raise untrue and dishonest allegations due to some animosity against the accused which cannot be accepted unless he undergoes the test of cross-examination which indeed helps to expose the truth and veracity of allegations. The whys and wherefores of cross examination lead to a pathway which may dismantle and impeach the accurateness and trustworthiness of the testimony given against the accused and also uncovers the contradictions and discrepancies. Not providing an ample opportunity of defence and depriving the accused from right of cross-examination of departmental representative who lead evidence and produced documents against the accused is also against Article 10A of the Constitution.\nDeputy Director Food and 2 others v. Akhtar Ali, Food Grains Inspector 1997 SCMR 343; Secretary to Government of N.W.F.P, and 2 others v. Saifur Rehman 1997 SCMR 1073; Muhammad Zaheer Khan v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment and others 2010 PLC (C.S.) 559 and Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel and others AIR 1985 SC 1416 ref.\nIf the inquiry officer or inquiry committee is appointed for conducting inquiry in the disciplinary proceedings, it is an onerous duty of such Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee to explore every avenue so that the inquiry may be conducted in a fair and impartial manner and should avoid razing and annihilating the principle of natural justice which may ensue in the miscarriage of justice.\nDespite the handiness and accessibility of well guided procedure for conducting an inquiry under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 (E,D Rules), the inquiry officer in the present case did not adhere to it religiously and conducted the inquiry in a slipshod manner. Inquiry report did not depict that any witness was called for recording evidence in support of the allegations leveled against the accused. On the contrary, the inquiry report put on view that against each charge only the defence of the accused officer is mentioned along with the rebuttal of the departmental representative and thereafter the finding of the inquiry officer is recorded and finally, the accused was found guilty of inefficiency, misconduct and corruption on account of charges. Mere reproduction of charges with defence submitted in writing by the accused and then the rebuttal submitted by the departmental representative in the inquiry report was not sufficient to prove the accuseds guilt as there was no evidentiary value except two statements on record and allegations vice versa (words against words) which could only be proved one way or the other. Had the evidence been recorded, both the statements would have been subjected to cross-examination accompanied by other oral and documentary evidence for sifting the grain from the chaff. Without exploring and finding guilt of accused into the charges of misconduct, neither the inquiry report can be construed as fair and impartial, nor did it commensurate to the procedure provided under the E,D Rules for conducting an inquiry into allegations of misconduct. Inquiry report showed that no opportunity was provided to the accused to conduct cross examination even on the departmental representative who allegedly rebutted the defence of the accused in writing before the inquiry officer and also produced evidence against the accused; at least he should have been subjected to cross examination by the accused, particularly when no other witness was called for recording evidence. In such circumstances, the Service Tribunal had rightly converted major penalty of dismissal from service into minor penalty of stoppage of one increment for a period of one year with reinstatement in service.\nSupreme Court observed that the matter of a departmental inquiry should not be conducted in a cursory or perfunctory manner and in order to improvise the norms and standards of departmental inquiry under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and E,D Rules or in other enabling Rules, it would be advantageous that a Handbook of inquiry procedure be compiled by the Federal Government with the excerpts of all relevant Rules including the rule of natural justice and due process of law enshrined under Article 10-A of the Constitution for the step-by-step help and assistance of inquiry officers or inquiry committees so that in future, they may be well conversant with the precise procedure before embarking on the task of an inquiry and conduct the inquiry proceedings without ambiguities. Appeal was dismissed.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-All judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authorities should carry out their powers with a judicious and evenhanded approach to ensure justice according to tenor of law and without any violation of the principle of natural justice.\nSohail Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary of Interior Ministry, Islamabad and others 2022 SCMR 1387 and Inspector General of Police, Quetta and another v. Fida Muhammad and others 2022 SCMR 1583 ref.\n(c) Remand-\n-Remand of a case to the lower fora-Scope-Such remand cannot be claimed as a vested right, but it is always the province of the Court or Tribunal to first figure out whether any material error or defect was committed by the Court in the order or which really and adversely affected the corpus of the case and caused serious prejudice or injustice to the party requesting remand on some essential questions of law or fact which was ignored by the courts below while deciding the lis.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973=6Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.33-K of 2018, decided on 26th December, 2022. (On appeal against judgment Dated 25.07.2017 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Karachi Bench in Appeal No. 191(K)CS/2015), heard on: 26th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Irfan Mir Halepota, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nMalik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue\nFBR House, Islamabad and others-Appellants\nVersus\nZAHID MALIK-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23410", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 572 = 2023 SLD 572 = 2023 SCMR 613", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. VI, R. 17-Amendment of plaint-Scope-Suit for specific performance of oral agreement to sell- Respondents/plaintiffs (vendees) filed a suit for specific performance of a purported oral sale agreement against the defendant (vendor)-After filing of the said suit the vendor passed away and some of her legal heirs were brought on the record-Petitioner, who claimed to be one of the legal heirs of the vendor was not arrayed as a legal heir in the suit, therefore, he submitted an application for his impleadment in the suit as a defendant, which was allowed-Once the evidence in the suit was led and concluded, the respondents (vendees) filed an application seeking amendment of the plaint, alleging that the petitioner was not the son of the deceased vendor-Said application was dismissed by the Trial Court, however, the same was allowed by the revisional Court, whose order was sustained by the High Court in the impugned -Validity-Interest of the respondents was better protected with the petitioner remaining a defendant, since in the eventuality that the suit were to be decreed without petitioner being arrayed as a party then he may file an application, under section 12(2), C.P.C., stating that the decree was obtained by fraud since he was a necessary party being a legal heir, yet was not arrayed as a defendant, and sought to set aside such decree-Respondents wanted to amend their plaint by challenging petitioners paternity/maternity which had no connection with a suit which sought specific performance of a purported agreement-Defendants in the suit, including the petitioner, were keen to proceed with the suit, filed by the respondents nineteen years ago, but the respondents were delaying its conclusion, giving credence to the petitioners contention that since the respondents were in possession of the suit property they did not want the suit to be decided-In the facts and circumstances of the case, Trial Court had rightly dismissed the respondents application for amendment of the plaint-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned orders of the revisional court and the High Court were set aside with costs imposed on the respondents throughout as they had abused the process of the court and indulged in unnecessary litigation.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=17", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 715 of 2020, decided on 17th February, 2023. (Against the judgment Dated 19.12.2019 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.P. No. 103227 of 2017), heard on: 17th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Muhammad Yusuf, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nAftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 2 - 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR IQBAL-Petitioner\nVersus\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,\nFEROZEWALA and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23411", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 573 = 2023 SLD 573 = 2023 SCMR 616", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 9-Tortious breach by a State Corporation resulting in pure economic loss to its employee-Suit for damages for tortious liability against the State entity/Corporation-Maintainability-Civil Court, jurisdiction of-Civil Court did not lack jurisdiction to try such a suit- In the absence of any law regulating tortious breaches resulting in pure economic loss, the Civil Court as a Court of plenary jurisdiction has the power as well as jurisdiction to entertain, adjudicate and decree suits for damages.\n(b) Tort-\n-Tort of interest in property-Economic loss-Proof and burden of proof-Suit for damages arising out of an employment matter-Jurisdiction of Civil Court to award decree for damages caused by mental agony and torture-Respondent in his suit claimed that by virtue of litigation that had ensued between the parties, the appellant (State Corporation) had committed a tort of interest in property; that he had to spend his financial resources as well as physical integrity insofar as he was subjected to face anxiety, mental stress of having to approach various legal fora, arrange legal representation and expend his limited financial resources for enforcement of his legitimate rights-Held, that the main physical, perceivable and ostensible damages that the Respondent had arguably suffered was monetary/ economic in nature-Respondent could claim redressal from such a tort but in proving economic loss, the evidentiary burden of proof was on a claimant-At the time of filing the suit the respondent had annexed and subsequently exhibited all the relevant documentary evidence including legal fees and certificates aggregating a sum of Rs.310,000/-, therefore he successfully discharged the onus of proof on him-During cross-examination of the respondent conducted by the appellant no suggestion had ever been made to the respondent that he had frivolously instituted the suit for damages; that he had not suffered any loss due to actions of the appellant; or that he had instituted the suit for damages as vendetta or to settle a personal grudge-In the absence of such suggestions, it would be deemed that the appellants had admitted that the respondent had suffered loss due to the actions of the appellant-Said findings had also been upheld by all the courts below-Respondent had indeed suffered monetary/economic loss due to the actions of the appellant, that he had an actionable claim which he brought before the Trial Court in the form of a suit for recovery of damages, and that he was well within his rights to be compensated for such loss suffered-Trial Court/Civil Court was well within its jurisdiction to pass decree for payment of damages to the extent of Rs.310,000/-, and a sum of Rs.2,000,000/- in favour of the respondent for the mental agony and torture suffered by the respondent due to the actions of the appellant-Appeal was dismissed.\nMunawar Ahmed, Chief Editor Daily Sama and another v. Muhammad Ashraf PLD 2021 SC 564 ref.\n(c) Tort-\n-Vicarious liability-Corporation vicariously liable for the acts of its employees-Employees of a Corporation not implementing orders of National Industrial Relations Commission-Factors to be considered by Courts when determining vicarious liability of the Corporation-First consideration that the courts have to look at when deciding whether an entity/organization is vicariously liable for breaches in tort committed by its employees is whether or not a tortious breach has actually been committed in the first place-Next consideration would be whether or not the tortious acts had been committed by an employee of an organisation during the course of his employment-Final consideration would be whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to hold an organisation/entity vicariously liable for the actions of its employees during the course of their employment which resulted in tortious acts.\nFirst of many considerations that the courts have to look at when deciding whether an entity/organization is vicariously liable for breaches in tort committed by its employees is whether or not a tortious breach has actually been committed in the first place. In the present case the respondent-employee had to approach courts of law repeatedly for redressal of his legitimate grievances, and but for acts/ omissions of employees of the appellant Corporation, who were acting in the course of their employment, the respondent could have been spared the time, effort, expense and mental agony of repeatedly approaching different legal fora for years on end. A tort had been committed by the appellant against the respondent when the appellant failed to implement the order of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) as well as when the appellant forced the respondent to repeatedly arrange legal representation for other ancillary and connected matters before the NIRC.\nLister v. Hesley Hall Ltd, [2002] 1 AC 215; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd. v. Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366 and Catholic Child Welfare Society and others v. Various Claimants and the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools and others 2012 UKSC 56 ref.\nThe next consideration would be whether or not the tortious acts had been committed by an employee of an organisation during the course of his employment. In the present case it was never the case of the appellant before any of the courts below that the appellant had directed its employees to implement the NIRC order and that individual employees had flouted an express order of the appellant to implement the said order of the NIRC. It is also not the case of the appellant that the non-implementation of judgements/orders were done through unauthorised acts of which the appellant had no knowledge. On the contrary, there is enough material on record to show not only that at all relevant times the relevant officers/decision makers had knowledge of the acts in question but either directly, indirectly, or by implication, authorised tortious acts or failed to act where, by law, they were required to act or tacitly encouraged, condoned or approved of such acts. The appellant never distanced itself from the any of its employees by claiming that the said employees had failed to implement the order of NIRC of their own accord. In the absence of anything to the contrary, it would appear that the employees of the appellant who had failed to implement the NIRC order as well as those employees who were delaying the implementation of the said order were doing so in the course of their employment with the knowledge, consent and approval of the appellant. The appellant could have directed the employees under its control to implement the order of NIRC immediately after it was passed. The appellant, instead, not only delayed, hampered or procrastinated but also failed to implement the said order and initiated implementation actions only when the respondent approached the NIRC through his various petitions for implementation of the order. The consequences and responsibility for not implementing the NIRC order as expeditiously as possible must be borne by the appellant in the absence of any express order directing its employees to implement the NIRC orders in letter and spirit as expeditiously as possible.\nThe final consideration would be whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to hold an organisation/entity vicariously liable for the actions of its employees during the course of their employment which resulted in tortious acts. The lethargy and intentional lack of interest in implementing lawful orders of a court of competent jurisdiction shown by the appellant cannot be granted a premium by holding that, for policy reasons, it would not be fair, just and reasonable to find the appellant vicariously liable for the tortious breaches committed by its employees when it failed to implement the NIRC order. The appellant in the present case is a state-owned television broadcaster and falls within the administrative competence of the information and Broadcasting Division of the Federal. However, admittedly, the appellant is a non-statutory body having its own Service Rules as well as Memorandum and Articles of Association. Whilst it may be controlled and directed by the Federal Government through the Information and Broadcasting Division, it is, for all intents and purposes, a separate corporate entity. Therefore, the Respondent was not bound to follow the requirement laid down in section 79 of the C.P.C. read with Article 174 of the Constitution since the appellant cannot be considered a part of the Federal Government for the sole reason that the Government administers the appellant. The appellant has its own corporate personality and cannot be considered a part of the Government. It can therefore sue or be sued in its own name and there is no requirement for potential, claimants/plaintiffs to implead the Government when they wish to sue the appellant. Appeal was dismissed.\n(d) Tort-\n-Vicarious liability-Suit for damages for tortious liability against a State entity/Corporation- Maintainability- Sovereign immunity-Scope-State Corporation cannot claim that it cannot be sued vicariously for the actions of its employees by invoking sovereign immunity-Even otherwise, the defence of sovereign immunity and its application in Pakistan has been done away with by the Supreme Court in the case reported as Pakistan through Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Railways and Communications, Karachi v. Muhammad A. Hayat (PLD 1962 SC 28).\nPakistan through Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Railways and Communications, Karachi v. Muhammad A. Hayat PLD 1962 SC 28; Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Rehabilitation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Yaqoob Butt and others PLD 1963 SC 627; Ch. Muhammad Nawaz v. Province of Punjab PLD 1975 BJ 11 and Nazir Ahmed v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division PLD 1991 Lah. 469 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=9", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 284 of 2017, decided on 27th September, 2022.\n(Against judgment Dated 18.10.2016 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Regular Second Appeal No. 30 of 2015), heard on: 27th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN AND SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Nazir Jawad, Advocate Supreme Court and Ahmad Nawaz Chaudhary, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nMalik Muhammad Qayyum, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (via V.L. from Lahore) and Chaudhary Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION-Appellant\nVersus\nNOOR SANAT SHAH-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23412", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 574 = 2023 SLD 574 = 2023 SCMR 636", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 185(3)-Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution to grant leave to appeal-Such jurisdiction is discretionary-Conduct of a petitioner has a substantial bearing on the question of granting or declining such leave to him.\nNoora v. State PLD 1973 SC 469; Pakistan v. Faizan 1983 SCMR 413; Bilqis v. Fazal 1987 SCMR 1441; Haider v. Manzur 1989 SCMR 1133; Amir v. Dad PLD 1990 SC 1078; State v. Akbar 1992 SCMR 964; Nawaz v. Hameed 1993 SCMR 1902; Seamlen Pipe Industries v. Security Leasing Corporation 2002 SCMR 1419; Sharif v. Hamayun 2003 SCMR 1221; Bank of Punjab v. Shahzad 2006 SCMR 1023; Ilahi v. Altaf 2011 SCMR 513; Ghulam Rasool v. State PLD 2022 SC 806; Tilawatunnisa v. Settlement Commissioner 1978 SCMR 225; Noor Khan v. M.B.R. 1984 SCMR 681; Zahida v. State 1984 SCMR 687; Deen Carpets v. I.T.O. PLD 1989 SC 516; Hassan Bano v. Mumtaz PLD 1989 SC 346; British Biscuits Company v. Atlas Investment Bank 2005 CLD 674; Ali Shan v. Essem Hotel 2007 SCMR 741 and Kamal v. Govt. of N.W.F.P. 2010 SCMR 1377 ref.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XI, R. 21-Party failing to comply with any order to answer interrogatories, or for discovery or inspection of documents-Effect-Conduct of party-Scope-Conduct of a party is material for the purpose of exercising the courts discretion under Rule 21 of Order XI, C.P.C.: the court takes the penal action of dismissing the suit of the plaintiff or striking out the defence of the defendant when the party concerned is guilty of contumacious conduct by disregarding the specific order of the court, for compliance of which the court has granted a reasonable time and a sufficient opportunity-However, it is not only a deliberate failure to comply with a specific order of the court by a party that is regarded as his contumacious conduct but a series of separate inordinate delays caused by him at different stages of the proceedings of the case is also a convincing proof of such conduct.\nBabbar Sewing Machine Company v. Trilok Nath AIR 1978 SC 1436; U.B.L. v. Yousuf 1988 SCMR 82; Culbert v. Stephen G. Westwell, Co [1993] PIQR 54; Grovit v. Doctor [1997] 1 All ER 417; Arbuthnot Latham Bank v. Trafalgar Holdings [1998] 2 All ER 181 and Choraria v. Sethia [1998] EWCA Civ 24 = [1998] Lexis Citation 20 ref.\n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XI, Rr. 7, 21-Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002) S. 14-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A-Defamation-Suit for damages-Contumacious conduct of defendant-Defendant failing to comply with order to answer interrogatories and prolonging the proceedings-Effect-Striking out of the right of defence-[Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. (Majority view): Proceedings of the case were prolonged by the petitioner (defendant) at every stage of the case in the Trial Court to delay the decision of the case-During proceedings for delivering and answering the interrogatories by the parties under Order XI, C.P.C., the petitioner showed the same delaying tactics by which he had been hindering the progress of the suit earlier-Trial Court had provided the petitioner with more than sufficient opportunities to submit his answers to the interrogatories of the respondent, before taking the penal action under Rule 21 of Order XI, C.P.C.-Conduct of the petitioner had remained willfully contumacious and disobedient throughout the proceedings of the case in the Trial Court-Trial Court had not committed any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by dismissing the objections (application) of the petitioner for rejection of the interrogatories of the respondent and directing him to submit the answers to those interrogatories and subsequently by striking out the right of defence of the petitioner due to non-submission of the answers to the said interrogatories]-[Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. (Minority view): In the present case the order of the Trial Court whereby the right of the petitioners defence was struck out, the facts of the case did not establish that the petitioner committed willful default or intentionally and deliberately disobeyed an order of the Court-Effect of striking out the defence was that it deprived the party of its ability to defend itself in the case which was a serious matter-In the present case the Court had other alternatives, at its disposal, to regulate the pace of the proceedings as well as the conduct of the petitioner, one of which was to impose costs which would not only serve as a form of deterrence but would also lay the foundation for expeditious justice-Trial Court proceeded in a mechanical manner with the case, and granted numerous adjournments without so much as imposing cost so as to discourage the same-Order by which the right of defence of the petitioner was struck out, did not state that it was based on the history of the case or the overall conduct of the petitioner in the case-Petitioners recent public shooting and injury at a political rally justified the grant of an adjournment for a reasonable time under the circumstances-Right to defence could not be struck out without considering all relevant factors-Impugned order of the Trial Court, whereby right of defence of petitioner was struck out, was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Trial Court to grant reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to file answers to the interrogatories and thereafter to proceed with the case in accordance with law]\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. (Majority view)\nRespondent instituted a suit for recovery of damages against the petitioner alleging the commission of his defamation by the petitioner. The petitioner filed his written statement. After the close of the pleadings, the trial court fixed the case for pre-trial proceedings of discovery and inspection under Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (C.P.C.). Both the parties delivered their respective interrogatories. The respondent later withdrew some questions and delivered the amended interrogatories, with permission of the trial court. The respondent filed the answers to the interrogatories of the petitioner. The petitioner, however, filed objections (application) for rejection of the interrogatories of the respondent, instead of filing the answers thereto. The trial court observed that an application for rejection of the interrogatories could be filed under Rule 7 of Order XI, C.P.C. within seven days after service of the interrogatories, while the petitioner had first sought several adjournments for submitting the answers to the interrogatories and then filed such application (objections) after the lapse of about two months without any lawful justification and without seeking condonation of the delay. With these observations, the trial court overruled the objections of the petitioner and directed him to submit his answers to the interrogatories of the respondent, vide its order dated 20.10.2022. The petitioner was, thereafter, provided with several opportunities to file the answers to the interrogatories, but he failed to avail them. Consequently, the trial court struck out the right of defence of the petitioner under Rule 21 of Order XI, C.P.C., vide its order 24.11.2022, due to his non-submission of the answers to the said interrogatories. The petitioner challenged both the orders of the trial court by filing two revision petitions in the High Court, which petitions were dismissed by the impugned order and order of trial court was upheld.\nSuit was instituted by the respondent, on 07-07-2017. The petitioner appeared in the suit through his counsel, on 09-09-2017. Petitioner and respondent filed several applications during proceedings of the case, wherein the petitioner was given warnings of last and final and absolute last and final opportunities to advance his arguments. Petitioner was provided with nine opportunities to file his written statement, again with warnings of last and final and absolute last and final opportunities. At last, the petitioner filed his written statement on 27-07-2021 after a period of about four (4) years since his appearance in the suit on 09-09-2017, which should have been filed by him till 09.10.2017 within a period of thirty days from the day of his appearance in the suit. Summary of the proceedings of the case in the trial court made during a period of four years, from the date of appearance of the petitioner on 09-09-2017 till 22-09-2021, gave credence to the contention of the respondent that the conduct of the petitioner had remained contumacious throughout the proceedings of the case in the trial court. The way the proceeding was prolonged by the petitioner at every stage of the case in the trial court, to delay the decision of the case, was more than evident.\nSurvey of the proceedings of the trial court as to delivering and answering the interrogatories by the parties under Order XI, C.P.C., from 05-01-2022 to 20-10-2022, showed the same delaying tactics of the petitioner by which he had been hindering the progress of the suit earlier.\nTrial court had provided the petitioner with more than sufficient opportunities to submit his answers to the interrogatories of the respondent, before taking the penal action under Rule 21 of Order XI, C.P.C.\nOverall conduct of the petitioner showed that he had protracted the proceedings of the case at every stage in the trial court, to delay the decision of the case.\nConduct of the petitioner had remained willfully contumacious and disobedient throughout the proceedings of the case in the trial court. Trial court had not committed any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction by dismissing the objections (application) of the petitioner for rejection of the interrogatories of the respondent and directing him to submit the answers to those interrogatories and subsequently by striking out the right of defence of the petitioner due to non-submission of the answers to the said interrogatories. Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\nPer Ayesha A. Malik, J. (Minority view)\nThe basic question in the present case was to determine whether there was willful default on the part of the petitioner whereby he deliberately and intentionally disobeyed the order of trial court requiring him to file answers to the interrogatories. Present case was not a case of willful default and the failure on the part of the petitioner to file his answers was due to circumstances beyond his control. On 03-11-2022, the petitioner, while leading a political rally, was shot at and was taken to the hospital where he was operated upon. This fact was shown on all national news channels and covered by the print media and was not denied by the respondent. The trial court itself accepted the reason of hospitalization and injury on 08-11-2022 as well as 17-11-2022 which was evident from its orders. Under the circumstances, there was sufficient cause for seeking the adjournment and the Court acted in haste by issuing a warning on 17-11-2022 and thereafter incorrectly recorded in its order of 24-11-2022 that there was no lawful justification for the grant of adjournments especially since it accepted these reasons on 08.11.2022 and 17-11-2022. Accordingly, there was sufficient ground to give the adjournment, and the default was not willful. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was willful default and it also could not be said that the conduct of the petitioner was willfully contumacious, obstinate and disobedient. Further it also could not be said that during the period from 08-11-2022 to 24-11-2022, the adjournments were sought with the intent to delay the proceedings.\nPower for striking out of the defence under Order XI, Rule 21, C.P.C. can be exercised where the defaulting party fails to attend the hearing or is guilty of prolonged or inordinate and inexcusable delay which may cause substantial or serious prejudice to the opposite party; however, it is expected that before making an order for striking out of defence, the court must consider all the reasons given for the default which merits due consideration and assessment of facts. This is because the effect of striking out of the defence is that it will deprive the party of its ability to defend itself in the case which is a serious matter. In the present case, the court had other alternatives, at its disposal, to regulate the pace of the proceedings as well as the conduct of the petitioner, one of which was to impose costs which would not only serve as a form of deterrence but would also lay the foundation for expeditious justice and promote a smart legal system.\nQazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge 2023 SCP 32 ref.\nIn this case the trial court exercised its power mechanically and more importantly, the order by which the right of defence of the petitioner was struck out, did not state that it was based on the history of the case or the overall conduct of the petitioner in the case. In the event that the trial court was of the opinion that the conduct of the party suggested that there was willful disobedience or deliberate attempt to delay the proceedings then it had to record its findings accordingly. The trial court focused on the dates subsequent to the order by which it dismissed the objections (application) of the petitioner for rejection of the interrogatories of the respondent and directed him to submit the answers to those interrogatories, and not on the overall conduct of the petitioner, and reasoned that the adjournments were sought without cause and sufficient opportunities had been granted, i.e. the adjournments from 08-11-2022 to 24-11-2022. However, the order sheet did show that there were many adjournments, it also showed that oftentimes, the court had proceeded in a routine manner without much focus on the reasons for the adjournments.\nThe petitioners recent public shooting and injury at a political rally justified the grant of an adjournment for a reasonable time under the circumstances. The right to defence could not be struck out without considering all relevant factors, and the court must weigh the balance between a fair trial and the circumstances at hand. The order sheet showed that the court proceeded in a mechanical manner with the case, and granted numerous adjournments without so much as imposing cost so as to discourage the same.\nThe striking out of the petitioners right to defence, at present stage, while ignoring the legitimate factors in play, would be a gross injustice. The balancing act of justice must be upheld, and under these circumstances, the right to a fair defence must prevail. Accordingly, the impugned order of the trial court, whereby right of defence of petitioner was struck out, was set aside; and the case was remanded to the trial court to grant reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to file answers to the interrogatories and thereafter to proceed with the case in accordance with law.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J [Majority view]\n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XVII- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 10A, 37(d)-Adjournments-Scope-Conclusion of litigation process within reasonable time period-Significance-Leniency shown on part of judges of Trial Court in the matter of accommodating unjustified requests for adjournment, even at the cost of disregarding the timelines provided in the relevant laws, is unwarranted-Peremptory order of the court, which specifies a time to do a certain act in the proceedings of the case with a warning of last opportunity, must be followed by the legal consequences prescribed by the relevant law for its non-compliance-Orders granting repetitive adjournments with warnings of last and final and absolute last and final opportunity become meaningless and shatter the confidence of the litigant public in the court orders and consequentially weaken the authority and fiat of the court-Toothless court is the worst form of injustice-Radical approach is required to tackle the problem of delay in the litigation process by enforcing a court-controlled case management system, which should ensure that once a litigant has entered the litigation process, his case proceeds in accordance with a timetable as prescribed by rules of court-Rules containing time limits for doing the specified acts necessary for the progress of a case are intended to accomplish the constitutional goal of fair trial and expeditious dispensation of justice by concluding the litigation process within a reasonable timeframe-Such rules should, therefore, be observed.\nMoon Enterpriser v. SNGPL 2020 SCMR 300; Department of Transport v. Chris Smaller Transport [1989] 1 All ER 897 and Arbuthnot Latham Bank v. Trafalgar Holdings [1998] 2 All ER 181 ref.\n(e) Administration of justice-\n-Procedural law- Timeframes provided in procedural law-Interpretation-Procedural rule prescribing the timeframe for doing a certain act in the course of the proceedings of a case should be followed as a rule and the departure therefrom can be made only as an exception in exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the party concerned.\nThe provisions of a procedural law are ordinarily directory in nature and are construed liberally to advance the cause of justice, as their main purpose is to facilitate the administration of justice. The same purposive approach is to be adopted while construing and applying a procedural provision which provides a timeframe for doing a certain act necessary to the further progress of the case. The main purpose of providing a timeframe in procedural rules is to expedite the hearing and conclusion of the case and to avoid unnecessary adjournments. Such rules are, therefore, to be adhered to for giving effect to the purpose of their making, else the non-compliance therewith would frustrate the objective of expeditious decision of the cases sought to be achieved by the legislature or the rule-making authority, as the case may be. The procedural rule prescribing the timeframe for doing a certain act in the course of the proceedings of a case should, therefore, be followed as a rule and the departure therefrom can be made only as an exception in exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the party concerned. The court may also ask for the filing of an affidavit or the necessary documents, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, in support of those exceptional circumstances.\nKailash v. Nanhku AIR 2005 SC 2441 ref.\n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XI, Rr. 1, 2, 6, 7-Interrogatories submitted to the Court-Power of the Trial Court under Rules 1 and 2 of Order XI, C.P.C.-Scope-Power of the Trial Court under Rule 1 of Order XI, C.P.C. to examine the interrogatories before delivering the same to the party concerned under Rule 2 and reject any irrelevant interrogatory at that stage, is permissive, not obligatory; the non-exercise of which does not vitiate the order of the court delivering the interrogatories to the party concerned under Rule 2 for submitting the answers-Since Trial Courts are overburdened with high pendency of cases, they cannot be expected, in the prevailing circumstances, to make such examination of the interrogatories in every case, under Rule 1-Rather, it is more practicable in the prevailing circumstances and in our system of administration of civil justice, which is primarily adversarial, that the party concerned should invite the attention of the Trial Court for such examination, either (i) by making an application under Rule 7 of Order XI if all or most of the interrogatories delivered appear to be irrelevant by specifying the particular objection taken to each of such interrogatories separately, or (ii) by answering those interrogatories which he thinks are relevant and taking objection to those which he thinks are irrelevant as per Rule 6 of Order XI, C.P.C.\n(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XI, R. 21-Process of delivering interrogatories and requiring their answers-Non-compliance with order for discovery-Suo motu power of Trial Court to take penal action-Scope-Penal action under Rule 21 of Order XI, C.P.C. can be taken by a court not only on an application of the party, but also suo motu-Trial Court does have the power to take the penal action on its own if its order is not complied with despite giving the warning of last opportunity for compliance.\nAbdul Aziz v. Raj Chhabra AIR 1968 All 119 and Namita Dhar v. Amalendu Sen AIR 1977 Cal 187 not relevant.\n(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XI, R. 21-Process of delivering interrogatories and requiring their answers-Non-compliance with order for discovery-Application under Rule 21 of Order XI, C.P.C.-Form-Expression apply used in Rule 21 includes oral application (request) also, and the application need not be in the written form necessarily.\nAbdul Aziz v. Raj Chhabra AIR 1968 All 119 ref.\n(i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XVII, R. 1-Adjournments-Scope-Power of the trial court under Rule 1 of Order XVII of the C.P.C. to grant an adjournment on being shown the sufficient cause is discretionary; therefore, an appellate court cannot interfere with the order of the Trial Court, either granting or refusing adjournment, unless it is found that the discretionary power has been exercised perversely or arbitrarily.\n(j) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XI, Rr. 1, 2-Interrogatories-Significance-Interrogatories serve as a useful tool to shorten litigation and reduce expenses of litigation-However, the process of interrogatories should not be abused and misused to prolong the trial and add to the expenses-Such an abuse of the process of interrogatories has to be curbed with a heavy hand-Fair use of the process of interrogatories should be encouraged, for it would result in considerable saving of time and money and thus be beneficial to the parties of the case as well as to the administration of justice in general.\nJ,LS Goodbody v. Clyde Shipping Company and McCabe v. Irish Life Assurance [2015] 1 IR 346 ref.\nPer Ayesha A. Malik, J; dissenting with Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. (Minority view)\n(k) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XI, R. 21-Party failing to comply with any order to answer interrogatories, or for discovery or inspection of documents-Effect-Consequence of noncompliance with an order of the Court directing for answers to the interrogatories, discovery or inspection is grave which is why the law is settled on this point that penal provisions should be strictly construed and used with caution where circumstances mandate the same-What the Court is essentially looking for under Order XI, Rule 21, C.P.C. is a default on the part of the plaintiff or defendant to comply with its order to file its answer to the interrogatories or for discovery, or for inspection of documents-Test to ascertain whether there has been a default in compliance with an order of the Court is to see whether such default was done willfully-Act of being willful means that it is done deliberately and intentionally and cannot be something that is done by accident or inadvertently or for reasons beyond the control of the party-Essentially, it goes directly to the conduct of a person with reference to the order for filing the answers to interrogatories, or for discovery or inspection and the intent behind such conduct.\nMessrs United Bank Limited v. Yousuf Haji Noor Muhammad Dhadhi 1988 SCMR 82 and Messrs Babar Sewing Machine Company v. Tirlok Nath Mahajan (1978) 4 SCC 188 ref.\n(l) Administration of justice-\n-Procedural law, compliance with-Penal provisions, interpretation of-Exercise of discretion by court-Scope-Compliance with rules of procedure is fundamental to the pace and course of the litigation-When construing penal provisions, the exercise of judicial discretion by the Court has to be based on sound reasons that the circumstances justify-Judicial discretion in itself has inbuilt restraint which means that the Court cannot ignore facts and circumstances prevailing at the time and where such error can be corrected or condoned for adequate reasons, the court can condone the non-compliance in furtherance of justice because there has been no deliberate attempt to ignore an order of the court-Further penal provisions do not mandate that they be applied in a mechanical way in every case rather it must be a thoughtful step, based on circumstances, that indicates willful failure, deliberate default and intentional non-performance.\nAsha Rani Gupta v. Vineet Kumar 2022 SCC OnLine SC 829; Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash and others (1980) 3 SCC 610 and Bilmal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal (1981) 3 SCC 486 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "C. P. 3436-L/2022 and C. P. 3437-L/2022, decided on 29th December, 2022.\n(Against the consoli Dated order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, Dated 07.12.2022, passed in C.Rs. Nos.76624 and 76628 of 2022), heard on: 29th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Mian Muhammad Kashif, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Imran Iqbal, Advocate for Petitioner (in both cases).\nMustafa Ramday, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Ms. Zoe K. Khan, Akbar Khan, Saad Sibghatullah, Asfand Mir, Ms. Mahnoor Ahmed and Bakhtayar Malik, Advocates for the Respondent (in both cases).\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J; Amin-ud-Din Khan, J agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J dissenting. (Majority view)", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMRAN AHMAD KHAN NIAZI-Petitioner\nVersus\nMain MUHAMMAD SHAHBAZ SHARIF-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23413", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 575 = 2023 SLD 575 = 2023 SCMR 670", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence- During the course of proceedings before the Trial Court, the complainant stated before the Court that he moved an application for registration of case, which bears his signature, without disclosing time and the name of the subscriber of the application-Further it was not mentioned anywhere that where and when such application was drafted when it was an admitted fact that the Police Karvai was conducted in Police Station-Complainant was a distant relative of deceased residing at a distance of 6 kilometers while real son of deceased who was inmate of the same house was absent in every material aspect of the case, which was a serious lapse-Son of the deceased who was stated to have witnessed the occurrence, was given up at the time of trial-Occurrence had taken place in the odd hours of the night, however, no source of light had been mentioned by the Investigating Officer either in the FIR, rough site plan, scaled site plan or even during the course of proceedings before the Trial Court-Both the alleged witnesses of the ocular account were not residents of the locality and were residing at a distance of 5/6 kilometers away from the place of occurrence-Not a single person from the inmates of the house where occurrence took place or from surrounding inhabitants appeared in support of the prosecution version and the whole prosecution case was silent about this aspect of the matter-Record clearly reflected that the prosecution witnesses were not present at the place of occurrence, rather they managed to appear as witnesses after due consultation and deliberation-Record further showed that the complainant was inimical towards the deceased-In such circumstances, it seemed impossible that deceased would have invited an inimical person for his help before his death-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt-Appeal was allowed and accused persons were acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Motive-Burden of proof-if a specific motive has been alleged by the prosecution then it is duty of the prosecution to establish the said motive through cogent and confidence inspiring evidence-Otherwise, the same would go in favour of the accused.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd - Crime empty sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory after the arrest of the accused or together with the crime weapon-In such circumstances the positive report of the Laboratory looses its evidentiary value-Sending the crime empties together with the weapon of offence is not a safe way to sustain conviction of the accused and it smacks of foul play on the part of the Investigating Officer simply for the reason that till recovery of weapon, he keeps the empties with him for no justifiable reason.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Heinousness of offence-Mere heinousness of the offence if not proved to the hilt is not a ground to punish an accused.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Benefit of doubt-Scope-For the accused to be afforded the right of the benefit of the doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating uncertainty and if there is only one doubt, the benefit of the same must go to the accused.\nMst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 and Abdul Jabbar v. State 2019 SCMR 129 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 560 of 2020, decided on 2nd January, 2023. (Against the judgment Dated 24.01.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 288-J of 2013 and Murder Reference No. 304 of 2013), heard on: 2nd January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN, SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sagheer Ahmed Qadri, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nMirza Muhammad Usman, D.P.G. for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SARFRAZ and another-Appellants\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23414", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 576 = 2023 SLD 576 = 2023 SCMR 679", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss. 21, 24-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 109, 509-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Transmitting objectionable photographs and videos through mobile phone-Bail, grant of-Rule of consistency-Although the petitioner was nominated in the FIR with the specific allegation of transmitting objectionable photographs and videos of the complainant but the record revealed that the sim used for the purpose of transmitting the said photographs and videos was owned by person A, co-accused, and according to A he forgot his sim at the house of person T, another co-accused-Both A and T were brother-in-law of the complainant-Although according to the investigation, the mobile phone in which the said objectionable photographs and videos were available, was recovered from the possession of the accused but according to the prosecution while transmitting the said objectionable photographs and videos the sim owned by A was used-Bail had already been granted to A and in such eventuality, the accused had become entitled to the concession of bail on the principle of rule of consistency-Even otherwise, the accused had no previous criminal record-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was granted bail.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Offences not falling within the prohibition contained in section 497, Cr.P.C.-In such like cases grant of bail is a rule and refusal is an exception.\nTariq Bashir and 5 others v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016=21,24Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=109,509Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1353 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1831 of 2022, decided on 6th December, 2022.\n(On appeal against the order Dated 15.07.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 805-B of 2022), heard on: 6th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMalik Javaid Iqbal, Additional Attorney General, Huma Khalil, SI and Waseem Sikandar, SI for the State.\nCh. Zafar Ali Warraich, Advocate Supreme Court along with Complainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAHZAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23415", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 577 = 2023 SLD 577 = 2023 SCMR 681", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss. 3(1A), 71-Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007, R. 58H-Steel re-rolling mills-Scope and payment of sales tax-Final discharge of tax liability-Tax department (petitioner) contended that since the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007 was applicable in the present case, the tax payers (respondents) were not liable under section 3 of the Sales Tax, Act, 1990 (the Act), but they would still be liable under section 3(1A) of the Act because amendments therein were made subsequently, that is, during the subsistence of section 71 of the Act-Validity-Section 71 of the Act enables special procedure to be made with regard to the scope and payment of tax to be made and the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007 (the Special Procedure) were made pursuant thereto, which contained an overriding, non obstante, clause, which uses categorical and clear language and must be given effect to, and the respondents were entitled to be treated in accordance therewith-Particular rate and mechanism for the imposition of sales tax on steel re-rollers was prescribed and it was stipulated that it will be considered as their final discharge of tax liability, which the respondents had discharged in accordance therewith-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed.\nZak Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, 2020 SCMR 131 not applicable.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 185(3)-Tax laws-Petitions for leave to appeal/appeals filed before the Supreme Court-Relevant provisions of the law to be attached with petitions/appeals-Supreme Court observed that tax laws in the country are subject to extensive changes almost every year, and at times more than once in a year, therefore, in tax cases the relevant provisions of the law as at the relevant time must be reproduced or attached with the appeal/petition filed in the Supreme Court, but more often than not, this is still not done; that resultantly considerable court-time is unnecessarily wasted in just trying to ascertain the law at the relevant time.\n(c) Precedent-\n-To constitute precedent the law which was interpreted must be the same or similar to the case in hand.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3134 and 3135 of 2022, decided on 30th January, 2023. (Against the judgment Dated 22.06.2022 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in Sales Tax Reference Applications Nos. 03 and 04 of 2021), heard on: 30th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, YAHYA AFRIDI AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahsan Ahmad Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court and Khalid Aziz, Assistant Director, RTO, Quetta for Petitioners (in both cases).\nTariq Mahmood, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (has filed caveat) (in C.P. No. 3134 of 2022).\nNemo for Respondent (in C.P. No. 3135 of 2022).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, QUETTA -Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs HAJVAIRY STEEL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED, QUETTA and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23416", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 578 = 2023 SLD 578 = 2023 SCMR 686", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDUXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974-\n-R. 8-A-Promotion-Acting charge basis-Acting charge does not amount to an appointment by promotion on regular basis, nor does it confer any vested right for regular promotion to the post or grade held on acting charge basis.\n(b) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974-\n-R. 8-A-Promotion on acting charge basis, regularization of-Effective date of promotion-Scope-Promotion of respondents was made on acting charge basis in the year 2017 but after three years the incumbents were promoted on regular basis, which demonstrated that there was no case of withdrawal, or dissatisfactory service, or complaint, or any recommendation of the Provincial Public Service Commission (PPSC) justifying the reversion from acting charge to the substantive post, rather the competent authority of its own volition and satisfaction regularized the promotion made on the basis of acting charge after three years on the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) which means that, after verifying the dossier with regard to the performance and antecedents of the respondent-employees, the recommendations for regularizing the promotions were acted upon by the competent authority-Despite this the matter was yet again sent to the DPC for effecting regularization for recommendations after a timespan of three years which did not stand to reason-Respondents merely approached the Tribunal for directions to consider the regularization of their acting charge promotion from the date when they were initially assigned the duties in BS-17 on acting charge basis rather than regularizing their promotion after three years with immediate effect, or else they should have been considered for the regularization of their acting charge promotion from the date when the posts had fallen vacant-Sub-rule 4 of Rule 8-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 (the 1974 APT Rules), provides that acting charge appointment can be made against posts which are likely to fall vacant for a period of six months or more and against vacancies occurring for less than six months, but in the case of the present respondents the acting charge continued for up to three years without any logical justification or reason and at the end of the day their promotion was regularized without any demur but with immediate effect-Command of Sub-rule 4 of Rule 8-A of the 1974 APT Rules was not adhered to despite the availability of vacant positions on which the promotion was regularized after a considerable period-Tribunal had not issued any directions for reckoning or regularizing the date of promotion on acting charge basis with effect from any specific date but in all fairness, the directions were issued to the competent authority to consider the promotion with effect from the dates when vacancies in their quota became available-No illegality was found in the impugned of the Tribunal-Appeals were dismissed.\n(c) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974-\n-R. 8-A- Promotion / appointment on acting charge basis-Duration-To stretch or continue acting charge or ad hoc arrangement on own pay scale (OPS) for an extensive period rather than making timely appointments or filling the post by promotion according to the ratio or quota, as the case may be, creates misgivings and suspicions and such a tendency is highly destructive and deteriorative to the civil service structure-Where appointments on current or acting charge basis are necessary in the public interest, such appointments should not continue indefinitely and every effort should be made to fill posts through regular appointments in shortest possible time.\nSecretary to Government of the Punjab, Communication and Works Department, Lahore and others v. Muhammad Khalid Usmani and others 2016 SCMR 2125; Dr. Naveeda Tufail and 72 others v. Government of Punjab and others 2003 SCMR 291; Abdul Jabbar Memon and others case 1996 SCMR 1349 and Pakistan Railways through G.M., Lahore and another v. Zafarullah, Assistant Electrical Engineer and others 1997 SCMR 1730 ref.\n(d) Civil service-\n-Selection process- Merit- Nepotism and favoritism-Adverse consequences-Wrongful selection of blue eyed candidates founded on nepotism, favoritism or other extraneous considerations or pressures lead to chaos and turmoil in the civil service structure and also incites unrest and discontent amongst the civil servants with long-term and serious repercussions-Merit should be the sole criteria in the selection process which is an integral part of good governance.\n(e) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974-\n-R. 8-A-Promotion on acting charge basis, regularization of-Effective date of promotion-Scope-Promotion cases of the candidates holding acting charge under the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) may be considered by the competent authority, with their fine sense of and proper application of mind from the date when the posts in the promotion quota fall vacant\nDr. Muhammad Amjad and another v. Dr. Israr Ahmed and others 2010 SCMR 1466; Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman, Lahore and another v. Muhammad Nawaz Khan and another 1998 SCMR 640; Government of N.-W.F.P. and others v. Buner Khan and others 1985 SCMR 1158; S. Abu Saeed v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary to the Government of N.-W.F.P, Education Department, Peshawar and another 1990 SCMR 1623; B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana, [1981] 1 SCR 1024; A. Janardhana v. Union of India [1983] 2 SCR 636; G.P. Doval v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. [1984] 4 SCC 329; Narender Chadda v. Union of India [1985] 2 SCC 157; A.N. Pathak v. Secretary to the Government [1987] Suppl. SCC 763; Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India [1992] Suppl. 1 SCC 272; Rajbir Singh v. Union of India AIR (1991) SC 518; A.N. Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran [1992] Suppl. 1 SCC 304; S.L Chopra v. State of Haryana [1992] Suppl. (1) SCC 391 and Baleshwar Das v. State of U.P. [1981] 1 SCR 449 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 52-K to 71-K of 2022, decided on 30th December, 2022.\n(Against the judgment Dated 03.12.2021 passed by the Sindh Service Tribunal at Karachi in Appeals Nos. 508 to 526 of 2020 and Appeal No. 8 of 2021).   heard on: 30th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Suresh Kumar, Additional A.G. Sindh and Bhouro Mal, Law Officer (SGA,CD) for Appellants.\nM. Aqil Awan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court along with Danish Rashid, Associate for Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 52-K to 64-K of 2022).\nSohaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.As. 53-K to 63-K and 65-K to 71-K of 2022).\nFaraz Ahmed Siddiqui, Ghulam Shabbir, Najeebullah Qureshi and Babar Nizamani for Respondents (Respondents in person).", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF SINDH through Chief Secretary and others-Appellants\nVersus\nGHULAM SHABBIR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23417", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 579 = 2023 SLD 579 = 2023 SCMR 700", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S. 23-Matters to be considered in determining compensation-Intention of the legislature behind section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Whenever a Court is determining the quantum of compensation to be awarded to those who had been subjected to exercise of the power of eminent domain under the Act, it needs to be considerate and sympathetic towards the claims made by those whose property was compulsorily taken by the State against their will for a public purpose-Section 23 allows a Court to compensate such landowners for giving up their properties for the greater good, on the doctrine of individual rights must give way to the greater public interest (salus populi suprema lex esto).\n(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S. 23-Matters to be considered in determining compensation-One-year market average (price) of the subject land-Basing compensation on a one-year average of the acquired land would defeat the intent of the legislature behind enacting section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.\nPakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. v. Province of NWFP and 3 others 1993 SCMR 1700 ref.\n(c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 28, 34-Payment of interest-Compound interest-Scope, purpose and repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Benefit of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) is statutory in nature and its benefit cannot be withheld from property owners on the ground that such benefit constitutes riba and goes against the injunctions of Islam-Section 34 is meant to ensure that the State compensates citizens whose lands have been acquired through compulsory acquisition as soon as possible and any delay in compensating affected citizens would entail penal consequences-Whilst riba/usury may be predatory in nature, the interest under section 34 of the Act is beneficial, since it ensures that property owners are compensated in a timely manner.\nInterest in terms of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) is not linked to whether or not the quantum of compensation has been enhanced in terms of section 28 but is instead a standalone provision. The legislature has, in its wisdom, ensured by way of section 34 that if the State fails to compensate citizens whose land has been acquired by means of an exercise of eminent domain, the State shall be liable to suffer penal consequences in the form of imposition of compound interest until such time that the entire amount of compensation has been deposited and ready to be disbursed to the citizens affected by the acquisition. The interest imposed in terms of section 34 is beneficial and not detrimental to the public at large and is not by any stretch of the language exploitative (as Riba is) since it ensures that if the State wishes to exercise eminent domain, it must adequately compensate citizens expeditiously and failure would entail penal consequences.\nIt is important to clarify that unlike riba/interest that arises/accrues in a financial transaction between parties, the word interest in section 34 of the Act is not interest stricto sensu. The interest which is imposed on the State or land-acquiring entity is awarded to the affectees of compulsory acquisition by way of compensation and where compensation originally awarded is found to be inadequate and is later enhanced by a competent forum, to cover the property owner by way of compensation for the time lag between when the property was taken and the time that he receives compensation for the same. Section 34 is therefore compensatory in nature and allow the Courts to cover that property owner (as far as possible) for the loss that he may have suffered by reason of compulsory acquisition of his property and delayed payment of compensation. Unlike a financial transaction where the parties enter into transactions of their freewill, an exercise of compulsory acquisition cannot in any sense be construed as either a consenting transaction between the parties involved (i.e. the State and the affected citizens) nor can it be assumed that the State and the affected citizens are equal in terms of bargaining power. The power of compulsory acquisition is, after all, unilaterally exercised by the government and no consent from the affected property owners is required under the law.\nSheikh Muhammad Ilyas Ahmed and others v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others PLD 2016 SC 64 ref.\nThe benefit of Section 34 is statutory in nature and its benefit cannot be withheld from property owners on the ground that the benefit of section 34 of the Act constitutes riba and goes against the injunctions of Islam. The said Section is meant to ensure that the State compensates citizens whose lands have been acquired through compulsory acquisition as soon as possible and any delay in compensating affected citizens would entail penal consequences. Whilst riba/usury may be predatory in nature, the interest under section 34 of the Act is beneficial since it ensures that property owners are compensated in a timely manner.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=23", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.140-L, 141-L and 142-L of 2015, decided on 14th November, 2022.\n(Against the judgments of the Lahore High Court, Lahore all Dated 20.01.2015 passed in Regular First Appeals Nos.70, 71 and 122 of 2002), heard on: 14th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN, MUNIB AKHTAR AND SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Muhammad Tariq Rajwana, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY-Appellant\nVersus\nRai AHMAD NAWAZ KHAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23418", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 580 = 2023 SLD 580 = 2023 SCMR 795", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Pre-meditated murder-Promptly lodged FIR-Daylight occurrence-Independent witnesses-Medical evidence corroborating ocular account-Motive proved-Positive report of Forensic Science Laboratory-Confession of guilt before Magistrate-In the present case, the crime report was lodged in the Casualty Ward of DHQ Hospital within an hour of the occurrence-Distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station was 7 kilometers whereas the distance between Police Station and DHQ Hospital, was 7.7 kilometers-Thus, it could be safely said that FIR was lodged with promptitude-Promptness of FIR, prima facie, showed truthfulness of the prosecution case and it excluded possibility of deliberation and consultation-Occurrence took place in the broad day light and the parties were known to each, therefore, there was no chance of misidentification-Ocular account had been furnished by complainant and two court bailiffs-Said bailiffs of the Family Court were independent witnesses who went to the house of the accused in compliance with a decree passed by the Family Court-Witnesses of ocular account were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defence but nothing favourable to the accused or adverse to the prosecution could be produced on record-Said witnesses had given all necessary details of occurrence qua the date, time, place, name of accused, name of witnesses, manner of occurrence, kind of weapon used in the occurrence, the locale of injuries and the motive of occurrence-Counsel for the accused could not point out any reason as to why the complainant had falsely involved the accused in the present case and let off the real culprit, who had brutally murdered her father and uncle-Substitution in such like cases was a rare phenomenon-Said witnesses had reasonably explained the circumstances of their going to the house of the accused i.e. they went there to take the dowry articles pursuant to a decree issued by the Family Court-Medical evidence available on the record corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the persons of the deceased is concerned-Neither the defence seriously disputed the motive part of the prosecution story nor the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined on such aspect of the matter-In such circumstances, the prosecution had successfully proved the motive against the accused-Investigating Officer had collected four crime empties from the place of occurrence and accused was arrested on the same day after couple of hours of the occurrence along with the weapon of offence-Although, the weapon of offence and the crime empties were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory together on but as the accused was arrested on the same day, therefore, the same was of no help to him-According to the positive report of FSL, the empties were found fired from the weapon recovered from the accused-Accused confessed to his guilt before the Magistrate and the proper procedure was followed for such purpose-When the accused was confronted with such confessional statement while recording his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C. he did not deny the same but stated that the same was extracted by the Police by using force with connivance of complainant party and the same was not recorded under the requirements of law-However, such assertion was just an afterthought-Evidence available on record clearly suggested that the accused did not inform the Judicial Magistrate about the alleged coercion at the time of making his judicial confession, and also did not place on record any evidence to show that the Investigating Officer was inimical towards him and forced him to confess his crime-Even otherwise, if the confessional statement of the accused was excluded from consideration, there was sufficient material available on the record in the shape of unbiased and unimpeachable ocular account supported by medical evidence, motive and recovery to sustain conviction of the accused-Pursuant to the outcome of proceedings carried out in a Family Court, the accused knew that the complainant was coming to the house to take her dowry articles-Accused was duly armed with a pistol and consequent events reflected his mindset-Such evidence was sufficient to indicate premeditation of accused, therefore, he did not deserve any leniency in the death sentence awarded to him-Appeal was dismissed and death sentence awarded to accused was upheld.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Prosecution witnesses related to the deceased-Mere relationship of the prosecution witnesses with the deceased cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such witnesses out-rightly-If the presence of the related witnesses at the time of occurrence is natural and their evidence is straight forward and confidence inspiring then the same can be safely relied upon to award capital punishment.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Ocular account-Medical evidence-Preference-Where ocular evidence is found trustworthy and confidence inspiring, the same is given preference over medical evidence and the same alone is sufficient to sustain conviction of an accused-Value and status of medical evidence and recovery is always corroborative in its nature, which alone is not sufficient to sustain conviction.\nMuhammad Iqbal v. The State 1996 SCMR 908; Naeem Akhtar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 396; Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2010 SCMR 1025 and Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 ref.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Ocular account-Medical evidence-Minor discrepancies-Minor discrepancies and conflicts appearing in medical evidence and the ocular version are quite possible for variety of reasons-During occurrence witnesses in a momentary glance make only tentative assessment of the distance between the deceased and the assailant and the points where accused caused injuries-In such a scenario it becomes highly improbable to correctly mention the number and location of the injuries with exactitude-Minor discrepancies, if any, in medical evidence relating to nature of injuries do not negate the direct evidence as witnesses are not supposed to give pen picture of ocular account-Even otherwise, conflict of ocular account with medical evidence being not material in imprinting any dent in prosecution version would have no adverse affect on prosecution case-Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not affecting the material considerations of the prosecution case ought not to prompt the courts to reject evidence in its entirety-Such minor discrepancies which do not shake the salient features of the prosecution case should be ignored.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 82 of 2022, decided on 13th February, 2023.\n(Against the judgment Dated 08.11.2016 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad bench in Criminal Appeal No. 139-A of 2012), heard on: 13th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haider Mehmood Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nRaja Muhammad Rizwan Ibrahim Satti, Advocate Supreme Court for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMRAN MEHMOOD-Appellant\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23419", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 581 = 2023 SLD 581 = 2023 SCMR 714", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTU", - "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]-\n-Ss. 231, 263, 265-Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)-Inspection of books of account by registrar, etc.-Investigation of affairs of company on application by members or report by registrar-Scope, nature and distinction between the SECPs power of inspection under Section 231 and the power of investigation under sections 263 and 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 stated.\nSection 231 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (the Ordinance) empowers the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), as a regulator, to inspect the books of account and related books and papers of a company. So, inspection is limited to books of account and related papers and books, and it does not include other record of the company which is unrelated to the accounts of the company. The exercise of this power is administrative in nature, essentially to ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements pertaining to the books of account. Books of account are the journals and ledgers which contain financial information related to the business and include books such as purchase books, cash books, sales books, debit ledger and credit ledger amongst others. There is also a corresponding obligation on the directors, officers and employees of the company to provide all books of account and papers and to give all assistance in connection with the inspection. An inspection under section 231 of the Ordinance is, therefore, restricted in its scope and requires every director, officer or employee of the company to produce the books of account and is not an open ended inspection. Further the officer who conducts the inspection must make a report to the SECP on the inspection. This goes to the scope of inspections which is to ensure regulatory compliances and to ensure that the books of account are duly maintained as required under the law. While, there exists an obligation to record reasons in writing for the exercise of power under section 231 of the Ordinance, there is no requirement under the Ordinance for the issuance of a show cause notice stating the reasons for the inspection, for which a reply is required before passing an order under Section 231 of the Ordinance. The obligation is to issue notice to inform the company of the reasons of the inspection simplictor. The difference being that the former contains allegations for which a reply and right of hearing is needed whereas the latter simply contains information of the inspection and the reasons for it.\nOn the other hand, sections 263 and 265 of the Ordinance deal with the exercise of power of investigation by the SECP. The powers under sections 263 and 265 are wider and also come with more procedural requirements. The SECP is empowered to initiate an investigation on an application by the members or on the basis of a report of the Registrar or it can initiate an investigation if there are circumstances suggesting that the business of the company is being conducted with intent to defraud the creditors, members or any other person, or if the business is being conducted for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, or if the members concerned with the formation of the company are guilty of fraud, misfeasance, breach of trust or other misconduct. The spirit of sections 263 and 265 of the Ordinance is to ensure that the business is managed in accordance with sound business principles or prudential commercial practice and that the financial position of the company is not threatened. When carrying out an investigation, before passing an order, SECP is obligated to give an opportunity to the company to show cause against the investigation proposed to be taken. As per section 268 of the Ordinance, all officers, employees and agents of the company and all persons dealing with the company are to assist in connection with the investigation. The scope of who is to assist in investigations is wider than that of inspections. The inspectors report under section 269 of the Ordinance can form the basis of prosecution under section 270 of the Ordinance and an action under sections 271 and 272 of the Ordinance. The scope of the investigation is based on the allegations pertaining to the affairs of the company and requires a probe into the allegations to ascertain their veracity.\nThus, the provisions relating to inspection and investigation are distinct. An inspection is an administrative power exercised by the SECP to ensure compliance of regulatory requirements. This power is limited to the inspection of books of account of a company after recording of reasons for the inspection in this regard. Whereas, an investigation against a company is a serious matter, as it is capable of entailing consequences both financial and penal which will impact the goodwill of the company. Consequently, an investigation cannot be ordered except on statutory grounds which include allegations of fraud, illegalities into the affairs of the company, or misuse and misappropriation of funds of the company. It is then the duty of the SECP to consider and weigh multiple factors, such as the nature of the complaint and its source, ensure due process and follow the statutory process in good faith, without any bias, prejudice or ulterior motives. The Ordinance does not prescribe the same process for an inspection simply because its scope is limited as are its consequences.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=231,263,265", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3263 of 2022, decided on 2nd November, 2022.\n(Against judgment Dated 06.06.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court Islamabad in W.P. No. 2607 of 2012).   heard on: 2nd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Islamabad and others-Respondents\nSalman Aslam Butt, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSultan Mazhar Sher Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Ibrar Saeed and Syed Asif Ali, Public Prosecutors (SECP) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAIF POWER LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Law, Civil Secretariat" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23420", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 582 = 2023 SLD 582 = 2023 SCMR 723", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah-Reappraisal of evidence-Incident took place at 10:30 a.m.-Deceased and injured witness were firstly taken to DHQ Hospital where the matter was reported to the Police-First Information Report was lodged on the same day at 1:45 p.m.-Distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station was 32 kilometers whereas as per the record the place of occurrence was one hour away from the DHQ Hospital-Thus, it can be said that FIR was lodged with promptitude-Promptness of FIR showed truthfulness of the prosecution case and it excluded possibility of deliberation and consultation-Occurrence took place in broad daylight and the parties were known to each other, therefore, there was no chance of misidentification-Ocular account in the case had been furnished by the complainant, who lived in the adjacent house; an inmate of the same house; and an resident of the same locality-Therefore, presence of said witnesses at the place of occurrence was natural-Prosecution witnesses were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defence but nothing favourable to the accused or adverse to the prosecution could be brought on record-Witnesses had given all necessary details of occurrence qua the date, time, place, name of accused, name of witnesses, manner of occurrence, kind of weapon used in the occurrence, the locale of injuries and the motive of occurrence-Injured witness sustained injuries during the occurrence, which had fully been supported by the medical evidence-Medical evidence available on the record further corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injury on the person of the deceased and injured was concerned-Counsel for the accused could not point out any plausible reason as to why the complainant would falsely involve the accused in the present case and let off the real culprit, who had committed murder of his real brother-Substitution in such like cases was a rare phenomenon-Weapon of offence recovered at the instance of the accused and the crime empties collected from the place of occurrence were separately sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory and the report was positive-Conviction of accused under sections 302(b), 324, 337-D, P.P.C was maintained-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah-Ocular account-Preference over medical evidence-Where ocular evidence is found trustworthy and confidence inspiring, the same is given preference over medical evidence and the same alone is sufficient to sustain conviction of an accused.\nMuhammad Iqbal v. The State 1996 SCMR 908; Naeem Akhtar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 396; Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2010 SCMR 1025 and Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah-Medical evidence-Recovery evidence-Conviction-Value and status of medical evidence and recovery is always corroborative in its nature, which alone is not sufficient to sustain conviction.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah-Medical evidence-Discrepancies-Minor discrepancies, if any, in medical evidence relating to nature of injuries do not negate the direct evidence as witnesses are not supposed to give photo picture of ocular account.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah-Prosecution witnesses related to the deceased-Mere relationship of the prosecution, witnesses with the deceased cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such witnesses.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah-Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Death sentence reduced to life imprisonment-Motive not established-Motive behind the occurrence was statedly the love marriage of deceased, with the injured witness-However, the High Court had rightly discarded the same by holding that the love marriage had taken place about two years back and the grievance of the family of injured witness had been redressed as pursuant to a compromise the daughter of the deceased was given in the nikah of son of co-accused-Hence, the motive part of the prosecution case did not inspire confidence so as to term it is as a cause of the murder-Keeping in view the fact that motive was disbelieved, the High Court has rightly taken a lenient view and converted the sentence of death into imprisonment for life to meet the ends of justice, hence, it left no room to further deliberate on this point-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,337-D", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 883 of 2017 and Criminal Petition No. 1793-L of 2017, decided on 7th February, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment Dated 23.10.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1273 and 1125 of 2013, Criminal Revision No. 675 of 2013 and Murder Reference No. 209 of 2013), heard on: 7th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Ghulam Sarwar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in J.P. 883 of 2017).\nShahid Tabbassum, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in Criminal Petition 1793-L of 2017 through video link from Lahore).\nMirza Muhammad Usman, D.P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMAN ULLAH and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23421", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 584 = 2023 SLD 584 = 2023 SCMR 734", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 395, 342, 506-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Dacoity, wrongful confinement, criminal intimidation-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Crime report was lodged after a lapse of nine months and sixteen days-Only explanation given by the complainant for such delay was that he was himself trying to find the robbed property, and when he got to know that it was the accused who had allegedly robbed his car, he approached him to return his property and on his refusal he lodged the crime report-Such explanation could not be accepted-Case record was silent as to on which date, the complainant got the information and when did he approach the accused-Nothing was on record to indicate as to why the accused kept mum for such a long period of time and did not even bother to inform the Police-No recovery had been affected from the accused despite of the fact that he remained with the police on physical remand for a considerable period of time-Accused was behind the bars for the last more than five months-Accused had made out a case for bail as his case squarely fell within the purview of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into his guilt, which even otherwise did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was admitted to bail.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 503, 506-Criminal intimidation-Scope-Whenever an overt act materializes and ends into an overt act, the provision of section 506, P.P.C. would not be applicable and the only provision which will remain in the field is the overt act, which is committed in consequence of criminal intimidation.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Offence not falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Grant of bail in such like cases is a rule whereas its refusal is an exception.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=395,342,506Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1392 of 2022, decided on 8th December, 2022.\n(On appeal against the order Dated 05.09.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Hyderabad in Criminal Bail Application No. S- 760 of 2022).   heard on: 8th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Altaf Hussain Kandawal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nZafar Ahmed Khan, Additional P.G. and Nabi Bux, SI for the State.\nJunaid Iftikhar Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ alias KARO-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23422", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 585 = 2023 SLD 585 = 2023 SCMR 737", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTSs", - "Key Words:": "Supreme Court Rules, 1980-\n-O. XI-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 188, 185(3)-Constitution of Benches-Judgment of Division Bench of High Court altered by a two Member Bench of the Supreme Court without granting leave to appeal-Propriety-In the present case, though the two Member Bench of the Supreme Court (in the under review) was inclined to grant leave to appeal to a limited extent vis-a-vis the rate of mark-up, but it was also true that no leave to appeal was granted against the impugned of the High Court-In the under review on the sole statement of the counsel for the respondent, the alleged excessive rate of markup was simultaneously modified in the without recording any consensual statement of the petitioners (banks) counsel-Two Member Bench of the Supreme Court, taking into consideration the assiduousness and exactitudes of Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, could grant leave or dismiss the civil petition for leave to appeal, but could not modify, alter or amend the of Division Bench of High Court for which the matter should have been fixed before a three Member Bench of the Supreme Court as per the said Rules-Review petition was allowed and Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal was restored to its original number, with the direction that the same shall be fixed for hearing before a three Member Bench for leave to appeal.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=188,185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No. 35-K of 2020 in Civil Petition No. 146-K of 2019, decided on 10th November, 2022.\n(Review against the judgment of this Court Dated 04.09.2020), heard on: 10th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nArshad M. Tayebaly, Advocate Supreme Court (video-link from Karachi) and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nMOHAMMAD NAEEM and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23423", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 586 = 2023 SLD 586 = 2023 SCMR 742", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981)-\n-S. 10- United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Art. 27-Persons With Disabilities (PWDs)-National Accountability Bureau (NAB)-Quota for Persons with Disability-Under section 10 of the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981 establishments (including NAB) are to employ persons with disabilities not less than 3% of the total number of persons employed at any time by the said establishment, and there is no limitation or distinction of grade in allocating 3% quota for persons with disabilities in any organization-Quota of 3% for persons with disability applies across the board in an organization, covering all tiers of posts in an organization and goes upto to the highest post including that of the Chairman, NAB-Said quota for PWDs must co-exist alongside the general category of posts-Given the variety of posts with different qualifications, skill sets, and descriptions it is only appropriate that the disability quota be apportioned and allocated against the sanctioned strength of various categories which have a separate selection criterion-Supreme Court directed NAB to immediately comply with the provisions of the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981 and earmark posts representing 3% quota for PWDs across the institution at all tiers.\nMalik Ubaidullah v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 599 = PLC 2021 (C.S.) 65 ref.\n(b) Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981)-\n-S. 10-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9, 18, 25-United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Art. 27-Persons With Disabilities (PWDs)-Employment quota-Employment of PWDs is not a charity but a right-Constitutional values of equality and social justice, the fundamental rights to life, to carrying out a profession and to non-discrimination also extend to PWDs and make no distinction between PWDs and others- Any law or policy relating to PWDs is rights-based and is not to be viewed as charity or pity or mercy-Universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of constitutional values and fundamental rights fully encompass the persons with disabilities and discrimination guarantees them full protection without discrimination.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981=10", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 4729 of 2019, decided on 5th December, 2022.\n(Against the judgment of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad Dated 17.10.2019, passed in Writ Petition No.218 of 2016).  heard on: 5th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. G.M. Chaudhary, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nSattar Awan, DPG, NAB, Hafiza Mehnaz Nadeem Abbasi, S.P., NAB, Imran Sohail, Director (HRM) NAB Hqrs. and Adnan Nadeem, Dy. Director, NAB for Respondents.\nRespondent No. 2 in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Peerzada WAQAR ALAM-Petitioner\nVersus\nNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) through Chairman, Islamabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23424", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 587 = 2023 SLD 587 = 2023 SCMR 748", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTTg", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2), 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Dishonestly issuing a cheque-Pre-arrest bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Admittedly, it was the accused himself who stopped the payment of the cheque on the ground that the cheque had been removed from his cheque book illegally/unauthorizedly-Further there was inordinate delay in registration of FIR, which had not been explained-As yet no proof had been tendered to show that the disputed amount was paid to the accused by the complainant-No evidence was available on record, at present stage, with regard to the stated ingredients of section 489-F, P.P.C., which may bring it within the ambit of mala fide on the part of the complainant-In such circumstances this also made it a case of further inquiry-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was admitted to pre-arrest bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=489-FConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1278-L of 2020, decided on 14th March, 2022.\n(Against the order Dated 12.11.2020 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 52632-B of 2020), heard on: 14th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Danyal Ijaz, Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nAhmed Raza Gillani, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab and Waheed Hassan, SI/IO (through video-link from Lahore) for the State.\nMalik Mateeullah, Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link from Lahore) for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BASHIR AHMED-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23425", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 588 = 2023 SLD 588 = 2023 SCMR 750", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTXo", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 34, 148, 149, 302(a), 302(b), 302(c)-Qatl-i-amd-Multiple assailants-Common intention or common object-Duty of court to ascertain the aspect of common intention or common object at the time of framing of charge and sentencing of accused persons stated.\nWhile dealing with cases of qatl-i-amd as embodied under section 300, P.P.C. in Chapter XVI of the Penal Code, the Trial Court has to evaluate as to whether the act is committed in furtherance of common intention/object or on the basis of individual liability to press in the provision of section 302(a), 302(b) or 302(c), P.P.C. and it has to give a definite finding qua the same. Any which concludes that the offence of qatl-i-amd under section 302(b), P.P.C. was committed in furtherance of common intention or common object but the sentence is inflicted on the basis of individual liability, the same would be squarely in defiance of the intent and spirit of law on the subject. However, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the elements of common intention and common object have not been established, then each accused would be dealt with according to their individual role and severity of allegations and would be sentenced accordingly by the Court exercising its discretionary powers.\nBashir Ahmed v. The State 2022 SCMR 1187 and Muhammad Nawaz v. The State PLD 2022 SC 523 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=34,148,149,302(a),302(b),302(c)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 614 and 618 of 2017, decided on 30th November, 2022.\n(On appeal against the judgment Dated 31,03.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in Criminal Appeals Nos. 228 and 284 of 2012 and Murder Reference No. 43 of 2012), heard on: 30th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Basharatullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Criminal Petition No. 614 of 2017).\nAnsar Nawaz Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Criminal Petition No. 618 of 2017).\nMirza Muhammad Usman, D.P.G. and Muhammad Jaffer, Additional P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD IQBAL and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23426", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 589 = 2023 SLD 589 = 2023 SCMR 755", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDTXk", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. I, R. 10-Scope and object of O. I, R. 10, C.P.C.-Court, in exercise of powers conferred under O. I, R. 10, C.P.C. may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined be struck out and add the party who ought to have been joined or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved-Object of the said Rule is to bring on record all the persons who are parties to the dispute relating to the subject matter so that the dispute may be determined in their presence at the same time without any protraction, inconvenience and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3760 and 3759 of 2019, decided on 1st December, 2022, heard on: 1st December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Asif Taufique Awan, Additional A.G., Punjab for Petitioners (in both cases).\nMudassar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.M.A. No. 10929 of 2019 in C.P. No. 3759 of 2019).\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIVIL PETITION NO. 3760 OF 2019\nLahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in W.P. No. 3111/2018) AND CIVIL PETITION NO.3759 OF 2019\nLahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in W.P. No.341/2019)\nPROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB through Deputy Commissioner/District Collector,\nRawalpindi and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD AKRAM and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23427", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 590 = 2023 SLD 590 = 2023 SCMR 761", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Incapacitated employee of Pakistan Railways-Visual impairment-Adjustment in another suitable and appropriate post keeping in view the degree and level of incapacitation-Perusal of Clauses 510 and 512 of the Personnel Manual of the Pakistan Railways reveals that in order to protect and safeguard the interest and right to employment of an officer who has been incapacitated during service, such an employee can be transferred or accommodated against a post in the organization which is more suitable and appropriate to his condition or disability-Under the said Manual efforts are to be made to ensure that the employee gets transferred to a post in an equivalent grade-In the present case the respondent-employee developed visual impairment and as a result was transferred to a post of lower grade against which the respondent agitated and finally the Tribunal transferred him to a post of an equivalent grade i.e. Ticket Collector Grade-I (TCR)-In terms of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),to which Pakistan is a party, it is the duty of an employer to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided to persons with disabilities (PWDs) and that those with disabilities are not discriminated against-Perusal of job description of the TCR provided in clause 6.18 of the Commercial Manual of Pakistan Railways revealed that a visual impaired officer could carry out the duties of TCR, as provided in the said Manual-Supreme Court directed Pakistan Railways to revisit the Personnel Manual in the light of the fundamental rights and principles of policy enshrined in the Constitution, as well as, the CRPD, in particular Article 27 thereof, so that the Personnel Manual was constitution compliant and met the international standards when dealing with persons with disabilities-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 9, 38(d)- Civil service- Incapacitated employee-Adjustment in another suitable and appropriate post keeping in view the degree and level of incapacitation-In case an officer develops physical incapacitation the department has to reach out to said officer to ensure the best possible option available for the officer in his condition to continue to serve the department-Said transfer to another suitable post of the respondent is as a special case and is over and above the regular process of transfer, appointment or promotion-Such a special transfer is to provide reasonable accommodation to an employee who has been incapacitated during service and for no fault of his own suffers from a disability-Any such reasonable accommodation is a priority action item for the department and must be addressed at the earliest-Suitability of the new post must factor in the earlier job description as well as the grade so that the employee is not worse off in financial terms-Such reasoning finds support from Article 9 and 38(d) of the Constitution which provide for right to life, which includes right to a meaningful livelihood as an integral part of life and policies must be made by the State to safeguard the interest of persons suffering from infirmity or sickness.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4618 of 2019, decided on 28th November, 2022.\n(Against the judgment of Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad Dated 30.09.2019, passed in Appeal No. 1503(R) of 2016)\nheard on: 28th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Ayesha A. Malik and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jawad Mehmood Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link from Lahore) for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nUMAR DARAZ-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23428", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 591 = 2023 SLD 591 = 2023 SCMR 766", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Appointment-Bank employee-Practice or policy of appointing authority-Legitimate expectation, doctrine of-Scope-Doctrine of legitimate expectation connotes that a person may have a reasonable expectation of being treated in a certain way by administrative authorities owing to some uniform practice or an explicit promise made by the concerned authority-Legitimate expectation ascends in consequence of a promise, assurance, practice or policy made, adopted or announced by or on behalf of government of a public authority-When such a legitimate expectation is obliterated, it affords locus standi to challenge the administrative action before the court of law-However, it is for the Court to decide as to whether the expectation is legitimate or not-Said doctrine is applied as a tool to watch over the action of administrative authorities and in essence imposes on all authorities to act fair and square in all matters encompassing legitimate expectation.\nModel Customs Collectorate, Islamabad v. Aamir Mumtaz Qureshi 2022 SCMR 1861 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 184(3), 199- Judicial review- Scope- Administrative/ executive actions-Constitutional courts being guardians of the Constitution have the power to judicially review the administrative/ executive actions and the conduct of the public authorities but the same shall be on the touchstone of fairness, reasonableness and proportionality.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Appointment-Son-quota-Concealment of involvement in criminal case-Although the respondent was involved in a criminal case of murder of his wife and was acquitted subsequently pursuant to proceedings carried out under section 265-K, Cr.P.C., but it is settled law that even if the allegations leveled in the FIR are admitted to be false, even then without recording of evidence, it cannot be said that there was no probability of conviction of the accused-In order to ascertain the genuineness of the allegations, the Trial Court ought to have allowed the prosecution to lead evidence-Respondent was offered the job of cashier in the Bank but when the Bank came to know that he has a criminal background, the Bank did not allow him to join the duty-Post of cashier is considered to be very important in a Bank, as it is the cashier who collects and disburses cash-While not allowing the respondent to join the duty, the Bank was well within its domain and acted naturally-High Court ought to have taken into consideration the such fact but it failed to do so-Appeal was allowed, and the impugned of the High Court directing the Bank to allow the respondent to join his duty in pursuance of his appointment order was set-aside.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3),199", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 441 of 2021, decided on 16th January, 2023.\n(Against the judgment Dated 22.09.2020 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench in Writ Petition No. 830-A of 2019)   heard on: 16th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz Ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rai Mohammad Nawaz Kharal, Advocate Supreme Court and Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.Nemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PRESIDENT NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others-Appellants\nVersus\nWAQAS AHMED KHAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23429", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 592 = 2023 SLD 592 = 2023 SCMR 770", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Fraud and misappropriation of public money-In a case of proven fraud and misappropriation of public money, the delinquent cannot be exonerated-Embezzlement of public money cannot be treated as misconduct of a minor nature.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Fraud and misappropriation of public money-Long term of service is no ground for conversion of punishment of dismissal from service into compulsory retirement-If such type of leniency is shown in the heinous matters of misappropriation of public money or public funds, then it will amount to giving a license to all such civil servants to first join service, then serve at considerable length and commit crimes or misconduct at the verge of retirement without any fear of disciplinary proceedings, but with the confidence and assurance that the dismissal order from service will be converted into compulsory retirement by the competent authority or court by taking a lenient view.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Fraud and misappropriation of public money-Accused refunding the misappropriated amount-Not a mitigating factor to reduce quantum of punishment-Civil servant has no justification for claiming lenient treatment (in the matter of his punishment) merely for the reason that he refunded the misappropriated amount, which does not vitiate the gross misconduct of misappropriation, nor can this be treated as mitigating circumstance.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2602 of 2019, decided on 5th October, 2022.\n(Against the judgment Dated 20.05.2019 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No.2321(R)CS of 2016\nheard on: 5th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Afrasiab Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional A.G.P. and M. Hafeez ur Rehman, Dept. Rep. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALLAH DITTA-Petitioner\nVersus\nDEPUTY POSTMASTER GENERAL (ADMN.), OFFICE OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, NORTHERN PUNJAB CIRCLE, RAWALPINDI and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23430", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 593 = 2023 SLD 593 = 2023 SCMR 774", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance (II of 1971)-\n-Ss. 13, 16, 17-Pakistan National Accreditation Council Act (VI of 2017), Ss. 4(a), 4(d)-Punjab Agricultural Pesticides Rules, 2018, R. 22-Pesticide laboratory-Accreditation and certification-Rule 22 of the Punjab Agricultural Pesticides Rules, 2018 (the 2018 Rules), vires of-Laboratories (in Pakistan) can only be accredited or certified by Pakistan National Accreditation Council (PNAC)-Rule 22 of the 2018 Rules to the extent where it requires that the pesticide laboratory shall be duly certified by ISO is not reconcilable with Section 13 of the Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, 1971, and section 4 of the Pakistan National Accreditation Council Act, 2017 (the 2017 Act)-Applying the principle of reading down, the Supreme Court saved the legality of Rule 22 of the 2018 Rules by directing that that the phrase the pesticide laboratory shall be duly certified by International Organizations for Standardization (ISO) is to be read down to mean that the pesticide laboratory shall follow the national and international standards as accredited by Pakistan National Accreditation Council (PNAC) under 2017 Act.\nRule 22 of the Punjab Agricultural Pesticides Rules, 2018 (the 2018 Rules) provides that the pesticide laboratory has to be duly certified by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).However, under the Pakistan National Accreditation Council Act, 2017 (the 2017 Act) the conformity assessment bodies or laboratories in the country, including pesticide laboratories, have to be accredited and certified by the Pakistan National Accreditation Council (PNAC) to follow and implement national and international standards. Thus, Rule 22 of the 2018 Rules requiring the certification to be done by ISO is offensive to the provisions of the 2017 Act. In Pakistan laboratories can only be accredited or certified by PNAC.\nMuhammad Asghar and 3 others v. Station House Officer and 2 others PLD 2020 Lah. 87 distinguished.\nInternational Organization for Standardization (ISO) only sets standards, which are then adopted by the national accreditation body. Under the 2017 Act, PNAC establishes internationally recognized accreditation system inline with national and international standards. ISO does not perform certification of laboratories. ISO only develops international standards and is not involved in their certification and does not issue certificates. Thus a company or organization cannot be certified by ISO.\nRule 22 of the 2018 Rules to the extent where it requires that the pesticide laboratory shall be duly certified by ISO is not reconcilable with section 13 of the Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, 1971 (the Ordinance), and section 4 of the 2017 Act, and in such a situation rule being a subordinate provision must give way.\nMaxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11 ed, p 50 ref.\nApplying the principle of reading down, the Supreme Court saved the legality of Rule 22 of the 2018 Rules by directing that that the phrase the pesticide laboratory shall be duly certified by International Organizations for Standardization (ISO) is to be read down to mean that the pesticide laboratory shall follow the national and international standards as accredited by PNAC under 2017 Act. Supreme Court further directed the Provincial Government to review Rule 22 of the 2018 Rules, and bring the same in conformity with the provisions of the Ordinance and 2017 Act. Petitions for leave to appeal were partly allowed.\n(b) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Rules made under a statute-Reconciling Rules with the parent statute-Scope-No rule can be framed so as to be in conflict with or in derogation from the statute under which it is framed or in conflict with any other statute, which is not inconsistent with the parent statute under which the rule is framed-However, before declaring so, the court should endeavour to reconcile the rule, that is to say, the rule may be so read, if the phraseology permits it, as to make it consistent with the provisions of the statute.\nNS Bindra, Interpretation of Statutes, 10th edition, p.560 ref.\n(c) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Reading down a provision in a statute or a Rule-Concept of reading down stated.\nThe golden rule behind the rule of reading down is to recognize and respect the wisdom of the legislature and assume that legislature would never have intended to legislate an invalid law. The same principle applies to subordinate legislation as it is not expected that the subordinate legislating authority will frame rules in violation to the parent Act or any other statute. Rule of reading down a statutory provision is now well recognized rule of interpretation. This rule avoids striking down of statute or rule which carries curable constitutional or legal vice and instead by reading them down achieves to harmonize the statute or the rule with the general scheme of the Act and the Rules. It is a rule of harmonious construction under a different name. It is generally used to straighten the crudities or ironing out the creases to make a statute or a rule workable. The rule of reading down is used for a limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statues.\nJ. K. Udaipur Udyog Ltd v. State of Gujarat (Full Bench of High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad) - MANU/GJ/0499/2001 and Union of India v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd, (2011) 4 SCC 635 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 1336-L of 2021 to C.P. 1340-L of 2021, decided on 6th January, 2023.\n(Against the consoliDated order of Lahore High Court, Lahore Dated 14.04.2021, passed in W.P. No. 121 of 2021/BWP, etc.)\nheard on: 6th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Amin-ud-Din Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Shamshad Khan, Additional A.G., Asif Mehmood Cheema, Additional A.G., Zafar Zulqarnain Sahi, Additional A.G. along with Javed Iqbal, Law Officer, Faqeer Ahmed D.G. Pest Warning and Dr. M. Akram Director Soil Fertility Lahore for Petitioner.\nM. Afzal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Malik Ali Muhammad Dhol, Advocate for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Secretary Agriculture Department, Lahore-Petitioner\nVersus\nSALEEM IJAZ and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23431", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 594 = 2023 SLD 594 = 2023 SCMR 781", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)-Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, Rr. 4, 5, 6-Police Rules, 1934, Rr. 22.16, 22.18, 22.70, 27.11, 27.12-High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders (Civil and Criminal), Rr. 14-E, 14-F, 14-H-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 516-A-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Possessing and trafficking narcotics-Non-production of recovered narcotics or vehicle in Trial Court-Effect-Case property is always relevant for the decision of the case because if the narcotics are recovered from any accused, the same should have been shown in court, and then the report of the laboratory would be helpful to the prosecution-Likewise, in narcotics cases, the conviction and sentence are based on the possession of the narcotics or on aiding, abetting or associating with the narcotics offences-In such eventuality, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to produce the case property before the court to show that this is the narcotics/case property that was recovered from accuseds possession-However, if the narcotics are destroyed under section 516-A, Cr.P.C, then, such destruction should be done after issuing notice to the accused, and the destruction should be done in the presence of the accused or his representative-Magistrate is required to prepare samples of the narcotics substance that was ultimately destroyed so that a representative (sample) of the destruction process could be produced in the Court; besides, the certificate so issued by the Magistrate would also be relevant and the same should be exhibited in the Court-When the material (narcotics) is neither produced nor exhibited, the presumption can be drawn that it is not in existence at all-When the best evidence, i.e., the case property/narcotics, vehicle, etc., is withheld by the prosecution and there is no plausible explanation for the non-production of the same in court, an adverse inference or assumption against the prosecution could be drawn under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, and it can easily be presumed that no such material/narcotics is in existence-In the present case, the exhibits include an application to the SHO, the FIR, a recovery memo and a report of the chemical examiner which were produced during trial; however, the narcotics substance and the vehicle, which formed the case property, were neither produced in court nor exhibited by the prosecution without plausible explanation-Prosecution had, thus, failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed and accused persons were acquitted of the charge.\nQamar Zaman v. Waseem Iqbal and 5 others 2004 SCMR 1209; State of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Deputy Attorney: General for Pakistan v. Kenneth Marshal and 2 others 2005 SCMR 594; Gul Dast Khan v. The State 2009 SCMR 431; Amjad Ali v. State 2012 SCMR 577; Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 5 SCC 123; Vijay Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013) 14 SCC 527 and Vijay Pandey v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2019) 18 SCC 215 ref.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Proof, standard of-Harder the punishment, the stricter the standard of proof.\nAmeer Zeb v. The State PLD 2012 SC 380 ref.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Scope-For the purposes of extending the benefit of doubt to an accused, it is not necessary that there be multiple infirmities in the prosecution case or several circumstances creating doubt- Single or slightest doubt, if found reasonable, in the prosecution case would be sufficient to entitle the accused to its benefit, not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right.\nTajamal Hussain v. The State 2022 SCMR 1567; Sajjad Hussain v. The State 2022 SCMR 1540; Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2022 SCMR 1527; Kashif Ali v. The State 2022 SCMR 1515; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2022 SCMR 1328; Khalid Mehmood v. The State 2022 SCMR 1148; Muhammad Sami Ullah v. The State 2022 SCMR 998; Bashir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2022 SCMR 986; The State v. Ahmed Omer Sheikh 2021 SCMR 873; Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 736; Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857; Abdul Jabbar v. The State 2019 SCMR 129; Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Hashim Qasim v. The State 2017 SCMR 986; Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772; Muhammad Zaman v. The State 2014 SCMR 749; Khalid Mehmood v. The State 2011 SCMR 664; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230; Faheem Ahmed Farooqui v. The State 2008 SCMR 1572; Ghulam Qadir v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221 and Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9(c)Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001=4,5,6Police Rules, 1934=22.16,22.18,22.70,27.11,27.12", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No.48 of 2021, decided on 13th December, 2022.\n(On appeal against the judgment Dated 10. 12.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Criminal Appeal No.2831 of 2010). \nheard on: 13th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Rizwan Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nMuhammad Jaffar, Additional P.G. Punjab (via video link from Lahore) for the State.\nRaja Inaam Ameen Minhas, Advocate Supreme Court, Amicus Curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AHMED ALI and another-Appellants\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23432", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 595 = 2023 SLD 595 = 2023 SCMR 831", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-First Information Report was registered just after 1 hour and 25 minutes of the occurrence-Distance between the place of occurrence and the police station was 25 kilometers, thus, it could safely be said that FIR was lodged with promptitude-Promptness of FIR showed truthfulness of the prosecution case and it excluded possibility of deliberation and consultation-Occurrence took place in the broad daylight and the parties were known to each other, therefore, there was no chance of misidentification-Ocular account had been furnished by complainant and an another witness, who were residents of the same locality where the occurrence took place-Said witnesses had given all necessary details of occurrence qua the date, time, place, name of accused, name of witnesses, manner of occurrence, kind of weapon used in the occurrence, the locale of injuries and the motive of occurrence-Complainant had sustained injuries during the occurrence, which had fully been supported by the medical evidence; this clearly proved her presence at the place of occurrence-Counsel for the accused could not point out any plausible reason as to why the complainant would falsely involve the accused in the present case and let off the real culprit, who had committed murder of her mother and sister-Substitution in such like cases was a rare phenomenon-Medical evidence available on the record further corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased and injured was concerned-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused, and conviction of accused under section 302(b), P.P.C. was maintained.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Interested witness-Witness related to deceased-Distinction-Term related is not equivalent to interested-Witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit in seeing an accused person punished-Witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye-witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be interested.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Injured witness, testimony of-Scope-Testimony of an injured eye-witness carries more evidentiary value.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Ocular evidence- Medical evidence-Preference-Where ocular evidence is found trustworthy and confidence inspiring, the same is given preference over medical evidence and the same alone is sufficient to sustain conviction of an accused. Muhammad Iqbal v. The State 1996 SCMR 908; Naeem Akhtar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 396; Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2010 SCMR 1025 and Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 ref.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Medical evidence- Recovery evidence-Value and status of medical evidence and recovery is always corroborative in nature, which alone is not sufficient to sustain the conviction of an accused.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Ocular account provided by a witness-Contradiction and minor discrepancies-Distinction and effect-Contradiction in the statement of a witness is fatal for the prosecution case whereas minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution case doubtful-Normal course of human conduct is that while narrating a particular incident there may occur minor discrepancies-Parrot-like statements are always discredited by the courts-In order to ascertain as to whether the discrepancy pointed out was minor or not or the same amounts to contradiction, regard is required to be made to the circumstances of the case by keeping in view the social status of the witnesses and environment in which such witnesses were making the statement-Normal discrepancies are always present, howsoever, honest and truthful a witness may be-Such discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, memory due to lapse of time and mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence-Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person.\n(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Recovery of weapon of offence was inconsequential as admittedly no crime empty was recovered from the place of occurrence-High Court had rightly disbelieved the motive by holding that a divorce, which was the alleged motive for the occurrence, took place two years prior to the occurrence, therefore, what happened immediately before the occurrence, which provoked the accused to take lives of two innocent persons, remained shrouded in mystery-Hence, the motive part of the prosecution case did not inspire confidence so as to term it is as a cause of the murder-Keeping in view the fact that motive had been disbelieved and the recovery was inconsequential, the High Court has rightly taken a lenient view and converted the sentence of death into imprisonment for life-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 553 of 2017, decided on 16th February, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment Dated 06.06.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 106-J/2014 and Murder Reference No. 79/2014) heard on: 16th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rizwan Ibrahim Satti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AQIL-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23433", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 596 = 2023 SLD 596 = 2023 SCMR 803", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-\n-S. 5-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 212(3)-Factual questions-Service Tribunal, jurisdiction of-Scope-Tribunal is the final forum for the purpose of determination of facts and the Supreme Court cannot go into the reappraisal of the said facts.\nSecretary Revenue Division v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabbasam PLD 2019 SC 563 ref.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Misappropriation- Removal from service- Duration of misappropriation and amount misappropriated nor relevant-Embezzlement or misappropriation constitutes misconduct and the duration of such embezzlement or misappropriation has little relevance-In the present case, the respondent admittedly misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1,24,305/- on account of electricity bills he collected from consumers before depositing the same in the Government exchequer after almost 23 days without any remorse-Tribunal approved the inquiry report which contains conceding statements on behalf of the respondent admitting that he had retained the said amount as he needed it because he was constructing a house, and therefore, did not deposit the same on time-Duration of this misappropriation, or the amount involved, is irrelevant as the act itself is sufficient to constitute misconduct-Tribunal has not given any reasons or explanation to examine the penalty imposed by the department on the touchstone of proportionality and with a stroke of a pen reduced the said penalty from Removal from Service to reduction to three stages lower in pay scale for two years-Such casual interference by the Tribunal in the penalty imposed by the department cannot be sustained-Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the penalty imposed by the department does not offend the law or the test of proportionality-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed, impugned of the Tribunal was set-aside and order passed by the department awarding major penalty of Removal from Service was restored.\nDivisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Muhammad Arif Butt 2021 SCMR 1033 and Divisional Superintendent v. Siddique Ahmed 2021 SCMR 1398 ref.\n(c) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-\n-S. 5-Service Tribunal, powers of-Scope-Under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (Act) the Tribunal is empowered to confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed before it, however, such powers are to be exercised carefully, judiciously and after recording reasons for the same- Tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant arbitrary relief to any person as the powers of the Tribunal under section 5 of the Act are neither unqualified and nor unlimited.\nChief Postmaster Faisalabad v. Muhammad Afzal 2020 SCMR 1029; Divisional Superintendent v. Muhammad Zafarullah, 2021 SCMR 400; Divisional Superintendent v. Muhammad Arif Butt 2021 SCMR 1033; Chairman Dr. A.Q. Khan, Research Laboratories v. Malik Muhammad 2010 SCMR 302 and Central Board of Revenue v. Shafiq Muhammad 2008 SCMR 1666 ref.\n(d) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-\n-S. 5-Service Tribunal, powers of-Limited power of the Service Tribunal to reduce penalty imposed by the department on a civil servant-Scope-Test of proportionality for interfering in quantum of penalty/punishment-Scope-Only in exceptional circumstances, i.e. where it is against the law or is unreasonable or fails the test of proportionality, that the Tribunal can interfere in the penalty imposed by the department and that too supported by detailed reasons-Where the Tribunal or the Court interferes in the quantum or nature of the penalty imposed by the competent authority by terming the same as unreasonable, perverse or harsh, or by exercising leniency, such interference is, in effect, only made when the Tribunal or the Court concludes that the penalty is disproportionate to the misconduct proved by employing the test of proportionality-Only where the penalty imposed by the department is so shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct or inefficiency proved that to let it stand would be unfair, unjust and inequitable, that the same would justify interference based on the test of proportionality.\nImposition of punishment under the law is primarily the function and prerogative of the competent authority and the role of the Tribunal or the Court is secondary unless it is found to be against the law or is unreasonable. This is because the department/competent authority, being the fact finding authority, is best suited to decide the particular penalty to be imposed keeping in view a host of factors such as the nature and gravity of the misconduct, past conduct, the nature and the responsibility of the duty assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department, as well as any extenuating circumstances. The question of interference with relation to the quantum or the nature of the penalty imposed by the department only arises when the Tribunal or the Court, in consonance with the decision of the competent authority, has also found the delinquent guilty of the same or some form misconduct or inefficiency. It is, therefore, only in the above exceptional circumstances, i.e. where it is against the law or is unreasonable, that the Tribunal or the Court can interfere in the penalty imposed by the department. The imposition of the penalty being against the law would entail that it cannot be held as legally sustainable, such as, when misconduct or inefficiency for which the penalty has been imposed has not been proved and a lesser form of misconduct or inefficiency, in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Court, is proved, or the procedure provided under the law for imposing the penalty has not been followed or the penalty imposed has not been provided for in the law or rules applicable, and therefore, the imposition of the penalty itself is not sustainable under the law, thereby, justifying interference. However, where the Tribunal or the Court comes to the conclusion that the misconduct or inefficiency, for which the penalty has been imposed by the department, has been proved, the procedure under the law has been followed and the penalty imposed is provided for under the law amongst other penalties for the like misconduct or inefficiency, interference in the discretion exercised by the department in imposing a certain penalty would only be possible if the penalty imposed is considered to be starkly unreasonable.\nGovernment of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal 2022 SCMR 2114; Postmaster General Sindh Province v. Syed Farhan 2022 SCMR 1154; Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain 2013 SCMR 817; Deputy Commissioner v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749; Noor Muhammad v. Registrar, Lahore High Court 2008 PLC (C.S.) 1188; Muhammad Ali v. FOP 2008 PLC (C.S.) 428; Senior Superintendent v. Shahid Nazir 2022 SCMR 327; Muhammad Idris Khan v. Secretary/Chairman, Ministry of Railways 2007 PLC (C.S.) 247 and Member (ACE, ST), FBR v. Muhammad Ashraf 2008 PLC (C.S.) 1161 ref.\nWhere the Tribunal or the Court interferes in the quantum or nature of the penalty imposed by the competent authority by terming the same as unreasonable, perverse or harsh, or by exercising leniency, such interference is, in effect, only made when the Tribunal or the Court concludes that the penalty is disproportionate to the misconduct proved by employing the test of proportionality. However, the application threshold of the proportionality test remains high and interference in the penalty imposed by the department cannot be based on mere conjectures or surmises. Interference with the penalty imposed by the department has to be exercised cautiously and with circumspection where the order imposing the penalty is wholly perverse or ex facie so demonstrably disproportionate and excessive for the misconduct, that to let it stand would be unfair, unjust and inequitable. Merely observing that the penalty imposed is not commensurate with the offence is not enough and constitutes arbitrary capricious and unstructured exercise of jurisdiction on part of the Tribunal. The order must show that the Tribunal has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and exercised its discretion in a structured, lawful and regulated manner, duly supported by legally sustainable reasoning. Therefore, it is only where the penalty imposed by the department is so shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct or inefficiency proved that to let it stand would be unfair, unjust and inequitable, that the same would justify interference based on the test of proportionality.\nAkhtar Ali v. Director, Federal Government 2011 PLC (C.S.) 808; Shibli Farooqui v. FOP 2009 SCMR 281; Muhammad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan 2008 SCMR 214; Muhammad Ali v. FOP 2008 SCMR 214; Commissioner Faisalabad Division v. Allah Bakhsh 2020 SCMR 1418; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal 2022 SCMR 2114; Chairman v. Goparaju (2008) 5 SCC 569; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749; Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471; Director General Federal Directorate v. Tanveer Muhammad 2021 SCMR 345; Deputy Postmaster General v. Habib Ahmed 2021 PLC (C.S.) 531 and Government of Pakistan v. Nawaz Ali Sheikh 2020 SCMR 656 ref.\n(e) Civil service-\n-Penalty, quantum of-Test of proportionality-Reasonableness for the purposes of assessing the quantum or nature of a penalty imposed by the department is to be gauged by applying the test of proportionality-Penalty imposed must be commensurate with the misconduct or inefficiency that has been proved.\nSabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board PLD 2019 SC 189; Postmaster General Sindh Province v. Syed Farhan 2022 SCMR 1154; Government of Punjab v. Muhammad Arshad 2021 PLC (C.S.) 47 and Inspector-General (Prisons) v. Syed Jaffar Shah 2009 PLC (C.S.) 47 ref.\n(f) Civil service-\n-Misappropriation or embezzlement of public funds-Moral turpitude-Scope-Misappropriation or embezzlement of public funds while in Government service would be considered as gross misconduct involving moral turpitude.\nImtiaz Ahmed Lali v. Returning Officer 2008 PLC (C.S.) 934 and Ghulam Hussain v. Chairman, P.O.F. Board 2002 SCMR 1691 ref.\n(g) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-\n-S. 5-Service Tribunal, powers of-Moral turpitude-Punishment, quantum of-Test of proportionality for interfering in quantum of penalty/punishment imposed by department/competent authority-Scope-Notion of proportionality requires that the punishment ought to reflect the degree of moral culpability associated with the offence for which it is imposed-In order to render punishment compatible with justice, it is not enough to restrict punishment to the deserving, but also to restrict the degree of punishment to the degree that is deserved-Degree of wrongfulness is described variously as the moral culpability, gravity or depravity associated with the offence-Therefore, along with the gravity of the misconduct, interference on the grounds of proportionality in the penalty imposed for misconduct is also assessed in view of the depravity or moral culpability associated with the same-Test of proportionality is, therefore, more stringent in cases of misconduct involving moral turpitude in view of the depravity or moral culpability involved.\nBurgh, Richard W. Do the guilty deserve punishment? Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):193-210 (1982) and Ian P. Farrell, Gilbert and Sullivan and Scalia: Philosophy, Proportionality, and the Eighth Amendment, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 321 (2010). https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss2/2 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Service Tribunals Act, 1973=5Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3855 of 2022, decided on 17th January, 2023.\n(Against the judgment of Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad Dated 30.8.2022, passed in Appeal No.384(R)CS of 2022)\nheard on: 17th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom, Additional A.G.P. and Ali, Assistant Superintendent for Petitioner.\nM. Ramzan Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.\nAssisted by: Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, POSTAL SERVICES, D.G. KHAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nNADEEM RAZA and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23434", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 597 = 2023 SLD 597 = 2023 SCMR 815", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 12, 42-Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 54-Agreement to sell-Proof-Suit for specific performance and declaration-Property in question was measured as 10 Marlas and was jointly owned by F and A in equal shares-Petitioner/vendee in his evidence admitted that at the time of the agreements he did not know who the owner of the entire property was and did not check whether F was the absolute owner of the property-Property was not partitioned by metes and bounds which meant that no specific portion of the property was earmarked for signifying the specific share or location which could be dealt with independently, including the sale of an individual share out of the joint property-Petitioner filed his suit after 13 years of the execution of the agreements, and at least two years after it came into his knowledge that the whole property was not owned by F-Neither any legal proceedings were initiated by the petitioner during the life time of F for properly transferring the title of the property pursuant to the alleged sale agreements, nor did he offer any plausible reason which may justify his act or omission of nor approaching a court of law for the implementation of the agreements at the relevant time-Appellate Court rightly reached the conclusion that the agreements were not proved and that the co-owner A never signed the agreements-Petitioner was claiming the title merely on the strength of the agreement to sell by one co-owner while the other co-owner never signed any such agreement-In the alleged agreements no proper description or even exact location of the suit property was mentioned, instead the description of the property was jotted down in the plaint rather than in the alleged agreements-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 12, 42-Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 54-Agreement to sell-Suit for specific performance and declaration-Scope-On the basis of a sale agreement, no legal character or right can be established to prove the title of the property unless the title is transferred pursuant to such agreement to sell, but in case of denial or refusal by the vendor to specifically perform the agreement despite the readiness and willingness of the vendee, a suit for specific performance may be instituted in the court, but suit for declaration on the basis of a mere sale agreement is not the solution for appropriate relief.\nMuhammad Yousaf v. Munawar Hussain and others 2000 SCMR 204 ref.\n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12-Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 54-Agreement to sell-Suit for specific performance-person seeking specific performance has to establish that he is enthusiastic and vehement to act upon his obligations as per the contract but the opponent is refusing or denying its execution.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 189-Judgments of the Supreme Court-Binding effect-Prospective in nature-Judgments of the Supreme Court unless declared otherwise operate prospectively.\nPakistan Medical and Dental Council and others v. Muhammad Fahad Malik and others 2018 SCMR 1956; Sakhi Muhammad and another v. Capital Development Authority, Islamabad PLD 1991 SC 777 and Pir Bakhsh and others v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee and others PLD 1987 SC 145 ref.\n(e) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 10-Contract-Terms and conditions of contract-Where an effective and enforceable contract is not structured by the parties, it is not the domain or province of the Court to make out a contract for them, and the lis would be decided on the basis of terms and conditions agreed and settled down in the contract.\n(f) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12- Decree for specific performance-Scope-Decree for specific performance may not be passed if the substratum of the contract suffers from shortcoming or legal infirmities which renders the contract unacceptable and unenforceable.\n(g) Words and phrases-\n-Caveat emptor- Meaning, connotation and scope.\nBrooms Legal Maxims (Tenth Edition), Chapter IX, (page 528); Blacks Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), page 222; Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition), Volume 6A (Pages 8 and 9); Wood v. Ross, Tex. Civ. App., 26 S.W. 148, 149; Kain v. Weitzel, 50 N.E.2d 605, 607, 72 Ohio App. 229; Sherwood v. Salmon, 2 Day, 128, 136; Burwells Admrs v. Fauber, Va., 21 Grat. 446, 463; Major Law Lexicon (Fourth Edition), (page 6035-see page number); Gour Kishan v. Chunder Kishore, per Gart T CJ, (1876) 25 SUTH WR 45 (46) and Bahar Shah and others v. Manzoor Ahmad (2022 SCMR 284 ref.\n(h) Appeal-\n-Inconsistency between the findings of Trial Court and the Appellate Court-In such a case findings of the Appellate Court must be given preference in the absence of any cogent reason to the contrary.\nAmjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar 2015 SCMR 1; Madan Gopal and 4 others v. Maran Bepari and 3 others PLD 1969 SC 617 and Muhammad Nawaz through LRs. v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through LRs. and others 2013 SCMR 1300 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12,42Transfer of Property Act, 1882=54", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1133-L of 2016, decided on 16th January, 2023.\n(Against the judgment Dated 15.02.2016 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 997/2010)\nheard on: 16th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nJam Khursheed Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 2 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Rao ABDUL REHMAN (DECEASED) through legal heirs-Petitioner\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD AFZAL (DECEASED) through legal heirs and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23435", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 598 = 2023 SLD 598 = 2023 SCMR 826", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 118- Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims-Scope-On completion of all formalities, if the claim is not satisfied/cleared within ninety days without any fault of the claimant when it becomes due, then, under the implied term of every contract of insurance the liquidated damages must be granted.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 118-Group insurance contract-Legal heirs of insured person-Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims-Entitlement of legal heirs to claim liquidated damages under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Scope-Group insurance is designed to provide monetary benefits to the family of the assured person; particularly, if the assured person has not defaulted in payment of premium amount-In the present case the insurer had failed to prove that its failure to pay the claim within the stipulated time of 90 days (mentioned under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000) was due to circumstances beyond its control-Claim of the widow and legal heirs of deceased assured person for payment of liquidated damages was well founded, and thus, they were entitled to receive it-Appeal was dismissed.\nMadan Gopal v. Maran Bepari PLD 1969 SC 617 ref.\n(c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 2(xlv)- Insurance policy-Effective date-Policy/contract becomes effective from the date it is signed by the executants.\nBhaiyat v. L. Chong Kha and others AIR 1934 Rangoon 342 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=118", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 929 of 2017 and C.M.A. No. 1708 of 2019, decided on 6th March, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment Dated 22.05.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Insurance Appeal No. 1288 of 2015)  heard on: 6th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz Ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for Appellants.\nLiaqat Ali Butt, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for Respondent No. 1.\nSanaullah Zahid, Additional A.G. and Shahid Fiaz, DEO (S.E), Narowal for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION and another-Appellants/-Applicants\nVersus\nMst. RAZIA AMEER and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23436", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 812 = 2023 SLD 812 = 2023 AIR 606", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDSXk", - "Key Words:": "ACT:\nPenal Code-Ss. 302, 325, 323-Constitution of India-Art.\n136-High Court setting aside acquittal-Appeal by special leave-If Supreme Court could reappreciate evidence.\nHEADNOTE:\nThe appellants who were charged with the offence of murder were acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge but the order of acquittal was set aside in appeal by the High Court. The High Court convicted them under various sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment for the offence of murder and to shorter terms for the other offences. The prosecution case was that when the deceased, along with three other persons, was returning from temple, he was attacked at about 4 P. M. on the day of the occurrence by the appellants. The deceased, who was mortally injured, was carried in a bullock cart to a nearby police station. On the way he succumbed to his injuries. The first information report was lodged in the police station at 12.30 that night. Allowing the appeal to this Court, \nHELD : This Court in an appeal under Art. 136 will examine the evidence only if the High Court while setting aside the order of acquittal by the trial court has failed to apply correctly the principles governing appeals against acquittals. In Sheo Swarup, Ors v. The King Emperor, 61 I.A. 398, Surajpal Singh v. The state [1952] S.C.R.193 and Sanwat Singh v. State Of Rajasthan [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120, the principles governing appeals against acquittal are firmly established. The Code of Criminal Procedure made no distinction between the powers of the appellate court in regard to the two categories of appeals and, therefore, the High Court has powers as full and wide in appeals against acquittal as in appeals against conviction. Whether the High Court is dealing with one class of appeals of criminal jurisprudence that unless the, statute provides to the contrary there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and secondly that the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt. Due regard to the views of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses in matters resting on pure appreciation of evidence and the studied slowness of the appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, where such seeing and hearing can be useful aids to the  assessment of evidence are well known principles which generally inform the administration of justice and govern the exercise of all appellate jurisdiction. They are self-imposed limitations on a power otherwise plenary and like all voluntary restraints, they constitute valuable guidelines. Such regard and slowness must find their reflection in the appellate , which can only be if the appellate court deals with the principal reasons that influenced the order of acquittal and after examining the evidence with care gives its own reasons justifying a contrary view of the evidence. It is implicit in this judicial process that if two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, the finding of acquittal ought not to be disturbed.\nIf after applying these principles, not by their mechanical recitation in the , the High Court has reached the conclusion the order of acquittal ought to be reversed, this court will not reappraise evidence in appeals brought before it under art. 136of the Constitution. In such appeals, only such examination of the evidence would ordinarily be necessary as is required to see whether the high court has appliedthe principles correctly. The High Court is the final court of facts and the reserve jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136, though couched in wide terms,is by long practice exercised in exceptional cases where the High Court has disregarded the guidelines set by this Court for deciding appeals against acquittal or by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done, or where the finding is such that it shakes theconscience of the court.\nThe High Court in the instant case was evidently aware of these principles but it failed to apply then to the case on hand. The High Court was not correct in characterising of the findings recorded by the trial court as perverse.\n(i) The High Court was not right in rejecting the view of the Sessions Judge that there was undue delay in lodging the report and that the delay was not satisfactorily explained. Whether the delay was so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the case of the prosecution must depend upon a variety of factors which would vary from case to case. \n(ii) In the instant case the defence of the appellants that the occurrence must have taken place under cover of darkness, that is, long after the time at which it was alleged to have taken place is well founded and the High Court was clearly in error in discarding it. \n(iii) If the principal witness had no compunction in creating an eyewitness his evidence had to be approached with great caution. The High Court was not justified in holding that the only impact of the false discovery of an eye witness on the prosecution case was that the evidence of the principal witness had to be rejected in part.\n(iv) Yet another witness had made conflicting statements on oath before two courts on an important aspect and the question which the High Court should have asked itself was whether the view taken by the Sessions Court in regard to this witness was a reasonable one. The High Court was not right in saying that there was no reason to discard the testimony of the other eye witnesses even if his evidence was left out.\n(v) The motive was said to be illicit intimacy between the deceased and daught of one of the assailants. But one of the witnesses deposed that the assailants were dacoits and that they searched his pocket as well as the pockets of his companions. The first information report made no mention of any one of the accused referring to the illicit intimacy before, during or after the attack. The endeavour at the trial was to show that the incident was connected with the illicit affair. if that be the true motive, it is hardly likely that the assailants would search the pockets of the deceased and his companions. The Sessions Judge was justified in attaching due importance to this aspect of the matter and the High Court was not right in saying that unnecessary emphasis was laid on a minor matter.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": " Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1970. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order Dated the 8th January 1970 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 634 of 1967. Date OF JUDGMENT21/12/1973", - "Judge Name:": " BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.  BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH", - "Lawyer Name:": "A. N. Mulla and R. L. Kohli, for the appellants.\nO. P. Rana, for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PETITIONRAM JAG AND OTHERS\nVs.\nTHE STATE OF U.P." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23437", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2020 2553 = 2020 SLD 2553 = 2020 PCRLJ 638", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTc", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 22-A, 22-B, 561-A-Application filed before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace for giving direction to the police for the registration of FIR was rejected-Validity-Record showed that petitioner filed an application under S. 22-A, Cr.P.C. for registration of FIR before Justice of Peace and disclosed all the relevant facts but Justice of Peace rejected the same on the ground that no cognizable offence appeared to have been committed from the facts of the case-Petitioner contended that Justice of Peace did not consider the relevant provisions of law-Commission of cognizable offence of murder had been sufficiently disclosed and even the accused were also nominated in the application-Police admitted that petitioners family made several complaints to the police and the higher authorities, even copies of such complaints were annexed with captioned writ petition, which clearly stated that the offence of murder of deceased was alleged against the persons nominated in the application-On the face of said clear and explicit allegation leveled by the complaint what more was required to register FIR by the concerned Police Officials was beyond the comprehension and understanding of the court-Dead body lying in mysterious circumstances and injury sheet indicating the multiple injuries on the body of the deceased, complaint alleged the previous enmity with the suspected accused-Although, police took a stand that there was need to conduct a preliminary inquiry and they conducted inquiry but found nothing-Such like inquires were not the substitute of the FIR and proper investigation-Post-mortem report showed the wounds on the dead body of deceased-Medical Officer, after receiving report of Forensic Science Laboratory wrote that cause of death of the deceased was not unnatural and most probably was due to a disease called, Epilepsy-Police, in the present case, had consumed a miserably long time in inquest proceedings-Purpose of holding inquest proceedings as per S. 174, Cr.P.C. was very limited but the police in garb of said proceedings refused to register the FIR of a cognizable offence reported to it-Case clearly depicted insensitivity of police department-Writ petition was accepted with direction to the police to register FIR in the light of application filed by petitioner forthwith and proceed into the matter in accordance with law. [Paras. 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 of the ]\nLiaqat Ali and 2 others v. Raja Shahid Nawaz and 2 others 2007 PCr.LJ 246 and Muhammad Nazir v. Justice of Peace and 2 others 2018 YLR 1599 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=22-A,22-B,561-A", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 262 of 2018, decided on 13th December, 2019.", - "Judge Name:": " Raza Ali Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hazoor Imam Kazmi for Petitioner.\nSaqib Javaid, Legal Advisor of Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. QASIM JAN-Petitioner\nVs\nSENIOR SUPERINTENDENT POLICE, DISTRICT NEELUM AZAD KASHMIR and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23438", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 813 = 2023 SLD 813 = 2023 PTD 556 = (2024) 129 TAX 89", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTY", - "Key Words:": "Issue:\nThe petitioners, running manufacturing units in the erstwhile Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, sought tax exemption on raw materials imported by them, citing exemptions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nLegal Development:\nClause 146 of Second Schedule, Part-I of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was omitted by the Finance Act, 2021.\nSection 148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was also omitted by the Finance Act, 2020.\nEntry No. 151 of the Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was inserted, which specifically deals with sales tax at the import stage.\nTo seek exemption from income tax, the petitioners were required to apply under Section 159 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court declined to interfere with the statutory amendments, and the constitutional petition was dismissed.\nRelevant Case:\nMessrs Hadi Khan Silk Mills and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, 2021 PTD 1842", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=70,80,83,159", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.258-M of 2022, decided on 15th November, 2022, heard on: 15th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, JUSTICE AND DR. KHURSHID IQBAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for Petitioner.\nSaid Jamil, Assistant Attorney General and Razauddin Khan, Additional Advocate General for Official Respondents.\nIshtiaq Ahmad (Junior) for Respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS SOHAIL STEEL GL SHEET COMPANY THROUGH PROPRIETOR\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY FINANCE AND REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23439", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 814 = 2023 SLD 814 = 2023 PTD 384", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Sales Tax on Services (Adjudication and Appeals) Rules, 2012-Rr.13 16-Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act (XLII of 2012), Ss.52 14-Recovery of tax not levied or short levied-Appellate Adjudication-Assessing Officer, duty of-Scope-Special provision and tax withholding provisions-Punjab Revenue Authority issued a show cause notice to the appellant for its failure to withhold and deposit sales tax on services-Assessing Officer partially accepted the stance of the appellant while rejected its stance regarding the heads of sale promotion and freight-Appellant preferred an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) wherein it was held responsible for not providing the documentary evidence, therefore, findings of the Assessing Officer were upheld-Validity-Commissioner (Appeals) had failed to look into the record and the evidence produced before her i.e. copies of invoices and breakup/summary of expenses on the prescribed format-Show cause notice in the case contained the figures of trans-provincial activities of the appellant-Assessing Officer was duty bound to afford as many opportunities as possible to the appellant to get all the relevant data of the tax authorities operating on trans-provincial basis to arrive at the exact amount of tax liability payable within the bounds of Punjab Revenue Authority-Case of the appellant needed a fresh decision-Appeal was accepted, impugned order was set aside and the case was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) with a direction to decide the case afresh after going through the available record.\n(b) Punjab Sales Tax on Services (Adjudication and Appeals) Rules, 2012-\n-Rr.13 16-Duty of Commissioner (Appeals)-Principles of natural justice-Scope-Adjudication officer is supposed and required to dilate upon all issues involved in the case and to make a speaking order thereafter, by looking into every piece of evidence produced by the parties.\n(c) Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act (XLII of 2012)-\n-S.52-Recovery of tax not levied or short levied-Scope-Primary duty is always of the authority to dig out the truth which enables it to assess the tax demand in exact terms and not on presumption-In tax regime no presumptions or guess work is allowed to be the basis of tax demand/assessment rather the demand/assessment essentially requires it to be in exactness.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 10-A-Right to fair trial-Opportunity of hearing-Scope-First and foremost aspect in a pending lis is, the fairness and grant of ample opportunity to both parties involved in litigation to prove its stance so that no one feels discriminated.", - "Court Name:": "Punjab Revenue Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services (Adjudication and Appeals) Rules, 2012=13,16Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=14,52", - "Case #": "Appeal No.38 of 2021, decided on 24th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Ch. Muhammad Tariq Javed, Chairperson and Ch. Javed Anwar, Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zeeshan Chishti, AR for Appellant.\nMuhammad Afzal, Deputy Secretary (Legal-II), DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs PAKISTAN GUM AND CHEMICALS LIMITED\nVs\nADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER, ENF-III, PRA, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23440", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 815 = 2023 SLD 815 = 2023 PLD 105", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-O. XLI, R. 27-Additional evidence, producing of-Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court-Scope-Conduct of the party-Petitioner filed an application under O. XLI, R. 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, before the Appellate Court seeking permission to produce marginal witnesses of alleged gift-deed-Contention of the petitioner was that the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to allow the production of witnesses who were not produced before the Trial Court-Appellate Court dismissed the said application of the petitioner-Validity-Record revealed that petitioner had already mentioned name of said witnesses in the list of witnesses having been submitted before the Trial Court, however, order-sheets of the Trial Court showed that despite several opportunities, no efforts had been made by the petitioner to produce the said witnesses-Parties to the suit must be vigilant while contesting the suit and if any party is careless or fails to take necessary steps for production of evidence then subsequently any request on behalf of such party under the garb of O. XLI, R. 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for production of additional evidence has to be considered with extreme caution as the conduct of a party is always extremely relevant-Petitioner, without mentioning any cause, did not produce the witnesses before the Trial Court-Order XLI, R. 27(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, stipulates that only in those cases where the Trial Court has refused to admit any evidence which ought to have been admitted, then the Appellate Court can exercise the discretion to allow additional evidence-Trial Court, in the present case, was never approached by the petitioner in such context, instead he, despite taking responsibility to produce said witnesses, failed to do so-Neither the powers under O. XLI, R. 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, are unfettered nor the Appellate Court has the discretion to allow additional evidence per its own caprice, rather the said discretion is structured / limited by the factors enunciated in the said provision of law-Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.\nIdeal Arcade Builders and Development v. Miss Farida Shehnaz PLD 2019 Sindh 691 ref.\nKhursheed Ali v. Shah Nazar PLD 1992 SC 822 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=O. XLI,R. 27", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 613 of 2022, decided on 5th May, 2023, heard on: 7th April, 2002", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Aamir Nawaz Rana, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rasool Bakhsh Baloch for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Saleem Lashari and Salman Langove for Respondent No.1.\nRespondent No.2 proceeded against Ex-parte on 08.12.2022.\nAbdul Tahir for Official Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAVED IQBAL\nvs\nSHAHEEN IQBAL and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23441", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 816 = 2023 SLD 816 = 2023 PTD 467", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss.122, 111, 35-Sales Tax Rules, 2006, R.14-Amendment of assessment-Unexplained income or assets-Stock-in-trade vis- -vis Annexure F of sales tax return (carry forward summary)-Scope-Appellant in Annexure F of its sales tax return declared its closing stock of Rs. 1.3 billion whereas it had declared the closing stock in its income tax return to be Rs. 1.115 billion-Assessing Officer treated the difference of Rs. 185 million as expenditure on excess purchases, having not been declared in income tax return-Validity-Data as given in Annexure F of sales tax return was basically a summary of input tax which could not be made basis for calculating stocks held on a particular date to make its comparison with that of stock-in-trade as declared in income tax return-Annexure F was only meant for summary of input tax and excess carry forward amount of sales tax credit-None of the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990, or of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, had purported to deem these figures of carry forward summary to be the closing stocks-Such could not be equated with stock statement of a taxpayer on the whims and wishes of the department for creating concurrent tax liabilities under two separate statutes having different standards of reporting stocks and inventory-Appeal of the taxpayer was allowed and the orders passed by the authorities were vacated.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss.129, 122-Decision in appeal-Scope-Language of S.129(1)(a) only empowers the Commissioner (Appeals) to confirm, modify or annul the assessment order and exception whereof is enumerated in Cl. (b) of S. 129(1), which empowers the Commissioner (Appeals) to make such order as he thinks fit-Express language of law has unequivocally prescribed power of Commissioner (Appeals) under S. 129 while dealing with the assessment order and explicitly describes Commissioner (Appeals) powers while dealing with other cases-Section 129 unequivocally eclipses and restricts the power of Commissioner (Appeals) to confirm, modify or annul the assessment.\nPLD 1965 SC 434; 1975 SCMR 221; 1976 SCMR 388; 1987 CLC 2425; PLD 2003 SC 271 and 2001 SCMR 838 ref.\n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss.129, 122-Decision in appeal-Remand-Scope-Where matter in issue is an assessment order then resort can only be have to S. 129(1)(a)-Said provision unequivocally eclipses and restricts the Commissioners scope of power to confirm, modify or annul the assessment and the Commissioners decision cannot go beyond the ambit of assessment.\nPLD 1965 SC 434; 1975 SCMR 221; 1976 SCMR 388; 1987 CLC 2425; PLD 2003 SC 271 and 2001 SCMR 838 ref.\n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss.129, 122-Decision in appeal-Remand-Scope-Order passed under S. 122 creating liability is an assessment order for all intents and purposes and can only be dealt under Cl. (a) of S. 129(1) and binds the Commissioner (Appeals) only to confirm, modify or annul the assessment order and does not in any manner confer jurisdiction on the Commissioner (Appeals) to remand the matter to the assessing officer.\nDewan Textile Mills Ltd. v. ACIR-B Audit D-1 LTU Karachi 2017 PTD 1663 and 2013 PTD (Trib.) 1288 ref.\n(e) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.129-Decision in appeal-Remand-Scope-Remand should not be directed in a light vein-In ultimate analysis, a remand neither favours the revenue nor the assessee-In revenue matters, without an exception after remand the fate of an assessee never changes for the better-In most of the cases the remand order is rather employed by the assessing officer to make the fate of assessee even worse-All previous discrepancies are meticulously taken care of so that the assessee finds no favourable factual or legal proposition to urge before the appellate forum.\n(f) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss.111, 35-Unexplained income or assets-Stock-in-trade-Purchasing excess stock; an investment or expenditure-Scope-If any difference of declared stock is found or is effectively unearthed through audit or otherwise, it cannot be added as expenditure under S.111(1)(c)-Stocks ought to be added in investment, money, assets or valuable articles owned by a person whose sources are not adequately explained by him but it cannot be added towards his expenditures-Genuinely, if any misappropriation of stocks is found by comparing the declarations made under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, with that information available in sales tax record then its addition can be made under S. 111(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the provisions of S. 111(1)(c) are least relevant on the subject-Stocks are physically tangible in trade or business whereas expenditures are irretrievably gone into costs of goods.\nPLD 1982 Kar. 684 ref.\n(g) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.35-Stock-in-trade-Meaning-Stock-in-trade means anything produced, manufactured, purchased or otherwise acquired for manufacture, sale or exchange, and any material or supplies to be consumed in the production or manufacturing process, but does not include stocks and shares.\n(h) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Strict rule of interpretation-Scope-Strict rule of interpretation mandates that plain, clear and direct meaning is given to words which are used in common parlance by the general public to which such law is applicable-No presumption with respect to a particular meaning-Particular meaning cannot be given to a word which is not clear by making a presumption that particular meaning is the intention of the legislature-Court cannot under the guise of possible or likely intention of the legislature give meaning to the words which are not clear and where contextual meaning cannot be made out.\n(i) Words and phrases-\n-Expenditure-Meaning-Expenditure is what is paid out or away and is something which is gone irretrievably.\nPLD 1982 Kar. 684 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,111,35Sales Tax Rules, 2006=14", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No.3228/LB of 2022, decided on 3rd October, 2022, heard on: 19th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Babar Zaman Khan and Abuzar Hussain for Appellant.\nHassan Mabroor, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS KBS STEEL, GUJRANWALA\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23442", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 817 = 2023 SLD 817 = 2023 PTD 487", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRSs", - "Key Words:": "Limitation-Condonation of delay-Scope-If decisions are assailed they should be done within the prescribed period, and it should not be assumed that delay would be condoned when there is no valid reason to condone the same.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4145 of 2022, decided on 6th February, 2023, heard on: 6th February, 2023. (Against the judgment Dated 06.09.2022 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Customs Reference No. 21-P of 2022)", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Yousaf Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC (E,C) CUSTOMS HOUSE, PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER\nVS\nZAIN UL ABIDIN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23443", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 818 = 2023 SLD 818 = 2023 PTD 488", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Sixth Schedule, Entry No. 151-Notification Letter C.No.2(2)L,P/2016, dated 31-08-2021-Port of clearance-Determination-Petitioner company was aggrieved of denial of authorities to clear goods imported by petitioner at Karachi Port-Plea raised by petitioner company was that total import for financial year was less than Rs.200 million and authorities were not allowing it to clear imported consignment at Karachi Port-Validity-Goods imported by petitioner company were destined for its home consumption at manufacturing unit situated at Federally Administered Tribal Area-Clear data was not readily available-Authorities could redress grievance of petitioner company if its import fell within the concession provided by Federal Board of Revenue through notification Letter C.No.2(2)L,P/2016, dated 31-08-2021-High Court directed petitioner company to approach relevant authorities at Karachi for doing the needful for release of consignment in terms of letter dated notification Letter C.No.2(2)L,P/2016, dated 31-08-2021-Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\nPakistan v. Hazrat Hussain 2018 SC 939 = 2018 PTD 1204 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=151", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2694-P of 2022, decided on 5th August, 2022, heard on: 5th August, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED ARSHAD ALI AND DR. KHURSHID IQBAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rauf Rohaila for Petitioner.\nQazi Babar Irshad, DAG for Federation.\nMukhtar Ahmad Maneri along with Arshad Hilali Law Officer and Sharifullah A.D. (Legal).", - "Petitioner Name:": "PRESENT: " - }, - { - "Case No.": "23444", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 819 = 2023 SLD 819 = 2023 PTD 492 = (2024) 130 TAX 671", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Words and Phrases – Meaning\nThe reference highlights authoritative legal dictionaries and law lexicons to define terms and phrases:\nMerriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law - Revised for legal terminology.\nWords and Phrases (Permanent Edition) Vol. 12, Thomson/West - Essential for legal interpretations.\nP. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon (4th Edition) Vol. 2 - Comprehensive for advanced legal definitions.\nBlack’s Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition) - Renowned for precise legal terminology.\nThese resources serve to clarify meanings essential for legal reasoning and judgments.\n(b) Administration of Justice – Principles of Natural Justice\nNatural Justice:\nThe principle of audi alteram partem ( no one should be condemned unheard ) is pivotal in legal proceedings.\nA written order must:\nConfront the affected party with relevant material.\nProvide an opportunity for the party to present objections (both factual and legal).\nRequirements of a Written Order:\nIt must constitute a speaking order, which explains the rationale and addresses concerns of affected parties.\nIt ensures transparency, accountability, and adherence to natural justice.\nJudicial Precedents:\nCases cited illustrate the application of these principles in various legal systems:\nCaritativo v. California (1958) and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank (1950) – Highlight procedural fairness.\nSelvarajan v. Race Relations Board (1976) – Reinforces the necessity of procedural safeguards.\n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) – Specific Case on Workers Welfare Fund (WWF)\nFacts:\nAuthorities demanded tax under the Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 without issuing a written order.\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue invalidated this demand, citing non-compliance with principles of natural justice.\nLegal Findings:\nWritten Orders:\nObligations such as WWF payments require determination and communication through a written order.\nThe written order can be part of the assessment order itself, provided it meets legal requirements.\nFailure in Proper Notice:\nLack of notice and written determination invalidates the demand.\nAdherence to natural justice is a minimum standard for such demands.\nHigh Court Ruling:\nThe High Court upheld the Tribunals decision, confirming that failure to observe the principles of natural justice rendered the tax demand unsustainable.\nRelevant Case Law:\nSeveral cases support the principle that written orders and proper notice are integral to legal proceedings, especially in matters creating liabilities.\nTakeaway\nThis passage underscores the foundational principles of natural justice, emphasizing the necessity of written and reasoned orders in legal and administrative decisions. It also provides insights into how these principles are upheld in tax-related cases, ensuring fairness and accountability in proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971=4", - "Case #": "P.T.R. No.112 of 2014, heard on 28th March, 2022, heard on: 28th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Liaquat Ali Chaudhry, Legal Advisor for Applicant.\nCh. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE\nVS\nMESSRS DESCON ENGINEERING LIMITED, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23445", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 820 = 2023 SLD 820 = 2023 PTD 499", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRXo", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.161, 153, 152-Failure to pay tax collected or deducted-Payments to non-residents-Payments for goods, services and contracts-Scope-Taxpayer was imposed upon a liability for its failure to deduct tax at the time of making payments under Ss. 152, 153 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Validity-Once it was established that the taxpayer was a withholding agent and payments fell within the domain of S.153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 then the taxpayer was the only person who could explain the nature of payment whether deductible or not by providing the record-Assessing officer had himself mentioned in the assessment order that the taxpayer was invited to bifurcate the inter-connection charges into those paid to foreign and local telecom operators, which divulged that it was in the knowledge of the assessing officer that some of the payments were made to foreign telecom operators and no tax was required to be deducted from such payments, but regardless of this he had applied the same yardstick for creating demand under S.161 on whole expenditure and such approach was against the law of natural justice-Matter was sent back to the assessing officer to examine the record in respect of nature of payment, quantum of tax deduction and status of the parties to whom the payments were made before finalization of proceedings initiated under Ss. 161, 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n87 Tax 2601; 89 Tax 430; 2000 PTD 2664 and 2012 PTD 122 ref.\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue v. Messrs Islam Steel Mills 2015 PTD 2335 and Messrs BILZ (Pvt.) Ltd. v. DCIT, Multan and another 2002 PTD 1 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,153,152", - "Case #": "I.T.As. Nos.816/IB and 817/IB of 2013, decided on 18th August, 2020, heard on: 18th August, 2020.", - "Judge Name:": " MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMTIAZ AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faheem Sikandar, DR for Petitioner.\nMs. Sadia Nazir, FCA for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, ISLAMABAD\nVs\nMessrs WI-TRIBE PAKISTAN LIMITED, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23446", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 821 = 2023 SLD 821 = 2023 PTD 505 = (2024) 130 TAX 629", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDRXk", - "Key Words:": "This case relates to the issuance of a show-cause notice under Section 122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and the constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan challenging its validity. Below is a summarized analysis of the legal principles and court findings in this matter:\nKey Legal Principles:\nMaintainability of a Constitutional Petition Against a Show-Cause Notice:\nA constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is generally not maintainable against a show-cause notice unless exceptional circumstances exist.\nThe High Court can intervene if the notice is found to be issued without lawful authority or is patently illegal.\nPre-conditions for Issuance of Notice Under Section 122(9):\nSection 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, provides that an amendment to an assessment can only be made if:\nThe assessment order is erroneous, and\nIt is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue.\nBoth elements must co-exist; they cannot be applied independently.\nDeficiency in the Show-Cause Notice:\nThe notice must explicitly identify:\nThe erroneous elements in the assessment order.\nThe resulting prejudice to the revenue.\nFailure to do so renders the notice invalid.\nJudicial Precedent:\nThe court referred to case law establishing that notices failing to meet statutory requirements are invalid:\nMessrs S.N.H. Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income-Tax Department (2004 PTD 330)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Jahangir Khan Tareen (2022 SCMR 92)\nFindings of the High Court:\nThe Additional Commissioner of Income Tax failed to elaborate on:\nSpecific errors in the assessment order.\nHow those errors prejudiced the revenue.\nThe High Court concluded that the notice did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 122(5A) and was therefore invalid.\nThe matter was remanded to the Additional Commissioner to reassess whether the assessment order was erroneous and caused prejudice to the revenue. The authority was directed to proceed only if these conditions were met.\nOutcome:\nThe constitutional petition was allowed.\nThe impugned show-cause notice was set aside.\nThe Additional Commissioner was directed to reevaluate the matter in light of the requirements under Section 122(5A).\nImportant Case Law Referenced:\nMessrs S.N.H. Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income-Tax Department (2004 PTD 330)\nGlaxo Laboratories Limited v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (1992 PTD 932)\nPakistan Oilfields Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2022 PTD 413)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Jahangir Khan Tareen (2022 SCMR 92)\nSignificance:\nThis case reaffirms that tax authorities must strictly adhere to statutory requirements when issuing notices under the Income Tax Ordinance. It also underscores the limited but essential role of constitutional courts in ensuring that statutory powers are exercised lawfully.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 1922=122(5A),(9)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1951 of 2017, decided on 22nd September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " AAMER FAROOQ, JUSTICE ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abad-ur-Rehman for Petitioner.\nSyed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi and Ms. Arooj Zeb Abbasi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS PAKISTAN OILFIELDS LIMITED THROUGH MANAGING DIRECTOR\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ISLAMABAD AND 4 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23447", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 822 = 2023 SLD 822 = 2023 PTD 513", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss. 46, 40B-Appeal to Appellate Tribunal-Scope-Department sought vacation of stay granted by the Tribunal wherein the operation of order passed by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under S.40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, was suspended till the outcome of appeal and the department was restrained from proceeding further-Validity-Appeal filed by the registered person was not maintainable as S. 46 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 did not give any right of appeal to the registered person to file an appeal before the Tribunal against an order passed by the FBR under S.40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990-No statutory right of appeal was available to the registered person-Application of department was accepted and order passed by the Tribunal was vacated.\n(b) Appeal-\n-Appeal cannot be claimed as a right unless provided by the statute.\nMughal Surgical (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.7 and others 2006 SCMR 590; Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1981 SC 94 and Malik Umar Aslam v. Mrs. Sumaira Aslam and others 2014 SCMR 45 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46,40B", - "Case #": "MA(R) STA No.17/IB in MA (Stay) STA No.581/IB in STA No.146/IB of 2019, decided on 27th May of 2019, heard on: 27th May, 2019.", - "Judge Name:": " M.M. Akram, Judicial Member and Nadir Mumtaz Warraich, Accountant Member ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shamshad Gul, DR for Appellant.\nRana Munir Hussain for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, SIALKOT\nVs\nMessrs GENERAL FAN COMPANY (PVT.) LTD., GUJRAT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23448", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 823 = 2023 SLD 823 = 2023 PTD 516", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTY", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.124, 221, 226-Constitutional petition-Appeal Effect Order, non-issuing of-Plea of rectification- Petitioner / taxpayer was aggrieved of non-issuance of Appeal Effect Order by authorities on the plea of pending rectification application-Validity-Inactions in discharge of statutory obligations, like filing of appeal before Appellate Tribunal within time and non-filing of reference was covered up by moving rectification application, which was not a regular proceeding-Application under S.221 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was meant to rectify a mistake, legal or factual, floating on record, where no interpretation or long drawn arguments were required to rectify it, for which limitation was five years-Proceeding in an application for rectification before Appellate Tribunal did not fall under S.226(b)(ii) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Commissioner was bound to issue Appeal Effect Order under S.124(4) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, within two months as order by Appellate Authority had attained finality-Commissioner had ample power, after implementation of order under S. 124(4) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, if rectification application was accepted, to take a remedial action for recovery of tax while giving effect to Appellate Tribunals order under relevant provisions of S. 124 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Excuse and grounds for non-implementation raised by authorities had no force-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nCommissioner of Income Tax Companys II, Karachi v. Messrs National Food Laboratories 1992 PTD 570 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=124,221,226", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.10593 of 2022, decided on 20th April, 2022, heard on: 20th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Ahmed Pervaiz and Saffi-ul-Hassan for Respondents.\nAsad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan.\nIshtiaq Ahmad, Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTO, Lahore. for Respondents.\nShahbaz Butt, Ibrahim Hassan, Asad Abbas Raza, Muhammad Usman Zia, Muhammad Ahsan Mahmood, Muhammad Adnan Afzal, Kashif Akbar Bandesha, Salman Farooq and M. Irfan Arif Sheikh for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS PRESSON DESCON INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD.\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23449", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 824 = 2023 SLD 824 = 2023 PTD 524", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTU", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 161, 153-Failure to pay tax collected or deducted-Payment for goods, services and contracts-Scope-Case against taxpayer related to non-deduction/non-payment of withholding tax which surfaced violation of the provisions of Ss.153, 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) had found that the Assessing Officer while framing the assessment order had chosen the figures at random from the details provided by the taxpayer without assigning any reasons and the assessing officer had not referred the documents which were not acceptable to him-Approach of the Assessing Officer was not in consonance with the practicing proceedings because tax was to be levied and charged on a clear and definite verdict-Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) had rightly found that the department should have given the detail of documents along with the party name which was on default in view of the provisions of Ss.153, 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) despite holding the legal flaw in framing the assessment order had given a chance to the department to establish the default against the taxpayer-Filing of appeal against such an order was misconceived and against the facts particularly when the department had nothing to rebut the finding rendered by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals)-Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,153", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No.1350/LB of 2015, decided on 22nd June, 2020, heard on: 22nd June, 2020.", - "Judge Name:": " MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Arshad, DR for Petitioner.\nRiaz Ahmed Raja, ITP for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, WITHHOLDING TAX ZONE, RTO, MULTAN\nVS\nMESSRS SHAH SONS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. INDUSTRIAL ESTATE MULTAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23450", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 825 = 2023 SLD 825 = 2023 PTD 527 = (2024) 129 TAX 75", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitutional Petition & Constitutional Matter Decision\nPrinciple: Courts should avoid deciding larger constitutional issues if the case can be resolved on narrower or other grounds. The cardinal principle is to decide only what is necessary for the case.\nPrecedents:\nLDA v. Imrana Tiwana, 2015 SCMR 1739\nS A Haroon v. Collector of Customs, PLD 1959 SC 177\nPakistan v. Qazi Ziauddin, PLD 1962 SC 440\n(b) Role of Customs Department in Tax Collection\nIssue: Whether the Customs Department, under S.148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, has a role beyond acting as a collecting agent for advance tax.\nConclusion: The Customs Department merely acts as a tax collecting agent and has no jurisdiction over income tax matters.\nPrecedent:\nPakistan (FBR) v. Hazrat Hussain, 2018 SCMR 939\n(c) Interpretation of Statutes - Headings\nIssue: Do headings control the meaning and scope of statutory sections?\nConclusion: Headings may assist in interpretation but cannot restrict the plain words of a section. They dont define scope but may help if words are ambiguous.\n(d) Redundancy in Interpretation of Statutes\nPrinciple: Redundancy should not be attributed to legislation or its words. Courts should not add words that arent expressly or reasonably implied.\nPrecedents:\nCollector of Sales Tax v. Mega Tech, 2005 SCMR 1166\nIqbal Hussain v. Pakistan, 2010 PTD 2338\n(e) Customs Act (1969) – Jurisdiction of Customs Authorities Post-Release of Goods\nIssue: Whether Customs authorities can reassess taxes after goods are released and cleared.\nConclusion: Customs authorities cannot reassess or recover taxes after goods have been cleared. Jurisdiction for reassessment of income or sales tax lies with Inland Revenue.\nCase Decision: Show-cause notices issued by Customs for reassessment after clearance were without jurisdiction and thus set aside.\nPrecedents:\nFederation of Pakistan v. Durrani Ceramics, 2014 SCMR 1630\nPakistan (FBR) v. Hazrat Hussain, 2018 SCMR 939", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,79,80,179Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C.P. No.D-5482 of 2017, (And connected matters, particularized in the Schedule1 hereto) decided on 29th November, 2022. Dates of hearing: 7th and 15th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hyder Ali Khan, Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Sami-ur-Rehman Khan, Tasawwar Hashmi, Fahad Ali Hashmi, Saifullah Sachwani and Vivek Harani for Petitioners.\nShahid Ali Qureshi, Dr. Shah Nawaz Memon, Khalid Rajpar, Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Ms. Fozia M. Murad, Syed Mohsin Imam Wasti, Mohabat Hussain Awan, Aatif Awan, Muhammad Bilal Bhatti, Muhammad Rashid Arfi, Parvaiz Ahmed Memon, Bilal Memon, Qaim Ali Memon, Ms. Bushra Zia and Irfan Mir Halepota for Respondents.\nSyed Yasir Ahmed Shah, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NESTLE PAKISTAN LIMITED THROUGH AUTHORIZED OFFICER AND OTHERS\nVS\nTHE FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE THROUGH CHAIRMAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23451", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 826 = 2023 SLD 826 = 2023 PTD 541", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQS8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.161-Income Tax Rules, 2002, R.44(4)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Tax due-Recovery-Reconciliation- Dispute was with regard to notice of recovery of tax due issued under S.161 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Validity-Rational in S. 161(1B) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was that a tax liable to be adjusted against tax due, could not be recovered when tax due had already been paid- Recovery of any amount, thereafter, not adjustable against tax due for relevant period was to be refunded and whole exercise for recovery would be futile, as tax collected would not become part of National Exchequer rather would burden it with an expense which could have been expended for recovery of tax due- Pursuit of creating such demands by tax administrators, to meet budgetary targets, not only wasted resource and revenue but burdened judicial hierarchy up till Supreme Court- There must, at least initially, be some reason or information available with Commissioner for him to conclude that there was, or could have been, a failure to deduct tax- All tax authorities for the purpose of S.161 Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 were to identify payments, whether singly or in lump sum (i.e.) as part of a broader class or category of such payments-Triggering event for issuance of Notice was a failure to either collect tax or deduct it-Commissioner was to point out a payment to cast burden wholly or solely on the taxpayer-After issuance of Notice, the first thing needed to be verified was, whether tax, required to be deducted or collected, of a person had been paid or not-If tax liability for relevant tax year was found paid/discharged, the Commissioner could proceed only to impose default surcharge and penalty-Reconciliation, under R. 44(4) of Income Tax Rules, 2002, could not be called without first ensuring filing of statements under the rule-High Court set aside order in question as the same was passed by authorities ignoring s passed by Superior Courts-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 1325 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s PEPCO Pakistan 2015 PTD 863 fol.\nPepsi Cola International (Private) Limited through Authorized Representative v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad and another 2022 PTD 51; Northern Power Generation Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2015 PTD 2052; Nagina Silk Mill, Lyallpur v. The Income-Tax Officer, A-Ward, Lyallpur and another PLD 1963 SC 322; M/s Pakistan Mobile Communication (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad, (Civil Appeals Nos. 1091-1092/2009 etc.); Habib Bank Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division and 5 others 2013 PTD 1659; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s. PEPCO Pakistan 2015 PTD 863; Sui Northern Gas Pipelines v. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue and others 2014 PTD 1939; Messrs Riaz Bottlers (Pvt.) Ltd. through Tax Manager v. Lahore Electric Supply Company (LESCO) through Chief Executive and 3 others 2010 PTD 1295 and Messrs BILZ (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another 2002 PTD 1 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.81107 of 2021, decided on 1st April, 2022, heard on: 1st April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Akram Raja for Petitioner.\nMirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan.\nAnas Sheikh for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PEPSI COLA INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LIMITED\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23452", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 827 = 2023 SLD 827 = 2023 PTD 552", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss.11, 4, 73-SRO No. 1125(I)/2011, dated: 31-12-2011-Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded-Zero-rating-Scope-Appellant showed zero-rated supplies of goods to various registered persons-Cross-matching of the sales tax returns of appellant with the buyers returns revealed that the buyers were not active taxpayers; that purchases from the appellant were not shown and that the buyers did not fall in the zero-rated sector-Appellant was ordered to pay sales tax along with default surcharge and penalty-Validity-Pre-requisite for availing benefit of zero-rating under the SRO No. 1125(I)/2011, dated: 31-12-2011, three conditions for the qualifying person to be fulfilled were (i) doing business in five major zero-rated sectors, (ii) registered under the Act as manufacturer, importer, exporter or wholesalers, (iii) appearing as an active person at ATL-All such conditions had duly been met with by the appellant-Payments had also been received through banking channel as required under S. 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990-Appeal was accepted and the impugned orders were set aside.\n(b) Taxation-\n-Tax cannot be levied on presumptions, assumptions, whims and conjectures for which there is no room in the fiscal statutes.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-No one would suffer for the act of another and nobody could be punished for the wrong of others.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,4,73", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No.315/LB of 2014, decided on 7th October, 2021, heard on: 24th September, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khubaib Ahmed for Appellant.\nMs. Amina Batool, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS TOWN CRIER (PVT.) LTD. FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23453", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 828 = 2023 SLD 828 = 2023 PTD 567", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJDQTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-S.131-Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal-Stay of proceedings-Scope-Appellant/assessee sought stay of proceedings in consequence of an order passed by Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals)-Validity-Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) had annulled the order of the assessing officer, therefore, no demand existed against the appellant/assessee-Department could only proceed afresh if the facts of the case and legal provisions so warranted-Request for granting stay of proceedings was not allowed.\n(b) Words and phrases-\n-Annulment-Defined.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "M.A. (Stay) No.92/LB of 2021, decided on 7th January, 2021, heard on: 7th January, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD AZAM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahbaz Butt for Applicant.\nAman Ullah Virk, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS EMIRATES SUPPLY CHAIN SERVICES (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CRTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23454", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1999 2275 = 1999 SLD 2275 = 1999 ITR 174", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNCs", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.133, 161, 174-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10-A-Reference-Tax demand-Record, maintenance of-Limitation-Failure to pay tax collected or deducted-Authorities issued notice for recovery of tax for the period beyond six years-Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue set aside the demand created by tax authorities as the same was barred by time-Validity-In the event that State generates a tax demand by making an adverse presumption against taxpayer that he has not discharged his obligation to withhold tax on behalf of the State, due to failure of such taxpayer to produce tax records, even though the time period prescribed by law for preservation and maintenance of tax records has already passed, such demand cannot be considered to be in accordance with law and qualifies as confiscatory in nature-Such adverse presumption by tax authorities due to failure of production of tax records after prescribed period under S.174 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, fell foul of the guarantee under Art. 10-A of the Constitution, which promises that civil rights and obligations are to be adjudicated fairly through due process-Any tax demand generated pursuant to proceedings initiated under S.161 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on the basis of taxpayers failure to produce tax record beyond the period prescribed for preservation of such records under S. 174 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was not backed by legal authority- Reference was dismissed, in circumstances.\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division and 5 others 2013 PTD 1659; The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-1, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 1325; Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. v. Federal Board of Revenue 2016 PTD 2074 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Lahore v. M/s Panther Sports and Rubber Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2022 SCMR 1135 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,161,164Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "Date OF JUDGMENT:    24/03/1999", - "Judge Name:": " Bench: S.P. Bharucha, V.N. Khare, A.P. Misra", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BANGALORE \nV. \nVENKATESWARA HATCHERIES (P) LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23455", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 948 = 2023 SLD 948 = 2023 PTD 569", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNDk", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.133, 161, 174-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10-A-Reference-Tax demand-Record, maintenance of-Limitation-Failure to pay tax collected or deducted-Authorities issued notice for recovery of tax for the period beyond six years-Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue set aside the demand created by tax authorities as the same was barred by time-Validity-In the event that State generates a tax demand by making an adverse presumption against taxpayer that he has not discharged his obligation to withhold tax on behalf of the State, due to failure of such taxpayer to produce tax records, even though the time period prescribed by law for preservation and maintenance of tax records has already passed, such demand cannot be considered to be in accordance with law and qualifies as confiscatory in nature-Such adverse presumption by tax authorities due to failure of production of tax records after prescribed period under S.174 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, fell foul of the guarantee under Art. 10-A of the Constitution, which promises that civil rights and obligations are to be adjudicated fairly through due process-Any tax demand generated pursuant to proceedings initiated under S.161 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on the basis of taxpayers failure to produce tax record beyond the period prescribed for preservation of such records under S. 174 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was not backed by legal authority- Reference was dismissed, in circumstances.\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division and 5 others 2013 PTD 1659; The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-1, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 1325; Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. v. Federal Board of Revenue 2016 PTD 2074 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Lahore v. M/s Panther Sports and Rubber Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2022 SCMR 1135 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,161,174,174(3),205Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10AIncome Tax Rules, 2002=44", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No.253 of 2015, decided on 19th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB AND BABAR SATTAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saeed Ahmed Zaidi for Applicant.\nAdnan Haider Randhawa for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nMESSRS ISLAMABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED, ISLAMABAD (IESCO)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23456", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 949 = 2023 SLD 949 = 2023 PTD 576", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNDg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S.25(1)-Access to record and documents-Pre-conditions-Phrase as an when required - Scope-Event or stage when said phrase may come into play and is given some meaning is when a Commissioner examines return of a tax payer, he may have some queries which might be tempting to call record as he may not be able to reconcile and/or resolve them through return statement-Such queries must be understood and settled to the satisfaction of the Commissioner before he can make up his mind further-Audit is nowhere in the scheme when such questions come for consideration after going through the returns while the Commissioner acts under 25(1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990- Record may satisfy curious mind but queries must be genuine at the time of calling the record which could not have been answered without going through the record required- Record calling cannot be a roving exercise and cannot be a courtesy call either.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S.25(1)-Access to record and documents-Commissioner, jurisdiction of-Scope-Requirements of S.25(1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, are neither unfettered nor are so liberal that a hunting expedition would commence-There has to be an event or occasion when Commissioner requires record and documents maintained under Sales Tax Act, 1990, or any other Act- Even requiring documents/record for satisfaction of queries must be revealed so that notice may not transform into a hunt.\nPLD 2019 Sindh 144 and 8 N.J. Misc. 418 (1930) rel.\n(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S.25(2)-Access to record and documents- Phrase on the basis of the record , obtained under subsection (1) -Applicability-Phrase applies to Commissioners act of authorizing officer to conduct audit, i.e., selecting taxpayer for an audit, and not officers act of conducting audit itself- Provision of S.25(2) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, does not concern the manner in which audit is to be conducted but specifically concerns selection of a person for an audit, inquiry or investigation.\nDewan Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others Suit 850/2020 and others and Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2002 PTD 1574 rel.\n(d) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S.25(1) & (2)-Access to record and documents-Commissioner, duty of-Scope-Two provisions of S.25 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, are distinct and different but inseparable as well-Commissioner who calls documents and/or record of taxpayer for the satisfaction of queries and objections in context of returns, he must have formed a view for officer of Inland Revenue to be communicated for conducting audit-Provision of S.25(2) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, cannot work independently unless Commissioner has framed such obligations on the basis of record that he obtained.\n2016 PTD 1429 rel.\n(e) Constitution of Pakistan-Art.199-Judicial review-Scope-All administrative actions are subject to judicial review-To judicially review such actions, Courts must be able to see its legitimacy, based on which the authority has acted-If no legitimate occasions are disclosed, there is no basis on which an action can be judicially reviewed-That is precisely why the Courts have consistently read in the requirement to provide reasons in all statutes, even where such requirement is not explicitly mentioned in a statute.\nMuhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630; Zahir Shah v. Muhammad Usman Ghani - 2005 YLR 1394; Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2005 PTD 152 and Airport Support Services v. Airport Manager, Quid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi 1998 SCMR 2268 rel.\n(f) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss.25 & 72B-Selection of case for audit-Federal Board of Revenue and Commissioner-Jurisdictions-Distinction-Petitioners were taxpayers who were aggrieved of selection of their cases for audit by Commission on the directions of Federal Board of Revenue-Validity-Powers of Commissioner under S.25 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and powers of Federal Board of Revenue under S.72B of Sales Tax Act, 1990, were independent-Former was based on subjective criteria and Commissioner was empowered to critically analyze returns of taxpayer-While the Commissioner was required to apply his mind to case of individual taxpayer and decide if there were reasons to select a taxpayer for audit-Federal Board of Revenues powers under S.72B of Sales Tax Act, 1990, were objective in substance and were done under an objective policy for that year and then taxpayers were selected and/or a sector or sectors of taxpayers were selected through computer balloting on the basis of criterion-Where the Commissioner was to apply mind and provide reasons for selection, the later scheme of Federal Board of Revenue under S.72B of Sales Tax Act, 1990, enabled it to select a taxpayer through random and parametric balloting based on the development of a software which tookover the task of a Commissioner- It was an automatic selection and in some cases even notices calling for documents/record under S.25(1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 under automatic audit selection-In the present case the entire exercise by Commissioner was carried out at the behest and on directions of Federal Board of Revenue and resulted in demand created against petitioners and Federal Board of Revenue itself was responsible for such foul play-High Court quashed notices issued by authorities-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue v. Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills 2018 SCMR 1328; Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 PTD 1484; Indus Motors Co. Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 PTD 297; Hyundai Nishat Motor v. The Federal Board of Revenue - W.P. No.25793 of 2021; Wateen Telecoms case 2019 PTD 1030; Assistant Director (I & I) v. B.R. Herman PLD 1992 SC 485; Saif-ur-Rehman v. Additional District Judge and others 2018 SCMR 1885; Muhammad Nawaz Chandio v. Muhammad Ismail Rahu and others 2016 SCMR 875; Dilawar Hussain and others v. Province of Sindh and others PLD 2016 SC 514; Director General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others 2016 SCMR 447 and Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25,25(1),25(2),72BConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Federal Excise Act, 2005=46", - "Case #": "C.P. No.D-4729 of 2021 along with 89 others petitions and three High Court Appeals (As per Annexure A to this judgment) decided on 20th December, 2021. Dates of hearing: 29th September, 8th, 15th, 22nd and 29th November, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hyder Ali Khan, along with Sami ur Rehman, Shaheer Roshan and Hamza Waheed, Ali Almani, Arshad Hussain, Naeem Suleman, Ovais Ali Shah along with Ms. Maryam Riaz, Abdul Rahim Lakhani, Abdul Jabbar Mallah, Attta Muhammad Qureshi, Ijaz Ahmed, M. Saleem Mangrio along with Vivek Herani, Iqbal Salman Pasha, Anwar Kashif Mumtaz, Muhammad Aleem, Maqbool Hussain Shah, Ms. Lubna Pervez, Muhammad Usman Alam, Darvesh K. Mandan, Imran Ali Abro, Syed Mohsin Ali, Syed Muhammad Hassan Meerza, Naveed Sultan, Manzar Hussain Memon, Irfan Ali Shaikh, M. Amin Bakdukda, Inzmam Sharif holds brief for Qazi Umair Ali, Ghazanfar Ali Jatoi, Mansoor Ali Ghanghro, Aamir Ali Shaikh, Rehmat Shakil, Ms. Tehmina Ashraf and Waseem Shaikh for Petitioners.\nAmeer Bux Metlo, Shahid Ali Qureshi, Ayaz Sarwar Jamali along with Raja Love Kush, Imran Ali Metlo, Dr. Shah Nawaz Memon, along with Ms. Fozia M. Murad Tunio, Aqeel Ahmed Khan, Qaim Ali Memon, Imran Ali Mithani, Fayaz Ali Metlo, along with Barkat Ali Metlo, Rana Sakhawat Ali, Syed Shafqat Ali Shah Masoomi, Munawar Ali Memon, Barrister Ali Tahir, Haider Naqi, Chaudhry Mehmood Anwar, Touqeer Ahmed, Irfan Mir Halepota, Ms. Bushra Zia holding brief for Zubair Hashmi, Imtiaz Ali Solangi, Akhtar Jabbar Shaikh, Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Deputy Attorney General, Barrister Hussain Bohra, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAZIR ALI INDUSTRIES LTD.\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23457", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 950 = 2023 SLD 950 = 2023 PTD 603 = (2023) 127 TAX 780", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNHo", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) - Oral Gift and Non-registration\nIssue: Whether an unregistered oral gift of immovable property can be accepted for tax purposes despite the requirement for registration under the Registration Act, 1908 (S.17).\nConclusion:\nLegal Background:\nUnder the Registration Act, 1908, Section 17, a gift deed involving immovable property must be registered. However, an oral gift is an exception to this requirement.\nFor an oral gift to be legally valid, three key elements must be present:\nOffer of the gift.\nAcceptance of the gift.\nDelivery of possession of the property.\nDespite the lack of registration, an oral gift confers valid title upon the donee if these elements are fulfilled.\nThe fact that the gift had not been recorded in the relevant revenue records was deemed immaterial and did not invalidate the gift.\nTax Law Considerations:\nWhile for income tax purposes, it is prudent to record property transactions (including gifts) in the revenue record to prevent tax avoidance, this does not invalidate the gift itself.\nThe Income Tax Appellate Tribunals decision was upheld, confirming the legal validity of the oral gift and dismissing the authorities objections.\nPrecedents:\nMuhammad Zaman Khan v. The Additional Chief Land Commissioner, 1986 SCMR 1121.\nMst. Saadia v. Mst. Gul Bibi, 2016 SCMR 662.\nFinal Decision: The High Court declined to interfere with the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and the appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=136Registration Act, 1908=17", - "Case #": "Tax Appeals Nos.147, 123, 124, 238, 290, 291 and 292 of 2000, decided on 8th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Aamer Farooq, Chief Justice and Saman Rafat Imtiaz, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mustasim Malik Toor for Appellant.\nSardar Taimoor Aslam Khan and Mudassar Abbas for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX/WEALTH TAX, ISLAMABAD and others\nVs\nHAMEEDA BEGUM and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23458", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 951 = 2023 SLD 951 = 2023 YLR 1054", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJTNHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-Ss. 302, 324, 449 337-F(v)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah- Appreciation of evidence-Ocular account-Scope-Accused were charged for committing murder of two persons of the complainant party and injuring one person by firing, complainant party made firing in defence, due to which one person of the accused party was hit and died-Ocular account of the incident had been furnished by complainant and injured-Complainant reiterated the whole story of the case as mentioned in the FIR-Said witness had been subjected to lengthy and taxing cross-examination through skilful hand, but nothing favourable to defence could be extracted from his mouth while answering the questions of defence-Complainant remained stuck to his stance taken in the FIR and site plan-Complainant correctly pointed out the places of the deceased, injured and the accused at the time of occurrence-Record showed that the occurrence had taken place inside the house of the complainant at 08:00 p.m. but in the recent days marriage of injured had taken place in the house and the prosecution had brought ample evidence on file about availability of plenty of light lit in the house at the time of occurrence, therefore, identification of accused was quite possible, particularly, when they were previously known to the complainant party-Nothing was extracted from the mouth of the complainant to the effect that on the day and time of occurrence he was not present in the house and was present somewhere else-As per statement of complainant, he was 62 years old; therefore, his presence in his house at the time of incident was quite natural and was appealable to a prudent mind-Another eye-witness aged 24/25 years, who had stamp of injuries on her person appeared and remained stuck to her initial stance and corroborated the testimony of complainant on each and every aspect of the occurrence i.e. the day, time and place of occurrence as well as the mode and manner in which the occurrence took place-Injured witness had also furnished true account of the events occurred at the spot-Said witness had not tried to minimize the role of firing on their behalf by deceased-Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused persons through cogent and confidence direct/ocular evidence-Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-Ss. 302, 324, 449 337-F(v)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah- Appreciation of evidence-Place of occurrence was not doubtful-Scope-Accused were charged for committing murder of two persons of the complainant party and injuring one person by firing, complainant party made firing in defence, due to which one person of the accused party was hit and died-In the present case, from the places of deceased persons as well as injured, blood was secured by the Investigating Officer along with last worn bloodstained garments of the deceased and that of injured was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, positive report whereof corroborated the ocular account of the eye-witnesses and proved the crime spot to be the same place as alleged by the eye-witnesses-Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused persons through cogent and confidence direct/ocular evidence-Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-Ss. 302, 324, 449 337-F(v)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah- Appreciation of evidence-Recovery of weapon of offence and crime empties-Reliance-Scope-Accused were charged for committing murder of two persons of the complainant party and injuring one person by firing, complainant party made firing in defence, due to which one person of the accused party was hit and died-Forensic Science Laboratory Report with regard to Kalashnikovs of deceased persons produced by complainant to the author of Murasila at the time of report were also sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory by the Investigating Officer along with 14 and 04 crime empties-According to Forensic Science Laboratory Report 14 empties were fired from the Kalashnikov of accused/deceased and 04 from that of deceased-Said piece of circumstantial evidence also corroborated the ocular account furnished by the eye-witnesses-Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused persons through cogent and confidence direct/ocular evidence-Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-Ss. 302, 324, 449 337-F(v)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah- Appreciation of evidence-Medical evidence-Scope-Accused were charged for committing murder of two persons of the complainant party and injuring one person by firing, complainant party made firing in defence, due to which one person of the accused party was hit and died-Statement of Lady Medical Officer, who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased and examined injured, also supported the ocular account of the prosecutions case-According to post-mortem report, lady deceased met her unnatural death due to firearm injuries to her vital organ like heart-Similarly, as per Medico-Legal Report, injured had sustained firearm injuries-Medical Officer, who had conducted autopsy on the dead body of deceased persons appeared in the witness box and affirmed the death of both the deceased as unnatural due to firearm injuries-All the deceased had received firearms injuries on their bodies having different dimensions meaning thereby that different weapons had been used in the commission of offence-Medical evidence supported the eye-witnesss account-Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused persons through cogent and confidence direct/ocular evidence-Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-Ss. 302, 324, 449 337-F(v)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah- Appreciation of evidence-Motive was proved-Scope-Accused were charged for committing murder of two persons of the complainant party and injuring one person by firing, complainant party made firing in defence, due to which one person of the accused party was hit and died-Motive behind the occurrence was that some 14/15 years prior to the occurrence, deceased lady/relative of accused party had eloped with brother-in-law of the complainant, due to which, incident took place-Record showed that motive advanced by the complainant had not only been proved by the prosecution in the case but also admitted by the accused party in FIR wherein it had been alleged that on the relevant night there was a Jirga between the parties over the issue of elopement of deceased lady with brother-in-law of the complainant-Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused persons through cogent and confidence direct/ocular evidence-Appeal was dismissed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=34,302,324,337F(v),449", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 1450-P of 2019, decided on 27th January, 2022, heard on: 27th January, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Rooh ul Amin Khan and Syed Arshad Ali Shah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Altaf Khan and Muhammad Fahim for Appellants.\nMuhammad Nisar, A.A.G. for the State.\nSyed Mubashir Shah for Respondent No.2", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAHID MURAD and another-Appellants\nVersus\nThe STATE and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23459", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 952 = 2023 SLD 952 = 2023 PTD 644 = (2023) 127 TAX 829", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) - Sections 3(1A), 71, and Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007 - Steel Re-Rolling Mills\n•\nIssue: Whether steel re-rolling mills (respondents) are liable under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 despite the applicability of the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007.\n•\nConclusion:\no\nThe Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007 provide a specific mechanism for the imposition of sales tax on steel re-rollers, which includes a final discharge of tax liability.\no\nSection 71 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 enables the creation of a special procedure, and the Special Procedures Rules were made in accordance with it. These rules contain a non-obstante clause that overrides the general provisions of the Act.\no\nThe respondents, having complied with the prescribed procedure and tax mechanism, were entitled to treat the tax payment as a final discharge of their liability.\no\nThe Tax Departments argument that they were liable under Section 3(1A) was rejected because the special procedures for steel re-rollers, as outlined in the Special Procedures Rules, superseded the general provisions.\no\nThe petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.\n•\nReference: Zak Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, 2020 SCMR 131 (not applicable).\n________________________________________\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan - Article 185(3) - Tax Laws and Petitions for Leave to Appeal\n•\nIssue: The importance of attaching relevant provisions of the law with petitions/appeals before the Supreme Court in tax cases.\n•\nConclusion:\no\nThe Supreme Court observed that tax laws are frequently subject to changes, often multiple times within a year. As a result, it is essential for petitioners or appellants to attach the relevant provisions of the law as they stood at the time of the dispute when filing appeals or petitions.\no\nThe failure to do so causes unnecessary delays, as courts have to spend time identifying the law applicable to the case, which could otherwise be avoided.\n________________________________________\n(c) Precedent - Requirement for Similar Law\n•\nIssue: The criteria for a case to constitute a precedent.\n•\nConclusion:\no\nFor a case to be considered as a precedent, the law interpreted in the prior case must be the same or similar to the law under consideration in the current case.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,3(1A),4,71Sales Tax Rules, 2006=58H", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3134 and 3135 of 2022, decided on 30th January, 2023. (Against the judgment Dated 22.06.2022 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in Sales Tax Reference Applications Nos. 03 and 04 of 2021), heard on: 30th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, YAHYA AFRIDI, JUSTICEAND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahsan Ahmad Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court and Khalid Aziz, Assistant Director, RTO, Quetta for Petitioners (in both cases)\nTariq Mahmood, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (has filed caveat) (in C.P. No. 3134 of 2022)\nNemo for Respondent (in C.P. No. 3135 of 2022)", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, QUETTA\nVS\nMESSRS HAJVAIRY STEEL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED, QUETTA AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23460", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 953 = 2023 SLD 953 = 2023 PTD 649 = 2023 PTCL 856", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.25, 177-Selection of case for audit-Word reasons-Scope-Petitioner taxpayer was aggrieved of letter and notices issued by authorities selecting its case for audit-Validity-Word reason connotes an expression giving justification for an action, a ground to explain something, a consensus of informed thoughts whether factual or legal-Reasons should be so explicit so as to catch ones eye at the first glimpse and should not be a leap in a dark or a subject of fishing and roving expedition, but has to be based on sound principles of law-Before conducting audit, department is legally obliged to muster those grounds after proper application of mind and thereafter, while confronting taxpayer about selecting the case for audit, mindful as well as meaningful reasons have to be advanced, which have to be convincingly intimated to taxpayer to enable the latter to furnish a suitable reply and advance objections, if any, and those reasons should be based on independent application of mind and not on the basis of some unfounded notions, or capricious believes-Requirements of section 25 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, would not be fulfilled until and unless proper, just and identifiable reasons were intimated to taxpayer with regard to selection of its case for audit-Only when such reasons were given and thereafter if no compelling response was received, the case could be selected for audit-Other parameters as enshrined under S.25 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, would then come into play-Such requirement of law could not be termed to be simply procedural only-High Court vacated letter and subsequent notices in question as those were not in accordance with law and directed that authorities were fully authorized under the law that if they had certain requisite material for selecting case of petitioner for audit, the same should be communicated to petitioner and proceedings could be initiated afresh in accordance with law-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue, Sialkot and others v. Messrs Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills and others 2018 SCMR 1328; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Jahangir Khan Tareen and others 2022 SCMR 92 and Dr. Iqrar Ahmad Khan v. Dr. Muhammad Ashraf and others 2021 SCMR 1509 distinguished.\nPakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 PTD 1484; Indus Motor Company Limited and others v. Pakistan and others 2020 PTD 297; Wateen Telecom Ltd. through Authorized Attorney v. Sindh through The Secretary of Ministry of Finance Government of Sindh, Karachi and 2 others 2019 PTD 1030; Hyundai Nishat Motor (Pvt.) Limited v. The Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman and others PTCL 2022 CL. 56; Dewan Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others PTCL 2022 CL. 67; Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others 2022 PTD 1574 and Raza Motor Industries v. The Federation of Pakistan and others 2022 PTD 19 rel.\nMuhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Central Secretariat, Islamabad and others 2015 SCMR 630; Zain Yar Khan v. The Chief Engineer, C.R.B.C., WAPDA. D.I. Khan and another 1998 SCMR 2419; Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268; Amanullah Khan and others v. The Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 1990 SC 1092; Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary and 3 others v. Mejee Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Mardan and others 1997 SCMR 1804; Director Food, N.W.F.P and another v. Messrs Madina Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 18 others PLD 2001 SC 1; Shahida Bibi and others v. Habib Bank Limited and others PLD 2016 SC 995; Zia ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed Hussain and others 2014 SCMR 1015; Daniyal Aziz v. Muhammad Tariq Anis and others 2017 CLC Note 46; Muhammad Anwar and others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum and others PLD 2013 SC 255; Arslan Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Officer Inland Revenue and others 2015 PTD 448; Port Qasim Authority through Secretary v. Executive District Officer (Revenue), Karachi and others 2017 YLR Note 14; Shakeel Ahmed v. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through President and others 2017 PLC (C.S.) Note 76; Suo Motu Case No.18 of 2010: In the matter of (Violation of Public Procurement Rules, 2004) PLD 2011 SC 927; Haji Khan Bhatti v. Province of Sindh and 4 others 2017 CLC 1650; Shahnawaz Mallah and 2 others v. Raza Muhammad Brohi and 8 others 2013 CLC 792; Muhammad Tariq Khan v. Khawaja Muhammad Jawad Asami and others 2007 SCMR 818; Mst. Balqees Begum v. Additional District Judge and others 2020 CLC 1950; Executive District Officer (Education), Rawalpindi v. Muhammad Younas 2007 SCMR 1835; Moulana Atta-ur-Rehman v. Al-Hajj Sardar Umar Farooq and others PLD 2008 SC 663; Omer Ismail Khalid and others v. Pakistan Medical and Dental Council and others PLD 2015 Isl. 65; Asad Jamal Daudpoto v. Assistant Commissioner Ratodero and 4 others 2020 CLC 1945; Shafqat Ali Shah v. Nasreen Akhtar and 3 others PLD 2020 Pesh. 148; Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2010 SC 483 and Atlis Honda Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 PTD 866 ref.\n(b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)-\n-S.24A-Speaking order-Scope-Parameters as enshrined under S.24A of General Clauses Act, 1897, with regard to exercise of discretion by an executive authority for giving reasons for its decision are mandatory-Any action taken by an executive authority in violation of such principle is liable to be struck down.\nMuhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Central Secretariat, Islamabad and others 2015 SCMR 630; Zain Yar Khan v The Chief Engineer, C.R.B.C., WAPDA. D.I. Khan and another 1998 SCMR 2419; Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268; Amanullah Khan and others v. The Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 1990 SC 1092 and Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary and 3 others v. Mejee Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Mardan and others 1997 SCMR 1804 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=25,177", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-1079 of 2022, decided on 4th October, 2022, heard on: 22nd August, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND RASHIDA ASAD, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mushtaq Hussain Qazi for Petitioner.\nPir Riaz Muhammad Shah, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan (DAG) for Respondent No.1.\nDr. Shah Nawaz for Respondents Nos.2 to 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS ZAM ZAM LPG (PVT.) LIMITED THROUGH ATTORNEY\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY/CHAIRMAN REVENUE DIVISION AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23461", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 954 = 2023 SLD 954 = 2023 PTD 662", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzU", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.196-Reference-Redemption fine-Release of vehicle-Tampered chasis number-Authorities were aggrieved of release of vehicle which was confiscated for smuggling of petrol-Customs Appellate Tribunal released the vehicle on deposit of 20% redemption fine-Validity-Vehicle in question had tampered chasis number and same was proved from unchallenged forensic report-Vehicle was rightly confiscated by Custom Authorities-Customs Appellate Tribunal committed grave error by releasing vehicle in question subject to payment of 20% redemption fine on its custom value-High Court set aside the order passed by Customs Appellate Tribunal which overlooked forensic report vis- -vis tempered chasis number and order of authorities confiscating vehicle was upheld-Reference was allowed, in circumstances.\nChaudary Maqbool Ahmed v. Customs, Federal Excise and Sales Tax, Appellate Tribunal 2009 PTD 77 and Noor Muhammad v. Customs Appellate Tribunal, Peshawar 2020 SCMR 246 rel", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "Customs Reference Application No.73 of 2020, decided on 4th August, 2022, heard on: 1st August, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHEER-UD-DIN KAKAR AND MUHAMMAD AAMIR NAWAZ RANA, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Changaiz Baloch for Applicant.\nMazhar Ali Khan and Yasmeen Khattale for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF GAWADAR\nVs\nSYED SHABBIR AHMED SHAH AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23462", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 955 = 2023 SLD 955 = 2023 PTD 666", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 3, 3(1A), 24-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.249-A, 365-K, 561-A-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199-Constitutional petition-Quashing of criminal proceedings without petitioner approaching Trial Court-Recovery of bogus tax returns- Initiation of proceedings-Limitation-Petitioner was accused of committing fraud in receiving bogus tax returns-Petitioner sought quashing of his case without filing application under Ss.249-A/265-K, Cr.P.C., before Trial Court-Plea raised by petitioner was that proceedings were initiated beyond period of limitation-Validity-It was the third time when authorities proposed to initiate civil / criminal proceedings against petitioner, which twice had culminated/dropped and finalized in favour of petitioner- Proceedings initiated by authorities were not in accordance with law- Proceedings of FIR were lodged after 11 years of tax fraud, if any, and authorities required the petitioner to submit accounts details, documents etc., pertaining to that period which was beyond the mandatory period as provided under S. 24 of Sales Tax Act, 1990- Criminal proceedings against petitioner fell within exceptional circumstances and he was entitled that FIR lodged against him be quashed-High Court quashed FIR lodged against petitioner and all criminal aspects emanating from that FIR were declared null and void and of no legal effect-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nMuhammad Measum and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and others 2015 PTD 702; Decision of the Honble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Appeals Nos.1475 to 1479 of 2015; Zaheer Ahmed v. Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation-IR and others (C.P. No.D-3337 of 2013); Messrs Popular Juice Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue and others 2021 PTD 1329; Lucky Cement v. Federation of Pakistan and others (C.P. No.D-216 of 2013); Messrs Yasir Enterprises through Ch. Basher Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 7 others 2013 PTD 821; Khurram Farooq Siddiqui v. Department of Customs and Excise, Collectorate of Customs (Export) and another 2009 PTD 992; Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2014 PTD 1807; Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman and 4 others 2014 PTD 1733; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Lahore v. Messrs Panther Sports and Rubber Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2022 SCMR 1135; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division and 5 others 2013 PTD 1659; Nagina Daal Factory through Allah Ditta Partner v. ITO and another 18 TAX 1 SC; Model Customs Collectorate Islamabad v. Aamir Mumtaz Qureshi 2022 SCMR 1861; Sahabzadi Maharunnisa and another v. Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another PLD 2016 SC 358; Bashir Ahmed Badini, D,SJ, Dera Allah Yar and others v. Honble Chairman and Member of Administration Committee and Promotion Committee of Honble High Court of Balochistan and others 2022 SCMR 448; Unique Engineering Works (Pvt.) Ltd., through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary of Law Islamabad and 3 others 2022 PTD 1502; Pepsi Cola International (Private) Limited through Authorized Representative v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad and another 2022 PTD 51; Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd., v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2016 PTD 2074; D.G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd., through Chief Financial Officer and others v. Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and 5 others 2020 PTD 2111 ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-Ss.249-A, 265-K, 561-A-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition- Quashing of proceedings-Inherent jurisdiction of High Court-Scope-When a criminal matter is pending before a Trial Court and interim challan has been submitted, under normal course application under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C is to be filed before concerned Court in case the accused is of the opinion that charge is either groundless or there is no probability of conviction-In exceptional circumstances if facts of a case so warrant a person/accused can approach High Court for quashing of FIR, if the action is patently illegal, without jurisdiction-In such circumstances sending a person to go through full process of trial and then get himself acquitted would be a miscarriage of justice with that person-High Court should exercise its powers under S.561A, Cr.P.C., in such circumstances.\nHaji Sardar Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf and others 2006 SCMR 1192; A Habib Ahmed v. MKG Scott. Christian and 5 others PLD 1992 SC 353; Ghulam Muhammad v. Mozamil Khan and others PLD 1967 SC 317; Muhammad Hassan Nadeem and 2 others v. Model Customs Collectorate (Enforcement and Compliance) through Collectors and 4 others 2021 PTD 764 and Muhammad Amir v. Federation of Pakistan (C.P No.D-4410/2020) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,3(1A),24Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=249-A,365-K,561-AConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-3974 of 2021, decided on 9th January, 2023. Dates of hearing: 11th October, 1st, 23rd November, 14th and 20th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ovais Ali Shah and Umer Ilyas Khan for Petitioner No.2.\nG.M. Bhutto, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents Nos.1 and 2.\nShahid Ali Qureshi for Respondent No.3.\nGhulam Asghar Pathan for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED ATIF SALMAN HASHMI AND ANOTHER\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE, EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN FBR AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23463", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 956 = 2023 SLD 956 = 2023 PTD 679 = (2023) 127 TAX 569", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYy8", - "Key Words:": "Interpretation of Statutes and Sales Tax Act (1990)\n(a) Interpretation of Statutes:\nIssue: Interpretation of the words or and and in legislative instruments, particularly in fiscal statutes.\nConclusion:\n Or is used in a disjunctive sense, meaning it separates items or concepts.\n And is used in a conjunctive sense, meaning it combines items or concepts.\nIn some cases, these words can be interchangeable to give effect to the clear legislative intention or to avoid absurdity, redundancy, or unreasonableness.\nCourts interpret statutes by considering the purpose of every word and ensuring no provision is redundant. If there is ambiguity, the interpretation favorable to the taxpayer is preferred.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (1990):\nIssue: Interpretation of the word or in Section 2(17) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nConclusion:\nThe word or in Section 2(17) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is used in a disjunctive sense, meaning owns and has his own manufacturing facility are distinct concepts.\nThe word or implies that these terms convey different meanings in the context of the statute.\n(c) Words and Phrases – Own :\nIssue: Meaning of the term own in various legal dictionaries.\nConclusion:\nVarious legal dictionaries provide interpretations of the term own .\nBlacks Law Dictionary, Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Chambers Concise Dictionary, and Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary all define own as relating to possession or legal entitlement to something, with slight variations in phrasing but generally affirming ownership or control.\n(d) Sales Tax Act (1990) and Registration Modification:\nIssue: Modification of registration from Manufacturer-cum-exporter to Commercial Exporter by tax authorities.\nConclusion:\nThe Income Tax Appellate Tribunal set aside the modification of registration, ruling that the respondent entity could not be classified as a Commercial Exporter because it had its own manufacturing facility and was entitled to claim refunds under the Expeditious Refund System (ERS) of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006.\nThe High Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, dismissing the reference by authorities.\nThe Commissioner could not suo motu change the registration details under Rule 7 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006.\nReferences:\nSuo Motu Case No. 8 of 2018 and Civil Misc. Application No. 649-L of 2018, PLD 2019 SC 201\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Muhammad Kassim, 2000 PTD 280\nCM Pak Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, PLD 2018 Isl. 243\nInam-ul-Rahiem v. Chairman, NAB, PLD 2018 Isl. 251\nSheikh Kashif Imtiaz v. Faysal Bank Ltd., 2020 CLD 904\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs ORI Tech Oil (Pvt.) Ltd., 2019 SCMR 875\nORI-Tech-Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Manager Registration, 2017 PTD 1497", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(17),47Sales Tax Rules, 2006=7(4),29(1)(b)", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 35 of 2022, heard on 23rd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate/Legal Adviser for Applicant.\nMian Khalid Hussain Mitru and Inayat-ur-Rehman for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, LTO, MULTAN\nVS\nMESSRS USMAN TRADER LINKERS, MULTAN " - }, - { - "Case No.": "23464", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 958 = 2023 SLD 958 = 2023 PTD 689", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYys", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.18, 79(1)(e), 122(4)(5A), 133, 166(1)(a)-Reference- Tax exemption-Adventure in nature of trade-Scope-Taxpayer was an industrial unit and sold its land by converting it into a housing scheme and earned profit-Validity-For an adventure in nature of trade there had to be “indicia of trade” which was present in transaction in question-Intention of a person in selling out any asset depended upon the conduct of that person and the circumstances of the case- Manner and method in which land was sold out fell under adventure in the nature of trade and was taxable in the hands of company and was not exempted under S.79 of Income Tux Ordinance, 2001, as claimed by the tax payer-Earlier proceedings on same subject under S.122(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which were dropped, in those proceedings procedure through which the issue was probed during audit proceedings was not carried out by the department-Such was neither a case of change of opinion nor it was a past and closed transaction-All three authorities below i.e. Taxation Officer, Commissioner Appeals and Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue were justified in reaching to the conclusion that exemption claimed by taxpayer under S.79(1)(e) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was not applicable-Reference was dismissed, in circumstances.\nFecto Cement Limited v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue C.P. No.D-2595/2015 and Messrs Julian Hoshang Dinshaw Trust and others v. Income Tax Officer and others 1992 SCMR 250 distinguished.\nFancy Foundation v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi 2017 SCMR 1395 and Load Sands in IR v. Livingstone 11 TC 538 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=18,79,79(1),79(1)(e),122(4),122(5A),133,166(1)(a)", - "Case #": "I.T.R.A. No. 98 of 2018, decided on 6th January, 2023, heard on: 15th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE\nZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Anwar Kashir Mumtaz and Usman Alam for Applicant.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS MODerN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED THROUGH LIQUIDATOR\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23465", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 959 = 2023 SLD 959 = 2023 PTD 698", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.32-Mis-declaration-Absence of mens rea-Scope-Appellant declared the disputed goods to be Glass Parts for Chandelier but on physical examination the same were found in complete sets, hence, there was a difference in chargeable duty and taxes which resulted in an order for confiscation of goods-Validity-No element of mens rea and collusion was brought on surface nor mentioned in the show-cause notice-Adjudicating officer had passed the impugned order with least application of judicious mind as the pitch of fine and penalty imposed did not correspond with the gravity of the offence-Impugned order was modified to the extent that the appellant was only liable to pay all adjudged amount of additional duty and taxes-Impugned order was modified accordingly.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.32-Mis-declaration-Absence of mens rea-Scope-Element of mens area is to be seen when a criminal liability is required to be established against a person and not in the cases of assessment whether even duty/taxes has been detected.\nMessrs Liver Brothers of Pakistan Ltd. v. Customs Sales Tax and Central Excise Appellate Tribunal and others 2005 PTD 2462 ref.\n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.2(s)-Smuggling-Scope-Mala fide and mens rea are necessary ingredients for committing any offence, including that of smuggling.\nOmalsons Corporation v. The Deputy Collector of Customs (Adjudication) Karachi SBLR, 2002 Tribunal 57 and Moon International v. Collector of Customs (Appraisement) Lahore PTCL 2001 CL 133 ref.\n(d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.32-Mis-declaration-Absence of mens rea-Scope—Two questions are required to be addressed before invoking S. 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, for mis-declaration (i) whether mens rea which is essential element for the purpose of subsection (i) of S.32 has been proved and (ii) whether a demand for short recovery can be made under the provisions of subsection (2) of S.32-If element of mens rea is not visible and guilty intention is not proved then provisions of S.32 cannot be invoked.\nUnion Sport Playing Cars Co. v. Collector 2002 YLR 2651; Al- Hamd Edible Oil Limited v. Collector 2003 PTD 552; A.R. Hosiery Works v. Collector of Customs Export 2004 PTD 2977; Ibrahim Textile Mills Limited v. F.O.P PLD 1989 Lah. 47; Central Board of Revenue v. Jalil Sheep Co. 1987 SCMR 630; State Cement Corporation v. G.O.P. C.A. No.43 of 1999 and Cargill Pakistan Seeds (Pvt.) v. Tribunal 2004 PTD 26 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,2(s)", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-1238 of 2017, decided on 15th April, 2022, heard on: 28th February, 2022", - "Judge Name:": " ABDUL JABBAR QURESHI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-I ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Ullah Shaikh for Appellant.\nAmir Shuja, A.O., for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS RANA ENTERPRISES \nVS\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION-I) CUSTOMS HOUSE, KARACHI AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23466", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 960 = 2023 SLD 960 = 2023 PTD 704 = 2023 PTCL 883", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpYzg", - "Key Words:": "Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)- Ss. 19(6), 21-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199—Constitutional petition-Show-cause notice without jurisdiction—Criminal proceedings, initiating of-Pre-conditions-Petitioners were aggrieved of proceedings initiated by authorities on the allegation of obstructing tax recovery process- Plea raised by authorities was that petitioners had alternate remedy of appeal available to them-Validity-Objection taken to maintainability of constitutional petition by authorities was without substance, as order passed by authorities was without jurisdiction and the matter was rightly agitated in a petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution, without availing statutory right of appeal- Petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution was maintainable against show-cause notice which was without jurisdiction and lawful authority-Petitioners were slapped with criminal liability without adopting course of action as provided in Federal Excise Act, 2005- High Court apprehended that if such course was allowed as a matter of routine, that would bring chaos and would displace criminal jurisprudence-Questions raised by petitioners were of paramount importance, viz, in presence of proper procedure provided for adjudication of criminal trial, imposition of fine in the garb of penalty through an executive order would amount to high handedness on the part of authorities and would be without lawful authority-High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction set aside show-cause notices and orders-in-original passed against petitioners-Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\nS.A. Haroon v. Collector of Customs PLD 1959 SC 177; M. Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty PLD 1961 SC 119; Pakistan v. Qazi Zia ud Din PLD 1962 SC 440; Nagina Silk Mills v. Income Tax Officer PLD 1963 SC 322; Murree Brewery v. Pakistan PLD 1972 SC 279; Premier Cloth Mills v. Sales Tax Officer 1972 SCMR 257; Town Committee v. Authority-under Payment of Wages Act PLD 2002 SC 452; National Bank of Pakistan v. Sacked Employees Review Board Establishment Division 2019 PLC (C.S.) 1516; Kinza Anwar v. Office of the Ombudsman for Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace 2022 CLC 1477; Hydri Ship Breaking Industries v. Sindh Government 2007 MLD 770; Usmania Glass Sheet v. Sales Tax Officer 1971 PTD 1; Edulji Dinshaw Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer 1990 PTD 1155; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. 2009 SCMR 1279; Oil and Gas Company v. FBR 2016 PTD 1675; Dowell Schlumberger (Western) SA v. Pakistan (W.P. No. 1486 of 2016); Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Exploration Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue 2021 PTD 1644; Shahnawaz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan 2011 PTD 1558; Engro Vopak Terminal Ltd. v. Pakistan 2012 PTD 130; Association of Builders and Developers of Pakistan 2018 PTD 1487; State v. Zia Ur Rehman PLD 1973 SC 49; Maula Dad Khan v. West Pakistan Council PLD 1975 SC 469; Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Limited PLD 1993 SC 109; Amba Lai v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 264; Manicklal Sen v. Additional Collector of Customs AIR 1965 Cal. 527 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Aasia Film Artist 2001 PTD 678 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=19(6),21Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 3709 and 4095 of 2016, decided on 31st January, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " AAMER FAROOQ, C.J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hyder Ali Khan for Petitioners.\nBabar Bilal for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JS BANK LIMITED THROUGH DULY AUTHORIZED/ATTORNEY AND OTHERS\nVS\nPAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE AND EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN FEDERAL BOARD REVENUE, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23467", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 961 = 2023 SLD 961 = 2023 PTD 710 = 2023 PTCL 741", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpY3o", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.25-A, 32, 196-Reference-Goods Declaration—Invoice retrieved from consignment-Effect-Authorities instead of imposing duty / taxes on the basis of self-assessment by declaring lower invoice value relied upon invoice retrieved from consignment-Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside the duties / tax imposed on importer on the basis of invoice retrieved from consignment-Validity-Cases where invoice was retrieved from any container, as per provision of S. 25A of Customs Act, 196% the value was to be taken as per the invoice retrieved form the consignment-Co-relation between retrieved invoice was to be kept into consideration with what importer and exporter had mentioned in the invoice-In case any invoice was retrieved, it was incumbent upon the authorities to substantiate their assessment by making confirmation from the shipper or to ascertain its market value or to examine the value declared by similar consignments-In absence of such parameters retrieved invoice would lose its significance when goods declaration and other documents produced by importer were found to be genuine and original and were backed by other necessary documents-In cases where retrieved invoice was found to be genuine and the goods declaration of importer was found to be fake then in such circumstances not only the importer was liable to be assessed on the basis of retrieved invoice but was also guilty of mis-declaration of imported consignment and concealment of material facts and in such situation provision of S. 32 of Customs Act, 1969, were fully attracted- Authorities did not bring on record any cogent material to substantiate its assessment and failed to take into account the document furnished by importer and that those documents were not found to be fake and forged-High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Customs Appellate Tribunal-Reference was dismissed, in circumstances.\nJunaid Traders v. Additional Collector of Customs (Appraisement-I) 2012 SCMR 1876; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others v. Messrs Horison International, Karachi and others 2018 PTD 1403 and Collector of Customs, Karachi v. M/s. Muhammad Shafiq (Civil Appeal No. 1846 of 2016) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25-A,32,196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.75 of 2022 and Constitution Petition No.D-2065 of 2022, decided on 16th November, 2022. Dates of hearing: 29th September, 27th October and 3rd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Masooda Siraj along with Javed Hussain for Petitioner (in Special Customs Reference Application No.75 of 2022).\nImran Iqbal Khan along with Aneel Zia for Petitioners (in Constitution Petition No.D-2065 of 2022 and Special Customs Reference Application No.75 of 2022).\nG.M. Bhutto, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan (A.A.G.) for Respondent No.1 (in Constitution Petition No.D-2065 of 2022).\nMirza Nadeem Taqi for Respondent No. 2 (in Constitution Petition No.D-2065 of 2022).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS THROUGH DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND OTHERS\nVS\nMESSRS NETPAC AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23468", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 962 = 2023 SLD 962 = 2023 PTD 717", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpY3k", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 46, 40B-Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal-Posting of Inland Revenue Officer-Scope-Appeal was preferred against an intimation letter whereby the Commissioner had posted/nominated certain officers/staff of Inland Revenue department at the premises of the assessee under S. 40B of Sales Tax Act, 1990, for monitoring of production, supplies and stocks-Validity-Intimation in question was not an order passed by the Commissioner himself, but merely an implementation of the authorization/order by the Board for action under S. 40B of Sales Tax Act, 1990-Section 46 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, provided for appeals against orders passed by the CIR(A), C1R, or Board under specific provisions of the Act-Appellant’s case did not fall under S. 46(1)(b) as the impugned intimation letter could not be considered an order passed by the CIR for the purpose of filing an appeal-Intimation was merely an implementation of the original authorization by the Board for action under S. 40B-No appeal could be filed against the intimation/nomination of officers by the Commissioner-Commissioner was a subordinate functionary bound to obey the orders of the Board and the impugned intimation letter was an implementation of the Boards authorization, not an order passed by the Commissioner himself-Appeal was not maintainable before the ATIR and was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46,40B", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1089/LB of 2018, decided on 10th January, 2023, heard on: 14th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD IRFAN RAZA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mudassar Shuja Butt for Appellant.\nAli Ahsan Warraich, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS PUNJAB BEVERAGES (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE\nVERSUS\nCOMM1SSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23469", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 963 = 2023 SLD 963 = 2023 PTD 720 = (2023) 128 TAX 265 = 2023 PTCL 772", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTc", - "Key Words:": "Refund Claims and Scrutiny of Invoices\nIssue: Whether the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenues rejection of show-cause notices for refund claims was valid, given the involvement of suppliers who were blacklisted, non-existent, or had suspended registration status.\nConclusion:\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue found that the taxpayer (respondent) had provided sufficient documentation, including invoices, proof of purchases, and bank payment records, to support the refund claim.\nThe taxpayer had complied with Section 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe authorities failed to demonstrate that the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenues factual findings were perverse or against the record.\nThe High Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal and ruled in favor of the respondent-taxpayer, dismissing the reference made by the authorities.\nReferences:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Ali Hassan Metal Works, 2018 PTD 108\nCivil Petitions Nos. 432-L, 446-L, 468-L, 469-L, 719-L, 1006-L, 1090-L, 1092-L, 1140-L, 632-L, 447-L and 695-L of 2018", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 18 of 2010, heard on 9th December, 2022, heard on: 9th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE, MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Nadeem Anwaar, Waqar A. Sheikh, Izharul Haque Sheikh, Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema, Rana Muhammad Mehtab, Ch. M. Imtiaz Elahi, Javed Athar, Syed Zain ul Abidein Bokhari, Malik Abdullah Raza, Kausar Parveen, Sheikh Nadeem Anwaar, Waqas B. Khokhar, Mohsin Ali vice Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Noor Muhammad Khan Chandia, Mian Yusuf Umar, Sardar Ali Masood Raza, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Ch. Muhammad Yasin Zahid and Sultan Mehmood for Petitioners.\nAsad Raza, Syed Saqlain Hussain, Muhammad Fayyaz Mansab, Saood Nasrullah Cheema, Azhar Mukhtar, Muhammad Asghar, Hashim Aslam Butt, Abdul Sattar, Muhammad Naeem Munawar, Imran Rasool, Shah Behram Sukhera, Sumair Saeed Ahmad, M. Hafeez Uppal, Khurram Ahmad Saeed, Mumtaz Hussain Bhutta, Imran Rashid and Mian Abdul Bari Rashid for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL DIVISION, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, LAHORE\nVS\nMESSRS RAFAQAT MARKETING, LAHORE THROUGH CHAIRMAN AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23470", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 964 = 2023 SLD 964 = 2023 PTD 725 = (2024) 129 TAX 231", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTY", - "Key Words:": "Misdeclaration and Criminal Proceedings\nIssue: Whether criminal proceedings and penalties for misdeclaration of the value of goods and the duty paid thereon were valid under the Customs Act, 1969.\nConclusion:\nMens Rea (guilty mind) is a necessary condition for invoking criminal liability under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nThe Customs Act, 1969 post-GATT era requires valuation of goods based on their actual value and not arbitrary or fictitious values linked to the value of goods from other countries.\nNo evidence of deliberate misdeclaration or willful misconduct was found in this case. The authorities failed to substantiate that the importer had acted with the necessary mens rea (intentional wrongdoing).\nThe imposition of fine and penalty was not justified as there was no clear proof of willful fault or deliberate misdeclaration.\nThe High Court set aside the allegation of misdeclaration, ruling that the imposition of a fine and penalty could not be sustained due to the lack of incriminating evidence.\nReferences:\n2021 PTD 2027\nMessrs Latif Brothers v. Deputy Collector, Customs, Lahore, 1992 SCMR 1083", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,32,196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Appeal No.63 of 2002, decided on 3rd November, 2022, heard on: 29th September, 2022. ", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ammar Yasser for Appellant.\nG.M. Bhutto, A.A.G. for Respondents Nos.1, 2 and 4.\nSarfaraz Khan Marwat for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS XAVIER COMPANY THROUGH PARTNER\nVS\nCUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SALES TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23471", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 965 = 2023 SLD 965 = 2023 PTCL 512 = 2023 SCMR 939", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTU", - "Key Words:": "COMPANIES ORDINANCE, 1984 (XLVII OF 1984)-Section 3- Where no material or concrete evidence was produced by Department to substantiate the principal ground of sister concern relationship, respondent company is not a subsidiary or holding company.-The short-lived facts of the case are that during audit proceedings it was revealed that M/s Qadbros Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. (respondent) had claimed input adjustment of sales tax paid earlier on purchases from their sister unit M/s Qadri Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd. A Show Cause Notice was issued to the respondent on 2.2.1998 (“Show Cause”) with the allegation that it had wrongfully claimed input adjustment of sales tax on the purchase of M/s chanels from its sister unit.\nThe learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the respondent could not claim input adjustment of sales tax on purchases from its sister concern. It was further contended that during the years 1995-96 150 invoices were fabricated in order to provide undue benefit to the respondent.\nThe bone of contention triggered from the Show Cause on the allegation of securing input sales tax adjustment by a company from its sister concern or subsidiary on the basis of manipulated and unverified invoices. However, in the Order-in-Original No. 48/99, the Additional Collector-11 Sales Tax, Lahore has not given any definite findings on the crucial plea or allegation with regard to the relationship between the respondent and Qadri Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd. But merely observed that the invoices were not authenticated by the proper Excise/Sales Tax Office.\nThe main allegation in the Show Cause is related to the alleged business transaction between the two sister concerns or subsidiary companies. There is no definition of “sister concern” cither in the repealed Companies Ordinance, 1984 or the present Companies Act, 2017, but this turn of phrase basically delineates two or more distinct businesses or ventures owned by one and the same conglomerate but such undertakings/concerns do not have any link or nexus with the operations of each other’s business with the exception of conjoint ownership but legally or financially are not related to each other despite its affiliation with another company with a separate identity and workforces.\nThe petitioner’s department completely failed to establish that M/s Qadbros Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. (respondent) is the sister concern or a subsidiary company of the M/s Qadri Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd. (supplier). No tangible evidence was produced including the record, if any, obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in relation to the incorporation and substratum of both the companies together with the verification of holding company of the alleged subsidiary company.\nNo doubt the learned Appellate Tribunal, being cognizant of its jurisdiction as conferred by the law, engaged it in order to unravel the alleged claim of input adjustment by means of the stratagem adopted by the respondent assessee and also determined the true character of the transactions but did not find out that the respondent, being a subsidiary company, embarked on any fake or sham transaction or applied any feigned modus of presenting paper transactions or fake invoices issued by its sister concern with the sole intent of claiming tax benefit. No material or concrete evidence was produced by the department to substantiate the principal ground of sister concern relationship. The Tribunal had judiciously examined the pith and substance of the transaction and then rightly reached the conclusion that the respondent is not a subsidiary or holding company of M/s Qadri Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd.\n“Subsidiary company”. A company is deemed to be a subsidiary of another, the holding company, if the latter holds a majority of its voting rights; is a member of it and has the right to appoint or remove a majority of board of directors; or is a member of it and controls alone (under an agreement with other members) a majority of its voting rights. A company is also deemed to be a subsidiary of another if it qualifies as a subsidiary of a subsidiary of the holding company. A “wholly-owned subsidiary” is one whose shares are exclusively owned by a holding company, its wholly-owned subsidiaries and the nominees of either [Ref: Palmer’s Company Law (2019 Edition). Volume 3, paragraph 9.303, page 9246], According to Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fifth Edition), Volume 14 (pages 54-55), a company is a ‘subsidiary’ of another company, its ‘holding company’, if that other company: (1) holds a majority of the voting rights in it; or (2) is a member of it and has the right to appoint or remove a majority of its board of directors; or (3) is a member of it and controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other members, a majority of the voting rights in it, or if it is a subsidiary of a company which is itself a subsidiary of that other company. A company is a wholly- owned subsidiary of another company if it has no members except that other and that others wholly-owned subsidiaries or persons acting on behalf of that other or its wholly-owned subsidiaries. Whereas in Company Law by C.R. Datta (Seventh Edition), Volume I, Chapter I (Page 1382-1383), a holding company and its subsidiary are separate legal entities. But, for certain purposes, affairs of a subsidiary have been treated by the Acts as affairs of the holding company.\nCorporate Veil.- It is true that occasionally the corporate veil of a company is pierced through in order to find out the substance but that is only where it is permitted by a statute or in exceptional cases of fraud. \nMerely by becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of another company, the company will not be deemed to be directly/indirectly financed or the company’s operation being substantially controlled by any other person or body of person.- The modem tendency is, where there is identity and community of interest between companies in the group, especially where they are related as holding company and wholly owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, to ignore their separate legal entity and look instead at the economic entity of the whole group tearing of the corporate veil. Merely by becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of another company, the company will not be deemed to be directly/indirectly financed or the companys operations becoming substantially controlled by any other person or body of persons. In Balwant Rai v. Union of India, where the subsidiary company was responsible for facilitation of services from workmen to the holding company, even though the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the subsidiary company provided that the subsidiary shall wholly-owned subsidiary of the holding company, its share capital shall be held by the holding company and/or its nominees; the holding company controls the composition of the Board of Directors of the subsidiary, including the power to remove any such director or even the Chairman of the Board. Further, the holding company has the right to issue directions to the subsidiary company which the latter is bound to comply with. The Supreme Court held that even in such a case, it cannot be said that the subsidiary is merely a veil between the workmen and the holding company. \nIt is true that occasionally the corporate veil of a company is pierced through an order to find out the substance but that is only where it is permitted by a statute or in exceptional cases of fraud.\nIn a suitable case, the court can lift the corporate veil where the companies share the relationship of a bolding company and a subsidiary company and also to pay regard to the economic realities behind the legal facade.\nSALES TAX ACT, 1990 Section 7\nNutty-gritties of presumptive tax regime.-The nitty- gritties of the presumptive tax regime, which in fact denotes that the tax so deducted or paid is treated as a final discharge of tax liability whereas the production capacity is reckoned by the Department according to the notified and applicable sales tax rates vis-a-vis the production as per comparative past and present physical production data including the machine ratings. Presumptive tax regime predominantly encompasses the usage of indirect means to determine tax liability, which diverges from the normal rules founded on the taxpayers accounts to indicate a legal presumption that the tax liability is not less than the amount occasioning from the application of the indirect method.\nSections 7,11, 23\nThe invoices issued under Section 7 permits the adjustment of input tax, if the supplier issues invoice erroneously or in violation of law then the department should initiate legal action for recovery against them who issues the invoice rather the buyer.—The predominant allegation in the Show Cause was that M/s Qadri Brothers was paying fixed sales tax on fixed production basis, therefore the invoices No. 1 to 150 were arranged by it to provide the undue benefit of input adjustment to its sister concern M/s Qadbros Engineering (respondent). Notwithstanding the fixed sales tax payment structure, M/s Qadri Brothers, being an independent registered person is not proscribed under the letter of law from issuing invoices as a supplier against the sales made to the buyers. The invoices were issued under Section 7 of the 1990 Act which permits the adjustment of input tax with a rider under Sub-section (2) that a registered person shall not be entitled to deduct input tax from output tax unless, in case of a claim for input tax in respect of a taxable supply made, he holds a tax invoice in his name and bearing his registration number in respect of such supply or in case of supply of electricity or gas, a bill bearing his registration number and the address where the connection is installed. If the supplier issued invoices erroneously or in violation of law then the Department should have initiated legal action for recovery against them rather than the buyer which is not the sister concern or subsidiary company of the supplier. In all fairness, if some fault was committed by the supplier while issuing invoices then the respondent could not be penalized or disqualified from claiming input tax adjustment in accordance with the law.\nIf some fault is committed by supplier while issuing invoice then the other buyer could not be penalized or disqualified from claiming input tax adjustment in accordance with law. \nSection 46\nThe Tribunal is the final forum to settle all the factual aspects in the matter and finding of fact recorded by Tribunal are considered final.- The Tribunal is the final forum to settle all the factual aspects in the matter and the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal are considered final.\nIt was held that the Tribunal is the final forum for determination of facts in tax matters. The Appellate Tribunal is therefore the final fact-finding body and its findings of facts are conclusive; the High Court cannot disturb them unless it is shown that there was no evidence on which the Appellate Tribunal could arrive at its conclusion and record such findings, or the same are perverse or based on surmises and conjectures.\nSection 47\nJurisdiction of High Court under Section 47.- As the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 47 of the 1990 Act is concerned, we have noticed that prior to the amendment made through Finance Act, 2005, (assented on 29.6.2005), a right of appeal was provided which v>a> later amended to a remedy of filing Reference. In both the scenario, the jurisdiction of High Court was and is strictly confined to answering questions of law which is evident from plain reading of original and amended Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and obviously, the source of question must be the order of the Tribunal. The elementary characteristic of this jurisdiction is that it has been conferred to deal only with questions of law and not questions of fact. When we talk of a question of law, it connotes a tangible and substantial question of law on the rights and obligations of the parties founded on the decision of the Tribunal.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=3", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 409-L of 2021, decided on 20th February, 2023. (Against the judgment Dated 12.11.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in STA. No. 13/2005). Date of Hearing: 20.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa, Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi, Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, ASC.\n(Through Video Link from Lahore)\nFor the Respondent : N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Lahore\nVersus\nM/s. Qadbros Engineering, (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23472", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 966 = 2023 SLD 966 = 2023 PTCL 561 = (2023) 127 TAX 774 = 2024 PTD 793", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Toll Manufacturing and Sales Tax Collection – Sindh vs. Federation\nIssue: Dispute over who has the authority to collect sales tax on toll manufacturing after the 18th Amendment to the Constitution.\nConclusion: Toll manufacturing is a manufacturing activity, not a service. Once the Sindh Province agreed that the Federation (FBR) would collect the tax, it couldnt later treat it as a service. Tax paid to FBR is considered the final discharge of liability, and any further proceedings by Sindh are abated.\nReferences: Sales Tax Act, 1990, Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, Constitution of Pakistan (Fourth Schedule, Entry 49).\nToll Manufacturing – Manufacturing Process vs. Service\nIssue: Whether toll manufacturing should be taxed as a service or manufacturing.\nConclusion: Toll manufacturing is classified as manufacturing because it involves transforming goods into a different product. Misinterpretation as a service is incorrect.\nReferences: Sales Tax Act, 1990, Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011.\nCase 3: Exemption and Jurisdiction Over Sales Tax\nIssue: The effect of exemptions by the Province on the collection of sales tax by FBR.\nConclusion: Exemptions by the Sindh Province do not alter the fact that toll manufacturing is a manufacturing activity. The Federation (FBR) retains the authority to collect tax, and tax paid to FBR is the final discharge of liability.\nReferences: Sales Tax Act, 1990, Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011.\nFinal Ruling:\nToll manufacturing is a manufacturing process, not a service.\nThe Federation (FBR) is responsible for collecting tax, and any tax paid to FBR is the final settlement.\nThe Province of Sindh cannot collect sales tax for toll manufacturing activities after 2011.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(16),2(33),3Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=2(79),3", - "Case #": "C. P. No. D-1472 of 2016 along with C. P. No. D-5160/2013, C. P. No. D-1078. 1201, 1202, 3642, 4279, 766/2014, C. P. No. D-3394, 7965, 7966/2015, C. P. No. D-1888, 3629, 4087, 4627, 5095, 5630. 6850, 6851/2016, C. P. No. D- 196, 3087, 596, 6295/2017, C. P. No. D-2485, 6455/2018, C. P. No. D-915. 916, 2544,, 6884/2019, C. P. No. D-3379. 338J, 5909, 5956, 5957/2020. C P. No. D-2499, 2500, 4241, 4346/2021, Spl. Sales Tax Reference Application Nos. 119, 95, 96/2016, S.T.R.A Nos. 175, 889 of 2017", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners. M/s. Khalid Javed Khan, Hyder Ali Khan, Arshad Hussain Shahzad Samiur Rehman Khan, Omer Akhund, Umaimah Anwar Khan, Abid H. Shaban, Imtiaz Ali, Naveeda Basharat, Lunba Pervez, Shafqat Zaman, Abdul Sattar Silat, Abdul Rahim Lakhani, Asim Iqbal, Farmanullah Khan, Syeda Marium, Abdul Jabbar Mallah, Abdul Ahad, Naeem Suleman, Taqueer Randhawa, Kashan Ahmed, Atif Hafeez, Zeeshan Khan, Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Khurram Ashfaq, Muhammad Adeel Awan, Atta Muhammad Qureshi, Asadullah Shaikh, Muhammad Yahya Advocates.\nFor the Respondents. M/s. Shahid Ali Qureshi, Kashif Nazeer, Shamshad Ahmed Narejo, Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Irfan Mir Halepota, Ayaz Sarwar Jamali, Dr. Huma Sodhar, Muhammad Zubair Hashmi, Fahim Ali, S. Ahsan Ali Shah, Ali Tahir Soomro, Dr. Shah Nawaz Memon, Fozia M. Murad, S. Shafqat Ali Shah Masoomi, S. Mohsin Imam Wasti, Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Advocates. Mr. Zeeshan Adhi, Additional Advocate General Sindh. Mr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Additional Advocate General Sindh. Mr. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General. Ms. Manzooran Gopan, Law Officer, Law Department, Government of Sindh. Mr. Sikandar Hassan, Law Officer, Law Department, Government of Sindh.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. TUFAIL CHEMICAL\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23473", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 967 = 2023 SLD 967 = 2023 PTCL 569 = (2023) 127 TAX 511", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWS8", - "Key Words:": "Power of Taxation and Sovereignty\nConstitutional Basis: The power to tax is a core attribute of a states sovereignty. Under Article 7 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), taxation is a fundamental sovereign function, but it is constrained by the need for enabling laws passed by the legislature.\nArticle 77 of the Constitution emphasizes that taxes can only be levied through law, underscoring that the legislative process governs taxation powers. Taxes on areas not mentioned in the Federal Legislative List can only be imposed by the Provinces.\nArticle 142 grants legislative powers to both the Federation and the Provinces, clarifying the scope of their respective competencies.\nTaxation on Capital Gains and Assets\nCapital Gain Tax and Capital Assets: The text explores the relationship between capital gain taxes and assets. It highlights that the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 defines key terms like capital gain, capital asset, and property. Capital gains tax is levied on the sale of capital assets, but specific exclusions (such as agricultural land) may apply.\nSection 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001: This section deals with the treatment of market value as income, which was declared ultra vires (beyond the competence of the Federal Legislature). It clarifies that capital value taxes, such as those on immovable property, can only be imposed under Entry 50 of the Federal Legislative List and must be legislated appropriately.\nCapital Value of Assets: Prior to the 18th Amendment of the Constitution, immovable property was excluded from capital gains tax, but after the amendment, the imposition of tax on capital gains from immovable property was brought within the scope of federal jurisdiction under income tax laws.\nLegislative Competence and Federal vs. Provincial Powers\nFederal vs. Provincial Authority: According to Article 77 and Article 142 of the Constitution, the federal government has exclusive powers to impose taxes on matters listed in the Federal Legislative List, while provinces can levy taxes on matters not enumerated in that list.\nEntry 47 and 50 of the Fourth Schedule (Federal Legislative List): Entry 47 deals with capital gains on immovable property and the general scope of federal competence in taxing income. However, tax on the capital value of assets is only within federal competence under Entry 50 if the assets are not specifically excluded (e.g., agricultural land). The 18th Amendment shifted the jurisdictional boundaries for taxation, bringing immovable property under the purview of federal taxation for capital gains purposes.\nWealth Tax and Income Tax\nThe Wealth Tax Act, 1963 defines capital assets broadly and ties it to the taxation of wealth, which includes property but excludes certain categories like agricultural land. The Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 elaborates on the taxation of capital assets, including the treatment of capital gains as a type of income tax rather than a tax on property itself.\nCapital Gain Tax: The tax on capital gains is not a tax on the property but rather on the gain derived from the sale or transfer of that property. This is a key distinction in the legal framework governing taxation in Pakistan.\nDiscriminatory Provisions in Section 7E\nThe provisions under Section 7E that exclude certain classes of people (e.g., police and military personnel or those who receive compensation for injuries) from tax obligations have been challenged as discriminatory. These exclusions were seen as unjustified under Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law.\nClassifications within Taxation: The court found that certain exclusions under Section 7E did not meet the legal criteria for justifiable distinctions, making them ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the legislature.\nInterpretation of Tax Laws and Judicial Review\nThe judiciarys role in interpreting tax laws is significant, particularly when challenges arise regarding the constitutionality or fairness of taxation provisions. Courts are cautious about intervening in taxation matters unless there is a clear violation of constitutional limits or fundamental rights.\nInterpretation of Statutes: Taxation laws, including those related to capital gains and assets, are subject to judicial interpretation. Courts often balance legislative intent, constitutional provisions, and the practical impact of taxes on citizens and businesses.\nConclusion\nThe taxation framework in Pakistan involves a complex interplay of constitutional provisions, statutory laws, and judicial interpretations. The state’s power to tax is an essential aspect of its sovereignty, but the application of taxes must be in line with constitutional competence and fairness. The 18th Amendment and its impact on federal and provincial authority over taxation, particularly in relation to immovable property and capital gains, have had significant implications. Additionally, challenges to discriminatory tax provisions underline the importance of constitutional equality in tax law.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=7Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=77,142,236K", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 52559 of 2022, decided on 6th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE SHAHID JAMIL KHAN.    ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: M/s Syed Muhammad Baqir Ali and Syed Zeeshan Ali, Advocates.\nM/s Salman Akram Raja, Shahbaz Butt, Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Anwaar-ul-Haq, Tahir Mehmood Butt, Ahmad Abdullah Dogar, Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Syed Muhammad Ijaz, Muhammad Mansha Sukhera, Rana Muhammad Afzal, Mohammad Ahmad Qayyum, Mian Ashiq Hussain, Muhammad Arshad, Ch. Mumtaz ul Hassan, Shumail Arif, Muqadam Sukhera, Shahid Pervez Jami, Mudassar Shujauddin, Ashiq Ali Rana, Abbas Ali Awan, Naved Amjad Andrabi Barrister M. Abubakar, Malik Nadir Ali Sherazi, Muhammad Usman, Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Atira Ikram, Sh. Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Imran, Nadeem Iqbal Ch., Sardar Azeem Afrasiyab, Muhammad Ali Talib, Hammad ul Hassan Hanjra, M. Hassan Asif, Syed Muhammad Islam, Ibrahim Haroon, Saqib Jillani, Ahsan Bashir, Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Azeem Suleman, Faisal Rasheed, Ghulam Murtaza, Hassan Yousaf Shah, Muhammad Akbar, Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, Mudassar Ijaz, Hafiz Hamid Aziz Ahsan, Mehr Abdul Shakoor, Khalil-ur-Rehman, Aizaz Malik, Zohaib Ali Sidhu, Muhammad Nasir Khan, Muhammad Awais, Yasir Hamid, Saqib Qadeer, Muhammad Abrar, Rasheed Ahmed Sheikh, Umar Rasheed, Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh, M. Hamzan Rauf, M. Imran Khan, Mian Fahim Khadim, Ali Shahzad, Nabila Tariq, Imran Anjum Alvi, Rai Asad Ahmad Dhudhi, Mian Zulfiqar Ali, Usman Khalil, Farhan Shahzad, Asad Javaid Jutt, Omer Iqbal Khawaja, Ahmad Khalid, Arslan Saleem Ch., Muhammad Siddique Butt, Waqar Fayyaz Dogar, Mian Nafees Bashir, Zahid Imran Gondal, Malik Bashir Ahmad Khalid, Saad Nusrullah, Mustafa Kamal, Muhammad Anwar Bhatti, Shakeel Ahmad Basra, Abuzar Hussain, Tahir Shabbir, Safdar Shaheen Pirzada, Shahzaib ul Hassan Chattha, Tauqeer Ahmad Ranjha, Raja Hamza Anwar, Muhammad Rashid Chaudhry, Hamood ur Rehman Awan, Malik Khalid Rafiq, Hafiz Muhammad Imran Rashid, Belal Jabbar Memon, Muhammad Shahid Baig, Muhammad Bilal Pervaiz, Barrister Saffi ul Hassan, Arif Latif, Malik Aaqib Ali, Hamid Bashir, Muhammad Sajjad, Azeem Ullah Virk, Barrister Ahtesham Mukhtar, Muhammad Mohsin Virk, Ch. Qamar-uz-Zaman, Ali Raza Kamboh, Sheikh Aqeel Ahmad, Zahoor Ahmad Zahid, Muhammad Aslam Sheikh, Abdul Waheed Habib, Muhammad Amin Goraya, Mirza Mubashir Baig, Basit Waheed Watoo, Asad Rahim Khan, Muhammad Nadeem, Asmar Tariq Mayo, Ch. Imran Arshad Naro, Ch. Shahid Iqbal, Muhammad Naeem Munawar, Syed Najaf Hussain Shah, Mian Asghar Ali, Zaheer-ud-Din Babar, Sarfraz Ahmad, Malik Muhammad Akram Shahab, Muhammad Ijaz Ali Bhatti, Khurram Saleem, Sardar Qasim Hassan Khan, Abid Hafeez, Rehan Sarwar, Amir Fahim Chaudhry, H. M. Majid Siddiqi, Abad-ur- Rehman, Zarq Khan, Muhammad Asif, Rai Amer Ijaz Kharal, Samia Aslam, Syed Nasir Ali Gilani, Azhar Abbas, Basharat Ali, Hasham Maqsood, Hafiz Ijaz Ahmad, Muhammad Zafar Iqbal Mian, Muhammad Tayyab, Aamer Hanif, Muhammad Farooq Sheikh, Muhammad Abu Bakar Shahzad, Muhammad Umer Riaz, Muhammad Shakeel Malik, Amir Jalil Siddiqui, Mamoon Nisar, Asad Aslam, Ali Ijaz Shah, Asad Abbas Raza, Muhammad Ali Malik, Adam Hassan Malik, Muhammad Mahtab Chughtai, Sardar Akbar Ali Khan Dogar, Muhammad Zulqarnain, Syed Moazzam Raheel, Syed Arsalan Bukhari, Sharafat Ali, Haseeb Tahir, Shahbaz Siddique, Fahad Azhar Butt, Shahid Hussain Ch., Muhammad Naeem Aziz, Ikram ul Haq Sheikh, Khawaja Muhammad Ihsan, Muhammad Waqar Akram, Umair Maqsood, Khawaja Muhammad Ayaz, Muhammad Asfandyar Khan Tareen, Muhammad Younas Khalid, Muhammad Kashif Tahir, Malik Allah Nawaz Nasir, Faiz-e-Azhar Ajmal, Nimra Arshad, Shezad Raza, Akmal Anayat Butt, Ch. Fahad Iftikhar Gujjar, Muhammad Adnan Afzal, Advocates in connected petitions.\nRespondents by: Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan and Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nCh. Muhammad Jawad Yaqoob, Additional Advocate General Punjab, Barrister Zargham Lukhesar and Muhammad Irfan Arif Sheikh, Assistant Advocate Generals, Punjab.\nM/s Khalid Ishaq, Asma Hamid, Abdul Muqtadir Khan, Syed Zain-ul-Abidein Bukhari, Shahid Sarwar Chahal, Riaz Begum, Nida Aftab, Nayab Ahmad Tarar, Adeel Shahid Karim, Sh. Muhammad Ali, Maryam Asad, Saeed ur Rehman Dogar, Barrister Scheherzade Shahryar, Sana Azhar, Amna Parveen, Muhammad Sharfeen Sandhu, Muhammad Rizwan, Abdul Hafeez Dhillon, Bilal Munir, Naeem Khan, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Anwar Ali Singha, Baran Khan Sherwani and Anas Sheikh, Advocate/Legal Advisor for respondent FBR.\nMs. Laila Ghafoor, Director, Law, FBR and Muhammad Majid, CIR Legal, LTO, Lahore.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD OSMAN GULL\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23474", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1340 = 2023 SLD 1340 = 2023 PTD 742", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-Redundancy, principle of-Applicability-No provision of law is to be read either in isolation nor such interpretation be made which may render other provisions as redundant or nugatory.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.32-Show-cause notice, issuance of-Re-assessment of goods-Limitation-Petitioner was importer and aggrieved of issuance of show-cause notice for re-assessment of goods and recovery of taxes under S.32 of Customs Act, 1969, beyond period of limitation-Validity-For reopening of any matter or issuing show-cause notice upon a person, time limit has to be counted as five years from the relevant date and not from the detection date-Issuance of a show-cause notice in a timely manner is a sine-qua-non for assuming jurisdiction vested under the provision of S.32 of Customs Act, 1969-Where show-cause notice is issued beyond period of limitation, it has to be considered and declared as null and void- Notices issued beyond mandatory period are liable to be struck down as acceptance of a show cause notice after period of limitation will amount to enhancement of period of limitation and this is not legally permissible- High Court set aside show-cause notices issued beyond period of limitation-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nMessrs Lever Brothers Pakistan Ltd. v. Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise Appellate Tribunal and another 2005 PTD 2462; Muhammad Measum and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2015 PTD 702; Collector of Customs, Customs House, Karachi v. Syed Rehan Ahmed 2017 SCMR 152; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, RTO, Hyderabad v. Messrs Hyderabad Electric Supply (HESCO) Hyderabad) 2014 PTD 951; Messrs Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi v. Collector (Appeals) Customs Sales Tax and Federal Excise, Karachi and another 2010 PTD 251; Multan Electric Power Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Multan and others (Tax Ref. No.27/2014); Messrs Lucky Cement Limited v. Federation of Karachi Pakistan and others (C.P. No.D-216/2013) and Nestle Pakistan Limited v. The Federal Board of Revenue and others (C.P. No.D-5482/2017) ref.\nAdditional Collector, Model Customs Collectorate, Multan v. M/s. Reliance Commodities (Pvt.) Ltd. and others (Cus. Ref. No.12/2016); Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi v. Pakistan State Oil Karachi 2011 SCMR 1279 and Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v Jahangir Khan Tareen and others 2022 SCMR 92 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32", - "Case #": "C.P. No.D-2890 of 2020, decided on 12th December, 2022, heard on: 6th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Irfan Saadat Khan and Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qazi Umair Ali for Petitioner.\nG.M. Bhutto, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No.1.\nMuhabbat Hussain Awan for Respondents Nos.2 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs MICRO INNOVATIONS AND TECHNOLOGIES (PVT.) LTD. through constituted attorney\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Federal Secretary Ministry of Commerce and 4 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23475", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1341 = 2023 SLD 1341 = 2023 PTD 750 = (2024) 130 TAX 662", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Confiscation of Vehicle in Smuggling Cases:\nNotification SRO No.499(I)/2009, Clause (b):\nTo invoke the barring clause for confiscation of a vehicle, authorities must establish that:\nThe smuggled goods were concealed in false cavities of the vehicle, or\nThe vehicle was used wholly and exclusively for smuggling purposes.\nInterpretation of Wholly and Exclusively :\nThe terms imply that the vehicle was used entirely for smuggling and for no other purpose.\nIf smuggling was not the vehicles primary or sole purpose, the barring clause does not apply.\nCase-Specific Observations:\nIn the referenced case, the smuggled goods were not concealed in false cavities.\nThe owner of the vehicle did not have a history of using it for smuggling.\nUnder Clause 2(f) of the Notification, the vehicle could be released upon payment of redemption fine rather than being subjected to outright confiscation.\nJudicial Outcome:\nThe High Court upheld the Customs Appellate Tribunal’s decision, noting that the vehicle did not meet the criteria for outright confiscation.\nThe reference challenging the Tribunal’s order was dismissed.\n(b) Interpretation of Statutes:\nTaxing Statute Principles:\nTaxing statutes typically contain two components:\nCharging provisions: Establish liability for taxation, to be interpreted strictly.\nMachinery provisions: Facilitate the collection and assessment of taxes.\nTwo Interpretations Rule:\nWhere a taxing statute is ambiguous and allows for two reasonable interpretations, the interpretation favoring the taxpayer should be adopted.\nSupporting Precedents:\nAsbestos Cements Case (1992) 66 Tax 140: Reinforces the principle that ambiguities in taxing statutes should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.\nTrustee of Port Karachis Case 1989 PTD 1048: Highlights the necessity for strict interpretation of charging provisions in taxing statutes.\nLegal Implications:\nIn cases of confiscation under customs law, authorities must meet strict criteria for barring clauses, ensuring procedural fairness.\nTaxpayers benefit from the principle of favorable interpretation in ambiguous statutory provisions.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,18,79,178,196", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No. 12-P of 2022, decided on 31st March, 2022, heard on: 31st March, 2022", - "Judge Name:": " Abdul Shakoor, JUSTICE and Syed Arshad Ali, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rahat Ali Khan Nahqi for Petitioner.\nWaqas-ur-Rehman for Respondent No. 1", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR CUSTOMS MCC, PESHAWAR\nvs\nPAINDA NOOR and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23476", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1342 = 2023 SLD 1342 = 2023 PTD 758 = (2024) 129 TAX 111", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWTg", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe taxpayer challenged the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), upon hearing the matter, remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer for de novo proceedings (a fresh review).\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, however, found that the remand order passed by the Commissioner was without jurisdiction. As a result, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the remand order and took its own decision on the case.\nThe issue arose from the powers of the Appellate Tribunal under Section 132(3)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, especially regarding its ability to remand a case or make a decision on its merits.\nIssues:\nAppellate Tribunal’s Powers: Whether the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue had the jurisdiction to set aside the remand order passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) and take a decision on the case itself or whether it should have referred the matter back to the Commissioner (Appeals) for a de novo decision.\nScope of Remand Orders: Whether the Appellate Tribunal properly exercised its powers under Section 132(3)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in deciding the case or should have referred it back for further inquiry.\nArguments:\nTaxpayers Argument: The taxpayer contended that the Commissioners remand was in accordance with the law and should have been upheld by the Appellate Tribunal. The taxpayer also argued that the Appellate Tribunal did not have the power to decide the case on its merits.\nTax Authorities Argument: The tax authorities argued that the remand order was issued without proper jurisdiction and the Appellate Tribunal was correct in setting aside the remand and taking a decision on the matter.\nDecision:\nThe High Court noted that the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue had the jurisdiction to remand the case back to the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 132(3)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and could either remand the case or proceed to decide it on merits.\nSince the Appellate Tribunal had found that the Commissioners remand was without jurisdiction, the correct course of action would have been for the Appellate Tribunal to set aside the remand order and refer the case back to the Commissioner (Appeals) for a decision on the merits. The Appellate Tribunal failed to do so and instead took a decision on its own, thereby bypassing the Commissioner (Appeals).\nThe High Court emphasized that the rationale behind having more than one appellate forum under tax law was to ensure that the exercise of powers by tax authorities was cross-checked and that proper taxation was achieved under the statute.\nTherefore, the High Court set aside the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and remanded the matter to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) for decision afresh.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court ruled that the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue did not exercise its jurisdiction correctly under Section 132 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and that the matter should be remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for a fresh decision.\nThe Reference was disposed of accordingly, with the matter to be decided on its merits by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals).\nKey Takeaways:\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue has the power to either remand a case for further inquiry or decide the case on its merits.\nRemand orders issued by Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) should be made within the bounds of their jurisdiction.\nAppellate Tribunals must exercise their powers in a way that upholds the cross-checking mechanism of the taxation process under the law.\nThe High Court can step in when the Appellate Tribunal fails to follow the correct procedural steps, ensuring that matters are decided on their merits at the appropriate level.\nRelated Cases:\nAssistant Collector Customs and others v. Messrs Khyber Electric Lamps and others (2001 SCMR 838)\nKhyber Tractors (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan through Ministry of Finance, Revenue and Economic Affairs (PLD 2005 SC 842)\nShahida Bibi v. Habib Bank Limited and others (PLD 2016 SC 995)\nThe Collector of Sales Tax v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons (2017 SCMR 1427)\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Ltd. (2022 SCMR 1021)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,122(1),129,132,133", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 41041 of 2022, heard on 22nd September, 2022, heard on: 22nd September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Jamil Khan and Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zain-ul-Abidein Bokhari for Applicant.\nSarfraz Ahmad Cheema for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-II, RTO, GUJRANWALA\nVS\nMESSRS CRYSTAL DISTRIBUTORS, GUJRANWALA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23477", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1343 = 2023 SLD 1343 = 2023 PTD 763 = (2023) 128 TAX 14", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWXo", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe Norwegian Refugee Council (the respondent/taxpayer) was granted an exemption from sales tax on the grounds that it was supplying goods to internally displaced persons (IDPs), based on its claim that these supplies were made to IDPs within a tribal area. The respondent argued that under the exemption provisions of the Sales Tax Act, the supplies to IDPs were entitled to sales tax immunity.\nDispute: The main dispute revolved around whether the sales tax exemption applied to the Norwegian Refugee Councils supplies to IDPs within a settled area. The issue hinged on whether the constitutional immunity under Article 247 (which has since been repealed) applied to supplies made to internally displaced persons located within a settled area or only in a tribal area.\nIssues:\nExemption Applicability: Whether the exemption from sales tax under Article 247 of the Constitution (which was territory-specific) could be applied to the Norwegian Refugee Councils supplies to IDPs located in a settled area.\nSales Tax Immunity: Whether the immunity from sales tax under Article 247 was available to the Norwegian Refugee Council, considering that the supplies were made in a settled area, not a tribal area.\nArguments:\nRespondent’s Argument: The Norwegian Refugee Council argued that the supplies it made to IDPs should be exempt from sales tax based on the exemption provisions available under Article 247 (which previously provided immunity from tax for certain individuals and entities operating in tribal areas).\nTax Authorities’ Argument: The tax authorities argued that Article 247 immunity was territory-specific (only applying to tribal areas) and not applicable to supplies made in settled areas. The Sales Tax Act provisions did not exempt the Norwegian Refugee Council from paying sales tax in settled areas.\nDecision:\nTerritory-Specific Immunity: The High Court ruled that Article 247 (repealed) of the Constitution provided immunity from sales tax that was territory-specific, not person-specific. Therefore, the Norwegian Refugee Council was not exempt from sales tax on goods supplied in settled areas.\nWrongful Exemption: The Customs Appellate Tribunal had wrongly held that supplies made to IDPs in a settled area were exempt from sales tax under Article 247. The High Court set aside the Customs Appellate Tribunals order and upheld the Orders-in-Original passed by the Appellate Authority.\nRestoration of Orders: The High Court restored the orders made by the Appellate Authority, holding that the Norwegian Refugee Council was not entitled to any exemption from the sales tax under Article 247 for supplies made in a settled area.\nReference Allowed: The High Court allowed the reference made by the tax authorities, effectively ruling that the Norwegian Refugee Council was not entitled to the claimed exemption.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court ruled that the sales tax exemption under Article 247 (since repealed) of the Constitution applied only to goods supplied in tribal areas, not settled areas.\nThe Norwegian Refugee Council was not exempt from the sales tax on goods supplied to IDPs in a settled area.\nThe High Court set aside the decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal and restored the orders-in-original passed by the Appellate Authority.\nKey Takeaways:\nImmunity is Territory-Specific: Exemptions or immunities under Article 247 were territory-specific (applying only to tribal areas) and not person-specific.\nSettled Areas: Supplies made to IDPs in settled areas were subject to sales tax.\nLegal Precedent: The ruling aligns with previous cases that clarified the application of Article 247 immunity as territory-specific.\nRelated Cases:\nCommissioner of Income-Tax Peshawar v. Messrs Gul Cooking Oil and Vegetable Ghee (Pvt.) Ltd. (2003 PTD 1913)\nMessrs Taj Packages Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Government of Pakistan (2016 PTD 203)\nPakistan through Chairman FBR and others v. Hazrat Hussain (2018 SCMR 939)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,7,26,33(1),33(2),33(5),33(6),33(11)(b)(c),33(13),33(19),33(21),37A,47Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=247", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 8-A of 2016, decided on 7th February, 2023. date of hearing: 19th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " WIQAR AHMAD, JUSTICE AND KAMRAN HAYAT MIANKHEL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid Idrees Mufti for Petitioner\nIshaq Ali Qazi for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, ABBOTTABAD AND ANOTHER\nVS\nMESSRS SAIM TRADERS AND ANOTHER " - }, - { - "Case No.": "23478", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1344 = 2023 SLD 1344 = 2023 PTD 773", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpWXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)-Ss. 62, 111-Assessment on production of accounts, evidence, etc-Penalty for concealment of income-Scope-During the assessment proceedings, the taxation officer alleged that certain expenses claimed by the respondent were false and inaccurate and were added to the total income as concealed income-However, the original order was subsequently amended and part of the alleged addition was deleted while some of it was set aside-No record of the original proceedings was presented to rebut the factual determination made by the lower forums against the department-Taxation officer failed to determine the actual guilt warranting a penal action and did not consider the exception created by subsection 2(A) of S. 111 of the Ordinance, which stated that a mere disallowance of an expenditure would not constitute concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income unless it was proven that the assessee deliberately claimed a deduction for an expenditure not actually incurred-Deletion of the penalty was fully justified, therefore, the Reference Application was dismissed in limine.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)-S. 111-Penalty for concealment of income-Scope-Mens rea- Scope-Existence of mens rea is a mandatory condition for levying any penalty under S.lll of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979-Burden to prove such act of an assessee is also on the department-Mere failure to determine correct income and pay tax accordingly, until it is a result of fraud or willful gross neglect, will not ipso facto warrant imposition of penalty-Falsity of an explanation by the taxpayer is not in and of itself a cause to mandatorily impose penalty under the Ordinance- Assessee is not called upon to prove his innocence; it is for the department to establish his guilt-Penalty can be imposed, only when the revenue officer establishes a case indicating dishonest motive of an assessee in filing a return-For the purposes of imposition of penalty, the assessee must be conscious of having concealed the particulars of his income-For imposition of penalty it is not sufficient that the assessee’s explanation was not satisfactory or was even false; an evidence independent of assessee’s explanation should be on record before penalty could be imposed-Even if an assessee agrees to a higher assessment than the returned income, it is not sufficient to levy penalty, whereas, the position may be different if the assessee admits that the addition may be treated as its concealed income, in which case the department need not establish anything more to levy penalty- Before penalty can be imposed the entirety of circumstances must reasonably point to the conclusion that the disputed amount represented income and that the assessee had consciously concealed the particulars of his income or had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars.\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Habib Bank Limited 2007 PTD 901; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Civil Aviation Authority 2002 PTD 388; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gokuldas Harivallabhdas (1958) 34 ITR 98; Muhammad Muslim v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1980) 42 Tax 129; Anantharam Veerasinghhaiah, Co. v. CIT [1980] 123 ITR 457 (SC); Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kamran Steel Re Rolling Mills [1989] 60 Tax 13; Commissioner of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh v. C.V.C. Mining Company, Gudur (1976) 102 ITR 830 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anwar Ali AIR 1970 SC 1782 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=62,111", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Application No.D-493 of 2009, decided on 14th February, 2023, heard on: 14th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi for Applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER (LEGAL DIVISION)\nVS\nPAKISTAN SERVICES LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23479", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1345 = 2023 SLD 1345 = 2023 PTD 778", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.2(s), 16, 177-Smuggling-Restriction on possession of goods in certain areas-Scope-Appellant assailed order-in-original passed by Collector of Customs (Adjudication) whereby his vehicle was confiscated for being smuggled-Contention of appellant was that he was a subsequent purchaser of vehicle from open market after verification of its legality-Validity-There was no indication that the appellant was involved in the act of smuggling-Nothing was available on record to show collusion between the appellant and the owner of smuggled goods-Vehicle was not intercepted in an area notified under S. 177 of the Customs Act, 1969-Vehicle in question was purchased by the appellant after due verification set forth under S. 25 of the Provincial Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965-Subject vehicle was more than 15 years old and the import record could not be obtained after lapse of period of more than 10 years-Department was directed to release the vehicle unconditionally to the appellant-Appeal was allowed.\nCollector of Customs Preventive Karachi v. Ghulam Muhammad 2008 PTD 525 and The Additional Director, Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation-FBR, Regional Office, Karachi and others v. Imran and another 2021 PTD 1683 ref.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 157, 180-Extent of confiscation-Scope-Phrase “shall also be liable to confiscation” used in S. 157(2) of Customs Act, 1969, does not mean liable to confiscation automatically-Discretion given to the authority to confiscate the goods or vehicle must be exercised on sound judicial principles-If the words “liable to confiscation” give a discretion to the confiscating authority to deprive a person of his property, then this discretion must be exercised upon the principles of natural justice; that is to say, the person sought to be deprived of the property must be given notice to show cause and he must be provided adequate opportunity of putting forward his point of view and the same must receive due consideration.\n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.17-Detention, seizure and confiscation of goods imported in violation of S.15 or S.16-Scope-No person should be deprived of his property by way of penalty unless it is clear that he is in some measure responsible for assisting or furthering the commission of the offence committed and no innocent person should be unjustly punished or deprived of his property.\n(d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.2(s), 16-Smuggling-Scope-Smuggling means bringing into or taking out of Pakistan in breach of any prohibition or restriction or evading payment of customs duties and taxes.\n(e) Administration of justice-Equity is the soul of the law in dispensation of justice.\n(f) Administration of justice-Proper place of procedure in any system of administration of justice is to help and not to thwart rights of the people.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,177", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.H-52 of 2022, decided on 30th June, 2022, heard on: 11th May, 2022", - "Judge Name:": " ABDUL JABBAR QURESHI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-1", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Adnan Moton for Appellant\nRana Shahbaz, Inspector for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN\nVS\nTHE ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION), QUETTA AT HYDERABAD AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23480", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1346 = 2023 SLD 1346 = 2023 PTD 789", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 124 & 221-Assessment giving effect to an order-Rectification of mistakes-Scope-According to S.124 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the assessing officer must adhere to the directions given in the appeal effect order and cannot make any additions, deletions, or alterations on his own-Furthermore, the appeal effect order must solely focus on the issues stated in the appellate order and cannot address any extraneous or unrelated matters-If the assessing officer believes that an incorrect assessment has been made, he can proceed with amending the assessment subject to limitation-However, its important to note that the assessing officer cannot amend the assessment of income in rectification proceedings.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.221-Rectification of mistakes-Scope of rectification is limited to correcting mistakes that are easily identifiable on the surface of the order.\n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.221-Rectification of mistakes-Scope-Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, is circumscribed to rectifying mistakes that are evidently discernible from the record-Phrase mistake from the record utilized in S.221 pertains to an error or mistake that is glaringly evident and unambiguous and, if allowed to remain on the record, may have a substantial impact on the case.\n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.221-Rectification of mistakes-Scope-An error of law or fact that directly relates to a question regarding the determination of the rights of the parties involved, affecting their significant rights or causing harm to their interests, is not a mistake that is evident from the record to be rectified under S.221.\nMushtaq Ahmad and Co. v. CIR 2015 PTD 1926 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=124,221", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 2462/LB of 2015, decided on 13th July, 2022, heard on: 25th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Bilal Hassan, DR for Appellant.\nOmer Iqbal Khawaja for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO-II, FAISALABAD\nVS\nMESSRS CRESCENT TEXTILE MILLS, LTD., FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23481", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1347 = 2023 SLD 1347 = 2023 PTD 793", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTU", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969 )-Ss. 32(1), 32(2), 25, 79, 209, 156(1), Cls. 1, 14, 45—SRO No.499(I)/2009 dated 13-06-2009-Mis-declaration-Examination- Redemption fine and penalty, imposition of-Discriminatory treatment-Scope—Appellant/importer declared imported goods as “old, used computers”-Contention of the appellant/importer was that the redemption fine and penalty had been imposed only on the apprehension that the importer had deliberately committed mis- declaration of contents of the consignments in order to avoid payment of due amount of leviable duty and taxes-Held, that that there was absolutely no likelihood of escape of leviable duty and taxes on imported consignments of used computers as the same were invariably marked for 100 percent examination-Examination report of such consignments reflected the composition of imported goods accurately, thus making it almost impossible to evade leviable duties and taxes on such imports unless there was some oversight by the Examination Staff of the Collectorate-Such consignments, however, consisted of mixed lot purchased from abroad and it was not possible for the importers to make correct declaration of all the contents of such consignments at the time of declaration before the Department-Any mistake in the declaration was, therefore, not intentional on the part of importers of such goods by any means-Record revealed that previously the Department had released identical goods of other importers, thus discriminatory treatment with the appellant / importer was unfair-Imposition of fine and penalty, in the present case, was too harsh and thus was not applicable as no element of Mens Rea was established against the appellant/importer- Fine and penalty imposed was cancelled/waived-Order-in-Original and Order-in Appeal were set aside-Appeal was allowed, under circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1),32(2),25,79,156(1),1,14,45", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-8051 of 2021, decided on 1st March, 2023. Dates of hearing: 8th and 20th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Muhammad Saleem for Appellant.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRA GOOD LUCK TRADERS THROUGH PROPRIETOR\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS) AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23482", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1348 = 2023 SLD 1348 = 2023 PTD 817", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)-S.72-Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S.2(27)-Determination of value for the purposes of duty-Retail price-Scope-Appellant was held liable to include the notional value of Federal Excise Duty in retail price for the purpose of calculating sales tax on the ground that :he excise duty was to be factored in while computing the retail price-Validity-Departments valuation and methodology were clearly arbitrary-Notional excise duty had no connection whatsoever with the . abject matter of excise duty, which was the manufacture of goods- Orders passed by the department were set aside and the appeal was accepted.\n2007 SCMR 1367 rel.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S.11-Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005), S.14-Recovery of tax- Show cause notice-Adjudication proceedings-Order-in-original- Limitation-Scope-Commissioner, under subsection (5) of S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and subsection (2) of S. 14 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, is obligated to record reasons in writing for the grant of an extension of time-Commissioner cannot extend the time according to his own choice and whims as a matter of routine without any limit or constraint; he can only do so after applying his mind and recording reasons for such extension in writing-Under the said provisions, routine extensions granted by the Commissioner without recording reasons are null and void-Language of the relevant provisos is clear and explicit and no exception can be taken to the fact that the Commissioner is required to adhere to the condition precedent of recording reasons in writing before passing the assessment, order.\n(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S.11-Recovery of tax-Show-cause notice—Adjudication proceedings-Order-in-original-Limitation-Scope-First proviso to S. 11(5) is mandatory in nature and failure to comply with it would render the order invalid.\nCollector of Sales Tax v. Messrs Super Asia 2017 SCMR 1427 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=72,14Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(27)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 957/LB of 2022, decided on 5th January, 2023, heard on: 27th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waseem Ahmad Malik for Appellant.\nGhulam Husain Yasir, DR along with Mazahar Ali DCIR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS PAKISTAN FRUIT JUICE CO. (PVT.) LTD.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23483", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1349 = 2023 SLD 1349 = 2023 PTD 825", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 11, 3(1A), 2(25)-Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded-Further tax- Registered person-Scope-Show-cause notice was issued to the applicant alleging supplies made to unregistered persons and consequent thereto recovery of further tax was sought-Applicant acknowledged having made supplies to unregistered persons but based its defense on the argument that such persons were “liable to be registered ” as defined in S. 2(25) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, therefore, such persons should be considered registered for the purposes of the Act, and no further tax was due-Department did not agree with the defense and an order-in-original was passed-Appellate Tribunal maintained the order-in-original-Validity-Section 3(1 A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, required that further tax should be charged, levied and paid where taxable supplies were made to an unregistered person- Section 3(1A) unequivocally imposed the obligation of further tax upon supplies to unregistered persons-Definition could not override the charging section of law-Definition given in a statute had to be construed so as not to be repugnant to the context and a mere definition by itself could not create any charge, liability and/or exception-Applicants reading of the law would have rendered S.3(1A) as redundant, but the law required that redundancy should not be attributed to legislation-Verbiage of S. 2(25) also contained a proviso precluding conferment of any benefit, in respect of supplies to persons liable to be registered-Applicant was held liable to pay further tax under subsection (1A) of S.3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, for supplies made to unregistered persons. \nChairman Federal Board of Revenue v. A1 Technique Corporation of Pakistan Limited PLD 2017 SC 99 and Suresh Kumar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 Sindh 62 rel.\nZak Re Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Limited v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and others 2020 SCMR 131; Tandlianwala Sugar Mills Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2001 SCMR 1398; Collector of Sales Tax v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. 2005 SCMR 1166 and Iqbal Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan 2010 PTD 2338 ref.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 11, 33-Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded-Offences and penalties- Scope-Penalty may only be contemplated in the demonstrable presence of culpable mens rea attributed to the person.\nZak Re Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Limited v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and others 2020 SCMR 131; Tandlianwala Sugar Mills Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2001 SCMR 1398; Muhammad Waheed v. Customs Appellate Tribunal 2016 PTD 35; NICON (Private) Limited v. CIR RTO 2016 PTD 2748; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Habib Bank Limited 2007 PTD 901; DG Khan Cement Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2004 PTD 1179 ref.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Courts ought to abstain from deciding larger questions, if a case could be decided on narrower grounds-It is preferred for the courts to confine determinations to questions pivotal for the determination of a case.\nZak Re Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Limited v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and others 2020 SCMR 131 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,3(1A),2(25)", - "Case #": "Sp. S.T.R.A. No.59 of 2007, decided on 22nd April, 2022, heard on: 12th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmed Hussain for Applicant.\nIrfan Ahmed Memon, Deputy Attorney General for Respondents.\nAmeer Bux Metlo, Imran Ahmed Metlo and Imran Ali Mithani for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIGRI SUGAR MILLS LIMITED\nVERSUS\nTHE ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SALES TAX AND CENTRAL EXCISE AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23484", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1350 = 2023 SLD 1350 = 2023 PTD 834 = (2024) 129 TAX 245", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVSs", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nImported Goods and Mis-declaration: The respondent/importer declared goods as Miscellaneous electronics items including LED lights, fittings and fixtures, bulbs and parts, chandeliers, galvanized iron, and steel screws, as well as CTCP printing plates. However, the goods were subject to seizure and re-examination due to alleged mis-declaration regarding the description and quantity of the imported items.\nIssue with Assessment: The importer contested that the CTCP printing plates were wrongly assessed by the Customs Department in kilograms instead of square meters, which is the correct unit for this item as per the HS Code No. 3701.3020.\nIssues:\nRe-examination of Goods: Whether the re-examination of the goods and the subsequent assessment by the reporting agency was conducted legally and in accordance with the relevant rules.\nMis-declaration: Whether there was a mis-declaration of the goods, specifically concerning the CTCP printing plates.\nJurisdiction and Powers of the Reporting Agency: Whether the reporting agency had the authority to re-examine the consignment without prior approval from the Chief Collector of Customs.\nArguments:\nPetitioner (Customs Department) Argument: The Customs Department argued that the CTCP printing plates were assessed incorrectly in square meters as per the HS code, and they should have been assessed in kilograms as per their own interpretation.\nRespondent (Importer) Argument: The importer contended that the CTCP printing plates should have been assessed in square meters as per the relevant HS code (3701.3020) and the Departments assessment in kilograms was erroneous. The importer also pointed out that no glaring discrepancy was found in the description of the goods.\nDecision:\nIllegality of Re-examination: The court ruled that the entire process of re-examination and re-assessment conducted by the reporting agency was illegal and without jurisdiction. The reporting agencys action was deemed faulty because the agency did not have the authority to re-examine the consignment without prior approval from the Chief Collector of Customs under SRO 486(I)/2007.\nIncorrect Assessment of CTCP Printing Plates: The court concluded that the assessment of the CTCP printing plates in kilograms was incorrect. As per the relevant HS Code (3701.3020), CTCP printing plates should be assessed in square meters, not kilograms. Thus, the Departments claim that these plates should be assessed by weight (kilograms) was baseless.\nNo Mens Rea (Guilty Mind): The court found no mens rea (guilty mind) on the part of the respondent/importer, meaning no deliberate intention to deceive or mislead customs authorities was established. Additionally, no significant discrepancies were found in the description of the imported goods.\nFine and Penalty Already Paid: The respondent had already paid the fine and penalty as per the Order-in-Original passed by the Adjudicating Authority, thus the matter could not be pursued further. The Adjudicating Authoritys decision was upheld.\nAppeal Dismissed: The appeal was dismissed because the re-examination was illegal, the assessment was incorrect, and the fine and penalty had already been paid. There was no ground for further interference in the Order-in-Original.\nConclusion:\nThe appeal was dismissed and the Order-in-Original passed by the Adjudicating Authority was upheld.\nThe Customs Department was found to have conducted the re-examination and re-assessment illegally and without proper jurisdiction.\nThe CTCP printing plates should have been assessed in square meters, not kilograms, as per the relevant HS code.\nThe importer had already paid the fine and penalty, and the court found no evidence of intentional mis-declaration.\nKey Takeaways:\nRe-examination without Prior Approval: Re-examination of imported goods by a reporting agency must be conducted with the prior approval of the Chief Collector of Customs.\nAssessment Based on HS Code: Goods must be assessed according to the proper HS code and the correct unit of measure (e.g., square meters for CTCP printing plates).\nMens Rea: Without intentional mis-declaration or evidence of fraudulent intent, the penalty or fine should not be unduly prolonged or escalated.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.K-102 of 2020, decided on 15th March, 2023, heard on: 9th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulamullah Shaikh and Akshy Kumar for Respondent No.1", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE DIRECTOR THROUGH DEPUTY DIRECTOR (LAW) DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION-CUSTOMS, KARACHI\nVS\nMESSRS JUTT LIGHTS AND 2 OTHERS " - }, - { - "Case No.": "23485", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1351 = 2023 SLD 1351 = 2023 PTD 847 = (2024) 129 TAX 561", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTk", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nDispute Involving ADR: The dispute centers around the invocation of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) under Section 195-C of the Customs Act, 1969. The aggrieved party sought to invoke the ADR process for resolving the dispute related to customs matters.\nArguments:\nPetitioner’s Argument: The aggrieved party argued that the ADR mechanism should be applicable to their case as a method of resolving the dispute without going through the usual litigation process.\nRespondent’s Argument: The tax authorities (or concerned body) contended that ADR could only be invoked for disputes that are already under litigation in a court of law or an appellate authority, and the process is only applicable to cases that are still pending adjudication.\nDecision:\nScope of ADR: The court emphasized that Section 195-C of the Customs Act, 1969 clearly defines the scope of ADR. ADR can only be invoked for disputes that are under litigation and have not yet been adjudicated by the court or appellate authority. This means that the ADR process is not applicable to disputes that have already been resolved or adjudicated.\nProcedure for ADR:\nIf the ADR Committee successfully resolves the dispute, the aggrieved person is required to withdraw the case from the court or appellate authority within a specified period.\nIf the aggrieved party is satisfied with the decision of the ADR Committee, the decision will be binding on the Collector (customs authority).\nHowever, if the ADR Committee fails to resolve the dispute within 90 days, the FBR (Federal Board of Revenue) is required to dissolve the ADR Committee, and the dispute will be referred back to the court or appellate authority where the case was originally pending.\nNature of ADR: The court clarified that ADR under Section 195-C is an alternative mechanism for dispute resolution, not an additional remedy. This means that ADR can only be pursued while the dispute is still under litigation. If ADR fails, the aggrieved party returns to the original forum for adjudication.\nConclusion:\nADR as an Alternative Remedy: The court confirmed that ADR under Section 195-C of the Customs Act, 1969 is meant to provide an alternative remedy for disputes that are still pending in a court or appellate authority, not an additional option for cases that have already been decided or are outside of active litigation.\nThe ADR process will only succeed if both parties agree to the outcome and the case is withdrawn from the court or appellate authority; otherwise, the dispute will continue in the original forum.\nKey Takeaway:\nSection 195-C of the Customs Act, 1969 provides an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for pending disputes before courts or appellate authorities. If the ADR process is successful, the case is withdrawn, and the decision is binding. If not, the dispute reverts to the original forum for adjudication. Therefore, ADR is an alternative remedy, not an additional one, and can only be invoked when the dispute is under active litigation.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=195-C", - "Case #": "Constitution of Petition No. D-946 of 2013, decided on 26th December, 2022, heard on: 26th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, JUSTICE AND ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Jawed Khan for Petitioner.\nQazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondents Nos. 1 and 4.\nNemo for Respondent No.2.\nSardar Zafar Husain along with Haroon Waqar Malik, ADC and Tauqeer Ahmed, P.A. Customs for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS ASTRO PLASTIC (PVT.) LTD THROUGH COMPANY SECRETARY AND ANOTHER\nVS\nMINISTRY OF FINANCE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23486", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1352 = 2023 SLD 1352 = 2023 YLR 1146", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVTg", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 420, 468, 471, 109 & 34-Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5-National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000), S. 30-Dishonestly inducing delivery of property, forgery for purpose of cheating, using as genuine a forged document, abetment, common intention-Corruption and corrupt practices-Bail, grant of-Accused persons, officials of Passport Office, were alleged to have issued passports to minors on the basis of fake B-Form-Passports in question were issued on the basis of FRC (Family Registration Certificate) issued by NADRA-Nothing was available on record to show that for preparation of passports in question, the accused persons had taken any illegal bribe-Accused persons were government officials, as such, there was no apprehension that they would abscond after getting bail-Investigating Agency had already collected the evidence, so, there was no chance of tampering with the prosecution evidence by the accused persons-Investigation had already been completed and report under S. 173, Cr.P.C., had been sent to the Trial Court-There was no prospect of earlier conclusion of the trial and the accused persons could not be kept behind the bars for an indefinite period without determining their guilt by the Court of competent jurisdiction-Accused persons were admitted to bail, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=420,468,471,109,34", - "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1671-B of 2023, decided on 25th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Waheed Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Yousafzai for Petitioner.\nHafeez Saeed Akhtar for Petitioners (in connected bail petitions Cr. Misc. Nos.4295-B and 4298-B of 2023).\nMs. Sophia Masood, Assistant Attorney General with Jamshaid Nadeem, Assistant Director Federal Investigating Agency (FIA).\nSardar Qamar Sultan for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ZAHEER-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23487", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1353 = 2023 SLD 1353 = (2023) 127 TAX 673 = 2025 PTD 424", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVXo", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nConstitutional Petition: The petitioners filed a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the show cause notices dated 02.07.2021 and 16.08.2021 issued by the Respondent No. 4 under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (the 1990 Act). The notices related to the determination of the tax liability and input tax credit denied to the petitioners.\nDispute: The petitioners contended that their claim for input tax credit, particularly concerning the supply of equipment to their other plant, was wrongly disallowed. They argued that they were not involved in taxable supplies and, therefore, had no nexus with taxable supplies, which should entitle them to the relief they sought.\nArguments:\nPetitioners Argument: The petitioners argued that they were not contributing to taxable supplies and did not have a nexus with any taxable activity. Therefore, they should be allowed to claim input tax credit and the relevant show-cause notices issued by the tax authorities were unjustified.\nRespondents Argument: The respondents contended that the input sales tax on the supply of equipment was correctly disallowed based on their interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 1990 Act.\nDecision:\nInput Tax Credit Determination: The court decided that the matter needed further verification. The petitioners’ claim for input tax credit would be examined by a qualified/expert team who would conduct an on-site/physical verification of the goods on which the input tax was claimed. The verification would determine whether the goods were used for taxable activities or taxable supplies.\nVerification Process: The court directed that a team of qualified experts be constituted to visit the petitioners’ manufacturing premises. The team would verify the invoices related to the input tax claims and confirm whether the goods were used for taxable activities, as per the 1990 Act.\nAdjudication: After the physical verification, the matter would be adjudicated by the adjudicating authority. The authority would take into account the legal provisions, relevant case law, and any applicable laws, including the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and the Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007. The authority would also consider previous judgments, particularly the Nishat Mills Limited Case.\nThe court emphasized that the adjudication process should be completed within the prescribed period as per the law.\nConclusion:\nThe petition was not dismissed outright but was instead referred for further inquiry. The court called for an on-site verification of the goods and invoices to determine whether the input tax was validly claimed.\nAfter the verification, the adjudicating authority would make a final decision, considering all legal provisions and applicable case law.\nCases Referred to:\nNishat Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2020 PTD 1641)\nCoca-Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd. v. Customs, Excise, and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (2017 PTD 2380)\nReliance Commodities (Private) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 Lahore 632) = (2020 PTD 1464)\nTariq Iqbal Malik v. M/s Multipliers Group Pvt. Ltd. (2022 CLD 468)\nChenah Flour and General Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2021 Lahore 343)\nRamzan Sugar Mills Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue (2021 PTD 1321)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2,7,8,8(1)(b),11(2)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 52043/2021, decided on 24.01.2023", - "Judge Name:": " JAWAD HASSAN, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui. Advocate for the Petitioners alongwith Miss Sibgha Saqib and Barrister Fasih-ur-Rehman. Advocates for the Appellants\nMr. Muhammad Yahya Johar, ASC/Legal Advisor for the Respondent-FBR.\nMr. Nasir Javaid Ghumman, Deputy Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DG KHAN CEMENT COMPANY LIMITED ETC.\nVERSUS\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23488", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1354 = 2023 SLD 1354 = (2023) 127 TAX 680", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpVXk", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nAudit and Show-Cause Notices: The taxpayer (applicant) was selected for an audit under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Subsequently, show-cause notices were issued to the applicant under Section 122(9) read with Section 122(5).\nAmendment of Assessments: The tax assessments of the applicant were amended by the tax authorities under Section 122(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance. These amendments led to additions in the applicants tax liability under:\nSection 21(c) (for deductions not allowed),\nSection 36 (related to expenses on long-term contracts),\nSection 111 (for unexplained income/assets).\nAppeal Process: The applicant contested the amendments, but the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) upheld the additions. The Appellate Tribunal also confirmed these additions. As a result, the applicant sought further relief before the High Court.\nIssues:\nUnexplained Income and Assets: Whether the additions under Section 111(1)(a) and 111(1)(b) for unexplained income/assets were valid.\nLong-Term Contracts: Whether the applicants agreement for sale fell under the definition of a long-term contract under Section 36(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, and whether revenue from such contracts should be recognized on a percentage of completion basis.\nCapitalization of Expenditure: Whether the applicant could capitalize expenditures under Section 21(c) of the Ordinance in computing income.\nArguments:\nApplicants Argument:\nThe applicant challenged the additions under Section 111 (unexplained income) and contended that the agreement for sale should not be treated as a long-term contract, thereby not necessitating revenue recognition based on the percentage of completion method.\nThe applicant also sought to capitalize costs related to long-term contracts under Section 21(c).\nTax Authorities Argument:\nThe tax authorities defended the additions, asserting that the applicants income must be recognized using the percentage of completion method for long-term contracts. Additionally, the authorities stated that costs related to long-term contracts should not be capitalized under Section 21(c) unless properly accounted for in the relevant year.\nDecision:\nSection 111 (Unexplained Income):\nThe High Court cannot overturn the factual findings of the Appellate Tribunal unless there is clear illegality or jurisdictional error. Since the applicant failed to provide any new material or facts that were overlooked by the tax department or the appellate forums, the Court upheld the additions under Section 111 for unexplained income.\nLong-Term Contracts:\nThe Court confirmed that the agreement for sale fell within the definition of a long-term contract under Section 36(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. As a result, the applicant was required to recognize revenue from this contract using the percentage of completion method.\nThis method of revenue recognition is standard for long-term contracts, particularly for builders and developers.\nCapitalization of Expenditures:\nThe Court held that the applicant could not capitalize expenditures under Section 21(c) as these expenditures related to long-term contracts must be properly accounted for in the tax year in which they were incurred. The Court upheld the treatment of these expenditures as part of the income calculation for the relevant year.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court dismissed the reference and upheld the additions made by the tax authorities under Sections 21(c), 36, and 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe Court found no merit in the applicant’s challenges regarding unexplained income, the classification of the agreement for sale, and the capitalization of expenditures.\nThe Court reaffirmed the use of the percentage of completion method for recognizing revenue from long-term contracts and the tax treatment of related expenditures.\nCases Referred to:\nWorkers Welfare Funds, M/o Human Resources Development, Islamabad v. East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt) Ltd. (PLD 2017 SC 28)\nPakistan Petroleum Ltd. v. SPEC Energy DMCC and others (2022 CLC 1412)\nCommissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pardesh v. Purshottam Premji (1970) 2 SCC 287\nSentinel Rolling Shutters v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (1979 AIR 1747)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=219c),36,36(1),36(3),100D,100D(9),111,111(1)(a),111(1)(b),122(1),122(5),122(9),177", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 34 of 2013, decided on 04.10.2022, heard on: 04.10.2022", - "Judge Name:": " BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE AND SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Muhammad Idrees and Syed Farid Bukhari, Advocates for the Applicants.\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S EMAAR DHA ISLAMABAD LIMITED\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (LEGAL), LARGE TAXPAYERS UNIT ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23489", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1355 = 2023 SLD 1355 = (2023) 127 TAX 709 = 2025 PTD 586", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTc", - "Key Words:": "SRO 833(I)/2018 – Dated 03.07.2018 (Exemptions on Import of Vintage Vehicles)\nFacts:\nPetitioner: Shah Zaman, who imported a vintage Rolls Royce (Model 1967, Chassis No. SRH23870) from the UK.\nIssue: The vehicle was detained by the Customs Collectorate at Mughalpura Dry Port, Lahore, despite the petitioner having complied with the notification SRO 833(I)/2018, issued by the Ministry of Finance on 03.07.2018, which exempted customs duties, regulatory duties, federal excise duty, sales tax, and withholding tax on the import of vintage or classic vehicles (vehicles older than three years).\nThe petitioner’s application for the release of the vehicle was rejected by the Ministry of Commerce on the grounds that the Import Policy Order 2016 only allowed the import of used cars less than three years old, and the vintage Rolls Royce did not fall within this policy.\nPrevious Legal Proceedings:\nThe petitioner had filed several petitions in the Lahore High Court and was directed to pursue a resolution from the Ministry of Commerce. The Secretary, Ministry of Commerce issued an order on 16.04.2020 rejecting the release of the vehicle.\nCourt Directions: The petitioner’s case was heard multiple times, and directions were issued for the relevant authorities to resolve the matter. The dispute was also referred to the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), and various other related actions were taken, but the issue was not resolved in favor of the petitioner.\nPetitioner’s Argument:\nThe petitioner argued that the notification SRO 833(I)/2018 allowed the import of vintage vehicles with exemptions on customs duties if the total value of the taxes and duties exceeded USD 5,000.\nThe petitioner contended that he had relied on the SRO and made arrangements to import the vintage vehicle into Pakistan based on the understanding that the vehicle would be released upon payment of taxes and duties amounting to USD 5,000.\nThe petitioner claimed that the Customs authorities were estopped from detaining the vehicle, as he had already altered his position based on the expectation created by the official notification.\nRespondents’ Argument:\nThe respondents pointed out that the Import Policy Orders of 2016 and 2020 clearly prohibit the import of vehicles older than three years, including vintage vehicles, and this policy overrules the exemption provided under the SRO 833(I)/2018.\nThe respondents argued that the federal government (Cabinet) had addressed the disparity between the notification and the import policy but decided not to relax the restriction on importing vehicles older than three years.\nDecision:\nDisparity in Policies: It was acknowledged that there was a discrepancy between the SRO 833(I)/2018, which allows exemptions on vintage vehicles, and the Import Policy Orders of 2016 and 2020, which restrict the import of used cars older than three years. However, this matter was referred to the Cabinet, which did not approve a relaxation of the restriction for the import of vintage vehicles.\nCabinets Decision: On 02.11.2021, the Cabinet decided not to approve any one-time relaxation to allow the import of vintage cars older than three years. Following this decision, the Ministry of Commerce requested the FBR to rescind SRO 833(I)/2018 to resolve the ambiguity in tax and import policies.\nNo Merit in the Petition: Given the Cabinets decision not to amend the Import Policy Order, the writ petition was dismissed. The Court determined that there was no legitimate expectation for the petitioner to import a vintage vehicle older than three years, as the Import Policy Order clearly prohibited such imports, and the exemption notification could not override this restriction.\nConclusion:\nThe petition was dismissed, and the import of vintage vehicles older than three years remained prohibited under the Import Policy Orders of 2016 and 2020, despite the SRO 833(I)/2018 exemption.\nThe Cabinet’s decision not to allow relaxation of the import restrictions on vintage vehicles older than three years was upheld.\nCases Referred to:\nMeena Munawar Khan v. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 407)\nMain Jamal Ahhasi v. Federation of Pakistan (2020 PTD 660)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19Federal Excise Act, 2005=16Import Policy Order, 2016=(21)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=53,148Sales Tax Act, 1990=13(2)(a)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 2518 of 2021, decided on 20.05.2022, Dates of hearing: 08.04.2022, 21.04.2022 and 13.05.2022", - "Judge Name:": " MIANGUL HASSAN AURUNGZEB, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Badar Iqbal Ch. Advocate for the Petitioner.\nCh. Muhammad Tahir Mehmood, Assistant Attorney General for the Respondent and Waqar A. Sheikh and Rana Muhammad Mehtab. Advocates for Respondents No.3 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAH ZAMAN\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23490", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1356 = 2023 SLD 1356 = (2023) 127 TAX 748", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTY", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe Applicant Department has challenged the decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal dated 09.11.2015 in Customs Appeal No. K-1173/2021.\nThe Respondent (a factory owner) suffered damage to their goods in a fire caused by arson/riots in December 2007. The goods in question were 526,733 kg of imported PSF (Polyester Staple Fibre), which the respondent claimed were burnt in the incident.\nThe Respondent sought remission of duty and taxes under SRO 450(I)/2001, which allows remission of duty and taxes for goods destroyed due to unforeseen circumstances like fire, provided certain conditions are met.\nThe Adjudicating Authority denied the remission of duty and taxes, arguing that the respondent failed to give proper account of the burnt goods.\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that the Respondent was entitled to the remission of duty and taxes on the damaged goods.\nQuestion Raised:\nThe Applicant has raised the following legal question for reference to the High Court:\nWhether the Customs Appellate Tribunal erred in law by ignoring the explicit provisions of Rule 307A(1) of SRO 450(I)/2001, which requires the proper accounting of goods destroyed in such incidents? The Respondent allegedly failed to report the incident of fire within the prescribed time, which the department argued should forfeit the right to avail the remission benefit.\nArguments:\nApplicant’s Argument:\nThe Applicant argued that the Respondent did not report the fire incident within the required time, thereby forfeiting the right to claim remission of duty and taxes as per the provisions of SRO 450(I)/2001 and Rule 307A.\nThe applicant contended that the Respondent failed to provide proper documentation to account for the goods that were burnt, and thus, should not be eligible for remission.\nRespondent’s Argument:\nThe Respondent supported the Tribunal’s decision, asserting that the fire and the damage to the factory were undisputed facts.\nThe Respondent also pointed out that an insurance claim had been settled in their favor for the damaged goods, supporting their entitlement to the remission of duties and taxes.\nThe Respondent argued that the fire incident was an exceptional circumstance that warranted the remission, and they should not be penalized for the timing of the report.\nDecision:\nExceptional Nature of the Case:\nThe Court recognized that the fire incident in December 2007 was part of widespread riots, resulting in substantial destruction of several factories, including the Respondent’s.\nIt was considered an exceptional case due to the riot and fire circumstances, and the law allows remission of duty and taxes in such extraordinary situations.\nTribunal’s Correct Decision:\nThe Tribunals ruling was upheld, as it correctly found that the Respondent was entitled to the remission of duty and taxes under SRO 450(I)/2001 despite the timing issues related to reporting the fire.\nThe authorities had failed to properly exercise the discretion granted under Rule 307A of the Customs Rules. The Tribunal found no valid reasons provided by the authorities for denying remission, especially given the exceptional circumstances of the case.\nNo Cogent Reasons for Denial:\nThe Court found that the authorities below had not given any cogent reasons for denying the remission, even though the incident was an extraordinary situation. Therefore, the Tribunal’s decision to grant remission was justified.\nConclusion:\nThe Reference Application filed by the Applicant was dismissed.\nThe Question proposed by the Applicant was answered in favor of the Respondent and against the Applicant.\nThe Tribunal’s order was affirmed, and the Respondent was entitled to the remission of duty and taxes on the damaged goods.\nOutcome:\nThe Reference Application was dismissed, and the Tribunals order was upheld. The Respondent was entitled to the remission of duty and taxes on the goods damaged by fire in the December 2007 riots.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196(5),196(8),307A(2)(d)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 71/2016, decided on 22.02.2021, heard on: 22.02.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MAHMOOD A. KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iqbal M. Khurram, Advocate for the Applicant.\nImran Iqbal Khan, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF EXPORTS, CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S ISLAND TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23491", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1357 = 2023 SLD 1357 = (2023) 127 TAX 752 = 2025 PTD 288", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTU", - "Key Words:": "Legality of Locally Purchased Goods and Tribunal’s Exercise of Powers\nDetails:\nThe applicant challenged the Customs Appellate Tribunals judgment dated 12.12.2019, in Customs Appeal No. K-1079/2019. The case involved the seizure of 15,000 yards of cloth by customs authorities on suspicion of smuggling. The respondent provided purchase receipts to prove the goods were locally acquired, but the seizing agency and adjudicating officer did not adequately consider this evidence. The Tribunal found that the adjudicating officer failed to evaluate all available evidence and issued an unreasoned order, leading to the unconditional release of the goods. The applicant contended that the Tribunal’s decision was flawed and raised legal questions regarding the proof of legality of goods, statutory obligations, and the Tribunal’s exercise of powers.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunals order was found to be cursory and lacked proper reasoning.\nThe Tribunal failed to fully evaluate the evidence and did not remand the case for proper adjudication.\nThe case was remanded to the Adjudicating Officer for a de novo review.\nThe officer was directed to re-examine all available evidence, including the respondent’s purchase receipts, and issue a reasoned order within 60 days.\nThe Tribunals approach was found inadequate regarding evidence assessment and statutory obligations under Rule 126 of the Customs Rules, 2001, and Section 168 of the Customs Act.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=168,196(5),211Customs Rules, 2001=126General Clauses Act, 1897=24-A", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 148 of 2020, decided on 18.02.2021, heard on: 18.02.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khalid Mahmood Rajpar, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Muhammad Ishaque, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nM/S. ABDUL NASIR SHAH, ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23492", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1358 = 2023 SLD 1358 = (2023) 127 TAX 103", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe taxpayer is an individual engaged in the pharmaceutical and medicine business, and filed an income tax return for the year, declaring income of Rs. 4,240,081. The return was deemed assessed under Section 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe case was selected for audit through a random ballot under Section 214C by the FBR, and notices were issued under Section 176(1) from time to time. However, the taxpayer failed to attend the proceedings or respond to the notices.\nSubsequently, the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (ACIR) issued a show cause notice under Section 122(9), but there was no compliance from the taxpayer. Consequently, the ACIR passed an order under Section 122(1)(d), in conjunction with Sections 214C and 177(1) of the Ordinance, which led to an assessment based on the best judgment of the officer.\nThe taxpayer filed an appeal before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR(A)), but the appeal was dismissed due to the taxpayer’s non-attendance.\nThe taxpayer challenged the decision before the Appellate Tribunal.\nIssue:\nThe key legal issues were:\nWhether the best judgment assessment under Section 121 of the Ordinance was correctly applied.\nWhether the order passed under Section 122(1)(d) and Section 177(10) was legally valid, given that the taxpayer had provided relevant documents and details.\nArguments:\nTaxpayer’s Argument:\nThe taxpayer argued that the best judgment assessment could only be made under Section 121 if the taxpayer had failed to file a return or produce required documents. The taxpayer contended that they had provided full details and reconciliation documents, so the best judgment assessment was unjustified.\nThe taxpayer claimed that the audit selection under Section 214C was improper and lacked jurisdiction, making the order invalid.\nDepartment’s Argument:\nThe department contended that the taxpayer was deliberately not responding to notices or attending hearings, justifying the best judgment assessment under Section 177(10). The ACIR was justified in invoking this provision to make an assessment based on the available information.\nDecision:\nDeemed Assessment under Section 120:\nThe deemed assessment order under Section 120 could be amended under Section 122 if the assessment was considered erroneous or prejudicial to revenue. However, the amendment should have been done in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Ordinance.\nBest Judgment Assessment:\nThe Tribunal found that the assessment should have been made under Section 121 rather than Section 122(1)(d) because the taxpayer had submitted the required documents and details. The best judgment assessment was not applicable in this case because it should only be invoked if the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements for producing documents or filing a return.\nSection 121 specifically governs the best judgment assessment, which cannot be made arbitrarily or capriciously. The Assessing Officer must take into account all available information, including any documents or details submitted by the taxpayer.\nEx-Parte Assessment:\nThe Tribunal concluded that the assessment made by the ACIR was an ex-parte assessment as the taxpayer did not attend the proceedings. However, the Tribunal ruled that the assessment could not be considered valid because the ACIR failed to give due weight to the taxpayers provided documents and reconciliation.\nThe ACIR’s failure to point out specific defects or issues with the taxpayer’s submitted documents rendered the ex-parte assessment invalid. An ex-parte order cannot be passed without considering the available evidence, and the officer must act on the best judgment informed by all facts and details submitted by the taxpayer.\nRemand for Further Consideration:\nThe Tribunal emphasized that all documents and details provided by the taxpayer must be reviewed properly by the DCIR/OIR. The Tribunal found that the ex-parte assessment was improperly made and should be quashed.\nThe case was remanded back to the DCIR/OIR for a thorough review and a fresh decision, based on the merits of the case and in compliance with the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, within 90 days from the receipt of the order.\nLegal Principles:\nThe Tribunal highlighted several key principles:\nBest judgment assessments should not be arbitrary but should be based on a fair and reasonable evaluation of all available information.\nAn ex-parte order must be based on definite information and cannot be passed without due consideration of the taxpayer’s submissions.\nJudicial orders, especially in tax matters, must be speaking orders, meaning they must address the facts and law raised by the parties involved.\nSummary of Findings:\nThe order passed by the ACIR under Section 122(1)(d) was not a best judgment assessment and was not legally maintainable.\nThe best judgment assessment under Section 121 was improperly applied, and the ex-parte assessment did not take into account the taxpayer’s submissions.\nThe case was remanded for further review and decision in accordance with the law, after considering all documents and evidence provided by the taxpayer.\nConclusion:\nThe ex-parte assessment was quashed, and the case was remanded to the DCIR/OIR for reconsideration based on the best judgment principles and all available evidence. The decision emphasized the importance of fairness in tax assessments and the proper application of tax laws", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=23(4),111(1)(a),114(3)(4),115(5),120,120(1),121,121(1),121(1)(d),122,122(1),122(1)(d),122(4),122(5),122(5A),174,176,177,177(1),177(6),177(10),214-C", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1296/KB/2019, decided on 15.10.2020, heard on: 14.09.2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND HABIBULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ghanzafar Ali Jatio, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Azhar Erum Memon, DR., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. NOA HEMIS PHARMACEUTICALS, KARACHI\nVERSUS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE- IV, RTO, III KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23493", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1359 = 2023 SLD 1359 = (2023) 127 TAX 757 = 2023 PTD 1600 = 2023 SCMR 1166", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUS8", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe petitioner filed its income tax return for the tax year 2013. A deemed assessment order was issued under Section 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which was later amended after a show cause notice was issued under Section 122(5A) and Section 122(9).\nThe petitioner filed an appeal with the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR(A)), which was partly allowed. However, the legal question raised regarding the delegation of powers under Section 122(5A) was dismissed.\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue also disposed of the cross-appeals filed by both the petitioner and the department on merit but dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on the legal question of delegation of powers.\nThe petitioner filed an Income Tax Reference under Section 133 of the Ordinance, raising the same legal issue regarding the delegation of powers, which was decided against the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court.\nIssue:\nThe key legal question raised by the petitioner was whether the powers of the Commissioner under Section 122(5A) of the Ordinance could be delegated to the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (ACIR) under Section 210.\nArguments:\nPetitioner’s Argument: The petitioner argued that the deemed assessment under Section 120 of the Ordinance is made by the Commissioner, and any amendment under Section 122(5A) is based on the said assessment. Since the amendment process involves the Commissioner’s discretion to determine if the assessment is erroneous or prejudicial to revenue, this power cannot be delegated to the Additional Commissioner.\nDepartment’s Argument: The department countered that Section 210(1A) explicitly allows the Commissioner to delegate powers, including those under Section 122(5A). Moreover, Section 211 affirms that the delegated powers shall be treated as having been exercised by the Commissioner.\nDecision:\nInterpretation of Fiscal Statutes:\nThe Court emphasized the importance of a literal interpretation of fiscal or taxing statutes. The Court held that the provisions of the statute must be interpreted as written, without reading into them assumptions or implied provisions.\nDelegation of Powers:\nThe Supreme Court held that the Commissioner has the explicit authority to delegate powers, including the authority to “consider” and decide amendments under Section 122(5A), to the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (ACIR).\nThe Court found that the Income Tax Ordinance clearly permits the delegation of such powers under Section 210(1A), and as such, the argument put forward by the petitioner that the discretion of the Commissioner cannot be delegated was without merit.\nPrecedents:\nThe Court referred to a previous decision by a three-member bench, which affirmed the delegation of jurisdiction to the Additional Commissioner under Section 122(5A) in a case involving The Bank of Punjab.\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the well-reasoned orders of the lower courts. As a result, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the delegation of powers was upheld.\nKey Takeaway:\nThe Supreme Court upheld the delegation of powers under Section 210(1A), confirming that the Commissioner can delegate powers, including the discretion to amend assessments under Section 122(5A), to the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue. The petition for leave to appeal was therefore dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(13),120,120(1),122(5A),122(9),127,210,210(1A)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 6-L of 2023, decided on 23.05.2023, heard on: 23.05.2023\nAgainst the judgment Dated 20.10.2022, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in ITR No.63041 of 2022", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI. JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Ikram ul Haq, ASC for the Petitioner.\nCh. Muhammad Shakeel, ASC. Naveed Akhtar. DC for the Respondents.\nAssisted by Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk, Supreme Court.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23494", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1360 = 2023 SLD 1360 = (2023) 127 TAX 763 = 2024 PTD 758", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUSs", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe respondent-taxpayer filed an income tax return, which was found to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. As a result, the assessment was amended by including capital gains under Section 37 and disallowing expenses for Repair and Maintenance (R & M) of vehicles.\nThe taxpayer filed an appeal with the Commissioner (Appeals), who confirmed the additions under Section 21(k) (relating to the disallowance of certain expenses). However, the addition of lease rentals and vehicle expenses was deleted.\nOn further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal deleted the addition on account of capital gains under Section 37, holding that the transaction fell within the parameters of Section 97, which concerns the non-taxation of certain inter-corporate transfers. The Tribunal also concluded that the additions made were illegal and void.\nIssues Raised:\nThe Department filed a reference to the High Court, questioning:\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition on capital gains under Section 37.\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the transaction falls under the parameters of Section 97.\nArguments:\nLegal Advisor for the Department argued that the Appellate Tribunal was incorrect in deleting the addition on capital gains under Section 37 of the Ordinance.\nRespondents Counsel argued that there was no capital gains in the case of the merger of a wholly owned subsidiary with the holding company.\nDecision:\nMergers and Capital Gains:\nThe High Court observed that when a wholly owned subsidiary merges with its holding company, no profit or gain arises. This is because the amalgamating (subsidiary) company ceases to exist, and its assets and liabilities are absorbed by the amalgamated (holding) company.\nIn such a merger, there is no transfer of assets that would generate a capital gain in the hands of the amalgamating company, as it ceases to exist as a legal entity. If the shareholders of the amalgamating company receive shares in the amalgamated company, it is the shareholders who would recognize any capital gain, not the amalgamating company itself.\nCapital Gains and Section 37:\nThe High Court agreed with the Appellate Tribunals decision that no capital gains should be taxed under Section 37 in the case of the merger, as the transaction did not involve a taxable transfer of assets.\nThe Appellate Tribunal had correctly applied the principles of Section 97 of the Income Tax Ordinance, which exempts certain inter-corporate transfers from taxation, especially in the case of mergers where there is no realization of profit or gain by the merging company.\nNo Legal Infirmity:\nThe High Court found that the Appellate Tribunal had not committed any legal error in deleting the addition made by the Department under Section 37. The Department failed to demonstrate any illegality or legal infirmity in the Tribunal’s decision.\nFinal Ruling:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the respondent-taxpayer and against the Department. The reference application filed by the Department was decided in favor of the respondent, confirming that no capital gains tax should be levied in this case.\nCases Referenced:\nCIT (Delhi) v. Bharat Development (Pvt.) Limited (135 ITR 456)\nForbes Forbes Campbell and Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [(1983) 37 CTR Bom 212]\nShaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [(1979) 119 ITR 399]\nGeneral Radio & Appliances Co. Ltd. v. M.A. Khader (Dead) by Lrs (1986 AIR 1218 = 1986 SCR (2) 607)\nConclusion:\nThe High Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal and ruled that no capital gains tax was applicable in the case of a merger between a wholly owned subsidiary and its holding company. The addition made under Section 37 was deemed void and illegal. The reference application filed by the Department was dismissed in favor of the respondent-taxpayer.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(k),37,75,97,120,133", - "Case #": "PTR No. 147 of 2013, decided on 29.03.2023, date of hearing; 29.03.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Imran Rasool, Advocate.\nMr. Hameed Bukhsh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, LTU, LAHORE\nVS\nM/S SHEZAN INTERNATIONAL LTD., LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23495", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1361 = 2023 SLD 1361 = (2023) 127 TAX 770", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTk", - "Key Words:": "Legal Provisions Involved:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Sections: 119, 122, 122(a), 137, 177, 214(l)(a)(b), 214D, 214D(a)(b), 214E\nFinance Act, 2015 and 2018 – Amendments related to Section 214D.\nFacts:\nThe petitioners challenged notices issued by the Income Tax Department under Sections 177 and 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, claiming they were unconstitutional, unlawful, and void.\nThe notices were issued in relation to the audit selection of the petitioners tax returns, which were selected due to the petitioners failure to file returns and pay taxes within the prescribed time limits.\nPetitioners argued that Section 214D, which previously governed the automatic selection for audit, had been inserted through the Finance Act, 2015, but was deleted in the Finance Act, 2018. They contended that after the omission of Section 214D, no further audit proceedings should continue, as a vested right had accrued to them, making the impugned notices invalid.\nArguments:\nPetitioners Argument:\nThe petitioners argued that after the deletion of Section 214D, they had a vested right that prevented further audit proceedings.\nThey cited the case of Shah Nawaz (Pvt.) Ltd. to support their claim that the deletion of Section 214D should result in the cessation of audit proceedings.\nRespondents Argument:\nThe respondents (tax authorities) contended that no vested right had accrued to the petitioners.\nThey maintained that the petitioners failure to file returns and deposit the required tax resulted in the automatic selection of their cases for audit, regardless of the deletion of Section 214D.\nThe selection was based on the petitioners non-compliance with statutory deadlines and obligations, not on the provisions of Section 214D.\nDecision:\nAutomatic Selection for Audit:\nThe Court noted that the petitioners had failed to file their returns within the stipulated or extended time frame and had not paid the tax determined under Section 137. As a result, their cases were automatically selected for audit, even after the omission of Section 214D.\nThe Court clarified that the selection for audit was not dependent on the provisions of Section 214D once it was omitted. The selection was automatic due to the petitioners non-compliance with tax filing and payment deadlines.\nOmission of Section 214D:\nThe Court held that the deletion of Section 214D did not affect the petitioners cases, as their selection for audit was based on their default in filing returns and paying taxes. Therefore, the petitioners had not acquired any vested rights due to the omission of the section.\nProcedural Nature of Impugned Notices:\nThe Court observed that the actions taken by the tax authorities, including the issuance of notices under Sections 177 and 122, were procedural in nature. These actions were in accordance with the existing provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nSection 177 outlines the manner in which audits should be conducted, and Section 122 relates to the amendment of deemed assessments, which applied to the petitioners in this case due to their non-compliance.\nNo Vested Rights:\nThe Court held that no vested right had accrued to the petitioners. The failure to meet tax obligations led to their automatic selection for audit, and the omission of Section 214D did not change this outcome.\nAs a result, the Court found no grounds to invalidate the impugned notices.\nDismissal of Petitions:\nThe petitions were dismissed as the Court found no merit in the petitioners objections.\nThe Court ruled that the tax authorities could proceed with the audit and related proceedings based on the notices that had already been issued.\nCase Referenced:\nShah Nawaz (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Pakistan (2011 PTD 1558)\nConclusion:\nThe Court ruled that the petitioners failure to comply with tax filing and payment requirements led to the automatic selection of their cases for audit, regardless of the deletion of Section 214D. The petitioners did not have a vested right preventing the continuation of the audit, and the notices issued by the tax authorities were procedural, valid, and in line with the existing legal framework. Consequently, the Court dismissed the constitutional petitions and allowed the tax authorities to proceed with the audit and related actions.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=119,122,122(a),137,177,214(1)(a)(b),214D(a)(b),214E", - "Case #": "Const. P. Nos. D-412/2021, D-1141/2021, D-1142/2021, D-147/2021, D-278/2021, D-279/2021, D-3266/2021 and D-8009/2022, decided on 15.03.2023, heard on: 09.03.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAJFAR, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Ovais Ali Shah, Maryam Riaz, Fizzah Bucha, Muhammad Mushtaq, Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Advocates for the Petitioners.\nM/s. Muhammad Taseer Khan, Ayaz Sarwar Jamali. Advocates for the Respondents.\nMr. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. UNITED CARPETS LTD AND OTHERS\nVS\nPAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23496", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1362 = 2023 SLD 1362 = (2023) 127 TAX 618 = 2025 PTD 248", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUTg", - "Key Words:": "Legal Provisions Involved:\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Article 199 (Constitutional Petition)\nCustoms Act, 1969 – Sections 16, 32, and 156(1)\nSRO 577(I)/2006 – Governs the import and sale of diplomatic vehicles.\nFacts:\nThe petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking a declaration that the seizure of their vehicle was without lawful authority and jurisdiction.\nThe vehicle was originally imported by the Consulate General of Saudi Arabia and was later purchased by the petitioner.\nThe Customs authorities issued a Show Cause Notice on 13-04-2021, alleging that the vehicle violated provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 and was subject to confiscation.\nThe petitioner contended that the vehicle was lawfully imported under diplomatic exemption, and the Show Cause Notice was issued without jurisdiction and lawful authority.\nArguments:\nPetitioner’s Argument:\nThe vehicle was imported by the Consulate General of Saudi Arabia under diplomatic exemption and later purchased by the petitioner. The relevant letters from the Royal Consulate General of Saudi Arabia and the Customs Authorities are on record, which the petitioner argues proves the vehicle’s lawful importation.\nThe petitioner also insisted that the constitutional petition was maintainable since, if an order or notice is issued without lawful authority or jurisdiction, the High Court can intervene under Article 199 of the Constitution.\nRespondents Argument:\nThe respondents (Customs authorities) argued that the Show Cause Notice was issued within their jurisdiction and the petitioner could contest the matter within the proper legal framework provided under the Customs Act, 1969.\nDecision:\nImpuning of Show Cause Notice:\nThe Court noted that challenging a Show Cause Notice under constitutional jurisdiction is an exception, not the rule. If a notice or order is without jurisdiction, the Court can intervene, but this must be determined within the proper legal context, especially when statutory remedies are available under the relevant law.\nConstitutional Jurisdiction:\nThe Court held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court should not be invoked when an alternative remedy under the Customs Act is available. In this case, the matter could be adjudicated through the administrative or judicial channels provided under the Act, and therefore, invoking constitutional jurisdiction was inappropriate at this stage.\nTendency to Bypass Legal Remedies:\nThe Court emphasized that it discouraged the tendency of challenging Show Cause Notices in tax or customs cases via constitutional petitions. The Court noted that the Customs Act, 1969 provides a comprehensive legal framework for appeals and disputes, including appeal to Special Tribunals and references to the High Court, which should be followed before seeking relief under constitutional jurisdiction.\nLegal Remedy Under Special Law:\nIt was observed that when a special law (like the Customs Act, 1969) provides a legal remedy for resolving disputes, that remedy should be exhausted before seeking constitutional relief. In this case, the petitioner could contest the Show Cause Notice through the appropriate mechanisms within the Customs Act.\nVehicle’s Lawful Importation:\nThe Court noted that the vehicle still carried the diplomatic number plate issued to the Royal Consulate General of Saudi Arabia, which raised doubts about the vehicle’s lawful importation. The letters from the Consulate stating the vehicle could be used by a private individual were insufficient to prove the vehicle’s lawful status.\nThe policy governing the importation and sale of diplomatic vehicles (SRO 577(I)/2006) required permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the vehicle could be sold to a private individual. Since the required certifications from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not provided, the vehicles sale and use by the petitioner were questioned.\nInterim Release of Vehicle:\nThe Court rejected the request for the interim release of the vehicle, noting that the petition was premature, as the Customs authorities had initiated proceedings under the Customs Act, which could result in the vehicle’s confiscation. The Court held that the request for interim relief was beyond the scope of the constitutional petition.\nDismissal of the Petition:\nThe Court found the petition to be misconceived and not maintainable at this stage of the proceedings, as the petitioner had failed to follow the proper legal channels under the Customs Act, 1969. The petition was dismissed, and the petitioner was ordered to pay a cost of Rs. 10,000 to the Sindh High Court Clinic.\nConclusion:\nThe Court held that constitutional petitions to challenge Show Cause Notices under the Customs Act, 1969 are generally not maintainable, especially when alternative remedies are available within the special law. The petitioner’s challenge to the seizure of the vehicle was deemed premature, and the request for interim relief was rejected. The dismissal of the petition emphasized the importance of following the statutory procedures under the relevant law rather than bypassing them through constitutional jurisdiction.\nCases Referred:\nCustoms Act, 1969 – Sections 16, 32, and 156(1).\nSRO 577(I)/2006 – Governs the import and sale of diplomatic vehicles.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Customs Act, 1969=16,32,156(1)(9),156(1)(10A),156(1)(14)", - "Case #": "Const. P. No. D-3673 of 2021 decided on 23.06.2021.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND RASHIDA ASAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raj Ali Wahid Kunwar, Advocate for the Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ARSHAD ALI KHAN\nVs\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23497", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1363 = 2023 SLD 1363 = (2023) 127 TAX 796", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUXo", - "Key Words:": "Import of a vehicle under personal baggage scheme - Detention by the Respondents/Customs Authorities on the ground that duties and taxes have not been paid in accordance with the requirements as stipulated in import policy - Validity - Challenge through Civil Petition in High Court -\nFACTS\nThe petitioner has imported a vehicle under personal baggage scheme in terms of Import Policy Order, 2020 (“Import Policy”). The Respondents/ Custom Authorities have detained the same on the ground that the duties and taxes have not been paid in accordance with the requirements as stipulated in the Import Policy.\n \nIt appears that the petitioner has retired after serving with Dubai Electricity and Water Authority from 12.03.2007 to 31.10.2020 and as stated was drawing a salary of AED 24.150 per month. He has placed on record a certificate issued by the said authority, which has not been disputed. The Petitioner was maintaining a regular account with ADIB Bank U.A.E. and has annexed such statement of account, which reflects that he had sufficient funds in the said account and made three withdrawals in cash on 08.12.2020, 23.12.2020 and 26.12.2020 of AED 150.000. 240.000 and 5000. respectively. It is the case of the petitioner that since a direct remittance from ADIB Bank, Dubai, U.A.E. to any of his account(s) in Pakistan or of his family was too expensive, he deposited the said amount with UBL Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai, UAE into his account jointly being maintained by him and his wife via Tezraftaar Application Scheme and the said deposit was made online to be transferred into his UBL account being maintained at Model Colony Branch, Karachi. This deposit was made in two parts, one of AED 150.000 on 21.12.2020 and the other of AED 245,000 on 28.12.2020. It has further come on record that UBL Karachi issued him Proceed Realization Certificate dated 12.02.2021 for Rs. 10,682,000 and Rs.6,532,500 and when the same was presented, the Customs Authorities wrote a letter to UBL with certain reservations. This was replied by UBL Head Office, dealing with remittances and confirmed the encashment/ withdrawals by further stating that the same qualifies for home remittance as per Policy of State Bank and in this letter of 31.03.2021 all details, as required for home Remittance and in terms of the Import Policy were mentioned; but an objection was raised by the Customs department that in the column for remittance, sender’s bank details with account number has not been mentioned.\n \nARGUMENTS\n \nLearned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner on his return to Pakistan from U.A.E., after retirement, has brought a vehicle under personal baggage scheme and made remittance from UAE to his Pakistani account being maintained at UBL, Model Colony Branch, Karachi, however, despite this, the Customs Authorities have refused to release the vehicle, even though they have accepted the duties and takes into their account. He submits that UBL, Karachi, has already issued a Home Remittance Certificate in terms of guidelines issued by State Bank of Pakistan, which has been presented to the Customs Authorities; but despite this they are adamant and have refused to release the vehicle, lie prays that since the requirements of the Import Policy have been fulfilled, directions be issued for release of the vehicle.\n \nOn the other hand, counsel for the department ably supported by the departmental representatives namely Mr. Taufiq Ahmed Shaikh. Principal Appraiser & Mr. Abdul Ghani Soomro, Appraising Officer. (MCC-A) West has contended that since in the certificate issued by UBL, Karachi, the account number from which the remittance has originated is not mentioned; therefore, the Petitioner has failed to fulfill requirements of Import Policy; resultantly, the vehicle has been detained; and the Petitioner has been informed accordingly. They have also relied upon letter dated 10.9.2020 issued by FBR in consultation with Ministry of Commerce and have contended that if this is permitted, then all duties and taxes would be paid by Overseas Pakistanis through hundi/hawala.\n \nDECISION\n(a) UBL Bank, Karachi has accepted payment at their Branch at Dubai, they cannot therefore mention account no. of petitioner - Merely for the reason that in the certificate issued by UBI. Bank. Karachi, the sender’s account number is not mentioned, we cannot accept the stance of the customs department that it never originated from Petitioners account abroad. It is not a cash deposit per se directly into his joint account in Karachi. If that had been the case, then perhaps the objection would have been weighty. Here, the amount has been first withdrawn from the foreign account of the Petitioner and then was deposited. The certificate has been issued by UBI. in Karachi and naturally since they have accepted payment at their branch at Dubai, UAE. as from a customer having an online account, they cannot mention the account number of the Petitioner being maintained at ADIB Bank, UAE.\n \n(b) The facts are exceptional in the present case therefore, the pleas of Deptt that people would remit amount through exchange companies is not attracted - Lastly, though the departmental representatives were apprehensive that if this is permitted; then people would use this as a precedent and the remittance would then be sent through exchange companies and or by Hundi/Hawala and would open a floodgate of unscrupulous means to avoid stringent measures enforced by the Government to confine the scheme in question being available only to genuine Overseas Pakistanis, the facts here are exceptional.\n \n(c) Petitioner has made out a case for the grant of relief, therefore, petition was allowed and respondents were directed to release the vehicle - The petitioner has fully established that he was employed with Dubai Electric & Power Authority; was earning substantial amount in AED; was maintaining an account with ADIB Bank, Dubai, U.A.H. duly supported by the Bank Statement; various transactions have taken place on continuous basis before and after the transactions in question; that the withdrawal 01 amount in AED was exactly the same which he deposited at UBI. Dubai. U.A.E. by availing the benefit of Tezraftaar scheme initiated-by the Bank on the directions of the State Bank of Pakistan to facilitate Overseas Pakistanis; therefore, for the present purposes we may observe that the Petitioner has made out a case for grant of the relief so claimed, warranting interference by this Court in view of the peculiarity of his case; therefore, by means of a short order dated 22.06.2021. we had allowed this Petition by giving directions to the respondents to release the vehicle to the petitioner after payment of duties and taxes and these are reasons thereof.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P No. D-3268 of 2021, decided on 22.06.2021, heard on: 15.06.2021, 22.06.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND RASHIDA ASAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Aqeel Ahmed Khan. Advocate for the Petitioner.\nMr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi. Deputy Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan. Ms. Afsheen Aman, Advocate along with Mr. Taufiq Ahmed Shaikh, Principal Appraiser, Mr. Abdul Ghani Soomro, Appraiser (Model Customs Collectorate-Appraisement-West for Respondent No.2. Mr. Alam Zaib, Advocate for Respondent No.3 (State Bank of Pakistan).", - "Petitioner Name:": "REHAN ARIF\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23498", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1364 = 2023 SLD 1364 = (2023) 127 TAX 127", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpUXk", - "Key Words:": "Issue: Unexplained income or assets, assessment, amendment of assessments, audit, and jurisdiction of the tax authorities in issuing amendment orders and conducting audits.\nFacts:\nThe taxpayer filed a return for tax year 2017, resulting in a deemed assessment under Section 120(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe taxpayer’s case was selected for audit under Section 177 on 30-03-2018. The audit report was issued on 12-10-2018, and following this, the taxpayers explanations were sought.\nA show-cause notice was issued on 07-12-2018, which led to an amendment order on 31-12-2018 under Section 122(5), making certain additions to taxable income.\nThe taxpayer contested the amendments, arguing that several additions were not confronted in the audit report, and that certain provisions were not applicable to insurance companies.\nGrounds of Appeal:\nAdditions not confronted in the audit report: The taxpayer contended that the assessing officer had not confronted certain additions identified during the audit, which violated legal requirements.\nBonus income under Section 236M: The taxpayer argued that the bonus income should not be considered taxable.\nAdditions under Section 111: The taxpayer contended that additions made under Section 111 (related to unexplained income or assets) were unjustified.\nAdditions under Section 174: The taxpayer disputed the additions made under Section 174, arguing that the information sought was not provided due to the taxpayer’s inability to furnish complete records.\nArguments:\nTaxpayer’s Arguments:\nThe taxpayer claimed that the audit report did not confront certain issues before the show-cause notice was issued, violating the mandatory provisions.\nThe taxpayer further argued that additions under Sections 111 and 236M were not applicable to insurance companies like the appellant.\nThe additions under Section 174 were also challenged, as they were based on incomplete documentation.\nTax Department’s Arguments:\nThe tax department argued that the audit report, having been issued, met the requirements of Section 177(6), and the taxpayer had ample opportunity to explain the issues raised.\nThe department further contended that the assessing officer had followed due process by issuing the show-cause notice and confronting the taxpayer with issues identified after the audit.\nDecision:\nJurisdiction under Section 122(1)(4):\nIt was held that the assessing officer cannot assume jurisdiction under Section 122(1)/(4) without first obtaining an explanation from the taxpayer based on the audit report issued under Section 177(6).\nThe assessment cannot be amended solely on issues identified after the show-cause notice, as this would require separate amendment proceedings.\nAdditions Based on Issues Identified Post-Audit:\nAdditions made based on issues identified after the audit report (such as capital gains, bonus income, and credit entries in bank statements) could not be relied upon for amending the assessment under Section 122(5). These issues must be confronted during the audit process, and the taxpayer’s explanation must be sought before any amendments are made.\nProvisions under Sections 111 and 236M:\nThe provisions of Section 111 (unexplained income/assets) and Section 236M (bonus income) were found not applicable to insurance companies like the appellant. The court referenced specific provisions in the Fourth Schedule to the Ordinance, which govern the taxation of general insurance companies, and concluded that these provisions precluded the application of Sections 111 and 236M.\nSection 174 and Failure to Provide Complete Records:\nThe assessing officer was found not to have sufficient definite information to proceed with amendments under Section 122(5) in the absence of complete documentation. If the taxpayer failed to provide records, the assessment should have been made under Section 121(1)(d) and Section 177(10), not Section 122(5).\nLegal Precedents:\nThe decision followed precedents where the Lahore High Court and other appellate decisions condemned actions under Section 111 in the absence of a separate notice and clarified that amendments based on incomplete or uncontroverted information are not legally sustainable.\nConclusion:\nTaxpayer’s Favor:\nThe additions made under Section 111 were annulled, and the bonus income from a bonus issue was not considered taxable income for the appellant.\nAdditions under Section 174 were also deleted, as the assessing officer did not possess sufficient information to make those additions.\nThe provisions of Sections 111 and 236M were ruled inapplicable to insurance companies, and the taxpayer’s explanations regarding various issues were not properly sought before the assessment amendments.\nCases Referred to:\nCIR vs. Allah Din Steel Rolling Mills and others (2018 PTD 144)\nCIR vs. Khan Filling Station (2017 PTD 1731)\nNestlé Pakistan Limited vs. FBR (2017 PTD 686)\nEFU General Insurance (2011 PTD 2042)\n2019 PTD 1828 (Lahore High Court Judgment)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,120(1),122,122(5),122(9),122(1)(4),174,177,177(6),177(10),236MIncome Tax Rules, 2002=5(a),5(d)", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 2914/LB/2019, decided on 01.03.2022, heard on: 15.02.2022", - "Judge Name:": " DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Burhan Ahmad, ACA for the Appellant.\nIftikhar Masood Khan, DR. for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. ALFALAH INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, LAHORE\nVS\nTHE CIR, LTU, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23499", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1365 = 2023 SLD 1365 = (2023) 127 TAX 142", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpTTc", - "Key Words:": "Issue: Recovery of sales tax, default surcharge, and penalty for adjustment of input tax on invoices issued by suspended/non-active suppliers.\nFacts:\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) issued a show cause notice to the taxpayer, based on discrepancies in the Computerized Risk-Based Evaluation of Sales Tax (CREST), regarding input tax adjustment on purchases from suspended/non-active suppliers for the period July 2011 to June 2013.\nThe DCIR demanded sales tax recovery of Rs. 6,125,728, along with default surcharge and penalty for violating sections 8(1)(caa), 8(1)(ca), and 8A of the Sales Tax Act.\nThe respondent filed an appeal, which was considered by the Commissioner (Appeals), Inland Revenue (CIRA). The CIRA ruled that section 8(1)(caa), introduced in 2013, could not apply retrospectively, and section 8(1)(ca) was ultra vires, as per the Lahore High Court ruling.\nArguments:\nAppellant (Tax Department): Argued that the CIRA should not have ignored section 8(1)(ca), which denies input tax credit if the respective supplier does not deposit the tax into the government treasury.\nRespondent (Taxpayer): Argued that the CIRA properly discussed the facts of each supplier, highlighting that the suppliers were active at the time of purchase and therefore, input tax should be allowed.\nDecision:\nSection 8(1)(caa): The provision was declared ultra vires by the Lahore High Court in M/s. D.G Khan Cement Limited v. Pakistan (PTCL 2013 CL 534). The Court ruled that this section could not be applied to the case.\nInput Tax on Suspended Suppliers: The CIRA correctly found that the suppliers were active at the time of purchase, meaning the respondent was entitled to claim input tax credit, even if those suppliers were blacklisted later.\nFailure of the Tax Department’s Appeal: The tax department did not succeed in showing that the CIRA’s decision was flawed. The appellate order was comprehensive, addressing all factual and legal aspects. Therefore, the CIRA’s decision was upheld, and the tax department’s appeal was dismissed.\nConclusion:\nTaxpayer’s Favor: The appeal filed by the tax department was dismissed, and the decision of the CIRA was upheld, confirming the taxpayer’s entitlement to the input tax credit for purchases made from suppliers who were active at the time.\nCases Referred:\nM/s. D.G Khan Cement Limited v. Pakistan (PTCL 2013 CL 534)\nMessrs. Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd., Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582)\nThis case underscores the importance of assessing the factual and legal circumstances surrounding input tax adjustments and the retrospective application of provisions introduced after the tax periods in question.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(1),8(1)(a),8(1)(caa),8(1)(d),11(2),73", - "Case #": "STA No.278/KB/2015 decided on 21.01.2021, heard on: 08.09.2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIFULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naib Ali Pathan, D.R., for the Appellant.\nSaudul Hassan, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMTSSIONER-IR, ZONE-IV, LTU, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S. ATLAS HONDA LIMITED, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23500", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1366 = 2023 SLD 1366 = 2023 SCMR 929", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpTTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302, 396, 324, 149-Dacoity with murder, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, unlawful assembly-Reappraisal of evidence-Matter was reported to the police and the formal FIR was registered on the same day-In the crime report, the names of the accused were not mentioned obviously for the reason that they were not known to the complainant party, however, their features were specifically given in the crime report-Witnesses of the ocular account remained consistent on each and every material point qua the date, time, mode, manner of the occurrence and the locale of the injuries on the person of the deceased and the injured witness-Injuries sustained by the injured witness were fully supported by the medical evidence-Testimony of injured witness as well as the stamp of injuries on his person clearly proved his presence at the place of occurrence-All codal formalities and guidelines for the identification parade were observed by the Judicial Magistrate-Accused persons remained in the house of the complainant for a considerable length of time and the complainant had close proximity to remember them which enabled him to identify them later-Medical evidence available on the record further corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased and injured was concerned-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Evidence-Discrepancies and contradictions-Distinction-Discrepancies have to be distinguished from contradictions-Contradiction in the statement of a witness may be fatal for the prosecution case but minor discrepancy in evidence will not make the prosecution case doubtful-Where discrepancies are of minor character and do not go to the root of the prosecution story and do not shake the salient features of the prosecution version, they need not be given much importance.\n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 22- Test identification parade- Scope- Process of identification parade has to be carried out having regard to the exigencies of each case in a fair and non-collusive manner and such exercise is not an unchangeable ritual, inconsequential non-performance whereof, may result into failure of prosecution case, which otherwise is structured upon clean and probable evidence-Even otherwise, holding of identification parade is merely a corroborative piece of evidence-If a witness identifies the accused in court and his statement inspires confidence; he remains consistent on all material particulars and there is nothing in evidence to suggest that he is deposing falsely, then even the non-holding of identification parade would not be fatal for the prosecution case.\nTasar Mehmood v. The State 2020 SCMR 1013; Ghazanfar Ali v. The State 2012 SCMR 215 and Muhammad Ali v. The State 2022 SCMR 2024 ref.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 391, 396-Dacoity and dacoity with murder-Expression conjointly-Meaning-Use of word conjointly in sections 391, 396, P.P.C. indicates that five or more dacoits act with knowledge and consent and in aid of one another or pursuant to an agreement or understanding, i.e., unitedly-For the offence of dacoity, the essential pre-requisite is the joint participation of five or more persons in the commission of the offence-If in the course thereof any one of them commits murder, all members of the assembly would be guilty of dacoity with murder and would expose themselves to the punishment stipulated in section 396, P.P.C.\nMuhammad Ali v. The State 2022 SCMR 2024 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,396,324,149", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 405 of 2021 and Criminal Petition No. 946 of 2021, decided on 2nd March, 2023, heard on: 2nd March, 2023.\n(Against the judgment Dated 31.03.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 453-J of 2014)", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Tabinda Islam, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in Criminal Petition No. 946 of 2021).\nMehnaz Bibi, sister of Ansar in person (in J.P. No. 405 of 2021).\nRashad Javaid Lodhi, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.\nMirza Muhammad Usman, D.P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ANSAR and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23501", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1372 = 2023 SLD 1372", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpTTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(c),114(1),120,120(1)(b),122,122(1),122(5),122(9)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=65,66A", - "Case #": "ITA No.1998/IB/2021, MA (AG) No.72/IB/2022 (Tax Year 2018), date of order: 15.08.2022, date of hearing: 06.07.2022", - "Judge Name:": " M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER and MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Shafique, DR\nMr. Wilayat Khan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Zarar Ahmed, Prop: Zarar Traders, Ghalla Mandi, G.T. Road, Lalamusa.\nVs \nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Gujrat Zone), RTO, Sialkot." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23502", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1398 = 2023 SLD 1398 = 2023 SCMR 1011 = (2023) 128 TAX 291", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpQTU", - "Key Words:": "Summary of Key Legal Points:\n(a) Preference for Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs):\nUnder Section 107 of the Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), any provision in a Double Taxation Avoidance Treaty (DTT) takes precedence over conflicting provisions of domestic tax laws. This has been reaffirmed in the case Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal Division), LTU, Islamabad v. Messrs Geofizyka Krakow Pakistan Ltd., 2017 SCMR 140, where it was ruled that clear stipulations in a DTT override general tax provisions in local law.\n(b) Interpretation of DTTs:\nThe primary aim of a DTT is to regulate the division of tax revenues between treaty signatories in a manner that avoids taxing the same income twice. If a treaty includes unambiguous provisions, they supersede the general income tax laws. The purpose is to manage international commercial relations between the contracting states and prevent double taxation.\n(c) Super Tax and DTTs:\nThe imposition of super tax is discussed in light of the DTTs. In particular, the Convention between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation (Swiss DTT) exempts or reduces super tax obligations for taxpayers within the treaty framework. The Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court’s decision, which had considered these aspects, was reasoned and did not require further review.\n(d) Leave Refusing Orders:\nThe Supreme Court’s refusal to grant leave to appeal is not mandatory to be accompanied by a detailed order. At the leave stage, the Court only assesses whether the impugned judgment is sound enough to proceed further. The order for leave to appeal is determined by the appropriateness of the case for further proceedings, not based on an exhaustive review.\n(e) Review Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:\nReview jurisdiction is a process to correct clear errors of law or facts that could alter the outcome of a case. It does not serve as an avenue for re-hearing or revisiting arguments that have already been thoroughly considered. Review is not meant to address mere dissatisfaction with a judgment, but rather to correct significant errors that affect the course of justice. This is explained through various precedents, such as Messrs Habib and Company v. Muslim Commercial Bank (PLD 2020 SC 227).\n(f) Improper Filing of Review Petitions:\nThe practice of filing review petitions without identifying specific errors or making baseless claims is discouraged by the Supreme Court. Lawyers are expected to thoughtfully assess whether a review petition is warranted and ensure that it is grounded in clear and specific errors. Filing routine, unfounded petitions wastes judicial time, especially considering the Court’s backlog of cases. The Court emphasized that review petitions should only be filed when there is an apparent error in the judgment that substantially affects the outcome, and such errors must be clearly identified in the review application and certificate by the advocate.\nKey Takeaways:\n1.\nPriority of DTTs: DTT provisions should prevail over conflicting national tax provisions, guiding tax treatment between treaty partners.\n2.\nSuper Tax and DTTs: Taxpayers under DTTs are often exempt or face reduced tax rates, especially for super tax, as per treaty guidelines.\n3.\nScope of Review: Review by the Supreme Court is reserved for correcting clear, substantial errors, not for re-hearing the case.\n4.\nReview Practice: The Supreme Court disapproves of the filing of review petitions that are not based on specific and significant legal errors. Lawyers must ensure they are not wasting judicial resources with frivolous or routine petitions.\nThis legal framework and the interpretations by the Court help ensure that the tax laws are applied correctly, while also upholding constitutional safeguards for justice and preventing abuse of the judicial process.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4B,44(1),107,107(1),109Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3),188", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petitions Nos. 432-K to 459-K of 2022 in Civil Petitions Nos. 672-K to 692-K of 2021 and 694-K, 724-K to 729-K of 2021, decided on 9th February, 2023, heard on: 9th February, 2023.\n(Review against the order of this Court dated 23.05.2022)", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Justice and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court and Irfan Mir Halepota, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nSyed Mehmood Abbas, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1 (in C.R.Ps. Nos. 432-K, 434-K, 435-K, 438-K, 440-K, 444-K, 447-K, 448-K, 452-K and 453-K).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE Z-III, CORPORATE REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, TAX HOUSE, KARACHI and another-Petitioners\nVs\nMessrs MSC SWITZERLAND GENEVA and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23503", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1423 = 2023 SLD 1423 = 2023 LHC 7493 = (2024) 129 TAX 643 = 2025 PTD 282", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpNC8", - "Key Words:": "Legal Challenges in Recovery of Tax Demand - Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nKey Points:\nPetitioners Issue:\nThe petitioner challenged the withdrawal of an amount from his personal bank account, which was done under Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ( Ordinance of 2001 ). The petitioner contended that the notice issued to the bank did not contain adequate details about the tax demand against him, particularly not mentioning the assessment order or any prior proceedings.\nBackground:\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue justified the action by claiming that the demand was against the company, Modern Building Maintenance (Pvt) Ltd., of which the petitioner was a director. A notice under Section 139 was issued to the petitioner on 21.09.2023 before invoking Section 140.\nThe Notice under Section 140:\nThe notice issued to the bank did not disclose any details of the demand under an assessment order, nor did it confirm that the demand was not recoverable from the company. This failure to follow due process became the central issue in the petition.\nThe Courts Analysis:\nSection 139 of the Ordinance mandates that a person (like the petitioner, a director of the company) should be confronted with the non-recoverability of tax from the company before any action under Section 140 is taken. The court found that the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Article 10A of the Constitution (right to fair trial) had been violated because he was not adequately informed about the proceedings that led to the action taken against him.\nThe court referred to earlier judgments that emphasized the requirement for the taxation authorities to show that tax is not recoverable from the company before targeting the director for the tax liability. The court emphasized that tax officials cannot take action against a director or shareholder without exhausting all recovery options against the company.\nCourts Decision:\nViolation of Fundamental Rights:\nThe court held that the notice issued under Section 140 lacked essential details, including the assessment order, final demand, and evidence that the demand was not recoverable from the company. These omissions violated the petitioner’s rights under Article 10A (right to a fair trial) and Article 19A (right to information) of the Constitution of Pakistan.\nProcedure for Invoking Section 140:\nThe court clarified that Section 140 should only be invoked after exhausting all recovery procedures against the company, and the director should be confronted with the non-recoverability of the tax from the company. The court relied on previous judgments, including Sultan Muhammad Khan v. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue and Mubashir Yameen v. Assistant/Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, which set the precedent for following due process before coercive recovery actions are taken.\nReprimanding Taxation Officers:\nThe court reprimanded the taxation officers for reckless recovery actions and instructed the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to issue a notification warning tax officers that failure to comply with due process would lead to disciplinary proceedings. The court highlighted that actions taken without following due process, especially regarding fundamental rights, could be deemed misconduct under service laws.\nReturn of Funds:\nThe court ordered that the amount wrongfully withdrawn from the petitioner’s bank account be returned within 15 days.\nFinal Ruling:\nThe petition was allowed, and the coercive measures under Section 140 were declared invalid due to the failure of the authorities to follow the proper procedures.\nConclusion:\nThis case highlights the importance of due process and fundamental rights in the context of tax recovery actions under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The court reinforced that tax authorities must follow the legal steps and provide the necessary information to taxpayers before taking coercive actions like freezing bank accounts. Failure to do so not only violates the taxpayers rights but also constitutes misconduct on the part of tax officials.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=138,139,140Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A,19A", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.71690 of 2023, date of hearing 07.12.2023", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Rana Muhamad Afzal, Advocate.\nFederation by: Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General.\nRespondent-Departments by: Mr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocate. M/s Malik Abdullah Raza and Hassan Safdar Khan, Advocates. Dr. Shazia Gull, Commissioner Inland Revenue, Syeda Lubna Shah Deputy Commissioner, Inland Revenue and Mr. Akhtar Suraj, ADCIR, Lahore.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SARDAR WASEEM ILYAS\nVS. \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23504", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1424 = 2023 SLD 1424 = 2023 SCMR 1171", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpNCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-Ss. 39 & 42-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 3-Suit for declaration and cancellation of mutation entries- Limitation-Respondent/plaintiff had challenged mutation entries of the years 1959 and 1966 through a suit filed in 1996, and admittedly being out of possession had to justify such delay-Though in the plaint, the respondent had asserted that she had come to know about the impugned entries a year before filing the suit, however, neither the respondent nor her witnesses in their depositions uttered a single word to justify this inordinate delay in filing the suit-Consequently, the suit itself was hopelessly barred by time-Appeal was allowed.\nMuhammad Sharif v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 1158 ref.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-Ss. 39 & 42-Suit for declaration and cancellation of mutation entries-Oral lease (mustajri)-Proof-Respondent/plaintiff had set up a case that she had leased out the subject property to the appellant through an oral lease (mustajri) agreement and the lease money was being paid to her regularly-However, she admitted in her cross examination that she had no proof or receipt to show that any lease (mustajri) money was ever paid by the appellant-Evidence produced by the respondent to prove that the subject land was given to appellant on lease (mustajri) did not inspire confidence as the respondent in her deposition very categorically asserted that she herself entered into a lease (mustajri) agreement with the respondent and that there were no witnesses of lease whereas one of her witnesses in his cross examination stated that the terms of lease (mustajri) agreement were settled in his as well as his brothers presence-Suit filed by respondent was rightly dismissed-Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=39,42Limitation Act, 1908=3", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 670 of 2018, decided on 4th January, 2022.heard on: 4th January, 2022.\n(Against the order Dated 5.4.2018 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench in C.R. No. 652 of 2011/BWP)", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Sajjad Ali Shah and Munib Akhtar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Umar Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nA.R. Aurangzeb, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASHIQ MUHAMMAD and others-Appellants\nVs\nMst. SUHAGAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23505", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1425 = 2023 SLD 1425 = 2023 SCMR 1174", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpNDk", - "Key Words:": "Supreme Court Rules, 1980-\n-O. IV, R. 19 & O. III, R. 9-Mode and manner of informing the Advocates regarding fixation of the cases by the Supreme Court stated.\nThe process of informing the Advocates regarding fixation of case is through the supply of the cause list to the respective Advocate-on-Records (AORs) under Order IV, Rule 19 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ( Rules ). Otherwise, informally as a matter of tradition and by way of standing practice, the cause lists are also put up in the Bar Rooms and SMS messages are also sent to the Advocates by the Court. However, the procedure covered by the Rules is the supply of cause list to the AORs. In case of a petitioner in person, notices are served to the petitioner under Order III, Rule 9 of the Rules.\nThe present application for restoration of Civil Petition, which was dismissed for non-prosecution, does not agitate that the above mentioned procedure was not followed. In addition, copy of the cause list has not been placed on record to show that the case or the name of counsel did not appear therein. Further, the application states that the AOR failed to inform the counsel, as well as, the petitioner about fixation of the case, however, it does not furnish any reason as to why the AOR, who had knowledge of the fixation of the case, failed to appear in the case himself. There is no affidavit filed by the AOR affirming the facts mentioned in the application. There is no sufficient ground for allowing the present application, which is accordingly dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.M.A No. 9009/2022 in Civil Petition No.361 of 2020, decided on 26th May, 2023, heard on: 26th May, 2023.\n(Application for recall of order Dated 04.10.2022 and restoration of C.P. No.361/2020)", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Applicant.\nAhmad Pervaiz Malik, Advocate Supreme Court (through V.L. Lahore Registry), Tahir Farooq Tarar (Head Legal PEMRA), Mohsin Hameed Dogar, (Dir. Regulations) and Barrister Syed Ali Asghar (Law Officer) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEHTAB PUBLICATION (PVT.) LTD.-Applicant\nVs\nPAKISTAN ELECTRONIC MEDIA REGULATORY AUTHORITY (PEMRA) and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23506", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1426 = 2023 SLD 1426 = 2023 SCMR 1176", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRVJpNDg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)-\n-S. 13(3)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Talb-i-Ishhad, making of-Proof-It is mandatory for the plaintiff/pre-emptor to state the names of the witnesses for Talb-i-Ishhad in his plaint and then prove their attestation by producing them in Court.\nTalb-i-Ishhad, or demand by establishing evidence, means the calling of two witnesses by the pre-emptor to attest his making of the first demand (Talb-i-Muwathibat) to strengthen his claim for preemption. The calling of witnesses is not necessary for the validity of his claim for pre-emption, it is on the other hand, intended to provide the pre-emptor with proof when the vendee denies the demand (Talb). This position of law unequivocally suggests that proving the presence of witnesses is one of the material facts, within the contemplation of Order VI, C.P.C., which establishes that the essential formalities for making Talb-i-Ishhad were observed by the pre-emptor. As such, it is mandatory for the plaintiffs to first state the names of the witnesses for Talb-i-Ishhad in their plaint and then prove their attestation by producing them in Court.\nSarjug Singh and another v. Jagmohan Singh and others AIR 1919 Patna 496 ref.\nIn the present case the plaintiffs had omitted to mention the names of the witnesses of Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint. Such omission is fatal to the claim proffered by the plaintiffs. The right of pre-emption is but a feeble right. As it disseizes another who has acquired a property in bona fide manner for good value, it entails that the ritual of the Talbs must be observed to the letters, and any departure, howsoever slight it may be, defeats the right of pre-emption.\nDr. Pir Muhammad Khan v. Khuda Buksh 2015 SCMR 1243 ref.\n(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)-\n-S. 13(3)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Talb-i-Ishhad, making of-Scope-Mere signing and sending a notice to the vendee without confirming the intention to exercise the right of pre-emption is not sufficient for purposes of making Talb-i-Ishhad.\nMuhammad Zahid v. Dr. Muhammad Ali PLD 2014 SC 488 ref.\n(c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)-\n-S. 13(3)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Talb-i-Ishhad, making of-Omissions in notice of Talb-i-Ishhad, which creates doubt as to its making- Benefit of such omissions must go to the vendee.\nMehmood Alam v. Mushtaq Ahmed and 5 others 2017 Law Notes 238 = 2017 CLC Note 110 ref.\n(d) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)-\n-Ss. 13(3) & 14-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Talb-i-Ishhad made through an agent/lawyer-General rule and exceptions-Scope-In the present case the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad did not bear the signature or thumb impression of any of the pre-emptors/plaintiffs, but the signatures of both the witnesses and the counsel for the plaintiffs were there-Talb-i-Ishhad can be done by an agent, as provided in section 14 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987, but this is only an exception in the case of person who is unable to make the demand personally- Such exception cannot supersede the general rule-In the present case the pre-emptors/plaintiffs could not be allowed to avail themselves of this exception as it required them to prove two things: first, what was the disability which prevented them from making the demand themselves?; and second, was the agent specifically authorized to do so in explicit terms before making the demand-Evidence brought on record showed that the pre-emptors/plaintiffs were not suffering from any disability due to which they could not make a demand on their own-On the contrary, the statement of the one of the pre-emptor/plaintiff proved that he himself first made the Talb-i-Muwathibat and later he himself went to the lawyer and got the notice written-Same statement of the plaintiff also unfolded that no express authority was given to the lawyer before making the Talb-i-Ishhad-Such deficiency was sufficient to dismiss the pre-emption suit-Appeal was dismissed.\nMedni Proshad and others v. Suresh Chandra Tewari and others AIR 1943 Patna 96; Abdul Qayyum v. Muhammad Sadiq 2007 SCMR 957 and Unair Ali Khan v. Faiz Rasool PLD 2013 SC 190 ref.\n(e) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)-\n-Ss. 5 & 13-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Right of pre-emption-Scope-Such right is strictissimi juris (strict rule of law) and the slightest deviation from the formalities required by law will prevent its accrual.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, (X of 1987)=13(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 795 of 2017, decided on 18th May, 2023, heard on: 18th May, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment Dated 10.04.2017 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in C.R. No.67 of 2010)", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Samad Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Peshawar) for Appellants.\nZia-ur-Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KASHMALI KHAN and others-Appellants\nVersus\nMst. MALALA-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23507", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1427 = 2023 SCMR 1182 = 2023 SLD 1427", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 311, 324, 452, 365, 337-A(ii), 148 149-Qatl-i-amd, house-trespass, kidnapping or abducting with intent secretly and wrongfully to confine person, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly-Bail, refusal of-Allegations against the accused as to his involvement in the crime were supported by the statements of witnesses recorded by the investigating officer under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Cr.P.C.), which included the statements of the injured witness, and three female residents of the house where the incident took place, in addition to the statement of the complainant whose son had died in the incidence-Incident was further supported by the footage recorded on the CCTV camera of a neighbouring house-Sufficient incriminating material was thus available on the record of the case to connect the accused with the commission of the alleged offences-Accused, therefore, had no case for grant of bail under subsection (2) of section 497, Cr.P.C.-In the facts and circumstances of the case the accused was not entitled to the relief of bail even if the question of his vicarious liability for the offence of qatl-i-amd was left to be determined in trial-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused, and accused was refused bail.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-S. 497-Bail-Vicarious liability, question of-Although the question of vicarious liability of an accused can also be looked into at the bail stage and it is not an absolute rule that it must always be left to be determined in trial.\nNazar Muhammad v. State PLD 1978 SC 236; Muhammad Rashid v. State 1979 SCMR 92; Asandas v. State 1975 SCMR 237 and Ghulam Nabi v. State 1996 SCMR 1023 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-S. 497(1)-Bail-Offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1), Cr.P.C.-Exceptions to grant of bail in such offences-It is true that in such offences, bail is to be granted as a rule, but not as of right-Bail can be refused in such offences when the case of the accused falls within any of the three well established exceptions: (i) likelihood to abscond to escape trial; (ii) likelihood to tamper with the prosecution evidence or influence the prosecution witnesses to obstruct the course of justice; and (iii) likelihood to repeat the offence.\nTariq Bashir v. State PLD 1995 SC 34; Zafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Anwar 2009 SCMR 1488; Muhammad Tanveer v. State PLD 2017 SC 733 and Iftikhar Ahmad v. State PLD 2021 SC 799 ref.\n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-S. 497(1)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 311, 324, 452, 365, 337-A(ii), 148 149-Qatl-i-amd, house-trespass, kidnapping or abducting with intent secretly and wrongfully to confine person, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly-Bail, refusal of-Possibility of accused absconding or causing harm to alleged abductee-In the present case, the accused being the father of the alleged abductee appeared to have had the real motive for the commission of the alleged offences while the others abetted him in his cause-Most of the other accused persons were absconders, and the police had so far only succeeded to bring the accused and a co-accused person to justice-Thus there was a likelihood that the accused may also abscond if he was released on bail-Further, and more importantly, the alleged abductee had not yet been recovered-No one knew whether she was alive or not-There was a possibility that the accused may cause her harm or may coerce her to influence her evidence concerning the facts of the present case if he was released on bail-Two of the exceptions to grant of bail in offences not falling within prohibitory clause of section 497(1) Cr.P.C., i.e, likelihood of repeating the offence and influencing the witness were attracted in the present case-Case of the accused, therefore, attracted not one but almost all the three exceptions which justified the declining of bail even in offences that did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1), Cr.P.C.-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused, and accused was refused bail with the directions that the concerned Inspector General of Police, shall personally look into the matter and depute a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police to supervise the investigation of the case and to ensure recovery of the alleged abductee at the earliest; that on recovery of the alleged abductee, she may be lodged in Dar-ul-Aman (or some other similar institution) for at least two days before recording her statement as to the facts of the case, so that she may be in a position to make her statement voluntarily without the undue influence of anyone, and her statement should preferably be recorded by the Magistrate concerned under section 164, Cr.P.C.\n(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 445, 446, 452 458-Lurking house-trespass or housebreaking by night after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint-Bail, refusal of-Facts alleged in the FIR prima facie constituted the offence of house-breaking by night after preparation for causing hurt, punishable under section 458 of the P.P.C., instead of section 452 of the P.P.C.-Accused and his accomplices allegedly committed house-breaking, that is, trespassed into the complainants house by scaling over the wall of the house, as defined in clause (2) of section 445 and that housebreaking was also committed by night, that is, after sunset and before sunrise, as defined in section 446, P.P.C.-Offence under section 458 of the P.P.C. being punishable with imprisonment upto fourteen years fell within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C.-Therefore, even, if the actual role of the accused was considered, his case also fell within the prohibitory clause-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused, and accused was refused bail.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-Ss. 455 458-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 14-Sanctity and privacy of home-Scope-Offences of house-breaking committed after having made preparation for causing hurt or fear of hurt-Categorization as grave offences-It is the sanctity and privacy of home, as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution, that the offences of house-breaking committed after having made preparation for causing hurt or fear of hurt have been categorised by the legislature as grave offences under section 455, P.P.C. (when committed at daytime) and section 458, P.P.C. (when committed at night), punishable with imprisonment upto ten years and fourteen years respectively-House of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress as well as for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose-It would be the worst position of a society if its people do not feel safe and secure even within their houses-Failure to provide protection to its citizens in their houses would amount to the failure of the State-All the organs of the State, including the judiciary, should therefore enforce the laws protecting the privacy of home strictly in letter and spirit.\nSemayne case (1604) 5 Coke 91 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,311,324,452,365,337-A(ii),148,149", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 461 of 2023, decided on 24th May, 2023, heard on: 24th May, 2023. (Against the order of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, dated 28.03.2023 passed in Criminal Misc. No. 326-B of 2023)", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Anwar Afridi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nDSP Khalid Mehmood Awan, Inspector and Ashiq Shah, I.O. for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HILAL KHATTAK-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23508", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1428 = 2023 SCMR 1243 = 2023 SLD 1428", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RTk", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 148 149-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault with firearms- Ad-interim pre-arrest bail, confirmation of-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-First Information Report was lodged after an inordinate delay of about three days-Only explanation put forth by the complainant was that firstly they got the Police letter for treatment from Civil Hospital and after the treatment they lodged the FIR-However, this explanation did not seem to be impressive, especially when the Police was allegedly approached by the complainant on the very first day-Complainant and the injured prosecution witness received injuries on the non-vital parts of the body and the accused and co-accused did not repeat the fire despite having ample opportunity to do so-In this view of the matter, the question whether section 324, P.P.C. would be applicable in the case or not would be determined by the Trial Court after recording of evidence-Case of the accused and co-accused squarely fell within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into their guilt-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals, and allowed, ad interim pre-arrest bail granted to the accused was confirmed, whereas the co-accused was admitted to post-arrest bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=324,148,149Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 41-K and 42-K of 2023, decided on 29th May, 2023.\n(On appeal against the order dated 30.01.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Sukkur in Crl. Bail Applications Nos. S -678/2022 and S-32/2023)heard on: 29th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zuber Ahmed Rajput, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with Petitioner in person (via video link from Karachi).\nHussain Bukhsh Baloch, Additional P.G. Sindh for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAMALUDDIN and another-Petitioners\nVs\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23509", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1429 = 2023 SCMR 1258 = 2023 SLD 1429", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 126-Bank guarantee-Contract of guarantee-Scope-Since a guarantee is, for the purposes of the Contract Act, 1872 a contract under the law, the parties to the guarantee are deemed to be regulated by the terms of the guarantee which they have mutually agreed upon keeping in view the legal principle of consensus ad idem (meeting of the minds) when it comes to construction of contracts-Once a guarantee is executed between the parties (i.e. between a guarantor/surety and a creditor), they would be bound by the terms and conditions of the guarantee irrespective of any independent obligation of the principal debtor towards the creditor-Once a bank issues a guarantee, it is duty-bound to pay the beneficiary of a guarantee in terms of the guarantee itself.\nEFU General Insurance Ltd. v. Zhongxhing Telecom Pakistan (Private) Limited 2022 SCMR 1994; Edward Owens Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd. [1977] 3 W.L.R. 764; Commercial Bank of Ceylon PLC v. Ace Containers (Pvt.) Ltd. [2015] 1 S.L.R. 223;U.P. State Sugar Corporation v. Sumac International Ltd. [1997] 1 SCC 568 and Simon Carves Ltd. v. Ensus UK Limited [2011] EWHC 657 (TCC) ref.\n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 126-Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 202-Bank guarantee, encashment of-Scope-Expiry of bank guarantee-Recovery of Government dues by the Customs department-Contract of guarantee is a standalone and independent contract between the guarantor (in this case, the appellant-bank) and the beneficiary (in this case, the Customs department) for a limited period (unless the guarantee contract specifically states that it is a continuing guarantee or language to that effect and no date or event of expiry thereof is specified) and for a limited purpose (that is, to pay the amount mentioned therein on a call being made within the time specified) without reference to any third party or the underlying transaction that constituted the basis for issuance of the guarantee-Parties to the guarantee contract are bound by the terms and conditions of the guarantee including its date of expiry-Unless a valid call is received by the Guarantor within the time specified in the guarantee, the Guarantor is released of any and all obligations under the contract and the contract itself expires-Guarantor (bank), by reason of issuing the guarantee, does not become subject to section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969 in the sense understood by the High Court by reason of guaranteeing payment of certain sums-Guarantor does not become liable to pay government dues referenced to in section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969 because such liability continues to be attached to the person who owes such dues to the Customs Department-Department can, therefore, rely on section 202 to recover the said dues from the person/company-Appeal filed by the bank was allowed and impugned of High Court was set-aside.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=126", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 196-P of 2014, decided on 30th May, 2023.\n(Against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 22.09.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 2064 of 2010)\nheard on: 30th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Advocate-on-Record/Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Peshawar) for Appellant.\nAbdul Rauf Rohaila, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Peshawar) for Respondents Nos. 1- 4.\nNemo for Respondent No. 5\nRaja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, DAG on Court's Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED-Appellant\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Collectorate of Customs, Peshawar\nand others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23510", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1430 = 2023 SCMR 1267 = 2023 SLD 1430", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Deeming clause-Scope-In order to interpret a statute, the Court is obligated to give effect to the deeming provisions while taking into consideration the object of a legal fiction and also dredge up the rationales of statutory fiction to its cogent finale vis- -vis the intention of legislature so it should not cause any injustice-Legal fictions give rise to explicit objectives restricted to the purposes which should be construed contextually but should not be elongated further than the legislative wisdom for which it has been created.\nBlacks Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, Pg. 477-478; All Pakistan Newspapers Society v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 1; Anwar Aziz Chaudhry v. The State 1991 SCMR 994; Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan and others PLD 1975 SC 397 and Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell and others v. Ramesh Gelli and others (2016) 3 SCC 788 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Adequate remedy-Meaning-Extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is envisioned predominantly for affording an express remedy where the unlawfulness and impropriety of the action of an executive or other governmental authority could be substantiated without any convoluted inquiry-Expression adequate remedy signifies an effectual, accessible, advantageous and expeditious remedy which should also be remedium juris i.e. more convenient, beneficial and effective-To effectively bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, the remedy available under the law must be able to accomplish the same purpose which is sought to be achieved through a writ petition-Extraordinary jurisdiction (of the High Court) is provided as remedy to cure an illegality which can be established without any elaborate enquiry into disputed facts.\nDr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813 ref.\n(c) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)-\n-Ss. 60 99A-University of Balochistan Act, 1996, S. 39(1)-Constitutional petition- Maintainability- S.R.O. 156(I)/2004 dated 13.03.2004 issued by Ministry of Defence under section 99A of the Cantonments Act, 1924-Cantonment dues-Exemption or rebate of 60% for Government servants-Professor at the University of Balochistan [BPS-21] (petitioner)-Notice of demand was issued to petitioner for payment of Cantonment Board dues and arrears without granting him the 60% exemption or rebate under S.R.O.156(I)/2004 dated 13.03.2004 (the SRO), on the basis that he was not an employee of Provincial Government-Constitutional petition filed by the petitioner before the High Court was dismissed on the basis that he did not avail the alternate remedy of appeal under section 84 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (the Act)-Validity-Petitioner was a public servant-Right of appeal provided under section 84 of the Act was provided against the assessment or levy of or against the refusal to refund any tax under the Act-Conspicuous distinctiveness existed between a claim of exemption under the SRO issued under section 99A of the Act and challenge to an assessment of house tax etc. made by the competent authority under the provisions of the Act-Framework and skeleton of the writ petition moved by the petitioner in the High Court was in relation to the enforcement of SRO, and did not challenge any assessment order of tax, therefore in all fairness, he was wrongly non-suited on the ground of non-availing the alternate remedy of appeal which was not applicable in the present case-On the contrary, petitioners claim of exemption or rebate could be easily decided in writ jurisdiction in view of the terms and conditions of the SRO wherein no factual controversy or disputed question of facts were involved to determine the petitioners entitlement in view of the available documents and correspondence-Petitioner was entitled to claim the exemption/rebate under the SRO-Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 47-Q of 2016, decided on 21st March, 2023.\n(Against Order dated 29.03.2016 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in C.P. No.112 of 2014)heard on: 21st March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Amin-ud-Din Khan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Gohar Yaqoob Yousafzai, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nAdnan Basharat, Advocate Supreme Court, (For Cantonment Board) and Abdul Zahir Kakar, A.A.G., Balochistan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. ABDUL NABI, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY, UNIVERSITY OF BALOCHISTAN, SARIAB ROAD, QUETTA-Petitioner\nVs\nEXECUTIVE OFFICER, CANTONMENT BOARD, QUETTA-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23511", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1431 = 2023 SCMR 1278 = 2023 SLD 1431", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5RXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Crime report was lodged one hour and fifty five minutes after the incident-Keeping in view the fact that the deceased was firstly taken to hospital, which was situated at a distance of more than five kilometers from the place of occurrence where he succumbed to the injuries and the matter was reported from the hospital, it would be considered a promptly lodged FIR-Promptness of FIR prima facie showed truthfulness of the prosecution case and it excluded possibility of deliberation and consultation-Accused was known to the deceased and another witness, as such, there was no chance of misidentification-Witnesses of ocular account had reasonably explained their presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time-Said witnesses had given all necessary details of occurrence qua the date, time, place, name of accused, name of witnesses, manner of occurrence, kind of weapon used in the occurrence, the locale of injuries and the motive of occurrence-Witnesses had no enmity or ill-will against the accused to falsely involve him in the case-Medical evidence available on the record corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the persons of the deceased was concerned-Appeal against conviction was dismissed.\n \n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Witnesses related to the deceased-Testimony, reliance on-Scope-If the presence of the related witnesses at the time of occurrence is natural and their evidence is straightforward and confidence inspiring then the same can be safely relied upon to sustain conviction of an accused.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Ocular account-Medical evidence-Preference-Where ocular evidence is found trustworthy and confidence inspiring, the same is given preference over medical evidence and the same alone is sufficient to sustain conviction of an accused.\nMuhammad Iqbal v. The State 1996 SCMR 908; Naeem Akhtar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 396; Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2010 SCMR 1025 and Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 ref.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Recovery evidence-Medical evidence-Scope-Value and status of medical evidence and recovery is always corroborative in its nature, which alone is not sufficient to sustain conviction.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence- Recovery evidence-Where the empty of cartridge and the weapon of offence i.e. .12 bore pump action gun were sent together to the Forensic Science Agency, such recovery (evidence) was inconsequential-Appeal against conviction was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 446 of 2020, decided on 6th June, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 20.12.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Murder Reference No. 201 of 2013 and Criminal Appeal No. 789 of 2013)heard on: 6th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " JUDGMENT\nMUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J.-This Civil Petition for leave to appeal is directed against the Order dated 29.03.2016 passed by the learned Balochistan High Court, Quetta in C.P. No.112/2014 whereby the Constitution Petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed.\n2. The ephemeral statistics of the lis are that the petitioner is a Professor in the Basic Pay Scale 21, who is imparting education in the Department of Chemistry at the University of Balochistan, Quetta (\"\"University\"\") and he claimed to be a government servant within the meaning of section 39 of the University of Balochistan Act, 1996 (\"\"UOB Act\"\"). According to him, he is the owner of the house bearing No.254/24-B, situated at Jinnah Town, Quetta, within the territorial limits of Cantonment Board Quetta. On 10.08.2010, the petitioner was called upon to pay a sum of Rs.57360/- on account of House Tax, Water Charges, Rent of Residential Building etc. He paid the dues on 11.08.2010 for a period commencing from 14.08.2005 to 30.06.2011 and was also allowed 60% rebate on the basis of being a provincial Government Servant. However, on 30.09.2012 the petitioner was sent a notice of demand for payment of Cantonment board dues and arrears amounting to Rs.124,550/-. Being dissatisfied, the petitioner made some representations whereby the department asked him to produce confirmation from the University that he is an employee thereof, which was provided to the respondent. In unison, the respondent also sought verification from the Office of the Director, Military Lands and Cantonment Department, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and vide their letter dated 10.07.2013, it was confirmed that the said exemption is available to regular employees (serving or retired) of the Federal Government, Provincial Government and Cantonment Board, but the respondent declined to recognize the status of the petitioner as a Government Servant (BPS-21) and refused to grant the 60% exemption and/or rebate in view of the S.R.O.156(I)/2004 dated 13.03.2004. The petitioner challenged the refusal of rebate in the High Court but his constitution petition was dismissed vide the impugned judgment dated 29.03.2016.\n3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the learned High Court failed to appreciate the jurisdiction vested in it under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 (\"\"Constitution\"\") as there was no alternate remedy for seeking declaration as to the status of the petitioner as a \"\"government servant\"\" within the meaning of section 39 of the UOB Act. It was further contended that there was no dispute regarding the Assessment of House Tax etc. under the Cantonments Act, 1924 (\"\"Cantonments Act\"\"), rather the prime question was the denial of 60% exemption as a government servant, therefore, section 84 of the Cantonments Act was not applicable. He further averred that the petitioner, being an employee of the University, is in fact a government servant within the ambit of section 39 of the UOB Act.\n4. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioner was rightly non-suited by the learned High Court due to his failure to avail the alternate remedy provided under section 84 of the Cantonments Act. He further added that after availing the right of appeal against the assessment, an aggrieved person may also file a revision application under section 88 of the Cantonments Act before the relevant authority provided under the law. He further argued that the petitioner was not entitled to claim any exemption or rebate in view of the notification relied upon by the petitioner, hence this civil petition is liable to be dismissed.\n5. Heard the arguments. The judgment of High Court unequivocally reflects that the petition remained pending since 2014 to decide the question of maintainability on account of availability of alternate remedy and finally, the learned High Court reached the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to avail an alternate and adequate remedy, therefore the petition was dismissed. What we have deciphered is that there is no discord in the midst of the parties in relation to the performance of duties by the petitioner as a professor in the Department of Chemistry at the University; instead the bone of contention was with regard to the claim of rebate or exemption being an employee of the Provincial Government. In order to advert to the line of reasoning upstretched by the parties vice versa, it is most expedient to analyze the relevant provisions of the UOB Act wherein, under section 2, definition clause (k), an \"\"Employee\"\" means a person borne on pay roll of the University but shall not include (a) a person holding purely fixed tenure post, (b) a person appointed by the University on contract basis, or (c) a person on deputation with the University. Whereas section 39 of the UOB Act expounds the status of employees of the University, which is for the ease of reference, reproduced as under:-\n39. (1) Employees of the University and their retirement.-All employees of the university including employees appointed on contract basis and/or on fixed tenure posts shall be deemed to be provincial public servants as defined by section 21 of Pakistan Penal Code: [emphasis supplied]\nProvided that the sanction of their prosecution shall be granted by the respective competent authority in the University and not by any other authority in the University and not by any other authority prescribed by Federal or Provincial Government.\n(2) An Officer, teacher or other employee of the University shall retire from service:\n(i) On such date after he has completed 25 years of service qualifying for pension or other retirement benefits as the competent authority may, in the public interest direct, or\n(ii) Where on direction is given under clause (i) on the completion of the sixty years of his age.\nExplanation.-In this section \"\"Competent Authority or a person duly authorized by the appointing authority in that behalf, not being a person lower in rank to the officer, teacher or other concerned employee.\n6. According to section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (\"\"P.P.C.\"\"), the expression \"\"public servant\"\" is defined as under:-\n21 \"\"Public servant\"\"-The words \"\"public servant\"\" denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely: First. [Omitted by Ord. XXVII of 1981]\nSecond. Every Commissioned Officer in the Military [Naval or Air] Forces of [Pakistan] while serving under the [Federal Government) or any Provincial Government;\nThird. Every Judge;\nFourth. Every officer of a Court of Justice whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the Court; and every person specially authorized by a Court of Justice to perform any of such duties;\nFifth. Every juryman, assessor, or member of a panchayat assisting a Court of Justice or public servant;\nSixth. Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by any Court of Justice, or by any other competent public authority;\nSeventh. Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement;\nEighth. Every officer of [the Government] whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety, or convenience;\nNinth. Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property on behalf of [the Government], or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of [the Government], or to execute any revenue-process, or to investigate, or to report, on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of [the Government], or to make, authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of [the Government], or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of [the Government], and every officer in the service or pay of [the Government] or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty;\nTenth. Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, to make any survey or assessment or to levy any rate of tax for any secular common purpose of any village, town or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town or district;\n[Eleventh. Every person who holds any office in virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election.]\n7. In the case in hand, the employees of the University, in line with the provisions of the UOB Act are deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21, P.P.C., which denotes that they shall be dealt with strictly during the course of duties as compared to other classes and genres of persons mentioned in the definition of public servants. According to Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, Pg. 477-478, the meaning of the word \"\"Deem\"\" is to treat (something) as if it were really something else, or it has qualities that it does not have. \"\"'Deem' has been traditionally considered to be a useful word when it is necessary to establish a legal fiction either positively by 'deeming' something to be what it is not or negatively by 'deeming' something not to be what it is...\"\". In order to interpret the statute, the Court is obligated to give effect to the deeming provisions while taking into consideration the object of such legal fiction and also dredge up the rationales of statutory fiction to its cogent finale vis- -vis the intention of legislature so it should not cause any injustice. Legal fictions give rise to explicit objectives restricted to the purposes which should be construed contextually but should not be elongated further than the legislative wisdom for which it has been created. In the case of All Pakistan Newspapers Society v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 1), this Court, while referring to the case of Mubeen-us- Salam v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006, SC 602), held that the purpose of importing a deeming clause is to place an artificial construction upon a word/phrase that would not otherwise prevail and sometimes it is to make the construction certain. It was further held that a deeming clause is a fiction, which cannot be extended beyond the language of the section by which it is created or by importing another fiction. In the case of Anwar Aziz Chaudhry v. The State (1991 SCMR 994), this Court held that in an enactment specific officers or persons holding specific offices in an organization may be particularized as persons falling within the definition of 'public servant', or those who normally would not fall within that category may be treated as falling within that definition, or all persons working in that organization may be deemed as falling within that definition. The absence of definition section in an enactment does not mean that the persons concerned who are covered by the enactment are not to be treated at all as public servants. What it means is that section 21 of the P.P.C. would come into play, which will determine which of such persons, can be treated as falling in the category of public servants. In the case of Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan and others (PLD 1975 SC 397), it was held that when a statute contemplates that a state of affairs should be deemed to have existed, it clearly proceeds on the assumption that in fact it did not exist at the relevant time but by a legal fiction we are to assume as if it did exist. The classic statement as to the effect of a deeming clause is to be found in the observations of Lord Asquith in East End Dwelling Company Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council that \"\"where the statute says that you must imagine the state of affairs, it does not say that having done so you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs\"\". In the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell and others v. Ramesh Gelli and others ((2016) 3 SCC 788), the Court dilated upon the situation when the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 deemed every member to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Penal Code, 1860 and the Court observed that when the legislature creates a legal fiction, the court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining this, to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries for giving effect to the fiction and finally held that there is no escape from the conclusion that the Appellant is a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Penal Code. Whereas in the case of G.A. Monterio v. The State of Ajmer (AIR 1957 SC 13), the Court held that the true test to determine whether a person is an officer of the government, is: (1) Whether he is in the service or pay of the Government, and (2) whether he is entrusted with the performance of any public duty and if both these requirements are satisfied it matters not the least what is the nature of his office, whether the duties he is performing are of an exalted character or very humble indeed.\n8. The petitioner had claimed the exemption/rebate taking into account the S.R.O. 156(I)/2004 dated 13.3.2004, issued by Ministry of Defence pursuant to the powers conferred by section 99A of the Cantonments Act whereby the Federal Government granted certain exemptions in the payment of house or property tax imposed under section 60 of the aforesaid Act, on the lands and buildings situated within the cantonment limits in Pakistan. The relevant Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) is reproduced as under:-\n\"\"THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN\nStatutory Notifications (S.R.O) GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN\nMINISTRY OF DEFENCE NOTIFICATIONS\nRawalpindi, the 13th March, 2004\nS.R.O. 156(I)/2004.-In exercise of the powers conferred by section 99A of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (II of 1924), and in supersession of its Notification No. S.R.O. 1207(I)/79, dated the 22nd December, 1979, the Federal Government is pleased to grant the following exemptions in payment of house or property tax imposed under section 60 of the aforesaid Act, on the lands and buildings situated within the cantonment limits in Pakistan, namely:-\n(a) 10% of the annual tax, on account of cost of repairs and other expenditure incurred to maintain the building in a condition in which it may fetch the gross annual rent;\n(b) 5% of the annual tax, in a case in which the tax in respect of a financial year is paid in lump sum before the 30th day of September in that year;\n(c) 60% of the annual tax payable in respect of one house in any cantonment in Pakistan owned by a person or the spouse of such person whether self-occupied or rented out either wholly or in part, who is Federal Government or a Provincial Government or a Cantonment Board servant, exemption will be permissible to these serving employees who are regularly employed by a Competent Authority of the aforesaid authorities. A Cantonment Board servant would mean a servant of a Board holding a substantive whole time appointment under the Board paid from the Cantonment Fund. Persons appointed on contract under rule 9 of the Pakistan Cantonments Servants Rules, 1954 or those employed on ad hoc or purely temporary basis will not be entitled to this exemption;\n(d) 100% of the annual tax payable in respect of one house in any cantonment in Pakistan owned by a retired Federal Government or a Provincial Government of a Cantonment Board servant or his/her spouse whether self-occupied or rented out either wholly or in part. Exemption will be permissible to those retired servants who have retired after superannuation or after completing qualifying pensionable service. Those retired compulsorily, removed from service, prematurely retired due to fault or discipline or dismissed from service will not be entitled for the exemption\"\". [emphasis supplied]\n9. According to section 99A of the Cantonments Act, the general power of exemption vests in the Federal Government to issue a notification in the official Gazette for exemption, either wholly or in part, for the payment of any tax imposed under the Act, for any person or class of persons or any property or goods or class of property or goods. While relying on the aforesaid S.R.O., the petitioner invited our attention for consideration to a letter dated 19.12.2013, communicated by the Director Human Resource, Directorate of Human Resource, University of Balochistan, Quetta stating that all the employees of the University, including employees appointed on contract basis and/or fixed tenure, are provincial public servants as defined by section 21 of the P.P.C. and also referred to Section 39 of the UOB Act. The petitioner also placed on record another letter dated 10.7.2013 sent by the Assistant Director General (Finance and Budget), Military Lands and Cantonments Department to the Director, Military Lands and Cantonments, Quetta Region, Quetta Cantt. for providing the exemption of House Tax to the petitioner and it is clearly mentioned in the letter that the exemption as per rule is available to regular employees (serving/retired) of the Federal Government, Provincial Government and Cantonment Boards and, in the end, a request was made to ask the CEO, Cantt. Board, Quetta to take further necessary action. Despite all this interdepartmental correspondence, the grievance of the petitioner was not redressed, hence he approached the High Court for the enforcement of the notification allowing the exemption, but the petition was dismissed on the question of maintainability.\n10. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is envisioned predominantly for affording an express remedy where the unlawfulness and impropriety of the action of an executive or other governmental authority could be substantiated without any convoluted inquiry. The expression \"\"adequate remedy\"\" signifies an effectual, accessible, advantageous and expeditious remedy which should also be remedium juris i.e. more convenient, beneficial and effective. To effectively bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, the remedy available under the law must be able to accomplish the same purpose which is sought to be achieved through a writ petition. This extraordinary jurisdiction is provided as remedy to cure an illegality which can be established without any elaborate enquiry into disputed facts. In the case of Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others (2011 SCMR 1813), this Court held that the question of adequate or alternate remedy has been discussed time and again by this Court and it is well settled by now that the words \"\"adequate remedy\"\" connote an efficacious, convenient, beneficial, effective and speedy remedy and also articulated the guiding principles to be considered by the High Courts in order to determine the adequacy of the alternate remedy that if the relief available through the alternative remedy in its nature or extent is not what is necessary to give the requisite relief within the meaning of Article 199 and the law has prescribed any remedy that can redress that category of grievance in that way and to the required extent.\n11. In fact, the impugned judgment is structured on the sole issue of non-availing the right of appeal provided under section 84 of the Cantonments Act, hence the petition was dismissed but there was no dispute as to whether the petitioner was a public servant and entitled to the rebate or not but he was called upon to avail the right of appeal rather than approaching High Court in writ jurisdiction. It is clear beyond any shadow of doubt that the right of appeal in the aforesaid Section is provided against the assessment or levy of or against the refusal to refund any tax under the Cantonments Act. There is a conspicuous distinctiveness struck between a claim of exemption under the notification issued under section 99A of the Cantonments Act and challenge to an assessment of house tax etc. made by the competent authority under the provisions of Cantonments Act. The framework and skeleton of the writ petition moved by the petitioner in the High Court was in relation to the enforcement of S.R.O. 156(I)/2004, dated 13.3.2004, issued by Ministry of Defence pursuant to the powers conferred by section 99A of the Cantonments Act and did not challenge any assessment order of tax, therefore in all fairness, he was wrongly non-suited on the ground of non-availing the alternate remedy of appeal which was not applicable in the present case but, on the contrary, his claim of exemption or rebate could be easily decided in writ jurisdiction in view of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid SRO wherein no factual controversy or disputed question of facts were involved to determine the petitioner's entitlement in view of the available documents and correspondence. After considering the pros and cons, we reached the finale that the petitioner is entitled to claim the exemption/rebate under the letter of law. The learned counsel for the respondent neither offered any lawful justification nor could give any good reason which may suffice to disentitle the petitioner from the benefit of exemption/rebate, nor did he controvert that the petitioner does not fall within the category or status of provincial public servant.\n12. In the wake of the above discussion, this Civil Petition is converted into an appeal and allowed. As a consequence thereof, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the petitioner is held to be entitled to the benefit of S.R.O. 156(I)/2004, dated 13.3.2004, issued by Ministry of Defence pursuant to the powers conferred by section 99A of the Cantonments Act, 1924.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sagheer Ahmed Qadri, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G. for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL WAHID-Appellant\nVs\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23512", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1432 = 2023 SCMR 1284 = 2023 SLD 1432", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTc", - "Key Words:": "Preston University Ordinance (LII of 2002)-\n-S. 4-Higher Education Commission Ordinance (LIII of 2002), S. 10-Pakistan Engineering Council Act (V of 1976), S. 14-Unaccredited university-Suit for damages filed by student on the basis that the University established its Faculty of Engineering without accreditation from the Pakistan Engineering Council (the Council), consequently, his degree would not be recognized by the Higher Education Commission (HEC) and he would not be recognized with the Council-Held, that in absence of its accreditation, the University was not competent to offer engineering education and enrol students-Degree issued by an unaccredited institution would be worthless like a piece of paper, as such, would be of no value-Since the University was not accredited, the respondent/plaintiff rightly decided to discontinue his education to secure his future-Respondent lost his precious nine months due to fault on part of the Universitys administration for not obtaining accreditation prior to offering admission, therefore, he was left with the only remedy of recovering the expenses incurred for the period he remained in the University, and for the damages on the grounds mentioned in his plaint-Suit for damages filed by respondent was rightly decreed.\nAppellant-University offered multiple courses, including Bachelor of Engineering (B.Eng). Its administration was required to comply with the provisions of the Preston University Ordinance, 2002 (the Ordinance, 2002) and the requirements necessary for establishment of its Faculty of Engineering in accordance with the Statute proposed by the Board of Governors (the Statute). It must also have complied with the provisions of the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 (the HEC Ordinance), the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 (the PEC Act) and the Engineering Council Regulations for Engineering Education in Pakistan (the Regulations), in order to obtain its accreditation status. It is a fact that the University did not disclose its accreditation status while offering admission to students, including the respondent/plaintiff for the reason that it was not accredited. The respondent alleged that after getting admission and completing his first semester, he came to know that the University had not received its accreditation status from the Pakistan Engineering Council (the Council), which was revealed for the first time when the list of unaccredited universities/institutions was published by the HEC. The respondent inquired into the matter from the University administration which admitted the fact that the University was not accredited. After filing of suit by the respondent, the appellants filed their written statement, but did not reply to the contention of the respondent with regard to the Universitys accreditation status. It was contended that since the University was affiliated with the HEC, it was competent to issue an engineering degree. The appellant for the first time in its appeal before the High Court and in the memo of appeal before the Supreme Court, alleged that the University had applied to the Council for its accreditation, but the process remained incomplete till date. This proves the fact that the University is not accredited by the Council. In absence of its accreditation, the University was not competent to offer engineering education and enrol students. Without accreditation of the University from the Council, the degree of B.Eng issued by it would not be recognized by the HEC and the Council will not register a person holding such degree. Under such circumstances, the degree issued by an unaccredited institution would be worthless like a piece of paper, as such, would be of no value. Since the University was not accredited, the Respondent rightly decided to discontinue his education to secure his future. In view of the fact that the Respondent lost his precious nine months due to fault on part of the Universitys administration for not obtaining accreditation prior to offering admission, therefore, he was left with the only remedy of recovering the expenses incurred for the period he remained in the University, and for the damages on the grounds mentioned in his plaint. Suit for damages filed by respondent was rightly decreed. Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002=10", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1833 of 2019, decided on 10th March, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 17.04.2015 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in R.F.A. No. 122 of 2010)\nheard on: 10th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Yasir Nawaz and others v. Higher Education Commission and others PLD 2021 SC 745 ref.\nKhurram Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nMian Iqbal Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Peshawar) for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHANCELLOR PRESTON UNIVERSITY, KOHAT and others-Appellants\nVs\nHABIBULLAH KHAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23513", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1433 = 2023 SCMR 1292 = 2023 SLD 1433", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Administration of justice-\n-Concurrent civil and criminal proceedings-Stay of criminal proceedings-Principles-Object of a civil proceeding is to enforce civil rights and obligations while that of a criminal proceeding is to punish the offender for the commission of an offence-Therefore, both the civil proceeding and criminal proceeding relating to one and the same matter can be instituted and ordinarily proceeded with simultaneously-Although there is no bar to the simultaneous institution of both proceedings, the trial in the criminal proceeding may be stopped in certain circumstances-Guiding principle in this regard is that where the criminal liability is dependent upon or intimately connected with the result of the civil proceeding and it is difficult to draw a line between a bona fide claim and the criminal act alleged, the trial in the criminal proceeding may be postponed till the conclusion of the civil proceeding-Thus, where either of these two conditions is not fulfilled, i.e., where the subject matter of civil proceeding and that of criminal proceeding are distinct, not intimately connected, or where the civil proceeding is instituted mala fide to delay the criminal prosecution, not bona fide, the criminal proceeding may not be stayed.\nAslam Zaheer v. Shah Muhammad 2003 SCMR 1691; Rafique Bibi v. Muhammad Sharif 2006 SCMR 512; Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf 2006 SCMR 1192; Seema Fareed v. State 2008 SCMR 839; Sikandar Ali v. SHO 2021 SCMR 1486; Muhammad Akbar v. State PLD 1968 SC 281; Manak Ji v. Fakhar Iqbal 1969 PCr.LJ 411; Muhammad Tufail v. State 1979 SCMR 437; Abdul Haleem v. State 1982 SCMR 988; Habib Ahmed v. M.K.G. Scott Christian PLD 1992 SC 353; Muhammad Anwar v. Badshah Begum 1999 SCMR 1475; Sheraz Ahmad v. Fayyaz-ud -Din 2005 SCMR 1599; Abdul Ahad v. Amjad Ali PLD 2006 SC 771; Zafar v. Umar Hayat 2010 SCMR 1816; Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95; Muhammad Aslam v. State 2017 SCMR 390 and Mohammad Ahmad v. State 1972 SCMR 85 ref.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 9 O. VII, R. 11-Civil Court-Bar of jurisdiction-Scope-Rejection of plaint, application for-Bar on the jurisdiction of the civil court to try a suit of civil nature or on the maintainability of a suit envisaged by section 9 or clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII, C.P.C. is that which is created either expressly or impliedly by some statutory law enacted by the legislature-Courts in Pakistan, cannot import an implied bar from another countrys jurisprudence.\nAkram v. Farman Bi PLD 1990 SC 28 ref.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Concurrent civil and criminal proceedings-Scope-Standard of proof required in civil and criminal proceedings is different-In the former, a mere preponderance of probability is sufficient to decide the disputed fact but in the latter, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond any reasonable doubt-Therefore, there are chances of giving divergent s by the civil and criminal courts on the facts that give rise to both civil and criminal liabilities.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2000-L of 2020, decided on 26th May, 2023.\n(Against the order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 08.12.2020, passed by in Writ Petition No.64232 of 2020)Dates of hearing: 25th and 26th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zakaullah Khan v. Muhammad Aslam 1991 SCMR 2126; Richard Benjamin v. Ismail 1980 PCr.LJ 1172 and Aijaz v. Karachi Transport Corporation 2004 MLD 491 ref.\nHafeez Saeed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nCh. Zulfiqar Ali, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SALMAN ASHRAF-Petitioner\nVs\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23514", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1434 = 2023 SCMR 1299 = 2023 SLD 1434", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7(ff)-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 5-Acts of terrorism, possession of explosives, detonators and safety fuses-Reappraisal of evidence-Police officials/witnesses appeared to prove the factum of recovery whereas Bomb Disposal Commander/witness gave his report to the effect that the detonators and safety fuses were alive-Testimonies of said witnesses were reliable, straightforward and confidence inspiring, and they had no enmity with the accused to falsely implicate him in the present case-Parcel containing sample of recovered explosive substance was sent to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory and according to the report of the Agency the sample contained explosive material-Conviction and sentences passed against the accused were maintained-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Police/official witnesses, testimony of- Reliance- Scope-Testimony of official witnesses is as good as any other private witness unless it is proved that they have animus against the accused-Reluctance of general public to become witness in cases has become judicially recognized fact and no legal bar or restriction has been imposed with respect to considering statements of official witnesses-Police/official witnesses are as good witnesses and could be relied upon, if their testimonies remain un-shattered during cross-examination.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Minor contradictions/discrepancies on prosecution evidence-Scope-As long as the material aspects of the evidence have a ring of truth, courts should ignore minor discrepancies in the evidence-Test is whether the evidence of a witness inspires confidence-If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter, the defence can take advantage of the same-While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth-Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not affecting the material considerations of the prosecution case ought not to prompt the courts to reject evidence in its entirety-Such minor discrepancies which do not shake the salient features of the prosecution case should be ignored.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7(ff)Explosive Substances Act, 1908=5", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 169 of 2021, decided on 1st June, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 16.03.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 76554 of 2017)\nheard on: 1st June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sikandar Zulqarnain Saleem, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. and Haseeb Ashraf, D.O. CTD for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAZIR AHMED-Petitioner\nVs\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23515", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1435 = 2023 SCMR 1305 = 2023 SLD 1435", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-Ss. 5 6(1)- Suit for possession through pre-emption-Pre-emption, decree for-Scope-No partial decree is possible in a pre-emption suit as the right of pre-emption is one of substitution, even in the case of pre-emption under statute law, unless the statute itself has made a departure in this regard to any extent-From the doctrine that the right of pre-emption is one of substitution it follows that, unless the statute conferring the right of pre-emption otherwise provides, the pre-emptor must take over the whole bargain, that is to say, the pre-emptor must seek pre-emption of the whole of the subject-matter of the sale and pay the entire price paid by the vendee as consideration-This, however, is subject to certain limitations which, at any rate, do not include the vendors defective or want of title-Pre-emptor is not bound to seek pre-emption of the whole of the property sold and pay the full sale price if his right of pre-emption extends over only a portion of the property sold or if a portion of the property is capable of pre-emption and the other is not-In case of any such limitation, partial pre-emption on payment of proportionate price may be permitted as of necessity and not because the pre-emptor wants it.\nMst. Bashiran and others v. Abdul Ghani and others 1995 SCMR 1833 and Malik Hussain and others v. Lala Ram Chand and others PLD 1970 SC 299 ref.\n(b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-Ss. 13(2) 13(3)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Talb-i-Muwathibt and Talb-i-Ishhad- Proof- Petitioner (pre-emptor) produced two witnesses before the Trial Court to establish Talb-i-Muwathibat, however neither of the two witnesses deposed regarding the date on which the petitioner made Talb-i-Muwathibat-On of them also deposed that he was not aware of the other witnesses/signatories to the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad, and merely speculated as to who they could be, and was unaware of the contents of the notice and its recipients-Moreover, neither of the two witnesses deposed any specific date on which Talb-i-Ishhad was made-No receipt of acknowledgement due was produced in evidence, nor was any evidence or witness brought to show that the respondents (vendees) had refused to be served with the notice-It was for the petitioner to produce the postman during the evidence stage in order to establish the factum of Talb-i-Ishhad, which he failed to do-Suit for possession through pre-emption was rightly dismissed-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991=5,6(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 446-L of 2014, decided on 4th May, 2023.\n(Against Judgment dated 11.02.2014 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in R.S.A. No. 177 of 2005)\nheard on: 4th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mst. Bibi Fatima v. Muhammad Sarwar 2022 SCMR 870 ref.\nZafar Iqbal Klasoon, Advocate Supreme Court (through Video Link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD RIAZ-Petitioner\nVs\nMUHAMMAD RAMZAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23516", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1436 = 2023 SCMR 1311 = 2023 SLD 1436", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QS8", - "Key Words:": "Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013)-\n-S. 14(4)-Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms (Processing of Representations) Rules, 2014, Rr. 2(1)(b) 8(3)-Officer nominated by the President under section 14(4) of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, powers of-Such officer only processes the representations filed before the President-Decision-making powers of the President are not delegated to the said officer as the final decision on the representation is taken only by the President.\nThe nominated officer under section 14(4) of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 (the Act) only processes the representation before sending the case to the President for his decision. Processing the representation comprises of the actions or steps towards achieving the required objective i.e. a decision on the representation by the President. The views so expressed by the nominated officer in the form of recommendations/proposals form part of the procedure to process the representation before the case is sent to the President and the final decision thereon is taken only by the President.\nPresident is specifically authorized to nominate an officer to process a representation by preparing the case and giving his/her views on the said representation, which are likely to be only in the shape of recommendations/proposals, and in no manner can it be stated that the nominated officer is deciding the representation. The case is then placed before the President for decision thereon and the power to decide the representation resides solely with and is exercised only by the President after due application of mind.\nPower to process a representation, by preparing the case, and the power to decide that representation, after due application of mind, are inherently distinct functions and cannot be equated or conflated. The function of processing a representation by the nominated officer is only ancillary to the main objective of decision on the representation by the President.\nFor practical purposes, the role of the nominated officer is only to consolidate and simplify the record, and prepare the case before him so that it can be presented before the President for his decision. This in no manner dilutes the decision-making powers of the President because the discretion to accept or reject a representation is retained and vested entirely in the President himself, who, while deciding the representation, may agree with the recommendations/proposals so forwarded by the nominated officer, by adopting the reasons given by the nominated officer and/or also for his own reasons, or disagree with them for his own reasons and decide the representation after assessing the available record and independently applying his mind to the matter. Consequently, the power of the President to decide the representation himself remains intact and cannot be said to have been delegated to any other officer nominated by him under section 14(4) of the Act.\nUnited Woollen Mills Ltd. Workers Union v. United Woollen Mills 2010 SCMR 1475; Mollah Ejahar v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 173; Gouranga v. The Controller of Import and Export PLD 1970 SC 158; Government of Pakistan v. Farheen 2009 PLC (C.S.) 966 and Razia Jafar v. Government of Balochistan 2007 SCMR 1256 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reform Act, 2013=14(4)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1942 of 2022, decided on 26th May, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 03.03.2022, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in W.P. No. 3563 of 2017)\nheard on: 26th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sabir Hussain Tanoli, Advocate Supreme Court along with Muhammad Zahid, Assistant Registrar for Petitioners.\nRespondent No. 1 in person along with Ruqia Samee, Advocate Supreme Court.\nRaja Shafqat Abbasi, D.A.G. and Muhammad Saleem, Dir. Legal (President House) for Government of Pakistan.\nAssisted by Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk, Supreme Court.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Prof. Dr. MANZOOR HUSSAIN and others-Petitioners\nVs\nZUBAIDA CHAUDHRY and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23517", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1437 = 2023 SLD 1437 = 2023 SCMR 1319 = 2023 PTCL 751 = 2023 PTD 1306 = 2023 PLJ 555 = (2024) 130 TAX 387", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QSs", - "Key Words:": "Confiscation of Vehicle Used in Smuggling - Legality of Penal Action without Issuance of Show Cause Notice to Vehicle Owner\nIssue (a): Confiscation of Vehicle Used in Smuggling – Legality of Penal Action\nThis case addresses the confiscation of a vehicle allegedly used in smuggling, and the non-issuance of a show cause notice to the owner of the vehicle.\nFacts:\nThe vehicle in question was involved in smuggling activities. The owners name was disclosed in the inventory memo, but instead of issuing a show cause notice to the vehicle owner, it was issued to the driver of the vehicle and the owner of the smuggled goods.\nPenal action was taken against the owner of the vehicle without adhering to the necessary formalities under Section 180 of the Customs Act, 1969, which requires the issuance of a show cause notice to the vehicle owner before any penal action is taken.\nLegal Principle:\nThe court emphasized the principles of natural justice, which necessitate that a delinquent (in this case, the vehicle owner) should be afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense, provide an explanation, and contest the allegations before being found guilty.\nSince no show cause notice was issued to the owner of the vehicle, the penal action taken against him was deemed invalid.\nDecision:\nThe court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court, which had rightly ordered the unconditional release of the seized vehicle.\nThe petition for leave to appeal was dismissed as it was found that the necessary procedural steps were not followed in issuing the show cause notice to the vehicle owner.\nLegal Reference:\nThe court referenced the case of University of Dacca through Vice Chancellor and another v. Zakir Ahmed (PLD 1965 SC 90) and Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. and another (1994 SCMR 2232) to support the importance of issuing a show cause notice and following natural justice principles.\nIssue (b): Scope of the Audi Alteram Partem Rule and Show Cause Notice\nThe Audi Alteram Partem rule (Latin for hear the other side ) is a fundamental principle of natural justice, ensuring that no person should be condemned unheard. This rule requires that a person facing an accusation be given a fair opportunity to explain their position and defend themselves.\nScope of Show Cause Notice:\nA show cause notice serves as a formal communication from an authority to a person, informing them of the allegations against them and the penal actions that may be taken.\nThe purpose of a show cause notice is to provide the accused with a reasonable opportunity to contest the allegations, explain why they should not be penalized, and provide a defense within a specified time frame.\nRequirements of a Show Cause Notice:\nThe notice must contain clear and unambiguous allegations against the recipient.\nIt should outline the specific legal provisions that have been violated and the potential consequences or penal actions, ensuring the recipient understands the nature of the charges.\nDecision:\nThe show cause notice is essential for maintaining impartiality and ensuring justice. It gives the person accused of wrongdoing an opportunity to be heard, which is a critical aspect of the audi alteram partem rule.\nIn the absence of a properly issued show cause notice, penal actions would be deemed unfair and invalid.\nConclusion:\nThe case highlights the importance of adhering to procedural fairness in administrative matters, especially when confiscating property or imposing penalties. The failure to issue a show cause notice to the owner of the vehicle led to the invalidation of the penal action against them.\nThe Audi Alteram Partem principle ensures that a person must have the opportunity to defend themselves before being penalized. Thus, the authorities must issue a clear and comprehensive show cause notice outlining all relevant allegations and legal provisions before taking action.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,157,168,180Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2682 of 2022, decided on 11th May, 2023, heard on: 11th May, 2023.\n(Against Judgment dated 17.05.2022 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Customs Reference No. 106-P of 2019)", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocate Supreme Court (via Video Link from Peshawar) and Muhammad Sharif Janjua, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, PESHAWAR-Petitioner\nVs\nMUHAMMAD ISMAIL and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23518", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1438 = 2023 SCMR 1325 = 2023 SLD 1438", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss. 194-B 196-Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Ss. 132 133-Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), Ss. 46 47-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185-Findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal under various tax statutes-Inference with such facts by the High Court and Supreme Court-Conditions for such interference stated.\nGenerally, it is for the Appellate Tribunal, being the last fact-finding adjudicator, to finally determine the factual aspects of the controversy, and such findings are not interfered with by the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under various tax statutes; as the scope and extent of the power of the High Court hearing matters under the tax statutes in reference jurisdiction, as well as of the Supreme Court hearing appeals against decisions of the High Court made in such reference jurisdiction, is limited to deciding the question(s) of law, which may arise from the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. This rule is, however, not absolute. Where the Appellate Tribunal has based its decision on some perverse or totally incorrect finding of fact, which is contrary to the material available on record or which is based on surmises and conjectures; the decision based on such erroneous finding of fact can be corrected by the High Court. In cases, where the High Court has relied on the findings of the Appellate Tribunal, without a proper appraisal of the material before it, the Supreme Court being the appellate court of the High Court, may positively exercise the jurisdiction that is vested in the High Court but having not been exercised by it, in order to correct the perverse or arbitrary findings of fact.\nMessrs Mohammad Akbar v. I.T.A.T. 1972 SCMR 409; Messrs F.M.Y. Industries v. Deputy Commissioner I.T. 2014 SCMR 907; Messrs PTV Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2017 SCMR 1136; Messrs Squibb Pakistan v. Commissioner of I.T. 2017 SCMR 1006; Messrs Shah Nawaz v. Commissioner of I.T. 1969 SCMR 123; Commissioner of I.T. v. Messrs Smith, Kline and French 1991 SCMR 2374; Commissioner of I.T. v. Messrs Farrokh Chemical 1992 SCMR 523; Ibrahim Ishaq v. Commissioner of I.T. 1993 SCMR 287 and Messrs Irum Ghee Mills v. I.T. A.T. 2000 SCMR 1871 ref.\nThe exception to the rule of not interfering with the findings of fact, recorded by the Appellate Tribunal, is by no means to be exercised in order to facilitate a delinquent party, with a chance to fill up the lacunas in his case. Thus, this exception is not meant for allowing the additional material, particularly in circumstances, where in the grounds of appeal, a case for additional evidence has not been set out, or any independent formal application has been moved for the purposes of producing additional evidence.\nAbdul Aleem v. Idara N.I.C.F.C. 2016 SCMR 2067 and Muhammad Tariq v. Shamsa Tanveer PLD 2011 SC 151 ref.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss. 194-B 196-Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Ss. 132 133-Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), Ss. 46 47-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185-Findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal and High Court under various tax statutes-Inference with such facts by the Supreme Court-Scope-Whether the Supreme Court, while hearing a petition arising from a tax statute, can for the first time consider additional material relating to factual aspects of the case-Held, that the Supreme Court can accept additional material produced before it for the first time, provided that: firstly, it is relevant to resolving the controversy in the case; and that the additional material proposed to be adduced was neither in the possession nor knowledge of the party seeking to produce the same in evidence; and finally, that the party proposing to introduce that additional material in the evidence has been prompt in seeking its production without any delay-Once the Supreme Court finds it just and proper to consider the additional material, it would then have to decide; whether it is to pass a finding thereon or refer the matter to a lower forum.\nSecretary to the Govt. of W.P. v. Gulzar Muhammad PLD 1969 SC 58 ref.\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 184(3)-Suo motu powers of the Supreme Court-Scope-No one can dispute the efficacy of the exercise of the Suo Motu jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, in matters of public importance involving enforcement of any of the fundamental rights, which require urgent attention of the Court to ensure that the rule of law in the country prevails-However, the exercise of this jurisdiction by the Court is intended to be the need of the hour to ensure and enforce the rule of law; and not to undermine the lawful authority of the departments, institutions, authorities or offices-Not to mention the prejudice it may cause the parties who would not have any right of appeal against the orders passed by the Supreme Court in its Suo Motu jurisdiction and the adverse effect it may have on the adjudicatory process that may ensue-Supreme Court, while exercising its Suo Motu jurisdiction, therefore should not only be very cautious on what matters it exercises this jurisdiction, but also very mindful of the directions it makes, so that, the lawful authority of the investigating authorities or the adjudicatory forums is not undermined.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-B,196Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=132,133Sales Tax Act, 1990=46,47Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1600 to 2807 of 2021, decided on 23rd June, 2023.\nheard on: 23rd June, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.11.2020 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Special Customs Reference Application No. 9 of 2015 along with SCRAs Nos. 10 to 14, 45 to 54, 204 to 295, 1161 to 1216, 1239 to 1338, 1389 to 1488, 1662 to 1710, 2188 to 2287, 2290 to 2389, 2394 to 2493, 2610 to 2609(sic.), 2618 to 2717, 2721 to 2791 of 2015 and 559 to 792 of 2017)", - "Judge Name:": " Umer Ata Bandial, C.J., Yahya Afridi and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Anas Makhdoom, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Saad Rasool, Advocate for Petitioner (in all cases).\nRaja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL LOGISTICS CELL, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, HQ NLC, KARACHI-Petitioner\nVs\nThe COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, PORT MUHAMMAD BIN QASIM, KARACHI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23519", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1439 = 2023 SCMR 1399 = 2023 SLD 1439", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-Ss. 11 12-Unsoundness of mind-Proof-Registered sale deed and exchange deed executed by plaintiffs father challenged on the plea that their father had been suffering from paralysis for a long time; his hands and other limbs were affected with tremors and trembles; he could not relieve himself of his natural urges, and even to talk he used to express himself in gestures; and because of his illness he was very weak and could not walk around-Validity-Crucial point of determination in case a plea of insanity or unsoundness of mind is taken is the time of execution of the contract-In the present case, the disputed documents were registered in 1996 while plaintiffs father (executant) died in 1998 and thus the plaintiffs were to clearly state when their father had an attack of paralysis; did this occur before the documents were executed or after it?-This was a material fact that ought to have been disclosed in the plaint, but was conspicuously omitted, and since the plaintiffs could not go beyond the scope of their pleadings, they could not even be allowed to put in any statement or material to rectify the omission during the course of evidence, and as such, it would be fair to hold that the plaintiffs had failed to discharge their burden of pleadings, and tumbled at the first stage of the trial of their claim-Best evidence of the fathers mental disorder could have been the medical attendant (hakeem) who treated him at the relevant time-However said physician (hakeem) was not examined, nor was any explanation furnished why he was not presented-One of the plaintiffs, who was also son of the executant, stated in his examination-in-chief that his father was ill and suffering from paralysis; but he did not say that his father was mentally challenged-However, during cross-examinations he said that his father had tremor in his body before his death, and that in the year 1995-1996, his father had sold his other land to another person-Such statement proved that the father (executant), though ill, was of sound mind and able to look after his own affairs at the time of registration of the disputed sale deed and exchange deed-Burden of proving their fathers unsoundness in the first place was on the plaintiffs and when they failed to do so, the Court could not cure that infirmity by reading the statement of the defendants witness, such as the lambardar who had verified the fathers thumb impression on the disputed documents-In the ordinary course of life, the said witness (lambardar) was not supposed to have any information about the fathers health and the details of his medication-Contents of the disputed documents and of the statement of the witnesses, particularly of the Sub-Registrar did not support the inference, drawn by the High Court, that the father did not understand the value of the property he was selling or of which he was exchanging-Even if it was accepted that the father had paralysis and tremors, it cannot be said that the father did not comprehend the nature and effect of the disputed documents at the time of their writing and registration-Suits for declaration filed by the plaintiffs were rightly dismissed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court-Appeals were allowed and impugned s and decrees of High Court were set-aside.\nMuhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 ref.\n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-Ss. 11 12-Unsoundness of mind-Scope-Permanent paralytic affection, though it somewhat saps the physical energy of the sufferer, does not necessarily impairs his mental power to such an extent to render him incapable of transacting business.\nSajid Ali v. Ibad Ali (23 Cal. 1) ref.\n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 42-Suit for declaration-Registered sale deed and exchange deed-Plea of fraud-Not established-Sale deed and exchange deed executed by plaintiffs father was challenged on the plea that their father was unable to walk due to illness, so the defendants produced another person before the Sub-Registrar and got the disputed documents registered fraudulently, and that the Sub-Registrar did not mention their fathers identity card number on the disputed documents-Validity-Neither the plaintiffs in their plaint nor any of their witnesses had alleged that the Sub-Registrar was in cahoots with the defendants-Disputed documents were registered by the Sub-Registrar/Naib Tehsildar, and he was produced as a witness by the defendants; he clearly stated in his examination-in-chief that the disputed documents were presented before him by the father himself, and he was identified by the lambardar, the statements of witnesses were recorded, and the father admitted that consideration amount had been received, and also acknowledged the exchange of land-During cross-examination, the Sub-Registrar/Naib Tehsildar admitted that the fathers identity card number was not mentioned on the disputed documents, but stated that if there was no identity card number, the document was registered on the identification of a proper person, which included lambardar, councillors etc.-Plaintiffs father was identified by the lambardar, who appeared in Court and confirmed it-Even without so, the fathers identification would not have been difficult to ascertain as he was a lambardar himself, and generally the Sub-Registrar/Naib Tehsildar knows the lambardar of his area-Thus, in the given circumstances, merely on the basis of non-recording of the fathers identity card number, it could not be said that any other person had appeared instead of the father at the time of registration of the disputed documents, and any fraud was committed-Since the plaintiffs, had failed to discharge their initial burden, it did not shift to the defendants to prove the transactions-Defendants not only produced all the witnesses to the disputed documents, the identifier, and the Sub-Registrar, but also produced all their records from the custody of the Record-Keeper before the Trial Court and from the statements of all of them, the transactions recorded in the disputed documents were proved-Suits for declaration filed by the plaintiffs were rightly dismissed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court-Appeals were allowed and impugned s and decrees of High Court were set-aside.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=11,12", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1731, 1732 and C.M.As. Nos.13433, 13475 of 2021, decided on 24th May, 2023.heard on: 24th May, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 22.10.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revisions Nos. 3332 and 3333 of 2010)", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUNIR and others-Appellants\nVs\nUMAR HAYAT and others-Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "Khalil Ahmad v. Abdul Jabbar Khan and others 2005 SCMR 911; Messrs SAZCO (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Askari Commercial Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 558 and Haji Muhammad Yunis (deceased) through Legal heirs and another v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others 2022 SCMR 1282 ref.\nAgha Muhammad Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in both cases).\nMalik Matee Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for Respondents Nos. 1 - 3 (in both cases).\nEx-parte for Respondent No. 4 (in both cases)." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23520", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1440 = 2023 SCMR 1348 = 2023 SLD 1440", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QXo", - "Key Words:": "Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)-\n-Ss. 25 30(1)(d)-Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009, Rr. 7(e), 9(5), 13(3) 16(2)-Multi-Channel Multi-Point Distribution Service (MMDS) license, revocation of-Change in management of licensee without prior permission from PEMRA-Unlawful conduct of PEMRA and licensee-Remand of case to PEMRA-Before the 10 year term of respondents license expired, the CEO of the respondent-company handed over its management to a new set of persons-New directors/major shareholders informed PEMRA about the change in management of the company-Thereafter an application for renewal of license was made by the new CEO which was granted by PEMRA-Respondent company paid Rs.45 million by way of revalidation fee that was due from it-Subsequently PEMRA issued a show cause notice to the company threatening suspension/revocation of the license and imposition of fine under the provisions of section 30(1)(d) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 (PEMRA Ordinance, 2002) read with Rule 16(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 (PEMRA Rules, 2009) for unlawful change in its management without prior permission from PEMRA-PEMRA revoked the license of the respondent company-Such action was appealed by the company before the High Court-While the appeal was pending in the High Court, the respondent company again changed its management twice-Be that as it may, the High Court remanded the matter back to PEMRA-On remand PEMRA once again revoked all licenses of the respondent company-Legality-PEMRA gave a post facto validation of the license to the respondent company, until the date its license was revoked-Such stance may possibly have been meant to mitigate the past conduct of PEMRA when having granted renewal of the license on 15-10-2012 to the new management of the respondent, PEMRA had thereafter taken a contrary stand by issuing the respondent a show cause notice on 19-3-2014 and then revoking its license on 5-5-2014-In the impugned High Court failed to consider the statutory conditions laid down in section 30(1)(d) of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002 read with Rule 16(2) of PEMRA Rules, 2009-Furthermore, the impugned did not take into account the specific conditions applicable to the scrutiny of an application for transfer of management of a licensee company laid down in section 25 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 read with Rules 13(3), 9(5) and 7(e) of the PEMRA Rules, 2009-High Court had over emphasized PEMRAs requirement demanding the outgoing directors of the respondent company to be present whilst considering the application by the respondent company for change in its management-Accordingly, the conditions of remand directed the impugned disregarded the mandatory requirement of prior permission imposed by the statute in the provisions of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002-Said statutory provisions had mandatory effect and could not be overlooked merely because an unlawful or unreasonable condition of personal appearance of the outgoing directors before PEMRA had been imposed by the latter authority-Such condition of personal appearance may be relevant for processing the application for change of management of a licensee under particular circumstances, therefore, the same could not be ruled to be altogether irrelevant for consideration by PEMRA-In the present case PEMRA had itself misled the respondent company by a course of action that justified the consideration of the latters change of management application on its merits-PEMRA could only be justified to insist upon the revocation of license as the only consequence attracted by the delinquent conduct of a licensee when it had acted lawfully in the enforcement of the statutory provisions-Supreme Court remanded the matter to PEMRA to consider the change of management application filed by the respondent strictly in accordance with law- Petition for leave to appeal was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002=25,30(1)(d)Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009=7(e),9(5),13(3),16(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 5469 of 2021, decided on 11th August, 2022.heard on: 11th August, 2022.\n(Against the order/judgment dated 02.09.2021 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in M.A. 7 of 2017)", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Haris Azmat, Advocate Supreme Court along with Tahir Farooq Tarar, Head Legal PEMRA, Mohsin Ahmed Dogar, Dir (Regulations) and Wakeel Khan, DG (Licensing) for Petitioners.\nSalahuddin Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN ELECTRONIC MEDIA REGULATORY AUTHORITY (PEMRA) through Chairman, Islamabad and others-Petitioners\nVs\nSOUTHERN NETWORKS LIMITED, KARACHI-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23521", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1441 = 2023 SCMR 1353 = 2023 SLD 1441", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5QXk", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 310-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched. Art. 181-Applications filed under the Companies Act, 2017-Limitation-There is no specific provision in the Limitation Act, 1908 which deals with the applications or proceedings filed under the Companies Act, 2017, except Article 112 thereof, which deals with a call by a company registered under any Statute or Act therefore, the general provision dealing with the applications would be applicable to the applications filed under the Companies Act, 2017-General provision, which deals with the applications, where no period of limitation is provided in the Limitation Act, 1908, etc., is Article 181 thereof-Any application filed under the Companies Act, 2017 would be governed by Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 and there would be a period of limitation of three years for such applications.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=310Limitation Act, 1908=181", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1123 of 2020, decided on 15th February, 2023.heard on: 15th February, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 12.12.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in J.C.M. No. 15 of 2000)", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nadeem-ud-Din Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nDr. Chaudhry Waseem Iqbal, Official Assignee/Official Liquidator for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs BENTONITE PAKISTAN LIMITED through Director/Chief Executive-Petitioner\nVs\nBANKERS EQUITY LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23522", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1442 = 2023 SCMR 1357 = 2023 SLD 1442", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODc", - "Key Words:": "National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-\n-Ss. 9 10-Corruption and corrupt practices-Development Schemes-Works done and executed by contractors under the supervision of the Assistant Executive Engineer not as per specifications and payments made in the measurement books-Petition for cancellation of pre-arrest bail, dismissal of-National Accountability Bureau (NAB) did not seek the arrest of any of the accused persons during the course of initial inquiry or during the investigation-Counsel for NAB was unable to explain why NAB sought their arrest now, at present stage, given that the Reference had been filed and the matter was now before the Trial Court-Furthermore, the accused persons had fully cooperated during the course of the investigation, as they had been attending all proceedings and did not misuse the concession of bail-According to the prosecution they were no longer required for investigation-Further, NAB had taken into possession all the relevant record and no recovery was to be effected from the accused persons-Contents of the Reference showed that the role of each of the accused had yet to be proven with reference to the work allegedly done by each contractor contrary to the measurement books-Similarly, in each case, it had yet to be determined the exact loss caused to the government exchequer and the benefit derived by the accused persons-Hence, the accused persons had to face trial for a determination by a court of competent jurisdiction about their involvement with the Assistant Executive Engineer (co-accused) and the monetary gains made, if any-Petitions for leave to appeal seeking cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to accused persons were dismissed, and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "National Accountability Ordinance, 1999=9,10", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 101 to 110 of 2020, decided on 29th March, 2022.heard on: 29th March, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 30.10.2019, passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, in C.Ps.1000, 1002 to 1005, 1007 to 1009, 1019 and 1020 of 2019)", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Din v. Chairman National Accountability Bureau and another 2019 SCMR 372 and Tallat Ishaq v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman and others PLD 2019 SC 112 distinguished.\nMumtaz Yousaf, Deputy Prosecutor General, NAB for Petitioner (in all cases).\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU, ISLAMABAD-Petitioner\nVs\nYAR MUHAMMAD SOLANGI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23523", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1443 = 2023 SCMR 1402 = 2023 SLD 1443", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Gift-\n-Gift/tamleek mutation-Proof-Immoveable property gifted by a sister to her brother-Respondents/donees had substantiated the fact of tamleek through cogent evidence in the form of the revenue record and witnesses produced before the Trial Court-Furthermore the suit of appellants was badly barred by time as the mutation in dispute was executed on 29.12.1981, whereas the suit was filed with a delay of almost 15 years on 3.5.1997-Appellant had no locus standi to challenge the legality of the (gift) mutation on a vague allegation of fraud when the donor had never challenged the same in her life time and the mutation had been given effect in the revenue record-Suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by appellants was rightly dismissed-Appeal was dismissed.\nAbdul Haq and another v. Mst. Surrya Begum 2002 SCMR 1330; Taj Muhammad Khan through L.Rs and another v. Mst. Munawar Jan and others 2009 SCMR 598 and Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others 2013 SCMR 299 ref.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 115-Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope of such jurisdiction stated.\nIf the concurrent findings recorded by the lower fora are found to be in violation of law, or based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, then they cannot be treated as being so sacrosanct or sanctified that they cannot be reversed by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction which is pre-eminently corrective and supervisory in nature. In fact, the Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.), can even exercise its suo motu jurisdiction to correct any jurisdictive errors committed by a subordinate Court to ensure strict adherence to the safe administration of justice. The jurisdiction vested in the High Court under section 115, C.P.C. is to satisfy and reassure that the order is within its jurisdiction; the case is not one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction and, in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally or in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, or by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which affected the ultimate decision. The scope of revisional jurisdiction is restricted to the extent of misreading or non-reading of evidence, jurisdictional error or an illegality in the of the nature which may have a material effect on the result of the case, or if the conclusion drawn therein is perverse or in conflict with the law.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115", - "Case #": "Civil appeal No. 1300 of 2019, decided on 3rd May, 2023.heard on: 3rd May, 2023.\n(Against Judgment dated 12.03.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in Civil Revision No. 96-D of 2003)", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Anwar Mubeen Ansari, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. FAHEEMAN BEGUM (DECEASED) through L.Rs and others-Appellants\nVs\nISLAM-UD-DIN (DECEASED) through L.Rs and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23524", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1444 = 2023 SCMR 1361 = 2023 SLD 1444", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S. 30(a)-Ex-parte arbitration award, setting aside of-No plausible objections raised-Merely filing an objection under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 carries no great weight and is inconsequential unless some substantial grounds are alleged in the objections warranting and deserving the setting aside of the award, which the petitioner failed to underline in the present case-Record reflected that ample opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to join the (arbitration) proceedings but the petitioner was so reckless and reluctant to join for which the Arbitrator cannot be blamed-Even no plausible grounds are raised in the objection which may infer, corroborate or substantiate any act of misconduct on the part of the Arbitrator which could be proved to the satisfaction of the Court-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S. 30(a)-Grounds for setting aside arbitration award-Legal misconduct by Arbitrator-Scope-Arbitrator misconducts the proceedings when (i) there is a defect in the procedure followed by him; (ii) he commits breach and neglect of duty and responsibility; (iii) he acts contrary to the principles of equity and good conscience; (iv) he acts without jurisdiction or exceeds it; (v) he acts beyond the reference; (vi) he proceeds on extraneous circumstances; (vii) he ignores material documents; or (viii) he bases the award on no evidence.\n(c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S. 30(a)-Grounds for setting aside arbitration award-Arbitrator, duties of-Moral misconduct by Arbitrator-Scope-It is essential that there must be abundant good faith, and the arbitrator must be absolutely disinterested and impartial, as he is bound to act with scrupulous regard to the ends of justice-Arbitrator must be a person who stands indifferent between the parties-Arbitrator should in no sense consider himself to be the advocate of the cause of the party appointing him, nor is such party deemed to be his client-When a claim or matter in dispute is referred to an arbitrator, he is the sole and final Judge of all questions, both of law and of fact-Arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract-Deliberate departure or conscious disregard of the contract not only manifests a disregard of his authority or misconduct on his part, but it may also be tantamount to mala fide action and vitiate the award.\n(d) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S. 30-Arbitration award-Non-interference by courts-Scope-Opinion/decision of the Arbitrator should not be lightly interfered by the court while deciding the objection thereto, until a clear and definite case within the purview of the section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is made out.\nCourt cannot review the award, nor entertain any question as to whether the arbitrators decided properly or not on a point of law or otherwise. It is not open to the Court to re-examine and reappraise the evidence considered by the arbitrator to hold that the conclusion reached by the arbitrator is wrong. Where two views are possible, the Court cannot interfere with the award by adopting its own interpretation. The general principle underlying the concept of arbitration as translated in the scheme of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is that, as the parties choose their own arbitrator to be the Judge in the dispute between them, they cannot, when the award is good on the face of it, object to his decision, either upon law or fact. The error or infirmity in the award which rendered the award invalid must appear on the face of the award and should be discoverable by reading the award itself. The arbitrator is the final Judge on the law and facts and it is not open to a party to challenge the decision of the Arbitrator, if it is otherwise valid. An award cannot be lawfully disturbed on the premise that a different view was possible. Arbitration is a forum of the parties own choice and is competent to resolve the issues of law and the fact between them, which opinion/decision should not be lightly interfered by the court while deciding the objection thereto, until a clear and definite case within the purview of the section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is made out. The Court does not sit in appeal over the award and should not try to fish for or dig out the latent errors in the proceedings or the award. It can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which is incorrect. The Court can set aside the award if there is any error, factual or legal, which floats on the surface of the award or the record.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=30(a)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3059 and 3060 of 2021, decided on 18th May, 2023.\nheard on: 18th May, 2023.\n(Against Judgment dated 01.03.2021 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in R.F.As. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2018)", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Aeroflot Russian International Airlines 2018 SCMR 662 ref.\nMohammad Siddique Awan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "INJUM AQEEL-Petitioner\nVs\nLATIF MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23525", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1445 = 2023 SCMR 1371 = 2023 SLD 1445", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. VI, R. 1-Pleadings-Scope-Plaintiff cannot lead evidence beyond the pleadings.\nMuhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914; Sardar Muhammad Naseem Khan v. Returning Officer, PP-12 and others 2015 SCMR 1698; Binyameen and 3 others v. Chaudhry Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336; Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary and 5 others v. Malik Ibrahim and Sons and another 2000 SCMR 1172 and Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 ref.\n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 55-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell-Time essence of the contract-Scope-Terms of the agreement to sell immoveable property showed that time was essence of the contract when date for performance and consequences for non-performance by the plaintiff-vendee were specifically mentioned, and it was provided that the agreement shall be cancelled and earnest money will be confiscated-Plaintiff admitted that he could not arrange the remaining consideration amount even on the date of performance and even three months thereafter and further he dishonestly pleaded that he approached the legal heirs of the vendor as he had passed away before the date of performance which was factually incorrect, and his own evidence as well as the evidence of his witnesses contradicted his pleadings-In the present case time was essence of contract, and the consequence was to be in accordance with the agreement-When fault was with the vendee-plaintiff he was absolutely not entitled for the discretionary relief in the shape of a decree for specific performance-Appeal was allowed, the s and decrees passed by the three fora below were set aside, and as a result suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent was dismissed with costs.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1Contract, Act, 1872=55Specific Relief Act, 1877=12", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 781 of 2017, decided on 4th May, 2023.heard on: 4th May, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 31.10.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in R.S.A. No. 93 of 2011)", - "Judge Name:": " Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Usman Karim ud Din, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nIftikhar Ahmed Chaudhary, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM and others-Appellants\nVs\nMUHAMMAD ANWAR-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23526", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5OC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1446 = 2023 SCMR 1375 = 2023 SLD 1446", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5OC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Incident took place at 02:30 p.m. whereas the matter was reported to the Police on the same day at 06:05 p.m.-Distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station was 18 kilometers, thus, it could safely be said that FIR was lodged with promptitude-Complainant and another witness had heard the gunshot and witnessed the accused fleeing away from the place of occurrence after commission of offence with a pistol in his hands-Evidence of said witnesses was in the nature of wajtakar, the probative strength of which rested in the doctrine of res gestae in view of Article 19 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984-Said doctrine of res gestae was based upon the assumption that statements of witnesses that constituted part of the res gestae were attributed a certain degree of reliability because they were contemporaneous making them admissible by virtue of their nature and strength of their connection with a particular event and their ability to explain it comprehensively-Prosecution witnesses in question were residents of the same locality, therefore, their presence at the place of occurrence was natural-Said witnesses were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defence but nothing favourable to the accused or adverse to the prosecution could be brought on record-Said witnesses gave all necessary details of occurrence qua the date, time, place, name of accused, name of witnesses, manner of occurrence, kind of weapon used in the occurrence, the locale of injuries and the motive of occurrence-Accused could not point out any plausible reason as to why the complainant would falsely involve the accused in the present case and let off the real culprit, who had committed murder of his daughter-Substitution in such like cases was a rare phenomenon-Medical evidence available on the record further corroborated the prosecution case so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased was concerned-Accused remained absconder for a long period of more than five years, which was also a corroboratory piece of evidence against him-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused and conviction and sentence awarded to accused was maintained.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Related witness, evidence of-Scope-Related witness cannot be termed as an interested witness under all circumstances-Related witness can also be a natural witness-If an offence is committed within the presence of the family members then they assume the position of natural witnesses-In case, their evidence is reliable, cogent and clear, the prosecution case cannot be doubted-However, a related witness would become an interested witness when his evidence is tainted with malice and it shows that he is desirous of implicating the accused by fabricating and concocting evidence-Evidence of an eyewitness who is a near relative of the victim should be closely scrutinized by the Court.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Minor discrepancies in statements of eye-witnesses/prosecution witnesses-Effect-Where discrepancies are of minor character and do not go to the root of the prosecution story and do not shake the salient features of the prosecution version, they need not be given much importance.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, quantum of-Sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to accused instead of death sentence-Justified-Report of the Forensic Science Laboratory was negative, therefore, the recovery of weapon of offence was inconsequential-So far as motive part of the prosecution story was concerned, the Trial Court had rightly disbelieved the motive by holding that was a vaguely formulated motive because no material evidence could be placed on record to prove the motive-Courts below had already taken a lenient view while awarding the sentence of imprisonment for life to the accused (instead of death sentence)-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused and conviction and sentence awarded to accused was maintained.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 206 of 2019, decided on 8th May, 2023.heard on: 8th May, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 11.03.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 2018)", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syeda B.H. Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD IJAZ-Petitioner\nVs\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23527", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5OCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1447 = 2023 SCMR 1381 = 2023 SLD 1447", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5OCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Appointment-Legitimate expectation, doctrine of-Applicability-Appointments made to posts other than the ones advertised-Applications were invited by National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) through newspapers for the posts of Customer Service Executive (CSE)-Respondents participated in the recruitment process and qualified the test and interview but they were appointed as Data Entry Operators (DEOs) rather than CSEs which was the originally advertised post-This was a violation of the terms and conditions of the recruitment process formulated for the appointment of CSEs-Respondents took the plea before High Court that they had accepted the said offer on the promise made to them that they would be appointed to the advertised posts on completion of one month on-job training, however despite the successful completion of training and achieving qualifying scores, NADRA failed to appoint them on the posts applied for and continued to employ them as DEOs-Respondents applied for the posts of CSEs and, after qualifying the prerequisites, they legitimately expected their appointment on the applied posts unless their credentials were rejected, which was not the case in the present case-Neither their applications were rejected after due diligence, nor the recruitment process was scrapped for any reason-High Court rightfully granted relief to redress the grievance of the respondents-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Legitimate expectation, doctrine of-\n-Scope of the doctrine of legitimate expectation stated.\nThe doctrine of legitimate expectation connotes that a person may have a reasonable expectation of being treated in a certain way by administrative authorities owing to some uniform practice or an explicit promise made by the concerned authority. In fact, a legitimate expectation ascends in consequence of a promise, assurance, practice or policy made, adopted or announced by or on behalf of government or a public authority. When such a legitimate expectation is obliterated, it affords a locus standi to challenge the administrative action and even, in the absence of a substantive right, a legitimate expectation may allow an individual to seek judicial review of a wrongdoing; and in deciding whether the expectation was legitimate or not, the Court may consider that the decision of the public authority has breached a legitimate expectation and, if it is proved, then the Court may annul the decision and direct the concerned authority/ person to live up to the legitimate expectation.\nUzma Manzoor v. Vice-Chancellor, Khushal Khan Khattak University 2022 SCMR 694 ref.\n(c) Promissory estoppel, doctrine of-\n-Pre-requisites for lodging a right or entitlement under the doctrine of promissory estoppel stated.\nThe essential prerequisites for lodging a right and entitlement under the doctrine of promissory estoppel are that there must be a promisor and a promisee, and the promisee suffered a loss due to renunciation of promise. In such a situation, the Courts may put into operation this doctrine for administering justice to an aggrieved person. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be repressed in line with equivalent constriction as estoppel in the stricto sensu, rather it is an equitable course of therapy developed by the Courts for doing justice against a valid cause of action. It is not necessary in all circumstances for the attraction of this doctrine that the promisee who placed trust and dependence on the promise should sustain harm, but what is actually necessary is that the promisee should have changed his position in reliance on the promise and was caused prejudice.\nNational Saving Central Directorate, Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Farooq Raja PLD 2021 SC 320; Azra Riffat Rana v. Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Works, Islamabad and others PLD 2008 SC 476; Federation of Pakistan and others v. Ammar Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited and others 2002 SCMR 510; Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition), Volume 34 (At page 533-534); Whartons Concise Law Dictionary (15th Edition) (At page 834) and Halsburys Laws of England (Fifth Edition), Volume 47 (At page 355) ref.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Contractual employees of National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)-Appointments made to posts other than the ones advertised-Constitutional petition filed before the High Court-Maintainability-In the present case the respondents had applied for the position of Customer Service Executive (CSE) and qualified the test and interview but they were offered the post of Data Entry Operators (DEOs) without any rhyme or reason, which is a violation of the terms and conditions of the recruitment process formulated for the appointment of CSEs-Neither the respondents were terminated employees, nor did they challenge any dismissal or termination order from service, nor did they seek any relief from the High Court for regularization of their contractual services into permanency, rather they only invoked the writ jurisdiction (of the High Court) for their appointment as CSEs for which they applied and fulfilled the criteria and not as DEOs-High Court was not only justified in entertaining the petition, but also rightfully granted relief to redress the grievance of the respondents-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 596 to 598 of 2021, decided on 8th May, 2023.\nheard on: 8th May, 2023.\n(Against Judgment dated 01.12.2020 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat in W.Ps. Nos. 1043-M to 1045-M of 2018)", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Chairman NADRA v. Muhammad Ali Shah and others 2017 SCMR 1979 and Maj. (Retd.) Syed Muhammad Tanveer Abbas v. Federation of Pakistan and another 2019 SCMR 984 distinguished.\nHafiz S.A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL DATABASE AND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY (NADRA) through Chairman, Islamabad and others-Petitioners\nVs\nJAWAD KHAN and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23528", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1448 = 2023 SCMR 1390 = 2023 SLD 1448", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODk", - "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-Ss. 2(h) 10-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 17(2) 79-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12-Suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immoveable property-Unsigned agreement-Whether an unsigned agreement was valid, and its specific performance could be ordered.\nWhere the parties intend to bind themselves orally or by their conduct, but have the further intention of reducing their agreement into writing after the oral agreement is made, in such situation, the written agreement of the completed oral contract remains unaffected even if it is not signed by either party. The requirement of signing the agreement by the parties is to show their free consent and intention to be legally bound by their oral offer and acceptance. In circumstances where the agreement is reduced into writing and is not signed by either or one of the parties, it may still be valid and enforceable, however, its legal effect will be limited and the enforceability may be more difficult to establish in such case. It is, therefore, necessary that it must be pleaded in the pleadings and the requirements of a valid contract must be proved through cogent evidence by the party relying upon it. These factors will be considered by the courts in determining the intent of the parties and steps partially taken for giving effect to the agreement. Thus, if the courts are satisfied that the party relying upon an unsigned agreement has proved the necessary ingredients for its validity, it may be enforced in favour of the party claiming its performance.\nPLD 1971 SC 784; 2006 SCMR 721; 2017 SCMR 98 and 2020 SCMR 832 ref.\nThe record of the present case reveals that the respondents (successors of the plaintiff) in their plaint have pleaded the execution and the fact of part payment of the consideration for the subject matter of the agreement in advance. In order to prove the validity and existence of the agreement between the parties with their free will and consent, the respondents produced marginal witnesses before the Court. They were cross-examined at length by the counsel for the appellant/defendant, but nothing favourable was extracted therefrom. Rather the witnesses have confirmed the contents of the plaint and the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties, on the basis whereof the Trial Court decreed the suit. The appeal filed by the appellant was partly allowed by the Appellate Court, directing him to return the amount received by him from the predecessor of the respondents as part of the consideration. By not challenging the of the Appellate Court, the appellant has accepted the part payment made by the predecessor of the respondents; which was one of the terms and conditions of the agreement. The intention of the appellant to enter into a valid agreement is evident from his deeds, by accepting the amount and signing the agreement with his free will and consent, which bound both of the parties. The steps taken for the part performance of the agreement prove its execution. Under such circumstances, irrespective of the absence of the signatures of the respondents predecessor on the agreement, it is held to be valid, therefore, the appellant cannot deny its existence and enforceability. Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=2(h),10Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=17(2),79Specific Relief Act, 1877=12", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 102-L of 2017, decided on 17th May, 2023.heard on: 17th May, 2023.\n(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 24.03.2017 passed in C.R. No. 2095 of 2012)", - "Judge Name:": " Munib Akhtar and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Iqbal Javed Dhillon, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nZafar Iqbal Chohan, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Lahore) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAID RASOOL-Appellant\nVs\nMAQBOOL AHMED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23529", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1449 = 2023 SCMR 1394 = 2023 SLD 1449", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5ODg", - "Key Words:": "Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 10(5)-Dissolution of marriage through khula-Deferred dower-Entitlement of wife-Scope-Per section 10(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (the Act), in a suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation fails, the Family Court shall immediately pass a decree for dissolution of marriage and in case of dissolution of marriage through khula, may direct the wife to surrender up to fifty percent of her deferred dower or up to twenty-five percent of her admitted prompt dower to the husband-In the present case the house from the petitioner/husband, as mentioned in Nikahnama, was the deferred dower and as per the khula , the respondent/wife was only entitled to fifty percent(50%) of the house (deferred dower)-This premise was grounded in Section 10(5) of the Act that while obtaining dissolution on the sole basis of khula, the respondent was bound to surrender fifty percent (50%) percent of her share in deferred dower-Wife, in case of khula, had to forego the dower amount as per section 10 of the Act-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned order was modified to the extent of the deferred dower and the respondent/wife was held entitled only to fifty percent (50%) share in the house in question or market value thereof.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=10(5)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2865 of 2022, decided on 5th May, 2023.heard on: 5th May, 2023.\n(Against the Order dated 13.06.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Writ Petition No.1674 of 2022)", - "Judge Name:": " Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Arif v. Saima Noreen 2015 SCMR 804 ref.\nSh. Ahsan-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSh. Muhammad Suleman, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed AMIR RAZA-Petitioner\nVs\nMst. ROHI MUMTAZ and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23530", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5OHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1450 = 2023 SLD 731 = 2023 SLD 1450", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5OHo", - "Key Words:": "Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S.4-Acquisition of land-Selection of land-Jurisdiction-Petitioners were aggrieved of acquisition of land by authorities for the purpose of graveyard-Plea raised by petitioners was that authorities should have acquired baren land instead of agriculture land-Validity-Such was consideration of acquiring agency keeping in view nature of public purpose, for which they proposed a particular site, process was completed and ultimately award was issued-Neither petitioner nor residents of the area or anyone else approached authorities concerned for redressal of their grievance-Neither petitioners nor added respondents who were supporting petitioners contention were able to establish violation of law, infringement of their fundamental rights or contravention of statutory provision i.e. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Acquisition Rules, 2020-High Court declined to interfere in the matter-Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=4", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1015-M of 2021, decided on 18th May, 2022.heard on: 18th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Naeem Anwar and Muhammad Ijaz Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Rahim Shah and Malak Sarwar for Petitioner.\nRazauddin Khan, A.A.G. for Official Respondents.\nFaisal Khan for Respondent/TMA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. AMJAD ALI-Petitioner\nVersus\nGOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Chief Secretary and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23531", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5OHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1451 = 2023 SCMR 613 = 2023 SLD 1451", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlF5OHk", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S.115, O.XVIII, R.17, O.XXXVII, Rr.2 3- Suit for recovery of money on the basis of pro-note-Re-summoning of witness-Principle-Petitioner / plaintiff sought re-summoning of a witness which permission was denied by Trial Court-Validity-Provision of O.XVIII, R.17, C.P.C. was not meant and not designed for the purpose of enabling a party to fill up omissions in evidence of a witness who was already examined-Purpose, nature and scope of power available to Court under O.XVIII, R.17 C.P.C. was to enable Court to seek clarification on any issue or to have a doubt cleared in statement of that witness which if left outstanding would be difficult for the court to take a right decision-Case set out by petitioner / plaintiff for re-summoning of witness under O. XVIII, R.17, C.P.C. did not qualify the test-Whole proceedings took place before Trial Court who had rightly dismissed application filed by petitioner /plaintiff-High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Trial Court as there was no illegality or irregularity committed by Trial Court-Revision was dismissed in circumstances", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115,17,2,3", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No.220-A of 2022, decided on 21st July, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Kamran Hayat Miankhel, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Chanzeb for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAJID-Petitioner\nVersus\nIBRAR GUL-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23532", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2017 2998 = 2017 LHC 5744 = 2017 SLD 2998", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "S.T.R No. 07 of 2013, date of hearing: 01.02.2017", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE\nMUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR), JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Tariq Rasheed Qamar and Shahid Iqbal, Advocate for petitioner.\nMr. Tanvir Ahmad and Furqan Ahmad Khan, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Special Zone, Regional Tax Office, Multan. \nvs\nM/s. Hafeez Ghee & General Mills (Pvt) Ltd, Bahawalpur Road, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23533", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1577 = 2023 LHC 3770 = 2023 SLD 1577 = (2023) 128 TAX 521 = 2024 PTCL 71 = 2024 PTD 837", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "Challenge to the Constitution of the Authority and Show Cause Notices under Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012\nIssue:\nThis case centers around the constitution of the Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA) and the issuance of show cause notices by its officers under the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 (PSTSA). The primary contention is whether the officers of the PRA were legally appointed and whether they had the jurisdiction to issue show cause notices under Section 52 of the PSTSA, without the necessary rules being in place as required by the legislation.\nFacts:\nThe petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA), specifically with regard to the appointment of officers and their jurisdiction to issue show cause notices under the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012.\nThe petitioners argued that the officers lacked the authority to issue show cause notices under Section 39(1) and Section 52 of the Act.\nAccording to the petitioners, Section 2(31) of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 defines prescribed as being prescribed by rules. Therefore, appointments for the exercise of powers under the Act had to be made by rules formulated by the Punjab Revenue Authority. Since no rules were formulated for the appointment of officers, they contended that the appointment of officers and their exercise of jurisdiction was invalid.\nArguments:\nPetitioners Argument:\nThe term prescribed manner in Section 2(31) of the Act requires that rules must be enacted for the appointment of officers. Without such rules, the officers cannot legally assume jurisdiction or exercise powers, including issuing show cause notices under Section 52 of the Act.\nThey contended that Section 39(1), which authorizes the PRA to appoint officers for specific areas or cases, cannot be exercised unless the rules for such appointments are in place. Since the rules were not enacted, the officers actions were ultra vires (beyond their legal authority).\nRespondents (PRAs) Argument:\nThe Punjab Revenue Authority argued that the issuance of show cause notices and the jurisdiction of its officers were legally valid despite the absence of prescribed rules for appointments.\nDecision:\nJurisdiction and Appointment of Officers:\nThe court agreed with the petitioners, stating that no officer can be appointed or exercise jurisdiction unless the Punjab Revenue Authority enacts the rules for the appointment of officers. Since the rules had not been formulated, the officers did not have the legal authority to issue show cause notices under Section 52 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012.\nThe absence of rules for appointing officers meant that any actions taken by officers appointed without following the prescribed process were ultra vires (beyond their powers) and invalid.\nOutcome:\nThe court declared that the show cause notices issued by the PRA officers were issued incompetently and without lawful authority. As a result, these notices were struck down and deemed of no legal effect.\nHowever, the court also clarified that the Punjab Revenue Authority may proceed according to the law if it wishes to pursue the allegations against the petitioners, but this must be done in accordance with the prescribed rules.\nConclusion:\nThe court ruled in favor of the petitioners, emphasizing that the Punjab Revenue Authority cannot appoint officers or allow them to exercise jurisdiction without first enacting the necessary rules for such appointments. The show cause notices issued were declared invalid and struck down. The Authority was granted the opportunity to take action in compliance with the law, but only after properly enacting the required rules.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=3,3(4),5(4),39,39(1),52,76,76(2)", - "Case #": "W.P No.16217 of 2020, date of hearing: 06-06-2023", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Imtiaz Rasheed Siddiqui, Barrister Shehryar Kasuri, Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Ch. Anwar ul Haq Arif, Muhammad Nasir Khan, Azeem Hafeez, Mudassar Shuja ud Din, Waseem Ahmad Malik, Muhammad Farooq Sheikh, Irtaza Ali Naqvi, Shahid Pervez Jami, Mustafa Kamal, Mahmood Ahmad, Muhammad Asif ur Rehman, Anwar ul Haq, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Muhammad Hamza Sheikh, Jamshaid Alam, Sabeel Tariq Mann, Fasih ur Rehman, Muhammad Ahsan Nawaz, Azeem Ullah Virk, Omer Wahab, Rana usman Habib Khan, Noreen Fozia, Muhammad Yasir Ibrahim, Gul-e-Shifa, Mahmood Arif, Rana Muhammad Afzal Razzaq Khan, Asmar Tariq Mayo, Faisal Anwar Minhas, Kashif Habib, Muhammad Zeeshan Sulehria, Muhammad Arslan Saleem Chaudhry, Mohsin Majeed, Asif Amin Goraya, Najmul Husnain, Ch. Sabir Ali and Hannan Maqsood, Advocates for the Petitioners.\nM/s Waqas Ahmad Mir, Ahmad Hassan, Momna Taufeeq, Sajid Ijaz Hotiana, Tanzil ur Rehman Hotiana, Dilnawaz Ahmad Cheema, Sardar Qasim Hassan Khan, Hassan Kamran Bashir, Fahad Ikram, Riaz Ahmad Kharal, Ans Ghazi, Sikandar Ali, Ch. Sultan Mahmood, Haseeb Tariq, Muhammad Amin, Samran Mushtaq Chaudhry, Ch. Ahmad Ali Gondal, Faizullah Niazi, Muhammad Baqir Hussain, Syed Tassadaq Mustafa Naqvi, Muhammad Sarfraz Nawaz, Muhammad Ali Farooq, Ghulam Mustfa,\nNaheed Baig, Muhammad Nauman Yahya, Malik Muhammad Awais Khalid, Ch. Nusrat Javed Bajwa, Qasim Mustafa, Asad Abbas Butt, Riaz Ahmad Khan, Ali Javed Bajwa and Muhammad Umer Riaz, Advocates for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S NISHAT HOTELS & PROPERTIES LTD & ANOTHER\nVS\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23534", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1512 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1512", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": " (RAHEEL KAMRAN) JUDGE", - "Lawyer Name:": "r. Abad ur Rehman, Advocate for the petitioner.\nMr. Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nMr. Muhammad Ashfaq Bhullar, Advocate for FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23535", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1513 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1513", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": " ALI BAQAR NAJAFI) JUDGE", - "Lawyer Name:": ". Sarfaraz Ahmad Cheema and Anas Irtiza Awan, Advocates for petitioner.\nMr. Sheraz Zaka, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nMs. Humaira Bashir Chaudhary, Advocate for respondents No.2 and 3.\nMr. Yasir Islam Chaudhary, Advocate for respondent No.3.\nMuhammad Nadeem Asad, Deputy Commissioner Audit (LTO), Lahore, in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Petitioners By\nMr. Salman Akram Raja, Mr. Arslan Riaz, Rai Amer Ijaz Kharal, Mr. Rabeel Safdar Tatla, Mr. Muhammad Omar Malik, Mr. Arslan Fazil, Mr. Mustafa Kamal, Malik Bashir Ahmad Khalid, Mr. M.A. Rizwan Kamboh, Mr. Qamar-uz-Zaman Cheema, Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, Mr. Hashim Aslam Butt, Mr. Naveed Khalid, Ms. Samia Aslam, Mr. Saima Safdar Chaudhary, Ms. Uzma Firdous, Malik Farrukh Khurshid, Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Hafiz Muhammad Shehzad, Ch. Iqbal Ahmad Khan Dehangal, Mr. Nauman Aziz, Mr. Abdul Rehman Qadar Khan, Barrister Hassan Qadar Khan, Rana Sohail Ashraf, Malik Imran Khan Thaheem, Mr. Muhammad Ihtisham Arshad, Mian Mehmood Rashid, Mr. Irfan Ghaus Ghumman, Mr. Irfan Dogar, Mr. Hassan Raza, Mr. S.M. Ghaffar Khan, Mr. Iftikhar Gull Khan, Mr. Muhammad Amir Masood Niazi, Barrister Muhammad Hassan Anwaar Pannun, Rana Muhammad Imran Qamar, Mr. Muhammad Tariq Bashir, Mr. Muhammad Abu Bakar, Mr. Abdul Hameed Tahir Kasuri, Mr. Ali Akbar Rana, Mr. Tanveer Ahmad Gill, Mr. Abdul Waheed Habib, Mr. Muhammad Nauman Khurshid Mayo, Mr. Waseem Ahmad, Ch. Babar Waheed, Syed Tassadaq Mustafa Naqvi, Syed Tassadaq Murtaza Naqvi, Mr. Ali Naqi Zaidi, Mr. Muhammad Anwar Khan, Mr. Muhammad Usman Latif, Mr. Muhammad Arfan Randhawa, Mr. Muhammad Umar, Syed Muhammad Ali Abdullah Mashhadi, Mr. Omer Daraz Sheikh,Sardar Jehangir Hassan Dogar, Barrister Ch. Hasnain Yunus, Mr. Mujtaba Hassan Tatla, Mian Aqeel Chaudhary, Mr. Muhammad Nadeem Abbasi, Barrister Taimoor Malik, Barrister Maleeha Bukhari, Mr. Mohsin Iqbal, Barrister Maryam Hayat, Mr. Naveed Anjum, Mr. Muhammad Irfan Khan, Mr. Fazal Elahi Akbar, Mr. Muhammad Usman Rafiq, Mr. Muhammad Imran Mansha, Mr. Moiz Tariq, Mr. Riasat Noor" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23536", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1514 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1514", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": " (Safdar Saleem Shahid)\n(Muzamil Akhtar Shabir)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abad ur Rehman, Advocate for the petitioner.\nMr. Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nMr. Muhammad Ashfaq Bhullar, Advocate for FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sarfaraz Ahmad Cheema and Anas Irtiza Awan, Advocates for petitioner.\nMr. Sheraz Zaka, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nMs. Humaira Bashir Chaudhary, Advocate for respondents No.2 and 3.\nMr. Yasir Islam Chaudhary, Advocate for respondent No.3.\nMuhammad Nadeem Asad, Deputy Commissioner Audit (LTO), Lahore, in person" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23537", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1515 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1515", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": " RIZWAN AHMAD URFI) Accoi/ntant Member\n(SARFRAZ ALI KHAN) Judicial Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Adv.\nMr. Tahir Bhatti, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23538", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1516 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1516", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": " MONIM SULTAN (Judicial Member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ms. Kehkshan Khan, DR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23539", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1517 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1517", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Taimur Ahmed Qureshi, Advocates for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23540", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1518 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1518", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": " M.M. AKRAM", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Nazir Abdul", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Anjum Khalid Malik, House, No.02, Street No. 16E, Sector C, Bahria Enclave, Islamabad.\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Cant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23541", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1519 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1519", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.672/LB/2016\n(Tax Year 2013)\n30-05-2023 Date of order: 31-05-2023", - "Judge Name:": " ANWAAR UL HAQUE,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Ali. DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Appellant Respondent\nAppellant by:\nNone\nRespondent by:\nMr. Muhammad Ali, DR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23542", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1520 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1520", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1167/LB/23 (Tax Year 2016)\n27.03.2023", - "Judge Name:": " asctr Mahmud", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Nasir Ali Gilani, Adv.\n\nMr. Gulfam Afzal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "....Appellant\nVersus\nCommissioner Inland Revenue,\nZone-II, RTO-II, Lahore.\n....Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23543", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1521 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1521", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA (Rectification) No.3A/MB/2022 In ITA No.lGOVMB/2015 Tax Year 2011 25.08.2022", - "Judge Name:": " MAIN ABDU1 BASIT. JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Adv Mr. Muhammad Qaswar Hussain, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23544", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1522 = 2011 = 2023 SLD 1522", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.1057/LB/2010 (Tax year 2006) 09.09.2011", - "Judge Name:": " MOHAMMAD NAWAZ BAJWA Judicial Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by :\nMrs Nawal Sheikh, D.R\nRespondent by :\nNone", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. MUHAMMAD YASIN\nMST. SHEHNAZ KAUSER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23545", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1523 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1523", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 155/MB/2023 ( Tax Year 2019 )\n29.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD NAEEM", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shabir Fakharuddin, ITP.\nMr. Muhammad Qaswar Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Choudhry Muhammad Rafiq Lahore.\n.\nVersus\nThe CIR, Multan-Zone, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23546", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1524 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1524", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.3609/LB/2020 (Tax Year 2014)\n01.09.2021", - "Judge Name:": " Zahid Sikandar", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Aftab Hussain Nagra, Advocate,\nQari Habib-ur-Rehman Zubair, Advocate, Rana Munir Husain, Advocate,\nSyed Muhammad Naeem Shah, Advocate, Mr. Jamil Akhtar Baig, ITP,\nMr. Farhan Shahzad Butt, Advocate,\nMr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Advocate,\nMr. Qamar-uz-Zaman, Ch. Advocate,\nMr. Shakeel Ahmad Khan, Advocate,\nMr. Arshad Nawaz Maan, Advocate,\nMr. Amjad AM, Advocate,\nMr. Shahbaz Siddiq, Advocate,\nMr. Mudassar Aftab Cheema, Advocate.\nRespondent by:\nDr. Ishtiaq Ahmad, Commissioner Inland\nRevenue, alongwith\nRao Shehzad Akhtar AM Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. M. Munir Butt, Sialkot.\nVersus\nCIR, Sialkot, Zone, RTO, Sialkot." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23547", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1525 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1525", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Const. P. 7493/2021\n24.08.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Syed Ahsan Ali Shah, Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Aamir Ali Shaikh, Zulfiqar Ali Mirjat, Bilal Bhatti, Zohaib for Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Imran Ahmed Maitlo, Ali Tahir Soomro, Burhan Jagirani, Ghazi Khan Khalil, Ameer Nausherwan Adil, Abdul Hakeem Junejo, Abdul Razzak, Syed Kumail Abbas, Muhammad Shahid, Irfan Mir Halepota, Qaim Ali Memon, Advocates for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Muhammad Tariq Masood, Syed\nAijaz Hussain Shirazi, Shams Mohiuddin Ansari, Naeem Suleman, Zafar Hussain, Mian Ashfaq Ahmed, Ehsan Ghulam Malik, Shariq A. Razzak, Manzoor Arain, Riaz Moin Siddiqui, Rehmat Shakil, M. Anjum Khan, Syed Hamza Ahmed Hashmi, Atir Aqeel Ansari, Imran Iqbal Khan, Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Jahanzeb Awan, Shahan Karimi, Rashid Khan Mehar, Abdullah Azzam Naqvi, Mohsin Kadir Shahwani, Adnan Ali Khan Sherwani, Muhammad Taimur Ahmed, Ghulam Akbar Lashari, Waheed HussainPetitioner." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23548", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1526 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1526", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No 2118/LB/2022\n05.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD TAHIR", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Farhan Ahmed, Advocate\n\nMr Zam-ul-Abidain. DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Ayaan Plastic, Lahore.\nClR CTO. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23549", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1527 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1527", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDRXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "J. C. M. No. 06 of 2022\n22.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": " NADEEM AKHTAR,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sthrough Mr. Abdul Qayyum Abbasi Advocate.\nECP through Syed Hafiz Ibad, Law Officer, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1.\nB.R.R. Investment (Private) Limited,\n2.\nBRR Guardian Limited and\n3.\nB.R.R. Guardian Modaraba," - }, - { - "Case No.": "23550", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1528 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1528", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "J. C. M. No. 10 of 2022\n 31.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": " NADEEM AKHTAR,", - "Lawyer Name:": "through M/S Omer Soomro and Shahbakht Pirzada Advocate.\nSECP through Law Officer Syed Hafiz Ibad.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. Bhanero Energy Limited,\n2.\nBhanero Textile Mills Limited," - }, - { - "Case No.": "23551", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1529 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1529", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "PA 671 ari TO 713, 7A8/7.022,\nr.P.NIL/207-2. C.M A-9348/2022 IN C,P,Nlt,/?Q22 AN-\nIMo.D- lb09/2023)\n13.04.2023", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ MR JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI MR. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLA", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. (Jzair Karamat Bhandari, A SC\nMr. Anis Muhammad Shahzad, AOR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Bhattra Sons v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nM/s. Yousufi & Sons v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Ministry of Law Government of Sindh & others\nM/s. F. Rabbi and Co. v. The Sindh Revenue Board through its Chairman &\nothers\nM/s. Reliance Commercial Associates v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Finance Department Government of Sindh & another\nM/s. S^Ejazuddin & Co. v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Finance Department Government of Sindh & others\nM/s. Nuricon Union (Private) Limited v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Finance Department Government of Sindh & another\nM/s. International Trading Corporation v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Finance Department Government of Sindh & others\nM/s. Sayeed International v. Province of Sindh through * Secretary Finance Department ^Government of Sindh &. another\nM/s. Flecbon Corporation v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Finance Department Government of Sindh & others\nM/s. Al-Abd Corporation v. The Sindh Revenue Board through its Chairman &. others\nM/s. Shahslka Pakistan v. The Sindh Revenue Board through its Chairman & others\nM/s. Trans Continental Agencies v. The Sindh Revenue Board through its Chairman & others\nM/s. Health Care Products v. The Sindh Revenue Board through its Chairman & others\nM/s. Health Care Products & others v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Finance Department Government of Sindh & others\nM/s. Technobiz Private Limited v, Province of Sindh through Secretary, Finance Department Government of Sindh & others\nM/s. Intertrade Distributors Private Limited v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Finance Department Government of Sindh & another\nM/s. Progressive Traders (Private) Limited v. The Sindh Revenue Board through its Chairman & others\nM/s. Analytical Measuring Systems (Private) Limited v. The Sindh Revenue Board through its Chairman & others\nM/s. Progressive Traders (Private) Limited v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Finance Department Government of Sindh & another\nM/s. Gudia (Private) Limited v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & another\nM/s. S.B.R. & Company’of Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nM/s. Veer Corporation & another v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nM/s. Noshad Trading v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nM/s. Al Ameen Services v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nM/s. Indus Basin Company v, Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nM/s. Tri Brothers v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nM/s. MWK & Sons v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nSheikh Javed Ahmed &. others v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nKhawaja Basir Ahmed & others v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nM/s. Dystar Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nMuhammad Fahim v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nAbdul Razzaq v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\n'\nM/s. Zakaria Trading Company & others v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nM/s. Pak-Oleo Chemicals & others v. Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department & others\nV. Province of Sindh, through the C\nSecretary, Karachi and others\nM/s Get; Pharma (Private) Limited Karachi v. Province of Sindh, through the Chief Secretary, Karachi and others\nZona Pakistan (Private) Limited Karachi v. Province of Sindh, through the Chief Secretary, Karachi and others Zona Pakistan (Private) Limited Karachi v. Province of Sindh, through the Chief Secretary, Karachi and others\nM/s Fairs and Exhibition Service, Karachi v. Province of Sindh, through the Secretary, Finance Department, Karachi and others\nM/s Nazer & Co. Karachi v. Province of Sindh, through the Secretary, Finance Department, Karachi and others\nM/s Metal Engineering Works (Private) Limited, Karachi v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Finance Department, Karachi and others\nM/s Al Ameen Trading Corporation (Private) Limited, Karachi v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Finance Department, Karachi and others\nM/s Creative Textile & Apparel Services, Karachi v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Finance Department, Karachi and others\nM/s Intertrade Distributors Private Limited, Karachi v. The Province of Sindh, through the Secretary, Finance Department, Karachi and others\nM/s Apparel Merchandising Services Karachi v. Sindh Revenue Board through Its Chairman, Karachi and others\nM/s Shakoo (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi v. The Province of Sindh through the Secretary Finance Department, Karachi and others\n46\nC.A.4032/2022\nM/s SULCO' Chemcentre),\nM/s Silver Bell Corporation through Its Proprietor Mrs. Seema Tahir, Karachi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23552", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1530 = 2023 SLD 1530 = (2023) 128 TAX 358", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTU", - "Key Words:": "Reopening and Modification of Assessment under Income Tax Ordinance, 1979\nIssue:\nThe case revolves around the assessment of income of an AOP (Association of Persons) engaged in contracting business, specifically in the construction of a plaza under a Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme with the Cantonment Board. The key issues include the reopening of assessments under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, the disallowance of certain deductions (such as premium and brokerage), and the legality of such modifications and supervisory powers of the Income Tax Officer (ITO) and Income Tax Appellate Commissioner (IAC).\nFacts:\nAppellant (AOP/URF) consists of six members involved in the business of contracting. They entered into a contract with the Cantonment Board to develop a plaza named Quaid-e-Azam Shopping Centre in Hyderabad.\nThe project was floated on a BOT (Built-Operate-Transfer) basis. The AOP was the highest bidder, with a non-refundable premium of Rs. 1,44,07,860/- for land utilization and construction.\nThe contract agreement was executed in February 1996, and the land was handed over to the AOP in November 1996. The AOP made payments in installments, including the premium for land utilization.\nDuring the assessment proceedings, the AOP declared a loss but was later subject to a modification of the assessment under Section 66-A of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, with the total income assessed at Rs. 60,20,874 instead of the declared income of Rs. 2,53,965.\nThe CIR(A) annulled the order, which led the department to file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.\nThe case underwent several remands, and issues such as the premium and brokerage claims remained unresolved.\nArguments:\nAppellant’s (AOPs) Arguments:\nThe AR (Advocate) argued that in the preceding year (1996-97), a similar issue was addressed, and the Tribunal had restored the original order, suggesting that the principles of res judicata should apply.\nThe IAC had not properly considered the premium and brokerage issues, which were already explained in earlier assessments, and therefore, the assessments were being arbitrarily modified.\nThe AOP had provided explanations regarding the premium and brokerage, which were not given due consideration in the subsequent assessments.\nRespondent’s (Department’s) Arguments:\nThe department argued that the IAC had supervisory powers to ensure the proper application of the law by the ITO and that the assessments should be revised to ensure the correct duty of tax.\nDecision:\nPowers of IAC:\nThe Tribunal recognized that the IACs role is supervisory in nature, meant to avoid arbitrary exercise of powers by the ITO. The IAC should ensure that no errors in law or fact occur in the assessments.\nThe IAC failed to adequately address the premium issue in the modified assessments, which had already been explained in prior proceedings and was adjudicated in the previous tax year.\nTribunal’s View:\nThe Tribunal noted that the issues related to premium and brokerage had already been extensively discussed and settled in the previous year (1996-97) and no new facts or errors were found in the current year that justified a different approach.\nThe Tribunal emphasized that there was no error of law or fact in the original assessment, and that the modified order issued under Section 66-A was incorrect.\nThe Tribunal concluded that the original order of the ITO should be restored, as the AOPs explanations regarding the premium and brokerage had not been properly considered.\nFinal Outcome:\nThe Tribunal allowed the appeal and cancelled the amended order issued under Section 66-A.\nThe original order of the ITO was restored, as it was found to be in line with the proper application of the law and facts.\nThe appeal was disposed of with the decision to reinstate the original order of the ITO.\nKey Points:\nRes Judicata: The principle of res judicata applied here as the issues related to premium and brokerage were already settled in the preceding years assessment. The Tribunal decided that the same approach should be followed in the current year.\nSupervisory Powers of IAC: The IACs role is supervisory, aimed at preventing arbitrary decisions by the ITO. The IAC should ensure that no errors of law or fact are made, but the Tribunal found no error in the original assessment and concluded that the IAC had overstepped in modifying it.\nRestoration of the Original Order: The original order of the ITO was found to be accurate, and the subsequent modifications were considered unwarranted. Therefore, the original income assessment was restored.\nConclusion:\nThe Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the AOP, restoring the original order of the ITO and cancelling the modified order under Section 66-A. The Tribunal emphasized the correct application of facts and law, with special consideration given to the premium and brokerage issues, which had been fully explained in prior proceedings. The appeal was allowed, and the IACs actions were deemed improper.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=24(ff),30,66-A,135", - "Case #": "ITA No.1697/KB of 2007 decided on 20.01.2021, date of hearing:22.10.2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND HABIBULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. A.S. Jaffri, Advocate for the Appellant. \nMr. Rizwan Memon, D.R., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. PROGRESSIVE ENGINEERING SPONSOR, HYDERABAD\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, HYDERABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23553", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1531 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1531", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.l50/KB/2017\n(Tax Period July-2012 to June-013) U/s.l 1(2)\n15-06-2023", - "Judge Name:": " Ail TOKHIO.", - "Lawyer Name:": "MR. M. AMINULLAH SIDDIQUI, J.M\nMR. MANZOOR ALI JOKHIO, A.M", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sukkur Electric Power Company Limited, Sukkur\nVersus\nThe CIR Zone-I, LTO, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23554", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1532 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1532", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO.345/KB/2016 STA NO.346/KB/2016 STA NO.347/KB/2016\n(Tax Period Jan. & Feb., 2015) u/s.11(3)\n20.07.2023", - "Judge Name:": " DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ahsan Ali, D.R. : Mr. Kamran Rizvi, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zone-II, RTO, Hyderabad\n\nVersus\nHabibullah Coal Mining Co., Hyderabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23555", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1533 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1533", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA(Cond.) NO.261/LB/2022 ( Tax Year 2020 )\nIn\nITA NO.3324/LB/2022\n21.09.2022", - "Judge Name:": " NWAAR UL HAQUE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Mehmood, DR alongwith\nMr. Usman Khalil, LA Mr. Tariq Naseer, LA\n Mr. Mansoor Baig, Adv", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, CTO, Lahore.\nVERSUS\niohinoor Energy Ltd, Lhr" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23556", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1534 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1534", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITIONS NO. 4700, 310-K TO 314-K,\n423-K TO 426-K, 553-K & 493-K OF 2021\n(Against the common judgment dated 24.12.2020, passed by High Court of Sindh at Karachi, in C.P.No.D-187/2017,\nC.P.No.D-5604/2016,\n01.06.2022", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Arshad Shahzad, ASC Mr. Nadeem Qureshi, ASC,\n(Video link from Karachi)\nDr. Shah Nawaz, ASC\nIrfan Mir Halepota, ASC\nMrs. Abida Parveen Channar, AOR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Rajby Industries Karachi\n2.\nM/s Multinational Export\n3.\nM/s NFK Exports (Pvt.)Ltd. & others\n4.\nM/s International Textile Limited\n5.\nM/s Proline Private Limited\n6.\nM/s Mustaqim Dyeing & Printing\n7.\nM/s Liberty Mills Limited & others\n8.\nM/s Gatron Ind. Ltd. & another\n9.\nM/s Orient Textile Mills & others\n10.\nM/s Mima Knit (Pvt.) Limited\n11.\nM/s Adamjee Enterprises\n12.\nM/s Aferoz Textile Industries Pvt. Ltd.\nVERSUS\nFederation of Pakistan and other" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23557", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1535 = 2022 SLD 1535 = 2023 SCMR 1856 = (2023) 128 TAX 461 = 2024 PTCL 322", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQTg", - "Key Words:": "Short Levy of Federal Excise Duty on Supply of White Crystalline Sugar\nIssue:\nThe main issue in this case revolves around the short levy of Federal Excise Duty (FED) by a respondent company on local supplies of white crystalline sugar. The petitioner department alleged that the company had charged FED at the wrong rate (0.5% instead of 8%), leading to a shortfall in the duty collected. The respondent company contested the claim, and the case progressed through various levels of appeal.\nFacts:\nThe respondent company supplied white crystalline sugar locally and charged FED at a rate of 0.5%, instead of the correct rate of 8%.\nAs a result, there was a short levy of FED.\nThe petitioner department issued a show cause notice alleging the short levy and demanding the recovery of the short-paid FED, along with a surcharge and a 5% penalty.\nThe Order-in-Original was passed by the department, which held the respondent liable for the short levy and imposed the recovery of the unpaid duty and penalties.\nThe respondent company filed an appeal before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), but it was dismissed as barred by time.\nThe respondent then filed a rectification application, which was also dismissed.\nThe respondent further challenged these orders through two appeals before the Appellate Tribunal:\nOne appeal was allowed by the Tribunal, overturning the CIR(A)s decision.\nThe appeal against the Order dated 24.12.2020 was deemed infructuous.\nThe petitioner department then filed two references before the Lahore High Court, but the court upheld the Tribunals decision.\nThe petitioner department sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court.\nArguments:\nPetitioners Argument (Department):\nThe department argued that the respondent company had failed to charge the correct rate of FED (8% instead of 0.5%), leading to the short levy of duty.\nThe department contended that the CIR(A) wrongly dismissed the appeal on the grounds of time limitation, and the Tribunals decision was erroneous.\nRespondents Argument:\nThe respondent company filed a written reply to the show cause notice, arguing that the rate of duty applied was correct and contested the departments claims of short levy.\nThe company also contested the dismissal of its appeal by the CIR(A) due to time limitations, and subsequently, the rectification application was wrongly dismissed.\nDecision:\nRight to Fair Process:\nThe Supreme Court highlighted that individuals must be dealt with in accordance with the law, and that when a specific allegation is not presented to the recipient (in this case, the respondent company), denying them an opportunity to respond would violate their right to due process and a fair trial under Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan.\nFactual Determination:\nThe Court found no perversity in the Tribunal’s reading of the evidence, and upheld the Tribunal’s factual findings. The High Court had previously upheld the Tribunals decision, and the Supreme Court saw no reason to interfere.\nDismissal of Appeal by CIR(A):\nThe CIR(A) dismissed the respondents appeal based on time limitation, but the Court found that the Tribunal had rightly overturned this decision. The Tribunal’s reasoning and decision were considered sound and in line with the law.\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petitions filed by the petitioner department, upholding the Tribunals decision.\nThe Tribunals findings were maintained, and the petitioner departments claims of short levy and penalty were dismissed.\nKey Points:\nMisapplication of FED Rate:\nThe central issue in this case was the short levy of FED due to the incorrect application of the duty rate (0.5% instead of 8%).\nThe petitioner department sought to recover the unpaid duty and impose a penalty, but the Tribunal found no sufficient evidence or legal grounds to justify the recovery.\nRight to Respond:\nThe case emphasized the right of the respondent to be informed of the specific allegations and given an opportunity to respond, as guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan under Articles 4 and 10A.\nTribunals Role:\nThe Appellate Tribunal played a crucial role in examining the facts and applying the law correctly, thereby overturning the decisions of the CIR(A) and dismissing the department’s claims.\nFinal Decision:\nThe Supreme Court upheld the Tribunals ruling, denying the departments appeal, and dismissed the petitions filed by the department for leave to appeal.\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Courts decision in this case underscores the importance of due process, factual accuracy, and the correct application of the law. The Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the departments claims of short levy and penalty was upheld, and the petitioner department’s appeal was dismissed, affirming the rights of the respondent company to a fair hearing and proper legal consideration.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=8,10,14,14A,33Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10A,185Sales Tax Act, 1990=22(1)(a)(c),22(1)(e),73", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No.1842-L & 1843-L of 2022 decided on 11.11.2022, heard on: 11.11.2022\n(Against the order of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 31.03.2022, passed in ETRs No.32241 & 32246 of 2021)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J., SYEDMANSOOR ALI SHAH, ATHARMINALLAH AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Saba Saeed, ASC (thr. video-link, Lahore) for the petitioner.\nMr. Shehbaz Butt, ASC (thr. video-link, Lahore) for the respondent.\nAssisted by: Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nM/S RYK MILLS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23558", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1536 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1536", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NQ.539/LB/2021\n8.2.2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Mr. Muhammad Aamer.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Mulmmmad Afzal Aslain, Advocate.\nMr. Muhammad Awais Knmboh. ’Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Qnmnr Abbas s/o Ghaus Muhammad r/o Mnhallnh Mandiya! Town. Joharnbad, Tehsil and District Khushnb.\n\nAppellant\n,\nVERSUS\n1.\nAdditional Collector of Customs (Adjudication). Fnisalabad.\n2.\nDirector. Intelligence & Investigation*FBR. Multan.\n3.\nAdditional Director. Intelligence & Investigation'FRK. Fnisalabnd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23559", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1537 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1537", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDQXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Spl. Cus. Ref. A. 368/2019, 19.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar", - "Lawyer Name:": "Through Mr. M. R. Sethi, Advocate.\nThrough Mr. Pervaiz Iqbal Kansi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23560", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1538 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1538", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Application No.192 of 2006.\n21.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar", - "Lawyer Name:": "Collector of Sales Tax & Federal Excise, LTU, Karachi\nThrough Dr. Shah Nawaz Memon, Advocate\nM/s. Hilton Pharma (Pvt) Limited Through M/s. Abdul Rahim Lakhani, Suneel Ali Memon and Atta Mohammad Qureshi, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23561", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1539 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1539", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.2795/LB/2022 (TAX YEAR 2019)\nITA No.2097/LB/2021 (TAX YEAR 2011}\n28.03.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MR. MUHAMMAD WASEEM CH, (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Shiraza Hameed, OR LTO Mr. Muhammad Mohsin Vick, Adv- -i'< ' Mr. Pervaiz Iqbal. Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone IV, Large Taxpayer Unit, Lahore.\nVersus\nShadman -1, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23562", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1540 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1540", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NQ.364/LB/20Q7 M/r D.G. \n29.3.2022", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD AAMER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ahsnn Mehmood, Advocate\n\nMr. Sultan Mehmood. Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Limited. Multan\nVS\n1.\nCollector of Customs, MCC, Multan.\n2.\nCollector of Customs (Appeals), Multan.\n3.\nAssistant Collector (Recovery Officer). MCC. Multan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23563", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1541 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1541", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "E.F.A No.22133 of 2023\n03.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zeeshan Haider Zaidi, Advocate.\nMr. Moiz Tariq, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s G.A Traders (Sole Proprietorship) vs.\nAllied Bank of Pakistan JUDGMENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23564", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1542 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1542", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDOC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITIONS NO.3121 TO 3125 OF 2021\n10.06.2022", - "Judge Name:": " Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, CJ Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar Mrs. Justice Ayesha A. Malik", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Shazia Bilal, ASC\nKamranullah, Additional Commissioner Naeem Hassan, Secretary Litigation (FBR)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies ...Petitioner(s) Zone, Islamabad\n(in all cases)\nVersus •\nM/s Fauji Foundation Limited" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23565", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1543 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1543", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDOCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO.25 l/LB/2021\n25-04-2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Rehan, Advocate.\nCh. Muhammad Awais Kamboh, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Fazal ur Rchman\nVERSUS\n1.\nCollector of Customs (Adjudication), Lahore.\n2.\nDirector, Directorate of I&LFBR, Lahore.\n3.\nDeputy Director, Directorate of I&LFBR, Lahore.\n4.\nSuperintendent, Directorate of I&LFBR, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23566", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1544 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1544", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Suit No. NIL of 2023\n30.08.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Junaid Ghaffar", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Kamran Iqbal advocate for the Plaintiff along with Plaintiff\nMr. Amir Zeb Khan, D.A.G alongwith M/s Muneeb Ahmed, Bank Al-Falah,\nManager Overdue Department, Khurram Sheikhani, Assistant Manager\n(legal) Meezan Bank and Dr. Atifuddin, advocate for State Bank of\nPakistan", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23567", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1545 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1545", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P No. 6127-P/2019\n07.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " SYED ARSHAD ALL", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Salman Akram Raja & Qazi Ghulam Dastagir, Advocates.\nM/s Sanaullah DAG, Rehmanullah & Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocates, along with Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Salman Akram Raja & Qazi Ghulam Dastagir, Advocates.\nM/s Sanaullah DAG, Rehmanullah & Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocates, along with Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23568", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1546 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1546", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDOHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO.22/KB/2023\n(Tax Period Dec., 2014 to June 2015) u/s.ll(2)\n01.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. A.S. Jafri & Mr. Kamran Rizvi, Advocates Mr. Akhtar Hussain, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Habibullah Coal Mining Co., Hyderabad\nVersus\nThe Commissioner-IR,\nZone-II, RTO, Hyderabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23569", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1547 = 2021 = 2023 SLD 1547", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDOHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.24-Q OF 2014\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 20.09.2010 passed by the Balochistan High Court, Quetta in Const. Petition No.320 of 2010.)\nAND\nCIVIL APPEAL NO.26-Q OF 2018\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 15.07.2013 passed by the Balochistan High Court, Quetta in Custom Reference No.20 and 23 of 2018.)26.05.2021", - "Judge Name:": " Munib Akhtar,", - "Lawyer Name:": ": Mr. Naseebullah Khan, ASC (in both cases, Video-Link, Quetta)\n: Mr. Shakeel-ur-Rehman, ASC Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR (in CA 24-Q/2014)\nMr. Iftikhar Raza Khan, ASC (in CA 26-Q/2018, Video-Link, Quetta)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Haji Tooti\n: (in CA 24-Q/2014)\nMuhammad Usman\n: (in CA 26-Q/2018)\nvs\nThe Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad &\n:\n(in CA 24-Q/2°14)\nothers\nThe Collector of Customs, Model Customs :\n(in CA 26-Q/2018)\nCollectorate, Custom House, Quetta" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23570", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1548 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1548", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.4259//LB/2023 (Tax Year 2022)\n18.08.2023", - "Judge Name:": " RIZWAN AHMED URFi", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr.Waheed Shahzad Butt, Advocate\nMr. Rao Shahzad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Hasan Nazir Aujla, Gujranwala.\nVersus\nThe CIR, RTO, Gujranwala." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23571", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1549 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1549", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "HCA No. 357 of 2017\n 05.10.2022", - "Judge Name:": " Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Advocate.\nMr. M. Ishaque Pirzada, Advocate. Mr. Aijaz Ahmed Zahid, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue Services (AEC) & others\nM/s. Clariant Pakistan Limited" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23572", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1550 = 2023 SLD 1550 = 2023 SLD 1550 = (2023) 128 TAX 259", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDU", - "Key Words:": "Mis-declaration of Classification and Evasion of Customs Duty, Sales Tax, and Income Tax\nIssue:\nThe key issue in this case is whether M/s ESSEF Traders had correctly classified their imported aerosol spray paints under the appropriate tariff heading, and if not, whether their mis-declaration led to evasion of customs duty, sales tax, and income tax.\nFacts:\nM/s ESSEF Traders imported a consignment of aerosol spray paints and declared the goods under a specific classification, seeking to claim benefits under SRO 659(I)/2007 dated 03.06.2007.\nThe customs authorities argued that ESSEF Traders had mis-declared the classification of the goods, leading to the evasion of customs duty, sales tax, additional sales tax, and income tax.\nBased on this mis-declaration, the department issued a show cause notice and a subsequent Order-in-Original.\nThe respondent challenged the Order-in-Original before the Collector of Customs (Appeals), which ruled in favor of ESSEF Traders. The department appealed the decision to the Customs Tribunal.\nArguments:\nAppellants (Departments) Argument:\nThe department argued that the Collector of Customs (Appeals) had passed the Order-in-Appeal without properly considering the departments evidence and legal arguments.\nThe department contended that similarly, other traders who imported goods of a similar nature (as per GD Nos. KPPIHC-36409 and KAPW-HC-53709) were found to have misclassified their goods, and as a result, the benefit under SRO 659(I)/2007 was disallowed.\nThe department claimed that ESSEF Traders goods were acrylic-based, and thus they should have been assessed under the appropriate PCT heading 3208.2090, not under the concessional tariff under the SRO.\nRespondents (ESSEF Traders) Argument:\nThe respondents counsel argued that the audit findings and classification proposed by the department were incorrect.\nESSEF Traders counsel contended that the aerosol spray paints were indeed polyamide-based, as claimed by them, and not acrylic-based.\nThe department failed to provide any concrete evidence supporting the claim that the paints were misclassified, and the audit document created by the department lacked any supporting documentation.\nDecision:\nThe Tribunal found that the appellant department failed to produce any evidence to support its claims, particularly the audit document which was central to the department’s argument.\nSince no evidence was provided to establish that the aerosol paints were incorrectly classified or that the concession under SRO 659(I)/2007 was wrongly applied, the Tribunal upheld the Collector of Customs (Appeals) decision.\nThe Tribunal concluded that the paints in question were polyamide-based, as argued by the respondent, and that the departments claim of mis-declaration was unfounded.\nConsequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the Order-in-Appeal passed by the Collector of Customs was upheld as well-reasoned and legally sound.\nKey Points:\nMis-declaration and Classification:\nThe central issue in the case was the classification of the aerosol spray paints. The department argued that the goods were wrongly classified and thus wrongly benefitted from the concessional tariff under SRO 659(I)/2007.\nHowever, the Tribunal sided with the respondent, ruling that the department failed to establish that the goods were misclassified, noting that the paints were polyamide-based, as per the respondents claims.\nEvasion of Taxes:\nThe department argued that misclassification led to the evasion of customs duty, sales tax, additional sales tax, and income tax.\nHowever, since the department failed to provide concrete evidence to prove its claims, the evasion of taxes was not substantiated.\nRole of Evidence:\nA key takeaway from the case is the importance of evidence. The departments case was significantly weakened due to its failure to provide evidence supporting its claim of mis-declaration.\nWithout supporting evidence, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal and upheld the order-in-appeal favoring the respondent.\nSRO 659(I)/2007:\nThe benefit of SRO 659(I)/2007 was claimed by the importer, and the Tribunal found no reason to disallow it, given the lack of evidence proving that the goods were misclassified.\nTribunal’s Ruling:\nThe Tribunals decision is notable for its emphasis on the lack of evidence from the department, which failed to prove its case on classification and evasion of taxes. As a result, the Collector of Customs (Appeals)s decision was upheld.\nConclusion:\nThe case underscores the importance of evidence in customs disputes, especially when challenging the classification of goods and the application of tax exemptions. The Tribunal sided with M/s ESSEF Traders, confirming that the goods were correctly classified and the benefit under SRO 659(I)/2007 was rightly applied. The appeal by the department was dismissed, and the Order-in-Appeal was upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=3,6,7,32(1),32(2),32(3A)Sales Tax Act, 1990=7A,34Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-286/2018 decided on 07.03.2023, heard on: 22-02.2023", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Yaqoob, PA present for the Appellant.\nMr. Mohammad Siddiq Zia & Mohammad Aslam, Advocates present for the Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR OF POST CLEARANCE AUDIT THROUGH ASSISTANT DIRECTOR DIRECTORATE POST CLEARANCE AUDIT CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S ESSEFF TRADERS, KARACHI AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23573", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1551 = 2023 SLD 1551", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23574", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1552 = 2023 SLD 1552 = 2025 PTCL 352", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNC8", - "Key Words:": "Interpretation of Section 25(2)(d) & (e):\nRoyalties or license fees may only be added to the customs value if:\nThey relate directly to the imported goods, and\nAre a condition of sale for those goods.\nThe payments in question pertained to technical assistance for local parts manufacturing (deleted items) and not to the CKD kits imported, hence falling outside the scope of these provisions.\nApplication of WTO Valuation Agreement:\nThe judgment reaffirmed Pakistan’s commitment to WTO Article VII (Customs Valuation Agreement), emphasizing that transactional value is the primary method and must be interpreted strictly.\nRoyalty payments for post-import activities, or those unconnected with the imported goods, are excluded from customs value.\nClause 16 of the Indus Motor Technical Agreement:\nFound to pertain to progressive deletion targets under local manufacturing policy, not import transactions.\nTherefore, the associated royalty payments were not a pre-condition of sale, nor related to the imported CKD components.\nTime Bar and Legal Remedy:\nThe demand notices issued under Section 32(3) of the Customs Act were deemed time-barred for pre-2000 imports.\nThe court also observed that sales tax and income tax recovery by customs after clearance of goods is unlawful, per Nestle Pakistan Ltd..\nMaintainability of Writ Petitions:\nThe Court held that constitutional petitions challenging fresh show cause notices were maintainable, especially when the core issue had already been settled by the Tribunal in the taxpayers’ favor.\nInternational Precedents Relied Upon:\nThe Court extensively referred to judgments from India (Mahindra, Maruti, Toyota Kirloskar) and South Africa (Delta Motors), reaffirming that royalty for post-import or unrelated activities is not dutiable.\nLegal Significance:\nThis judgment lays down a comprehensive precedent for interpreting transactional value under Pakistan’s customs law in harmony with international trade obligations under the WTO regime. It provides strong jurisprudence against arbitrary inclusion of post-import royalties in customs value and reiterates taxpayer protection through fair valuation and adherence to procedural time limits.\nThe ruling will have far-reaching implications, especially for automobile assemblers, franchised manufacturers, and industries operating under technical assistance arrangements", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25(1),25(2)(d),25(2)(e),25(10),194-A,196", - "Case #": "C .P No. D- 1372 of 2018, 20.02.2023, Dates of hearing: 20.02.2023, 06.03.2023, 07.03.2023 & 08.03.2023. Date of Judgment: 17.07.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners:\nM/s. Rashid Anwar, Aadil Saeed, Advocates.\nFor the Respondents (in Petitions): Dr. Shah Nawaz Memon, Khalid Rajpar, Sardar Muhammad Ishaque, Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Waqar Ahmed Maitlo, Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Muhammad Bilal Bhatti, M/s. Munawwar Ali Memon, Masooda Siraj, Fozia M. Murad, Zuhaib Ahmed, Muhammad Idrees Jakhrani, Bushra Zia for Muhammad Zubair, Pervaiz Ahmed Memon, Syed Mohsin Iman, Touqeer Ahmed Seehar, Hafeezullah, Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Jazib Aftab, Shumaila. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi (Assistant Attorney General)\nSyed Zain ul Abdin, Deputy Commissioner, SRB.\nFor the Applicants: (in SCRAS) M/s. Munawwar Ali Memon, Masooda Siraj, Syed Mohsin Imam, Advocates.\nFor the Respondents (in SCRAS): M/s. Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, Ahmed Hussain, Khalid Jawed Khan, Hanif Faisal Alam, Uzair Qadir Shoro, Umer Akhund, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. C.P No. D-1372 of 2018 M/s. Indus Motor Company Limited Vs. Federation of Pakistan & others.\n2. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 125/2008 Collector of Customs VS M/s. Dewan Farooq Motors Ltd.,\n3. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 242/2008 The Collector of Customs VS M/s. Indus Motor Company Ltd.,\n4. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 243/2008 The Collector of Customs VS M/s. Indus Motor Company Ltd.,\n5. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 287/2014 Collector of Customs VS M/s. Dewan Farooq Motors Ltd. & another\n6. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 288/2014 Collector of Customs VS M/s. Dewan Farooq Motors Ltd. & another\n7. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 289/2014 Collector of Customs VS M/s. Dewan Farooq Motors Ltd. & another\n8. Const. P. 1410/2018 Indus Motors Co. Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n9. C onst. P. 1665/2020 M/s Indus Motors Co. VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n10. Const. P. 3593/2021 M/s Indus Motor Co. VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n11. Const. P. 4807/2021 M/s Indus Motor Co. Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n12. Const. P. 4808/2021 M/s Indus Motor Co. Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n13. Const. P. 7372/2021 M/s Indus Motor Co. VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n14. Const. P. 56/2022 M/s Indus Motor Co. Ltd VS Fed. of Pakis tan and Others\n15. Const. P. 868/2022 M/s Indus Motor Co. Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23575", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1553 = 2022 SLD 1553 = (2023) 128 TAX 193 = 2023 PTD 1718 = 2024 PTCL 201", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNCs", - "Key Words:": "Lease of FLIC Tapes – Nature of Income and Taxability under the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation between Pakistan and Netherlands\nIssue:\nThe key issue in this case is whether the income earned by a non-resident company from the lease of software programs (FLIC tapes) in Pakistan constitutes royalty under Article 12 of the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation (DTAA) between Pakistan and the Netherlands, or whether it should be considered business profits under Article 7 of the agreement, thereby exempting it from tax in Pakistan.\nFacts:\nThe respondent, a non-resident Dutch company, entered into an agreement to lease FLIC software programs (FLIC tapes) to Schlumberger Seaco Inc., a company with a place of business in Pakistan.\nThe respondent received rental payments from the lease, which it claimed were exempt from tax in Pakistan under Article 7 of the DTAA between Pakistan and the Netherlands.\nThe Income Tax Officer (ITO) disagreed, asserting that the income from the lease constituted royalties under Article 12 of the DTAA, and thus taxable in Pakistan.\nAppeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) were unsuccessful, and the matter was brought before the High Court.\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the respondent, stating that the payments did not qualify as royalties under Article 12, which led to an appeal before the Supreme Court.\nLegal Provisions:\nArticle 7: Business profits under the DTAA.\nArticle 12: Royalties under the DTAA, which includes income from the use of copyrights, patents, and certain other intellectual property rights.\nSection 136(1) and Section 133(1): Provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (ITO 1979) and the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO 2001) that govern the powers of the High Court in tax matters.\nSection 107 and 107(2): Related to tax assessment and filing requirements under the ITO.\nArguments:\nRespondents Argument:\nThe respondent argued that leasing software programs (FLIC tapes) did not constitute royalties under Article 12 of the DTAA, as it involved the use of a software product, not the granting of rights to use a copyright.\nThe respondent contended that since the income was derived from the lease of a product (software), it should be treated as business profits under Article 7 of the DTAA, and therefore exempt from tax in Pakistan.\nDepartments Argument:\nThe Income Tax Officer (ITO) argued that the payments were royalties under Article 12(3) of the DTAA because the leasing of the software involved the use of intellectual property, and thus the payments should be treated as royalties.\nThe Department asserted that the income derived from the lease of the software should be taxable in Pakistan.\nDecision:\nThe Supreme Court of Pakistan delivered a split opinion:\nJustice Umar Ata Bandial & Justice Qazi Faez Isa:\nIncorrect application of OECD Model Convention (MC) by the High Court, which had considered irrelevant factors such as the applicability of the OECD MC instead of focusing on the UN Model Convention (UN MC) and its commentary.\nHigh Courts decision was found to be based on incorrect premises:\nThe FLIC tapes were referenced in the 1986 agreement, not the 1995 agreement, which did not mention FLIC tapes.\nThe High Court could not make factual determinations under the scope of Section 136(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.\nRestoration of the Tribunals Decision: The Court restored the Tribunals judgment, affirming that the income from the lease of FLIC tapes should be treated as royalties and thus taxable under Article 12 of the DTAA.\nThe appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Courts judgment with costs throughout.\nJustice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah:\nLease of software (FLIC tapes) does not constitute royalty under Article 12(3) of the DTAA.\nA distinction is drawn between the use of copyright and the use of a copyrighted product. In this case, the lease involved software programs (a product), not the granting of rights over a copyright.\nThe lease income should be treated as business profits, and Article 12 (royalty provisions) does not apply.\nThe High Courts judgment was upheld as the lease payments were not royalty but business profits.\nKey Points:\nNature of the Income:\nThe core issue revolved around whether the income from leasing software programs (FLIC tapes) constituted royalty or business profits.\nThe Supreme Court noted that leasing a software product does not involve the use of a copyright, and therefore the payments were not royalties under the DTAA.\nThe High Court correctly determined that the payments did not qualify as royalties but rather as business profits, which are taxable under Article 7 of the DTAA.\nTax Treatment under the DTAA:\nThe OECD Model Convention was found to be misapplied by the High Court. The UN Model Convention should have been considered instead.\nThe UN MC and mutual agreement procedures under Article 24 of the DTAA could have provided an alternate avenue for resolving the tax dispute, but this option was not pursued by the respondent.\nFinal Judgment:\nJustice Bandial and Justice Faez Isa ruled in favor of the Department, stating that the income was royalty and taxable under Article 12 of the DTAA.\nJustice Mansoor Ali Shah ruled in favor of the respondent, stating that the income was business profits and not subject to the royalty provisions of Article 12.\nOutcome:\nThe case was decided in a split opinion, with Justice Bandial and Justice Faez Isa setting aside the High Courts judgment and restoring the Tribunals decision.\nJustice Mansoor Ali Shah disagreed and upheld the High Courts judgment, dismissing the appeal.\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court delivered a divided opinion regarding the taxability of income derived from the lease of software programs (FLIC tapes). One opinion held that the income was royalties and taxable under Article 12 of the DTAA, while the other opinion treated the income as business profits under Article 7. The case highlights the complexities in interpreting international tax agreements and the distinction between royalty and business profits.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=107,107(2)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=50(4),133(1),136(1),163", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No. 94 to 106 of 2008 and Civil Appeal No.550 of 2011 decided on 08.09.2023, heard on: 07.09.2022\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 12.10.2007 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in ITRAs No. 71/1997, 99/2006, 274/1997, 275 to 281/1998, 514 to 516/2006) and Civil Appeal No. 550/2011\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 11.11.2010 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in ITR No. 229/2005)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CHIEF JUSTICE, QAZI FAEZ ISA, JUSTICE AND SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, ASC (in CAs 94 to 106/2008) and Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR (in CA 94/2008), Sh. Mehmood Ahmed, AOR (in CAs 95 to 106/2008), Hafiz Ahsan Ahmad Khokhar, ASC and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR (in CA 550/2011) for the Appellants.\nMr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR assisted by M/s Saad Hashmi and Khawaja Aizaz Ahsan, Advocates for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX\nVs\nM/S. INTER QUEST INFORMATICS SERVICES" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23576", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1554 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1554", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1640/KB/2022\n(Tax Year-2018) U/s. 122(5A)\n15-06-2023", - "Judge Name:": " MANZOOR ALI JOKHIO", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Mohsin Ali, Advocate Mr. Imran Ali Sheikh, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sukkur Electric Power Company Limited, Sukkur\nVersus\nThe CIR Audit-II, LTO, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23577", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1555 = 2023 1555", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No 2641/LB/2022 (Tax Year 2019), dated: 19.09.2022", - "Judge Name:": " NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER, ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abuzar Hussain along with Mr. Baber Zaman, Advocates\nMr. Mr. Hassan Mabroor, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Haroon Brothers Steel, Gujranwala\nvs\nThe CIR.LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23578", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1556 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1556", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.621/LB/2022 (Tax Year 2015)\n18.08.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Nasir Mahmud", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Ahsan-ul-Haq, Adv.\nAsad, DR.\nMs. Zainab", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue,\nZone-II, RTO-II, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23579", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1557 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1557", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJDNHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "1TA No. 1890/LB/2022 (Tax Year 2020)\n28.03.2023", - "Judge Name:": " AEYSHA FAZIL QAZI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shoatb Hassan Butt. Advocate.\nMr. M. Suleman, D R", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Zhengbang Agriculture Pakistan\n(Pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\n\nVersus\nThe CIR. CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23580", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1558 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1558", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "rr A No.2763/Ll3/20l 7 (Tax Year 2013)\n29.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Nasir Mahmud", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Usman Zafar, Adv. Mr. All Asjid, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S Malik Amir Trader,,\n220 GT Road, Bcighbunpurti, Lahore.\nVersus\nCommissioner Inland Revenue,\nZone-IV, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23581", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1559 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1559", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1013/KB-2023 (Tax Year, 2018) U/s. 122 (5A)\n:25.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": " AAMIR MAQSOOD", - "Lawyer Name:": ":Ms. Riffat Naeem, Advocate\n :Mr. Imran Yousuf, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Khalid Hussain, Quetta.\nVersus\nThe Commissioner, RTO, Quetta." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23582", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1560 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1560", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.598/LB/2023\n 05.04.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Farhan Shahzad, Advocate\n\nMr. Zubair Khan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "J'/I/S Rizwan Garment, Lahore.\n\nVersus\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23583", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1561 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1561", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ICA No.55931/2023\n12.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": " ANWAR HUSSAIN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdul Wahecd Habib, Advocate for the appellants.\nRaja Hassan Kayani, Assistant Attorney General.\nMs. Riaz Begum, Advocate for respondents No.2 to4 (on Court’s call).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/$ Sufyan Malik. Ayub etc.Versus Federation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23584", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1562 = 2017 = 2023 SLD 1562", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "EFA No. 24 of 2016\n21.03.2017", - "Judge Name:": " Muzamil Akhtar Shabir", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Muhammad Latif Khokhar, Advocate for appellants.\nM/s. Malik Muhammad Kashif Rajwana, M. Rafique Khan and Malik M.H. Rajwana, Advocates for respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Metro Petroleum etc VS\nAskari Bank etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23585", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1563 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1563", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.493/LB/2017\n27.03.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Mr. MUAHMAMD WASEEN CH", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr, Imran Anwar Saeed, DR\nMs. Shiraza Hameed, DR\nMr. Muhammad Moshsin Virk. Advocate Mr. Pervaiz Iqbal, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone IV, Large Taxpayer Unit, Lahore\nVersus\nM/s Mughal Iron & Steel Industries Limited 31-A, Shadman - I, Lahore NTN: 3533975*6" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23586", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1564 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1564", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 299 of 2022 JUDGMENT\n 20.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by:\nMuhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate.\nRespondents by:\nRao Riasat Ali Khan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Farooq VERSUS\nZarai Taraqiati Bank Limited" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23587", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1565 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1565", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTYzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.1729/LB/2014 (Tax year 2011)\n29.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Hyder Ali Khan, advocate along with Mr. Sami ur Rehman Khan,\nadvocate for the plaintiff.\nSyed Ghulam Shabbir Shah, advocate for the defendants 2 & 3.\nMr. Zaheer-ud-Din Babar, FCA.\n\nNone.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. R.Y.K Mills Ltd, Lahore.\n... Appellant\nNTN:2934487-5\nVersus\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23588", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1566 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1566", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.598/LB/2023\n05.04.2023", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Farhan Shahzad, Advocate\nMr. Zubair Khan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "J'/I/S Rizwan Garment, Lahore.\n\n\nVersus\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23589", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1567 = 2023 SLD 1567 = (2023) 128 TAX 480 = 2025 PTD 96", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTY3k", - "Key Words:": "Exemption of Income from Property Under Income Tax Ordinance, 1979\nIssue:\nThe case addresses whether income from property, not held for religious or charitable purposes, is exempt from tax under Clause (93) of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The central question is whether the Karachi Stock Exchange (now Pakistan Stock Exchange) qualifies for tax exemption based on its claim that the income from property was used for purposes aligned with religious and charitable objectives.\nFacts:\n•\nThe appellant, represented by the Pakistan Stock Exchange (formerly Karachi Stock Exchange), challenged the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), which had held that the income from property was exempted from tax under Clause (93) of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.\n•\nThe Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) argued that its property was under a legal obligation to use its income for the company’s charitable and religious purposes, as outlined in the Memorandum & Articles of Association.\n•\nThe Department denied the tax exemption, claiming that the PSE was not a religious or charitable institution, and the income generated from property held by the institution should not be exempt from tax.\n•\nThe Commissioner’s ruling, which denied the exemption, was upheld by the Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner, and this decision was challenged in the case.\nLegal Provisions:\n•\nSection 2(14): Defines charitable purpose within the context of income tax, which is crucial for determining whether an entity qualifies for tax exemptions based on its charitable activities.\n•\nSection 62: Discusses the scope of income that may be eligible for exemption under certain conditions.\n•\nSections 133(5), 136(1), and 136(2): These sections relate to assessments, the powers of the Appellate Tribunal, and the process of challenging decisions made by tax authorities.\nArguments:\n1.\nAppellants Claim (Pakistan Stock Exchange):\no\nThe PSE argued that the income from its property should be exempt from tax under Clause (93) of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.\no\nThe PSE asserted that, as a company limited by guarantee, it was legally obligated to use its income in a manner consistent with charitable and religious purposes as per its Memorandum & Articles of Association. Therefore, it claimed that its income from property, despite not being a traditional charitable institution, should qualify for the exemption.\n2.\nDepartment’s Rejection:\no\nThe Department rejected the claim, arguing that the PSE was not a religious or charitable institution as defined under the relevant sections of the ordinance.\no\nAccording to the Department, Clause (93) of the Second Schedule only applies to entities that hold property specifically for religious or charitable purposes, which the PSE did not qualify as.\nDecision:\n•\nThe court held that income from property not held for religious or charitable purposes is not exempt from tax under Clause (93) of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.\n•\nThe court disagreed with the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), stating that the PSE did not qualify for the tax exemption because its property was not held for religious or charitable purposes as defined in Section 2(14) of the Ordinance.\n•\nThe decision of the Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner, which denied the exemption, was upheld.\n•\nThe Income Tax Case was decided in favor of the appellant department, rejecting the respondents claim for exemption.\nKey Legal Reasoning:\n1.\nClause (93) of the Second Schedule provides exemptions for income derived from property held for religious or charitable purposes. The court emphasized that these exemptions are strictly limited to those institutions meeting the specific criteria of holding property for such purposes.\n2.\nThe Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) did not meet the legal definition of a religious or charitable institution under Section 2(14) of the Income Tax Ordinance, which requires a direct connection to religious or charitable activities.\n3.\nPromissory Estoppel and the legal framework of the Memorandum & Articles of Association were not sufficient grounds for granting tax exemption because they did not align with the statutory provisions regarding charitable purpose.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe court ruled that the Pakistan Stock Exchange did not qualify for tax exemption on the income from property, as the property was not held for religious or charitable purposes under the terms of Clause (93) of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.\n•\nThe Income Tax Appellate Tribunals decision was reversed, and the orders of the Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner were upheld.\n•\nThe income from property held by the PSE was subject to tax because it did not meet the statutory criteria for exemption based on charitable or religious purposes.\nKey Takeaways:\n1.\nTax exemptions for income from property are strictly governed by statutory criteria, particularly regarding the purpose for which the property is held (charitable or religious).\n2.\nIncome Tax Appellate Tribunal’s findings may be challenged if they conflict with the statutory definitions and legal framework, as demonstrated in this case.\n3.\nMemorandum & Articles of Association may outline organizational purposes but do not override statutory tax provisions unless the organization meets the specific exemptions defined in the law.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=2(14),62,133(5),136(1),136(2)", - "Case #": "Income Tax Cases No.233 to 238 of 2001, decided on 03.05.2023, heard on: 03.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Munawwar Ali Memon Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Abdul Khaliq Khatri Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INCOME TAX\nVS\nKARACHI STOCK EXCHANGE (G) LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23590", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1568 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1568", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO.135/LB/2022, 25.4.2022", - "Judge Name:": " MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Rehan,\nAdvocate.\nCh. Imtiaz Elahi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO.135/LB/2022 Sodnm Khan -Appellant\nVs\nAdditional Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23591", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1569 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1569", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No. 444 & 445 of 2017.\n10 May 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Hasan Irfan Khan, ASC assisted by Mr. Saqib\nAsghar, Advocate. (in C.A. 445/2017)\nMr. Azid Nafees, ASC a/w Syed Rifaqat Hussian Shah, AOR. (in C.A. 444/2017)\nFor the respondents:\nBarrister Haris Azmat, ASC and Mr. Azid Nafees,\nASC. (in C.A. 445/2017)\nMr. Hasan Irfan Khan, ASC and Mr. Azid Nafees, ASC. (in C.A. 444/2017)", - "Petitioner Name:": "A. Rahim Foods (Pvt) Limited\n(in C.A. 445/2017)\nCompetition Commission of Pakistan\n(in C.A. 444/2017)\nVersus\nK&N’s Foods (Pvt) Limited and others\n(in C.A. 445/2017)\nA. Rahim Foods (Pvt) Limited and another (in C.A. 444/2017)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23592", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1570 = 2023 SLD 1570", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.1032 OF 2018\n(Against the judgment dated 27.03.2018 of the High Court of Sindh Karachi passed in STRA No. 737 of 2015)\n14.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Athar Minallah,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Asma Hamid, ASC\n\nMr. Ghulam Rasool Mangi, ASC/AOR\n(via video-link, Karachi)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-IV, Large Taxpayer Unit,\nKarachi\n\nVersus\nM/s Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd. A-39,\nManghopir Road, SITE, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23593", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1571 = 2023 SLD 1571", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL No.178/LB/2017, 30.3.2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Arif Mchmood, Advocate.\nMr. Muhammad Awais Kamboh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Shag Sportswear, Sialkot\nVS\n1.\nCollector of Customs, MCC, Sialkot.\n2.\nCollector of Customs (Adjudication) Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23594", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1572 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1572", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil PetitioN\ns No. 329-K to 391-K of 2022\n28.04.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "Assisted by M/s. Rasheed Mehar\n& Subhan Tasleem, Advocates\nMr. Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, AOR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Telenor Microfinance Bank Limited Versus\nShamim Bano & others\nRehana Sabir & others\nAsma & others\nKomal & another\nFarah Unnar & others\nRani & others\nShakeel & others\nShumaila & others\nAneesa & others\nNisho Manghar & others\nKirshan & another\nHajab & another\nMuhammad Raheem & another\nMalook & another\nAmeer Hassan & another\nDil Sher & another\nTaro & another\nShahib & another\nAbdul Raheem & another\nPunhoon & another\nKhan Muhammad & another\nRamesh Kumar & another\nDahu Mal & another\nMavji & another\nImam Bux & another\nRano & another\nDhevji Mal & another\nJeebo & another\nAbdul Hafeez & another\nDhanji & another\nSaman & another\nAmeen Muhammad & another\nGulab & another\nMuhammad Hassan & another\nHakim & another\nJaimal & another\nPehlaj & another\nMansingh & another\nPrem & another\nJumoon & another\nSher Muhammad & another\nGhamoon & another\nJetho & another\nTulcho & another\nChahnoo & another\nKirshan & another\nPhoto Mal & another\nPirsoo & another\nAli Muhammad & another\nAli Bux & another\nMeer Muhammad & another\nGaagan Das & another\nAsghar Khan & another\nDhevji Mal & another\nAbdul Rauf & another\nMuhammad Mithan & another\nPartab & another\nRanjho & another\nAllah Warayo & another\nMuhammad Aslam & another\nPartab & another\nAli Ghulam & another\nAmanullah & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23595", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1573 = 2017 = 2023 SLD 1573", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Const. Petition Nos.D-2421/2016 a/w 4524/2015, 1070, 1585, 2247, 2687 & 3462 of 2016, 2167, 2532 & 2800 of 2017\n08.05.2017", - "Judge Name:": " Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Aminuddin Ansari, advocate for the petitioners.\nMr. Khalid Javed Khan, advocate for petitioner in C.P.No.D-2167 of 2017.\nMr. Amjad Jawaid Hashmi, advocate for petitioner in C.P.No.D-3462/2016.\nMr. Muhammad Younus, advocate for the petitioner.\nMr. Taimur Ali Mirza, advocate for the petitioner in C.P.No.D-2800/2017.\nMr. Farooq H. Naek, advocate for respondent No.2 in C.P.No.D-2167/2017.\nMr. Mohsin Qadir Shahwani, advocate for the respondent in C.P.Nos.4524 of 15, 1070, 2687 and 3462 of 2016.\nMr. Muhammad Najeeb Jamali, advocate for the respondent in C.P.Nos.1585 & 2421 of 2016.\nMr. Muhammad Sarfaraz Ali Metlo, advocate for the respondent. Mr. Saifullah, AAG\nMr. Mir Hussain, Assistant Attorney General.\nSyed Zainul Abdin, Deputy Commissioner (Legal), SRB.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Young’s (Private) limited and others\n\nVersus\nProvince of Sindh and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23596", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1574 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1574", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Suit No.319 of 2023\n01.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Akbar Sarwana", - "Lawyer Name:": "Maxco (Pvt.) Ltd. through Mr Omer Memon Advocate\nPakistan through M/s Syed Ebadur Rehman, Law Officer along with Shahrukh Arfani, Additional Joint Director and Imran Ali Shamsi, Additional Joint Director,", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23597", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1575 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1575", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO.150/KB/2017\n15-06-2023", - "Judge Name:": " MANZOOR Ail TOKHIO,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Mohsin Ali, Advocate Mr. Imran Ali Sheikh, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sukkur Electric Power Company Limited, Sukkur\nVersus\nThe C1R Zone-I, LTO, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23598", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1576 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1576", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh Chief Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Suit 675 of 2016\n20.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Saddiq", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Faraz Mahar, advocate holding brief for Mr. Ayan Mustafa\nMemon, advocate for the plaintiff.\nMr. Javed Ali Sangi, advocate for the defendant/SRB.\nMr. Shehryar Qazi, Additional Advocate General Sindh.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23599", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1577 = 2023 SLD 1577 = 2023 PTD 1514 = 2023 SCMR 1421 = (2024) 130 TAX 85", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTWXk", - "Key Words:": "Issue:\nThe case involves the interpretation of Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969, particularly the provision regarding provisional assessment of imported goods and the consequences if the final assessment is not completed within the stipulated time. The primary issue is whether the provisional assessment becomes final if the final assessment is not completed within the specified period.\nFacts:\nWhen goods are imported into Pakistan, the customs authorities are responsible for assessing the applicable duties on the goods. This is typically done when an importer files a bill of entry (now called a goods declaration) under Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nIn cases where the goods cannot be immediately assessed to duty, the customs authorities are allowed to provisionally assess the goods under Section 81 of the Customs Act.\nAccording to Section 81(2), the customs authorities are required to complete the final assessment of the imported goods within a specified period.\nSection 81(4) provides that if the final assessment is not completed within the prescribed period, the provisional assessment becomes final by default, unless extended by the Collector of Customs due to exceptional circumstances.\nArguments:\nLegal Provision:\nSection 81(4) is a penal provision designed to protect importers and exporters from unnecessary delays by the customs authorities. If the customs authorities fail to complete the final assessment within the specified period, the provisional assessment automatically becomes final.\nThis provision is in place to prevent harassment and undue delays in clearing imported goods, ensuring that cases are not dragged on indefinitely under the pretext of awaiting final assessments.\nThe Collector of Customs can extend the period for final assessment in cases where there are exceptional circumstances, but this must be done within the legal framework.\nRole of Collector:\nThe Collector of Customs has the power to extend the assessment period, but only in cases of exceptional circumstances. This is intended to ensure that there is no arbitrary delay in finalizing the duty assessments on imported goods.\nPrecedents:\nThe case refers to several precedents to establish the scope and intent of the law, including:\nCollector of Customs, Lahore v. S. Fazal Illahi and Sons (2015 SCMR 1488): This case reinforces the principle that provisional assessments become final if the final assessment is not completed within the stipulated period under Section 81(4).\nCollector of Customs v. Automobile Corporation of Pakistan (2005 PTD 2116) and Dewan Farooque Motors Ltd v. Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (2006 PTD 1276): These cases further support the application of Section 81 and its provisions on provisional assessment.\nDecision:\nSection 81(4) is designed to protect importers from undue delays and prevent arbitrary actions by the customs authorities. If the customs authorities fail to finalize the assessment within the stipulated period, the provisional assessment automatically becomes final.\nThe provision empowers the Collector of Customs to extend the assessment period only in exceptional circumstances, ensuring that the final assessment is made in a timely manner.\nThis approach serves to protect the rights of importers and ensures the efficient functioning of customs operations.\nConclusion:\nIf the final assessment is not completed within the period specified under Section 81(2), the provisional assessment automatically becomes final under Section 81(4).\nThe provision aims to protect importers from the arbitrary delays by the customs authorities, making the provisional assessment final unless exceptional circumstances justify an extension.\nThe Collector of Customs is empowered to extend the period only in cases where exceptional circumstances exist, preventing indefinite delays in customs assessments.\nKey Takeaways:\nProvisional assessment becomes final if the final assessment is not completed within the stipulated period.\nThe Collector of Customs can extend the period only in exceptional circumstances.\nThe provision is intended to prevent delays and ensure timely final assessments.\nThe case highlights the importance of provisional assessments in preventing harassment of importers and delays in the clearance of goods.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=81,81(2),81(4)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 565/2011, 772 to 780/2012, 768 to 772/2014, 1070/2015, 132 to 156/2017, decided on 24th July, 2023, heard on: 6th September, 2022.\n(On appeal against the judgments/orders dated 12:11.2010, 04.06.2011, 29.11.2013 , 24.07.2015 and 21.09.2016 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No. D-1285/2008, SCRAs Nos. 150-158/2010, 117 to 121/2010, 218/2012 and 70 to 94/2010)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ALA BANDIAL, C.J., QAZI FAEZ ISA AND SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Khalil Dogar, Advocate Supreme Court (through Video Link, Karachi) for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 565/11, 132-156/17).\nK. A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record (through Video Link, Karachi) for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 565/11, 765-772/14, 1070/15, 132-156/17).\nRaja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 772-780/12, 768-772/14 and 1070/15).\nMakhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 772-780/12).\nQari Abdur Rasheed, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.As. Nos-. 768-772/14).\nKhalid Javed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 132-156/17).", - "Petitioner Name:": "FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION/CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS\nVERSUS\nSUS MOTORS (PVT.) LTD. AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23600", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1578 = 2017 = 2023 SLD 1578", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "COMPLAINT NO.3174/KHI/IT/2022", - "Judge Name:": " DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Seema Shakil, Advisor\n: Mr. Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor\nMr Moaz Mehmood, Advocate.\n : Mr. Saad Ali Hassain. (ADC)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed Mumtaz Alam,\n\nPlot No. C-11-C, 3rd Floor, Flat No. 05 Khayaban-e-Sehar, Phase-7, DHA Karachi.\nVersus\nThe Secretary,\n\nRevenue Division,\nIslamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23601", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1579 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1579", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITANO.2089/LB/2014 (Tax Year 2010)\n01.03.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad lamil Bhatti", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by:\nMr. M. Imran, DR\nRespondent by:\nNone", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR. Zone- XI, RTO-I1, Lahore.\nVersus\nM/s Tayyaba Affan Cora, Kasur." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23602", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1580 = 2022 = 2023 SLD 1580", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.200/MB/2022 v (Tax Year 2019)\n10.03.2022", - "Judge Name:": " RIZWAN AHMAD URFI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Adv. Mr. Tahir Bhatti, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Shabbir Feed Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Multan\nVersus\nThe ClR, CTO, Multan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23603", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1581 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1581", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No: 245/KB-2023 (Tax Period 2017-2020)\n15.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Anwer Kamal,.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abid Shaban, Advocate Mr. Muhammad Aslam Jamro, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Triple Tree Associates,\nKarachi\nAppellant\nVersus\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue,\nEnf-II, MTO, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23604", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1582 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1582", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 805 of 2015\n19.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": " (SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ)", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Nasim Sikandar, Nudrat Sultana Alvi\nAdvocates for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.\n805/2015, 806/2015, 826/2015, 1041/2015.\nMr. Haseeb Shakoor Paracha Advocates for the\nPetitioners in W.P. Nos.905/2015, 1028/2015,\n1029/2015.\nNemo for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 768/2015,\n1008/2015, 1132/2015.\nM/s Babar Bilal Advocate for FBR in W.P. Nos.\n768/2015, 905/2015, 1008/2015, 1028/2015.\nMr Usama Shahid Advocates for FBR, in W.P. Nos.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Oil and Gas Development Company Limited\nVs\nThe Federal Board of Revenue, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23605", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1583 = 2023 SLD 1583 = (2023) 128 TAX 229", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVSs", - "Key Words:": "Issue:\nThe petitioners challenge the withdrawal of the subsidy on industrial electricity tariff, which had been promised by the Federal Government at a rate of Rs. 19.99 per unit until June 30, 2023. The subsidy was withdrawn through a notification on February 28, 2023, resulting in a tariff rate of Rs. 45 per unit for the electricity consumed by the petitioners, thus disrupting their export contracts. The petitioners seek a declaration that they are entitled to the subsidized tariff until June 30, 2023, as promised by the Federal Government.\nFacts:\nThe petitioners are companies in the export sector, which had based their export contracts on the subsidized electricity tariff of Rs. 19.99 per unit, promised by the Federal Government.\nThe Federal Government issued a notification on February 28, 2023, withdrawing the subsidy and introducing a new tariff of Rs. 45 per unit starting March 1, 2023.\nThis change significantly impacted the petitioners, as it would lead to higher electricity costs, threatening the completion of their export orders and possibly resulting in closure of industries.\nThe petitioners argue that this withdrawal violates their sovereign guarantees and promissory estoppel, as they had relied on the Governments commitment to the subsidized tariff.\nArguments:\nPetitioners:\nArgued that the Federal Government had made a lawful promise to provide the subsidized tariff of Rs. 19.99 per unit until June 30, 2023.\nThe withdrawal of the subsidy constitutes a violation of their sovereign guarantee and promissory estoppel, as they made business decisions based on the governments promise.\nThe withdrawal also violates their constitutional rights under Articles 4, 10-A, 18, 24, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan.\nFederal Government:\nArgued that the subsidy was not granted based on statutory powers but was an economic policy decision made under specific circumstances.\nThe subsidy was not legally binding and could be revoked at any time by the government due to changes in economic conditions.\nRelied on the Supreme Court judgment in the K-Electric case (PLD 2023 SC 412), asserting that subsidies are not guaranteed and can be withdrawn by the government as part of its policy decisions.\nLegal Principles:\nPolicy Decisions: The governments policy decisions are typically not subject to judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution, especially if they involve economic feasibility or other contingent factors.\nPromissory Estoppel: The concept of promissory estoppel is limited in this case because the governments decision to grant the subsidy was based on circumstances beyond its control and the subsidy could be revoked as part of a policy change.\nSovereign Guarantees: While the government’s promise to maintain the subsidized tariff could be seen as a sovereign commitment, the court ruled that such promises are not legally enforceable if they are subject to policy changes and economic realities.\nAlternate Remedies: Issues related to the tariff and subsidy can be challenged through NEPRA (National Electric Power Regulatory Authority), as they pertain to the regulation of electricity prices and the implementation of subsidies.\nDecision:\nThe court ruled that the Federal Government has the authority to withdraw the subsidy at any time as part of its policy decisions.\nThe principle of promissory estoppel was not applicable in this case, as the subsidy was granted under specific economic conditions that were later subject to change due to factors outside the governments control.\nPolicy decisions regarding subsidies are within the executives discretion, and judicial review cannot be applied to challenge such decisions unless they violate a clear constitutional or statutory provision.\nThe petitioners claims were rejected because the subsidy was not legally binding and could be withdrawn. Additionally, the NEPRA offers an alternative forum for challenging tariff-related issues.\nConclusion:\nThe writ petitions filed by the petitioners were dismissed, as the withdrawal of the subsidy was a valid exercise of the government’s policy-making powers.\nThe petitioners were advised to explore alternate remedies through NEPRA for challenging the tariff adjustments.\nKey Takeaways:\nPolicy decisions by the government, especially related to subsidies, are not typically subject to judicial review under Article 199 unless they violate specific constitutional rights.\nPromissory estoppel does not apply when the governments promise is contingent upon changing economic circumstances.\nSubsidies granted by the government can be withdrawn at any time, especially if they were not based on statutory powers.\nNEPRA is the appropriate forum for challenging electricity tariffs and related decisions.\nCases Referred:\nK-Electric Limited through CEO, Karachi Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2023 SC 412)\nAl-Samrez Enterprise Vs. Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917)\nMessrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582)\nNational Saving Central Directorate Vs. Muhammad Farooq Raja (PLD 2021 SC 320)\nPeshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. Vs. SS Polypropylene (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2023 SC 316)\nDewan Salman Fibber Ltd. Vs. Federation of Pakistan (2015 PLD 2304)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W.P. No.23960 of 2023 decided on 12.07.2023, heard on: 21.06.2023, 23.06.2023, 26.06.2023 and 27.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " ALI BAQAR NAJAFI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Salman Akram Raja, Mr. Arslan Riaz, Rai Amer Ijaz Kharal, Mr. Rabeel Safdar Tatla, Mr. Muhammad Omar Malik, Mr. Arslan Fazil, Mr. Mustafa Kamal, Malik Bashir Ahmad Khalid, Mr. M.A. Rizwan Kamboh, Mr. Qamar-uz-Zaman Cheema, Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, Mr. Hashim Aslam Butt, Mr. Naveed Khalid, Ms. Samia Aslam, Mr. Saima Safdar Chaudhary, Ms. Uzma Firdous, Malik Farrukh Khurshid, Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Hafiz Muhammad Shehzad, Ch. Iqbal Ahmad Khan Dehangal, Mr. Nauman Aziz, Mr. Abdul Rehman Qadar Khan, Barrister Hassan Qadar Khan, Rana Sohail Ashraf, Malik Imran Khan Thaheem, Mr. Muhammad Ihtisham Arshad, Mian Mehmood Rashid, Mr. Irfan Ghaus Ghumman, Mr. Irfan Dogar, Mr. Hassan Raza, Mr. S.M. Ghaffar Khan, Mr. Iftikhar Gull Khan, Mr. Muhammad Amir Masood Niazi, Barrister Muhammad Hassan Anwaar Pannun, Rana Muhammad Imran Qamar, Mr. Muhammad Tariq Bashir, Mr. Muhammad Abu Bakar, Mr. Abdul Hameed Tahir Kasuri, Mr. Ali Akbar Rana, Mr. Tanveer Ahmad Gill, Mr. Abdul Waheed Habib, Mr. Muhammad Nauman Khurshid Mayo, Mr. Waseem Ahmad, Ch. Babar Waheed, Syed Tassadaq Mustafa Naqvi, Syed Tassadaq Murtaza Naqvi, Mr. Ali Naqi Zaidi, Mr. Muhammad Anwar Khan, Mr. Muhammad Usman Latif, Mr. Muhammad Arfan Randhawa, Mr. Muhammad Umar, Syed Muhammad Ali Abdullah Mashhadi, Mr. Omer Daraz Sheikh,Sardar Jehangir Hassan Dogar, Barrister Ch. Hasnain Yunus, Mr. Mujtaba Hassan Tatla, Mian Aqeel Chaudhary, Mr. Muhammad Nadeem Abbasi, Barrister Taimoor Malik, Barrister Maleeha Bukhari, Mr. Mohsin Iqbal, Barrister Maryam Hayat, Mr. Naveed Anjum, Mr. Muhammad Irfan Khan, Mr. Fazal Elahi Akbar, Mr. Muhammad Usman Rafiq, Mr. Muhammad Imran Mansha, Mr. Moiz Tariq, Mr. Riasat Noor Zaman, Mr. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh, Mr. Muhammad Shehzad Wattoo, Mr. Muhammad Naeem, Mr. Muhammad Tahir, Mr. Haris Iftikhar, Mr. Mustafa Haroon, Mr. Mohib Ghazi, Mr. R.A. Majid, Mr. Abdul Qadus, Rana Zohaib, Mr. Anees Sherwani, Mr. Sher Baz Ali, Mr. Muhammad Imtiaz Gujjar, Mr. Muhammad Saad, Mr. Muhammad Javed Arshad, Mr. Hammad-ul-Hassan Hanjra, Malik Ghulam Hassan Ahmad, Mr. Waqar Hassan, Mian Muhammad Hussain, Mr. Nauman Azeem Butt, Mr. Abuzar Hussain, Sardar Azam Mehmood Kasana, Mian Ijaz Latif,Mr. Anees-ur-Rehman, Malik Nadir Ali Sherazi, Mehar Junaid Masood Ahmad, Mr. Faisal Zaffar, Ch. Ahsan Gujjar, Mr. Tanvir Abbas Bhatti, Mr. Muhammad Muzahir Chaudhary, Syed Alamdar Hussain, Mr. Muhammad Irfan Liaqat, Mian Subah Sadiq Klasson, Mr. Muhammad Faizan Sadiq, Syed Waqas Zafar, Mr. Aasim Sohaib, Mr. Muhammad Tahir Munir, Rana Muhammad Usama, Mr. Saad Waqas, Mr. Muhammad Imtiaz-ur-Rehman, Azeem Ullah Virk, Ch. Usman Latif, Mr. Sagheer Ahmad, advocates for the Petitioners.\nMr. Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, Mr. Badar Munir Malik, Deputy Attorney General and Ch. Usman Ghani, Assistant Attorney General for the Respondents.\nMr. Shoaib Rashid, Mr. Waleed Khalid, advocates for LESCO for the Respondents.\nMr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, advocate for LESCO/FBR/NTDC for the Respondent.\nMehr Shahid Mehmood, Deputy Manager (Legal), Mr. Basharat Ali Mehmood, Deputy Manager (Legal) LESCO for the Respondents.\nMirza Aurangzeb and Mr. Muhammad Imran Naru, advocates for GEPCO for the Respondents.\nMr. Waqar A. Sheikh, Muhammad Azeem Daniyal and Syed Faisal G.Meeran, Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema, Shehzad Ahmad Cheema, advocates for FESCO for the Respondents.\nMian Muhammad Javed and Malik Asif Rafiq Rajwana, Barrister Kashif Rafiq Rajwana, Mr. Hammad Khan Babar, Mr. Ahtisham-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Nauman Sarwar advocates for MEPCO/GEPCO with Ansar Mehmood, Chief Law Officer GEPCO for the Respondents.\nMr. Shehzad Ahmad Cheema, advocate for respondent in W.P.No.27763-2023 and W.P.No.24401-2023.\nMr. Muhammad Saqlain Arshad and Ehsan Malik for NTDC for the Respondents.\nMr. Shahid Sarwar Chahil, advocate for FBR Faisalabad for the Respondent.\nBarrister Pirzada Muhammad Aurangzaib, advocate for NEPRA for the Respondent.\nMr. Afaq Shaheen, advocate for IESCO for the Respondent.\nMr. Muhammad Ijaz Jamal, advocate for Model Town Society for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ARZOO TEXTILE MILLS LTD. ETC.\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23606", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1584 = 2023 SLD 1584 = 2023 PTD 1534 = (2024) 130 TAX 557 = 2024 SCMR 1716", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation and Condonation (Limitation Act, 1908 - Section 5)\nConnected Civil Petitions with Delayed Filing:\nA Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal (CPLA) was filed before the Supreme Court, which was barred by seven days.\nThe Supreme Court condoned the delay because it was part of multiple connected petitions involving the same question of law.\nLegal Precedent:\nThe case of FBR through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Messrs Wazir Ali and Company and others (2020 SCMR 959) was relied upon, emphasizing that technicalities like delay should not obstruct justice, especially when identical issues are under consideration.\nPrinciple Established:\nIn cases of connected petitions raising the same question of law, the Supreme Court may condone minor delays in filing if doing so serves the interest of justice.\n(b) Valuation Rulings and Provisional Release of Goods (Customs Act, 1969)\nProvisional Release under Section 81:\nSection 81 of the Customs Act allows provisional release of goods where an assessment cannot be made due to pending inquiries or tests. It provides a temporary remedy for importers until the final determination of value.\nValuation Ruling under Section 25A:\nSection 25A enables the Customs Department to issue a Valuation Ruling, which is a formal decision determining the value of a specific category of goods for assessment purposes. This ruling is binding unless challenged through prescribed procedures.\nInterplay Between Sections 25A and 81:\nHigh Court’s Misapplication: The High Court ordered the release of imported consignments under Section 81 and Rule 125, despite a Valuation Ruling having already been issued.\nSupreme Court’s Interpretation:\nSection 81 cannot be invoked when a Valuation Ruling exists because the ruling provides a definitive value for assessment.\nProvisional release under Section 81 is applicable only where assessment cannot be completed due to the need for further inquiry or testing. It is not a mechanism for bypassing a \nValuation Ruling.\nRole of Rule 125 of Customs Rules, 2001:\nRule 125 applies only when Section 81 is applicable (i.e., provisional assessments). It does not extend to situations where a Valuation Ruling exists and goods are pre-assessed.\nSupreme Courts Conclusion:\nThe High Court’s orders were inconsistent with the Customs Act, 1969, as they improperly applied Section 81 and Rule 125 in the context of an existing Valuation Ruling.\nThe Supreme Court set aside the High Courts orders, converting the petitions for leave to appeal into appeals and allowing them.\nKey Principles Derived:\nLimitation Act (Section 5):\nDelays in filing petitions may be condoned by the Supreme Court when connected petitions raise the same legal issue, ensuring substantive justice over procedural technicalities.\nCustoms Act (Sections 25A, 25D & 81):\nProvisional Release: Section 81 applies only in cases where goods cannot be assessed due to pending inquiries, not when a Valuation Ruling exists.\nValuation Rulings: These rulings provide binding assessments for the value of goods unless formally challenged under Section 25D.\nCustoms Rules (Rule 125):\nRule 125 supports provisional releases under Section 81 but is inapplicable when goods are pre-assessed through Valuation Rulings.\nJudicial Review:\nCourts must ensure that statutory provisions are applied within their intended scope. High Courts should avoid extending the application of statutory provisions in ways that contravene their legislative intent.\nImplications:\nFor Importers: Valuation Rulings under Section 25A must be challenged through proper procedures, as provisional release under Section 81 is unavailable when a ruling exists.\nFor Customs Authorities: Ensure clear distinctions between provisional assessments and pre-assessed goods to avoid procedural missteps.\nFor the Judiciary: Decisions must align with the legislative framework, avoiding interpretations that undermine statutory mandates.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25A,25D,81Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)Limitation Act, 1908=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 323-L to 326-L of 2014, decided on 23rd February, 2022, heard on: 23rd February, 2022.\n(Against the orders dated 3.12.2013, 10.12.2013, 12.12.2013 and 10.1.2014, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Writ Petitions Nos. 31010, 31839 and 32085 of 2013 and 466 of 2014)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J., SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sarfraz Ahmed Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in all cases).\nShahid Tasawar Rao, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (in C.Ps. Nos. 323-L to 325-L of 2014).\nEx-parte Respondent No. 1 (in C.P. No.326-L of 2014).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and another Vs. M/s Wasim Radio Traders, Lahore, etc.\nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and others Vs. M/s Gateway international Lahore, etc.\nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Labors and another Vs. M/s Hong Kong Telecom, Lahore, etc.\nCollector cf Customs, Customs House, Lahore and others Vs. M/s Kamla Brothers, Lahore, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23607", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1585 = 2023 = 2023 SLD 1585", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Wi ll Petition No.47033/2023.\n14.07.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/S Salman Akram Raja and Malik Bashir Ahmad Khalid, Advocates for the Petitioners.", - "Petitioner Name:": "QiipUu Textile Mills Llinllcil elc.\nVersus\nFedcmtioii of I'nkistnn etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23608", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1586 = 2023 SLD 1586", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.42272 of 2023\n21.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " RAHEEL KAMRAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abad ur Rehman, Advocate for the petitioner.\nMr. Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nMr. Muhammad Ashfaq Bhullar, Advocate for FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Abdullah Sugar\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan, etc.\nMills Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23609", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1636 = 2023 CLD 466 = 2023 SLD 1636", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTQXo", - "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]-\n-Ss. 231, 263 265-Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)-Inspection of books of account by registrar, etc.-Investigation of affairs of company on application by members or report by registrar-Scope, nature and distinction between the SECPs power of inspection under Section 231 and the power of investigation under sections 263 and 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 stated.\nSection 231 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (the Ordinance) empowers the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), as a regulator, to inspect the books of account and related books and papers of a company. So, inspection is limited to books of account and related papers and books, and it does not include other record of the company which is unrelated to the accounts of the company. The exercise of this power is administrative in nature, essentially to ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements pertaining to the books of account. Books of account are the journals and ledgers which contain financial information related to the business and include books such as purchase books, cash books, sales books, debit ledger and credit ledger amongst others. There is also a corresponding obligation on the directors, officers and employees of the company to provide all books of account and papers and to give all assistance in connection with the inspection. An inspection under section 231 of the Ordinance is, therefore, restricted in its scope and requires every director, officer or employee of the company to produce the books of account and is not an open ended inspection. Further the officer who conducts the inspection must make a report to the SECP on the inspection. This goes to the scope of inspections which is to ensure regulatory compliances and to ensure that the books of account are duly maintained as required under the law. While, there exists an obligation to record reasons in writing for the exercise of power under section 231 of the Ordinance, there is no requirement under the Ordinance for the issuance of a show cause notice stating the reasons for the inspection, for which a reply is required before passing an order under Section 231 of the Ordinance. The obligation is to issue notice to inform the company of the reasons of the inspection simplictor. The difference being that the former contains allegations for which a reply and right of hearing is needed whereas the latter simply contains information of the inspection and the reasons for it.\nOn the other hand, sections 263 and 265 of the Ordinance deal with the exercise of power of investigation by the SECP. The powers under sections 263 and 265 are wider and also come with more procedural requirements. The SECP is empowered to initiate an investigation on an application by the members or on the basis of a report of the Registrar or it can initiate an investigation if there are circumstances suggesting that the business of the company is being conducted with intent to defraud the creditors, members or any other person, or if the business is being conducted for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, or if the members concerned with the formation of the company are guilty of fraud, misfeasance, breach of trust or other misconduct. The spirit of sections 263 and 265 of the Ordinance is to ensure that the business is managed in accordance with sound business principles or prudential commercial practice and that the financial position of the company is not threatened. When carrying out an investigation, before passing an order, SECP is obligated to give an opportunity to the company to show cause against the investigation proposed to be taken. As per section 268 of the Ordinance, all officers, employees and agents of the company and all persons dealing with the company are to assist in connection with the investigation. The scope of who is to assist in investigations is wider than that of inspections. The inspectors report under section 269 of the Ordinance can form the basis of prosecution under section 270 of the Ordinance and an action under sections 271 and 272 of the Ordinance. The scope of the investigation is based on the allegations pertaining to the affairs of the company and requires a probe into the allegations to ascertain their veracity.\nThus, the provisions relating to inspection and investigation are distinct. An inspection is an administrative power exercised by the SECP to ensure compliance of regulatory requirements. This power is limited to the inspection of books of account of a company after recording of reasons for the inspection in this regard. Whereas, an investigation against a company is a serious matter, as it is capable of entailing consequences both financial and penal which will impact the goodwill of the company. Consequently, an investigation cannot be ordered except on statutory grounds which include allegations of fraud, illegalities into the affairs of the company, or misuse and misappropriation of funds of the company. It is then the duty of the SECP to consider and weigh multiple factors, such as the nature of the complaint and its source, ensure due process and follow the statutory process in good faith, without any bias, prejudice or ulterior motives. The Ordinance does not prescribe the same process for an inspection simply because its scope is limited as are its consequences.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=231,263,265Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3263 of 2022, decided on 2nd November, 2022.\n(Against judgment dated 06.06.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court Islamabad in W.P. No. 2607 of 2012)\nheard on: 2nd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Aslam Butt, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSultan Mazhar Sher Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Ibrar Saeed and Syed Asif Ali, Public Prosecutors (SECP) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAIF POWER LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Law, Civil Secretariat Islamabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23610", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1637 = 2023 CLD 372 = 2023 SLD 1637", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTQXk", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 10(9)(10)(11)(12) 22-Suit for recovery of Bank loan-Leave to defend the suit, dismissal of-Word forthwith-Effect-Framing of issues and recording of evidence-Application for leave to defend the suit filed by appellant/defendant was dismissed and Banking Court did not passing and decree, instead issues were framed, evidence was recorded and then suit was decreed-Validity-Upon rejection of leave application Banking Court was to forthwith pass and decree under S. 10(12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Word forthwith was preceded by shall that had not left any discretion with Banking Court but to pass and decree on the material that was available on record-If sufficient material was available on record and suit of respondent/plaintiff/Bank was in accord with S. 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, then there was no need to proceed further for recording of evidence-If Banking Court on consideration of plaint, leave application and reply thereto was of the view that some substantial question of law and/or fact was raised and it required evidence, then procedure of law as envisaged in Ss. 10(9), (10) (11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was to be followed-High Court set aside and decree and remanded the matter to Banking Court for decision afresh on application for leave to defend the suit filed by appellant / defendant- Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nZakaria Ghani and 4 others v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon and 8 others PLD 2016 SC 229 and Faysal Bank Limited v. Sajjad Aslam and others 2022 CLD 123 ref.\nMrs. Jawahar Afzal v. Messrs United Bank Limited 2003 CLD 119; Messrs United Bank Limited through Authorized Attorney v. Banking Court No. II and 2 others 2012 CLD 1556; Khurram Farooq v. Bank Al-Falah Limited and another 2018 CLD 1417 and Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. 2012 CLD 337 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=10(9)(10(11)(12)22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 44 of 2020/BWP, heard on 13th June, 2022.heard on: 13th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan and Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Basit Babar Chughtai for Appellants.\nAli Raza Kabeer for Respondent-Silk Bank.\nRana Rizwan Mehmood for Respondents Nos. 3 and 3(a).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs AL-BARKAT SEED CORPORATION and 3 others-Appellants\nVersus\nSILK BANK LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23611", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1638 = 2023 CLD 378 = 2023 SLD 1638", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODc", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 313, 314, 337(e) 414-Winding up proceedings stay of-Pre-conditions-Applicant/director/Chief Executive Officer of company under winding up sought stay of proceedings on the plea of formulation of revival plan and intention of induct further capital-Validity-Two conditions were required under S. 313 of Companies Act, 2017 to be satisfied for bringing an order of stay of winding up in existence (i) filing of an application either of the Official Liquidator or of any creditor or contributory or of the registrar or the Commission or a person authorized by it for stay of winding up proceedings; (ii) proof to the satisfaction of the Court that all proceedings in relation to the winding up ought to be stayed-If such two conditions were satisfied, High Court had discretion to stay winding up proceedings, either altogether or for a limited time by imposing appropriate terms and conditions-Consequence of winding up order was that all assets of the company would come under the control of Court and management of company would vest with liquidator instead of Directors and Chief Executive of the company-Applicant/director did not have any locus standi to file such petition-Only official liquidator was empowered under S. 337(e) of Companies Act, 2017 to institute or defend any suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the Company under liquidation-High Court declined to interfere in the matter as the application was not filed as per requirement of S. 313 of Companies Act, 2017 rather the same was filed by director/Chief Executive and that too without any authorization-Winding up proceedings were still underway and staying of the proceedings at such stage would cause delay in liquidation process and prejudice to the rights of other creditors, if any, as protected under S. 314 of Companies Act, 2017-Application was dismissed, in circumstances.\nSaudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company Ltd. v. Chenab Limited 2020 CLD 339 and The Additional Registrar Company v. Al-Qaim Sugar Mills Limited 2021 CLD 931 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=313.314.337(e),414Companies Act, 2017=414", - "Case #": "C.M. No. 2 of 2018 in C.O. No. 39619 of 2017, decided on 12th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Asad Buttar for Applicant.\nAdil Umar Bandial and Hashim Rathore for Petitioner-SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DEPUTY REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES-Applicant\nVersus\nMUKHTAR TEXTILES MILLS LIMITED and 8 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23612", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1639 = 2023 CLD 383 = 2023 SLD 1639", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODY", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-\n-Ss. 17 21-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 75, 76 129 illustration (g)-Environmental Protection Order, violation of-Documentary evidence-Photocopies-Benefit of doubt-Accused was proceeded against by Punjab Environmental Tribunal for violating Environmental Protection Order-During the trial, prosecution placed on record photocopies of necessary documents-Validity-Primary and best evidence was withheld by prosecution by not submitting original Environmental Protection Order and Original Compliance Status Report-Documents were to be proved by primary evidence under Art. 75 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 except the cases mentioned in Art. 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-Prosecution withheld primary evidence and only produced photocopies of Environmental Protection Order and Compliance Status Report-Prosecutor failed to satisfy the Tribunal as to where were the original documents and why those were not produced-Photo copies were not admissible in evidence and prosecution did not prove its case in accordance with Art. 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond shadow of doubt and accused was acquitted of the charge-Complaint was dismissed, in circumstances.\n2022 MLD 1941; 2021 CLC 1348; PLD 2010 SC 604 and 2011 SCMR 1009 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Punjab Environmental Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Environmental Protection Act, (XXXIV of 1997)=17,21Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=75,76,129", - "Case #": "Complaint No. 531 of 2012, decided on 13th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (R) Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, Chairperson and Muhammad Irfan, Member (General)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mohsin Sarfraz Cheema, Law Officer for EPA.\nHina Sahar, ADPP for the State.\nRespondent in person with Muhammad Yasin Hatif, Advocate Supreme Court.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR GENERAL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUNJAB-Complainant\nVersus\nMessrs UNITED ETHANOL LIMITED, TEHSIL SADIQABAD DISTRICT RAHIM YAR KHAN through Chief Executive-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23613", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1640 = 2023 CLD = 2023 SLD 1640", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODU", - "Key Words:": "Islamabad Consumer Protection Act (II of 1995)-\n-S. 2(c) (e)-Carriage by Air Act (IV of 2012), Ss. 4, 33 34-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Consumer rights-Travel by air-Liability of airline-Forum of adjudication-Petitioner/Airline was aggrieved of proceedings initiated under Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995, for imposing damages upon it for loss of baggage of respondent/passenger-Validity-Manner of determining liability of a carrier and quantum whereof were matters covered by the First Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 2012-Person, for whose benefit such claim could be made, came within the ambit of Second Schedule-In either case general provisions of law stood excluded and matter was to be determined within the four corners of Carriage by Air Act, 2012, read with its Conventions referred to in the Schedules-Said Act was special act and only provided mechanism to quantify damages under terms of Conventions-There was no exclusion provision in Carriage by Air Act, 2012, to exclude jurisdiction of any other court, tribunal or forum-Legislative intent was to be considered accordingly and claim submitted against petitioner required no interference-Consumer or complainant or any passenger who suffered loss at the hands of any carriage by air company or airline could either approach Consumer Court to claim his original amounts of loss suffered as consumer or could claim further damages, special damages, pecuniary damages from plenary court of civil jurisdiction-Rights of consumer with reference to damages or loss suffered could only be calculated on the yardstick provided in Carriage by Air Act, 2012-High Court declined to interfere in proceedings pending adjudication before Court under Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995- Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nEvacuee Trust Property Board v. Mst. Sakina Bibi 2007 SCMR 262; The Gujranwala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Hafizabad v. Muhammad Feroze PLD 1969 SC 252; Chalna Fiber Company Ltd. v. Abdul Jabbar PLD 1968 SC 381; Regional Manager, Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Lahore and 3 others 2012 CLD 846; Pakistan Mobile Communication Ltd v. Judge District Consumer Court, Gujranwala and 3 others PLD 2015 Lah. 204 and Dr. Naheed Fatima and 3 others v. Messrs Pakistan International Air Corporation (PIAC) through Chairman and another PLD 2011 Kar. 514 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995=2(c),(e)Carriage By Air Act, 2012=2(4,33,34Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petitions No. 1422 and 2579 of 2019, decided on 21st October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ikhlaq Awan for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AIR BLUE (PVT.) LIMITED through M.D. and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nJUDGE CONSUMER COURT (WEST), ISLAMABAD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23614", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1641 = 2023 CLD 397 = 2023 SLD 1641", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODQ", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 99-Suit for recovery of finance decreed-Execution proceedings-Objection-Appellant intervened execution proceedings on the ground that auction purchaser intended to dispossess him of his land purchased by him through registered sale deed during execution proceedings-Validity-Judgment and decree passed by Court were binding upon parties to proceedings-Person who was not a party to proceedings was not bound by such decree or nor it could be detrimental to their rights and interest in the property-Land mortgaged in favour of Bank was fully described in relevant documents of Bank and also in the plaint- Such description was incorporated in the notice published for auction of property, in report of the court auctioneer as well as in sale certificate issued by Banking Court-Banking Court in execution of decree directed that possession of property be handed over to auction purchaser-High Court declined to interfere in execution proceedings- Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\nMst. Amina Begum v. Chairman Karachi Development Authority and 5 others 1993 CLC 1307 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=99", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 54 of 2016, decided on 24th February, 2022.heard on: 24th February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Shams Mehmood Mirza and Rasaal Hasan Syed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shahid Siddique for Appellant.\nSyed Ali Awas Tirmizi for Respondent No. 1.\nMs. Kashwar Naheed for Respondent No. 4.\nRespondents Nos. 2, 3 and 5 to 8 ex parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMJAD ALI-Appellant\nVersus\nAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK now ZTB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23615", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1642 = 2023 CLD 404 = 2023 SLD 1642", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTOC8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 11(1)-Suit for recovery of money-Interim decree-Phrase while granting leave to defend-Scope-Plaintiffs/customers sought passing of interim decree on the basis of facts admitted by defendant/bank-Contention of defendant/Bank was that before grant of leave to defend the suit, interim decree could not be passed-Validity-Words while granting leave to defend employed in S. 11(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, did not bar or imply that such decree could not be passed before leave to defend was granted, especially when admitted amount was payable by defendant/Bank to plaintiff/customer regardless of the fact whether leave to defend was granted or refused-High Court directed defendant/Bank to return admitted amounts to plaintiffs / customers and interim decree was passed-Application was allowed accordingly.\nBank of Punjab through SVP v. TN Pakistan Pvt. Ltd. 2014 CLD 1341 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,11(1)", - "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 41078 of 2022, decided on 18th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muzamil Akhtar Shabir, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Bilal Hassan Minto, Ahmad Manzur and Muhammad Usman Sheikh for Plaintiffs/Applicants.\nShahzada Mazhar, Jawad Khan Lodhi, Zahid Umar, Rizwan Rasool and Nouman Ahmad for Defendant No. 1/H.B.L.\nHashim Waqar Butt and Mian Kashif Abbas for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.\nSajjad Ali for MCB Bank (in C.Ms. Nos. 3 and 4).", - "Petitioner Name:": "UZMA TAHRIM and others-Plaintiffs/Applicants\nVersus\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and others-Defendants/Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23616", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1643 = 2023 CLD 410 = 2023 SLD 1643", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTOCs", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 2(b) 19(7)-Execution of decree-Pecuniary jurisdiction-Determination-Respondent/Bank filed suit for recovery of Rs. 109.460 million and after passing of consent decree, amount claimed by decree-holder bank was reduced to Rs. 64.900 million-Applicant/ debtor sought transfer of Execution Proceedings to Banking Court on the plea of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of High Court-Validity-Applicant/ debtor on one hand accepted concession of easy installments along with conditional waiving off the claims regarding amounts of costs of funds, charges, markups etc. while not objecting to original decree despite the same being less than Rs. 100 million and not even at subsequent stage of modified agreement while taking further concessions-Applicant/ debtor on the other hand took a totally different plea of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction at much belated stage-Such transfer application seemed to be an attempt to avoid scheduled and agreed upon payments/installments-If stance of applicant/ debtor was to be accepted as correct then as a necessary consequence initial consent decree was also liable to be set aside on the sole ground of being coram non judice and in that case applicant/ debtor was bound to pay Rs. 109.460 million claim of respondent/Bank-High Court declined to transfer execution proceedings to Banking Court on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction-Application was dismissed, in circumstances.\nHabib Bank Limited through Attorneys v. Messrs Rehmania Textiles Mills (Pvt.) Limited Jhang Road, Faisalabad 2003 CLD 689; Mashraq Bank v. Messrs Amtul Rehman Industries (Pvt.) Limited and others 2002 CLD 336 and MCB Bank Limited through Duly Authorized Attorney v. Eden Developers (Pvt.) Limited and others 2019 CLD 219 ref.\nMuhammad Khalid alias Khalid Mehmood and others v. Muhammad Yousaf and others 2017 YLR 2347; Muhammad Yousaf v. Mrs. Muhammad Mohsin and 5 another 1986 MLD 342; Dr. Pir Muhammad Khan v. Khuda Bukhsh and others 2015 SCMR 1243 and Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1454 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(b),19(7)", - "Case #": "Execution Application No. 64900 of 2017, heard on 7th February, 2023.heard on: 7th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms. Minahil Khan for the decree-holder Bank.\nMuhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court, Aqif Majeed, Fazal Mehmood, Bilal Mehmood and Rao Zahid for the Judgment-Debtor.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB BANK LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs MAZCO INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23617", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1644 = 2023 CLD 417 = 2023 SLD 1644", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODk", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 281, 282 283-Scheme of arrangement-Scope-Petitioner companies sought approval to transfer the entire undertaking of two companies to third company-Validity-Under the Scheme of Arrangement, the entire undertaking and business of the two companies, including their assets, rights, properties, benefits, powers, privileges, contracts, liabilities, encumbrances, obligations, and dues, would be transferred, vested, and assumed by the third company-Additionally, the Scheme of Arrangement would result in the cancellation of the share capital of the transferor companies, causing them to cease to exist or be dissolved without winding up-Scheme of Arrangement had taken care of the members, creditors, employees, and shareholders of the transferor companies, ensuring the security of their rights and interests-If the business of the transferor companies were to continue, the merged entity would need to amend its memorandum and articles of association to accommodate such activities-Petitioner Companies had fulfilled all the necessary legal formalities, including holding separate meetings of shareholders and board of directors, and publishing and issuing notices to the SECP-As the High Court could not challenge the of the petitioners in approving the Scheme of Arrangement, therefore, the petition was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,281,282,283", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 47 of 2021, decided on 20th February, 2023.heard on: 8th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Fahem Ahson Hashmi and Ms. Sanaya Vachha for Petitioners.", - "Petitioner Name:": "G.A. ENTERPRISES (PRIVATE) LIMITED AND 2 OTHERS: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23618", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1645 = 2023 CLD 420 = 2023 SLD 1645", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTODg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 72-Nomination by policy holder-Scope-Section 72 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, authorizes and empowers the policy holder to nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of the policy holders death-However, this provision of the law does not exclude the legal heirs from inheriting the assets, including the policy proceeds, of the deceased in accordance with the principles of Islamic Law-Constitution guarantees that no law can be made which is contrary to the Injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah, which stipulate that the legal heirs of a deceased Muslim will inherit their assets according to the principles of Islamic Law-Nominee is only supposed to collect the policy proceeds and disburse them among the legal heirs-Furthermore, the nominee must not exclude or deprive the legal heirs of the fruits of the policy.\nPLD 1991 SC 731 distinguished.\nMst. Ameer Khatoon v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2005 SCMR 512; Mst. Amtal Habib and others v. Mst. Musarat Perveen and others PLD 1974 SC 185 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Zonal Head Lahore v. Rabia Jamshaid and others C.P No.1810 of 2011 rel.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 72-Nomination by policy holder-Scope-Role of the nominee is simply to collect the proceeds of the policy as a trustee and then distribute it among the legal heirs of the insured person.\nMst. Ameer Khatoon v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2005 SCMR 512; Mst. Amtal Habib and others v. Mst. Musarat Perveen and others PLD 1974 SC 185 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Zonal Head Lahore v. Rabia Jamshaid and others C.P No.1810 of 2011 rel.\n(c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 72-Nomination by policy holder-Scope-Section 72 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, empowers the policy holder, when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment, nominate a person or persons as the beneficiary of the policy to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of the insured persons death.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=72", - "Case #": "Case No. 16 of 2023, decided on 10th March, 2023.heard on: 8th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (R) Ali Akbar Qureshi, Chairman and Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member (Legal)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Usman Ali Butt for Petitioner.\nBarrister Mian Hammad Ahmad for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nNemo for Respondent No. 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD UMAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nIGI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23619", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1646 = 2023 CLD = 2023 SLD 1646", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTOHo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 72-Nomination by policy holder-Scope-Section 72 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, authorizes and empowers the policy holder to nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of the policy holders death-However, this provision of the law does not exclude the legal heirs from inheriting the assets, including the policy proceeds, of the deceased in accordance with the principles of Islamic Law-Constitution guarantees that no law can be made which is contrary to the Injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah, which stipulate that the legal heirs of a deceased Muslim will inherit their assets according to the principles of Islamic Law-Nominee is only supposed to collect the policy proceeds and disburse them among the legal heirs-Furthermore, the nominee must not exclude or deprive the legal heirs of the fruits of the policy.\nPLD 1991 SC 731 distinguished.\nMst. Ameer Khatoon v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2005 SCMR 512; Mst. Amtal Habib and others v. Mst. Musarat Perveen and others PLD 1974 SC 185 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Zonal Head Lahore v. Rabia Jamshaid and others C.P No.1810 of 2011 rel.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 72-Nomination by policy holder-Scope-Role of the nominee is simply to collect the proceeds of the policy as a trustee and then distribute it among the legal heirs of the insured person.\nMst. Ameer Khatoon v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2005 SCMR 512; Mst. Amtal Habib and others v. Mst. Musarat Perveen and others PLD 1974 SC 185 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Zonal Head Lahore v. Rabia Jamshaid and others C.P No.1810 of 2011 rel.\n(c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 72-Nomination by policy holder-Scope-Section 72 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, empowers the policy holder, when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment, nominate a person or persons as the beneficiary of the policy to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of the insured persons death.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=72", - "Case #": "Case No. 16 of 2023, decided on 10th March, 2023.heard on: 8th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (R) Ali Akbar Qureshi, Chairman and Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member (Legal)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Usman Ali Butt for Petitioner.\nBarrister Mian Hammad Ahmad for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nNemo for Respondent No. 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD UMAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nIGI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23620", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1647 = 2023 CLD 426 = 2023 SLD 1647", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTOHk", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 282, 283 285-Scheme of arrangement-Merger and demergers-Scope-Petitioners sought approval of Scheme of Arrangement, which involved the demerger of four portions of an undertaking from the transferor company and their merger into four transferee companies, while the remaining undertaking was to stay with the transferor company-Validity-Separate meetings were held for the members of the transferor and transferee companies, and 100% of the members had approved the Scheme of Arrangement-Secured creditors had not raised any objections and certificates to that effect were placed on record-Scheme of Arrangement was arrived at by a majority and no objections were raised by the entire body of shareholders, ensuring the protection of their interests-Scheme of Arrangement and demerger of the undertaking was found to be in compliance with the requirements of the law-As a result, the petition was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,282,283,285", - "Case #": "Judicial Companies Miscellaneous No. 45 of 2021, decided on 2nd February, 2023.heard on: 2nd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mikael Azmat Rahim for Petitioners.\nIbad-ur-Rehman, Law Officer on Court's Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASSOCIATED CONSULTING ENGINEERS ACE LIMITED AND 4 OTHERS: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23621", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1648 = 2023 CLD 429 = 2023 SLD 1648", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 3 2(k)-Abuse of dominant position-Relevant market-Scope-Complainants (Internet Service Providers) alleged that the respondent (Electricity Supply Company) was in a dominant position in the relevant market for right of way for aerial cables across electricity poles and had violated Ss. 3 4 of the Competition Act, 2010-Contention of respondent was that it did not operate in the relevant market and was active in a separate market altogether-Validity-Issue at hand did not concern supply/distribution of electricity but the public right of way to be/or being provided by respondent-Electricity distribution facilities covered an area of approximately 78,088 sq. km, which further strengthened the aspect of dominance of the respondent in the relevant market of right of way as it owned/managed a significant number of electric poles and no other adequate substitutes were available in the relevant market-Respondents argument was rejected.\n(b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 3 2(k)-Abuse of dominant position-Relevant market-Substitutability-Scope-Complainants (Internet Service Providers) alleged that the respondent (Electricity Supply Company) was in a dominant position in the relevant market for right of way for aerial cables across electricity poles and had violated Ss. 3 4 of the Competition Act, 2010-Contention of respondent was that the complainants had substitutes for right of way-Validity-Developing and digging underground passages required heavy investment cost and prior approvals from the relevant authorities and there also existed practical impediments for laying down underground cables such as lack of access to corridors/green belts on road, streets, etc-As for PTCL (telecommunication company) poles, the same were customized to PTCLs own requirements i.e. installed at the end of PTCLs underground network of cables-Streetlight poles were not a suitable substitute due to being scattered, positioned in different areas and not being available in all areas-Respondents argument was rejected.\n(c) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 3-Abuse of dominant position-Price discrimination-Scope-Complainants (Internet Service Providers) alleged that the respondent (Electricity Supply Company) was in a dominant position in the relevant market for right of way for aerial cables across electricity poles and had committed price discrimination by charging different prices for the same service from the complainants as compared to the price charged from normal TV cable operators-Validity-Respondent charged complainants PKR 100 per pole/structure, while TV cable operators paid only PKR 10-Such discriminatory conduct was solely for the reason of the dominant position it held rather than for any objective reasons and could be deemed to be exploitative and harmful for undertakings deploying Aerial Optical Fiber Cable-Respondent was found to have acted in violation of S. 3(3)(b) of the Competition Act, 2010-Respondent was directed to provide access to the right of way to the complainants on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and not to repeat the prohibited act.\n(d) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 3-Abuse of dominant position-Unfair trading conditions-Scope-Complainants (Internet Service Providers) alleged that the respondent (Electricity Supply Company) was in a dominant position in the relevant market for right of way for aerial cables across electricity poles and had imposed unfair conditions on the complainants by stipulating 10 minutes free advertising for it and free internet facility for its offices on top of charging a rent for use of the relevant service-Validity-Conditions appeared onerous and not freely negotiated upon by the parties concerned-It could also be treated as an added barrier for undertakings to compete effectively and efficiently in the market for provision of internet cable and telephony services-In terms of monetary value, it was also an added cost-Competition Commission declared that the contravention in terms of S. 3(3)(a) of the Competition Act, 2010 had been committed by the respondent-Respondent was directed to provide access to the right of way to the complainants on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and not to repeat the prohibited act.\nCase T-139/98 Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Slato (AAMS) v. The European Commission [2001] and Ravinder Singh Bawa and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited Case No. 13 of 2022 rel.\n(e) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 3-Abuse of dominant position-Refusal to deal-Scope-Complainants (Internet Service Providers) alleged that the respondent (Electricity Supply Company) was in a dominant position in the relevant market for right of way for aerial cables across electricity poles and had violated Ss. 3 4 of the Competition Act, 2010-Contention of respondent was that it had annulled the Pole Renting Policy-Complainants claimed that refusal to provide right of way amounted to refusal to deal in violation of S. 3(3)(h) of the Competition Act, 2010-Validity-Section 27A of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 and Policy Directive issued by the Federal Government had imposed a legal obligation on the respondent to provide right of way-Conduct of the respondent was discriminatory as admittedly, decommissioning notices related to the removal of cables were only sent to the complainants-No other action was taken against normal cable TV operators-Annulment of the Pole Renting Policy and denial of right of way might not be a classic refusal to deal under S. 3(3)(h) on the part of respondent i.e. solely based on a monopolistic intent to of keeping the facility/poles for its own commercial benefit or to strengthen its own dominant position, nevertheless, a clear contravention of S. 3 of the Competition Act, 2010, was established through the respondents discriminatory and unfair conduct concerning the complainants-Respondent was directed to restore access to the right of way to the complainants on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and not to repeat the prohibited act.\nCase C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom v. Commission,\nECR 1-09555 rel.\n(f) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 2(k)-Relevant market-Scope-Relevant market definition for the purposes of competition law is an open definition and revolves around the concerned product/service being offered, taking into consideration both demand-side and supply-side factors.\n(g) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 3-Abuse of dominant position-Unfair trading conditions-Scope-Term unfair trading conditions is indeed wide in scope and deals with either or both exclusionary and exploitative forms of abuse of dominance-It includes unfairly coercing customers by forcing an entity to sell services against their will and unfairly taking advantage of ones superior bargaining position to impair free decision making of a transacting party.\n(h) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 3- Abuse of dominant position- Scope- Section 3(3) is not exhaustive and only enumerative-Section 3 prohibits any abuse by an undertaking that is in a dominant position.\nCase AT 39523 - Slovak Telekom [2014] and Case C-165/19 P Slovak Telekom v. European Commission [2021] ref.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=3,2(k)", - "Case #": "F. No. 382/PESCO/C&TA/CCP/2020, decided on 13th December, 2022.Dates of hearing: 10th, 21st, June, 7th July, 24th November and 8th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Ms. Rahat Kaunain Hassan, Chairperson and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sultan Mazhar Sher, Advocate Supreme Court, Irfan Reayat, Chief Law Officer, PESCO, Aslam Khan Gandapur, Chief Operating Officer, Ishfaq, Director Safety and Atif Jawad, Safety Department for Messrs Peshawar Electric Supply Company Limited.\nMuhammad Ahmed, Company Secretary and Ms. Zainab Janjua, Advocate High Court Ajuris for Messrs Nayatel (Pvt.) Limited.\nShahid Rafique Dogar, Assistant Manager (Legal and Regulatory Affairs) and MNA Rehan, Advocate AQLAAL for Messrs Cyber Internet Services (Pvt.) Limited.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHOW CAUSE NOTICE ISSUED TO MESSRS PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD.: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23622", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1649 = 2023 CLD 454 = 2023 SLD 1649", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDY", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 282, 283 285-Scheme of arrangement-Merger and demergers-Scope-Petitioners requested for Courts approval of a Scheme of Arrangement, which involved specific portions of undertakings of companies Nos. 1 and 2 vesting in company No. 3, while the companies Nos. 1 and 2 would continue to operate as going concerns, as well as company No. 3 with their existing names, without any of them being dissolved-Cumulative effect of this arrangement would be a reduction in shareholders equity of companies Nos. 1 and 2, particularly in their issued and paid-up share capital-Consequently, the shares of company No. 3 would be allotted to those transferring shareholders whose shares in companies Nos. 1 and 2 were cancelled owing to reduction in issued and paid-up share capital-Petitioners had completed all necessary legal formalities, including holding separate meetings of shareholders and creditors and publishing and issuing notices to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-As there no obstacles to granting the petition, same is allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,282,283,285", - "Case #": "J.C.M. Petition No. 44 of 2021, decided on 17th February, 2023.heard on: 17th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mikhael Azmat Rahim for Petitioners.\nIbad-ur-Rehman, Law Officer for the SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SHAFI TANNERIES (PRIVATE) LIMITED AND 2 OTHERS: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23623", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1650 = 2023 CLD 456 = 2023 SLD 1650", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDU", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 122-Insurance claim-Scope-Insurance Company approached a medical college to provide coverage for the annual fees of students-Along with the Group Family Takaful coverage plan, it was a condition precedent that students also purchase the Salamati Plan, whereby the company provided life coverage to the students-Petitioner, through her father, deposited the first premium for both policies-Later, her father died and the petitioner approached the Insurance Tribunal after her insurance claim was not taken note of-Argument of the insurance company was that the father of the petitioner had failed to pay the second premium within the stipulated time, causing the policy to lapse-Validity-Process of the two policies was completed when the consideration of the contract was paid and accepted by the insurance company-Both policies were silent about the date of premium payment, whereas the Salamati Plan document bore the date of premium payment as the 25th of February each year-First premium was paid against a receipt on 18-2-2020, indicating that the period was to be started from that date until 25-2-2021-Contract had to be construed and interpreted objectively-Father of the petitioner had died on 21-3-2021 within the grace period of 25-2-2021 to 25-3-2021, making the insurance company responsible, according to the terms of the policy documents, for paying the annual fee of the petitioners MBBS (four-year) program-Petition was allowed.\nMuhammad Shahnawaz and 44 others v. Karachi Electric Supply Company and others 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1579 and Universal Insurance Company and another v. Karim Gul and another PLD 2021 SC 906 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122", - "Case #": "Case No. 31 of 2022, decided on 1st March, 2023.heard on: 9th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (R) Ali Akbar Qureshi, Chairman Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member (Legal)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haris Iftikhar for the Petitioner.\nMs. Iqra Riaz and Abdul Hameed Chohan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. KHADIJA AKHTAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nDAWOOD FAMILY TAKAFUL-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23624", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1651 = 2023 CLD 464 = 2023 SLD 1651", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 282, 283 285-Scheme of arrangement-Scope-Petitioners requested the Courts approval of Scheme of Arrangement, which involved merging company No. 3 into company No. 2 through the management of company No. 1-Scheme of Arrangement provided for the transfer, vesting, and assumption of the entire undertaking and business of company No. 3, including its assets, rights, properties, benefits, powers, privileges, contracts, liabilities, encumbrances, obligations and dues by company No. 2-Consequently, company No. 2 would operate under its name, while company No. 3 would stand dissolved without being wound up-Scheme of Arrangement safeguarded the rights and interests of members, creditors, employees and certificate holders-No objection certificate was secured from Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and secured creditors-Petitioners completed all necessary legal formalities, including holding separate meetings of certificate holders and board of directors and publishing and issuing notices to the SECP-No certificate holder of any of the companies objected to the scheme-As there were no obstacles to granting the petition, it was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,282,283,285", - "Case #": "J.C.M. Petition No. 18 of 2022, decided on 7th February, 2023.heard on: 7th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mikael Azmat for Petitioner.\nIbad-ur-Rehman, Law Officer for SECP on Court's Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HABIB METROPOLITAN MODARABA MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED AND 2 OTHERS: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23625", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1652 = 2023 CLD 599 = 2023 SLD 1652", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Federal Investigating Agency Act, 1974 (VIII of 1975)-\n-S. 5(5)-Restrictions imposed on property rights-Pre-conditions-Powers under S. 5(5) of Federal Investigating Agency Act, 1974 are based on four ingredients: (i) property has some nexus with investigation/alleged offence; (ii) there is likelihood that the property is to be removed, transferred or otherwise disposed of before an order passed by appropriate authority for its seizure is obtained; (iii) by issuing an order in writing directing the owner or any person who is for the time being in possession thereof not to remove, transfer or otherwise dispose of such property in any manner; and (iv) the order has to be subject to any order made by the Court having jurisdiction in the matter-Powers bestowed upon members of FIA under S. 5(5) of Federal Investigating Agency Act, 1974, are not unfettered, rather are subject to certain restrictions and limitations, required to be used sparingly and in cases of exceptional nature.\nNajib Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and 3 others PLD 2017 Sindh 53; Muhammad Sohail Shaikh v. The State and 2 others PLD 2021 Lah. 612 and Fazal Mahmood v. Sardar Khan PLD 1996 Kar. 475 rel.\n(b) Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010)-\n-Ss. 2 3-Money laundering-Pre-condition-Necessary element of offence of money laundering is commission of a predicate offence-Execution of predicate offence gives birth to proceeds of crime, the movement of which attracts criminal conduct of money laundering-Without commission of predicate offence there cannot be an offence of money laundering.\nJustice Qazi Faez Isa v. The President of Pakistan PLD 2021 SC 1 rel.\n(c) Federal Investigating Agency Act, 1974 (VIII of 1975)-\n-S. 5(5)-Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010), Ss. 3 4-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Quashing of proceedings- Restrictions imposed on Bank accounts and properties-Petitioners were aggrieved of initiation of inquiry by Federal Investigating Agency and imposing restrictions on their properties and bank accounts-Validity-There was no Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) against petitioners nor Federal Investigating Agency had any report in its possession to reasonably believe that property was involved in Money-Laundering-Investigating officer did not seek permission of Trial Court to attach Bank accounts nor had sent any notice to petitioners-Seizure of property was not made in accordance with the law rather the same was in contravention of the provision of law-Seizure of Bank accounts of the petitioners was nothing but a nullity in the eye of law-High Court set aside seizure letter issued by Federal Investigating Agency as the same suffered from perversity and clear transgression of authority and was nullity in the eye of law-Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\nMaryam Nawaz Sharif v. Chairman, NAB and 2 others PLD 2020 Lah. 205 and Rafi Ullah v. State 2019 PCr.LJ 1608 ref.\n(d) Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002)-\n-Ss. 2(xi), (xv), 23(3)(f), 23(4) 23(6)-Pakistan Oil (Refining, Blending, Transportation, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, Rr. 34 35-License, issuance of-Pre-condition-Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority allows provisional licensee to undertake marketing of petroleum products/refined oil products, when it completes first storage facility and area of marketing is restricted to Province, where it develops that storage/depots and so on till it completes the entire work programme, which entitles the licensee to have a licence for a longer period i.e. maximum 30 years-New licensee does not have to first complete all its entire marketing infrastructure before having license for undertaking marketing of petroleum product, establish retail outlets and filling stations during initial license period, which are a part and parcel of the work programme-Provision of R. 35 of Pakistan Oil (Refining, Blending, Transportation, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, nowhere places any embargo that licensee cannot operate retail outlets or its storages during the initial license term of three years.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Investigation Agency Act, (VIII of 1974)=5(5)Anti Money Laundering Act, 2010=3,4Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 72202, 70346, 73456, 73458 of 2021 and 9531 of 2022, decided on 29th December, 2022.Dates of hearing: 16th and 23rd December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Momin Malik for the Petitioner (in W.P. No. 72202 of 2021).\nBarrister Muhammad Umar Riaz, Saqib Haroon Chishti, Barrister Ch. Abubakar, Waqas Umar and Saba Shaheen for Petitioners (in W.P. No. 9531 of 2022).\nArshad Nazir Mirza, Barrister Maryam Salman, Barrister Ms. Amna Iqbal and Shan Saeed Ghumman for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 70346 of 2021).\nRai Sarfraz Ali Khan for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 73456 and 73458 of 2021).\nBarrister Ahmed Pervaiz, Barrister Saffi-ul-Hassan and Barrister Ahtasham Mukhtar on behalf of OGRA.\nAsad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General-I for Pakistan assisted by Mian Shahzad Khadim Manday, Assistant Attorney for Pakistan along with Muhammad Javed Sultan, Assistant Director, FIA for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UZMA ADIL KHAN and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nFEDERAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY through Director General, Islamabad\nand others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23626", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1653 = 2023 CLD 475 = 2023 SLD 1653", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNCs", - "Key Words:": "Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 11 31(1)(d)(i)-Competition (Merger Control) Regulation, 2016, Regln. 6-Pre-merger proceedings-Acquiring of shares-Pakistan Stock Exchange intended to acquire total shares of Central Depository Company (CDC) from two seller companies-Validity-Intention of acquisition is based on two circumstances i.e. where parties have signed a share purchase agreement, or have agreed in principle to proceed with the transaction-Provision of S. 11(2) of Competition Act, 2010, deals with a situation where an undertaking intends to acquire and provision of S. 11(3) of Competition Act, 2010, deals with the situation where the concerned undertaking agrees in principle or signs a non-binding letter of intent-Intent to acquire more shares in CDC as disclosed in Pakistan Stock Exchanges financial statement, did not attract pre-merger notification requirement, until willingness of the seller existed-Phase II review was not tenable to the extent to allow clearance for subject transaction and review remaining potentially acquisitions up to the extent of percentage so mentioned-Competition Commission was not empowered to treat such transaction in piecemeal and the same was contradictory to the stance of Pakistan Stock Exchange, where it had itself stated that such a transaction was not at all certain and would require a number of steps to be consumed before Pakistan Stock Exchange would be in a position to submit a pre-merger application and such was premature-Competition Commission could not assume or approve a transaction hypothetically-In regulatory scheme, timeline envisaged was not followed, therefore notwithstanding the regulatory intent, the Commission could not proceed on mere assumption in the absence of willing sellers-Competition Commission restricted Phase II review to the extent of Pakistan Stock Exchanges acquiring specified percentage of shareholdings in CDC-Current acquisition of specified percentage of share-holdings taking the total share-holding to a specific percentage in CDC did not raise any competition concern and would not lead to any material change in control in CDC or lessening of competition in the relevant market-Proposed transaction was authorized under S. 31(1)(d)(i) of Competition Act, 2010-In subject transaction, the matters that might fall outside the scope of Commissions purview remained subject to applicable laws-Application was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=11,31(1)(d)(i)", - "Case #": "Case No. 1346/Merger-CCP/22, decided on 21st March, 2023.heard on: 13th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ms. Rahat Kaunain Hassan, Chairperson and Ahmed Qadir, Director General", - "Lawyer Name:": "Farrukh H. Khan, Chief Executive Officer, Nadir Rehman, Chief Operating Officer, Dr. Fakhara Rizwan, Company Secretary, Tariq Qureshi, Director General Manager, Vaseeq Khalid, Partner, Mohsin Tayebaly & Co. and Ms. Eman Siddique, Associate, Mohsin Tayebaly & Co. for Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited.\nBadiuddin Akber, Chief Executive Officer and Shariq Jafrani, Chief Financial Officer, Company Secretary and Head of Legal for Central Depository Company of Pakistan Limited.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ACQUISITION OF UPTO % SHAREHOLDING OF MESSRS CENTRAL DEPOSITORY COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LIMITED BY MESSRS PAKISTAN STOCK EXCHANGE LIMITED FROM MESSRS ALLIED BANK LIMITED AND MESSRS IGI INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED: In re" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23627", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1654 = 2023 CLD 491 = 2023 SLD 1654", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Suit for recovery of finance facility-Maintainability-Locus standi to institute suit-Attorney holder-Suit was instituted by bank official who was attorney holder of the Bank-Defendant/customer raised objection that suit was not instituted by a competent person-Validity-Attorney holder was authorized through Special Power of Attorney executed in his favour by the President and Chief Executive of plaintiff Bank to institute the suit-Chairman of Board of Directors of plaintiff Bank appointed general power of attorney authorizing him to further delegate his powers authorizing him certain powers including the powers to take all requisite steps/actions in relation to legal proceedings of plaintiff Bank-Suit was instituted by competent person having requisite authority from President/CEO of plaintiff Bank under special power of attorney-Objection was rejected, in circumstances.\nThe Bank of Punjab v. Magic River Services and 4 others 2016 CLD 171 rel.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 10-Suit for recovery of finance-Leave to defend the suit, refusal of-Evasive defense-Effect-Plaintiff/Bank filed suit for recovery of finance against which defendant/customer sought leave to defend the suit-Validity-Provisions of S. 10(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were mandatory in nature-Non-compliance of mandatory provisions entailed penal consequences, as provided under S. 10(6) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Execution of documents filed with plaint was not denied by defendants/customers in Petition for Leave to Appear and were not entitled for leave to defend in the suit-Defendants/customers did not discharge their obligations as per the agreements, therefore, suit was rightly instituted by plaintiff/Bank-Where defendant had not complied with mandatory requirement of law, the plaintiff was entitled to have the suit decreed in his favour as mandated under S. 10(12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Defense set up in defendants application for leave to defend the suit was evasive, improbable and no substantial questions of law or facts were raised in the leave application-Suit was decreed accordingly.\nPagets Law first published in 1904; National Bank of Pakistan v. Kohinoor Spinning Mills Limited and others 2021 CLD 1112; Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Ltd. and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500; Muhammad Arshad and another v. Citibank N.A., Lahore 2006 SCMR 1347; The Bank of Punjab v. Messrs Magic River Services and 4 others 2016 CLD 171; Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268; Syed Abbas Ali v. Bank of Punjab through Manager and others 2015 CLD 1409; NIB Bank Limited v Mirza Ghulam Mujtaba 2015 CLD 1547; National Bank of Pakistan v. Najma Sugar Mills Limited 2015 CLD 1990; Messrs Al-Madan Coal Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Regional Development Finance Corporation 2009 CLD 645 and Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. City Steel Industries Lahore through Partners and others 2023 CLD 235 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9", - "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 175411 of 2018, decided on 16th January, 2023.heard on: 16th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Adil Umar Bandial, Sajjad Ali, Kh. Fahad Ahmad, Asad Farzand and Muhammad Waqas for Platinff.\nMuhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court with Akif Majeed and Hassan Ismail for Defendants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB BANK LIMITED-Plaintiff\nVersus\nTANVEER SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23628", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1655 = 2023 CLD 517 = 2023 SLD 1655", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNDg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 118- Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims-Scope-On completion of all formalities, if the claim is not satisfied/cleared within ninety days without any fault of the claimant when it becomes due, then, under the implied term of every contract of insurance the liquidated damages must be granted.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 118-Group insurance contract-Legal heirs of insured person-Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims-Entitlement of legal heirs to claim liquidated damages under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Scope-Group insurance is designed to provide monetary benefits to the family of the assured person; particularly, if the assured person has not defaulted in payment of premium amount-In the present case the insurer had failed to prove that its failure to pay the claim within the stipulated time of 90 days (mentioned under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000) was due to circumstances beyond its control-Claim of the widow and legal heirs of deceased assured person for payment of liquidated damages was well founded, and thus, they were entitled to receive it-Appeal was dismissed.\nMadan Gopal v. Maran Bepari PLD 1969 SC 617 ref.\n(c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 2(xlv)- Insurance policy-Effective date-Policy/contract becomes effective from the date it is signed by the executants.\nBhaiyat v. L. Chong Kha and others AIR 1934 Rangoon 342 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=118", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 929 of 2017 and C.M.A. No. 1708 of 2019, decided on 6th March, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 22.05.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Insurance Appeal No. 1288 of 2015)heard on: 6th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz Ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for Appellants.\nLiaqat Ali Butt, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for Respondent No. 1.\nSanaullah Zahid, Additional A.G. and Shahid Fiaz, DEO (S.E), Narowal for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION and another-Appellants/Applicants\nVersus\nMst. RAZIA AMEER and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23629", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1656 = 2023 CLD 521 = 2023 SLD 1656", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNHo", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 66 90-Execution of decree-Sale, objections to-Inadequate price-Appellant/ debtor after confirmation of sale through auction and delivery of possession assailed auction proceedings on inadequacy of sale price-Validity-Auction proceedings in respect of property in question were conducted, sale was confirmed and possession of suit property along with its title/documentation was conveyed/transferred to auction purchaser-Rights of such auction purchaser could not be disregarded-Order confirming sale through auction had attained finality and appellant/ debtor failed to raise any logical and legal ground, which required interference of High Court in bona fide rights of auction purchaser-High Court maintained the order passed by Executing Court as the same was in consonance with law-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nPLD 2003 SC 500; PLD 2014 SC 283; Mst. Anwar Sultana v. Bank Al-Falah Ltd. and others 2014 SCMR 1222; Mumtaz-ud-Din Feroz v. Shaikh Iftikhar Adil and others 2009 CLD 594; Mst. Noor Khatoon and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd and another 2013 CLC 702; Muhammad Rafiq through Attorney v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and others 2013 CLD 1667 and Hudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1987 SC 512 ref.\nUnited Bank Limited v. Messrs A.Z Hashmi (Pvt.) Limited and others 2000 CLC 1438 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=66,90", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 5 of 2018, decided on 2nd November, 2022.heard on: 2nd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Kausar Sultana Hussain, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jawaid Farooqui for Appellant.\nWaqar Ahmed for Respondent No. 1.\nAyatullah Khawaja for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ANJUM SALEEM-Appellant\nVersus\nCITI BANK and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23630", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1657 = 2023 CLD 525 = 2023 SLD 1657", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJTNHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXI, R. 66(2)(e), proviso-Reserve price-Court, duty of-Scope-Fixing value of property is a matter of opinion and Court cannot give its opinion on such point-Object of proviso to O. XXI, R. 66(2)(e), C.P.C., is to relieve Court from the burden of affirming accuracy of value of property shown in proclamation of sale and to enable prospective purchaser to form his own opinion relying upon the estimates given by parties-Provision of O. XXI, R. 66(2)(e), C.P.C. stipulates that proclamation must contain every other thing which the Court considers material for a purchaser to know in order to judge nature and value of property.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 83-Execution of decree-Reserved price-Auction at low price-Limine control, doctrine of-Applicability-Appellant/ debtor assailed reserve price of mortgaged property on the plea of Executing court fixing the same on lesser side-Validity-Nothing stopped debtor to locate and bring forward a buyer of her choice either in auction or before the Court prior to sale if property was to be sold for a price which in the estimation of debtor was on the lower side-Sales under O. XXI, R. 83, C.P.C., could be postponed to enable a debtor for raising money through private sale of the property-Judgment debtor could not be allowed to derail auction process by submitting evaluation report prepared at his instance instead of arranging a buyer for the properties to be auctioned-Condition of confirmation of sale by Court also operated as the biggest safeguard against the property which was sold at inadequate price irrespective of the fact whether any irregularity or fraud in conduct of sale was committed or not-Banking Court rightly dismissed application of appellant / debtor as there was no illegality or perversity in orders which were passed in accordance with law-High Court applying doctrine of Limine Control declined to interfere in the order passed by Executing Court-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nDr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212; Al-Hadi Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd through Chief Executive and 4 others v. MCB Bank Limited and 6 others 2023 CLD 85 and Messrs Colony Textile Mills Limited and another v. First Punjab Modaraba 2021 CLD 1212 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=66(2)(e)", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 20277 of 2023, decided on 27th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Jawad Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Imran Mohammad Naeem for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HUMAIRA MEHBOOB-Appellant\nVersus\nSUMMIT BANK LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23631", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1658 = 2023 CLD 530 = 2023 SLD 1658", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzc", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 2(49), 225(2) 228(1)-Exemption from disclosures-Principle-Remuneration of directors-Exemption was sought on the count that disclosure of remuneration of CEO/director was a cause of concern-Validity-Such financial statement would reveal such facts for public and would then be available for public inspection-It was not a cause where exemption could be granted in public interest-Appellant was a company whose shares were held by holding company and was incorporated abroad-Appellant was not a company strictly in terms of S. 2(49) of Companies Act, 2017, which even itself had restricted right to transfer its shares which rested with holding company-Company which was a subsidiary, whose shares were held by a holding company and consolidated financial statements of the group was attached with financial statement of that holding company, then such consolidated financial statement of the group would serve as a single enterprise and such consolidated financial statement would comply with disclosure requirement of relevant law and financial reporting standards notified by the Commission-Holding company had not discharged such obligations, if at all it was under such duty-Holding company did not disclose such data in consolidated financial statements of the group and presented as those of single enterprise and that such would be within domain of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, so the purpose of non-disclosure of the remuneration of CEO or director of relevant company whose shares were held, would be inconsequential-If the requirement of S. 228(1) of Companies Act, 2017, was achieved by any means, application then for such exemption would stand matured for consideration-Appeal was rejected, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=2(49),225(2),228(1)", - "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2 of 2022, decided on 13th February, 2023.Dates of hearing: 6th, 20th December, 2022 and 18th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mayhar Kazi for Appellant.\nS. Imran Ali Shamsi, Law Officer for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCKINSEY AND COMPANIES PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Authorized Representative-Appellant\nVersus\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23632", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1659 = 2023 CLD 534 = 2023 SLD 1659", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzY", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXVII, R. 3-Suit for recovery of money on the basis of negotiable instrument-Leave to defend the suit-Condition, imposition of-Principle-Denial of negotiable instrument-Petitioner/defendant was aggrieved of grant of conditional leave to defend the suit by Trial Court-Plea raised by petitioner/defendant was that when issuance of bank cheque was denied leave would have been granted unconditional-Validity-Imposition of condition or granting unconditional leave was within the discretion of Trial Court-When statute conferred such discretion, exercise of same should not be ordinarily interfered-Discretion was required to be exercised in careful manner and same should be based on logical and legally sustainable reasoning- While granting leave to defend the suit, Trial Court imposed condition mainly on the basis of unilateral statement of respondent/plaintiff without even considering any dispute raised in leave application-Exercise of discretion by Trial Court, conferred under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was based on some misunderstanding of principles governing exercise of such discretion-High Court set aside leave granting order and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh- Revision was allowed accordingly.\nFarzand Ali and another v. Khuda Bakhsh and others PLD 2015 SC 187 and Manzoor Hussain v. Haji Khushi Muhammad 2017 CLC 70 distinguished.\nMinistry of IPC through Secretary and others v. Arbab Altaf Hussain and others 2014 SCMR 1573; Mian Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. and another PLD 1996 SC 749; Mukhtar Ahmad Gondal v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary Health, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and 2 others 2000 YLR 4 and Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=3", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 170 of 2022/BWP, heard on 17th May, 2022.heard on: 17th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zubair Ahmad and another v. Shahid Mirza and 2 others 2004 SCMR 1747; Province of Punjab through Special Secretary, Specialized Healthcare and Medical Education Department, Lahore and Others v. Khadim Hussain Abbasi 2021 SCMR 1419; Habib Bank Limited, Circle Office, Multan v. Al-Qaim Traders and another 1990 SCMR 686 and Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh AIR 1958 SC 321 rel.\nRana Rizwan Ahmed for Petitioner.\nA.R. Aurangzeb for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian EJAZ AMIR-Petitioner\nVersus\nHaji MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23633", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1660 = 2023 CLD 541 = 2023 SLD 1660", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzU", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. I, R. 10-Execution of decree-Third party rights-Appellants/interveners sought permission to be impleaded as a party to execution proceedings on the plea of being rightful owner of suit property-Validity-Legal status of appellants/interveners was that they had no concern with grievance of parties to the suit-Bank filed suit for recovery of amount borrowed by defendant in years 1976 and 1977 and its execution was also disposed of-In disposed of matter appellants/interveners could not be joined as party-Executing Court rightly dismissed application of appellants/interveners filed under O. I, R. 10 C.P.C., who could move Civil Court having jurisdiction in the matter-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "Ist Appeal No. 51 of 2018, decided on 24th November, 2022.heard on: 24th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Kausar Sultana Hussain, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Sarfraz Ahmed for Appellants.\nAttorney of Respondent No. 4, Syed Zulfiqar Abbas Zaiid and Respondent No. 6, Abdul Mateen present in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ABDUL QAYYUM SHAIKH and another-Appellants\nVersus\nAHMAD CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD. and 8 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23634", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1661 = 2023 CLD 544 = 2023 SLD 1661", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 116 118-Payment of money in Tribunal-Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims-Scope-Applicant filed an application under S. 116 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 to deposit the amount of the death claim of an insured person-Validity-Firstly, the insurance company had failed to make the payment to the claimant or deposit it in the Tribunal within nine months, as required by S. 116 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Secondly, the company intentionally and deliberately retained the due amount for a long time, in order to utilize it in its business for profit or to retain it in its bank accounts to earn interest, which was not permitted by law-As a result, the insurance company was directed to pay the sum assured along with liquidated damages under S. 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, excluding the grace period of nine months provided in S. 116-Application was disposed of accordingly.\nState Life Insurance Corporation and another v. Mst. Razia Ameer and another Civil Appeal No. 929 of 2017 rel.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 116-Payment of money in Tribunal-Scope-Section 116 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, provides a procedure to the insurance company to pay the policy proceeds in the Insurance Tribunal instead of retaining the same itself, in case, it is not possible for the insurance company to discharge its liability in the normal circumstances-First part of subsection (1), S. 116 to provides a complete procedure to make the payment in the Tribunal from the date of maturing the policy, whereas, the second part of the subsection mandates that the insurance company shall apply to the Tribunal for the payment of the policy proceeds from the date on which notice of such maturity is given.\n(c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 116-Payment of money in Tribunal-Scope-Simple reading of S. 116 reveals that the policy proceeds (including all claims) are to be paid to the policy holder or the legal heirs in time and in case of delay, the profit/interest earned by the insurance company while retaining the same is also to be paid to the insured person or the legal heirs as the case may be-Further, if the proceeds are deposited with the Tribunal by the insurer, the same is to be invested by the Tribunal in government securities under S. 116(5) so that the policy holder, or the legal heirs as the case may be, could avoid the effect of devaluation of the amount.\n(d) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 116 118-Payment of money in Tribunal-Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims-Scope-Although, there is slight difference between Ss. 116 118 but while deducing the analogy from S. 118 as regards the due date to make the policy proceeds/death claim by the insurer is almost the same-In S. 116, the payment becomes due when the policy matures or from the date of which the notice of such maturity is given to the insurer and further, if the insurance company is satisfied that the payment of claim is not possible to the policy holder or the nominee, the same is to be paid in Tribunal according to the terms of the section.\n(e) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 116 118-Payment of money in Tribunal-Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims-Scope-On the due date i.e. on the expiry of grace period (nine months), the amount of the death claim becomes the ownership of the legal heirs and they are entitled to receive the amount along with profit/interest incurred thereon earned by the insurance company from the date due, till its realization.\n(f) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 118-Payment of money in Tribunal-Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims-Scope-Scheme of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, provides that the policy proceeds including the death claim should be paid to the claimant forthwith, when the same becomes due-No such provision is available in the Ordinance which permits the insurer to retain the due amount for an indefinite period and if the insurance company retains the due amount for no reason against the spirit of scheme of law that will always be at the risk and responsibility of the Insurance Company-It is the responsibility of the insurer to pay the due amount to the claimant within time and if any delay occurs, the insurer is liable to pay the liquidated damages or all the profits incurred on the due amount attracted immediately after due date.\nPLD 2022 Lah. 188 ref.\n(g) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 118-Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claims-Scope-The moment the insured person dies, the succession opens and the policy proceeds or the amount of the death claim vests and devolves upon the heirs of the deceased like the property, moveable or immoveable, by operation of law as provided by the Principles of Islamic Law.\n(h) Words and phrases-\n-Due-Owed-Meaning.\nWhen some of money is due, it must be paid immediately.\nSomething due or owned-something that rightly belongs to one payment or obligation required by law.\nTo somebody as a debt because it is his right or because he has done something to observe it.\nOwing is a debt-payable required or expected in the prescribed, normal or logical course of events.\nOXFORD Advance Learners Dictionary; PLD 2022 Lah. 188; Askari General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Islam Lubricants Private Ltd. 2022 CLD 425; State Life Insurance Corporation and another v. Mst. Razia Ameer and another Civil Appeal No.929 of 2017 and Merriam Webster Dictionary rel.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=116,118", - "Case #": "Case No. 10 of 2023, decided on 31st March, 2023.heard on: 17th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (Retd.) Ali Akbar Qureshi, Chairman and Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member (Legal)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qaisar Ameen Rana for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JUBILEE LIFE INSURANCE-Petitioner\nVersus\nSUMERA IMRAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23635", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1662 = 2023 CLD 554 = 2023 SLD 1662", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYy8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 3, 9, 17 22-Suit for recovery of finance facility-Date of default-Determination-Appellant/ debtor was aggrieved of imposing cost of funds by Trial Court from the date of institution of the suit-Validity-When finance facility was for specified period and not only the finance facility but also due date of payment had expired then date of default would be the date when the facility and due date of payment had expired-No mark-up could be allowed after expiry of finance period and at best only cost of funds could be allowed-When finance facility and due date of payment of installments was still in field, then date of default was the date when financial institution triggered incident of default and had filed suit under S. 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for customer default in fulfillment of financial obligations, provided the suit was decreed and not found to be premature-Last payment of installment in year 2016 against payment schedule valid till 2026 could not be treated as date of default for the purpose of cost of fund under S. 3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Decree for cost of fund from institution of suit was not entirely adverse to appellant/ debtor-Finance facility was valid for period of 12 years and respondent/financial institution had the option to wait till expiry of said period and recover entire outstanding amount along with agreed mark-up-Respondent/financial institution filed suit earlier and had surrendered its claim of mark up from filing of suit till expiry of finance facility-Respondent/financial institution only claimed cost of funds as contemplated under S. 3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which was much less than rate of mark up in the house finance facility agreement-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nUnited Bank Limited v. Nothern Polyethylene Limited and others 2008 CLD 688; Crescent Commercial Bank now Samba Bank Ltd. v. Genertech Pakistan Ltd. 2011 CLD 37; Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited v. Nothern Polyethylene Limited and others 2006 CLC 565 and Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Pakistan Belting (Pvt.) Limited and others 2006 CLD 808 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=3,9,17,22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 17 of 2021, decided on 22nd February, 2022.heard on: 22nd February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Abid Aziz Sheikh and Muhammad Shan Gul, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Aslam Saddiqui for Appellant.\nMuhammad Masood Sabir for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Rana MUHAMMAD AUSAF-Appellant\nVersus\nHOUSE BUILDING FINANCE COMPANY LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23636", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1663 = 2023 CLD 559 = 2023 SLD 1663", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYys", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 2(68)-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss. 2(38) 3 [since repealed]-Sister concern-Meaning and definition-No definition of sister concern is provided either in the repealed Companies Ordinance, 1984 or the present Companies Act, 2017, but this turn of phrase basically delineates two or more distinct businesses or ventures owned by one and the same conglomerate but such undertakings/concerns do not have any link or nexus with the operations of each others business with the exception of conjoint ownership but legally or financially are not related to each other despite its affiliation with another company with a separate identity and workforces.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 2(68)-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss. 2(38) 3 [since repealed]- Subsidiary and wholly-owned subsidiary-Definition provided.\nPalmers Company Law (2019 Edition), Volume 3, paragraph 9.303, page 9246; Halsburys Laws of England (Fifth Edition), Volume 14 (pages 54-55) and C.R. Datta (Seventh Edition), Volume I, Chapter I (Page 1382-1383) ref.\n(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-S. 7-Input tax-Company securing input adjustment of sales tax on purchases made from its alleged subsidiary/sister concern-Subsidiary/sister concern relationship-Not proved-Tax department completely failed to establish that respondent-company was the sister concern or a subsidiary company of the supplier-company-No tangible evidence was produced including the record, if any, obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in relation to the incorporation and substratum of both the companies together with the verification of holding company of the alleged subsidiary company-Tribunal had judiciously examined the pith and substance of the transaction and then rightly reached the conclusion that the respondent-company was not a subsidiary or holding company of the supplier-company-Furthermore if the supplier issued invoices erroneously or in violation of law then the Department should have initiated legal action for recovery against them rather than the buyer (respondent) which was not the sister concern or subsidiary company of the supplier-If some fault was committed by the supplier-company while issuing invoices then the respondent-company could not be penalized or disqualified from claiming input tax adjustment in accordance with the law-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, and leave was refused.\n(d) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-S. 7-Input tax -Presumptive tax regime-Scope-Presumptive tax regime denotes that the tax so deducted or paid is treated as a final discharge of tax liability whereas the production capacity is reckoned by the Department according to the notified and applicable sales tax rates vis- -vis the production as per comparative past and present physical production data including the machine ratings-Presumptive tax regime predominantly encompasses the usage of indirect means to determine tax liability, which diverges from the normal rules founded on the taxpayers accounts to indicate a legal presumption that the tax liability is not less than the amount occasioning from the application of the indirect method.\n(e) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-S. 47-Reference to the High Court-Powers of High Court under section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990-Scope-Jurisdiction of High Court under section 47 is strictly confined to answering questions of law-Source of question must be the order of the Tribunal-Elementary characteristic of such jurisdiction is that it has been conferred to deal only with questions of law and not questions of fact-Question of law connotes a tangible and substantial question of law on the rights and obligations of the parties founded on the decision of the Tribunal-Tribunal is therefore the final fact-finding body and its findings of facts are conclusive; the High Court cannot disturb them unless it is shown that there was no evidence on which the Appellate Tribunal could arrive at its conclusion and record such findings, or the same are perverse or based on surmises and conjectures.\nArmy Welfare Trust (Nizampur Cement Project), Rawalpindi and another v. Collector of Sales Tax (Now Commissioner Inland Revenue), Peshawar 2017 SCMR 9; Pakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Assistant Collector, Sales Tax and Central Excise Mardan and others 2019 SCMR 906 and Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Messrs Sargodha Spinning Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Faisalabad and others 2022 SCMR 1082 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=2(68)Companies Ordinance, 1984=2(38),3Sales Tax Act, 1990=7", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 409-L of 2021, decided on 10th March, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 12.11.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in S.T.A. No.13/2005)\nheard on: 20th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " JUDGMENT\nABID AZIZ SHEIKH, J.-This Regular First Appeal under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (Ordinance) has been filed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 25.8.2020 passed by learned Judge Banking Court-III, Multan whereby suit for recovery filed by respondent (financial institution) has been decreed against the appellant for an amount of 47,87,617/- with costs and cost of fund w.e.f. 01.3.2019 till date of realization.\n2. Relevant facts are that appellant availed house finance facility under \"\"Ghar Asan Flexi Scheme\"\" (House Finance) for construction of house. The appellant mortgaged his property to secure the said house finance facility. On request of appellant, the said house finance facility for an amount of Rs.35,00,000/- was sanctioned on 05.12.2014 and amount was disbursed to the appellant through four cheques. The house finance facility amount was repayable in a period of 12 years by way of 144 monthly installments. Initial monthly installment was of Rs.50322/- which was to be increased in rate after one year and date of expiry of said house finance facility was fixed as 04.12.2026. The appellant defaulted in payment of installments, resultantly, the suit was filed on 01.3.2019, which was eventually decreed for an amount of Rs.47,87,617/- with costs and cost of fund from 01.3.2019 till the date of realization. The appellant being aggrieved has filed this appeal.\n3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that as per para 8 of the plaint, admittedly the last installment of Rs.100000/- was paid by appellant on 13.7.2016 and therefore, the date of default for the purpose of cost of fund under section 3 of the Ordinance is 13.7.2016 and not when the suit was filed on 01.3.2019, hence the impugned judgment and decree is not sustainable to that extent.\n4. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submits that last installment of house finance facility was payable on 04.12.2026, however, as several installments were not paid despite repeated notices, the suit was filed on 01.3.2019. He therefore, submits that the date of default is from the institution of suit for the purpose of cost of fund under section 3 of the Ordinance.\n5. Arguments heard. Record perused. The availing of house finance facility and execution of documents are not in dispute, however, the only contention of the appellant is that date of default for the purpose of cost of fund under section 3 of the Ordinance is 13.7.2016 and not 01.3.2019 when the suit was filed. In order to determine this legal question, it is expedient to reproduce sections 3, 9(1) and section 17 of the Ordinance as under:-\n\"\"Section 3. Duty of a customer.:- (1) It shall be the duty of a customer to fulfill his obligations to the financial institution.\n(2) where the customer defaults in the discharge of his obligation, he shall be liable to pay for the period from the date of his default till realization of the cost of funds of the financial institution as certified by the State Bank of Pakistan from time to time, apart from such other civil and criminal liabilities that he may incur under the contract or rules or any other law for the time being in force.\n(3) For purpose of this section a judgment against a customer under this Ordinance shall mean that he is in default of his duty under subsection (1) and the ensuing decree shall provide for payment of the cost of funds as determined under subsection (2).\nSection 9. Procedure of Banking Courts:- (1) Where a customer or a financial institution commits a default in fulfillment of any obligation with regard to any finance, the financial institution or, as the case may be, the customer, may institute a suit in the Banking Court by presenting a plaint which shall be verified on oath, in the case of financial institution by the Branch Manager or such other officer of the financial institution as may be duly authorized in this behalf by power of attorney or otherwise.\nSection 17. Final decrees:- (1) The final decree passed by a Banking Court shall provide for payment from the date of default of the amounts found to be payable on account of the default in fulfillment of the obligation, and for costs including, in the case of a suit filed by a financial institution cost of funds determined under section 3.\n(2) The Banking Court may, at the time of passing a final decree, also pass an order of the nature contemplated by subsection (1) of section 16 to the extent of the decretal amount\"", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "(emphasis supplied)", - "URL Link:": "", - "Citation or Reference": "", - "Case Link:": "", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "6. From the plain reading of subsection (3) of section 3 of the Ordinance, it is evident that a judgment against a customer under the Ordinance would tantamount to declaration that he is in default of his duties under subsection (1) of section 3 of the Ordinance and decree obtained against customer shall provide for payment of cost of fund as determined under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance. Consequently, the customer who defaulted in discharge of his obligation under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance shall be liable to pay cost of fund from the date of default till the realization of amount. Similarly, the perusal of section 9 of the Ordinance shows that \"\"default\"\" in discharge of obligations not only incurs cost of fund under section 3(2) of the Ordinance but same is also actionable for filing of suit under section 9 of the Ordinance. Resultantly, the final decree passed under section 17 of the Ordinance, shall inter-alia provide for cost of fund from the date of default of the amount to be payable by the customer. From the above provisions, there is no manner of doubt that cost of fund under section 3 of the Ordinance, is to be determined from the \"\"date of default\"\" in the discharge of customer's obligation till realization of the decretal amount.", - "URL Link:": "", - "Citation or Reference": "", - "Case Link:": "", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "7. However, the moot question is that what is the \"\"date of default\"\" in various situations for the purpose of cost of fund under section 3 of the Ordinance. Whether the date of default is the date when the finance facility and due date of payment has expired or the date of default is the date when the suit has been filed or the date of default is the date when last installment was paid. No precise definition of \"\"date of default\"\" has been provided in the Ordinance, however, from the conjunctive and holistic reading of provisions of sections 3, 9 and 17 of the Ordinance, it is manifest that when the finance facility is for specified period and not only the finance facility but also due date of payment has expired, than the \"\"date of default\"\" will be the date when the said facility and due date of payment has expired. This is also for the reason that as per settled law, no mark up can be allowed after expiry of finance period and at best only cost of fund can be allowed. However, when the finance facility and due date of payment of installments is still in field, than the \"\"date of default\"\" shall be the date when the financial institution triggered the incident of default and filed the suit under section 9 of the Ordinance for customer \"\"default\"\" in fulfillment of financial obligations, provided the suit is decreed and not found to be premature. However, the last payment of installment in year 2016 against payment schedule valid till 2026, (like in present case), cannot be treated as \"\"date of default\"\" for the purpose of cost of fund under section 3 of the Ordinance.", - "URL Link:": "", - "Citation or Reference": "", - "Case Link:": "", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "8. The following case law on the subject also supported the above interpretation of law. In United Bank Limited v. Nothern Polyethylene Limited and others (2008 CLD 688), there was a default in payment of installment but cost of fund was provided from the date of institution of the suit. Similarly, in Crescent Commercial Bank Now Samba Bank Ltd v. Genertech Pakistan Ltd. (2011 CLD 37), the installments were payable till 26.11.2010 but not a single installment was paid and the cost of fund was allowed from the date of institution of the suit. In Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited v. Nothern Polyethylene Limited and others (2006 CLC 565), the amount was payable from 01.1.1995 to 01.7.2011 and the decree for mark up was granted till last installment payable and cost of fund thereafter. In Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Pakistan Belting (Pvt.) Limited and others (2006 CLD 808), the facility was expired in 1992 but suit was filed in 2003 and learned Court granted cost of fund not from the expiry of facility but from the date of institution of suit, in order to protect the interest of customer.", - "URL Link:": "", - "Citation or Reference": "", - "Case Link:": "", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "9. Even otherwise, the impugned decree for cost of fund from institution of suit, is not entirely adverse to the appellant. In the present case, when admittedly the finance facility was valid for period of 12 years till 04.12.2026, the respondent financial institution had the option to wait till expiry of said period and recover the entire outstanding amount along with agreed mark up but instead it filed suit on 01.3.2019, hence surrendered its claim of mark up from 01.3.2019 till expiry of finance facility i.e. 04.12.2026 and has only claimed cost of funds as contemplated under section 3 of the Ordinance, which is admittedly much less than the rate of mark up in the house finance facility agreement.", - "URL Link:": "", - "Citation or Reference": "", - "Case Link:": "", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "10. In view of above discussion, this appeal being merit-less is dismissed with no order as to cost.\"", - "URL Link:": "Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court (through Video Link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Citation or Reference": "The COLLECTOR OF SALES TAX AND CENTRAL EXCISE, LAHORE-Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs QADBROS ENGINEERING (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE-Respondent", - "Case Link:": "", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23637", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1664 = 2023 CLD 570 = 2023 SLD 1664", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 2-Suit for specific performance of agreement-Interim injunction, grant of-Lifting of veil of incorporation-Scope-Plaintiff claimed that the Company, a family-owned business, violated an Undertaking that entitled each brother to a 25% share in Companys assets-Despite entrusting control to a brother (defendant), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to uphold the agreement-In 2005, the company sold its Islamabad property and divided the proceeds among the brothers-Subsequently, they agreed to sell the Clifton property, but a lawsuit arose due to a delay in the sale agreement-Ultimately settled in 2018, the buyer deposited funds with the Court for release to the Company-Plaintiff sought his rightful share, filing a lawsuit to halt the release of funds deposited with the Court and to enforce the Undertaking-Validity-Plaintiff had prima facie demonstrated that the Company and its shareholders had acted upon the Undertaking by treating the immovable assets of the Company as the joint assets of the brothers-But what still remained to be seen was whether that practice of the parties was sufficient justification for a Court of law to ignore the corporate personality of the Company so as to enforce the Undertaking against the Company-Answer to such question would in turn determine the ownership of the sale proceeds of the Clifton property lying with the Court-Till such time, the plaintiff had made out an arguable case for preserving the sale proceeds-Application was disposed of by restraining the Company from obtaining release of sale proceeds.\nPresident v. Mr. Justice Shaukat Ali PLD 1971 SC 585; Central Board of Revenue v. S.I.T.E. PLD 1985 SC 97; Nagina Films Ltd. v. Usman Hussain 1987 CLC 2263; Union Council Ali Wahan, Sukkur v. Associated Cement (Pvt.) Ltd. 1993 SCMR 468 and Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. PLD 1965 SC 221 rel.\nTheresa Henry v. Calixtus Henry 2010 1 ALL ER 988; U.I.G. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muhammad Imran Qureshi 2011 CLC 758; V. B. Rangaraj v. V. B. Gopalakrishnan AIR 1992 SC 201; Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta v. Associated Clothiers Ltd. AIR 1963 Calcutta 629; Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax AIR 1972 SC 2600; Anjum Rashid v. Shehzad 2007 CLC 1414 and Neelofar Shah v. Ofspace (Pvt.) Ltd. 2013 CLD 114 ref.\n(b) Company-\n-Doctrine of separate legal entity-Scope-Identity of a company as a juristic person and consequently its assets are separate from the identity and assets of its shareholders.\n(c) Company-\n-Doctrine of separate legal entity-Lifting of veil of incorporation-Scope-Instances of piercing or lifting the veil of incorporation are by way of an exception to the general rule that at law a company is a person separate and distinct from its shareholders.\nSalomon v. A. Salomon and Co. Ltd. (1897) AC 22 ref.\n(d) Company-\n-Doctrine of separate legal entity-Lifting of veil of incorporation-Scope-Number of circumstances are by now recognized as grounds for lifting the veil of incorporation, including the circumstance where the arrangement between the company and the shareholders is such which makes the business, the business of the shareholders-At the same time, actual instances of lifting the veil of incorporation are few and far between-Whether the Court lifts the veil of incorporation or not, actually depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.\nUnion Council Ali Wahan, Sukkur v. Associated Cement (Pvt.) Ltd. 1993 SCMR 468 rel.\n(e) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 304-Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S. 44-Petition for winding up of Company-Dissolution of partnership by the Court-Scope-In a particular case the principles of dissolution of partnership may be applied if the apparent structure of the private limited company is not the real structure and on piercing the veil of incorporation the Court finds that in reality it is a partnership.\nLadli Prasad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. PLD 1965 SC 221 and Nagina Films Ltd. v. Usman Hussain 1987 CLC 2263 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "Suit No. 1529 of 2018, decided on 13th June, 2022.Dates of hearing: 25th August, 16th, 24th September, 8th October, 2021 and 3rd June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qazi Umair Ali for Plaintiff.\nMuhammad Zeeshan Abdullah and Adnan Abdullah for Defendant No. 1.\nAbdul Qayyum Abbasi for Defendant No. 2.\nTaimur Ali Mirza for Defendant No. 3.\nNemo for Defendant No. 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOHAMMAD AHMAD ANSARI-Plaintiff\nVersus\nINTERGLOBE COMMERCE PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23638", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1665 = 2023 CLD 583 = 2023 SLD 1665", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpYzg", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 122 118- Insurance claim- Life insurance policy-Limitation-Communication of claim to insurer-Delay in settlement of claim-Scope-Wife of petitioner purchased a policy from the respondent and paid first premium, but unfortunately, after about 03 months, she died-Petitioner reported the matter and filed the claim to recover the policy proceeds in the office of the respondent under S. 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Respondent instead of deciding the claim within the stipulated period of 90 days kept pending the same for more than 03 years and finally repudiated the same-Contents of the repudiation letter did not disclose the cause or reason on the basis of which, the claim of the petitioner was refused-Deputy Manager, Claim Examiner, while appearing before the Tribunal had admitted that the inquiry conducted by the respondent was based on hearsay evidence and he had not recorded that statement of parents of the deceased or of any other relative-Respondent had categorically admitted the fact of conducting the medical/clinical investigation by its authorized and hired doctor-Such investigation could not be called into question-Respondent had failed to prove that any material fact was concealed by the insured lady at the time of purchasing the product of the respondent-Petitioner had successfully proved his case, therefore, his case was decreed.\n2021 SCMR 1347 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122,118", - "Case #": "Case No. 4 of 2022, decided on 19th January, 2023.heard on: 19th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (Retd.) Ali Akbar Qureshi, Chairman and Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member (Legal)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Liaqat Ali Butt for Petitioner.\nSh. Shahzad Akram for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL BASIT-Petitioner\nVersus\nSTATE LIFE INSURANCE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23639", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1666 = 2023 CLD 589 = 2023 SLD 1666", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpY3o", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 19-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2) O.XXI-Decree of Banking Court-Auction of mortgaged property by Bank- Co-owners of mortgaged property claiming fraud and objecting to auction of suit property-Held, that perusal of section 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 showed that once the decree of Banking Court was passed in favour of the bank, the decree by itself constituted and conferred sufficient power and authority on the bank to sell or cause to be sold any and all mortgaged properties of the -debtors along with their marketable titles-Banking Court was not bound to follow the procedure laid down in Order XXI of the C.P.C.; it could adopt any procedure in order to satisfy and execute the decree passed in favour of the respondent-Bank-Even otherwise, the auction was advertised and the bid of the auction purchaser for the suit property being the highest was accepted vide the Banking Courts order-Since second co-owner never took the ground that the decree was obtained fraudulently or that the auction purchaser had obtained the suit property fraudulently, he could not travel beyond his pleas taken before the lower fora and rely on the arguments raised by first co-owner-Even otherwise, second co-owner could not agitate the questions at present stage for the first time since he was not a party in the execution proceedings before the Banking Court-First co-owner in her objection petition admitted the fact that the suit property was mortgaged to the respondent-Bank; she did not raise any plea before the lower fora that the sale certificate should not be issued to defeat her proprietary interest in the suit property as well as the ground that she was unaware that the suit property had been auctioned off and sold in favour of the auction purchaser-First co-owner therefore could not, at present stage, raise a ground which she had not taken before the Banking Court-It did not appeal to reason that the first co-owner was unaware of the fact that the suit property was mortgaged; that a suit for recovery was pending against the suit property, and that her own father, brothers and sisters were -debtors in the said suit-Since the sale certificate had been issued by the Banking Court after the objection petition of first co-owner was dismissed, the sale certificate could not be set aside on the ground that both the co-owners proprietary right in the suit property would be affected-Appeals filed by the co-owners were dismissed.\nMujahid Karim and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2016 SCMR 66; Nice N Easy Fashion (Ltd.) and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and another 2014 SCMR 1662 and Habib and Company and others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and others 2019 SCMR 1453 ref.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. VI, R. 7-Pleadings, departure from-Party is not allowed to improve its case beyond what was originally setup in the pleadings.\nMuhammad Yaqoob_v. Mst. Sardaran PLD 2020 SC 338 and Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam 2015 SCMR 21 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 335 and 336 of 2010, decided on 22nd February, 2022.\n(Against the order dated 25.05.2009 of Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in E.F.A. No. 91 of 2009)heard on: 22nd February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Asad Manzoor Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in both cases).\nTariq Masood, Advocate Supreme Court, Raja Muqsit Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Present: Ijaz ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ\nKAUSER PARVEEN and another-Appellants\nVersus\nKASB BANK and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23640", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1667 = 2023 CLD 715 = 2023 SLD 1667", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpY3k", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 10-Suit for recovery of finances-Petition for leave to defend-Markup beyond the expiry period of agreement-Scope-Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of certain amount outstanding in respect of finance facilities availed by the defendant company-Validity-Defendant company, its directors and guarantor had admitted availing of the finance facilities-Contention of defendants regarding claim of markup made in the plaint by the bank had considerable force-With regard to the Letter of Credit facility, markup had been claimed-On the contrary, no such claim was raised in the plaint-What was due to the plaintiff was an amount of commission, which was fixed as flat 0.20% per quarter (LC pending only)-There was no basis for claiming an amount of markup on the facility of letter of credit-With respect to other finance facilities, any amount charged beyond the date of expiry of agreement was unlawful-No other issue was raised by the defendants which entitled them to the grant of leave to appeal-Application for leave to defend was dismissed-Suit was decreed against the defendant company, its directors and guarantor jointly and severally for a certain amount with costs of funds in terms of S. 3 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 64519 of 2020, decided on 15th June, 2022.heard on: 15th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Karim, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ahmad Khan Niazi, Ali Rana and Asim Sarfraz Uppal for Plaintiff.\nMuhammad Imran Malik and Hassan Ismail for Defendants Nos. 1 to 4.\nCh. Mushtaq for Defendant No. 6.\nMs. Maryam Salman for Defendant No. 8.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SUMMIT BANK LIMITED through Authorized Attorney-Plaintiff\nVersus\nMessrs OTO PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. through Executive Officer/Director\nand 8 others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23641", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1668 = 2023 CLD 613 = 2023 SLD 1668", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTc", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 122-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XVI, R. 1-Insurance claim-Summons to attend to give evidence or produce documents-Life insurance policy-Pre-insurance ailment, claim of-Scope-Respondent filed an application for summoning of three doctors and record keeper of the hospital along with record of the deceased (insured person) in the Tribunal-Ground for filing of application was that the insured person had pre-insurance ailment which was not disclosed to the respondent-Validity-Respondent had admitted that the deceased was medically examined before issuance of the policy-When the insured was medically examined and found fit by the doctors of the insurer before issuing the policy, subsequently, the insurer could not avoid the policy on the ground of pre-insurance ailment-In such circumstances, summoning of the doctors along with medical record as respondents witnesses would be a futile exercise-Application was dismissed.\nState Life Insurance Corporation v. Atta-ur-Rehman 2021 SCMR 1347 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1", - "Case #": "Case No. 127 of 2022, decided on 19th January, 2023.\nheard on: 19th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (Retd.) Akbar Qureshi, Chairman and Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member (Legal)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Usman Ali Butt for Petitioner.\nSh. Shahzad Ahmad for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NADEEM AHMAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nSTATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23642", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1669 = 2023 CLD 616 = 2023 SLD 1669", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTY", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 281, 282, 283 285-Compromise with creditors and members-Reconstruction or amalgamation of companies-Scope-Petitioners sought sanction of the High Court to a Scheme of Arrangement-In terms of the Scheme of Arrangement entire undertaking and business including assets, rights, properties, benefits, powers, privileges, contracts, liabilities, obligations and dues of the transferor company would be transferred to and vested in and assumed by the transferee company against the allotment and issue of shares to the formers shareholders-Transferor company would cease to exist without winding up and its shares shall stand cancelled-Transferor company was a subsidiary of the transferee company which held 96% of the issued and paid up share capital of the transferor company; its balance shares were held in equal proportions by two persons who were the legal and beneficial owners of 100% issued and paid up share capital of the transferee company-No shares of transferee company were required to be issued to the shareholders of transferor company-Not a single shareholder or secured creditor of any of the two petitioners had objected to the scheme-Petition was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,281,282,283,285", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 12 of 2022, decided on 2nd March, 2023.\nheard on: 2nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mikael Azmat Rahim for Petitioners.\nIbad-ur-Rehman, Law Officer for SECP on Court's Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAZAQUE STEELS (PVTJ.C.M. No. 12 of 2022, decided on 2nd March, 2023." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23643", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1670 = 2023 CLD 618 = 2023 SLD 1670", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-\n-S. 12-Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002, R. 95-Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2022, Reglns. 3, 4 5, Sched. I(D) Sched. II(C)-Grant of small-scale license or lease for mining minor minerals like sand, gravel and sandstone- Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports, significance of-Mining sector must adopt climate proof mining policy which must consider how climate change will impact mining areas so that the climate change risks are integrated into the environment assessment-Without an IEE or EIA, these matters are totally neglected-Not only do the IEE and EIA consider the environmental impact of the project but can also include standards and initiatives to improve sustainability of the sector-Mines and Minerals Department (MMD) is responsible for obtaining the IEE or EIA reports before initiating the process for bidding of the projects-Adverse impact on the environment due to exploration and mining of minor minerals stated.\nThe Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2022 (the Regulations) clearly specify the requirement of Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports, which is a fundamental and basic step before a project starts, so as to ensure that an adverse effect on the environment has been considered and addressed. This is because even the exploration and mining of minor minerals has an adverse impact on the environment, which includes deforestation, pollution, production of toxic waste water, loss of habitats and disruption of the ecosystem. In particular, with reference to sand mining; deforestation, loss of biodiversity, soil erosion and acid drainage are some of the serious environmental impacts, which have to be given due consideration. Surface mining creates health hazards for miners and local communities as well as gives rise to air pollution and produces toxic waste water, and causes droughts all of which must be catered for. In this context, climate change is one of the biggest global threats and the combination of surface mining and climate change becomes a serious threat for the ecological system. Hence, the mining sector must adopt climate proof mining policy which must consider how climate change will impact mining areas so that the climate change risks are integrated into the environment assessment. Therefore, without an IEE or EIA, these matters are totally neglected. Hence, special attention must be given to all environmental aspects even with reference to the mining of minor minerals.\nJason Phillips, Climate change and surface mining: A review of environment-human interactions and their spatial dynamics, 74, Applied Geography, 95-108 (2016); Lukas Ruttinger and Vigya Sharma (2016) Climate Change and Mining: A Foreign Policy Perspective, Germany, adelphi and Sustainability 2017 - Review on Environmental Impacts of Sand Exploitation ref.\nThe relevance of the IEE and EIA cannot be ignored. Not only do the IEE and EIA consider the environmental impact of the project but can also include standards and initiatives to improve sustainability of the sector. This can be vital in projects of mining under the Mines and Minerals Department (MMD). They also prescribe mitigation measures and put in place a monitoring method through an Environment Management Plan (EMP). The EMP provides the basic framework for implementing and managing mitigation and monitoring measures. It identifies the environment issues, the risks and recommends the required action to manage the impact. This is vital because not only does the miner know what its obligations are, it also gives the MMD and the EPA a framework to follow and to ensure its compliance. Hence, all factors considered the IEE and EIA ensure that the project is sustainable and all possible environmental consequences have been identified and addressed adequately.\nThere is no timeline provided in the Regulations within which the IEE and EIA approvals are to be obtained nor does it specify any process to bind the successful bidder of the project to the terms of any EMP or other measures provided for in the IEE or EIA. However, the Regulations do clarify that the proponent of the project has to obtain the IEE or the EIA and in this case, the proponent of the project will always be the MMD, hence the practice of requiring a successful bidder to obtain an IEE or EIA after bidding of the project totally negates the purpose and impact of these reports. The impact on the environment must be looked into before bidding commences by the MMD and at the time of bidding a bidder must know the terms set out in the IEE or EIA that they are bound by and are required to comply with especially the mitigation measures and the EMP. Hence, it is the MMD that is responsible for obtaining these reports before initiating the process for bidding of the said projects. In this regard, it would be useful for the MMD to provide guidelines and SOPs to facilitate this process and also provide penalizing provisions within the license or lease for any violation of the EMP so as to ensure compliance.\n(b) Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-\n-S. 12- Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2022, Reglns. 3, 4 5-Mining licences-Climate proof mining policy-Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports, significance of-While mining is an essential part of the economy, it must be conducted in a responsible and sustainable manner to minimize its impact on the environment-By implementing best practices and adhering to strict guidelines and developing a climate proof mining policy, it can be ensured that mining continues to provide for the economy while also protecting the health of the planet and its inhabitants-Economic growth is important but it must be achieved in a way that is sustainable and respectful of the natural systems that support it.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Environmental Protection Act, (XXXIV of 1997)=12Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002=95", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 55 of 2020, decided on 2nd February, 2023.\n(Against order dated 18.11.2019, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in W.P. No. 56780 of 2019)\nheard on: 2nd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rafey Alam, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nQasim Ali Chohan, Additional A.G., Ashfaq Ahmed Kharal, Additional A.G., Noman Sarfraz, Deputy Director (Mines and Minerals) and Nawaz Majid, Deputy Director (L) Environment for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PUBLIC INTEREST LAW ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTAN registered under the Societies Act, 1860 through authorized person Chaudhry Awais Ahmed-Petitioner\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat, Lower Mall, Lahore and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23644", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1671 = 2023 CLD 624 = 2023 SLD 1671", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 283 505-Competition Act (XIX of 2010), S. 11-Compromise with creditors and members-Reconstruction or amalgamation of companies-Approval of mergers from Competition Commission, exemption from- Scope- Petitioners (Modaraba Companies) sought sanction of the High Court to a Scheme of Arrangement-In terms of the Scheme of Arrangement entire undertaking and business including assets, rights, properties, benefits, powers, privileges, contracts, liabilities, encumbrances, obligations and dues of the petitioners Nos. 2 3 would be transferred to and vested in and assumed by petitioner against the issuance of certificates of petitioner No. 4 to certificate holders of petitioners Nos. 2 3 in terms as set out in the Scheme of Arrangement-Petitioner No. 4 would act accordingly as a going concern whereas the petitioners Nos. 2 3 would cease to exist without winding up-Members, employees and certificate holders, etc. of the petitioners Nos. 2, 3 4 would remain secured and their rights and interests were taken care of in the Scheme of Arrangement and so also the sole secured creditor who had also given its no objection-Petitioners were exempt from obtaining an approval to the merger from the Competition Commission of Pakistan in terms of S. 11 of the Competition Act, 2010-Not a single certificate holder of any of the petitioners objected to the scheme-Petition was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,283,505Competition Act, 2010=11", - "Case #": "Judicial Companies Miscellaneous Petition No. 16 of 2022, decided on 2nd March, 2023.heard on: 2nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faiz Durrani for Petitioners.\nIbad-ur-Rehman, Law Officer for SECP on Court's Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AWWAL MODARABA MANAGEMENT LIMITED AND 3 OTHERS: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23645", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1672 = 2023 CLD 627 = 2023 SLD 1672", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWS8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 22-Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 141-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11-Suit for recovery of finance-Rejection of plaint-Surety, liability of-Plaintiff/Bank was aggrieved of rejection of its plaint by Banking Court-Validity-Provision of S. 141 of Contract Act, 1872 had no implication as an entitlement was given to the surety to the benefit of every security which the creditor had against principal debtor at the time when contract of suretyship was entered into-Surety was discharged to the extent of value of security-Appellant/Bank did not try to make recoveries from the company as it was one of the petitioners in liquidation petition-Liability of directors who executed memoranda of deposit of title deeds would stand reduced to the extent of the amount recovered by appellant/Bank in the liquidation proceedings from the total amount of company owed to appellant/Bank-Directors of the company who executed memoranda of deposit of title deeds could not be totally absolved from their liability simply on the ground that the appellant/Bank/creditor was able to recover its debt partially in liquidation proceedings or that the liquidation Court had ordered that the decree obtained by the creditor could not be executed against assets of the company-Such partial recovery did not put at naught liability of directors who had executed memoranda of deposit of title deeds for securing repayment of companys debt to appellant/Bank-High Court set aside order passed by Banking Court and remanded the matter for decision afresh-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nAbdul Ghaffar Adamjee v. National Investment Trust Ltd. 2019 SCMR 812; Sultan-ul-Afreen v. District Officer (Revenue), City District Government, Karachi 2013 CLD 1280 and Mubarak Ali v. First Prudential Mudaraba 2006 CLD 927 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22Contract, Act, 1872=141Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=11", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 45 of 2013, decided on 17th April, 2023.heard on: 22nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb and Arbab Muhammad Tahir, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Taimoor Aslam Khan for Appellant.\nRespondents ex parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB BANK LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nTARIQ AHMED KHAN LODHI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23646", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1673 = 2023 CLD 639 = 2023 SLD 1673", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWSs", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 281, 282, 283 285-Compromise with creditors and members-Reconstruction or amalgamation of companies-Scope-Petitioners sought sanction of the High Court to a Scheme of Arrangement-In terms of the Scheme of Arrangement entire undertaking and business including assets, rights, properties, benefits, powers, privileges, contracts, liabilities, encumbrances, obligations and dues of the transferor company would be transferred to and vested in and assumed by the transferee company against the allotment and issue of shares to shareholders of the transferor company-Transferee company would act accordingly whereas transferor company would cease to exist without winding up and its shares held by the shareholders would stand cancelled-All issued share capital of both the companies was wholly owned by a parent company, thus, no shares of transferee company were required to be issued to shareholders of the transferor company-Not a single shareholder or secured creditor of any of the two petitioners had objected to the scheme-Petition was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,281,282,283,285", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 13 of 2022, decided on 2nd March, 2023.heard on: 2nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mikael Azmat Rahim for Petitioners.\nIbad-ur-Rehman, Law Officer for SECP on Court's Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "LUCKY LANDMARK (PVT.) LTD. AND ANOTHER: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23647", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1674 = 2023 CLD 641 = 2023 SLD 1674", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTk", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 115-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 11-Insurance Tribunal-Jurisdiction-Res-judicata, principle of-Petitioner was an insurance company and aggrieved of assumption of jurisdiction by Insurance Tribunal-Plea raised by petitioner was that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction and earlier another Tribunal had also dismissed the claim therefore, principle of res-judicata was applicable-Validity-Objection of res-judicata could be adjudicated only once issue of jurisdiction was settled-If Tribunal otherwise lacked jurisdiction it could not proceed to decide question of effect of principle of res-judicata-High Court declined to interfere in the matter-Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.\n \nMessrs Reliance Insurance Company Limited v. Messrs Ahsan Ikram Textile (Pvt.) Limited 2022 LHC 3939 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=115Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=11", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 27393 and C.M. No. 2 of 2023, decided on 28th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Asim Hafeez, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Muhammad Arshad Khan for Petitioner.\nLiaqat Ali Butt for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs UNIVERSAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. through Managing Director-Petitioner\nVersus\nRANA BASIT RICE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23648", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1675 = 2023 CLD 644 = 2023 SLD 1675", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWTg", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 281, 282, 283 505-Competition Act (XIX of 2010), S. 11-Competition (Merger Control) Regulations, 2016, Regln. 6-Compromise with creditors and members-Reconstruction or amalgamation of companies-Approval of mergers from Competition Commission, exemption from-Scope-Petitioners (Modaraba Companies) sought sanction of the High Court to a Scheme of Arrangement-In terms of the Scheme of Arrangement entire undertaking and business including assets, rights, properties, benefits, powers, privileges, contracts, liabilities, obligations and dues of the transferor company would be transferred to and vested in and assumed by the transferee company against the issuance of certificates to the formers certificate holders-Transferee company would act accordingly as a going concern whereas the transferor company would cease to exist without winding up-Members, employees and certificate holders, etc of both the companies would remain secured and their rights and interest were taken care of in the Scheme of Arrangement-Both the companies had secured creditors-Parent company of the transferor and transferee companies, which was vested with the rights of their management had got the requisite No Objection Certificate from the Registrar Modaraba, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)-Petitioners were exempt from seeking an approval regarding their merger from the Competition Commission of Pakistan in terms of S. 11 of the Competition Act, 2010 and Regulation 6 of the Competition (Merger Control) Regulations, 2016-Not a single certificate holder of any of the petitioners had objected to the\nscheme- Petition was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,281,282,283,505Competition Act, 2010=11", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 9 of 2022, decided on 2nd March, 2023.heard on: 2nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faiz Durrani for Petitioner.\nIbad-ur-Rehman, Law Officer for SECP on Court's Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AWWAL MODARABA MANAGEMENT LIMITED AND 2 OTHERS: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23649", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1676 = 2023 CLD 647 = 2023 SLD 1676", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 115- Application of Pakistani law to policies issued in Pakistan-Scope-Marine Insurance Policy-Plain reading of S. 115 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, shows that it is a non-obstante clause, which provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary, contained in the policy or any agreement relating thereto, the holder of the insurance policy issued by an insurer in respect of insurance business transacted in Pakistan after the commencement of the Ordinance, shall have the right to receive payment in Pakistan of any sum secured thereby and to sue for any relief in respect of the policy in any tribunal-Further if suit is brought in Pakistan, any question of law arising in connection with any such policy shall be determined according to the law in force in Pakistan-However, there is an exception to this section by way of proviso that this section shall not apply to a policy of Marine insurance-This simply means that if in the Marine Insurance Policy it is specifically provided that payment can be received or suit can be filed in any other country, this non-obstante provision of section 115 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, will not override such Marine Insurance Policy-Obvious purpose of proviso to section 115 of the Insurance Ordinance is to avoid any kind of interference with the normal business of Marine Insurance, in as much as Marine Insurance Contracts are international in scope and most of the time are for the benefit of the consignee abroad who have option of stipulating clause in the Marine Insurance Policy mentioning place where such contracts are intended to be carried out between the parties.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 122-Insurance claim-Scope-Insurance Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases of all kinds of insurance, including life, general and marine.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=115", - "Case #": "Case No. 279 of 2022, decided on 4th April, 2023.heard on: 4th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (Retd.) Ali Akbar Qureshi, Chairman and Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member (Legal)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Liaqat Ali Butt for the Petitioner.\nRana Muhammad Arshad Khan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RANA BASIT RICE MILLS-Petitioner\nVersus\nUNIVERSAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23650", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1677 = 2023 CLD 652 = 2023 SLD 1677", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpWXk", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 281 282-Merger of companies-Object, purpose and scope-Petitioner companies sought approval of Scheme of their merger-Validity-Approach was channelized to ascertain (i) whether statutory requirements were complied with and (ii) to determine whether the scheme as a whole had been arrived at by the majority, bona fide and the interest of whole body of shareholders in whose interest the majority purported to act, and (iii) whether scheme was such that fair and reasonable shareholder would consider it to be for the benefit of the company for himself-No objection from any quarter had come forward while all requisite formalities had been fulfilled-Wise group of businessmen had taken decision considering all its pros and cons and while taking such decision there were chances of success and failure but then while questioning such decision the bona fide was the real litmus test-Businessman takes decisions foreseeing the future aspect whereas the Court can only see if all 4 legal formalities have been fulfilled and that the scheme is neither unjust nor unfair or against the national interest-Court cannot challenge wisdom of a decision of businessman as by doing that the Court would be overriding the wisdom of a businessman and their prerogative-Report of Chartered Accountants was also very material who were engaged for calculating the swap ratio in respect of envisaged scheme of Amalgamation/Merger-High Court approved the scheme of Merger as there was no impediment-Petition was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280281,282,285", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 1 of 2022, decided on 12th December, 2022.heard on: 30th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saleem uz Zaman for Petitioners.\nIbad-ur-Rehman, Law Officer for Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NADEEM POWER GENERATION (PVT.) LTD. AND ANOTHER: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23651", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1678 = 2023 CLD 655 = 2023 SLD 1678", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 20-Suit for recovery of finances-Territorial jurisdiction-Scope-Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of finances-Defendants contended that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction for the reasons that finance facilities were extended to them at district H and that the agreements pursuant thereto were also executed at ICT and the district H, thus, the plaint was liable to be returned-Plaintiff contended that the registered office of the defendants fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court-Validity-No doubt, the registered office of a defendant served as official address for legal and administrative purposes and determined the jurisdiction to which the firm was subject to but at the same time it is important to note that the registered office did not necessarily determine the sole basis for establishing jurisdiction, especially when the cause of action had arisen in a different city, such as the location of the contract execution-Finance facilities were extended to the defendants after execution of agreements at ICT and district H, the defendants were residents of ICT and district H, correspondence for applying and approving the finance facilities were made by the parties at ICT and district H, mortgaged properties were situated at ICT and district H, hence, the High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to pass any and decree against the defendants-Plaint was returned to the defendants for presenting it before a Court of competent jurisdiction.\nBahoo Dying Industries (Private) Limited v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited and others PLD 2021 Lah. 186 rel.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 2(a)- Financial institution- Scope- Word branches mentioned in S. 2(a) means a branch from where the suit is to be filed before the Banking Court having jurisdiction to entertain it.\n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 2(a), 5 9-Financial institution-Establishment of Banking Court-Procedure of Banking Courts-Scope-Section 9(1) stipulates the term Branch Manager, which, when read in conjunction with S. 2(a), implies that the suit is to be filed by the aforementioned Branch Manager in accordance with Ss. 9(2) 9(3)-Suit should demonstrate the amount availed by the defendant, the amount paid by the defendant to the financial institution, and other finance-related amounts payable by the defendant-If the wording of S. 9 is read in conjunction with S. 5, it becomes clear that the Banking Court is established to exercise its jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 10-Suit for recovery-Leave to defend-Scope-Wording of S. 10(1) states that in any case in which the summons has been served on the defendant under S. 9(5), the defendant shall not be entitled to defend the suit unless he obtains leave from the Banking Court-While S. 10(3) gives a chance to the defendant to file leave to defend containing substantial questions of law as well as of fact.\n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 2(a) 9-Financial institution-Procedure of Banking Courts-Leave to defend-Scope-As S. 2(a) read with S. 9(5) mentions branch offices, the amount of finance availed, carrying on or transaction of business, therefore, the statement of account being sent to the defendant at his address would also be taken into consideration while deciding the leave to defend.\n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Preamble-Scope-Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was enacted by the Government to ensure speedier recovery of the finances advanced by the financial institutions and to make the banks recovery law more effective-Preamble to the Act provides that it was enacted to expedite the process of stuck-up loans from the unscrupulous customers/debtors of the banks.\n(g) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Preamble-Scope-Though the preamble to a statute is not an operational part of the enactment but it is a gateway, which discusses the purpose and intent of the legislature to necessitate the legislation on the subject and also sheds clear light on the goals that the legislator aims to secure through the introduction of such law-Preamble of a statute, therefore, holds a pivotal role for the purposes of interpretation in order to dissect the true purpose and intent of law.\nDirector General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others 2016 SCMR 447 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Kohinoor Spinning Mills and others 2021 CLD 1112 rel.\n(h) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 4, 5, 7 9-Financial institution-Banking Court-Customer-Finance-Ordinance to override other laws-Powers of Banking Court-Procedure of Banking Courts-Scope-Section 2(b) defines the Banking Court, in respect of a case; (i) in which the claim does not exceed hundred million rupees, and for the trial of offences under the Ordinance, in terms of S. 2(b)(i); (ii) means, a court established under section 5, and in respect of any other case, the High Court-While S. 5 enables the Federal Government to establish Banking Courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Ordinance-Being creature of the statute, the Banking Courts drive powers/jurisdiction under S. 7-Banking Courts, in exercise of its civil jurisdiction, shall have all powers otherwise available to a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-By virtue of the said provision, the Banking Court is bound to follow the procedure as provided in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, however where it is silent, the procedure provided in the C.P.C. shall apply-Pertinently, the Banking Courts are creatures of statute and they derive their powers/jurisdiction from S. 7(4) read with Ss. 9(1), 2(a), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e) 4 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and where the Ordinance does not prescribe a particular procedure with respect to a matter, the proceedings under the Ordinance are to be governed by the C.P.C.\nGulistan Textile Mills Ltd. and another v. Soneri Bank Ltd. and another PLD 2018 SC 322 rel.\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. WRSM Trading Company, LLC and others PLD 2018 SC 795 ref.\n(i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 20-Suit to be instituted where defendant resides or cause of action arises-Forum non conveniens-Scope-Section 20, C.P.C. contains a general rule regarding territorial jurisdiction which inter alia, enjoins that a suit must be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises-Explanation to said section prescribes that a corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office, or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place-Since this provision primarily keeps the defendant in perspective, the corporation spoken of in the explanation, obviously refers to the defendant-Plain reading of the section arguably allows the plaintiff a multitude of choices in regard to where it may institute its lis, suit or action-Corporations and partnership firms, and even sole proprietorship concerns, could well be transacting business simultaneously in several cities-If subsections (a) and (b) of S. 20, C.P.C., are to be interpreted disjunctively from subsection (c), as the use of the word or appears to permit the plaintiff to file the suit at any of the places where the cause of action may have arisen regardless of whether the defendant has even a subordinate office at that place-However, if the defendants location is to form the fulcrum of jurisdiction, and it has an office also at the place where the cause of action has occurred, then the plaintiff is precluded from instituting the suit anywhere else-Obviously, this is also because every other place would constitute a forum non conveniens.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=20", - "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 1 of 2022, decided on 7th June, 2023.heard on: 7th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Sardar Umer Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Hassan Matiullah for Plaintiff.\nUmar Hanif Khichi for Defendants Nos. 1 and 2.\nAgha Muhammad Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court/Amicus Curiae assisted by Waqar Khalid Khawaja for Defendants.\nRashid Mehmood, Research Officer, Lahore High Court, (Rawalpindi Bench).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB BANK LIMITED-Plaintiff\nVersus\nADEEL SHAHBAZ STEEL MILLS and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23652", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1679 = 2023 CLD 670 = 2023 SLD 1679", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTY", - "Key Words:": "Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-\n-Ss. 56, 60, 60A, 66 72-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 54-Suit for declaration and injunction-Intellectual property-Infringement of copy right work-Plaintiffs claimed to be the first original creator, adopter, sole owner and exclusive right holder of a cartoon character named Dollar Mascot and its various forms and variation including colour scheme and artistic work which was duly registered under Copyright Ordinance, 1962-Plaintiffs alleged that defendant in order to deceive and cause confusion amongst the buyers displayed, uploaded and offered for sale the same cartoon character and its various forms/modes through an internet website-Validity-Offering independent protection to fictional characters would limit the pool of raw material and would do a great disservice to public-Main concern of copyright law was to promote progress of arts and at the same time to secure an everlasting source of revenue for the creator of a fictional characters-Defendant infringed copyrighted work of plaintiffs, as he took entire work from plaintiffs platform and offered it for sale (or downloads) to third parties, not only infringing copyright but at the same time inducing dilution of plaintiffs trademark rights in that character-Where a copyright in any way was infringed, its owner was entitled to all such remedies by way of injunction, damages and accounts- Civil remedies for such infringement were provided in S. 60 of Copyright Ordinance, 1962, whereas S. 60A of Copyright Ordinance, 1962, offered special remedies to apply to a court for immediate relief, notwithstanding regular proceedings in the form of a suit or civil proceedings which were not initiated by then-Eventualities as to how a copyright work stood infringed were enumerated in S. 56 of Copyright Ordinance, 1962, while S. 66 of Copyright Ordinance, 1962, was responsible for punishment, and S. 72 of Copyright Ordinance, 1962, suggested procedure for criminal cases-Defendant left no stone unturned to infringe plaintiffs copyrighted work and scheme of law fully supported the plaintiffs-Suit was decreed, in circumstances.\nNichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 7 U.S.P.Q. 84 (2d Cir. 1930); 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954); Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751; Detective Comics, Inc., v. Bruns Publications, 111 F.2d 432; Copyrightability of Cartoon Characters by Cathy J. Lalor PTC Research; Foundation of the Franklin Pierce Law IDEA: The Journal of Law and Technology; 2003 CLD 1531; Ferozsons Pvt. Ltd. v. Dr. Col. Retd. K.U. Kureshi 2003 CLD 1052 and Sid Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Copyrights Ordinance, 1962=56,60,60A,66,72Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54", - "Case #": "Civil Suit No. 142 of 2012, decided on 15th September, 2022.heard on: 12th August, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rafiq Ahmed Kalwar for Plaintiffs.\nNemo for Defendant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DOLLAR INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED through Authorized Signatory/Director and another-Plaintiffs\nVersus\nKAMRAN AKHLAQ-Defendant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23653", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1680 = 2023 CLD 679 = 2023 SLD 1680", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTU", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Ss. 30, 33 39-Rules of Procedure for the Functions of the Disputes Review Expert, R. 9(c), (d)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115-Arbitration-Revisional jurisdiction-Concurrent findings of Courts below-Petitioner Authority awarded contract to respondent company-Dispute between the parties was decided by an arbitrator-Objections against award announced by arbitrator were dismissed by Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court and award was made rule of the Court-Validity-If on reappraisal of evidence, a different view is possible, High Court cannot substitute its own view and upset findings of fact concurrently arrived at by the Courts below-Such findings can only be interfered with if the Courts below had misread the evidence or had committed a jurisdictional error- Dispute between the parties could not be resolved without the assistance of Dispute Review Expert (DRE)-It was for such reason that respondent company referred the dispute to DRE under specific clause of the Conditions of Particular Application-Just like rule 9(c) of Rules of Procedure for the Functions of the Disputes Review Expert, the provision of R. 9(d) of Rules of Procedure for the Functions of the Disputes Review Expert also does not prescribe any time limit within which a party can refer a dispute to DRE-Contractual provisions which placed a time limit on a partys right to initiate a dispute resolution process had to be strictly construed- Reference of dispute to DRE did not offend any provision of Conditions of Particular Application read with Rules and Procedures for the Functions of the Disputes Review Expert-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the award made rule of the Court-Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.\nUniversal Insurance Company v. Karim Gul 2021 CLD 1189; Co-operators Life Insurance Co. v. Gibbons [2009] 3 SCR 605; Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna 2001 SCMR 1700 and Abdul Hakeem v. Habibullah 1997 SCMR 1139 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=30,33,39Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115", - "Case #": "C.R. No. 233 of 2016, decided on 7th February, 2023.Dates of hearing: 26th October, 3rd, 17th November, 2022 and 18th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Asghar Khan, Ali Roshan Gillani and Atif Waheed for Petitioner.\nBarrister Muhammad Mumtaz Ali for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY (NHA) through Chairman-Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs SAMBU CONSTRUCTION CO. LIMITED and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23654", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1681 = 2023 CLD 691 = 2023 SLD 1681", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 286-Affairs of company-Coram to file application-Threshold of 10% of membership-Application was filed by two members which met the criteria but one petitioner withdrew and a new member was inducted-Objection was raised by respondent to maintainability of application-Validity-Maintainability of application was to be judged on the day it was presented-After withdrawal of one member it was cured by a bona fide attempt when a new member was added as co-petitioner-Application was maintainable in circumstances.\n(b) Isra University Act (V of 1997)-\n-Ss. 7(1) 30-Foundation formed under the Companies Law-Vacancies of university, filling of-Nomination and appointment-Distinguished-Respondent university was a private institution and petitioners assailed its affairs regarding filling of vacancies, number of its members and finances etc.-Validity-Fundamental difference between nomination and an appointment was that the former represented interest of the nominating authority and was to serve at its pleasure whereas the latter was in relation to an independent position and was to serve in accordance with terms and conditions of the post to which he or she was appointed-Private universities are regulated and governed but cannot be taken over-Respondent university was a statutory body but it remained a private university (since it had been established by the Foundation and not the State) and did not perform any sovereign functions though operate and function within the frame of Isra University Act, 1997-Superior Courts have consistently refused to issue writs of quo warranto to private universities even though they were established through statutes-If High Court was to approve nomination of Chancellor by the Foundation, subject to approval and appointment by Board of Governors of University, it would amount to rewriting S. 7(1) of Isra University Act, 1997-There was no such requirement in S. 7(1) of Isra University Act, 1997, or any other provision as the same would destroy the distinction between nominate and appoint that had been intentionally created by the Legislature in Isra University Act, 1997 and every person to be nominated under the Isra University Act, 1997, would then also have to be appointed by the Board of Governors-This would necessitate rewriting of all provisions that related to nominated posts under Isra University Act, 1997 and defeat the purpose and intent of Isra University Act, 1997, which was to provide the Foundation a role in the affairs of the University through Chancellor and instead would make the foundation subservient to the Board of Governors-Such appointment of Chancellor would destroy the very fabric that had distinguished nomination and appointment-High Court restored the Foundation to its original members as it stood in year 2011 prior to induction of new members-High Court declared that the council so restored would be at liberty to amend Memorandum and Articles of Association and consequently induct any or as many member council as the amended Articles permitted-High Court directed that the restored council would announce a date of meeting for nominating a Chancellor and until then Registrar of University was to perform daily functions in routine; that audit of Foundation (IIF) would be conducted for last ten years and claim of rent was neither illegal nor illogical but should be fair as far as quantum was concerned-Application was allowed accordingly.\nRajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. A. Nageshwara Rao AIR 1956 SC 213 (215 Para 5); Jagdish Chand Mehra v. New India, Embroidery Mills AIR 1964 Punjab 401 (Page 402 Para 7); Prof. Dr. Asad Aslam Khan v. Government of Punjab 2021 PLC (C.S.) 304; Waseem Majid Malik v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 CLD 1207; Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Zafar v. The Province of Punjab 2019 PLC (C.S.) 63; Salman Shahid v. University of Management and Technology 2022 CLC 1328; Aown Abbas Bhatti v. Forman Christian College PLD 2018 Lah. 435 and Anoosha Shaigan v. Lahore University of Management Sciences PLD 2007 Lah. 568 ref.\n(c) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Reading down, principle of-Applicability-Principle of reading down is applied when a provision is capable of more than one interpretation and one or more of those interpretations would render the other provisions either redundant or illusory or in conflict with main frame of the Statute-In such cases, Courts read down the provision in a manner that saves the provision.\nPeoples University of Medical and Health Sciences for Women v. Pakistan Ministry of Health PLD 2021 Sindh 256; Muhammad Arif Ice Factory v. Federation of Pakistan 2021 PTD 1608 and Province of Sindh v. M.Q.M. PLD 2014 SC 531 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=286", - "Case #": "Judicial Company Miscellaneous No. 29 of 2020, decided on 9th December, 2022.Dates of hearing: 6th, 22nd, 29th September, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 12th and 13th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Tayebally and Omer Memon for Petitioners.\nRaashid Anwar for Respondent No. 1.\nMamoon N. Chaudhry for Respondent No. 2.\nNemo for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. AMIR BUX CHANNA through Attorney and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nISRA ISLAMIC FOUNDATION (GUARANTEE) LTD. through Secretary and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23655", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1682 = 2023 CLD 995 = 2023 SLD 1682", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 15-Sale of mortgaged property-Mode and manner-Non-compliance of statutory requirements-Scope-Appellants assailed the rejection of their objection petition directed against the auction of mortgaged property-Validity-Report of the auction committee revealed that the advertisement was published only in one Urdu newspaper, although it was also required to be published in one reputable English newspaper as well-Additionally, the place of the auction was mentioned as the Office of Assistant Director, but as per S. 15(4), it must be a public auction-In the present case, the auction was conducted only three days after the issuance of publication-Three notices in terms of S. 15(2) were purportedly issued by the respondents in the name of appellants, but the record was absolutely mute about their effective service-Respondents were required to file the auction report before the Banking court within thirty days of the auction, as per S. 15(11), but it was filed after almost 13 months-Only the auction of the mortgaged property was alleged to have been conducted, and no further steps were taken-Thus, the impugned auction by no means had attained finality to be rendered as a past and closed transaction-Impugned order was set aside, allowing the matter to be open for the re-auction of mortgaged property-Appeal was allowed.\nMst. Shamim Akhtar v. Muhammad Riaz and another 2008 CLD 186; Rao Muhammad Sadaqat Ali and another v. Messrs Rana Jamal Akbar Ice Factory Rajan Pur and another 2013 CLD 546; Kamran and another v. Zonal Manager and another 2014 CLD 304; Irfan Nawab through Attorney v. Soneri Bank Limited 2012 CLD 1922; Izhar Alam Farooqi, Advocate and another v. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Lasi and others 2008 CLD 149; Muhammad Ismail v. Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Ltd. 2016 CLD 5 and Muhammad Moizuddin and another v. Mansoor Khalil and another 2017 SCMR 1787 rel.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 15-Sale of mortgaged property-Scope-Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, reveals that the financial institution, before exercise of its powers under subsection (4), shall cause to be published a notice in one reputable English daily newspaper and one Urdu daily newspaper with wide circulation in the Province in which the mortgaged property is situated, specifying particulars of the mortgaged property, including name and address of the mortgagor, details of the mortgaged property amount of outstanding mortgage money, and indicating the intention of the financial institution to sell the mortgaged property; moreover, the financial institution shall also send such notices to all persons who, to the knowledge of the financial institution, have an interest in the mortgaged property as mortgagees.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=15", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 77 of 2017, decided on 12th December, 2022.heard on: 12th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan and Anwaar Hussain, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Safeer Mughal for Appellants.\nWaqar ul Haq Sheikh for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nWahab Mehdi Butt for Respondent No. 3.\nRashid Mehmood, Research Officer, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR JAVED and others-Appellants\nVersus\nPUNJAB SMALL INDUSTRIES and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23656", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1683 = 2023 CLD 718 = 2023 SLD 1683", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)-\n-S. 25-Privatization Commission (Modes and Procedures) Rule, 2001, R. 6-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 153 173-Karachi Electric Supply Company Limited-Process of privatization, challenge to-Petitioners sought a declaration that the privatization process of Karachi Electric Supply Company Limited (KESC) by the Privatization Commission, including the transfer of shares and management to the respondent consortium, was illegal, void, and without legal effect-Validity-Approval from the Council of Common Interests (CCI) was obtained in 1993, and post-facto approval was also received in 2006-CCIs formal approval was granted twice, fulfilling the requirements of Article 153 of the Constitution for KESCs privatization-Decision to privatize KESC was prompted by significant financial losses, reaching around PKR 16 billion annually, escalating to approximately PKR 80 billion in 2002-As a result, the Federal Government initiated the privatization process-First attempt to privatize KESC was made in March 2002 under S. 25 of the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000-Strategic investors were invited to express their interest in acquiring 51-73% of KESCs share capital-Only two parties submitted their expressions of interest, and when both were requested to submit a statement of qualification (SOQ), only one party complied by the closing date-Privatization Commissions pre-qualification committee reviewed the SOQ but the party withdrew during the due diligence phase-Subsequently, the Federal Government re-launched the privatization process in September 2003, inviting fresh expressions of interest from potential investors-Five parties submitted their EOIs, and four out of five parties submitted their SOQs-Financial Advisor assessed the SOQs and identified three parties as suitable to proceed to the next stage-However, one party later withdrew from the bidding process, leaving only two-Parties were allowed to belong to multiple consortia as long as the lead bidder in each consortium was different-Prior to the bidding, a reference price of PKR 1.30 per share was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Privatization, which remained confidential-Bidding began in 2005, and each party was required to deposit PKR 100 million as earnest money and subscribe to redeemable preference shares worth PKR 4.38 billion in KESC-Both parties submitted their bids, and the highest bid was accepted-Unfortunately, the highest bidder disappeared without making the balance payment, resulting in the forfeiture of the earnest money-Consequently, the second attempt to privatize KESC was unsuccessful-Under Rule 6 of the Privatization (Modes and Procedures) Rules, 2001, the Privatization Board opted for a negotiated sale-Unsuccessful bidder (original consortium) was given the opportunity to match the previously offered bid by the highest bidder-Unsuccessful bidder, after obtaining permission to form a new consortium, formed it accordingly and the same expressed its willingness to match the bid-Cabinet Committee on Privatization approved the transaction and forwarded it for Cabinet ratification-Eventually, the transaction was completed-Overall, the official respondents substantially complied with the relevant constitutional articles and legal provisions of the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000, and Privatization Commission (Modes and Procedures) Rule, 2001, during the privatization process of KESC-Petitioners, failed to provide evidence demonstrating that the Federal Governments privatization of KESC was unconstitutional, illegal, or violated the principles of natural justice-Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances.\nWattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697 and Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455 rel.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 173 9-Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000), S. 25-Power to acquire property and to make contracts-Right to electricity-Karachi Electric Supply Company Limited-Process of privatization, challenge to-Federal Government retaining regulatory control over privatized assets-Petitioners sought a declaration that the privatization process of Karachi Electric Supply Company Limited (KESC) by the Privatization Commission, including the transfer of shares and management to the respondent consortium, was illegal, void and without legal effect-Objection has been raised by petitioners to the effect that electricity being an essential service cannot be privatized as it is the responsibility of the State to provide all the essential services to the citizens and protect the fundamental right as guaranteed under the Constitution including the right to life-Validity-Certain percentage of shares of KESC had been sold/transferred to a private company, whereas, the Government was still the shareholder and had regulatory control over the affairs of the Company under Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997-NEPRA being the regulator maintained supervisory control over the functions of KESC-Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances.\n(c) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)-\n-Preamble-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 173-Privatization of National Asset-Scope-Executive, duty of-Even if there is no specific embargo under the Constitution or the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000, along with the Privatization (Modes and Procedures) Rules, 2001, restricting the sale or transfer of a National Asset that holds a strategic position and relates to the exercise of sovereign rights by the State, the Executive must exercise extraordinary caution and due care-Executive should ensure that, in the guise of privatizing, a public asset supposedly in the public interest and citing financial exigency, it does not diminish or affect the sovereign rights of the State, its obligation to provide essential services and the safeguarding of fundamental rights of citizens-This caution is necessary to avoid losses to the public exchequer and to ensure the generation of profits.\nAtique Hussain and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Communication and 2 others 2005 CLC 1931 rel.\nCalicon (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federal Government of Pakistan and others 1996 MLD 705 ref.\n(d) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)-\n-Preamble-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Karachi Electric Supply Company Limited-Process of privatization, challenge to-Judicial review-Scope-Petitioners sought a declaration to the effect that the process of privatization of Karachi Electric Supply Company Limited (KESC) adopted by the Privatization Commission and KESC, including the transfer of shares and management to the respondent consortium, was illegal, void and of no legal effect-Respondents attacked the maintainability of the petition-Validity-Privatization of KESC under the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000, was a matter of public interest and could be regarded as a simple transaction involving the transfer of shares from one company to another-On the contrary, considering the governments clear stance on privatization and the sale and transfer of shares to the respondents, it was evident that the matter held public importance-Therefore, the transaction, which entailed scrutiny of constitutional, legal and procedural aspects, could be subjected to judicial review by the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution.\nWattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697 rel.\n(e) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)-\n-Ss. 28A, 29 30-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Maintainability-Process of privatization, challenge to-Scope-Once the process of privatization of a public asset has been challenged by any citizen of Pakistan as pro bono in a public interest litigation, for being violative of the Constitutional mandate and contrary to the legal requirements as per Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000, then the same cannot be entertained or decided by the High Court while exercising limited jurisdiction in terms of Ss. 28-A, 29 30 of the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000, read with Privatization (Modes and Procedures) Rules, 2001-Any citizen having locus standi to file a constitutional petition for seeking enforcement of fundamental rights, under Art. 199 of the Constitution can file a constitutional petition for the scrutiny of the process of privatization of a public asset-Objection raised by respondents as to maintainability was overruled.\nWattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697 rel.\n(f) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 173, 142 Fourth Sched. Pt. II, Entry No. 4-Legislation relating to electricity-Parliament, authority of-Scope-As per Art. 142(a) of the Constitution, the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any matter in the Federal Legislative List, whereas, as per Entry No.4 of Part-II of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution electricity is the subject matter of Federal Legislative List, therefore, any legislation relating to electricity falls within the domain of the Legislative Authority of the Parliament-Article 173(1) of the Constitution, gives powers to the Federation and to the Provinces to exercise executive authority, subject to any Act of the appropriate legislature, to grant, sell, disposition or mortgage any property vested in and to purchase or acquisition of any property on behalf of the Federal Government or as the case may be the Provincial Government and also to make contract.\nWattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697 rel.\n(g) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 9-Security of person-Right to electricity-Scope-Right to electricity is a part of right to life, which includes right to quality of life, hence part of fundamental right of a citizen of Pakistan-To provide electricity to the citizen is the responsibility of a State, whereas, electricity service is part of essential services to be provided by the State to its citizens.\n(h) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction-Public interest litigation-Bona fide of petitioner-Discretion of court-Scope-Any individual or small group of persons, in the garb of public interest litigation, cannot be allowed to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution, on mere allegation of mala fide in respect of any decision of the executive authority, whereas, Courts are required to exercise restraint, and should ensure that unless there is a matter of public interest or enforcement of fundamental rights, only then its discretion under Art. 199 of the Constitution should be invoked and exercised by the Courts-In such type of cases, extra caution and care has to be exercised, and unless good faith on the part of petitioner is established and the matter is found to be of a public interest, and the respondent is not in a position to distinguish that the impugned transaction does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect or patent illegality, the Courts may not encourage frivolous litigation between the parties and cause miscarriage of justice.\n(i) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction-Public interest litigation-Subsequent event, notice of-Scope-High Court while exercising jurisdiction, particularly in cases relating to public interest litigation, can take cognizance of subsequent events during pendency of lis before it, in order to do complete justice, however it is to be done without changing the complexion of proceedings.\nSalahuddin Ahmed along with Saifullah Abbasi for Petitioners.\nPetitioner in person (in Constitutional Petition No. D-3818 of 2015).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Privatisation Commission Ordinance, 2000=25Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=153,173", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-1511 of 2005, D-3775, D-3776 of 2012, D-3767 and D-3818 of 2015, decided on 21st January, 2021.heard on: 17th August, 2020.", - "Judge Name:": " Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Arshad Hussain Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Sattar Pirzada for Respondent/Privatization Commission along with Mamoon Chaudhry and Qazi Umair Ali.\nSajid Zahid along with Taha Alizai, Zeeshan Khan and Jawad Raja for Respondent No. 10.\nKashif Hanif for Respondent/NEPRA.\nOmer Soomor along with Danish Nayyer for Respondent.\nAemal Kansi for Respondent along with Ms. Sehar Rana along with Syed Irfan Ali Shah, head of Legal Affairs, K. Electric.\nMalik Naeem Iqbal for Respondent.\nHassan Ali for Respondent No. 6.\nMuhammad Aminullah Siddiqui, Assistant Attorney General.\nSaifullah, A.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KESC LABOUR UNION through Chairman and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Cabinet Secretary and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23657", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1684 = 2023 CLD 819 = 2023 SLD 1684", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 5-New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, Art. IV-Documents, reliance on-Scope-Court has to only examine documents filed, in order to enforce such award under the doctrine of pro-enforcement bias.\n(b) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 7-New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, Art. II, cl. 2 Art. V (1) (a)-Invalidity of agreement-Electronic communication-Plea raised by objector to award was that agreement between the parties was invalid-Validity-Communications were exchanged between the parties and were sent through automated information system- Such communication squarely came within the meaning of terms defined in Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, as well as within the meaning of agreement in writing defined in Art. II, cl. 2 of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958.\nLouis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse S.A. v. Acro Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 2018 Lah. 597; Hitachi Limited v. Rupali Polyester 1998 SCMR 1618; Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v. Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38 and Kabab-Ji SAL v. Kout Food Group [2021] UKSC 48 rel.\n(c) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 7-New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, Art. V(2)(b)-Final award-Unenforceability-Public policy, contrary to-Plea raised by objector to award was that the award was contrary to public policy in Pakistan-Validity-Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award under S. 7 of Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 and New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, could be refused if competent authority in Pakistan would find that recognition or enforcement of the award was contrary to public policy of Pakistan-To avail benefit of Art. V(2)(b) of New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, the objector had to satisfy the High Court that the recognition or enforcement of award was contrary to public policy of Pakistan-Parties to an arbitration agreement were compelled under Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 to take their claims to Tribunals agreed for resolution of disputes by parties and further required the Courts in Pakistan to refer the parties to arbitration-This was the public policy of Pakistan and had be adhered to-There was no violation of Pakistani law or public policy in circumstances.\nOrient Power Company (Private) Limited through Authorized Officer v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through Managing Director 2019 CLD 1069 and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co, 417 US 506 (1974) rel.\n(d) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Preamble-Object, purpose and scope-Preamble means an introductory statement in a Constitution, Statute or Act-It explains the basis and objective of such a document-Though Preamble to a statute is not an operational part of the enactment but it is a gateway, which discusses purpose and intent of Legislature to necessitate the legislation on the subject-Preamble sheds clear light on the goals that Legislator aims to secure through introduction of such law-Preamble of a statute holds a pivotal role for the purposes of interpretation in order to dissect true purpose and intent of law.\nDirector General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others 2016 SCMR 447; Orient Power Company v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines PLD 2019 Lah. 607 and Dhanya Agro-Industrial (Pvt.) Limited through Attorney v. Quetta Textile Mills Ltd. through Chief Executive 2019 CLD 160 rel.\n(e) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Preamble S. 2(e)-Foreign arbitral award-Court, jurisdiction of-Scope-Preamble of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 provided expeditious mechanism for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral agreements and foreign arbitral awards pursuant to New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958-Final Award was made by London Court of International Arbitration against the parties who belonged to consented countries and were bound by New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, therefore, it came within the meaning of S. 2(e) of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011.\n(f) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 7-New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, Art. V(2)(b)-Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award-Pro-enforcement bias-Object, purpose and scope-New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, in Art. V advocates pro-enforcement bias policy in dealing with applications of recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards-General principle has been set forth that each contracting state has to recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them-As a result, foreign awards are entitled to a prima facie right to enforcement in the contracting states-Essentially it means pro-enforcement attitude of national courts enforcing foreign award-After ratifying New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 and Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, Courts in Pakistan have enforced the awards through pronouncements of s and such enforcement casts a duty upon the Courts to build the confidence of investors by protecting the sanctity of arbitration agreements.\nYukos Oil v. Dardana, [2001] EWCA Civ 1077 and M.C.R. (Pvt.) Ltd. Franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority and others 2021 CLD 639 rel.\n(g) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 6 7-New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, Art. V(2)(b)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 10-Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award-Pro-enforcement bias-Effect-Applicant filed application seeking recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award in Pakistan, issued by London Court of International Arbitration-Objector to the award raised plea of pro-enforcement bias-Validity-Pro-enforcement policy under New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, refers to a legal approach that favors recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards-Such approach is based on the principle of comity, which requires countries to show respect and deference to legal systems and decisions of other countries and arbitral tribunals-Pro-enforcement policy under New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, is important because it promotes finality and enforceability of arbitration awards-When parties agree to resolve their disputes through arbitration, they expect that resulting award is final and binding-Pro-enforcement policy helps to ensure that parties can rely on arbitration process to resolve their disputes and that resulting awards are enforced in other countries-In practice, a pro-enforcement policy means that courts should apply a narrow standard of review when considering applications for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards-Such standard requires courts to limit their review to procedural matters and to refrain from re-examining substance of dispute-Such approach ensures that recognition and enforcement process is swift and efficient, which benefits both parties and promotes international trade and commerce-Pro-enforcement policy under New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, is essential to promote recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards-Such approach reflects importance of promoting finality and enforceability in arbitration process, which in turn contributes to stability and predictability of international commerce-High Court is bound to implement it as such-Objector failed to defend its foreign arbitration award on the grounds raised under S. 7 of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 read with Art. V(2)(b) of New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, by its conduct while appearing before London Court of International Arbitration Award, and by not filing proper documents under Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 and even by its reply filed before High Court-Objector filed reply (four pages only) without any document/annexure by taking preliminary objections, whereas, applicant filed application under S. 6 of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, read with Art. IV of New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, and had met with all requirements for enforcement of the Final Award-High Court recognized the Final Award as binding-High Court passed in the amount represented in the Final Award, which would be executed as decree of High Court-High Court in exercise of powers under O. XXI, R. 10, C.P.C. converted the application into execution proceedings- Application was allowed accordingly.\nTariq Iqbal Malik v. Messrs Mltiplierz Group Pvt. Ltd. and 4 others 2022 CLD 468; Malik Mehboob v. Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 2023 Lah. 97; Abdullah v. Messrs CNAN Group SPA through Chief Executive/Managing Director and another PLD 2014 Sindh 349 and Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse S.A. v. ACRO Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 2018 Lah. 597 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Ordinance, 2011=5,7", - "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 80492 of 2017, decided on 28th April, 2023.heard on: 22nd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Iftikhar ud Din Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court with Ahmad Abdul Rehman, Smam Mir and Mehrunisa Virk for Applicant.\nDeeba Tasneem Anwar, Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court, Jam Waseem Haider, Haseeb Ahsan Javed, Ch. Nabeel Rafaqat and Jawad Jamil Malik for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs TRADHOL INTERNATIONAL SA SOCIEDAD UNIPERSONAL- Applicant\nVersus\nMessrs SHAKARGANJ LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23658", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1685 = 2023 CLD 867 = 2023 SLD 1685", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVTg", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 22- Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched. Art. 166- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2) O. XXI, R. 89-Execution of decree-Sale, assailing of-Limitation-Deposit of auction money-Effect-Appellant/ debtor was aggrieved of dismissal of his application under O. XXI, R. 89, C.P.C. and auction of mortgaged house was maintained by Banking Court- Earlier appeal against dismissal of application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. filed by appellant/ debtor for getting and decree set aside was withdrawn by him-Validity-Appellant/ debtor filed application under the provisions of O. XXI, R. 89, C.P.C.-Appellant/ debtor was afforded opportunity and means under O. XXI, R. 89, C.P.C. for setting aside sale after it was validly carried out by making payment of amount specified in proclamation of sale minus any amount received by decree holder since date of proclamation of sale along with a further sum of 5% of purchase money for payment to auction purchaser-In order to avail such opportunity, appellant/ debtor was required under Art. 166 of Limitation Act, 1908 to file application as well as make deposit within a period of 30 days from the date of sale-As soon as appellant/ debtor withdrew his appeal, Banking Courts order dismissing application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. had attained finality-Such dismissal order could not be attacked and interfered with or made ineffective subsequently, by direct or indirect means, in a collateral proceeding-Having deposited entire bid money within the time stipulated by law, and in addition, upon confirmation of sale by Banking Court, auction purchaser had acquired valuable rights in subject property-Such rights of auction purchaser, lawfully conferred by the Court, had to be protected and could not be taken away-High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Banking Court-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Khalil v. Faisal M.B. Corporation 2019 SCMR 321; Anwar Ahmed Ansari v. Pak Libya Holding Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and another First Appeal No.219 of 2017; Asma Zafarul Hasan v. United Bank Ltd. 1981 SCMR 108; Yasmeen Yaqoob v. Allied Bank 2007 CLD 1511; Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani PLD 2005 SC 819 and Habib and Company v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2019 SCMR 1453 ref.\nAsma Zafarul Hasan v. United Bank Ltd 1981 SCMR 108; Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani PLD 2005 SC 819; Anwar Sultana v. Bank Al-Falah 2014 SCMR 1222; Zakaria Ghani v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon PLD 2016 SC 229; Muhammad Ikhlaq Memons case PLD 2005 SC 819; Zakaria Ghanis case PLD 2016 SC 229; Muhammad Suleman v. Allied Bank 1987 CLC 1338; Hudaybia Textile Mills v. Allied Bank PLD 1987 SC 512; 1991 SCMR 51 and Ghulam Qadir v. Abdul Wadood PLD 2016 SC 712 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Limitation Act, 1908=166Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2),89", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 15 of 2020, decided on 23rd May, 2023.heard on: 4th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Irfan Saadat Khan and Sana Akram Minhas, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Saleem Mangrio for Appellant.\nAijaz Shirazi for Respondent No. 1.\nKhaleeq Ahmed for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ANWAR AHMED ANSARI-Appellant\nVersus\nPAK LIBYA HOLDING CO. (PVT.) LTD. and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23659", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1686 = 2023 CLD 879 = 2023 SLD 1686", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVXo", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 10 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. IX-Suit for recovery of finance-Leave to defend the suit-Dismissal of suit for non-prosecution-During pendency of application for leave to defend the suit, Banking Court dismissed the suit for non-prosecution-Validity-When case was fixed for arguments on leave application, Banking Court could neither dismiss leave application for non-prosecution nor could it decide the suit unless leave application was decided-No limitation runs against void order-Question of limitation in respect of application seeking restoration of suit was not relevant as dismissal itself was not proper-High Court set aside order passed by Banking Court and suit was restored-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nMst. Suraya Parveen v. Mst. Rukhsana Hanif and others 2012 SCMR 656; National Bank of Pakistan v. The Additional District Judge, Lahore and 2 others PLD 1985 Lah. 326; Muhammad Iftikhar through Special Attorney v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through Chairman and another 2005 CLD 1454; Messrs Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. through Deputy Chief (Legal) v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd., Avari Hotel Branch, Lahore through Manager and another 2006 CLD 816; Abid Aziz Khan and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through Branch Manager 2007 CLD 997; Rab Nawaz Shahid and 3 others v. Bank of Khyber and 2 others 2007 CLD 1236 and Messrs Fateh Textile Mills Ltd. v. West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation PLD 2008 Kar. 103 ref.\nCITIBANK N.A. through Manager and duly authorized Attorney of the Bank v. Judge Banking Court-III, Lahore and another 2006 CLD 1543; Jamshed Iqbal Butt and another v. Mst. Bushra Tufail 2015 CLC 316 and Qazi Munir Ahmed v. Rawalpindi Medical College and Allied Hospital through Principal and others 2019 SCMR 648 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10,22", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 191715 of 2018, heard on 7th June, 2021.\nheard on: 7th June, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Abid Hussain Chattha, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ashar Elahi for Appellant.\nSyed Zille Hussnain Gillani for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAYSAL BANK LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nNATIONAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23660", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1687 = 2023 CLD 883 = 2023 SLD 1687", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpVXk", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 281, 282 285-Compromise with creditors and members-Reconstruction or amalgamation of companies-Scope-Petitioners sought sanction of the High Court to a Scheme of Arrangement-In terms of the Scheme of Arrangement entire undertaking and business including assets, rights, properties, benefits, powers, privileges, contracts, trading terminals, servers, back-office system, trademarks, patents, liabilities, obligations and dues of the transferor company would be transferred to and vest in and assumed by transferee company against allotment and issue of shares-Ratio of shares and scheme was based on the recommendation of the Chartered Accountants after considering the financial positions of the companies-Transferee company would act accordingly whereas the transferor company would cease to exist without winding up and its shares held by shareholders would stand cancelled-Creditors of the petitioners had consented to the Scheme of Arrangement-Not a single shareholder of any of the two petitioners had objected to the scheme- Petition was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,281,282,285", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 14 of 2022, decided on 13th March, 2023.heard on: 13th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rehman for Petitioners.\nS. Ibad-ur-Rehman, Law Officer for SECP on Court's Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FOUNDATION SECURITIES (PVT.) LTD. AND ANOTHER: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23661", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1688 = 2023 CLD 885 = 2023 SLD 1688", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Jurisdiction-\n-Scope-Capacity of the Court to take account of any dispute submitted to it is called jurisdiction-Thus, without a specific jurisdiction, the Court will not possess the prowess to decide on a particular dispute.\nProvince of Punjab through Secretary to Government of Punjab, Communication and Works Department, Lahore and another v. Messrs Muhammad Tufail and Company through Muhammad Tufail (deceased) through Legal Heirs PLD 2017 SC 53; MCB Bank Limited v. Adeel Shahbaz Steel Mills and others 2023 CLD 655 and Bahoo Dying Industries (Private) Limited v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited and others PLD 2021 Lah. 186 ref.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 5(1), 21 286-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10-Petition for winding up of company-Return of plaint-Territorial jurisdiction of (Lahore) High Court-Scope-Registered office of a company-Section 5(1) of the Companies Act, 2017 (the Act) unequivocally provides that the jurisdiction shall be determined on the basis of place of the registered office of the company situated in the territorial jurisdiction of the respective High Court-Thus, location of registered office of a company carries pivotal role and status while determining territorial jurisdiction of the Court dealing with company matters-Section 21 of the Act elucidates that the registered office will be the one where all communications and notices would be addressed to the company-All issues arising out of the Act are to be dealt with by the Company Judge of a Court having jurisdiction at the place where the registered office of the Company is situated, which in the present case was Lahore High Court, Lahore (Principal Seat), where admittedly the registered office of the petitioner-company is located-Since registered office of the petitioner-company is situated at Lahore, therefore, Rawalpindi Bench of the (Lahore) High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present petition-Application was allowed and it was directed that the present petition be returned to the petitioners to be filed before the Company Judge at Principal Seat of the Lahore High Court, if so advised.\n \nIftikhar Hussain and others v. Dadex Enternit and others 2002 CLD 575; PHOENIX Security Service (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director Commercial v. Messrs Emerald Mining Company (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2000 Pesh. 78; Chief Executive Officer, Peshawar Electric and Power Company (PEPCO) and another v. Sajeeda Begum and others 2023 PLC (C.S) 90 = 2022 SCMR 2058; Brother Steel Mills Ltd. and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and 14 others PLD 1006 SC 543; Zafar Iqbal v. Nasreen Ahmed 2014 CLD 1039; Iftikhar Hussain and others v. Dadex Enternit and others 2002 CLD 575 and Abdul Rauf and another v. Messrs Mifatah Uddin Flour Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2000 Pesh. 83 ref.\n(c) Jurisdiction-\n-Question of jurisdiction-If a mandatory condition for the exercise of a jurisdiction before a Court, tribunal or authority is not fulfilled, then the entire following proceedings become illegal and suffer from want of jurisdiction-So, there rests no room for stepping ahead with a case without first attending to and adjudicating upon question of jurisdiction.\nZahid Zaman Khan and others v. Khan Afsar and others PLD 2016 SC 409; Government of Sindh through Secretary Education and Literacy Department and others v. Nizakat Ali and others 2011 SCMR 592; Pakistan Red Crescent Society, Punjab Provincial Branch v. Zia Ullah Khan Niazi 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1640 and Khyber Tractors (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager v. Pakistan through Ministry of Finance, Revenue and Economic Affairs, Islamabad PLD 2005 SC 842 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.M. No.3 of 2023 and Civil Original No. 11 of 2022, heard on 1st June, 2023.heard on: 1st June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mohsin Kamal, Nauman Iqbal and Waleed Khan for Petitioners.\nSyed Ijaz Ali Akbar Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Kamal Hassan and Mrs. Kalsoom Akhtar for the Respondents/Applicants Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.M. No.03 of 2023).\nMuzaffar Ahmed Mirza, Chief Prosecutor, Executive Director, Legal Affairs, SECP with Syeda Muneeza Fatima, Special Public Prosecutor on behalf of Respondent No.4.\nRashid Mehmood, Research Officer, Lahore High Court, (Rawalpindi Bench).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs MANDVIWALLA BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nM. AWAIS SHEIKH CEO MANGLA VIEW RESORT AND MANGLA GARRISON HOUSING (PVT.) LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23662", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1689 = 2023 CLD 905 = 2023 SLD 1689", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTY", - "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-\n-S. 118-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr. 1 2-Suit for recovery of money-Leave to defend the suit, grant of-Negotiable instrument-Presumption-Pleading of another suit-Dishonored bank cheque-Parties were ex-husband and wife and suit was filed by respondent/plaintiff for recovery of money on the basis of dishonored Bank cheques-Trial Court relied upon written statement of appellant/defendant (husband) filed in another suit filed by respondent/plaintiff (wife) against her previous father-in-law-Trial Court declined to grant leave to defend and suit was decreed in favour of respondent/plaintiff-Validity-Presumption under S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was attached to negotiable instrument and burden was upon the person denying the same to prove to the contrary-Such presumption was rebuttable by evidence-Parties were spouse at the relevant time, so there could be probability of stance taken by husband-Without providing opportunity to appellant/ defendant to prove his stance through leading evidence his stance could not be discarded straight away on the basis of presumption that the version of appellant/defendant would be wrong or erroneous-Respondent/plaintiff denied claim of appellant/defendant through her counter affidavit but it was difficult at such stage to decide such dispute in absence of evidence of the parties-Trial Court denied leave to defend application of appellant/defendant on the premise of relying on contents of written statement of appellant/defendant allegedly filed by him in another suit, instituted by respondent/plaintiff against her former father-in-law-Trial Court while dismissing application to defend the suit filed by appellant/defendant, did not consider legal status of the pleadings of another suit-When no evidence is recorded, then contents of written statement could not be treated as proved and believable, as true and correct-Contents of pleadings of any other suit could not be considered in another matter for deciding fate of it, which suits have no nexus with each other-Prima facie there was substantive dispute between parties, which required deeper inquiry-High Court remanded the case with direction to Trial Court to decide leave to defend application of appellant/defendant afresh-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n2001 CLC 653; 2004 CLC 356; 2020 CLC 1289; 1991 CLC 442 and Fine Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=118Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 59 of 2022, decided on 12th December, 2022.heard on: 12th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Kausar Sultana Hussain, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shehzeb Akhtar Khan for Appellant.\nMuhammad Faisal Khan for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHURRAM MUGHAL through duly Constituted Attorney-Appellant\nVersus\nMrs. NAUREEN MUGHAL and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23663", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1690 = 2023 CLD 912 = 2023 SLD 1690", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 118 79-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 129(g), 72, 78 117-Insurance claim-Non-disclosure or misrepresentation-Withholding best evidence-Proof of contents of documents-Post-mortem report, evidentiary value of-Scope- Appellant impugned and decree passed by the Insurance Tribunal whereby the suit of respondent for recovery of life insurance claim was allowed-Appellant in order to obtain benefit of S. 79 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 and to repudiate the contract placed reliance on a medical prescription issued by a specialist of mental disease and addiction treatment certificate along with inquiry report of the appellants official-Validity-Neither inquiry officer of the appellant nor the doctor whose prescription had been presented was produced as witnesses-Prescription appended with the inquiry report was a photocopy and not the original-Probative value of the prescription evaporated in the thin air on the ground that it was a private document, hence, the genuineness of the same was required to be proved in terms of Art. 72 read with Arts. 78 117 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-None of the relatives of the deceased had appeared in support of their statements made before the Inquiry Officer-No effort was made on the part of the appellant to get post mortem of the deceased conducted and in absence of the same, there was no reason to discard the death certificate, which was a public document and to which presumption of truth was attached-Mere fact that the death had occurred within short period of time after the purchase of the policy was not per se a suspicious circumstance to deny the relief to the beneficiary-Since the appellant had denied and lingered the claim of the respondent without any just cause, therefore, High Court awarded an additional cost to the appellant-Appeal was dismissed.\n \nMuhammad Zakria and 3 others v. Bashir Ahmad 2001\nCLC 595 rel.\nKhan Muhammad Yusuf Khan Khattak v. S. M. Ayub and 2 others PLD 1973 SC 160; Muhammad Ashraf v. Shah Noor Khan and another 1996 MLD 1819; Muhammad Aslam and another v. Mst. Sardar Begum alias Noor Nishan 1989 SCMR 704; Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore through Secretary v. Mst. Sobia Chand 1999 CLC 1166; Fateh Ullah v. Noor Ahmad 2012 CLC 246 and Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Smt. Parkash Kaur and others 1997 (1) MPLJ 203 ref.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 79-Non-disclosure or misrepresentation-Scope-Insurance contracts belong to that limited category of contracts, which are regarded as ones falling under doctrine of uberrimae fidei i.e., of the utmost good faith and hence any concealment may lead to cancellation thereof.\n(c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 79- Non-disclosure or misrepresentation- Scope- Non-disclosure or wrong declaration of any material information can entitle an insurer to invoke S. 79 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, to repudiate the contract of insurance.\nLife Insurance Corporation of India and others v. Asha Goel and others (2001) 2 SCC 160 rel.\n(d) Insurance-\n-Non-medical life insurance-Scope-Non-medical life insurance assumes a no medical test while issuing a policy, as opposed to a traditional policy where medical tests are required and are executed while relying upon the declaration, which the insured makes at the time of making of the contract of insurance.\n(e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 72 78-Proof of contents of documents-Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or written document produced-Scope-Production of documents and their admissibility as well as the proof and probative value carried by such documents are entirely two different things and should never be used or construed interchangeably-For proving veracity of a document, the person who authored it must depose before the court in support of the contents, otherwise such document can merely be taken into consideration for the purpose of showing that such a document was issued but whether the contents of the same are correct or not, such facts cannot go into the evidence unless the author of the document deposes before the court and faces cross-examination-Once a document is produced as a piece of evidence, it has to undergo the crucible of objective scrutiny in terms of Art. 78 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-Mere production of a document neither lends any credence nor confers any probative value to it.\nPakistan Engineering Consultants through Managing Partner v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through Managing Director and another PLD 2006 Kar. 511 and Messrs United Ethanol Industries Limited v. Messrs JDW Sugar Mills Ltd. 2015 YLR 1429 ref.\n(f) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 129(g)- Withholding best evidence- Scope- An adverse presumption is to be drawn against the party which withholds the best evidence.\nDilshad Begum v. Nisar Akhtar 2012 SCMR 1106 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=118,79Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=129(g),72,78,117", - "Case #": "Insurance Appeal No. 178 of 2021, decided on 27th September, 2021.heard on: 27th September, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Ch. Muhammad Masood Jahangir and Anwaar Hussain, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Malik Sohail Ashiq Shujra for Appellant.\nSardar Muhammad Rashid Khan Baloch for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN (SLIC) through duly authorized Officer/Attorney-Appellant\nVersus\nMst. Bibi REEMA-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23664", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1691 = 2023 CLD 920 = 2023 SLD 1691", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 3, 9 10-Bankers Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S. 4-Suit for recovery of finances-Indoor management, doctrine of-Authority to file suit-Principle-Leave to defend the suit, refusal of-Effect-Suit for recovery of two finance facilities was filed by Bank against defendants-Validity-Statement of account was duly verified under Bankers Book Evidence Act, 1891 and entries therein were not consciously and lawfully disputed by defendants-Authority of person filing plaint on the strength of Power of Attorney was the question of doctrine of indoor management, that was concerned with authorization and was never considered as substantial question of law-Authorization from Power of Attorney was recognized in terms of S. 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and on account of principle of Indoor Management, it was only the principal who could object to it-Defendants neither denied execution of agreement nor challenged authority to execute agreement with them on behalf of plaintiff bank-This was not a question of law that could form substantial question out of the pleadings in consideration of law of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and execution of documents in particular-Defendants availed two facilities i.e. Letter of Credit and Running Facility-High Court declined to grant leave to defendants and suit was decreed along with cost of funds in terms of S. 3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Suit was decreed accordingly.\nApollo Textile Mills Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268; Dewan Automotive Engineering Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Limited 2017 CLD 342; Ehsan-ul-Haq v. MCB Bank Limited 2016 CLD 1874 and KASB Bank Limited v. Mirza Ghulam Mujtaba 2011 CLD 461 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=3,9,10Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891=4", - "Case #": "Suit No. D-39 of 2021, decided on 6th February, 2023.Dates of hearing: 10th, 11th November and 7th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Bahzad Haider for Plaintiff.\nMs. Alizeh Bashir for Defendant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The BANK OF PUNJAB through authorized Attorney-Plaintiff\nVersus\nMessrs HASCOL PETROLEUM LIMITED through CEO/MD-Defendant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23665", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1692 = 2023 CLD 928 = 2023 SLD 1692", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUS8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 22 27-Suit for recovery of finance-Finality of order-Principle of past and closed transaction-Applicability-Decretal amount, amendment of-After the and decree was maintained by High Court, on the application of respondent Bank, the Banking Court enhanced decretal amount-Validity-Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court under the theory of merger was merged in and decree passed by High Court in exercise of appellant jurisdiction, in the earlier round of litigation and had become past and closed transaction-Respondent Bank, at its own will and whims could not assail before Banking Court, the which had merged into final passed by High Court, by moving a miscellaneous application-Banking Court had allowed application of respondent bank in violation of the provisions of S. 27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Only remedy available to respondent bank was to assail and decree passed by High Court by filing appeal before Supreme Court-When in an appeal/revision/writ, of lower forum was reversed, varied, modified or affirmed, after recording reasons on the consideration of issues of law and/or fact, the /order of the subordinate Court/forum merged into the decision of appellate Court, irrespective of the fact that such had reversed, varied or affirmed the decision of subordinate Court/forum-Decision of appellate Court would be operative and capable of enforcement in such case on the principle of merger-Application for modification of decretal amount could only be moved before High Court-High Court set aside the order of Banking Court on the doctrine of merger and the same was also violative of S. 27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nMarhaba Textile Limited v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 1822; Askari Commercial Bank Limited through Authorized Signatory v. Messrs Bake Line Products through Partners and 5 others 2013 CLD 836; Anwar Mehmood v. Messrs Askari Bank Limited 2013 CLD 912; Messrs. Tharparkar Sugar Mills through Authorized Representatives and others v. Bankers Equity Limited through Official Liquidator 2014 CLD 1343 and Sahabzadi Maharunisa and another v. Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another PLD 2016 SC 358 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22,27", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 173 of 2013, decided on 21st June, 2016*.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Jamil Khan and Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Qadoos Khan Tareen for Appellant.\nMansoor Alam for Respondent-Bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SHAHID KHAN-Appellant\nVersus\nFAYSAL BANK LTD. and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23666", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1693 = 2023 CLD 934 = 2023 SLD 1693", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-\n-Ss. 5, 6, 7 8-Defective motor vehicle-Claim filed against manufacturer of vehicle before the Consumer Court-Alleged defects not mentioned in the pleadings-Effect-Claim filed by respondent/ claimant did not make any specific mention of the alleged defects in the vehicle-Even the legal notices sent by respondent made no mention of any specific defects, and it was only in his affidavit, submitted as his examination-in-chief, that he mentioned the defects-Litigant was required to plead all material facts that were necessary to seek the relief claimed and then to prove the same through evidence-Parties were required to lead evidence in consonance with their pleadings and no evidence could be led or looked into in support of a fact or a plea that had not been taken in the pleadings-Notably, respondent also admitted in his cross-examination that he had not described the specific defects in the vehicle in his pleadings/claim-Therefore, the defects alleged in the affidavit of respondent were beyond the scope of the pleadings and, hence, could not have been considered-Appeal was allowed and claim filed by respondent was dismissed.\nMuhammad Ghaffar v. Arif Muhammad 2023 SCMR 344; Saddaruddin v. Sultan 2021 SCMR 642; Moiz Abbas v. Latifa 2019 SCMR 74 and Muhammad Tariq v. Shamsa PLD 2011 SC 151 ref.\n(b) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-\n-S. 30(1)(c)- Defective motor vehicle- Claim filed against manufacturer of vehicle before the Consumer Court-Expert evidence-Where the defects alleged are of such a nature that required expert inspection or probe, the onus to provide such expert evidence falls on the consumer who is alleging that the product is defective or faulty-Where such defects are alleged by the consumer, a Consumer Court, before deciding that a certain product is defective or faulty, must satisfy itself that sufficient expert evidence is available and could be relied upon to ascertain the defects so alleged instead of merely placing reliance on the statement of a consumer who may not be from the related field of expertise and therefore, not competent to address the technicalities forming part of the alleged defects, especially where the claim of the consumer is denied by the manufacturer-To this effect, section 30(1)(c) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 allows the Consumer Court to invite expert evidence, if required, where the claim alleges that the products are defective and do not conform to the accepted industry standards.\nIn the present case despite alleging technical manufacturing defects in the vehicle, no expert evidence was led by respondent/claimant or invited by the Consumer Court under section 30(1)(c) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 (the Act) to prove that the said defects alleged by respondent actually existed. Instead, the Court relied only on the evidence of respondent, who was not an expert in the automotive industry, and firstly deposed in his cross-examination that the alleged defects were based on his general observations regarding the vehicle and then stated that there were no manufacturing defects in the vehicle. It is apparent that at least two of the defects alleged by the claimant, i.e. with regards to the hatch box and the colour of the stereo, were of such nature that could not have been ascertained without expert inspection. Where the defects alleged are of such a nature that required expert inspection or probe, the onus to provide such expert evidence falls on the consumer who is alleging that the product is defective or faulty. Where such defects are alleged by the consumer, a Consumer Court, before deciding that a certain product is defective or faulty, must satisfy itself that sufficient expert evidence is available and could be relied upon to ascertain the defects so alleged instead of merely placing reliance on the statement of a consumer who may not be from the related field of expertise and therefore, not competent to address the technicalities forming part of the alleged defects, especially where the claim of the consumer is denied by the manufacturer. To this effect, Section 30(1)(c) of the Act allows the Consumer Court to invite expert evidence, if required, where the claim alleges that the products are defective and do not conform to the accepted industry standards. Additionally, section 30(1)(d) of the Act provides that where the dispute cannot be determined without proper analysis or test of the products, the Consumer Court shall obtain a sample of the products from the claimant and refer the same to a laboratory to make analysis or test with a view to find out if such products suffer from any defect, which may be paid for by the claimant, or if the test or analysis supports the version of the claimant, then to be paid by the defendant, as stipulated under Section 30(1)(e) of the Act. In the present case, the onus to prove the alleged defects was on respondent, which he failed to do. No expert evidence was produced by respondent or invited by the Consumer Court to ascertain whether the alleged defects existed in the vehicle. Therefore, respondent failed to prove that the vehicle was defective in construction or composition as required under section 5 or that it was otherwise defective for the purposes of any other provision of the Act. Appeal was allowed and claim filed by respondent was dismissed.\nPlum Qingqi v. Muhammad Moeed 2015 CLC 1538; Muhammad Aslam v. General Manager Pioneer Pakistan Seed Limited 2014 CLD 257 and Dawlance v. Muhammad Jameel 2012 CLD 1461 ref.\n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 30-Admission-Admission of a co-defendant is not binding on the other defendant.\nFarzand Ali v. Khuda Bakhsh PLD 2015 SC 187 and Shah Muhammad v. Dullah 2000 SCMR 1588 ref.\n(d) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-\n-S. 28(4)-Settlement of claims-Limitation period, commencement of-Defective motor vehicle-Claim filed against manufacturer of vehicle before the Consumer Court-Limitation period of 30 days provided under section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 runs from date of knowledge of the defect or fault in the product or service-During this time, the consumer has to first send a written notice to the manufacturer or service provider under Section 28(1) of the Act and provide 15 days to respond to the same, as required under section 28(2) of the Act.\nEven though no limitation period is provided for sending a written notice under section 28(1) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 (the Act) it is apparent that section 28(4) of the Act in unequivocal terms stipulates and clarifies that a claim with regards to a defective or faulty product or service, or contravention of the provisions of the Act by the manufacturer or service provider, has to be filed within 30 days of the arising of the cause of action. The cause of action, in such circumstances where a product or service is faulty, therefore, arises the moment the consumer obtains knowledge that the product or service is defective or faulty.\nThe limitation period in consumer protection claims, involving defective products, becomes more significant especially because claimants should bring a claim as quickly as possible due to the potential depreciation of the product in question, the characteristics of which may differ according to the specific product. Delaying the filing of a claim can lead to challenges in establishing the products condition at the time of purchase and linking any defects to the consumers use or handling. As time passes, the product may deteriorate, be repaired or modified, or become unavailable, making it more difficult to prove the defects or assess its original condition. Bringing a claim promptly helps ensure that the products condition and any defects can be accurately evaluated and documented. This can also contribute to a stronger case by providing evidence that directly supports the consumers claim. Additionally, timely action demonstrates the consumers diligence and commitment to addressing the issue.\nWhen the consumer obtains knowledge of the defect or fault in the product or the service, the 30-day limitation period stipulated under section 28(4) of the Act commences. It is during this period that the consumer has to first put his grievance before the manufacturer or service provider, seeking rectification of the defect or fault in the product or service, or damages, and provide 15 days to the manufacturer or service provider to remedy the same, as required under section 28(2). It is only after the manufacturer or the service provider responds to the written notice, or where he fails to respond within the stipulated 15-day period, that the consumer can file a claim before the Consumer Court if the cause of action still subsists. The consumer can still file a claim before the Consumer Court by giving sufficient cause for filing the claim beyond 30 days which will be examined by the Consumer Court, as per the provisos to section 28(4) of the Act.\n(e) Limitation-\n-Limitation is not a mere technicality, and where the limitation period has expired, a right accrues in favour of the other side which cannot be lightly brushed aside.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005=5,6,7,8,30(1)(c)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 797 of 2017, decided on 23rd May, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 20.02.2017, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in F.A.O. No. 115 of 2014).\nheard on: 23rd May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Anwar v. Essa PLD 2022 SC 716 and Asad Ali v. The Bank of Punjab PLD 2020 SC 736 ref.\nKhalid Ishaq, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nMuhammad Ayyub Aheer, Advocate along with Faisal Jameel Butt/claimant in person for Respondent No.1.\nRespondent No. 2 in person (via video link from Lahore).\nAssisted by Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk, Supreme Court.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ\nMessrs PAK SUZUKI MOTORS COMPANY LIMITED through Manager -Appellant\nVersus\nFAISAL JAMEEL BUTT and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23667", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1694 = 2023 CLD 946 = 2023 SLD 1694", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Environmental Protection Act (VIII of 2014)-\n-Ss. 26 27-Environmental issues-Proceedings before Courts and forums-Locus standi-Respondents objected to maintainability of appeal on the plea that appellants had no locus standi to file the appeal-Validity-Concerned citizens were not prevented from placing their grievances before competent Courts or high forums, even if they were not direct affectees but noticed that environmental issues were handled wrongly or unjustifiably with illegality and irregularity etc.-Appellants had a right to approach Environmental Protection Tribunal as aggrieved persons and concerned citizens having sufficient interest and locus standi to be heard in the matter-Appeal was maintainable, in circumstances.\nSyed Haroon Ahmed v. Messers Dadex Eternit Ltd. through Chairman and another 2010 CLD 1555 and Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others v. Province of Punjab and others 2015 CLD 983 rel.\n(b) Sindh Environmental Protection Act (VIII of 2014)-\n-Ss. 26 27- Sindh Environmental Protection Agency (Environmental Assessment) Regulations 2021, Regln. 17-Environmental issues- Environment Impact Assessment (EIA)-Conditional approval-Appellants assailed EIA approval accorded by Environmental Protection Agency to Proponent for construction of Malir Expressway Project- Validity- Approval was subject to numerous conditions, which were total 30 in number, therefore, such approval was conditional one-Most of the environmental issues were addressed in such conditions, compliance and implementation of which was responsibility of respondents-Overall object, necessity and importance of project could not be denied-Purpose for such mega project expressway was to provide support to bulk and heavy vehicles that transport goods from Karachi Port, KICT, Kiamari Terminal, etc. to other parts of the country-Need for corridor in question was highlighted in Traffic Master Plan prepared by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2012 titled as Karachi Transportation Improvement Project-After about ten years, the Project was being executed to avoid heavy traffic from entering and clogging main arteries of the city-Such vehicles were currently using main roads and combined with traffic of city, were creating a compounded pollution effect- If the bulk material transport was provided as separate bypass to access rest of the country, pollution effect would be reduced- On account of tremendous increase in population, a rapid increase of ancillary vehicles in the city resulted in a lot of pressure on citys infrastructure and surroundings, therefore, the situation demanded construction of expressway to cater extreme need of public at large-Project in question was not a private or commercial but was a public road and an initiative of Provincial Government-Expressway was for the larger interest of general public and it would permanently bring savings in terms of fuel and time of public traveling to any place of the country-It was to avoid unsustainable load on existing roads specifically of Landhi and Korangi Industrial Area, which were being used at maximum limit, having no more capacity of expansion or enlargement-Project in question would certainly reduce huge burden at least from the roads of such areas, which had resulted in serious issue of traffic congestion as well as heavy pollution- Damage of any kind caused and likely to be caused to people of project area and surroundings and for the loss of any type already sustained or to be sustained by project affectees and all other issues concerning the environment and socioeconomic related matters which would arise due to construction of the project, could not be left unattended without redressal of the grievances and implementation of the same-Environmental Protection Tribunal directed the authorities to constitute/notify Complaint Redressal and Implementation Committee (CRIC) for redressal of such issues-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\nArdeshir Cowasjee and 10 others v. Karachi Building Control Authority and 4 others 1999 SCMR 2883; H.M. Saya Co., Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd., Karachi and another PLD 1969 SC 65; Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Environmental Protection and 6 others PLD 2014 Sindh 511; Feryal Ali Gauhar and others v. Environmental Protection Agency, Punjab and others 2016 CLD 1011; Syed Haroon Ahmed v. Messrs Dadex Eternit Ltd. through Chairman and another 2010 CLD 1555; Arif Belgaumi and others v. Sindh Environmental Protection Agency and another 2022 CLD 502; PLD 2007 Kar. 293; Ms. Salma lqbal Chundrigar and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Islamabad and others 2009 CLD 682; Lahore Development Authority and others v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others 2015 SCMR 1739; 2021 SCMR 305; 2021 SCMR 328; Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Sindh Environmental Protection Agency and 2 others 2015 CLD 772; Imrana Tiwana and others v. Province of Punjab and others 2015 CLD 983; Zain Yar Khan v. The Chief Engineer C.R.B.C. WAPDA, D.I. Khan and another 1998 PLC (C.S.) 1484; Capital Development Authority and another v. Shaheen Farooque and another 2007 SCMR 1328; Chairman State Life Insurance Corporation and others v. Hamayun Irfan and 2 others 2010 PLC (C.S) 1183; Amanullah Khan v. Federal Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1990 SC 1092; Pakistan through The Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi PLD 1969 SC 407; Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority v. Government of Sindh and others 2022 SCMR 595; Abid Hussain and others v. P.I.A.C. and others 2005 SCMR 25; Lahore Development Authority and another v. Muhammad Tariq Niaz 2020 SCMR 1957; Mst. Arshan Bai through Mst. Fatima Bai and others v. Moula Bakhsh through Mst. Ghulam Safoor and others 2003 SCMR 318; The State v. Asif Adil and others 1997 SCMR 209; Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338; Moiz Abbas v. Mrs. Latifa and others 2019 SCMR 74; 2007 CLD 1358; PLD 2011 Karachi 132; Muhammad Tariq Abbasi and others v. Defence Housing Authority and others 2007 CLC 1358 and 2011 SCMR 1743 ref.\n(c) Sindh Environmental Protection Agency (Environmental Assessment) Regulations, 2021-\n-Regln. 17-Approval, cancellation of-Principle-Approval can be cancelled if conditions of approval have not been complied with or the information supplied by Proponent in the approved EIA or EMP is incorrect.", - "Court Name:": "Environmental Protection Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Environmental Protection Act, (VIII of 2014)=26,27", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 5 of 2022, decided on 15th April, 2023.heard on: 15th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (Retd.) Nisar Muhammad Shaikh, Chairman, Muhammad Arif Khan, Member (Legal) and Abdul Rauf Memon, Member (Technical)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zubair Ahmed Abro along with Ms. Palvasha Shahab for Appellants.\nRavi R. Pinjani for Respondent No. 2.\nHabib-ur-Rehman Solangi, Deputy Director Law along with Mubarak Ali, Deputy Director Technical/Authorized Officer, SEPA for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL QAYOOM and another-Appellants\nVersus\nSINDH ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AGENCY through D.G. and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23668", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1695 = 2023 CLD 984 = 2023 SLD 1695", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-\n-S. 25-Defective part/item of sold product (car)-Warranty offered by the manufacturing company-Scope-Consumer Court directed the appellant to replace the defective engine of the vehicle with new one without any charges-Contention of the appellant/motor vehicle manufacturing company(company) was that the quality of engine had been compromised on account of improper periodic maintenance and use of non-branded/substandard lubricants/filters as maintenance of the vehicle was not carried out by its(companys) dealer-Held, that the documentary evidence produced by the respondent/claimant, inter alia, showed that engine oil and filters of a branded company were used after regular intervals-Contents of the Warranty Booklet did not impose any burden upon the respondent for carrying out maintenance from authorized dealer(s), rather free maintenance service was offered and the customer was advised to follow the instructions regarding maintenance contained in Owners Manual for efficient working of the vehicle-Furthermore, engine fell within the items which were covered by the Warranty; and it was mentioned in the Warranty Booklet that the company would either repair or replace any part which would be revealed defective in material or workmanship under normal use within certain basic coverage period-Documents relied upon by the respondent for coverage of such period had not been disputed by the appellant/company-Vehicle-in-question was also within warranty period when the defect was communicated to the appellant/company-High Court maintained the order passed by the Consumer Court that the appellant/company was bound to replace the defective engine of the vehicle with new one without any charges-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-\n-S. 25-Defective part/item of sold product (car)-Warranty offered by the manufacturing company-Expert opinion-Not necessary where malfunction admitted-Consumer Court directed the appellant/company to replace the defective engine with new one without any charges-Contention of the appellant/motor vehicle manufacturing company (company) was that the Consumer Court was obliged to invite expert evidence to establish the condition of the engine-Held, that the appellant/company had not denied malfunctioning of the engine and its stance was that the defect occurred due to negligence of respondent/consumer-Consumer Court had rightly appreciated the facts and evidence while not calling for any expert evidence-High Court maintained the order passed by the Court below that appellant/company was bound to replace the defective engine of the vehicle with new one without any charges-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(c) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-\n-Ss. 10 25-Defective part/item of sold product (car)-Warranty offered by the manufacturing company-Damages, award of-Scope-Consumer Court ordered the appellant/company to pay damages to the respondent/consumer while directing the appellant to replace the defective engine of the vehicle with new one without any charges-Held, that the respondent/consumer was under heavy duty to substantiate financial loss, mental torture/agony at the hands of appellant/company through independent and reliable evidence, which he (respondent/consumer) had failed to produce-Respondent had not suffered any damage from the vehicle, rather the defect was observed during a routine check-up-Restriction contained in the S. 10 of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 which stated that where the consumer has not suffered any damage from the product except the loss of utility, the manufacturer shall not be liable for any damages except a return of the consideration or a part thereof and the costs-Consumer Court had though rightly appreciated the facts and evidence while coming to the conclusion that the appellant/company was bound to replace the defective engine of the vehicle with new one without any charges, however, the Court below was not justified to award damages to the respondent/consumer- Claim of the respondent/ consumer to the extent of damages was declined-Appeal was partly allowed.\n(d) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-\n-Ss. 25 28-Defective part/item of sold product (car)-Claim of the consumer in light of the warranty offered by the manufacturing company-Cause of action, accrual of-Limitation-Consumer Court directed the appellant to replace the defective engine of the vehicle with new one without any charges-Contention of the appellant/motor vehicle manufacturing company (company) was that the claim of the respondent/consumer was time-barred as the cause of action accrued when the matter was reported for the first time by the complainant, whereas he filed complaint after about forty-six (46) days of said reporting-Validity-Record revealed that the prescribed notice in terms of S. 28(1) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 (the Act 2005) was issued to the appellant about seventeen (17) days after the defect had been reported-Reply to the said notice, denying the claim of the respondent/consumer, was transmitted by the appellant after thirty (30) days of reporting but fifteen (15) days of sending of notice-Cause of action, in the present case, accrued on said date of denial of claim by the appellant/company, thus the complaint having been filed after about fourteen (14) days of said denial was well within time prescribed in S. 28(4) of the Act, 2005-High Court maintained the order passed by the Consumer Court that the appellant/ company was bound to replace the defective engine of the vehicle with new one without any charges- Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMessrs Deltex Courier Service v. Sajid Imran Gill and others 2019 CLC 1041 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005=25", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 03 of 2018/BWP, decided on 8th February, 2021.heard on: 8th February, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sheikh Usman Ahmad and Shehryar Sindhu for Appellant.\nNadeem Iqbal Ch., Rana Rizwan Ahmad and Nusrat Jabeen for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The INDUS MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nABDUL KHALID GILL and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23669", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1696 = 2023 CLD 991 = 2023 SLD 1696", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUXo", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 310-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched. Art. 181-Applications filed under the Companies Act, 2017-Limitation-There is no specific provision in the Limitation Act, 1908 which deals with the applications or proceedings filed under the Companies Act, 2017, except Art. 112 thereof, which deals with a call by a company registered under any Statute or Act therefore, the general provision dealing with the applications would be applicable to the applications filed under the Companies Act, 2017-General provision, which deals with the applications, where no period of limitation is provided in the Limitation Act, 1908, etc., is Art. 181 thereof-Any application filed under the Companies Act, 2017 would be governed by Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 and there would be a period of limitation of three years for such applications.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=310Limitation Act, 1908=181", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1123 of 2020, decided on 15th February, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 12.12.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in J.C.M. No. 15 of 2000)heard on: 15th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nadeem-ud-Din Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nDr. Chaudhry Waseem Iqbal, Official Assignee/Official Liquidator for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs BENTONITE PAKISTAN LIMITED through Director/Chief Executive-Petitioner\nVersus\nBANKERS EQUITY LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23670", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1697 = 2023 CLD 1124 = 2023 SLD 1697", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpUXk", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2) O. IX, R. 13-Suit for recovery of finances-Judgment, setting aside of-Fraud and misrepresentation-Proof-Settlement, concealing of-Appellant/defendant did not appear in Banking Court and suit to his extent was decreed-Plea raised by appellant/defendant was that respondent/Bank concealed fact of settlement arrived at by him-Validity-Simply by moving an application on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation to cover his negligence to pursue the matter and to make an attempt to neutralize vires of subsisting against borrowers would not protect them from the repercussion, which were bound to follow them-In absence of any convincing evidence, no misrepresentation or fraud could be alleged to have been contrived by respondent/Bank to obtain a decision in its favour, which came into being mainly due to failure of appellant/defendant to put up appearance before the Court in pursuance of the notices and summons issued to him-Banking Court considered material facts including settlement between the parties-Amount paid by appellant/defendant was deducted from the amount claimed by respondent/Bank-Nothing was available on the record, which could show that appellant/defendant while acting upon settlement reached between him and the Bank in year 2013 had either fulfilled terms of that settlement and/or had paid outstanding amount due against him to respondent/Bank-In absence of any proof in respect thereof, filing of application under S. 12(2) of C.P.C. lacked bona fide on the part of appellant/defendant-High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Banking Court as there was no concealment of facts and/or misrepresentation on the part of respondent/Bank as alleged by appellant/defendant-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMessrs Watan Construction Company Government Contractor v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Public Health Engineering Department and 4 others 2013 CLC 1028; Progressive Engineers Alliance Limited v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Ltd., Bin Qasim (PIPRI) Karachi 1990 ALD 709(2) and Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and others v. Messrs National Development Finance Corporation 2002 CLC 166 distinguished.\nMessrs First Dawood Investment Bank Limited through Authorized officers/attorney v. Mrs. Anjum Saleem and 3 others 2016 CLD Sindh 920 and Messrs Allied Bank Limited v. Messrs Golden Eagle Enterprises and 9 others 1999 MLD 64 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=13", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 46 of 2017, decided on 13th March, 2023.heard on: 24th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Irfan Saadat Khan and Arshad Hussain Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shaikh Adnan Usman for Appellant.\nKhalil Ahmed Siddiqui as well as Mehran Khan, A.A.G. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOHAMMAD IFTIKHAR-Appellant\nVersus\nMessrs FIRST DAWOOD INVESTMENT BANK LTD. through Authorized Officer/Attorney and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23671", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1698 = 2023 CLD 1001 = 2023 SLD 1698", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 185-Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court-Scope-Concurrent findings of facts by courts below-Interference with-In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in civil cases, the Supreme Court as a third or fourth forum, as the case may be, does not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below on the issues of facts unless it is shown that such findings are on the face of it against the evidence available on the record of the case and is so patently improbable or perverse that no prudent person could have reasonably arrived at it on the basis of that evidence-Mere possibility of forming a different view on the reappraisal of the evidence is not a sufficient ground to interfere with such findings.\nFederation of Pakistan v. Ali Ihsan PLD 1967 SC 249; Abdur Rauf v. Babu Munir 1976 SCMR 436; Fateh Muhammad v. Muhammad Adil PLD 2007 SC 460; Khan Muhammad v. Muhammad Din 2010 SCMR 1351; Mohyuddin Hashmi v. Allama Iqbal Open University 2012 SCMR 1414 and Hussain Naqvi v. Zakara Chatha 2015 SCMR 1081 ref.\n(b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 31, 37 38 Preamble-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 18-Freedom of trade and business-Scope-Free and fair competition in trade and business is an intrinsic part of the fundamental right to freedom of trade and business guaranteed by Article 18 of the Constitution.\nThe preamble to the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act) sets out the objective of the Act and provides for free competition in all spheres of commercial and economic activity to enhance economic efficiency and to protect consumers from anti-competitive forces. The Act aims to address the situations that tend to lessen, distort or eliminate competition, such as (i) actions constituting an abuse of market dominance, (ii) competition restricting agreements, and (iii) deceptive marketing practices. Free and fair competition is a fundamental concept in economics that involves providing a level playing field for all market participants. It is based on the principles of a free market where businesses compete on equal terms, and consumers make decisions based on price, quality, and preference. Free and fair competition is competition that is based on quality, price, and service rather than unfair practices. Predatory pricing, competitor bashing, and the abuse of monopoly-type powers, for example, are unfair practices. When competitors can compete freely on a level playing field, economies are more likely to thrive. On the other hand, unfair competition is using illegal, deceptive, and fraudulent selling practices that harm consumers or other businesses to gain a competitive advantage in the market. However, free and fair competition is encouraged and enforced through legislation and regulation to promote economic efficiency, innovation, and consumer welfare. Violations of fair competition principles can lead to legal consequences, penalties, or other corrective measures. Competition is not only healthy for businesses, but pivotal for innovation. It sparks creativity and nurtures transformation and progress.\nArticle 18 of the Constitution provides that every citizen shall have the right to conduct any lawful trade or business and clause (b) of the proviso to the said Article states that nothing in this Article shall prevent the regulation of trade, commerce or industry in the interest of free competition. Therefore, regulation in the interest of free competition actualizes the fundamental freedom guaranteed under the Constitution to conduct lawful trade and business. As free and fair competition ensures freedom of trade, commerce and industry and therefore forms an intrinsic part of the fundamental right to freedom of trade and business guaranteed under Article 18 of the Constitution. The preambular objective of the Act is to ensure free competition in all spheres of commercial and economic activity to enhance economic efficiency and to protect consumers from anticompetitive behaviour. The free competition envisaged by the Constitution and aimed to be ensured by the Act, therefore, means a competition through fair means, not by any means. To ensure fair competition in trade and business, Section 10 of the Act has prohibited certain marketing practices by categorising them as deceptive marketing practices, and Sections 31, 37 and 38 of the Act have empowered the Commission to take appropriate actions to prevent those practices.\n(c) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 10(2)(d)-Deceptive marketing practices-Expression fraudulent usein Section 10(2)(d) of the Competition Act, 2010-Meaning and scope stated.\nThe expression fraudulent use in Section 10(2)(d) of the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act)has made the intention of the defendant (user of anothers trademark, firm name, or product labelling or packaging) relevant for holding him liable under the Act. However, as the Act has not defined the term fraudulent and thus not given any particular meaning to it, the expression fraudulent use in section 10(2)(d) is to be understood in its ordinary sense of intentional and dishonest use in contrast to a mere mistaken or negligent use. Needless to mention that intention, being a state of mind, can rarely be proved through direct evidence, and in most cases, it is to be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.\nThe word use in section 10(2)(d) of the Act includes the use of trademark, firm name, or product labelling or packaging which is confusingly similar (also referred to as deceptively similar) to that of another undertaking.\n(d) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 10(2)(d)- Deceptive marketing practices- Criterion for determining confusing similarity in the use of anothers product labeling and packaging stated.\nCriterion to determine the confusing similarity is well-established in our jurisdiction in passing-off and trademark-infringement actions, which also applies in deciding disputes under Sections 10(2)(d) of the Competition Act, 2010. It is whether an unwary ordinary purchaser is likely to be confused or deceived into purchasing the article of the defendant carrying the contentious mark, name or get-up as that of the plaintiff (complainant). The criterion is thus that of such an ordinary purchaser who knows more or less the peculiar characteristics of the article he wants; he has in his minds eye a general idea of the appearance of the article and he looks at the article not closely, but sufficiently to take its general appearance. It is not that of a careful purchaser neither is it of a moron in a hurry. The purchaser is unwary in the sense that he does not when he buys the article look carefully to see what the particular mark or name upon it is but not that he does not even know the peculiar characteristic of the article he wants to buy. An ordinary customer is not supposed to precisely remember every detail of the mark, name or get-up of the article he intends to buy. The standard is therefore also described as that of a purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. Further, to determine the confusing or deceptive similarity from the point of view of an unwary ordinary purchaser, the leading characteristics, not the minute details, of the two marks, names or get-ups (labelling or packaging) are to be considered. As the competing marks, names or get-ups when placed side by side, may exhibit many differences yet the overall impression left by their leading characteristics on the mind of an unwary purchaser may be the same. An unwary ordinary purchaser acquainted with the one and not having the two side by side for comparison, may well be confused or deceived by the overall impression of the second, into a belief that he is buying the article which bears the same mark, name or get-up as that with which he is acquainted.\nJamia Industries v. Caltex Oil PLD 1984 SC 8; Insaf Soap v. Lever Brothers PLD 1959 Lah. 381; Ram Kumar v. Wood Co. AIR 1941 Lah. 262; Lever v. Goodwin (1887) 36 Ch.D. 1; Pasquali Cigarette v. Diaconicolas and Capsopolus 1905 T.S. 472; Morning Star v. Express Newspapers [1979] F.S.R. 113; Corn Products v. Shangrila Products AIR 1960 SC 142 and Amritdhara Pharmacy v. S. D. Gupta AIR 1963 SC 449 ref.\n(e) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 10(2)(d)-Deceptive marketing practices, action for-Pre-requisites-Registration of trademark (or for that matter, registration of firm name, or product labelling or packaging) is not necessary for the applicability of the provisions of section 10(2)(d) of the Competition Act, 2010-Neither the common law action of passing-off requires such registration nor does the language of section 10(2)(d) of the Act provide for any such requirement.\n(f) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-\n-S. 46-Trademark-infringement-Passing-off, tort of-Difference between the objectives of a passing-off action and a trademark-infringement action-Passing-off action essentially aims to protect property in goods on account of its reputation (goodwill), not the trademark thereof, whereas the trademark-infringement action is meant to protect property of trademark as a trademark itself is a property.\nTabaq Restaurant v. Tabaq Restaurant 1987 SCMR 1090 ref.\n(g) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 10(2)(d)-Deceptive marketing practices-Using a competitors product labelling and packaging in a deceptive marketing manner-In the present case, to determine the liability of appellant-company under section 10(2)(d) of the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act), the Competition Commission (the Commission) specifically mentioned the criterion applied, that is, whether the striking similar packaging and labelling is misleading enough to cause confusion in the minds of the average consumer of a commodity, with the end result of an unjust advantage accruing to the copycat at the expense of and to the detriment of the complainant-Commission further observed that it would examine the appearance of the product packaging and labelling as a whole which may collectively include visually confusing resemblances in elements of colour scheme, layout style, design, images, labels, font usages etc., instead of each individual similarity in isolation-By applying this criterion the Commission recorded the findings of facts and held appellant-company liable for the contravention of section 10(2)(d) of the Act-Competition Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal), affirmed the criterion applied and the findings of facts recorded by the Commission-Supreme Court observed that in determining the liability of appellant-company under section 10(2)(d) of the Act, the criterion applied by the Commission and affirmed by the Tribunal was legally correct, and the Commission and the Tribunal had correctly decided that the facts of the case fell within the prohibition of section 10(1) read with section 10(2)(d) of the Act-Appeals were dismissed.\n(h) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 10(2)(a) 10(2)(d)-Deceptive marketing practices-Meaning of distribution of false or misleading information in section 10(2)(a) of the Competition Act, 2010 stated.\nSection 10(2)(a) of the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act) has codified the common law on injurious falsehood claims. In common law, misrepresentation is a common ground in both the actions for passing-off and injurious falsehood, but it is understood and applied in a different sense in each action. The general difference between misrepresentation in a passing-off action and misrepresentation in an injurious falsehood action is that in the former action, the misrepresentation is made by the defendant concerning his own goods while in the latter it is made concerning the goods of the plaintiff. In a passing-off action, the defendant by misrepresentation primarily attempts to take the undue benefit of the reputation (goodwill) of the goods of the plaintiff though he thereby also causes damage to the business of the plaintiff indirectly; but in an injurious falsehood action, the direct and express purpose of the misrepresentation is to cause damage to the reputation (goodwill) of the goods of the plaintiff though it may also impliedly or indirectly benefit the business of the defendant.\nChristopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing-Off (5th Ed. 2016) p 16.; White v. Mellin [1895] A.C. 154 HL; Kaye v. Robertson [1991] F.S.R. 62 CA and Schulke and Mayr v. Alkapharm [1999] F.S.R. 161 ref.\nThere is nothing in the language of section 10(2)(a) of the Act that suggests that the legislature has changed therein the meaning of misrepresentation as understood in common law action for injurious falsehood. On the contrary, the use of the words false or misleading information in section 10(2)(a) shows that the legislature has intended to retain the same meaning; for in common law both the terms false and misleading are used in injurious falsehood actions for a representation to be taken as misrepresentation. Further, the use of the phrase harming the business interests of another undertaking in section 10(2)(a) of the Act, and not in section 10(2)(d), denotes that the said phrase has been used in the sense of causing express and direct harm to the business interests of the complainant undertaking as it is understood in an injurious falsehood action. And the non-mentioning of this phrase in section 10(2)(d) of the Act shows that the damage caused to the business interests of the complainant undertaking is taken to be an implied and indirect effect of the fraudulent use of its trademark, etc., as it is understood in a passing-off action, which the legislature has considered unnecessary to be expressly mentioned.\nKaye v. Robertson [1991] F.S.R. 62 CA and White v. Mellin [1895] A.C. 154 HL ref.\n(i) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 12 43-Competition Commission of Pakistan (the Commission)-Appeal filed by the Commission before the Supreme Court against an order passed by the Competition Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal)-Maintainability-Adjudicatory body (such as the Commission) deciding a matter in exercise of its quasi-judicial powers between two rival parties under a law cannot be treated as an aggrieved person if its decision is set aside or modified by a higher forum under that law or by a court of competent jurisdiction and such body thus does not have locus standi to challenge the decision of that higher forum or court.\nAlthough the role of the Competition Commission (the Commission) under the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act) is primarily of a regulatory body, it is quasijudicial as well under some provisions of the Act. The provisions of clauses (a) and (d) of section 10(2) of the Act, envisage the quasi-judicial role of the Commission while deciding upon the divergent claims and allegations of two competing undertakings. And, an adjudicatory body deciding a matter in exercise of its quasi-judicial powers between two rival parties under a law cannot be treated as an aggrieved person if its decision is set aside or modified by a higher forum under that law or by a court of competent jurisdiction and such body thus does not have locus standi to challenge the decision of that higher forum or court. The appeal filed by the Commission in the present case against the decision of the Tribunal setting aside partially its quasi-judicial order is therefore not maintainable. Appeals were dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185Competition Act, 2010=31,37,38Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=18", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 444 and 445 of 2017, decided on 10th May, 2023.\n(Against the judgment of the Competition Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad, dated 25.01.2017, passed in Appeal No. 03 of 2016).heard on: 10th May 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Wafaqi Mohtasib v. SNGPL PLD 2020 SC 586 ref.\nHasan Irfan Khan, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Saqib Asghar, Advocate for Appellant (in C.A. 445 of 2017).\nAzid Nafees, Advocate Supreme Court along with Syed Rifaqat Hussian Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant (in C.A. 444 of 2017).\nBarrister Haris Azmat, Advocate Supreme Court and Azid Nafees, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. 445 of 2017).\nHasan Irfan Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Azid Nafees, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. 444 of 2017).", - "Petitioner Name:": "A. RAHIM FOODS (PVT.) LIMITED and another-Appellants\nVersus\nK&N'S FOODS (PVT.) LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23672", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1699 = 2023 CLD 1021 = 2023 SLD 1699", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTY", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 10 22-Suit for recovery of bank loan-Leave to appear and defend the suit-Availing of finance facility was admitted by the clients (appellants) of the bank-Court dismissed the appellants application to leave to defend and decreed the suit of the bank/respondent-Appellants asserted that the amounts paid by them towards adjustment of finance facility had not been accounted for-Validity-Held, that such assertion had not been substantiated by the appellants in their application for leave to defend through tangible material/details of any amount adjusted and even no specific amount that could have been counted as disputed was mentioned in said application- When the application for leave to defend did not fulfill the dictates of Ss. 10(3), 10(4) 10(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ( the Ordinance 2001), then such application was liable to be rejected in terms of S. 10(6) of the Ordinance 2001 and in consequence, allegation of facts as contained in the plaint were deemed to have been admitted as per S. 10(1) of the Ordinance 2001-Appellants also failed to raise any substantial question of law and fact-No illegality or infirmity was noticed in the impugned and decree passed by the Court below-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nApollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10,22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 73 of 2013, decided on 1st June, 2022.heard on: 1st June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Raza Qureshi and Shakil Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zeeshan Haider Zaidi for Appellants.\nMalik Tariq Rajwana, Barrister Kashif Rajwana and Muhammad Ibtasam Ahmad for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs S.M. NISAR AND COMPANY through Managing Partner and others-Appellants\nVersus\nASKARI BANK LIMITED, BRANCH HIGH STREET, SAHIWAL-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23673", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1700 = 2023 CLD 1025 = 2023 SLD 1700", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-\n-S. 25(b)-Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 16(3)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Plea bargain-Incidental charges-Scope-Undue influence-Proof-Petitioner accused before National Accountability Bureau (NAB) who entered into plea bargain with NAB but assailed imposition of 15% incidental charges over and above the liability so determined-Validity-National Accountability Bureau had no right to demand such incidental charges either in law or equity-Petitioner while he was deprived of his freedom agreed to the same which indicated use of undue influence-Such use of authority resulted in an unfair advantage over the other-National Accountability Bureau obtained an unfair advantage over the petitioner by extracting an amount from him not otherwise due by using its dominant position over petitioner-Incidental charges as part of plea bargain were unconscionable-According to S. 16(3) of Contract Act, 1872, burden of proof that contract was not induced by undue influence was on the person who was in a position to dominate the will of another when he entered into contract with such person and where transaction had appeared to be unconscionable-National Accountability Bureau was unable to explain what incidental charges, if any, were incurred in respect of a plea bargain-Law did not authorize NAB to charge the same and NAB had failed to discharge its burden of proof-Public functionaries were expected to act fairly and justly and could not be allowed to profit from predicament of a person in their custody-High Court condoned delay in invoking Constitutional jurisdiction by petitioner-In absence of law and/or expenses incurred by NAB, the clause of plea bargain whereby petitioner agreed to pay incidental charges was unenforceable for lack of free consent-High Court declared that such clause of plea bargain entered into by petitioner was void to the extent of 15% incidental charges and the same could not be recovered from petitioner-Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\nAsghar Ali v. National Accountability Bureau 2016 PCr.LJ 477; Haji Khan Muhammad v. Government of Pakistan, National Accountability Bureau 2013 PCr.LJ 1571; Zaheer Afzal Chatha v. National Accountability Bureau 2018 PCr.LJ Note 9; Pakistan Agriculture Storage v. Crescent Jute Products 2004 CLD 849; Pakcom Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 44; Amber Ahmed Khan v. Pakistan International Airlines, Karachi Airport Karachi PLD 2003 Kar. 405; A.R. Azhar v. Pakistan through Chairman Railway Board P.W.R. Lahore and 5 others 1980 PLC (C.S.) 139 and Zahid Shafiq v. National Accountability Bureau (W.P. No. 3068 of 2016) rel.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199- Constitutional petition- Laches, principle of-Applicability-Laches may be condoned where act of which petitioner is aggrieved is patently illegal and/or to avoid grave injustice.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "National Accountability Ordinance, 1999=25(b)Contract, Act, 1872=16(3)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2908 of 2014, decided on 4th May, 2023.heard on: 2nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Aamer Farooq, C.J. and Saman Rafat Imtiaz, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Majid v. Mst. Zubeda Begum 2007 SCMR 866 and Hafiz Muhammad Sharaf-ud-Din v. District Judge, Khushab 2015 MLD 1081 rel.\nAbid Jalil for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Rafay Maqsood, Special Prosecutor, NAB and Zahid Usman, A.D./I.O., NAB for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TANVIR HUSSAIN MANJI-Petitioner\nVersus\nNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU through Chairman and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23674", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1701 = 2023 CLD 1040 = 2023 SLD 1701", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTQ", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XX, Rr. 4 5-Suit for recovery of finance-Appreciation of evidence-Judgment-Failure to give reasons-Appellant/Bank was aggrieved of and decree passed against it by Banking Court-Validity-Issues were decided by Banking Court only on the basis of affidavit-in-evidence without giving own findings and recording own reasons before deciding the two issues in affirmative-Decision on three issues, having factually admitted position, was given accordingly, as such issues did not require any deliberation/decision on the part of Banking Court-For decision on remaining issues, Banking Court either reproduced facts of case, extracts from depositions, cross-examination, or contents of letters furnished during the course of arguments-Judgment, to some extent, lacked independent decision on the issues-Though Banking Court was justified in reproducing contents of affidavit-in-evidence, cross-examination, other depositions, contents of letters, etc. and other various documents produced before it but should also carry reasons for deciding issues, which aspect was lacking in the matter-Though was quite elaborate in nature but the same mainly contained reproductions, and aspects of giving reasoning of eleven issues framed in the matter were wanting-Banking Court did not properly adjudicate upon the matter which needed proper decision on the issues so framed in the suit-High Court set aside and decree passed against appellant/Bank and matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision afresh-High Court directed Banking Court to give independent reasonings and decision on the issues except those which were factually admitted-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nHakim Muhammad Buta and others v. Habib Ahmed and others PLD 1985 SC 153; Ghulam Muhammad and others v. Malik Abdul Qadir Khan PLD 1983 SC 68; Khairati and 4 others v. Aleem-ud-Din and another PLD 1983 SC 69 and Almas Ahmed Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab 2006 SCMR 783 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=4,5", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 72 of 2012, decided on 15th June, 2023.Nemo for Respondent No. 2.\nDates of hearing: 2nd, 8th, 22nd February, 2nd, 21st, 27th March, 3rd, 17th April, 8th and 22nd May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Irfan Saadat Khan and Arshad Hussain Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Moulvi Iqbal Haider for Appellant.\nShabbir Ahmed Shaikh for Respondent No. 1.\nNemo for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SILK BANK LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nZAFAR MEHMOOD SHAIKH and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23675", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1702 = 2023 CLD 1051 = 2023 SLD 1702", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTS8", - "Key Words:": "Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 6 7-New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, Art. V(1)(c)-Recognition and enforcement of award-Terms and conditions of contract, violation of-Non-filing of appeal against Award-Effect-Respondent company committed default in terms of contract and did not establish letter of credit in favour of applicant company within stipulated period-Applicant company sought enforcement and recognition of award announced by International Cotton Association (Association)-Respondent company raised objections against award-Validity-In relation to grant of interest/compound interest or alleged erroneous findings of arbitral tribunal about measurement standard, respondent company had remedy of appeal available to it under by-laws of the Association or by recourse to curial law-Respondent company chose not to avail remedies available to it with the result that Award had become final-Respondent company waived its right for raising such objections at enforcement stage-Grounds listed in New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, on the basis of which a Court could refuse to enforce an arbitral award were exhaustive-Standard of review on defense based on Art. V(1)(c) of New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, was fairly limited and such defenses did not include mistakes of fact or law by the arbitrators-Court before which a petition for enforcement of award was brought could not review merits or substance of award on the principle that the Court could not substitute its for that of the arbitrators-High Court could not enter into reappraisal of merits of the award like an Appellate Court-Claim of parties arising from their contract and grant of interest and compound interest could not form any basis for refusing to endorse the award-Award in question was passed within the parameters of the dispute referred to the arbitral tribunal and did not exceed its authority or mandate-High Court recognized the award as respondent company failed to raise any valid defense in accordance with Art. V of New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958-High Court directed to enforce the award as a of High Court-Application was allowed, in circumstances.\n \nEnka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v. OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38; Arbitrators to Apply Contract Terms from the Perspective of the New York Convention; Management and Technical Consultants S.A. v. Parsons-Jurden Intl Corp. 820 F.2d at 1531; Aasma v. American Merican SS Owners Mutual Protection, 238 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Parsons and Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de LIndustrie du Papier (RAKTA) 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) and Rahat and Company v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan PLD 2020 SC 366 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Ordinance, 2011=6,7", - "Case #": "C.M. No. 13116 of 2017, decided on 10th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Shams Mehmood Mirza, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Wasif Majeed for Applicant.\nM. Imran Malik for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "REINHART INDIA (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Special Attorney-Applicant\nVersus\nBASHIR COTTON MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive Officer-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23676", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1703 = 2023 CLD 1064 = 2023 SLD 1703", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTSs", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 157, 163, 166 508(2)-Corporate Governance Rules, 2013, Rr. 2(25), 2-C, 3-A(1) (3)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Nominee Director-Removal-Doctrine of pleasure-Applicability-Petitioners were nominee directors who were aggrieved of their removal from the Board of Directors-Validity-Nominee Director had no personal right to claim benefit of tenure available to other Directors-Even removal of Nominee Directors was based upon doctrine of pleasure-Petitioners had rightly been removed which was the prerogative of nominating body i.e. Federal Government-It was not constitutional mandate of Courts to run and manage public or private institutions or to micro-manage them or to interfere in their policy and administrative internal matters-Courts neither enjoyed such jurisdiction nor possessed requisite technical expertise in such regard-Courts should step in only when there arise justiciable disputes or causes of action between parties involving violation of Constitution or law-Removal of petitioners by their nominating body was the sole authority of that body within their policy domain to either allow petitioners to continue as members of Board of Directors or to remove them or to reconstitute the Board-Such action of authority could not be called in question by petitioners-High Court declined to interfere in the matter as petitioners failed to highlight their vested right as they were appointed by Federal Government and were not Independent Directors-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nBabar Sattar v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2016 CLD 134; Malik Muhammad Bashir Lakhesar, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab v. Government of Punjab and others 2019 PLC (C.S.) 266; Agha Imtiaz Ali Khan Babar and 2 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Water and Power and 2 others 2018 CLD 80; Nadeem Mumtaz Qureshi v. Pakistan Petroleum Limited and others 2019 CLD 1374; Khyber Medical University and others v. Aimal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 92 and Waseem Majid Malik v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 CLD 1207 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=157,163,166,508(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3970 of 2022, decided on 2nd May, 2023.heard on: 12th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in person.\nUsman Rasool Ghumman, A.A.G. for Federation.\nTaimoor Aslam Khan and Mudassar Abbas for Respondent No.2.\nM. Ishaq Khan and Malik Qamar Afzal for Respondents Nos.11 and 12.\nBarrister Haris Azmat and Barrister Faiza Asad for Respondents Nos.6, 7 and 14.\nFarrukh Aftab, Director (Legal), FESCO.\nShafqat Abbas Tarrar and Asia Batool for Respondents Nos.8 and 9.\nNauman Munir Parahca for Respondents Nos. 5, 19 and 13.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IRFAN AHMAD CHATTHA and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Energy (Power Division), Pak Secretariat, Islamabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23677", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1704 = 2023 CLD 1072 = 2023 SLD 1704", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Private Partnership Act (XLII of 2020)-\n-Ss. 4, 11, 12 29-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Galiyat Development Authority Act (XII of 2016), Ss. 3, 4, 6 14 [as amended by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Galiyat Development Authority (Amendment) Act (XVII of 2020)]-Development of Galiyat-Award of contract-Legal regime applicable-Scope-Petitioner company was aggrieved of not following provisions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Private Partnership Act, 2020, in awarding of contract to respondent company-Validity-Having overwhelming powers for dealing with its own properties, the only way of harmonious interpretation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Galiyat Development Authority Act, 2016, with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Private Partnership Act, 2020, was to hold that it was optional for fully autonomous bodies to have resort to Public Private Partnership or to enter into such contract under its own legal regime-It was up to Galiyat Development Authority as contracting authority to enter into mechanism provided under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Private Partnership Act, 2020-If Galiyat Development Authority did not make recourse to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Private Partnership Act, 2020, it had its own powers under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Galiyat Development Authority Act, 2016 and Regulations framed thereunder to enter into Public Private Partnership for leasing out its property-Such act of Galiyat Development Authority, in not entering into Public Private Partnership, as provided in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Private Partnership Act, 2020, did not suffer from illegality or want of lawful authority-It was optional for the contracting authority i.e. Galiyat Development Authority as well as Provincial Government to have opted for undertaking the project under the provisions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Private Partnership Act, 2020, but if neither of the two had opted thereof, and rather had undertaken the project under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Galiyat Development Authority Act, 2016, read with Galiyat Development Authority Auction Regulations, 2019, their decisions were not invalid and unlawful or lacking lawful authority-High Court declined to interfere in the matter- Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nOxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income-Tax 2001 PTD 2484; Shahzada Colonel Sharif-ud-Din and others v. The Settlement Officer District Upper and Lower Chitral and others 2021 CLC 1968; Market Committee, Khudian v. Town Committee, Khudian 1992 SCMR 1403; Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Taiwana 2015 SCMR 1739; Messrs Pakland Cement Limited through Director v. Shamim Mushtaq Siddiqui 2002 CLD Kar. 1392; Travel Agents Association of Pakistan v. Pak Travel Agency (Pvt.) Ltd. 1999 CLC 1962; Rashidah Begum v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Circle II Lahore 1986 MLD 1941 and Inayatullah Hassan v. Bashirunnisa 1984 CLC 2463 ref.\n(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Wildlife and Biodiversity (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Act (I of 2015)-\n-S. 29-Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997), S. 12-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Galiyat Development Authority Act (XII of 2016), Ss. 3, 4, 6 14 [as amended by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Galiyat Development Authority (Amendment) Act (XVII of 2020)]-National Park-Accessibility to public-Recreation, education and research purposes-Scope-Petitioner was aggrieved of award of contract by authorities to respondent company-Validity-Provisions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Wildlife and Biodiversity (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Act, 2015, did not aim at obviating all such activities in a National Park-For the purposes of recreation, education and research, under S. 29 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Wildlife and Biodiversity (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Act, 2015, National Park was to be accessible to public subject to such restrictions as Government might impose- Provision of access roads to and construction of rest houses, hostels and other buildings along with amenities for public under S. 29(3) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Wildlife and Biodiversity (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Act, 2015, were to be made in such a way, as not to impair the object of establishment of National Park-Facilities so provided were to be in conformity with the recommendations of environmental impact assessment or initial environmental examination within the meaning of Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997-Construction of public amenities and necessary roads were not totally banned but were regulated-Regulating powers of concerned authority would apply to the subject project with full force-High Court did not declare contract in question as illegal in toto-High Court declared that all its provisions were to be read in accordance with and subject to all the prevalent laws of the land applicable in the area-Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\nShin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. v. Jain Studios Limited AIR 2006 SC 963 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 803-A of 2021, decided on 28th September, 2022.heard on: 28th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Wiqar Ahmad and Kamran Hayat Miankhel, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Nasir Aslam Khan, Sardar Aman Khan and Khalid Mehmood for Petitioner.\nKhurram Ghias Khan, Rasheed-ul-Haq Qazi, Barrister Syed Muddassar Ameer, Muhammad Tariq Afridi, Sardar Ali Raza, A.A.G. along with Syed Ali Raza, Director GDA and Junaid Alam, SDFO for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAMSON GROUP OF COMPANIES-Petitioner\nVersus\nPUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23678", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1705 = 2023 CLD 1086 = 2023 SLD 1705", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTTg", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 10-Suit for recovery of bank loan-Leave to defend-Scope-Bank filed a suit for recovery of certain amount against the appellant-Appellant filed the application for leave to defend stating that the amount shown to have been disbursed to him was incorrect and that he had repaid the due amount, which was not reflected in the statement of account-Banking Court did not consider the defense taken by the appellant to be bona fide and consequently passed decree against him-Validity-Judgment passed by the Banking Court had not dealt with the defense raised by the appellant in any meaningful way-Appellant in his application for leave to defend had substantially complied with the requirements of S. 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Banking Court, however, had mechanically stated in the order that the appellant had not fulfilled the requirements of S. 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Appeal was allowed and the Banking Court was directed to expeditiously decide the application for leave to defend.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 172 of 2021 and C.M. No. 1327 of 2022, decided on 5th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Shams Mehmood Mirza and Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hamayoun Syed Rasool for Appellant.\nMian Khurram Hashmi for Respondent/Bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASGHAR ALI-Appellant\nVersus\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23679", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1706 = 2023 CLD 1088 = 2023 SLD 1706", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTXo", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 281, 282, 283 285- Scheme of Merger-Approval-Duty of Court-In terms of the Scheme of Merger entire undertaking and business including assets, rights, properties, benefits, powers privileges, contracts, liabilities, encumbrances, obligations and dues of company were to be transferred to other company-Validity-Approach of Court was channelized to ascertain; (i) whether statutory requirements were complied with and; (ii) to determine whether the scheme as a whole was arrived at by the majority, bona fide and the interest of whole body of shareholders in whose interest the majority purported to act and; (iii) whether scheme was such that fair and reasonable shareholder would consider it to be for the benefit of the company and for himself-No objection from any quarter had come forward while all requisite formalities were fulfilled and no exception could be taken-To understand the concept, it was to be seen from the perspective that a wise group of businessmen had taken a decision considering all its pros and cons-While taking such decision there were chances of success and failure but then while questioning such decision, bona fide was the real litmus test-Businessman could take decision foreseeing future aspect and Court could only see that all legal formalities were fulfilled and that the scheme was neither unjust nor unfair or against national interest but could not challenge wisdom of a decision of businessman as by doing that Court would be overriding wisdom of a businessman and their prerogative-Report of Chartered Accountants was very material who were engaged for calculating swap ratio in respect of envisaged scheme of Merger-High Court allowed merger of the companies in question as there was no impediment in the Scheme of Merger-Petition was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,281,282,283,285", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 49 of 2021, decided on 23rd January, 2023.heard on: 23rd January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Ibrahim for Petitioners.\nSyed Ibad, Law Officer, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SPI INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED AND THE UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LIMITED: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23680", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1707 = 2023 CLD 1092 = 2023 SLD 1707", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpTXk", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Suit for recovery of bank loan-Scope-Appellant assailed the passed by the Banking Court whereby it decided that the cost of funds was payable only if the date of default was determined by the court, with the observation that markup had already been charged-Validity-Settlement was arrived at between the parties during the pendency of the suit-Terms of settlement, eclipse the Financing Agreement and normally the suit is decreed in terms of the settlement-Cost of funds, mentioned in the settlement, was declined, by holding it against the law-Payment of a certain amount as costs of funds was part of the settlement and could not be lightly ignored by the Trial Court-Impugned and decree were set aside and the Trial Court was directed to re-interpret the settlement agreement-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 184 of 2022, decided on 23rd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Jamil Khan and Raheel Kamran, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Khurram Qureshi Hashmi for Appellant.\nKalim Ullah Buzdar for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager-Appellant\nVersus\nARSHAD MUNIR KHALID and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23681", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1708 = 2023 CLD 1094 = 2023 SLD 1708", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Environmental Protection Act (VIII of 2014)-\n-S. 18-Strategic environmental assessment-Publication of policy-Scope-Whenever any policy, plan, program or legislation is proposed, it must be translated into the national as well as provincial language and reproduced side by side in the draft and also published on the respective website in all three languages (English-Sindhi-Urdu), so that the essence of having public consensus thereto could be achieved-Understanding the law or policy is the first step towards adhering to the principles of fair trial as enshrined in the Constitution and to foster the rule of law.\n(b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)-\n-S. 23-Provisions applicable to making of rules or bye laws after previous publication-Scope-Section 23 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws can only be made after previous publication.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Environmental Protection Act, (VIII of 2014)=18", - "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No. 67 of 2021, decided on 2nd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant in person.\nPervez Ahmed Mastoi, A.A.G. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZUBAIR AHMED-Appellant\nVersus\nSINDH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY through Chief Secretary\nand others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23682", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1709 = 2023 CLD 1098 = 2023 SLD 1709", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 122 123-Insurance Tribunal-Powers and procedure-Scope-For all intents and purposes, the Tribunal has powers of a Civil Court under C.P.C.-Trial before Insurance Tribunal is conducted in the same manner in which a suit before Civil Court proceeds-Tribunal has powers to enforce attendance of any person, examine him on oath, receive evidence on affidavits and issue permission for examination of witnesses or documents-All procedural as well as substantive provisions contained in C.P.C. and Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, are applicable for trials before Insurance Tribunal.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. VI, R. 1-Pleadings-Scope-Pleadings cannot be equated with evidence-No party to lis can be allowed to lead evidence beyond pleadings nor can it be read in evidence-Parties are required to lead evidence in consonance with their pleadings and no evidence can be led or looked into in support of a plea, which has not been taken in pleadings-Party is required to plead facts necessary to seek relief claimed and to prove it through evidence of unimpeachable character.\nSaddaruddin (since deceased) through LRs. v. Sultan Khan (since deceased) through LRs. and others 2021 SCMR 642; Muhammad Rafique and another v. Syed Warand Ali Shah and others 2021 SCMR 1068 and Mst. Khanai and 4 others v. Ghulam Rasool and 9 others 2022 CLC 433 rel.\n(c) Evidence-\n-Marked document-Validity-Document placed as a marked document is worthless and inadmissible in evidence-Such document cannot be even read in evidence.\nState Life Insurance Corporation v. Javaid Iqbal 2011 SCMR 1013; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another v. Jaffar Khan and others PLD 2010 SC 604 and Azhar Abbas and others v. Haji Tahir Abbas and another 2021 CLC 1351 rel.\n(d) Interpretation of document-\n-Construction of instrument-Principle-Question of construction of an instrument or document is a question of law-It is duty of Court to interpret a document in its proper legal perspective-While interpreting a document intention of parties must essentially be gathered from language adopted in document and viewed in law through surrounding circumstances-For proper comprehension and insight into an instrument same has to be read as a whole-Where language of document is simple, clearly understandable, and capable of no ambiguity, then intention of parties to such instrument has to be gathered from its contents alone without adverting to any other extraneous consideration.\nConcentrate Manufacturing Company of Ireland and 3 others v. Seven-up Bottling Company (Private) Limited and 3 others 2002 CLD 77; Liaqat Ali Khan and others v. Falak Sher and others PLD 2014 SC 506 and Khushi Muhammad and others v. Muhammad Ashfaq and others PLD 2014 Lah. 26 rel.\n(e) Interpretation of document-\n-Deed of contract-Court, duty of-Principle-Court should lean towards any interpretation which effectuates an instrument rather than one which invalidates an instrument-Deed of contract has to be construed strictly and literally without deviating or anything which was not supported by the intention of parties and language of document-Nothing can be implied in a contract that was inconsistent with it.\nDr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212; Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Private) Ltd., Islamabad v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan and another PLD 2003 SC 215; Haji Naimatullah v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another PLD 2013 Sindh 406 and House Building Finance Corporation v. Shahinshah Humayun Cooperative House Building Society and others 1992 SCMR 19 rel.\n(f) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 121 124-Insurance claim-Proof-Surveyors report-Appellants/insurers sought recovery of damages claimed by them for theft of equipment and parts of machinery imported by them-Insurance Tribunal dismissed the claim against respondent/insurance company-Appellants/insurers contended that Surveyors Reports were not credit-worthy-Validity-Appellants/insurers were beneficiaries of insurance claim and only produced their directors as witnesses and no independent witness was produced throughout to establish factum of burglary and consequent loss, which constituted a condition precedent for attracting indemnification clause contained in Insurance Policies-Evidence of witnesses of appellants/insurers denuded testimony of any credence-Appellants/insurers failed to discharge onus hence relevant issue was correctly decided against them-Reports of Surveyors were neither challenged in application nor before Commission under Securities and Exchange Commission (Insurance) Rules, 2002, therefore, it was too late in the day to throw a challenge in such regard-Where evidence of plaintiff was self-contradictory and not confidence inspiring then he must fail and where the case was doubtful, the decision must be given in favour of adversary rather than the claimant-Plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own rather than weaknesses of other side-High Court declined to interfere in and decree passed by Insurance Tribunal as the same was neither jurisdictionally flawed nor suffered from any misreading or non-reading of evidence- Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\nKhan Muhammad v. Muhammad Din through LRs 2010 SCMR 1351 and Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar 2022 SCMR 1054 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122,123Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 40462 of 2019, decided on 19th September, 2022.heard on: 19th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Bilal Hassan and Muhammad Raza Qureshi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Irshad Ullah Chattha for Appellants.\nMuhammad Hamza Sheikh for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "J. K. TWILLS AND DRILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Authorized Director and another-Appellants\nVersus\nPREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LIMITED and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23683", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1710 = 2023 CLD 1111 = 2023 SLD 1710", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTU", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 279, 280, 281, 282, 283 285-Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S), R. 781-Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, R. 19-Competition (Merger Control) Regulation, 2016, Regln. 5-Scheme of Merger-Approval-Duty of Court-Pre-merger clearance, requirement of-Principle-Sanction of Scheme of Arrangement meant for amalgamation of petitioner companies was sought-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan pressed pre-merger clearance-Validity-Company in which other company was to be merged was a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxford Publishing Limited, which in turn was a wholly owned subsidiary of the University of Oxford, thus belonged to the same economic group as merging company (University of Oxford)-Such merger fell within the exemptions set out under Regln. 5 of Competition (Merger Control) Regulations 2016 and pre-merger clearance was not required-Scheme of Merger, pursuant to S. 282(1)(c) read with S. 282(9) of Companies Act, 2017, provided transfer of the whole undertaking and property and liabilities in Pakistan of the University of Oxford which was a body corporate and hence the transferor company-Reasons for such transfer and benefits were never considered for a judicial review as it was their wisdom, which could not be challenged-Only thing which was important for the Court to see was whether the merger was lawful and had undergone requirement of law-Scheme of Arrangement under consideration was approved as was done by petitioner companies and the creditors, which was fair and reasonable and was not against public or any individuals interest-All financial and other related information including last audited accounts and unaudited accounts of petitioners were disclosed and no investigation proceedings were pending before any forum including Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Petition was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,281,282,283,285Companies (Court) Rules, 1997=19", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 4 of 2022, decided on 3rd March, 2023\nheard on: 30th January, 2023..", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Abdur Rahman for Petitioners.\nSyed Ibad, Law Officer, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHANCELLOR MASTERS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD AND OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS PAKISTAN (SMC-PRIVATE) LIMITED: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23684", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1711 = 2023 CLD 1116 = 2023 SLD 1711", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 10, 22 27-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2) O. IX, R. 9-Suit for recovery of bank loan-Leave to appear application, pendency of-Absence of defendant-Ex-parte and decree, setting aside of-Jurisdiction of Banking Court-Appellants/defendants were aggrieved of ex-parte and decree passed by Banking Court during pendency of application for leave to appear in suit due to non-prosecution-Validity-Once leave application was filed then Banking Court was under legal duty to consider the same regardless of non-appearance of appellants/defendants and their counsel-Banking Court under S. 10(8) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was required to read contents of plaint, application for leave to defend the suit, replication and then to determine whether any question of law and fact was raised, which needed recording of evidence-Powers were bestowed upon Banking Court under S. 10(9) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to grant conditional or unconditional leave to appellants/defendants-Banking Court under S. 10(11) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was empowered to reject leave application if it had not fulfilled conditions for grant of leave and thereafter could decreed the suit forthwith-Banking Court was required to consider and decide leave application on merits and there was no other choice left with Banking Court and could not dismiss leave application for non-prosecution-No such power was conferred upon Banking Court under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Proceeding otherwise than the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, would defeat the intent of legislature-Dismissal of leave application due to non-prosecution was without jurisdiction and patently illegal-Inherent jurisdiction of Banking Court was not ousted by S. 27 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-There was no specific provision available in Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, debarring application under O. IX, R. 9, C.P.C. or application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.-High Court set aside ex-parte and decree passed against appellants/defendants and remanded the matter to Banking Court for decision on merits-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nMessrs Awan Electronics (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 2 others v. National Bank of Pakistan through Branch Manager and another 2005 CLD 1660; Nasim Nizami v. Habib Bank Limited 2006 CLD 1213; Abid Aziz Khan and 2 others v. Bank of Punjab through Branch Manager 2007 CLD 997; Pak American Commercial (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director v. Humayoun Latif and 7 others PLD 2008 Kar. 540; United Bank Limited v. Mehmood Ilyas Khan and another 2012 CLD 1372; Crescent Jute Products v. A.D.J., Faisalabad and 2 others PLJ 2015 Lahore 800; Tariq Mehmood v. Atlas Bank Ltd. through Authorized Agent 2015 CLD 959; Nisar Ahmed Afzal v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2014 CLD 390; P. Q. Chemicals v. A. W. Brothers 2005 CLD 169 and Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan 2003 CLD 326 ref.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Void order-Effect-When basic order is void ab initio, the whole series of subsequent orders, together with the superstructure of rights and obligations built upon them must fall to the ground-Such orders have no foundation as they are based on void order.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Practice and procedure-Question of law-Scope-Pure question of law can be raised at any stage of proceedings.\nTalib Hussain and others v. Member, Board of Revenue and others 2003 SCMR 549; Mustafa Lakhani v. Pakistan Defense Officers Housing Authority, Karachi 2007 SCMR 611; Almas Ahmad Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore and another 2006 SCMR 783; Moulana Atta-ur-Rehman v. Al-Hajj Sardar Umar Farooq and others PLD 2008 SC 663; Abdul Hameed v. Deputy Commissioner/Administrator, Zila Council Mandi Bahauddin and 4 others 1997 CLC 540; Muhammad Siddiq v. Ashraf Ali and 3 others 2000 MLD 781; Faisal Jameel v. The State 2007 MLD 355; Secretary Communication and Works Department Government of Balochistan and others v. Dad Baksh and another 2013 CLC 343 and Muhammad Iqbal v. Muhammad Ahmed Ramzani and 2 others 2014 CLC 1392 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=10,22,27Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=9,12(2)", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 59 of 2016/BWP, heard on 28th March, 2017.*heard on: 28th March, 2017.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Tariq Iftikhar Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Muhammad Mujahid for Appellants.\nMahmood Ahmed Bhatti for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs BAHAWALPUR COTTON COMPANY through Partners and others-Appellants\nVersus\nUNITED BANK LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23685", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1712 = 2023 CLD 1148 = 2023 SLD 1712", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSS8", - "Key Words:": "Microfinance Institutions Ordinance (LV of 2001)-\n-S. 6(1)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr.1 2-Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss. 4 13-Microfinance institution/bank-Default in payment of loan-Promissory note integral part of finance agreement-Summary suits filed by the Bank before Trial Court on basis of promissory notes-Maintainability-High Court directed the petitioner-Bank to file civil suits for recovery in the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court instead of summary suits under Order XXXVII, C.P.C.-Validity-Trial Court and the Appellate Court both ignored the fact that the promissory note was an integral part of the finance agreement and a specific condition was incorporated in the finance agreement which expounded that the borrowers of the loan, being the customers and guarantors, solemnly declared that their signatures and thumb impression shall be deemed as the whole agreement or acceptance for all documents including but not limited to the finance agreement, promissory note, hypothecated goods, letter of pledge, MODT, authority of encashment, marking of lien and all relevant affidavits with regard to loan and authorized the bank to use each of them as part of the agreement under their relationship-Petitioner-bank rightly invoked the jurisdiction of the Court under the summary chapter on the strength of the promissory note which was printed in the finance agreement in a separate head-Concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below that the suits for recovery should have been filed in the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court rather than summary jurisdiction was misconceived and erroneous-Courts below only relied upon the finance agreement without adverting to its terms and conditions and the integral documents appended thereto and returned the plaint in a slipshod and injudicious manner-All the prerequisites required to be followed were fulfilled at the time of issuing the promissory notes and the summary suits were rightly filed under the summary chapter-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001=6(1)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=4,13", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 329-K to 391-K of 2022, decided on 28th April, 2023.\n(On appeal from Order dated 03.12.2021 of the High Court of Sindh Circuit Court, Hyderabad in M.As. Nos. 3-12/2021 and 31-83/2021)\nheard on: 28th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jahanzeb Awan, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Rasheed Mehar and Subhan Tasleem, Advocates and Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TELENOR MICROFINANCE BANK LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nSHAMIM BANO and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23686", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1713 = 2023 CLD 1131 = 2023 SLD 1713", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XVII, R. 3- Word forthwith- Applicability- Word forthwith means without any further adjournment yet it cannot be equated with the words at once pronounce the .\nMuhammad Aslam v. Nazir Ahmed 2008 SCMR 942 and Israr Ahmed Afzal v. Haji Muhammad Azram and another 2016 MLD 1490 rel.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 10 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XVII, R. 3-Suit for recovery of finance-Leave to defend the suit-Dismissal of suit for non-production of evidence-Scope-Appellant/Bank was aggrieved of dismissal of suit for failure to produce evidence on date fixed-Validity-Time must be granted by Court at the request of defaulting party-If time was not granted by Banking Court for production of evidence at the instance of the party against whom order was required to be made, then penal provision of O. XVII, R. 3, C.P.C. would not be applied against such party though in default on next date-Banking Court could have adjourned the matter subject to deposit of cost before taking extreme measures of closing the right of evidence-Provision of law, regarding closing of right of evidence, required grater care on the part of the Court, as it would shut out one party to defend itself and virtually it would be at the mercy of other party to do justice between the parties-High Court set aside the order passed by Banking Court and restored the suit and provided one opportunity to appellant/Bank to produce its evidence- Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nGhulam Qasim v. Ghulam Hussain PLD 1992 SC 577 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=3Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10,22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 157 of 2015/BWP, heard on 27th March, 2017.*heard on: 27th March, 2017.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Tariq Iftikhar Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Basit Babar Chughtai for Appellant.\nGulzar Ahmad Khan Durrani for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NIB BANK LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nMessrs PASBAN AGRO CHEMICALS COMPANY and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23687", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1714 = 2023 CLD 1136 = 2023 SLD 1714", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlJpSTk", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 27-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 54-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 11, O. VII, R. 11-Suit for declaration and injunction-Rejection of plaint-Res-judicata, principle of-Applicability-Plaintiff/DHA claimed that allotment of plot in question in the name of original allotee and then its transfer by him in the names of his sons by way of Gift (Hiba) was done in violation of Bye-Laws of predecessor society of plaintiff/DHA, which plot was cancelled and subject allotment and then transfer of plot in the names of his sons was based on forged documents, fraud and in contravention of Bye-Laws of the Society-Defendant/Bank sought rejection of plaint on the plea that there was no cause of action and principle of res-judicata was applicable-Validity-Although, cancellation of plot by plaintiff/DHA was set-aside by High Court in earlier proceedings but in compliance of High Courts order plaintiff/DHA after adopting legal formalities again cancelled it-Plaintiff/DHA thereafter filed instant suit in order to seek declaration of validity of cancellation order passed by it subsequently-Plaintiff/DHA had cause of action to file the instant suit-Earlier suit whereby first cancellation of plots order passed by plaintiff/DHA was challenged, was dismissed for non-prosecution-Present suit filed by plaintiff/DHA was for seeking declaration in respect of validity of cancellation of plot order of plaintiff/DHA, injunction and cancellation of mortgaged documents deposited by defendant/allottee in defendant/ Bank at the time of borrowing amount and it had no nexus with a previous suit filed by Bank for recovery of amount as that suit was between Bank and borrower for recovery of amount and the documents which were mortgaged had already been cancelled even before creation of mortgage of documents of plot in question-Such fact was not liable to be considered for rejection of plaint-Plea of res-judicata under S. 11, C.P.C was also not applicable as High Court in its earlier order quashed initial cancellation order but in the same order plaintiff/DHA was set at liberty to initiate any other action against defendants under the law and to decide it after hearing all the concerned parties-High Court declined to reject the suit-Application was dismissed, in circumstances.\n1986 MLD 1398; 1988 CLC 606; 2003 YLR 1760; 2003 1570; 2000 MLD 421, PLD 1992 Kar. 304 and H.M. Saya and others v. Wazir Ali Industries Limited PLD 1969 SC 65 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=27Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=11", - "Case #": "Execution No. 81 of 2001 and Suit No. 112 of 2006, decided on 28th November, 2022.Dates of hearing: 24th May, 3rd and 8th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Kausar Sultana Hussain, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Haleem Siddiqui for Plaintiff (in Suit No. 112 of 2006).\nMs. Lubna Aman for Decree Holder (in Execution No. 81 of 2001) and for Defendant No. 4 (in Suit No. 112 of 2006).", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN DEFENCE OFFICERS HOUSING AUTHORITY-Plaintiff\nVersus\nMst. GUL RUKH SAMINA BUTT and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23688", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1866 = 2023 SLD 1866 = (2023) 128 TAX 273", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDY3o", - "Key Words:": "Issue:\nThe primary issue in this case revolves around the non-issuance of a refund, which was ordered by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (A.T.I.R), despite no injunction being issued by the High Court on the subject. The Federal Tax Ombudsman (F.T.O) ordered the refund, but the department did not comply, leading to the filing of a writ petition challenging the F.T.Os jurisdiction.\nFacts:\n•\nRespondent No. 3 (the taxpayer) derives income from manufacturing medicines and filed its income tax returns for the year 2010-2011, claiming refunds of Rs. 393,195 and Rs. 1,192,896.\n•\nThe tax department initially rejected the full refund claims, issuing partial refunds of Rs. 0.135 million and Rs. 0.258 million, respectively.\n•\nThe respondent No. 3 appealed to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR), but the appeal was dismissed on March 24, 2014.\n•\nThe taxpayer then appealed to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (A.T.I.R), which ruled in the taxpayers favor on November 18, 2015, directing the full refund to be issued.\n•\nThe department challenged the A.T.I.Rs decision by filing Income Tax References (ITRs) No. 70 and 71 of 2016, which are still pending before the High Court.\n•\nDespite the A.T.I.R’s decision, the department failed to issue the refund, prompting Respondent No. 3 to file a complaint under Section 10(1) of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000.\n•\nThe F.T.O determined that non-payment of the refund constituted maladministration and directed the department to issue the refund.\n•\nThe department appealed the F.T.O’s decision to the respondent No. 1 (a higher authority), but this appeal was dismissed as well.\n•\nThe department then filed a constitutional petition challenging the F.T.Os orders before the High Court.\nLegal Context:\n•\nSection 114 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001: Requires taxpayers to file income tax returns.\n•\nSection 127: Deals with the filing of appeals against decisions made by the tax authorities.\n•\nSection 131: Relates to appeals to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue.\n•\nSection 153(1)(a): Deals with withholding tax obligations.\n•\nSection 171(2)(a): Pertains to matters of refunds.\n•\nFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000:\no\nSection 9(2): Discusses the jurisdiction of the F.T.O to entertain complaints related to maladministration.\no\nSection 10(1): Grants the F.T.O the authority to take action against maladministration.\nArguments:\n•\nPetitioner (Department):\no\nThe department argued that the F.T.O lacked jurisdiction under Section 9(2), as it contended that no maladministration occurred.\no\nThe department also claimed that no specific reasons for maladministration were given by the F.T.O or the Appellate Authority.\n•\nRespondent No. 2 (Federal Tax Ombudsman):\no\nThe F.T.O argued that it has jurisdiction under the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance and that the department had failed to comply with the A.T.I.R’s decision, which amounted to maladministration.\no\nRespondent No. 2 emphasized that the departments reluctance to comply with the A.T.I.R’s order was unlawful, and the F.T.O had the right to enforce the refund.\no\nThe F.T.O further noted that similar cases were complied with by the department, and its reluctance to implement the order in this case was unjustified.\nDecision:\n•\nRefund Claim Still Valid: The court ruled that the refund claim order was still valid, and no injunction or restraining order had been issued by the High Court in relation to the Income Tax References pending before it. Therefore, the department was under obligation to comply with the F.T.Os order and issue the refund.\n•\nF.T.Os Jurisdiction: The court held that the F.T.O had jurisdiction to direct the payment of the refund. It was emphasized that the mere pendency of the I.T.R.s before the High Court did not create a barrier to the F.T.O’s jurisdiction. The department had failed to point out any defect in the F.T.O’s order, nor had it provided any valid reason to justify its non-compliance with the Appellate Tribunals order.\n•\nImplementation of F.T.O’s Order: The court found that the department had been acting in maladministration by refusing to implement the Appellate Tribunals order and directed the refund to be issued as per the F.T.Os ruling.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe writ petition filed by the department was dismissed, and the F.T.Os order was upheld. The department was ordered to issue the refund in accordance with the decision of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (A.T.I.R).\nKey Takeaways:\n•\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman (F.T.O) has jurisdiction to issue directions when the department fails to comply with orders from higher authorities like the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (A.T.I.R).\n•\nThe pendency of references in a court does not prevent the F.T.O from enforcing compliance with orders that are still in effect.\n•\nThe departments failure to implement lawful orders for refunds can be deemed maladministration, triggering action from the F.T.O.\nCases Referred:\n•\nAbdul Waheed Khan, etc v. Federal Tax Ombudsman (2017 PTD 2019)\n•\nM/s Universal Footwear v. Deputy Commissioner Income Tax (W.P. No. 3764 of 2004)\n•\nState Cement Corporation of Pakistan v. Chairman, Penal 01 Special Zone (W.P. No. 6037 of 2001)\n•\nI.T.R No. 17 of 2020", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,127,131,153(1)(a),171(2)(a),Clause (24A) of Part II of Second ScheduleFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=9(2),10(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1900 of 2022 decided on 18.10.2022, heard on: 19.09.2022", - "Judge Name:": " ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Arooj Zaib Abbasi and Hajra Zakir Shah, Advocates for the Petitioners.\nMr. Almas Ali Jovinda and Muhammad Arif Hymuyoon, Advocates for Respondent No.2. M/s Ms Raheema Khan, M. Sannan Khan, and Muhammad Sanaullah, Advocates for Respondent No.3.\nMr. Khalid Mehmood Dhoon, AAG.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nPRESIDENT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23689", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1867 = 2023 PLD 962 = 2023 SLD 1867", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDY3k", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.194-C-Customs Appellate Tribunal-Technical Member-Scope-Legislature does not want a Single Member, Technical, to be prevented from hearing case that involves decision in relation to a question of law-Member Technical is fully empowered under the law to decide a question of law.\nCollector of Customs v. Syed Rehan Ahmed 2017 SCMR 152 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194_C", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.73 of 2009, decided on 9th February, 2022, heard on: 27th January, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ\"", - "URL Link:": "Iqbal Khurram for Applicant.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Citation or Reference": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF PaCCS, CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI\nvs\nAlhaj AJAB KHAN", - "Case Link:": "", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23690", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1868 = 2023 SLD 1868 = 2023 PTD 985", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Pakistan Plant Quarantine Rules, 2019-Rr. 8, 44, 46 (4) 56-Import Policy Order, 2022, Sr. No. 78, Pt-IV-Plant and Plant Products, import of-Necessary documents- Petitioner was auction purchaser of consignment of Dark Red Kidney Beans-Plant Protection Authorities declined to issue Plant Protection Release Order (PPRO) as petitioner did not have Phytosanitary Certificate issued by concerned authority of exporting country, resultantly the consignment could not be released from the port- Validity-Consignment of Red Kidney Beans could only have been imported under Sr. No. 78, Pt-IV titled Import of Plant and Plant Products of the Import Policy Order, 2022, along with (i) Valid Import Permit issued by DPP (ii) Phytosanitary Certificate from National Plant Protection Organization (NPPO) of country of origin and Phytosanitary Certificate for re-export if the country of export was other than the country of origin, and (iii) compliance with food safety requirements- In absence of such essential requisites, respondent authority could not be compelled to provide Plant Protection Release Order-PPRO, nor an order for conducting phytosanitary inspection of the consignment at such stage could be passed as it would frustrate the entire scheme of law posing serious bio hazards-Plant protection and phytosanitary laws, rules, conventions and guidelines were put into place globally to protect indigenous plants and crops from pests and diseases that could accompany plants and plant products imported into the country of import, which would have ultimate effect on public health and could danger the eco- balance-Such regime was to ensure local plants, flora and fauna’s protection and aimed to save crops from pests and diseases-It was for such public purpose that stringent border controls were created and phytosanitary standards were made compulsory at the highest levels in World Trade Organization (WTO)-Only option available to customs authorities in respect of such phytosanitary- offensive consignment would be that such consignments was confiscated, destroyed, or returned to the port of origin at the expense of the importer-Such goods could never be permitted to be let out to reach national soil or waters, resultantly the exercise to have the goods auctioned was not only illegal but also without any application of sound mind exhibiting complete lack of coordination between different organs of Customs authorities-High Court directed Customs authorities to have the consignment returned to port of origin at the expense of importer or in alternate, to have complete consignment destroyed and return auction amounts submitted by petitioner to him along with all taxes paid by him in such pursuit-Constitutional petition H’ui dismissed, in circumstances. \n(b) Maxim-Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum- Meaning-When anything is prohibited directly, it prohibited also indirectly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-4335 of 2019, decided on 12th October, 2022, heard on: 16th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ\"", - "URL Link:": "Pervez Iqbal and Ms. Falak Naz Fatima for Petitioner.\nRashid Arli for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3/Customs Department.\nG.M. Bhutto, D.A.G. and M. Ishaque Pirzada for Respondents.\nAllah Ditta Abid, Plant Protection Adviser and Director General of Respondent No. 1", - "Citation or Reference": "MUHAMMAD AMIR \nvs\nDEPARTMENT OF PLANT PROTECTION and 2 others", - "Case Link:": "", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23691", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1869 = 2023 PLD 1019 = 2023 SLD 1869", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.32, 32-A 83-Mis-declaration-Fiscal fraud-Scope- Appellants imported consignments of “Coated Writing Paper in Sheets (gloss) (Nevia brand)” from China through their authorized Clearing Agents vide Goods Declarations-Goods were cleared under S. 83 of the Customs Act, 1969; subsequently, the post import clearance data revealed that goods were assessed and released under tariff heading 4810.1910 (attracting 20% customs duty reduced to 16% on presentation of certificates of origin issued under China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement) which were actually classifiable under tariff heading 4810.1910 being not specifically meant for “writing” and chargeable to 20% customs duty having no tariff concession-Show cause notices were issued to the importers and their clearing agents for recovery of evaded amount of duty/taxes and penal action-Charges levelled in the show-cause notices were upheld and the appeals were also dismissed- Validity-Department had exercised its supervisory power of checking the Goods Declarations and had passed the final assessment orders in respect of more than 250 consignments of identical goods-Such assessments were neither assailed by the department under S. 193 nor re-opened under S. 195 of the Customs Act, 1969-Department had released the consignments with the admission that “the classification declared on the scanned documents is in conformity with the classification determined by the Assessing Group”-Similar controversy relating to tariff headings 4810.1910 and 4810.1990 had already been adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal in favour of the importers- Appellate Tribunal was the final fact finding body and its findings were conclusive-Appeals were allowed and the impugned orders were set aside.\nCIR v. Messrs Sargodha Spinning Mill (Pvt.) Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1082 = 2022 PTD 1079 rel. \n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.32, 32-A 209-Mis-declaration-Fiscal fraud-Liability of principal and agents-Scope-Where the department had not placed on record any adverse material or evidence against the Customs Clearing Agents which could establish without any reasonable doubt that they were directly or indirectly the beneficiaries of alleged misdeclaration of US Code and allegedly evaded duty/taxes thereon, which was the basic requirement of issuance of show cause notice and imposition of penalties; Appellate Tribunal observed that the Agents neither fell within the ambit Ss. 32 32-A nor imposition of penalties was sustainable against them under the law. \nPorts Ways Customs House Agents v. Collector of Customs 2002 YLR 2651. ref.\n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.32-Mis-declaration-Scope-Classification of goods is a mixed question of law and facts and so also of interpretation of statutory provision i.e. tariff heading which is part of First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969; hence, there could always be a difference of opinion in interpreting the same administratively and judicially-It is not that it always will be a case of mens rea and imposition of penalty if interpretation of tariff heading for classification of goods is not accepted by the department.\n2021 PTD 1430 rel.\n2011 SCMR 1279 = 2011 PTD 2220 ref.\n(d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S. 223-Officers of Customs to follow Board’s orders, etc.-Scope- Directions of the Board contained in Customs General Order No. 12/2002, though not binding upon the authorities performing quasi-judicial functions, but such directions are mandatory in nature and are binding upon the functionaries and field officers discharging their functions and duties under the Customs Act, 1969 relating to administrative matters in terms of S. 223 of the Customs Act, 1969- Field officers of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) are not authorized to act as per their own discretion in a situation, wherein, FBR has already issued directions and/or guidelines.\n2021 PTD 1430 and 2016 PTD 35 rel.\n1993 SCMR 1232; 2003 PTD 2090 and 2016 PTD 35 ref.\n(e) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.194-B-Orders of the Appellate Tribunal-Scope-Unless and until stay order or supervening order is passed by the Apex Court against the order I of the Appellate Tribunal the Department and the lower forums have to follow the order/ of the Tribunal in letter and spirit.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,32-A,83", - "Case #": "Customs Appeals Nos.K-824 to K-841 of 2022, decided on 16th August, 2022, heard on: 30th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " \nABDUL JABBAR QURESHI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-I", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aqeef Ahmed and Muhammad Bilal for Appellants.\nSaboor Kakar, A.O. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS YOUSUF & CO. AND 34 OTHERS \nVERSUS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE APPRAISEMENT (EAST), KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23692", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1870 = 2023 SLD 1870 = 2023 PTD 1046 = (2024) 130 TAX 124", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTU", - "Key Words:": "Issue:\nThe case revolves around the failure of the taxpayer to pay the tax collected or deducted on payments made for goods, services, and contracts as required under Section 153(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core issue is whether the taxpayer fulfilled their statutory obligations regarding withholding tax and whether the Appellate Tribunals decision to allow the taxpayer’s appeal was valid.\nFacts:\nThe respondent/taxpayer made payments to various persons (recipients) in the course of their business but did not provide proof of tax deduction as required under Section 153(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nAs a result, the tax department issued a notice under Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 for the failure to deduct and pay the withholding tax.\nThe taxpayer did not respond to the notice, leading to the issuance of a show-cause notice and multiple opportunities for a hearing.\nUltimately, an Order-in-Original was passed, and a tax demand was raised against the taxpayer.\nThe taxpayer appealed the decision to the Commissioner (Appeals), who dismissed the appeal.\nThe Appellate Tribunal, however, allowed the taxpayer’s appeal, which led to the current reference application.\nLegal Context:\nSection 153(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001: This section mandates persons making payments for goods, services, and contracts to deduct tax at the prescribed rates and deposit it with the government.\nRule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002: This rule outlines the procedure for dealing with failure to comply with the withholding tax obligations, including issuance of notices.\nSection 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001: This section holds a person liable for failure to collect or deduct tax in the prescribed manner.\nRuling:\nThe Appellate Tribunals Decision:\nThe Appellate Tribunal ruled that the default of tax deduction for the relevant tax year was established. However, it also found that the recipients of the payments had filed their tax returns, which led to the conclusion that the Assessing Officer was not justified in creating the tax demand.\nThis finding was self-contradictory because, although it acknowledged the failure to deduct taxes, it also relied on the filing of returns by the recipients as a reason to cancel the tax demand.\nThe Courts Analysis:\nThe respondent did not present any evidence proving that the recipients of the payments had actually paid the taxes due on the payments made to them by the respondent. Simply filing tax returns was insufficient to establish that the tax due was actually paid.\nThe respondent, as a prescribed person, had a statutory obligation to deduct and deposit the tax as a withholding agent under Section 153(1)(a). Failure to meet this obligation cannot be excused based solely on the recipients’ return filings.\nConclusion:\nThe Appellate Tribunal’s decision was flawed in its reasoning, as it was self-contradictory and did not properly address the statutory obligations of the taxpayer.\nThe respondent’s failure to provide proof of tax payment by the recipients led to the conclusion that the taxpayer could not be absolved of its withholding tax obligations.\nThe reference application was allowed, and the tax demand raised by the Assessing Officer was upheld.\nKey Takeaways:\nThe taxpayer, as a withholding agent, has a statutory duty to deduct and remit taxes under Section 153(1)(a), and failure to do so results in a valid tax demand.\nFiling of returns by the recipients of the payments is not sufficient to prove that taxes were paid unless there is actual evidence that the taxes were remitted.\nCourts or tribunals cannot accept contradictory findings, and the taxpayer cannot be absolved of their responsibilities without providing sufficient evidence.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,133(5),136,153(1)(a),161,161(1),161(1B),161(2),205Income Tax Rules, 2002=44,44(4)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No.77610 of 2022, decided on 7th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Karim, Justice and Anwaar Hussain, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ibrar Ahmad for Applicant.\nAqib Ali for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE \nVs\nPUNJAB MEDICAL STORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23693", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1871 = 2023 PTD 1049 = 2023 SLD 1871", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.187-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1974) Arts.117 121-Burden of proof as to lawful authority-Scope-Section 187 of the Customs Act, 1969, provides two conditions, which are as follows: (i) when a person is charged with an offence under the Customs Act, 1969, burden of proof is cast upon him to show that he had the lawful authority to commit that act; (ii) when a person is found in possession of any goods the burden of proof is cast upon him to show that he was holding such goods under some lawful authority, permission or license, etc-Clause (ii) provides for an eventuality where a person is found to be in possession of certain goods which fall under a prohibited category or which in an unlawful manner find place in the possession of custody of the accused-In such Case the burden is upon the accused to show that he falls under some exemption or exception to hold such goods- Type of eventuality as envisaged and stated in clause (ii) essentially represents a statement of the general principle of the law of evidence contained in Art. 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-This principle states that anyone claiming to be under a preferential, exempt, or excepted category must demonstrate fulfillment of the conditions to fall within that category-This obviously should not be confused with the factum of possession for which no presumption or burden of proof has been spelt out, in view whereof the possession itself has to be proved independently by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt-In case of clause (i) it is to be determined whether the burden of proof solely lies upon the accused to disprove allegations of mis-declaration and mis-description leveled by the customs authorities and whether the customs authorities are under no obligation to lead evidence and discharge any onus of proof-This part of S. 187 perhaps appears to be contrary to the general principle of law of evidence contained in Art. 117 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, that whosoever alleges existence of a particular fact must prove the same-There is little doubt that a special law of particular statute can provide for a distinct regime of rules of evidence contained in a general law-In fact the law goes on as far as providing that the laws of evidence can be altered even by mutual consent and contract-However, on a close scrutiny of the provisions of S. 187 it appears that in such a situation it is only the evidential and tactical burden of proof which is cast upon the accused while the legal burden to bring home the allegations remains with the prosecution.\nMessrs Kamran Industries’s case PLD 1996 Kar. 68 and Barkat Ali v. The State PLD 1973 Kar. 659 rel.\nPLD 1975 Kar. 458 ref.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.26-Obligation to produce documents and provide information- Scope-Object of S. 26 of the Customs Act, 1969 is to empower the authority to ask for information or require the production of documents or inspect the same in order to determine the legality or illegality of importation or exportation of goods which had been imported or exported, the value of such goods, the nature, amount and sources of funds or the assets with which the goods were acquired and the customs duty chargeable thereon-Such information can only be called for from the claimant for the specific purpose of determining the legality of possession of impugned goods-Authorized officer of the customs can call upon any importer or exporter to furnish information in case where such determination is required-Such officer cannot make a roving inquiry or issue notice by merely shooting in the dark in the hope that it would enable him to find out some material out of these documents and then charge the party with irregularity or illegality- Customs Authority has to state and disclose in the notice the purpose for which party is required to produce those documents or supply information-Unless such purpose is specified in the notice, the addressee would be clueless about the demand being made through such a notice-Section 26 does not provide for making indiscriminate roving and fishing inquiry, irrespective of fact whether any determination of legality or illegality in import or export of funds with which goods are acquired is to be determined-Even in cases of suspicion of commission of illegality, details should be provided to the party to enable him to have an opportunity to produce all relevant documents and disclose information-Depending on facts and circumstances of a case, any notice without disclosing any fact or particulars for which information or documents are required would be in violation of principles of natural justice and can be struck down as illegal and without jurisdiction.\nAssistant Director Intelligence and Investigation v. M/s B.R. Herman PLD 1992 SC 485 rel.\n1995 PTD (Trib.) 580 ref.\n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.26-Obligation to produce documents and provide information- Scope-State functionaries have no power and authority to conduct fishing and roving inquiries without possessing definite and proper information, just in hope to unravel some concealment and illegality on the part of the assessee/taxpayer/citizen-In other words, before embarking upon any inquiry the state functionary must already possess some definite material so as to establish any illegal action having been taken by the citizen.\nAssistant Director Intelligence and Investigation v. M/s B.R. Herman PLD 1992 SC 485 rel.\n1995 PTD (Trib.) 580 ref.\n(d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 2(s), 156(1)(8), 156(1)(89) 156(1)(90)-Smuggling-Scope- If a person has been found without lawful excuse in possession of smuggled goods he would be dealt with under Cl. (89) of S. 156(1) and if the evidence produced by the prosecution establishes that accused was smuggling the goods outside or into Pakistan, then he would be liable to be dealt with under Cl. (8) of S. 156(1) and in such circumstances, would not be punished, under Cl. (89) of S. 156(1)- Thus, Cl. (8) applies in relation to the very act (or acts together) which constitute the offence of smuggling-As S. 2(s) makes clear, this would include an attempt to smuggle and/or an abetment or connivance thereof-Clause (89) on the other hand applies to, or at, the stage when the offence of smuggling is already complete-Such difference can also be understood by noting that in Cl. (8), the word “smuggled” is used as a verb, whereas in Cl. (89), it is used in a descriptive sense as part of the expression “smuggled goods “ (i.e. as an adjectival participle or verb adjective to indicate a past or completed action)-If the act or offense of smuggling is proven, even if it occurred a long time ago, it is crucial to establish whether the goods in question are considered “smuggled goods” and whether S.2(s) is applicable-This determination determines whether Cl. (89) or (90) should be applied- Clause (89) applies to smuggled goods, and clause (90) applies to those goods to which the former does not apply, i.e., those which are not smuggled goods-It necessarily follows from this that clauses (89) and (90) cannot simultaneously, be held to apply to the facts and circumstances of a particular case-Either the goods involved are smuggled goods, or they are not-Determination on order that concludes that both clauses apply, or purports to hold a person liable in terms of both, is bad in law and cannot be sustained-Furthermore, when Cl. (89) is examined, it is seen that it applies to “smuggled goods” in two distinct situations-Firstly, it applies when it has been determined that the goods are indeed smuggled goods-But, secondly, it also applies when there is a “reasonable suspicion” that the goods are smuggled goods-This obviously sets or requires a lower threshold, but it is important to note that the focus must still be on the goods being smuggled goods-Thus, when clauses (89) and (90) are considered together, three situations emerge: (i) the goods can be smuggled; or (ii) there may be reasonable suspicion that the goods are smuggled goods; or (iii) the goods are those to which neither (i) nor (ii) apply-The first two contingencies come within clause (89) and the third within clause (90)-For a lawful determination to be made when a question arises in relation to any goods as to whether customs duty and other taxes leviable thereon have been evaded or that such goods have been brought into Pakistan in breach of any prohibition or restriction, it must be carefully considered whether (i) the goods are smuggled goods, or (ii) are those in respect of which there can be a reasonable suspicion that they are smuggled goods-For this purpose, the definition of smuggling in S. 2(s) must be carefully considered in order to determine whether it applies in the facts and circumstances of the particular case-If the answer is in the affirmative then (and only then) clause (89) applies-If not, then it is only clause (90) that can be applied-Onus of such determination lies on the customs authorities.\n(e) Equity-Equity is the soul of law in dispensation of justice.\n(f) Administration of justice-Proper purpose of procedure in any system of administration of justice is to help and not to thwart the grant of rights to the people-All the technicalities have to be avoided unless it be essential to comply with them on the ground of public policy-Any system which gives effect to the form but not to the substance defeats substantive rights and is defective to the extent-Ideal must always be a system that gives to every person what is his right under the law. \nImtiaz v. Ghulam Ali PLD 1963 SC 382 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=187Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=117,121", - "Case #": "Customs Appeals Nos.H-794 and H-796 of 2022, decided on 5th October, 2022, heard on: 7th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Abdul Jabbar Qureshi, Member Judicial-I and Abdul Basit Chaudhary, Member Technical-l", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Iqbal Riaz for Appellant.\nGhulam Muhammad Shar, Superintendent for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS FAZAL IMPEX AND ANOTHER\nVS\nTHE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION (CUSTOMS), CUSTOM HOUSE, HYDERABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23694", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1872 = 2023 PTD 1069 = 2023 SLD 1872", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWS8", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 11, 3, 7 8-Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded-Determination of tax liability- - Tax credit not allowed-Scope-Taxpayer adjusted and claimed a certain amount as input tax on obsolete stock-Department while refusing to accept the claim of taxpayer ordered for recovery- Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal filed by taxpayer- Validity-In the scheme of Sales Tax Act, 1990, Ss. 7 8 are not charging sections-Both the sections pertain to the domain of payability-Section 7 enunciates the principle for determining the tax liability for particular tax period of a registered person in respect of taxable supplies and it is provided that such registered person shall be entitled to deduct input tax paid during the tax period for the purpose of taxable supplies made or to be made by him from the output tax that is due from him in respect of a particular tax period-Amount paid by the taxpayer belonged to him and the assessee was entitled to seek at its discretion either adjustment or refund- Impugned order did not require interference-Appeal of the department was dismissed. \nMessrs Mafair Spinning Mills Ltd., Lahore v. Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and 2 others 2002 PTCL 115 foll.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,3,7,8", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No.417/KB of 2015, decided on 29th November, 2019, heard on: 8th October, 2019.", - "Judge Name:": " Mrs. Ambreen Aslam, Judicial Member and Saifullah Khan, Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Azam, D.R. for Appellant.\nAdan Mufti, FCA for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, LTU, KARACHI\nvs\nABU DAWOOD TRADING COMPANY (PVT.) LTD., KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23695", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1873 = 2023 PTD 1087 = 2023 SLD 1873", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWSs", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S.21-Sales Tax Registration-Suspension-Principle of natural justice, violation of-Petitioner was aggrieved of suspension of his Sales Tax Registration without providing him any opportunity of hearing-Validity-After noting some shortcomings on the part of petitioner, the concerned authority suspended Sales Tax Registration with immediate effect-Such act proved that prior to order of suspension, petitioner was not communicated with regard to shortcomings, if any recorded by the authority-No reply was obtained from the petitioner nor any opportunity of hearing was given to him- High Court declined to endorse action taken by authority with immediate effect as no One could be condemned unheard-Before drawing any adverse inference, authority was bound to call explanation / reply from petitioner and in absence of such mandatory legal requirement, action of authority was non-est in the eyes of law-High Court directed the authority to restore Sales Tax Registration of petitioner in accordance with law as its decision was illegal and unqualified for-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nC.P. No.D-8101 of 2017 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21", - "Case #": "ORDER:\nMRS. AMBREEN ASLAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.-Through this order we intend to dispose off the titled appeal filed by the department against the Order bearing . No. STA/152/LTU/2015 dated 12-06-2015, passed by the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-I), Karachi on the following grounds:\n1. That the order of the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-I) is had in law and on merits of the case.\n2. That the learned Commissioner-IR (Appeals-I) was not justified under the law to", - "Judge Name:": " Irfan Saadat Khan and Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmed Masood for Petitioner.\nNone has appeared for Respondents Nos.1 and 2.\nG.M. Bhutto, Assistant Attorney General for the Federation of Pakistan (A.A.G.) On Court Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD TAHIR THROUGH ATTORNEY \nVS\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE THROUGH CHAIRMAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ISLAMABAD AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23696", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1874 = 2023 PTD 1090 = 2023 SLD 1874", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 32, 25, 79 80-Mis-declaration-Value and description of imported goods (specific size of pneumatic tires of rubber)-PCT heading, finalization of-Department alleged subject goods were for light truck whereas importers/appellants claimed the tires were useable in construction, mining or industrial handling vehicles or machinery- Held, that no mens rea was found , in the present case, on the part of the appellants-Impugned orders passed by Adjudicating Authority and Collector (Appeals), having been infested with legal infirmities, were set-aside-Clearance Collectorate was directed to finalize the assessment in light of Manufacturers’ Catalogues as well as in accordance with Import Policy Order-Appeals were accepted.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,25,79,80", - "Case #": "Customs Appeals Nos.K-571, K-572, K-573 of 2022 and K-1476 of 2019, decided on 31st January, 2023, heard on: 24th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Yaseen, Consultant for Appellant.\nGhani Somroo and Naqeebullah, A.O. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS ATEEQ AUTOS AND OTHERS \nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS) AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23697", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1875 = 2023 PTD 1103 = 2023 SLD 1875", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Finance Act (XIII of 2022)-S. 8-Capital Value Tax-Foreign assets of taxpayer-Amnesty scheme-Immunity from taxation-Scope-Appellant (taxpayer) assailed imposition of capital value tax on foreign assets-Contention of appellant was that he had declared foreign assets by availing Amnesty Scheme and his assets Were immune from any taxation- Validity-At the time of availing Amnesty Scheme, law legislated by the Parliament was acknowledged and availed, which sought declaration of foreign assets-No objection was raised that Amnesty Schemes had extra territorial operations-Constitutionality of Wealth Tax Act, 1963, was consistently upheld by constitutional courts, which law had taxed the assets, either inside or outside Pakistan-No case for arbitrariness and unintelligible classification arose within the class of persons subjected to tax, which constituted a reasonably and intelligibly defined classification-Appeal was dismissed.\nC.P. No.4942 of 2022 rel.\n2023 PTD 268 foll.\n(b) Finance Act (XIII of 2022)-S.8-Capital Value Tax-Jurisdiction-Scope-Officer Inland Revenue has inherent jurisdiction for the purpose of collection of Capital Value Tax over persons whose income tax records and income tax affairs, the Officer Inland Revenue can examine for their income tax treatment.\n(c) Finance Act (XIII of 2022)-S.8-Capital Value Tax-Foreign assets-Scope-Imposition of capital value tax on foreign assets of resident individuals by legislature is to bring fairness in taxation by imposing direct tax on the rich individuals in Pakistan-However, as individuals having foreign assets up to 100 million rupees have been exempted from such tax, therefore, this tax can be said to have been imposed on super rich instead of even rich individuals-Such persons are required to file declaration of capital value tax and pay capital value tax. \n(d) Taxation-Principles of tax equity demand levy of higher tax on individuals with higher ability to pay tax.\n(e) Taxation-Non-provision and non-production of documents does not give the taxpayer right to enjoy while sitting on the fence.\n(f) Equity-One who seeks equity must have equities in his favour and anyone who seeks justice must come with clean hands.\n(g) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-Art. 117-Burden of proof-Scope-One who asserts existence of facts must prove that the facts exist.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2022=8", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No.645/KB of 2023, decided on 9th June, 2023, date of hearing: 30th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SARDAR M. AJAZ KLIAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMTIAZ ALI SOLANGI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Shabbar Zaidi and Asim Zulfiqar, FCAs for Appellant.\nBarrister Dr. Huma Sodher, Legal Advisor and Ajaz Ahmed, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI TABBA, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE. AEOI, ZONE. LTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23698", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1876 = 2023 PTD 1158 = 2023 SLD 1876", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWXo", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.221 122(5A)-Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed], Ss.62, 80-D, 156 Third Sched., R.5-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 4-Assessment order-Rectification-Change of opinion-Scope-Taxation Officer, powers of-Scope-Initial depreciation allowable on building and plant and machinery installed by 30th June, 2002-Original assessment was finalized on 28-09-2002 and further proceeded under Ss. 156 80D of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979-Earlier two notices under S.122(5A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, (1TO, 2001) having been issued in the year 2003 were still pending, another notice under S.221 of the ITO, 2001 was served upon the applicant (Refinery Company) alleging that initial depreciation on buildings and plant machinery was incorrectly allowed-Appellate Tribunal treated notice under S.221 of ITO, 2001 as valid one-Applicant assailed order of the Tribunal contending that the impugned order amounted to “change of opinion” from assessment order passed in the year 2002, which could not be passed during pendency /disposal of two notices already issued under S.122(5A) of the ITO, 2001-Validity-Record revealed that initial depreciation was never claimed by the applicant/company , rather First Year Allowance @ 80% of the “capitalized assets” was claimed-Taxation officer allowed initial depreciation under R.5(l)(cc) of the Third Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, which provision was not relevant to the facts of the present case, because the same prescribed 40% depreciation allowance to machinery or plant given on lease by a Scheduled Bank, a Financial Institution or Modarba or leasing company duly approved by the FBR-Case of applicant/company for allowing initial depreciation being against the said provision of law, compelled the Taxation Officer to rectify the order in exercise of power under S.221 of the ITO, 2001-Incorrect statement of law was always open to rectification and penitence-Taxation Officer was empowered to rectify assessment order under S. 221 of ITO, 2001and rectification of the Assessment Order under S.221 of ITO, 2001, could be applied retrospectively-Expression “mistake apparent from the record” as used in S. 221 of ITO, 2001, meant that error or mistake was so manifest and clear, which if permitted to retain on record, could materially affect the case-Conditions precedent to amend an assessment order under S. 122(5A) of ITO, 2001, were different from the conditions laid down in S. 221 of ITO, 2001-For S. 122(5A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the order had to be erroneous insofar as prejudicial to the interest of revenue, whereas S. 221 of the ITO, 2001, empowered the Taxation Officer to amend the order to the extent of rectifying the legal or factual mistake apparent from the face of the assessment or if mistake was apparent, obvious and floating on the surface of order and could be rectified without long drawn arguments and proceedings for appreciating facts and interpretation of provisions of law-There was no involvement of any fresh investigation-Mistake was apparent on the basis of facts floating on record as well as the applicable law-Under the law Taxing Authority had power to correct a mistake in tax matter resulting in loss of revenue in blatant violation of law after terming such mistake to be apparent on face of record-Any other interpretation of the said provision would be against the spirit of Art. 4 of the Constitution guaranteeing equal treatment in accordance with law-Findings of facts given by the Appellate Tribunal were not open to further scrutiny by the High Court in reference jurisdiction when the same had not been shown either to be perverse or against record and the High Court had to give opinion in advisory jurisdiction, on the basis of facts as determined by the Appellate Tribunal-No adjudication on merit was made on the earlier notices, therefore, doctrine of res judicata was not applicable-Mere issuance of notices did not bar the Authority from either issuing fresh notice or exercise power of rectification within scope of S.221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-No interference was made out in the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Reference was dismissed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221,122(5A)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=62,80-D,156Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4", - "Case #": "PTR No. 545 of 2006, heard on 20th October, 2020, heard on: 20th October, 2020.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Karim and Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ali Zafar and Mehak Zafar lor Applicant.\nLiaquat Ali Ch. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAK ARAB REFINERY LIMITED \nvs\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX/WEALTH TAX (APPEALS), ZONE-I, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23699", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1877 = 2023 PTD 1165 = 2023 SLD 1877", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDWXk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Fifth Schedule, Serial No. 11-Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), Sixth Schedule-Boiler and Pressure Vessel Ordinance (CXXI of 2002), S. 7-Notifications SRO 202(I)/2015, dated 09-03-2015 and SRO 377(I)/2015, dated 27-04-2015-Alternative and Renewable Energy Promotion Policy-Exemption of duty and taxes-Import of Boiler included in list of machinery-Petitioner company was aggrieved of declining concession of duty and taxes regarding boiler included in machinery on the grounds that boiler in question was already available in local market-Validity-Performance guarantees’ aspect of the project was also of importance and the project could only be accomplished if entire OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) products were used-Fishing expedition seeking look-alike and make- alike boilers for replacement of vital OEM parts with local components might largely reduce thermal efficiencies of the project, which was the very purpose for which the entire exercise was being undertaken to take advantage of heat lost to the atmosphere-Boilers, were high pressure components, not to be taken lightly at any occasion-Treatment meted out to petitioner by Customs Authorities was on account of non-inclusion of Engineers and Material Scientists in Customs Preventive and Examination Department, where specific mention of Engineers and Material Scientists was given for such posts, for example through notifications SRO 202(I)/2015 dated 09-03-2015 and SRO 377(I)/2015 dated 27-04-2015-High Court directed Chairman Federal Board of Revenue to ensure such specialist deployment-High Court directed the authorities to forthwith release consignment of the boiler while treating it as partial shipment of WHR Power Plant’s equipment per terms of the consignments already released by giving concession of the Fifth Schedule of Customs Act, 1969 and Sixth Schedule of Sales Tax Act, 1990-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nFauji Cement Company Limited v. Deputy Collector of Customs (Appraisement-V) 2021 PTD 949; Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Limited v. Sales Tax Officer PLD 1971 SC 205 and M/s. Alpha Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others PTCL 2014 CL. 103 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=11", - "Case #": "C.P. D-529 of 2022, decided on 15th March, 2022, heard on: 8th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haider Waheed and Munim Masood for Petitioner.\nMs. Afsheen Aman along with Muzaffar Ali for Respondents.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, D.A.G. \nMs. Syeda Sadaf Ali Shah, D.C. (East), MCC (East), Karachi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FLYING PAPER INDUSTRIES LTD. THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23700", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1878 = 2023 PTD 1177 = 2023 SLD 1878 = (2024) 130 TAX 190 = 2025 PTCL 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969) - S. 194-B, 196; Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) - Ss. 132, 133; Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) - Ss. 46, 47; Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 - Findings of Fact and Inference by Higher Courts\nIssue:\nThis matter deals with the scope of interference by higher courts (specifically the High Court and Supreme Court) with the findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal under various tax statutes. It discusses when the courts can interfere with such findings, the conditions under which such interference is warranted, and the extent of their jurisdiction over questions of fact.\nSummary:\nGenerally, the Appellate Tribunal serves as the final fact-finding authority in tax matters, and its findings of fact are not interfered with by the High Court in its reference jurisdiction, nor by the Supreme Court when appeals are filed against the High Courts decisions. The High Courts role is primarily to address questions of law rather than reappraising factual findings.\nHowever, this principle is not absolute. The High Court or Supreme Court may intervene if the findings of fact by the Appellate Tribunal are based on:\n1.\nA perverse or incorrect finding of fact, meaning it contradicts the material available on record.\n2.\nSurmises and conjectures rather than evidence.\nWhen the High Court has not properly evaluated the material or evidence, the Supreme Court, as the appellate authority over the High Court, may step in to correct these findings if they are arbitrary or unjust.\nConclusion:\nThe courts will only interfere with factual findings when there is a clear error or misjudgment that undermines the material available or if the findings are based on speculation. The interference should not be used to help a party fill in gaps or to admit new material unless the party has complied with procedural requirements to produce new evidence.\nCitations:\n•\nMessrs Mohammad Akbar v. I.T.A.T. 1972 SCMR 409\n•\nMessrs F.M.Y. Industries v. Deputy Commissioner I.T. 2014 SCMR 907\n•\nMessrs PTV Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2017 SCMR 1136\n•\nMessrs Squibb Pakistan v. Commissioner of I.T. 2017 SCMR 1006\n•\nMessrs Shah Nawaz v. Commissioner of I.T. 1969 SCMR 123\n•\nCommissioner of I.T. v. Messrs Smith, Kline and French 1991 SCMR 2374\n•\nCommissioner of I.T. v. Messrs Farrokh Chemical 1992 SCMR 523\n•\nIbrahim Ishaq v. Commissioner of I.T. 1993 SCMR 287\n•\nMessrs Irum Ghee Mills v. I.T.A.T. 2000 SCMR 1871\n________________________________________\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969) - S. 194-B, 196; Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) - Ss. 132, 133; Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) - Ss. 46, 47; Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 - Supreme Court and Additional Evidence\nIssue:\nThe question arises as to whether the Supreme Court, when hearing a case related to tax statutes, can consider additional material related to the factual aspects of the case for the first time.\nSummary:\nWhile the Appellate Tribunal is the final authority on facts, the Supreme Court may, in exceptional circumstances, accept additional material when hearing a case. However, the following conditions must be met for the Supreme Court to do so:\n1.\nRelevance: The material must be pertinent to resolving the issue at hand.\n2.\nNo Previous Knowledge: The material must not have been available to the party earlier and should not have been in their possession or knowledge before.\n3.\nPrompt Action: The party must seek the production of this additional material promptly without unnecessary delay.\nIf the Supreme Court determines that it is justified to consider the additional material, it will decide whether to pass a finding on the matter itself or to refer the issue back to a lower court or forum for further examination.\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court can accept additional material if it meets the conditions stated above, such as being relevant and introduced without delay. It then has the option to make a determination or refer the matter back to the relevant forum.\nCitation:\n•\nSecretary to the Govt. of W.P. v. Gulzar Muhammad PLD 1969 SC 58\n________________________________________\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan - Art. 184(3) - Suo Motu Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court\nIssue:\nThe issue here is the scope and limitations of the Supreme Courts suo motu jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, particularly in relation to matters of public importance and fundamental rights.\nSummary:\nArticle 184(3) of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court the power to take suo motu action in cases involving matters of public importance that require the enforcement of fundamental rights. While this power is undeniable and necessary to uphold the rule of law, it must be exercised with caution.\nThe Supreme Courts suo motu jurisdiction is meant to address urgent issues that require immediate attention to enforce the rule of law and safeguard fundamental rights. However, it should not undermine the lawful authority of other institutions or the adjudicatory process. The Court should be cautious about the cases it chooses to intervene in and the directions it issues, as it may prejudice the parties involved, particularly when there is no right of appeal against the Supreme Courts suo motu orders.\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Courts suo motu jurisdiction should be exercised judiciously, ensuring it addresses only matters that urgently require intervention to maintain the rule of law, while avoiding interference that undermines the authority of other forums or prejudices the rights of the parties involved.\nCitations:\n•\nAbdul Aleem v. Idara N.I.C.F.C. 2016 SCMR 2067\n•\nMuhammad Tariq v. Shamsa Tanveer PLD 2011 SC 151", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-B,196Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=132,133Sales Tax Act, 1990=46,47Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1600 to 2807 of 2021, decided on 23rd June, 2022, heard on: 23rd June, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.11.2020 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Special Customs Reference Application No. 9 of 2015 along with SCRAs Nos. 10 to 14, 45 to 54, 204 to 295, 1161 to 1216, 1239 to 1338, 1389 to 1488, 1662 to 1710, 2188 to 2287, 2290 to 2389, 2394 to 2493, 2610 to 2609(sic.), 2618 to 2717, 2721 to 2791 of. 2015 and 559 to 792 of 2017)", - "Judge Name:": " UMER ATA BANDIAL, C.J., YAHYA AFRIDI AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Anas Makhdoom, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Saad Rasool, Advocate for Petitioner (in all cases).\nRaja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL LOGISTICS CELL, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, HQ NLC, KARACHI\nVERSUS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, PORT MUHAMMAD BIN QASIM, KARACHI AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23701", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1879 = 2023 PTD 1190 = 2023 SLD 1879", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTY", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S. 19-Government of Pakistan (Revenue Division) Notification SRO No.499(I)/2013 dated 12-06-2013-Electric Vehicles and Hybrid / Semi-Hybrid Vehicles-Distinction-Public Notice, status of- Petitioners/ importers were aggrieved of denial of exemption by Customs authorities on the basis of Public Notice creating distinction between fully hybrid and semi-hybrid vehicles-Validity-Notification SRO No.499(I)/2013 dated 12-06-2013 only classified Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) with PCT Headings without drawing any distinction with regard to fully, semi, mild hybrid or used or new vehicles or any specification of large batteries-Exemption of customs duty, sales tax and withholding tax on import of Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEVs) falling within the ambit of PCT Code 87.03 specified in column No.2 of the table to the extent as specified in column 3 in terms of notification SRO No.499(I)/2013 dated 12-06-2013, could neither be denied nor circumvented under the garb of Public Notice in question-High Court declared that denial of benefit of exemption under notification SRO No.499(l)/2013 dated 12-06-2013 to petitioners / importers was illegal, without lawful authority, without jurisdiction and in conflict with the notification-High Court directed the authorities to refund duty / taxes collected from petitioners under the garb of Public Notice in question, as petitioner were entitled to be treated in accordance with notification SRO No.499(l)/2013 dated 12-06-2013-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nCollector of Customs. Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar v. Waseef-Ullah and another (Custom Reference No.270-P/2020) rel.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.623-P of 2023, decided on 16th March, 2023, heard on: 16th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " S.M. ATTIQUE SHAH AND SHAKEEL AHMAD, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aamir Bilal for Petitioners.\nAbbas Bakhtiar along with Wajid Noor, Appraising Officer, Customs Department for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS ITTEHAD CUSTOMS AGENCY, PESHAWAR THROUGH CLEARING AGENT ASIF ALI AND OTHERS\nVERSUS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION/CHAIRMAN FBR, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23702", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1880 = 2023 PTD 1210 = 2023 SLD 1880", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTU", - "Key Words:": "Mushtaq Hussain Qazi for Petitioners Nos. 1 and 3.\nAmer Raza Naqvi for Petitioners Nos. 2 and 4.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, D.A.G. for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nSarfaraz Ali Metlo for Respondent No.3.\nGhulam Asghar Pathan for Respondents Nos.4 and 5.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-5162 of 2020, decided on 20th June, 2022. Dates of hearing: 27th April, 18th, 25th and 31st May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND MAHMOOD A. KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mushtaq Hussain Qazi for Petitioners Nos. 1 and 3.\nAmer Raza Naqvi for Petitioners Nos. 2 and 4.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, D.A.G. for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nSarfaraz Ali Metlo for Respondent No.3.\nGhulam Asghar Pathan for Respondents Nos.4 and 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BURSHANE LPG (PAKISTAN) LIMITED THROUGH DULY CONSTITUTED ATTORNEY AND 3 OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY/CHAIRMAN REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD LAND 4 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23703", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1881 = 2023 PTD 1231 = 2023 SLD 1881", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.209, 32, 32-A 79-Liability of principal and agents-Mis- declaration-Fiscal fraud-Liability of Customs Agent-Scope- Clearing Agent assailed the imposition of penalty by the department- Validity-Department had imposed penalty under Cls. l(i), 14(ii), 14A 44 of S. 156(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, which were irrelevant- Such clauses could be invoked for contravention of S. 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 and could not be invoked against the Customs Agents, not involved in any deliberate misdeclaration-Clearing Agent had limited liability under S. 209 and could not be held guilty under Ss.32 32A without conclusive proof-Role of Customs Agent was only to file the goods declaration on the basis of the documents furnished to him by his principal, hence he could not be punished for his association with the principal-Present case was neither a case of connivance nor collusion which needed a conspiracy to be hatched, however, no concrete evidence for it had been provided by the department-Penalty imposed on the Customs Agent was remitted and the order-in-original was modified accordingly to the extent of Customs Agent-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 209, 32, 32-A 79-Liability of principal and agents-Mis-declaration-Fiscal fraud-Liability of Customs Agent-Scope- Customs Agent files goods declaration on the basis of documents furnished to him by the principal, therefore, his job is to translate the facts of those documents into goods declaration and file it on behalf of the importer-Customs Agent, if found incorrectly depicting the facts from the documents provided to him by the Principal then he will be guilty owing to his failure to discharge his duties as per laid down criteria and parameters-However, if the Customs Agent files the goods declaration on behalf of his principal with due cud any error or lapse is detected by customs on the basis of the documents furnished by the principal, then such discrepancy would not be attributed to the Clearing Agent who has no role in negotiations with the exporter, shipping agent, bank transactions or signing any contract or agreement.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=209,32,32-A,79", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-806 of 2022, decided on 29th June. 2022, heard on: 9th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ABDUL JABBAR QURESHI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-J AND ABDUL BASIT CHAUDHRY, MEMBER TECHNICAL-I", - "Lawyer Name:": "Umar Farooq for Appellant.\nTauseef Ahmed, A.O. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS AHSAN TRADER (CHAL IT KCUS-522)\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION-11) AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23704", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1882 = 2023 PTD 1237 = 2023 SLD 1882", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 121, 122 177-Amendment of assessments-,-Audit-Best assessment-Scope-Once a case has been selected for audit under S. 177, the audit will be conducted in accordance with the procedure outlined in the section-Subsection (1) allows the Commissioner to call for record or documents including the taxpayers books of accounts-These books of accounts and records are specified in S.174(1) and are prescribed under the Income Tax Rules, 2002- Subsection (2) states that the Commissioner can only conduct an audit of the income tax affairs, including an examination of accounts and records, after obtaining a persons records under subsection (1) or, if necessary, where the record is not maintained-Subsection (6) provides that after the completion of the audit, the Commissioner may proceed to amend the assessment under S. 122(1) or S. 122(4) after obtaining the taxpayers explanation on all the issues raised in the audit-This means that a report of the issues raised in the audit must first be prepared and issued and then the taxpayers explanation must be obtained before proceeding under S. 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Therefore, a notice under S. 122(9) can only be validly issued to pass an amendment order under S. 122(1)/122(5) after obtaining the taxpayers explanations to the issues raised in the audit-Moreover, if a case has been selected for audit but no records or books of accounts are obtained from the taxpayer, subsection (10) of S. 177 specifies the course of action to be taken by the assessing officer-This provision applies regardless of subsections (2) (6), and the overriding provisions of S. 177(10) are applied when a person fails to produce any accounts, documents, and records required to be maintained under S.174, any relevant document, electronically kept record, electronic machine, or any other evidence that may be required by the Commissioner-Commissioner may proceed to make the best assessment under S. 121, and in a case where no records or \nbooks of accounts are produced or audited, subsection (10) would apply, and the assessment will be completed under S. 121(1)(d).\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.121 177-Audit-Best assessment-Scope- Subsection (10) of S. 177 overrides other provisions and specifies that if a person fails to provide the Commissioner with any required accounts, documents, or records under S. 174, or any other relevant document, electronically kept record, electronic machine, or evidence needed for an audit or income tax assessment, then the Commissioner may proceed to make a best assessment under S.121-Any assessment based on revised income tax return, filed by the taxpayer, shall be of no legal effect.\n(c) Administration of justice-In order to arrive at the correct conclusion a scheme of law is to be examined in its totality.\nMessrs Bilz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The DCIR, Multan and another 2002 PTD 1 ref.\n(d) Administration of justice-When the law requires an act to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner alone.\nIAC Income Tax v. M/s. Micro Pak (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2002 PTD 877 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121,122,177", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No.3614/LB of 2022, decided on 23rd November, 2022, heard on: 23rd November, 2002.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, CHAIRMAN AND ANWAAR-UL-HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khubaib Ahmad for Appellant.\nMrs. Sana Aslam Janjua, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RIZWAN ANWAR \nVERSUS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23705", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1883 = 2023 PTD 1258 = 2023 SLD 1883 = (2024) 130 TAX 308 = 2022 LHC 8476", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVSs", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969) – Sections 80, 81, and 193: Judicial and Merit Reviews\n•\nProvisional Assessment and Release of Goods: The petitioner (importer) challenged the assessment order made by the customs authorities under Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969. The key issue was the distinction between judicial review and merits review.\no\nJudicial Review: In judicial review, the court examines whether the authorities acted within their jurisdiction, followed the law, and whether the decision-making process was fair. The merits of the decision itself, such as the classification and assessment of duties on the goods, are not typically within the scope of judicial review, unless there is an issue of legality, procedural fairness, or jurisdictional overreach.\no\nMerits Review: A merits review involves a detailed examination of the factual correctness of the assessment or decision. The petitioner could challenge the assessment order on the merits under Section 193 of the Customs Act, which provides a remedy by appeal to an appellate authority.\n•\nReassessment under Section 80: Section 80(3) allows customs officers to reassess duties, taxes, and charges when checking goods declarations, with the power to reclassify goods or alter the duty assessments. The High Court found no illegality in the reassessment conducted under Section 80, as it did not violate the provisions of the Customs Act.\no\nSection 81: Section 81 of the Customs Act deals with provisional assessment of duties in cases where the assessment cannot be immediately made. However, the provisions of Sections 80 and 81 are mutually exclusive and cater to different situations. Section 81 is invoked when an assessment cannot be made under Section 80, and it allows goods to be released on the basis of provisional assessment.\no\nCourts Conclusion: The Court refrained from addressing factual issues related to the classification and assessment of goods. Since the goods had already been reassessed under Section 80, the provisions of Section 81 could not be applied in this case. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the order made by the customs authorities, and the constitutional petition was dismissed.\nCase Law Referenced:\n•\nSUS Motors (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Federation of Pakistan (2011 PTD 235)\n•\nCollector of Customs v. Messrs S.M. Ahmad & Co. (1999 SCMR 138)\n•\nMessrs Fatima Enterprises Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (2012 SCMR 416)\n•\nCollector of Customs v. Universal Gateway Trading Corporation (2005 SCMR 37)\n•\nProvince of Punjab v. Chief Engineer (North/Central) (2021 SCMR 624)\n•\nKhalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs (1999 SCMR 1881)\nSummary:\n•\nJudicial Review vs. Merits Review: Judicial review focuses on the legality and procedural aspects, while merits review addresses the factual correctness of decisions.\n•\nSection 80 of the Customs Act permits reassessment of duties and taxes. The Court found no illegalities in the reassessment process.\n•\nSection 81 provides for provisional assessment but is not applicable when goods have already been reassessed under Section 80.\n•\nThe Court dismissed the constitutional petition, refraining from commenting on the factual issues and affirming the legality of the reassessment order passed by the authorities.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=80,81,193", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.82461 of 2022, decided on 26th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ASIM HAFEEZ, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Mansoor for Petitioner.\nSheraz Zaka, Assistant Attorney General.\nRana Muhammad Mehtab for FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS IT COMM PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE\nVS\nCOLLECTOR, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (APPRAISEMENT) AND 4 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23706", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1884 = 2023 SLD 1884 = 2023 PTD 1268 = 2025 PTCL 142", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTk", - "Key Words:": "Limitation Act, Constitutional Jurisdiction, and Customs Act – Scope and Limitations\n(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) – S.3\nDetails:\nThe law of limitation is designed to ensure the settlement of disputes within a fixed period, creating legal certainty. It discourages indolent litigants who fail to act diligently within the prescribed timeframe, even if they are otherwise entitled to relief. The purpose is to prevent stale claims, necessitating a strict construction of limitation laws.\nHeld:\nLitigants must act within the statutory period; otherwise, they forfeit their claims. Courts strictly interpret limitation laws to maintain certainty in legal proceedings.\nCitations:\n•\nZTBL v. Yasmin Dahiri (2022 CLD 118)\n•\nKhushi Muhammad v. Mst. Fazal Bibi (PLD 2016 SC 872)\n________________________________________\n(b) Constitutional Jurisdiction – Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan\nDetails:\nThe constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is not an all-encompassing remedy for every legal wrong. Where an equally efficacious, alternative remedy exists under the law, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a substitute.\nHeld:\nThe High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be expanded to bypass statutory remedies. Litigants must first exhaust alternative legal remedies before approaching the constitutional courts.\nCitations:\n•\nSyed Iqbal Hussain Shah Gilaniv. PBC and others (PLD 2021 SC 391)\n•\nSana Jamali v. V. Mujeeb Qamar (Civil Petition No.32-Q of 2019)\n________________________________________\n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969) – Ss. 194-B & 196\nDetails:\nThe authorities challenged an order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal through a Rectification Application, raising substantive legal issues rather than rectifying a mistake apparent on record. Instead of seeking rectification, the authorities should have filed a Reference Application before the High Court against the Tribunal’s main order. The belated rectification attempt was deemed an effort to revive a time-barred matter.\nHeld:\nA Reference Application under S.196 of the Customs Act, 1969, against a rectification order under S.194-B(2) was not maintainable. The Tribunal correctly held that the authorities should have raised their objections through a Reference Application before the High Court at the appropriate time. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the Reference.\nCitations:\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Karachi v. Abdul Ghani (2007 PTD 967)\n•\nMessrs Pakistan Oil Fields v. Customs Central Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad (2009 PTD 1664)\n•\nGhulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi (2015 PTD 107)\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Ateed Riaz (2002 PTD 570)\n•\n2022 PTD 1342\n•\n2000 PTD 2407", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=3Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Customs Act, 1969=194-B,194B(2),196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 399 of 2017, decided on 19th January, 2023, heard on: 19th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Masooda Siraj for Applicant.\nOsman A. Hadi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, PORT MUHAMMAD BIN QASIM, KARACHI\nvs\nM/S PACIFIC OIL MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23707", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1885 = 2023 SLD 1885 = 2023 PTD 1280 = (2024) 129 TAX 16", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVTg", - "Key Words:": "Appeal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan\nCase Summary:\n•\nIssue: The case revolves around the validity of a bank guarantee and its enforceability, following a writ petition filed by Respondent No. 5 challenging the withdrawal of a tax exemption on the import of raw materials. The Peshawar High Court directed the Customs authorities to release the goods upon the writ petitioner’s furnishing a bank guarantee. Subsequently, the Customs authorities did not approach the bank for encashment of the guarantee within the typical period. However, after the expiration of the ordinary period, the petitioner was served a notice for the encashment of the bank guarantee, which raised the question of whether the guarantee remained enforceable after its expiration, especially when it was not a continuous guarantee.\n•\nAppellant’s Argument: The appellant bank argued that the guarantees were issued at the request of Respondent No. 5, and the first formal demand for their encashment was made by the Customs authorities three years after the guarantees had expired. The appellant sought a writ for prohibition, which was dismissed by the High Court. The bank requested that the appeal be allowed, and the writ petition be accepted, challenging the enforcement of the guarantee after its expiration.\n•\nRespondents Argument: The respondents contended that under Section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969, there was no limitation on the customs authorities’ ability to encash the guarantee, even after its expiration.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nObligation Under the Guarantee:\no\nThe Court found that the obligation of the appellant to pay was based on the contract of guarantee and not the Customs Act itself. Therefore, the appellants liability under the guarantee was separate from the government dues referenced in Section 202 of the Customs Act. The guaranteed amount under the contract of guarantee did not fall within the scope of government dues as defined by the Customs Act.\n2.\nBenefit of No Limitation Period:\no\nThe Court ruled that the appellant, being a separate entity from Respondent No. 5, could not be held liable for government dues once the guarantees expired. While Respondent No. 5 could be subject to no period of limitation for the recovery of government dues under Section 202, such a benefit did not extend to the appellant bank. The appellant was not subject to the Customs Act and, therefore, the guarantees could not be encashed after their expiration.\n3.\nRecovery of Government Dues:\no\nThe Court clarified that under Section 202 of the Customs Act, the liability for government dues continues for the taxpayer (Respondent No. 5) but does not extend to the guarantor (the appellant). The appellant was not liable for the recovery of government dues under this provision because such liability did not apply to the bank as the guarantor.\n4.\nMisapplication of Law:\no\nThe Court found that the High Court had misapplied the law by disregarding the express terms of the guarantees and permitting their encashment based on Section 202 of the Customs Act. The guarantee was not a continuous, unlimited guarantee, and the High Court could not have allowed its encashment after its expiration.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the Peshawar High Court, and granted the appellant’s writ petition. The Court held that the guarantees issued by the appellant could not be encashed by the Customs authorities at any point, regardless of their expiration dates, because they did not fall under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1969. The appellant bank was not liable for the payment of government dues once the guarantees had expired, and the High Courts decision was therefore unsustainable.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal References:\n1.\nSection 202, Customs Act, 1969 - Recovery of government dues.\n2.\nContract of Guarantee - The obligations under the guarantee were separate from government dues.\n3.\nJudicial Precedents:\no\nBara Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Assistant Collector Customs (PLD 2017 SC 738)\no\nUniversal Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Collector Customs (2005 PTD 2355)\no\nAtif Mehmood Kiyani v. Messrs Sukh Chayn Private Ltd. (2021 SCMR 1446)\no\nEFU General Insurance Ltd. v. Zhongxhing Telecom Pakistan (2022 SCMR 1994)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,203Customs Act, 1969=202", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 196-P of 2014, decided on 30th May, 2023.\n(Against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 22.09.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 2064 of 2010)", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN, MUNIB AKHTAR AND JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Advocate-on-Record/Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Peshawar) for Appellant.\nAbdul Rauf Rohaila, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Peshawar) for Respondents Nos. 1-4. \nNemo for Respondent No. 5\nRaja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, DAG on Court’s Notice. Date of hearing: 30th May, 2023.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS, PESHAWAR AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23708", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1886 = 2023 PTD 1290 = 2023 SLD 1886", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVXo", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.32 25-Mis-declaration-Confiscation of goods-Value and description of imported goods-Auction proceedings-Scope-Surety amount, refund of-Dispute was with regard to importer declaring imported goods as Magazines/Printed material but the Customs Department alleged that the subject goods were high value dutiable luxury goods such as cosmetics, electronics items, food supplement, toiletries-Record revealed that the impugned consignment had been auctioned, as such the instant appeal had become infructous-In view of said factual position, the appellant requested that after adjustment of penalty, the balance amount of total surety amount be refunded to him-Respondent/Department was directed to refund the balance amount to the appellant within 15 days-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,25", - "Case #": "Custom Appeal No.K-1453 of 2019, decided on 3rd April, 2023, heard on: 21st March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-II", - "Lawyer Name:": "Farukh Saleem, Consultant for Appellant.\nAkash, A.O. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PARADISE E-COMMERCE SOLUTIONS\nvs\nTHE DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23709", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1887 = 2023 PTD 1292 = 2023 SLD 1887", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDVXk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 11 51-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Appendix A(3)- SRO 509(I)/2007, dated 9-6-2007-SRO 163(I)/2011 dated 2-3-2011- Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42-Zero rated goods-Proof-Suits, types of-Dispute was with regard to Zero rating of goods supplied by tax payer/plaintiff- Suit was decreed in favour of tax payer/plaintiff- Validity-To avail concessional treatment under any taw, it was an established principle and incumbent upon the claimant to satisfy that its case fully fell in the ambit of concessional regime-HS Code in question i.e “other colouring matter and other preparations” was changed from 3206.4900 to 3206.4910 with the aim to isolate masterbatches from concessional regime which clarification was issued through the communication relied upon by appellant / authorities, where masterbatches classifiable under PCT Heading 3206.4910 were held to be excluded from the purview of zero-rating from the date of issuance of the SRO 509(I)/2007 i.e. 09.06.2007-Such clarification was never challenged before any Court or forum and had attained finality-Claim of appellant / authorities communicated through notice in question was tenable-Suit had no triable issues and was not inherently maintainable-Such plaint Hid not find mention in types of suits which Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Appendix A(3) titled “Plaints” envisaged amongst 49 types of suits specifically detailed therein- Division Bench of High Court in exercise of appellant jurisdiction set aside and decree passed by Trial Court and remanded the suit for decision afresh-Intra Court appeal was allowed accordingly.\nCollector of Model Customs Collectorate v. Naveena Industries (Ltd.) 2017 PTD 2123; Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 1444; Gul Ayaz Khan and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others (C.P. No.D-91 of 2013) and Thai Limited and another v. The Federation of Pakistan and others (C.P. No.D-6067 of 2016) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,51Specific Relief Act, 1877=42", - "Case #": "H.C.A. NO.357 OF 2017, DECIDED ON 30TH DECEMBER, 2022. Dates of hearing: 5th and 20th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi and M. Ishaque Pirzada for Appellants.\nAijaz Ahmed Zahid for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE SERVICES (AEC) AND 4 OTHERS\nVS\nMESSRS CLARIANT PAKISTAN LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23710", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1888 = 2023 PTD 1299 = 2023 SLD 1888", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTc", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 2(s), 16, 156(1), (8), (89), 157, 168, 181 201-Customs Rules, 2001, R.58-Imports and Exports (Control) Act (XXXIX of 1950), S.3-SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13-6-2009-SRO 566(I)/2005 dated 6-6-2005-Smuggling-Seizure and confiscation—Auction proceedings-Scope-Seizing agency detained tanker of the claimant / appellant containing High Speed Diesel Oil (USD) as it was suspected to have been brought into country through illegal channel as no documents were produced to establish otherwise-Seized oil tanker was auctioned during pendency of appeal before the Customs Appellate Tribunal-Validity-Respondent /department, surprisingly, had already auctioned the seized/confiscated vehicle despite the fact that in the auction list provided by the appellant the said vehicle was not included which clearly showed mala fide on the part of respondents—Auction proceedings were not conducted legally and properly by the respondents as neither the appellant nor the owner of vehicle was served any notice for such proceedings as required by R.58 of the Customs Rules, 2001, read with S.201 of the Customs Act, 1969—However, since the auction had already taken place, the only remedy available to the appellant was reimbursement of sale proceeds—Respondent / Department was directed to reimburse the sale proceeds to the appellant immediately after deduction of 20% Redemption Fine under S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969, of the Customs Value of the vehicle as already assessed in Reserve Price for auction by the Respondent/Department—Appeal was disposed off accordingly.\n2005 PTD (Trib.) 2262 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,156(1),(8),(89),157,168,181,201Customs Rules, 2001=58", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. H-519 of 2018, decided on 30th March, 2023, heard on: 9th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iqbal Riaz for Appellant.\nHumayun Naseer, Inspector for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BOHAIR\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC, HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23711", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1889 = 2023 PTD 1313 = 2023 SLD 1889", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTY", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 32, 32-A, 156(1), (14) (14-A) 196-Customs General Order No. 12 of 2002 dated 15-06-2002, Chap. X-Duty free imported goods, selling of-Mis-declaration-False statement, error etc.—Fiscal fraud-First appellant [(purportedly a company operating Duty Free Shops under a license (‘company’)] after obtaining licenses , hired the services of the other appellant as Managing Director who was in-charge of all affairs of the company-Allegation against both the appellants, as per audit of their record, was that around a hundred containers/ consignments released by the customs department had not reached appellant’s Bonded Warehouse, thus duty free imported goods, which were meant for sale from bonded Sales Outlets at airports, were actually sold to traders-Contention of the first appellant (company) was that for any wrong doing, committed by the Managing Director (the other appellant), the company could not be held responsible-Plea of the other appellant (Managing Director) was that even the Chief Executive of the company who was based abroad was aware of each and every action of the company-Held, that first appellant (licensee) as a company and the other appellant as its Managing Director, both were fully responsible for the illegalities committed leading to massive loss to the exchequer -Payments were, surprisingly, received through cheques in the bank accounts of the appellant/ company duly operated by appellant / Manager Director, whereas at Duty Free Shops the passengers used to make payments through cash or credit cards and not through cheques-Either the invoices of sales were never issued to the passengers or fake/bogus invoices were issued to give cover to sales made in the open market -Both the appellants had tried to shift the burden on each other but had not denied any of the illegalities committed by the licensee; thus both the appellants, with blessings of all the ranks of the Customs Department, in total and blatant violation of all the relevant rules/laws/procedures caused a huge loss of Rs.751.97 Million to the exchequer out of which Rs. 641.673 Million was still recoverable-Absence of prescribed encashable securities and lapses of the Customs Department had seriously jeopardized the recovery of legitimate revenue of the State-Customs Appellate Tribunal deprecated that despite detection of the scam-in-question about fourteen years ago, no meaningful efforts had been made by successive concerned officers to pursue the matter and to ensure recovery of colossal loss to the exchequer, and directed concerned office to send a copy of present order to the Chairman FBR for taking appropriate steps-Appeals were dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,32-A,156(1),(14),(14-A),196", - "Case #": "Customs Appeals Nos. K-374 and K-385 of 2011, decided on 20th February, 2023, heard on: 13th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ABDUL JABBAR QURESHI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-I AND ABDUL BASIT CHAUDHRY, MEMBER TECHNICAL-I", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Abbas for Appellant (in C.A. No.K-374 of 2011).\nDarvesh K. Madhan along with Sher Afghan Malik for Appellant (in C.A. No.K-385 of 2011).\nFaizan Arif, Assistant Collector along with Aftab Kalhoro, A.O. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS EDF SERVICES (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS\nVERSUS\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS) KARACHI AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23712", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1890 = 2023 PTD 1323 = 2023 SLD 1890", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-Taxing statute-Tax exemptions-Principle-In taxing statute one has to look at what is clearly said; there is no room for any intendment; there is no equity about a tax, nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied-Where a provision in taxing statute can be reasonably interpreted in two ways, interpretation which is favourable to assessee has to be accepted-If two views are possible, the one which favours the assessee has to be accepted-Rules regarding exemption under taxing statute have to be established by precedents and exemption under taxing statute must be strictly construed-Grants of tax exemptions are given a rigid interpretation against assertions of taxpayer and in favour of taxing power-Basis for such rule is the same as that supporting a rule of strict construction of positive revenue laws that burden of taxation should be distributed equally and fairly among members of society-When an exempting provision is susceptible to two interpretations, the one going against tax payer is preferred.\nCommissioner of Income Tax Khanpur v. Upper Doab Sugar Mills 1978 All L-128; Pakistan Textile Mill Owners Association, Karachi and 02 others v. Administrator of Karachi and 02 others PLD 1963 SC 137; Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited v. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue Audit-II, LTU, Islamabad 2016 PTD 2685; CIT v. Naga Hills Tea Co. Ltd AIR 1973 SC 2524; Sun Export Corporation v. Collector of Customs (1997) 6 SCC 564; Sutherland on Statutory Construction (Third Edition Vol.3); Collector of Custom FBR and another v. Messrs Fitter Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. 2020 SCMR 1157; Oxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone-I, Karachi and others 2019 SCMR 235; Pakistan Machine Tool Factory (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Commissioner of Sales, Central, Zone-B, Karachi 2006 SCMR 1577 and Messrs Bisvil Spinners Ltd. v. Superintendent Central Excise and Land Customs Circle Sheikhupura and another PLD 1988 SC 370 rel.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-S. S3-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 199 247 [as amended by 25th Constitutional Amendment]-Notification SRO 1213(I)/2018 dated 05-10-2018-Constitutional petition-Tax exemption-Consent of parties-Residents of erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Area- Proof-Petitioner company, a partner of joint venture, sought exemption from payment of tax under Notification SRO 1213(I)/2018 dated 05-10-2018, as it had registered office at erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Area-Plea raised by petitioner company was that in the contract petitioner was exempted from payment of income tax- Validity-Petitioner company allegedly subsequently established the place of business but relevant officer of Income Tax visited the place and could not find any place of business of the petitioner-JV-This was purely a question of fact and could not be decided by High Court in its limited jurisdiction, once it was seriously disputed by respondent authorities-Tax was levied under the authority of Parliament / appropriate legislature-Exemption could be granted by appropriate legislation or delegated authority under the legislation-Contracting Authority had no authority either to commit with the contractor or to allow the contractor to claim exemption from statutory taxation- Ignorance of law was no excuse for a person that he would not be subject to penal or taxing laws of the State-High Court declined to interfere in the matter as petitioner company failed to make out a case for grant of exemption-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nPakistan through Chairman FBR and others v. Hazrat Hussain and others 2018 SCMR 939; Hasnain Cotex Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore 2017 PTD 1561; Messrs Taj Packages Company (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager v. The Government of Pakistan through Federal Secretary Finance and Revenue Division and 6 others 2016 PTD 203; Messrs Arshad Company v. Capital Development Authority, Faisalabad through Chairman 2000 SCMR 1557; Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa and others 2011 SCMR 1990 and PAKCOM Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 44 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4346-P of 2019, decided on 30th January, 2023, heard on: 30th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKEEL AHMAD AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Isaac Ali Qazi for Petitioner.\nSanaullah D.A.G., Shakirullah Afridi and Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS CGGC-DESCON JOINT VENTURE THROUGH AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY, LAHORE\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ISLAMABAD AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23713", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1891 = 2023 PTD 1334 = 2023 SLD 1891", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S. 194—Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012), Ss. 16 18—Release of imported goods—Solange method— Doctrine of Comity—Applicability—Dispute pertained to forfeiture and seizure of imported goods under Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012—On the contrary Customs Appellate Tribunal directed the authorities to release the consignment—Validity—Solange method at its core is considered to be an example of judicial comity which is understood to be an inherent part of tasks and functions of a judge or arbitrator aiming to resolve disputes in conformity with principles of justice—Such principle is applied when such Courts and Tribunals are determining whether or not to exercise their jurisdiction in a specific case brought before them—Doctrine of comity, and application of Solange method dictated that trade mark infringement dispute was exclusively adjudicable within the jurisdictional competence of Intellectual Property Tribunal, whose verdict would prevail upon any order or proceedings adjudicated under competing jurisdiction of Customs Tribunal or any matter decided by the customs authorities within the ambit of Customs Act, 1969, pertaining to intellectual property laws—High Court directed Customs authorities to disregard departmental original as well as appellate orders or even Customs Appellate Tribunals orders/ in presence of any contradictory order or passed by Intellectual Property Tribunal, unless there were orders passed by any appellate forum or a Court made available to it which prevented performance of the acts mandated by any order or of Intellectual Property Tribunal—Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012=16,18", - "Case #": "C.P. No.D-533 of 2020 along with C.Ps. Nos.D-8477 and D-8478 of 2019, decided on 6th December, 2022, heard on: 30th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shahnawaz Memon, Malik Abdul Sami, Zuhaib Akhtar and Ms. Fouzia Murad for Petitioners (in C.P No.D-533/2020) and tor Respondent No.2 (in C.Ps. Nos.D-8477 and D-8478 of 2019).\nMrs. Masooda Siraj and Javed Hussain for Respondent No.7 (in C.P. No.D-533/2020) and for Respondents Nos.3 and 4 (in C.Ps. Nos.D-8477 and D-8478 of 2019).\nIftikhar Hussain Qureshi Respondent No.4 (in C.P No.D-533/2020 and in C.P Nos.D-8477 and D-8478 of 2019).\nAmjad Hayat, G.M Bhutto, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT AND OTHERS THROUGH DEPUTY DIRECTOR\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23714", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1892 = 2023 PTD 1342 = 2023 SLD 1892", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUS8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.133, 115(4), 169(1)(b) 233(3) as amended by Finance Act, 2004]-CBR’s Circular No. 7 of 2004 dated 1-7-2004-Withholding tax-Advance tax-Tax withheld from commission paid to Travel and Insurance Agents-Presumptive tax regime-Final tax-Scope-Loss was declared in annual return by the Tax payer/travel agent who was engaged in sale of air tickets on behalf of Travel Air Lines (Principal Company)—Authorities/applicant assailed order of Tribunal passed in favour of the taxpayer I respondent, contending that the commission earned by the Travel Agent from the principal company fell within the purview of Presumptive Tax Regime-Held, that the Travel and Insurance agents (agents’) were subjected to withholding taxes under subsection (3) of S.233 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance 2001’)through an amendment introduced by Finance Act, 2004 and the tax withheld from commission paid to the agents was brought in the Presumptive Tax Regime under subsection (4)- Amendment made in subsection (b) of S. 169 of the Ordinance 2001 clearly provided that tax withheld from agents under S. 233(3) of the Ordinance, 2001 was to be treated as final tax-Section. 115(4) of the Ordinance, 2001, was also amended to provide that the tax withheld from agents was the final tax and they were not required to furnish return of income for the tax year 2005 and onward-Said (amended) provision was also clarified vide CBR’s Circular No. 7 of 2004, dated 1-7-2004-Tribunal, while misconstruing said provisions of law as well as circular, had concluded in the impugned order that the income of agents did not fall in the ambit of final tax for the year 2005 -Tax deducted on payments on account of commission made by the principal to a Travel Agent @ 10% would be treated final discharge of tax liability for tax year 2005 and onward-Ordinance, 2001 used the term ‘Advance Tax ’ for withholding tax because normally income tax was to be paid after the end of tax year accounting period but the withholding tax was deducted/collected during the tax year, hence, was in nature of tax paid in advance -Judgment passed by the Appellate Tribunal was set-aside-Reference application was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,115(4),169(1)(b),233(3)", - "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 129 of 2008, heard on 25th November, 2020, heard on: 25th November, 2020.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID KARIM AND MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema for Applicant.\nSyed M. Raheel and Murtaza Naeem for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX\nVS\nMESSRS PAK LAND TRAVELS (PVT.) LTD., FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23715", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1893 = 2023 PTD 1347 = 2023 SLD 1893", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUSs", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 131, 128(5), 161, 205, 236-G 236-11-Advance tax, deduction of-Default-Scope-Notices, issuance of-No reply of taxpayer- Assumption-Powers of the Commissioner (Appeals) to exam evidence-Scope-Assessment order was passed by the Officer Inland Revenue after the taxpayer allegedly failed to make any compliance of the notices under Ss.161 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the ITO, 2001’), issued by the Department-Assessment order was assailed before Commissioner (Appeals) contending that the taxpayer being a sugar mill did not make any sales to the retailers, rather the entire sales were made to dealers, wholesalers, distributors, Trading Corporation of Pakistan and registered dealers-Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the appeal of taxpayer (sugar mill) on the ground that the Officer Inland Revenue had bifurcated , on his own , the sales between retailers and wholesalers just w charge tax in terms of Ss. 236-G 236-11 of the ITO, 2001-Department preferred appeal against the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) contending that he was not justified to rely on evidence which was not provided to the Officer Inland Revenue at the adjudication stage-Validity-No information, reason or material on record had been mentioned in the order-in-original in determining the bifurcation of sales allegedly having been made to retailers and wholesalers/distributors-Instead, only after not receiving any reply /details from the taxpayer in response to notices, the Officer Inland Revenue observed that default of non-deduction of advance tux under Ss. 236-G 236-11 of the ITO, 2001, stood established-Though every taxpayer was required to co-operate with the Department by ensuring the compliance, however, the Assessing Officer could not be allowed to pass orders merely_ on assumptions-Taxpayer / respondent was admittedly a sugar mill which in ordinary course of business, did not sell sugar directly to retailers, rather used to make supplies to distributors/wholesalers etc.- bifurcating total sales between retailers and wholesalers just for the purpose of charging large amount of tax was a clear reflection of arbitrariness which was not permissible in fiscal laws-Record revealed that it was second round of litigation and the mutter-in-hand was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) Jor the purpose to verify the sales made to retailers/unregistered persons or wholesalers-Even otherwise, the Commissioner (Appeals) was empowered under the provisions of S. 128(5) of the ITO, 2001, to receive and examine evidence during the first appeal which was necessary for the adjudication-Contention of the appellant/department was misconceived and the Commissioner (Appeals) had passed the impugned order after being satisfied with assertions of the respondent/taxpayer well supported by the documentary evidence- Appeal preferred by the Department was dismissed, in circumstances.\nThe CIR v. Malik Auto and Agriculture Industries PTR No.222/2011 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131,128(5),161,205,236-G,236-11", - "Case #": "I.T.A. NO. 962/LB OF 2015, DECIDED ON 20TH DECEMBER, 2022, heard on: 4th July, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sarim Bhatti, DR for Appellant.\nNone for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, LAHORE\nVS\nMESSRS HAQ BA1IU SUGAR MILLS (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23716", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1894 = 2023 PTD 1352 = 2023 SLD 1894", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTk", - "Key Words:": "Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)-Ss.2(3), 9 10-Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), Ss.2(44), 3-11 66- Time of supply of vehicle-Change of definition-Refund of excess tax-Maladministration-Complaint against the Authorities for failure to refund excess tax-Rate of sales tax was reduced from 17% to 12.5% vide Finance Act, 2021 on vehicles having engine capacity up to 1000cc, while definition of ‘time of supply’ was also changed to the effect that the tax became chargeable at the time of delivery of goods- Previously the complaints for refund of excess tax were filed by the Customers who had paid sales tax at the rate of 17% while booking vehicles before 1st July 2021, but delivery to them was made after said date when rate of sales tax had been reduced to 12.5% vide Finance Act, 2021-Said complaints were favourably disposed of holding that the amount paid in excess of 12.5% was refundable and the Authorities were directed to refund said differential amount-Later Federal Tax Ombudsman took Own Motion to provide relief to the customers because as many as 9000 cases, waiting for refund surfaced- Objection of the Revenue Division was that transaction was between two private parties (manufacturer and customer), hence primary condition of maladministration against Revenue Division or Tax Department employee(s) was not applicable-Held, that transaction-in-question was not between the two parties as the Vehicle Manufacturing Company (‘the Manufacturer’) had collected tax leviable on vehicles from the customers on behalf of the FBR being their withholding agent and deposited the same through Monthly Sales Tax Return, thus the Department (Revenue Division) was very much a party in the present case; and the amount collected in excess from the customer by the manufacturer had to be refunded by the FUR (concerned office) to the manufacturer who would then refund the same to the customers/complainants, thus, objection of the Department that they were not party in the dispute not sustainable-Section 3-B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, (‘the Act 1990’) was also not operative, in the present case, because when the price, inclusive of tax, was paid, it was according to the rate of sales tax chargeable and payable at that time- Situation changed when amendment in S. 2(44) of the Act, 1990 was made and rate of sales tax was reduced from 17% to 12.5% vide Finance Act, 2021-Since amount was collected before 1st July 2021 and delivery of the vehicles was made after the said date, therefore, refund of excess amount collected became due-It was incorrect to say that the incidence of tax had been passed on to the end consumer- Manufacturer was not claiming refund, in the present case, on its own, rather end-consumers were demanding refund of excess amount paid by them to the manufacturer which was to be refunded to them by the manufacturer when the FBR (concerned office) would refund them the amount paid in excess-Federal Tax Ombudsman passed directions while prescribing proper procedure assigning responsibility to each stakeholder so that the manufacturer would remit amount to customers-Own Motion was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3),9,10Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(44),3-11,66", - "Case #": "OM/0016 of 2022, dated 7-4-2022 R.O. Karachi, decided on 18th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Dr. Asif Mahmood Jah, Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Lawyer Name:": "Pak Suzuki Motor Company, Authorized Representatives.\nA. Hameed Mangrio, DCIR, LTO, Karachi, Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD: In the matter of\nManzoor Hussain Memon, Advisor Dealing Officer.\nMrs. Sarwat Tahira Habib, Senior Advisor, Appraising Officer.\n(i) Ms. Yasmin Ajani, FCA (ii) Shaham Ahmed, Head of Treasury (iii) Muhammad Farhan Mashkoor, DM (F)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23717", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1895 = 2023 PTD 1358 = 2023 SLD 1895", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUTg", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 7 8-Determination of tax liability-Tax credit not allowed- Deduction of input tax-Scope-Appellant (Electric Supply Company) assailed the disallowance of input tax claimed on purchase of computers and allied stationery items-Validity-Without computers and the allied stationery items (office equipment), the appellant could not complete its taxable activity of supplying electricity-Input tax paid on the purchase of these goods was fully admissible under S. 7 of Sales Tax Act, 1990-Printing of bills of electricity, online redressal mechanism of the complaints and smooth uninterrupted supply of electricity were statutory and contractual obligations-Disallowance of input tax paid on purchase of computers and allied stationery items was against the text of Ss. 8(1)(h) 8(1)(i) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990-Burden of proving that the computer and allied stationery items, like toner, paper, etc was not related to the taxable activity and taxable supplies was on the revenue which it failed to discharge-Attempt of the Commissioner (Appeals) to shift this burden on the appellant was arbitrary and against the settled principles of the law-Appeal was allowed and the impugned orders were annulled.\n2005 PTD 2012 and 2007 PTD (Trib.) 2391 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7,8", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 686/LB of 2021, decided on 5th April, 2022, heard on: 18th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " AMINA NAZEER ANSARI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan for Appellant.\nKhurram Ali Qadri, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAISALABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD., FAISALABAD\nVs\nThe commissioner inland revenue, corporate zone, regional tax office, jail road, faisalabad and 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23718", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1896 = 2023 SLD 1896 = 2023 PTD 1365 = (2023) 128 TAX 115", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUXo", - "Key Words:": "Issue:\nThe issue revolves around the mis-declaration of the exported goods as agriculture produce (Pakistani origin dates). The Collectorate issued a Show-Cause notice against the exporter/appellant, alleging that the Phytosanitary Certificates (issued by the Department of Plant Protection) were tampered with in connivance with the clearing agent.\nFacts:\nThe exporter/appellant declared the goods as Pakistani origin dates under the agricultural produce category, which required Phytosanitary Certificates issued by the Department of Plant Protection, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. The authorities claimed that the certificates were not authentic but were instead issued for another consignment, allegedly indicating a deliberate tampering effort.\nThe exporter/appellant contended that the clearing agent had mistakenly submitted the Phytosanitary Certificates from another consignment, without any mala fide intention. It was argued that this was an error, not a deliberate act to deceive.\nLegal Context:\nThe relevant laws include Sections 16, 32(1), 131, 179, and 209 of the Customs Act, 1969, along with the Export Policy Order, 2020 (SRO 901(I)/2020 dated 25-09-2020). These sections address matters of declaration, export regulations, and penalties in case of non-compliance with the specified procedures.\nRuling:\nThe Adjudicating Authority imposed penalties on both the exporter and the clearing agent. The decision was based on the premise that the certificates provided were from another consignment, suggesting either negligence or intentional fraud.\nAppellate Decision:\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal directed a verification of the Phytosanitary Certificates. Upon review by the concerned Ministry, it was confirmed that the Phytosanitary Certificates, despite being for a different consignment, were genuine. Importantly, the exporter had not caused any loss to the government through the export of these consignments.\nConclusion:\nThe Appeals were accepted on both legal and factual grounds. The penalties imposed on the exporter and the clearing agent were remitted, and the Orders-in-Original were set aside. The matter was decided in favor of the appellant, recognizing the absence of intentional misconduct or damage to government revenue.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=16,32(1),80,131,179,209", - "Case #": "Customs Appeals Nos. K-1697, K-1698 and K-1699 of 2022, decided on 21st February, 2023, heard on: 8th February, 2022", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Abbas for Appellant.\nMuhammad Ibrahim, AO for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS SHARMEEN FOODS (PVT.) LTD. AND OTHERS \nVS\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC EXPORTS, CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23719", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1897 = 2023 PTD 1371 = 2023 SLD 1897", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDUXk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 3, 46 45(B)-Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000), S. 10 Preamble-Assessment orders, assailing of- Commissioner (Appeals)-Jurisdiction and power-Federal Tax Ombudsman, powers of-Scope-Only reason given by the Commissioner (Appeals) to dismiss the first appeal filed by the appellant /taxpayer was that he had already obtained relief from Federal Tax Ombudsman (‘the Ombudsman’), therefore, no grievance was pending which required adjudication-Validity-Record revealed that though the appellant/taxpayer filed complaint before the Ombudsman, however, the same was disposed of after passing certain directions / recommendations to the Federal Board of Revenue-Order passed by the Ombudsman could /should not have any bearing on the fate of first appeal filed by the appellant / taxpayer before the Commissioner (Appeals)-Ombudsman was not an Appellate Authority against the assessment orders passed by the officers, rather the scope and jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was confined to questions relating to maladministration which were defined under the relevant laws- Whereas all questions decided in the assessment order, either factual or legal, were appealable before the Commissioner (Appeals) which was the Competent Authority to adjudicate upon-Ombudsman had passed order on account of maladministration, however, Commissioner (Appeals), being an Appellate Authority, was required to pass the impugned order against the assessment order on its own merits- Record showed that the Respondents / Department had availed/exhausted review jurisdiction against the said order of the Ombudsman whereas the appellant / taxpayer had invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court in which the directions were passed to the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the matter in accordance with law-Powers of the Appellate Authority had been duly given in the statute, but the Commissioner (Appeals) failed to apply his judicial mind while deciding the first appeal independently on its own merits through a speaking order-Commissioner (Appeals) had dismissed first appeal in a cyclostyle manner-Impugned order was set- aside and the matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for decision afresh by passing a speaking order-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,46,45(B)Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No.612/LB of 2013, decided on 20th March, 2023, heard on: 1st November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waseem Ahmad Malik for Appellant.\nDr. Babar Chohan, DR lor Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NADEEM \nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, LAHORE and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23720", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1898 = 2023 PTD 1374 = 2023 SLD 1898", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTc", - "Key Words:": "Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)-Ss.2(3), 9(2) 10-Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 3(2) [as amended vide Finance Act, 2019]-Customs Act (IV of 1969), Ss. 25 25-A-Customs General Order No. 12 of 2019 dated 30-02-2019-\nMaladministration-Scope-Certain goods were made chargeable to sales tax on the basis of retail price at the time of import by virtue of amendments made in S.3(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990-Federal Tax Ombudsman took Own Motion to check development and functionality of an I.T. based Module having been developed to cater for said budgetary changes-Validity-Record (progress report etc.) established that FBR (the Department) had so far failed to develop a functional and practicable solution to develop an I.T. based Module to cater for the budgetary changes with a view to capture and realize the exact amount of due taxes at the import stage on items subjected to tax on retail price vide Finance Act, 2019-Although the Directorate of Post Clearance Audit had made substantial detections and recoveries of revenue loss to the tune of Rs.286.632 million, however, the same appeared to be tip of the ice-berg keeping in view the enormity of the task and limited human resources -Failure to develop effective and robust mechanism / module to capture due amount of sales tax at the import stage resulting in enormous loss of legitimate revenue, tantamount to maladministration under S. 9(2) of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000-Federal Tax Ombudsman passed directions to the FBR to ensure development of an effective Module prescribing proper procedure assigning responsibility to concerned quarters by exploiting mechanism and human resources-Own Motion was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3),9(2),10Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(2)Customs Act, 1969=25,25-A", - "Case #": "OM/0006 of 2022, dated 7-2-2022, R.O. Karachi\"\", decided on 27th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Dr. Asif Mahmood Jah, Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Tahir Raza Zaidid, Advisor Dealing Officer.\nMrs. Sarwat Tahira Habib, Senior Advisor Appraising Officer\n(i) Ms. Zamzam Aman, D.C. and (ii) Abdul Qadeer Abbasis, ACIR Departmental Representatives.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23721", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1899 = 2023 PLD 46 = 2023 SLD 1899", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction-Rule of exhaustion of available remedy-Applicability-Rule of exhaustion of available remedy, though not prescribed by Art. 199 of the Constitution, however it is statutory creation by which High Court regulates its proceedings-Presence of alternate remedy is neither a principle of law nor rule of thumb impressions but one of the practice-If High Court is of the view that alternate remedy available to petitioner/claimant is a remedy in law, i.e. a remedium juris and one which is not less convenient, beneficial and effective, inexpensive, expeditious and efficacious, the petitioner/claimant must first avail the remedy provided by statue before he applies for issuance of a writ-Two well recognized exceptions to the doctrine with regard to exhaustion of statutory remedies-In the first place, where proceedings are taken before a tribunal or a public functionary under provision of law, which is ultra vires, it is open to party aggrieved to move to High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution for appropriate writ for quashing the proceedings on the grounds that they are incompetent without his being obliged to wait until such proceedings run their full course, secondly the doctrine has no application, unless order in question has been made in violation of principles of natural justice or where proceedings themselves are abuse of process of law.\n(b) Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act (XL of 1997)-\n-Ss. 7(g), 12-A 31-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Alternate and efficacious remedy-Petitioners were aggrieved of imposing/incorporating maximum demand indicator in their monthly electricity bills-Plea raised by authorities was that petitioners had alternate remedy available to them-Validity-Dispute between the parties related to determination of Tariff as envisaged in S.31(7) of Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, for which a relief could be conveniently sought in terms of 7(g) and 12-A of Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997-Such was equally efficacious, inexpensive, beneficial and convenient-Mechanism for redress of grievance was provided in Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997-Petitioners were to first avail remedy provided by statute before applying for a writ or order in the nature of writ-High Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution, as adequate remedy was available under the relevant law-Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.\nHuman Rights (Environmental Pollution in Balochistan in Re: v. Human Rights [Environmental Pollution in Balochistan PLD 1994 SC 102; Abdur Rehmans case PLD 1987 SC 21; Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Ismail 1987 SCMR 810 and Moula Bux alias Mouledino v. Station House Officer, Police Station Hatri Ghulam Shah and 2 others 2003 YLR 1316 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Regulation of Generation Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997=7(g),12-A,31", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3573-P of 2022 and (all connected cases), decided on 28th September, 2022.heard on: 28th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Rooh-ul-Amin Khan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Isaac Ali Qazi for Petitioner.\nAamir Javed, Additional Attorney General and Sana Ullah, D.A.G. for the Federation.\nAsad Jan for Respondents/PESCO along with Muhammad Tofeeq, Law Officer (PESCO) and Amir Nawaz, Deputy Director (TESCO).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs CHERAT CEMENT CO. LTD., NOWSHERA through Senior Manager Accounts-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Federal Secretary, Ministry of Energy (Power Division), Islamabad and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23722", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1900 = 2023 PLD 47 = 2023 SLD 1900", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f), 203-B(c), 203-D 203-G-Shariat petitions relating to Riba/interest-Maintainability-Federal Shariat Court, jurisdiction of-Federal Shariat Court has jurisdiction to examine and review any law on the touchstone of the Injunctions of Islam in the light of the Quran and the Sunnah and to decide whether such law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam or not, irrespective of the fact if any law or the provision of any law is linked with any Article of the Constitution-Federal Shariat Court has full jurisdiction over the fiscal laws also to analyze them at the touchstone of Islamic injunctions, i.e., the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (SAW)-Petitioners had challenged certain laws on the basis of Islamic Injunctions, seeking declaration that these provisions of law are against the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in Holy Quran and Sunnah (SAW) because they fall within the definition of Riba, which is prohibited in Islam-Hence, the prayer of the petitioners in their petitions cannot be and should not be viewed as a prayer for only the implementation of Art. 38(f) of the Constitution, which is Principle of Policy i.e. non-justiciable right in the Constitution-Present petitions before the Federal Shariat Court were maintainable.\nGovernment of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Law Department v. Malik Said Kamal Shah PLD 1986 SC 360; Nusrat Baig Mirza v. Government of Pakistan and another PLD 1991 SC 509; Qazalbash Waqf and others v. Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab, Lahore and others PLD 1990 SC 99 and Zahid Rehman v. The State PLD 2015 SC 77 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Part II, Chap. 2- Principles of Policy mentioned in the Constitution-Scope-Although the Principles of Policy are non-justiciable rights, however, each such Principle mentioned in the Constitution is binding upon the government and it is the responsibility of each organ and authority of the State to act in accordance with these Principles of Policy.\n2015 SCMR 1739; 2012 SCMR 779; PLD 2016 SC 189; 2005 SCMR 100; PLD 2015 SC 275 and PLD 1984 SC 439 ref.\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Types of transactions falling within the definition of Riba-Concept of Riba according to Injunctions of Islam in the light of Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (SAW) and views of Muslim jurists stated.\nProhibition of Riba is complete and absolute in all its forms and manifestations according to the Injunctions of Islam in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The charging of any amount in any manner over the principal amount of a loan or debt is Riba which is completely prohibited according to the Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (SAW)-Riba is undisputedly, categorically, explicitly and absolutely prohibited by Nass-i-Qati, i.e., Quran and Sunnah. There is consensus and unanimity amongst (Muslim) scholars that the word Riba means to increase, to grow, and to rise. Any amount taken or given in a loan transaction in excess to the actual loan amount is Riba. The increased amount upon a loan transaction has to be pre-determined or has to be mentioned as a condition for grant of loan or granting of extra time at the end of agreed period to return the loan. [pp. 120, 143, 243] G1, K1 A5\nhttps://al-maktaba.org/book/28100/1778;\nhttps://al-maktaba.org/book/12145/1096; https://al-maktaba.org/book/33866/487;\nal-Jami al-Saghir of as-Suyuti, Hadith No.6336,:\nRiba should be defined inclusively not exclusively. It means that in the light of the verses of the Quran, saying of the Prophet (SAW) and the practice of Sehabah Karam, any transaction which has the slightest doubt of being included in any type or category of Riba must be included in the definition of Riba.\nThere are 12 verses in the Quran which deal with the term Riba which is relevant to the present case. Sequence of the revelation of these versesis different from the sequence in which they occur in the Quran. The sequence of their revelation is important to understand because the verse which declared complete prohibition of Riba in all its forms and manifestation was revealed gradually. Hence, all the verses of the Holy Quran regarding the prohibition of Riba must be read and understood collectively. Any attempt to read any of such verse out of context may cause misunderstanding in comprehending the full meaning of prohibition of Riba.\nSurah ar-Rum, 30:39; Surah al-Baqarah, 2: 276;\n \nSurah an-Nisa, 4: 160-161\n \nSurah Aal-e-Imran, 3:130\n \nThere is a consensus amongst (Muslim) scholars that the last and final hukam in the Quran which unequivocally/expressly and categorically prohibited Riba was revealed in verses 275 to 279 of Surah Al-Baqarah. There is also another consensus among the scholars that this was the final hukm of Allah which was revealed upon Prophet Muhammad (SAW) before he left this world. [pp. 134, 135] I1 J1\nSurah al-Baqarah, 2:275-279;\n \nThe first and the foremost type of Riba is called Riba al-Nasi h , which is the most well-known type of Riba. Since this type of Riba is prohibited in Quran; therefore, it is also called Riba al-Quran . This type of Riba was known and practiced by the Arab tribes before the dawn of Islam in the period of ignorance. Therefore, this kind of Riba is also called Riba al-Jahiliya . As this type of Riba is associated with a transaction involving loan, therefore, it is also called Riba al-Qard . Some jurists have also called it as Riba Jali .\nAnother type of transaction known as Riba al-fadl is also prohibited which was explained by Prophet (SAW) himself. The Riba al-fadl is also called Riba-ul-Sunnah because its prohibition is based on Ahadith and Sunnah of the Prophet (SAW). Prohibition of Riba al-fadl is in fact a precautionary measures introduced by Islam to implement the complete prohibition of Riba in any manner and all its forms.Basically Riba al-fadl is referred to that specific increase which occurrs in relation to exchange of exactly similar types of goods. Riba al-Fadl is related to trade of goods, but not directly related to banking and financial transactions. However some principles can be drawn, while doing trade or drafting trade contracts which are being used in banking, on the basis of the Ahadith explaining the prohibition of Riba al-fadl.\n \nAccording to the majority of the (Muslim) jurists, Riba of surplus or Riba al-fadhl comes into existence in a sale transaction that involves the exchange of one of the Ribawi commodities, i.e., the commodities which are mentioned in the Ahadith of the Prophet (SAW) (such as dates, wheat, and salt etc.) for the same type of commodity but different amount or weight. Riba al-fadl arises from the exchange between two items of the same type, but in unequal amounts. The addition on one side of the transaction has to be in physical quantity rather than in value, it is irrelevant if that increase or addition is initially stipulated in the contract or not.\n \nBulugh al-Maram 7: 833, Sahih Muslim 81: 1587, https://sunnah.com/bulugh/7/66\nSahih Muslim, The Book of Musaqah : 1584e. https://sunnah.com/muslim:1584e\nMishkat al-Masabih, Business Transactions , Hadith 2813, Hukm:\nhttps://sunnah.com/mishkat:2813. ref.\nIn the light of all the verses related to the prohibition of Riba in the Quran, Ahadith of the Prophet (SAW), explanations of all the jurists, scholars and mufassirin of Quran it can be concluded that:\ni. According to the Injunctions of Islam, Riba exists in a loan or a financial transaction in which increase in principal amount of the lender of the money occurs;\nii. That increase in a transaction occurs according to the wishes of loan lending party (lender) at a predetermined rate or without any predetermined rate. (It is irrelevant whether the increased amount upon a loan is fixed at the initiation of the loan contract or charged after the lapses of certain stipulated time period);\niii. The transaction occurs in the absence of any exchange of a counter-value or recompense or Iwid; and\niv. Riba is prohibited absolutely in all of its forms and manifestations.\nShariah strictly prohibit all types of Riba, therefore any kind of socio-economic, legal or religious change in the borrower or the lender of a loan transaction involving Riba does not change the nature of prohibition. Riba is equally forbidden for the poor and the rich and even for the Muslims and the Non-Muslims in an Islamic State. Similarly, nature of its prohibition does not change with the change in the purpose of taking loan; which means that the loan taken on Riba for commercial, productive of industrial purpose is as prohibited as the charging of Riba upon a loan which is taken to fulfill personal need. Likewise, change in the ratio of percentage at which Riba is charged on a loan in a transaction does not change legal effect of prohibition of Riba in a transaction. This means that no limit of percentage can be fixed for the purpose that up till a certain limit charging of interest upon a loan is legal or permissible and more than such limit is forbidden or prohibited. Similarly, change in legal status of any party involved in a Riba transaction, for example if one of the parties or both the parties in a transaction are legal persons, does not change the legal or Sharai effect of the Ribatransaction, as it will remain prohibited.\nAny transaction of money for money of the same denomination and value where the quantity on both sides is not equal, either in a spot transaction or in a transaction based on deferred payment is Riba. A barter transaction between two weighable or measureable commodities of the same kind, where the quantity on both sided is not equal, or where the delivery from one side is deferred is Riba. Similarly a barter transaction between two different weighable or measurable commodities where delivery from one side is deferred is also Riba.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam- Simple interest and Compound interest -Question as to whether the term Riba is confined to compound interest only, and hence in light of Islamic Injunctions only charging of compound interest on loans is prohibited and not the charging of simple interest-Held, that Riba is haraam or prohibited in every form and quantity; its prohibition is not at all dependent on its percentage or the mathematical style in which it is calculated-Phraseology or expression of the Quran used in Verse 130 of Surah Aal-e-Imran itself makes it evident that in the said verse only doubled or multiplied interest is not meant or intended but it also includes even the smallest percentage of interest-Riba or interest is absolutely prohibited and forbidden-Shariat petitions were allowed.\nSurah Aal-e-Imran, 3:130; al-Jassas, Abu Bakr Ahmad bin Ali al-Razi, (305-370H/ 917-981);\n(e) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Question as to whether there is any difference between the terms usury (Riba) and interest -Held, that the terms interest and usury are synonyms used to translate the meaning of the term Riba-According to the Islamic principles of jurisprudence there is no difference between Riba (usury) and interest-Hence in principle both are one and the same thing and prohibited in Islam-Alteration in the name of any term does not change its legal effect-Shariat petitions were allowed.\nhttps://www.bible.com/search/bible?q=usury and Book of Exodus (22:25) ref.\n(f) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Question as to whether the prohibition of Riba in Islam changes with the change in the percentage of interest charged upon a loan-Held, that according to Injunctions of Islam, a thing which is prohibited is deemed to be prohibited completely and absolutely; its quantity does not have any effect over its prohibition, i.e., if large quantity of a thing is prohibited, a very small quantity of the same is also equally prohibited-According to the Holy Quran and Sunnah, the prohibition of Riba does not depend upon the quantum or the percentage of amount on which the interest is charged in any transaction, or the rate of interest taken in a transaction-Prohibition of Riba is absolute-Shariat petitions were allowed.\n(g) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Consumption loans and commercial loans-Question as to whether only the charging of interest upon consumption loans is prohibited and the charging of interest upon commercial or productive loan is not prohibited in Islam-Held, that the prohibition of Riba is absolute, irrespective of the purpose for which the loan is taken on interest-Purpose of taking a loan does not change the status of prohibition of Riba-Shariat petitions were allowed.\nProhibition of Riba is absolute. It does not differentiate between the rich and the poor loan borrower. Riba or interest be it on personal loan or on commercial loan is haram and prohibited. Purpose of taking a loan does not change the status of prohibition of Riba. According to Injunctions of Islam, usury is associated with the ways and mode of transaction not with the quantity or type of interest. The nature of prohibition of Riba does not change with any change in the form or status of the borrower or the lender. Any change in the socio-economic status of the borrower or for that matter of the lender does not have any effect on the legal status of Riba or interest as it remains prohibited under any circumstances.\nIn early twentieth century some Muslim scholars felt that banking is unavoidable in the realm of commerce and industry, not just on a national but also on worldwide level. This drove them to claim that only usury is haram (illegal), but not commercial interest, because making commercial interest haram would obstruct their path to industrialization and economic advancement in insurmountable ways. They only included usury in the name of Riba since it is explicitly banned in the Quran and Sunnah, and they excluded commercial interest from ambit of Riba. As a result, it was determined that the ban of Riba was limited to usury, whereas interest on commercial loan was permissible. This approach is against the basic principle of Islamic Injunctions. When Islam prohibits anything, it prohibits not only one specific form of something which is currently widespread, but it prohibits all forms of that thing that may emerge in the future. The fact that the state or form has changed has no bearing on the .\nSir Syed Ahmed Khan, Syed Ahmad Taqvi bin Syed Muhammad Muttaqi, (1817 ref.\nThe claim that commercial interest did not exist in the days of the Prophet (SAW) is completely wrong. The Arabian society at that time was a trading society and charging of interest on commercial loan was very much in vogue in Arabia at that time rather the existence of interest on commercial loan was one of the reasons for revelation of some of verses of the Quran relating to Riba. Shariat petitions were allowed.\n(h) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Islamic banking model, practicality of-Islamic Banking or interest free banking was a reality; it was not only practical but also feasible not only in Pakistan but all across the world-Calling the Islamic Banking as a whole as heela i.e. a device to avoid what is otherwise Riba, is an unfounded and baseless argument-Products of Islamic Banking issued by the State Bank are reviewed and approved from Shariah Board of the State Bank in the light of Islamic Injunctions-Accounting standard adopted by the State Bank of Pakistan for such purpose are made and issued by a highly reputed International body of well recognized Islamic scholars of the world called Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)-Islamic Banking is contributing a lot in bringing economic stability in the country according to its market share-Similarly, the apprehension that Islamic Banking may pose a risk to security of the country is also unfounded-State Bank of Pakistan was also making efforts to remain compatible with the international standers of Islamic Banking-Currently there are many international organizations which are systemically working on standardization of Islamic finance and Islamic banking like Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)-In Pakistan a comprehensive framework exists for Sukuk (bonds) and regular issuance of Sukuk (bonds) can be used to make the financial system Shariah compliant and interest free at the Government Level-Gradual target can be set by Government to convert its entire borrowing to Islamic modes in next few years and stop issuance of interest-based instruments-Therefore, to eliminate Riba completely Federal Shariat Court directed all Public Sector entities to start dealing only in interest-free Shariah-compliant modes which are approved by the State Bank of Pakistan-Steps taken and standards adopted by the State Bank of Pakistan and Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance to promote Islamic Banking in Pakistan stated.\n(i) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Business transaction-Question as to whether interest or Riba becomes permissible if a transaction is undertaken or made in the name of a business-Held, that all or any transaction undertaken by a bank, if it involves interest or Riba at any percentage, less or more, in any form simple or multiplied or compound, is prohibited and haram-Banking itself per se is neither permissible nor impermissible according to the Injunctions of Islam in the light of the Quran and Sunnah, and it is actually the nature of transaction which it undertakes that makes it permissible or impermissible-If its transactions are Shariah compliant then it is permissible ,and if they are not Shariah compliant or there are doubts about them of being Shariah compliant, then such transactions are impermissible and against the Injunctions of Islam-Shariat petitions were allowed.\nverse 2: 275 of Surah Baqrah ref.\n(j) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f), 203-B(c) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Federal Shariat Court, jurisdiction of-Scope-Question as to whether mechanism of indexation and inflation should be adopted by the banking sector in Pakistan to balance the inherent imbalance in the economic transactions-Held, that such question did not come under the precinct of jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court because presently there did not exist any law which contains the said issue-At present, there did not exist any law, regulation or SRO of State Bank, etc., which deals with the question of indexation; therefore, the question of indexation and all the related questions in such regard, which are connected to the effect of inflation of money over the borrowed amount during the period of borrowing fall outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court at the moment-Mechanism of indexation and inflation was a matter to be decided by the relevant authorities like the regulator of the banking sector, i.e., Sate Bank of Pakistan or the Government or the Parliament-Shariat petitions were allowed.\n(k) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 2-A, 203-D 227-Federal Shariat Court, jurisdiction of-Scope-Policy guidelines-To give a policy guideline to the government or to any sector in order to mould that sector in accordance with the principles of Islam is not the job of Federal Shariat Court-Such obligation and duty was on the Parliament to follow the guiding principles by itself keeping in view the Islamic provision of the Constitution like Arts 2-A 227 in addition to the overall framework of the Constitution or it could seek the assistance of Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan.\n(l) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Charging of interest by banks on loans given by them to their customers-Interest paid by the bank to its depositors upon their deposits in the bank-Held, that both said forms of interest were Riba, and, thus prohibited-Banking interest is Riba in all its forms and manifestation-Loan that draws any additional amount which is normally called as interest is Riba; be it the amount taken by the banks from their customers upon lending them loan for any purpose or be it the payment made by the banks to its customers against their deposits which they maintain with the banks-Shariat petitions were allowed.\nThe banking interest charged by the bank upon extending any kind of loan to any kind of customer does fall within the definition of Riba. The money provided by conventional banks to their customers is undoubtedly a loan, and at the time of return of principal amount by the customer to the bank any increase in that principal amount does fall in the category of Riba Al-Naseah or Riba al-Quran.\nShariah considers bank deposits as Qarz and not as amanah because the repayment of the deposited money to the depositor is guaranteed and the bank has full freedom to use it, spend and invest it in any manner which the bank decides in accordance with Shariah. It means that it is not given by the customer to the bank only and solely for keeping in a safe custody. Hence, deposits made in the banks are considered as Qarz given by the depositors to the banks and the charging of interest upon the deposit, under any name, is Riba and, thus, prohibited. Overwhelming majority of the jurists in the Islamic world have consensus over it.\nResolution No. 10 (10/2) regarding: Rulings on Usury-based Bank Transactions and Dealing with Islamic Banks, passed in 2nd Session in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 10-16 Rabi Rabi al-Awwal 1406H / 22 28 December 1985. For English version .https://iifa-aifi.org/en/ 32234.html and Arabic version: https://iifa-aifi.org/ar/1598.html; Sahih al-Bukhari, 3129 https://sunnah.com/ bukhari:3129 and Resolution No. 86 (3/9) regarding: Bank Deposits (Bank Accounts), passed in 9th Session held in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on 1-6 Dhu al-Qidah 1415H/ 1 6 April 1985. For English version .https://iifa-aifi.org/en/ 32511.html and Arabic version: https://iifa-aifi.org/ar/1992.html ref.\nSince financial activity is an ever-evolving phenomenon; the different modes of financial and economic actions must be made to confirm to the guiding principle of Islamic financial principles. This means that all and every financial transaction must be completely free from Riba, al-Gharar (uncertainty), al-Qimar (gambling) and al-Maysir (unearned income). Shariat petitions were allowed.\n(m) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 203-D-Action/activity prohibited by Shariah-Consent of any party while doing an action or activity which is prohibited and forbidden in Shariah does not make it legal or permissible.\n(n) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-International commitments on payment of interest or Riba on international loans already taken by Pakistan-Future foreign borrowing by the Federal Government-Held, that according to the Injunctions of Islam, Pakistan is bound to fulfill all or any financial obligation regarding its foreign debt, however, if it wants to make those Riba based transactions Shariah-compliant, then it is also possible but with the mutual consent of the parties-Any interest stipulated in the Government borrowings acquired from domestic or foreign sources is Riba and clearly prohibited by the Holy Quran and Sunnah, therefore, in future the Government should adopt Shariah-compliant modes while borrowing either from domestic or from foreign sources-For future foreign borrowing there are enough Shariah-compliant modes available in the international financial market which can be used and which are well recognized by the International banks and financial institutions-Islamic finance structure savailable for financing infrastructure projects and shariah compliant solutions for foreignborrowing offered by major international banks and multi-lateral agencies stated.\n(o) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D(2)(b)-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Timeline for the Government to take necessary steps for formulation of legislation which could provide enabling legal framework necessary to transform the Conventional banking system into Riba-free or Islamic banking system-Held, that under the prevalent circumstances it is appropriate and suitable for the Federal Shariat Court to set a time line for complete implementation of present decision which is also a Constitutional requirement in terms of Art. 203-D(2)(b) of the Constitution-Setting of the timeline is the requirement of the Constitution which also fulfills the requirement of Shariah as in some situations time is required for proper implementation of a Shariah ruling-Existence of Shariah Standard for Audit and Accounting approved by the State Bank of Pakistan and above all the existence of number of full-fledged Islamic Banks in the country in addition to many conventional Banks with branches or windows of Islamic Banking is ample evidence that the transformation from conventional banking system into Riba-free or Islamic banking system can be completed very easily-Federal Shariat Court observed that five years period is reasonably enough time for the implementation of the present decision completely i.e converting economy of Pakistan into, equitable, asset based, risk sharing and interest-free economy-Accordingly the Federal Shariat Court specified 31-12-2027 as the date on which the present decision shall take effect by way of complete elimination of Riba from Pakistan-Shariat petitions were allowed.\n(p) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Interest Act (XXXII of 1839), Preamble-Government Savings Banks Act (V of 1873), S. 10-Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss. 78, 80, 114 117(c)-Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), Ss. 28, 32, 33 34-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 2(12), 34, 34-A, 34-B, 35(3) 144(1) O. XXI, R. 11(2)(g), O. XXI, R. 38, O. XXI, R. 79(3), O. XXI, R. 80(3), O. XXI, R. 93, O.XXXIV, Rr. 2(1)(a)(i), 2(1)(a)(iii), 2(1)(c)(i) 2(1)(c)(ii), O.XXXIV, R. 2(2), O.XXXIV, R. 4, O.XXXIV, Rr. 7(1)(a)(i), 7(1)(a)(iii), 7(1)(c)(i) 7(1)(c)(ii), O.XXXIV, R.7(2), O. XXXIV, R. 11, O.XXXIV, R. 13 (1), O.XXXVII, R. 2 O.XXXIX, R. 9-Co-operative Societies Act (VII of 1925), Ss. 33-A, 50, 59(2)(e), 71(2)(m) 71(2)(ee)-Co-operative Societies Rules, 1927, Rr.14(1)(h), 22 41 Appendices 1 to 4-West Pakistan Money-Lenders Ordinance (XXIV of 1960), Preamble-Sindh Money-Lenders Ordinance (W.P Ordinance XXIV of 1960), Preamble-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Money-Lenders Ordinance (W.P. Ordinance XXIV of 1960), Preamble-West Pakistan Money-Lenders Rules, 1965-Agricultural Development Bank Rules, 1961, Rr. 17(1), 17(2) 17(3)-Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962), S. 25(2)(a)-Banking Companies Rules, 1963, R. 9-Banks (Nationalization) Payment of Compensation Rules, 1974, R. 9-Defense Saving Certificates Rules, 1966-Special Savings Certificates Rules, 1990-Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act (XXXV of 1973), S. 61(2)(c)-Life Insurance Nationalization Order (President s Order No. 10 of 1972), Preamble-War Risks Insurance Ordinance (XXXII of 1971), Preamble-Federal Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act (II of 1969), Preamble-War Risks Insurance Ordinance (XXVI of 1965), Preamble-Riots and Civil Commotion Risks Insurance Ordinance (III of 1947), Preamble-War Injuries (Compensation) Insurance Act (XXIII of 1943), Preamble-Shariat petitions-Riba/interest-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Federal Shariat Court declared that the Interest Act, 1839, the West Pakistan Money-Lenders Ordinance, 1960, the Sindh Money-Lenders Ordinance, 1960, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Money-Lenders Ordinance, 1960, the West Pakistan Money-Lenders Rules, 1965, Section 10 of Government Savings Banks Act, 1873, Sections 78, 80, 114 and 117(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (so far as these sections are used to support or facilitate any interest bearing transaction), Sections 28, 32, 33, and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (so far as the word interest is used in these sections within the meanings of banking interest), Section25(2)(a) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 relating to interest and mark-up, Section 61(2)(c) of Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 (to the extent theword any interest is used in this clause), the Defense Saving Certificates Rules, 1966, the Special Savings Certificates Rules, 1990, Rule 9 the Banking Companies Rules, 1963, Rules 17(1) (2) of the Agricultural Development Bank Rules 1961, Rule 9 of the Banks (Nationalization) Payment of Compensation Rules, 1974, Rules 14(1)(h), 22 41 along with Appendices 1 to 4 of the Cooperative Societies Rules 1927 (and any circular made thereunder containing the provision of word interest), are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (SAW)-Federal Shariat Court further declared that Sections 33-A, 50, 59(2)(e), 71(2)(m) and 71(2)(ee) of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, Sections 2(12), 34, 34-A, 34-B, 35(3) 144(1) and O. XXI, R.11(2)(g), O. XXI, R. 38, O.XXI, R. 79(3), O. XXI, R. 80(3), O. XXI, R. 93, O.XXXIV, Rr. 2(1)(a)(i), 2(1)(a)(iii), 2(1)(c)(i) 2(1)(c)(ii), O.XXXIV, R. 2(2), O.XXXIV, R. 4, O.XXXIV, Rr. 7(1)(a)(i), 7(1)(a)(iii), 7(1)(c)(i) and 7(1)(c)(ii), O.XXXIV, R.7(2), O. XXXIV, R. 11, O.XXXIV, R. 13(1), O.XXXVII, R. 2 and O.XXXIX, R. 9 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to the extent that the word interest appears in all these provisions are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam hence they shall be deleted and be amended appropriately-Federal Shariat Court also declared that the Life Insurance Nationalization Order, 1972, the War Risks Insurance Ordinance, 1971, the Federal Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act, 1969, the War Risks Insurance Ordinance, 1965, the Riots and Civil Commotion Risks Insurance Ordinance, 1947, and the War Injuries (Compensation) Insurance Act, 1943, to the extent the word interest occurred in these laws, are against the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, hence the same should be deleted or alternatively changed where ever possible with any of the Shariah-compliant mode which is approved by the State Bank of Pakistan.\nHabib Bank Limited v. Muhammad Hussain and another PLD 1987 Kar. 612 ref.\n(q) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 38(f) 203-D-Shariat petitions-Insurance business-Takaful-Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam-Concept of insurance per se is not un-Islamic; its prohibition and permissibility in Shariah depends upon the modes of business in which an insurance company is involved to generate profits for itself and its customers-If an insurance company is involved in those type of modes which are linked with or based upon those activities which are prohibited in Islam like Riba, al-Gharrar or al-Qimar, then such insurance services given by a company are prohibited according to the Injunctions of Islam-Otherwise, if an insurance company is involved in any of the Shariah-csompliant business modes to generate profits for itself and for its customers then it is permissible according to the Injunctions of Islam-Islamic concept of insurance is called Takaful-Word Takaful originates from the Arabic word Kafalah which means to Guarantee, Guardianship, Foster care and protective care etc.-Takaful companies undertake business in accordance with the Shariah-compliant Modes which are free from Riba, al-Gharar and al-Qimar-Concept of Takaful is based on Islamic Injunctions.\nQamoos al-Maani , Qamoos Arabi anglezi ref.\nPer Muhammad Noor Meskanzai, CJ; agreeing with Dr. Syed Muhammad Anwer, J.\n(r) Jurisdiction-\n", - "Court Name:": "Federal Shariat Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=38(1),203-B(c),203-D,203-G", - "Case #": "Shariat Petition No.30-L of 1991, Shariat Miscellaneous No.4-L of 2002, Shariat Petition No. 11-I of 1989, Shariat Petitions Nos. 27-L, 8-K, 17-I, 18-I, 20-I, 21-I, 21-L, 30-I, 31-I of 1990, Shariat Petitions Nos.1-K, 1-L, 2-I, 2-L, 3-I, 4-I, 4-K, 16-I, 16-A/I, 16-C/I, 17-I, 17-A/I, 17-C/I, 24-L, 25-L, 27-I, 28-I, 30-I, 31-I, 32-I, 33-I, 35-I, 42-I, 45-I, 48-L, 51-I, 56-I, 57-I, 64-I, 65-I, 66-I, 67-I, 68-L, 69-L, 70-L, 71-L, 72-L, 74-I, 74-L, 78-I, 79-I, 80-I, 82-I, 83-I, 84-I, 85-L of 1991, 1-", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Noor Meskanzai, C.J., Dr. Syed Muhammad Anwer and Khadim Hussain M. Shaikh, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Petitioners:\nDr. Aslam Khaki, Advocate (supported by Mrs. Yasmeen Haider, Advocate), Qaiser Imam, Advocate, Saif Ullah Gondal, Advocate for Jamat-e-Islami, Dr. Fareed Ahmed Paracha, Imam Dullah and Sujah Ullah, Zafar Ali Raja, Advocate. Raja Muhammad Akram, Advocate, Malik Ghulam Sabir, Advocate, Col. Retd. Syed Iqbal Hashmi, Advocate, Muhammad Siddique Mughal and Qazi Muhammad Siddique, Advocates, Emad-ul-Hassan, Advocate, Javed Mansoor Khan, Advocate, M. Kowkab Iqbal, Advocate, Rai Bashir Ahmad, Ghulam Farid Senator and M.Asad Manzoor Butt, Advocates, Raja Farrukh Arif Bhatti, Advocate, Ghulam Qadir Jatoi, Advocate, Prof. Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Advocate, Touseef Abbasi, Sher Hamad Khan Advocates, Anwar Mansoor Khan, Senior Advocate, Faiz Rasool Jalbani, Advocate, Syed Sikander Abbas Gillani, Advocate, Salamat Ali Chohan, Adviser to State, Mehmood ur Rehm, Advocate, Atif Waheed, Ishtiq Ahmed Farooq, Liaquat Baloch, Jamat-e-Islami, Lahore, Dr. Atta-ur-Rehman, Jamat-e-Islami, Lahore, Dr. Sahams-ul-Haq Hanif, Peshawar, Khuda Yar Khan, Muhammad Aftab Abbasi, Tanzim-e-Islami, Qazi Irfan, Muhammad Saeed Al-Raee, Retd Inspector General of Police, Squardon Leader (Retd.) Tariq Abdul Majeed, Lt. Commander Rtd. Mehmood Iqbal, General Secretary (Foreign), Ghulam Murtaza Jatoi, Advocate, Adnan Ramay and Muneeb Ali Awan, Advocates, Muhammad Younas Meo, Advocate, Maluna Abdul Maalik, Muhammad Anwer Abbasi, Advocate, Dr. Muhammad Hafeez Arshad, Al-Hafeez Welfare Trust, DHA-II, Abdul Ghafoor Chochan, Wing Commander Zarin Qureshi for Tanzee-e-Islami, Imran Shafique, Advocate, Dr. Sahams-ul-Haq Hanif, Peshawar, Mst. Rashidan, Mst. Shukran Bibi, Mst. Saleema Bibi daughters of Khurshid Muhammad, Messrs Bodhla Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory, Umer Latif, Mufti Ahsan Waqar, Head Shariah Board, NBP. Dr. Mufti Tajamal Muhammad Zubair Usmani, UBL, Tanveer Farhan Mehmood, Head of Islamic Banking System, UBL. Mufti Muhammad Ibrahim Essa, Shariah Advisor and Jalaluddin Ahmed, Chief Executive, Muhammad Saeed Alrai (PSP), Muhammad Iqbal, Muhammad Ayub, Director Research and Training Islamabad, Muhammad Anwar Abbasi, Col. (R) Abdul Rahman, Ghulam Jillani. Prof. Dr. M. Fahim Khan, Riaz Ahmed, Zahoor Ahmed and Saeed Ahmed sons of Khurshid Muhammad, Khuda Yar Khan, Messrs Farooq Brothers, Ishtiaq Ahmed Farooq, Babar Moinuddin, Mufti Abdul Ghaffar, Darul Fatta, Sukkur, Dr. Humaira Awais Shahid, Lahore, Gul Muhammad Toor, Prof. Muhammad Asif, Mir Zaman Khan, Tauseef Ahmed Advocate, Khurram Imam Advocate, Imdadullah Advocate, Ms. Abida Safdar, Assistant A.G. KPK and Ms. Sofia Noreen, Assistant A.G.KPK.\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed Khan, Attorney General for Pakistan, Anwar Mansoor Khan, Ex-Attorney General for Pakistan, Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Ex-AG Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, DAG, Pervaiz Khan Tanoli, Assistant Attorney General for Federal Govt., Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab and Ahsan Hameed Dogar on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayyaz Khan, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Balochistan, Syed Aley Rizwi, Addl. A.G. Sindh, Kashif Paracha, Addl. AGP. Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, Assistant A.G. Balochistan, Malik Akhtar Hussain, Addl. A.G. KPK, Nazeer Abbasi, Standing Counsel for Federal Government, Razzaq.A. Mirza, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Syed Wajid Ali Gillani, Addl. Advocate General, Punjab, Mujahid Ali Khan, DAG KPK. Ms. Sofia Noreen, Assistant Advocate General, KPK, Nadeem Arshad, SO Legal Ministry of Finance, Ali Safdar Naghra, Law Officer on behalf of Secretary Finance Punjab, Raja Ahsan Mehmood Satti, Standing Counsel for Federal Government, Syed Aley Maqbool Rizvi, Additional Advocate General, Sindh, Barrister Qasim Ali Chochan, Assistant A.G. Punjab, Arshad Ahmad, Assistant A.G. KPK, Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, Raza Abbas Naqvi, A.A.G. Punjab, Shaukat Rauf Siddiqui, Addl. Advocate General, Punjab, Muhammad Zikria Sheikh, Deputy Attorney General of Pakistan, Lahore, Yousaf Qureshi, Assistant A.G. Punjab, Walayat Khan, Assistant A.G. KPK, Razaq A. Mirza, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Wallayat Khan, Assistant Advocate General, KPK, Salman Akram Raja, Advocate for SBP, Syed Ansar Hussain, Deputy Director on behalf of SBP, Javed Iqbal Khan, Advocate for Chairman Punjab Co-operative Board for Liquidation Lahore, Mehmood Nazir Rana, Law Officer SBP, Mufti Ehsan Waqar, Chairman/Head Shariah Board, NBP, Barrister Maqbool Ahmed, Advocate on behalf of Salman Akram Raja, Advocate, Muhammad Tajamul Hussain, Manager NBP Legal, Rustam on behalf of Sindh Bar Counsel, Zaheer Tanoli, Law Officer on behalf of UBL, Tahir Shabbir, Deputy DAO, Rawalpindi on behalf of Secretary Finance, Punjab Lahore, Shahid Saleem, Ministry of Finance, Lahore. Ms. Iram Younas on behalf of Ministry of Commerce and PIC, Masood Anwar, Advocate for NICL Ministry of Commerce, Aziz ur Rehman, Advocate, Ayyaz Hussain, Executive Officer Law National Insurance Corporation, Shakeel Asghar, Law Officer on behalf of Chief Secretary KPK, Dr. Mehmood ul Rehman Faisal, DG National Savings, Shaukat Rauf Siddiqui, Addl. Advocate General, Punjab, Raja Saleem Ullah, Law Officer Finance Department Government of Punjab, Malik Ghulam Advocate for State Bank of Pakistan, Ghulam Nabi Azhar, Industrial Assistant Registrar Cooperative Department Lahore, Wallayat Khan, Assistant Advocate General, KPK, Muhammad Yousaf, MD Legal Affairs SLIC, Abdul Shakoor Saqib, Deputy DAO Rawalpindi, Feroz Malik, Deputy Manager State Life Insurance, Khan Pacha, Senior Superintendent, Office of the Chief Executive Terbela, Ms. Bushra Qamar, President Provincial Bar Council Punjab Lahore, Salah ud Din Khan, Gandapur and Manzoor Leghari, Advocates on behalf of Sindh Bar Council, Shakil Ahmed, Assistant Solicitor Ministry of Law and Justice, Javed Ali, Deputy District Accounts Officer Punjab Finance Department, Muhammad Javed Iqbal, Assistant Vice President, ZTBL, Muhammad Javed Ali, DAO Punjab Finance Department Rawalpindi, Muhammad Asad Mehmood, Section Officer (Insurance) Commerce Islamabad, Muhammad Aslam Sipra, Deputy Director Finance, Punjab Government, Ghulam Muhammad and Mehmood Shafqat for State Bank of Pakistan, Saleem Shehzad, Section Officer Ministry of Finance, Sohabt Ali Talpur, Deputy Secretary Ministry of Finance Islamabad, Saleem Ullah, Director State Bank of Pakistan, Muhammad Yousaf, SPS to Ahmed Dildar, Member Legal FBR Islamabad, Rana Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Advocate, Saim AR Abbas, Assistant Registrar Industrial Cooperative, GM Abbasi, Director State Bank of Pakistan, Mrs. Imrana Baloch, AOR on behalf of Government of Punjab, Zain-ul-Abidin, Secretary Sindh Bar Council, Raza Mohsin Qazalbash, Director State Bank of Pakistan, Ghani Value, Glass Limited, Lahore, Muhammad Yaseen Traders, Commission Agent, Momin Cotton Ginners and Oil Mills, Rahim Yar Khan, Welcome Agro Chemicals, Bahawalpur, Raazi Hospital, Rawalpindi and Mazhar A Nurani.\nEconomist:\nShaukat Shehzad.\nJurisconsults:\nDr. Attiq-ul-Zafar Khan, Dr. Hafiz Muhammad Tufail, Dr. Muhammad Ayub, Dr. Muhammad Tahir Mansori, Dr. Muhammad Qaseem, Prof. Dr. Muhammad Yousaf Farooqi and Asim Mansoor Khan.\nAmici Curiae:\nDr. Ijaz Ahmed Samdani, Dr. Zaheer-ud-Din Babar Awan, Advocate, Barrister Abdullah Babar Awan, Advocate, Anwar Mansoor Khan, Asim Mansoor Khan, Maluana Asmat Ullah, Maulana Ahmed Ali Siddiqui and Dr. Waqar Masood, Ex-Secretary Finance, Islamabad.\nPublic Notice:\nShakeel Ahmed, Ex-Banker. Mst. Balqees Rahat, Advocate, Syed Arshad Hussain, Advocate, Sayyid Tahir, Saad. Hujaj Ali Nawaz Khan, Muhammad Umar Khan and Siraj ul Haq, Ameer Jama'at-e-Islami.\nShariat Misc. Application No.04-L of 2002\nCounsel for petitioner:\nCh. Abdur Rehman, Advocate and Mian Sher Alam, Advocate, Barrister Abrar Nahakm, Advocate, Malik Wiqar Saleem, Advocate and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nCh. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G.\nShariat Petition No.27-L of 1990\nFor petitioner:\nIqbal Hamed-ur-Rehman, Advocate and Muhammad Amin Sheikh, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nAijaz Ali Khaskheli, Ghulam Rasool Korai and Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocates on behalf of NBP\nShariat Petition No.01-K of 1991\nFor Petitioner:\nS.M. Saeed, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nAhmad Bashir and Aziz-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Advocates, Ms. Sarah Rehman, Advocate, Babar Sattar, Advocate for HBL, Aneeq Salman Malik, Advocate for HBL and Muhammad Saleem, Manager HBL Zone Office Islamabad.\nShariat Petition No.08-K of 1990\nFor Petitioner:\nSyed Afzal Hussain (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate, for Chairman Pakistan Banking Council Karachi and Farrakh Qayyum, Deputy Secretary (BKG) Government of Pakistan Finance Division Islamabad.\nShariat Petition No.17-I of 1990\nFor petitioner:\nDr. Mahmood ur Rehman Faisal (in person)\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate, Salaman Akram Raja, Advocate for SBP. Syed Ansar Hussain, Deputy Director SBP, Mahmood Nazir Rana, Law Officer SBP and Barrister Maqbool Ahmed, Advocate SBP.\nShariat Petition No.18-I of 1990\nFor petitioner:\nDr. Mahmood ur Rehman Faisal (in person) and Tahir Malik, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.20-I of 1990\nFor petitioner:\nDr. Mahmood ur Rehman Faisal (in person)\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.21-I of 1990\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Amin Sheikh, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.21-L of 1990\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Amin Sheikh, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nBabar Sattar, Advocate, Aneeq Salman Malik, Advocate for HBL, Muhammad Saleem, Manager HBL Zone office Islamabad and Ms. Sarah Rehman, Advocate for HBL.\nShariat Petition No.30-I of 1990\nFor petitioner:\nDr. Mahmood ur Rehman Faisal (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.31-I of 1990\nFor petitioner:\nDr. Mahmood ur Rehman Faisal (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate, Muhammad Sultan, A.P. Legal National Savings, Muhammad Tanveer Mehmood, (NSO) C.D.N.S, Aziz-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Advocate, Bakht, Bahadur, Director CDNS, Nazir and Sardar Hameed, CDNS Islamabad, Zaheer Abbas, Joint Director, CDNS, Sardar Hameed Akhtar on behalf of Ministry of Finance and Sardar Hamad Akhtar, CDNS, Islamabad.\nShariat Petition No.01-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nCh. Ijaz Ahmad (in person).\nFor respondents:\nMalik Muhammad Nawaz, Advocate.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.02-I of 1991\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed Khan, Attorney General for Pakistan, Anwar Mansoor Khan, Ex-Attorney General for Pakistan, Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Ex-AG Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, DAG and Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab and Ahsan Hameed Dogar on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayyaz Khan, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Balochistan, Syed Aley Rizwi, Addl. A.G. Sindh, Khashif Paracha, Addl. AGP. Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, Assistant A.G. Balochistan, Malik Akhtar Hussain, Addl. A.G. KPK, Nazeer Abbasi, Standing Counsel for Federal Government, Razzaq.A. Mirza, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Mujahid Ali Khan, DAG KPK, Nadeem Arshad, SO Legal Ministry of Finance, Ali Safdar Naghra, Law Officer on behalf of Secretary Finance Punjab, Raja Ahsan Mehmood Satti, Standing Counsel for Federal Government, Barrister Qasim Ali Chochan, Assistant A.G. Punjab, Arshad Ahmad, Assistant A.G. KPK, Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, Raza Abbas Naqvi, A.A.G. Punjab, Yousaf Qureshi, Assistant A.G. Punjab and Walayat Khan, Assistant A.G. KPK.\nShariat Petition No.02-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nDr. Syed Asad Gillani (in person) and Sheikh-ul-Hadith Maulana Abdul Malik, Mansoora Lahore.\nFor respondents:\nGhulam Nabi-Azhar, Industrial Assistant Registrar Cooperative Society Lahore and Mian Azhar Hussain, Assistant Electric Inspector Energy Department Govt. of Punjab.\nShariat Suo Motu No.03-I of 1991\nFor respondents:\nCh. Ishtiaq Meharban, DAG and Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab and Ahsan Hameed Dogar on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayyaz Khan, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Balochistan, Syed Aley Rizwi, Addl. A.G. Sindh, Khashif Paracha, Addl. AGP, Asthar Ausaf Ali, Ex-A.G. Pakistan, Khalid Javed Khan, Attorney General for Pakistan, Anwar Mansoor Khan, Ex-Attorney General for Pakistan, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, Assistant A.G. Balochistan, Malik Akhtar Hussain, Addl. A.G. KPK, Nazeer Abbasi, Standing Counsel for Federal Government, Razzaq A. Mirza, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Mujahid Ali Khan, DAG KPK, Nadeem Arshad, SO Legal Ministry of Finance, Ali Safdar Naghra, Law Officer on behalf of Secretary Finance Punjab, Raja Ahsan Mehmood Satti, Standing Counsel for Federal Government, Barrister Qasim Ali Chochan, Assistant A.G. Punjab, Arshad Ahmad, Assistant A.G. KPK, Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, Raza Abbas Naqvi, A.A.G. Punjab, Yousaf Qureshi, Assistant A.G. Punjab and Walayat Khan, Assistant A.G. KPK.\nShariat Suo Motu No.04-I of 1991\nFor respondents:\nCh. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. and Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab and Ahsan Hameed Dogar on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayyaz Khan, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Balochistan, Syed Aley Rizwi, Addl. A.G. Sindh, Khashif Paracha, Addl. AGP, Asthar Ausaf Ali, Ex-A.G. Pakistan, Khalid Javed Khan, Attorney General for Pakistan, Anwar Mansoor Khan, Ex-Attorney General for Pakistan. Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, Assistant A.G. Balochistan, Malik Akhtar Hussain, Addl. A.G. KPK, Nazeer Abbasi, Standing Counsel for Federal Government, Razzaq A. Mirza, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Mujahid Ali Khan, DAG KPK, Nadeem Arshad, SO Legal Ministry of Finance, Ali Safdar Naghra, Law Officer on behalf of Secretary Finance Punjab, Raja Ahsan Mehmood Satti, Standing Counsel for Federal Government, Barrister Qasim Ali Chochan, Assistant A.G. Punjab, Arshad Ahmad, Assistant A.G. KPK, Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, Raza Abbas Naqvi, A.A.G. Punjab, Yousaf Qureshi, Assistant A.G. Punjab, Walayat Khan, Assistant A.G. KPK, Ashraf, AC (HR) Kasur and Javed Ali, Punjab Finance Department.\nShariat Petition No.04-K of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nJaved Mazhar (in person).\nFor respondents:\nCh. Muhammad Nawaz, Advocate for respondent No.3, Amjad Ali, A.O. Customs and Muhammad Javed Iqbal, APV, ZTBL.\nShariat Petition No.16-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nRaja Muhammad Akram, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nAijaz Ali Khaskheli, Ghulam Rasool Korai and Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocates on behalf of NBP and Qasim Bhatti, MIS, Officer, NBP, Regional Office Rawalpindi, Muhammad Riaz, Vice-President UBL, Legal Division and Zaheer Ahmad Tanoli, Law Officer for UBL.\nShariat Petition No.16-A/I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nRaja Muhammad Akram, Advocate and Sameer Khosa, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nQasim Bhatti, MIS-Officer NBP, Regional Office Rawalpindi and Abdul Rauf, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.16-C/I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nRaja Muhammad Akram, Advocate and Sameer Khosa, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nQasim Bhatti, MIS-Officer NBP, Regional Office Rawalpindi.\nShariat Petition No.17-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nNemo.\nFor respondents:\nMalik Muhammad Siddique Awan and Rizwan Mahmood, Advocates, for NBP.\nShariat Petition No.17-A/I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nRaja Muhammad Akram, Advocate and Sameer Khosa, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nNadeem, SO Legal Ministry of Finance.\nShariat Petition No.17-C/I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nRaja Muhammad Akram, Advocate and Sameer Khosa, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nQasim Bhatti, MIS-Officer NBP, Regional Office Rawalpindi.\nShariat Petition No.24-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Ashraf and Muhammad Akram (in person).\nFor respondents:\nJaved Iqbal Khan, Advocate and Ch. Muhammad Yaqub Sidhu, Advocate for Chairman Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation Lahore, Jameel Ahmed Qazi, Industrial Inspector Rawalpindi, Ghulam Nabi Azhar, Industrial Assistant Registrar Cooperative Department Lahore, Rana Naeem Akhtar, Assistant Manager Legal for NICFC/PCBL and Liaqat Ali, Industrial Assistant Registrar Lahore Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.25-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Iqbal Naz (in person).\nFor respondents:\nNasir Javeid Virk and Tahir Lateef Sheikh, Advocates HBFCL, Shafqat Rasool, Manager Legal, HBFC, Sammer, IAR Cooperative, Jameel Ahmed Qazi, Industrial Inspector Rawalpindi, Muhammad Shahid Butt, Industrial Assistant Registrar Cooperative and Rana Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.27-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Ashraf (in person).\nFor respondents:\nJameel Ahmed Qazi, Industrial Inspector Rawalpindi and Liaqat Ali, Industrial Assistant Registrar Lahore Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.28-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Iqbal Naz (in person).\nFor respondents:\nJameel Ahmed Qazi, Industrial Inspector Rawalpindi and Liaqat Ali, Industrial Assistant Registrar Lahore Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.30-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nS.M. Tayyab, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nJaved Iqbal Khan, Advocate on behalf of Chairman Cooperative Board for Liquidation, Lahore, Rana Naeem Akhtar, Assistant Manager Legal for NICFC/PCBL and Syed Mir Ahmed Shah, Cooperative Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.31-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nFaiz Ahmad (in person).\nFor respondents:\nAhmed Bashir and Aziz ur Rehman Farooqi, Advocates, Syed Ali Zafar, Advocate, Mehmood Tanveer, NSO and Muhammad Saleem, Manager HBL Zone office Islamabad.\nShariat Petition No.32-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nFaiz Ahmed (in person).\nFor respondents:\nAhmed Bashir and Aziz ur Rehman Farooqi, Advocates for HBL and Muhammad Saleem, Manager HBL Zone Office Islamabad.\nShariat Petition No.33-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nFaiz Ahmed (in person).\nFor respondents:\nAhmed Bashir Advocate, Aziz ur Rehman Farooqi, Advocate for HBL and Muhammad Saleem, Manager HBL Zone Office Islamabad.\nShariat Petition No.35-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nKashmir Fabrics (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.42-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Hashim (in person).\nFor respondents:\nAziz Ali Khaskhali, Advocate, Ghulam Rasool Korai and Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocates on behalf of NBP.\nShariat Petition No.45-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Hashim (in person).\nFor respondents:\nAziz Ali Khaskhali, Advocate, Ghulam Rasool Korai and Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocates on behalf of NBP.\nShariat Petition No.48-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nPetitioner s counsel has died.\nFor respondents:\nTahir Lateef, Advocate for HBFC, Shafaat Rasul, Manager Legal HBFC and Hashmat Ali Habib, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.51-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Iqbal Advocate (in person).\nFor respondents:\nNemo.\nShariat Petition No.56-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nKashmir Fabrics (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.57-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nKashmir Fabrics (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.64-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMohammad Mukhtar Ahmad Farani (in person).\nFor respondents:\nGovt. of Sindh through Secretary Law.\nShariat Petition No.65-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMohammad Mukhtar Ahmad Farani (in person).\nFor respondents:\nGovernment of Balochistan through Secretary Law.\nShariat Petition No.66-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Mukhtar Ahmad Farani (in person).\nFor respondents:\nGovernment of NWFP through Secretary Law.\nShariat Petition No.67-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMohammad Mukhtar Ahmad Farani (in person).\nFor respondents:\nGovernment of Punjab through Secretary Law.\nShariat Petition No.68-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Amin Sheikh, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate ABL and Khawar Ehsan, Manager SAM ABL.\nShariat Petition No.69-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Amin Sheikh, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate, Khawar Ehsan, Manager SAM ABL and Khurram Ehsan, Member SAM North ABL.\nShariat Petition No.70-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Amin Shaikh, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nAijaz Ali Khaskheli, Litigation Officer, Ghulam Rasool Korai, and Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocates for NBP and Syed Ali Zafar, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.71-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Amin Shaikh Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nAijaz Ali Khaskheli, Litigation Officer, Ghulam Rasool Korai, and Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocates for NBP, Syed Ali Zafar, Advocate.\nShariat Petition No.72-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMuhammad Amin Shaikh, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nAijaz Ali Khaskheli, Litigation Officer, Ghulam Rasool Korai, and Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocates for NBP, Syed Ali Zafar, Advocate and Muhammad Javed Iqbal, APV, ZTBL.\nShariat Petition No.74-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nAbdul Qayyum Qureshi (in person).\nFor respondents:\nAttorney General and Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan.\nShariat Petition No.74-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nNaveed Asif (in person).\nFor respondents:\nAijaz Ali Khaskheli, Litigation Officer, Ghulam Rasool Korai, and Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocates for NBP.\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate and Khurram Ehsan, Member SAM North ABL.\nShariat Petition No.78-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nGulzar Ahmad Khan (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Mir Ahmed Shah, Cooperative Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.79-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nGulzar Ahmad Khan, Senator (in person).\nFor respondents:\nJaved Iqbal Khan, Advocate for Chairman Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation Lahore, Jameel Ahmed Qazi, Industrial Inspector Rawalpindi, Rana Naeem Akhtar, Assistant Manager Legal for NICFC/PCBL and Liaqat Ali, Industrial Assistant Registrar Lahore Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.80-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nGulzar Ahmad Khan, Senator (in person).\nFor respondents:\nPunjab Cooperative Board.\nShariat Petition No.82-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nCh. Sarwar Hayat (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Mir Ahmed Shah, Cooperative Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.83-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nCh. Sarwar Hayat (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Mir Ahmed Shah, Cooperative Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.84-I of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nCh. Sarwar Hayat (in person).\nFor respondents:\nSyed Mir Ahmed Shah, Cooperative Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.85-L of 1991\nFor petitioner:\nMohammad Sharif (in person).\nFor respondents:\nMuhammad Shahid Butt, Industrial Assistant Registrar Cooperative and Liaqat Ali, Industrial Assistant Registrar Lahore Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.01-L of 1992\nFor petitioner:\nSyed Afzal Haider, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nSyed Mir Ahmed Shah, Cooperative Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.07-I of 1992\nFor petitioners:\nAbdur Rehman Siddiqui Advocate and Muhammad Mansoor Jafer (in person).\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, DAG for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK. Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK. Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, Muhammad Tanveer Mehmood, (NSO) C.D.N.S. Sardar Hameed Akhtar, CDNS National Savings, Muhammad Sultan, AP (Legal) National Savings, Bakht Bahadur, Director CDNS, Nazir and Sardar Hameed, CDNS Islamabad, Zaheer Abbas, Joint Director, CDNS. Sardar Hameed Akhtar on behalf of Ministry of Finance and Sardar Hamad Akhtar, CDNS, Islamabad.\nShariat Petition No.08-I of 1992\nFor petitioners:\nAbdur Rehman Siddiqui Advocate and Muhammad Mansoor Jafer (in person).\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK. Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, Muhammad Tanveer Mehmood, (NSO) C.D.N.S, Muhammad Sultan, AP (Legal) National Savings, Bakht Bahadur Director CDNS, Nazir and Sardar Hameed, CDNS Islamabad, Zaheer Abbas Joint Director, CDNS, Sardar Hameed Akhtar on behalf of Ministry of Finance and Sardar Hamad Akhtar, CDNS, Islamabad.\nShariat Petition No.09-I of 1992\nFor petitioners:\nAbdur Rehman Siddiqui Advocate and Muhammad Mansoor Jafer (in person).\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK. Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, Muhammad Tanveer Mehmood, (NSO) C.D.N.S, Muhammad Sultan, AP (Legal) National Savings, Bakht Bahadur, Director CDNS, Nazir and Sardar Hameed, CDNS Islamabad, Zaheer Abbas, Joint Director, CDNS. Sardar Hameed Akhtar on behalf of Ministry of Finance. Sardar Hamad Akhtar, CDNS, Islamabad and Raja Mehmood Subhani, Manager Legal on behalf of Chief Secretary Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.11-I of 1989\nFor petitioner:\nMusthaq Hussain Shah (in person), Salah ud Din Khan, Advocate and Musa Bashir Janjua Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Imtiaz Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, Aziz-ul-Haque Nishtar, Advocate for respondent, Sajjad Ali, Advocate for Director (Legal) WAPDA, WAPDA House Lahore, Tahir Malik, Advocate for State Life Insurance Cooperation Rawalpindi Zone, Salman Mushtaq, Deputy DAO on behalf of Chief Secretary Punjab, Masood Anwar, Advocate for NICL, Ayaz Hussain, Executive Officer NICL, Muhammad Umar Khan, NICL-MOC, Barrister Adam Hassan Malik on behalf of Postal Life Insurance, Awal Daad, Assistant Superintendent Postal Life Insurance, Sajjad Zafar, Advocate for WAPDA, Mehr un Nisa Khalid, AGM, Abdul Bais, Dy. Director Admn WAPDA, Muhammad Farooq Malik, DM, SLIC, Abdul Shakoor Saqib, Deputy DAO Rawalpindi. Syed Wajahit Ali, ADPLI Lahore, Muhammad Siddique Malik, DG Legal GEPCO WAPDA, Dr. Muhammad Akram Nawaz, GM Postal Life Insurance, Post office Service Management Board, Niaz Sardar, Deputy Director Admin WAPDA, Rao Akram Khurram, Advocate on behalf of Pakistan Insurance Corporation, Muhammad Nusrat Hussain, ED (OPS) NICL, Khan Bacha, Senior Superintendent WAPDA Office CE (P) Tarbela, Mahmud Raza Khan, Advocate on behalf of Chairman Pakistan Insurance Corporation and Jibran Khalil, Law Officer Government of Punjab.\nShariat Petition No.59-I of 1992\nFor petitioner:\nRoshan Din Roshan (in person).\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Umar Chaudhary, Law Officer Punjab Bar Council, Salah ud Din Khan Gandopar, Sindh Bar Council, HCB (Annexue) Karachi, Muhammad Farooq Malik, DM, SLIC, Abdul Shakoor Saqib, Deputy DAO Rawalpindi, Syed Wajahit Ali, ADPLI Lahore and Zain ul Abideen, Secretary Sindh Bar Council.\nS.S.M.No.02-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, DAG for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nS.S.M. No.03-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.04-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.05-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.06-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.07-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.08-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.09-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.10-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.11-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan and Shafqat Rasool, Advocate NICL.\nShariat Suo-Motu No.13-I of 1992\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh and Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan.\nShariat Petition No.04-I of 2003\nFor petitioner:\nRai Khan Muhammad, Advocate.\nFor respondents:\nDeputy Attorney General for Pakistan.\nShariat Petition No.02-L of 2004\nFor petitioner:\nRana Ghulam Sarwar, Advocate, Noor Ahmad, Assistant Board of Revenue Tehsil Municipal Administration Kasur, Muhammad Abid, Municipal Officer (Finance) Municipal Corporation Kasur, Rashid Mehmood, Municipal Officer Retd Municipal Corporation Kasur, Idrees Khan, Municipal Officer Regulations Municipal Committee Kasur and Khalil Ahmed, Tehsil Municipal Administration Government of Punjab Kasur.\nFor respondents:\nKhalid Javed, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Ishtiaq Meharban, D.A.G. for Pakistan, Ch. Saleem Murtaza Mughal, Addl. Advocate General Punjab, Arshad Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Sardar Ali Raza, Addl. A.G. KPK, Muhammad Fareed Dogar, A.A.G. Balochistan, Ahsan Hameed Dogar Advocate on behalf of A.G. Sindh, Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, ", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs FAROOQ BROTHERS and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nUNITED BANK LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23723", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1901 = 2023 PLD 51 = 2023 SLD 1901", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5, Sched.-Maintenance of children and grandchildren-Grandfather, responsibility of-Scope-Family suit was decreed ex-parte against father/respondent-During execution proceeding, service was also not effected on father/respondent-Executing court through the impugned order directed the petitioner being grandfather to deposit the maintenance in the CCD account-Objection petition of the petitioner/grandfather was overruled by the Executing court and Appellate court also dismissed the appeal-Validity-Petitioner/ grandfather was neither a party in the suit nor in the execution proceedings-From the bare perusal of principles embodied in Para 370 of Principles of Muhammadan Law, it was crystal clear that if the father and mother was alive, the grandfather could not be held responsible for maintenance of his grandchildren and unless it was first determined that he was in easy circumstances-In order to determine that grandfather was in a position to maintain his grandchildren, it was incumbent upon the Family Court to first adjudicate and determine this fact, which could not be done unless he was a party to the suit, having a fair opportunity to explain his status and position-Orders impugned were set aside being not maintainable, in circumstances-Civil revision petition, was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Executing Court to entertain the objection of the petitioner, providing him opportunity of hearing and producing evidence, and thereafter, to decide the same in accordance with law.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 51 O.XXI, R.10-Execution of decree-Power of Executing Court-Scope- Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree-No decree can be executed against a person who is not a part to the proceedings.\nIrshad Masih and others v. Emmanuel Masih and others 2014 SCMR 1481 ref.\n(c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 13-Enforcement of decree-Family court is to adopt its own modes to execute its decree.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=5Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 118 of 2022, decided on 3rd October, 2022.heard on: 20th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Iqbal Ahmed Kasi, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naseer Ahmed and Saifullah Durrani for Petitioner.\nJahanzaib Khan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NIAZ MUHAMMAD (NAZAK KHAN)-Petitioner\nVersus\nBIBI KHATIMA and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23724", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1902 = 2023 PLD 51 = 2023 SLD 1902", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 6-Declaration that land was required for a public purpose-Scope-Government department got awarded certain land for construction of residential accommodation of the Government officials-Petitioner alleged that the land in his ownership and possession was dedicated for shrine/religious purpose and approached the Prime Minister, whereupon, the Prime Minister directed the concerned department to issue notification for de-award-Approval of the Prime Minister was not implemented by the respondents, as such, petitioner approached the High Court for implementation of the approval-Validity-Only those approvals/ directives of the Chief Executive could be implemented which were in line with the law, rendered on a duly processed file-Disputed land was situated at a place where the approach had been proposed and due to de-award of the land, the scheme/plan of whole project would be destroyed-Respondents were directed to carry out the plan and complete the same within the stipulated period-Writ petition was dismissed.\n2021 SCR 665; 2012 YLR 1580; 2019 SCR 703 and 2001 YLR 3367 ref.\n2010 PLC (C.S.) 1195 and 2014 SCR 298 rel.\n(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S. 6-Declaration that land is required for a public purpose-Scope-Prerogative of the acquiring agency to acquire any land subject to reasonable compensation or de-award the same, if the same is not required for the proposed project or has become surplus.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44Land Acquisition Act, 1894=6", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 235 of 2015, decided on 30th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Liaqat Hussain, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Muhammad Haneef Khan for Petitioners.\nCh. Muhammad Ismail, Legal Advisor for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. CHAND BIBI (Widow) and 6 others-Petitioners\nVersus\nAZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR GOVERNMENT through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 11 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23725", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1903 = 2023 PLD 53 = 2023 SLD 1903", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTSs", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Hindus Marriage (Amendment) Act (XLIX of 2018)-\n-Ss.11 14-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A-Rule Nisi-Change of faith-Marriage without divorce-Recovery of wife-Petition to Court-Procedure-Petitioners wife converted to Islam and contracted marriage with respondent without waiting for Iddat (intervening period)-Petitioner sought recovery of his wife and two minor daughters-High Court sent the wife to Darul Amann to remain there till decision of petition-Validity-High Court declared that marriage with respondent contracted during Iddat period was Fasid (irregular) and not Batil (void) and released the wife from Darul Amman and she could enter into Nikkah with respondent a fresh, if she so wished-High Court declared that if a married, non-Muslim woman embraced Islam, she was to file petition in Family Court for termination / dissolution of marriage and Family Court would summon her husband, inform him of her conversion, and would offer him to accept Islam, Family Court then would wait till expiry of her Iddat period for reply/decision of her husband-High Court further directed that if husband in response to offer embraced Islam within the period of Iddat, the marriage would continue but if he remained non-Muslim even after expiry of Iddat period, the Court could pass a decree of termination/dissolution of marriage and the woman, thereafter, would be free to marry a Muslim man if so, wished-High Court further directed that Iddat was compulsory after dissolution of marriage of any character and Iddat was imposed in order to provide an opportunity to non-Muslim husband to consider whether he wished to embrace Islam and also as a matter of public policy in order to ascertain whether the woman was pregnant by earlier husband, so as to avoid confusion of parentage-Family Court in case in such petition filed by women, fresh convert to Islam,[or a petition filed by parents or any guardian pleading forced marriage of their underage (below 18 years) daughter] would proceed to determine on evidence in each case whether the conversion or marriage was prima facie genuine (and was not forced), or only a pretext and decide accordingly-In the first case, findings would operate as a defense against criminal prosecution and in the latter, it would make the perpetrator of act, offender of law-High Court declined to interfere in the matter-Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.\nPLD 1988 SC 713; Sardar Masih v. Haider Masih PLD 1988 FSC 78; NLR 1989 SD 640; Mst. Safia Bibi v. Muhammad Arif, A.S.I. and 3 others 1997 MLD 158; PLD 2020 Lah. 489 and Writ Petitions Nos.4110, 3885 of 1995 and 15214 of 1994; Muhammadan Law by Syed Amir Ali, Vol. II, p. 346 (7th Edn.); (11) Outlines of Muhammadan Law by A.A. Fyzee pp.173-176); Mullah Sections 264 and 267; Outlines of Muhammadan Law by Asaf A.A. Fayzee (Oxford University Press, 1964 (pp. 169, 173); Rakeya Bibi v. Aneel Kumar Mukar Jee (1948) 2 Cal. 119; Noor Jehan v. Euqene Tischenko; (1942) 2 Cal. 165; Sayenda Khatoon v. M. Obadiah (1949) 2 CWN 745; Robaba Khanum v. Khodadad Bomanji Irani (1946) 48 Bom. LR 864 and Faiz Ali Shah v. Ghulam Akbar Shah PLD 1952 Azad JK 32 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=561-A", - "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. S-177 of 2022, decided on 30th September, 2022.Dates of hearing: 2nd, 9th and 16th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Hans Raj Naurang for Applicant along with Applicant.\nMehfooz Ali Laghari for Respondents Nos.3 and 4 along with Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.\nMst. Murk produced from Darul Amann.\nMrs. Razia Ali Zaman Khan, Ishrat Ali Lohar, Muhammad Jamil Ahmed and Sajjad Ahmed Chandio, amici curiae.\nShahzado Saleem Nahiyoon, Additional P.G. for Official Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "LALOO-Applicant\nVersus\nSENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, MIRPUR KHAS, SINDH and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23726", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1904 = 2023 SLD 1904 = 2023 PLD 55", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Local Government Act (VII of 1990)-\n-S. 19 Second Sched. Part II, Entry No. 3-Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), Arts. 44, 4(4)(1) 4(4)(15)-Writ petition-Local Government elections-Elected members-Disqualifications of candidates-Age limit-Scope-Case of petitioner is that the upper age limit prescribed for contesting election of local bodies is ultra vires to the constitutionally fundamental guaranteed rights-Validity-Law recognizes such person as a voter who attains the age of eighteen years meaning thereby that he/she is qualified to elect his/her representative as per his/her choice and sweet will but simultaneously he/she is qualified to contest election of local bodies until he/she attains the age of twenty five years (which is a marked difference of seven years)-Such like barrier is not convincing enough for a prudent mind to accept this analogy as to how a person can be put out of arena to contest election of local bodies without exhibiting any rationale in this regard, thus, although in logical and rational parlance, age of eighteen years itself is sufficient equally for the purpose of contesting election of local bodies on the yardstick of constitutionally fundamental guaranteed rights i.e. Arts. 4(4)(1) 4(4)(15) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, but it is up to the Legislature to expose its wisdom and to bring it in consonance with the constitutional guarantees-However, age of twenty-one years as unanimously prescribed by all the four provinces of Pakistan seems plausible in this regard at local bodies level-To declass a person/voter randomly in the guise of age is not a reasonable classification as no legislation or specific expertise is rationally required in this regard-Schedule 2 Part II Entry No. 3 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Local Government Act, 1990 inserted through Azad Jammu and Kashmir Local Government (Amendment) Act, 2021 is severable from the rest of Act-Impugned provision in parlance of the scheme of Constitution cannot stand ex proprio vigore and lacking the ratio legis (the reason or purpose of making a law)-Impugned legislation is liable to be sent in hibernation-Constitutional petition was accepted, in circumstances.\n2002 CLC 1130 ref.\nShahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmad and others 2017 SCMR 206 rel.\n(b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Local Government Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss. 19, 8, 9, 11 Second Sched. Part II, Entry No. 3-Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), Arts. 44, 4(4)(1) 4(4)(15)-Writ petition-Local Government elections-Elected members-Disqualifications of candidates-Age limit-Scope-Case of petitioner is that the upper age limit prescribed for contesting election of local bodies is ultra vires to the constitutionally fundamental guaranteed rights-Validity-At the local bodies level no legislation or law-making is required at any stage-Scope and area of working/ performing duties of the members of local bodies is limited merely to the extent of local geographic limits-Working area and spheres have been circumscribed to the extent of local government issues meant for development schemes and uplifting the undeveloped areas-While on the other hand the public representatives in higher public fora i.e. Assembly and Senate have been bestowed with totally different job and are burdened with onerous liabilities qua legislation/law making, that is why the prescribed age limit for such like fora in different countries is even more than twenty-five years and the wisdom behind the same is crystal clear that the cumbersome task of law making and legislation inter alia with other qualities requires adequate maturity coupled with mental agility-Although maturity improves wisdom but information technology has rapidly brought the entire world even closer by introducing the concept of Global Village thus, wisdom and maturity ipso facto cannot be bracketed and tagged with age-Through the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Local Government (Amendment) Act, 2021 certain amendments have been introduced by the legislature inter alia by providing room to the women and youth members at the ratio of 12.5% each of the total number of seats for the District Council, Local Council/Union Council, Town Committee and Municipal Committee-When the law itself allows the entry of youth in local bodies by allocating/reserving seats (without prescribing age limit) then 25 years barrier is meaningless and does not seem to serve the very purpose of law-Barrier of the age of 25 years has stood left or for that matter become redundant in this view of the matter after subsequent amendment-Impugned legislation is liable to be sent in hibernation-Constitutional petition was accepted, in circumstances.\n(c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 4(4)(15)-All State subjects equal before law and entitled to equal protection of law-Law-Meaning and scope-Word law in the former expression is used in a philosophical sense whereas the word law in the latter expression denotes specific laws in force-Former implies the absence of any special privilege in favour of any individual and the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law, while the latter is a more positive concept implying equality of treatment in equal circumstances.\nNazir Hashmi v. Capital Development Authority PLD 1976 Lah. 1115 and Yahya Bakhtiar v. The State NLR 1980 Quetta 815 rel.\n(d) Words and phrases-\n-Youth-Meaning.\nYouth; the time of life when a person is young, especially the time before a child become adult, the quality or state of being young.\nOxford Dictionary ref.\n(e) Interpretation of statutes-\n-When a word has not been defined in the statute the ordinary dictionary meaning is to be looked at.\nChairman Pakistan Railway v. Shah Jahan Shah PLD 2016 SC 534 rel.\n(f) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Legislative intention is the paramount criterion in statutory interpretation.\n(g) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Functional construction-Scope-Functional construction rule provides aid for practical purpose (which requires a strained construction to be given to the enactment).\n(h) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Statutes are often prepared unscientifically, the limitation of language and human foresight makes it impossible for the legislator to cover every eventuality-It is function of the Judge to cooperate with the legislature in providing through interpretation a systematic treatment of the whole field of legal relationship.\nInterpretation of statutes by Vepa P. Sarathi ref.\n(i) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Work of interpretation in one sense is enduring and in another sense ephemeral; what is good in it endures, what is erroneous is pretty sure to perish, the good remains the foundation in which new structures will be built and the bad will be rejected and cast off in the laboratory of the years.\nThe nature of the Judicial process By Benjimun N Cardozo ref.\n(j) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Literal rule-Scope-Courts of law are bound to interpret a statutory provision as it is and not as it should be-If the language is plain and unambiguous, it cannot be ignored and must be adhered to.\n(k) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Mischief rule-Scope-Crux of mischief rules is that it proceeds on the presumption that the Parliament (law-making organ of the State) is taken to do nothing without a reason, meaning thereby there must be reason for passing an Act and an enactment therein.\n(l) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Golden rule-Scope-If there is nothing absurd in the statute, etc. you can rely on connotation of the crucial words-Mythology of canons of construction rests upon rationale to discern the legislative intention enunciated in the words-In this connection all the rules/techniques and tools of interpretation are not available in a static manner rather they are dynamic and vary from time to time.\n(m) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Orthodox view of the judicial function to the duty of interpretation of an enactment is search for the intention of the legislature from the words used-Judge is not to discover actually what the legislature intended as contra distinguished from what its words express, but what is the meaning of the word it used-Difficulties of so called interpretation arise when the legislature has had no meaning at all when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to it, then what the Judges have to do is not to determine what the legislature did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not presented to its mind if the point had been present.\nFundamental Law of Pakistan by A.K. Brohi rel.\n(n) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Casus Omissus-Scope and extent.\nCasus Omissus i.e. case omitted a point omitted can in no case, be supplied by the Court of law as that would amount to altering the provision Court of law is not entitled to read words into the Constitution or an Act of Parliament unless clear reason is found within the four corners of either of them.\nPLD 2013 SC 279 ref.\nIt is for the legislature to resolve a casus omissus in a statute by suitable amendment and not for the Court to remedy the defect.\nAir 1943 Lah. 48 and PLD 1966 Dacca 117 ref.\nIf there is an accidental omission in a statute and the intention of the legislature can be clearly culled from the word of statute, the omission can be supplied by the Court to serve the purpose of law.\nPLD 1972 Lah. 374 ref.\nCourt can supply an obvious omission in a particular provision of statute or omit the same which is apparently redundant in the context of the provision keeping in view the principle to advance the object of the Act and not to frustrate the same.\nPLD 2009 SC 809 ref.\nDoctrine of casus omissus will come into play where any statutory defect is liable to cure while doctrine of reading in provides aid and is available where constitutional defect requires repairment through this technique.\nTechnique of reading in is available to cure constitutional defect while the doctrine of casus omissus is helpful where defect is oozing from a peace of legislation requiring repairment through this interpretative approach.\nAam Log Party v. The Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 39 rel.\nThere are several guiding principles laid down by the superior courts qua supplying an omission such as, that interpretation in possible construction should be preferred which carries into effect the object of the statute.\nCourt can supply an obvious omission in a particular provision of statutes or omit the same which is apparently redundant in the context of the provision keeping in view to advance object of the Act and not to frustrate the same.\nShah Hussain v. The State PLD 2009 SC 809 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Local Government Act, 1990=19Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44,4(4)(1),4(4)(15)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2992 of 2022, decided on 14th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Habib Zia, Mian Arif Hussain and Syed Shahid Bahar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AYAN ALI RAJA-Petitioner\nVs\nAZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY through Secretary and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23727", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1905 = 2023 SLD 1905 = 2023 PLD 465", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDTTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 8-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 2(12)-Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI of 1887), S. 43-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 114-Suit for possession and mesne profits-Application to Revenue Officer for ejectment-Estoppel-Scope-Petitioner assailed the and decree whereby the respondents suit for possession along with recovery of mesne profits was decreed and the petitioners suit for specific performance of oral agreement to sell regarding the same suit property was dismissed-Contention of petitioner was that the respondents suit was not maintainable before the Civil Court rather the same was triable on revenue side-Validity-Petitioner by filing a suit for specific performance of contract had himself denied his status of a tenant-Similarly, in the suit for possession, he reiterated his position to be the owner of the suit land rather than holding that under the landlord-Petitioner, under the principle of estoppel, was estopped from claiming that Revenue Court was required to decide the eviction suit against him under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887-Even otherwise, the tenancy between the parties had long extinguished, but the petitioner neither had got the period of his tenancy extended nor had he vacated the possession of the suit land, therefore, his possession over the suit land could not be better than that of an illegal occupant-As regards recovery of mesne profits, Appellate Court had rightly observed that since the petitioners claim of oral agreement could not be proved and he had been in possession over the suit land without paying even a single penny, therefore, he was directed to pay a certain amount, which was equivalent to the last paid lease money, as mesne profit along with 10% annual mark-up-Revision petition was dismissed.\nMessrs Tanveer Spinning And Weaving Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Executive Director Finance v. Tariq Saeed through Shahzad Akber and 2 others 2017 YLR 1762 and Muhammad Parvez v. Additional Rent Controller Walton, Lahore and 2 others 2013 YLR 2714 rel.\nMuhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Ismail and others 1999 SCMR 1331; Mst. Nazir Mai v. Additional Secretary and 5 others 2011 YLR 972; Ghulam Rasool v. Government of Punjab through District Officer (Revenue), Sahiwal and 4 others 2016 MLD 1660 and Messrs Tanveer Spinning And Weaving Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Executive Director Finance v. Tariq Saeed through Shahzad Akber and 2 others 2017 YLR 1762 ref.\n(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 114-Estoppel-Scope-Estoppel is a collective name given to a bunch of legal doctrines whereby a person is prevented from making assertions, which are contradictory to his prior position on certain matters before the Court.\n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 114-Estoppel-Scope-For the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, three conditions are required to be satisfied: (i) the partys later position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position; (ii) whether the first Court had accepted the earlier position; and (iii) whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped-Nevertheless, the two crucial conditions are the first and the third-If they are met, even if the second condition is unsatisfied, still the doctrine of judicial estoppel would apply.\nNew Hampshire v. Maine 532 U.S. 742 rel.\nShri Surendra Nayak v. A.M. Mohammed Shafi 2016 (4) KCCR 3606 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=8Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2(12)Punjab Tenancy Act, (XVI of 1887)=43Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=114", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 30037 of 2021, decided on 26th November, 2021.heard on: 26th November, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja Mohsin Abbas, Farrukh Ilyas Cheema, Rizwan Afzal Tarrar and Shehzad Ahmad Cheema for Petitioner.\nMalik Muhammad Awais Khalid, M. Siraj-ul-Islam Khan and Mohammad Osman Khan for Respondent.\nResearch by Muhammad Imran Sheikh, Additional District Judge/Senior Research Officer and Ahmad Zia Ch., Civil Judge/Research Officer, LHCRC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAHIM DAD-Appellant\nVersus\nSAEEDA KHANUM-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23728", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 1922 = 2023 SLD 1922 = 2023 PTD 1120 = 2023 PLD 471 = (2023) 128 TAX 90 = 2023 LHC 3837", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNDRS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) – Super Tax\n•\nPetitioners Claim: The petitioners, who are taxpayers, challenged the imposition of the Super Tax, arguing it was discriminatory. The Super Tax was imposed by Section 4C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and was progressively reduced from 3% to 0% from 2018 to 2022. However, a sudden and significant increase in Super Tax to 10% (a 250% increase from the earlier maximum rates) was imposed by a proviso inserted by the Finance Act of 2022, which was deemed unreasonable and unjustified. The High Court found the imposition of a 10% Super Tax to be discriminatory, violating the doctrine of textualism (interpreting statutes based on their plain meaning) and the Constitutions principle of equality under Article 25. The court reduced the Super Tax rate from 10% to 4%, referencing previous cases and policy statements that had supported the lower rate.\no\nCase References: Shell Pakistan Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2023), Molasses Trading and Export v. Federation of Pakistan (1993), Lotte Pakistan PTA Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2011), FBR v. Messrs Wazir Ali and Co. (2020).\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) – Tax Year Types\n•\nSpecial Tax Year: Under Section 74 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, there are two types of tax years: the normal tax year and the special tax year. Both tax years span a period of twelve months. To avail the special tax year, a taxpayer must apply to the Commissioner in writing, as outlined in Section 74(3), and the permission is subject to Section 74(5). The special tax year is provided to accommodate taxpayers and not to facilitate the evasion of income tax in the normal tax year.\n(c) Interpretation of Statutes – Textualism\n•\nDoctrine of Textualism: This doctrine of statutory interpretation suggests that a statute should be interpreted strictly according to its plain text. This means that the law should be understood based on its explicit language, and not through the intent of the legislature, statutory purpose, or legislative history. The focus is on the words used in the statute, without delving into extrinsic factors like legislative intent.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan – Article 25 – Discrimination\n•\nIntelligible Differentia: Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan prohibits discrimination, but allows reasonable differentiation between classes of persons, provided the classification is based on intelligible differentia. This means that there must be a clear and rational distinction between groups, which must be logically connected to the objective of the law. For such differential treatment to be constitutionally valid, it must meet the test of reasonable classification. The differentiation must have a rational nexus to the legislative objective being sought.\no\nCase References: Hadayat Ullah v. Federation of Pakistan (2022), Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan (2010), Syed Azam Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (2022), Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Syed Sadiq Shah (2021).\nSummary:\n•\nThe Super Tax imposed on certain taxpayers under the Income Tax Ordinance was found to be discriminatory and unjustified by the High Court, which reduced the rate to 4%.\n•\nThe Tax Year Types under the Income Tax Ordinance allow taxpayers to apply for a special tax year, but it must be done in writing and is subject to specific conditions.\n•\nThe Textualism Doctrine of statutory interpretation emphasizes the plain meaning of the text in a statute.\n•\nArticle 25 of the Constitution permits differential treatment under certain conditions, provided the classification is based on a rational and logical distinction with a clear objective.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(42),4,4B,4C,74,74(3),74(5),80,114,120,First ScheduleConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 58683 of 2022 (and other connected Petitions), decided on 27th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: Salman Akram Raja, ASC, Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Arslan Riaz and Barrister Raja Hamza Anwar, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 58672, 64994, 67221 and 65025 of 2023). Mansoor Usman Awan, ASC, Haris Irfan and Hamza Shehram Sarwar, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.12761, 58689, 59245, 59251, 59911 and 12768 of 2023). Barrister Haroon Dugal, ASC with Subhe Nasib, Advocate (in W.P. No.75277 of 2022). Zoe K. Khan, Advocate (in W.P. No. 75528 of 2022). Shazib Masud, ASC, M. Asad Buttar, ASC and Jawad Jamil Mailk, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos.56758, 83260 and 59133 of 2023). Dr. Mazhar Ilahi, Advocate with Barrister Asfandyar Khan Tareen, Arslan Saleem Chaudhry and M. Siddique Butt, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 567, 829 and 1043 of 2023). Muhammad Shahbaz Butt, ASC with Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Muhammad Hassan Dogar, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 403, 530, 2452, 4359, 5291, 11364, 11635, 11646, 13559, 13615, 20124, 83497, 67867, 67979, 68023, 68017, 74076, 78120, 79612, 82816 of 2023, 83497 and 83301, 83126, 83311, 5297, 5299, 5347, 83320, 83323 of 2022 and 2023). Abdul Waheed Habib, Mirza Mubashar Baig and Jawad Ahmad, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 404 of 2023, 83485 and 83486 of 2022). Munawar ul Salam, ASC, Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, ASC and Hassan Pervaiz, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 60340 and 83294 of 2022). Adil Umar Bandial and Sajjad Ali, Advocates (in W.P. No.82429 of 2022). Scheherezade Shaharyar, Advocate (in W.P. No. 78882 of 2022). Khalil-ur-Rehman, Saad Ullah and Azam Jan Muhammad, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 93, 8245, 323, 10273, 571, 14746, 17747, 83231, 13464, 83098, 83384, 83484, 83473, 930, 6960, 2359 and 23807 of 2023). Muhammad Nauman Yahya and Shakeel Ahmad Basra, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 108 and 1211 of 2023). Bashir Ahmad Khalid and M.A. Rizwan Kamboh, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 112, 379, 3423 of 2023, 81874, 82187, 81884, 82192, 82788, 82969, 83482, 83371 and 82805 of 2022).\nJahangir Ahmad, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 163 of 2023 and 83400 of 2022).\nNadir Ali Sherazi, Barrister M. Abubakar and Muhammad Usman, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 200, 312, 627, 1998, 2531, 5550, 6347, 9987, 20606 of 2023, 82897, 82899, 82905, 83321, 83293, 82908, 82910, 66947, 82917, 83417, 83418, 83019, 83023 and 83025 of 2022).\nFaisal Rasheed Ghouri and Omar Iqbal Khawaja, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 206, 518, 3455, 2483, 9824, 9825 of 2023 and 67998, 83335, 66678, 68018, 66716, 66947, 67096, 83665, 83667, 83668 of 2022).\nMustafa Kamal, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos.250, 1339, 1837, 2415, 3397, 4958, 5913, 6645, 12858, 13416, 14899 of 2023, 60348, 64237, 66560, 79617, 80573, 82706, 82905, 83302, 81930, 82935, 83106, 83133, 83322, 83331, 83413, 83446 and 83571 of 2022).\nZia Haidar Rizvi and Zahid Imran Gondal, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.304 of 2023, 83590 and 83610 of 2022).\nMuhammad Zulqarnain, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 436, 83503 and 83505 of 2023).\nMuhamad Asif Rana and Amir Khan, Advocates.\nH. M. Majid Siddiqi, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 497 and 1989 of 2023).\nMuhammad Faisal Hafeez, Advocate (in W.P. No.556 of 2023).\nAhmad Yar Khan and Hashim Aslam Butt, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 557, 1999, 83392, 83410 and 83433 of 2023).\nS.M. Raheel, Advocate (in W.P. No. 577 of 2023).\nMudassar Shujauddin and Shahid Pervez Jami, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 653, 655, 2345, 4736, 82430, 82749, 82769, 82980, 83154, 83156, 83477, 83480, 2251, 83507, 83508, 83349, 83476, 83510 and 83514 of 2023).\nUsman Javaid Qazi, Muhammad Waseem and Javed Iqbal Qazi, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 820, 3237 and 3302 of 2023).\nMuhammad Zafar Iqbal Mian, Rana Muhammad Ishaq M. Rashid Tobassam and Mar Shoakat Hayat, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 990 and 83166 of 2023).\nMuhammad Ashraf Chaudhry and Jamil Akhtar Baig, Advocates (in W.P. No.1012 of 2023).\nBasharat Ali Awan, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos.1137 and 2040 of 2023).\nMuhammad Humzah, Advocate (in W.P. 1195 of 2023).\nBabar Murtaza Khan, Sajjad Ali Chaudhry and Mian Muzaffar Hussain, Advocates (in W.P. No.1285 of 2023).\nCh. Qamar-uz-Zaman, M. Waqar Akram, Muhammad Khalid, Rai Inam Qadir, Arif Munir, Zeba Munir, Ali Raza Cheema and Muhammad Bilal, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 1404, 1409, 83624, 7096 and 1404 of 2023).\nAllah Nawaz Nasir, Advocate (in W.P. No.1851 of 2023).\nWaqar Hasan, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 2067 and 2251 of 2023).\nMuhammad Naeem and Muhammad Aslam Sheikh, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.90, 2362, 5545 and 5576 of 2023).\nCh. Anwaar ul Haq Arif and Shahnawaz, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.76770 and 2399 of 2023).\nRai Amer Ijaz Kharal, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos.3434 and 2403 of 2023).\nAmir Fahim Chaudhry, Abbas Ali Awan, Zaheer Ahmad and Abrar Hussain, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 2324, 14472 and 15259 of 2023).\nMuhammad Amjal Khan, Khawaja Riaz Hussain, Babar Zaman, Omer Wahab, Rana Usman Habib Khan, Muhammad Ahsan Nawaz and Noureen Fouzia, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 2429, 5427, 12198, 13955, 14272, 83419 and 2630 of 2023).\nMuhammad Naeem Munawar and Farhan Ahmed Jan, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 2636, 7192 and 2639 of 2023).\nSyed Saif-ur-Rehman Gillani and Asif Hayat Khattak, Advocates (in W.P. No.2715 of 2023).\nMuhammad Mohsin Virk, Arfan Ahmad Chattha, Syed Tanzeel Haider, Hamza Habib Shaikh, Ch. Shoaib Ilyas, Tahir Shabbir, Waleed Akbar Chattha and Hassan Irtaza Tarar, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.2726, 81772 and 5832 of 2023).\nSyed Najaf Hussain Shah, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 3261, 8371, 7868, 7869, 7872, 7874 and 8371 of 2023).\nAhsan Ahmed Munir, Ghias Ahmad and Ramsha Shahid, Advocates (in W.P. No.3431 of 2023).\nRana Muhammad Afzal and Matie-ur-Rehman, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 3442, 83358, 83396, 83422, 83316, 83298, 83223 and 83356 of 2023).\nZeeshan Asif and Rizwan Anwar Baig, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 3704, 3707, 3746 and 3750 of 2023).\nHassan Ali, Waqqas Ahmad Mir, Ahmad Hassan, Momna Taufeeq, Saad Mazhar and Hamza Hayat, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 83141 of 2022 and 3743 of 2023).\nZahid Imran Gondal, Advocate (in W.P. No. 4119 of 2023).\nMahmood Ahmad, Mehmood Arif and Asmar, Advocates Tariq (in W.Ps. Nos.4198 and 5803 of 2023).\nShafaqat Ali, Hassan Maqsood Ahmad Aujla, Waris Nishaber Ali Cheema and Muhammad Idrees Aslam Chauhan, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 4615, 9493, 18117, 4839, 5297, 5299 and 5347 of 2023).\nSardar Abdul Majeed Dogar, Syed Qasim Askari and Sardar M. Arslan Raza Dogar, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 4659 and 8111 of 2023).\nFarhan Ahmed Jan, Advocate (in W.P. No.5454 of 2023).\nM. Zohaib Ali Sidhu, Syed Ali Tarab, Ali Aqib Shah and Usman Latif, Advocate (in W.P. No.5916 of 2023).\nZahid Ateeq Choudhary, Advocate (in W.P. No.6293 of 2023).\nFahad Majeed Rathor, Advocate (in W.P. No.6300 of 2023).\nJaved Farooq, Usman Khalil, Shahzaib ul Hassan Chattha, Ali Ijaz Shah and Tauqeer Ahmad Ranjha, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.6549 and 6560 of 2023).\nMahmood Ahmad, Shahid Rasool and Saad Asif, Advocates (in W.P. No.6708 of 2023).\nZahid Ateeq Choudhry, Advocate (in W.P. No.6925 of 2023).\nWaseem Ahmad Malik, Mahmood Ahmad, Mehmood Arif and Asmar Tariq, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.9221, 83548, 83549 and 75893 of 2023).\nZaheer-ud-Din Babar, Advocate (in W.P. No. 11525 of 2023).\nMuhammad Younas Khalid and Umer Farooq, Advocates (in W.P. No.12485 of 2023).\nSyed Zeeshan Ali and Syed Muhammad Baqir Ali, Advocates (in W.P. No.12800 of 2023).\nSaad Nusrullah and Irtiza Shoukat, Advocates (in W.P. No.13276 of 2023).\nMirza Mubasher Baig, Advocate (in W.P. No.15958 of 2023).\nHassan Kamran Bashir, Sikandar Ali and Asim Bin Majeed, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.13154, 16149, 59809, 78738 and 59809 of 2023).\nAkmal Inayat Butt, Advocate (in W.P. No.18716 of 2023).\nShehzad A. Elahi, Mussadiq Islam, Salman Zaheer Khan and Ch. Muhammad Ali, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 60005 of 2022, 60425, 81376, 81380, 81384, 81390 and 68129 of 2023).\nMalik Faiz Rasool Rajwana, ASC, Barrister Malik Kashif Rajwana, ASC and Malik Asif Rajwana, Advocate (in W.P. No. 64130 of 2022).\nSheikh Anwar-ul-Haq, Sheikh Naveed Anwaar and Sajjid Ali Baloch, Advocates (in W.P. No.65256 of 2022).\nMuhammad Asif, Advocate (in W.P. No.65917 of 2022).\nNaved A. Andrabi, ASC and Khurram Saleem, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos.66055, 82705 and 67781 of 2022).\nAhsan Ahmed Munir, Ghiaz Ahmed and Ramsha Shahid, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.66883 and 66898 of 2022).\nDr. Ilyas Zafar, ASC with Syed Nasir Ali Gillani, Advocate (in W.P. No.67937 of 2022).\nHamad-ul-Hassan Hanjra, Muhammad Nasir Khan and Muhammad Awais, Advocates (in W.P. No.74210 of 2022).\nSh. Aqeel Ahmad, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 83411, 83412, 75186 and 83424 of 2022).\nSultan Haider Ali Malik, Usman Khalil, Shahzaib ul Hassan Chattha, Ali Ijaz Shah and Tauqeer Ahmad Ranjha, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.75811 and 75861 of 2022).\nA.W. Chaddha, ASC with Jahanzaib Ahmad and Raja Ali Feroz, Advocates (in W.P. No.75869 of 2022).\nMuhammad Jawad Zafar, ASC with Khawar Shabbir Khan and Muhammad Talha Mushtaq, Advocates (in W.P. No.80898 of 2022).\nH.M. Majid Siddiqi, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 82101, 83062 and 83079 of 2022).\nMuhammad Afzal, Waqas Ahmad Virk and Waseem Bhatti, Advocates (in W.P. No.82260 of 2022).\nBarrister Muhammad Abubakar, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 82264, 82420 and 82265 of 2022).\nMuhammad Muqaddam Sukhera, Muhammad Mansha Sukhera and Muhammad Ali Awan, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.82221 and 82277 of 2022).\nMuhammad Ajmal Khan, ASC with Saleem Iqbal Rathor, Omer Wahab, Rana Usman Habib Khan, Muhammad Ahsan Nawaz and Noreen Fouzia, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.82305, 82753 and 83295 of 2022).\nSalman Aslam Butt, ASC with Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Furqan Naveed and Manahil Khan, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 83307, 82791 and 82378 of 2022).\nMuhammad Ijaz Lashari, ASC (in W.P. No.82670 of 2022).\nMian Abdul Bari Rashid, ASC with Mian Sajid Salam and Asim Mehmood, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 83033, 83035 and 82692 of 2022).\nJamshaid Anwar and Muhammad Riaz, Advocates (in W.P. No.82941 of 2022).\nHamad Ul Hassan Hanjra, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 83048 and 83051 of 2022).\nMuhammad Rafique Ch. and Shahbaz Siddique, Advocates (in W.P. No.83149 of 2022).\nBarrister Sheharyar Kasuri, ASC, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Jamshid Alam, Muhammad Humza, Sabeel Tariq Mann, Qadeer Kalyar and Fasih-ur-Rehman, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.83181, 82708, 82716, 82131, 82721 and 82727 of 2022).\nSumair Saeed Ahmed and Akhtar Ali, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.83182, 83185, 83189, 83299, 83289, 83262 and 83318 of 2022).\nSyed Alamdar Hussain Naqvi, Rana Sajid Rasool and Rai Abdullah Zahid Khan, Advocates (in W.P. No.83217 of 2022).\nYawar Mehdi Naqvi and Shahid Hussain Ch. , Advocates (in W.P. No.83224 of 2022).\nMuhammad Bilal Pervaiz, Advocate (in W.P. No. 83547 of 2022).\nMirza Mahmood Ahmad, ASC with Barrister Muhammad Saram Israr, Advocate (in W.P. No.83256 of 2022).\nMunawar us Salam, ASC with Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Advocate (in W.P. No.83294 of 2022).\nCh. Babar Waheed, ASC with Jawad Latif Chughtai, Moazzam Jaryal, Hamza Sajid and Akash Gohar, Advocates (in W.P. No.83297 of 2022).\nAdil Khalid Tirmizey, Barrister Aun Ali Raza, Rida Aslam Bhatti and Ahmed Nisar Khan, Advocates (in W.P. No.83308 of 2022).\nFaisal Naseer Rana and Muhammad Mujahid Arshad Tarar, Advocates (in W.P. No.83310 of 2022).\nTanzil-ur-Rehman Hotiana, Advocate (in W.P. No. 83313 of 2022).\nMoiz Tariq, ASC with Mian Mansoor Akbar, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos.83315, 83319, 83332, 83430 and 83436 of 2022).\nZia Haider Rizvi, ASC with Zahid Imran Gondal, Advocate (in W.P. No.83341 of 2022).\nKhuram Ahmed Saeed and Muhammad Javed Arshad, Advocates (in W.P. No.83401 of 2022).\nMuhammad Ifan, Asaad Fazil Shaikh, Faisal Ismail and Mian Dawood, Advocates (in W.P. No.83414 of 2022).\nMuhammad Amir Rehman and Shahbaz Siddique, Advocates (in W.P. No.83425 of 2022).\nSheikh Aqeel Ahmad, Advocate (in W.Ps. Nos. 83437, 83439, 83442, 83426, 83428, 83434, 83435 and 83444 of 2022).\nHassan Shakil, Advocate (in W.P. No.83479 of 2022).\nAkhtar Javed, Waseem Ahmed Malik and Mehmood Arif, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos.83541 and 83546 of 2022).\nRana Munir Hussain, ASC with Shahbaz Siddique, Advocate (in W.P .No.83613 of 2022).\nMuhammad Ishaq Beryar and Farhan Shahzad, Advocates (in W.Ps. Nos. 83615, 83617, 83619 and 83620 of 2022).\nRespondent(s) by\nNasir Javed Ghumman, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No.1.\nKhalid Ishaq, ASC, Nida Aftab, Ahmad Pervaiz, ASC, Jawad H. Tarar and Syed Zain-ul-Abidin Bukhari, Advocates for Respondent No.2/FBR.\nMs. Asma Hamid, ASC for Respondent No.3/CIR assisted by Noor Ahsan, Hammad Hussain, Muhammad Bilal Munir and Sana Azhar, Advocates along with Mir Badsha Khan Wazir, Chief Commissioner, IR, LTO, Lahore, Muhammad Majid Chudhary, Commissioner, IR, LTO Lahore and Ms. Laila Ghafoor, Director Law, IR Lahore.\nHussain Ibrahim Muhammad, Assistant Advocate General.\nDr. Asim Murtaza Cheema, Civil Judge/Research Officer, Lahore High Court, Lahore.\nDates of hearing: 8th, 9th, 16th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 29th, 30th, 31st March, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th and 12th April, 2023.\n\"\"Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.\"", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "(Judge Learned Hand, Chief Judge of US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)1\"", - "URL Link:": "SERVICE GLOBAL FOOTWEAR LIMITED and another-Petitioners\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents", - "Citation or Reference": "", - "Case Link:": "", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23729", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2021 = (2023) 128 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Minimum Tax on the income of certain persons – Mentioning of depreciation and other inadmissible expenses in the return – Addition – Tribunal upheld decision – Validity\nFACTS\nThe petitioner filed its Income Tax return mentioning depreciation and other inadmissible expenses by mistake. The Appellate Tribunal subtracted these inadmissible expenses but still upheld the decision that Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which applies to the minimum tax regime, was applicable. The petitioner argued that they suffered a gross loss in business and therefore should not be liable for the minimum tax under Section 113. They admitted to the mistake of including depreciation and other inadmissible expenses but maintained that even if these expenses were subtracted, they would still not fall within the minimum tax regime due to their gross loss. The petitioner pointed out that the Appellate Tribunal had applied a different approach in the case of the Bank of Punjab (ITA 1486/LB/2013, order dated 18 May 2021), where depreciation and inadmissible expenses were subtracted, and since the bank was in a gross loss, Section 113 was not applied.\nARGUMENTS\nThe petitioner’s counsel argued that, based on the approach applied in the case of the Bank of Punjab, the Tribunal should have subtracted depreciation and inadmissible expenses and then determined if the petitioner was in a gross loss. The respondent, Commissioner Inland Revenue, was unable to successfully counter this argument.\nDECISION\nThe High Court held that the Tribunal should have applied the same approach in this case as it did with the Bank of Punjab, namely, subtracting depreciation and inadmissible expenses before determining whether the petitioner was in a gross loss. Only if the petitioner did not suffer a gross loss could Section 113 of the Ordinance apply. Consequently, the decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court were set aside, and the appeal preferred by the petitioner (ITA No. 759/LB/2013) was deemed pending. The Tribunal was instructed to decide the appeal, following the principles outlined, preferably within three months of receiving the order.\nOutcome: The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed in favor of the petitioner, with the matter to be re-decided by the Tribunal.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1810-L of 2022 decided on 22.09.2022, heard on: 22.09.2022\n(Against the judgment dated 1S.03.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in PIR No.303/2013)", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, YAHYA AFRIDI AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Javed Iqbal Qazi, ASC for the Petitioner.\nMr. Ahmed Pervaiz, ASC a/w Mr. Azhar Jahangir, Addl. Commissioner, LTO, Lahore for the Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S PAK PANTHER SPINNING MILLS LIMITED, LAHORE\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23730", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2022 = (2023) 128 SLD 2022 = (2023) 128 TAX 34", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRS8", - "Key Words:": "Amendment of assessments - Savings - Limitation for assessment in certain cases - Powers of IAC to revise Income Tax officer’s order - Notices under Income Tax Ord: 2001 u/s 122(5A) - Annulment of order passed u/s 66A of repealed Ordinance, 1979 - Holding of Appellate Tribunal in appeal that the order u/s 66A is barred by time - Reference to High Court\n________________________________________\nFACTS\nThe tax references have been filed by the tax authorities with the taxpayers as respondents. In constitutional petitions, the positions are reversed.\nThe issues that arise for determination are framed as questions of law proposed by the Department in the tax references, notably ITRA 190/2012. These questions are:\n1.\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in annulling the order passed under section 66A of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, without considering the protection granted in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd [2009 SCMR 1279], which relates to the lacunae preventing the enforcement of the repealed Ordinance.\n2.\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal correctly held the order under section 66A was barred by time without excluding the period between the decision of the High Court in Honda Shahra-e-Faisal (2005 PTD 1316) and that of the Supreme Court in Eli Lilly (2009) which extended the limitation period.\n________________________________________\nARGUMENTS\nFor the Department:\nThe learned counsel for the Department argued that after the Honda Shahra-e-Faisal decision (issued 02.03.2005), the Department ceased issuing notices under section 122(5A) of the 2001 Ordinance. The Supreme Courts decision in Eli Lilly (22.06.2009) provided the Department with a fresh cause of action, allowing notices up to four years from 22.06.2009. The notice issued on 22.08.2010 was therefore within time.\nThe counsel referred to section 160(b) of the 1979 Ordinance and also to section 62BB, inserted in 2002, suggesting that after the Eli Lilly case, the Department could deem notices previously issued under section 122(5A) as valid under section 66A, thereby saving them from being barred by time.\nFor the Taxpayers:\nThe Taxpayers counsel argued that the assessment order made on 29.05.2002 meant the four-year period for issuing a notice under section 66A expired on 28.05.2006. Even though there was an attempt to use section 66 as a gateway to justify notices post Eli Lilly, section 66A is not related to section 66. Additionally, the first notice under section 122(5A) was issued on 30.12.2004 and withdrawn in favor of a notice dated 22.05.2007, which was challenged in a constitutional petition.\nThe Supreme Court’s decision in Eli Lilly did not extend the limitation period, and the notices issued after this were clearly time-barred. Furthermore, the notices were not even served in some cases, as per the taxpayers arguments.\n________________________________________\nDECISION\n1.\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979 vs. 2001: The Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 came into effect on 01.07.2002, replacing the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The latter applied to assessments for income years up to 30.06.2002. Therefore, notices under section 122(5A) of the 2001 Ordinance could not have been issued for assessments under the 1979 Ordinance, which applied until 30.06.2002.\n2.\nLimitation Period: The decision in Eli Lilly did not extend the limitation period. The argument for excluding the period between the Honda Shahra-e-Faisal and Eli Lilly decisions was rejected. The period between these decisions should not be excluded, and the notices under section 66A were issued after the expiration of the four-year limitation period. Therefore, the notices were time-barred, regardless of the Eli Lilly decision.\n3.\nValidity of Notices: In some references, the taxpayer argued that the notices were never received, a point upheld by the learned Appellate Tribunal as a factual finding. No legal questions were raised by the Department regarding this issue.\n4.\nRetrospective Effect of Section 122(5A): It was determined that section 122(5A) of the 2001 Ordinance had retrospective effect, contrary to the earlier position in Honda Shahra-e-Faisal. However, the Supreme Courts decision in Islamic Investment Bank clarified that the decision in Eli Lilly was not per incuriam.\n5.\nOutcome: Based on the principles outlined, the questions raised by the Department were answered against it and in favor of the Taxpayers. The tax references were dismissed, and the constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=59(1),62BB,65,66,66A,66A(2),160Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5),239", - "Case #": "ITRA No. 190 of 2012, decided on 08.02.2016, dates of hearing: 10, 11, 12, 13 and 17.11.2015 and 25.01 2016 and 08.02.2016", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Siddique Mirza, Mr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Mr. Jawaid Farooqui, Mr. Amjad Javed Hashmi and Mr. Atif Awan Advocates for the Department.\nMr. Arshad Siraj, Mr. Iqbal Salman Pasha, Ms. Lubna Parvez, Abdul Sattar Pirzada, Mr. Anwar Kashif Ali, Mr. Usman Alam and Akhtar Ali Mahmud Advocates for the Taxpayers.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III LARGE TAXPAYERS UNIT, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S. ICI PAKISTAN LTD, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23731", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2023 = (2023) 128 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRSs", - "Key Words:": "This case involves a dispute over the application of the minimum tax provisions under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically related to the wholesale and retail sale of wine/alcoholic drinks. The key issue revolves around the taxpayers argument that the sale of wine falls within the definition of Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCGs), thereby entitling them to a lower minimum tax rate of 0.25% instead of the 1.50% rate applied by the tax authorities under section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n•\nSection 2(13AA): Defines Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCGs) under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nSection 113: Imposes a minimum tax on the declared turnover of certain businesses.\n•\nSection 122(5A): Allows for the amendment of assessments by the tax authorities, which was invoked in this case after the ADCIR issued a notice for the failure to pay the correct minimum tax.\nFacts of the Case:\n•\nThe taxpayer is engaged in the business of wholesale and retail sale of wine/alcoholic drinks.\n•\nThe ADCIR (Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue) found that the taxpayer had failed to pay the minimum tax at the correct rate and issued a notice under section 122(5A).\n•\nThe ADCIR levied the minimum tax at 1.50% of the declared turnover, whereas the taxpayer contended that the tax should have been charged at 0.25%, arguing that wine qualifies as an FMCG.\n•\nThe CIR(A) (Commissioner of Income Tax) upheld the ADCIRs decision, and the taxpayer appealed to the Appellate Tribunal.\nArguments:\n•\nAppellants Argument: The taxpayer argued that wine should be classified as a Fast-Moving Consumer Good (FMCG) under the Income Tax Ordinance, which would qualify for the lower minimum tax rate of 0.25%. They relied on an interpretation of FMCGs that includes alcoholic beverages.\n•\nRespondents Argument (Tax Authorities): The Department argued that the orders of both the ADCIR and CIR(A) were correct, emphasizing that the sale of alcoholic beverages does not fall under FMCGs. Therefore, the higher rate of 1.50% of turnover was correctly applied.\nDecision of the Appellate Tribunal:\n•\nThe Tribunal rejected the taxpayers argument and confirmed the decision of both the ADCIR and CIR(A). The Tribunal concluded that alcoholic beverages, including wine, do not fall within the definition of Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCGs) under the relevant tax laws.\n•\nThe Karachi Bench’s prior observation that wine might be considered an FMCG was not accepted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the Karachi Bench had failed to consider the exclusion of alcoholic beverages from the reduced tax rate, and therefore disagreed with the earlier ruling.\n•\nThe Tribunal stated that since alcoholic beverages do not qualify as FMCGs, the taxpayer could not avail of the lower minimum tax rate of 0.25%, and the tax rate of 1.50% applied by the ADCIR was correct.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe taxpayers appeal was rejected, and the decision to impose a minimum tax of 1.50% on the declared turnover of the business was upheld.\n•\nThe case confirms that alcoholic beverages (including wine) do not come under the definition of Fast-Moving Consumer Goods for the purpose of the minimum tax provisions under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and the higher tax rate applies in such cases.\nLegal Reference:\n•\nThe case refers to previous decisions, such as the Karachi Bench ruling, but clarifies that alcoholic beverages are specifically excluded from the reduced rate of minimum tax.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(13AA),2(22A),113,122(5A)", - "Case #": "MA(Stay) No.301/KB/2023 ITA No: 269/KB/2023 decided on 08.02.2023, date of hearing: 06.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI ANWER KAMAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER ANDMANZOOR ALI JOKHIO, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr Yousuf Ali. Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Tariq Tunio, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PIONEER TRADERS, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, AUDIT-I, MTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23732", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2024 = (2023) 128 TAX 27", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRTk", - "Key Words:": "The case involves the interpretation of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 (FED) as it applies to a scheduled bank in Pakistan. The bank argued that certain incomes, such as fees, commissions, and brokerage related to foreign currency dealings, should not be subject to FED. The Departmental Collector of Income Revenue (DCIR) had imposed a 16% FED on these incomes, but the Commissioner (Appeals) affirmed this charge except for income related to foreign currency revaluation and reimbursement of godown expenses.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nFederal Excise Act, 2005 - Sections 2(23), 3, 3(1), and 16(1) along with the First Schedule were discussed to determine which services are taxable under the Act.\n2.\nBanking Business - The taxpayer is a scheduled bank, which operates under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962. According to the tax law, activities related to banking services may fall under the ambit of taxable services.\nAppellant’s Arguments:\n•\nThe appellant (bank) argued that certain services (like income from dealing in foreign currency, fee, commission, and brokerage) should not be subject to Federal Excise Duty (FED), as they were not specifically mentioned in the Federal Excise Act or its schedules.\n•\nThe appellant referred to the provisions of other tax laws, such as the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, Sales Tax Act, 1990, and Customs Act, 1969, which allow for certain exemptions or deductions based on the nature of the service.\nCIR(A) Ruling:\n•\nThe Commissioner (Appeals) held that all activities of the bank, except for foreign currency revaluation income and godown expense reimbursement, fell under the category of services and were thus subject to FED.\nAppellate Tribunal’s Decision:\n•\nThe Tribunal held that, under the Federal Excise Act, 2005, services provided in Pakistan are generally exempt from FED unless explicitly specified in the First Schedule.\n•\nThe Tribunal stated that for an activity to be taxed under FED, it must be listed in the First Schedule, particularly under Chapter 98 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff (PCT).\n•\nThe Tribunal further stated that the interpretation of the term other services should not encompass all banking activities as this would make other specific service categories redundant. Therefore, the DCIR’s assessment lacked clarity on which PCT headings applied to the specific banking activities in question.\n•\nThe case was remanded back to the DCIR for reconsideration, with the directive to specifically identify the relevant PCT headings that cover the taxable activities. Additionally, the Tribunal referenced a ruling from the Supreme Court in MZS Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd v. CIR (2019), emphasizing the need for clear specification in cases where tax liabilities are imposed.\nConclusion:\nThe appeal was remanded to the DCIR for further assessment, with instructions to clearly specify the relevant headings under the Pakistan Customs Tariff (PCT) that justify the imposition of FED. The Tribunal also made it clear that the mere classification of activities as services is not enough for taxation under the Federal Excise Act, unless those activities are clearly defined in the applicable tax schedules.\nThis case highlights the importance of properly identifying and classifying taxable activities under the Federal Excise Act, particularly in the context of banking services.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=2(23),3,3(1),16(1),33Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962=5", - "Case #": "FEA Nos.23 to 25/LB/2013 decided on 17.01.2023, heard on: 15.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": " DR. SHAHID SIDDIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND AYESHA FAZAL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Mansoor Beg, Advocate for the Appellant.\nNemo for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED, LAHORE\nVS\nTHE CIR, LTU, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23733", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2025 = (2023) 128 TAX 38", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRTg", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\n•\nAppellant’s Business: M/s ARY Communication Ltd. is a local company primarily involved in establishing and broadcasting satellite TV channels.\n•\nIssue: The ADCIR amended the appellants assessment, treating an amount of Rs. 2,219,000,000 as a royalty payment that was not subject to tax withholding. The payment in question was made to M/s ARY Digital FZLLC (a non-resident company) for broadcasting services. The ADCIR argued that the payment should be treated as royalty, whereas the appellant disputed this categorization.\n•\nAppeal: The appellant filed an appeal before the CIR (Appeals-I) Karachi, which set aside the ADCIR’s amended order for de novo assessment proceedings under Section 122(5A).\nLegal Framework:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: The provisions invoked include Sections 2(24)(b), 2(24)(c), 21(C), 122(1), 122B, 122(5A), 122(9), and others, which deal with the scope of assessment, deductions, amendments, and appeals in the context of taxation.\n•\nTax Treaty (UAE-Pakistan): Article 12(3) of the Avoidance of Double Taxation Treaty between Pakistan and the UAE was central to the dispute, particularly regarding whether the payment constituted royalty under the treaty.\nAppellants Arguments:\n1.\nNo Royalty in Accounts: The appellant argued that the payment was not classified as royalty in their audited accounts or tax returns.\n2.\nNo Tax Withholding: The appellant contended that no tax was due because the payment did not constitute royalty under the treaty.\n3.\nExemption Certificate: The exemption certificates issued to the non-resident company ARY Digital FZLLC were binding, and the ADCIR had no basis to reclassify the payments as royalty.\nLegal Issues:\n•\nWhether the payment made by the appellant to ARY Digital FZLLC should be classified as royalty under Article 12(3) of the tax treaty, and if so, whether it was subject to withholding tax.\n•\nWhether the CIR(A) was right in setting aside the ADCIR’s amended order and remanding it for de novo proceedings under Section 122(5A).\nTribunals Findings:\n1.\nNo Royalty: The Tribunal found that the payment was not royalty under Article 12(3) of the Treaty. The sale of airtime (rather than the transfer of rights to use copyrighted content) was considered part of the “business profits” of ARY Digital FZLLC. Therefore, the ADCIR’s treatment of the payment as royalty was incorrect.\n2.\nLegal Infirmities: The Tribunal noted that the ADCIR had failed to properly examine the issue of withholding tax and the classification of the payment, and did not consider the audit proceedings or withholding tax monitoring.\n3.\nCompetency of CIR(A): The Tribunal held that the CIR(A) had no authority to set aside or remand the ADCIR’s amended order under Section 129(1)(a). The Tribunal ruled that the amended assessment order was an assessment order and thus not subject to remand under Section 129(1)(a), as the Finance Act 2005 amended the scope of this provision.\n4.\nAmended Order on a Public Holiday: The Tribunal also found that the ADCIRs order, passed on a Sunday (a public holiday), was void, as per previous Tribunal decisions stating that assessments cannot be passed on public holidays.\n5.\nFailure to Provide Opportunity: The CIR(A) had not provided an opportunity for the appellant to be heard regarding discrepancies found in the figures, particularly regarding differences in the audited accounts for different tax years (2012-2013 vs. 2013-2014).\n6.\nForgery Allegation: The allegation of forgery and tampering of the agreement was deemed baseless, as no notice was issued to the appellant, and there was no concrete evidence to support the charge.\nOutcome:\n1.\nAddition of Rs. 2,219,000,000: The Tribunal concluded that the amount should not be treated as royalty under Article 12 of the Treaty, and directed that the addition made by the ADCIR be deleted.\n2.\nTransfer Pricing Addition: The addition of Rs. 298,662,391 related to transfer pricing was also found to be incorrect and was directed to be deleted.\n3.\nAnnulment of ADCIR’s Order: The amended assessment order by the ADCIR was annulled due to legal infirmities, including passing the order on a public holiday and not following proper procedural steps.\n4.\nIncompetency of CIR(A) to Remand: The Tribunal ruled that the CIR(A) had no authority to remand the case for de novo proceedings.\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nRoyalty vs. Business Profits: The classification of payments as royalty under tax treaties depends on the transfer of specific rights (e.g., copyrighted content), which was not the case here.\n2.\nAuthority of CIR(A): After the amendments to Section 129(1), the CIR(A) cannot remand cases back for de novo proceedings, as they are now restricted to deciding appeals on the merits.\n3.\nStatutory Limitations: The principle that assessment orders cannot be made on public holidays, and that such orders may be annulled if passed in violation of this rule.\n4.\nNatural Justice: Failure to confront discrepancies and provide an opportunity for the appellant to address them renders the order void.\nConclusion:\nThe Tribunal found in favor of the appellant, setting aside the ADCIR’s amended assessment, deleting the addition of Rs. 2,219,000,000 for royalty, and ruling that the transfer pricing adjustments were made on incorrect facts. The case also highlights procedural and substantive issues, including the authority of the CIR(A) and the importance of following legal provisions and providing fair opportunities for the parties involved.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(24)(b),2(24)(c),2(54)(c),21(c),108,122(1):122B,122(9),122(5A),129,129(1),129(1)(a),129(1)(b),159(2),161,170(b),177,205", - "Case #": "ITA No 1162/KB/2019 decided on 02.11.2021, heard on: 25-10-2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHARIF AWAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SARDAR M. AJAZ KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Riazuddin, & Vishno Raja Advocates for the Appellants.\nM. Aslam Jamro DR., for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. ARY COMMUNICATION LTD., KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE - IV, CRTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23734", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2026 = 2023 SLD 2026 = (2023) 128 PLJ 771 = (2023) 128 TAX 127 = 2023 LHC 3935 = 2023 PTD 1791", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRXo", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) - Assessment of Tax and Recovery of Tax with Default Surcharge and Penalty\n________________________________________\nFacts:\nThe petitioner filed a constitutional petition to challenge the show cause notice dated June 5, 2023 and the subsequent notice dated June 13, 2023 issued by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, Large Taxpayers Office (LTO), Lahore.\n•\nThe show cause notice alleged that the petitioner, a registered person, had failed to pay their sales tax liability and had not filed sales tax returns for certain tax periods.\n•\nAs a result, the petitioner was exposed to default surcharge under Section 34(1)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and a penalty under Section 33(5) of the Act.\n•\nThe second notice was issued in response to the petitioner’s clarification letter, which stated that the show cause notice was issued under Section 11(1) of the Act.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nPetitioner’s Argument:\nThe petitioner contended that they were a registered person who failed to file returns for specific periods, and their case fell under Section 11(6) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, not under Section 11(1). The petitioner argued that under Section 11(6), the liability should be assessed differently, specifically under the provisions of Chapter 17 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006. Hence, the petitioner claimed that the show cause notice issued under Section 11(1) was invalid and issued without lawful authority.\n•\nRespondent’s Argument (FBR on Watching Brief):\nThe respondent, representing the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), contended that Section 11(6) of the Act only imposes the minimum tax liability, and this does not absolve the petitioner from the assessment of the full tax liability under the Act. Therefore, the FBR argued that the petitioner remained liable to pay the full tax liability, and the show cause notice issued under Section 11(1) was valid.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nSales Tax Act, 1990 - Section 11(1) & 33:\no\nThe Court held that Section 11(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 authorizes the Inland Revenue Officer to assess tax, including the imposition of penalty and default surcharge, in accordance with Sections 33 and 34 of the Act.\no\nA mandatory requirement under Section 11(1) is that the person in default must be given a notice to show cause before the tax assessment order is passed.\n2.\nSales Tax Act, 1990 - Section 11(1) & 11(6):\no\nThe Court noted that the provisions of Section 11(1) and Section 11(6) of the Act do not conflict with each other. In the absence of any contradiction, the petitioner’s plea that Section 11(6) should take precedence over Section 11(1) was not valid.\no\nThe Court explained that the show cause notice issued under Section 11(1) was in accordance with the law, and the non-obstante nature of Section 11(6) did not prevent the applicability of Section 11(1) in this case.\n3.\nDismissal of Petition:\no\nThe Court found that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it in limine, meaning that the petition was rejected at the initial stage without further examination.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Court ruled that the show cause notice issued under Section 11(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was valid and lawful. The petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed, and the show cause notice for the assessment of the tax, default surcharge, and penalty stood upheld.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n•\nSection 11(1) empowers the Inland Revenue officer to assess tax and impose penalties and default surcharges.\n•\nThe non-obstante clause in Section 11(6) does not create an inconsistency with Section 11(1) when the provisions are applied properly.\n•\nSales Tax Act provides a structured approach to the assessment of tax and penalties, and the show cause notice is an essential step in ensuring due process before the tax is levied.\n________________________________________\nReferences:\no\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Gujranwala v. S.K. Steel Casting, Gujranwala (2019 PTD 1493)\no\nMuhammad Mohsin Ghuman and others v. Government of Punjab through Home Secretary, Lahore (2013 SCMR 85)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(9),3(1),6(2),7(1),11,11(1),11(6),14,26,26(1),33,33(5),34.34(1),34(1)(a)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=18(a),157,157(5)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 42272 of 2023 decided on 21.06.2023, date of hearing: 21.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " RAHEEL KAMRAN, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abad ur Rehman, Advocate for the petitioner.\nMr. Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nMr. Muhammad Ashfaq Bhullar, Advocate for FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ABDULLAH SUGAR MILLS LTD.\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23735", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2027 = (2023) 128 TAX 134 = (2023) 128 LHC 3960 = 2023 PTD 1687 = 2024 PTCL 406", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTRXk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) - Rectification of Mistake by Appellate Tribunal\n________________________________________\nFacts:\nIn this case, the respondent was issued a show cause notice on January 29, 2015, which led to the Deputy Commissioners assessment order creating a demand for sales tax along with a default surcharge. The respondent appealed this decision, but the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) dismissed the appeal. The respondent then filed a further appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, which reversed the Commissioner’s decision and accepted the respondent’s appeal. The Tribunals decision led to the deletion of the demand upheld by the Collector (Appeals).\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nApplicant’s Argument (Revenue Authorities):\nThe learned counsel for the applicant (revenue authorities) argued that the Appellate Tribunal had unlawfully assumed the jurisdiction of review under the guise of rectification of a mistake, as provided by Section 57 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. They contended that the Tribunal exceeded its powers by reversing the decision in favor of the respondent, essentially reviewing the merits of the case, which is not permissible under the section concerning rectification.\n•\nRespondent’s Argument:\nOn the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent defended the Tribunals decision, arguing that the Tribunal had properly applied the rectification provision and had validly amended its earlier order. They emphasized that the rectification was necessary to correct errors that materially affected the outcome of the case.\n________________________________________\nQuestions of Law:\nThe following legal questions were referred to the High Court for its opinion:\n1.\nWhether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal unlawfully assumed the power of review under the guise of rectification?\n2.\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal had the power to amend its order by deleting the demand that had been upheld by the Collector (Appeals)?\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nSection 47 & Section 57 - Rectification and Review:\no\nThe Court examined the scope of Section 57 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which deals with rectification of mistakes. The Court clarified that rectification is allowed when there is an apparent mistake in the record that affects the outcome of the case. A mistake that was not adjudicated upon but is critical to the cases outcome may be corrected under Section 57, provided other conditions and limitations are met.\no\nHowever, the Court also stated that decisions already assailed in appeal or tax reference, which have merged into the final decision of a higher forum, are not subject to rectification.\no\nIn this case, the Court determined that the Appellate Tribunal had not overstepped its jurisdiction, as the rectification was based on valid reasons, and no illegality or infirmity was found in its action.\n•\nAnswers to Questions:\no\nThe Court answered Question 1 in the negative, meaning that the Tribunal had not unlawfully assumed the power of review.\no\nThe Court answered Question 2 in the affirmative, ruling that the Tribunal had the power to amend its order by deleting the demand upheld by the Collector (Appeals).\nThe Reference Application was disposed of in favor of the respondent and against the revenue authorities.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Appellate Tribunal was found to have properly exercised its powers under Section 57 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, to rectify a mistake in its order. The Tribunal was within its rights to delete the demand upheld by the Collector (Appeals) based on the rectification process, as there was no procedural irregularity or legal infirmity in its actions.\n________________________________________\nReferences:\no\nCommissioner Inland Revenue vs. Messrs Lahore Rubber Store (2023 PTD 182)\no\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Multan vs. Messrs Hafeez Ghee and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd Multan (2020 PTD 2025)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,7,8B,22,26,33(5),34,,47,57", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 53 of 2017, decided on 31.05.2023, heard on: 31.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": " ABID AZIZ SHEIKH AND RAHEEL KAMRAN, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Sultan Mahmood and Shahzad Ahmed Cheema, Advocates for the Applicants.\nMr. Sumair Saeed Ahmed, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVERSUS\nM/S MEHRAN BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL (PVT) LTD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23736", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2028 = 2023 SLD 2028 = 2024 PTCL 594 = (2023) 128 TAX 141", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTc", - "Key Words:": "Super Tax for Rehabilitation of Temporarily Displaced Persons - Constitutional Challenges\n________________________________________\nFacts:\nThe petitioners challenged the imposition of super tax under Section 4C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Some of the petitioners had also received notices from the Commissioner demanding super tax. They contended that the tax was unconstitutional and ultra vires to the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan, particularly Articles 4, 18, 23, and 24. The super tax was levied on high-earning individuals for the rehabilitation of temporarily displaced persons.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nPetitioners Argument:\no\nThe petitioners argued that the super tax, as imposed under Section 4C, was retrospective in nature and violated their vested rights. They contended that retrospective legislation cannot impair rights acquired through past transactions or events, as this would contravene the fundamental rights outlined in the Constitution. They emphasized that the super tax was being levied for a tax year (2022) based on events or transactions that had already occurred.\no\nThe petitioners also challenged the computation method for the super tax, claiming it was akin to ‘presumptive taxation,’ which should not be taxed under the Income Tax Ordinance, particularly in light of other provisions of the law.\n2.\nRespondents Argument (Government):\no\nThe government argued that the liability for super tax is determined at the time the income tax return is filed, which for the petitioners was after the promulgation of the Finance Act 2022. Therefore, the challenge to the super tax should be dismissed as the tax was legally imposed following the new law.\no\nAdditionally, the government referred to earlier decisions by High Courts that upheld the validity of Section 4B, which is similar to Section 4C, suggesting that the issue was already settled by the courts.\n3.\nSubmission on the Nature of Tax:\no\nMr. Sukhera argued that the new category of income created for the purposes of the super tax was a form of ‘presumptive taxation,’ which is permissible under the Federal Legislative List but should not be taxed in a manner inconsistent with other provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\nThe Court concluded that:\n1.\nSection 4C Ultra Vires:\no\nSection 4C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as it stands, is ultra vires the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 18, 23, and 24, read in conjunction with Article 4 of the Constitution. The super tax imposed under this section is considered to be against the scheme of the Constitution, and the Court decided that Section 4C should either be read down or declared unconstitutional.\no\nAll notices of demand or recovery issued under Section 4C were set aside. However, this did not prevent the revenue authorities from issuing fresh notices, provided they were in compliance with the Courts findings.\n2.\nReading Down Section 4C:\no\nThe Court chose to read down Section 4C, which meant adjusting its application to ensure compliance with constitutional principles. Specifically, the Court decided that:\n\nExclusions: Certain classes of income, which are already taxed under other provisions of the Ordinance, should be excluded from the computation of the super tax.\n\nExemptions: The super tax should not apply to exemptions related to benevolent funds or petroleum and exploration companies, where the tax would exceed the prescribed thresholds.\n\nProspective Application: Section 4C, as read down, would apply only prospectively, meaning it would not apply to transactions or events that occurred before June 30, 2022.\n\nDepreciation and Losses: Brought forward depreciation, business losses, and amortization allowances available under other provisions of the Ordinance would be excluded from the super tax calculation.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Courts decision ensures that while the super tax levied under Section 4C is not completely struck down, its application is significantly modified. It will not apply to events prior to July 1, 2022, and certain types of income and taxpayers are exempted. The decision emphasizes the constitutional need to balance taxation with the protection of fundamental rights and ensures that retrospective taxation does not infringe on the rights of individuals or businesses. The Courts approach is to save the provision rather than destroy it, making it applicable in a manner that aligns with constitutional principles.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4B,4CConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,18,23,24", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4027 of 2022 decided on 18.04.2023, dates of hearings: 27.10.2022, 23.11.2022; 09.12.2022, 15.12.2022, 23.12.2022, 10.01.2023, 11.01.2023, 12.01.2023, 13.01.2023, 17.01.2023, 18.01.2023, 23.01.2023, 24.01.2023, 25.01.2023, . 30.01.2023, 31.01.2023, 02.02.2023; 03.02.2023, 07.02.2023, 08.02.2023, 09.02.2023, 10.02.2023, 13.02.2023, 14.02.2023, 20.02.2023, 21.02.2023, 24.02.2023, 27.02.2023, 28.02.2023, 01.03.2023, 07,03.2023, 09.03.2023, 20.03.2023, 27.03.2023, 31.03.2023, 03.04.", - "Judge Name:": " SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Salman Akram Raja, Asad Ladha, Ramsha Banuri, Sameen Qureshi and Malik Ghulam Sabir, Advocates in WPs 4027, 4028, 4359, 4899, 4901, 4915/2022, 429, 430, 431/2023 Hafiz Muhammad Idris and Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Advocates in WPs 485.1, 4852, 4861, 4875, 4877, 4896/2022 and 36, 74, 157, 245, 246, 441, 689,. 696/2023 Sardar Ahmad Jamal Sukhera, Advocate in WPs 4854, 4855/2022, 49, 202, 203, 872/2023 Mr. Adnan Haider Randhawa, Advocate in WPs 230 and 231/2023 Mr. Faisal Khursheed Awan, Advocate in WPs 577, 578, 580, 581, 582, 675/2023 Mr. Muhammad Abubakar, Advocate in WP 432/2023 M/s Waheed Alam, Muhammad Shahrukh Sheikh, Sardar Alam Shafqat and Barrister Haroon Dugal, Advocates in WPs 4454 and 4457/2022 Mr. Faraz Fazal Sheikh, Advocate in -WP 622/2023 M/s Rashid Hafeez and Muhammad Usman Shaukat, Advocates in WPs 84, 85, 106, 320, 366, 367, 584, 681/2023 Ch. Imran ul Haq, Ch. Naeem ul Haq and Ch. Faheem ul Haq, Advocates in WPs 4653, 4857, 4876, 4897/2022, 35, 302/2023 Barrister SM Yawar, Advocate in WP 312/2023 M/s Shahbaz Butt and Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Advocates in WPs 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146/2023 Mr. Khalil ur Rehman, Advocate in WPs 4731, 4805, 4853, 4866/2022 Mr. Adnan Haider, Advocate in WP 230 and 231/2023 M/s Nasim Sikandar and Nudrat Sultana Alvi, Advocates in WPs 4765, 4766, 4767 and 4768/2022 Ch. Muhammad Nasir, Advocate in WP 58/2023 Mr. Khurram Mehmood Qureshi, Advocate in WP 300/2023 Mr. Khurram M. Hashmi and Noman A. Farooqi, Advocates in WPs 4904/2022 Mr. Waqar Javed, Advocate in WP 162/2023 Mirza Saqib Siddeeq, Advocate in WPs 162,'201, 923/2023 Mr. Mansoor Usman Awan, Ms. Zainab Janjua and Mr. Salar Khan, Advocates in WPs 188, 774/2023 Syed Tanseer Bukhari, Syed Tauqeer Bukhari and Syed Ali Murtaza Abbas, Advocates WPs 4924/2022 and WPs 283, 297/2023 Mr. Rahat Shaheen Khokhar, Advocate in WPs 4848 and 4849/2022 Barrister Yousaf Khosa, Abdullah Alam Qureshi and Malik Omair Saleem, Advocates in WP 4879/2022 M/s Shaheer Roshan Shaikh and Haider Aii Khan, Advocates in WP 4864/2022 Mr. Sabir Hussain, legal advisor in WPs 4028 and 4359/2022 Raja Shayan, Advocate in WP 4915/2022 for the Petitioners.\nHafiz Ahmad Rasheed, learned AAG for the Respondents.\nM/s Asma Hamid, Sana Azhar, Noor Ahsan and Mr. Hammad Hussain, Advocates for Commissioner IR, Syed Mumtaz Mazhar and Mr. Riaz Hussain Azam Bopera, Advocates for FBR for the Respondents.\nMr. Muhammad Akhtar Abbasi, Advocate for respondent no.7 and 8 in WP 534/2023 Barrister Atif Rahim Burki, Advocate in relevant petitions. Syed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi and Muhammad Imtiaz Abbasi, Advocates in relevant petitions\nMr. Muhammad Faisal Mushtaq Dar, Commissioner 1R (Legal) and Khan Faisal, Additional Commissioner IR, LTO for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S FAUJI FERTILIZER COMPANY LIMITED AND OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23737", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2029 = (2023) 128 TAX 187", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTY", - "Key Words:": "Refund of Customs Duty and Sales Tax\n________________________________________\nFacts:\nThe Respondents had imported Ring Spinning Frames and paid the statutory duties and taxes without challenging the imposition. Other textile mills, who imported the same machines, contested the imposition of duties and taxes. These mills approached High Courts and obtained ad-interim release orders, leading to the suspension of duties and taxes. However, the Respondents did not challenge the imposition of duties and taxes, and their request for the benefit of SRO 1076(I)/95 was dismissed by the department. They appealed to the Customs Tribunal, which allowed their claim for a refund of duties and taxes. The issue was then referred to the High Court.\n________________________________________\nQuestion of Law:\nThe central legal question is whether the Respondents were entitled to a refund of customs duty and sales tax under SRO 1076(I)/95, despite not having the goods released provisionally, nor having any ongoing legal challenge, unlike other importers.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nApplicant’s Argument (Department):\nThe learned counsel for the Applicant argued that the Respondents were not entitled to the benefit of SRO 1076(I)/95 because their goods were not released provisionally, nor was there a legal challenge pending. Therefore, the refund claim should be rejected. The case of Nishat Mills was cited in support of this position.\n•\nRespondent’s Argument:\nThe learned counsel for the Respondents argued that the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) issued a clarification on May 20, 1996, stating that the condition for provisional release or a pending court order was removed. Hence, the benefit of SRO 1076(I)/95 should be extended to all concerned, including the Respondents, and the Tribunals decision to allow the benefit was justified.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\nThe High Court held that the Respondents were not entitled to the benefit of SRO 1076(I)/95. The Court reasoned that none of the Respondents consignments had been released provisionally. They had accepted the levy of statutory duties and taxes without raising objections. Therefore, the Respondents did not meet the specific conditions laid out in SRO 1076(I)/95, which explicitly mentioned applicability under particular circumstances.\nThe proposed question was answered negatively, in favor of the Applicant and against the Respondents. The High Court set aside the impugned orders passed by the Customs Tribunal on March 20, 2006, and May 8, 2006, thus rejecting the Respondents claim for the refund of duties and taxes.\n________________________________________\nReferences:\n•\nSRO 1076(I)/1995, dated 5th November 1995\n•\nCase law referred: Nishat Mills\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Respondents were not entitled to the benefit of refund of customs duties and sales tax under SRO 1076(I)/95 due to failure to meet the conditions specified in the SRO, especially the requirement of provisional release or a pending court order. The Customs Tribunals decision was overturned by the High Court.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19,196(5)Sales Tax Act, 1990=13(1)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application Nos. 87 & 176 of 2006 decided on 20.02.2023, heard on: 20.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Masooda Siraj, advocate for the Applicant along with Mr. Jawaid Hussain advocate.\nMr. Hanif Faisal Alam, advocate for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUTSOMS\nVS\nM/S. CRESCENT TEXTILE MILLS (PVT) LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23738", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2030 = (2023) 128 TAX 84", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal – Service of Documents and Condonation of Delay\nDetails:\nThe Revenue filed an appeal against an order issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) (CIRA) dated 07.04.2022. The order was served on the Revenue on 17.05.2022, and the appeal was filed on 07.07.2022 under Section 131 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Registrars Office of the Appellate Tribunal treated the appeal as time-barred. The Revenue argued that the appeal was filed within the prescribed 60-day limitation period from the date of service and requested condonation of delay if any discrepancy arose regarding the computation of limitation.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal addressed the following key issues:\nService of Notices/Orders (Section 218): Notices/orders served electronically via IRIS cannot alone be considered proper service under Section 218 unless accompanied by primary or substituted modes of service as outlined in the Ordinance.\nPresumption of Service: Service through IRIS does not carry a presumption of proper service unless other approved modes (e.g., physical delivery) are simultaneously or consecutively employed.\nCondonation of Delay: Given that the service date (17.05.2022) was within the prescribed limitation period, the Tribunal overruled the objection of time-barred filing and allowed the condonation application.\nDecision:\nThe appeal was admitted for hearing, with the Tribunal concluding that electronically served orders/notices must be supplemented by primary modes of service to meet legal requirements. The case was listed for further hearing on merits.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131,218Income Tax Rules, 2002=74", - "Case #": "MA(Cond.) NO.261/LB/2022 in ITA NO.3324/LB/2022, decided on 21.09.2022, date of hearing:21.09.2022", - "Judge Name:": " ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Mehmood, DR alongwith Mr. Usman Khalil, LA and Mr. Tariq Naseer, LA for the Applicants.\nMr. Mansoor Beg, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE CIR, CTO, LAHORE\nVs\nM/S. KOHINOOR ENERGY LTD, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23739", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2031 = (2023) 128 TAX 93", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Amendment of Assessments – Minimum Tax on Income of Certain Persons\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, an Association of Persons (AOP) engaged in manufacturing grain products, filed a return for Tax Year 2010 declaring income of Rs. 2,362,388 and turnover of Rs. 454,750,560. Tax was assessed under Section 120(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (ACIR) deemed the assessment erroneous and prejudicial to revenue interests and issued a notice under Sections 122(5A) and 122(9), intending to levy minimum tax under Section 113 at 1% of turnover. Despite the taxpayers objections, the ACIR raised a tax demand of Rs. 4,547,505. The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) [CIR(A)] accepted the taxpayers appeal, which the Department contested.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held that turnover tax under Section 113 was not applicable to individuals and AOPs for Tax Year 2010, as the Finance Act, 2010, introduced this liability from Tax Year 2011 onwards. Since the taxpayers case pertained to the Tax Year 2010 (July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010), the imposition of turnover tax was invalid. The Tribunal found the CIR(A)’s order comprehensive, based on a reasonable interpretation of the law, and upheld it. The Department’s appeal was dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\n2019 SCMR 1111\n•\n1999 PTD (Trib.) 3226", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113,122(9),122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 354/KB/2016 decided on 18.10.2021, date of hearing: 08.10.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MS. SHAHER BANO WALAJAHI ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND QAZI ANWER KAMAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Amanat Ali Sher, DR, for the Appellant.\nMs. Lubna Pervez, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO-II, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S. PIONEER FLOUR MILLS, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23740", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2032 = (2023) 128 TAX 99", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Amendment of Assessments – Unexplained Income and Assets\nDetails:\nThe case involves an individual taxpayer, a member of the Karachi Stock Exchange, who derived income from dividends and the sale/purchase of shares. The taxpayer filed a return declaring Rs. 128,792/- in dividend income, subject to tax under the final tax regime. However, the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) discovered a bank account with transactions amounting to Rs. 149,202,250/- from 02-07-2008 to 24-03-2009. The DCIR issued a show cause notice under sections 122(5) and 122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and after no response from the taxpayer, made additions under section 111 of the ordinance. The taxpayer appealed to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR), who deleted the additions. The department appealed the decision before the Appellate Tribunal.\nHeld:\n•\nProcedural Fairness: The Appellate Tribunal found that the DCIR passed the order in a summary manner without providing the taxpayer a sufficient opportunity to present his case. The failure to offer a reasonable opportunity of being heard violated the principles of natural justice.\n•\nAdditions under Section 111: The addition under section 111(1)(a) for unexplained income of Rs. 149,202,250/- and section 111(1)(b) for Rs. 14,632,721/- (considered the opening balance of a bank account) were both vacated. The Tribunal noted that the amount was the closing balance for the prior tax year and not liable for taxation in the current year.\n•\nFresh Proceedings Ordered: The Tribunal directed the DCIR to issue a fresh show cause notice under sections 122(5) and 122(9), allowing the taxpayer to respond with all relevant documentation. The order of both the DCIR and the CIR (A) were vacated, but the observations on jurisdiction and limitation were confirmed. A new investigation was ordered with a timeline of three months to finalize the order.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,122(5),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA No.254/KB/2016 decided on 18.10.2021, heard on: 13.10.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MS. SHAKER BANO WALAJAHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND QAZI ANWER KAMAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Amanat Ali Sher, DR for the Appellant.\nMr. Muhammad Zeeshan Merchant, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, RTO, KARACHI\nVS\nMR. MUHAMMAD ABID ALIAS ABID ALI HABIB, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23741", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2033 = 2023 SLD 2033 = (2023) 128 TAX 104", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQSs", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 - Amendments and Deductions in Audit and Assessment\nDetails:\nThe case involves a Private Limited Company, a subsidiary of a Malaysian company holding 89% of the shares, which was subject to an audit under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The audit targeted the tax years 2013 and 2014, and issues arose regarding regulatory fee deductions, unverified expenses, commission on bank guarantees, and cash withdrawals. Despite submitting some replies and documents, the company faced additional assessments due to alleged non-compliance. The Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) confirmed these additions, which were contested by the taxpayer in appeal.\nHeld:\n•\nRegulatory Fee Addition: The addition related to regulatory fees was deemed illegal. The payment in question pertained to Access Promotion Contributions, not for Long Distance International License, and the officer failed to justify the disallowance based on conflicting facts. The payment had stopped since 2010 but the officer did not cross-check with the PTA.\n•\nOutstanding Liability: The addition under Section 34(5) concerning an outstanding liability was found to be incorrect. The issue pertained to a tax year prior to the one under audit, thus making the addition legally invalid.\n•\nCash Expenses Disallowance: The disallowance of cash expenses under Section 21(l) was deemed unjustified. The officer failed to specify the expense heads and voucher details, thereby making the entire cash withdrawal inadmissible without proper analysis.\n•\nBrought Forward Losses: The officer was instructed to work out the brought forward losses correctly, disallowing any excess brought forward by invoking Section 221 of the Ordinance.\n•\nNon-Compliance and Section 121: The order under Section 121 for non-compliance was challenged as unjustified. The officer had admitted that the audit observations were duly responded to by the taxpayer, and no sufficient grounds existed for issuing an order under Section 121.\n•\nAdministration of Justice: It was emphasized that failure to follow required procedures would undermine the entire legal process, emphasizing the need for adherence to legal principles.\nCitations:\n•\nSindh High Court in (2009) 100 TAX 289 (H.C. Kar.)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(l),21(c),21(g),34(5),120,121,122(1),122(5),122(9),174(2),177,214C,231A", - "Case #": "ITA No. 616/KB/2019 decided on 25.01.2021, date of hearing: 04.11.2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIFUALLH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. S.M. Rehan, FCA for the Appellant.\nMr. Aijaz Ahmed DR for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S MULTINET PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE M, LTU, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23742", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2035 = 2023 SLD 2035 = 2023 PTD 850", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.32 & 16-Mis-declaration-Power to prohibit or restrict importation and exportation of goods-Scope-Appellant imported residue solvent-Department found the material to be petrol, high speed diesel and fuel oil-Since the fuel oils were importable only by approved oil marketing companies according to Serial No. 02, Part II of Appendix B to Import Policy Order, 2020, therefore, the goods were confiscated-Validity-No proper test was ever conducted to ascertain the exact nature of the impugned goods-Laboratory report was not sought to ascertain the description or nature of the impugned sample rather a reference was sent to the laboratory to ascertain whether the sample was petrol, diesel or fuel oil-Irresponsible handling of the matter resulted into a very unspecific report which neither pointed out the percentage of Aliphatic or Aromatic Hydrocarbons in the sample nor the specific grade/number of fuel-Order-in-original was passed without ascertaining the facts thoroughly, as such, the same was set aside-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\nPLD 2008 SC 663 and Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia PLD 1958 SC 104 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=16, 32", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.K-7119 of 2021, decided on 25th October, 2021, heard on: 30th September, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Abdul Jabbar Qureshi, Member Judicial-I", - "Lawyer Name:": "Afzal Bhatti for Appellant.\nZikarur Rehman, AO for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs JADOON TRADING COMPANY\nVersus\nThe ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION-II) and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23743", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2036 = 2023 SLD 2036 = 2023 PTD 863 = (2023) 128 TAX 3 = 2023 PTCL 722", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQTg", - "Key Words:": "Interpretation of International Tax Conventions and Exemption from Tax under Double Taxation Convention\nDetails:\nThe case involved the interpretation of the Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the avoidance of double taxation, specifically regarding the exemption from income tax for a non-resident company (the petitioner) providing engineering services to a local company in Pakistan. The issue centered around whether the petitioner had a permanent establishment in Pakistan, which would subject its income to taxation. The petitioner claimed exemption under the Convention as it did not meet the necessary conditions to establish a permanent establishment.\nHeld:\n•\nTreaty Interpretation Rules: The court emphasized that international tax treaties, such as the one between Pakistan and the Netherlands, are governed by international law principles like those under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which differ from domestic tax laws. Unlike domestic tax rules, tax treaties are based on mutual agreements and are intended to avoid double taxation, not impose taxes.\n•\nPermanent Establishment Requirement: The court ruled that the petitioner, a non-resident company, did not meet the threshold requirement for a permanent establishment in Pakistan as set out in Article 5, Clause 4 of the Convention. The department failed to provide evidence that the petitioner had rendered services in Pakistan for more than four months in a twelve-month period, which is necessary to constitute a permanent establishment.\n•\nExemption from Tax: The petitioner was entitled to the exemption provided under the Convention as it did not fulfill the conditions for establishing a permanent establishment in Pakistan. Therefore, the income derived from providing engineering services to the local company was exempt from income tax in Pakistan.\nCitations:\n•\nAssistant Director of Income Tax v. E-Funds IT Solution Inc. (2018) 13 SCC 294\n•\nDIT (International Taxation), Mumbai v. Morgan Stanley and Co. Inc. (2007) 7 SCC 1", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=170,107(2)(c)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3286 to 3289 of 2017, decided on 2nd August, 2022.\n(Against the consolidated judgment of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad dated 15.06.2017, passed in ITR Nos. 160 of 2016, etc.)", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Chief Justice, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Justice and Munib Akhtar, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR for the Petitioners. (in all cases).\nMr. Babar Bilal, ASC a/w Shahid Soomro, Commissioner (Legal) for the Respondents. (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SNAMPROGETTI ENGINEERING B.V. through Special Attorney\nVersus\nCOMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE ZONE-II, L.T.U, ISLAMABAD and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23744", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2037 = 2023 SLD 2037 = 2023 SLD 876 = (2023) 128 TAX 69", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Customs Value of Imported Goods – Determination and Mis-declaration\nDetails: The case involved a dispute over the customs value of imported goods, where the appellant (importer) declared the transactional value of the goods and provided valid invoices and allied documents. The respondent (Department) rejected this declared value based on import data of identical goods from other importers but failed to provide cogent evidence to disprove the appellants declared value. The issue focused on the burden of proof regarding the declared transactional value under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969.\nHeld:\nBurden of Proof: The Court held that the appellant had successfully discharged the onus of proving the declared transactional value by submitting valid invoices and supporting documents.\nDuty of the Department: The Department was required to disprove the declared value with clear evidence but failed to provide such evidence. The reliance on import data of identical goods from other importers was insufficient to reject the appellants declared value.\nAcceptance of Declared Value: The Court concluded that the appellants declared transactional value should be accepted in accordance with Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, for subsequent assessment.\nOrders Set Aside: The impugned assessment order and the Order-in-Appeal were set aside, and the appeal was allowed.\nCitations:\nCollector of Customs, Port Muhammad Bin Qasim v. Messrs Zymotic Diagnostic International, Faisalabad (2008 SCMR 438)\n2005 PTD 909\n2007 PTD 1858\n2019 SCMR 1126", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25A,79,80,81Customs Rules, 2001=107A,109,438Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=85", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.K-1418 of 2016, decided on 31st January, 2023, heard on: 19th January, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " Shakil Ahmed Abbasi, Member Judicial-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Muhammad Ishauqe and Waqar Ahmed for Appellant.\nAdnan Younus, AO for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s FAISAL TRADING CO.\nvs\nThe COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS) and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23745", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2038 = 2023 SLD 2038 = 2023 SLD 889", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTQXk", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-S. 131-Appeal to Appellate Tribunal-Extension of stay order-Scope-Appellant sought extension of stay against recovery of tax demand-Validity-Tribunal had already granted stay to the appellant for aggregated period of 360 days in portions-There was no change in facts and circumstances of the case as were prevailing earlier-Main appeal was pending before the Tribunal and there existed special circumstances-Appellate Tribunal granted stay order to provide temporary relief to the appellant from undue hardship till disposal of main appeal.\n2016 PTD 1702 ref.\nMessrs Holmore Power Generation Company Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner, I.R and others (W.P.No.2608 of 2018) rel.", - "Court Name:": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "MA(Stay-Ext) No.969/KB of 2022 in I.T.A. No.345/KB of 2021, decided on 25th March, 2022, heard on: 25th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Habib Ullah Khan, Accountant Member and M. Aminullah Siddiqui, Judicial Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faiz Ahmed for Appellant.\nTariq Tunio, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FILTER PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED, KARACHI\nVersus\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, MTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23746", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2039 = 2023 SLD 2039 = 2023 PTD 892", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODc", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.196-Reference to High Court-Scope-Jurisdiction of High Court limited to questions of law-Imported vehicles, nature of-Tribunal was the last forum for the determination of facts-In the present case the Tribunal had concluded that the imported vehicles were prime movers-High Court realized the shortcomings in the references of the Customs department, therefore, it took it upon itself to ascertain the nature of the vehicles-High Courts jurisdiction under section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 was limited to a question of law, therefore, it did not lay within the jurisdictional domain of the High Court to itself determine the nature of the imported vehicles-If the High Court preferred any particular reports which were before it, and if it was setting aside the judgments of the Tribunal then it should have given valid reasons for its preference-However, the High Court should not have embarked upon determining the nature of the vehicles itself, and to do so by relying upon material which had not been produced either before the adjudicating officer or the Tribunal-Manner in which the High Court took upon itself to ascertain the nature of the imported vehicles could not be endorsed-Appeals were allowed by setting aside the impugned judgments of the High Court, with the direction that the subject vehicles be released immediately on payment of the applicable duties and taxes, if the same had not already been paid.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 2016 and 2017 of 2022, decided on 16th February, 2023, heard on: 16th February, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.05.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No. D-1390 of 2020 and SCRA No. 303 of 2020)", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, Yahya Afridi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahzada Mazhar, Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link, Lahore) for Appellant (in both cases).\nM. Nadeem Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms. Sania Rasool Bhutto, Assistant Collector (though video-link, Karachi) for Respondent (in C.A. No. 2016 of 2022).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs MIDDLE EAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, KARACHI\nVersus\nThe COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23747", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2040 = 2023 SLD 2040 = 2023 PTD 896", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODY", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.196, 194A & 194B-Reference to High Court-Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal-Reasons for decision-Scope-Appellate Tribunal must independently decide the controversy before it and not approve the finding of Collector (Appeals) in a slipshod manner-As the last fact-finding forum, it is the Tribunals duty to reach an independent decision after considering the contentions raised by the parties-High Court cannot approve a mere endorsement of Collector (Appeals) appellate order-If the Tribunal does not take relevant facts into consideration or deliberate on the reasons for or against the appeal, then it has not decided the appeal and any purported order or judgment would be a nullity in law-Therefore, if the Tribunal fails to address a question of law or fact raised before it or before any other forum under the relevant statute, it is treated as a question of law for the purposes of a reference application before the High Court.\nWateen Telecom Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2015 PTD 936 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194A,194B,196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Applications Nos.259 to 269 C.M.A. No.1816 of 2012 and 1594 of 2014, decided on 15th December, 2020.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Agha Faisal, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Pervez Iqbal Kasi for Applicant.\nShakeel Ahmed for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IBRAHIM FIBRES LIMITED\nVersus\nCUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23748", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2041 = 2023 SLD 2041 = 2023 PTD 899", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODU", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.32, 25, 79, 80 & First Schedule-General Rules for Interpretation of First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969, R.3(a)-Customs General Order No. 12 of 2002, dated 15-6-2002-Imported goods, classification of-Assessment-Classification Committee, powers of-Dispute pertaining to classification of Tin Mill Black Plate of thickness 0.30 mm or less (TMBP)-Whether as per version of appellant/importer TMBP was classifiable under PCT heading 7209.1891 or as per version of respondent/Department, the same was classifiable under PCT heading 7209.1810-Held, that the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969, (Pakistan Customs Tariff and Trade Controls) prescribed that the heading under PCT heading 7209.1891 was a specific heading for TMBP, whereas the heading relied upon by the respondent/Department pertained to some other kind of goods-Examination report as well as physical description of the impugned goods by the appropriate officer had confirmed that TMBP fell under its specified PCT heading 7209.1891 read with R.3(a) of General Rules for Interpretation of First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969-Committee, in the present case, was formed without any reference by an aggrieved person-Formation of Committee was not even publicly communicated through any Public Notice as mandated under CGO No. 12/2002-Record also revealed that the dispute of classification of the TMBP was already settled by the Customs Appellate Tribunal previously, thus the decision of the Classification Committee, in the present case, was to disregard, disrespect and sabotage the judgment of Appellate Tribunal - Impugned Decision was not sustainable under the law and could not be made basis to assess the consignment of the appellant- Final assessment and Order-in Appeal were set-aside-Appeal was allowed, under circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,32,79,80,First Schedule", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.K-1581 of 2022 and K-1582 of 2022, decided on 29th March, 2023, heard on: 20th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Shakil Ahmed Abbasi, Judicial Member-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Imran Iqbal for Appellants.\nAlvis, AO for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs SHAMIM TIN MERCHANT through Proprietor\nVersus\nThe COLLETOR OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS), KARACHI and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23749", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2042 = 2023 SLD 2042 = 2023 PTD 908", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODQ", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 32, 32-A, 80 & 196-Pak-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) notified vide SRO 659(I)/2007 dated 30-06-2007-Reference-Imported goods, classification of-Question of facts-Scope-Importer/applicant declared the imported goods as Methyldopa USP 34 and claimed exemption of customs duty under S. No. 1083 of Table-1 to SRO 659(I)/2007 dated 30.06.2007 (the Notification)-Department issued Show Cause Notice against the importer contending that the exemption of customs duty was available to some other commodity Alanine thus disentitling the importer for exemption under the Notification-Importer /applicant filed Customs Reference impugning the Order-in-Original and Order-in-Appeal passed against him contending his version as a question of law-Held, that Serial Nos. 1082 and 1083 at the Notification disclosed description of the goods as Alanine -Jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked for reappraisal of the facts as to the classification of goods imported by the applicant-Tribunal had determined the concerned question(s) of facts, which had attained finality-Questions raised by the Importer /applicant in the Reference were not based on law but on facts-No interference by the High Court made out against the order and judgment passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal-Reference application was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,32A,80,196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.136 of 2017, decided on 27th March, 2023, heard on: 27th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Agha Faisal, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Pervez Iqbal Kasi for Applicant.\nKhalid Mehmood Siddiqui for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs OBS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. through Senior Manager Finance\nVersus\nThe CUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23750", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2043 = 2023 SLD 2043 = 2023 SLD 911", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTOC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 153, 161 & 53-SRO 586(I)/91 dated: 30-06-1991-Failure to pay tax collected or deducted-Payments for goods, services and contracts-Exemptions and tax concessions-Scope-Department raised demand and imposed liabilities upon the appellant for its failure to withhold income tax on payment of Use of System Charges (UOSC) to National Transmission and Dispatch Company-Validity-Payments relating to UOSC were in fact made for the supply of electricity-Taking into consideration the nature/definition/explanation of UOSC, it could be construed that UOSC was part and parcel of the process for electricity supply and could not be separated from supply of electricity-As such, its exempt from deduction of income tax as per Clause 46AA of the 2nd Schedule to the Part IV of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and SRO 586(I)/91 dated: 30-06-1991-Orders passed by department were set aside.\nMessrs Multan Electric Power Company, Multan v. The CIR, RTO, Multan (ITA No. 1687/LB/2019) rel.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 161 & 177-Failure to pay tax collected or deducted-Audit-Scope-Direct invoking of S. 161 without recourse to audit under S.177 is bad in law.\n2015 PTD (Trib.) 654 and 2012 PTD (Trib.) 122 ref.\n(c) Administration of justice-Thing required by law to be done in a certain manner must be done in the same manner as prescribed by law or not at all.\n2001 SCMR 838 and 2003 SCMR 1505 ref.\n(d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art.129(e)-Public documents-Presumption-Scope-Presumption of regularity and correctness is attached to the contents of all official documents.\n2001 SCMR 279 and 2017 CLC Note 139 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=53,153,161,177", - "Case #": "I.T.As. Nos.441/PB to 444/PB of 2019, decided on 28th September, 2022, heard on: 28th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Masood Manzar, Chairman and Imtiaz Ahmed, Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hussain Ahmed Sherazi and Mouazzam Ali Butt for Appellants.\nNone for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, LIMITED (PESCO), WAPDA HOUSE, PESHAWAR\nVs\nThe COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23751", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2044 = 2023 SLD 2044 = 2023 PTD 919 = (2024) 130 TAX 619", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTOCs", - "Key Words:": "This passage discusses a constitutional petition involving the audit selection process under Pakistans Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001). Here are the key points:\nAudit Selection under Sections 177(1) and 214C:\nThe petitioners, taxpayers, challenged the selection of their cases for audit.\nThe court clarified that the audit selection by the Commissioner Inland Revenue under Section 177(1) does not depend on prior selection by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under Section 214C.\nDeemed Assessment and Audit:\nDeemed assessment under Section 120 does not preclude audit selection.\nAn audit may or may not lead to an amended assessment.\nThe audit process must ensure compliance with principles of natural justice, particularly the right to be heard (audi alteram partem).\nCommunication and Justification:\nAudit selection notices must include specific reasons for the selection, which must be communicated to the taxpayer.\nIf the reasons are inadequate, the notices may be set aside or remanded for proper reasoning after hearing the taxpayer.\nProcess for Audit and Hearing:\nThe law does not mandate a two-step process (initial hearing and then audit) if adequate reasons for selection are provided in the notice.\nA preliminary audit or intermediate speaking order is not required before proceeding with the audit.\nCase Examples:\nThe audit-selection notice, in this case, identified discrepancies such as mismatches in salary expenses and withholding tax deductions, incorrect expense proration, unexplained cash expenses, and other financial anomalies.\nThe court found these reasons sufficient to meet the legal standard.\nDisposition:\nThe constitutional petition was disposed of, allowing the audit to proceed with adherence to legal and procedural safeguards.\nCited Case Law: The judgment referenced several precedents, including Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2016 PTD 1484), Kohinoor Sugar Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 PTD 821), and others, to support its conclusions about audit selection and procedural requirements. These cases emphasize the balance between taxpayer rights and the powers of the tax authorities.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.35 and 136 of 2022, decided on 27th January, 2023, heard on: 12h December, 2022", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Rasheed Ghouri for Petitioner (in W.P. No.35 of 2022).\nBarrister Atif Rahim Barki for Respondents Nos.2 to 4 (in W.P. No.35 of 2022).\nCh. Tahir Mehmood, A.A.G. (in W.P. No.35 of 2022).\nHafiz Muhammad Idris for Petitioner (in W.P. No.136 of 2022).\nBabar Bilal for Respondents Nos.1 to 3, Ch. Muhammad Tahir Mehmood, A.A.G. assisted by Masood Akhtar, Commissioner IR Audit LTU and Muhammad Faheem, Deputy Commissioner, IR Unit, LTU, Islamabad for Respondents (in W.P. No.136 of 2022).", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAIRDEAL EXCHANGE COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Director of Company\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Ministry of Finance and 3 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23752", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2045 = 2023 SLD 2045 = 2023 PTD 953 = (2023) 128 TAX 244 = 2023 PLD 953", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Extension of Limitation for Income Tax Assessment\nDetails: This case involved the extension of the limitation period for completing an amendment of an assessment under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, following the issuance of a notification by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) on 30-06-2020. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue set aside the extension of limitation granted under the FBR’s notification. The issue revolved around whether the word finalization in the notification could extend the limitation period for cases where proceedings had not commenced within the prescribed period.\nHeld:\nLimitation and Finalization: The High Court clarified that the word finalization refers to the completion or closure of proceedings that have already begun within the prescribed time limit. It is not applicable to cases where proceedings had not commenced within the limitation period.\nNotification C. No. 3 (22) S (IR-Operations) 2020: The Court held that this notification applied only to cases where proceedings had already been initiated before the expiration of the limitation period, specifically for tax year 2014. It did not authorize the commencement of proceedings after the expiry of the limitation period under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nExercise of Discretionary Power: The Court upheld the exercise of discretionary power under Section 214-A by the FBR to extend the time limit for completing proceedings when a notice was issued within the prescribed period but finalization could not occur for justifiable reasons beyond the control of the taxpayer or the revenue authority.\nReference Dismissed: The reference challenging the extension of the limitation was dismissed, with the Court declining to give an expansive interpretation to the word finalization in the notification.\nCitations:\nChambers Concise Dictionary\nThe Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Muhammad Din and Sons (2017 PTD 1756)\nFederal Board of Revenue v. Abdul Ghani (2021 SCMR 1154)\nFaisalabad Electricity Supply Company Limited v. The Federation of Pakistan (2021 SCMR 1463)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(2),133,214A", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No.64481 of 2022, decided on 22nd May, 2023, heard on: 15th March, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Karim, Justice and Raheel Kamran, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Sikandar Khan for Applicant.\nShahbaz Butt for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nvs\nMUHAMMAD AFZAL CHEEMA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23753", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2046 = 2023 SLD 2046 = 2023 PTD 928 = (2023) 128 TAX 16", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTODg", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax Exemption on Import of Styrene Butadiene Rubber (SBR)\nDetails: The appellant (Customs Department) contested the exemption from sales tax on the import of Styrene Butadiene Rubber (SBR) Grade 1502 by the respondent (importer). The exemption was granted under SRO 1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011, which allowed a sales tax exemption on SBR imported in latex form. The Department argued that the exemption applied only to SBR in latex form and that the respondent had imported SBR in solid lumps, which did not have usage in the export-oriented sector.\nHeld:\nClassification of SBR: The Court ruled that SBR in latex form was not classified under PCT 4002.1900 but was specifically classified under PCT 4002.1100.\nExemption under SRO 1125(I)/2011: The exemption from sales tax under SRO 1125(I)/2011 was specifically granted for SBR under PCT 4002.1900. The exemption claimed by the respondent for importing SBR Grade 1502 was rightfully extended by the Clearance Collectorate.\nRule of Consistency: The Court observed that several consignments from other importers had already been released with the same exemption under SRO 1125(I)/2011. As a result, the rule of consistency applied in this case.\nOrder-Upheld: The Court upheld the order-in-original passed in favor of the importer/respondent, and the appeal by the Customs Department was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1),32(2),32(5),79,156(1)", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-385 of 2020, decided on 31st January, 2023, date of hearing: 30th January, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " Shakil Ahmed Abbasi, Member Judicial-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aijaz Khan, IO present for the Appellant.\nSiddiq Zia and Mohammad Aslam for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION-CUSTOMS, KARACHI\nVs\nMAYA CORPORATION and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23754", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2047 = 2023 SLD 2047 = 2023 PTD 938", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTOHo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.81-Provisional determination of liability-Scope-Petitioner sought direction to the department to allow provisional release of imported consignments under S. 81 of the Customs Act, 1969, till such time its representation for granting exemption from levy of regulatory duty was finally decided by the department-Validity-Pendency of mere representation could not be accepted as a cause for provisional release of any consignment-Petition being misconceived was dismissed.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-Art.199-Constitutional jurisdiction-Ad-interim relief-Scope-High Court, in exceptional circumstances, can pass ad-interim orders pending final adjudication of a petition; but that can only be done when a prima facie case is made out that the petitioner may be able to succeed before the Court in its final determination of the dispute-Ad-interim relief can only be granted where there is every likelihood that if such a relief is not granted, the party approaching the Court may be prejudiced-It is only when the Court is empowered to grant the final relief, an ad-interim relief can be granted-Approaching a constitutional court, in any other situation or manner, is not a correct approach.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=81Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No.D-699 of 2023, decided on 2nd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Agha Faisal, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Adeel Awan for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs JAMAL SEAMLESS PIPE (PVT.) LTD. through Constituted Attorney\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary (Revenue Division) and 4 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23755", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2048 = 2023 SLD 2048 = 2023 SLD 942", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTOHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S. 179-Power of adjudication-Issuance of order-in-original-Limitation-Scope-Where Adjudication Officer had passed the order-in-original after 3 years, 2 months and 24 days instead of 120 days as specified in S. 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, Customs Appellate Tribunal held that the time lines prescribed in S. 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, were mandatory and not directory-Order-in-original was set aside without touching merits of the case-Appeal was accepted.\nCollector of Customs v. Israr and others 2021 PTD 501 and Collector Gujranwala v. M/s. Super Asia 2017 SCMR 1427 = 2017 PTD 1756 rel.\n(b) Words and phrases-\n-Remand-Meaning.\nMeaning of word remand is to send back a case to the same Court out of which it came for purpose of having some action on it there.\nNazzaz Ali v. Member Judicial 1993 MLD 1333 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=179, 179(3)", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.K-7591 of 2021, decided on 30th November, 2021, heard on: 1st November, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Abdul Jabbar Qureshi, Member Judicial-I", - "Lawyer Name:": "Afzal Bhatti for Appellant.\nZeeshan, I.O. for Respondent No.IV.\nZikir ur Rehman, A.O. for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs SOHAIL AZHAR\nVersus\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS MCC OF PaCCS CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23756", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2049 = 2023 SLD 2049 = 2023 PTD 1419", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDc", - "Key Words:": "Section 5 of the Sindh Sales Tax on Service Act, 2011 (‘the Act’), being the charging provision, is a substantive provision and has a direct nexus to the taxable event provided for under Section 4 which particularly excludes the services of the employees to the employer. In any event, the. taxing event cannot go beyond the parameters drawn under Section 8 of the Act which restricts the scope of the tax to the value of taxable service. Put simply, the charging provision (Section 5) must align with the taxable event (Section 4) while staying within the scope of the tax (Section 8).\nThe amount of sales tax on services levied is based purely on the value charged by the service provider for the service it renders, which value is determined by the service provider itself, establishing a connection between the consideration paid and the service provided. Moreover, for a service to be taxable, it must be listed in the First Schedule to the Act and involve an economic activity conducted as a business, profession, or trade, whether or not for profit. The service is treated under the Act as an economic activity and will not include the activities of the employee to carry out the service. As per the procedure under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Rules, 2011 (‘the Rules’), the service provider is required to collect and deposit the tax in the government treasury, for which purpose, the service provider issues an invoice that includes the value of the service including the salaries paid, and other expenses associated with security and manpower.\nArgument of petitioner (Sindh Revenue Board) that the gross amount charged includes all amounts, including reimbursable expenses such as salaries, lacks merit. This is because these amounts are actually paid by the service recipient, and neither do they form part of the economic activity conducted by the service provider, nor of the consideration paid for by the service recipients for the services rendered. Gross amount charged, for the purposes of sales tax on services, relates to the consideration in money paid for the value of the taxable service under section 5, the applicability of which is restricted by Section 8 defining the scope of the tax, which means that quantum is charged for the service alone, nothing more and nothing less. The value of taxable service is determined on the basis of the value of economic activity - carried out in the provision of the service and salaries, being reimbursable expenses, are not part of the taxable service or its value; thus, they are not included in value of the service. The consideration paid is only for the services rendered and cannot include the cost borne by the service recipient in respect of the salaries paid to the security and manpower it procured. Therefore, the sales tax on services can only be levied on consideration paid for service provided or rendered, and salaries paid by the employer to the employees are not part of the service rendered for this purpose, and so are not taxable.\nThe scope of the tax as provided under the Act cannot be altered by the Rules. Hence, the scope or value of the tax could not be expanded than what the Act has proscribed through the Rules. So, irrespective of the amendments through which the provisos to Rules 42E(3) and 42E(5) of the Rules were omitted, salaries could not be included in the gross amount charged or taxed. Even if the amendments were brought about only to bring the salaries paid to the labour and manpower with the preview of the tax, the same still could not have been allowed being not only beyond the scope of the Act but also being inconsistent with it. Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\nSuo Motu Case No. 13 of 2009 PLD 2011 SC 619 and Suo Motu Case No. 11 of 2011 PLD 2014 SC 389 ref.\n(b) Delegated legislation——Delegated legislation is intended to enforce the law and advance the purpose of the underlying legislature, without overriding it and while minutiae could be filled in, the parent statute could neither be added to nor subtracted from.\nMuhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630 ref.\n(c) Interpretation of statutes—Rules framed under a statute—Scope—If a rule goes beyond what the parent statute contemplates, it must yield to the statute.\nCollector of Central Excise and Sales Tax v. Rupali Polyester Limited 2002 SCMR 738 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=4,5,8", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 414 of 2021, C.M.A. No. 1963 of 2021 in C.P. 414 of 2021, Civil Petitions Nos. 1188 to 1259, 47S-K, 476-K, 1422 to 1430, 2819, 317-K to 389-K of 2021, 579 and 777 of 2022, decided on 12th October, 2022. Dates of hearing: 29th September, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 11th and 12th October, 2022.\n(Against the judgments and orders dated 17.11.2020, 01.02.2021, 19.01.2021, 09-02.2021, 23.12.2021 and 19.01.2022, passed by the High Court of Sindh in C.Ps. Nos.D-5283, D-5220, D-5252 to D-5224", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Uzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis M. Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No.414 and C.M.A. 1963 of 2021).\nAzid Nafees, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos. 1188 to 1259, 1422 to 1430, 2819 of 2021, 579 and 777 of 2022).\nSaifullah, Additional Advocate General, Sindh (via video link from Karachi) for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos.317-K to 389-K, 475-K and 476-K of 2021).\nMakhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Saad Hashmi, Advocate and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record . for Respondents (in C.Ps.320-K, 324-K, 330-K, 337-K, 340-K, 342-K, 345-K to 347-K, 351-K, 353-K, 356-K, 361-K, 366-K, 377-K, 378-K, 380-K and 385-K of 2021).\nAbdul Sattar Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.Ps. Nos.1207, 1208, 1226, 1245 and 1251 of 2021).\nZaheer Minhas, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.P.414 of 2021). \nFaisal Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents, (in C.Ps. Nos. 1222 of 2021 and 359-K of 2021).\nMoiz Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.Ps. Nos.348-K and 384-K of 2021).\nKhalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Karachi) for Security Services (in C.Ps. Nos.2819 of 2021 and 475-K of 2021).\nNemo for other Respondents (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SINDH REVENUE BOARD through Secretary Government of Sindh, Karachi and others\nVS\nMessrs QUICK FOOD INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23757", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2050 = 2023 SLD 2050 = (2023) 127 TAX 639 = 2024 PTD 955", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Tax Credit for Investment – Amendment of Section 65B and Vested Rights\nDetails: Section 65B was introduced in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, through the Finance Act 2010, granting a 10% tax credit to qualifying companies for investment in plant and machinery, provided the purchase and installation occurred within a specified timeframe. Over the years, the deadline for eligibility was extended multiple times, including until 30th June 2021 by the Finance Act 2018. However, the Finance Act 2019 reversed the deadline to 30th June 2019 and halved the tax credit for the tax year 2019.\nThe petitioners contended that they had accrued vested rights under the previous version of Section 65B, and the 2019 amendment unfairly prejudiced these rights by reducing the credit retrospectively. They argued that those who had installed plant and machinery by June 2019 should receive the full tax credit, and those who had installed by June 2021 should still be entitled to it. The respondents argued that the amendment only altered the expiration date, without affecting vested rights.\nHeld:\nVested Rights: The Court found that the petitioners had vested rights under the previous provisions of Section 65B. The amendment in the Finance Act 2019, which retroactively altered these rights, was considered unjust.\nScope of Amendment: The Court allowed the petitions, ruling that the provisions of Section 65B should reflect that the tax credit is available for plants and machinery purchased before 30th June 2019 and installed before 30th June 2021.\nRevised Interpretation of Section 65B:\nSection 65B(2): The tax credit provisions apply to plant and machinery purchased before 30th June 2019 and installed before 30th June 2021.\nSection 65B(3): The credit amount should be deducted from the tax payable for the tax year in which the installation occurred.\nThe determination of whether the purchase and installation occurred within the specified timeframe should be conducted by the tax department in ongoing or new proceedings.\nStriking Down of Proviso: The first proviso to Section 65B(1), introduced through the Finance Act 2019, was struck down as it was deemed to unjustly abridge the petitioners vested rights.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=65B", - "Case #": "C.P.D. 8233 of 2019, decided on 07.02.2023, Dates of hearing: 25.01.2023 26.01.2023 07.02.2023 (and connected matters, particularized in the Schedule hereto.)", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, Justice and Agha Faisal, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Messrs. Raashid Khalid Anwar, Hussain Ali Almani, Ovais Ali Shah, Abid H Shaban, Anwar Kashif Mumtaz, Naveed A. Andrabi. Ammar A. Saeed, Khawaja Aizaz Ahsan, Imran Iqbal Khan, Naeem Suleman. Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Qazi Umair Ali, Fahim Bhayo, Tasawwur Ali Hashmi, Fahad Ali Hashmi. Usman Alam, Ameen M. Bandukda, Sami-ur-Rehman, Syed Muhammad Ali Mehdi, Basil Nabi Malik, Tauqeer Randhava, Asghar Bangash, Ali Akbar Poonawala, Kashan Ahmed, Maimona Nasim, Syed Danish Ghazi, Maaz Waheed, Muhammad Inzimam Sharif, Muhammad Din Qazi, Abdul Rahim Lakhani, Abdul Jabbar Mallah. Atta Muhammad Qureshi, Ameer Haider Khan. Maryam Riaz, Imtiaz Ali Sahito, Naveeda Bisharat, Imtiaz Ali, Sufiyan Zaman, Muneeb U Qidwai, Jawaid Farooqi, Umer Hays Khan, Faiz Durrani, Sarnia Faiz Durrani. Ghulam Muhammad, Gharib Shah, Bilal Ahmed Khan. Rizwan Ahmed, limad ul Hasan, Syed Aamir Ali Shah, Farhan Ali Shah, Faizan Faizi & Ali Nawaz Khuhawar, Advocates for petitioners.\n \nMessrs. Shah Nawaz Memon, Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Shahid Ali Qureshi, Rana Sakhawat Ali, M. Taseer Khan, Iqbal, Fayaz Ali Metlo, Imran Ali Mithani, Alizeh Shahani, Qaim Ali Memon. Munawwar Ali Memon. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Zohaib Ahmed, Fozia M. Murad. Muhammad Bilal Bhatti, Ayaz Sarwar Jamali, Riaz Sarwar Jamali, Motia Sikandar on behalf of Muhammad Zubair Hashmi. Bushra Zia, Asma Zahra, Irfan Mir Halepota, Farha Naz Qazi. Tauqeer Ahmed Seehar, Iqbal Hussain, Fouzia M. Murad, Sami Malik, Arshad Ali Tunio, Imzan Ahmed Maitlo. Muhammad Idrees Rahmoon, Zulfiqar Ali Jalbani, Ali Tahir, Hafeezulah. Syed Mohsin Imam, Abdul Sattar Pathan, S. Ahsan Ali Shah. Abdul Sami, Faheem Raza, Asif Ali Siyal. Mujeeb Zeeshan Kumbhar, Sajjad Ali Solangi, Advocates; G.M. Bhutto (Assistant Attorney General), Qazi Ayazuddin (Assistant Attorney General) Ms. Manzooran Gopang. (Law Officer. Law Department) for the respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAPPHIRE TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23758", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2051 = 2023 SLD 2051 = (2023) 127 TAX 785 = 2025 PTD 521", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDU", - "Key Words:": "Customs Duty, Sales Tax, and Surcharge on Aircraft under Dry Lease – Writ Petition for Mandamus, Prohibition, and Certiorari.\nDetails: In 2013, the petitioner, International Airlines Corporation Limited, added three aircraft to its fleet on a dry lease. Following this, the petitioner received a demand from customs authorities for payment of customs duties, sales tax, and other taxes. The petitioner referred the matter to the Finance Minister, and the Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) allowed the taxes to be paid in installments. However, a post-clearance audit led to a show-cause notice for failing to levy a surcharge under Section 83 of the Customs Act, 1969. The petitioner contested this, arguing that no duty was due because the aircraft were on dry lease and therefore not subject to import taxes.\nHeld:\n•\nLack of Challenge to Principal Liability: The Court held that the orders demanding payment of Rs. 1,258,044,330, including the arrangement allowing installment payments, had not been contested by the petitioner since 2013. The Court found the petition premature as it had not been raised in the appropriate forum.\n•\nAdequate Remedy through Appellate Tribunal: The Court emphasized that the petitioner had an adequate remedy through the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The tribunal is the appropriate forum to resolve matters of fact and law, and the Court noted that the Appellate Tribunal had become functional after the appointment of its chairman.\n•\nNo Grounds for Declaration on Principal Liability or Surcharge: The Court concluded that the principal liability regarding the taxes and surcharge could not be contested in a writ petition. The petitioner should approach the relevant authorities, such as the Federal Board of Revenue or the ECC, if it wished to revisit the issue of liability.\n•\nDecision on Appeal: The Court rejected the petition seeking a declaration on the principal liability and surcharge but directed the Appellate Tribunal to expeditiously decide the petitioner’s appeal. Meanwhile, the department was restrained from taking coercive measures for the disputed liability until the tribunal’s decision.\nCitations:\n•\nMessrs Kamalia Sugar Mills Limited, Kamalia Vs. Superintendent, Intelligence and Investigation (Customs and Central Excise), Regional Office, Lahore and another (2002 PTD 632)\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore Vs. B.C. Srinivasa Setty [(1981) 128 ITR 295]\n•\nDr. Sher Afghan Khan Niazi Vs. Ali S. Habib and others (2011 SCMR 1813)\n•\nThe Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and 3-others Vs. Messrs S.M. Ahmad and Company Pvt. Ltd. (1999 SCMR 138)\n•\nThe Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. Vs. Federation of Pakistan and 2-others (RED 1972 SC 279)\n•\nSyed Ali Abbas and others Vs. Vishan Singh and others (PLD 1967 SC 294)\n•\nLt. Col Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan Vs. The Controller of Estate Duty (PLD 1961 SC 119)\n•\nCh. Iftikhar Ahmad Vs Chief Secretary Punjab and others (2012 PLC (CS) 1470)\n•\nOther cited cases and precedents.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,199(1)(a)(i),199(1)(a)(i)(ii),199(1)(b)(i),199(1)(b)(i)(ii),199(1)(CC)Customs Act, 1969=18,25", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 2158 of 2020, decided on 18.01.2022, date of hearing: 20.10.2021", - "Judge Name:": " AAMER FAROOQ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Anwar Kamal, Advocate and Mr. M. Umer Khan Verdag, Advocate for the Petitioners.\nMr. Umer Farooq Malana, Advocate, Mr. Mazhar-ul-Haq Hashmi, Advocate, Kh. Muhammad Imtiaz, Deputy Attorney General for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION LIMITED\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23759", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2052 = 2023 SLD 2052 = (2023) 127 TAX 564 = 2024 PTD 265", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax on Imported Indian Raw Cotton – Application of SRO 1125(I)/2011 and SRO 154(I)/2013, Recovery of Deficit Tax, Penalty\nDetails: The applicant imported Indian Raw Cotton and paid 2% sales tax upon release of the consignment, based on SRO 1125(I)/2011 dated 21.12.2011. However, during an audit, it was determined that the applicable sales tax rate for the import was 16%, and a demand for the recovery of the deficit tax, along with penalties, was issued. The applicant appealed the decision, arguing that the reduced 2% sales tax was correct, particularly under the provisions of SRO 154(I)/2013. The appeal was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal, leading to the filing of a reference to the High Court.\nHeld:\n•\nApplication of SRO 154(I)/2013: The High Court ruled that the applicant was entitled to the benefit of SRO 1125(I)/2011, as amended by SRO 154(I)/2013. The court found that SRO 154(I)/2013 applied to goods used as industrial inputs at the spinning stage in the textile sector, and the applicant’s imported raw cotton was eligible for this reduced tax rate.\n•\nInterpretation of Statutes/Notifications: The court emphasized that when interpreting fiscal statutes or notifications, the language used must be applied strictly. Equitable considerations or assumptions cannot be used to alter the clear provisions. If multiple reasonable interpretations of a tax provision exist, the interpretation favoring the taxpayer must be adopted.\n•\nOutcome: The decision of the Appellate Tribunal was overturned, and the applicant was entitled to pay the reduced 2% sales tax under the relevant SROs.\nCitations:\n•\nMessrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Sheikh Muhammad Ilyas and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others (PLD 2020 SC 641)\n•\nMessrs Continental Chemical Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan and others (2001 PTD 570)\n•\nFatima Fertilizer Company Limited through Duly Authorized Officer v. Commissioner-II, Sindh Revenue Board (2021 PTD 484)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.52 of 2016 decided on 02.02.2023, date of hearing: 02.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Asim Hafeez, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abad-ur-Rehman, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Izhar-ul-Haq Sheikh, Advocate for the Respondent-Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S BASFA TEXTILE (PVT.) LIMITED, Lahore\nVersus\nDEPUTY DIRECTOR (CUSTOMS), Lahore & Others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23760", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2053 = 2023 SLD 2053 = (2023) 127 TAX 41", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNC8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Withholding Tax, Tax Deduction on Payments to Non-Residents, Assessee in Default\nDetails: This case involves the appellant’s failure to withhold tax on payments made to Hydrochina Corporation (offshore supplier) for the purchase of plant, machinery, and equipment, and to Hydrochina International Engineering Company Limited (onshore service provider) for construction and installation services. The DCIR issued a show-cause notice under section 161(1A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, treating the appellant as an Assessee in Default for not deducting tax at the time of payment to the offshore supplier. The CIR(A) upheld the DCIR’s order, and the appellant challenged this decision, asserting errors in the application of relevant tax provisions.\nHeld:\n•\nThe relationship between the offshore supplier (Hydrochina Corporation, China) and the appellant was not established as that of associate companies, as per section 152(7)(a) of the Ordinance, and the DR’s claim was not supported by the record.\n•\nSection 152(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 requires persons to inform the Commissioner before making payments to non-residents without withholding tax, but this provision did not apply in this case, as the transaction was an import of goods where the title passed outside Pakistan.\n•\nThe supply of plant, machinery, and equipment by Hydrochina Corporation, China, to the appellant did not fall under the mischief of section 152(1)(a)(iii) as part of an overall arrangement between associates.\n•\nThe mere existence of a Cost and Freight contract did not imply a scheme to avoid tax liability; it was a legitimate business arrangement between buyer and seller.\n•\nA Permanent Establishment (PE) status could not be established merely due to control by a parent company; it required a fixed place of business, which was not present in this case.\n•\nBoth the DCIR and CIR(A) had made legal errors by declaring the appellant an Assessee in Default and imposing tax, default surcharge, and penalties.\n•\nSection 152(5) of the Ordinance was considered a declaratory provision, not mandatory, and the legal error in its application led to the deletion of the tax levied under section 161(1) and section 152.\nCitations:\n•\nEFU General Insurance Ltd (2010 PTD 1159)\n•\nM/s. Hongkong Huihua Global Technology Limited vs. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. 3448 of 2017)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(41),2(41)(g),85,101,101(3),109,152,152(1A),152(5),152(7),152(7X2),152(7)(2)(i),152(7)(a)(ii),152(7)(a)(iii),161,161(1),161(1A),182,205Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 859/KB/2021 decided on 08.04.2022, date of hearing: 31.01.2022", - "Judge Name:": " Habib Ullah Khan, Accountant Member and Mohammad Aminullah Siddiqui, Judicial Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Qadir Memon, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMehran Khan D.R., and Abid Aziz, D.R., for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. ACT WIND (PVT) LTD, Karachi\nVs\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (APPEALS-III), CTO, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23761", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2054 = 2023 SLD 2054 = (2023) 127 TAX 92", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNCs", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Limitation for Tax Assessment and Recovery, Time-Barred Orders\nDetails: This case concerns the assessment of sales tax and the recovery of tax that was short levied for the year 2001-2002. The original order was passed in 2003 but was remanded by the tribunal in 2012 for reconsideration. However, after the appellant company entered winding-up proceedings in 2006, the official liquidator sought expediency in the case before the High Court. Despite the direction for an expedited decision, the order-in-original was issued in 2016, beyond the limitation period specified in the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nHeld:\n•\nThe Department was aware of the tribunals order in 2012 and the limitation period under section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had expired by 2016, making the order-in-original time-barred.\n•\nThe CIR(A) was not justified in confirming the order-in-original, which was issued after the statutory limitation period had elapsed.\n•\nThe order-in-original dated 08-11-2016 was deemed illegal, void, and without lawful authority due to being time-barred under the prescribed limitation period of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n•\nThe appeal was allowed, and the impugned order-in-appeal and order-in-original were set aside.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,11(4),11(5),36(3)", - "Case #": "STA No.649/KB/2018 decided on 09.11.2020, heard on: 05.11.2020", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Jawed Zakaria, Judicial Member and Saif Ullah Khan, Accountant Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waqas Asad Sheikh, Advocate for the Applicant.\nSardar Abdul Rab, D.R., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S PREPAC PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER - IR, ZONE-II, RTO, Quetta" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23762", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2055 = 2023 SLD = 2023 YLR 1148", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDk", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 161, 165, 165-A & 109-Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5-Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act, public servant obtaining valuable thing, without consideration from person concerned in proceeding or business transacted by such public servant, abetment of offences defined in Ss. 161 & 165, P.P.C.-Criminal misconduct-Pre-arrest bail, grant of-Scope-Accused persons sought bail before arrest-Co-accused who was booked in another crime registered by the same agency, which was not only punishable under the same sections under which the accused persons were being tried but Ss. 3 & 4 of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, were also added and had already been granted post-arrest bail-Accused persons were also entitled for grant of bail-Bail granting order had gone unchallenged by the prosecution-Investigating Officer had categorically made a statement that all the accused persons had joined investigation inasmuch as their respective statements had also been recorded-Pre-arrest bail were allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=161,165-A,109Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=5", - "Case #": "Criminal Bail Applications Nos. 566, 671, 672, 912, 913, 972, 973, 1003, 1004, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1591 to 1594 and 1663 to 1666 of 2021, decided on 21st September, 2021.heard on: 21st September, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Aftab Ahmed Gorar, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja Shamsul Islam and Shahzad Mehmood for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Application No. 566 of 2021).\nHaider Waheed and Muhammad Ahmed Masood for Applicants (in Criminal Bail Applications Nos. 671, 672, 972, 973, 1003, 1004, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1591, 1592, 1593, 1594, 1663, 1664, 1665 and 1666 of 2021).\nShakeel Ahmed for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Applications Nos.912 and 913 of 2021).\nMuhammad Ahmed, Assistant Attorney along with Muhammad Nadeem Khan, Assistant Attorney General along with I.O. Sheheryar AD FIA, CCRC, Karachi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL GHAFFAR and others-Applicants\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23763", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2056 = 2023 SLD 2056 = 2023 SLD 1148 = 2023 YLR", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIRlNTNDg", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 161, 165, 165-A & 109-Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5-Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act, public servant obtaining valuable thing, without consideration from person concerned in proceeding or business transacted by such public servant, abetment of offences defined in Ss. 161 & 165, P.P.C.-Criminal misconduct-Pre-arrest bail, grant of-Scope-Accused persons sought bail before arrest-Co-accused who was booked in another crime registered by the same agency, which was not only punishable under the same sections under which the accused persons were being tried but Ss. 3 & 4 of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, were also added and had already been granted post-arrest bail-Accused persons were also entitled for grant of bail-Bail granting order had gone unchallenged by the prosecution-Investigating Officer had categorically made a statement that all the accused persons had joined investigation inasmuch as their respective statements had also been recorded-Pre-arrest bail were allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=161,165,165-A,109Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=5", - "Case #": "Criminal Bail Applications Nos. 566, 671, 672, 912, 913, 972, 973, 1003, 1004, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1591 to 1594 and 1663 to 1666 of 2021, decided on 21st September, 2021.heard on: 21st September, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Aftab Ahmed Gorar, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja Shamsul Islam and Shahzad Mehmood for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Application No. 566 of 2021).\nHaider Waheed and Muhammad Ahmed Masood for Applicants (in Criminal Bail Applications Nos. 671, 672, 972, 973, 1003, 1004, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1591, 1592, 1593, 1594, 1663, 1664, 1665 and 1666 of 2021).\nShakeel Ahmed for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Applications Nos.912 and 913 of 2021).\nMuhammad Ahmed, Assistant Attorney along with Muhammad Nadeem Khan, Assistant Attorney General along with I.O. Sheheryar AD FIA, CCRC, Karachi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL GHAFFAR and others-Applicants\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23764", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2091 = 2023 SLD 2091 = 2023 PTD 1415 = (2025) 132 TAX 275", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUTU", - "Key Words:": "Details:\nPetitioners challenged levy of 10% regulatory duty on their consignments of motor spirit.\nThey relied on SRO 806(I)/2022 (20.06.2022), which provided exemption from regulatory duty if (i) LCs had already been opened before 20.06.2022, or (ii) consignments were already at high seas before 20.06.2022.\nPetitioners argued that their consignments were at high seas and hence exempt. They produced contracts and Bills of Lading.\nHowever, their Letters of Credit were opened later (29.06.2022 and 03.07.2022). The vessel reached Port Qasim on 16.07.2022.\nMeanwhile, SRO 966(I)/2022 (30.06.2022) imposed regulatory duty @10% on motor spirit imports effective 01.07.2022.\nHeld:\nThe benefit of SRO 806(I)/2022 was meant to protect matured transactions (i.e., LCs established or vessels demonstrably carrying cargo for the petitioners before 20.06.2022).\nMere presence of a vessel on the high seas does not prove it was carrying cargo for petitioners without a matured transaction.\nSince the LCs were not opened before 20.06.2022 and the vessel arrived after expiry of SRO 806(I)/2022, petitioners could not claim exemption.\nUnder Section 30 of Customs Act, 1969, the applicable rate is that in force at the time of filing GD/clearance. Thus, SRO 966(I)/2022 (effective 01.07.2022) applied, making regulatory duty @10% payable.\nCitations:\nSRO 806(I)/2022 dated 20.06.2022\nSRO 966(I)/2022 dated 30.06.2022", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=18(3),30,79", - "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos.D-4446, D-4513, D-4552, D-6927, D-4553 -and D-4618 of 2022, decided on 14th April, 2023, heard on: 11th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shaft Siddiqui and Agha Faisal, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Jawed Khan along with Uzair Qadir Shoro and Masood Anwar Ausaf along with Munim Masood for Petitioners.\nQazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General and Muhammad Khalil Dogar and Agha Shahid Majeed for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HASCOL PETROLEUM LTD. through Authorized Attorney and another\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Revenue Division and 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23765", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2092 = 2023 SLD 2092 = 2023 PTD 1434 = (2025) 131 TAX 76 = 2024 PTD 517 = 2022 LHC 6324", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Money Laundering Investigation – Jurisdiction of Inland Revenue Directorate\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Article 12\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Sections 192, 192A, 194 & 199\nAnti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 – Sections 2(xviii), 3, 8, 9, 21(2), Schedule-1\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 – Sections 4(1), 5(2), 154, 173, 202\nDetails:\nPetitioners challenged the investigation of alleged money laundering by the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (I & I), Inland Revenue, during proceedings under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. They contended that the Directorate lacked jurisdiction to investigate past transactions under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010. The court examined the retrospective application of the law, the requirement of a predicate offence, and the powers of investigative agencies under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010.\nHeld:\nJurisdiction of I & I, Inland Revenue: The Directorate, as an investigating agency, has no bar on investigating cases where the offence was committed before its inclusion as an authorized body. The Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 aims to prevent money laundering by attaching/confiscating proceeds derived from a predicate offence.\nRetrospective Application: Since the Act is a penal statute, it has no retrospective effect under Article 12 of the Constitution. Proceedings cannot be initiated for transactions before the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, were designated as predicate offences in Schedule-1 of the Act.\nPredicate Offence Requirement: The commission of a predicate offence is a prerequisite for action under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010. The offence of money laundering is distinct and punishable separately, irrespective of the predicate offences date.\nInvestigation and Inquiry: The investigating officer must strictly adhere to the law as interpreted by superior courts. The High Court refused to interfere in the ongoing investigation, dismissing the constitutional petition.\nCall-Up Notice (Section 9, AMLA, 2010): A valid notice must specify the alleged money laundering offence and the property derived from the proceeds of crime. A notice failing these requirements is invalid.\nFraming of Rules: The absence of specific rules does not impair the investigation process. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are deemed sufficient.\nRegistration of FIR: The investigating officer may register an FIR under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, if the accused fails to provide information in response to a Section 9 notice.\nCompounding of Offences: Predicate offences under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, are compoundable. However, compounding a predicate offence does not bar the trial for money laundering, which proceeds independently.\nAttachment of Property (Section 9(5), AMLA, 2010): Attachment ceases only if the accused is acquitted in both the predicate and money laundering offences.\nRelevant Case Law:\nCol. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq (2006 SCMR 276)\nMustafa Impex v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. MCB Bank Limited (2021 SCMR 1325)\nAssistant Director Intelligence and Investigation v. Messrs B.R. Herman (PLD 1992 SC 485)\nMuhammad Idrees v. The State (2021 SCMR 612)\nDr. Arsalan Iftikhar v. Malik Riaz Hussain (PLD 2012 SC 903)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=192,192A, 194,199Anti Money Laundering Act, 2010=2 (xviii),3,8,9,9(5),Schedule-1Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=12,199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 16567 of 2021 (and other connected petitions), decided on 2nd September, 2022. Dates of hearing: 28th April, 9th June, 1st July, 23rd September, 1st, 8th, October, 2021, 24th January, 23rd, 30th, 31st, May, 1st, 13th, 17th, 27th, 29th and 30th June of 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Shams Mehmood Mirza, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners By: Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Barrister Sheheryar Kasuri, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Jamshaid Alam, Sabeel Tariq Mann, Qadeer Ahmad Kalyar and Muhammad Hamza Sheikh (in W.Ps. Nos. 16567, 27072, 67652 and 28111 of 2021)\nBarrister Muhammad Umer Riaz, Saqib Haroon Chishti, Haroon Rashid Mir, Waqas Umer and Rana Rehan (in W.Ps. Nos. 56349, 67310, 56280, 60213 of 2021 and 3646 of 2022).\nAshtar Ausaf Ali, Barrister Asad Rahim Khan, Ms. Nimra Arshad and Khalil Ahmed Bhulla (in W.Ps. Nos.24755 and 24757 of 2021).\nMohammad Shoaib Rashid, Waleed Khalid and Faizan Daud (in W.Ps. Nos. 21462 of 2022, 80285 of 2021 and 363 of 2022).\nMuhammad Ajmal Khan, Mian Ejaz Latif and Malik Farhan Babar (in W.Ps. Nos. 48665, 18942, 38830, 48846 of 2021, 12661, 3678, 3189, 12657, 3675, 12660 and 12662 of 2022).\nMuhammad Mohsin Virk, Tahir Shabbir, Nasir Khan, Malik Farhan and Muhammad Fezan Saleem (in W.Ps. Nos. 37934, 39048, 39045, 39058, 42302, 49013, 45025, 67756 and 74919 of 2021).\nSyed Tassadaq Murtaza Naqvi and Syed Tassadaq Mustafa Naqvi (in W.P. No.74306 of 2021).\nShahbaz Butt, Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Muhammad Ahsan Mahmood Butt, Asad Abbas Raza, Muhammad Usman Zia, Muhammad Ibraheem Hassan, Mudassir Aftab, Muhammad Yaqoob, Muhammad Danish Zuberi and Aqeel Jffar (in W.Ps. Nos. 12031, 34504, 35964, 35967, 35977, 35989, 36873, 36889, 36883, 36900, 42551, 46861, 47618, 48978, 52337, 55404, 27704, 29710, 29716, 39236, 39243, 39249, 39253, 45551, 57164, 52333, 58076, 44232, 59967, 60012, 65189, 63615, 70197 of 2021 and 50 of 2022).\nCh. Muhammad Arfan Faiz Kalaar, Ch. Rizwan Kashif and Ch. Adnan Faiz Kalaar (in W.P. No.25509 of 2022).\nMuhammad Mansha Sukhera, M. Muqadam Sukhera and Malik Muhammad Ali Awan (in W.Ps. Nos.9830, 9839, 29000, 29005, 29011 and 30179 of 2022).\nHashim Aslam Butt, M. Hafeez Uppal, Syed Saqlain Hussain, •Asad Tariq and Ahmad Yar Khan (in W.P. No.28990 of 2022).\nTouqeer Ahmad Ranjha, Shahzaib Chattha and Ali Ijaz Shah (in W.Ps. Nos.4624, 4626, 12486, 15993 and 16001 of 2022).\nRiaz Ahmed Ch. (in W.P. No. 71322 of 2021).\nMukhtar Ahmad Awan (in W.P. No.26299 of 2022).\nGhulam Ahmed Ansari (in W.P. No.35694 of 2021).\nMian Muhammad Naseer and Zunaira Pattrick (in W.P. No. 39503 of 2021).\nMian Danish Quddous (in W.P. No. 363, 21462 of 2022 and 80285 of 2021).\nS.M. Raheel, Qamar ul Haq Bhatti, Muhammad Imran ul Haq Bhatti and Murtaza Naeem (in W.Ps. Nos. 36488 and 78377 of 2021).\nFarhan Shahzad, Zohaib Ali Sidhu, Syed Ali Tarab and Ghulam Ahmed Ansari (in W.Ps. Nos. 57350, 56291, 57342, 76686, 76689, 71303, 76711, 72157, 72160 of 2021 and 6284 of 2022).\nMian Shakeel Ahmad (in W.P. No. 81801 of 2021).\nRiaz Ahmed Khan (in W.P. No. 54711 of 2021).\nSyed Abid Raza kazmi (in W.Ps. Nos. 61531 and 61524 of 2021).\nRana Rehan (in W.P. No. 60213 of 2021).\nMuhammad Zikria Sheikh, Ch. Amanat Ali and Rai Shaban Ali Kharal (in W.P. No. 80410 of 2021).\nHafeez ur Rehman Ch., Malik Asif Iqbal, Noor Dad Chaudhary and Ms. Roha Khan (in W.Ps. Nos. 30005, 30008 and 21623 of 2021).\nMuhammad Naeem Shah (in W.Ps. Nos. 49933 and 50183 of 2021).\nMuhammad Naeem Munawar (in W.Ps. Nos. 5087, 34780 and 34695 of 2022).\nMuhammad Nasir Khan (in W.P. No.71354 of 2021).\nAsif Shahdat, Ahmad Hassan, Rana M. Khurram Rafique and Rana M. Umer Rafique (in W.Ps. Nos.29771 and 71399 of 2021).\nMuhammad Akram Sheikh (in W.Ps. Nos.79268, 37382 of 2021 and 15377 of 2022).\nAftab-Ahmed Bajwa (in W.P. No.42491 of 2021).\nShahnawaz (in W.P. No. 54858 of 2021).\nTanveer Ahmed and Sh. Zafar ul Haq (in W.Ps. Nos. 68138, 68534, 71353, 71354 and 71355 of 2021).\nMuhammad Ayub Sheikh (in W.P. No. 50533 of 2021).\nSyed Imtiaz Hussain (in W.P. No.72160 of 2021).\nMuhammad Ashfaq Mughal (in W.P. No.36529 of 2022).\nShahzad Hassan Sheikh (in W.Ps. Nos. 23432 and 23428 of 2021).\nShakeel Ahmad Basra, Ijaz Rehmat Basra and Mirza Mubashir Baig (in W.P. No. 30611 of 2022).\nMudassar Shuja ud Din, Behwal Asad Rasul, Touseef Arshad and Shahid Pervez Jami(in W.Ps. Nos. 26906, 77267, 77978, 77986, 77239, 76158, 78051, 78231, 81539, 78010, 75273, 81529, 31599 and 61491 of 2021).\nRana Usman Habib Khan, Noreen Fouzia and Haseeb Arif (in W.Ps. Nos. 48846 of 2021 and 3189 of 2022).\nMuhammad Ijaz Ali Bhatti (in W.P. No.42983 of 2021).\nWaseem Ahmed Malik (in W.Ps. Nos.30790 and 75214 of 2021).\nMuhammad Imran Rasheed (in W.Ps. Nos. 74742, 71849 and 71877 of 2021).\nImran Muhammad Sarwar (in W.Ps. Nos.77284 and 77186 of 2021).\nMustafa Kamal (in W.Ps. Nos. 1253 of 2021 and 25389 of 2022).\nHaris Tanveer Rarta and Mian Tabasum Ali (in W.P. No.3 of 2022).\nMian Shakeel Ahmad (in W.P. No. 81808 of 2021).\nMahar Saghir Ahmad (in W.Ps. Nos.29011 and 29000 of 2022).\nSh. Muhammad Akram (in W.Ps. Nos. 74742, 37382, 71877, 79268 and 71849 of 2021).\nOmer Wahab and Muhammad Ahsan Nawaz Sial (in W.P. No. 38830 of 2021).\nTanveer Ahmad, Shahid Rafiq Mayo and Ms. Nasreen Naseer- ud-Din (in W.Ps. Nos. 63138, 68534, 71355, 71354 and 71353 of 2021).\nBarrister Osama Zafar (in W.P. No.71654 of 2021).\nZafar Iqbal Mian (in W.Ps. Nos. 76889, 76884 of 2021, 17981, 21673, 26529, 30166 and 37408 of 2022).\nMian Muhammad Arshad (in W.P. Nos.48194 of 2021).\nSyed Muhammad Ghazanfar (in W.P. No. 50533 of 2021).\nGhulam Hussain Awan and Ch. Zeeshan ur Rehman (in W.P: No. 44548 of 2021). \nBarrister Danyal Ijaz Chadhar (in W.P. No.80680 of 2021). Shehzad Hassan Sheikh (in W.Ps. Nos.23432 and 23428 of 2021).\nUsman Khalil, Ali Ijaz Shah, Tuqeer Ahmad Ranjha and Shahzaib ul Hassan Chattha (in W.Ps. Nos.4624, 4626, 12486, 15993 and 16001 of 2022).\nCh. Qamar uz Zaman, Muhammad Waqar Akram, Muhammad Khalid, Rai Inam Qadir, Arif Munir and Ms. Zeba Munir (in W.P. No.39064 of 2021).\nMian Muhammad Naseem (in W.P.No.39503 of 2021). Muhammad Amir Latif Sehr Bhutta (in W.P. No.38746 of 2021).\nMuhammad Naseem Munawar (in W.P. No.5087 of 2022).\nFarrukh Ilyas Cheema (in W.P. No.76686 of 2021).\nCh. Anwaar ul Haq Arif (in W.P. No.59858 of 2021).\nZahid Ateeq Choudhry, M. Ehsan Awan and Rashid Khan (in W.P. No.22738 of 2021).\nFahad Azhar Butt (in W.Ps. Nos.35710, 23666 and 23584 of 2022).\nIkram-ul-Haq Sheikh (in W.P. No.31668 of 2022).\nRespondents By: For Federation\nAzmat Hayat Khan Lodhi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan (in all cases).\nFor FBR\nSarfraz Ahmed Cheema (in W.Ps. Nos. 65189, 22738, 37934, 27072, 23432, 28111, 24755, 24757, 60219, 61524, 29716, 29710, 67756, 71322, 76711, 76686, 80680, 80285, 77186, 63615, 67652, 81808, 77284, 69545, 74919, 38830, of 2021 and 363, 3189, 1406, 4624, 3646, 4626, 6284, 12031, 12486, 15993, 16001, 19916, 19910, 19913, 19906, 21462, 29011, 23666, 23584 and 26299 of 2022).\nKhawar Ikram Bhatti (in W.Ps. Nos. 29771, 31599, 38746, 26906, 60012, 59967, 78377, 81539 and 70197 of 2021).\nRiaz Begum and Muhammad Waseem Malik (in W.Ps. Nos. 61491, 71354, 71353, 71355, 71399, 75214, 77978, 77986, 78010, 50533, 52333, 39058, 39045, 39064, 61531, 44548, 60213, 80410 of 2021 1253, 9830, 9839, 12661, 15377, 12660, 26529, 37408, 48194 and 3678 of 2022).\nZain ul Abideen Bukhari (in W.Ps. Nos.27704, 77267, 78231, 81529, 42302, 42983, 48846, 48978, 56291, 68138, 68534, 27072 of 2021, 3675, 16507, 17981, 21673, 25509, 34695, 34780 and 25389 of 2022).\nAdeel Shahid Karim (in W.Ps. Nos.36873, 34504, 35989, 36889 and 36883 of 2021).\nMrs. Amina Parveen (in W.Ps. Nos. 21623, 30005, 39243, 39236, 30008, 39249, 39253, 55404 and 67310 of 2021).\nMalik Abdullah Raza (in W.Ps. Nos.35964, 35967, 35977, 36900 of 2021 and 3646 of 2022).\nYahya Johar (in W.Ps. Nos. 74306, 76158, 76889, 78051, 30179, 37382, 39503, 54858, 60206, 71849, 71877, 75273 and 76884 of 2021).\nCh, Muhammad Imtiaz Elahi (in W.Ps. Nos. 30790, 61521, 60213, 39045, 39058, 39064, 44548, 50533, 52333 and 48194 of 2021).\nAhmed Pervaiz and Scheherezade Shaharyar (in Instant petition and in W.Ps. Nos. 18942, 79269, 16567, 79268 of 2021 and 74742, 35710, 39982 and 3 of 2022).\nSohail Zahid Butt (in W.P. No.30166 of 2022).\nFaran Ahmad Cheema (in W.Ps. Nos.76686, 80680, 80285 and 77186 of 2021).\nIzhar ul. Haque for Respondents Nos.2 to 4 (in W.P. No.42491 of 2021 and 31688 of 2022).\nCh. Muhammad Ashfaq Bhullar (in W.Ps. Nos.50337, 50183, 46861 and 49933 of 2021).\nMs. Shagufta Ijaz (in W.Ps. Nos. 44232 and 47618 of 2021).\nAamir Riaz Minhas, Sardar M S Tahir, M. Yasir Khan and Zafar Iqbal Bhatti (in W.Ps. Nos.76689, 48665, 49013, 61491,16567 and 42302 of 2021).\nCh. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Mohsin Ali and M. Wasaf Masood (in W.Ps. Nos. 48665, 49013, 76689, 71303, 72157, 72160 of 2021, 5087, 12657, 29000, 29005, 28990, 30166 and 12262 of 2022).\nAnas Sheikh (in W.Ps. Nos.23428 of 2021 and 34700 of 2022).\nAbu Bakr Shahzad (in W.Ps. Nos. 37011 and 54401 of 2021).\nCh. Umar Imran Mayo for Respondents Nos.3 and 4 (in W.Ps. Nos.56280 and 56349 of 2021).\nMian Faisal Naseer (in W.P. No.29716 of 2021).\nCh. Imran Masood for Respondents Nos.3 and 4 (in W.Ps. Nos.56280, 56349 of 2021 and 6039 of 2022).\nUsman Azam Gondal (in W. P. No. 29710 of 2021).\nMs. Nadia Bashir Chaudhary, Legal Advisor on behalf of Director Intelligence (in W.Ps. Nos. 45025, 42551, 77239, 36488 and 50 of 2022).\nRepresentatives of FBR in all cases\nDr. Khalid Malik, Director and Dr. Tanvir Hussain Bhatti Additional Director, (I&I) Islamabad.\nMs. Sarkhshan Khalid, Deputy Director (I&I) Faisalabad.\nAbid Rasool, Additional Director (I&l) Multan.\nMuhammad Irfan, Additional Director (I&I) Lahore.\nFor Customs Department\nHuma Shahid Butter (in W.P. No 74742 of 2021).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL SABOOR \nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23766", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2093 = 2023 SLD 2093 = 2023 PTD 1492 = 2024 PTCL 57 = (2024) 130 TAX 91 = 2024 SCMR 1797", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUS8", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, Fake Invoices, Burden of Proof\nDetails: This case concerns allegations against the taxpayer for issuing fake/flying invoices and claiming input tax on the basis of these invoices. The liability was raised by the tax authorities based on presumptions without making efforts to verify the facts. The show cause notice was issued in a mechanical and vague manner, requiring the taxpayer to prove that the suppliers had not made the supplies or deposited output tax. No proper inquiry or audit was conducted by the department to substantiate the allegations.\nHeld:\n•\nThe show cause notice issued was based on vague allegations and presumptions rather than verified facts.\n•\nThe department failed to conduct an inquiry or audit under the powers of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, to verify the authenticity of the invoices and the suppliers tax deposits.\n•\nThe onus was on the department to establish, through proper evidence, that the invoices were fake or flying and that the suppliers had not made actual supplies or deposited the relevant taxes.\n•\nThe appeal filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue was dismissed.\nInterpretation of Fiscal Statutes\nDetails: This section addresses the approach courts take when interpreting fiscal statutes. The focus is on the clear language used in the statutes, with no room for presumptions or equity.\nHeld:\n•\nIn interpreting fiscal statutes, courts only consider the clear language of the statute.\n•\nThere is no room for reading in or implying any presumptions or equities in tax-related matters.\nCitations:\n•\nMessrs Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Government of Sindh and others 1993 SC MR 920\n•\nMuhammad Younus v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1964 SC 113\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Mst. Khatija Begum PLD 1965 SC 472\n•\nGovernment of West Pakistan and others v. Messrs Jabees Ltd. PLD 1991 SC 870\n•\nGovernment of Pakistan and others v. Messrs Hashwani Hotels Ltd. PLD 1990 SC 68\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 10A, Right to Fair Trial\nDetails: This section discusses the concept of reverse onus in the context of Article 10A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial. The principle of reverse onus, which places the burden of proof on the accused, is contrary to the presumption of innocence.\nHeld:\n•\nReverse onus, where the burden is placed on the accused to disprove allegations, runs contrary to the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence.\n•\nCourts lean towards interpreting or reading down such provisions to safeguard the right to a fair trial.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25,8(1)(c)(a)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1032 of 2018, decided on 23rd May, 2023, heard on: 14th February, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 27.03.2018 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in STRA No. 737 of 2015)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CHIEF JUSTICE, AYESHA A. MALIK AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Asma Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nGhulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on- Record (via video-link, Karachi) for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-IV, LARGE TAXPAYER UNIT, KARACHI\nvs\nM/S AL-ABID SILK MILLS LTD., A-39. MANGHOPIR ROAD. SITE, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23767", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2094 = 2023 SLD 2094 = 2023 PTD 1519", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUSs", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)——S. 162—Damages, recovery of—Civil suit—Maintainability— Negligence of authorities—Quantum of loss, determination of—Mental shock, agony and torture—Proof—Plaintiff claimed that ship purchased by him for breaking sank near shore and 2100 metric tons of scrap remained under water and Income Tax Authorities/defendants restrained plaintiff from cutting, scrapping, removing and lifting that scrap from capsized ship, which resulted into loss—Authorities raised plea of bar of S. 162 Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, regarding maintainability of suit—Plaintiff claimed recovery of damages for the loss sustained by him—Validity—When certain actions of officials of Income Tax Department were called in question and they were found to be in excess of jurisdiction and tainted with mala fide then bar contained in S. 162 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, was not attracted and suit was maintainable—For relief of damages as claimed by plaintiff, there was no hard and fast rule to calculate quantum of compensation, as well as there was also no yardstick to measure the sufferings—Plaintiff claimed damages on account of huge present and future economic loss and on account of undergoing irreversible phase of perpetual mental torture and loss of re/ station—Mental shock, agony and torture implied a state of mind, which could be proved only by positive assertion of one who had experienced the same—Plaintiff claimed that owing to illegal act of authorities jointly and severally he suffered mental shock and agony but he could not produce any medical record to bolster/strengthen such contention—Plaintiff introduced on record that owing to acts of authorities whereby they directed plaintiff to stop work of breaking/cutting the vessel which he was legally entitled to perform, he suffered a lot and detailed out the same in his plaint— Quantum of damages would have been different if plaintiff had produced medical record in support of his claim of damages on account of mental torture—High Court awarded damages against officials of Income Tax department as their illegal acts tainted with mala fide and aggravated by their ex facie maladministration, were proved—Excessive use of lawful power was itself unlawful—Due to the actions of officials, plaintiff was prevented at least to a certain degree, from use and enjoyment of the vessel which he imported—High Court directed officials to pay the damages awarded against them jointly and severally, considering the principle of vicarious liability—Where government functionaries were guilty of committing illegality of such a degree, then they had to compensate the person wronged—Suit was decreed accordingly.\nAmanullah Khan v. Mst. Akhtar Begum 1993 SCMR 504; Abbasia Cooperative Bank and another v. Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghous and 5 others FLD 1997 SC 3; Al-Riaz Pvt. Ltd. v. Muhammad Ismail 2018 CLC 596; PLD 2021 Sindh 1 and 1996 CLC 627 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=162", - "Case #": "Suit No. 212 of 1984, decided on 9th June, 2022, heard on: 1st October, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff present in person.\nNemo for Defendants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ANWAR \nvs\nPAKISTAN through Secretary to the Government of Pakistan Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23768", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2095 = 2023 SLD 2095 = 2023 PTD 1528 = (2024) 129 TAX 658", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUTk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)——Ss. 11, 36 & 47— Reference—Wrong provision of law—Effect— Show-cause notice was set aside by Customs Appellate Tribunal for mentioning of S.U(3) instead of S.36 of Sales Tax Act, 1990— Validity—Merely because show-cause notices were labelled under S.ll(3) instead of S.36 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, was not such a defect or vagueness to undergo test of judicial scrutiny—Such omission did not cause any prejudice to respondent-taxpayers and the same could not be declared invalid under the law—Main issues raised by parties were not decided by Customs Appellate Tribunal, therefore, High Court in reference jurisdiction was deprived of the views of the Tribunal, as Reference Application was to be decided on the basis of facts determined by Appellate Tribunal—High Court set aside order in question and matter was remanded to Customs Appellate Tribunal for decision afresh after providing opportunity of being heard to both the parties—Reference was allowed accordingly.\nCollector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Lahore v. Zamindara Paper and Board Mills and others 2008 SCMR 615; Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi v. Abdul Ghani 2007 PTD 967 and Commissioner of Income Tax, Peshawar v. Messrs Islamic Investment Bank Ltd. 2016 SCMR 816 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=1,11,33,34,36,47", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No.155 of 2015, heard on 21st September, 2022, heard on: 21st September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD SAJ MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Saba Saeed Sheikh, Legal Advisor for Applicant.\nAbuzar Hussain for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, FAISALABAD\nVERSUS\nMESSRS AHMAD STRAW BOARD PRIVATE LIMITED, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23769", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2096 = 2023 SLD 2096 = 2023 PTD 1541", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUTg", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)— —Ss.19 & 196—Import Policy, 2013, Para. 20—Import of vehicle— Diplomatic exemption—Foreign experts from donor country— Relaxation in exemption criteria—Federal Government, jurisdiction of—Dispute was with regard to import of vehicle in question on the grounds that importer was not entitled to such exemption and vehicle was older than the period provided for under Import Policy, 2013— Validity—Federal Board of Revenue issued certificate to importer qualifying him for such exemptions particularly in terms of SRO 540(I)/2001, which had defined privileged personnel to mean all foreign experts, consultants or technicians visiting and residing in Pakistan under a proper aid agreement in which provision for application of customs concessions were made—Such experts included not only personnel directly in the employment of foreign or donor country or agency, but also those who had served in Pakistan under direct or agreement with such government or agency and whose salary and travelling expenses to and from Pakistan were paid by foreign government or agency—Federal Government under Para. 20 of Import Policy Order, 2013, enjoyed powers to allow import in relaxation of any prohibition or restriction under Import Policy Order, 2013—Federal Board of Revenue issued letter in such regard condoning the period to a period of one year and nine months in respect of import of vehicle in favour of importer—Application of Import Policy Order, 2013, did not apply to a privileged personnel working under grant-in-aid agreements particularly when a relaxation had been sought by the importer from Federal Government under Para. 20 of Import Policy Order, 2013, for import of an older car for latter’s personal use—High Court answered the questions against the department and in favour of the importer—Reference was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19,196", - "Case #": "S.C.R.A. No. 326 of 2017, decided on 26th October, 2022, heard on: 29th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Masooda Siraj along with Jawed Hussain, and Ishaque Pirzada for Applicant.\nNemo, for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS \nVS\nKRISTOF W. DUWAERTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23770", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2097 = 2023 SLD 2097 = 2023 PTD 1550", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUXo", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]——S. 80-C—Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 182—Sale of Goods Act (III of 1930), Ss. 19 & 20—Presumptive tax regime—Fertilizer manufacturing company and marketing company—Whether principal- agent relationship—Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that as marketing company was an agent of the fertilizer manufacturing company, hence, keeping in view the relationship of agent and principal, the manufacturing company could not claim any benefits under the presumptive tax regime provided under section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (‘ITO 1979’) and was liable to dealt with through normal assessment under section 62 of the I. T.O., 1979—High Court, however, held that the agreement between the two companies envisaged the outright sale of fertilizers manufactured by the manufacturing company to the marketing company, thus, the advance income tax deducted under section 50(4) of the I.T.O., 1979 upon the payments made by the latter to the former qualified to be treated as the income of the manufacturing company under section 80-C of the I.T.O., 1979 and the assessment should be finalized for the year in question under section 80-C of the I.T.O., 1979—Held, that survey and analysis of the terms and conditions of the ‘Agreement’ between the two companies showed that it was an agreement for outright sale by means of which the payments were being made in full after deduction of the advance income tax by the marketing company for settlement of invoices—Neither substratum of the agreement under lined any characteristics of agency nor contained any provision for agency commission—Even if issue of relationship between the companies was left to one side, section 80-C of the I.T.O., 1979 articulates that any amount received under which tax was deductible under Section 50(4) was deemed to be the total income tax liability of the assessee which was not disputed or resisted by the tax department in the present case, therefore, the amount received after deduction under section 50(4) was rightly deemed to be the total income tax liability and for all practical and legal purposes, the manufacturing company could not be deprived of the benefit of section 80-C of I.T.O., 1979—No irregularity or perversity was found in the impugned judgments passed by the High Court—Appeals were dismissed.\nBolan Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. v. PepsiCo Inc. and 4 others PLD 2004 SC 860; Messrs Vijay Traders v. Messrs Bajaj Auto Ltd. 1995 SCC (6) 566; State of Mysori v. Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited AIR 1958 SC 1002; Gordon Woodroffe & Co. v. Sheikh M. A. Majid & Co. AIR 1967 SC 181; Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Bhopal 1977 SCR (3) 578; W.T. Lamb and Sons v. Goring Brick Company Limited (1932) K.B. 710; Hutton v. Lippert (1883) 8 A.C. 309 and Tirumala Venkateswara Timber and Bamboo Firm v. Commercial Tax Officer, Rajahmundry AIR 1968 SC 784 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=80CContract, Act, 1872=182", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1275 of 2009, C.M.A. No. 6731 of 2018, Civil Appeals Nos. 1292 to 1296 of 2009 and Civil Appeal No. 227 of 2011, decided on 13th March, 2023. Date of hearing; 13th March, 2023.\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1275 OF 2009, AND C.M.A. NO. 6731 OF 2018\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 09,02.2005 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in . I.T.A. No. 915 of 1999)\nAND\nCIVIL APPEALS NOS. 1292 TO 1296 OF 2009 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 227 OF 2011\n(On appeal from the judgments dated 15.04.200", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J., MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Karachi) for Appellants (in C.A. No. 1275 of 2009).\nZafar Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Tasneem Amin, Advocate-on-Record (via video link from Lahore) for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1292-1296 of 2009 and 227 of 2011).\nRashid Awan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Karachi) for Respondents (in all cases).\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1 (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE-II, NEW INCOME TAX BUILDING, SHAHRAH-E-KAMAL ATTATURK, KARACHI AND ANOTHER\nVS\nMESSRS PAK SAUDI FERTILIZERS LTD., KARACHI THROUGH M.D. AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23771", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2098 = 2023 SLD 2098 = 2023 PTD 1571", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDUXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 25, 25A & 25D—Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199—Valuation Ruling (‘the Ruling’) issued by Customs department—Constitutional petition before the High Court challenging such Ruling— Maintainability—Alternate remedy of review under section 25D of the Customs Act, 1969 not availed—Effect—Instead of challenging the Valuation Ruling directly in the High Court, the best course available to the petitioners (importers) was to file a Review Petition against the said Ruling under section 25D of the Customs Act, 1969 which was an appropriate remedy provided under the law in which all factual disputes with regard to the valuation as well as transactional value could be raised, but this statutory remedy was circumvented—Legislature had purposely and consciously provided this remedy under section 25D of the Act to an aggrieved person to assail the Valuation Ruling and, at the same time, it also provides an opportunity to the Director General Valuation to rectify the legal or factual defects, if any, made while issuing the Valuation Ruling—In the present case the impugned Valuation Ruling could not be construed as violative or in contravention of any provision of Customs Act, 1969 for the purposes of challenging it within the domain or realm of Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, however, the remedy provided under section 25D had its own wide scope and parameters where an aggrieved person may file review petition to challenge the Ruling which was the best available remedy rather than approaching the High Court directly—Writ petitions had been rightly dismissed by the High Court due to lack of jurisdiction—Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan——Art. 199—Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court—Scope— Exhaustion of remedies, doctrine of—Scope—Writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be exploited as the sole solution or remedy for ventilating all miseries, distresses and plights regardless of having equally efficacious, alternate and adequate remedy provided under the law which cannot be bypassed to attract the writ jurisdiction—Doctrine of exhaustion of remedies stops a litigant from pursuing a remedy in a new court or jurisdiction until the remedy already provided under the law is exhausted—Profound rationale accentuated in this doctrine is that the litigant should not be encouraged to circumvent or bypass the provisions assimilated in the relevant statute paving the way for availing remedies with precise procedure to challenge the impugned action.\n(c) Interim order-Principles—No interlocutory order survives after the original proceeding comes to an end—Interim orders are made in the aid of the final order that the court may pass and they merge intd the final order and do not survive after the final adjudication.\nGen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf through Attorney v. Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 2014 Sindh 389 and PLD 2016 SC 570 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25A,25D", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3215, 3644, 3656, 3657 to 3689, 3731 to 3732, 3216, 3745 to 3749, 3217, 3634 to 3643, 3645 to 3655, 3690 to 3730, 3733 to 3744, 3750 to 3780 of 2021, decided on 7th June, 2022, heard on: 7th June, 2022.\n(Against the judgment passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 22.03.2021 in SCRAs. Nos. 212-323, 324-329 and 330-361 of 2016)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ALA BANDIAL, C.J., MUHAMMAD ALI MAZLIAR AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shafqat Mehmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MIAN AZAM WAHEED AND 2 OTHERS \nVERSUS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23772", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2099 = 2023 SLD 2099 = 2023 SLD 1582", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTc", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)—S. 221—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XLVII, R. 1— Rectification of mistakes—Review—Scope—Word review refers to the re-examination of a previously expressed view by a court or other legal forum—If no view has been expressed on certain vital issues that are fundamental to a case and have a direct impact on its outcome, then direction to adjudicate the unresolved issues under S. 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, cannot be considered a review — Rather, it is a simple rectification of the mistake of failing to adjudicate the vital issues that are directly related to the fate of the case—Furthermore, the wording of S. 221 is similar to R. 1 of O.XLVII of the C.P.C., which supports the view that even though the section is titled Rectification of Mistakes, the title of a section cannot control the power given by the express wording of the section—If the wording permits review, it cannot be considered prohibited under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. \n2008 PTD 169 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O. XLVII,R. 1", - "Case #": "MA(Rect.) No.242/LB of 2022 in I.T.A. No.3117/LB of 2020, decided on 22nd February, 2023, heard on: 8th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AEYSHA FAZIL QAZI. JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sayyid Ali Imran Rizvi for Applicant.\nM. Asif, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUTI-UR-REHMAN, LAHORE \nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23773", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2100 = 2023 SLD 2100 = 2023 PTD 1590 = (2024) 129 TAX 625", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTY", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, Fauji Foundation, Income Classification, Business Income vs. Income from Other Sources\nDetails: This case concerns Fauji Foundation, a welfare trust that generates income from various business activities to fund its welfare projects. The question arose regarding whether the income derived from interest on bank deposits should be classified as income from other sources or as income from business under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.\nHeld:\n•\nThe Fauji Foundation is a welfare trust that generates income from business activities for the purpose of funding welfare projects.\n•\nIncome from its investments, including interest on bank deposits, is not considered income from other sources but income from business, as it is used for the Foundations objectives.\n•\nThe Foundation’s activities involve raising income for welfare purposes through investments, which include bank deposits.\n•\nPetitions for leave to appeal were dismissed, and leave was refused.\nIncome Classification, Business vs. Other Sources\nDetails: This section discusses the process of determining whether income should be classified as business income or income from other sources. The dispute arises when the classification of income is unclear, especially in cases where an organization’s purpose and functions are under scrutiny.\nHeld:\n•\nIn cases where there is a dispute over income classification, the facts must be carefully examined, including the organizations objectives, functions, and foundation documents.\n•\nThe primary business and functions of the organization must be verified to assess whether the income is related to its declared objectives.\n•\nThe actual operations of the assessee, including its tax returns and the treatment of its income, must be considered to determine the correct classification of income.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=22,30", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3121 to 3125 of 2021, decided on 10th June, 2022, heard on: 10th June, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 18.01.2021 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, passed in Income Tax References Nos.06/2003, 53 to 56/2007)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CHIEF JUSTICE, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Shazia Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court, Kamranullah, Additional Commissioner and Naeem Hassan, Secretary Litigation (FBR) for Petitioner.\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Zahid Nawaz Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Lahore) for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE, ISLAMABAD\nVS\nMESSRS FAUJI FOUNDATION LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23774", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2101 = 2023 SLD 2101 = 2023 PTD 1594", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTU", - "Key Words:": "Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)-Ss. 2(3), 9 & 10—Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), Ss. 11, 45-B & 73- Sales Tax Refund Rules, 2002, Rr. 7 & 37—Maladministration— Scope—Refund of tax to commercial exporter on zero rated supplies— Authorities proceeded against the importer alleging him of using fake/flying invoices while taxpayer/ importer trying to satisfy the authorities—Complaint was filed by the importer against the Authorities for issuing show-cause notice to him (claimant / importer) in present matter which remained unresolved for about two decades with series/rounds of litigations, even in presence of order in his favour having been duly passed by the Commissioner (Appeal) and the Department neither filed second appeal nor sanctioned him the refund amount—Held, that matter-in-hand was a classic example of neglect, inattention, delay incompetence, inefficiency and ineptitude that constituted maladministration in terms of S. 2(3)(ii) of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000—Case of the complainant, prima facie, had been mishandled badly by the department due to, inter alia, rapid changes in the jurisdiction and transfer/posting of the officers from one place to another—Situation of the present matter had reached a stage where the Department would have no choice other than to give effect to the order of the Commissioner Appeals as the same (order) had attained finality and their (Department’s) representation before the President against the previous order passed by this Forum/Federal Tax Ombudsman) had also been rejected —Issuing Show-Cause Notice again to the claimant / importer relating to 19 years old matter and rejecting the claim on allegation of fake / flying invoices without having incriminating evidence / documents would be a blatant violation of the law and the orders having been passed—During 19 years, no serious and professional effort was made on record to show that the matter-in-hand was paid any prudent heed by the Department—Federal Tax Ombudsman passed certain recommendations directing FBR to give effect to the order passed by the Commissioner Appeals in favour of the complainant; and also to treat matter-in-hand as “case study” for academic, research and training purposes at the FBR—Complaint was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,45B.73Sales Tax Refund Rules, 2002=7,37Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3),9,10", - "Case #": "Complaint No. 1408/KHI/ST of 2022, dated 13th April, 2022, decided on 31st May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Manzoor Hussain Memon, Advisor for Dealing Officer.\nMrs. Sarwat Tahira Habib Sr. Advisor for Appraising Officer.\nObayedullah Mirza, AR for Authorized Representative.\nHumyaun Farooq, Senior Auditor, CTO, Karachi for Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD KHALID \nVERSUS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23775", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2102 = 2023 SLD 2102 = 2023 PTD 1610 = (2024) 130 TAX 97 = 2023 SCMR 1972", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Customs Act, Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, Confiscation of Goods, Excess Consignment\nDetails: This case involves the respondent company, which availed the Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, 2010, for the transportation of goods to Afghanistan. The consignments of polyester fabric were found to be in excess of the declared quantities at the port of entry (Karachi). However, the department did not allege that the transit rules were violated, nor was there any tampering of seals or pilferage. The case centers around the legality of the confiscation of goods when no attempt was made to evade customs duties or taxes, and the goods were not unloaded or diverted in violation of transit rules.\nHeld:\n•\nThe respondent company had followed the provisions of the Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement and there was no evidence of rule violations or tampering with seals.\n•\nThe departments allegation that the consignments exceeded the declared quantities did not amount to a breach of the transit facility, as there was no act of pilferage, unlawful unloading, or diversion of goods.\n•\nOffenses under sections 32 and 129 of the Customs Act, 1969 are related to the evasion or short levy of duties or taxes. In this case, there was no such allegation or evidence of an attempt to evade duties.\n•\nSince there was no violation of the customs rules, no offense under section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 was made out.\n•\nThe Federal Government had not issued any prohibition on bringing polyester fabric into Pakistan in excess of the declared value.\n•\nThe petition for leave to appeal was disposed of and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,129", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 5671 and 5672 of 2021, decided on 24th February, 2023, heard on: 24th February, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.06.2021 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Customs References Nos. 5-P and 6-P of 2012)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CHEIF JUSTICE, AYESHA A. MALIK, JUSTICE AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nAyaz Shaukat, D.A.G. along with Afnan, Additional Collector for Federation.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, PESHAWAR\nVERSUS\nMESSRS NEW SHINWARI LTD. AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23776", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2103 = 2023 SLD 2103 = 2023 SLD 1606", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 3(9-A), 11, 33(24) & 40-C—Issuance of invoices by registered person outside the Point of Sales (POS) system—Penalty—Assessment and recovery of tax short-levied, etc.—Scope—Plea of the appellant was that invoices-in-question could not be issued in prescribed manner due to some connectivity problem of the software with the internet in the computerized system at relevant time; and that the same were duly shown in monthly sales tax returns, hence no violation of law and tax evasion had been committed— Validity—Record revealed that appellant had also been penalized for similar default on issuing invoices on different dates, which showed the regular involvement of the appellant in issuing invoices outside POS system—Every person integrated with the FBR system was required to conduct transactions in the prescribed manner and was liable for penal consequences in case of committing default—Issuance of invoices outside the POS system had not been denied by the appellant, rather had contested the default by raising the ground / plea of internet connectivity problem, which amounted to an admitted position that the appellant was habitual in committing such default as penalty was also imposed on appellant (registered/person ) against other invoices of’ different dates—Record also showed that the appellant had not pursued the matter with due diligence before the authorities below rather had avoided the proceedings there—Plea / ground taken by the appellant appeared to be an afterthought, which was neither convincing nor substantial—Commissioner Appeals had rightly confirmed the penalty order, which was nether arbitrary nor fanciful—Tribunal upheld the impugned orders for having been passed in accordance with law—Appeal filed by the taxpayer(registered person) was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss.3(9-A), 11, 33(24) & 40-C—Issuance of invoices by the registered person outside the Point of Sales (POS) system—Penalty— Assessment of tax and recovery of tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded—Scope—Plea of the appellant (registered person) was that S.11 of the sales Tax Act, 1990, for being related to short payment of tax , could only be invoked for assessment purposes and not for penalty—Held, that ‘sales tax’ included the tax, additional tax, default charge, a fine, penalty of any other sum payable under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, or the Rules made thereunder— Sales tax (including penalty) could only be assessed and recovered under S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, hence the contention of the appellant (registered person) was turned down—Tribunal upheld the impugned orders passed by both authorities below for having been passed in accordance with law—Appeal filed by the taxpayer (registered person) was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009=3(9-A),11,33(24),40-C", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No.319/LB of 2023, decided on 5th June, 2023, heard on: 5th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Basharat Ali for Appellant.\nMst. Zil e Huma, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS CITY CASH AND CARRY, FAISALABAD \nVERSUS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23777", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2104 = 2023 SLD 2104 = 2023 PTD 1614", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTSs", - "Key Words:": "Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)——Ss. 2(3)(i)(a)(b) & 2(3)(ii), 9 & 10—Pending cases of taxpayers, non-assigning of—Maladministration—Scope—Federal Tax Ombudsman took Own Motion against FBR Authorities to provide relief to the taxpayers because more than 65000 cases were unassigned, lying in CTO portal, in wake of split of one RTO into three RTOs— Validity—Though a large number of cases were revealed to be dead ones, however, as many as 18591 cases belonged to live / active tax-payers whose jurisdiction was yet to be ascertained—Unusually large number of cases were lying without assigning proper jurisdiction, causing not only grievance to taxpayers but also suffered from enforcement inaction, if any, by the Department—Apathy, inattention, ineptitude in discharge of duties tantamount to maladministration under S.2(3)(i)(a)(b) & (ii) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000—Federal Tax Ombudsman passed directions to the FBR to ensure developing an effective IT process so as to ensure timely assignment of newly registered cases to their proper jurisdiction; and also to the 18591 cases awaiting proper jurisdiction—Own Motion was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3)(i)(a)(b),2(3)(ii),9,10", - "Case #": "0009/OM/2022, dated 16th March, 2022, decided on 17th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Seema Shakil, Advisor Dealing Officer.\nMuhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor Appraisal.\nQazi Mohammad Mohuddin, OIR, CTO Karachi, Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD: IN THE MATTER OF" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23778", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2105 = 2023 SLD 2105 = 2023 PTD 1628", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)——Ss. 233, 158(c), 161 & 205—Brokerage and Commission—Advance tax, deduction of—Insurance companies, business of—Collection of premium—Principal and agent, relationship of—Commissioner Appeals deleted the liability under the commission under S. 233 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, imposed by the Assessing Officer—Plea of the appellant / Department was that S.233 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, envisaged that where any company made payment on account of brokerage and commission to another person (agent), the Principle (Company) would deduct advance tax at the rate specified— Validity—Record revealed that the respondent/company had not made payment directly to the commission agent rather it was paid by lead Insurer Company and the respondent, being co-insurer, shared the cost of commission through book adjustments and internal account settlement—Insurance services were, normally, provided by a number of insurance companies jointly by creating a consortium under an agreement to the client / insured—Premium is collected from the insured by the lead Insurer and allocated among the Insurance Companies proportionate to their understanding of the risk—It is the duty of the lead Insurer Company to ensure the discharge of deduction of advance tax against the payments made to the Commission Agent— There is no separate transaction / payment between the lead Insurer and the Co-insurer for the purpose of collection of advance tax under S.233 of the Ordinance, 2001—Insurance premium is received in full by the lead Insurer ;and after payment of taxes / deductions on the entire amount, the rest is distributed among the Co-insurer on the basis of alleged shares—Co-insures and their shares of risk are decided through agreement—Co-insurance agreement is only in the nature of general regulation for sharing the risk and premium involved in an insurance policy and the entire insurance premium as well as payment to Commission Agent has already suffered tax at the time of its receipt / payment in the hands of the lead Insurer—If there was any non-deduction on the payment made to Agent, the lead Insurer might be inquired but not the Co-insurer who had not made any payment directly to the Commission Agent—Tax liability, in the present case, was created by the Assessing Officer on a defective understanding of the subject which had rightly been deleted by the Commissioner Appeals— Tribunal directed the Appellant/Department to verify the factum of payment of withholding tax by the lead/Co-insurer on the disputed transactions and in case any non-deduction was found, proceedings be initiated against the lead Insurer in accordance with law—Tribunal further directed that the respondent shall provide all the necessary details regarding payment, lead Insurers and transactions— Commissioner Appeals had rightly deleted the tax-in-question— Tribunal upheld the impugned orders for having been passed in accordance with law—Appeal filed by the appellant (Department) was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)—Ss. 153(1)(b) & 149(3) as inserted by Finance Act, 2014—Payment of salaries by the employer to its employees—Deduction of tax at source—Payments for services—Director’s fee—Deduction of tax— Among the salaries paid by the taxpayer (company), Officer Inland Revenue taxed the payments on account of Director’ fee by holding that said payments were in nature of services and tax deduction was applicable under S. 153(1)(b) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001— Commissioner Appeal deleted the same by observing that the fee paid to directors had been made liable to withholding tax vide Finance Act, 2014, through insertion of subsection (3) of S. 149 of the Ordinance, 2001, whereas the matter-in-hand pertained to tax year 2013—Validity—Held, that under the existing provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance , 2001 (‘Ordinance 2001 ’) at the relevant time (tax year 2013), a company, being an employer, was required to deduct tax at the time of payment of salary to its employees—However, there was no specific provision for deduction of tax on the remuneration paid to a director which was not in nature of salary—Director had not provided any technical or professional service to the assessee, therefore, payment of sitting fees did not constitute payment for rendering services under S.153(1)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001—Had it been included in S.153(1)(b) of Ordinance, there was no need of insertion of subsection (3) in S.149 of Ordinance, 2001 specifically providing the deduction of tax at the time of payment made for directorship fee— Amendment brought in tax year 2014 relating to deduction of tax on director’s fee in S. 149 of Ordinance, 2001 was prospective and did not apply in the present case—Commissioner Appeals had rightly deleted the tax -in-question—Tribunal upheld the impugned order passed by the Commissioner Appeals for having been passed in accordance with law—Appeal filed by the appellant (Department) was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=149,161,205,153(1)(b),158(c),233", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No.3546/LB of 2015, decided on 21st March, 2023, heard on: 2nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Zeeshan, DR for Appellant.\nAsim Zulfiqar Ali, FCA for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, LAHORE\nVS\nMESSRS ADAM JEE INSURANCE COMPANY'LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23779", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2106 = 2023 SLD 2106 = 2023 PTD 1635 = (2023) 128 TAX 435", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTTg", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax and Excise Duty Exemptions, Protection of Economic Reforms Act, Legal Challenges\nDetails: This case examines the legality of various Sales Tax and Excise Duty exemptions granted to the manufacture of polyester staple fiber (PSF) in North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) under different SROs, and their removal or alteration through subsequent notifications. The respondent company, a manufacturer of PSF, challenged the imposition of sales tax on raw materials and the withdrawal of previous exemptions under the Sales Tax Act (1990) and Central Excise Act (1944), arguing that the changes were in violation of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act (1992), particularly Section 6, which protects such fiscal incentives. The case involved multiple notifications issued between 1988 and 1995, with majority and minority views on their applicability to the respondents claims.\nHeld:\nPer Munib Akhtar, J. (Majority View):\nSRO 580/91 & SRO 561/94: SRO 580/91, which provided tax exemptions to promote industrialization in the region, came under the scope of Section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, and could not be altered to the disadvantage of the investors. SRO 561/94, which sought to supersede SRO 580/91, was in conflict with Section 6 of the Act, and thus, SRO 580/91 remained applicable, preserving the exemptions granted to the respondent company.\nSRO 462/88 & SRO 482/92: SRO 462/88 provided an exemption on raw materials (MEG and PTA) for the manufacture of PSF, but this was superseded by SRO 482/92, which removed the exemption. The majority held that SRO 462/88 did not fall under Section 6 of the 1992 Act due to its issuance before the effective date of the Act and its lack of a time-bound nature.\nSRO 531/88 & Subsequent Notifications: SRO 531/88 granted a complete excise duty exemption on PSF manufacturing, but this exemption was also subject to the broader changes brought about by later SROs, including SRO 477/95, which imposed a 5% excise duty. Section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act did not apply to these general exemption notifications, and the High Court erred in granting relief to the respondent.\nSRO 515/95: The notification provided a reduction in the sales tax rate on PSF, but it did not come under the ambit of Section 6 of the 1992 Act, as it was not time-bound and was intended for a broader range of goods, not just those benefiting the respondent. The respondent could not claim exemption under this notification, and the High Court’s decision was set aside.\nPer Yahya Afridi, J. (Minority View):\nThe minority opinion focused on the doctrines of vested rights and promissory estoppel. It argued that the respondent company had acquired vested rights under the previous SROs and that the government’s action to withdraw the exemptions amounted to a breach of those rights. The respondent’s reliance on these fiscal incentives was legitimate, and the subsequent changes through SRO 482/92 and SRO 477/95 were unfairly detrimental, violating the principles of estoppel.\nCitations:\nCollector of Central Excise v. Azizuddin Industries, PLD 1970 SC 439\nArmy Welfare Sugar Mills v. Federation of Pakistan, 1992 SCMR 1652\nAbdul Baqi v. Government of Pakistan, PLD 1968 SC 313\nNawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan, PLD 1993 SC 473\nShahid Mehmood v. Afzal Mehmood, 2011 SCMR 551\nAl-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2011 SC 811\nHanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan, PLD 2018 SC 189\nAl-Samrez Enterprise v. Federation of Pakistan, 1986 SCMR 1917", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=13(1)Central Excise Act, (I of 1944)=3", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1089 to 1090 of 2015, decided on 1st September, 2023. Dates of hearing: 30th January, 2019 and 10th August, 2023.\n(On appeal from the order dated 14.5.2015 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in I.C.A. No.82 of 1997, W.Ps. 287 and 1105 of 199&in of 20)(sic.)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, JUSTICE, MUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE AND YAHYA AFRIDI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nAbdul Hameed Anjum, Secy. Legal FBR (in C.As. Nos. 1089- 1090 of 2015).\nSikandar Bashir Mohmand, Advocate Supreme Court for the Contesting Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 1089-1090 of 2015).\nPer Munib Akhtar, J; Umar Ata Bandial, J., agreeing; Yahva Afridi, J. partially dissenting.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE\nVS\nDEWAN SALMAN FIBER LTD. AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23780", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2107 = 2023 SLD 2107 = 2023 SCMR 1247 = (2023) 128 TAX 61 = 2023 PTCL 691", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Customs Act – Valuation Ruling, Review, Constitutional Jurisdiction, Exhaustion of Remedies\nDetails: This case involves the challenge to a Valuation Ruling issued by the Customs department under the Customs Act, 1969. The petitioners, who were importers, approached the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, directly challenging the Ruling. However, they had not availed the alternate statutory remedy of filing a review petition under Section 25D of the Customs Act. The High Court dismissed their writ petitions on the grounds that the statutory remedy had not been exhausted. The case discusses the scope of constitutional jurisdiction, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, and the inapplicability of interim orders after the final decision.\nHeld:\n•\nAlternate Remedy of Review: The petitioners should have filed a review petition under Section 25D of the Customs Act, 1969, to challenge the Valuation Ruling. This remedy is provided specifically for aggrieved parties to challenge such rulings, allowing the Director General of Valuation to address any factual or legal errors. By bypassing this statutory remedy, the petitioners failed to follow the proper legal procedure. Therefore, the High Court correctly dismissed the writ petitions.\n•\nConstitutional Jurisdiction (Art. 199): The writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution should not be used as an alternative to the statutory remedies available under the law. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies emphasizes that litigants must first exhaust the available statutory remedies before seeking relief from the High Court. The purpose is to respect the legislative intent and allow administrative authorities to rectify any mistakes before judicial intervention is sought.\n•\nInterim Orders: The court reaffirmed the principle that interim orders or interlocutory orders do not survive after the final decision in a case. These orders are meant to aid in the final adjudication and merge into the final order once the main matter is resolved.\nCitations:\n•\nGen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf v. Pakistan, PLD 2014 Sindh 389\n•\nPLD 2016 SC 570", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25A,25DConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3215, 3644, 3656, 3657 to 3689, 3731 to 3732, 3216, 3745 to 3749, 3217, 3634 to 3643, 3645 to 3655, 3690 to 3730, 3733 to 3744, 3750 to 3780 of 2021, decided on 7th June, 2022, heard on: 7th June, 2022\n(Against the judgment passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 22.03.2021 in SCRAs. Nos. 212-323, 324-329 and 330-361 of 2016)", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Chief Justice, Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Justice and Ayesha A. Malik, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shafqat Mehmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian AZAM WAHEED and 2 others-Petitioners\nVs\nThe COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS through Additional Collector of Customs, Karachi-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23781", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2108 = 2023 SLD 2108 = 2023 SCMR 1407 = (2023) 128 TAX 74 = 2023 PTCL 818 = 2023 PTD 1244", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDTXk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax Act – Interpretation of Statutes, Input Tax Adjustment, Retrospective Application\nDetails: This case involves the interpretation of provisions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, specifically focusing on the legality of input tax adjustments for packing materials and the withdrawal of a proviso in a notification. The petitioners challenged the withdrawal of a proviso from the Sales Tax Notifications (S.R.O. 491(I)/2016 and S.R.O. 777(I)/2018), which restricted input tax credit for packing materials. They argued for retrospective application of the withdrawal, but the court dismissed their plea, ruling that the withdrawal was not retroactive and that the proviso was within the powers of the Federal Government.\nHeld:\n•\nStrict Construction of Tax Laws: Sales tax statutes must be strictly construed. No strained construction should be made merely to raise revenue, and such laws should not be applied retroactively unless explicitly stated by lawmakers.\n•\nWithdrawal of Proviso (S.R.O. 491(I)/2016 and S.R.O. 777(I)/2018): The restriction imposed on reclaiming input tax on packing material through the impugned proviso was within the powers vested in the Federal Government. The petitioners’ challenge to the constitutionality of the proviso was found to be misconceived, as the proviso was not ultra vires to the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n•\nRetrospective Application: The withdrawal of the proviso in S.R.O. 777(I)/2018, effective from 01.07.2018, did not have a retrospective effect. The language of the notification did not suggest any intention for retrospective application, nor was it deemed a curative statute meant to rectify an error in the prior notifications.\n•\nNon-Obstante Clause: The court explained the scope of the non-obstante clause, which allows certain provisions to override other conflicting legal provisions within the same law or other laws.\n•\nUltra Vires Doctrine: Actions taken by authorities that exceed their legal powers are considered ultra vires (beyond their powers), while those within their granted authority are intra vires (within their powers).\n•\nProviso Interpretation: The function of a proviso is to qualify or except something from the main enactment, and it may help clarify the true meaning of the main section if the enactment is unclear.\n•\nCurative and Remedial Legislation: Curative legislation aims to rectify defects or omissions in prior laws and is typically clarificatory. Retroactive application can only be applied if the law explicitly indicates such an effect, usually to resolve ambiguities or errors in earlier legislation.\nCitations:\n•\nFawad Ahmad Mukhtar v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, 2022 SCMR 426\n•\nZila Council Jehlum v. Pakistan Tobacco Company, PLD 2016 SC 398\n•\nMessrs AMZ Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Appellate Tribunal, 2006 PTD 2821", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=4", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 4700, 310-K to 314-K, 423-K to 426-K, 553-K and 493-K of 2021, decided on 1st June, 2022, heard on: 1st July, 2022.\n(Against the common judgment dated 24.12.2020, passed by High Court of Sindh at Karachi, in C.P. No. D-187/2017, C.P. No. D-5604/2016, C.P. No. D-2475/2017, C.P. No. D-4491/2018, C.P. No. D-2613/2019, C.P. No. D-6211/2016, C.P. No. D-272/2017, C.P. No. D-925/2017, C.P. No. D-7674/2017, C.P. No. D-3455/2019 and C.P. No. D-2713/2019)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CHIEF JUSTICE, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Shahzad, Advocate Supreme Court, Nadeem Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court (Video link from Karachi) for Petitioners.\nDr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court, Irfan Mir Halepota, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record (Video link from Karachi) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS RAJBY INDUSTRIES KARACHI AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23782", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2109 = 2023 SLD 2109 = (2023) 128 TAX 241 = 2025 PTD 656", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTc", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Blocking of Tax Number (NTN) – Failure to Respond to Demand Notice\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the blocking of their Tax Number (NTN) following the issuance of a demand cum hearing notice dated 16.02.2023 by the respondents. The petitioner failed to respond to the notice, leading to the blocking of their NTN. The department cited Section 155-M of the Customs Act, 1969 to justify the action.\nHeld:\n•\nThe blocking of NTN cannot be based solely on the failure to respond to the demand and hearing notice. According to Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, a Show Cause Notice must first be issued before recovery can be made. Furthermore, the blocking of the NTN is only permissible after an adjudication and the exhaustion of recovery methods as provided under Section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969.\n•\nThe Court directed the respondents to immediately unblock the NTN, while allowing them to proceed in accordance with the legal provisions of the Customs Act, including Section 32.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,155M", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-2866 of 2023 and Misc. No.13738/2023 decided on 12.06.2023, heard on: 12.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Amjad Hayat Advocate for the Petitioner\nMr. Zafar Hussain Advocate for the Respondent No.2 and Qazi Ayazuddin, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAHIR NAWAZ\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23783", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2110 = 2023 SLD 2110 = (2023) 128 TAX 253 = 2025 PTD 279", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Smuggling – Confiscation of Smuggled Vehicle – Locus Standi\nDetails:\nThe petitioner sought to implement an order setting aside the outright confiscation of a smuggled vehicle by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi. The petitioner was not the appellant in the case, nor did they have any direct connection to the matter. The petitioners request to withdraw the petition and refile was denied by the Court, and they were found to lack locus standi.\nHeld:\n•\nThe petitioner, despite being a practicing advocate, lacked the necessary standing (locus standi) to file the petition, as there was no direct involvement or actionable nexus with the case.\n•\nThe Court expressed concerns regarding the petitioners conduct but refrained from taking further action against her out of compassion.\n•\nThe petition and any pending applications were dismissed in limine due to lack of bona fide and proper standing.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=17", - "Case #": "C P D-716 of 2023 decided on 28.02.2023, heard on: 28.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "BENISH MEHBOOB\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS", - "Petitioner Name:": "BENISH MEHBOOB\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23784", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2111 = 2023 SLD 2111 = (2023) 128 TAX 257", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Failure to Pay Tax Collected or Deducted – Limitation – Tax Demand\nDetails:\nThe tax department generated a demand against the respondent for failure to withhold tax on payments for goods, services, and contracts. The demand was based on the failure of the taxpayer to produce records, even though the statutory period for retaining tax records had passed. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the department’s appeal, ruling that the tax demand was barred by time. The department filed a reference to the High Court challenging the Tribunals judgment.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Tribunal correctly accepted the respondents appeal, ruling that the tax demand was not valid because it was based on the taxpayer’s failure to produce records beyond the six-year statutory retention period under section 174 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. This demand was considered confiscatory and violated the guarantee of fair due process under Article 10A of the Constitution.\nAny tax demand generated due to the failure of the taxpayer to produce records beyond the prescribed period for record retention (under section 174) is not legally valid and cannot stand.\nThe High Court upheld the Appellate Tribunals decision.\nCases Referred to:\nHabib Bank LTD vs. Federation of Pakistan (2013 PTD 1659)\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-1, LTU vs. MCB Bank Limited (2021 SCMR 1325)\nMaple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd vs. Federal Board of Revenue (2016 PTD 2074)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Lahore vs. M/s Panther Sports & Rubber Industries (2022 SCMR 1135)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,153,161,162,165,174,174(1),174(3)Income Tax Rules, 2002=29,29(4),44,44(4)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4(2)(c),10A,24", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 253 of 2015 decided on 19.01.2023, date of hearing: 19.01.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE AND BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Saeed Ahmed Zaidi, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Adnan Haider Randhawa, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nM/S ISLAMABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED, ISLAMABAD (IESCO)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23785", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2115 = 2023 SLD 2115 = (2023) 128 TAX 162", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Best Judgment Assessment – Deemed Assessment – Immunity from Audit\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, an Association of Persons (AOP) engaged in transport services, filed a return of income declaring Rs. 1,514,370. The case was selected for audit through FBR’s computer balloting under section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The DCIR, after repeated unsuccessful attempts to obtain documents from the taxpayer, proceeded under section 121(1)(d), issuing an assessment order showing an income of Rs. 9,947,175. The taxpayer appealed, arguing that the order was passed without a hearing and that the taxpayer had met the conditions for immunity from audit under clause (84) of Part-IV of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The CIR(A) annulled the order, leading to an appeal by the department before the Appellate Tribunal.\nHeld:\nThe taxpayer fulfilled the conditions for immunity from audit by paying 25% more tax compared to the previous year (2012), as required under clause (84) of Part-IV of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. This gave the taxpayer a vested right to immunity from audit.\nIn the absence of evidence to the contrary, the taxpayer was entitled to this immunity.\nThe CIR(A) rightfully annulled the DCIRs order, as the taxpayer was not provided an opportunity for a hearing, and no sufficient evidence was presented by the department to dispute the taxpayer’s immunity.\nThe order of CIR(A) was confirmed, and the department’s appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),121(1)(d),177,214C,Clause (84) of Part IV of the Second Schedule", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1260/KB/2015 decided on 09.11.2021, heard on: 02.11.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MS. SHAHER BANO WALAJAHI ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND QAZI ANWER KAMAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Tassawar Iqbal, D.R., for the Appellant.\nMr. Muhammad Mazhar-ul-Hassan, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III, RTO-II, KARACHI\nVERSUS\nM/S. M.K. KHANA GOODS TRANSPORT COMPANY, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23786", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2116 = 2023 SLD 2116 = (2023) 128 TAX 167", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax on Purchases from FATA/PATA - Withholding Obligations\nDetails:\nThe appellant, M/s Terbella Steel Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt) Ltd., was found to have failed to withhold and deposit the required 1% withholding sales tax on taxable purchases made from unregistered persons during the tax periods from 2014 to 2016 and 2018. The purchases in question were made from FATA, where the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had not been extended. The department issued a show cause notice and subsequently passed an assessment order demanding Rs. 1,115,316 in sales tax along with default surcharge and penalty. The appellant argued that since the Sales Tax Act, 1990 did not apply to FATA/PATA under Article 247(3) of the Constitution, they were not required to withhold tax on purchases from these areas. The Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) upheld the demand, leading to an appeal before the tribunal.\nHeld:\nThe tribunal agreed with the appellant’s argument, stating that the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had not been extended to FATA or PATA under the relevant constitutional provision, meaning the appellant was not required to withhold sales tax on purchases from these areas. The tribunal also emphasized that public functionaries, such as the Assessing Officer, must adhere to the law and the directions of higher authorities or courts. Therefore, the tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to recalculate the sales tax liability based on the findings of the Income Tax Ordinance proceedings, where only taxable transactions of Rs. 1,775,500 were found unverifiable and subject to withholding tax.\nCitations:\nM/s Taj Packages Company (Pvt) Ltd Vs Government of Pakistan (PTCL 2016 CL 402)\nPakistan through Chairman FBR and others Vs Hazrat Hussain (2018 PTD 1204)\nDr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others Vs Federation of Pakistan (2012 CLD 520)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=34,35(5)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=247(3)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 24/PB/2020 decided on 27.01.2021, heard on: 27.01.2021", - "Judge Name:": " M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMTIAZ AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Yawar Muhammad, ACA for the Appellant.\nNemo for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S TERBELLA STEEL RE-ROLLING MILLS (PVT) LTD, SWABI\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CORPORATE ZONE, RTO, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23787", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2117 = 2023 SLD 2117 = (2023) 128 TAX 175", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSSs", - "Key Words:": "INCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 (XLIX OF 2001)-Sections: 37, 51(1), 111, 111(1), 111(1)(b), 122(1)(5), 128, 128(1A), 128(1AA), 131(5), 182 & 207 - Unexplained income or assets - Amendment of assessments - Capital gains - Procedure in appeal - Appeal to Appellate Tribunal - Offences and penalties - Appeal pending before CIR(A) - Application for the grant of further extension of stay rejected - Filing of appeal as well as application for grant of stay before Appellate Tribunal - Validity -\nFACTS\nIn this case, the taxpayer moved an application before the learned CIR(A) for grant of further extension of stay which was rejected by the learned CIR(A). Being aggrieved from the order passed by the learned CIR(A) the taxpayer approached this forum by filing of appeal as well as application for grant of stay.\nARGUMENTS\nThe learned counsel for the appellant in furtherance to above also apprised that the main appeal was heard by the learned CIR(A) on 22-07- 2020 but the order could not be passed and still pending adjudication before the CIR(A). He further submitted that the department had created huge illegal disputed demand. He further submitted that applicant has got a good prima facie/arguable case and balance of convenience is also tilted in favour of the taxpayer. According to the learned counsel the entire process of filing of this appeal would be rendered nugatory in case the impugned recovery proceedings are not stayed, more particularly when the appeal of the taxpayer is pending adjudication before the CIR(A), In the circumstances he prayed that the department may be directed not to initiate forcible coercive measure and stay of recovery of disputed demand may be granted. The learned D.R. on the other hand, strongly opposed the grant of stay.\nDECISION\n(a) Appeal not decided by CIR(A) - He has inherent, ancillary and implied powers to grant stay till the decision of appeal - It is noted that the learned CIR(A) has neither decided the appeal though heard on 22.7.2020. Therefore, the misery has been added to the taxpayer.\nThe learned CIR(A) has inherent, ancillary and implied powers to grant the stay till the decision or disposal of the appeal.\n(b) If appeal is not decided within time, the stay would continue till the decision of appeal. There is no need to file application for stay time and again - A reasonable interpretation of Section 128 ibid obviously would be that the time specified therein is directory and, therefore, if the appeal is not decided within the said period, the stay would continue till the disposal or decision of the appeal by CIR(A), unless expressly vacated by the Higher Courts on the written Miscellaneous Application for vacation of the stay.\nIt is, therefore, opined that there was no mandatory need to even file application by the taxpayer before the learned CIR(A) time and again, seeking stay of recovery of disputed tax.\n(c) Denial of stay to the taxpayer is against the norms of justice - CIR(A) is a judicial officer who is supposed to pass orders judiciously - In the instant case the denial of stay to the taxpayer is against the norms of justice and fair play.\nTherefore, the CIR(A) being a judicial officer within the meaning of section 224 of the Ordinance, 2001 is a judicial officer. He is supposed to pass the order judiciously. By not granting stay the misery of the taxpayer may further be aggravated.\n(d) CIR(A), directed to either issue appellate order within 30 days or grant unconditional stay till disposal of main appeal - The CIR(A) ought to pass judicious speaking order after application of conscious mind, dispose of the appeal and issue/serve the appellate order as observed supra. Till then, as a protective measure Respondent/ Department is strictly directed not to adopt any coercive measures for the recovery of the disputed demand and de-attach bank accounts (if any already attached).\nCases Referred to:\nMiss Aasia Film Artist reported as (2001 PTD 618); Saigol Qingqi Motors Limited reported as (2011 PTD 1290); (2010 PTD (Trib.) 551); (1996) 13 TAX 132) and UTI Mutual Fund v. ITO [TS-111-HC- 2012(2012(Bom)].", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=37,51(1),111,111(1),111(1)(b),122(1)(5),128,128(1A),128(1AA),131(5),182,207", - "Case #": "M.A.(Stay) No.466/KB/2020 ITA No. 829/KB/2020 decided on 02.11.2020, heard on: 24.08.2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIF ULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khaliq-ur-Rehman, FCA & Syed Safdar Imam, (ACMA), for the Applicants.\nImran Ahmed, D.R. RTO, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MANSOOR MASOOD KHAN, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III, AEOI-LTU, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23788", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2119 = 2023 SLD 2119", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Disallowance of Tax Credit for Lack of Documentary Evidence\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer filed an appeal against the disallowance of a tax credit amounting to Rs. 5,597,194/- by the Inland Revenue Officer (IRO) under section 221(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The disallowed credit was claimed without supporting documentary evidence, which was required under the provisions of the Ordinance. The IRO had issued a show cause notice under section 221(2) of the Ordinance, and after reviewing the taxpayers response, determined that the tax credit claimed was unsubstantiated.\nThe taxpayer’s claim involved a tax deduction of Rs. 5,430,339/- under section 231b for the registration of vehicles, but the taxpayer could only provide proof for Rs. 5,330,934/- of the claimed Rs. 10,928,128/-. As a result, the assessing officer rectified the deemed assessment order, disallowing the unverified portion of the tax credit. The taxpayer appealed to the Commissioner (Appeals), who upheld the disallowance.\nHeld:\nThe tribunal confirmed the actions of the authorities below, affirming that the claim for tax credit was rightly disallowed due to the lack of documentary evidence. It was ruled that claims for tax credit, particularly those involving tax deductions, must be substantiated by appropriate documentation, and the failure to do so renders the claim a mistake floating on the surface under section 221 of the Ordinance. The tribunal reiterated that such mistakes can be rectified under section 221, but only when the issue is clear and does not require detailed deliberations.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221,221(1),231bIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=156Income Tax Act, 1922=35", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1237/IB/2023 (Tax Year 2019), heard on: 05.10.2023. Date of order: 05.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": " TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN,\nSAJID NAZIR MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Sardar Salman Ejaz, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Shehryar Akram, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. ITC Logistics (Pvt) Limited, Plot No.417, Industrial Area, 1-9, Islamabad\nVs\nThe CIR, CTO, Islamabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23789", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2120 = 2023 SLD 2120 = 2023 PTCL 811", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSTg", - "Key Words:": "SALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)-Section 38-Scope, restrictions and powers under Section 38.—Section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 permits an officer authorized by the Federal Board of Revenue or the Commissioner Inland Revenue to have free access to business or manufacturing premises, registered office or any other place whereby any stocks, business records or documents required under this Act are kept or maintained belonging to any registered person; and such officer may, at any time, inspect the goods, stocks, records, data, documents, correspondence, accounts and statements, utility bills, bank statements, information regarding nature and sources of funds or assets with which his business is financed, and any other records or documents and may take into custody such records, statements, diskettes, documents or any part thereof, in original or copies thereof in such form as the authorized officer may deem fit against a signed receipt. Needless to say that while taking cognizance under this provision, inter-alia, the authorized officer must restrict himself to the record/documents that are in plain sight or voluntarily made available by the person present at the premises, for the purposes of inspection and taking into custody. This provision does not envisage any authority to compel the production of any record or document that is not presented voluntarily. Any record or document forcibly taken into custody must not be used adversely against the person from whose custody it was taken. The powers under this provision, by no stretch of imagination, can compromise the fundamental rights and constitutional guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.\nSection 38 does not envisage any authority to compel the production of any record or document that is not presented voluntarily.\nAny record or document forcibly taken into custody must not be used adversely against the person from whose custody it was taken.\nSections 38, 40 & 40A\nThe failure to place any material before the Court to establish that there were sufficient reasons and grounds for bypassing normal course of action specified in Section 40 and non satisfaction of pre requisites mentioned in Section 40A renders the action taken under Section 38 unsustainable and consequently the search and seizure was illegal without lawful authority and of no legal effect. We have specifically asked learned Legal Advisor for applicant-department to show whether the Assistant Collector had prepared a statement in writing of the grounds of belief that there was danger that the records or the goods may be removed before the search could be effected in terms of section 40, the answer was simply in the negative. Admittedly, it is/was not the stance of applicant-department that there was any likelihood of elimination or taking away the record/documents. Learned Legal Advisor was confronted with the provisions of sections 40 and 40A of the Act of 1990, but he repeatedly referred to the provisions of section 38, without explaining as to whether section 38 could be read in isolation from the provisions of sections 40 & 40A, relating to “searches under warrant” and the “search without warrant”. The failure to place any material before the Court to establish that there were sufficient reasons and grounds for by-passing normal course of action specified in section 40 and non-satisfaction of pre-requisites mentioned in section 40A renders the action taken under section 38 unsustainable and consequently the search and seizure was illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect.\nSections 40 & 40A\nSections 40 & 40A are aimed at to curtail and monitor the unlimited and unbridled powers of Sales Tax Authorities to avoid undue harassment to the taxpayer.\nSection 40A\nSection 40A, application.—Section 40A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (since omitted) was to be applied only where any Officer of Sales Tax not below the rank of an Assistant Collector of Sales Tax has reasons to believe that any documents or things which, in the opinion, may be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding under this Act are concealed or kept in any place and that there is a danger that they may be removed before a search can be effected under section 40, he may, after preparing a statement in writing of the ground of his belief for which search is to be made, search or cause search to be made in his presence, for such documents or things in that place.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=38,40,40A,47", - "Case #": "STR No. 97 of 2013, date of hearing:12th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE JAWAD HASSAN & MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Advocate/Legal Advisor.\nRespondents by: Mr. Abdus Salam Sajid, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III, LARGE TAXPAYERS, KARACHI.\nVS\nM/S. ADAM SUGAR MILLS LTD., KARACHI." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23790", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2121 = 2023 SLD 2121 = 2023 PTCL 761 = (2023) 128 TAX 469", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Taxability of Warranty Replacements under the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThis case concerns the taxability of auto parts replaced under warranty by a motor vehicle manufacturer from July 2004 to December 2005. The applicant, a vehicle manufacturer, replaced defective auto parts under warranty without charging any additional consideration for the parts, as the cost was already incorporated in the price of the vehicle. The warranty provided to customers assured the free replacement of defective parts within an agreed period or mileage.\nUnder the contract, the sale of the motor vehicle and the service of replacing defective parts were bundled together. The applicant contended that since no separate charge was made for the replacement parts, and the cost was part of the original vehicle price on which sales tax had already been paid, this did not constitute a taxable supply as per the Sales Tax Act, 1990. According to Section 2(33) of the Act, a transaction is only considered a supply if there is a consideration involved, which was not the case in this scenario for the warranty parts.\nHeld:\n•\nThe replacement of auto parts under warranty was not taxable because no separate consideration was charged for the parts, and the cost of the warranty replacements was included in the initial price of the vehicle.\n•\nSince the warranty service was a bundled part of the vehicle sale, with sales tax already paid on the total price of the motor vehicle, the replacement parts under warranty did not qualify as a taxable supply.\n•\nThe replacement service, being part of the composite supply of the vehicle, was not subject to separate sales tax under Sections 2(33), 2(41), and 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(39),2(41),2(46),3,4,6,7,11(2),13,23,26,34,36(1),47Sale of Goods Act, (III of 1930)=12", - "Case #": "S.T.R No. 93 of 2010 & 85 of 2011, heard on 20th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI & MR. JUSTICE SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: M/s Khalid Ishaq, Abid Hussain Sayyal and Mr. Wajahat Ali, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Malik Abdullah Raza, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. HONDA ATLAS CARS (PAKISTAN) LIMITED. \nVS\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR, LEGAL, LTU, LAHORE ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23791", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2122 = 2023 SLD 2122 = 2023 PTCL 801 = 2025 PTD 544", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDSXk", - "Key Words:": "CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, 1973-Article 199-See Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nISLAMABAD CAPITAL TERRITORY (TAX ON SERVICES) ORDINANCE, 2001\nSchedule - S. No. 5\nCivil Aviation Authority is not an organ of Federal Government; the services provided by the petitioner to CAA are not exempt from tax in terms of Clause 5 of Schedule.- The second challenge to the impugned notice is on the ground that since the CAA is an organ of the Federal Government, therefore, the services provided by the petitioner to CAA are exempt from tax in terms of clause 5 of the Schedule to the Islamabad Capital Territory (Tax on Services) Ordinance, 2001. This ground taken by the petitioner is misconceived as (i) the petitioner is an independent third party contractor i.e. a joint venture (ii) the tax is charged on the “services provided by the petitioner pursuant to contract, and (ii) the CAA being government entity is not the “provider of services” in the case in hand.\nSALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)-Section 11-Show cause notice is not an adverse order, the applicable law provides various remedies to petitioner in case an adverse order is passed as in absence of any jurisdictional defect, the remedies available to petitioner under applicable law in respect of grievances are adequate and efficacious.- The petition has been filed assailing show cause notice, which admittedly, is not an adverse order. The impugned show cause notice provides an opportunity to the petitioner to explain as to why the tax as mentioned therein should not be imposed. The grounds raised before this Court can be taken and agitated by the petitioner before the respondent Department.\nIn absence of any jurisdictional defect, the remedies available to the petitioner under the applicable law in respect of the grievances are adequate and efficacious.\nThe jurisdiction of High Court in matters assailing a show cause notice is limited to inquiry where show cause notice is issued without jurisdiction, patently illegal, with premeditation without application of mind for extraneous reasons, if violate fundamental rights, where interpretation of law is required and where there is no adequate and efficacious remedy available to aggrieved person. \nSections 11,30 & 31\nThe assumption of jurisdiction by Officer Inland Revenue is not in contravention of Section 30 & 31.—The judgment relied upon by the petitioner i.e. Zaver Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Federation of Pakistan, etc.” [2016 PTD 2332], has been examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled “The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-Ill, RTO-II, Lahore v. Messrs Hamza Nasir Wire and others” [PTCL 2021 CL. 1].\nAll OIRs of different grades appointed under section 30(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 possess the power to issue show cause notices under section 11 ibid. Consequently, the impugned show cause notices were issued by the OIRs competently under section 11(3) ibid in aid of proceedings commenced for recovery of tax.\nNowhere does section 30(3) restrain the CIRs from delineating the territorial and personal jurisdiction of their subordinate OIRs. The conferment of power under section 30(3) on the CIRs is meant to efficiently organise the team of officers subordinate to them.\nThe question whether the Officer Inland Revenue has lawfully assumed jurisdiction and issued the impugned notice has been dealt with and answered in the afore-referred judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The assumption of jurisdiction is, therefore, not in contravention of section 30 and 31 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 or the provisions of the Islamabad Capital Territory (Tax on Services) Ordinance, 2001.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,11,11(2),11(3),22,23,25(2),26,30,30(1),30(3),31,33,33(5),34Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Islamabad Capital Territory (Tax on Services) Ordinance, 2001=Schedule,S.No. 5", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 4201/2018, announced on 11th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Ms. Zainab Janjua, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Abdullah Aleem Qureshi, Advocate.\nMalik Umair Saleem, Advocate, Mr Manzoor Hussain, Advocate.\nMr Khalid Mehmood Dhoon, Asstt. Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GUARANTEE-SALEX-THALES JOINT VENTURE\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23792", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2123 = 2023 SLD 2123 = 2023 PTCL 891 = 2025 PTD 451", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTc", - "Key Words:": "Judicial Review of Presidential Order – Maladministration in Tax Proceedings\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the decision of the President of Pakistan dated 31.05.2017, which had set aside an order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) dated 20.02.2017. The FTO had found that officials of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) acted in maladministration by failing to comply with a stay order issued by the Commissioner (Appeals) on 11.11.2016. The officials claimed they were unaware of the stay order, which was deemed by the FTO to be a perverse and unjust act falling within the definition of maladministration under Section 2(3)(i) & (l)(b) of the FTO Ordinance, 2000.\nThe President, while hearing a representation against the FTO’s order, wrongly concluded that the FTO had exceeded his jurisdiction by addressing matters related to assessment and interpretation of law. The High Court held that the President misapplied the law and the facts, as the FTO’s findings were strictly limited to maladministration. The High Court further observed that denial of knowledge by tax officials was without merit and warranted disciplinary action.\nHeld:\nThe High Court allowed the petition, set aside the order of the President of Pakistan dated 31.05.2017 for being legally unsustainable, and upheld the FTO’s order dated 20.02.2017. It directed FBR to implement the FTO’s recommendations in accordance with law. The Court also confirmed its subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction to conduct judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3),2(3)(i)(b),14,14(6)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121(1)(d),128,128(1A)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2510/2017, decided on 22nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE BABAR SATTAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by Mr. Waheed Shahzad Butt, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Adnan Haider Randhawa, Advocate.\nMr. Aqeel Akhtar Raja, Assistant Attorney General", - "Petitioner Name:": "MASUD REZA\nVS\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH PRESIDENT & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23793", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2124 = 2023 SLD 2124 = 2023 PTCL 900", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTY", - "Key Words:": "SALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)\nSection 3\nAppellant being a retailer integrated its point of sale with the Online Computer System of FBR, has supplied its textile products to the persons who were neither liable for sales tax registration nor were actually registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as undoubtedly, all of them were “End- Consumers”.-It is an admitted fact that the appellant being a retailer integrated its point of sale with the Online Computer System of FBR, has supplied its textile products to the persons who were neither liable for sales tax registration nor were actually registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as undoubtedly, all of them were “End-Consumers”. The appellant has made supplies to the general public for their own use as such, the alleged buyers are end-consumers whereas liability to pay further tax under section 3(1A) of the Act arises only when a taxable supply is made in the course of furtherance of business/taxable activity. The meaning of “in furtherance of” indicative of the fact that the taxable supply has been made for the enhancement or further development of the business/taxable activity contrarily, the appellant has supplied the alleged goods to the general public for their own use and the said goods were never used in the course of furtherance of business/ taxable activities.\nAppellant has made supplies to the general public for their own use as such, the alleged buyers are end-consumers whereas liability to pay further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Act arises only when a taxable supply is made in the course of furtherance of business/taxable activity.\nThe meaning of “in furtherance of’ indicative of the fact that the taxable supply has been made for the enhancement or further development of the business/taxable activity contrarily, the appellant has supplied the alleged goods to the general public for their own use and the said goods were never used in the course of furtherance of business/taxable activities.\nAppellant is engaged in retail sales of its textile products to End-Consumers from his retail outlets as is also evident from his computer profile as well as Form of Registration 181 and no further tax is chargeable thereon under the first proviso to sub-section (1A) of section 3 of the Act, wherein it is Federal Government who may by a notification in Official Gazette, specify taxable supplies in respect of which further tax shall not be charged, levied and paid.-There is nobody denying the fact that the appellant is engaged in retail sales of its textile products to End-Consumers from his retail outlets as is also evident from his computer profile as well as Form of registration 181 and no further tax is chargeable thereon under the first proviso to sub-section (1A) of section 3 of the Act, wherein it is Federal Government who may by a notification in Official Gazette, specify taxable supplies in respect of which further tax shall not be charged, levied and paid. Accordingly, sales made to end- consumers were not subject to levy of further tax under section 3(1A) of the Act in the light of cumulative reading of section 3(1A) of the Act read with S.R.O. 648(I)/2013 dated 9th July-2013 wherein, supply of goods directly to the end-consumers have been excluded from the provisions of section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 therefore; no further tax is payable thereon.\nSales made to end-consumers were not subject to levy of further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Act in the light of cumulative reading of Section 3(1A) of the Act read with S.R.O. 648(I)/2013 wherein, supply of goods directly to the end- consumers have been excluded from the provisions of Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 therefore; no further tax is payable thereon.\nIf the goods are supplied to other than registered persons i.e. to end-consumers, it would in no case injure the Government treasury because the tax is charged on the market price, i.e. price to be paid by ultimately consumer meaning thereby that the government treasury collects the ultimate tax well in advance at the time of sale of goods.-If the goods are supplied to other than registered persons i.e. to end-consumers, it would in no case injure the Government treasury because the tax is charged on the market price, i.e. price to be paid by ultimately consumer meaning thereby that the government treasury collects the ultimate tax (which it would have collected when supplied goods were actually sold in the market) well in advance at the time of sale of goods from the sale outlet or factory manufacturing premises of the appellant without any fear of returning it to any person in case of refunds because end-consumer cannot claim it as input tax under the law, therefore, charging of further tax is illegal and unlawful in the given circumstances. Reliance is placed on the judgment of ATIR, Lahore in case of “M/s. Nimsay Redefining Style (Pvt) Limited, Faisalabad vs. The CIR, RTO, Faisalabad” reported at (2021 PTD (Trib.) 1266). \nThe expression “End-Consumers” has not been defined in the Act therefore, its extent and scope would be determined by reference to the ordinary dictionary meanings and under the established principles of statute interpretation, commonly known as the principle of ‘Ejusdem Generis’.-The expression “End-Consumers” has not been defined in the Act therefore, its extent and scope would be determined by reference to the ordinary dictionary meanings and under the established principles of statute interpretation, commonly known as the principle of ‘Ejusdem Generis’. This principle provides that words and phrases occurring in a provision of law are not to be taken in an isolated or detached manner, dissociated from the context, but these are to be read together and construed in the light of overall context of the provision of the law. The expression “End-Consumers” as used in the cited notification is to be interpreted in the light of words associated to it and not in pure isolation as per whims and wishes of the Inland Revenue.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,3(1A)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 734/LB/2022 & 1125/LB/2022, decided on 2nd November, 2022. NOTIFICATION NO. S.R.O. 648(I)/2013, DATED 9.07.2013", - "Judge Name:": " MR. SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR (CHAIRMAN) & MR. ANWAAR-UL-HAQUE (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mrs. Sana Aslam Janjua, (DR).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. MUJTABA SAUD TEXTILES, FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR, (RTO), FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23794", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2125 = 2023 SLD 2125 = 2023 PTCL 907 = (2024) 129 TAX 77", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Super Tax on Insurance Companies and Rule 6DA of the Fourth Schedule\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer challenged the imposition of super tax based on Section 4C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for the tax year 2022, arguing that the super tax should be levied in terms of Rule 6DA of the Fourth Schedule, which only applies from tax year 2023 onwards for insurance companies. The taxpayer contended that the assessing officer erroneously relied on Section 4C rather than Rule 6DA, which governs super tax for insurance companies from the specified tax year. The case revolves around whether Section 4C or Rule 6DA governs the imposition of super tax for insurance companies, with the taxpayer asserting that Rule 6DA applies from tax year 2023 onwards.\nThe Sindh High Court had previously ruled in the case of Shell Pakistan Limited v. Federation of Pakistan that Section 4C applies from tax year 2023, and the Revenues claim that it applies for the tax year 2022 was found to be legally incorrect. The taxpayer further argued that the Fourth Schedule is part of the main statute and takes precedence over Section 4C of the Ordinance when there is a conflict. Therefore, the taxpayer should not be charged super tax under Section 4C for the tax year 2022.\nHeld:\n•\nThe Sindh High Court’s ruling on Section 4C’s applicability from the tax year 2023 is still valid, and super tax can only be charged in terms of Rule 6DA from that year onward.\n•\nRule 6DA of the Fourth Schedule governs the imposition of super tax for insurance companies, and this rule cannot be superseded by Section 4C, as it is a special enactment related to insurance companies.\n•\nSection 4C does not override the Fourth Schedule; instead, the Fourth Schedule, as part of the main statute, prevails in case of conflict.\n•\nThe interpretation of fiscal statutes must favor the taxpayer, especially when two interpretations are possible.\n•\nThe show cause notice issued under Section 122(5A) referred to Rule 6DA, indicating that it remains applicable, and the inconsistency between this and the assessment under Section 4C was noted.\nCitations:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001, Sections 4C, 99, 122(5A)\n•\nFourth Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, Rule 6DA\n•\nPTCL 2023 CL. 162 “Shell Pakistan Limited Vs. Federation of Pakistan”\nInterpretation of Statute:\n•\nFiscal statutes must be strictly construed, and the courts should avoid interpreting provisions that result in redundancy or conflict.\n•\nThe principle of interpreting provisions favoring the taxpayer applies when two reasonable interpretations exist.\n•\nLegislative casus omissus cannot be remedied through judicial interpretation.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C,99,100A,122,Fourth Schedule,Rule 6DA,", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2451/LB/2023, decided on 18th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. NASIR MAHMUD, (JUDICIAL MEMBER) & MR. ANWAAR-UL-HAQUE (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asim Zulfiqar FCA.\nRespondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmad, DR. along with Mr. Sufian Ahmed Mian (ACIR).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. ADAMJEE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, LAHORE\nVS\nTHE CIR, CTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23795", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2126 = 2023 SLD 2126 = 2023 SCMR 1595 = 2023 PTCL 839 = 2023 SCP 193 = (2024) 130 TAX 175", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Presumptive Tax Regime and Principal-Agent Relationship\nDetails:\nA fertilizer manufacturing company and a marketing company were in a business arrangement where the marketing company purchased fertilizers from the manufacturing company. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal initially held that the marketing company acted as an agent for the manufacturing company, meaning the manufacturing company could not claim the benefits under the presumptive tax regime of Section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (ITO 1979) and should instead be assessed under the normal tax regime (Section 62). However, the High Court found that the agreement between the two companies was an outright sale, not an agency relationship. The payments made by the marketing company were subject to advance income tax under Section 50(4) of the ITO, 1979, and thus qualified to be treated as income under Section 80-C.\nHeld:\n•\nThe High Courts interpretation of the agreement as an outright sale was correct. The contract did not suggest any principal-agent relationship; it was a simple sale agreement with payments made after the deduction of advance tax.\n•\nUnder Section 80-C of the ITO, 1979, any amount received on which tax was deducted under Section 50(4) is deemed to be the total income tax liability of the manufacturing company, and therefore, the manufacturing company was entitled to the benefits under the presumptive tax regime.\n•\nNo irregularity or perversity was found in the High Courts judgment, and the appeals were dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979, Sections 80-C, 50(4), 62\n•\nContract Act, 1872, Section 182\n•\nSale of Goods Act, 1930, Sections 19 & 20\nCase Law Referred to:\n•\nBolan Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. v. PepsiCo Inc. and 4 others, PLD 2004 SC 860\n•\nMessrs Vijay Traders v. Messrs Bajaj Auto Ltd., 1995 SCC (6) 566\n•\nState of Mysore v. Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited, AIR 1958 SC 1002\n•\nGordon Woodroffe & Co. v. Sheikh M. A. Majid & Co., AIR 1967 SC 181\n•\nBhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Bhopal, 1977 SCR (3) 578\n•\nW.T. Lamb and Sons v. Goring Brick Company Limited, (1932) K.B. 710\n•\nHutton v. Lippert, (1883) 8 A.C. 309\n•\nTirumala Venkateswara Timber and Bamboo Firm v. Commercial Tax Officer, Rajahmundry, AIR 1968 SC 784", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=80CContract, Act, 1872=182Sale of Goods Act, (III of 1930)=19,20", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1275 of 2009, C.M.A. No. 6731 of 2018, Civil Appeals Nos. 1292 to 1296 of 2009 and Civil Appeal No. 227 of 2011, decided on 13th March, 2023, heard on: 13th March, 2023.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 09.02.2005 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in I.T.A. No. 915 of 1999)\nCIVIL APPEALS NOS. 1292 TO 1296 OF 2009 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 227 OF 2011\n(On appeal from the judgments dated 15.04.2008 and 22.06.2009 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in T.Rs. Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of 2008)", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Cheif Justice, Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Justice and Ayesha A. Malik, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Karachi) for Appellants (in C.A. No. 1275 of 2009).\nZafar Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Tasneem Amin, Advocate-on-Record (via video link from Lahore) for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1292-1296 of 2009 and 227 of 2011).\nRashid Awan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Karachi) for Respondents (in all cases).\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1 (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "The COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE-II, NEW INCOME TAX BUILDING, SHAHRAH-E-KAMAL ATTATURK, KARACHI and another-Appellants\nVs\nMessrs PAK SAUDI FERTILIZERS LTD., KARACHI through M.D. and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23796", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2127 = 2023 SLD 2127 = 2023 SCMR 1516 = 2023 PTCL 872 = (2024) 129 TAX 494", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Non-Deduction of Withholding Tax and Interpretation of Statutory Provisions\nDetails:\nThe Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited (IESCO) was found to have failed to deduct and collect withholding tax as required under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Deputy Commissioner (IR) initiated proceedings under Sections 161 and 205 of the Ordinance, without recourse to the audit proceedings specified under Section 177. Despite repeated opportunities, IESCO failed to provide the necessary documentation to support their tax deduction claims, leading to the issuance of a tax demand. Appeals before the Commissioner Inland Revenue and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue were dismissed, and petitions for leave to appeal were also rejected.\nHeld:\n•\nThe provisions of Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, do not require compliance with the pre-audit requirements under Section 177 as a condition for initiating proceedings. Both sections operate independently and do not overlap.\n•\nThe Deputy Commissioner (IR) was justified in issuing an order based on the available records after multiple opportunities were given to IESCO to provide the necessary documents and explanations.\n•\nThe failure of the petitioner to provide the required information and comply with the tax deduction obligations left the authorities no option but to finalize the tax demand.\n•\nThe Court dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal, affirming the decisions of the lower authorities.\nCase Law Referred to:\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited, 2021 SCMR 1325 (Distinguished)\n•\nFawcett Properties v. Buckingham County Council [1961] AC 636\n•\nCST v. Mangal Sen Shyam Lal AIR 1975 SC 1106\n•\nK.P. Varghese v. ITO [1981] 131 ITR 597 (SC)\n•\nState of Punjab v. Prem Sukhdas [1977] 3 SCR 403", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,177,205", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1920 to 1924 of 2022, decided on 10th August, 2022, heard on: 10th August, 2022.\n(Against the Judgment dated 09.03.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in I.T.Rs. Nos. 205, 208, 206, 209, 207 of 2015)", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Chief Justice, Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Justice and Ayesha A. Malik, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haseeb Shakoor Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in all cases).\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in all cases).\nNaeem Hasan Secretary (Lit), FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs ISLAMABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED (IESCO) through Finance Director, Islamabad-Petitioner\nVs\nThe APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE (H.Q), ISLAMABAD through Chairman and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23797", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2128 = 2023 SLD 2128 = 2023 PTCL 711", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRSs", - "Key Words:": "FEDERAL EXCISE ACT, 2005 Sections 3A & 14-CIR (A) was fully justified to delete the sales tax and SED because the same was charged without due confrontation.\nThe Special Excise Duty (SED) levyable under Section 3A is a separate levy under a Federal Excise Act and require separate proceedings. During the Sales Tax proceeding in the same Show Cause Notice demand of SED, is not justified.- The most important point in this case is that Show Cause Notice as well as order-in-original were issued under the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and there is no controversy on this point. Even Appeal in hand is also preferred under the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990. SED is imposed under the provisions of Federal Excise Act, 2005. SED has been levied without issuing of Show Cause Notice under the relevant provisions of Federal Excise Act. In fact the Departmental Authorities during the Sales Tax proceeding in the same Show Cause Notice demanded the SED, which is not justified. Even none of the provision of the Federal Excise Act was mentioned in the Show Cause Notice. The SED levyable under the provisions of section 3A of the Federal Excise Act is a separate levy under a separate Act and require separate proceedings. Since SED has been imposed without taking cognizance of the same, therefore, is not warranted under the law and liable to be set aside.\nSALES TAX ACT, 1990-Section 3-When “further tax” under Section 3(1A) was not in field then it did not matter whether supplies were made to a registered person or an unregistered person.-We agree with the learned CIR (A) in that even if the registered person had actually made supplies to someone else and not to M/s Hussain Cotex Pvt Ltd it hardly mattered under the circumstances because the liability of sales tax was fully discharged by the RP being the supplier as required by section 3(3)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. We are conscious of the fact that the instant appeal pertains to tax periods relevant to July 2009 to June 2010 when “further tax” under section 3(1 A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was not in the field. Thus it did not matter whether supplies were made to a registered person or an unregistered person.\nSection 11-Adjudication based on a ground which was not mentioned in the show-cause notice, the order was palpably illegal and void on the face of it.—The AR reiterated his arguments as taken before the first appellate authority and strongly agitated against the demand raised by the learned OIR without the mandatory confrontation as required under section 11(2) read with section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Additionally he placed reliance upon the famous judgment by the honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as “The Collector Central Excise & Land Customs & others v. Rahm Din” [1987 SCMR 1840] - Paragraph-7\n“However, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to determine this question of law in the facts of the present case as this petition can be disposed of on the short ground that the order of adjudication being ultimately based on a ground which was not mentioned in the show- cause notice, the order was palpably illegal and void on the face of it. \nWe have considered the rival arguments, perused the orders of the authorities below and studied the judgment by the honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan which is on all fours with the present case. It is patently clear from the OIRs order-in-original that the RP was confronted with imposition of penalty for not submitting the stock statement, but eventually after the receipt of the stock statement from the RP, the OIR raised huge demand of sales tax of Rs. 2,159,490 and SED of Rs. 134,968 without any further notice for absolutely different reasons. Thus we hold that the learned CIR (A) was fully justified to delete the sales tax of Rs. 2,159,490 and SED of Rs. 134,968 because the same was charged without due confrontation.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=3A,14Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A),11(2),11(5),33,34", - "Case #": "STA No. 1036/LB/2013, decided on 16th June, 2022", - "Judge Name:": " MR. SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER & DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zubair Khan, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Adeel Tariq advocate and Mr. Muhammad Rashid Khan, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, ZONE-VII, RTO II, LAHORE\nVS\nM/S. UNITED WIRE INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23798", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2129 = 2023 SLD 2129 = 2023 PTCL 718", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTk", - "Key Words:": "SALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)-Sections 8B & 33-Adjustment of 100% input tax instead of 90% in violation of Section 8B is a procedural lapse, at worst the department could have proceeded to impose penalties for non- compliance of a procedural formality and not beyond that.-Respondent-taxpayer adjusted 100% input tax instead of 90% in violation of Section 8B of the Act of 1990. Admittedly, respondent-taxpayer had deposited its total tax liability. The applicant-department is seeking recovery of said 10% excess input tax adjustment amount. Even if the said amount is paid, this would be part of carried forward amount and ultimately, respondent- taxpayer would be entitled to claim input tax adjustment of the said amount as well at the end of the year, hence, the claim of 100% tax adjustment is only a procedural lapse. At this stage, recovery of said amount from respondent-taxpayer is not justified as rightly held by learned Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order. Even otherwise, the issue in hand has already been settled by another learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Malik Enterprises (PTCL 2021 CL. 728).", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8,8B,8B(1),33,47,66", - "Case #": "STR No. 68393 of 2017, decided on 21st June, 2018.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI & MR. JUSTICE SHAHID JAMIL KHAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Barrister Pirzada Aurang Zaib.\nRespondents by: Mr. Shahbaz Butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE. \nVS\nM/S. ARCO PLASTICS (PVT.) LIMITED LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23799", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2130 = 2023 SLD 2130 = 2023 PTCL 924", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRTg", - "Key Words:": "CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE ACT, 1924\nGeneral\nSee Sections 3 & 43 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005. CENTRAL EXCISES ACT, 1944 (I OF 1944)\nSections 3 & 4\nSee Sections 3 & 43 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005.\nCENTRAL EXCISE GENERAL ORDER NO. 4 OF 2002, DATED 15TH JUNE, 2002\nSee Sections 3 & 48; and 1st Schedule of the Federal Excise Act, 2005\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE ACT, 2007 Sections 3 & 4\nSee Sections 3 & 43 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005. FEDERAL EXCISE ACT, 2005 Sections 3 & 43\nObservation on competence and authority of CBR/FBR for issuing statutory rules and orders, circulars and instructions under the repealed Act Le. Central Excises Act, 1944 and re-enacted Act Le. Federal Excise Act, 2005.\nSections 3 & 48; and 1st Schedule\nCentral Excise General Order No. 4 of 2002, dated 15th June, 2002 was not inconsistent with the 1st Schedule of the re-enacted Act i.e. Federal Excise Act, 2005, thus any notification/order issued under a repealed Act i.e. Central Excises Act, 1944 will be alive until rescinded under re-enacted Act.-The essential issue is whether the options provided in CEGO No. 4 of 2022 dated 15.06.2022; in any manner is inconsistent with the scheme of payment of excise duties as stipulated in Schedule I of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, therefore, it would also stand repealed on promulgation of Federal Excise Act, 2005 notwithstanding the provision of Section 24 of General Clause Act.\nSection 48 is silent about the effect of repeal relating to the notifications, orders issued under the repealed Act (Central Excises Act, 1944), therefore, under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, it is clear that where any Central Act is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any notification issued under such repealed Act shall, so far as it is inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue, in force, and be deemed to have been made under the provisions so re-enacted unless it is superseded by any notification or order issued under the provisions so re-enacted. It would be important to note that Section 48 of the re-enacted Act (Federal Excise Act, 2005), nowhere contains any intention to the contrary signifying that the operation of the repealed Act or of a notification issued thereunder was not to continue.\nThe 1st Schedule under the repealed Act and that of re-enacted Act relevant to a bottling company would show that the rate of duty for a bottling company on manufacturing of concentrate in all forms including syrup were governed under PCT Heading No. 2106.9010 whereas; the aerated water containing added sugar or other sweetening matter of flavored is described under PCT Heading No. 2202.1010. The letter attracts reduce rate of duty. Central Excise General Order No. 4 of 2002 has given option to the bottling companies either to avail option No. 1 i.e., to pay duty applicable on beverage concentrate syrup PCT Heading No. 21063.9011 and in that event, the recipient of the concentrate i.e., owner/operator of post machine shall in the capacity of manufacturer pay central excise duty on the aerated beverages produced and sold by him at the rate applicable to aerated beverages on the price at which they sell the cups to customer. The owner of post machine was also required to obtain central excise license and will maintain excise record. The alternate option No. 2 was that the bottling factory shall pay the same amount of central excise duty as would have been payable, had the factory manufactured bottles of 250 ml from the said unit of syrup by paying the duty applicable to aerated beverages. The 2nd option absolves the owners of the post mix machine of the liability to pay duty on aerated beverages made out of the syrup so cleared. In the said event, the recipient of concentrate syrup i.e., owner/operator of post machine was not required to obtain central excise license if if/he is otherwise a registered person. However, the important feature of this 2nd option was that the owner/operator of post mix machine shall not be required to pay any central excise duty on aerated beverages produced in the post mix machines or to maintain any central excise record. The mechanism and dispensation of two separate rate of duties relating to the sale of concentrate viz-a-viz aerated water was available under repealed Act as well as the re-enacted Act. The learned Tribunal was of the view that since the re-enacted Act has provided a separate rate of duty for concentrate, therefore, the options No. 2 available under the CEGO was inconsistent with the 1st Schedule of the re-enacted Act.\nIn our humble view, the Tribunal has erred by referring the said inconsistency because the word occurring inconsistent” in Section 24 of the General Clauses Act would obviously refer to the inconsistency in the scope, theme and object of the entire two statutes i.e., repealed and the re-enacted Acts.\nThe phrase “so far as it is inconsistent with the provision of re-enacted” occurring in Section 24 of the General Classes Act. refers to the inconsistency in the entire scheme of both the repealed and re-enacted Act and thus; if any notification order has been issued under a repealed Act and unless the re-enacted Act otherwise provide in clear terms, the said notification will be alive until rescinded under the re-enacted Act. In order to sum up the issue, we hold that/since two different rates of duties were provided under the repealed as well as the re-enacted Act relating to the payment of excise duties on sale bf concentrate viz-a-viz aerated water containing added sugar or other sweetening matter of flavoreds in the 1st Schedule of both the Acts and keeping in view the said two different rates, the Federal Board of Revenue in its own wisdom had allowed the bottling factories to pay the excise duties as per the rates applicable to the concentrate or avail the 2nd option as stated above, therefore, we could not find any inconsistency in the scheme procedure and the mechanism of levying duties on concentrate viz-a-viz aerated water in both the sets, therefore, keeping in view the mandate of Section 24 of the Act, the CEGO No. 4 of 2002 would still be alive and enforceable on repeal of the repealed Act (Central Excises Act, 1944) through the re-enacted Act (Federal Excise Act, 2005) and would continue so unless it is rescinded or recalled by the appropriate and competent forum under the scheme of the re-enacted Act (Federal Excise Act, 2005).\nSection 48\nScope and effect of repealing.\nThe word occurring “inconsistent” in Section 24 of the General Clauses Act would obviously refer to the inconsistency in the scope, theme and object of the entire two statutes repealed and the re-enacted Acts.\nThe phrase “so far as it is inconsistent with the provision of re-enacted” occurring in Section 24 of the General Classes Act, refers to the inconsistency in the entire scheme of both the repealed and re-enacted Act. The phrase “so far as it is inconsistent with the provision of re-enacted” occurring in Section 24 of the General Classes Act, refers to the inconsistency in the entire scheme of both the repealed and re-enacted Act and thus; if any notification order has been issued under a repealed Act and unless the re-enacted Act otherwise provide in clear terms, the. said notification will be alive until rescinded under the re-enacted Act.\nGENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897 (X OF 1897)\nSection 24\nSee Sections 3 & 48; and 1st Schedule (and Section 48) of the Federal Excise Act, 2005.\nWORDS AND PHRASES\n“Inconsistent”.—Meaning.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 22-P/2023, announced on 10th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Barrister Hassaan Akhtar & Mr. Ishtiaq Ahmad (Sr.), Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. NORTHERN BOTTLING COMPANY (PVT.) LTD\nVS\nTHE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE, PESHAWAR & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23800", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2131 = 2023 SLD 2131 = 2023 PTCL 947", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRXo", - "Key Words:": "CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1898 (V OF 1898) \nSections 96 to 105-Section 96 to Section 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 deals with the procedure how to make a search the premises of a person,-Section 96 to section 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 deals with the procedure how to make a search the premises of a person. Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is of significant importance, sub-section (1) thereof requires that two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to searched, be associated at the time of search. Sub-section (2) mandates that the search shall be made in the presence of such persons and list of all things seized shall be prepared by the searching officer and signed by inhabitants of the locality. Sub-section (4) of section 103 further emphasized that a list of all the things taken into possession shall be prepared and copy thereof shall be provided to the occupant of premises on his request.\nSection 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is of significant importance, sub-section (1) thereof requires that two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to search, be associated at the time of the search.\nSub-section (2) of Section 103 mandates that the search shall be made in the presence of such persons and list of all things seized shall be prepared by the searching officer and signed by inhabitants of the locality.\nSub-section (4) of Section 103 further emphasized that a list of all the things taken into possession shall be prepared and copy thereof shall be provided to the occupant of premises on his request.\nThe searching officer neither associated two witnesses of the locality in which the search was made nor did searching officer prepared the list of documents/record taken into possession/custody.\nWhole search/raid was conducted in sheer violation to the provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, hence as an ultimate corollary, whole edifice of the case falls on to the ground being founded on an illegal and unlawful act.—We are therefore of the confirmed view that whole search/raid was conducted in sheer violation to the provisions of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, hence as an ultimate corollary, whole edifice of the case falls on to the ground being founded on an illegal and unlawful act. It is an admitted position of the case that no witness was present during the search of the business premises of the appellant and moreover, searching officer did not prepare the list of documents/articles impounded during the search conducted under section 40 of the Act, 1990. It is also admitted by the learned DR that no proceedings against the appellant was pending under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 at the time of search/raid which establishes that the whole case was erected on an illegal foundation. If the law had prescribed method for doing of a thing in a particular manner, such provision of law is to be followed in letter and spirit and achieving or attaining the objective of performing or doing of a thing in a manner other than provided by law would not be permitted. This very issue has been articulated by the Hon’ble High Court, Lahore in case of “M/s. Pakistan Chipboard (Pvt) Ltd vs. Federation of Pakistan through revenue division and 5 others reported as (2015 PTD 1520).\nNo witness was present during the search of the business premises of the appellant and moreover, searching officer did not prepare the list of documents/articles impounded during the search.\nAny search/raid made in violation to the provisions of Section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with Sections 96 to 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 does not have any legal force and the impugned orders passed on the basis of such an illegal search/raid cannot he let to hold the field.\nCONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF\nPAKISTAN, 1973\nArticle 4\nIf the law had prescribed method for doing of a thing in a particular manner, such provision of law is to be followed in letter and spirit and achieving or attaining the objective of performing or doing of a thing in a manner other than provided by law would not be permitted.\nSALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)\nSection 3\nDepartment has raised exorbitant demand of sales tax merely on assumptions and presumptions without any tangible basis and has failed to provide documentary or any other corroborating evidence regarding physical delivery of the goods, receipt of any consideration of money and more so, the existence of any buyer without which no supply can be effected under Section 3 of the Act.—After having heard both the sides, we have noted that the department has raised exorbitant demand of sales tax merely on assumptions and presumptions without any tangible basis and has failed to provide documentary or any other corroborating evidence regarding physical delivery of the goods. receipt of any consideration of money and more so, the existence of any buyer without which no supply can be effected under Section 3 of the Act. The dispossession and actual transfer of goods by the manufacturer to the other part} is a basic requirement to bring the goods within the charge. Unless, the department is in a position to establish that the assessee did more production and the same has been transferred to another part}, sales tax cannot be charged. The estimate, however, strong it may be, unless is based upon some corroborating and solid evidences and reasons to believe cannot lead to creation of huge demand of sales tax. The departmental case is totally based upon hypothetical calculations without any proof which established beyond any shadow of doubt that impugned liability of sales tax is based on the figures and calculations, which are imaginary and presumptive without any logical and legal basis and no tax could be levied on the basis of assumption and presumption. It is now well-settled law that sales tax imposed on the basis of some assumption and presumption not warranted in law shall always be struck down.\nThe dispossession and actual transfer of goods by the manufacturer to the other party is a basic requirement to bring the goods within the charge. Unless, the department is in a position to establish that the assessee did more production and the same has been transferred to another party, sales tax cannot be charged.\nThe estimate, however, strong it may be, unless is based upon some corroborating and solid evidences and reasons to believe cannot lead to creation of huge demand of sales tax.\nSections 25 & 38\nMere reference to credible information of huge tax evasion without offering the same for review by the Appellate Tribunal is not sufficient to support a finding that the impugned action was in compliance with the requirements of Section 38 of the Act.- There is also nothing on the record to show that the visit on 07-10-2020 was conducted by an authorized officer or that there was reasonable cause to conduct the visit u/s 38 of the Act. Mere reference to credible information of huge tax evasion without offering the same for review by the Appellate Tribunal is not sufficient to support a finding that the impugned action was in compliance with the requirements of section 38 of the Act. Likewise, in the context of the facts of the present case, authorization by the learned Commissioner IR of twenty four persons, out of which fifteen were below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner, was ab initio null and void. Not only their authorization was nullity in the eyes of law but also any action taken by them pursuant to the nomination was also illegal and unlawful. The provisions of section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 empower the Board or the Commissioner IR to authorize only Officer of Inland Revenue to enter into the premises of a registered person. When the said provision is read with section 25(2) of the Act it further clarifies that the authorization of an Officer of Inland Revenue should not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner IR for the purpose of an investigation under section 38 of the Act whereas in the instant case, impugned order shows fifteen persons authorized by the Commissioner IR were below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner IR. The upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned order passed by the Commissioner IR under section 38 of the Act was illegal, ab initio void and without jurisdiction.\nAuthorization by the Commissioner IR of twenty four persons, out of which fifteen were below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner, was ab initio null and void. Not only their authorization was nullity in the eyes of law but also any action taken by them pursuant to the nomination was also illegal and unlawful.\nProvisions of Section 38 of the Act empower the Board. or the Commissioner IR to authorize only Officer of Inland Revenue to enter into the premises of a registered person. When the said provision is read with Section 25(2), it further clarifies that authorization of an Officer of Inland Revenue should not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner IR for the purpose of an investigation under Section 38 of the Act whereas, impugned order shows fifteen persons authorized by the Commissioner IR were below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner IR.\nSection 40\nSearch under section 40 can only be conducted in case when any proceedings are pending under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 but contrarily, there was admittedly no proceeding was pending in the case of appellant at the time of conducting raid and search, hence conducting search/raid in the absence of pending proceedings is violative to the statutory provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.- From bare perusal of above quoted provision of law, it becomes clear and obvious that the search shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898). Sub-section 1 of section 40 clarifies that the search under section 40 can only be conducted in case when any proceedings are pending under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 but contrarily, there was admittedly no proceeding was pending in the case of appellant at the time of conducting the raid and search under section 40 of the Act, hence conducting the search/raid in the absence of pending proceedings is violative to the statutory provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The sub-section 2 of section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 further provides the safeguard to the person who is searched, in a way that the search shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898).\nSub-section 2 of Section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 further provides the safeguard to the person who is searched, in a way that the search shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898).\nDespite several directions given to DR, to provide the record on the basis of which, charge of suppression of sales was created as well as recovery memo/list of the record seized during the search of appellant’s business premises under Section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, DR has provided only search warrant, order of CIR u/s 38 and roznamcha however, he has failed to provide recovery memo and list of record and documents seized during the search/raid.\nMore so, show cause notice and order-in-original neither speaks about the roznamcha, on the basis of which, charge of suppression of sales was created nor reflect the preparation of list of the documents and record taken into custody.-We have noted in this case that the searching officer neither associated the two witnesses of the locality in which the search was made nor did searching officer prepare the list of documents/record taken into possession/custody. Despite several directions given to the learned DR, during the hearing proceedings, to provide the record on the basis of which, charge of suppression of sales was created as well as recovery memo/list of the record seized during the search of appellant’s business premises under section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the learned DR has provided only search warrant dated 07-10-2020, order of CIR u/s 38 and roznamcha however, he has failed to provide recovery memo and list of record and documents seized during the search/raid. More so, the show cause notice and the order-in-original neither speaks about the roznamcha, on the basis of which, charge of suppression of sales was created nor reflect the preparation of list of the documents and record taken into custody. The case was founded on some trail balance but the appellant denied such trail balance hence, in absence any documentary evidence on the part of department and particularly in absence of list of documents taken into custody, it cannot be ascertained whether the said trail balance belong to the appellant or not, particularly when, the appellant has disowned of these documents i.e. roznamcha. The important document “roznamcha” on the basis of which, huge recovery of sales tax has been created against the appellant, neither contain any signature or sign” of any person on the behalf of appellant or its owner nor stamp” or “seal” nor even name of the firm” printed or hand-written thereon.\nThe case was founded on some trail balance but the appellant denied such trail balance hence, in absence any documentary evidence on the part of department and particularly in absence of list of documents taken into custody, it cannot be ascertained whether said trail balance belong to the appellant or not, particularly when, the appellant has disowned of these documents i.e. roznamcha.\nThe important document ‘roznamcha’ on the basis of which, huge recovery of sales tax has been created against the appellant, neither contain any “signature or sign” of any person on the behalf of appellant or its owner nor “stamp” or “seal” nor even “name of the firm” printed or hand-written thereon.\nIt is an admitted position of the case that no witness was present during the search of the business premises of the appellant and moreover, searching officer did not prepare the list of documents/articles impounded during the search conducted under Section 40 of the Act, 1990.\nNo proceedings against the appellant was pending under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 at the time of search/raid which establishes that whole case was erected on an illegal foundation.\nAny search/raid made in violation to the provisions of Section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with Sections 96 to 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 does not have any legal force and the impugned orders passed on the basis of such an illegal search/raid cannot be let to hold the field.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,25(2),38,40,40(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 134/LB/2023 decided on 9th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER) & MR. RIZWAN AHMAD URFI (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahmad Mujtaba, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. PUNJAB CERAMICS INDUSTRY, SHADMAN ROAD, FAISALABAD.\nVS\nCIR, LYALLPUR ZONE, RTO, FAISALABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23801", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2132 = 2023 SLD 2132 = 2023 SCMR 527", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDRXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Incident took place at 6:30 p.m. and the matter was reported to the Police instantly and the FIR was lodged on the same day at 8:40 p.m. i.e. just after two hours of the occurrence-Keeping in view the inter se distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station i.e. 13.5 kilometers, the contention that the FIR was delayed had no force-Occurrence took place in the broad daylight whereas the parties were known to each other, therefore, there was no chance of misidentification-Although both witnesses of ocular account were not residents of the locality where the occurrence took place but they had reasonably explained their presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time by stating that they had come to the house of their maternal uncle in connection with the matter of their land-Defence side did not deny anywhere that the said witnesses had no land in the vicinity-Presence of the said witnesses in the house of their maternal uncle could not be termed as unnatural-Said prosecution witnesses were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defence but nothing favourable to the accused or adverse to the prosecution could be brought on record-Both of them remained consistent on each and every material point inasmuch as they made deposition according to the circumstances that surfaced in the case-Medical evidence available on the record further corroborated the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased was concerned-Injuries ascribed to the accused on the body of the deceased were found available by the doctor, who conducted postmortem examination-Counsel for the accused could not point out any plausible reason as to why the complainant would falsely involved the accused in the present case and let off the real culprit, who had committed murder of his real brother-Substitution in such like cases was otherwise a rare phenomenon-Sufficient evidence was available to sustain the conviction of the accused under section 302(b), P.P.C.-Appeal was dismissed.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Ocular evidence- Medical evidence-Preference-Where ocular evidence is found trustworthy and confidence inspiring, the same is given preference over medical evidence.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Prosecution witnesses related to the deceased-Mere relationship of the prosecution witnesses with the deceased cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such witnesses.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Minor discrepancies in prosecution case-Even if there are some minor discrepancies, which do not hamper the salient features of the prosecution case, the same should be ignored-Accused cannot claim benefit of such minor discrepancies.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Recovery of weapon of offence disbelieved and inconsequential-Sentence of imprisonment justified-Admittedly the crime empties and the weapon of offence were sent to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory together, which made the recovery doubtful-Such recovery was rightly disbelieved by the High Court-So far as the quantum of punishment was concerned, keeping in view the fact that recovery was disbelieved, the High Court had already taken a lenient view and converted the sentence of death into imprisonment for life to meet the ends of justice, hence, it left no room for the Supreme Court for further deliberation on such score-Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 75-L of 2021, decided on 15th November, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.05.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 399-J/ 2012/BWP and Murder Reference No. 63/2012/BWP)\nheard on: 15th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sheikh Sakhawat Ali, Advocate Supreme Court (Via video link from Lahore) for Appellant.\nMirza Muhammad Usman, D.P.G. for the State.\nMalik Muhammad Imtiaz Mahl, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMANULLAH-Appellant\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23802", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2133 = 2023 SLD 2133", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Performance Evaluation Report-Scope and significance-Countersigning Officer and Reporting Officer-Significance of Performance Evaluation Report (PER) and the obligations of Countersigning Officer and Reporting Officer in preparation of the same stated.\nPerformance Evaluation Reports (PERs) are the most important documents in the service record of civil servants. They help the competent authorities in making informed decisions with regards to personnel administration matters, such as, selections for training, appointments/transfers, promotions, confirmations or screening of civil servants. An officers promotion and retention in service mostly depends on what has been recorded in his/her PER. It is, therefore, essential that the PERs are written by the Reporting and Countersigning Officers most carefully and responsibly. The PER forms that elaborate the criteria against which the performance of a subordinate officer is to be evaluated, and the instructions issued with regards to properly recording the PERs, are designed to ensure reporting on an officers strong and weak points more objectively, as only objective reporting can effectively serve the true purpose of such reports. If the Reporting or the Countersigning Officer is partial, his opinion is likely to cause incalculable damage to the officer reported upon, and if a PER is ambiguous or carelessly written, it would not serve the true purpose of recording PERs. Therefore, the Reporting and Countersigning Officers should evaluate the performance of the officer reported upon in a detached and objective manner, in accordance with the instructions issued on the subject.\nA Guide to Performance Evaluation (Edition 2004), Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, SECTION 1 and Government of Punjab v. Ehsanul Haq Sethi PLD 1986 SC 684 ref.\nRecording of PERs must be undertaken with complete objectivity and fairness, and with a view to improve individual and organizational productivity.\nhttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35921/Performance Management-in-the-Public-Administration-Seven-Success-Factors.pdf ref.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Performance Evaluation Report-Assessment by Countersigning Officer and Reporting Officer-Interference by Service Tribunal or Supreme Court-Grounds-Evaluation of the performance of a subordinate officer by his Reporting or Countersigning Officer, primarily being a matter of personal assessment based on the direct observation of the work of the officer concerned, is not to be usually interfered with by the Tribunal or the Supreme Court unless mala fide with full particulars, or the gross violation of the instructions, on the part of the Reporting or Countersigning Officer, as the case may be, is shown.\nI.G.P. v. Altaf Majid 1994 SCMR 1348 and Noor Elahi v. Director of Civilian Personnel 1997 SCMR 1749 ref.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Performance Evaluation Report-Countersigning Officer and Reporting Officer-Prior counseling of subordinate officer-Requirement of prior counselling of subordinate officer before recording adverse remarks against him in his PER elaborated.\nAccording to clauses 2.13(i)(ii) and 3.3(ii)(iv) of the Instructions contained in A Guide to Performance Evaluation (Edition 2004) published by the Establishment Division, as a general rule, an officer is to be apprised if his Reporting or Countersigning Officer is dissatisfied with his work, and the communication of such dissatisfaction with advice or warning should be prompt so that the officer may eradicate the fault and improve his performance. That is why it is emphasised that the Reporting or Countersigning Officers should not ordinarily record adverse remarks as to the performance of an officer without prior counselling. They are thus expected to apprise the officer concerned about his weak points and advise him/her how to improve, and to record the adverse remarks in the PER when the officer fails to improve despite counselling. The supervisory officers under whose supervision other officers work, must realise that the supervision does not mean cracking the whip on finding a fault in their performance, rather the primary purpose of the supervision is to guide the subordinates officers in improving their performance and efficiency, and that their role is more like a mentor rather than a punishing authority. As the purpose of counselling is to improve the performance of the officer and not to insult or intimidate him, the supervisory officers are also to see, having regard to the temperament of the officer concerned, whether the advice or warning given orally or in written form, or given publically in a general meeting of the officers or privately in a separate meeting with the concerned officer only, would be beneficial for the officer in improving his performance. The directions contained in the instructions, in this regard, on paying great attention to the manner and method of communicating advice or warning should be adhered to.\nA Guide to Performance Evaluation (Edition 2004), Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, SECTION 1 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos. 3447 to 3450 of 2022, decided on 7th February, 2023.\n(Against four judgments of Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad all dated 16.06.2022, passed in Appeals Nos. 62(R)CS, 417(R)CS, 114(R)CS and 115(R)CS of 2022)\nheard on: 7th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja M. Shafqat Khan Abbasi, D.A.G., Mrs. Ayesha Wani, Joint Secretary, Amin Tareen, Deputy Secretary and Sajid-ul-Hassan, Section Officer, Establishment Division, GOP for Petitioner.\nRespondents in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU-Petitioner\nVersus\nRIAZ-UL-WAHAB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23803", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2134 = 2023 SLD 2134 = 2023 SCMR 969", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-\n-S. 12-Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002, R. 95-Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2022, Reglns. 3, 4 & 5, Sched. I(D) & Sched. II(C)-Grant of small-scale license or lease for mining minor minerals like sand, gravel and sandstone- Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports, significance of-Mining sector must adopt climate proof mining policy which must consider how climate change will impact mining areas so that the climate change risks are integrated into the environment assessment-Without an IEE or EIA, these matters are totally neglected-Not only do the IEE and EIA consider the environmental impact of the project but can also include standards and initiatives to improve sustainability of the sector-Mines and Minerals Department (MMD) is responsible for obtaining the IEE or EIA reports before initiating the process for bidding of the projects-Adverse impact on the environment due to exploration and mining of minor minerals stated.\nThe Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2022 (the Regulations) clearly specify the requirement of Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports, which is a fundamental and basic step before a project starts, so as to ensure that an adverse effect on the environment has been considered and addressed. This is because even the exploration and mining of minor minerals has an adverse impact on the environment, which includes deforestation, pollution, production of toxic waste water, loss of habitats and disruption of the ecosystem. In particular, with reference to sand mining; deforestation, loss of biodiversity, soil erosion and acid drainage are some of the serious environmental impacts, which have to be given due consideration. Surface mining creates health hazards for miners and local communities as well as gives rise to air pollution and produces toxic waste water, and causes droughts all of which must be catered for. In this context, climate change is one of the biggest global threats and the combination of surface mining and climate change becomes a serious threat for the ecological system. Hence, the mining sector must adopt climate proof mining policy which must consider how climate change will impact mining areas so that the climate change risks are integrated into the environment assessment. Therefore, without an IEE or EIA, these matters are totally neglected. Hence, special attention must be given to all environmental aspects even with reference to the mining of minor minerals.\nJason Phillips, Climate change and surface mining: A review of environment-human interactions and their spatial dynamics, 74, Applied Geography, 95-108 (2016); Lukas Ruttinger and Vigya Sharma (2016) Climate Change and Mining: A Foreign Policy Perspective, Germany, adelphi and Sustainability 2017 - Review on Environmental Impacts of Sand Exploitation ref.\nThe relevance of the IEE and EIA cannot be ignored. Not only do the IEE and EIA consider the environmental impact of the project but can also include standards and initiatives to improve sustainability of the sector. This can be vital in projects of mining under the Mines and Minerals Department (MMD). They also prescribe mitigation measures and put in place a monitoring method through an Environment Management Plan (EMP). The EMP provides the basic framework for implementing and managing mitigation and monitoring measures. It identifies the environment issues, the risks and recommends the required action to manage the impact. This is vital because not only does the miner know what its obligations are, it also gives the MMD and the EPA a framework to follow and to ensure its compliance. Hence, all factors considered the IEE and EIA ensure that the project is sustainable and all possible environmental consequences have been identified and addressed adequately.\nThere is no timeline provided in the Regulations within which the IEE and EIA approvals are to be obtained nor does it specify any process to bind the successful bidder of the project to the terms of any EMP or other measures provided for in the IEE or EIA. However, the Regulations do clarify that the proponent of the project has to obtain the IEE or the EIA and in this case, the proponent of the project will always be the MMD, hence the practice of requiring a successful bidder to obtain an IEE or EIA after bidding of the project totally negates the purpose and impact of these reports. The impact on the environment must be looked into before bidding commences by the MMD and at the time of bidding a bidder must know the terms set out in the IEE or EIA that they are bound by and are required to comply with especially the mitigation measures and the EMP. Hence, it is the MMD that is responsible for obtaining these reports before initiating the process for bidding of the said projects. In this regard, it would be useful for the MMD to provide guidelines and SOPs to facilitate this process and also provide penalizing provisions within the license or lease for any violation of the EMP so as to ensure compliance.\n(b) Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-\n-S. 12- Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2022, Reglns. 3, 4 & 5-Mining licences-Climate proof mining policy-Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports, significance of-While mining is an essential part of the economy, it must be conducted in a responsible and sustainable manner to minimize its impact on the environment-By implementing best practices and adhering to strict guidelines and developing a climate proof mining policy, it can be ensured that mining continues to provide for the economy while also protecting the health of the planet and its inhabitants-Economic growth is important but it must be achieved in a way that is sustainable and respectful of the natural systems that support it.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Environmental Protection Act, (XXXIV of 1997)=12Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002=95", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 55 of 2020, decided on 2nd February, 2023.\n(Against order dated 18.11.2019, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in W.P. No. 56780 of 2019)\nheard on: 2nd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rafey Alam, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nQasim Ali Chohan, Additional A.G., Ashfaq Ahmed Kharal, Additional A.G., Noman Sarfraz, Deputy Director (Mines and Minerals) and Nawaz Majid, Deputy Director (L) Environment for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PUBLIC INTEREST LAW ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTAN registered under the Societies Act, 1860 through authorized person Chaudhry Awais Ahmed-Petitioner\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat, Lower Mall, Lahore and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23804", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2135 = 2023 SLD 2135 = 2023 SCMR 1113", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-Ss. 13(2) & 13(3)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Pre-requisites-Talb-i-muwathibat and Talb-i-ishhad-If performance of a single Talb is skipped or not proved, the superstructure and edifice of the suit for possession through pre-emption falls on the ground.\n(b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-S. 13(3)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Notice of Talb-i-ishhad, sending of- Service on only one of the two vendees-Effect-Not service in the eyes of law-In the present case to prove the notice of Talb-i-ishhad, although the plaintiff/pre-emptor had produced the Postman, however, a bare perusal of his statement showed that the notices were not directly delivered to the defendants/vendees T and R -Postman stated that it was defendant/vendee B who had received the notices on behalf of the other two defendants/vendees-Similarly, the notice sent to defendant/vendee AJ was received by another defendant AG -Such fact was also admitted by the plaintiff himself in his amended suit filed by him before the learned Trial Court-Suit for possession through pre-emption had been rightly dismissed-Appeal was dismissed.\nMunawar Hussain v. Afaq Ahmed 2013 SCMR 721 ref.\n(c) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-S. 13(3)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Pre-requisite-Notice of Talb-i-ishhad-Service of Talb-i-ishhad is a pre-requisite and if the performance of the same is not proved beyond any shadow as well as in the prescribed form, then the whole structure falls on the ground.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991=12(2),13(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 840 of 2017, decided on 6th April, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 10.02.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in R.S.A. No. 135 of 2010)\nheard on: 6th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Munib Akhtar and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Mansoor, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nMalik Muhammad Kabeer, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SARDAR MUHAMMAD (DECEASED) through LRs-Appellant\nVersus\nTAJ MUHAMMAD (DECEASED) through LRs and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23805", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2136 = 2023 SLD 2136 = 2023 SCMR 1135", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973-\n-Rr. 6(2) & 4(1)(b)(ii)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A-Compulsory retirement-No opportunity provided of cross-examining witnesses associated with inquiry proceedings-Effect-Defective inquiry-Breach of right to fair trial-During regular inquiry it is obligatory for the inquiry officer to allow an even-handed and fair opportunity to the accused to place his defence and if any witness is examined against him, then a fair opportunity should also be afforded to cross-examine the witnesses-When the statement of a witness is not subjected to cross-examination, its evidentiary value cannot be equated-It is an onerous duty of the Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee to explore every avenue so that the inquiry may be conducted in a fair and impartial manner and should avoid razing and annihilating the principle of natural justice which may ensue in the miscarriage of justice-Not providing an ample opportunity of defence and depriving the accused officer from his right of cross-examining departmental representative who led evidence and produced documents against the accused is also against the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 10-A of the Constitution-In the present case various witnesses were associated in the enquiry and their statements were also recorded but neither any opportunity was afforded to the petitioner (Accountant in police force) to conduct cross-examination, nor was it mentioned that an opportunity of cross-examination was afforded, but was declined by the petitioner-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and it was directed that the department shall conduct de novo inquiry; that in the course of de novo inquiry, ample opportunity of hearing should be provided to the petitioner; that petitioner shall be reinstated in service subject to the refund of dues within a period of one month as received by him from the department; that the de novo inquiry shall be concluded within a period of two months and the payment of back benefits, if any, shall also be subject to the final outcome of the inquiry.\n \nUsman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi and others 2022 SCMR 745 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973=6(2),4(1)(b)(ii)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 545-K of 2021, decided on 20th April, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 18.02.2021 passed by the learned Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi in Appeal No. 570 of 2019)\nheard on: 20th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Irfan Mir Halepota, Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link) for Petitioner along with Petitioner.\nSaulat Rizvi, Additional A.G., Adeel H. Chandio, SSP Thatta and Ghaffar, DSP Legal for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Raja MUHAMMAD SHAHID-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23806", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2137 = 2023 SLD 2137 = 2023 SCMR 1232", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-Ss. 42 & 54-Suit for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of benevolent funds-Employee of private bank-Pensionary benefits changed through a revised scheme-Through a Circular the appellant-bank introduced a new retirement benefits scheme (the new scheme)-New revised scheme was made effective from 01.07.2002 and it, generally, was applicable to all the employees of the appellant-bank unless an employee submitted a written option for the pension on frozen basic pay by 30.09.2002; and, in case of non-submission of such a written option by the cut-off date, the employee would be governed by the new revised scheme-By introducing the new revised scheme, the pension up to 30.06.2002 was protected and new retirement benefits in the shape of Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) and gratuity were introduced from 01.07.2002- New scheme, unequivocally, froze the basic pay as on 30.06.2002 for the purpose of the calculation of pension for an employee of appellant-bank who opted for the old scheme-Respondent admittedly, did not submit a written option to opt for the old scheme, and as such his case was to be dealt with in accordance with the new pension scheme-Respondent, being an officer in a position as high as the Vice-President of the bank, was fully conversant with the command as well as the operation of the new scheme and it was a matter of record that he had already received the retirement benefits in accordance with the new scheme and did not raise any objection thereto at the relevant time-Having received the benefits under the newly revised policy, he was now estopped to question the legality of the said new scheme-Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit of the respondent-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed.\n(b) Precedent-\n-Binding precedent, doctrine of-Scope-Doctrine of binding precedent promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and ensures an organic and systematic development of the law.\nProvince of East Pakistan v. Dr. Azizul Islam PLD 1963 SC 296; The Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Basher Cohwdhury PLD 1966 SC 854; Multiline Associates v.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2537 of 2020, decided on 25th May, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 20.07.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Civil Revision No. 399-P of 2020)\nheard on: 3rd May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Makhdoom Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nRespondent No. 1 in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nHABIB-UR-REHMAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23807", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2138 = 2023 SLD 2138 = 2023 SCMR 1189", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-Preamble-Whenever a Court is adjudicating a civil suit, it is regulated by the requisite laws and civil procedure applicable to it at the time the suit is filed and adjudicated upon.\n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-First Sched. & Art. 22-Bank employee-Wrongful dismissal-Suit for damages-Limitation-Respondent-employee was dismissed from service on 3.10.1991 and his review petition dated 19.4.1992 was rejected by the Competent Authority on 5.7.1992-Respondent filed his suit for on 12.6.1993, after almost one year-Cause of action to file a suit for compensation/damages arose to the Respondent on 5.7.1992 and was therefore within the limitation of one year provided in Article 22 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for claiming compensation for any other injury to the person-Appeal was dismissed.\n(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 73-Breach of contract-Damages, award of-Purpose and scope-Damages are costs that are imposed not as a deterrent or as a means to punish person(s) or party(s) who has/have breached a contract but instead to bring the person(s) or party(s) who has/have suffered from the breach of contract into a position which they would have been had the breach of contract not accrued-Said principle is known as the principle of restitutio in integrum (restoration to original condition)-It therefore stands to reason that damages are in fact the compensation that the law awards when a breach of contract occurs as compensation for the loss that a person or party has suffered from a breach of contract.\nLivingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25; Great Easter Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1971 Cal. 150 and Robinson v. Harmain (1848) 1 Exch 850 ref.\n(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 73-Breach of contract-General and special damages-Distinction and scope-Concept of awarding damages is, by its very nature, inclusive of awarding both general as well as special damages-However, the nature of general and special damages and proving the two are different compared to each other.\nAbdul Majeed Khan v. Tawseen Abdul Haleem 2012 PLC (C.S.) 571 ref.\n(e) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 73-Breach of contract-Damages, award of-Burden of proof-Onus would lie on a plaintiff or claimant to prove that there had been a contract entered into between the parties; that there had been a breach of contract; and the extent of the damages claimed thereof.\nHadley and another v. Baxendale [1854] EWHC Exch J70 and Messrs A.Z. Company, Karachi v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1973 SC 311 ref.\n(f) Habib Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981-\n-R. 39-Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 73-Bank employee-Wrongful dismissal-Suit for damages-Breach of employment contract by employer-Employee denied the right of an opportunity to defend himself and discriminated against-Effect-At no point did the Appellant-bank during cross-examination of the Respondent-employee ever try to rebut or deny the allegations made by him against the involvement of the General Management in the losses that had led to the initial preliminary inquiry and subsequent dismissal of the Respondent by the Appellant-In fact, the Appellant had agreed that it had allowed the General Manager, under whose instructions and supervision the Respondent worked, to resign as opposed to being dismissed from service-When the Respondent responded to the show-cause notice issued to him by the Appellant, he demanded a full and complete hearing before the Enquiry Committee-However, the Enquiry Committee constituted for probing the allegations against the Respondent dispensed with such requirement (under Rule 39 of the Habib Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981) without giving any reason and proceeded to dismiss the services of the Respondent-Principle of audi alteram partem i.e. being granted a hearing before an adverse order is passed applies to employees who are to be dismissed from service since dismissal entails reputational as well as financial loss-Enquiry Committee by dispensing with the requirements of Rule 39 of the Habib Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981 infringed the right of the Respondent to present oral evidence and cross-examine anyone who might have testified against him-Respondent was denied a fundamentally important right of an opportunity to defend himself-Furthermore, Respondent was discriminated against as admittedly the General Manager was the person who the Respondent reported to; under whose instructions the Respondent acted; and who admittedly appeared to be reason the branch of the Appellant faced colossal financial loss-Surprisingly, no civil proceedings were initiated by the Appellant against the General Manager and he was ultimately asked to resign from service whereas the Respondent was dismissed from service-Appellant had breached the Respondents employment contract- Appeal was dismissed.\nMrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. and another 1994\nSCMR 2232 ref.\n(g) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 73-Habib Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981, R. 39-Bank employee-Wrongful dismissal-Suit for damages-Breach of employment contract by employer-Employee denied the right of an opportunity to defend himself and discriminated against-Compensation, award of-Financial and economic loss naturally arising out of the wrongful dismissal-In the present case when the Respondent-employee was dismissed from service, it would have been difficult for him to be employed again owing to the fact that a dismissal from service on his record would have had the effect of either barring him from further employment or making it considerably more difficult for him to be employed again-Such blot on his service permanently marked the Respondent for the rest of his life and was only washed away when the Respondent passed away-Had the Appellant-bank treated the Respondent in a just and fair manner and conducted a fair, open and impartial inquiry giving him the opportunity to defend himself, the financial and reputational aspect of a claim in tort would have been non-existent or too remote-Dismissal from service is clearly a stigma and financial and reputational loss apart from mental torture, agony and distress are logical consequences-In the present case, owing to denial of the right to defend himself without just cause leads towards a conclusion of wrongful dismissal and financial as well as economic loss and therefore could naturally be considered to arise out of the wrongful dismissal of the Respondent by the Appellant-Since the Respondent had been wrongfully dismissed from service, the Appellant cannot be granted the premium of not being made to compensate the Respondent especially when the Appellant failed to prove that the damages the Respondent sought were too remote or did not naturally arise out of the breach of contract-Once the Respondent had proved that he had been wrongfully dismissed from service, the onus shifted on the Appellant to prove that the damages claimed by the Respondent were either too remote or did not arise out of the breach of contract-In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Respondent was entitled to such damages that in the opinion of the Court, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, arose directly out of the breach of contract as well as all damages claimed for wrongful dismissal from service-Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=22Limitation Act, 1908=22Contract, Act, 1872=73", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 371 of 2020, decided on 4th May, 2023.\n(Against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 14.05.2019 passed in High Court Appeal No. 57 of 2006)\nheard on: 22nd November, 2022 (J.R.).", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Mehmood Ghani, Advocate Supreme Court and M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Appellant.\nUmer Abdullah, Advocate Supreme Court and Mian Liaquat Ali, Advocate-on-Record (absent) for LRs. of Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HABIB BANK LIMITED through Attorney-Appellant\nVersu\nMEHBOOB RABBANI-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23808", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2139 = 2023 SLD 2139 = 2023 SCMR 1208", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 184, 185 & 199-Jurisdiction conferred upon Superior Courts by the Constitution- Jurisdiction conferred by law- Scope-Jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution ranks higher than jurisdiction conferred by law-Jurisdiction which has been conferred by law may also, by law, be revoked, but the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution cannot be revoked by law.\n(b) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)-\n-S. 3(2)- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 185(3) & 199-Constitutional petition filed before the High Court dismissed by Single Judge of the High Court-Against such dismissal Petition for Leave to Appeal filed before the Supreme Court without exhausting the available remedy of filing an Intra Court Appeal ( ICA ) under section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 ( Ordinance ) before the High Court-Maintainability-Appellate jurisdiction created by the Ordinance and through other laws does not take away the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court conferred by the Constitution under its Article 185-However, since the Ordinance created an appellate forum, the Supreme Court will not ordinarily permit it to be bypassed, which does not mean that the appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court, is made redundant-In appropriate cases the Supreme Court will not insist that an intra-court appeal provided under the Ordinance, be availed of first.\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Media Network PLD 2006 SC 787; Mst. Shohrat Bano v. Ismail Dada Adam Soomar 1968 SCMR 574; Province of Punjab v. Border Area Committee PLD 2011 SC 550; Federation of Pakistan v. Dewan Petroleum (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 189 and Naeem Tahir v. Jahan Shah PLD 2023 SC 207 ref.\n(c) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)-\n-S. 3(2)- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9, 14(1), 24, 185(3) & 199-National Police Foundation Housing Scheme ( the Housing Scheme )-Illegal allotment of second plot to Managing Director ( MD ) of National Police Foundation ( the Foundation )-Park/green area in layout plan converted into a plot-Constitutional petition filed before the High Court challenging such illegal allotment was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the Foundation was a private trust not susceptible to writ jurisdiction of the High Court-Against such dismissal Petition for Leave to Appeal was filed before the Supreme Court without exhausting the available remedy of filing an Intra Court Appeal ( ICA ) under section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 ( Ordinance ) before the High Court-Maintainability-Federal Government had paid a considerable amount and had established the Foundation which is a charitable endowment with stated objectives to be adhered to-Committee of Administration of the Foundation comprises of serving government officers-Foundations property can only be used as stipulated in its Scheme of Administration-In presence of such facts to contend that the High Court did not have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is inexplicable-In the present case a number of Fundamental Rights are also involved, including the right to life and dignity of man-Therefore, the objection with regard to the petitioner directly assailing, under Article 185 of the Constitution, the impugned judgment of the Single Judge (of the High Court), without first availing of the Intra Court Appeal provided for under the Ordinance, in the facts and circumstances of the present case is not sustainable.\nPresent case involves important questions of law such as the conversion and allotment of a designated park/green area. Every designated park/green area must be preserved; these areas may also be for the use and/or benefit of the public. Designated parks and green areas must not be allowed to be converted for exclusive private use and/or private profit.\nSuo Motu Case No. 11 of 2011 PLD 2014 SC 389 and Anjum Aqeel Khan v. National Police Foundation 2015 SCMR 1348 ref.\nAnother aspect of the case had to be considered and one which makes an intra-court appeal against the impugned judgment of High Court effectively redundant. A Divisional Bench of the same (Islamabad) High Court had already held in another case that since the Foundation was a charitable trust it was not amenable to the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution which was the same point on which the petitioner had been non-suited in the present case by the Single Judge of the High Court. However, this determination, that the Foundation was a private charitable trust and was not amenable to writ jurisdiction, is factually and legally incorrect.\nNational Police Foundation v. Sher Zaman I.C.A. No. 218 of 2015 ref.\nThe Government of Pakistan had paid an amount of twenty million rupees in trust for a charitable purpose to be known as the National Police Foundation which was vested in the Treasurer of Charitable Endowments for Pakistan. The Government spends or allocates money from public funds and such money cannot be stated to constitute private money or fund. The Committee of Administration of the Foundation comprises of serving government officers. The Foundations property can only be used as stipulated in its Scheme of Administration. In presence of these facts to contend that the High Court did not have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is inexplicable.\nIn the present case a number of Fundamental Rights are also involved, including the right to life and dignity of man. A clean atmosphere and unpolluted environment undoubtedly includes availability of parks and open spaces for recreation. The right to use a park with all amenities involves enjoyment of life which is covered by the word life employed in Article 9 of the Constitution. In addition, when land secured for a park or designated as green or open area is illegally converted and then unlawfully transferred to private use the people are deprived of their common or collective use of such land which violates Article 24 of the Constitution.\nArdeshir Cowasjee v. Karachi Building Control Authority 1999 SCMR 2883; Iqbal Haider v. Capital Development Authority PLD 2006 SC 394; Javed Haider Kazmi v. Province of Sindh 2009 SCMR 1387; Suo Motu Case No. 10 of 2005, 2020 SCMR 361, Human Rights Cases Nos. 4668/2006, 1111/2007 and 15283-G/2010, PLD 2010 SC 759 and Mall Development (Pvt) Ltd. v. Waleed Khanzada 2022 SCMR 2080 ref.\nTherefore, the objection with regard to the petitioner directly assailing, under Article 185 of the Constitution, the impugned judgment of the Single Judge (of the High Court), without first availing of the appeal provided for under the Ordinance, in the facts and circumstances of the present case is not sustainable. Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed.\n(d) Remand-\n-Scope-Generally, when a court fails to exercise jurisdiction vested in it and/or does not exercise jurisdiction for an incorrect reason, the case is remanded to that court for a decision on merits.\n(e) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-Ss. 24, 56 & 55-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9, 14(1) & 24-National Police Foundation Housing Scheme ( the Housing Scheme )-Illegal allotment of second plot to Managing Director ( MD ) of National Police Foundation ( the Foundation )-Park/green area in layout plan converted into a plot-Legality-After the Managing Director ( MD ) of the Foundation was allotted a plot, he misused his position to allot to himself a second plot, by illegally converting a designated park/green area-Within a year of being allotted the second the MD sold it and made a hefty (untaxed) profit on his investment-Both the MD and the Foundation had concealed from the buyer of the second plot the fact that the said plot had been designated as a park/green area and that it could not be converted into a residential plot, and sold-Sale agreement for the second plot between the MD and the buyer was void because its object, the sale and purchase of a designated park/green area, was unlawful-Therefore, the MD was not entitled to retain the amounts received by him and the buyer would be entitled to its refund/compensation.\nThe Foundations Application/Membership Form and the Terms and Conditions printed thereon, which every applicant of a plot signs stipulates that, An applicant can apply for only one plot. The Federal Government also confirmed this. Managing Director ( MD ) of the Foundation was allotted a plot, the first plot, and then misused his position as Managing Director of the Foundation to allot to himself the second plot, by illegally converting a designated park/green area. The second plot was not needed by him to construct a house for himself, but for personal aggrandizement as he soon sold it. Many in power like him illegally procure land. They also deprive others of their entitlement, including the less privileged and those without any shelter. This elite dismantling of the division between private and public interest disrupts a just social order and the spirit of community. The Constitution requires that Pakistan be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice. Whenever a second plot is allotted to the same person it deprives another, and when this is done at subsidized or below market rates private interest subverts the interest of the State. Land is a valuable asset of the State, therefore, when land is given away for free or at subsidized rates to the powerful elite by an impoverished State it harms the State because selling it at market rate would have alleviated the debt burden which condemns to servitude and poverty those not born yet.\nIt was expected that the Foundation would have welcomed the filing of present petition, but the Foundations representatives and counsel fought tooth and nail to ensure that wrongdoing goes unchecked and a park/green area is illegally converted to residential use. The only conceivable reason for this unprofessional and unbecoming conduct was to benefit the MD of the Foundation, and to do so at the expense of the Foundation, which they were paid to serve. Present case was a classic example of a member of the elite, an Inspector General of Police, audaciously taking land to which he had no entitlement and to then abuse his official position (as Managing Director) and make the Foundation defend the indefensible. Within a year of being allotted the second the MD sold it and made a hefty (untaxed) profit on his investment. The first plot was also sold by him. While there may be justification to assist serving and retired government servants to have a residence of their own and for this purpose to allot them a plot of land at subsidized or below market rates there can be none if the same is misused for monetary gain. In blatant disregard of the people and the country the elite capture land.\nThe second plot bought by the MD was sold to a third party (the buyer). Both the MD and the Foundation had concealed from the buyer the fact that the said plot had been designated as a park/green area and that it could not be converted into a residential plot, and sold. If requisite disclosure, which a seller is required to make, had been made then it is most unlikely that the buyer would have entered into the Sale Agreement by paying the then market rate for the plot. The Sale Agreement between the MD and the buyer was void because its object, the sale and purchase of a designated park/green area, was unlawful. Therefore, the MD is not entitled to retain the amounts received by him and the buyer would be entitled to its refund/compensation. The Foundation too is not entitled to retain any amount paid to it for the second plot, which was illegally converted and allotted. And since the MD had sold the second plot to the buyer the Foundation should refund the amount received in respect thereof to the buyer, and the balance amount/compensation is to be paid by the MD to the buyer within thirty days of the announcement of present judgment, failing which the buyer will be within his rights to file a suit for recovery, compensation and/or damages. Supreme Court declared that the Sale Agreement entered into between the MD and the buyer was unlawful; and that the limitation period for filing a suit for recovery, compensation and/or damages will commence from the date of announcement of the present judgment. Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=184,185 & 199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3203 of 2017, decided on 19th June, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 05.07.2017 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Writ Petition No. 1573 of 2010)\nheard on: 22nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Mehboob Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Mohammad Aslam Khaki, Advocate Supreme Court (Petitioner in person) for Petitioner.\nSyed Asghar Hussain Sabzwari, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.\nCh. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan for Respondent No. 2.\nSyed Khawar Ameer Bokhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 3.\nCh. Riasat Ali Gondal, Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 4.\nSardar Abdul Raziq, Advocate Supreme Court and M. Sharif Janjua, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. MOHAMMAD ASLAM KHAKI-Petitioner\nVersus\nKhawaja KHALID FAROOQ KHAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23809", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2140 = 2023 SLD 2140 = 2023 SCMR 1339", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-Ss. 11 & 12-Unsoundness of mind-Proof-Registered sale deed and exchange deed executed by plaintiffs father challenged on the plea that their father had been suffering from paralysis for a long time; his hands and other limbs were affected with tremors and trembles; he could not relieve himself of his natural urges, and even to talk he used to express himself in gestures; and because of his illness he was very weak and could not walk around-Validity-Crucial point of determination in case a plea of insanity or unsoundness of mind is taken is the time of execution of the contract-In the present case, the disputed documents were registered in 1996 while plaintiffs father (executant) died in 1998 and thus the plaintiffs were to clearly state when their father had an attack of paralysis; did this occur before the documents were executed or after it?-This was a material fact that ought to have been disclosed in the plaint, but was conspicuously omitted, and since the plaintiffs could not go beyond the scope of their pleadings, they could not even be allowed to put in any statement or material to rectify the omission during the course of evidence, and as such, it would be fair to hold that the plaintiffs had failed to discharge their burden of pleadings, and tumbled at the first stage of the trial of their claim-Best evidence of the fathers mental disorder could have been the medical attendant (hakeem) who treated him at the relevant time-However said physician (hakeem) was not examined, nor was any explanation furnished why he was not presented-One of the plaintiffs, who was also son of the executant, stated in his examination-in-chief that his father was ill and suffering from paralysis; but he did not say that his father was mentally challenged-However, during cross-examinations he said that his father had tremor in his body before his death, and that in the year 1995-1996, his father had sold his other land to another person-Such statement proved that the father (executant), though ill, was of sound mind and able to look after his own affairs at the time of registration of the disputed sale deed and exchange deed-Burden of proving their fathers unsoundness in the first place was on the plaintiffs and when they failed to do so, the Court could not cure that infirmity by reading the statement of the defendants witness, such as the lambardar who had verified the fathers thumb impression on the disputed documents-In the ordinary course of life, the said witness (lambardar) was not supposed to have any information about the fathers health and the details of his medication-Contents of the disputed documents and of the statement of the witnesses, particularly of the Sub-Registrar did not support the inference, drawn by the High Court, that the father did not understand the value of the property he was selling or of which he was exchanging-Even if it was accepted that the father had paralysis and tremors, it cannot be said that the father did not comprehend the nature and effect of the disputed documents at the time of their writing and registration-Suits for declaration filed by the plaintiffs were rightly dismissed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court-Appeals were allowed and impugned judgments and decrees of High Court were set-aside.\nMuhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 ref.\n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-Ss. 11 & 12-Unsoundness of mind-Scope-Permanent paralytic affection, though it somewhat saps the physical energy of the sufferer, does not necessarily impairs his mental power to such an extent to render him incapable of transacting business.\nSajid Ali v. Ibad Ali (23 Cal. 1) ref.\n(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 42-Suit for declaration-Registered sale deed and exchange deed-Plea of fraud-Not established-Sale deed and exchange deed executed by plaintiffs father was challenged on the plea that their father was unable to walk due to illness, so the defendants produced another person before the Sub-Registrar and got the disputed documents registered fraudulently, and that the Sub-Registrar did not mention their fathers identity card number on the disputed documents-Validity-Neither the plaintiffs in their plaint nor any of their witnesses had alleged that the Sub-Registrar was in cahoots with the defendants-Disputed documents were registered by the Sub-Registrar/Naib Tehsildar, and he was produced as a witness by the defendants; he clearly stated in his examination-in-chief that the disputed documents were presented before him by the father himself, and he was identified by the lambardar, the statements of witnesses were recorded, and the father admitted that consideration amount had been received, and also acknowledged the exchange of land-During cross-examination, the Sub-Registrar/Naib Tehsildar admitted that the fathers identity card number was not mentioned on the disputed documents, but stated that if there was no identity card number, the document was registered on the identification of a proper person, which included lambardar, councillors etc.-Plaintiffs father was identified by the lambardar, who appeared in Court and confirmed it-Even without so, the fathers identification would not have been difficult to ascertain as he was a lambardar himself, and generally the Sub-Registrar/Naib Tehsildar knows the lambardar of his area-Thus, in the given circumstances, merely on the basis of non-recording of the fathers identity card number, it could not be said that any other person had appeared instead of the father at the time of registration of the disputed documents, and any fraud was committed-Since the plaintiffs, had failed to discharge their initial burden, it did not shift to the defendants to prove the transactions-Defendants not only produced all the witnesses to the disputed documents, the identifier, and the Sub-Registrar, but also produced all their records from the custody of the Record-Keeper before the Trial Court and from the statements of all of them, the transactions recorded in the disputed documents were proved-Suits for declaration filed by the plaintiffs were rightly dismissed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court-Appeals were allowed and impugned judgments and decrees of High Court were set-aside.\nKhalil Ahmad v. Abdul Jabbar Khan and others 2005 SCMR 911; Messrs SAZCO (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Askari Commercial Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 558 and Haji Muhammad Yunis (deceased) through Legal heirs and another v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others 2022 SCMR 1282 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1926=11 & 12", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1731, 1732 and C.M.As. Nos.13433, 13475 of 2021, decided on 24th May, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 22.10.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revisions Nos. 3332 and 3333 of 2010)\nheard on: 24th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Muhammad Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in both cases).\nMalik Matee Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for Respondents Nos. 1 - 3 (in both cases).\nEx-parte for Respondent No. 4 (in both cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUNIR and others-Appellants\nVersus\nUMAR HAYAT and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23810", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2141 = 2023 SLD 2141 = 2023 SCMR 1397", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324 & 34-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault with firearms-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Only a general role had been ascribed to the accused persons and no details had been given as to which of the accused fired at which part of the body of the complainant-Complainant received injuries on the non-vital parts of the body-Bare perusal of the medico legal report revealed that at the one hand the medical officer declared the injuries as simple and on the other hand he held the same to be grievous -Law Officer admitted that none of the injuries exposed the bone-Complainant sustained injuries on non-vital parts of the body whereas more than 37 empties had been recovered from the place of occurrence, which prima facie showed that the accused had no intention to kill the complainant despite having ample opportunity to do so-In this view of the matter, the question whether section 324, P.P.C. would be applicable in the case or not would be determined by the Trial Court after recording of evidence-Case of the accused persons squarely fell within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into their guilt-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused persons were admitted to bail.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-If two views are possible from the evidence adduced in the case then the view favourable to the accused is to be adopted.\nSaghir Ahmed v. State 2023 SCMR 241 and Sahib Ullah v. The State 2022 SCMR 1806 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(5)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail, cancellation of-Guidelines for the purpose of cancellation of bail stated.\nFollowing are the guidelines for the purpose of cancellation of bail:\n(i) If the bail granting order is patently illegal, erroneous, factually incorrect and has resulted into miscarriage of justice.\n(ii) That the accused has misused the concession of bail in any manner.\n(iii) That accused has tried to hamper prosecution evidence by persuading/pressurizing prosecution witnesses.\n(iv) That there is likelihood of absconsion of the accused beyond the jurisdiction of court.\n(v) That the accused has attempted to interfere with the smooth course of investigation.\n(vi) That accused misused his liberty while indulging into similar offence.\n(vii) That some fresh facts and material has been collected during the course of investigation which tends to establish guilt of the accused.\nSamiullah v. Laiq Zada 2020 SCMR 1115 quoted.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 245 of 2023, decided on 4th May, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 20.02.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan in Criminal M.B.C. No. 123-D of 2022)\nheard on: 4th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nSultan Mazhar Sher Khan, Additional A.G. for the State.\nRaja Muhammad Farooq, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAEED ULLAH and 2 others-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23811", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2142 = 2023 SLD 2142 = 2023 SCMR 1514", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDQXk", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 34-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act (XXIII of 2013), S. 15-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention, unlicensed possession of arms-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-No direct evidence available against the accused-Counsel for complainant and law officer could not point out any material connecting the accused with the crime-At present stage, except the statement of the complainant under section 164, Cr.P.C., in which although he had pointed out his accusing finger towards the accused, but the said pointation was without any source or material-Due to such reasons the case of the accused called for further enquiry falling under subsection (2) of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed, and the accused was released on bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1578 of 2022, decided on 15th February, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 03.10.2022, passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 2330-P of 2022)\nheard on: 15th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Akram Gondal, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Sharif Janjua, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 2.\nZahid Yousaf Qureshi, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JUNAID ALI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23812", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2143 = 2023 SLD 2143 = 2023 PTD 1788", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODc", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 111(1)(b), 122(5A) & 218-Assets Declaration Ordinance (III of 2019), Ss. 3 & 4-Non-resident tax payer-Return of income filed as Nil -Assessment order, amendment of-Notices issued through IRIS (portal) only without following and adopting other modes of service of notices-Effect-On the incorrect advice of her tax consultant appellant/taxpayer filed her declaration under Assets Declaration Ordinance, 2019 and declared her old properties therein-In the meantime appellant/taxpayer obtained a second opinion from another tax consultant who advised her not to pay tax and file declaration as this declaration was only for those persons who have unexplained and unreconciled wealth-Consequently appellant/taxpayer did not pay tax thereupon-It is on this non-payment of tax in respect of the declared properties, that the Additional Commissioner treated the deemed order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue and added total assets shown in declaration under S. 111(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without confronting the taxpayer-Validity-Additional Commissioner only issued notices through IRIS (portal) without following and adopting other modes of service of notices as provided under S. 218 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Properties in question were purchased by the appellant/taxpayer in 1993 and 1998 from verifiable and reconciled funds-Present matter was a matter of verification of facts and the documents produced before the Appellate Tribunal needed to be checked and verified by the department-Appellate Tribunal remanded present case back to the department for reconsideration to thrash out the issue in the light documents discussed above and verify the claim of the appellant/taxpayer to arrive at a just and judicious conclusion strictly in accordance with law-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),120(1),122(5A),218", - "Case #": "I.T.A No.838/KB/2022, decided on 21st January, 2023, heard on: 17th January, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Anwer Kamal, Judicial Member and Dr. Tauqeer Irtiza, Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Immad Qamar for Petitioner\nAbsent for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ms. TANVIR SHARAFAT, through her attorney\nVs\nThe COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO-I, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23813", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2144 = 2023 SLD 2144 = 2023 SCMR 1427", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Board Ordinance (XXVIII of 2000)-\n-Ss. 3 & 7(a)-PAC Board Employees (Service) Rules, 2002, Rr. 2 & 4(g)-Employees of Mirage Rebuild Factory, Kamra appointed before promulgation of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Board Ordinance, 2000 (the PACB Ordinance)-Whether civil servants or employees of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Board (the PAC Board)-Option to remain a civil servant not exercised-Approbate and reprobate, doctrine of-Applicability-On one hand, the petitioners (employees) were asserting that they submitted the option ( to remain civil servants) but on the other hand, their never-ending and non-stop attempts in the departmental examination unambiguously corroborated that they never submitted any option (to remain civil servants) in keeping with the requirements laid down in the PACB Ordinance-Petitioners intermittently appeared in the departmental examinations starting from the year 2012 to 2018, but nobody could qualify the examination which was a precondition for awarding promotion-Demeanor of petitioners signified they assented and acquiesced to be governed by the PACB Ordinance and the PAC Board Employees (Service) Rules, 2002 (the PACB Rules), rather than being governed under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 (the APT Rules)-It was clear from the conduct of the petitioners that, after failure in the departmental examinations, a fall back stand was set in motion that the promotion cases of the petitioners should be processed in accordance with the APT Rules, being civil servants, and not as the employees of the PAC Board without submitting their option at the relevant time when they were afforded an opportunity to segregate themselves from the purview of the PACB Rules, but they failed to do so despite receiving an evenhanded and fair opportunity-Plea of the petitioners was also hit by the doctrine of approbate and reprobate-It was also beyond any logical comprehension that according to the petitioners they were forced to sit in the examination, but they never put forward any objection or reservation, nor anything was brought on record to show that they appeared in the examinations without prejudice to their right to challenge-First right of refusal was extended in terms of PACB Ordinance to opt the new service rules and service structure of the PAC Board according to the scheme of restructuring and reorganization, which cannot be construed the violation or infringement of any fundamental rights of the petitioners but it was founded on consensual act of every individual employee without any compulsion or pressure and the particular portion or provision of law inviting options from the employees was never challenged by the petitioners-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\nPakistan Aeronautical Complex through Chairman and others v. Nazar-ul-Islam 2019 SCMR 1933 ref.\n(b) Words and phrases-\n-Maxim qui approbat non reprobat (one who approbates cannot reprobate)-Meaning and scope-Person taking advantage under an instrument, which both grants a benefit and imposes a burden, cannot take the former without complying with the latter-Person cannot approbate and reprobate or accept and reject the same instrument.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Board Ordinance, 2000=3 & 7(a)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 657 to 662 of 2020, decided on 5th July, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 11. 12.2019 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, in Appeals. Nos. 1096(R)CS/2019, 1103(R)CS/2019, 1106(R)CS/2019, 1107(R)CS/2019, 1108(R)CS/2019 and 1109(R)CS/2019)\nheard on: 5th July, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Aftab Alam Rana, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nAyaz Shaukat, DAG, Wing Commander, Muhammad Kamran Haider Ali, Superintendent for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASRAR AHMED and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nCHAIRMAN PAKISTAN AERONAUTICAL COMPLEX BOARD, KAMRA and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23814", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2145 = 2023 SLD 2145 = 2023 SCMR 1434", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, as provided in Article 199 of the Constitution, is well-defined and its invocation is limited in scope against appellate decisions-Objective of Article 199 of the Constitution is to foster justice, protect rights and correct any wrongs, for which, it empowers the High Court to rectify wrongful or excessive exercise of jurisdiction by lower courts and address procedural illegality or irregularity that may have prejudiced a case-However, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a substitute for a revision or an appeal-High Court in constitutional jurisdiction cannot reappraise the evidence and decide the case on its facts-Interference is on limited grounds as an exception and not the rule-High Court, in its capacity under Article 199, lacks the jurisdiction to re-examine or reconsider the facts of a case already decided by lower courts-Its role is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors and procedural improprieties, ensuring the proper administration of justice.\nShajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique PLD 2007 SC 45; Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 and Arif Fareed v. Bibi Sara and others 2023 SCMR 413 ref.\n(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5, Sched.-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope of constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court while hearing petitions against appellate decisions, particularly in family cases-In the absence of a second appeal, the decision of the appellate court is considered final on the facts and it is not for High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction to offer another opportunity of hearing, especially in family cases where the legislatures intent to not prolong the dispute is clear-High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction should not substitute and adjudicate on the facts and tender its opinion, as it amounts to having an appeal out of the Appellate Courts judgment.\nIn the present case the respondent (wife) and her minor son filed a suit before the family court for recovery of dower, maintenance allowance and dowry articles, etc. The suit was decreed and later upheld by the appellate court. Subsequently, the petitioner (husband) filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the factual determinations of the lower courts in respect of the quantum of maintenance allowance, dower amount, recovery of dowry articles amongst other grounds. Regrettably the High Court fell in error and adjudicated upon the case on facts which falls outside the mandate of Article 199 of the Constitution. The High Court could have interfered to prevent miscarriage of justice, which is not established in the instant case. In fact the High Court substituted and adjudicated on the facts and tendered its opinion, which amounts to having an appeal out of the Appellate Courts judgment.\nPetitioner pursued his case through the family court and its appeal in the district court and then also invoked the High Courts constitutional jurisdiction to reargue his case amounting to a wrongful exercise of jurisdiction whereby the High Court upheld the factual findings of appellate court after making its own assessments on the same. Allowing a re-argument of the case constituted to arguing a second appeal which should not have been entertained regardless of the outcome of the case.\nThe right to appeal is a statutory creation, either provided or not provided by the legislature; if the law intended to provide for two opportunities of appeal, it would have explicitly done so. In the absence of a second appeal, the decision of the appellate court is considered final on the facts and it is not for High Court to offer another opportunity of hearing, especially in family cases where the legislatures intent to not prolong the dispute is clear. The purpose of this approach is to ensure efficient and expeditious resolution of legal disputes. However, if the High Court continues to entertain constitutional petitions against appellate court orders, under Article 199 of the Constitution, it opens floodgates to appellate litigation.\nOnce a matter has been adjudicated upon on fact by the trial and the appellate courts, constitutional courts should not exceed their powers by re-evaluating the facts or substituting the appellate courts opinion with their own - the acceptance of finality of the appellate courts findings is essential for achieving closure in legal proceedings conclusively resolving disputes, preventing unnecessary litigation, and upholding the legislatures intent to provide a definitive resolution through existing appeal mechanisms. Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was declined.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Family Courts Act, 1964=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1418 of 2023, decided on 17th July, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 16.12.2022, passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in W.P. No. 3885-P of 2019)\nheard on: 17th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner along with Petitioner in person\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M. HAMAD HASSAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nMst. ISMA BUKHARI and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23815", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2146 = 2023 SLD 2146 = 2023 SCMR 1442", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Disputed questions of fact-Expression alternate remedy-Meaning-Scope and purpose of constitutional jurisdiction of High Court stated.\nDisputed questions of facts cannot be entertained and adjudicated in the writ jurisdiction (of the High Court).\nCol. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others 2006 SCMR 276 and Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa and others 2011 SCMR 1990 ref.\nIn the constitutional jurisdiction, the High Court cannot go into miniature and diminutive details which could only be resolved by adducing evidence by the parties vice versa. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is envisioned predominantly for affording an express remedy where the unlawfulness and impropriety of the action of an executive or other governmental authority could be substantiated without any convoluted inquiry. The expression adequate remedy signifies an effectual, accessible, advantageous and expeditious remedy.\nDr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813 ref.\nTo effectively bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution the remedy available under the law must be able to accomplish the same purpose which is sought to be achieved through a petition under Article 199. The other remedy in order to be adequate must be equally convenient, beneficial and effective and the relief afforded by the ordinary law must not be less efficacious, more expensive and cumbersome to achieve as compared to that provided under Article 199.\nGul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd v. Collector of Customs Appraisement 1990 MLD 126; Pak. Metal Industries v. Assistant Collector 1990 CLC 1022; Allah Wasaya v. Tehsildar/AC 1st Grade 1981 CLC 1202; Syed Riaz Hussain Zaidi v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1981 Lah. 215 and Abdul Hafeez v. Chairman, Municipal Corporation PLD 1967 Lah. 1251 ref.\nThe object of proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution is the enforcement of a right and not the establishment of a legal right and, therefore, the right of the incumbent concerned which he seeks to enforce must not only be clear and complete but simpliciter and there must be an actual infringement of the right.\nAsadullah Mangi and others v. Pakistan International Airline Corporation 2005 SCMR 445 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Compensation claim under a Government Policy-Constitutional petition, filing of-Laches-Principles-If the remedy of filing a constitutional petition is not availed within reasonable time, the interference can be refused on the ground of laches-Question of laches in constitutional petition is always considered in the light of the conduct of the person invoking the constitutional jurisdiction.\nIf the remedy of filing a constitutional petition is not availed within reasonable time, the interference can be refused on the ground of laches. Delay would defeat equity which aids the vigilant and not the indolent. Laches in its simplest form means the failure of a person to do something which should have been done by him within a reasonable time. Question of laches in constitutional petition is always considered in the light of the conduct of the person invoking the constitutional jurisdiction.\nUmar Baz Khan v. Syed Jehanzeb and others PLD 2013 SC 268; Farzand Raza Naqvi and others v. Muhammad Din through Legal Heirs and others 2004 SCMR 400; State Bank of Pakistan v. Imtiaz Ali Khan and others 2012 SCMR 280 = 2012 PLC (C.S.) 218 and Asghar Khan and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2014 PLC (C.S.) 1292 ref.\nIn the present case the alleged claim of compensation is based on the damages caused in the year 2007, but the respondent filed his writ petition in the year 2019, which is virtually after 12 years. Notwithstanding the crucial aspect that a factual controversy cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction, the writ petition was also hit by laches which essential point at issue was not considered by the High Court in the impugned judgment. Merely advancing a plea that the respondent/ affectee was engaged in correspondence with different government officials for pursuing his claim does not protect or save the respondent from the drawbacks or impediments of the doctrine of laches which explicates that a party may have a right which was otherwise enforceable but loses right of its enforcement in case it is hit by laches. Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court was set-aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3750 of 2020, decided on 14th June, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 08.09.2020 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. 2683-P of 2019)\nheard on: 14th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shumail Aziz, Additional A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Zayed Safi, AC and Mir Ali for Petitioners.\nRespondent in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SPECIAL SECRETARY-II (LAW AND ORDER), HOME AND TRIBAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, PESHAWAR and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nFAYYAZ DAWAR-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23816", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2147 = 2023 SLD 2147 = 2023 SCMR 1450", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDOC8", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1), third proviso-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 379, 337-A(i), 337-L(2), 109, 148 & 149-Murderous assault-Bail, grant of-Statutory delay in conclusion of trial-In the present case, the statutory period was one year, whereas the accused was behind bars for a period of more than two years-Charge in the case was framed for the first time on 17-01-2023 and since then there was no fault on the part of accused qua delay in the trial-Although subsequently certain dates were obtained but they were not relevant because prior to framing of charge there was no delay on part of accused and he became entitled to concession of bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was enlarged on bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(1)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=324,379,337-A(i),337-L,109,148,149", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1618-L of 2022, decided on 6th June, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 03.10.2022 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. No. 49630-B of 2022\nheard on: 6th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood and Amin-ud-Din Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naveed Inayat Malik, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link for Lahore) for Petitioner.\nComplainant in person.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. Punjab, Javed Iqbal, ASI and Kamran, SI for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD UMER SHAHZAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23817", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2148 = 2023 SLD 2148 = 2023 SCMR 1451", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDOCs", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal – Conversion of Writ Petition into Service Appeal – Limitation – Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit\nDetails:\nA civil servant filed a constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution before the High Court instead of approaching the Federal Service Tribunal (FST) under S. 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The High Court, instead of dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction, directed that the writ petition be treated as a Service Appeal and transmitted to the FST along with its annexures. However, the FST dismissed the matter on the ground of limitation, without deciding it on merits.\nThe Supreme Court examined whether the FST was justified in dismissing the appeal on limitation, despite the fact that the High Court had ordered the writ petition itself (with all annexures) to be treated as an appeal.\nHeld:\nThe High Court’s intent was to convert the writ petition into a Service Appeal to protect the civil servant from limitation.\nThe petitioner was neither required nor obligated to file a fresh memo of appeal. The responsibility of transmitting the writ petition lay between the High Court office and the FST, not with the petitioner.\nOnce the writ was directed to be treated as an appeal, dismissing it on limitation was unjustified. The FST ought to have decided the case on merits after hearing both parties.\nThe Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the FST’s judgment, and remanded the matter back to the FST for fresh decision on merits.\nCitations:\nMuhammad Akram v. DCO, Rahim Yar Khan (2017 SCMR 56)\nAbdul Qadoos v. Commandant Frontier Constabulary, KPK, Peshawar (2023 SCMR 334)\nGovernment of Punjab v. Abdur Rehman (2022 SCMR 25)\nMaxim: Actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) – Homoeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed v. Government of Punjab (2022 SCMR 1546 = 2022 PLC (C.S) 1390)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Service Tribunals Act, 1973=4Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,212", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2467 of 2020, decided on 4th April, 2023.\n(Against Order dated 18.08.2020 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 141(P)CS/2022)\nheard on: 4th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J. and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Riaz H. Rahi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNasir Mehmood, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link at Peshawar) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABID JAN-Petitioner\nVs\nMINISTRY OF DEFENCE through Secretary, Islamabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23818", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2149 = 2023 SLD 2149 = 2023 SCMR 1457", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Contract-\n-Bank fraud-Duty of care owed by bank-Scope-Bank customer, rights of-Certain fraudster induced claimant/customer to instruct bank to make authorised transfer from her account-Question as to whether bank was under a duty not to execute instruction if on inquiry that could result in misappropriation of customers funds; whether such duty only arose where instruction was given by customers agent; and whether bank was in breach of duty owed to customer-Scope of duty of care owed by the bank to its customers in cases of authorised push payment (APP) fraud stated.\nThe claimant/respondent was deceived and persuaded by fraudsters to instruct the defendant bank, with which she had a current account, to make two authorised push payments totalling 700,000 to accounts in the United Arab Emirates. On each occasion, the payments were made after she visited a branch in person and gave instructions to transfer the money and after the defendant had telephoned her and obtained confirmation that she had made the transfer request and wished to proceed with it. By the time the fraud had been discovered the sums could not be recovered. The claimant brought proceedings against the bank, contending that there were various circumstances which should have caused it to question the transactions and to stop or delay them, or alternatively that it was in breach of duty after the fraud had been discovered in not taking adequate steps to recover the money. The trial judge granted the banks application for summary judgment, holding that although a bank was under a duty not to execute a payment instruction where it was on notice that its customers agent was attempting to misappropriate funds, such a duty did not arise where the instruction had been given by the customer herself. The Court of Appeal allowed the claimants appeal and set aside the order for summary judgment, holding that it was at least possible in principle that a relevant duty of care could arise in the case of a customer instructing her bank to make a payment when that customer was the victim of authorised push payment (APP) fraud.\nIt is a basic duty of a bank under its contract with a customer who has a current account in credit to make payments from the account in compliance with the customers instructions. This duty is strict. Where the customer has authorised and instructed the bank to make a payment, the bank must carry out the instruction promptly. It is not for the bank to concern itself with the wisdom or risks of its customers payment decisions.\nGray v Johnston (1868) LR 3 HL 1 and Westpac New Zealand Ltd v MAP and Associates Ltd [2011] NZSC 89, [2011] 3 NZLR 751 ref.\nIt would be possible for a bank to agree as an express term of the contract that it will not comply with a payment instruction given by the customer if the bank believes, or if the bank has reasonable grounds for believing, that the customer has been tricked by a third party into authorising the payment. But it is not suggested that in the present case the contract between the claimant and the bank contained any such express term. In the absence of an express term, no obligation of this kind can be implied or said to be inherent in the relationship between a bank and its customer. To the contrary, such an obligation would be inconsistent with the normal contractual basis on which banking transactions are conducted.\nThe Court of Appeal derived the alleged duty by extrapolating from the reasoning in the case of Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363. In this and other similar cases, courts have held that a bank has a duty not to execute a payment instruction given by an agent of its customer without making inquiries if the bank has reasonable grounds for believing that the agent is attempting to defraud the customer. However, the reason why the bank owes a duty to its customer to make inquiries in such cases is to ensure that it does not make a payment which the customer has not authorised. This reasoning does not apply to cases of the present kind where the customer has unequivocally authorised and instructed the bank to make a payment.\nSelangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555; Karak Rubber Co Ltd v Burden (No 2) [1972] 1 WLR 602; Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 987; Singularis Holdings Ltd v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd [2017] EWHC 257 (Ch), [2017] Bus LR 1386; Nigeria v JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA [2019] EWCA Civ 1641, [2019] 2 CLC 559; JP SPC 4 v Royal Bank of Scotland International Ltd [2022] UKPC 18, [2023] AC 461 and Stanford International Bank Ltd v HSBC Bank plc [2022] UKSC 34, [2023] 2 WLR 79 ref.\nThe duty of a bank which has come to be referred to as the Quince care duty is not some special or idiosyncratic rule of law. Properly understood, it is simply an application of the general duty of care owed by a bank to interpret, ascertain and act in accordance with its customers instructions. Where a bank is put on inquiry in the sense of having reasonable grounds for believing that a payment instruction given by an agent purportedly on behalf of the customer is an attempt to defraud the customer, this duty requires the bank to refrain from executing the instruction without first making inquiries to verify that the instruction has actually been authorised by the customer. If the bank executes the instruction without making such inquiries and the instruction proves to have been given without the customers authority, the bank will be in breach of duty. It will also in making the payment be acting outside the scope of its own authority from the customer and will therefore not be entitled to debit the payment to the customers account. These principles are not limited to corporate customers. They apply wherever one person is given authority to sign cheques or give other payment instructions to a bank on behalf of another. They apply, for example, where under the mandate for a joint account either account holder has power to bind the other. Similar reasoning would also apply where a bank is on notice, in the sense of having reasonable grounds for believing, that the customer lacks mental capacity to operate a bank account or manage her financial affairs. Banks duty of care may require the bank not to execute its customers instructions in such circumstances until further inquiries can be made. On the other hand, these principles have no application to a situation where, as in the present case, the customer is a victim of authorised push payment (APP) fraud. In this situation the validity of the instruction is not in doubt. Provided the instruction is clear and is given by the customer personally or by an agent acting with apparent authority, no inquiries are needed to clarify or verify what the bank must do. The banks duty is to execute the instruction and any refusal or failure to do so will prima facie be a breach of duty by the bank.\nHsu Ann Mei v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd [2011] SGCA 3 (Singapore Court of Appeal) ref.\nThe fact that a customers intention or desire resulted from a mistaken belief, including where it had been induced by another persons deceit, did not make it any less real or genuinely held, and the fact that the customers payment instruction was induced by fraud did not invalidate the instruction or give rise to any claim against the bank.\nShogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2004] 1 AC 919, para 6 and Whittaker v Campbell [1984] QB 318, 326-328 (Robert Goff LJ) ref.\nThere is another fundamental reason why questions about the appropriate policy response to authorised push payment (APP) fraud are outside the scope of present proceedings. This is that the claimants case is based on a duty allegedly owed to her by the bank under the contract between them governing the operation of her current account. The extent of the banks responsibilities under this contract does not depend on an evaluation of whether it would be a good or a bad thing if banks were required, either generally or in some circumstances, to reimburse customers who are victims of APP fraud. It depends on an analysis of what the parties to the contract have agreed. This requires the court to consider any relevant terms expressly agreed between the bank and the customer. A bank will invariably have standard terms on which it agrees to provide its services. As with other types of commonly recurring contractual relationship, however, the contract between a bank and a customer who holds a current account is one for which there is an established legal template consisting of certain basic terms and duties which have come to be recognised by the common law (and sometimes statute) as ordinary incidents of contracts of this type. These implied terms and duties apply automatically by default unless modified or excluded by express agreement. In the case of contracts between a bank and an account holder, they are the subject of a well developed body of case law.\nThe starting point in understanding the contract between a bank and a customer who holds a current account with the bank is the decision of the House of Lords in Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28. It established conclusively that under ordinary circumstances a bank is not a trustee or fiduciary of money deposited by a customer, but simply a debtor. Money deposited with a bank becomes the banks money, to lend or otherwise deal with (so far as the customer is concerned) as it thinks fit. The principal obligation owed by the bank is to discharge its debt to the customer when called upon to do so. Thus, the bank is obliged to repay to the customer on demand an equivalent sum to that deposited (plus any agreed interest and less any agreed charges) and also, so long as the account is in credit, to make payments in accordance with the customers instructions in reduction of its debt to the customer. Another basic principle that has long been established is that, in making such payments, the bank acts as the customers agent [Westminster Bank Ltd v Hilton (1926) 43 TLR 124, 126 (Lord Atkinson)].\nAs in the case of every contractual agency, a bank is bound to act in accordance with the authority conferred upon it by its principal and to perform what it has agreed to do. The terms on which a bank is authorised and undertakes to carry out its customers instructions to make payments are generally referred to as the banks mandate from the customer. Unless otherwise agreed, the banks duty to comply with its mandate is strict. Where the bank acts outside the mandate by making a payment which the customer has not authorised, it cannot debit the customers account. Conversely, where the bank receives an instruction to make a payment given in accordance with the mandate, the ordinary duty of the bank is simply to carry out the instruction and to do so promptly.\nBowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 22nd ed (2021), article 36; Bodenham v Hoskins (1852) 21 LJ Ch 864, 869 and Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 1340, 1356 ref.\nIn the present case circumstances which the claimant contends should have put the bank on inquiry that a fraud was being perpetrated on her include: the large and unprecedented sum of money received in her current account; the size of the payments which she instructed the bank to make; the fact that the payments were to bank accounts in the UAE; and the fact that the payees were companies with which she had no previous history of dealing. All these circumstances, however, were facts of which the claimant was to the banks knowledge aware, as she gave the instructions and confirmed the payment details to members of the banks staff in person. The bank therefore had no reason to doubt whether, if its customer was aware of these circumstances, she would desire the bank to make the payments. Incontrovertibly, she knew the circumstances known to the bank and was adamant that she wished the bank to make the payments. There is no basis on the undisputed facts of this case for asserting that the bank had material information relating to the transactions which its customer did not have.\nSince it was beyond dispute that the claimant had unequivocally authorised and instructed the bank to make the payments, the order of the judge giving summary judgment in favour of the bank, in so far as it related to the claim that the bank owed the claimant a duty not to execute her payments, should be restored. However, summary judgment should be refused in relation to the claimants alternative case in relation to the steps taken to recover the money once the fraud had been discovered.\nSupreme Court observed that the type of fraud which occurred in the present case is a growing social problem and can undoubtedly cause great hardship to its victims. Whether victims of such frauds should be left to bear the loss themselves or whether losses should be redistributed by requiring banks which have made or received the payments on behalf of customers to reimburse victims of such crimes is a question of social policy for regulators, government and ultimately for Parliament to consider. But it is not a question for the courts. It is not the role of the courts to formulate such policy, still less to impose on the parties to a contract an obligation to which they have not consented and cannot reasonably be presumed to have consented since it is inconsistent with the normal and established allocation of risk and responsibility under contracts of the relevant type. Appeal filed by the bank was allowed.\n(b) Principal-agent-\n-Agents authority-Scope-Scope of an agents authority is a matter of agreement between the agent and the principal-Where that agreement is recorded in writing, the question is one of interpretation of the document-No doubt it would be possible in theory for a principal in appointing an agent to agree that the agent may bind the principal even if and when the agent is acting dishonestly with the aim of defrauding the principal-But it seems inconceivable that any sane person would ever agree, or could reasonably be presumed to have agreed, to confer such authority on an agent-As is generally the case in commerce, parties to an agency relationship naturally deal with each other on an unspoken common assumption that each will act honestly in relation to the other-Authority conferred on an agent does not encompass acting dishonestly to further the agents own interests in opposition to the interests of the principal.\nLysaght Bros & Co Ltd v Falk (1905) 2 CLR 421 (High Court of Australia) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Decided on 12th July, 2023.\n(On appeal from: [2022] EWCA Civ 318)\nDates of hearing: 1st and 2nd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Lord Reed, President Lord Hodge, Deputy President Lord Sales, Lord Hamblen and Lord Leggatt", - "Lawyer Name:": "Patrick Goodall KC, David Murray and Ian Bergson (instructed by TLT LLP) for Appellant.\nHugh Sims KC, Christopher Hare, Lucy Walker and Jay Jagasia (instructed by Squire Biggs Law) for Respondent.\nDavid McIlroy and Tristan Jones (Instructed by Penningtons Manches Cooper LLP) for Intervener - Consumers' Association.\nSonia Tolaney KC and James Ruddell (Instructed by White and Case LLP (London)) for Intervener - UK Finance Ltd.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BARCLAYS BANK UK PLC-Appellant\nVersus\nPHILIPP-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23819", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2150 = 2023 SLD 2150 = 2023 SCMR 1502", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDODg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Directory and mandatory provisions-Distinction-In order to comprehend the true spirit of any provision, whether it is mandatory or directory, the conception, acumen and stratagem of the Act and the enabling Rules should be considered for proper resolution-For such purpose Court has to scrutinise the pith and substance and not exclusively the form-Sometimes a provision in the legislation seems to be mandatory, but substantially it is directory and, inversely, sometimes a provision seems to be directory but in quintessence it is found to be mandatory for compliance, therefore, for all practical purposes, it is the fundamental nature which counts and should take preference and affinity more than the form-If a provision gives a power as well as a duty, it is mandatory and the enabling text of law and rules should be interpreted as obligatory so that the underlying principle and raison detre is not contravened or flouted.\n(b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) [since repealed]-\n-S. 15(2)-Revised Trade Marks Rules, 1963. Rr. 30 & 76-Trademark-Opposition to registration of trademark-Limitation-Extension of time to file opposition-Registrar of Trademarks, discretion of-Scope-While exercising power to grant the extension of time to file opposition, the Registrar of Trademarks must be satisfied that the circumstances are such as to justify an extension of time with a further rider that the extension granted shall not exceed a period of more than one month at a time, provided that the total period of such extensions shall not exceed six months against each statutory period prescribed-Registrar should act with proper application of mind inasmuch as the powers conferred by the Rule do not permit the Registrar to entertain and grant extension in a mechanical or perfunctory manner.\nA perusal of Rule 76 of the Revised Trade Marks Rules, 1963 (the Rules) clearly expounds that, while exercising power to grant the extension of time to file opposition, the Registrar of Trademarks must be satisfied that the circumstances are such as to justify an extension of time with a further rider that the extension granted shall not exceed a period of more than one month at a time, provided that the total period of such extensions shall not exceed six months against each statutory period prescribed. The exactitudes of the aforesaid rule accentuate that before granting extension, the Registrar should act with proper application of mind inasmuch as the powers conferred by the Rule do not permit the Registrar to entertain and grant extension in a mechanical or perfunctory manner, rather he should be satisfied that the extension is justified.\nThe jurisdiction and powers to grant extension up to six months period is not an automatic or unstructured exercise but it should be justiciable and rational coupled with the precondition of satisfaction of the Registrar before granting any extension. According to Rule 76, no extension could be accorded longer than a month at a time which reckons that the extension should have been sought on a monthly basis and after satisfying himself the Registrar could consider the grant of extension or refuse the same. Neither it is the intention of the Rule making authority that since outer limit of six months is provided under the Rules, therefore, without complying with the provisions contained under Rule 76, the Registrar may entertain delayed requests ipse dixit and/or allow all requests for extension in one go or all at once and grant the requests, nor that the person seeking extension may apply for antedated extensions without incorporating plausible reasons for extension, nor can he dispatch all applications or requests simultaneously without being sensitized to the insinuated rudiments for applying extension on monthly basis consistent with the precisions of Rule 76.\nIn the present case it is clearly manifesting from the decision of the Registrar Trade Marks that the petitioner filed four requests for extension of time to file opposition in one go and on the same date. The petitioner attached all four requests with a Civil Miscellaneous Application which shows that stereotypical applications for extension of time were filed without providing any justification or reason for extension. All four requests were transmitted by post on one and the same date i.e. 11.03.2003, and in every application a one month extension was sought. The first request is dated 22.11.2002; second is dated 22.12.2002; third is dated 22.1.2003; last one is dated 22.2.2003 and all requests were sent to the Registrar by post on 11.03.2003 and he condoned the delay of 108 days without adverting to the ground reality and without adhering to statutory compliance that extension of time could not exceed a period of more than one month at a time, provided that the total period of such extensions shall not exceed six months.\nThe Registrar down rightly failed to consider that neither any satisfactory reason was assigned in the applications for extension except that more time is required to prepare opposition application , nor extension was applied for promptly on a monthly basis. Despite that antedated extension was accorded by the Registrar by dint of his decision which was rightly set aside by the High Court. Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave as refused.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be done in the same manner following the provisions of law without deviating from the prescribed procedure, and where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all.\nChaudhry Shujat Hussain v. The State 1995 SCMR 1249; Khalid Saeed v. Shamim Rizvan and others 2003 SCMR 1505; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another v. Director-General, Military Lands and Cantonments, Rawalpindi and others 2005 SCMR 177; Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Zainab Bibi 2007 SCMR 1086; Province of Punjab through Secretary, Excise and Taxation Department, Lahore and others v. Murree Brewery Company Limited and another 2021 SCMR 305; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance, Islamabad and another v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Limited and another 2022 SCMR 1021; Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor [1936 SCC OnLine PC 41] and Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and others (1999) 8 SCC 2661 ref.\n(d) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Principles relating to interpretation of statutes stated.\nIt is a fundamental canon of interpretation and understanding that the statute should be read in its mundane, natural and grammatical meaning in order to give effect with proper construction. If the language of the statute is plain and instantly recognizable then there should be no question of its construction or interpretation by the Court. A construction which diminishes the statute to a futility has to be avoided rather it should be construed as a workable instrument. It is the foremost duty of the Court to figure out the intention of the legislature through word for word meaning and if it admits only one meaning, no further interpretation is required except that meaning which should be put into effect in view of the legal maxims Absoluta sentential expositore non indiget (clear and unambiguous text should be read according to its plain meaning rather than with reference to secondary sources of interpretation); Ut res magis valeat quam pereat (An enacting provision or a statute has to be so construed to make it effective and operative); and, A verbis legis non-est recedendum (A provision of the law shall not depart or from the words of law there must be no departure).", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Mark Act, 1940=15(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1496-K of 2021, decided on 27th April, 2023.\n(Against judgment dated 15.7.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in M.A. No. 10 of 2004)\nheard on: 27th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Umar Lakhani, Advocate Supreme Court and Tahir Ahmed, Director, Tri-Star Industries for Petitioner.\nHassan Irfan Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Islamabad), Ms. Amna Salman, Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.\nS. Atta Muhammad Shah, Assistant Registrar, Trade Mark for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs TRI-STAR INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nTRISA BURSTENFABRIK AG TRIENGEN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23820", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2151 = 2023 SLD 2151 = 2023 SCMR 1573", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDOHo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Tort-\n-Private nuisance-Limitation period for bringing action-Continuing nuisance-Scope-Oil from an oil spill at sea reached claimants land and it was never removed or cleaned up-Claimants brought action for private nuisance-Question as to whether there was continuing nuisance-Held, that one-off oil spill did not represent a continuing nuisance regardless of the continued presence of the oil on the claimants land-No continuing nuisance existed in the present case because, outside the claimants land, there was no repeated activity by the defendants or an ongoing state of affairs for which the defendants were responsible that was causing continuing undue interference with the use and enjoyment of the claimants land-Oil leak was a one-off event or an isolated escape, and the oil pipe was no longer leaking after (first) six hours-Cause of action accrued and was complete once the claimants land had been affected by the oil: there was no continuing cause of action for as long as the oil remained on the land.\nOn 20 December 2011, during a transfer of oil into a tanker at the Bonga oil field, approximately 40,000 barrels of crude oil were leaked off the coast of Nigeria (the Bonga Spill). While the leak was stopped within six hours, it was alleged that the spill impacted the Nigerian shoreline, causing extensive harm to the local community. Just under six years after the Bonga Spill, two Nigerian citizens (on behalf of thousands of other individuals and communities said to have been affected) commenced English proceedings in the tort of nuisance. The initial defendants included Shell International Ltd and Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Co Ltd but four months later, the claimants applied to change Shell International Ltd to another Shell entity - Shell International Trading and Shipping Co Ltd. The defendants objected to the amendments on the basis that they were made more than six years after the oil spill occurred, and were therefore outside the statutory six year limitation period. However, the claimants argued that, because the oil spill had not been cleaned up properly, the damage to their land was ongoing and amounted to a continuing nuisance. As a result, they said the cause of action was not limited to the events on 20 December 2011, but started afresh each day on a rolling basis, and therefore the amendments were well within the limitation period. Those arguments were unsuccessful before the High Court and the Court of Appeal, both of which held that the claimants were out of time to amend. That meant that not only could the claimants not bring a claim against Shell International Trading and Shipping Co Ltd, but because there was no longer an English domiciled defendant to anchor the claim to the jurisdiction, the English court lacked jurisdiction over the Nigerian domiciled Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Co Ltd.\nPart of the difficulty in articulating what is meant by a continuing nuisance for the purposes of the tort of private nuisance is that, as a matter of ordinary language, one can naturally describe the effect of the interference or damage still being present, and not having been cleaned up or otherwise dealt with, as being a continuing nuisance in the sense of being a continuing problem. In this case, therefore, one can naturally describe the oil still being on the claimants land as a continuing nuisance. But that is wholly misleading when one is trying to clarify the meaning of a continuing nuisance in the legal sense.\nIn principle, and in general terms, a continuing nuisance is one where, outside the claimants land and usually on the defendants land, there is repeated activity by the defendant or an ongoing state of affairs for which the defendant is responsible which causes continuing undue interference with the use and enjoyment of the claimants land. For a continuing nuisance, the interference may be similar on each occasion but the important point is that it is continuing day after day or on another regular basis. So, for example, smoke, noise, smells, vibrations and overlooking are continuing nuisances where those interferences are continuing on a regular basis. The cause of action therefore accrues afresh on a continuing basis.\nHole v Chard Union [1894] 1 Ch 293 ref.\nIt is precisely because, in the normal case, the tort of private nuisance is continuing that an injunction, prohibiting the continuation of activity or a state of affairs, is a standard remedy for the tort of private nuisance. The concept of a continuing nuisance also has the consequence that, at common law, damages are given for the causes of action that have so far accrued and cannot be given for future causes of action which have not yet accrued. Where the nuisance continues, the claimant must therefore periodically come back to court to seek damages at common law. In contrast, damages for future causes of action can be given as equitable damages in substitution for (in lieu of) an injunction.\nMidland Bank plc v Bardgrove Property Services Ltd (1992) 65 P & CR 153; Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851; Hooper v Rogers [1975] Ch 43 and Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 ref.\nIt follows logically from the concept of a continuing cause of action that, if the limitation period is one of six years from the accrual of the cause of action, damages at common law for a continuing nuisance cannot be recovered for causes of action (i.e., for past occurrences of the continuing nuisance) that accrued more than six years before the claim was commenced.\nThe essence of the claimants submission is that there is a continuing nuisance in this case because, on the facts that are to be assumed for the purposes of this appeal, the oil is still present on the claimants land and has not been removed or cleaned up. If this submission were correct, it would mean that if the other ingredients of the tort of nuisance were made out, and a claimants land were to be flooded by an isolated escape on day 1, there would be a continuing nuisance and a fresh cause of action accruing day by day so long as the land remained flooded on day 1000. It can therefore be seen that the effect of accepting the submission would be to extend the running of the limitation period indefinitely until the land is restored. It would also impliedly mean that the tort of private nuisance would be converted into a failure by the defendant to restore the claimants land. It might also produce difficulties for the assessment of damages, which are, in general, to be assessed once and for all. Where land is flooded on day 1, all the losses, past and prospective, for that accrued cause of action can be assessed on day 1 (including the cost of restoration). It is unclear how there can be a different assessment of damages, for a different cause of action, on day 2.\nThere was no continuing nuisance in this case because, outside the claimants land, there was no repeated activity by the defendants or an ongoing state of affairs for which the defendants were responsible that was causing continuing undue interference with the use and enjoyment of the claimants land. The leak was a one-off event or an isolated escape. The oil pipe was no longer leaking after six hours and it is being assumed for the purposes of this appeal that the oil reached the Nigerian Atlantic shoreline (and hence the claimants land) within weeks rather than months of 20 December 2011. In this case the cause of action accrued and was complete once the claimants land had been affected by the oil: there was no continuing cause of action for as long as the oil remained on the land.\nSedleigh-Denfield v. OCallaghan [1940] AC 880 ref.\nDelaware Mansions Ltd v. Westminster City Council [2001] UKHL 55, [2002] 1 AC 321 distinguished.\nTo accept claimants submission would be to undermine the law on limitation of actions - which is based on a number of important polices principally to protect defendants but also in the interests of the state and claimants - because it would mean that there would be a continual re-starting of the limitation period until the oil was removed or cleaned up. Appeal filed by the claimants was dismissed.\nDarley Main Colliery Co v. Mitchell ("Darley") (1886) 11 App Cas 127 distinguished.\n(b) Tort-\n-Private nuisance-Scope-In general terms, the tort of private nuisance is committed where the defendants activity, or a state of affairs for which the defendant is responsible, unduly interferes with (or, as it has commonly been expressed, causes a substantial and unreasonable interference with) the use and enjoyment of the claimants land-Nearly always the undue interference with the use and enjoyment of the claimants land will be caused by an activity or state of affairs on the defendants land so that the tort is often described as one dealing with the respective rights of neighbouring landowners or occupiers-But the creator of the nuisance can be sued whether or not that person still has (or perhaps ever had) any interest in the land from which the nuisance emanates-Tort of private nuisance is actionable only on proof of damage and is not actionable per se-Such requirement is satisfied for private nuisance by establishing the undue interference with the use and enjoyment of the land-That includes physical damage to the land itself and damage to buildings or vegetation growing on the land-But commonly there will be an undue interference with the use and enjoyment of land - as by the impact of noise or smell or smoke or vibrations or being overlooked - even though there is no physical damage to the land or buildings or vegetation.\nLawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd ("Lawrence") [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822, para 3; Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery ("Fearn") [2023] UKSC 4, [2023] 2 WLR 339, paras 18 - 20 (per Lord Leggatt); Christian Witting, Street on Torts (16th edn, 2021) p 424; Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (23rd edn, 2020) para 19-01; Sedleigh-Denfield v OCallaghan ("Sedleigh-Denfield") [1940] AC 880, 903 and Clerk & Lindsell on Torts para 19-02 ref.\n(c) Tort-\n-Private nuisance-Scope-Continuing control of defendant-While continuing control will almost always be present in a case of continuing nuisance, this is not a necessary requirement; this is because the person who has created a nuisance can be sued in the tort of private nuisance even though that person may no longer have control over the state of affairs that is causing the continuing nuisance.\nThompson v Gibson (1841) 7 M & W 456; Rosewell v Prior (1701) 2 Salk 460; Christian Witting, Street on Torts (19th ed, 2021) p 430 and Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (23rd ed, 2020) para 19-70 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Decided on 10th May, 2023.\n(On appeal from: [2021] EWCA Civ 63)\nDates of hearing: 29th and 30th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Lord Reed, President Lord Briggs, Lord Kitchin, Lord Sales and Lord Burrows", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jonathan Seitler KC, Alice Hawker and Stuart Cribb (Instructed by RBL Law Ltd) for Appellants.\nLord Goldsmith KC, Dr Conway Blake and Tom Cornell (Instructed by Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (London)) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JALLA and another-Appellants\nVersus\nSHELL INTERNATIONAL TRADING AND SHIPPING CO. LTD. and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23821", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2152 = 2023 SLD 2152 = 2023 SCMR 1524", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDOHk", - "Key Words:": "Criminal law-\n-Practice and procedure-Application filed by accused for stay of proceedings for abuse of process-Summary dismissal of application-Trial fairness and trial efficiency, concepts of-Scope-Threshold applicable to summary dismissal of application in criminal law context explained.\nDefendants H and J were tried and found guilty of six counts of murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. Before convictions were entered, H and J applied for stays of proceedings for abuse of process on the basis that systemic police misconduct and the inhumane conditions of confinement they experienced while on remand caused prejudice to their rights to a fair trial and undermined the integrity of the justice system. Before the stay applications proceeded to a voir dire, the prosecution brought a motion for summary dismissal of the applications on the basis that neither application disclosed a sufficient foundation to establish that a voir dire was necessary or would assist the court in determining the merits of the applications. No opportunity to adduce viva voce evidence or to cross-examine key witnesses in either the open or the in camera portion of the hearing was provided to H and J. The trial judge concluded that, even if the applications were taken at their highest, the grounds advanced could not support a stay of proceedings, and, as such, an evidentiary hearing (i.e., a voir dire) on the merits would not assist the court. Trial judge summarily dismissed the applications and ordered the convictions entered. On appeal by H and J, the Court of Appeal quashed the convictions and remitted the stay applications to the trial court for a voir dire. It held that the trial judge imposed too high a standard to permit the applications to proceed to an evidentiary hearing and that the applications should have been fully addressed and decided at a voir dire on their merits.\nAn application in a criminal proceeding, including for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, should only be summarily dismissed if the application is manifestly frivolous. This threshold best preserves fair trials, protects the accuseds right to full answer and defence, and ensures efficient court proceedings. It is a rigorous standard that allows trial judges to weed out the sort of applications that the summary dismissal power is designed to exclude, but permits most applications to be decided on their merits in proportionate proceedings. In the present case, the stay applications were not manifestly frivolous and should not have been summarily dismissed.\nR. v. Kutynec (1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (C.A.) ref.\nTrial judges have the power to summarily dismiss applications made in the criminal law context in certain circumstances. The standard selected for summary dismissal must be based on the two sets of underlying values at play in such proceedings: trial efficiency and trial fairness. These values coexist and both must be pursued in order for each to be realised. In the criminal context, the need for efficient trials to reduce undue delay is manifest. Dismissing unmeritorious applications helps ensure that trials occur within a reasonable time, which is an essential part of the criminal justice systems commitment to treating presumptively innocent accused persons in a manner that protects their interests in liberty, security of the person, and a fair trial. As for trial fairness, it is more than a policy goal: it is a constitutional imperative. A criminal trial involves allegations made by the state against an accused whose liberty is often at stake. The summary dismissal of criminal applications can curtail the accuseds right to full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial by stopping the accused from fully making arguments and eliciting evidence on their application.\nR. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 27; R. v. Glegg, 2021 ONCA 100, 400 C.C.C. (3d) 276, at para. 36; Dersch v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1505 and R. v. Rose, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262) ref.\nThe underlying values of trial fairness and trial efficiency mandate the conclusion that a rigorous threshold should be applied to summary dismissal motions in criminal trials. A summary procedure is intended to be summary: preliminary, brief, and more in the nature of an overview than a deep dive. Summary dismissal is built upon allegations and supported by the artifice of assuming that the facts asserted are true. By contrast, a hearing on the merits involves a final determination of the facts, and of whether, after a full review, the proven facts support the allegations and ground the requested remedy. A rigorous threshold is also supported by the particular characteristics of criminal trials, including how the trial judges broad case management powers can help ensure the efficient, effective and proportionate use of court resources as well as the accuseds fair trial rights. Judges perform a gate keeping function, and the goal is that only those applications that should be caught by the summary dismissal power are in fact summarily dismissed. Trial judges should err on the side of caution when asked to summarily dismiss an application made in the criminal law context.\nR. v. Find, 2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863, at para. 28 ref.\nThe correct threshold for the summary dismissal of applications made in the criminal law context is whether the underlying application is manifestly frivolous. This threshold promotes both trial efficiency and trial fairness. The frivolous part of the standard weeds out those applications that will necessarily fail, and manifestly captures the idea that the frivolous nature of the application should be obvious. If the frivolous nature of the application is not manifest or obvious on the face of the record, then the application should not be summarily dismissed and should instead be addressed on its merits. This rigorous standard will allow judges to weed out those applications that would never succeed and which would, by definition, waste court time. It also protects fair trial rights by ensuring that those applications which might succeed, including novel claims, are decided on their merits. This standard does not apply to summary dismissal motions that are otherwise subject to a legislated or judicial threshold.\nOuellet v. R., 2021 QCCA 386, 70 C.R. (7th) 279, at para. 12, fn. 3 ref.\nThe party applying, on a motion for summary dismissal, bears the burden of convincing the judge that the underlying application is manifestly frivolous. When applying the manifestly frivolous standard, the judge should not engage in even a limited weighing of the evidence to ascertain if it is reasonably capable of supporting an inference, nor should the judge decide which among competing inferences they prefer. Any such weighing should be left to the voir dire. The judge must assume the facts alleged by the applicant to be true and must take the applicants arguments at their highest. The applicants underlying application should explain its factual foundation and point towards anticipated evidence that could establish their alleged facts. Where the applicant cannot point towards any anticipated evidence that could establish a necessary fact, the judge can reject the factual allegation as manifestly frivolous. The judge ought to generally assume the inferences suggested by the applicant are true, even if competing inferences are proffered. The judge should only reject an inference if it is manifestly frivolous, meaning that there is no reasoning path to the proposed inference. A similar approach is taken to the overall application. Because the truth of the facts alleged is assumed, an application will only be manifestly frivolous where fundamental flaws are apparent on the face of the record. Finally, the trial judges power to summarily dismiss an application is ongoing. Even if the judge permits the application to proceed to a voir dire, the judge retains the ability to summarily dismiss the application during the voir dire if and when it becomes apparent that the application is manifestly frivolous.\n \nIn exercising their discretion concerning whether to hear the summary dismissal motion, judges must consider the context and consequences associated with the underlying application, including whether it is amenable to summary disposition and how the applicants fair trial rights will be affected by a summary dismissal hearing. Additionally, judges must consider whether holding a summary dismissal hearing will be an effective use of court time or if it will actually create delay. Where, for example, the summary hearing would take almost as long as a voir dire on the underlying application, consideration needs to be given to whether fairness, efficiency and respect for the administration of justice more strongly support using the time to deal with the merits of the underlying application rather than devoting resources to matters preliminary to it. In terms of pure efficiency, judges could not be faulted for proceeding directly to a voir dire when it would take the same time to hear the application on its merits as to conduct a summary dismissal hearing.\nThe record on a summary dismissal motion should normally be minimal and of a summary nature because extensive evidence often demands the type of time, effort and delay which works to defeat the very purpose of the motion. While both parties are expected to put their best foot forward, there is no need to set firm rules about what type of record ought to be filed. The party who has brought the underlying application bears the minimal burden of providing the judge with the following specifics, through oral or written submissions: (i) what legal principles, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provisions, or statutory provisions are being relied on and how those principles or provisions have been infringed; (ii) the anticipated evidence to be relied on and how it may be adduced; (iii) the proposed argument; and (iv) the remedy requested. Deciding whether something more is required and how the summary dismissal motion is to proceed is then within the judges case management powers.\n \nIn the present caser, the Trial judge erred by failing to take the alleged facts and inferences as true, applying a more merits-based threshold for summary dismissal which was not sufficiently rigorous, and by focussing on the merits and on the ultimate outcome rather than on whether the applications were manifestly frivolous. The stay applications were not manifestly frivolous and should not have been summarily dismissed. Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Decided on 28th April, 2023.\n(On Appeal from the Court of Appeal for British Columbia)\nheard on: 4th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Wagner C.J. Karakatsanis, C t , Brown**, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal and O'Bonsawin, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mark K. Levitz, K.C., Geoff Baragar, K.C., and Mark Wolf for the Appellant.\nDagmar Dlab, Simon R. A. Buck and Roger P. Thirkell for the Respondent Cody Rae Haevischer.\nBrock Martland, K.C., Daniel J. Song, K.C., Jonathan Desbarats and Elliot Holzman for the Respondent Matthew James Johnston.\nAnil K. Kapoor and Dana C. Achtemichuk, as amici curiae.\nElaine Reid and David Schermbrucker for the Intervener the Director of Public Prosecutions.\nKatie Doherty for the Intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.\nScott C. Hutchison and Sarah Strban for the Intervener the Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario.\nMatthew A. Nathanson and Mika Chow for the Intervener the Independent Criminal Defence Advocacy Society.\nGraham Johnson and Stacey M. Purser for the Intervener the Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association.\nTony C. Paisana and Mark Iyengar for the Intervener the Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia.\nAndrew Matheson and Natalie V. Kolos for the Intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.", - "Petitioner Name:": "His Majesty The KING-Appellant\nVersus\nCODY RAE HAEVISCHER AND MATTHEW JAMES JOHNSTON-RespondentsAnd\nDIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, CRIMINAL LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION OF ONTARIO, INDEPENDENT CRIMINAL DEFENCE ADVOCACY SOCIETY, CRIMINAL TRIAL LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION, TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION-Interveners" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23822", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2153 = 2023 SLD 2153 = 2023 SCMR 1560", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDc", - "Key Words:": "Microfinance Institutions Ordinance (LV of 2001)-\n-S. 6(1)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2-Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Ss. 4 & 13-Microfinance institution/bank-Default in payment of loan-Promissory note integral part of finance agreement-Summary suits filed by the Bank before Trial Court on basis of promissory notes-Maintainability-High Court directed the petitioner-Bank to file civil suits for recovery in the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court instead of summary suits under Order XXXVII, C.P.C.-Validity-Trial Court and the Appellate Court both ignored the fact that the promissory note was an integral part of the finance agreement and a specific condition was incorporated in the finance agreement which expounded that the borrowers of the loan, being the customers and guarantors, solemnly declared that their signatures and thumb impression shall be deemed as the whole agreement or acceptance for all documents including but not limited to the finance agreement, promissory note, hypothecated goods, letter of pledge, MODT, authority of encashment, marking of lien and all relevant affidavits with regard to loan and authorized the bank to use each of them as part of the agreement under their relationship-Petitioner-bank rightly invoked the jurisdiction of the Court under the summary chapter on the strength of the promissory note which was printed in the finance agreement in a separate head-Concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below that the suits for recovery should have been filed in the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court rather than summary jurisdiction was misconceived and erroneous-Courts below only relied upon the finance agreement without adverting to its terms and conditions and the integral documents appended thereto and returned the plaint in a slipshod and injudicious manner-All the prerequisites required to be followed were fulfilled at the time of issuing the promissory notes and the summary suits were rightly filed under the summary chapter-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001=Rr1 & 2", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 329-K to 391-K of 2022, decided on 28th April, 2023.\n(On appeal from Order dated 03.12.2021 of the High Court of Sindh Circuit Court, Hyderabad in M.As. Nos. 3-12/2021 and 31-83/2021)\nheard on: 28th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jahanzeb Awan, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Rasheed Mehar and Subhan Tasleem, Advocates and Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TELENOR MICROFINANCE BANK LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nSHAMIM BANO and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23823", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2154 = 2023 SLD 2154 = 2023 SCMR 1508", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence- Day time occurrence- Promptly lodged FIR- Prompt post-mortem examination-Occurrence had taken place in a broad day light that too, at a place where certain shops were also available and the place of occurrence as well as the time of occurrence had not been disputed-Occurrence took place at 5:15 p.m. and after the occurrence, it was the priority of eye-witnesses, being father and brother of the deceased to shift the injured/deceased to the hospital, but he succumbed to the injuries on the way-Thereafter, they brought back the dead body to their house and complainant proceeded to the Police Station which was at a distance of 21 kilometers away from the place of occurrence and lodged the report at 8:00 p.m.; so there was no conscious delay in lodging the FIR, as prior to that the anxiety of the close relatives was to make efforts to save life of their nearer one-Promptness of the FIR also eliminated the chance of consultation and deliberation. It is also a circumstance that after registration of the FIR, the police party again travelled back to the house of the complainant, where dead body was lying-Inquest report and injury statement was prepared there and thereafter dead body was dispatched to the hospital where on the same night at 5:00 a.m. the postmortem was conducted. So any delay in conducting the postmortem was also explained from the circumstances, especially when Police Station was at a distance of 21 kilometers from the place of occurrence-Both the Courts below after appraisal and re-appraisal of the entire evidence rightly came to the conclusion regarding guilt of the accused-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Eye-witnesses closely related to deceased-Inconsequential-Ocular account consisted of statements of two witnesses, who were close relatives of the deceased but they had no motive to falsely implicate the accuse in this case-Both of them remained consistent on each and every material point and despite cross-examination their testimonies could not be shattered-Although said witnesses made statement against the accused after about more than five and half years of the occurrence, thus, minor discrepancies were bound to occur after such a long span of time-Both the witnesses gave details of the occurrence and also clarified the manner in which the accused along with co-accused attacked upon the complainant and it was the accused who fired three shots upon the deceased-Eye-witnesses being close relatives of the deceased were not expected to let off the real culprit and involve the accused in this case falsely especially, when it was not even suggested that they had any enmity, animosity or reason to falsely implicate him in this case-From the testimony of both the witnesses it was quite clear that they were truthful and reliable witnesses-Willful and unexplained abscondence of accused fully corroborated the ocular account as he did not give any plausible explanation of his long abscondence-Both the Courts below after appraisal and re-appraisal of the entire evidence rightly came to the conclusion regarding guilt of the accused-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Medical evidence corroborating ocular account-Ocular account was fully supported by the medical evidence-Duration given by the doctor also coincided with the time of occurrence-According to the witnesses, accused fired three shots upon deceased and the doctor also found three entry wounds on the person of the deceased, so the medical evidence fully supported the ocular account which otherwise was truthful and reliable-Both the Courts below after appraisal and re-appraisal of the entire evidence rightly came to the conclusion regarding guilt of the accused-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Petition for enhancement of sentence, dismissal of-Mitigating circumstances already taken into consideration by the High Court-High Court while taking into consideration that the motive was not established by the prosecution, and that the crime empties were not recovered from the place of occurrence and there was no positive report of Forensic Science Laboratory, reduced the sentence of the accused from death to life-Not a single eye-witness of the motive was ever produced; even the ladies who were allegedly teased were not produced, and no report for the same was lodged in the Police Station-High Court had rightly disbelieved the motive-Petition seeking enhancement of sentence of accused was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 816 of 2017 and Criminal Petition No. 775-L of 2016, decided on 14th June, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 16.05.2016, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 2012 and Murder Reference No. 81 of 2012)\nheard on: 14th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Matee Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for Petitioners (in J.P. No. 816 of 2017).\nMuhammad Zubair Saeed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Criminal Petition No. 7750-L of 2016).\nMuhammad Jaffar, Additional P.G. Punjab (via video link from Lahore) for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MASKEEN ULLAH and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23824", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2155 = 2023 SLD 2155 = 2023 SCMR 1609", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Negligence-\n-Medical practitioner-Legal test for establishing negligence by a doctor-Scope-Test for establishing negligence by a doctor in diagnosis or treatment is whether the doctor has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion ( professional practice test )-Qualification of this test is that, a court may, in a rare case, reject the professional opinion if it is incapable of withstanding logical analysis.\nBolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200 and Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 ref.\n(b) Negligence-\n-Medical practitioner-Professional practice test-Scope-Duty of doctor to advise and inform patient of reasonable alternative treatments-Whether alternative treatment reasonable-Correct legal test to be applied in assessing whether alternative treatment reasonable and requires to be discussed with the patient explained.\nOn 23 March 2012, Mr M, aged 39, was admitted to the Forth Valley Royal Hospital complaining of chest pains, nausea and vomiting. Dr L, a consultant cardiologist at the hospital, was asked to review an echocardiogram that had been performed on Mr M. Her review of Mr M indicated that his presentation did not fit with a standard diagnosis of pericarditis (an inflammation close to the heart). During the next few days, Mr Ms condition improved. On 30 March, he was discharged home on antibiotics. A couple of days later Mr M was readmitted to hospital complaining of the reoccurrence of chest pain. He was given intravenous fluids and antibiotics under the care of the medical team. On 2 April, a nursing entry stated Nil further chest pain. The next day, Dr L visited Mr M in the Acute Admissions Unit, having reviewed a further echocardiogram. He looked much better than when she had previously seen him and, in answer to her questions, he denied having any chest pain. That being the case, she saw no reason to prescribe any additional medical treatment. In her professional judgement, she did not regard it as appropriate to prescribe non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs ( NSAIDs ), such as ibuprofen, because Mr M was not in pain at the time she saw him and there was no clear diagnosis of pericarditis. On 6 April, Mr M was discharged home and remained on antibiotics. On 7 April he suffered a cardiac arrest at home from which he died. His widow and other family members brought an action against Forth Valley Health Board alleging that they were vicariously liable for Mr Ms death, which they claimed was caused by negligent treatment by Dr L. They alleged that Dr L was in breach of her duty of care by failing to inform Mr M that NSAIDs were a possible treatment option for him. It is alleged that had he been so advised he would have taken a NSAID and would not have died.The expert evidence indicated that, while some doctors would have prescribed NSAIDs to Mr M, there was also a responsible body of medical opinion that supported Dr Ls approach given that Mr M was not in pain and there was no clear diagnosis of pericarditis. The Lord Ordinary and the Inner House held that Dr L was not negligent in failing to inform Mr M about the possible treatment by NSAIDs. The widow and family members of Mr M appealed to the Supreme Court.\nThe correct test to decide what is a reasonable alternative treatment is what can be referred to as the professional practice test which is set out in the cases reported as Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582( Bolam ) at p 587 and Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200 ( Hunter v Hanley ) at p 206. A doctor who has taken the view that a treatment is not a reasonable alternative treatment for a particular patient will not be negligent in failing to inform the patient of that alternative treatment if the doctors view is supported by a responsible of body of medical opinion.\nTaking a hypothetical example to help explain, in more detail, how the court regards the law as working: a doctor will first seek to provide a diagnosis (which may initially be a provisional diagnosis) having, for example, examined the patient, conducted tests, and having had discussions with the patient. Say that, in respect of that diagnosis, there are ten possible treatment options; the doctor, exercising his or her clinical judgment, decides that only four of them are reasonable and that decision to rule out six is supported by a responsible body of medical opinion. The doctor is not negligent by failing to inform the patient about the other six even though they are possible alternative treatments. The narrowing down from possible alternative treatments to reasonable alternative treatments is an exercise of clinical judgment to which the professional practice test should be applied. The duty of reasonable care would then require the doctor to inform the patient not only of the treatment option that the doctor is recommending but also of the other three reasonable alternative treatment options (plus no treatment if that is a reasonable alternative option) indicating their respective advantages and disadvantages and the material risks involved in each treatment option. However the doctor cannot simply inform the patient about the treatment option or options that the doctor himself or herself prefers. Rather the doctors duty of care is to inform the patient of all reasonable treatment options applying the professional practice test.\nBolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200; Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 and Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430 ref.\nThe professional practice test is the correct legal test in respect of reasonable alternative treatments. This is so for a number of reasons. Firstly, in line with the distinction drawn in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430 (Montgomery) at para 83, between the exercise of professional skill and judgment and the court-imposed duty of care to inform, the determination of what are reasonable alternative treatments clearly falls within the former and ought not to be undermined by a legal test that overrides professional judgment. In other words, deciding what are the reasonable alternative treatments is an exercise of professional skill and judgment. That is why, it is appropriate to refer synonymously to reasonable alternative treatments or to clinically appropriate or clinically suitable alternative treatments. Secondly, the professional practice test is consistent with the two stage test set out in Duce v Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 1307 ( Duce ). The two-stage test identified in Duce is based on the distinction drawn in Montgomery between when the doctors role is, and is not, a matter of professional skill and judgment. All matters of professional skill and judgment, to which the professional practice test should be applied, fall within the first stage of the Duce test. The identification of which treatments are reasonable alternatives (i.e. clinically appropriate) is as much a matter falling within medical expertise and professional judgment, and hence governed by the professional practice test, as the identification of risks associated with any treatment. Indeed, they are closely linked. The risk of any given treatment will be a significant part of any analysis of alternative treatment options. The identification of reasonable alternative treatments (ie clinically appropriate treatments) should therefore be treated in the same way as the identification of risk in Duce. It is only once the reasonable alternative treatment options have been identified that the second stage advisory role arises. That is, the doctor is required at the second stage to inform the patient of the reasonable alternative treatments and of the material risks of such alternative treatments. Thirdly, the professional practice test is consistent with medical professional expertise and guidance.\nThe determination of reasonable treatment options is a matter of medical expertise and professional skill and judgment. Fourthly, the said test avoids an unfortunate conflict in the doctors role. If one were to reject the professional practice test in determining reasonable alternative treatments, one consequence would be an unfortunate conflict in the exercise of a doctors role. This is because the law would be requiring a doctor to inform a patient about an alternative medical treatment which the doctor exercising professional skill and judgment, and supported by a responsible body of medical opinion, would not consider to be a reasonable medical option. Fifthly, the said test avoids bombarding the patient with information. And lastly, the professional practice test avoids making the law uncertain for doctors who have to apply it.\nMontgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430 and AH v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2018] CSOH 57, 2018 SLT 535 ref.\nApplying the professional practice test to the facts of the present case, Dr L was not negligent because her view, that prescribing NSAIDs for Mr M was not a reasonable treatment option for him because he was not in pain and there was no clear diagnosis of pericarditis, was supported by a responsible body of medical opinion. She was therefore not in breach of her duty of care by not informing him of that possible option. Given the conclusion that Dr L was not in breach of a duty of care in not informing the patient about the possible alternative treatment by NSAIDs, the questions on causation do not arise.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Decided on 12th July, 2023.\n(On appeal from: [2021] CSIH 21)\nDates of hearing: 10th and 11th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Lord Reed, President Lord Hodge, Deputy President, Lord Kitchin,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Robert Weir KC and Lauren Sutherland KC (instructed by Drummond Miller LLP (Edinburgh)) for Appellants.\nUna Doherty KC, David Myhill and Ewen Campbell (instructed by NHS Central Legal Office (Edinburgh)) for Respondent.\nRoddy Dunlop KC (instructed by GMC Legal (Manchester)) for General Medical Council (1st Intervener).\nBen Collins KC and Sophie Beesley (instructed by Capital Law (Cardiff)) for British Medical Association (2nd Intervener) (written submissions only).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Lord Hamblen and Lord Burrows\nMcCULLOCH and others-Appellants\nVersus\nFORTH VALLEY HEALTH BOARD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23825", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2156 = 2023 SLD 2156 = 2023 PTCL 780", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDQ", - "Key Words:": "NOTIFICATION NO. S.R.O. 490(I)/2004, DATED 12-06-2004-Under Section 8(l)(b) of the Act, Federal Government through a delegated authority had restricted & prohibited the claim of input tax adjustment by ‘notifying items’ which do not relate to taxable supplies however, the alleged goods have not been included in the list of negative items notified under Notification No. S.R.O. 490(I)/2004 dated 12th June, 2004 as amended vide Notification No. S.R.O. 450(I)/2013 dated 27th May, 2013.\nNOTIFICATION NO. S.R.O. 450(I)/2013, DATED 27-05-2013-Under Section 8(l)(b) of the Act, Federal Government through a delegated authority had restricted & prohibited the claim of input tax adjustment by ‘notifying items’ which do not relate to taxable supplies however, the alleged goods have not been included in the list of negative items notified under Notification No. S.R.O. 490(I)/2004 dated 12th June, 2004 as amended vide Notification No. S.R.O. 450(I)/2013 dated 27th May, 2013.\nNOTIFICATION NO. SRO 897(I)/2013, DATED 14-10-2013-Since Notification No. SRO 897(I)/2013 dated 14-10-2013 has already been declared unconstitutional by the Hon’ble High Court, Lahore therefore, there was no justification to charge and demand amount of withholding sales tax @ 1/5th from the appellant.\nSALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)\nSection 2(35)\nUnder Section 2(35) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, yard stick to charge and levy sales tax is the sale constituting a taxable activity for a taxable supply. In order to create a charge of sales tax, two conditions must exist independently Le. transaction of sale to constitute a taxable activity and taxable supply. If anyone is missing, sales tax would not be leviable.\nSection 3\nNo input tax was claimed/adjusted on purchase of vehicle therefore, charging of sales tax on its subsequent disposal is not just and fair in terms of Serial No. 6 of Table-2 given under the Sixth Scheduled annexed with the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and obliviously resulting in double taxation not permissible under law.—We hold that the instant observation is baseless and unfounded because the appellant has sold vehicle (Car) No. LEC-888 during the financial year 2015-16 and received Rs. 2,200,000/- as sale proceeds through banking channel. No input tax was claimed/adjusted on purchase of such goods therefore, charging of sales tax on its subsequent disposal is not just and fair in terms of Serial No. 6 of Table-2 given under the Sixth Scheduled annexed with the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is resulting in double taxation not permissible under law.\nSince Notification No. SRO 897(I)/2013 dated 14-10-2013 has already been declared unconstitutional by the Hon’ble High Court, Lahore therefore, there was no justification to charge and demand amount of withholding sales tax @ 1/5th from the appellant.\nUnder Section 3(1B) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, FBR could by a notification duly published in the Official Gazette, in lieu of levying and collecting sales tax under Section 3(1) of the Act, levy and collect sales tax on the production capacity of plants, machinery or installation producing on manufacturing such goods but no such notification was issued in case of the present appellant therefore, demand of sales tax calculated merely on the basis of “production capacity” is illegal and without lawful authority.—There is considerable merit in the contentions raised by the learned counsel of appellant regarding suppression of sales on the basis of production capacity. After carefully examining the relevant provisions of law, we feel no hesitation in holding that under section 3(1B) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the FBR could by a notification duly published in the Official Gazette, in lieu of levying and collecting sales tax under section 3(1) of the Act, levy and collect sales tax on the production capacity of plants, machinery or installation producing on manufacturing such goods but no such notification was issued in case of the present appellant therefore, demand of sales tax calculated merely on the basis of production capacity ” is illegal and without lawful authority.\nThe production capacity and actual production are two different concepts. It is only in ideal condition that actual production is in accordance with the production capacity of any unit.- Furthermore, demand of sales tax calculated on the basis of production capacity is presumptuous and imaginative in character which is not permissible under law. The production capacity and actual production are two different concepts. It is only in ideal condition that actual production is in accordance with the production capacity of any unit. The dispossession and actual transfer of goods by the manufacturer to the other party is a basic requirement to bring the goods within the charge. Unless, the department is in a position to establish that the assessee did more production and the same has been transferred to another party, sales tax cannot be charged. The estimate, however, strong it may be, unless is based upon some corroborating and solid evidences and reasons to believe cannot lead to creation of huge demand of sales tax. The departmental case is totally based upon hypothetical calculations without any proof which established beyond any shadow of doubt that impugned liability of sales tax is based on the figures and calculations, which are imaginary and presumptive hence, no tax could be levied on the basis of assumption and presumption. Under section 2(35) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, the yard stick to charge and levy sales tax is the sale constituting a taxable activity for a taxable supply. In order to create a charge of sales tax, two conditions must exist independently i.e. transaction of sale to constitute a taxable activity and taxable supply. If anyone is missing, the sales tax would not be leviable.\nThe dispossession and actual transfer of goods by the manufacturer to the other party is a basic requirement to bring the goods within the charge. Unless, the department is in a position to establish that the assessee did more production and the same has been transferred to another party, sales tax cannot be charged.\nThe estimate, however, strong it may be, unless is based upon some corroborating and solid evidences and reasons to believe cannot lead to creation of huge demand of sales tax.\nSections 7, 8 & 10\nCompressor oil, generator oil and high speed diesel procured by the appellant were wholly used to generate electricity through diesel generators which was subsequently used having direct nexus with the production of taxable goods. Hence, input tax paid against purchase of compressor oil, generator oil and high speed diesel cannot be denied.-We are of the considered view that compressor oil, generator oil and high speed diesel procured by the appellant were wholly used to generate electricity through diesel generators which was subsequently used having direct nexus with the production of taxable goods. It is well settled proposition of law that once a registered person establish that the goods in question on which input tax has been paid were used or to be used “directly, indirectly or even remotely ” for the purpose of ‘taxable activity’ or for the purpose of ‘taxable supplies ’ made or to be made by that person, then the person becomes entitled to the deduction of the said input tax paid by the person for the said purpose from the output tax that is due from the person in respect of a particular tax period in terms of section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, the appellant adjusted input tax paid on the alleged goods as much as the same were used for the purpose of making of taxable supplies. Under section 8(1)(b) of the Act; the Federal Government through a delegated authority had restricted & prohibited the claim of input tax adjustment by ‘notifying items ’ which do not relate to taxable supplies however, the alleged goods have not been included in the list of negative items notified under Notification No. S.R.O. 490(I)/2004 dated 12th June, 2004 as amended vide Notification No. S.R.O. 450(I)/2013 dated 27th May, 2013 hence, input tax paid against purchase of compressor oil, generator oil and high speed diesel cannot be denied to the appellant.\nOnce a registered person establish that the goods in question on which input tax has been paid were used or to be used “directly, indirectly or even remotely ” for the purpose of ‘taxable activity’ or for the purpose of ‘taxable supplies’ made or to be made by that person, then the person becomes entitled to the deduction of the said input tax paid by the person for the said purpose from the output tax that is due from the person in respect of a particular tax period in terms of Section 7 of the Act.\nUnder Section 8(1)(b) of the Act, Federal Government through a delegated authority had restricted & prohibited the claim of input tax adjustment by ‘notifying items’ which do not relate to taxable supplies however, the alleged goods have not been included in the list of negative items notified under Notification No. S.R.O. 490(I)/2004 dated 12th June, 2004 as amended vide Notification No. S.R.O. 450(I)/2013 dated 27th May, 2013.\nDenial of input tax credit not only defeats “the purpose” of the Act but it is also found contrary to the law already laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of \n“Collector of Customs Sales Tax and Central Excise, etc vs. M/s. Sanghar Sugar Mills Ltd, Karachi” reported as (PTCL 2007 CL 565).\nThe goods which are used for the progress, promotion, advancement of the business activity are part of a taxable supply.\nSections 25,33 & 72B\nPunitive action under Section 33(9)(c) of the Act is provided in the cases where record was requisitioned under Section 25 of the Act and in violation thereof, the person not complying with its provisions was liable to be penalized but no such penalty is provided in case of non-compliance of provisions of Section 72B of the Act hence, penalty imposed against the appellant is illegal and unjustified.- Coming up to the merits of the case, the records provided by the appellant to the Audit Division on 15-04-2019 remained unattended more than one and a half year and not a single letter for any further specific record required for the audit purposes was issued by the concerned officer. The DCIR, on account of non-production of record call for audit has imposed a penalty of Rs. 65,000/- under section 33(9)(a), 33(9)(b) & 33(9)(c) of the Act, without any lawful authority as punitive action under section 33(9)(c) of the Act, is provided in the cases where record was requisitioned under section 25 of the Act and in violation thereof, the person not complying with its provisions was liable to be penalized but no such penalty is provided in case of non-compliance of provisions of section 72B of the Act hence, penalty imposed against the appellant is illegal and unjustified.\nDifference as alleged in the impugned show cause notice is not materially correct due to the reasons that the stock position as declared in Annex-F consist of local purchases, imported goods & fixed assets whereas in the income tax return, only stock of raw materials have been mentioned therein.- We have found that the difference of Rs. 21,998,923/- as alleged in the impugned show cause notice is not materially correct due to the reasons that the stock position as declared in Annex-F consist of local purchases, imported goods and fixed assets whereas in the income tax return, only stock of raw materials have been mentioned therein. The charge of suppression of sales is not proved through any documentary corroborating evidence regarding clandestine removal of goods or receipts of money consideration in excess to that of shown in sales tax invoice and in turn sales tax returns hence, it remains unsubstantiated without which the whole exercise is nullity in the eyes of law therefore, liability created on this account is deleted accordingly.\nSections 25 & 72B\nIt is a statutory requirement that an audit report is required to be issued and thereafter the taxpayer is to be afforded an opportunity of a hearing. Issuance of “Audit Report” is sine qua non for completion of audit proceedings under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and in its absence; whole audit exercise carried out by the department is illegal.- Legal issue is taken at the first, assailing that neither audit observations were issued and confronted to the appellant nor any audit report was given to him. In the present case, the appellant had been selected for audit and the department had every right to conduct such an exercise, within the ambit of the law. It is observed that no audit report was issued to the appellant containing audit observations and that no reasonable opportunity of a hearing was provided. The department without confronting the appellant with audit observations and without issuing any audit report, served the show cause notice after expiry of more than one and a half year, rendering their whole exercise of audit illegal and unlawful under section 25 of the Act read with sub-rule (4) & (5) of Rule 44A of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006. The discrepancies found in the audit were neither communicated and confronted to the appellant before finalizing the audit nor the audit report was issued. It is a statutory requirement that an audit report is required to be issued and thereafter the taxpayer is to be afforded an opportunity of a being heard. Issuance of “Audit Report” is sine qua non for completion of audit proceedings under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and in its absence; whole audit exercise carried out by the department is illegal. It has also been seen that in the adjudication proceedings, the adjudicating authority completely ignored the binding instructions and decisions of the higher appellate fora and has passed the assessment order on supposition/ assumption. The Hon’ble High Court, Lahore in case of “M/s. Nestle Pakistan Ltd vs. The Federal Board of Revenue, etc.” reported as (PTCL 2017 CL. 412) was relied upon which was subsequently upheld by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Lahore High Court in ICA No. 338 of 2017 through an order dated 18-07-2017.\nNo audit report was issued to the appellant containing audit observations and that no reasonable opportunity of a hearing was provided.\nThe department without confronting the appellant with audit observations and without issuing any audit report, has served the show cause notice after expiry of more than one and a half year, rendering their whole exercise of audit illegal and unlawful under Section 25 of the Act read with sub-rule (4) & (5) of Rule 44A of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006.\nThe discrepancies found in the audit were neither communicated and confronted to the appellant before finalizing the audit nor the audit report was issued.\nSections 26 & 33\nAny person who fails to furnish the information required by the Board through a notification issued under sub-section (5) of section 26, such person shall pay a lump sum penalty of rupees ten thousand instead of a separate penalty against the each tax period. It is further held that the department has imposed a penalty of Rs. 120,000/- on account of non-filing of Annex-J whereas under section 33(10) of the Act that any person who fails to furnish the information required by the Board through a notification issued under sub-section (5) of section 26, such person shall pay a lump sum penalty of rupees ten thousand instead of a separate penalty against the each tax period. This being so, penalty on account of non-filing of Annex-J is reduced to the extent of rupees ten thousand.\nSALES TAX RULES, 2006\nRule 44A\nSee Sections 25 & 72B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(9),2(35),2(44),3,3(1A),3(1B),6,7,8,8(1),8(1)(b),8(lXa)(b)(c)(f)(h),10,22,23,25,26,26(5),33,33(9)(c),33(10),34(1),72B,73Sales Tax Rules, 2006=44A(4),44A(5)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1841/LB/2021, decided on 5th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR (CHAIRMAN) & MR. RIZWAN AHMAD URFI (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mrs. Amna Kamal, (DR).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. LATIF EXPORTS (PVT.) \nVS\nTHE CIR, (RTO), LIMITED, FAISALABAD. FAISALABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23826", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2157 = 2023 SLD 2157 = 2023 CLD 1443", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNC8", - "Key Words:": "Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 10, 30 & 37-Deceptive marketing practices-Competition Commission imposed penalty upon electric cable/wire manufacturing company (appellant) who had adopted the practice of inserting cash/cash coupons of various denominations in the packing of the electric wire cable bundles without any indication of availability of scheme-Enquiry report found that due to omission of disclosure about the coupons, the actual consumers remained unaware and the benefit ultimately transferred to electricians-Appellant had committed violation of deceptive marketing in terms of Ss. 10(1), 10(2)(a) & 10(2)(b) of the Competition Act, 2010-Although the appellant claimed that the disclosures of tokens/cash coupons were available on the wrappers of cable packaging, but the claim could not be proved before Enquiry Committee or the Commission-Moreover, the undertakings submitted by the appellant indicated that they had contravened the provisions of the Competition Act, 2010 and did deceptive marketing practices enclosing cash coupons without disclosures on the wrapping of packaging-Compliance and commitment also clearly showed said violations-Competition Appellate Tribunal maintained the impugned judgment, imposing penalty upon the appellant, passed by the Competition Commission-Appeal filed by the electric cable manufacturing company was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=10,30,37", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 7 of 2022, decided on 14th July, 2023.\nDates of hearing: 12th January, 8th, 30th March, 15th June, 5th July, 11th October, 23rd November and 8th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice Mamoon Rashid Sheikh, Chairperson, Muhammad Asghar Ch., Member Technical and Raja Saad Sultan, Member Technical", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Iqbal Khan for Appellant.\nDaniyal Hassan assisted by Hassan Ahsan Mian and Haider Imtiaz, Law Officers for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs PAK MUZAFFAR CABLES-Appellant\nVersus\nCOMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23827", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2158 = 2023 SLD 2158 = 2023 CLD 1266", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNCs", - "Key Words:": "Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 3, 11 & 31-Merger of companies-Post-merger risks-Determination-Petitioners/companies applied for permission of their merger-Held, that there could not be any lessening of competition as both the groups had decisive influence over both the Merger Parties-Both the companies were being managed by common Chief Executive Officer, having same brandings and common distribution network-There was dependency of one partys operations on other partys assets and finances as well as profit sharing by both the parties on its production-Product lines of NP and CAN were being offered by two separate companies, ultimate controlling groups of the entities were same, therefore, AHG and FG were the sole producers of NP and CAN fertilizers and both the groups had decisive influence over the operation of Merger Parties-In post-merger scenario the Merger Parties consolidated their operation on papers in the form of surviving entity (FFCL) and post-merger risk of elimination of competitive constraints did not arise-Competition law was concerned with behaviour of an undertaking and conduct between undertakings that would ordinarily pursue an economic aim that was separate from that of its competitors (and would thereby have been in competition with each other) which was not the case in instant matter-Proposed transaction and consummated transaction were authorized under S. 31(1)(d)(i) of Competition Act, 2010-Competition Commission disposed of proceedings under S. 11(12) of Competition Act, 2010-Merger was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=3,11,31", - "Case #": "Case No. 1367/Merger-CCP/2023, decided on 13th July, 2023.\nheard on: 13th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ms. Rahat Kaunain Hassan, Chairperson and Ahmed Qadir, Director General (Policy)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Asad Murad, Chief Operating Officer, Kashif Mustafa, General Manager Finance and Muhammad Afzaal, Senior Manager Finance on behalf of Fatima Fertilizer Company Limited.\nMuhammad Musharraf Khan, Chief Financial Officer for Pakarab Fertilizers Limited.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MERGER OF MESSRS PAKARAB FERTILIZERS LIMITED WITH AND INTO MESSRS FATIMA FERTILIZER COMPANY LIMITED: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23828", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2159 = 2023 SLD 2159 = 2023 CLD 1283", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 75, 76, 77, 118 & 122-Insurance claim-Utmost good faith-Deceptive marketing conduct-Language used in the policy documents-Interpretation of the contract (policy documents) executed between the policy-holder and Insurance Company-Claim of the petitioner (policy-holder) was that she was entitled for recovery of assured amount/sum on attaining maturity of her insurance policy as per the policy documents-Contention of the respondent (insurance company) was that the petitioner was entitled for surrendered value only in light of nature of insurance policy being Unit link policy-Validity-Respondent/company, submitted that there was a schedule annexed with policy, and that the policy proceeds were to be paid according to the said schedule-Said schedule only spoke about different amounts which were to be paid in different years to the policy holder on surrendering the policy, whereas in the present case, the petitioner was claiming the policy proceeds on the maturity of the policy which was mentioned in the policy schedule-Business of insurance was based on the principle of utmost good-faith and the law required each party to act towards other party in respect of any matter arising in relation to the insurance with utmost good-faith-Policy documents, in the present case, although were signed by the petitioner/policy-holder but the same, on the face of it, were deceptive and mis-leading because the technicalities used in said documents had neither been explained nor disclosed to the policy-holder-Besides, in the written statement respondent/company had nowhere claimed/mentioned that the respondent/company or its agent had fulfilled the responsibilities as required by the law, therefore, respondent/company had failed to discharge its obligations as enshrined in S. 75 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Section 77 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 required that while constructing or drafting the policy documents (proposal form and claim forms etc.) a reasonable effort should be made to use plain and simple language-Contract (policy documents) was to be construed and interpreted objectively and the policy-holder was entitled to take benefits of the ambiguities created by the respondent/company in light of principle of contra-proferentem-Petitioner on the maturity of the policy had, admittedly, duly applied to the respondent/company for payment of policy proceeds on printed forms, namely Request Form for Policy Maturity Proceeds -It was nowhere mentioned in said printed forms, having been provided by the respondent/company, that on maturity of the policy, the policy holder would receive surrender value instead of the sum assured-Payment of total premium by the petitioner was proved from the contents of the policy and she had applied on the printed forms of the company after eight days of attaining maturity of term of policy, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to receive total sum assured amount of Rs.800,000/- along with liquidated damages under S. 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Respondent/company knowing that the petitioner was entitled to the sum assured as per terms of the policy documents unnecessarily delayed the matter for a long time and dragged the petitioner into litigation, therefore, petitioner was also entitled for the costs-Insurance petition was allowed with costs of Rs.50,000.\nMuhammad Shahnawaz and 44 others v. Karachi Electric Supply Company and others 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1579 and Universal Insurance Company and another v. Karim Gul and another PLD 2021 SC 906 ref.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 75, 76, 77 & 122-Insurance claim-Utmost good faith-Deceptive marketing conduct-Language used in the policy documents-Interpretation of the contract (policy documents) executed between the policy-holder and Insurance Company-Complaints against the Insurance companies for the mechanism being adopted from the time of selling policy to the maturity stage-Validity-Insurance Tribunal, on perusal of the policy documents and their contents, had found the same as deceptive and misleading-Terms/technical words (such as term , termination date , not Applicable , benefit type , FIB ) were used without explaining their (technical words) meanings-Almost all the pages of the documents were in English language, with only a little portion in Urdu language, using the smallest font of typing, which might hardly be understood by even the agents hired by the Insurance Companies themselves -Training and education of such agents was not at par- By adopting such ways, Insurance Companies were totally ignoring the ratio of education in the country and interest of the policy holder by violating the mandate and spirit of S. 76 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 and had adopted misleading and deceptive market conduct to sell the package and gain a substantial amount-Almost in all cases pending before the Insurance Tribunal, the policy holders were complaining that the purchasers were not being provided the complete information regarding the nature of the policy, instead wrong verbal information was extended and only a video of 2 or 3 minutes was shown to them-Tribunal, while allowing present insurance claim with costs, also passed directions to the SECP (being Regulator of Insurance Companies) to convey certain instructions to insurance companies, inter alia, for drafting policy documents in easily readable English as well as Urdu languages explaining relevant terms; which shall be explained by the trained agents while making video recordings at the time of explaining packages to policy purchasers.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=75,76,77,118,122", - "Case #": "Case No. 287 of 2022, decided on 19th July, 2023.heard on: 12 July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (Retd.) Ali Akbar Qureshi, Chairman and Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member (Legal)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Muhammad Qamar for Petitioner.\nBarrister Hamza Basharat for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASMA QAMAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nJUBILEE LIFE INSURANCE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23829", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2160 = 2023 SLD 2160 = 2023 CLD 1298", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNDg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 28(1)(b), 33, 36 & 37-Powers of the Commission in relation to a proceeding or enquiry-Power to call for information relating to undertaking-Scope of the Powers of the Competition Commission under sections 33, 36 & 37 of the Competition Act, 2010 stated.\nProceeding under section 33 means and only refers to proceedings under section 30 of the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act), and the power to call for information under section 36 of the Act or conduct of a study provided for under section 28(1)(b) cannot be treated as a proceeding within the meaning used in section 33 nor can the powers provided under section 33 be made available to Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) in their exercise of jurisdiction under section 36 or 28(1)(b).\nThe CCP is a regulator which aims to prevent and address anti-competitive practices across markets for which it studies the market to understand market trends and practices. For this reason, CCP under section 36 of the Act is empowered to call for information relating to an undertaking. Through a general or special order, it may call upon an undertaking to furnish periodically or as and when required any information concerning the activities of the undertaking, including information relating to its organization, accounts, business, trade practices, management and connection with any other undertaking, which information is necessary for the CCP for the purposes of the Act. This is a regulatory power available to CCP aimed to collect and gather information about the undertaking and does not fall under the ambit of a proceeding under section 30. Hence, merely calling for information does not constitute a proceeding nor does it trigger any penal consequences.\nSection 37 of the Act provides for enquiry and studies and subsection (1) thereof provides that the CCP may, on its own, conduct enquiries and studies into any matter relevant to the purposes of this Act or as per subsection (2) of section 37 of the Act, the CCP may conduct an enquiry and studies of an undertaking when it receives a complaint in writing of such facts that appear to constitute a contravention of the provisions of Chapter II of the Act unless it is of the opinion that the application is frivolous or vexatious or based on insufficient facts, or is not substantiated by any evidence to conduct an enquiry. Although enquiries and studies are referred together in section 37 of the Act, they serve distinct functions. Enquiry is a process available to the CCP to assess contravention of the Act before it initiates any proceedings under section 30 of the Act. Whereas, studies, as provided under section 28(1)(b) of the Act, are conducted to promote competition in all sectors of economic activity and in terms of section 37(3) of the Act, they are a function which may be outsourced by hiring consultants on contracts. Both enquiry and studies are used as independent tools by the CCP to collect and assess information on market trends and do not constitute an adverse action against the undertaking. Therefore, in terms of sections 36 and 37 the power to call for information or conducting an enquiry or study do not constitute a proceeding against an undertaking under section 30 of the Act.\nIt is important to draw a distinction between section 30 and section 37. Section 30 empowers the CCP to issue orders under section 31 when it is satisfied that there is a contravention of any provision in Chapter II of the Act. Before proceeding with the matter, the CCP must provide notice of its intent and the reasons behind it, giving the undertaking an opportunity to be heard and defend itself. On the other hand, section 37 defines a different scope for the CCP. Under this section, the CCP has the authority to conduct enquiries, either suo motu or based on references from the Federal Government, into matters related to the objectives of the Act. As mentioned above an enquiry under section 37 can also be initiated based on a complaint, unless the application is deemed frivolous, vexatious, lacks sufficient evidence, or is not supported by prima facie evidence. If, upon conducting this enquiry, the CCP is of the opinion that the findings necessitate taking action in the public interest, it shall initiate proceedings under section 30. In other words, the enquiry under section 37 serves as a preliminary step to gather information and evidence, and if it reveals a potential contravention of Chapter II of the Act, the CCP can then proceed. However, such enquiry is not always necessary to proceed against an undertaking, and if the CCP is satisfied on the information that it has available that a contravention of Chapter II of the Act is committed, it may proceed without it.\nThe CCP being a regulator must always act in a transparent manner, keeping the undertaking informed of its decisions. However, section 37 does not in itself result in penal consequences and the procedure is not a proceeding within the meaning of section 33. However, the CCP is required to provide the gist of its reasons as recorded in its internal deliberations which led to the decision of initiating such enquiry. This is a minimum requirement for the purposes of transparency and good governance and also facilitates the regulatory process by keeping the undertaking informed.\nWhen perusing an order under section 37 of the Act, the CCP is not required to give a detailed reasoned explanation to the undertaking as to the enquiry, but should have deliberated on the issue so as to come to the conclusion that an enquiry is necessary, the gist of which reasoning should be communicated to the undertaking in writing. The internal working documents of the CCP need not be communicated in their entirety to the undertaking whilst at the same time its intent, along with gist of the reasoning, to conduct an enquiry must be communicated.\n(b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 37-Powers of the Commission to call for information relating to undertaking-Scope-Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP), as a regulator, is not only empowered to but also bears the responsibility to collect the market information in order to understand the market structure as well as to ensure effective enforcement of the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act) being administered by it-In the absence of market information, that it may seek from different undertakings from time to time, CCP cannot carry out its functions as envisioned under the Act and the provision of this information by no stretch of the imagination amounts to an adverse action against an undertaking-Thus, it is an obligation upon the undertakings to fully comply with such orders of CCP for provision of information.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J; agreeing with Ayesha Malik, J. with his separate note.\n(c) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 28(1)(a), 28(1)(b), 28(1)(c), 30, 33, 36 & 37-Distinction between the object and scope of proceedings, studies and enquiries conducted by the Commission under Chapter IV of the Competition Act, 2010, and the duty of the Commission to act justly, fairly and reasonably and in a structured manner while exercising its discretionary power under section 37(1) of the Act to initiate on its own an enquiry against an undertaking stated.\nPower of the Competition Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) under section 36 of the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act) to call upon an undertaking to furnish certain information is not a proceeding within the meaning of this term as used in section 33 of the Act. Section 36 of the Act gives the Commission only one power, that is, to call upon an undertaking to furnish periodically or as and when required any information concerning the activities of the undertaking . By treating this power to call information as a proceeding within the meaning of section 33, one would be conferring upon the Commission a long list of powers provided in section 33, which include summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and requiring the production of any books, accounts or other documents in the custody of an undertaking, etc. And by so doing one would be adding further powers of the Commission in section 36 of the Act to interfere in the exercise of the fundamental right of the citizens to conduct any lawful trade or business which the Legislature has nor provided therein.\nAlthough the word proceeding used in section 33 has not been defined in the Act, the examination of the overall scheme of Chapter IV (sections 28 to 37) that describes the functions and powers of the Commission clearly indicates what it means. It has been used in section 33 in special meaning, not in general meaning; it means and refers to a proceeding initiated under section 30 of the Act. Therefore, the power of the Commission to call for information under section 36 and to conduct a study under section 28(1)(b), cannot be treated as a proceeding within the meaning of that word used in section 33 of the Act, nor can the powers mentioned in section 33 in relation to a proceeding be made available to the Commission for the purposes of calling information under section 36.\nThere is a also clear difference between the scope of enquires and studies to be conducted by the Commission under the Act. They cannot be used by the Commission as two alternate modes to ascertain any contravention of the Act before it initiates any specific action against an undertaking. Enquiries are a process available to the Commission to assess any contravention of the Act before it initiates any specific action against an undertaking. However, this is not the object of studies . Their object is mentioned in section 28(1)(b): the studies are to be conducted for promoting competition in all sectors of commercial economic activity, not to initiate any specific action against an undertaking. Under the Act, no regulatory action is triggered simply on the basis of the studies . Therefore, the Commission may under section 37(3) outsource studies by hiring consultants on contract. It cannot be said that by doing so, the Commission out sources its statutory regulatory function to some consultants hired on contracts. Enquiries and studies thus have no regulatory symbiotic relationship under the Act.\nSo far as the power of the Commission to initiate an enquiry against an undertaking either on its own under section 37(1) or on a complaint under section 37(2) of the Act is concerned, section 37(2) specifically requires that before initiating an enquiry under upon a complaint of such facts as appear to constitute a contravention of the provisions of Chapter II, the Commission is to examine the veracity of the complaint to ensure that it is neither frivolous or vexatious nor is it based on insufficient facts or unsubstantiated by prima facie evidence.\nThe Commission should, rather must, do so in order to exercise its discretionary power of initiating an enquiry on its own under section 37(1) of the Act in a just, fair and reasonable manner. And for this purpose, the Commission can advantageously follow the criterion prescribed by the legislature itself for initiating an enquiry on complaints under section 37(2). Further, it is also essential for the Commission to convey to the undertaking concerned the gist of the reasons and facts that prevail with the Commission in making the decision to initiate on its own an enquiry against that undertaking for a potential violation of any provisions of Chapter II of the Act.\n(d) Administration of justice-\n-Public institutions-Verbal orders-Institutions, and more so, public institutions dont function on the basis of verbal orders-Every opinion formed by the institution must be recorded and reduced in writing.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=28(1)(b),33,36,37", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1692 of 2021, decided on 29th March, 2022.\nheard on: 29th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, CJ, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nSyed M. Feisal Hussain Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.\nCh. Aamir Rehman, Additional A.G. for Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and others-Appellants\nVersus\nDALDA FOODS LIMITED, KARACHI-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23830", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2161 = 2023 SLD 2161 = 2023 CLD 1319", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNHo", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 122, 75, & 118-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 78 & 79-Insurance petition-Life insurance policy-Claim, repudiation of-Concealment pertaining to medical condition of the insured-Proof-Liquidated damages, award of-Petitioner was widow/nominee of the insured/policy-holder who passed away just after payment of the first premium-Insurance company paid the petitioner the cash value of the policy (Rs. 64,624/-) only and repudiated the death claim on the ground that deceased was suffering from pre-insurance ailments (heart, diabetes etc.) which were not declared by him at the time of his health declaration while purchasing the policy-Validity-Insurance company produced its Regional Sales Manager as a witness who admitted that neither he investigated the claim nor he conducted any inquiry of the death claim-No medical record was produced by the respondent/ company, instead the petitioner produced the record-keeper of the respondent/company who produced the same (medical record) showing that the deceased remained under treatment before his death-Respondent/company had neither produced any medical record of the insured prior to the insurance policy nor any doctor to prove its contention in accordance with Arts. 78 & 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-Respondent/company though produced its investigation report but neither produced the Claim Examiner who prepared the said report nor produced any neighbor on whose statement the report was prepared-Respondent/company failed to discharge the onus of the pre-insurance ailment of the deceased-Both the parties were bound to make correct declarations, however the respondent/company failed to prove that the deceased made material concealment pertaining to his medical condition-Payment of cash value to the petitioner amounted to the admission of the claim by the respondent/company as, If the claim was liable to be rejected by the respondent/company on ground of pre-insurance ailment, the petitioner was not entitled even to cash value of the policy-It appeared that the respondent/company tried to pacify the petitioner by paying meager amount of cash value of the policy-Regarding liquidated damages, the petitioner could not be held responsible for a long delay in recovery of her claim, instead it was respondent/company who occasioned delay by rejecting her claim, so she was entitled to recover the liquidated damages from the respondent/company as provided under S. 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, from 90 days after filing the claim-Petitioner had successfully proved her claim against the respondent/company-Insurance Tribunal decreed the claim as prayed for with costs along with liquidated damages.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122,75,118Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=78,79", - "Case #": "Case No. 12 of 2022, decided on 23rd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (Retd.) Ali Akbar Qureshi, Chairman and Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member (Legal)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Javed Mukhtar for Petitioner.\nSaadat Ali Saeed for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NARGIS BANO-Petitioner\nVersus\nPAK QATAR FAMILY TAKAFUL-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23831", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2162 = 2023 SLD 2162 = 2023 CLD 1324", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FDNHk", - "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-\n-S. 40-Infringement-Proof-Appellant was aggrieved of grant of interim injunction by Intellectual Property Tribunal in favour of respondent-Validity-In order to make out a case for infringement under S. 40(4) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, it had to be shown that appellant used in the course of trade mark which was identical with or deceptively similar to respondents registered trade mark or was using it in relation to goods or services which were not similar to those for which respondents trade mark was registered-Provision of infringement would apply where trade mark was a well-known trade mark or had a reputation in Pakistan, and use of the mark, was without due cause, took unfair advantage of, or was detrimental to distinctive character or repute of the trade mark-Services offered by appellant and respondent were the same i.e., medical/laboratory services therefore, use of name CITI LAB by appellant prima facie resulted in confusion and deception which in turn would be detrimental to the respondent who had a registered trade mark CITI LAB since the year 2000 albeit in Class Heading-1-High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Intellectual Property Tribunal as there was no illegality in the same-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nSoneri Travel and Tours Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Limited 2011 CLD 193 and Shan Foods Industries v. Eastern Products (Pvt.) Ltd. 2012 SCMR 1504 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001=40", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 76 of 2021, decided on 19th January, 2022.\nDates of hearing: 27th August, 22nd September, 5th, 18th October and 10th November, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Misbah-ul-Mustafa for Appellant.\nShaharyar Sohail for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAUMAN SAFDAR-Appellant\nVersus\nCITI LAB (COMPUTERIZED INNOVATIVE TESTS AND INVESTIGATION LAB)-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23832", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2163 = 2023 SLD 2163 = 2023 CLD 1332", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzc", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 & 22-Execution of decree-Mark-up, recovery of-Appellant/judgment debtor was aggrieved of including mark-up in decree for beyond contractual period-Validity-At the time of passing decree in question Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance, 1997, was in force-Harshness of previous law permitted award of continuous mark-up beyond contracted mark-up-Executing Court could not extend benefit of new law by replacing mark-up awarded by Banking Court under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance, 1997, with the award of cost of funds permitted under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-This would amount to empowering Executing Court to amend the decree-High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Executing Court-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nKhushi Muhammad and 2 others v. The Province of the Punjab through Secretary to Government of the Punjab and 2 others 1999 SCMR 1633 ref.\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Karachi Pipe Mills Ltd. 2006 CLD 842; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Packages Limited 2022 SCMR 634; Muhammad Akbar v. Major Taj-ud-Din 2007 SCMR 140 and Capital Development Authority, CDA, through Chairman, CDA, Islamabad v. Ahmad Murtaza and another Civil Petition No.3709 of 2022 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No 22133 of 2023, heard on 3rd May, 2022.heard on: 3rd May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Mirza Viqas Rauf and Muhammad Raza Qureshi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zeeshan Haider Zaidi for Appellant.\nMoiz Tariq for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs G.A. TRADERS SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP through Haji Ghazanfar Ali (since deceased)-Appellant\nVersus\nALLIED BANK LIMITED through Manager-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23833", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2164 = 2023 SLD 2164 = 2023 CLD 1339", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzY", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 10-Leave to defend the suit-Barred by time-Condonation of delay, non-seeking of-Petitioner/defendant was aggrieved of dismissal of his application for leave to defend the suit as the same was barred by 270 days-Validity-Despite filing application for leave to defend after much delay, no application for condonation of delay was filed and at the same time no plausible or sufficient cause/reason was forwarded for such delay-Order passed by Banking Court was silent about any verbal request made by petitioner/defendant at relevant time for condonation of delay-High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Banking Court as application for leave to defend the suit was hit by limitation and was rightly dismissed-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nNajam Iqbal v. Mst. Naseem Akhtar 2014 YLR 1388 distinguished.\n2004 CLD 732 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=10Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2438-P of 2022 with IR, decided on 19th July, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Lal Jan Khattak and Fazal Subhan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Taimoor Noor for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZARAI TARAQIYATI BANK LIMITED through Incharge, Legal Litigation Unit, Peshawar-Petitioner\nVersus\nMUZAFFAR KHAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23834", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2165 = 2023 SLD 2165 = 2023 CLD 1342", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 122 & 124-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 114-Insurance appeal-Insurance claim, admitted by the Insurance Company-Scope and effect-Insurance Company admitted the claim of policy-holder and made partial payment ; and stated before the Insurance Tribunal that the outstanding amount would be paid on availability of the funds-Insurance petition was disposed of on the statement of the company partly decreeing the claim, however, company later preferred appeal against the judgment passed by the Tribunal-Record revealed that appellant/company freely and explicitly acknowledged the claim of the respondent/policy-holder-Payment of partial claim tantamount to admission of its liability regarding the decretal amount-Admission/statement/undertaking by a party during the judicial proceedings had to be given sanctity while applying the principle of legal estoppel and estoppel by conduct as well as to respect moral and ethical rules-At the subsequent stage a party cannot turn around to wriggle out from the consequence of such admission-If disclaimer therefrom is allowed as a matter of right, then it will definitely result into distrust of the public/litigants over the judicial proceedings-Article 114 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, provids that when a person has by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative is allowed in any suit or proceedings between the parties to deny the truth of that thing-Said provision enacted a rule of evidence whereby a person was not allowed to plead contrary to a fact or a state of thing which he formerly asserted as existing and made the other party believe it as such and then the party acted on such belief-In fact, said principle was founded on equity and justness with straightforward objective to prevent fraud and ensure justice-Appellant in unequivocal terms agreed to pay back the remaining claim of respondent, which resulted into passing impugned judgment therefore, company was not allowed to challenge the same (decision) by filing an appeal-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nSardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1454; Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhai and others PLD 2016 SC 730; Mst. Ghazala Zakir v. Muhammad Khurshid and 7 others 1997 CLC 167; Muhammad Majid Iqbal through Special Attorney v. Judge Family Court, Dunya Pur and 2 others 2021 CLC 644; Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Islamabad and 2 others v. Wadero Lal Bux 2021 CLC 1609; Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mohsinn Iqbal 2022 CLC 1461; Haji Ghulam Rasool and others v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan PLD 1971 SC 376; Muhammad Sharif and 13 others v. Inayat Ullah and 24 others 1996 SCMR 145; Overseas Pakistanis Foundation and others v. Sqn. Ldr. (Retd.) Syed Mukhtar Ali Shah and another 2007 SCMR 569 and Shahzada Aman-e-Room and others v. Sher Bahadar Khan and others 2022 YLR 2295 ref.\n(b) Maxim-\n- Qui approbat non reprobat -Said maxim quite literally translates to the one who approbates, cannot reprobate or that which I approve, I cannot disapprove -Doctrine of approbate and reprobate was established upon Scottish Laws and is now an essential principle of equity-To approve or reject anything is to approbate or reprobate-Person cannot approbate and reprobate something simultaneously, according to law-Doctrine of approbate and reprobate is also commonly known as the doctrine of election in English Law-Doctrine of election bases itself upon the maxim allegans contraria non est audiendus which means when people make comments that contradict one another, they will not be heard.\nMBP v. LGK [2020] EWHC 90 (TCC) ref.\n(c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 122 & 124-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 114-Insurance appeal-Claim admitted by the Insurance company-Scope and effect-Insurance Company admitted the claim of policy-holder and made partial payment and stated before the Insurance Tribunal that the outstanding amount would be paid on availability of the funds-Insurance petition was disposed of on the statement of the company partly decreeing the claim, however, company later preferred appeal against the judgment passed by the Tribunal-Contention of the appellant (Insurance Company) was that Insurance Tribunal was, before deciding the main (insurance) petition, obliged to dispose of certain applications especially one seeking impleading a party (a Insurance Company) with whom appellant asserted to have made arrangements for payment to the respondent-Validity-In view of admissions of appellant, applications moved by the appellant had no material bearing on the merits of the case-Even otherwise, the party (another Insurance Company), the appellant wanted to be impleaded, had no privy to the contract-in-question between the parties to the proceedings; and said contention of the appellant had no link with the respondents claim and could not be the basis for impleading the said party-Miscellaneous application(s) ought not to be decided in all eventualities before the final determination of the controversy-If the matter is otherwise conclusively determined by the Court, the sole factum of indecision of some application(s) will not frustrate the proceedings/verdict of the Court-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nPeer Bakhsh and others v. Nabi Bakhsh and others 2002 YLR 1630; Hashwani Hotels Limited through Senior Manager v. Sindh Insurance Tribunal, Karachi and 3 others 2016 CLD 1790 and Mst. Mairaj Bibi and 4 others v. Muhammad Shafique through L.Rs. and others PLD 2020 Lah. 888 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122,124Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=114", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 10241 of 2023, heard on 16th February, 2023.heard on: 16th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Asim Hafeez, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Husnain Ali Ramzan for Appellant.\nMuhammad Zain Qazi, Assistant Attorney General on Court's call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SILVER STAR INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, LAHORE through Chief Executive-Appellant\nVersus\nMessrs KAMAL PIPES INDUSTRIES, LAHORE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23835", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2166 = 2023 SLD 2166 = 2023 CLD 1348", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Islamabad Consumers Protection Act (III of 1995)-\n-Ss. 2(f)(i), 6 & 8-Consumers protection-Unfair trade practice-Caveat emptor, doctrine of-Scope-Terms and conditions of agreement-Necessary party, non-summoning of-Appellant/ complainant alleged that driver of respondent/service provider demanded and received amount which was much more than the estimated/settled charges of ride-Driver of respondent/service provider did not attend Trial Court and complaint was dismissed on the ground of terms and conditions agreed by parties-Validity-Reliance of respondent/service provider on terms and conditions of agreement, which otherwise did not form part of its general representation/ advertisement itself was actionable as defined in S. 2(f)(i) of Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995-Such terms and conditions of agreement, if otherwise generally not represented to consumers through advertisements, could not be subsequently relied upon to avoid liability under Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995-Respondent/ service provider could not use such terms and conditions of agreement as concealed dagger to exploit consumers and defeat the ends of justice-Consumer protection laws were enacted to safeguard rights of consumers from exploitative, unscrupulous and unfair trade practices-Doctrine of caveat emptor was gradually replaced by modern age consumer protection laws, which had burdened vendors with certain responsibilities to ensure fair trade practices in market-Purpose of such legislative instruments could not be defeated through adhesion contracts-Dismissal of complaint without obtaining version of driver of respondent/service provider was pre-mature-Trial Court should have decided grievance after exhaustive inquiry under applicable law and made every possible endeavor to trace whereabouts of driver of respondent/service provider-Dismissal of complaint in cursory manner, when existence of substance involved in lis had been admitted, was not warranted-High Court set aside order dismissing the complainant and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh, after taking version of driver of respondent/service provider-Trial Court could seek assistance of agencies of Federal Government mentioned in S. 6(2) of Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995, to procure attendance of driver of respondent / service provider-Appeal was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995=2(f)(i),6,8", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 2022, decided on 17th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Arbab Muhammad Tahir, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Uber Technologies Inc. and others v. David Heller 2020 SCMR 1279 rel.\nMuhammad Hussain Shad and Sufyan Haider for Appellant.\nMuhammad Mannan Khan and Saad Javed Satti for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ARBAZ RAHIM-Appellant\nVersus\nThe MANAGER/INCHARGE CAREEM and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23836", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2167 = 2023 SLD 2167 = 2023 CLD 1354", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYy8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 115, proviso-Marine Insurance Policy-Law of Pakistan-Applicability-If in Marine Insurance Policy, it is specifically provided that payment can be received or suit can be filed in any other country, due to the proviso to S. 115 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, S. 115 does not override such Marine Insurance Policy-Purpose of proviso to S. 115 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000, is to avoid any kind of interference with normal business of Marine Insurance-Marine Insurance contracts are international in scope and most of the time are for the benefit of the consignees abroad who have option of stipulating clause in Marine Insurance Policy mentioning place where such contracts are intended to be carried out between the parties.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 122- Marine Insurance Policy- Insurance Tribunal-Jurisdiction-Marine Insurance Policy also falls within the scope of insurance policy and Insurance Tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of Marine Insurance Policy.\n(c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 124 (2)-Appeal-New plea, raising of-Effect-Grounds never raised before Insurance Tribunal cannot be raised in appeal for the first time.\nMuhammad Boota v. Basharat Ali 2014 CLD 63; Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Limited and others PLD 2018 SC 828; Malik Muhammad Faisal and others v. State Life Insurance and others 2008 SCMR 456 and Muhammad Rafique v. Qamar Ali and others 2003 MLD 52 rel.\n(d) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 115 & 124 (2)-Marine Insurance Act (V of 2018), Ss. 3, 19, 20, 44, 45, 46 & 47-Marine Insurance Policy- Knowledge of damage-Voyage, change/deviation of-Proof-Appellant/Insurance company was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Insurance Tribunal accepting claim of respondent company-Contention of appellant/insurance company was that damage to goods had occurred prior to issuance of Marine Insurance Policy in question-Validity-When appellant/insurance company itself issued Marine Insurance Policy on 31-05-2018 from warehouse to warehouse and also clearly mentioned that date of sailing was 20-05-2018, then subsequently it could not deny claim of insurance merely on the presumption that goods were damaged due to rain before the date of issuance of Marine Insurance Policy-Even if goods were damaged on 25/26-05-2018, there was nothing placed on record to show that respondent company was aware of such damage to the goods and had concealed such fact at the time of issuance of Insurance Policy on 31-05-2018-Nothing was placed on record by appellant/insurance company during evidence to show that respondent company had any knowledge about change of vessel or stoppage of vessel at any post-It cannot be said that there was mala fide on part of the respondent company or material facts were not disclosed at the time of Marine Insurance Policy on 31-05-2018-Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Insurance Tribunal against appellant/insurance company-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nMst. Naseem Begum and others v. State Life Insurance and others 2014 SCMR 655; State Life Insurance and others v. Mst. Sardar Begum and others 2017 SCMR 999; The Universal Insurance Company v. Rana Basit Rice Mills and others 2021 CLD 1441; Pattoki Sugar Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2021 PTD 587; Messrs Radiant Overseas Pvt. Ltd v. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority AIR 2012 CC 3041 and Multan Electric Power Company and others v. Muhammad Ashiq and others PLD 2006 SC 328 ref.\n(e) Marine Insurance Act (V of 2018)-\n-Ss. 44, 45, 46 & 47-Voyage-Change/deviation-Scope-Change of voyage under Ss. 44, 45, 46 & 47 of Marine Insurance Act, 2018, takes place when port of destination or port of departure is changed and there is deviation from voyage contemplated by insurance policy.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=115,122,124(2)", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 21810 of 2021, heard on 24th May, 2022.heard on: 24th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Abid Aziz Sheikh and Muzamil Akhtar Shabir, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Amjad Pervaiz Ch. for Appellant.\nSalman Ijaz and Miss Hira Jaleel for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED through Manager-Appellant\nVersus\nAHSAN IKRAM TEXTILE (PVT.) LIMITED through Director-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23837", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2168 = 2023 SLD 2168 = 2023 CLD 1365", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYys", - "Key Words:": "Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 6(1)-United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention), Art. V(1)(e)- International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, Art. 35(6)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120-Interim arbitration award-Scope-Enforcement of award-Proof-Onus to prove-Applicant company sought recovery of interim arbitration award passed in its favour and against respondent/National Highway Authority-Contention of respondent/Authority was that interim award was not enforceable-Validity-In order to be recognized and enforced under Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, an award must be (i) an arbitral award for the purposes of New York Convention; and (ii) a foreign arbitral award within the meaning of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011-Interim Award satisfied both the requirements-No distinction between interim awards and final awards was made under the provisions of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 and New York Convention-High Court could refuse recognition and enforcement under Art. V(1)(e) of New York Convention of such foreign arbitral award that had not yet become binding on the parties-Interim Award in question was not conditional or contingent on materialization of an eventuality in order for it to become binding-Until Interim Award was set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which it was made, such interim award remained binding on the parties-By agreeing for arbitration to be conducted in accordance with Rules of Arbitration of International Chamber of Commerce, parties had in effect agreed that Interim Award was binding on them-Every award was binding on parties under Art. 35(6) of International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration-By submitting dispute to arbitration under Rules of Arbitration of International Chamber of Commerce, parties had undertaken to carry out any award without delay-Burden was on respondent/National Highways Authority to furnish proof on the grounds listed in Art. V(1) of New York Convention of having been satisfied in order for recognition and enforcement of Interim Award to be refused-High Court recognized interim award as respondent/ Authority was not able to discharge the burden-High Court directed to execute interim award along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of award till the date of payment-Application was allowed, in circumstances.\nPT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK v. CRW Joint Operation 2015 SGCA 30; Resort Condominiums International Inc. v. Ray Bolwell and Resort Condominiums, Pty. Ltd. (XX Y. B. COM. ARB. 628 (1995)); Hall Steel Company v. Metaloyd Ltd. (XXXIII Y.B. COM. ARB 978 (2008)); Drummond Ltd. v. Instituto Nacional de Concesiones (XXXVII Y.B. COM. ARB 205 (2012)); Alcatel Space, S. A. v. Alcatel Space Industries (XXVIII Y.B. COM. ARB 990 (2003)); CE International Resources Holdings LCC v. SA Minerals Ltd. (2012 US Dist. Lexis 176158 (SDNY)); Tabular Holdings Pty Ltd. v. DBT Technologies Pty Ltd [2013] ZAGPJHC 155; Abdul Qayyum v. Niaz Muhammad 1992 SCMR 613; Ch. Muhammad Siddique v. Anwar Shah 1991 CLC Note 368; Polydefkis Corp. v. Trans Continental Fertilizer Co. (1996 WL 683629 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 26, 1996); British Ins. Co. of Cayman v. Water Street Ins. Co. (93 F. Supp. 506); Blue Sympathy Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Serviocean Intl (1994 WL 597144); Cairo Court of Appeal, 7th Commercial Circuit, Case No.44/134 JY, Decision dated 9 May 2018 and CVG v. CVH [2022] SGHC 249 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Ordinance, 2011=6(1)", - "Case #": "C.S. No. 118 of 2016, decided on 27th September, 2023.heard on: 13th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Aleem O. Shahid and Fazal Maula for Applicant.\nRizwan Faiz Muhammad and Muhammad Afzal Shinwari for Respondent.\nAssisted by Barrister M. Usama Rauf, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHINA WATER AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION (CWE) P.R. CHINA-Applicant\nVersus\nNATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY, ISLAMABAD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23838", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2169 = 2023 SLD 2169 = 2023 CLD 1390", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzk", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 76 & 77-Secondary evidence-Non-issuance of notice-Principle-Petitioner/defendant/ Bank was aggrieved of order passed by Trial Court allowing respondents/plaintiffs to produce documents as secondary evidence-Plea raised by petitioner/Bank was that secondary evidence could not be adduced without issuing notice in such regard-Validity-Requirement of notice to be issued was relevant in a situation when a document was required to be produced from the possession of a person-Documents to be produced were no more in the possession of petitioner/Bank and had been submitted in another Court-No notice was required to be issued to Bank-Respondents/plaintiffs had a prima facie case and they deserved permission to lead secondary evidence-High Court declined to interfere in permission to produce secondary evidence- Revision was dismissed , in circumstances.\nMuhammad Sharif through Legal Heirs and 4 others v. Sultan Hamayun and others 2003 SCMR 1221 and Messrs Expeditor International Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Sitara Textile Industries Ltd. and 2 others 2018 CLC 994 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=76,77Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115", - "Case #": "Civil Revisions Nos. 466, 467, 809 to 813 of 2022, heard on 22nd December, 2022.heard on: 22nd December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Anwaar Hussain, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ossama Shahid Khawajah for Petitioners.\nMahar Abdul Shakoor for Respondent No. 1.\nNemo for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAYSAL BANK LIMITED and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nCh. SHEHZAD MUNIR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23839", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2170 = 2023 SLD 2170 = 2023 CLD 1400", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTYzg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S. 31-International commercial contracts-Law applicable-Place of arbitration, selection of-Principle-Arbitration agreement, which creates rights and obligations of parties to submit disputes to arbitration and to abide by award, is an agreement severable from substantive contract in which it is embedded-Agreement is also capable of surviving termination, repudiation and frustration of substantive contract-Arbitration agreement is considered to have a distinct life of its own, it can be governed by a proper law of its own which need not be the same as the law governing substantive contract-Where there is no express choice of law governing arbitration agreement, presumption would be that the parties intended for law chosen to govern the substantive contract to be the law governing the arbitration agreement-Proper law of arbitration agreement governs obligation of parties to submit disputes to arbitration, and to honour an award-This has to be distinguished from curial law of arbitration, which governs conduct of individual reference-Procedural law of arbitration which is also called lex arbitri or curial law deals with a range of issues including the form and validity of arbitral award; and finality of award, including any right to challenge award in Courts of the place of arbitration-In order to determine curial law in absence of an express choice by parties, it is first necessary to determine the seat of arbitration-This is so because where parties do not choose curial law, the law of seat of arbitration would be the curial law which governs arbitration proceedings-Seat of arbitration is a location selected by parties as the legal place of arbitration, which consequently determines procedural framework of arbitration-Contracting parties have freedom to agree on seat of arbitration-Where parties make no such agreement, the seat may be determined by arbitral tribunal or administering arbitral institution in accordance with and subject to arbitration rules chosen by the parties-Where this is also not done the place where the arbitration is conducted is the seat of arbitration.\nEnka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v. OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38; Hitachi Limited v. Rupali Polyester 1998 SCMR 1618; Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania International de Seguros del Peru [1988] 1 Lloyds Rep 116; Enercon GmbH v. Enercon India Ltd [2012] 1 Lloyds Rep 519 and Shashoua v. Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 rel.\n(b) United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention)-\n-Art. V(1)(e)-Word law -Connotation-Word law employed in Art. V(1)(e) of New York Convention refers to lex arbitri or curial law i.e. law of seat of arbitration and not the proper law governing the Contract or arbitration agreement.\n(c) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 3(3)(a) & 6-Foreign arbitral award-Recognition and enforcement-Expression as nearly as may be -Scope-Mere fact that in terms of S. 3(3)(a) of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 High Court is to follow the procedure as nearly as may be provided for in C.P.C. does not mean that application under S. 6 of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 is to proceed strictly like a suit or that an order for the recognition of a foreign arbitral award is to be accompanied or followed by a decree-Expression as nearly as may be makes it permissible for High Court to deviate from procedural requirements in C.P.C.\nMehmood-ul-Hassan Babar Khan v. Liaqat Ali Kareem 2002 YLR 2227 and Farooq Ahmed Sheikh v. Privatization Commission 2006 CLD 1130 rel.\n(d) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 6(1)-Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss. 30 & 33-United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention), Art. V(1)(e)-Foreign arbitral award-Misconduct-Proof-Appellant/National Highway Authority was aggrieved of Foreign arbitral award passed against it in proceedings held in Paris, France-Appellant assailed the award on the plea of misconduct before District Judge Islamabad but the application was dismissed-Validity-New York Convention did not permit any review of merits of award to which it applied-Grounds on which recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award could be refused were exhaustively set out in Art. V of New York Convention-Even in cases where any of such grounds were satisfied, High Court could proceed to recognize and enforce the award- Use of word may in Arts. V(1) & (2) of New York Convention made refusal to recognize and enforce an award permissive and not mandatory-Grounds on which recognition and enforcement of award could be refused under Art. V of New York Convention did not include an erroneous decision in law or in fact by Arbitral Tribunal- High Court, while deciding an application under S. 6 of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 was not to review merits of Arbitral Tribunals decision-High Court directed to execute the award and accorded recognition to the award, as none of the grounds envisaged by Art. V of New York Convention for refusing to enforce a foreign arbitral award were satisfied by appellant/National Highway Authority-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nOrient Power Company (Private) Limited v. Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited PLD 2019 Lah. 607; Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Corporation Company (Private) Limited 2018 MLD 2058; Bharat Aluminum Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Service Inc. (AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 44); Karaha Bodas Co. LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (335 F 3d 357); Karaha Bodas Co. LLC (Cayman Islands) v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara - Pertamina (Indonesia) (Yearbook Comm. Arbn Vol.XXVIII (2003) Page 752); International Electric Corporation v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petroleva, Industrial Y Commercial (745 F Supp, 178 SDNY 1990); International Standard Electric Corp. (US) v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera (Argentina) (1992) VII Ybk Comm Arb 639; Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse S.A. v. Acro Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 2018 Lah. 597 and POSCO International Corporation v. Rikans International PLD 2023 Lah. 116 ref.\nCentury Indemnity Company et al. v. Axa Belgium (11 Civ. 7263 (JMF)); Oberlandesgeriht [OLG], Celle, Germany, 31 May 2007, 8 Sch 06/06; Jess Smith and Sons Cotton LCC v. DS Industries 2019 CLD 23; Messrs Tradhol International SA Sociedad Unipersonal v. Messrs Shakarganj Limited 2023 CLD 819; Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.LL v. Toys R Us, Inc. (XXIII Y.B. COM. ARB. 1058 (1998)); Noble Chartering Inc. v. Awan Trading Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2012 Sindh 114; A. Meredith Jones & Co. v. Usman Textile Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 1121; Gol Linhas Aereas SA v. Matlin Patterson Global Opportunities Partners (Cayman) II LP and others [2022] UKPC 21; Shipowner v. Time Charterer, Oberlandesgericht (6 Sch 3/98, XXV Y.B. COM. ARB. 641 (2000)); National Highway Authority v. Lilley International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2020 CLC 608 and National Highway Authority v. Messrs Sambu Construction Co. Ltd. 2023 SCMR 1103 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=31", - "Case #": "Execution Application No. 9 of 2019, decided on 4th October, 2023.heard on: 13th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb and Arbab Muhammad Tahir, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Javaid Akhtar, Zakir Hussain Baig and Hamid Nawaz for Applicant.\nRizwan Faiz Muhammad and Barrister Afzal Khan Shinwari for Respondent.\nAssisted by Barrister M. Usama Rauf, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHINA INTERNATIONAL WATER AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION (CWE) P.R. CHINA-Applicant\nVersus\nNATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23840", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2171 = 2023 SLD 2171 = 2023 CLD 1436", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTY3o", - "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 72-Documentary evidence-Scope-Documentary evidence always takes preference over oral deposition as a man can tell a lie but a document cannot.\nAbdul Ghani and others v. Mst. Yasmeen Khan and others 2011 SCMR 837 and Saleem Akhtar v. Nisar Ahmad PLD 2000 Lah. 385 rel.\n(b) Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act (XI of 2016)-\n-Ss. 6 & 13-Suit for recovery of outstanding gas charges-Bank guarantee, encashing of-Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited filed suit against appellant/Bank to encash bank guarantee provided in favour of consumer company to recovery outstanding gas charges of customer company-Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff company-Validity-Bank guarantee claiming a categorical undertaking imposed absolute obligation on guarantor bank to pay guaranteed amount without being influenced by performance of the contract-High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court as the same did not contain any illegality, material irregularity or misreading of evidence-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nMst. Nur Jehan Begum through LRs v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi 1991 SCMR 2300; Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, N.W.F.P. Peshawar and 2 others v. Mazhar Hussain and 2 others PLD 2004 SC 682 and Mst. Rehmat and others v. Mst. Zubaida Begum and others 2021 SCMR 1534 ref.\nAtif Mehmood Kiyani and another v. Messrs Sukh Chayn Private Limited, Royal Plaza, Blue Area, Islamabad and another 2021 SCMR 1446; Messrs National Construction Ltd. v. Aiwan-e-Iqbal Authority PLD 1994 SC 311; Standard Construction Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Communications and others 2010 SCMR 524 and SEPCO-III Electric Power Constructions Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Energy and 2 others 2022 CLD 1035 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=72Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, (XI of 2016)=6,13", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 70441 of 2022, heard on 16th January, 2023.heard on: 16th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Hameed Chohan for Appellant.\nMuhammad Hamza Amjad for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AL BARAKA BANK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED through Authorized Attorneys-Appellant\nVersus\nSUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LIMITED through General Manager-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23841", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2172 = 2023 SLD 2172 = 2023 CLD 1486", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTY3k", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 10 & 22-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 48 & 72-Bankers Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S. 4-Suit of recovery of finance-Leave to defend suit, grant of-Absence of original documents- Duplicate file- Scanned document-Scope-Appellant/ plaintiff was not granted leave to defend the suit and Banking Court passed decree in favour of respondent/Bank on the basis of duplicate file containing scanned document, which file was retained by respondent/Bank in its records-Validity-Whether duplicate file could be treated as good as its original file or not, or its substitute and whether such documents could be treated as primary evidence or were required to be established through secondary evidence, were the questions which were required to have been determined-Safekeeping of documents was also question which could have bearing upon final judgment to be arrived at in the matter-Appellant/plaintiff had repaid previous loan in year 2019 in which original pass book/finance document were returned to him and remaining documents including NOC were promised to be issued by respondent/Bank including letter of redemption, etc.-No new loan was obtained by him in year 2019 and non-availability of original file with respondent/Bank, entitled appellant/plaintiff for grant of leave to defend as the same had raised substantial question of law and fact requiring recording of evidence for determination-Such aspect of the matter was not considered by Banking Court-High Court set aside judgment and decree passed against appellant/plaintiff who was granted leave to defend and matter was remanded to Banking Court for decision of the matter afresh on its own merits in accordance with law-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nApollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268 and The Bank of Punjab v. Fazal Abbas and another 2020 CLD 977 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10,22Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=48,72Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891=4", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 299 of 2022, heard on 20th June, 2023.heard on: 20th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muzamil Akhtar Shabir and Safdar Saleem Shahid, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Suleman Bhatti for Appellant.\nRao Riasat Ali Khan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD FAROOQ-Appellant\nVersus\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED through Manager-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23842", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2173 = 2023 SLD 2173 = 2023 CLD 1448", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTc", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19, 15 & 22-Execution of decree of Banking Court-Auction of mortgaged property-Fair reserve price, determination of-Scope-Banking Court fixed new reserve price of mortgaged property on an application moved by decree-holder/Bank because earlier auction proceedings could not succeed as no bidder came forward-Application raising objection on determination of new reserve price moved by Judgment-debtors/appellants was dismissed by the Banking Court-Validity-Record revealed that earlier reserve was fixed pursuant to the evaluation having been submitted by the parties-Banking Court passed order on application for fresh determination of reserve price moved by the decree-holder/Bank, however, on that day/date no one was present on behalf of judgment-debtors/appellants-Banking Court on the very first date, accepted the said application (moved by decree-holder/Bank) in summary manner without issuing any notice or calling reply from the judgment-debtors/appellants-New reserve price determined by the Banking Court was quite low as compared to the earlier fixed reserve price-Determination of fair reserve price was always in interest of both sides because the same ensured the recovery for decree-holder and at the same time it guaranteed that judgment-debtor might not be deprived from his lawful entitlement-High Court set-aside new reserve price fixing order passed by the Banking Court while accepting application moved by the appellants, and the application under S. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 moved by the decree-holder (Bank/respondent )for fresh determination of reserve price, would be deemed pending before the Banking Court-Execution First Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,15,22", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 3 of 2022, decided on 24th February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Sohail Nasir and Shakil Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Sulaman Bhatti for Appellants.\nMian Khurram Qureshi Hashmi for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs MULTAN BRAIN CENTER through Partner and 3 others-Appellants\nVersus\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23843", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2174 = 2023 SLD 2174 = 2023 CLD 1450", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTY", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018-\n-Reglns. 15(3), 4(a), 18(c), 6(3)(a), 6(3)(c), 6(4) & 7(1)(b)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 40-A & 33-Anti-money laundering policies-Regulatory requirements, non-compliance of-Scope and effect-Appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Commission-Appellant, which was licensed with Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) as a securities broker, was imposed penalty by the Commission for contravention of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018 (the Regulations)-Contention of the appellant was that the Commission made changes to the Regulations and introduced new ones in the year 2019, which forced the Appellant to restart the entire policy process-Plea of the Respondent/Commission was that Anti-money laundering policies had been in existence since the year 2012 under the PSX Guidelines, which were not new to the Appellant-Held, that the Appellant had an obligation to adhere to the relevant requirements of the Regulations which should have been followed by the Appellant in true letter and spirit-Appellant had failed to comply with mandatory requirements, and had neglected to implement mandatory policies that had been in effect since the year 2012-Severity of money laundering, being a serious crime, could not be under-estimated-Regulated individuals were expected to be highly vigilant in adhering to Anti-money laundering laws and should not offer excuses to avoid compliance-Appellate Bench found no reason to interfere with the merits of the penalty imposing impugned order passed by the Commission, therefore, the same was maintained-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 5 of 2022, decided on 25th August, 2023.heard on: 25th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Irfan Mehmood Butt for Appellant.\nMuhammad Faisal, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.\nHammad Ahmed, Management Executive, Adjudication-I, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs HAMZA FARHAD SECURITIES (PVT.) LTD.-Appellant\nVersus\nDIRECTOR/HOD ADJ-I-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23844", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2175 = 2023 SLD 2175 = 2023 CLD 1452", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-\n-S. 12- Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2022, R. 8-Environmental Impact Assessment, approval of-Scope-Section 12 of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, explains that no proponent of a project shall commence construction or operation unless he has filed with the Federal Agency an Initial Environmental Examination or, where the projects is likely to cause an adverse environmental effect, an Environmental Impact Assessment, and approval from Federal Agency has to be obtained.\n(b) Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-\n-S. 12- Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2022, R. 8-Project of creation of a new site by the Capital Devolvement Authority for dumping garbage/solid waste-Environmental Impact Assessment-Scope-Contention of the petitioners was that site in question was a beautiful valley which would become terribly hazardous to the lives of residents-Validity-Record revealed that Capital Development Authority (CDA), being the proponent of the project, had filed an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) under S. 12 of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997 (the Act 1997) but, due to non-provision of certain documents by the respondent/CDA, the same was not completed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under Regln. 8 of the Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2022 (the Regulations 2022), and procedure as per S. 12(2), (4) and (7) of the Act 1997 was still incomplete-Hence, Respondent/CDA was bound to fulfill all the mandatory requirements of law and fill up all lacunas on their part so that the EPA should decide the EIA before starting use of land-in-question for the purpose-in-hand-Once the EPA completes the EIA and communicates the same to CDA, the latter would complete the process in order to start work on its project-High Court directed the respondent/CDA for submitting all the required documents/record in the EIA before the EPA, who shall conduct scrutiny, then make publication in newspaper, place it in District Council Hall and complete the same in accordance with law, after providing proper hearing to all the concerned including the petitioners- Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\nNaimatullah Khan Advocate and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2020 SCMR 1499; Muhammad Shahid v. Punjab Environmental Tribunal, Lahore and others 2018 CLD 506; Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. v. Environmental Protection Agency and others 2018 CLD 153; Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited v. Abrar Ahmed and 4 others 2019 CLD 578 and Haji Sher Zaman Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and 8 others 2020 CLD 1232 ref.\n(c) Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-\n-S. 7-Environmental Impact Assessment, approval of-Disclosure of information to the public-Scope-As per S. 7 of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997 (the Act 1997), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) shall maintain registers for Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment projects, which shall contain brief particulars of each project and a summary of decisions taken thereon, which shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours and the disclosure of the information in such register shall be subject to the restrictions specified in subsection (3) of the S. 7 of the Act 1997-Public has a right to receive the documents/information before the EPA and they can also file objection therein.\nMuhammad Asif Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 1106 and 1681 of 2023).", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Environmental Protection Act, (XXXIV of 1997)=12Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1106 of 2023, heard on 5th June, 2023.heard on: 5th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Umar Hayat for Petitioners (in W.P. No. 1148 of 2023).\nRizwan Akhtar Awan for Petitioners (in W.P. No. 1680 of 2023).\nSyed Mudassar Nazir Naqvi, Assistant Advocate-General with Ajab Hussain, Law Officer, Commissioner, Rawalpindi.\nMuhammad Sajid Khan Tanoli, Deputy Attorney General and Arshad Muhammad Malik, Assistant Attorney General.\nSardar M. Qadeer Hussain and Naeem-ul-Hassan, Advocates for Respondent No. 6/RWMC with Salman Aziz, Manager, Corporate Affairs RWMC.\nMaqbool Hussian Qureshi, Inspector EPA, Rawalpindi.\nSyed Zeeshan Haider Zaidi, Advocate for Respondent No.9/CDA with Malik Atta, Director Sanitation, CDA and Muhammad Anwar-ul-Haq, Member Environment, CDA\nNaseem-ur-Rehman Shah, Director (EIA) EPA, Punjab and Muhammad Rafique, Deputy Director (Environment), Rawalpindi.\nOssama Shahid Khawaja and Rashid Mehmood, Research Officer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SALEEM AKHTAR KIYANI and others-Petitioner\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23845", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2176 = 2023 SLD 2176 = 2023 CLD 1461", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 11 & 42-Merger of undertakings-Consenting statement-Withdrawal of proceedings-Appellant company made statement to withdraw proceedings pending before Competition Appellate Tribunal-Effect-In view of such statement of appellant company there was no live issue in appeal-Competition Appellate Tribunal highlighted important issue pointed out by Competition Commission regarding ride sharing market which was a developing section and could also fetch a significant Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and provide for new employment opportunities-Such increasingly important developing segment of economy had no regulatory legal framework in place and the Commission rightly recommended to propose a modern regulatory law for regulation of section in question to take care of licensing and issuing certificate of roadworthiness of vehicles-Appeal was dismissed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=11,42", - "Case #": "Diary No. 9 of 2020, decided on 22nd June, 2022.Dates of hearing: 16th and 22nd June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice Mamoon Rashid Sheikh, Chairperson, Muhammad Asghar Ch., Member Technical-I and Raja Saad Sultan, Member Technical-II", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jahanzeb Awan and Uzair Shafi for Appellants.\nHaider Imtiaz, Law Officer for Competition Commission of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AUGUSTA ACQUISITION B.V AND UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC.-Appellants\nVersus\nCOMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23846", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2177 = 2023 SLD 2177 = 2023 CLD 1464", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWS8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10-Suit for damages against the Bank-Civil Court, jurisdiction of-Relationship between the Bank and customer, question of-Suit for damages against the bank was filed before the Civil Court-Civil Court returned the plaint holding that the claim of the plaintiff fell within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court constituted under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance 2001)-Contention of the appellant/plaintiff was that suit filed by him did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court constituted under the Ordinance 2001, since no finance was extended by the respondent/bank and as such, the appellant/plaintiff did not fall in the definition of customer as stipulated in the Ordinance, 2001-Validity-Admittedly, the Finance Facility requested to the respondent/Bank by the appellant/plaintiff did not culminate into contractual relationship through execution of Agreement of Financing and no amount was disbursed to the appellant/plaintiff by the respondent/Bank; and there was only an approval letter-Appellant/plaintiff had pleaded in the plaint that in compliance of the said approval letter, he had to take certain steps which resulted in financial loss to him-Contents of the plaint/prayer clause primarily focused on non-disbursement of the Financial facility, and on account of losses suffered by the appellant/plaintiff, he sought damages from the respondent/Bank-Suit was competently filed by the appellant before the Civil Court of ordinary jurisdiction as the relationship of customer with the Bank with reference to finance would have been/was established only when the Agreement of financing had been duly executed between the parties and the Finance Facility had been duly disbursed, whereas the said elements were lacking in the present case-Hence, the Civil Court fell in error to hold that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the suit on its own merits-High Court set-aside impugned order of returning of plaint to the appellant and directed the parties to appear before the Civil Court-First Appeal against Order filed by the plaintiff was allowed, in circumstances.\nMarahaba Pakistan International and others v. Habib Bank Limited and another 2017 CLD 995 and Ishfaq Ahmed and 5 others v. Habib Bank Limited and another 2017 CLD 1639 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 11 of 2022, decided on 1st June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Abid Hussain Chattha, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid Mahmood Chaudhary for Appellant.\nMian Khurram Hashmi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAMID MEHMOOD SHAH KHAGGA-Appellant\nVersus\nBANK AL-FALAH LIMITED through President and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23847", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2178 = 2023 SLD 2178 = 2023 CLD 1466", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWSs", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-\n-S. 33-Appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Commission-Dismissal of appeal for non-appearance of the appellant (a Securities Limited Company)-Record revealed that appeal-in-hand was previously fixed for hearing on three dates, spanning about three and half years, and on all said dates the hearing was adjourned on the request of the appellant-Then the case was fixed on last date of hearing, however, once again the same was adjourned as no person appeared on the behalf of the appellant-In view of the said circumstances, it appeared that the appellant had no interest in pursuing the appeal-in-hand-Appeal preferred by the (Securities Limited) Company was dismissed for non-appearance and non-prosecution, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 17 of 2014, decided on 27th July, 2023.Dates of hearing: 9th January, 19th February, 2015, 12th July, 2018 and 20th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner and Aamir Khan, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for Appellant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication I, SECP.\nRaja Farrukh Ahmed, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication I, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KASB SECURITIES LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nHEAD OF DEPARTMENT (MSRD)-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23848", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2179 = 2023 SLD 2179 = 2023 CLD 1468", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTk", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 & 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 51 & O.XXI, R. 37-Suit for recovery of finance-Execution of decree-Arrest and detention-Principle-Appellant/judgment-debtor was aggrieved of order passed by Executing Court issuing warrants of arrest to recover decretal amount-Validity-Warrants of arrest of judgment-debtor could only be issued in cases where Court was satisfied that in order to obstruct or delay execution of decree, judgment-debtor was likely to abscond or leave limits of Court or had, after institution of suit in which decree was passed, dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed any part of his property, or committed any other act of bad faith in relation to his property, or judgment-debtor has, or had means to pay the amount of decree or some substantial part thereof and refuses or neglects or had refused or neglected to pay the same, or decree was for a sum for which judgment-debtor was bound in a fiduciary capacity to account for-Without satisfaction of such pre-conditions no mechanical order for detention in prison could be passed against appellant/judgment-debtor-Order whereby warrants of arrest of appellant/judgment-debtor were issued was not sustainable and serious attempt for sale of mortgaged property through open auction was required to be made so that outstanding decretal amount could be recovered from appellant/judgment-debtor without straightaway adopting process of issuance of warrants of arrest against him for execution of decree through arrest and detention-High Court set aside the order issuing warrants of arrest against appellant/judgment-debtor-High Court directed Executing Court to proceed further with execution proceedings by holding auction of mortgaged property, in accordance with law- Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Shahbaz Sharif v. Meezan Bank Limited and others 2019 CLD 729; Mirza Shahid Baig v. National Bank of Pakistan and 8 others 2002 CLD 623; Aftab Saleem Choudhary and another v. Soneri Bank Limited through Attorneys 2005 CLD 401; Aftab Saleem Choudhary and another v. Soneri Bank Limited through Attorneys 2007 YLR 107; Mansoor Ali v. Haji Liaquat Ali and another 2016 CLC Note 82; Messrs Azhar & Co and others v. National Bank of Pakistan 2018 CLD 830 and Muhammad Shafeeq v. United Bank Limited 2021 CLD 1002 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 15 of 2022, heard on 9th May, 2023.heard on: 9th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Tariq Saleem Sheikh and Muzamil Akhtar Shabir, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Muhammad Nazir Khan Saeed for Appellant.\nRao Riasat Ali Khan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ATTA MUHAMMAD-Appellant\nVersus\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. through Manager-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23849", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2180 = 2023 SLD 2180 = 2023 CLD 1480", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWTg", - "Key Words:": "Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013-\n-R. 25- Companies Ordinance (VI of 2016) [since repealed], S. 508-Review of the order passed by the Appellate Bench-Scope-Appellate Bench dismissed an appeal filed by the company (Steel Mill) against the order-in-original passed by the Commissioner-In said impugned order passed by the Appellate Bench, Applicant/Appellant sought review to remove the Benchs observation, (regarding appellant request to take lenient view) for having been attributed to the Applicant/appellant-Contention of the Applicant/Appellant was that attributed observation/words in relevant para of the impugned order, be expunged as the same might affect its (companys) integrity-Validity-Typographical error was actually observed in relevant para of the impugned order, wherein instead of the word Respondent , inadvertently the word Appellant had been used, therefore, the Bench rectified the said error and word Appellant would be deemed and read as Respondent -Bench observed that the arguments by the parties were thoroughly heard and examined before the issuance of the impugned order, therefore, contention of the Applicant with regard to the observation of the Bench did not hold merit-Even otherwise, the parties could not deny the arguments put forth during the previous round of litigation-Application filed by the company/appellant to review impugned order passed by the Appellate Bench was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013=25Companies Ordinance, 2016=508", - "Case #": "REVIEW APPLICATION NO. 1 OF 2019: In the matter of\nAppeal No. 5 of 2017, decided on 22nd June, 2023.heard on: 22nd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Jawwad Shekha for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23850", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2181 = 2023 SLD 2181 = 2023 CLD 1481", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWXo", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 8 & 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11-Suit for recovery of written-off finances-Pre-condition-Limitation-Scope-Banking Court dismissed suit filed by the bank under O. VII, R. 11, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, on the ground that the same was filed without observing conditions prescribed in S. 8 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Contention of the appellant/bank was that suit was instituted after passing Resolution in the meeting of Board of Governors-Validity-Record (statement of accounts etc.) indicated that in the year 2014 a certain principal amount which was credited in the account of respondent/customer was written-off by the appellant/bank showing the remaining balance as zero, whereas not a single document was found (in the record) which could prove that after passing Resolution in the meeting the suit-in-question was instituted-Besides, suit-in-question was instituted after a belated stage-Section 8 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, stipulated that the Bank could institute the suit against the respondent/customer within the prescribed period of five years with only one pre-condition of prior approval from the Board of Governors-Thus, the impugned order passed by the Banking Court was not open to debate for the High Court, for being based on sound reasoning which did not call for interference for the High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction-No illegality or infirmity was noticed in the impugned order and judgment passed by the Banking Court dismissing the suit filed by the appellant/Bank under O. VII, R. 11, Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Appeal filed by the Bank was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=8,9Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=11", - "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 19 of 2020, heard on 14th October, heard on: 14th October, 2021.2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Sohail Nasir and Ahmad Nadeem Arshad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Khurram Qureshi Hashmi for Appellants.\nRespondent No. 1 proceeded ex parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HABIB BANK LIMITED through Manager-Appellant\nVersus\nMessrs SAJID CLOTH HOUSE through Legal Heirs and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23851", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2182 = 2023 SLD 2182 = 2023 CLD 1484", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FTWXk", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 42 & 43-License, revocation of-Renewal-Compassionate grounds-Review of the order passed by the Appellate Bench-Appellate Bench while dismissing an appeal filed by the company (Research Concern) against the order-in-original passed by the Commissioner, upheld/maintained the order of revocation of license of company-Applicant/company sought review of the impugned order passed by the Appellate Bench on compassionate grounds-Contention was that owing to similar facts the applicant might also be afforded the same relief as rendered by the Bench while passing order in another appeal against revocation of license wherein another appellant was allowed to meet the requirements within six months-Validity-Admittedly, the present review had been filed on the basis of compassionate grounds and no illegality or anomaly in the impugned order had been highlighted by the applicant-It was the case of the applicant that owing to similar facts it might also be afforded the same relief as rendered by the Bench in another appeal-Record revealed that the applicant, after revocation of license, had filed an application for renewal of the same, however, said fact was not agitated by the applicant at any stage in appeal proceedings-Therefore, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the matter-in-hand and while relying on the decision of the Bench in another appeal (asserted by the applicant), Appellate Bench, taking a lenient view, allowed the applicant an opportunity to rectify/fulfill/comply upon paying late fees applicable under the law as well as all outstanding statutory requirements, to the satisfaction of the concerned department(s) of the Commission within a period of three months-Concerned Department(s) would be restrained from proceedings against the applicant under S. 43 of the Companies Act, 2017, while considering the case of renewal of license of the applicant on merits-Such one-time opportunity granted to the applicant would not be extended without express permission of the Appellate Bench-Review application moved by the company was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=42,43", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 30 of 2018, decided on 25th August, 2023.heard on: 22nd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Hanif, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant.\nMuhammad Farooq Bhatti, Additional Director, Adjudication II, SECP.\nMuhammad Javed, Assistant Director, Adjudication II, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23852", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6410 = 2022 SLD 6410 = 2022 PCRLJ 439", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTTU", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 500, 505, 506 & 109-Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss. 10, 11 & 20-Criminal intimidation, criminal conspiracy, cyber crime, hate speech and offence against dignity of a natural person-Bail, grant of-Criticizing a judge-Accused was arrested for criticizing Chief Justice of Pakistan using strong and undesirable language-Validity-Independent judge, despite harshness or tone of criticism, cannot be provoked to react in such a manner that results in his or her becoming the subject matter of a criminal case because of the profound consequences in context of due process and fair trial-Magnanimity, empathy and compassion, are the essential attributes of an impartial and independent judge-Extension of concession of bail becomes essential to ensure the right to due process and fair trial of an accused when the latter is alleged to have committed an offence directly or indirectly, involving interest of a judicial officer-Such was a legitimate ground unless there were compelling reasons to refuse grant of bail-Bail was allowed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Shafique Butt and another v. The State and others 2015 YLR 877 fol.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=500,505,506,109Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=10,11,20", - "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1296-B of 2021, heard on 16th December, 2021, heard on: 16th December, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Athar Minallah, C.J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Adnan Abbas Shah for Petitioner.\nSyed Muhammad Tayyab, Dy. Attorney General, Ayaz, Deputy Director, FIA, Inam, A.D/I.O. FIA with record for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MASOOD UR RAHMAN ABBASI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23853", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6411 = 2022 SLD 6411 = 2022 PCRLJ 71", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTTQ", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss. 20 & 22-Offences against dignity of a natural person-Child pornography-Bail, refusal of-Accused was alleged to have been the administrator of social media groups which were used to propagate and disseminate child sexual exploitation content-Contention of accused, inter alia, was that the offences with which he was charged did not fall under the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C.-Mere fact that an offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., did not mean that such an offence had become a bailable offence-Discretion still remained with the Court to consider whether if a person accused of such an offence did or did not deserve the grant of bail in accordance with established norms governing the exercise of such a power-Accused had committed the crime against the humanity by exploiting the most vulnerable segment of the society so such accused did not deserve the concession of extraordinary relief-Accused had failed to make out case for grant of bail on the ground of further inquiry as envisaged under S. 497(2), Cr.P.C.-Petition for grant of bail was dismissed, in circumstances.\n2020 PCr.LJ 1652; 2018 PCr.LJ 408; 2018 PCr.LJ 1667 and 2018 YLR 329 ref.\nShameel Ahmed v. The State 2009 SCMR 174; Muhammad Siddique v. Imtiaz Begum and others 2002 SCMR 442 and Haji Muhammad Nazir and others v. The State 2008 SCMR 807 rel.\nAfzaal Ahmed v. The State 2003 SCMR 573 fol.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=20,22", - "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1344-B of 2020, decided on 5th January, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Tariq Mehmood Jahangiri, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Usman Ali for Petitioner.\nImran Haider, Assistant Director-Law, FIA/CCRC, Islamabad.\nAnees-ur-Rehman, Technical Assistant-FIA, Islamabad.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IRFAN SARWAR-Petitioner\nVs\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23854", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2021 2945 = 2021 SLD 2945 = 2021 SCMR 1815", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTS8", - "Key Words:": "Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016)-\n-Ss. 20, 21 & 24-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 109-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Sexual harassment of woman by posting her photographs on social media using a cellular device-Bail, grant of-Investigating officer collected photographs during the course of investigation-Perusal of said photographs showed that some of them could be termed as close to nudity but they were not recognizable - Other photographs were in full attire without any question of immorality-Issue of said photographs could be resolved by the Trial Court after recording of evidence more authoritatively-Furthermore the accused was behind bars since more than 03 months-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was admitted to bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016=20,21,24Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=109Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 978 of 2021, decided on 17th September, 2021., heard on: 17th September, 2021.\n(Against the order dated 15.07.2021 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Cr. M(B.A.) No. 748-A of 2021)", - "Judge Name:": " Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nSyed Nayyab Hussain Gardezi, DAG and Syeda Pakeeza, SI/FIA for the State.\nMuhammad Junaid Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAKHAR ZAMAN\nVs\nThe STATE through D.A.G. and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23855", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2305 = 2023 SLD 2305 = 2023 PTD 1662", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 121(3) & 131—Best judgment assessment—Limitation—Scope— Order passed by the Officer Inland Revenue against the taxpayer was confirmed by the Commissioner Appeals—Objection of the appellant / taxpayer was that the order passed by the Officer Inland Revenue was barred by time as the order under S. 121 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘Ordinance, 2001)could legally be passed within 5 years after the end of the tax year and/or the income year—Validity—Record revealed that the Commissioner Appeals had rejected the said objection (regarding limitation) without discussing or determining the dates relevant for determination of question of limitation—When limitation as a moot point was asserted in any litigation, the same had to be decided on the basis of facts and law—Tax year-in-issue was 2017 and the limitation to adjudicate under S.121 of the Ordinance, 2001 ended on 30-06-2022 whereas, admittedly, the order under S. 121 of the Ordinance, 2001, in the present case, was passed by the Officer Inland Revenue on 28-02-2023, thus the same was beyond period of limitation as prescribed under S. 121(3) of the Ordinance, 2001—Issue of limitation was not a technicality which could not be ignored—Tribunal set-aside both the orders passed by the Officer Inland Revenue as well as the Commissioner Appeals—Appeal filed by the taxpayer was allowed, in circumstances.\nAdditional CIR v. M/s. Eden Builders Ltd. and others 2018 SCMR 991; Asad Ali v. The Bank of Punjab PLD 2020 SC 736 and Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 ref.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.132, 131 & 121—Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 189—Judgments of the Supreme Court—Binding on all Courts—Best judgment assessment—Limitation—Officer Inland Revenue passed order against the taxpayer after passing of 5 years of relevant tax-year, however, the same was confirmed by the Commissioner Appeals—Contention of the appellant / taxpayer was that the order passed by the Officer Inland Revenue was barred by time as the Supreme Court had held that the order under S. 121 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘Ordinance, 2001 ’) could legally be passed within S years after the end of the tax year and/or the income year—Validity—Issue regarding limitation had already been conclusively determined and settled by the Supreme Court through its authoritative pronouncement—Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue could not re-examine the issue already settled and decided by the Supreme Court which was binding upon the Tribunal under Art. 189 of the Constitution—Tribunal set-aside both the orders passed by the Officer Inland Revenue as well as the Commissioner Appeals—Appeal filed by the taxpayer was allowed, circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2001=121(3),131,132,121", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 3880/LB/2023, decided on 2nd August, 2023, date of hearing: 31st July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Hamza Sheikh for Appellant.\nYousaf Ismail, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MIAN FEROZE SALAH UD DIN\nVS\nThe COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-IV, RTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23856", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2311 = 2023 SLD 2311 = 2023 PTD 1667 = (2024) 129 TAX 71", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTTk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Imposition of Further and Extra Taxes for Non-Registration\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, who provides exempt supplies, was charged further and extra taxes in the electricity bill for not obtaining a registration number and not being listed as an active taxpayer. The petitioner challenged the imposition of these taxes in the High Court, arguing that as a provider of exempt supplies, they were not required to register and, therefore, the charges for further and extra taxes were not justified under the law.\nHeld:\nUnder Section 14 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, registration is required for persons engaged in making taxable supplies in Pakistan, including zero-rated supplies. Section 14(2) provides an option for persons not engaged in taxable supplies to register voluntarily if they wish to import or export.\nThe word “may” in Section 14(2) indicates an option, not a compulsion, for those not making taxable supplies to register, and thus, registration is not mandatory unless required by another provision of the Act or federal law.\nThe Commissioner’s interpretation of reading may as shall was incorrect. The imposition of further and extra taxes could only occur if the petitioner was required to be registered under another provision or law. The Commissioner failed to establish that the petitioner was under such an obligation.\nAs the petitioner was not legally required to register and was not informed otherwise through a formal notice, the imposition of further and extra taxes was deemed illegal.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=Ss.14(1),14(2),13(2),3(1A),3(5)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.67081 of 2022, decided on 10th July, 2023, heard on: 10th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qamar-uz-Zaman Cheema and Mehr Ahsan for Petitioner.\nSyed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General for Federation.\nAbdul Muqtadir Khan, Legal Advisor for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DAWAT SARAYE \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23857", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2306 = 2023 SLD 2306 = 2023 PTD 1671", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [Since repealed]—\n—Ss. 22 & 23—Income from business and profession—Deductions— Bad debts—Scope—While claiming any income from any business and profession, under S. 22 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, certain expenditures under S. 23 are allowable—Section 23(1)(x) deals with the claim made in respect of the bad debts claimed by an assessee—Bad debts are generally those accounts/amounts which due to any reason have become irrecoverable and all possible efforts with regard to their recovery including the hope of recovery has vanished which amounts are claimed as bad debts by an assessee—However, legislature has put a bar upon an assessee that only such amounts would be allowed as bad debts which are determined by the Deputy Commissioner to be irrecoverable—It is not a matter of discretion of an assessee to decide what is a bad debt, rather the assessee has to establish with cogent material and on reasonable grounds that such and such accounts/amounts since have become irrecoverable, therefore, the same are declared as bad debts—However the discretion to allow or not to allow the same has not been given to the assessee rather the said power is given to the concerned Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue to determine the amounts which actually have become irrecoverable as bad debts and the onus in this regard for claiming any accounts/amounts as irrecoverable as bad debts lies squarely on an assessee.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]——Ss. 22 & 23—Income from business and profession—Deductions— Bad debts—Scope—Simply on the basis of mere provision an expenditure cannot be allowed and for allowing the claim of the assessee the Assessing Officer is duty bound to call the record, necessary explanations /clarifications from the assessee and thereafter allow or disallow any claim.\n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]——Ss. 22 & 23—Income from business and profession—Deductions— Bad debts—Scope—Assessee is required to give the names of the account holders and amounts considered as bad debt in each case, as may be indicated in a certificate issued by the State Bank of Pakistan— Assessing Officer has the authority under the law to enquire into genuineness of the claim and the assessee has no arbitrary or irrational authority to write off any amount as bad debt until and unless the parameters, as provided under the law, have been fulfilled or met out, as simply making a provision for doubtful debt is not sufficient to claim deduction under S. 23(l)(x) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.\n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]——S.8—All officers to follow the orders of the Central Board of Revenue—Scope—Instructions of the CBR, now FBR, issued from time to time are binding upon the departmental authorities under S. 8 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=22,23,23(1)(x)Income Tax Act, 1922=10(2)(xi)", - "Case #": "I.T.As. Nos.829, 831 and 832 of 1999, decided on 3rd March, 2022. Dates of hearing: 19th February and 3rd March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mazhar Elahi Jafri for Appellant.\nMuhammad Zubair Qureshi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23858", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2307 = 2023 SLD 2307 = 2023 PTD 1679 = (2024) 129 TAX 649", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Confiscation of Transit Goods - Sale Proceeds and Tax Deductions\nDetails:\nThis case involves the seizure and confiscation of transit goods under the Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, 1965. The goods, intended for transit to Afghanistan, were seized due to the discovery of contraband foreign origin liquor in the containers. The Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside the confiscation and ordered that the goods be restored to the Afghan importer unconditionally for onward transit. However, when the goods were later sold at auction, the importer was refunded only 17% of the sale proceeds after the deduction of levied taxes.\nIn the second round of litigation, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the importer, holding that the goods were not subject to confiscation and that no taxes or duties were due. The Tribunal ordered that either the goods be restored or the full sale proceeds, without tax deductions, be refunded. The Customs Department challenged this decision, arguing that taxes and duties should be deducted from the sale proceeds before returning the balance to the importer.\nHeld:\n•\nUnder Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1969, transit goods to foreign territories (such as Afghanistan) are not subject to taxation upon arrival in Pakistan.\n•\nSection 201(2)(c) of the Customs Act, 1969, applies only when goods are sold under the provisions of the Act, and taxes or duties are owed to the Federal Government. As no taxes or duties were applicable in this case, the sale proceeds should not be subject to deduction.\n•\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunals decision to refund the full sale proceeds without tax deductions was correct, as the goods were not subject to taxation under the relevant fiscal statutes.\n•\nThe reference filed by the Customs Department was dismissed, and the order of the Tribunal was upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,32,129,169,201,201(2)(c),196", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.832-P of 2016, decided on 1st November, 2022, heard on: 1st November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " QAISER RASHID KHAN, CJ AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahid Qayyum Khattak for Petitioner.\nIsaac Ali Qazi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, CUSTOMS HOUSE, JAMRUD ROAD, PESHAWAR\nVS\nMESSRS WAHEED HAMID BROS. LTD AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23859", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2308 = 2023 SLD 2308 = 2023 PTD 1695", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpTXk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)——Ss.25-A, 29 & 196—Valuation of goods—Jurisdiction—Tare weight—Determination—Release of goods—Dispute was with regard to valuation of goods imported by respondents / importers, after the same had been released to respondents / importers—Validity—Collector and Director both were equally competent under S. 25-A of Customs Act, 1969x to determine customs value independently of each other without being bound by each others determination—Rightful course of action was to have the conflict between the two customs values resolved under S. 25-A (3) of Customs Act, 1969, by Director General Valuation, which was not done by him on his own motion after the Collector endorsed copy of valuation of goods imported to him—It was Director General Valuation who was required to resolve the conflict under S.25-A(3) of Customs Act, 1969, but he did not opt to do so, thereby validating Valuation Ruling of Collector, which was later / subsequent determination in time—Clearance of goods was made on declared value in accordance with the directions of Director General Valuation— Proposed application of valuation ruling by Directorate of Intelligence was not only unjustified but also tantamount to undermining exercise of statutory powers of Director General Valuation—Application of percentage of tare weight on goods which had already been cleared for home consumption was in violation of provision of S. 29 of Customs Act, 1969, which had restricted any amendment of any sort in Goods Declaration once the goods had been removed from customs area—No amendment under S. 29 of Customs Act, 1969, in goods declaration which had been cleared could be made on the basis of presumptions—High Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Customs Appellate Tribunal, as percentage of tare weight claimed by authorities was higher and excessive and that too without providing any reasoning of application of proposed percentage of 2% and 7% respectively—Reference was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25A,25D,29,196", - "Case #": "Customs References Applications Nos. 15 to 66 of 2023, decided on 31st May, 2023, heard on: 18th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ABDULLAH BALOCH AND IQBAL AHMED KASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Iftikhar Raza Khan for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE DIRECTOR DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION CUSTOMS FBR, QUETTA THROUGH DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND OTHERS\nVS\nMESSRS INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS HUB AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23860", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2309 = 2023 SLD 2309 = 2023 PTD 1701", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTc", - "Key Words:": "Import Policy Order, 2020——Clause 8—Notification SRO 902(I)/2020 dated 25-09-2020— Constitutional petition—Petitioner / importer was aggrieved of his consignment not being released by Custom Authorities, despite its clearance—Plea raised by petitioner was that the consignment was importable under SRO 902(I)/2020 dated 25-09-2020—Validity—When consignment of similar nature was imported, duly classifiable under a particular head and the same was also found to be in accordance with the declaration, there remained no justification available with the department to give similar previous unapproved treatment to newly imported consignments if those were found to be of similar nature and no change in their classification etc. was detected—Authorities were bound to accept same classification, HST Code, rate, duty and taxes as applied to previous consignment, if facts and circumstances of consignment of petitioner were found to be of similar nature—In order to ascertain goods, lab test was a prerequisite condition and lab test was done by authorities themselves—Sample of imported goods sent to lab was found to be synthetic polymer polyvinyl chloride, as declared by the petitioner—Insistence of authorities to again send samples to another laboratory was misconceived and uncalled for, as authority’s own lab had affirmed and confirmed, from the drawn sample of the consignment imported by the petitioner that those were in accordance with the declaration as made by the petitioner—High Court restrained the authorities from drawing any adverse view who were bound to release the goods in accordance with the law forthwith—Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Import Policy Order, 2020=8Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),122(4)", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No.D-2165 of 2021, decided on 3rd June, 2022, heard on: 3rd June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND MAHMOOD A. KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aqeel Ahmed Khan for Petitioner.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan (DAG) for Respondent No. 1.\nKhalid Rajpar for Respondent No.2.\nMrs. Aneela Jamil for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS SAJID PLASTIC FACTORY \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH CHAIRMAN FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23861", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2310 = 2023 SLD 2310 = 2023 PTD 1709 = (2024) 130 TAX 292", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes - Retrospective Applicability and Withholding Tax\nDetails:\nThis case involves the interpretation of fiscal statutes and the retrospective applicability of certain provisions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as amended by the Finance Act, 2016. The dispute centered around the failure of a respondent company to withhold and deposit the correct amount of sales tax in the years 2013 and 2014. The authorities issued a show-cause notice citing discrepancies, but the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ruled that the provisions of Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as amended by the Finance Act, 2016, did not apply retroactively.\nThe case also discussed the general principles of interpretation of fiscal statutes, emphasizing that fiscal statutes should be strictly interpreted, and that retrospective application should be avoided unless explicitly stated by the legislature.\nHeld:\nThe Finance Act, 2016, did not have retrospective effect and could not be applied to the period prior to its enactment.\nThe liability to pay sales tax rested with the person making taxable supplies, while the withholding agent was only responsible for withholding and depositing tax at the specified rate.\nAs the Finance Act, 2016, did not provide for retrospective application, the demand for tax and the imposition of penalties and surcharges for the period prior to 2016 were deemed without lawful authority.\nThe reference was dismissed, and no tax was due against the respondent company for the relevant period.\nCase Law Referred to:\nMessrs Super Engineering v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi, 2019 SCMR 1111\nPakistan Television Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, 2019 SCMR 282\nCommissioner of Wealth Tax v. Sharvan Kumar Swarup & Sons, 1995 ECR 425 SC", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(5AA),3,3(7),6,8,11,11(2),11(4A),47", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 9-P of 2016, decided on 2nd May, 2023, heard on: 2nd May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ABDUL SHAKOOR AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Syed Mudasir Ameer for Petitioner.\nIsaac Ali Qazi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE WITHHOLDING, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR\nVS\nMESSRS CHASHMA SUGAR MILLS (PVT.) LTD., D.I. KHAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23862", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2312 = 2023 SLD 2312 = 2023 PTD 1758", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)——Ss 179(3), 2(s), 15, 16, 156(1), Cls. (8) & (89) & 194-A— Smuggling foreign origin goods loaded on trailer/container, allegation of—Adjudication—Time-limit to decide the case—Extension—Scope— Contention of the importer/appellant was that the order-in-original passed by the adjudicating authority was issued in violation of mandatory provision of time limit contained in S. 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969—Validity—Impugned order passed the adjudicating authority mentioned that the extension in completion of adjudication proceedings had been duly given by the competent authority, which clearly explained that the contention of the appellant/importer, regarding time-barred issuance of order-in-original, was not of any legal significance, hence had no bearing on proceedings of the present appeal as the time period was extended by the competent authority—Appeal filed by the importer was dismissed , in circumstances.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)——Ss.187, 2(s), 15, 16, 156(1), Cls. (8) & (89), 157(2), 168 & 194-A— Customs Rules, 2001, R. 126—Smuggling of foreign origin goods loaded on trailer/ container, allegation of—Burden of proof as to having possession of goods with lawful authority or under prescribed documents—Scope—Question was whether the documents (i.e. Goods declaration and purchase invoices) submitted by the Appellant/importer could be considered authentic in wake of his failure to provide transport note and corresponding Sales Tax Invoices prescribed under R.126 of Customs Rules, 2001—Validity—The GDs furnished by the appellant alone could not discharge the burden of proof under S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969 from the appellant as the relevant CDs had to be correlated with transport note and Sales Tax Invoices or Sales Tax Return of the importer verifying that impugned goods imported vide said GDs were supplied to local buyer registered or unregistered under the Sales Tax regime—While the importer reflects the imports vide Annex, “B” of the Sales Tax Return as well as local supplies vide Annex “C” thereof —Whereas said supplies were also reflected in the buyers Sales Tax Return vide Annex “A” thereof—-Appellant failed to provide the Sales Tax record to confirm that imported goods were supplied to certain buyers, hence he failed to discharge his burden of proof under S.187 of the Customs Act, 1969 and under R. 126 of the Customs Rules, 2001, therefore, the case of the respondents / Department stood proved—Appeal filed by the importer was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),15,16,156(1),156(8),156(89),168,179(3),194-ACustoms Rules, 2001=126", - "Case #": "Customs Appeals Nos. H-7896 and H-7897 of 2021, decided on 20th April, 2022, heard on: 3rd March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ABDUL JABBAR QURESHI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-I AND ABDUL BASIT CHAUDHARY, MEMBER TECHNICAL-I", - "Lawyer Name:": "Azhar Abbas for Appellants.\nIrfan Ghani, I.O, for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS GHULAM MURTAZA AND OTHERS\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION), CAMPT AT CUSTOM HOUSE, HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23863", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2313 = 2023 SLD 2313 = 2023 PTD 1769 = 2025 TAX 280", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTQ", - "Key Words:": "Legality of Valuation Ruling No. 1449/2020 under Section 25 & 25-A of the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nApplicants (Customs Department) challenged a common Tribunal order (17.01.2022) that had set aside Valuation Ruling No. 1449/2020 (04.06.2020) and Order-in-Revision (09.10.2020).\nTribunal held that sequential methods under Section 25 of Customs Act, 1969 were not followed; hence, valuation directly under Fall Back Method (s.25(9)) was unlawful. It instead accepted Respondents’ declared transactional values.\nDepartment argued Tribunal misapplied law, as sequential methods were actually followed.\nRespondents argued valuation was arbitrary, done without associating them, and contrary to law and precedent (e.g., Sky Overseas, Osaka Electronics, Shazia Aman, Zakwan Steel).\nHeld:\nCourt found Tribunal erred in holding that valuation was determined directly under s.25(9) without following sequential methods. Record showed Director Valuation examined s.25(1), (5), (6), (7), and (8) before resorting to s.25(9). Question No. 1 answered in negative (in favour of Department).\nHowever, the application of Fall Back Method was unlawful since Director relied on PRAL database, web searches, and international prices not authorized under law at that time (proviso to s.25-A allowing such reliance was inserted later by Finance Act, 2021). Reasons for rejecting transactional/identical/similar values were insufficient. Question No. 2 answered in negative (against Department, in favour of Respondents).\nTribunal also erred in blindly accepting Respondents’ declared values as transactional values under s.25(1) without proper discussion or evidence.\nMatter remanded to Director Valuation for fresh determination of values in accordance with law.\nReference Applications partly allowed: Tribunal’s order, Valuation Ruling No.1449/2020, and Order-in-Revision No.30/2020 set aside to the extent of Respondents’ consignments.\nCase law:\nSaadia Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 PTD 1746)\nMessrs Sky Overseas v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 PTD 1964)\nCollector of Customs v. Osaka Electronics (2022 PTD 836)\nCollector of Customs v. Shazia Aman (2022 PTD 674)\nMessrs Zakwan Steel v. Federation of Pakistan (2023 PTD 9)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25A,25D,25(1),25(9),196Customs Rules, 2001=110,120,121", - "Case #": "Special Customs References Applications Nos.223, 224, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 240, 241, 242 and 243 of 2022, decided on 17th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Rajpar for Applicant (in SCRAs Nos.229 to 232 of 2022).\nAamir Raza for Applicant (in SCRAs Nos.223, 224, 226 and 228 of 2022).\nIrfan Mir Halepota for Applicant (in SCRAs Nos.240 to 243 of 2022).\nKhawaja Shamsul Islam for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI THROUGH DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND OTHERS\nVS\nMESSRS A.R. INDUSTRIES AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23864", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2314 = 2023 SLD 2314 = 2023 PTD 1779 = (2024) 130 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income Tax - Withholding Tax Deduction on National Savings Schemes\nDetails:\nThe case revolves around the mandatory obligation under section 151(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which mandates the deduction of withholding tax on yields from National Savings Schemes and Post Office Savings Accounts. The issue arose regarding the deduction of withholding tax on profits from savings certificates issued by the National Savings Center located in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Court affirmed that the National Savings Centers role is to facilitate the public in accessing the benefits of these savings schemes, and that the Directorate of National Savings is responsible for ensuring the statutory duty of tax deduction is fulfilled.\nHeld:\nThe deduction of withholding tax on yields from savings certificates issued by the National Savings Center located in the erstwhile FATA was held to be legal and constitutional.\nThe income of the Directorate does not arise or accrue in the Tribal Areas, but the deduction of tax remains a statutory obligation under section 151(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe decision of the Single Judge of the High Court was upheld, and the appeals were allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=151(1)(a)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131(1),151(1)(a)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 23 and 24 of 2017, decided on 8th December, 2022, heard on: 8th December, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 02.03.2016 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Intra Court Appeal No. 13 of 2014)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CHIEF JUSTICE, AYESHA A. MALIK AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rashdeen Nawaz Qasuri, Additional Attorney General for Appellants (in C.A. No. 23 of 2017).\nGhulam Shoaib Jolly, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in C.A. No. 24 of 2017).\nMuhammad Raza Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1-5.\nEx party for Respondents Nos. 6-7.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR GENERAL CENTRAL DIRECTORATE OF SAVINGS AND OTHERS\nVS\nABID HUSSAIN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23865", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2315 = 2023 SLD 2315 = 2023 PTD 1797 = (2024) 130 TAX 552", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSSs", - "Key Words:": "This interpretation of the Customs Act, 1969, highlights an important distinction between the finality of assessment under Sections 80 and 81 and the invocation of proceedings under Section 32. Heres a breakdown of the legal implications:\nProvisional Determination vs. Final Assessment:\nSection 81 allows for provisional assessment of imported goods, which can later attain finality once all requisite documentation or clarifications are received.\nSection 80, on the other hand, governs the final assessment of goods without any provisional stage.\nScope of Section 32:\nSection 32 addresses cases involving an offence, such as misdeclaration, fraud, or errors leading to non-levy, short-levy, or erroneous refunds of duties or taxes.\nIt allows proceedings for recovery of duties or taxes, provided the specified limitation period for such action is adhered to.\nFinality of Assessment vs. Section 32 Proceedings:\nThe finality of assessment under Sections 80 or 81 does not preclude the Customs authorities from invoking Section 32 for recovery or penal actions if:\nThere is evidence of short-levy, non-levy, or fraudulent refund.\nThe action is initiated within the prescribed time limits for recovery or prosecution.\nLimitation Period:\nThe limitation period for invoking Section 32 is distinct and specified based on the nature of the offence or recovery being pursued.\nAuthorities must ensure compliance with these timeframes to lawfully proceed under Section 32, irrespective of the finality achieved under Sections 80 or 81.\nLegal Distinction:\nThe final assessment under Sections 80 or 81 determines the tax liability at a given time based on the available information.\nSection 32 operates independently to address discrepancies or violations, focusing on rectification and enforcement of duties and taxes.\nPractical Implications:\nCustoms authorities retain the ability to act against violations or recover dues under Section 32 even after the finality of assessments, ensuring compliance and addressing malpractices. Importers, however, must be aware of the limitation period and the separate procedural grounds under which these provisions operate.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,80,81", - "Case #": "C.M.A. No. 819 of 2019 and Civil Appeal No. 1080 of 2011, decided on 2nd May, 2023, heard on: 2nd May, 2023.(Against the judgment dated 28.04.2011 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Special Custom Reference Application No.3 of 2010)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J., AYESHA A. MALIK AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja M. Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nFarhat Nawaz Lodhi, Advocate Supreme, Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS PORT MUHAMMAD BIN QASIM, KARACHI\nVS\nMESSRS MIA CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD. ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23866", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2316 = 2023 SLD 2316 = 2023 PTD 1801", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)——Ss.25, 79 & 81—SRO 499(I)/2013, dated 12-06-2023- Value of goods—Declaration—Assessment of imported goods, correctness of— Provisional determination of liability—Final determination not completed within stipulated period—Consequences—Differential amount paid or bank guarantee secured, return of—Scope—While final determination was not completed within six months, appropriate officer passed the impugned final assessment order by holding that the amount determined through provisional assessment order had become final and as a result thereof , the security instrument i.e. bank guarantee for differential amount should be encashed—Petitioner / importer assailed impugned order passed by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court—Validity—Though the appropriate officer, had herself admitted her failure to complete the final determination within six months, but her approach was not in consonance with the purpose, mandate and language of S. 81(4) of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act 1969’); she, while passing the impugned order, was probably misled by the explanation as at the end S. 81 of the Act, it was explained that the provincial assessment meant the amount of duties and taxes paid or secured against bank guarantee, however, the provisional determination of the duty as provided under subsection (1) of S. 81 of the Act, 1969, did not include the additional amount determined on the basis of provisional assessment and the said differential amount was indeed a speculated amount of duty which could ultimately be the actual amount of duty , taxes and other charges after a complete probe and inquiry leading to the final determination of duties / taxes etc.—It was only when there was actual final determination within the stipulated period that the additional amount was relevant and was adjustable in terms of subsection (3) of S. 81 of the Act, 1969—Said differential amount secured through bank guarantee in terms of S. 81(1) of the Act, 1969 was not part of provisional determination, therefore, when the appropriate officer failed to pass an order of final determination as per inquiry envisaged under the enabling provision of S. 81 of the Act, 1969 , then the amount only determined as a provisional assessment would be deemed as a final determination and as a consequence thereof, the differential amount if already paid, would be refunded or if it was secured through an instrument (pay-order / bank guarantee) the same would be returned to the importer—High Court set aside the impugned order passed by the Appropriate Officer, declaring that her findings were not based on correct appreciation of subsection (4) of S.81 of the Act 1969 and directed the respondents / Department to return the bank guarantee through which the differential amount was secured from the petitioner / importer—Constitutional petition filed by the importer was allowed, in circumstances.\nSUS Motors (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others 2011 PTD 235 ref.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)— —Ss. 79, 81, & 193—Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199—Declaration / assessment of imported goods, correctness of—Provisional determination of liability—Final determination not completed within stipulated period—Consequences—Differential amount paid or bank guarantee secured, return of—Scope—While final determination was not completed within six months, appropriate officer passed the impugned final assessment order by holding that the amount determined through provisional assessment order had become final and as a result thereof, the security instrument i.e. bank guarantee for differential amount should be encashed—Petitioner / importer assailed impugned order passed by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court—Objection of the respondents / department was that impugned order could be challenged before the next higher forum in terms of S.193 of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act, 1969’)—Validity— Section 193 of the Act, 1969 had provided specifically that an order passed by any officer of the Customs Department under different provisions of the Act, 1969 was appealable—Section 81 of the Act, 1969 did not figure in the said order which were appealable before the next higher forum—Indeed, appeal was a creation of statute and in absence of any provision of law envisaging for filing appeal against an order, the appeal could not be entertained by the upper forum as a matter of course—High Court set aside the impugned order passed by the appropriate officer, declaring that her findings were not based on correct appreciation of subsection (4) of S. 81 of the Act, 1969 and directed the respondents / department to return the bank guarantee through which the differential amount was secured from the petitioner / importer—Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\nHussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1 and Messrs Alpha Chemicals v. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others 2013 PTD 2064 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,79,81,81(1),81(4)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,199(1)(a),199(1)(c)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.737-P of 2021, decided on 11th April, 2023, heard on: 11th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ABDUL SHAKOOR AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aamir Bilal for Petitioner.\nSanaullah DAG, Gul Nazir Azam and Ishtiaq Ahmad (Junior) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS TEST INTERNATIONAL\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION / CHAIRMAN FBR, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23867", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2317 = 2023 SLD 2317 = 2023 PTD 1810", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSTg", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)——Ss. 25 & 25-D—Customs Rules, 2001, R. 121—Value of imported and exported goods—Revision of the value determined—Fall back method—Scope—Case revolved around the rejection of the appellant’s petition under S.25D through an order-in-revision by the respondent— Validity—Appellant had submitted relevant correspondence with the exporter, bank statements indicating the payment of the transaction amount to the exporter, sales register, sales tax invoices, and other supportive documents to the respondent—However, the respondent had failed to mention these facts in the order-in-revision—Furthermore, the respondent had not addressed the genuine and just grievances of the appellant—On the contrary, respondent had treated the appellant perfunctorily—Order passed by the respondent had not met the criteria of being a speaking or judicious order and thus failed the test of judicial scrutiny—Respondent had also failed to specify which customs method, as described under Ss. 25(5), 25(6), 25(7), or 25(8), was used while issuing the impugned valuation ruling and in what “flexible manner —Resorting to the subsequent method without exhausting the sequence indicated in S. 25 was impermissible, except for certain exceptional cases where massive group under-invoicing was suspected—Such suspicion was not visible in this case— Respondent was directed to issue a new valuation ruling based on the facts and values pertinent to the relevant period and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the law—Order-in-revision was set aside.\nSadia Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 PTD 1746 rel.\nRehan Omer v. Collector of Customs Karachi 2006 PTD 909; Messrs Toyo International Motorcycle v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others 2008 PTD 1494; Najam Impex Lhr v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Karachi and others 2008 PTD 1250; Faco Trading Company v. Members Custom, Federal Board of Revenue and others 2013 PTD 825 and Goodwill Traders, Karachi v, Federation of Pakistan 2014 PTD 176 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25D,25(5), 25(6), 25(7),25(8)Customs Rules, 2001=107(a),121", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-722 of 2017, decided on 22nd March, 2022, heard on: 9th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ABDUL JABBAR QURESHI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-I AND MUHAMMAD IQBAL BHAWANA, MEMBER TECHNICAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shahrukh Farogh Naseem for Appellant.\nNaeem Butt for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS MONDELEZ PAKISTAN LIMITED\nVS\nTHE DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF CUSTOMS (VALUATION), CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23868", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2318 = 2023 SLD 2318 = (2023) 128 TAX 341", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Customs - Valuation of Imported Goods, Provisional Determination of Liability\nDetails:\nThe respondent imported a consignment of energy-saving lamps from China and filed a Goods Declaration. Upon scrutiny, the department suspected that the declared value of the goods was suppressed. Consequently, remedial proceedings were initiated, and the assessing officer adjudicated a short levy of duties and taxes against the respondent. The respondent appealed the assessment order, which was dismissed. However, the Customs, Excise, and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal.\nHeld:\n•\nThe key issue was whether the method of assessment used by the department complied with the law.\n•\nThe court ruled in favor of the applicant department, stating that the assessment was in line with the legal requirements.\n•\nThe impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal was set aside, and the assessment/order in appeal was restored.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=13(a),25,25(1),25(2),25(2)(f),25(5),25(6),25(7),81,202ACustoms Rules, 2001=107(a),110,111,121,125", - "Case #": "SCRA 141 & 142 of 2010 decided on 14.03.2023, heard on: 23.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Pervaiz Ahmed Memon, Advocate and Muhammad Rashid Arfi, Advocate for the Applicants.\nMr. Daniyal Muzaffar, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC PACCS\nVS\nABDUL WAHID & CO." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23869", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2319 = 2023 SLD 2319 = (2023) 128 TAX 356 = 2024 PTD 670", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpSXk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax - Refund Claims, Retrospective Application of Rules\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a recognized agricultural tractor manufacturer, filed for a refund of input tax amounting to PKR 3.8 billion for the months of July 2021, September 2021, November 2021, December 2021, and February 2022. The appellant claimed the refund based on SRO 363(I)/2012, but the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) issued SRO 563(I)/2022, which applied to existing and future refund claims under specific conditions. The appellant challenged the retrospective application of SRO 563, arguing that it deprived them of their vested rights and impeded the processing of their valid refund claims.\nThe show cause notice was issued by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR), claiming that the new SRO applied to the appellant’s refund claims. The appellant argued that the retrospective application of the rules was unlawful and asked for the show cause notice to be quashed.\nHeld:\nVested Rights: The court held that the rights vested in the appellant could not be impaired or taken away by the FBR’s substitution of existing rules. Vested rights cannot be deprived by a retrospective notification issued by FBR, which could only be done by the legislature under its primary legislative power.\nIncorrect Application of SRO 563: The Deputy Commissioner misdirected himself by applying SRO 563 to the appellants claims. The appellant had legitimate claims that were valid under SRO 363, and the application of SRO 563 to these claims was deemed unlawful.\nRetrospective Amendment Invalid: The court ruled that the retrospective amendment made by SRO 563 was a mala fide act by the FBR, intended to deprive the appellant of its rightful refund claim. The court struck down the word existing in Rule 390 of SRO 563 and declared the show-cause notice and the order passed by the DCIR to be without legal authority.\nCitations:\nAl-Samrez Enterprise v. The Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917)\nMolasses Trading & Export (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (PTCL 1994 CL 222)\nM/s. M.Y. Electronics Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan (PTCL 1998 CL 450)\nM/s Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PTCL 1993 CL 188)\nMuhammad Rafique v. Federation of Pakistan (PTCL 2015 CL 219)\nPakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Samina Masood (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 831)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=50Sales Tax Rules, 2006=390Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "I.C.A No. 83099 of 2022 decided on 08.03.2023, heard on: 08.03.2023", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE AND RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Shahryar Kasuri, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui and Muhammad Hamza, Advocates for the Appellants.\nM/s Ahmad Pervaiz, Saffi ul Hassan Advocates and Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MILLAT TRACTORS LIMITED\nVS\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23870", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2320 = 2023 SLD 2320 = (2023) 128 TAX 368", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTc", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax - Track and Trace System Implementation, Deadline Compliance\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a tobacco manufacturer and importer, had entered into a tri-partite agreement with FBR and a consortium for implementing the track and trace system. Under the agreement, the petitioner was required to install tax stampers and order unique identification markings (tax stamps) for the system. However, due to FBR attaching the petitioner’s bank accounts, payments to the tax stamper manufacturers were delayed, causing the petitioner to miss the deadline for installation of the equipment.\nThe FBR issued Sales Tax General Order (S.T.G.O.) dated 18.01.2022, with a deadline of 30.04.2022 for the installation of the system. This deadline was extended to 20.05.2022 via an addendum dated 26.04.2022. The petitioner argued that failure to meet the deadline would result in coercive action and disrupt its business operations, as it would not be allowed to remove tobacco products without the affixed tax stamps.\nHeld:\n•\nNon-compliance with Deadline: The court ruled that the petitioner’s failure to pay the manufacturer due to the attachment of bank accounts did not provide a valid excuse to relieve the petitioner from its contractual obligations. The deadline of 20.05.2022 for the implementation of the track and trace system was binding.\n•\nDismissal for Delay in Filing Petition: The petitioner filed the writ petition just one day before the deadline, without providing a plausible explanation for the delay. The court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in limine.\nCitations:\n•\nSection 40(2), Sales Tax Act, 1990\n•\nSales Tax Rules, 2006, Rule 150ZF\n•\nSales Tax General Order No. 8 of 2022\n•\nS.T.G.O. dated 18.01.2022\n•\nAddendum dated 26.04.2022", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=59AA,59B", - "Case #": "CP D-8569 of 2018, Dates of hearing: 14.02.2023, 15.02.2023, 16.02.2023, 22.02.2023, 23.02.2023, 27.02.2023, 28.02.2023\n (And connected matters, particularized in the Schedule[1] hereto) decided on 28.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Messrs. Jam Zeeshan, Khalid Javed Khan, Farogh Naseem, Ovais Ali Shah, Rashid Anwar, Uzair Qadir Shoro, Umer Akhund, Marium Riaz, Umer Ilyas Khan, Fizzah Bucha, Ameer Haider Khan, Sami-ur-Rehman Khan, Fahad Khan, Ahmed Hussain, Imran Iqbal Khan, Adil Saeed, Salman Aziz, Faiz Durrani, Ghulam Muhammad & Saima Anjum, Advocates for Petitioners.\nMessrs. Shahid Ali Qureshi, Huma Sodher, Rana Sakhawat Ali, Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, S. Ahsan Ali Shah, Saad Shafiq Siddiqui, Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Tauqeer Ahmed Seehar, Hafeezullah, Fahim Ali, Imtiaz Mansoor Solangi, Sajjad Ali Solangi, Zain Mustafa Soomro, Kashif Nazeer, Manzar Hussain Memon, Irfan Mir Halepota, Faheem Ali, Farha Naz Qazi, Khurram Shehzad, Nadir Hussain Tunio, Bushra Zia for Zubair Qureshi, Ali Tahir Soomro, Tahir Khalil, Barkat Ali Metlo, Imran Ali Metlo, Fayaz Ali Metlo, Arshad Ali Tunio, Muhammad Idrees Rahimoon, Preetam Das, Abdul Mujeeb Zeeshan, Ayaz Sarwar Jamali, M. Taseer Khan Advocates, G.M. Bhutto (Assistant Attorney General), Qazi Ayazuddin (Assistant Attorney General) for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "INTERNATIONAL BRANDS LIMITED & others\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23871", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2321 = 2023 SLD 2321 = (2023) 128 TAX 393 = 2025 PTD 297", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax - Track and Trace System Implementation, Deadline Compliance\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a tobacco manufacturer and importer, had entered into a tri-partite agreement with FBR and a consortium for implementing the track and trace system. Under the agreement, the petitioner was required to install tax stampers and order unique identification markings (tax stamps) for the system. However, due to FBR attaching the petitioner’s bank accounts, payments to the tax stamper manufacturers were delayed, causing the petitioner to miss the deadline for installation of the equipment.\nThe FBR issued Sales Tax General Order (S.T.G.O.) dated 18.01.2022, with a deadline of 30.04.2022 for the installation of the system. This deadline was extended to 20.05.2022 via an addendum dated 26.04.2022. The petitioner argued that failure to meet the deadline would result in coercive action and disrupt its business operations, as it would not be allowed to remove tobacco products without the affixed tax stamps.\nHeld:\n•\nNon-compliance with Deadline: The court ruled that the petitioner’s failure to pay the manufacturer due to the attachment of bank accounts did not provide a valid excuse to relieve the petitioner from its contractual obligations. The deadline of 20.05.2022 for the implementation of the track and trace system was binding.\n•\nDismissal for Delay in Filing Petition: The petitioner filed the writ petition just one day before the deadline, without providing a plausible explanation for the delay. The court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in limine.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=40(2),40C(2)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=150ZF", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 1768 of 2022 decided on 20.05.2022, heard on: 20.05.2022", - "Judge Name:": " MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Usman Jillani, Advocate for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S KHYBER TOBACCO COMPANY LIMITED\nVS\nTHE FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23872", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2322 = 2023 SLD 2322 = (2023) 128 TAX 398 = 2025 PTD 55", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income Tax - Jurisdiction of Income Tax Authorities, Notice under Section 176\nDetails:\nThe Plaintiff received a notice from the Additional Director of the Directorate General, Intelligence & Investigation (DG I & I) under Section 176 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, requesting party-wise details of income tax collected and deposited from Steel Melters, re-rollers, or composite units under Section 235B. The Plaintiff argued that under SRO 115(I)/2015, as amended, only the “Additional Director-III” of DG I & I had territorial jurisdiction to issue such notices to large taxpayers. Since the impugned notice was issued by an “Additional Director” without specifying the correct jurisdiction, the Plaintiff contended that the notice was issued without jurisdiction and was thus invalid.\nHeld:\nSRO 115(I)/2015 Validity: The court ruled that SRO 115(I)/2015, dated 09-02-2015, was not ultra vires the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and did not violate its provisions.\nLawful Authority of the Notice: The notice issued by the Additional Director was found to be valid and issued with lawful authority, in line with the amending notification of 24-03-2016 and the transfer/posting notification of 14-02-2019.\nJurisdiction of the DG I & I: The court upheld that the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 176 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was correctly conferred upon the officers as per the relevant legal framework.\nCitations:\nCase Referred: Saleem Butt v. Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Suit No. 1872 of 2016", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=176,207,208,209,230,235B", - "Case #": "Suit No. 320 of 2020 decided on 18.05.2022, heard on: 18-05-2022", - "Judge Name:": " ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Hamza Waheed, Advocate for Plaintiff.\nMr. Bilal Khilji, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Defendants 1 and 2.\nMr. Ghulam Asghar Pathan, Advocate for Defendants 3 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "K-ELECTRIC LIMITED\nVS\nPAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23873", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2323 = 2023 SLD 2323 = (2023) 128 TAX 401", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax - Tax Fraud, Default Surcharge, Penalty, Remand for De Novo Consideration\nDetails:\nThe respondent taxpayer was selected for audit under Section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which led to the allegation of non-payment of due tax. A Show Cause Notice was issued, leading to the passing of an Order-in-Original, requiring the taxpayer to pay Rs.10.318 million along with default surcharge and penalty. The appeal was initially rejected by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR(A)), but the Appellate Tribunal remanded the case to the Taxation Officer for adjudication of the Show Cause Notice after a fair hearing. The taxpayer paid the principal amount but disputed the default surcharge and penalty. In the second round of litigation, the CIR(A) again remanded the matter for de novo consideration. The Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the taxpayer, stating that the CIR(A) had no authority to remand for a de novo review and that the Department failed to prove the commission of tax fraud.\nHeld:\n•\nDepartments Burden of Proof: The taxpayer had already paid the principal amount, and it was the Departments responsibility to prove that tax fraud had occurred, which it failed to do.\n•\nCIR(A)s Authority: The CIR(A) was not authorized to remand the case for de novo consideration under Section 46B(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which explicitly prohibits such remands.\n•\nNo Tax Fraud Proven: The Department did not provide sufficient evidence to support the claim of tax fraud under Section 2(37) of the Act, leading to the dismissal of the tax fraud allegations.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),46B(3),38", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 22 of 2020 decided on 10.05.2022, heard on: 10-05-2022", - "Judge Name:": " ATHAR MINALLAH, C.J AND BABAR SATTAR, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rehan Seerat, Advocate for the Applicant.\nCh. Naeem Ul Haq, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (EAST ZONE), LTU, ISLAMABAD\nVS\nM/S HORIZON BUSINESS NETWORK" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23874", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2324 = 2023 SLD 2324", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(n),22,22(15),23,24,177,122,122(1),122(5A),122(9)Contract, Act, 1872=23Transfer of Property Act, 1882=10Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991=2(a),2(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No.597/IB/2023, ITA No.598/IB/2023, ITA No.599/IB/2023, ITA No.600/IB/2023, (Tax Years 2018 to 2021)", - "Judge Name:": " M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER and MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Barrister Dr. Mazhar Ilahi assisted by Mr. Muzzamil Rasheed, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ms. Sobia Mazhar, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "PUNJAB RING ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING (PVT) LIMITED, Gate No.13, National Hockey Stadium, Gulberg-III, Lahore, Gulberg Town.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE, LTO, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23875", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2325 = 2023 SLD 2325 = (2023) 128 TAX 201", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRSs", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Customs - Mis-declaration, Re-assessment, Customs Rules, Power of Board or Collector to Pass Orders\nDetails: The appellant imported a consignment of Quartz Wall Clocks from Hong Kong and filed a Goods Declaration (GD) with correct details. However, the Customs Department refused to clear the goods, reassessed the value on the basis of instructions from the Assistant Collector (ADC-II), and increased the value without specific reasons. The Deputy Collector of Customs re-assessed the GD again, leading to an appeal before the Collector of Customs (Appeals), who upheld the re-assessment order. The appellant challenged the orders before the Customs Appellate Tribunal.\nHeld:\n•\nVoid Actions: The Customs Departments action of re-assessing the GD was in violation of the provisions of the Customs Act, 1969, as the goods were already out of charge, and there were proper recourses under Sections 32, 193, and 195 of the Customs Act for such matters.\n•\nLegal Precedent: Relying on the ruling in M/s Harris Silicones & Glass (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FOP & Others (2021 PTCL 451), it was found that the re-assessment was not in conformity with the law.\n•\nImpugned Orders Set Aside: The Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside the re-assessment and Order-in-Appeal, finding them void due to lack of legal basis and adherence to required procedural recourses.\nCitations:\n•\n(2021 PTCL 451) – M/s Harris Silicones & Glass (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FOP & Others", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25(1),32,32(3),32(3A),79,79(1)(a),79(4),80,80(2),80(3),83,180,193,195Customs Rules, 2001=113", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal Nos.K-1203/2019, K-7900/2021, K-7901/2021, K-419/2022, K-420/2022, K-1014/2022 and K-1015/2022 decided on 14.02.2023, date of hearing: 07-02-2023", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Muhammad Ishauqe & Waqar Ahmed, Advocates for the Appellants.\nMr. Ghani Soomro & Mr Shahzad, AO for the Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. IMPERIAL CORPORATION, KARACHI AND OTHERS\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS), KARACHI AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23876", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2326 = 2023 SLD 2326 = (2023) 128 TAX 221", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Failure to Pay Tax Collected, Offences and Penalties, Rectification of Mistakes, Res Judicata\nDetails: The appellant, a public limited company, was designated as a withholding agent but failed to deduct tax as required under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) completed monitoring proceedings and passed an order under Sections 161, 182, and 205. The appellant appealed to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR(A)), who confirmed the DCIRs order. The appellant contested the decision, arguing that the issue had already been adjudicated in a previous order, invoking the principle of res judicata.\nHeld:\nIllegal Order by DCIR: The DCIR passed an illegal order instead of dropping the proceedings, despite being aware of the earlier order on the same issue. The principle of res judicata, which prevents multiple adjudications on the same issue, applied here.\nRectification of Mistakes: The DCIR should have invoked the rectification procedure under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, rather than passing a new order.\nViolation of Constitutional Rights: The DCIR’s order violated the basic principles of a fair trial (Article 10A) and the right to be dealt with in accordance with the law (Article 4) under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.\nIllegality of Second Order: The second order passed by the DCIR was found to be illegal, void ab initio, and without jurisdiction, as it duplicated an already existing order for the same tax year.\nCitations:\n(2015) 112 TAX 504 (H.C. Lah.)\n(2010 PTD (Trib.) 150\n(2012 PTD 188 (Trib.)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,161(1),161(IB),182,205,206,221,221(4)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10A", - "Case #": "ITA No.714/KB/2022 decided on 19.09.2022, date of hearing: 29.08.2022", - "Judge Name:": " DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND QAZI ANWER KAMAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Mohsin Waheed, FC for the Appellant.\nMr. Abdul Wahid Shar, D.R, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. EXIDE PAKISTAN LTD., KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, LTU, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23877", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2327 = 2023 SLD 2327 = (2023) 128 TAX 229", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRTg", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Amendment of Assessments, Unexplained Income, Super Tax, and Audit Proceedings\nDetails: The appellant, a private limited company engaged in construction and property development, filed its return of income for Tax Year 2017, which became a deemed assessment order by operation of law. The case was selected for audit under Section 177(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and the audit led to an amendment under Section 122(1) of the Ordinance. The appellant contested the rejection of its capital gain claim, arguing that the facts and grounds of appeal were ignored. The Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR(A)) upheld the order, and the appellant appealed the decision.\nHeld:\n•\nIntention at the Time of Purchase: The appellants claim of capital gain was found to be genuine as the intention at the time of property purchase was not to sell it as part of the ordinary course of business. The claim was governed under Section 37, not Section 18.\n•\nSuper Tax Charge: The tribunal ruled that only the Commissioner could pass orders under Section 4B of the Ordinance. As the order was passed by a non-competent authority, the charge of super tax was declared void and was vacated.\n•\nUnexplained Bank Credits: The credit entries in the bank accounts were explained, and thus Section 111 was not applicable. The tribunal deleted the impugned additions on account of unexplained credits.\nCitations:\n•\nPakistan in Fancy Foundation v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2017 SCMR 1395)\n•\nP.M. Mohammed Meera Khan v. CIT [1969] 73 ITR 735\n•\nEclat Construction (P) Ltd. v. CIT [1988] 172 ITR 84 (Pat.)\n•\nShafqat Elahi Sheikh vs. DCIT (2020 PTD 604)\n•\nMajor General (Rtd.) M. Jalaluddin v. ACIT-IV, Zone-C, Karachi (2011 PTD 1377)\n•\nCommissioner Income Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca v. The Liquidator, Khulna Bagerahat Railway Company Ltd. (PLD 1962 Supreme Court 128)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(10),4B,18,21(C),37,37A,37(1A),39(3),111,111(1)(d),122(1),122(9),177,177(1)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=141,142", - "Case #": "ITA No.1500/KB/2018, decided on 26.04.2022, heard on: 19.01.2022 & 26.01.2022", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHARIF AWAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SARDAR M. AJAZ KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khawaja Aizaz Ahsan, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Naseer Ahmed, DR., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. IMPERIAL DEVELOPERS & BUILDERS (PVT) LTD. KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III, LTU-II, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23878", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2328 = 2023 SLD 2328 = (2023) 128 TAX 247", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Jurisdictional Issue in Sales Tax Demand\nDetails: The respondent, a wine merchant registered for sales tax, was issued a show cause notice under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by the Officer Inland Revenue (OIR) for the period July 2009 to June 2013, despite the taxpayer not being registered during that period. The demand was created based on the taxpayer’s income tax return. The taxpayer contested the jurisdiction of the OIR, stating that the jurisdiction lay with the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR), Zone II, RTO II, which covers the Food and Beverages sector, including wine and beer. The appeal was filed before the Commissioner Appeals (CIR(A)), which ruled in favor of the taxpayer, finding that the OIR had no jurisdiction.\nHeld: The tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner Appeals (CIR(A)), agreeing with the taxpayer’s contention that the OIR lacked jurisdiction. The tribunal emphasized that the jurisdiction of tax authorities cannot be conferred by consent or waived and that any order passed without jurisdiction is null and void.\nCitations:\nHalsbury’s Law of England, IV Edition, Vol. 10, P. 715\nFBR Jurisdiction Order C.No.57(2) jurisdiction/2011/10376 dated 30-06-2012\nSection 11(2) Sales Tax Act, 1990\nSections 15(2)(3) & 34 Indian Income Tax Act, 1922\nSection 65 Income Tax Ordinance, 1979\nSections 122(5) & 148(1) Income Tax Ordinance 2001", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,11(2)Income Tax Act, 1922=15(2)(3),34Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=65", - "Case #": "STA No. 351/KB/2015 decided on 04.11.2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIF ULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO-II. Karachi\nVs\nM/S. ASSOCIATED WINE MERCHANT, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23879", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2329 = 2023 SLD 2329 = (2023) 128 TAX 266", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpRXk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001) - Assessments, Claims, and Deduction Issues\nDetails:\nThis case involves the assessment of income tax for various tax years (2003 to 2012) concerning the appellant-bank. The proceedings were initiated by the department under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and its predecessor, the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The appellant-bank contested several orders relating to tax deductions, including claims for tax depreciation, provisions for non-performing advances, and other deductions under the Seventh Schedule. The issues primarily revolved around the admissibility of deductions, the limitation for filing documents, and the interpretation of tax law. Various appeals were filed, and orders were passed by the CIR(A) and the Appellate Tribunal.\nHeld:\nThe appellant-bank’s appeal was dismissed in most parts, including those concerning the non-deduction of taxes and failure to provide supporting documents.\nThe CIR(A) was justified in rejecting claims related to the exemption and non-deduction of taxes.\nThe appellant-bank was required to prove that tax was duly deducted, and no interference was warranted in the CIR(A)s decision.\nThe appeals related to tax years beyond the six-year period stipulated in Section 174(3) were accepted, vacating the orders under Section 161.\nThe appellant-banks claim for deductions based on the provisions for non-performing advances was upheld, with the correct figure of gross advances to be used in the calculation.\nThe issue of compensation for delayed refunds was resolved in favor of the department, confirming its taxability based on relevant case law.\nCitations:\nSection 120 & 122(5A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nSection 62 & 135 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979\nSupreme Court Judgment: The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited (2021) 124 TAX 211\nLahore High Court Judgment in PTR 196 of 2009", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122(5A)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=62,135", - "Case #": "ITA No.68 and 69/LB/2013, ITA No.57/LB/2013 and ITA No.1287/LB/2013, decided on 17.01.2023, heard on: 15.11.2022\nITA No.1356 to 1363/LB/2013, ITA No.176 to 179/LB/2013, ITA No.2124 and 2125/LB/2012, ITA No.180/LB/2013, ITA No.2102/LB/2012 and ITA No.989/LB/2013", - "Judge Name:": " DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Mansoor Beg, Advocate for the Appellant/Respondent.\nNemo for the Respondent/Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED, LAHORE\nVS\nTHE CIR, LTU, LAHORE\nITA No.1356 to 1363/LB/2013, ITA No.176 to 179/LB/2013, ITA No.2124 and 2125/LB/2012, ITA No.180/LB/2013, ITA No.2102/LB/2012 and ITA No.989/LB/2013\nTHE CIR, LTU, LAHORE\nVs\nALLIED BANK LIMITED, LAHORE \nITA No.68 and 69/LB/2013, ITA No.57/LB/2013 and ITA No.1287/LB/2013, decided on 17.01.2023" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23880", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2330 = 2023 SLD 2330 = (2023) 128 TAX 302", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTc", - "Key Words:": "Topic: FED Charge on A.S.P. Support Revenue - Franchise Services under the Federal Excise Act\nDetails: The appellant, a private limited company, was involved in supplying hardware and sublicensing software with related services to customers across Pakistan, under a distribution agreement with foreign entities. The Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) issued show cause notices and later orders-in-original, demanding Federal Excise Duty (FED) on franchise services, with penalties under Section 19(1) and default surcharge under Section 8. The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-1) upheld these orders. However, the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ruled in favor of the appellant, but the Islamabad High Court remanded the case back to the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh decision after the department filed a reference application.\nHeld:\n•\nThe revenue under ‘APS Support’ does not constitute ‘franchise services,’ and hence, the FED demand, along with default surcharge and penalty, was deleted.\n•\nThe appellant is not considered a distributor under the Federal Excise Act, and its relationship with foreign entities is not classified as a franchise.\n•\nThe focus should be on the substance of the business arrangement rather than its form.\nCitations:\n•\nHamza Nasir Wire (2018 PTD 1071)\n•\n2020 SCMR 1822\n•\nHonda Atlas Car Pakistan (2016 PTD 1328)\n•\nHabib Insurance Co., Ltd v. Commissioner Income Tax, Karachi (PLD 1985 SC 109)\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Gammon (Pak) Ltd, Karachi (1966) 14 Tax 304\n•\nSiemens AG (1991 PTD 488)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=2(12a),2(46),3(1)(d),4(3),8, 2, 2(2),14,19(1),43A,43A(2)", - "Case #": "FEA No.35 and 36/IB/2017 and FEA No.15/IB/2021 decided on 15.01.2023, heard on:19.12.2022", - "Judge Name:": " M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Asim Ali Zulfiqar, FCA and Mr. Muhammad Raza, FCA for the Appellants.\nMr. Imran Shah, DR for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ORACLE SYSTEMS PAKISTAN (PVT) LTD., KARACHI\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, UNIT-24, LTU, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23881", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2331 = 2023 SLD 2331 = (2023) 128 TAX 334", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTY", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 - De-registration, Blacklisting, and Suspension of Registration\nDetails: The case revolves around the suspension and potential blacklisting of the appellants registration due to the claim of inadmissible input tax adjustments. The appellant was accused of participating in tax fraud, specifically through flying invoices, resulting in the suspension of their registration. A show cause notice was issued, proposing blacklisting for fraudulent activities. The appellant contested the actions, arguing that they were based on suspicion without proper inquiry or proof of fraud. The case concerns the interpretation of provisions related to suspension of registration, input tax claims, and tax fraud.\nHeld: The suspension of registration and blacklisting of the appellant was deemed premature and legally invalid. The CIR (Collector of Income Tax) must first establish tax fraud or the issuance of fake invoices before taking such severe actions. The department failed to present evidence of fraud or fake invoices, and the actions were not based on due process. Consequently, the impugned order and show cause notice were struck down, and the appellants registration status was restored.\nCitations: PTCL 2018 CL 476, 2015 PTD (Trib.) 1643, W.P. No. 6990/2012, 1985 SCMR 365, 2003 SCMR 370, 2007 PTD 2188, 2016 SCMR 550, PTCL 2016 CL 630, PTCL 2017 CL 239, 2015 PTD 2256, 2018 PTD 986, PTCL 2019 CL 78, PTCL 2019 CL 97, PTCL 1993 CL 539, 2012 PTD (Trib.) 337, 2012 PTD (Trib.) 654, PTCL 2020 CL 142, PTCL 2018 CL 570, PTCL 2019 CL 476, 2016 PTD 467, 2005 SCMR 1814, 2005 SCMR 678, 2012 SCMR 1235, 2012 CLC 1236", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),3(A),3(3)(a),11(2),21,21(2),21(4),23,33,34,73Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12,(12(2)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No.799/LB/2021 decided on 17.06.2021, heard on: 10.06.2021", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, CHAIRMAN AND DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate, for the Appellant. \nMrs. Kiran Maqsood, (DR), for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAST ENGINEERING, FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23882", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2332 = 2023 SLD 2332 = 2023 SCMR 1724", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTU", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 114, 147, 148 & 149-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail, refusal of-In the ocular account a specific role had been ascribed to the accused-petitioner-Admittedly death of deceased was caused due to fire arm injuries-All the accused persons, including the petitioner, were armed with firearm weapons, the details of which were mentioned in the FIR-Offence was said to have been committed by the petitioner and other co-accused when the complainant party was cultivating their own land, therefore, the possibility of common object which stands for and connotes a prearrangement and common intention/objective of committing the murder of the deceased could not be ruled out-Delay of one day in lodging FIR had already considered by the High Court with ample reasoning which was not fatal to the prosecution case in the given circumstances-Co-accused assigned a similar role to that of petitioner was refused pre-arrest bail by the High Court and he subsequently withdrew his bail application from the Supreme Court, as a result of which he was still behind bars-So far as the plea of alibi was concerned, no proper details were provided to demonstrate that the petitioner was actually behind bars in some other case and on which date and time he was released by the Magistrate in the other case-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, and petitioner was refused bail.\nZaigham Ashraf v. The State 2016 SCMR 18 and Chaudhary Nadeem Sultan v. The State 2022 SCMR 663 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,114,147,148,149", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 52-K of 2023, decided on 17th August, 2023.\n(Against Order dated 06.03.2023 passed by the Sindh High Court Bench at Sukkur in Criminal Bail Application No. S-399 of 2022)\nheard on: 17th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Munib Akhtar, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ubedullah Ghoto, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nHussain Bux Baloch, Additional A.G., M. Yasin, SHO and M. Aslam, SI for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALLAH DEWAYO SHAHANI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General, Sindh-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23883", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2333 = 2023 SLD 2333 = 2023 SCMR 1642", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Scholarship Programme-Eligibility-Allegation of interpolation with regard to date of birth-Evidence presented by School Headmaster-No disputed questions of fact-High Court reached the conclusion that the date of birth of the respondent-candidate was the one being claimed by him and this was also authenticated and verified by the Headmaster on production of original record/extract from the schools admissions register-Merely directing one of the respondents to produce some documents for verification does not amount to an indulgence to resolve a factual controversy or a disputed question of fact-In order to resolve the issue of date of birth of a minor, the most appropriate authority was the Headmaster of the school who appeared and confirmed the correct date of birth as per the available record-In the present case, the question of ascertaining correct date of birth of the respondent did not require any external aid much less any oral evidence, but it was verified through documentary evidence produced by the Headmaster of the School, who was one of the respondents in the writ petition-Production of documents and verification by the Headmaster on notice of the High Court cannot be categorized within the realm and sphere of disputed question of facts-High Court is not powerless to undertake an enquiry on the basis of affidavits and admitted documents filed by the parties-High Court had rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is intended to provide an expeditious remedy in a case where the illegality of an impugned action can be established without any elaborate enquiry or recording of evidence-However if some complicated or disputed question of facts are involved, the adjudication of which is only possible to be resolved and decided by the Courts of plenary jurisdiction after recording evidence of the parties, then obviously the High Court should not embark on to decide convoluted issues of facts.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 614-P of 2022, decided on 3rd April, 2023.\n(Against Order dated 20.04.2022 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat in W.P. No.48-M of 2022)heard on: 3rd April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J. and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sultan Mazhar Sher Khan, Additional A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA though Chief Secretary Civil Secretariat, Peshawar and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nSHAH FAISAL WAHAB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23884", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2334 = 2023 SLD 2334 = 2023 SCMR 1645", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Gift-\n-Proof-Generally, the Courts follow a liberal approach towards evidence produced to prove the essential ingredients for a lawful gift, when it relates to one being gifted to a woman or minor child and that too by a close relative.\nGhulam Hassan v. Sarfraz Khan PLD 1956 SC 309; Alif Khan v. Mst. Mumtaz Begum and another 1998 SCMR 2124 and MZ Abbasi and SA Cheema, Family Laws in Pakistan (Oxford University Press 2018) ref.\n(b) Gift-\n-Proof-Alleged gift made by a brother in favour of his sister-Not proved-In the present case, apart from the admission of the objecting-son (respondent-plaintiff) regarding the possession of the disputed gifted property with the appellant-sister (donee), there was no reliable evidence to prove the actual transaction of an offer made by late donor and the same being accepted by his sister (alleged donee), so as to constitute a valid gift being made-In fact, the evidence so produced by the appellant-donee was essentially relating to the steps taken after the alleged oral gift was made, and in particular, the recording of the said gift in the revenue record-When the basic foundation of a fact was lacking, no legal superstructure could be built thereon-Though the effort was made to prove the entry of the gift being recorded in the revenue record, but proving the same could never substitute evidence to prove the essential ingredients of the original transaction of gift made by late donor to his sister (alleged donee)-Respondent failed to prove the instrument of gift mutation in line with the requirement of Article 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, as she examined only one witness of subject gift mutation, instead of two-Furthermore neither the concerned Revenue Officer or the Halqa Patwari were produced nor any effort was made for them to be produced through a court order-Original record of the mutation and Rapt Roznamcha was also not produced in the court to establish the genuineness of the mutation-Said deficiencies were enough to discredit the impugned mutation-In the instant case, there was no evidence produced by the appellant to substantiate her claim of receiving a valid gift of the disputed gift property from her deceased brother-Appeal was dismissed.\nHafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din PLD 2011 SC 241; Mst. Rabia Gula v. Muhammad Junan 2022 SCMR 1009 and Ghulam Farid v. Sher Rehman 2016 SCMR 862 ref.\n(c) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n-S. 42-Mutation entries-Scope-Mutation is always sanctioned through summary proceedings and to keep the record updated and for collection of revenue such entries are made in the relevant Register under section 42 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967-Mutation has no presumption of correctness prior to its incorporation in the record of rights-Entries in mutation are admissible in evidence but the same are required to be proved independently by the persons relying upon it through affirmative evidence-Oral transaction reflected therein does not necessarily establish title in favour of the beneficiary-Mutation cannot by itself be considered a document of title-Proving a mutation can never vest title in a party over immovable property.\nMuhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 2121 of 2017, decided on 24th July, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 19.10.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Civil Revision No. 77-D of 2011)heard on: 22nd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Zamir Hussain, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nRaja Nadeem Haider, Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link, Lahore) for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "REHMAT NOOR-Appellant\nVersus\nZULQARNAIN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23885", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2335 = 2023 SLD 2335 = 2023 SCMR 1652", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 100 & O. XLI, R. 31-Second appeal-Scope of jurisdiction of High Court in Second Appeal under section 100, C.P.C. stated.\nThe jurisdiction of a High Court under section 100, C.P.C. is constricted to appeals encompassing a substantial question of law rather than causing interference on a pure question of fact and, while taking cognizance by means of second appeal under section 100, C.P.C., it is a foremost fragment of jurisdiction to formulate the question of law which is inherent in the spirit of such jurisdiction, hence, for all intents and purposes, the requirements of Order XLI, Rule 31, C.P.C. must be complied with, however, if it is conceivable from the judgment that substantial compliance has been made whereby the cause of justice has not suffered or depreciated, that would be sufficient for the safe administration of justice despite non-adherence to the said Rule stricto sensu. Instead the litmus test is to visualize from the perusal of the judgment whether the controversy between the parties has been decided with proper appraisement, weighing and balancing the evidence and law and, if it is manifested from the judgment, then obviously it would be valid even though it does not contain the points for determination.\nMir Abdullah v. Muhammad Ali and 2 others 1977 SCMR 280; Mst. Naziran Begum through Legal Heirs v. Mst. Khurshid Begum through Legal Heirs 1999 SCMR 1171; Abdul Majid and others v. Khalil Ahmad PLD 1955 Federal Court 38; Durga Chowdhrani v. Jawahir Singh Chowdhri ILR 18 Cal. 23; Keramat Ali and another v. Muhammad Yunus Haji and others PLD 1963 SC 191; Pathana v. Mst. Wasai and another PLD 1965 SC 134; Muhammad Khan v. Mst. Rasul Bibi PLD 2003 SC 676; Shah Muhammad v. Sardar Habibullah Khan and others 1988 SCMR 72; Muhammad Tufail and 2 others v. Ghaus Muhammad through Legal Representatives PLD 2007 SC 26; Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh and others AIR 1961 SC 1097 and State Bank of India and others v. S.N. Goyal AIR 2008 SC 2594 ref.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-Ss. 96 & 100-Appeals under sections 96 & 100, C.P.C-Distinction stated.\nThere is a marked distinction between two appellate jurisdictions; one is conferred by section 96, C.P.C. in which the Appellate Court may embark upon the questions of fact, while in the second appeal provided under section 100, C.P.C., the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first Appellate Court, rather the jurisdiction is somewhat confined to the questions of law which is sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under section 100, C.P.C. The High Court cannot surrogate or substitute its own standpoint for that of the first Appellate Court, unless the conclusion drawn by lower fora is erroneous or defective or may lead to a miscarriage of justice, but the High Court cannot set into motion a roving enquiry into the facts by examining the evidence afresh in order to upset the findings of fact recorded by the first Appellate Court.\nMir Abdullah v. Muhammad Ali and 2 others 1977 SCMR 280; Mst. Naziran Begum through Legal Heirs v. Mst. Khurshid Begum through Legal Heirs 1999 SCMR 1171; Abdul Majid and others v. Khalil Ahmad PLD 1955 Federal Court 38; Durga Chowdhrani v. Jawahir Singh Chowdhri ILR 18 Cal. 23; Keramat Ali and another v. Muhammad Yunus Haji and others PLD 1963 SC 191; Pathana v. Mst. Wasai and another PLD 1965 SC 134; Muhammad Khan v. Mst. Rasul Bibi PLD 2003 SC 676; Shah Muhammad v. Sardar Habibullah Khan and others 1988 SCMR 72; Muhammad Tufail and 2 others v. Ghaus Muhammad through Legal Representatives PLD 2007 SC 26; Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh and others AIR 1961 SC 1097 and State Bank of India and others v. S.N. Goyal AIR 2008 SC 2594 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=100,31", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 307 of 2017, decided on 29th March, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 11.01.2017 passed by Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi in Regular Second Appeal No. 03 of 2014)heard on: 29th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J. and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Junaid Iftikhar Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nAzmatullah Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUZAFAR IQBAL-Appellant\nVersus\nMst. RIFFAT PARVEEN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23886", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2336 = 2023 SLD 2336 = 2023 SCMR 1660", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXI, R. 90-Execution of decree in favour of Bank-Auction proceedings-Objection petition regarding fraud in the passing of the decree and the sale carried out there-under-Judgment debtor in question was alive at the time of the compromise decree as well as the finalization of the sale of his share in the mortgaged property-Said judgment debtor did not challenge any of the actions taken in the proceedings leading to the decree and its realization in favour of the respondent decree holder Bank until his death on 08.10.2006-However, on 08.12.2007 his heirs i.e. respondents filed an application under Order XXI, Rule 90 of the C.P.C. alleging fraud in the passing of the decree and the sale carried out there-under-Held, that whereas the respondents disputed the compromise decree they brought no grievance against it before the Supreme Court-Moreover, the respondents objections fail to disclose particulars of any fraud, illegality or irregularity alleged against the co-judgment-debtors one of whom was the petitioner before the Court-Present matter pertained to a decree passed in 1981 and satisfied in 2001 by sale of the shares of all nine co-owners of the mortgaged property accomplished through their compromise with the decree holder Bank-Predecessor of the respondents never challenged the decree nor the execution of the decree during his life time; he was aware of the proceedings because he was the Managing Director of the company that had committed default in repayment of loans to the respondent decree holder Bank-Decree was ultimately settled through contribution by all the judgment debtors, namely, the nine co-owners of the mortgaged property sold under the decree to settle the liability of the judgment debtor company-Respondents and their predecessor waited for six years to challenge in 2007 the sale of the mortgaged property effected in 2001-No explanation for the delay occasioned had been given by the respondents-Respondents belatedly approached the executing Court in 2007 to incompetently dispute the consent decree passed by the Supreme Court in the year 2000 before the wrong forum-In any event, the said objections failed to disclose any fraud committed by the other judgment debtors including the petitioner and decree holder Bank-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed.\n(b) Limitation-\n-All objections regarding liability and its discharge come to a close after the lapse of the limitation period.\n(c) Practice and procedure-\n-Notice-Party residing outside Pakistan-Under the law service by publication is good service even in respect of parties living abroad.\nLilaram v. Ghulam Ali 1991 SCMR 932; Mir Wali Khan v. Manager, ADBP PLD 2003 SC 500 and Muhammad Attique v. Jami Limited PLD 2010 SC 993 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=90", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4779 of 2019, decided on 26th October, 2021.\n(On appeal from the judgment/order dated 04.09.2019 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in FAB 28-P of 2010)heard on: 26th October, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Wasim Sajjad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nM. Tariq Javed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 - 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Qazi HUMAYUN-Petitioner\nVersus\nMst. SABIHA QAYUM and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23887", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2337 = 2023 SLD 2337 = 2023 SCMR 1665", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-Ss. 5 & 14-Appeal, filing of-Limitation-Condonation of delay-Failure to explain delay in filing appeal-Petitioner (defendant) had failed to appear before the Trial Court willfully despite being provided with more than enough opportunities-Appeal of petitioner was also hopelessly barred by time and she failed to explain the delay so caused in filing of appeal reasonably-Contention of the petitioner that delay occurred because the petitioner filed an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. before the Trial Court due to which she could not file appeal within time was not sustainable as petitioner had knowledge and was party to the suit-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nDr. Syed Sibtain Raza Naqvi v. Hydrocarbon Development and others 2012 SCMR 377 ref.\n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 5-Condonation of delay-Discretionary power of Court-Power to condone the delay and grant an extension of time under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is discretionary.\n(c) Limitation-\n-Law providing for limitation for various causes/reliefs is not a matter of mere technicality but foundation of the law itself.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=5,14", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 174-Q of 2021, decided on 11th May, 2023.\n(Against judgment dated 26.04.2021 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Civil Revision No. 380 of 2017)\nheard on: 11th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdullah Khan Kakar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. MUSARAT PARVEEN-Petitioner\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD YOUSAF and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23888", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2338 = 2023 SLD 2338 = 2023 SCMR 1676", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQXo", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 94 & 265-C-Summons to produce documents-Powers of Trial Court under section 94, Cr.P.C.- Scope- Even before the commencement of the trial, an accused can apply to the Trial Court to exercise its power under section 94, Cr.P.C., and direct the prosecution or the complainant to produce a document, in its or his possession or power, which is not covered under section 265-C, Cr.P.C., if the production of that document is necessary or desirable for the purposes of the inquiry or trial-Even before entering on his defence, an accused can make an application for the production of a document under section 94, Cr.P.C. despite the provisions of section 265-F(7), Cr.P.C., which provides a similar opportunity to him at the stage of defence evidence.\nA bare reading of section 94, Cr.P.C. shows that there is no limitation as to the stage of the inquiry or trial when a court can, in the exercise of its power under this Section, make an order for the production of any document. The only condition for the exercise of the power under section 94 is that the production of the document must be necessary or desirable for the purposes of the inquiry or trial before the court. The word whenever in section 94 clearly indicates that a court can exercise the power of requiring the production of any document under this section at any stage of the inquiry or trial.\nFurther, section 94 does not restrict as to whose point of view, whether of the prosecution or the accused, the required document may be necessary or desirable for the purposes of the inquiry or trial. A court being a neutral arbiter does not act for either the prosecution or the accused but for the dispensation of justice. And for the dispensation of justice, the court is to ascertain the truth in respect of the matter under inquiry or trial before it. The production of a document that would facilitate the court in this regard is to be considered necessary or desirable for the purposes of the inquiry or trial. It is immaterial whether the production of such a document would support the prosecution case or the defence of the accused. Therefore, any party may at any stage of the inquiry or trial apply to the court, under section 94, for the production of a document and is entitled to its production if it satisfies the court that the production of that document is necessary or desirable for the purposes of such inquiry or trial.\nMuhammad Rahim v. Emperor AIR 1935 Sindh 13 ref.\nThere may be cases in which owing to dishonesty, negligence or any other reason, the prosecution does not produce certain documents with the police report, which may establish that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence or the charge against the accused is groundless, and the production thereof is thus necessary or desirable for the purposes of the inquiry or trial. But because such documents are not filed with the police report, the same will not be supplied to the accused under section 265-C, Cr.P.C. In such cases, it would not be just and fair to the accused to reject his application for the production of such documents and to let him undergo the ordeal of protracted trial proceedings and wait for the stage of defence evidence. Similarly, the documents which are not produced by the prosecution with the police report but are relevant to the matter under the inquiry or trial and to use them for his defence, the accused is legally required to confront the prosecution witnesses with those documents in their cross-examination. In such a circumstance also, it would be in the interest of justice that the application of the accused made under section 94 for their production is allowed. Otherwise, it would incur unnecessary delay, expense and inconvenience to recall the prosecution witnesses at the stage of defence evidence only for the purpose of confronting them with such documents.\nThe provision of subsection (7) of section 265-F, Cr.P.C., under which the accused, after entering on his defence, can apply to the trial court to issue any process for compelling the production of any document, does not in any way affect the power of the trial court under section 94(1), Cr.P.C. The provisions of section 94(1) have not been made subordinate by the legislature by the use of the expression, Subject to the other provisions of this Code, nor have the provisions of section 265-F(7) been given any overriding effect by using therein the expression, Notwithstanding anything contained in other provisions of this Code. Section 265-F(7), therefore, neither controls nor limits the power of a court under section 94(1). In essence, the provisions of these two Sections differ from each other in their extent and scope. They are not opposed to each other. Section 94(1) affords both the parties to an inquiry or trial (not to the accused alone) the opportunity of causing the production of any document at any stage of such inquiry or trial, with the condition that the party applying for it must satisfy the court that the production of the required document is necessary or desirable for the purposes of the inquiry or trial. Section 265-F(7), on the other hand, only gives the accused another similar opportunity at the stage of his defence subject to a lesser condition, which is that his application should not be for the purpose of vexation or delay or defeating the ends of justice.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=94,265", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 112 of 2020, decided on 15th June, 2023.\n(Against the judgment of the Islamabad High Court, dated 15.01.2020 passed in Criminal Revision No.84 of 2019)heard on: 15th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Tanveer Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court, Raja Muhammad Shahfqat Abbasi, D.A.G., Hafiz Bilal Bin Akbar, Deputy Director, DRAP and Ms. Sidra Fatima Hashmi, Assistant Director, FIA for Petitioner.\nKhawaja Muhammad Farooq Mehta, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The STATE-Petitioner\nVersus\nChaudhry MUHAMMAD USMAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23889", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2339 = 2023 SLD 2339 = 2023 SCMR 1683", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpQXk", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Ordinance (XXIII of 1978)-\n-S. 21(i)-Market Committee-Allotment of shops/plots, cancellation of-Non-payment of outstanding dues-Remand of matter to the Chairman, Market Committee-High Court held that the act of cancellation by the Chairman Market Committee was not justified and, more particularly, despite cancellation, dues were received which act also nullified the resumption/cancellation-High Court set aside the impugned orders and the matter was remanded to the Chairman, Market Committee to pass appropriate orders after providing an opportunity of audience to the occupants in order to determine the outstanding amount-Propriety-Despite clear observations by the Supreme Court in earlier round of litigation on 18.3.2010, no prompt or swift action was taken by the Market Committee and cancellation notice was issued at belated stage on 22.01.2016 which exhibited the reckless conduct of the Market Committee which waited for such a long time and postponed setting the law into motion for initiating cancellation move at their own will and conscience-Market Committee received the amount without demur and also issued payment challans, therefore, in such a situation, the action of outrightly cancelling the shops/plots was unfair and inequitable, therefore, it would be befitting in the interest of justice and fair-mindedness that the Chairman, Market Committee should determine the gravity of the default, reconcile from the record the amount paid by the occupants including those who have already paid full amount and also determine the liability of the accrued surcharge and penalty, if any, unpaid which crucial subject matter could not be reconciled or adjudicated in the writ jurisdiction but could be decided by the Chairman Market Committee so that the matter may attain finality after such protracted litigation-If the matter is reconsidered within the realm of the directions issued by the High Court, no prejudice will be caused to anyone, rather it would be beneficial to all and easier for the Authority to reconcile from the record the quantum of payment made so far by the alleged defaulters, the defaulted amount, as well as the determination of the up-to-date surcharge and penalty as per the terms and conditions of the allotment and pass order in accordance with law for further proceedings-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 6406 to 6434 of 2021, decided on 13th June, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 15.11.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court Multan Bench in W.Ps. Nos. 805 to 808, 322 to 339 of 2020, 1906 to 1908 of 2019, 1139 of 2020 and 7731 to 7733 of 2019)\nheard on: 13th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J. and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Ramzan Khalid Joiya, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in all cases).\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MARKET COMMITTEE, MULTAN through Chairman and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER (CONSOLIDATION), MULTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23890", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2340 = 2023 SLD 2340 = 2023 SCMR 1691", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODc", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 25(1)-Police official-Assistant Sub-Inspector in Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF)-Allegation of illegally snatching money from a civilian at a picket-Discrimination in award of penalty-Dismissal from service converted into minor penalty-Petitioner along with three other ANF officials was charge-sheeted for illegally taking/snatching an amount of Rs.103,000/- from a person K and a joint inquiry in this regard was conducted by Deputy Director, ANF-After inquiring into the matter, the Inquiry Officer recommended imposition of minor penalties on the three co-accused, whereas petitioner was removed from service-Statement of person K showed that case of the petitioner was not distinguishable from the other three co-accused-Petitioner had 33 years of unblemished service on his part and during present proceedings, his retirement age had passed-After serving the department for such a long period, the pensionary benefits were the right of an employee, which enabled him to spend rest of his life peacefully-By dismissing the petitioner from service while awarding minor penalties to the other officials, the petitioner had been discriminated against and the Service Tribunal did not take into consideration this aspect of the matter-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment to the extent of the petitioner was set-aside and the department was directed to treat the petitioner similar to his co-accused by awarding him minor penalty, and that if the date of retirement of the petitioner had passed, all pensionary benefits for which he was entitled, shall be given to him within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of present order.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 873 of 2021, decided on 25th July, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 02.02.2021 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 12(L) of 2017)heard on: 25th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Manzar Abbas Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nCh. Ehtisham ul Haq, Special Prosecutor ANF and Muhammad Tariq, Joint Director Law, ANF for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YASEEN-Petitioner\nVersus\nSECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NARCOTICS CONTROL, NARCOTICS CONTROL DIVISION, ISLAMABAD and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23891", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2341 = 2023 SLD 2341 = 2023 SCMR 1694", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]-\n-Ss. 22 & 30-Fauji Foundation-Income from interest on Bank deposits-Whether such income is to be considered and taxed as income from other sources or as income from business-Held, that respondent-taxpayer/Fauji Foundation is a welfare trust which derives income from business activities for undertaking welfare projects-Essentially it utilises income earned from its investments for the collective benefit of the beneficiaries of the Foundation-Hence, it is the business of the Foundation to invest in business to raise income, for the purposes of its welfare projects-Foundation can invest in industrial undertakings or otherwise, and any surplus income from these undertakings are to be utilized for the benefit of the Foundations beneficiaries-In this context interest from bank deposits is also surplus income, used to carry out the objectives of the Foundation-Hence, it is business income and not income from other sources-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]-\n-Ss. 22 & 30-Income from other sources or income from business-Determination-In cases where the dispute relates to determining whether its business income or income from other sources, the facts have to be duly considered so as to determine the objects of the assessee company, its functions and its memorandum of association or foundation documents-Once the primary business and functions are verified, the business activities need to be assessed to see it in the perspective of the declared objects and functions-Hence, the actual work of the assessee, its tax returns and how it treats its income has to be considered, to determine whether its income is business income or income from other sources.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=22,30", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3121 to 3125 of 2021, decided on 10th June, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 18.01.2021 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, passed in Income Tax References Nos.06/2003, 53 to 56/2007)\nheard on: 10th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Shazia Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court, Kamranullah, Additional Commissioner and Naeem Hassan, Secretary Litigation (FBR) for Petitioner.\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Zahid Nawaz Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Lahore) for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE, ISLAMABAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs FAUJI FOUNDATION LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23892", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2342 = 2023 SLD 2342 = 2023 SCMR 1698", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 376-Rape-Testimony of a victim in cases of sexual offences-Significance-Such testimony is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of a statement, the courts should find no difficulty to solely rely on the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault to convict the accused-However, the strict condition for this is that the same shall reflect that it is independent, unbiased and straightforward to establish the accusation against the accused and if the court finds it difficult to accept victims version, it may seek corroboration from some evidence which lends assurance to her version.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 376-Rape-Reappraisal of evidence-Implausible incident-DNA report inconclusive-Past conduct of victim adversely reflecting on her credibility-In the present case the victim was 49 years of age while the petitioner/accused was a young lad of 20 years at the time of commission of the alleged offence-Although it was not impossible that a twenty years old boy cannot commit zina with such an older woman but the story told by the victim was not plausible-According to her, the petitioners mother and his two sisters gave her some intoxicating drink, which made her unconscious and during this period, the petitioner and his friend committed rape with her-It is generally seen in our society that no matter how morally bad one is, he cannot do such kind of act in front of his mother and sisters-Story narrated by the victim did not appeal to reason to the mind of a prudent man-Victim was admittedly a married lady, therefore, medico legal report showing her hymen to be old ruptured was inconsequential-Victim had leveled a specific allegation of intoxicating material being administered to her but neither anything containing intoxicating material was recovered nor any intoxicating material was found in her blood in the medico legal report-Record reflected that the victim had lodged a similar kind of case against another person but the same ended in compromise later on-Such conduct of the victim adversely reflected on her credibility-DNA report was not conclusive and certain about the guilt of the petitioner-Victim had leveled allegation of rape against two persons but according to the report of Forensic Science Agency the co-accused of the petitioner was eliminated as being the contributor of male DNA-This meant that whatever the victim said was not entirely true-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was acquitted of the charge.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 376-Rape-DNA report-Scope-DNA report cannot be treated as primary evidence and can only be relied upon for the purposes of corroboration.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Heinous offences-Mere heinousness of the offence if not proved to the hilt is not a ground to punish an accused.\n(e) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Scope-For the accused to be afforded right of benefit of doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating uncertainty and if there is only one doubt, the benefit of the same must go to the accused.\nMst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 and Abdul Jabbar v. State 2019 SCMR 129 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=376", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 596-L of 2022, decided on 11th August, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.02.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 75142 of 2019)heard on: 11th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Sohail Dar, Advocate Supreme Court (Via video link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ATTA UL MUSTAFA-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23893", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2343 = 2023 SLD 2343 = 2023 SCMR 1703", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODQ", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 10A-Civil service-Appointment-Right of civil servant to be heard before declaring his appointment as illegal-Scope-Purported appointment letters did not mention that the petitioners were employed on contract basis, which fact was also verified from the appointment letters attached with the petitions and the advertisement inviting applications-Admittedly the petitioners had joined service, but their appointment letters were not issued by the competent authority, therefore, their appointments were subsequently withdrawn-Petitioners were never associated in any inquiry for the purpose of verifying the appointment letters or the appointment process, rather an inquiry was conducted against the former District Education Officer (DEO) who was allegedly responsible for managing the illegal appointments; but even with regard to him, there was no mention if any punitive action was taken against him for being involved in making the fake appointments whereby he fleeced and defrauded the department and petitioners both-Before declaring the appointments illegal or taking any drastic action against the petitioners, a drastic action should have been taken against the responsible person who committed illegality, if any, at the departmental level-Beneficiaries of the appointments could not be blamed alone because primarily the authority who had issued appointment letters in the recruitment process was bound to be punished first rather than the petitioners who had commenced their duties in view of the appointment letters-Keeping in mind all the attending circumstances, the department was bound to issue notice to the petitioners to show cause as to why their services should not be terminated and, in response, the petitioners might have appeared with the defence that the appointments were not illegal but issued after due process-Petitioners should have been afforded an opportunity of hearing, which was a fundamental right enshrined under Article 10A of the Constitution-Provincial Law Officer as well as the Deputy Secretary (Law) proposed that an inquiry committee may be constituted to consider/examine the appointment process of the present petitioners and to verify their credentials/antecedents to determine whether they were rightly appointed or appointed on the basis of fake appointment letters-Counsel for the petitioners agreed to such proposal-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed with relevant directions to examine the entire appointment process of the petitioners.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 903, 904, 905, 906 and 907 of 2023, decided on 3rd August, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 28.11.2022 passed by High Court of Sindh, Sukkur Bench in Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-1813, D-2159, D-3442 and D-3716 of 2013 and D-69 of 2014)\nheard on: 3rd August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Mumtaz Hussain Jai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner No. 14 (in C.P. No. 904 of 2023) and (Hamadullah Jatoi) in person.\nSuresh Kumar, Additional A.G., Sindh, Jawed Ali Khawaja, Dy. Secy. (Law), School Education and Literacy Dept., Government of Sindh (via Video Link from Karachi) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YASEEN and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary Education and Literacy Department, Government of Sindh at Karachi and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23894", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2344 = 2023 SLD 2344 = 2023 SCMR 1709", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpOC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S.37-Dangerous Drugs Act (II of 1930) [since repealed], S.35-C-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 12 & 188-Protection against retrospective punishment-Scope-Conviction and sentence recoded by a foreign court for possessing and distributing heroin-Forfeiture of property in Pakistan-By way of judgment under review, the Supreme Court declared the forfeiture of the properties of deceased-respondent (represented through his legal heirs) to be unlawful and hence set it aside-Plea on behalf of the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) was that the assets of the respondent could also have been forfeited under the provisions of Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 ( 1930 Act ) [since repealed] and it did not matter that section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1995 (the Ordinance) [since enacted as the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997] was promulgated on 07.8.1995 after the conviction and sentence against the respondent in the USA in the year 1993-Validity-Said submission was absolutely misconceived-Section 35-C of the 1930 Act did not envisage foreign conviction, which was for the first time introduced in section 37 of the Ordinance in 1995, hence the offence committed in the USA in the year 1993 could not possibly attract section 37 of the Ordinance of 1995-Such aspect had been dealt with in the judgment under review in great detail and the petitioner (ANF) could not be allowed to re-argue the case in review jurisdiction-No ground was made out for the review of the impugned judgment.\n(b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980-\n-O. XVII, R. 12 & O. XXVIII, R. 3-Counsel misleading the Court-Misrepresentation-Costs, imposition of-Counsel for the review petitioner tried to mislead the Court not once but twice by claiming that present matter had earlier been decided by the Supreme Court in earlier round of litigation-Such claim was not only incorrect but amounted to misrepresentation before the court-Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, subject to costs in the sum of Rs.10,000/- imposed under Order XVII, Rule 12 and Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980-Supreme Court directed that the costs shall be deposited by the counsel for the petitioner with any approved, recognized and well-known Charitable Organization and receipt thereof be submitted with the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court within a fortnight from the release of the present order, and that in case of failure to deposit the said amount within the stipulated period, the file of the case shall be put up before the Bench, on the administrative side, for appropriate orders.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997=37Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930=35Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=12,188", - "Case #": "Criminal Review Petition No. 5 of 2020, decided on 24th March, 2022.\n(Against the judgment of this Court dated 15.01.2020 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 01-L of 2015)\nheard on: 24th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zafar Iqbal Chohan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nWaqar Hassan Mir, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Present: Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ\nThe STATE through Deputy Director Law, Regional Directorate Anti-Narcotics Force, Punjab-Petitioner\nVersus\nTASNIM JALAL GORAYA (DECEASED) through LRs.-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23895", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2345 = 2023 SLD 2345 = 2023 SCMR 1712", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpOCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) & 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 420, 468 & 471-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Cheating, fraud and forgery- Ad-interim pre-arrest bail, confirmation of-Further inquiry-Complainant nominated the present petitioner (accused) and his other family members in his supplementary statement recorded after lapse of more than three months and eight days of the occurrence-Entire fraudulent transaction took place in a span of more than two years and no specific dates for commission of fraud had been given-Only basis to involve the petitioner in the case was the detail of his bank account, as the complainant suspected that the principal accused, who was son of petitioner, would have deposited the amount in petitioners account-Three co-accused of the petitioner had already been granted pre-arrest bail whereas the principal accused had been granted post-arrest bail by the court of competent jurisdiction-Possibility could not be ruled out that the petitioner had been involved in the case by throwing a wider net by the complainant-Mere fraud of huge amount was no ground to decline bail to an accused-Case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into his guilt-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the accused was confirmed.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Pre-arrest bail-Merits of the case-While granting pre-arrest bail, the merits of the case can be touched upon by the Court.\nMiran Bux v. The State PLD 1989 SC 347; Sajid Hussain alias Joji v. The State PLD 2021 SC 898; Javed Iqbal v. The State 2022 SCMR 1424 and Muhammad Ijaz v. The State 2022 SCMR 1271 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Registration of other cases of similar nature-Inconsequential-Mere registration of other criminal case against an accused does not disentitle him for the grant of bail if on merits he has a prima facie case.\nMoundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=420,468,471", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 701 of 2023, decided on 11th August, 2023.\n(On appeal against the order dated 29.05.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 12514-B of 2023)heard on: 11th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Jawwad Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Sharif Janjua, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner along with Petitioner in person.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G., Ashgar Ali, SI/IO and Ahsanullah, SI, Incharge Investigation for the State.\nMuhammad Javed Ch, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ch. SAEED AHMED KHALIL-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23896", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2346 = 2023 SLD 2346 = 2023 SCMR 1716", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 5-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Multiple connected Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal filed before the Supreme Court on the same question of law-One such Petition was barred by seven days-Supreme Court condoned such delay on the basis that it was a connected Petition, where the same question of law was involved.\nFBR through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Messrs Wazir Ali and Company and others 2020 SCMR 959 ref.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss. 25A, 25D & 81-Customs Rules, 2001, R. 125-Imported consignments-Valuation Ruling (the Ruling) issued by Customs department under section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969 (the Act)-Importers challenged the Valuation Ruling under section 25D of the Act, but at the same time also applied to the High Court for release of the consignments- High Court ordered release of imported consignments under section 81 of the Act read with Rule 125 of the Customs Rules, 2001-Legality-Basic issue in the present case was whether Section 81 of the Act is relevant and can be invoked where a Valuation Ruling has been issued under section 25A of the Act, for provisional release of the goods and secondly, whether section 81 of the Act can be invoked as of right before the High Court in such cases-Held, that purpose of section 81 of the Act is to make a provisional determination in a situation where an assessment cannot be made-In order to invoke section 81 of the Act, the Custom Officers must first satisfy themselves that it is not possible to assess the correctness of the value because it is necessary to first test the goods for further enquiry-Then and only then can the importer have the goods provisionally released under section 81 of the Act-Accordingly, section 81 cannot apply where a Valuation Ruling has been issued as the Valuation Ruling represents the declared value for the assessment of the goods or category of goods, which the importer is required to pay-As the Valuation Ruling is a formal decision providing the assessment value of the goods, the requirements of section 81 of the Act per se are not invoked-Consequently, where the goods are pre-assessed or capable of assessment, section 81 of the Act does not apply-Furthermore with respect to Rule 125 of the Customs Rules, 2001, the said Rule does not apply to cases where a Valuation Ruling has been issued, as it applies to cases where section 81 of the Act is applicable-Impugned orders of the High Court were, thus, against the mandate of the Customs Act, 1969, and were, therefore, set aside-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=5Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)Customs Act, 1969=25A,25D,81Customs Rules, 2001=125", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 323-L to 326-L of 2014, decided on 23rd February, 2022.\n(Against the orders dated 3.12.2013, 10.12.2013, 12.12.2013 and 10.1.2014, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Writ Petitions Nos. 31010, 31839 and 32085 of 2013 and 466 of 2014)heard on: 23rd February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sarfraz Ahmed Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in all cases).\nShahid Tasawar Rao, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (in C.Ps. Nos. 323-L to 325-L of 2014).\nEx-parte Respondent No. 1 (in C.P. 326-L of 2014).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CUSTOMS HOUSE, LAHORE and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nMessrs WASIM RADIO TRADERS, LAHORE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23897", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2347 = 2023 SLD 2347 = 2023 SCMR 1914", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpODg", - "Key Words:": "National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-\n-S. 31-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A-National Accountability Bureau (NAB)-Investigating Officer-Strictures recorded by the High Court, expunction of-Petitioners (Director General and Assistant Director in NAB) were not arrayed as parties to the appeal before the High Court, nor were they put to notice before recording the (adverse) observations against them-High Court may have been justified in highlighting the flaws and shortcomings, or even grave neglect in the investigations carried out by NAB, but the strong observations against the petitioners ought to have been avoided because of the profound consequences relating to their right to a fair trial in case of initiation of departmental proceedings or under section 31 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (Ordinance of 1999)-Strictures recorded by a High Court against an employed person who is subject to disciplinary proceedings are likely to prejudice the latters right to a fair trial-Strictures recorded by the High Court in the case in hand are in the nature of condemning the petitioners unheard since they were not served with any notice nor did they have an opportunity to put up a defence-High Court had highlighted the shortcomings and grave flaws relating to the manner in which the investigations had been conducted-Judicial precaution and propriety required restraint to have been shown by the High Court in recording of observations regarding the conduct, behavior and integrity of the petitioners-Decision whether to proceed against the petitioners should have been left to the competent authority of the NAB because there was no reason to presume that the latter, after taking into consideration the observations made by the High Court regarding the investigations, would not have acted in accordance with law-Strictures recorded by the High Court against the petitioners, therefore, infringed their right to a fair trial and are thus not sustainable-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed to the extent of expunging the strictures recorded against the petitioners in the impugned judgment.\nMs. Nusrat Yasmin v. Registrar, Peshawar High Court and others PLD 2019 SC 719 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "National Accountability Ordinance, 1999=31Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=31", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 806 of 2022 and Criminal Petition No.689 of 2022, decided on 17th November, 2022.\n(Against the order dated 28.4.2022 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Criminal Appeals Nos.50/2020, 51/2020, 30/2020 and Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2020)heard on: 17th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Ayesha A. Malik and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Inaam Ameen Minhas, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Criminal Petition No. 689 of 2022).\nMuhammad Amjad Iqbal Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Criminal Petition No. 806 of 2022).\nSattar Muhammad Awan, D.P.G., NAB for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Col. (Retd.) SUBH SADIQ MALIK and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE through Chairman, NAB, Islamabad-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23898", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2348 = 2023 SLD 2348 = 2023 SCMR 1732", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpOHo", - "Key Words:": "Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)-\n-Ss. 2, 3 & 5-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)-Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952), S. 2(1)(d)-Code of Conduct for Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts (framed by the Supreme Judicial Council under Article 209(8) of the Constitution), Art. IV-Trials of civilians under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952-Constitutionality-Judicial impartiality, principle of-Formation of Bench to hear present petitions-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court not consulting two senior most Judges of the Supreme Court before forming the Bench-Delay in deciding the petitions challenging the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023-Pattern in the Supreme Court of constituting Special Benches of some Judges (and not Full Court Bench) in cases of immense public importance-Recusal of a Judge from the Bench due to his relation with one of the petitioners-Observations, objections and notes recorded by certain Members of the Bench on different dates of hearing to the very constitution of the Bench hearing the present petitions provided.\nPer Qazi Faez Isa, J\nPer Sardar Tariq Masood, J\nI was also not consulted by the Chief Justice before putting me on the present Bench. Surprisingly, present petitions in this Bench have been fixed when just a day earlier one of the petitioners himself along with his counsel met the Chief Justice in his Chamber and thereafter on the next day these petitions have been fixed without any consultation or ascertaining my availability. If this practice is allowed then question is whether every petitioners/appellants whose petitions/appeals are lying in the Supreme Court since years can be allowed to meet the Chief Justice in the Chamber for getting fixed their cases on the very next day.\nI was awaiting the decision in the petitions through which the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ( the Act) has been challenged and expected that they would be decided soon as interim ex-parte stay order was issued which had suspended the operation of the then bill and the proposed Act. Section 3 of the Act stipulates that any matter invoking exercise of original jurisdiction under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution shall be first placed before the Committee constituted under section 2 for examination and if the Committee is of the view that a question of public importance with reference to enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution is involved, it shall constitute a Bench comprising not less than three Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which may also include the members of the Committee, for adjudication of the matter . However, the present matter was not referred to the Committee, of which I am a member. Only by presuming that the Act will be struck down, the mechanism provided in section 3 of the Act has been disregarded.\nSurprisingly present nine Members Bench was constituted on the assumption that the Act will be struck down because if it is not, than any party who is not satisfied with its decision, their right to appeal under section 5 of the Act would be made redundant because such an appeal is to be heard by a larger bench of the Supreme Court. Presently, the Supreme Court comprises of fifteen Judges and the Chief Justice, which makes a total of sixteen Judges. However, if the full court comprising of sixteen judges and the Chief Justice is available i.e. seventeen judges then an appeal would be heard by minimum of ten Judges which is not possible in the present situation, so the appeal if filed by either party would not be heard.\nI have not recused from the Bench, hence there was no question to sign the purported order in which it has been mentioned that new Bench will be constituted whereas my point of view was that present petitions be heard after the decision of the petitions which have been filed against the Act.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J\nIn the recent past there has been a consistent pattern and reluctance of not constituting the Full Court Bench (but instead Special Benches of some Judges) in cases of immense public importance that have far-reaching impact on the political, social and economic life of the people of Pakistan and their fundamental rights. The non-formation of the Full Court Bench has severely undermined the authority of the Court and the legitimacy of its judgments. The constitutional significance of the matter involved in the present case and its potential ramifications, call for the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Collective deliberations and diverse insights by all the judges in cases of public importance helps the Court arrive at a sound judgment and reinforces public confidence and trust in the Supreme Court.\nAdditionally until the Supreme Court decides the constitutionality of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, Section 3 of which prescribes the procedure for invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, all such matters under this jurisdiction must be heard by the Full Court Bench of the Supreme Court.\nPer Yahya Afridi, J\nThe entire edifice of a credible justice system is based on public trust. What is most serious and cannot be disregarded is that there are objections in writing from within the members of the Bench, to the very constitution of the Bench hearing the present petitions. In this regard, the Senior Puisne Judge has recorded in writing his said objections, and the same are by now in the public domain. Thus, the matter of the present composition of the Bench warrants urgent attention and reconsideration by the Chief Justice, lest it may dampen public trust in the justice system.\nAs a first step, the appropriate measure, would be that a Full Court Bench of the Supreme Court should be constituted to hear the present petitions. Without taking such a measure, any judgment rendered in present petitions by the present Bench may lead to the diminishing of the deference the decision requires and deserves. It is, therefore, most earnestly urged that the Chief Justice may consider the reconstitution of the present Bench, and refer the present petitions to a Full Court Bench.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J\nAlthough in a constitutional court, it is only for the judge concerned to decide according to his own conscience whether to recuse himself from hearing a case or not, he must in so deciding consider that his decision should not undermine the public trust in the impartiality of the court. For the appearance of his partiality would not only demean his reputation but also that of the institution of which he is a part. The insistence on the appearance of impartiality in the dispensation of justice is not some artificial attempt to mask imperfection in the judicial process, but rather an essential means of ensuring the reality of a fair adjudication. Both the appearance and reality of impartial justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus to the rule of law itself. Judicial impartiality upholds public trust, engenders predictability in the law, ensures fair trial, upkeeps the rule of law, and safeguards democracy. The principle of judicial impartiality, therefore, is not merely a moral imperative but a practical necessity to ensure justice, uphold democratic values, protect citizens rights, and maintain societal order.\nWilliams v. Pennsylvania 579 U.S. 1 (2016) per Justice Anthony Kennedy (Majority view) ref.\nJudges should not readily accede to the request for their recusal from hearing a case and decide the matter of their recusal after properly weighing the ground agitated for making such request. Where it is apparent that the perception of impartiality is being created for some ulterior motive without any sound basis, the judge must not yield to such strategy and abdicate performance of his duty. But if such a request is based on some reasonable ground which may genuinely raise doubt in the mind of a common person about the impartiality of the judge, the safest course for the judge is to accept such request in the larger interest of upholding public trust in the integrity and impartiality of the Court. In the present case, as one of the petitioners is admittedly my relative, a common person may not understand the difference between a petition filed in the public interest and a petition filed for personal interest. I, therefore, in the present case, find it preferable to accept the request and recuse myself from hearing the case. In order to safeguard the public trust in the integrity and impartiality of the Court, I recuse myself from hearing these petitions.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos. 24 to 26 of 2023 and C.M. Appeal No. 80 of 2023 in Constitutional Petition Nil of 2023.heard on: 22nd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Qazi Faez Isa, Sardar Tariq Masood, Ijaz ul Ahsan, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Munib Akhtar, Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kh. Ahmad Hosain, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No. 24 of 2023).\nSardar Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No. 25 of 2023).\nFaisal Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No. 26 of 2023).\nShoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court, Ajmal Ghaffar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.M. Appeal No. 80 of 2023).\nMansoor Usman Awan, Attorney General for Pakistan and Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional A.G.P. for the Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23899", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2349 = 2023 SLD 2349 = 2023 SCMR 1729", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpOHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) & 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 379-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)- Theft- Ad-interim pre-arrest bail, confirmation of-Further inquiry-Female accused-FIR was lodged after an inordinate delay of more than three months for which the complainant did not utter a single word-Co-accused of the petitioner, who was ascribed a similar role, had been granted post-arrest bail by the court of competent jurisdiction-Petitioner was a lady of advanced age-Maximum punishment provided under the statute for the offence under section 379, P.P.C. was three years and the same did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into her guilt-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the accused was confirmed.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Grant of bail in offences not falling within the prohibitory clause is a rule and refusal is an exception.\nTariq Bashir v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Pre-arrest bail-Merits of the case-While granting pre-arrest bail, the merits of the case can be touched upon by the Court.\nMiran Bux v. The State PLD 1989 SC 347; Sajid Hussain alias Joji v. The State PLD 2021 SC 898; Javed Iqbal v. The State 2022 SCMR 1424 and Muhammad Ijaz v. The State 2022 SCMR 1271 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=379Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 90-K of 2023, decided on 3rd August, 2023.\n(On appeal against the order dated 28.04.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Hyderabad in Criminal Bail Application No. S-362 of 2023)heard on: 3rd August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Khursheed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with Petitioner in person (Via video link from Karachi).\nZafar Ahmed Khan, Additional P.G. Sindh (Via video link from Karachi) for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUNAWAR BIBI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23900", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2350 = 2023 SLD 2350 = 2023 SCMR 1773", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 381 & 411-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Theft by clerk or servant of property in possession of master, dishonestly receiving stolen property-Pre-arrest bail, grant of-Entire fraudulent transaction took place in a span of more than four years and no specific dates for commission of theft have been given-FIR was lodged with an inordinate delay of 13 days for which the complainant did not utter a single word-Only allegation against the petitioner (accused) is that he used to purchase the stolen articles from the co-accused-Admittedly, petitioner was not employee of the complainant, therefore, the question of applicability of section 381, P.P.C. would be resolved by the Trial Court-All the co-accused of the petitioner have been granted post-arrest bail by the court of competent jurisdiction-Maximum punishment provided under the statute for the offence under section 411, P.P.C. is three years and the same does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Possibility cannot be ruled out that the petitioner has been involved in the case by throwing a wider net by the complainant-Mere allegation of causing huge loss is no ground to decline bail to an accused-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and petitioner was admitted to pre-arrest bail.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-For such offences grant of bail is the rule and refusal thereof an exception.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Pre-arrest bail-Merits of the case-While granting pre-arrest bail, the merits of the case can be touched upon by the Court.\nMiran Bux v. The State PLD 1989 SC 347; Sajid Hussain alias Joji v. The State PLD 2021 SC 898; Javed Iqbal v. The State PLD 2022 SCMR 1424 and Muhammad Ijaz v. The State 2022 SCMR 1271 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=381,411", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 62-L of 2023, decided on 23rd August, 2023.\n(On appeal against the order dated 18.01.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Misc. No. 70185-B of 2022)heard on: 23rd August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Akhtar Rana, Advocate Supreme Court and Tasneem Amin, Advocate-on-Record along with Petitioner in person (Via video link from Lahore).\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G., Nasir Abbas, DSP and Amir Ahmed, SI for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AZIZ alias MANA-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23901", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2351 = 2023 SLD 2351 = 2023 PTD 1776 = 2023 SCMR 1776 = 2024 PTCL 509 = (2024) 129 TAX 479", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDY", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011) - Sales Tax on Services\nDetails: The case involves the interpretation of the value of taxable services under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011. The issue was whether sales tax is levied on the gross amount charged, including salaries and allowances paid to security personnel and labor in the supply of services. The High Court ruled that sales tax is to be levied on the consideration for the service provided, and salaries, being reimbursable expenses, are not included in the taxable value of the service.\nHeld: The High Court concluded that the sales tax is applicable only to the value of the service rendered and does not include salaries paid to employees, as these are not part of the taxable service. Salaries are reimbursable expenses and not part of the taxable consideration. The scope of sales tax is restricted by the provisions of the Act and cannot include the salaries paid by the employer to employees.\nCitations: Suo Motu Case No. 13 of 2009 PLD 2011 SC 619, Suo Motu Case No. 11 of 2011 PLD 2014 SC 389\nDelegated Legislation\nDetails: This section discusses the nature and limits of delegated legislation, emphasizing that such legislation should aim to enforce the law without altering or expanding the scope of the parent statute. While delegated legislation can address specific details, it cannot amend or go beyond the framework set by the parent legislation.\nHeld: Delegated legislation must remain within the scope of the parent statute and cannot add to or subtract from it.\nCitations: Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630\nInterpretation of Statutes - Rules Framed Under a Statute\nDetails: The case addresses the relationship between rules and the parent statute. If a rule exceeds the scope of the parent statute, it must yield to the statute.\nHeld: Rules framed under a statute must not go beyond what the parent statute contemplates; otherwise, they are invalid and must yield to the statute.\nCitations: Collector of Central Excise and Sales Tax v. Rupali Polyester Limited 2002 SCMR 738", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services (Amendment) Ordinance, 2011=2(55A),2(78),3(1),4(3)(a),5(1)(a),8(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 414 of 2021, C.M.A. No. 1963 of 2021 in C.P. 414 of 2021, Civil Petitions Nos. 1188 to 1259, 475-K, 476-K, 1422 to 1430, 2819, 317-K to 389-K of 2021, 579 and 777 of 2022, decided on 12th October, 2022.\n(Against the judgments and orders dated 17.11.2020, 01.02.2021, 19.01.2021, 09.02.2021, 23.12.2021 and 19.01.2022, passed by the High Court of Sindh in C.Ps. Nos.D-5283, D-5220, D-5252 to D-5224, D-5244, D-5281, 5282, D-5284, D-5285, D-5449 to D-5452, D-5477 to D-5479, D-5586 to D-5588, D-5603, D-5612 to D-5614, D-5645, D-5690 to D-5694, D-5723, D-5733 to D-5735, D-5856, D-5926, D-5927, D-5936, D-5937, D-6017, D-6220, D-6226, D-6268, D-6453, D-6611, D-6622, D-6866, D-6888, D-7453, D-7610, D-7683, D-7987 of 2017, D-505, D-5146, D-5151, D-6126, D-6238 of 2018, D-443, D-4472, D-4473, D-5265, D-6608, D-6612, D-6613, D-8126 of 2019, D-344, D-494, D-495, D-1014, D-1468, D-1373, D-1867 of 2020, D-5691 of 2017, D-6124 of 2020, D-555, D-556, D-1275, 2544, D-2871, D-3469, D-3724, 6124 of 2018, D-8288 of 2017, D-8014 of 2018, D-5220, D-5603, D-5479, D-6622, D-5937, D-5451, D-7987, D-5285, D-7610, D-5693, D-5936, D-5477, D-5284, D-5690, D-5613, D-5586, D-6220, D-5927, D-5733, D-5223, D-7453, D-5587, D-5283, D-5692, D-5723, D-6866, D-5244, D-6226, D-5450, D-5735, D-5222, D-5449, D-5614, D-5612, D-5694, D-6611, D-6453, D-6017, D-7683, D-5478, D-6268, D-5645, D-5856, D-5224, D-5282, D-5281, D-5691, D-5588, D-5452, D-5734, D-5926, D-5273, D-6888 of 2017, D-6238, D-6126, D-505, D-5146 of 2018, D-4472, D-4473, D-6612, D-6608, D-8126, D-6613, D-5265, D-443 of 2019, D-5151 of 2018, D-495, D-1468, D-494, D-1014, D-1373, D-1867, D-344 of 2020, D-2968 of 2018 and D-7464 of 2021, respectively)\nDates of hearing: 29th September, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 11th and 12th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Chief Justice, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Justice and Ayesha A. Malik, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Uzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis M. Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. 414 and C.M.A. 1963 of 2021).\nAzid Nafees, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.Ps.1188 to 1259, 1422 to 1430, 2819 of 2021, 579 and 777 of 2022).\nSaifullah, Additional Advocate General, Sindh (via video link from Karachi) for Petitioners (in C.Ps.317-K to 389-K, 475-K and 476-K of 2021).\nMakhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Saad Hashmi, Advocate and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.Ps.320-K, 324-K, 330-K, 337-K, 340-K, 342-K, 345-K to 347-K, 351-K, 353-K, 356-K, 361-K, 366-K, 377-K, 378-K, 380-K and 385-K of 2021).\nAbdul Sattar Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.Ps.1207, 1208, 1226, 1245 and 1251 of 2021).\nZaheer Minhas, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.P.414 of 2021).\nFaisal Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.Ps.1222 of 2021 and 359-K of 2021).\nMoiz Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.Ps.348-K and 384-K of 2021).\nKhalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Karachi) for Security Services (in C.Ps.2819 of 2021 and\n475-K of 2021).\nNemo for other Respondents (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SINDH REVENUE BOARD through Secretary Government of Sindh,\nKarachi and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nMessrs QUICK FOOD INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23902", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2352 = 2023 SLD 2352 = 2023 SCC 1791", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-Ss. 2(t) & 9(c)-Possession and transportation of 10 kilograms of poppy plants-Reappraisal of evidence-Poppy plant, characteristics of-Poppy seeds-There is nothing in evidence as to what actually was recovered from the possession of the petitioner/accused; was it only the doda/basket/pouch or it was the whole plant with stems and flowers-In common parlance, often stems and leaves of the poppy plants are used as animal food-Poppy straw is derived from the plant Papaver somniferum, which has medicinal impact as well, and is largely used as a tonic for wellness of nervous system-Purpose of its cultivation is actually the production of poppy seeds, and the latter is used as a food stuff and as a raw material for manufacturing poppy-seed oil, which is used for making various varnishes, paints and soaps etc.-Therefore, every cultivation of poppy straw unless it is proved that it is made for the sole purpose of extracting narcotics after a proper method cannot be considered a criminal act-It has also not been brought on record as to whether from the ten kilograms of the recovered poppy plant, how much quantity was sack/pouch/doda as it is only the sack/pouch/doda which contains narcotic substance-Therefore, in absence of such report, it is difficult to determine as to whether the case against the petitioner falls within the purview of section 9(a), 9(b) or 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997-Peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case are sufficient to cast a shadow of doubt on the prosecution case, which entitles the petitioner to the right of benefit of the doubt-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Scope-For the accused to be afforded the right of benefit of doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating uncertainty and if there is only one doubt, the benefit of the same must go to the accused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=2(t),9(c)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 733-L of 2018, decided on 9th June, 2023.\n(On appeal against judgment dated 25.04.2018 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 65533 of 2017)heard on: 9th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rai Zamir-ul-Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BARKHURDAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23903", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2353 = 2023 SLD 2353 = 2023 SCMR 1797", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss. 25 & 8(1)(c)(a)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A-Allegation of issuing fake/flying invoices and claiming input tax against such invoices-Liability raised against tax payer based on presumptions-No attempt made by the Department to verify the invoices-In the present case the show cause notice was issued in a mechanical manner-Allegations were vague and the facts had not been verified-Moreover, the taxpayer was asked to establish that its suppliers i.e. the eight distinct entities had not made supplies and that they had not deposited the output tax in the government treasury-It was on this basis that it was presumed that the invoices were fake/flying and thus the input tax adjusted against such invoices was alleged to be inadmissible-Taxpayer was further asked to produce documents which were not required to be maintained under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (Act of 1990) at the relevant time-Department had issued a vague show cause notice pursuant to a report, without first making an inquiry of its own to verify the facts relating to the eight entities i.e whether they had deposited the tax in relation to the supply made to the taxpayer.\nBefore the issuance of the show cause notice no meaningful effort was made by the sales tax officials to conduct an audit nor was a proper inquiry made by exercising powers conferred under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (Act of 1990) in order to verify the allegations made in the report. The show cause notice was based on vague allegations and an assumption that, since some of the supplies were made by the eight entities which were involved in the issuance of fake/flying invoices, therefore, the invoices relating to such supplies must also have been of the same status. It was not the case of the Department that the eight entities were never engaged in business nor had made supplies. The taxpayer was asked by the sales tax authorities to provide documents which, at the relevant time, were not required to be maintained by a registered person.\nWhen the department alleges that a registered person is liable to make the payment of tax and the same has not been levied or charged, the former is burdened with a statutory duty to establish before the adjudicating forum, through persuasive and proper evidence, that the allegations are highly probable to be true, rather than being unreliable, false or doubtful. The duty to establish facts on the standard of balance of probabilities is on the department under the Act of 1990. In the present case the onus was on the Department to first establish that the eight suppliers had not made actual supplies and, thus, the invoices against which the input was claimed were fake/flying invoices. Moreover, it was the Departments responsibility to verify whether or not the eight entities had deposited the sales tax in the government treasury relating to the invoices against which the taxpayer had claimed input tax. It is evident from the record that the Department had made no attempt to verify whether the invoices relatable to the claim of input tax were fake/flying or otherwise. Appeal filed by Commissioner Inland Revenue was dismissed.\n(b) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Fiscal statute-While interpreting fiscal statutes, the court looks to what is clearly said and there is no room for any intendment nor is there any equity about a tax-There is no presumption as to tax and nothing was to be read in or implied and one could only look fairly at the language used.\nMessrs Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Government of Sindh and others 1993 SCMR 920; Muhammad Younus v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1964 SC 113; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mst. Khatija Begum PLD 1965 SC 472; Government of West Pakistan and others v. Messrs Jabees Ltd. PLD 1991 SC 870 and Government of Pakistan and others v. Messrs Hashwani Hotels Ltd. PLD 1990 SC 68 ref.\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 10A-Right to fair trial-Reverse onus on accused-Scope-Concept of reverse onus i.e. placing the burden on the person against whom an allegation has been made runs contrary to the established principle of presumption of innocence-It is therefore, for this reason that Courts lean in favour of interpreting or reading down such provision in an effort to safeguard the fundamental principles of fair trial.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25,8(1)(c)(a)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1032 of 2018, decided on 23rd May, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 27.03.2018 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in STRA No. 737 of 2015)heard on: 14th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Ayesha A. Malik and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Asma Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nGhulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record (via video-link, Karachi) for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-IV, LARGE TAXPAYER UNIT, KARACHI-Appellant\nVersus\nMessrs AL-ABID SILK MILLS LTD., A-39, MANGHOPIR ROAD, SITE, KARACHI-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23904", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2354 = 2023 SLD 2354 = 2023 SCMR 1803", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNC8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 107 & 133(1)-Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed], Ss. 163 & 136(1)-Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 1982, Arts.7, 12, paras. (3)(a), (3)(b), 22, 23 & 24-Concept of Royalties - Scope- Business profits-Non-resident foreign company-Exemption from income tax-Income/royalties earned by the non-resident company in Pakistan for the lease of certain software-Whether such income was business profits and thus exempt from payment of income tax in Pakistan under Article 7 of the Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (the Convention), or the same constituted royalties as defined in paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Convention and was liable to tax.\nPer Qazi Faez Isa, J. (Majority view)\nThe respondent, a company incorporated in the Netherlands and thus a non-resident for Pakistan income tax purposes, and another company (SSI), which had a place of business in Pakistan, entered into an Agreement for Lease of FLIC Tapes dated 1 February 1986 and a Software Rental Agreement dated 1 January 1995 (respectively the 1986 Agreement, the 1995 Agreement and collectively the Agreements). In the 1986 Agreement SSI is described as the lessee and in the 1995 Agreement it is described as the customer. The tax returns filed by the respondent claimed that the said receipts were business profits and exempt from payment of income tax in Pakistan under Article 7 of the Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (the Convention). However, the appellants (tax departments) case was that the receipts were royalties under Article 12 of the Convention and the respondent was liable to pay income tax thereon at the rate of fifteen percent. The Income Tax Officer, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal unanimously determined that the receipts of payments by the respondent constituted royalties in terms of paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of Article 12 of the Convention and were liable to income tax. The respondent then assailed the assessment orders, the appellate orders and the judgments of the Tribunal before the High Court by filing references. The High Court decided in favour of the respondent, and held that the amounts received by the respondent for leasing FLIC tapes (software programs) did not fall within the definition of income arising from royalties.\nThe respondent did not clearly set out its case and did not provide the following information, documents and facts or provided misleading information:\n(1) The respondent did not explain what each Agreement dealt with, which was necessary in view of their technical nature and as the language used therein was not self-evident, particularly the terms mentioned in the schedules thereto;\n(2) The respondent did not state that the 1986 Agreement, the duration of which was for four years, still subsisted, yet referred to FLIC tapes which were only mentioned therein (FLIC tapes were not mentioned in the 1995 Agreement);\n(3) The respondent did not itemize the nature of the receipts and then on the basis thereof claim that they did not constitute royalties (under Article 12 of the Convention) and that the same constituted business profits (under Article 7 of the Convention);\n(4) The respondent in its reply to the notices sent by the Income Tax Officer did not deny certain components of royalties (mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Convention);\n(5) The respondent did not specifically state under which Agreement it had received payment, and for what; and\n(6) The respondent had relied upon Article 12 of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Convention (OECD MC), its Commentary and textbook explanation/interpretation thereof, and did so despite the fact that the Conventions Article 12 had applied Article 12 of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (UN MC), and not Article 12 of the OECD MC.\nThere were also the following drawbacks and legal shortcomings in the respondents case:\n(1) The respondent did not present its case to the competent authority of its country (the Netherlands) under Article 24 of the Convention, and thus its point of view did not come forth and could not be considered;\n(2) If the respondent had presented its case (as stated above) and if the competent authority of the Netherlands had supported the respondents contention there was the possibility of the two countries resolving the matter and/or making regulation/s with regard thereto in terms of the Convention;\n(3) That by foregoing (1) and (2) (above) a very technical matter came before the High Court, which the High Court proceeded to determine without having the requisite technical expertise and without being provided it; and\n(4) The respondent had invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 136(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1970 (ITO 1979) and section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO 2001) which was restricted to questions of law, however, factual determination of whether the receipts constituted royalties was considered despite three forums (below) concurrently deciding the same against the respondent.\nThe High Court erred with regard to the following:\n(1) The High Court overlooked the fact that the High Courts jurisdiction under section 136(1) of the ITO 1979 and section 133(1) of the ITO 2001 was limited to considering and deciding questions of law, however, the instant cases were filed to overturn the factual determination made by three qualified forums (below) which had determined that the receipts were not royalties in terms of Article 12 of the Convention;\n(2) The High Court did not appreciate, as probably it was not explained to by the respondent, that there was no mention of FLIC tapes in the 1995 Agreement, and presumed that the receipts were payment for temporary use of FLIC tapes, which were only mentioned in the 1986 Agreement;\n(3) The High Court proceeded on an incorrect assumption that Article 12 of the Convention was based on Article 12 of the OECD MC, whereas in fact it was based on Article 12 of the UN MC, whereunder royalties earned in Pakistan were taxable;\n(4) The High Court did not consider the matter and the Convention holistically, including comprehensively considering Articles 7 and 12 thereof, and overlooked its Articles 22, 23 and 24;\n(5) The High Court without setting out the nature of the receipts, let alone doing so in detail, assumed that they did not constitute royalties in terms of Article 12 of the Convention, and did so without analogizing the receipts against the definition of royalties in paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of Article 12 of the Convention;\n(6) The High Court failed to appreciate that the Convention was a complete document, each term whereof had to be considered, and instead proceeded to interpret it in the light of precedents and textbook explanations of general terms (which were not so used in the Convention), and also did so without appreciating that the Conventions Article 12 was based on Article 12 of the UN MC and not on Article 12 of the OECD MC;\n(7) The High Court also (apparently) failed to appreciate that if the respondent was taxed in Pakistan under paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Convention its tax liability to such extent would have been accordingly adjusted in the Netherlands, and the respondent would not have been double taxed;\n(8) The High Court appears not to have considered that the receipts that were taxed were the respondents earnings in Pakistan, and to have kept this under consideration when considering the applicability of Article 12 of the Convention; and\n(9) The High Court did not abide by the recognized principle of interpretation that the State in which payment is made (under the Convention) is generally entitled to tax such payment.\nA. P. Moller v Commissioner of Income Tax 2012 SCMR 557 ref.\nImpugned Judgments of the High Court in all appeals are not sustainable nor are the reasons given by the High Court to set aside the assessment orders, the appellate orders and the Tribunals judgments, which are accordingly restored. Consequently, present appeals are allowed by setting aside the impugned Judgments of the High Court.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. (Minority view)\nThe character of payments received in transactions involving the transfer of computer software depends on the nature of the rights that the transferee acquires under the particular arrangement regarding the use and exploitation of the program. For a payment to constitute royalty under the Convention, it must fall at least in one of the three categories provided in Article 12(3) of the Convention. One can start by narrowing down the possibilities envisaged in Article 12(3) of the Convention. The agreement for the use of FLIC tapes (software programs) concluded between the respondent and the lessee on 1 February 1986 ( Agreement ) did not involve payments made for the use of or the right to use any patent, trademark or trade name, design or model, or cinematograph films and tapes for television and broadcasting. The next issue is whether the Agreement involved payments made for the use of or the right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. Equipment consists of tangible movable objects and since the software itself is only comprised of instructions and is pure intangible information, it is not covered by the equipment clause. It follows that the Agreement also did not involve payments made for the use of or the right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment.\nMatthias Valta and Stella Langner, in Reimer and Rust (eds), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (5th edn 2021) vol 1, art. 12, paras 160-162, 173-174 ref.\nAs regards the remaining possibilities envisaged in Article 12(3) of the Convention, insofar as the present case is concerned, with the payments made for the use of or the right to use secret formula or process, information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience or a copyright of a literary, artistic or scientific work. A secret formula or process comprises all kinds of company secrets, also known as industrial or trade secrets. The key element here is secrecy. This information must be confidential, meaning it is not widely known or easily accessible to those who typically deal with such information. It should have commercial value because of its secrecy and should be actively protected by the person who rightfully controls it through reasonable efforts. In the Agreement under the definition clause, the term FLIC tapes means the full set of the respondents proprietary software programs developed for use in oilfield data processing and log interpretation, including the software programs set out in the schedule attached to the Agreement, together with the related FLIC/VAX Handbook. Notably, however, what is not included is any other related documentation such as, but not limited to, source code listings, program specifications, system flow charts, logic diagrams, system manuals or other documentation underlying and supporting the FLIC tapes . The reason for this exclusion is the respondents intention that users shall have no knowledge of how FLIC tapes operate. It shows that the Agreement did not envisage supplying of information about the ideas and principles underlying the program, such as logic, algorithms or programming languages or techniques. The transaction between the respondent and the lessee cannot, therefore, be said to be a transfer of secret formulas or process behind the software.\nConcerning the question of information regarding industrial, commercial or scientific experience which is also known as know-how, it is seen that it is legally unprotected, not-secret-but-undisclosed knowledge that has been attained through experience. Such experience knowledge must go beyond the pure technical progress; it is related to persons having gained the knowledge by their activities. Such experience cannot be obtained simply by using the goods and services that are produced with the knowledge. Experience-based knowledge extends beyond mere technical progress and is tied to individuals who have acquired it through their activities. No such experience was shared between the parties under the Agreement. When know-how is shared, it cannot be taken back and its use cannot be prohibited. The transfer of the use cannot be distinguished from a transfer of full ownership. However, in this case, the lessee, on termination of the Agreement, and the lease granted under it, was bound to deliver up the FLIC tapes to the respondent together with all copies of any part of the FLIC tapes held or made by the lessee. Moreover, know-how beyond software can only be the specific programming design and structure such as algorithms and not the program itself. This means that the chance of the Agreement to involve payments for the use of or the right to use information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience is also eliminated.\nMatthias Valta and Stella Langner, in Reimer and Rust (eds), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (5th edn 2021) vol 1, Art. 12, paras 163-168 and Matthias Valta and Stella Langner, in Reimer and Rust (eds), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (5th edn. 2021) vol 1, art 12, para 175 ref.\nFinally it has to be determined if the case falls under the last possibility: whether the payments were made to the respondent in consideration for the use of or the right to use a copyright of a literary, artistic or scientific work. The Agreement between the respondent and the lessee did not contemplate any licence to reproduce and distribute to the public software incorporating the copyrighted program, or to modify and publicly display the program. Therefore, there wasnt any transfer of rights to use the program in a manner that would, without such licence, constitute an infringement of copyright. Nor was there any transfer of the full ownership of the rights in the FLIC tapes. The rights acquired by the lessee comprised of partial rights in the copy of the program. Income from the renting out of software is not covered by Article 12 but by Article 7 of the UN Model Convention ( UN MC ) and OECD Model Convention ( OECD MC ). In view of this, what follows is that no copyrights were leased out to the lessee which merely acquired a program copy of FLIC tapes for its operations.\nMatthias Valta and Stella Langner, in Reimer and Rust (eds), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (5th edn 2021) vol 1, art. 12, para 174; Geoquest Systems B.V. Gevers Deyootweg v. Director of Income Tax (2010) 327 and Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited v The Commissioner of Income Tax 2022 (3) SCC 321 ref.\nThe reliance placed by the High Court on the OECD MC and its Commentary, in order to decipher the true nature of payments received by the respondent and to understand the concept of royalties in the context of double taxation makes no material difference to the adjduciation of the case in hand. Notably, the UN MC Commentary on paragraph 3 of Article 12 includes the entire extract of the OECD MC Commentary on the question whether payments received as consideration for computer software are to be classified as royalties or not.\nThe majority judgment (of the present case) without definitively addressing whether the amounts received by the respondent constitute royalties, instead embarks upon a discussion which was not in contention between the parties. Thus the remark (in the majority judgment) that if the respondent was not taxed in Pakistan, it might still be subject to taxation in the Netherlands, is not a pertinent consideration for a court tasked with adjudicating a legal dispute. Once it is established that the income earned by the respondent non-resident Dutch company for leasing software in Pakistan does not qualify as royalty, delving into irrelevant factors serves no useful purpose. Furthermore, the majority asserts that the High Courts jurisdiction in this case was limited to addressing and deciding questions of law. It is worth noting that the sole point of contention between the parties revolved around whether the amounts received by the respondent constituted royalties or not, a matter which is a question of law squarely within the purview of the High Court.\nThe majority judgment suggests that the respondent had an alternative remedy under Article 24 of the Convention to present its case to the competent authority in its own country. It is said that if the competent authority in the respondents country agreed, it could then take up the matter with the competent authority in Pakistan. However, this provision of the Convention neither precludes the respondent from pursuing a remedy available under the laws of Pakistan, nor does it prevent the Supreme Court from adjudicating a question coming before it in its lawful jurisdiction.\nRespondent is correct in claiming that there is distinction between the use of copyright and the use of copyright product. No copyrights were leased out to the lessee which merely acquired a program copy of FLIC tapes (software programs) for its operations. Further, the transaction of lease of FLIC tapes software programs between the respondent and the lessee did not involve payments made for the use of or the right to use secret formula or process, or information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. Income resulting from the lease of FLIC tapes amounts to business profits and cannot be treated as income arising from royalties. Therefore, Article 12 of the Convention is not applicable to this case. Judgment of the High Court did not warrant any interference.\nA.P. Moller v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2012 SCMR 557 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=107,133(1)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=163,136(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 94 to 106/2008\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 12.10.2007 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in ITRAs Nos. 71/1997, 99/2006, 274/1997, 275 to 281/1998, 514 to 516/2006)heard on: 7th September, 2022.\nAnd\nCivil Appeal No. 550/2011\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 11.11.2010 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in I.T.R. No. 229/2005)", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, CJ, Qazi Faez Isa and Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in C.As. Nos. 94 to 106 of 2008).\nCh. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant (in C.A. No. 94 of 2008).\nSh. Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant (in C.As. Nos. 95 to 106 of 2008).\nHafiz Ahsan Ahmad Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant (in C.A. No. 550 of 2011).\nMakhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Saad Hashmi and Khawaja Aizaz Ahsan, Advocates for Respondent (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "The COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-Appellant\nVersus\nMessrs INTER QUEST INFORMATICS SERVICES-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23905", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2355 = 2023 SLD 2355 = 2023 SCMR 1843", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980-\n-O. XXVI, R. 9 & O. X, R.2-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188-Second review petition/curative review-Not maintainable-Article 188 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 envisage only one review of any judgment pronounced or any order made by the Court-Second review petition, whatever name is given to it including the curative review , is not maintainable under Article 188 of the Constitution read with the Supreme Court Rules, 1980.\nPer Umar Ata Bandial, J.\nSecond review petition was not maintainable in the present case.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J.\nEntertaining a second review petition would amount to vesting the Court with a jurisdiction not conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law.\nAhmad v. Abdul Aziz 1991 SCMR 234; Abdul Hameed Dogar v. Federation of Pakistan 2010 SCMR 312; Shabbar Raza v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 SCMR 514; Akhter Lalayka v. Mushtaq Sukhaira 2018 SCMR 1218 and Moinuddin v. State PLD 2019 SC 749 ref.\nIt is true that the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 bar entertaining the second review petition but are silent on the point whether the Supreme Court can exercise suo motu review jurisdiction to entertain a second review petition under Article 188 of the Constitution. It cannot do so for the reason that the prohibition on entertaining a second review petition is meant to put an end to litigation and ensuring finality of the judgments and orders of the apex court of the land, in the public interest. If this is the substance and purpose of the Supreme Court Rules, the prohibition operates both on the parties in moving the second review petition and on the Court as well, in exercising suo motu review jurisdiction the second time. If we assume that there is no prohibition on the suo motu exercise of its review jurisdiction the second time by the Court regarding a judgment or order, there will be no end to litigation nor will there be any finality of the judgment or orders of the Court as this suo motu review jurisdiction can then be exercisable for unlimited times and not only for the second time. Article 188 of the Constitution, thus, envisages only one-time exercise of the review jurisdiction, whether made on a review petition or suo motu, by the Court in respect of any of its judgments or orders passed in its original or appellate jurisdiction.\nThe second review petition, whatever name is given to it including the curative review , is not maintainable under Article 188 of the Constitution read with the Supreme Court Rules, 1980.\nPer Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.\nSo far as a second review petition is concerned, it is clearly provided under Rule 9 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 that, after the final disposal of the first application for review, no subsequent application for review shall lie to the Court and consequently it shall not be entertained by the Registry. Second review petition is not maintainable under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J.\n(b) Interpretation of Constitution-\n-Foreign jurisdictions-Any transplant of a rule from a foreign jurisdiction in ours can only be made after considering closely and thoroughly the difference in the constitutional texts and contexts.\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 187(1) & 175(2)-Power of the Supreme Court to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it-Scope-Bare reading of Article 187(1) of the Constitution shows that its provisions are subject to and controlled by Article 175(2) of the Constitution-Article 187(1) only confers power on the Court to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, and does not confer jurisdiction to take cognizance of any case or matter-Phrase in any case or matter pending before it used in Article 187(1) is the key to construe the provisions thereof-No independent proceedings can be initiated under Article 187(1)-Court can invoke its power under Article 187(1) only in a case or matter that is competently filed before it under any Article of the Constitution or provision of some other law conferring jurisdiction as stated in Article 175(2) and is also pending before it-Article 187(1) of the Constitution is not applicable where the case or matter stands finally concluded and is no more pending before the Court.\nZulfiqar Babu v. Government of Punjab PLD 1997 SC 11; Hitachi Limited v. Rupali Polyester 1998 SCMR 1618; Saeed Akhtar v. State 2000 SCMR 383 and Khyber Tractors v. Pakistan PLD 2005 SC 842 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=188", - "Case #": "C.M. Appeal No. 47 of 2020 in C.M.A. No. Nil of 2020 in C.R.P. No. 664 of 2018 in C.P. No. 130 of 2016, decided on 21st September, 2021.\n(Against the order of the Institution Officer dated 17.02.2020).heard on: 21st September, 2021.\nPer Umar Ata Bandial, J.; Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ. agreeing with their own reasons.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nBabar Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHALID MEHMOOD-Appellant\nVersus\nCHAKLALA CANTONMENT BOARD through C.E.O. and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23906", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2356 = 2023 SLD 2356 = 2023 SCMR 1853", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDk", - "Key Words:": "Rules of Business, 1973-\n-Sched. II, Sr. No. 84-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 97 & 137-Proceedings initiated and actions taken by the Prime Ministers Performance, Delivery Unit (Unit) and Pakistan Citizens Portal (Portal)-Constitutionality-High Court declared the working and functions of the Unit and the Portal to be unconstitutional and opined that the working of both the forums was transgression of the executive authority of the Province-Validity-Unit and the Portal merely receive complaints and they are automatically transmitted to the concerned authorities for consideration-Neither the Unit nor Portal exercises any power that would amount to prejudicing the rights of the citizens or treated as interference in the executive domain of the province-Transmission of information to the concerned authorities of a province, by no stretch of imagination, can be construed as interference or transgression in its domain-After receiving the information transmitted by the Unit or the Portal as the case may be, the concerned provincial authorities are expected to consider the same and thereafter proceed in accordance with the law; they are not bound to act in a particular manner nor can any direction or order be passed by the Unit or the Portal-High Court had not appreciated the working and functioning of both the forums-Moreover, the transmission of a complaint or information by the Federal Government to the concerned authorities of a province does not constitute interference or transgression in the executive domain of that province-Impugned judgment of the High Court, therefore, has not correctly appreciated and interpreted the status and functioning of the Unit and the Portal- Petitions for leave to appeal were disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Rules of Business, 1973=84Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=97,137", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 5633 and 5833 of 2021, decided on 1st December, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 29.09.2021 of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar ul Qaza) Swat passed in Writ Petition No.564 -M of 2021)\nheard on: 1st December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, CJ, Ayesha A. Malik and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rashdeen Nawaz Qasoori, Additional Attorney General along with Mujahid Khan, Dy. Director, NADRA for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 5633 of 2021).\nAtif Ali Khan, Additional A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Ali Rahman, Inspector Shakirullah, S.O. for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 5833 of 2021).\nMubarak Ali, Respondent in person.\nAmir Nawab, Respondent in person.\nZia Ullah, Respondent in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Interior and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nZIA ULLAH KHAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23907", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2357 = 2023 SLD 2357 = 2023 SCMR 1856", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNDg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 4 & 10A-Show cause notice-Significance and purpose of a show cause notice stated.\nA show cause notice is a formal communication from an authority, informing the recipient of an alleged violation or non-compliance with a law, and providing them with an opportunity to respond to the said allegations. It embodies the principle of natural justice, which requires that parties to a dispute be given a fair hearing before any decision is made that may affect their rights or interests. The principles of due process and fairness mandate that the recipient of a show cause notice be given adequate time to respond and present their case, that they be given access to relevant evidence and information, and that they be given the opportunity to be heard before any action is taken against them. This ensures that the decision-maker is not biased, that the decision is based on the facts of the case and the relevant law, and that the recipients rights and interests are protected. Thus, in addition to the fair hearing principle, there are other principles of natural justice that also apply for the purposes of issuance of show cause notices, including the principle of impartiality, which requires that the decision maker be impartial, and the principle of reasons, which requires that the decision-maker provide reasons for their decision. Therefore, a show cause notice is an important tool for enforcing the law, and to ensure that the recipient is given a fair and transparent opportunity to present their case before any adverse order affecting their rights and interests is passed.\nSiemens Engineering v. Union of India AIR 1976 SC 1785 and S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1984 ref.\nThe Constitution provides for the right to be treated in accordance with the law and enshrines the principles of fair trial and due process under Articles 4 and 10A, respectively. Article 4 of the Constitution provides for the right of citizens to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law as an inalienable right of every citizen. It further provides that no action detrimental to life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with the law and that no person shall be prevented from or be hindered in doing that which is not prohibited by law. Article 10A provides for the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process. The issuance of a show cause notice is an essential element in ensuring the provision of the said rights, as it provides individuals and organizations with the opportunity to explain their actions and to respond to allegations of violation or non-compliance with any law before any adverse action is taken against them. Hence, it follows that when a specific allegation is not put to the recipient, thereby failing to provide the recipient with the opportunity to respond to the same, any adjudication on the said allegation would be against the right of due process and fair trial and therefore, in contravention to Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution.\nA show cause notice can also be viewed as being akin to alternative dispute resolution ( ADR ) as it provides a pre-litigation opportunity for the recipient to present their position and show cause. By doing so, the matter can potentially be resolved before it escalates and requires any adjudication. This not only saves time and resources but also encourages the efficient resolution of disputes, acting as an effective mode of resolving disputes outside of the traditional legal framework. Thus, while acting as a means to ensure due process and fair trial by allowing the recipient to explain their position and respond to the allegations before any legal action is taken, the issuance of a show cause notice also acts as a tool to resolve the issue in the pre-litigation stage, similar to the objective of ADR.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 4 & 10A-Fresh/supplementary show cause notice, issuance of-Circumstances in which issuance of a fresh/supplementary show cause notice becomes necessary highlighted.\nIn certain cases and to uphold the principles and rights enshrined in Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution, after the issuance of the initial show cause notice, it may be necessary to issue a supplementary or a fresh show cause notice if there has been a significant change in circumstances or if new evidence has come to light. For example, if the recipient has provided a valid response to the initial show cause notice, but new information has surfaced suggesting that the alleged violation or non-compliance did occur, a fresh show cause notice may be required to enable the recipient to respond to the new allegations and provide further clarification. Similarly, where there has been a significant change in the circumstances or situation that led to the issuance of the initial show cause notice, a fresh or supplementary show cause notice may be required to address these changes; where the original notice was defective or incomplete, a fresh or supplementary notice would be required to be issued to provide a more detailed or accurate statement of the issues; and where the original notice does not fully address all of the issues or violations that need to be addressed, a fresh or supplementary notice should be issued to cover any outstanding matters. Ultimately, the decision to issue a fresh show cause notice should be predicated on a thorough and careful evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each case, guaranteeing that the principles of due process and fair trial are upheld.\n(c) Tax-\n-Show cause notice-Contents-Scope and purpose of a show cause notice stated.\nA show cause notice issued to a taxpayer must contain all the necessary facts and must specify the alleged actions or inaction by the taxpayer that violated the law, allowing for a meaningful response from the taxpayer. It is imperative that the taxpayer is confronted with specific allegations, along with the grounds upon which such allegations are based, in order to properly respond to the same and to place relevant material on record that would be necessary for any defence put forth and for any adjudication by the assessing officer in relation thereto. This is also because once a show cause notice is issued, the original adjudication on the said show cause notice can only be based on the grounds and allegations levelled therein. Unless the taxpayer is confronted with the allegations through a show cause notice, no determination can be made by the assessing officer with regards to the said allegations as it is beyond the competence of the department to make out a case which the department had never canvassed and the taxpayer had never been afforded the opportunity to meet. Hence, unless the allegations, and the grounds on which the said allegations are based, are not specifically alleged in the show cause notice issued to the taxpayer, the whole exercise becomes redundant and unsustainable in law.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Pakistan Tobacco Company 2022 SCMR 1251; Al-Khair Gadoon v. The Appellate Tribunal 2019 SCMR 2018; Raj Bahadur v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 81; New Delhi Television v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 2020 SC 2177; Collector of Central Excise v. H.M.M. Limited 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 322; Collector Central Excise v. Rahm Din 1987 SCMR 1840; SACI Allied Products v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2005) 7 SCC 159; Commissioner of Central Excise v. Ballarpur Industries (2007) 8 SCC 89 and Precision Rubber v. Commissioner of C. Ex. 2016 (334) ELT 577 (SC) ref.\n(d) Tax-\n-Fresh/supplementary show cause notice, issuance of-Circumstances in which issuance of a fresh/supplementary show cause notice becomes necessary highlighted.\nWhere in response to a show cause notice, the taxpayer, in defence, raises substantial grounds or puts forth substantial factual aspects that are not covered in the initial show cause notice and, therefore, require further inquiry or verification by the department, then, after conducting such further inquiry or verification, a fresh or supplementary show cause notice should be issued to the taxpayer, if it is then so required. No determination can be made with regards to the same unless the taxpayer is afforded the opportunity to respond to any deficiencies or misrepresentations found in relation thereto by specifically alleging the same in a fresh or supplementary show cause notice. Hence, instead of proceeding under the same show cause notice, it is necessary that a fresh or supplementary show cause notice is issued to the taxpayer in light of the defence so taken. Failure to do so would not only denote that in light of the grounds or facts raised in the defence put forth by taxpayer in response to the show cause notice, which were not in the knowledge of the tax authorities and therefore, were not part of the show cause notice, no further action is required under the said show cause notice, any adjudication in relation to the same would also be against the law, rendering the whole exercise redundant. Therefore, as a policy, such practice must be adopted by the tax authorities in order to prevent wastage of time and effort, and to curb unnecessary litigation. Not only would this allow a taxpayer to meaningfully respond to the specific allegations asserted against the taxpayer upon which the subsequent original adjudication, if any, will be based, as required under the law, it would also allow many cases to be resolved at the initial stages without the need to proceed any further and needlessly burden the public exchequer.\nWarner Hindustan v. Collector of Central Excise (1999) 6 SCC 762; Precision Rubber v. Commissioner of C. Ex. 2016 (334) ELT 577 (SC) and Godrej v. Commissioner of Customs 2002 (143) ELT 16 (SC) ref.\n(e) Tax-\n-Factual issues-Highest authority for factual determination in tax matters is the Tribunal.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Sargodha Spinning Mills 2022 SCMR 1082 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 PTD 1367 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10A", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1842-L and 1843-L of 2022, decided on 11th September, 2022.\n(Against the order of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 31.03.2022, passed in ETRs Nos. 32241 and 32246 of 2021)heard on: 11th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Athar Minallah\nand Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saba Saeed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (through video-link, Lahore)\nShehbaz Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (through video-link, Lahore)\nAssisted by: Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE-Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs RYK MILLS-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23908", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2358 = 2023 SLD 2358 = 2023 SCMR 1867", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNHo", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 9, 10A, 14, 25 & 37(d)- Incarcerated prisoners-Fundamental rights-Release of inmates from the prisons on the basis of probation-Duty of care owed by the State and its functionaries towards incarcerated prisoners explained.\nIt is an undeniable fact that living conditions and the treatment of prisoners in overcrowded and inadequately equipped prisons profoundly affects the constitutionally guaranteed rights. Most of the victims of a non-functional criminal justice system are those who belong to economically and socially marginalized sections of the society. They do not have the means to access the courts nor has the State fulfilled its constitutional obligation to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice contemplated under Article 37(d) of the Constitution.\nThe prisoner, whether convicted or non-convicted, has no choice but to place reliance for his right to life and other needs, such as medical attention, solely on the authorities holding him/her in custody. This reliance gives rise to a duty of care on the part of the State and its functionaries. The Constitution guarantees the right to life under Article 9. In the context of a prisoner, it is implicit in Article 9 that it is the duty of the State to ensure that every person incarcerated including those who are convicted for an offence and undergoing sentence, are treated in a manner that does not expose the latter to harm and that humane treatment is extended so long as the incarceration lasts. The prisoner is thus entirely dependent on the State and is at its mercy for the purposes of safeguarding the right to life. The State, therefore, owes a duty of care to every prisoner, regardless of the nature of offence for which the latter has been incarcerated. It is only liberty and the right of free movement that has been curtailed and definitely not the constitutional rights to life and to be treated with respect, having regard to the fundamental rights of inviolability of the dignity of man guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. Moreover, it becomes a duty of the functionaries to ensure that no prisoner is unjustifiably deprived of the right to liberty even if it is on the basis of being released on probation.\nIt is a right of every eligible prisoner to be considered for the purposes of enjoying liberty on the basis of probation. The neglect of the executive authorities to perform their obligations and duties imposed by law and to give effect to the enforced laws, particularly relating to the inmates of prisons amounts to a breach of the duty of care that is owed to the incarcerated prisoner. This breach of a fiduciary duty could expose the concerned authorities and the State to be sued by the inmates of the overcrowded prisons for damages.\nNeglect or refusal to effectively enforce the enacted laws relating to release of a prisoner on the basis of probation is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, inter alia, under Articles 9, 10-A, 14 and 25. The respective Chief Executives of the Federal Government and the provinces are directed to ensure that the enacted laws relating to release of a prisoner on the basis of probation are effectively implemented and made functional. The Federal and Provincial Governments, as the case may be, shall ensure that the prisoners who are eligible under the enacted laws for availing the benefit of being released on probation are identified and their cases are processed expeditiously.\nIn Attendance:\nCh. Aamir Rehman, Additional A.G.P., Malik Waseem Mumtaz, Additional A.G. Punjab, Muhammad Farid Dogar, A.A.G., Balochistan, Sibtain Mahmood, Additional A.G. Sindh (via video Link, Karachi), Mualim Jan, Director Probation, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Shakir Ullah, SO, Home Dept. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sajjad Ahmed Alvi, AD Probation, Rawalpindi and Hafiz Muhammad Sultan, AD Probation, Rawalpindi.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=9,10A,14,25,37(d)", - "Case #": "CRIMINAL M.A. NOS. 1566 AND 2027 OF 2016\nCRIMINAL M.A. NO.1566 OF 2016\n(Compliance report of Secretary, Law and Justice Commission\nof Pakistan in respect of order dated 23.11.2015 passed in Criminal Petition No. 449 of 2015)\nCRIMINAL M.A. NO. 2027 OF 2016\n(For permission to file and argue review filed against order dated 26.10.2016 of this Court passed in Criminal Petition No. 449 of 2016\nheard on: 23rd May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J. and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for Applicant/Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Raja AZMAT ALI-Applicant/Petitioner\nVersuS\nABU MALIK NASEEM and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23909", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2359 = 2023 SLD 2359 = 2024 PTCL 131", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1FpNHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-S. 13(1)-Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992), Ss. 3 & 6-SRO 580(I)/91 dated 27.06.1991 (SRO 580/91)-SRO 561(I)/94 dated 09.06.1994 (SRO 561/94)-SRO 612(I)/94 dated 14.06.1994-Manufacturer of polyester staple fiber (PSF) in North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)-Exemption from sales tax, removal of-Sales tax imposed on raw materials i.e. mono-ethylene glycol (MEG) and pure terephthalic acid (PTA)-Legality-Whether SRO 580/91 came within the ambit of section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992-[Per Munib Akhtar, J. (Majority view): If a notification came within the scope of section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 (the 1992 Act), it could not then be altered to the disadvantage of the investors -SRO 580/91 came squarely within the scope of said section; it was intended to encourage industrialization in North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)-SRO 580/91 thus provided a fiscal incentive for investment, which came within the scope and meaning of economic reforms ; it specified the period within which the industry had to be set up: 01.07.1991 to 30.06.1996-SRO 561/94 on the other hand, while covering the same ground as SRO 580/91 and even (if the provisos were taken into account) ostensibly the same period, clearly altered the benefit and incentive provided under the earlier notification to the disadvantage of the investors-It could not prevail against the provisions of section 6 of the 1992 Act-In this context section 3 of the 1992 Act is also relevant, which provides that the Act is to have overriding effect over the various statutes mentioned therein and also any other law for the time being in force -Sales Tax Act, 1990 was a law that clearly came within the scope of the overriding clause-Therefore, notwithstanding the issuance of SRO 561/94 and the purported supersession of SRO 580/91 thereby, the latter notification continued to remain available for its term by virtue of section 6 of the 1992 Act-Benefit of the exemption from sales tax under SRO 580/91 was available for the respondent companys Unit II, and could not be defeated by SRO 561/94-Impugned judgment of High Court was affirmed]-[Per Yahya Afridi, J. (Minority view): Challenge of the respondent-company to SRO 561/94 is to be upheld not only on the basis of section 6 of the Act of 1992, as done by the Majority view, but also on the doctrines of vested rights and promissory estoppel]-Appeal were dismissed.\nCollector of Central Excise v. Azizuddin Industries PLD 1970 SC 439 and Army Welfare Sugar Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1652 ref.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-S. 13(1)-Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992), S.6-SRO 462(I)/88 dated 26.06.1988 (SRO 462/88)-SRO 482(I)/92 dated 14.05.1992 (SRO 482/92)-SRO 529(I)/88 dated 26.06.1988 (SROs 529/88)-SRO 580(I)/91 dated 27.06.1991 (SRO 580/91)-Manufacturer of polyester staple fiber (PSF) in North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)-Exemption from sales tax, removal of-Sales tax imposed on raw materials i.e. mono-ethylene glycol (MEG) and pure terephthalic acid (PTA)-Legality-Whether SRO 462/88 came within the ambit of section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992- [Per Munib Akhtar, J. (Majority view): SRO 462/88 provided exemption from sales tax on the import/supply of MEG and PTA, the raw materials of PSF-SRO 462/88 superseded SRO 652(I)/81 dated 25.06.1981-Perusal of the latter notification shows that the exemption for MEG and PTA had also been given therein-SRO 462/88 was superseded by SRO 482/92, and the latter notification did away with the exemption for MEG and PTA-Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 (the 1992 Act) did not as such apply to SRO 462/88 in and of itself-This is so for two separate and distinct reasons-Firstly, SRO 462/88 was issued before 07.11.1990, the date specified in the definition of economic reforms for purposes of the 1992 Act-Secondly, it was not a time bound notification, i.e., the exemption granted in terms thereof did not operate over any specific period-High Court erred materially in coming to the conclusion that the company was entitled to the relief that it sought in respect of SRO 482/92-To such extent the impugned judgment of High Court was set-aside]-[Per Yahya Afridi, J. (Minority view): While examining the claim of the respondent-company in respect of SRO 482/92, the Majority view has not adverted to doctrines of vested rights and promissory estoppel and the well-established principle that what cannot be done directly is not permissible to be done indirectly, and has limited the judicial review of the act of the Government only to the extent of examining its legal power to issue the said SRO, within the scope of Act of 1992-Admittedly, SRO 482/92 withdrew the exemption of sales tax on raw material earlier granted vide SRO 462/88, and thus, the payment thereof became an additional cost for the respondent-company, as it could not be adjusted against the output tax, which had been exempted vide SRO 529(I)/88 dated 26.06.1988 (SROs 529/88) and SRO 580(I)/91 dated 27.06.1991 (SRO 580/91)-More importantly, the incentives offered for establishing an industrial unit in a less developed area had in effect been reduced to naught, and that too, after the respondent-company had done all that was required on its part, to acquire vested right to avail the benefit under the said SROs-Such impugned steps were in effect respondent-company specific, and not only adversely affected its vested rights, but blatantly benefited the commercial interests of the competitors-More so, the Government also defied the raison detre of the Act of 1992-By taking such unconscionable steps, like issuing SRO 482/92, the very object of inviting and protecting foreign investments in less developed areas of the country had been blatantly thwarted-SRO 482/92 cannot be made applicable to the respondent-company in taking away indirectly the exemption of sales tax granted to it by SROs 529/88 and SRO 580/91; and SRO 482/92 shall not apply to the respondent-company during the period of exemption from sales tax provided under SROs 529/88 and SRO 580/91]-Appeals were partly allowed.\n \nAbdul Baqi v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1968 SC 313; Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473; Shahid Mehmood v. Afzal Mehmood 2011 SCMR 551; Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 811; Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan PLD 2018 SC 189 and Al-Samrez Enterprise v. Federation of Pakistan 1986 SCMR 1917 ref.\n(c) Central Excise Act (I of 1944)-\n-S. 3-Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992), S. 6-SRO 531(I)/88 dated 26.06.1988 (SRO 531/88)-SRO 555(I)/79 dated 28.06.1979 (SRO 555/79)-SRO 500(I)/93 dated 14.06.1993 (SRO 500/93)-SRO Nos. 545(I)/94 and 546(I)/94, both dated 09.06.1994 (SRO 545/94 and SRO 546/94 respectively)-SRO 477(I)/95 dated 14.06.1995 (SRO 477/95)-Manufacturer of polyester staple fiber (PSF) in North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)-Exemption from excise duty on raw materials mono-ethylene glycol (MEG) and pure terephthalic acid (PTA)-Removal of-Legality-Whether SRO 531/88 came within the ambit of section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992-[Per Munib Akhtar, J: SRO 531/88 amended a general exemption notification issued under the Central Excises Act, 1944 (1944 Act), SRO 555(I)/79 dated 28.06.1979 ( SRO 555/79 )-Effect was to grant complete exemption from excise duty in respect of the manufacture of PSF-Now, before this notification (i.e., SRO 531/88) was issued, the position was that even under SRO 555/79 the manufacture of PSF was liable to the payment of excise duty, though at the exempted rate of Rs.2.50 per kg- Thus, when the respondent-company was incorporated (1989) and its units came into operation thereafter the complete exemption from excise duty was a relatively recent phenomenon-Practice adopted under the 1944 Act was for general exemption notifications to be issued, encompassing a wide range and variety of manufactured goods-SRO 555/79 was replaced by another such general notification (SRO 500/93), which in turn gave way to two general notifications, both issued on 09.06.1994, being SRO 545/94 and SRO 546/94-For present purposes, the combined effect of all of this was that the (complete) exemption from excise duty on the manufacture of PSF provided by SRO 531/88 was continued-Then came SRO 477/95, which amended SRO 546/94 such that a 5% excise duty was imposed on the manufacture of PSF-Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 (the 1992 Act) did not as such apply to SRO 531/88 in and of itself-This is so for two separate and distinct reasons-Firstly, SRO 531/88 was issued before 07.11.1990, the date specified in the definition of economic reforms for purposes of the 1992 Act-Secondly, neither it nor the general exemption notification that it amended (SRO 555/79), nor the general exemption notifications that came thereafter were time-bound notifications, i.e., the exemptions granted in terms of the general notifications did not operate over any specific period-High Court erred materially in coming to the conclusion that the company was entitled to the relief that it sought in respect of SRO 477/95-To such extent the impugned judgment of High Court was set-aside]-[Per Yahya Afridi, J: As to SRO 477/95, the doctrines of vested rights and promissory estoppel do not affect the exercise of its legal power by the Government to withdraw the exemption of excise duty as the Government had not made the earlier exemption from excise duty conditional on establishing an industrial unit in the specified less developed areas, as it had done in regard to sales tax exemption]-Appeals were partly allowed.\n \n(d) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss. 3(1) & 3(2)-Protection of Economic Reforms Act (XII of 1992), S. 6-SRO 515(I)/95 dated 14.06.1995 (SRO 515/95)-Manufacturer of polyester staple fiber (PSF) in North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)-Exemption from sales tax, removal of-Sales tax imposed on raw materials i.e. mono-ethylene glycol (MEG) and pure terephthalic acid (PTA)-Legality-Whether SRO 515/95 came within the ambit of section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992-[Per Munib Akhtar, J: SRO 515/95 reduced the rate of sales tax on the supply of PSF to 10%-At that time (14.06.1995) the rate was 15%-This notification did not, as such, apply to the company itself since the latter in any case enjoyed a complete exemption from sales tax for the specified periods in relation to its units-Rather, it applied in relation to its competitors-Now, SRO 515/95 was issued under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (the 1990 Act), as those provisions then stood-At that time, this subsection (in its clause (a)) allowed the Federal Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to provide that the supplies of goods as specified therein were to be charged at such higher or lower rates as set out in the notification, i.e., the specified rates could be greater or less than the statutory rate given in section 3(1)-And that is what was done by SRO 515/95-It was not an exemption notification, providing only for a rate of sales tax less than 15%-For many of the goods specified therein, the rate was in fact enhanced beyond and above the statutory rate-SRO 515/95 was therefore of a character somewhat different from a simple exemption notification-For the supply of some goods (such as PSF) it provided a benefit but for others it acted in a negative manner-It is therefore not easy to fit this notification into the scheme of section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 (the 1992 Act)-However, even if one focuses only on the supply of PSF (and those goods where the rate was reduced below that provided in the statute) the notification did not come within the scope of section 6-This is so because it did not provide for any time-bound measure-High Court erred materially in coming to the conclusion that the company was entitled to the relief that it sought in respect of SRO 515/95-To such extent the impugned judgment of High Court was set-aside]-[Per Yahya Afridi, J: As to SRO 515/95, the doctrines of vested rights and promissory estoppel do not affect the exercise of its legal power by the Government to reduce the rate of sales tax on final product for the competitors, as the Government had not made any representation to the respondent-company that it would not reduce the rate of sales tax on final product for the competitors]-Appeals were partly allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=1391)Protection of Economic Reform Act, 1992=3,6", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1089 to 1090 of 2015, decided on 1st September, 2023\n(On appeal from the order dated 14.5.2015 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in I.C.A. No.82 of 1997, W.Ps. 287 and 1105 of 1996 in of 20)(sic.)\nPer Munib Akhtar, J; Umar Ata Bandial, J., agreeing; Yahya Afridi, J. partially dissenting.\nDates of hearing: 30th January, 2019 and 10th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Munib Akhtar and Yahya Afridi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nAbdul Hameed Anjum, Secy. Legal FBR (in C.As. 1089-1090 of 2015).\nSikandar Bashir Mohmand, Advocate Supreme Court for the Contesting Respondents (in C.As. 1089-1090 of 2015).", - "Petitioner Name:": "FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE-Appellant\nVersus\nDEWAN SALMAN FIBER LTD. and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23910", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2360 = 2023 SLD 2360 = 2023 SCMR 1898", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yzc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) & 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 148 & 149-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Ad-interim pre-arrest bail, confirmation of-Further inquiry-Generalized allegation of causing indiscriminate firing has been alleged against the petitioner (accused), however, during the course of investigation, it transpired that the petitioner was empty handed at the time of occurrence and he has not been ascribed any overt act-Such opinion of the police has not been challenged, rather the petitioner was placed in column No. 2 of the report furnished under section 173, Cr.P.C.-Stance of the petitioner was that in-fact complainant party was the aggressor and two persons from the petitioners side also sustained injuries during the occurrence, which were suppressed by the complainant side-Admittedly the petitioner himself surrendered before the law and joined investigation-In these circumstances, it is the Trial Court, who after recording of evidence would decide about the guilt or otherwise of the petitioner and till then the petitioner cannot be put behind bars for an indefinite period-Petitioner is a student having no criminal history and keeping him behind bars with hardened criminals would not be in the interest of justice-Case of the petitioner squarely falls within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into his guilt-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and ad interim pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner was confirmed.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd-Bail-Absconsion of accused-Absconsion cannot be viewed as a proof for the offence-Mere absconsion cannot be made a ground to discard the relief sought for as disappearance of a person after the occurrence is but natural if he is involved in a murder case rightly or wrongly.\nRasool Muhammad v. Asal Muhammad 1995 SCMR 1373 and Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain PLD 2009 SC 53 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Pre-arrest bail-Merits of the case-While granting pre-arrest bail, the merits of the case can be touched upon by the Court.\nMiran Bux v. The State PLD 1989 SC 347; Sajid Hussain alias Joji v. The State PLD 2021 SC 898; Javed Iqbal v. The State PLD 2022 SCMR 1424 and Muhammad Ijaz v. The State 2022 SCMR 1271 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,148,149Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 150-L of 2023, decided on 20th June, 2023.\n(On appeal against the order dated 20.01.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Misc. No. 3872-B of 2023)heard on: 20th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sahir Mehmood Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G.and Saeed, SI for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAAD ZIA-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23911", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5YzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2361 = 2023 SLD 2361 = 2023 SCMR 1901", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5YzY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act (V of 1912)-\n-Ss. 19-A & 20-West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962), S. 2-A-Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Amendment) Act (XI of 1951), S. 2 [since repealed]-Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (IX of 1948), S. 2 [since repealed]-Punjab Laws Act (IV of 1872), S. 5 [since repealed]-State of Bahawalpur-Tenancy rights, inheritance of-Female heirs-Succession in tenancy matters prior to the year 1951-Even prior to the year 1951, when section 19-A was inserted in the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, sharia law was enforced in the State of Bahawalpur-Succession for the purposes of Muslims was governed by sharia law even before 1951 unless any custom was established as being consistently prevalent in the area and applicable to the parties-Even section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872 did not exclude sharia law from applying on personal law matters, provided a custom, not contrary to justice, equity and good conscience was established-Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948 clarified that muslim personal law was applicable for the purposes of succession notwithstanding any custom meaning that all decisions regarding succession were governed by sharia law-The 1948 Shariat Act was applicable to the State of Bahawalpur where the rule of decision for the purposes of succession was sharia law-Therefore, even prior to March 1951, sharia law was applicable in Bahawalpur to muslims on account of the 1948 Shariat Act which means that even in the presence of a custom or section 20 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 sharia law will prevail.\nGhulam Haider and others v. Murad through Legal Representatives and others PLD 2012 SC 501; Hakim Ali and others v. Barkat Bibi and others 1988 SCMR 293; Muhammad Yousaf v. Karam Khatoon 2003 SCMR 1535 and Government of Pakistan v. Brig, His Highness Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi and others PLD 1982 SC 367 ref.\n(b) Islamic law-\n-Inheritance-Limitation-Female heirs-No limitation runs against matters involving inheritance rights of a female where she has been defrauded of her right by her family-Where a person has been denied the right of inheritance that would give them cause of action-No limitation would run against a co-sharer.\nAbdul Ghafoor and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others PLD 1985 SC 407; Saadat Khan and others v. Shahid-ur- Rehman and others PLD 2023 SC 362; Shabla and others v. Ms. Jahan Afroz Khilat and others 2020 SCMR 352 and Khan Muhammad through LRs. and others v. Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others 2017 SCMR 1476 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912=19-A,20", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 419 of 2011, Civil Misc. Application No. 1839 of 2011 and Civil Appeal No. 1184 of 2019, decided on 22nd August, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 7.4.2011 and 20.3.2014, passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur, in C.Rs. Nos.407 of 1993 and 25-D-2002/BWP)heard on: 22nd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Ayesha A. Malik and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Zamir Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 419 of 2011).\nAgha Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 1184 of 2019).\nRespondents ex-parte.\nBarrister Umer Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court as Amicus Curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOHAMMAD BOOTA (DECEASED) through L.Rs., and others-Appellants\nVersus\nMst. FATIMA daughter of Gohar Ali and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23912", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5YzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2362 = 2023 SLD 2362 = 2023 SCMR 2016", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5YzU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 186 & 353-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7-Murder of police official while on official duty-Reappraisal of evidence-Occurrence had taken place in broad daylight whereas both the accused nominated in the crime report were previously known to the prosecution witnesses-Both of the witnesses of the ocular account were unanimous on the salient features of the prosecution version qua the time, mode and manner of the occurrence-Contents of FIR, statement of prosecution witnesses of ocular account were corroborated by the medical evidence-Accused was apprehended at the spot by the police officials soon after the occurrence leaving no ambiguity qua his involvement in the crime-Weapon of offence recovered from the accused was transmitted to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory without any delay in its dispatch-Report of Forensic Science Laboratory further confirmed that the empties recovered from the spot matched with the weapon recovered from the accused-Appeal against conviction was dismissed.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 186 & 353-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 235-Murder of police official while on official duty-Reappraisal of evidence-Trial for more than one offence-Scope-Offence committed in two phases-Incident had taken place in two phases; first when the accused fired upon the deceased (police official) in court premises but missed, and the other when the police officials retaliated, as a consequence of which both the accused tried to make their escape but in different directions-Police officials chased the accused persons and finally when deceased was likely to apprehend the present accused, he turned and fired upon the deceased which pierced through the left side of his chest, and resultantly he expired in hospital-Although the accused had committed the crime at two different places commencing from the court premises and finally when he reached in front of a tea stall which was at distance of 1-1/2 kilometers, it would be presumed one and the same transaction as per the spirit of law-As the act of the accused was in continuation till its conclusion, such aspect was fully covered by provision of section 235, Cr.P.C.-Therefore, the contention of the accused that the occurrence had taken place away from the court premises had no force-Appeal was dismissed.\n \n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Site plan-Scope and purpose-Statement of prosecution witnesses of the ocular account contradictory to the site plan qua the inter-se distance between the accused and the victim-Preference-Statements of prosecution witnesses would have precedence over the site plan in such circumstances-Even otherwise, site plan is not a substantive piece of evidence having no legal sanctity-Purpose behind the preparation of site plan is to explain or give a glimpse of the occurrence in black and white enabling the concerned to appreciate the facts of the case in a more rational way.\nTaj Muhammad v. Muhammad Yusuf and 2 others PLD 1976 SC 234 and Sardar Khan and 3 others v. The State 1998 SCMR 1823 ref.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Medical evidence-Contradiction between ocular account of witnesses and injuries observed by expert (doctor)-Preference-Primarily the ocular account is always considered as principle evidence-Litmus test to evaluate the veracity of the prosecution witnesses of ocular account depends on them being independent, reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring-Evidence of the expert is only confirmative in nature-If there is contradiction between the ocular account and medical evidence qua the number of injuries, the rule of thumb is that the preference would be given to the ocular account as the statement of prosecution witnesses of ocular account is always placed at a higher pedestal as compared to the medical evidence-Rationale behind such strict construction of the rule of thumb is that firstly, expert evidence is confirmatory in nature based upon opinion of an expert which can be influenced by many factors like, (i) lack of expertise (ii) lack of knowledge (iii) defective technique (iv) variation in observation (v) lack of coordination with subordinate staff and possibility of extending concession in favour of either of the parties due to extraneous considerations.\nAmrood Khan v. The State 2002 SCMR 1568; Manzoor and others v. The State 1992 SCMR 2037; Muhammad Younas and another v. The State 1990 SCMR 1272; Shafqat Ali and others v. The State PLD 2005 SC 288; Yaqoob Shah v. The State PLD 1976 SC 53 and Muhammad Hanif v. The State PLD 1993 SC 895 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=320(b),324,186,353Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 528 of 2019 in Jail Petition No. 327 of 2018, decided on 5th September, 2023.\n(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 14.01.2015 passed in Capital Sentence Reference No. 10 of 2011, Criminal Appeal No. 69-ATA of 2011 and Criminal Appeal No. 86-ATA of 2011)\nheard on: 29th September, 2020.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Munib Akhtar and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Shahbaz Khosa, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nCh. M. Sarwar Sidhu, Additional P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD HANIF-Appellant\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23913", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5YzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2363 = 2023 SLD 2363 = 2023 SCMR 1919", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5YzQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Balochistan Local Government Act (V of 2010)-\n-S. 37-Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 139-Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013, R. 72-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Local bodies elections-Election dispute-Order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) directing aggrieved party to approach the Election Tribunal- Aggrieved party invoking constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution-High Court setting-aside order of the ECP and declaring aggrieved party as the returned candidate-Legality-In the present case Election Tribunal had already been appointed, having powers to adjudicate upon the matter-Applications before the ECP were dismissed with the observation that if the aggrieved parties (respondents) so desired, they may approach the Election Tribunal-High Court, before adverting to the question of jurisdiction, not only entertained the (Constitutional) petitions filed by the respondents/ aggrieved parties but also declared the respondents as returned candidates with directions to the ECP to notify them-High Court neither determined the question of jurisdiction, nor rendered any findings as to why the aggrieved parties/respondents were not bound by law to avail the remedy provided before the Election Tribunal under section 37 of the Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010 (the 2010 Act)-In the instant case, after notifying the returned candidates and appointment of Election Tribunals, the ECP being sanguine and mindful to the provisions contained under section 37 of the 2010 Act, directed the parties to approach the Election Tribunal where the election disputes could be resolved by the Election Tribunal after recording evidence as the ECP had otherwise become functus officio for entertaining and deciding any election dispute-If the learned High Court was of the view that the issue challenged before it was not an election dispute, then definite findings should have been recorded bearing in mind the bar contained under section 37 of the 2010 Act and enabling provisions, but no findings were recorded with regard to jurisdiction-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for deciding in accordance with law the question of jurisdiction of the High Court in an election dispute after hearing the parties.\n \n(b) Jurisdiction-\n-Principles relating to jurisdiction of Courts and Tribunals stated.\nThe term jurisdiction in legal parlance means the command conferred to the Courts by law and Constitution to adjudicate matters between the parties. The jurisdiction of every Court is delineated and established to adhere to and pass legal orders. Transgressing or overriding the boundary of its jurisdiction and authority annuls and invalidates the judgments and orders. In order to deal with the different species of litigation, some Courts and Tribunals are vested with exclusive jurisdiction for taking cognizance of matters which other Courts cannot take under the rigidity or stringency of exclusive jurisdiction to deal with and decide the lis. No Court has the right to decide any lawsuit which is beyond the purview of its jurisdiction and want of jurisdiction conveys an action beyond the domain earmarked to any particular Court or Tribunal which cannot be cured, even by consent or acquiescence of parties. It is the prime duty of the Court to decide the question of jurisdiction first in case of doubts raised regarding its jurisdiction, and in any such situation it is the responsibility of the Court to endeavor to resolve the issue of jurisdiction at an early stage of the proceedings.\nJurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, nor can it be fettered unless there is a choice between more than one place in terms of jurisdiction. If the order or judgment is suffering from the vice of coram non judice it may be quashed and set aside by the Court when a special statute gives a right and also provides a forum for the adjudication of rights.\n(c) Jurisdiction-\n-Expression coram non judice-Meaning and scope-Expression coram non judice means an act done by a court which has no jurisdiction-When the suit is brought in a court without jurisdiction it is said to be coram non judice and any judgment is null and void-When a court of general jurisdiction undertakes to grant a judgment in an action where it has not acquired jurisdiction of parties by voluntary appearance or service of process, the judgment is void and may be disregarded and it is coram non judice.\nSecrest v. Galloway Co., 30 N.W. 2d 793, 797, 239 Iowa 168; Whartons Law Lexicon, 1976 reprint, p 260; K. J. Aiyers Judicial Dictionary, A Complete Law Lexicon, Thirteenth Edition and City of Monroe v. Niven, 20 S.E. 2d 311, 312, 221 N.C. 362, Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 9A ref.\n(d) Words and phrases-\n-Per incuraim-Meaning-Decision of a Court becomes per incuriam when it is rendered in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the force of statute.\nRupert Cross & J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law 149 (4th ed. 1991); Blacks Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition); C.C.K. Allen in Law in the Making (Page No. 246); Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson ((1947) 2 All E.R. 193); Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling ([1955] 2 QB 379) and Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944 KB 718 at 729 = (1944) 2 All E.R. 293 at 300)) ref.\n(e) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Exhaustion of remedies, doctrine of-Writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be worn out as a solitary way out or remedy for aerating all sufferings and deprivations-Doctrine of exhaustion of remedies stops a litigant from pursuing a remedy in a new court or jurisdiction until the remedy already provided under the law is exhausted-Underlying principle accentuated in this doctrine is that the litigant should not be encouraged to circumvent or bypass the provisions assimilated in the relevant statute-Extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be reduced to an ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010=37Elections Act, 2017=139Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013=72", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.2270 and 2272 of 2023, decided on 27th July, 2023.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 31.05.2023 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, at Quetta in Constitution Petitions Nos.353 and 352 of 2023)heard on: 27th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sajeel Shehryar Swati, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 2270 of 2023).\nShah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 2272 of 2023).\nKamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Private Respondents (Respondent No.6 in both cases).\nM. Arshad, DG (Law), Falak Sher, Consultant and Said Ghafoor, Deputy Director for ECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAMEEL QADIR and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND AGROVILLES DEPARTMENT, QUETTA through Secretary and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23914", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2364 = 2023 SLD 2364 = 2023 SCMR 1928", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yy8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n-S. 42-Mutation entries-Scope-Mutation entry confers no right in property as revenue record is maintained only for fiscal purposes.\nMst. Gohar Khanum and others v. Mst. Jamila Jan and others 2014 SCMR 801 ref.\n(b) Islamic law-\n-Inheritance-Legal heirs as co-sharers-Legal heir in possession has to be considered to be in constructive possession of the property on behalf of all the heirs in spite of his exclusive possession.\nKhair Din v. Salaman PLD 2002 SC 677 ref.\n(c) Limitation-\n-Inheritance-Inheritance mutation, challenging of-Whether law of limitation applies when challenging an inheritance mutation-In the present case, impugned inheritance mutation was attested on 5.4.1958 in favour of sons only to the exclusion of the daughter-Legal heirs of daughter challenged said mutation through a suit filed on 20.6.2005-Held, that law of limitation would be relevant when the conduct of the claimant (heir) demonstrates acquiescence and particularly when third party interest is created in the inherited property-In the instant case, there is nothing on the record to show that the daughter had either relinquished her interest in the disputed property or transferred it in favour of her brothers, therefore, the cause of action accrued when the appellants/defendants denied her right-As per averments of plaint, the plaintiffs (i.e. legal heirs of the daughter) came to know about the wrong entry for the first time on 22.12.2004 when they obtained copy of inheritance mutation of their maternal grandfather, therefore, the suit cannot be held as time barred-Appeal was disposed of.\nMst. Granan through legal heirs and others v. Sahib Kamala Bibi and others PLD 2014 SC 167 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967=42", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 130 of 2016, decided on 1st August, 2023.\n(On appeal against the Judgment dated 13.11.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in Civil Revision No. 399-D of 2014)heard on: 1st August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Riffqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nAsad Hussain Ghalib, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 - 6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NOOR DIN (DECEASED) through LRs-Appellant\nVersus\nPERVAIZ AKHTAR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23915", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2365 = 2023 SLD 2365 = 2023 SCMR 1932", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yys", - "Key Words:": "(a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act (XVI of 2009)-\n-Ss. 2(b), 2(c), 2(d) & 3- Employee not appointed by the Government or Government department- Eligibility for regularization-Petitioner had not been appointed through a competitive transparent process-Moreover, the appointment was made by the Principal of the (Government) College against a fixed remuneration paid from the Agency Development Fund-Appointment had not been made by the Government nor a Government Department as defined under clauses c and d of section 2 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009 (Act of 2009)-Expression employee has been defined in clause b of the Act of 2009 as meaning an ad hoc or a contract employee appointed by the Government on ad hoc or contract basis or second shift/night shift but excluded the employees of project post or appointed on work charge basis or who were paid out of contingencies-Petitioner, therefore, did not fall within the definition of the expression employee for the purposes of section 3 of the Act of 2009-Petitioner was not eligible to be regularized under the Act of 2009-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Appointment- Transparency and competitive process-Appointments of any nature, whether initial or ad hoc, permanent or temporary, if made in violation of the principle of transparency and competitive process, inter alia, without inviting applications from the public is in violation of the Constitution and are, therefore, void.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Appointment- Selection of candidates- Principles- Selecting a qualified, eligible and most deserving person is a sacred trust which is to be discharged honestly and fairly in a just and transparent manner and in the best interest of the public.\nGovernment of NWFP and others v. Muhammad Tufail Khan PLD 2004 SC 313; Chief Secretary Punjab and others v. Abdul Raoof Dasti 2006 SCMR 1876; Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana and others v. Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1159 and Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 132 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, (XVI of 2009)=2(b),2(c),2(d),3", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4424 of 2021, decided on 17th August, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 03.06.2021 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Writ Petition No.962-P of 2020)heard on: 17th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Umair Baloch, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SULEMAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nCHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, CIVIL SECRETARIAT, PESHAWAR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23916", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2366 = 2023 SLD 2366 = 2023 SLD 1935", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yzk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 105(3)(a), 107, 112(1), 112(2), 224(1), 224(2) & 184(3)-Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 57(1)-Constitutional petitions and suo motu proceedings regarding holding of General Elections to the Provincial Assemblies of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-Constitutional responsibility and authority for appointing the date for the holding of a general election to a Provincial Assembly, upon its dissolution in the various situations envisaged by and under the Constitution, and how and when such constitutional responsibility is to be discharged stated.\nPer Umar Ata Bandial, CJ, Munib Akhtar and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ. (Majority view)\nThe Constitution envisages three situations for the dissolution of a Provincial Assembly. In the context of the role of the Governor, the first situation is set out in clause (2) of Article 112. This envisages the dissolution of the Assembly by an order made by the Governor at his discretion, subject to the previous approval of the President and fulfillment of the conditions set out therein. In this situation, the Assembly cannot, and does not, dissolve without an order being made by the Governor, and dissolves immediately on the making of the order.\nThe second situation is set out in clause (1) of Article 112, when the Chief Minister advises dissolution. This situation can be divided into two sub-categories; the sub-category (a) of second situation is where the Governor acts on the advice tendered and makes an order dissolving the Assembly. Here, the Assembly dissolves immediately on the making of the order. The sub-category (b) of second situation is where the Governor does not make an order of dissolution on the advice tendered. Here, the Assembly stands dissolved on the expiry of forty-eight hours from the tendering of the advice by the Chief Minister (i.e., by the efflux of time), and that does not require an order of the Governor.\nThe third situation is set out in Article 107 of the Constitution. This provides that unless an Assembly is sooner dissolved (i.e., in terms of either of the two preceding situations), it stands dissolved after a term of five years. Here, the Governor has no role at all; the Assembly dissolves by the efflux of time.\nIn situations where the Assembly is dissolved by an order of the Governor, the constitutional responsibility of appointing a date for the general election that must follow is to be discharged by the Governor as provided in terms of Article 105(3)(a). These are the first situation and sub-category (a) of second situation described above.\nIn situations where the Assembly is not dissolved by an order of the Governor, the constitutional responsibility of appointing a date for the general election that must follow is to be discharged by the President as provided in terms of section 57(1) of the Elections Act, 2017 (the 2017 Act). These are the sub-category (b) of second situation and third situation described above.\nSince the general election on a dissolution of a Provincial Assembly has to be held within a time period stipulated by the Constitution itself, which is a constitutional imperative, the President or, as the case may be, the Governor must discharge the constitutional responsibility of appointing a date for the said election swiftly and without any delay and within the shortest time possible. The Election Commission must proactively be available to the President or the Governor, and be prepared for such consultation as required for a date for the holding of general elections.\nIn the present case in relation to the dissolution of the Punjab Assembly, to which the sub-category (b) of second situation applied, the constitutional responsibility for appointing a date for the general election that must follow was to be discharged by the President. However, in relation to the dissolution of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly, to which the sub-category (a) of second situation applied, the constitutional responsibility for appointing a date for the general election that must follow was to be discharged by the Governor.\nIn ordinary circumstances the general election to the Punjab Assembly ought to be held on 09.04.2023, the date announced by the President in terms of his order of 20.02.2023. However, on account of the delay in the emergence of the date for the holding of the general election, it may not be possible to meet the 90 day deadline stipulated by the Constitution. It is also the case that (possibly on account of a misunderstanding of the law) the Election Commission did not make itself available for consultation (with the President) as required under section 57(1) of the 2017 Act. Supreme Court directed that the Election Commission shall use its utmost efforts to immediately propose, keeping in mind sections 57 and 58 of the 2017 Act, a date to the President that is compliant with the 90 day deadline; thatif such a course is not available, then the Election Commission shall in like manner propose a date for the holding of the poll that deviates to the barest minimum from such deadline; that after consultation with the Election Commission, the President shall announce a date for the holding of the general election to the Punjab Assembly; that the Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province must after consultation with the Election Commission forthwith appoint a date for the holding of the general election to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly and the directions issued in relation to elections to the Punjab Assembly shall, mutatis mutandis, apply in relation thereto.\nSupreme Court further directed that the Federation, and in particular the Federal Government, is obligated, on an immediate and urgent basis, to forthwith provide the Election Commission with all such facilities, personnel and security as it may require for the holding of the general elections; that in like manner, it is the duty of the Provincial Governments, acting under the Caretaker Cabinets, to proactively provide all aid and assistance as may be required by the Election Commission, and that the duty cast upon the authorities as set out in section 50 of the 2017 Act must also be discharged forthwith and proactively. Constitution petitions and suo motu proceedings, being maintainable, were disposed of accordingly.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ. dissenting (Minority view)\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 105(3)(a), 107, 112(1), 112(2), 224(1), 224(2) & 184(3)-Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 57(1)-Constitutional petitions and suo motu proceedings regarding holding of General Elections to the Provincial Assemblies of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-Maintainability-Detailed reasons for finding the Constitutional petitions and suo motu proceedings as not maintainable recorded.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ. (Minority view)\nThe present suo motu proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of the case, are wholly unjustified in the mode and manner they were taken up under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, besides being initiated with undue haste. The suo motu case and the Constitutional petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, in the light of the principles settled in cases reported as Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1975 Supreme Court 66) and Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 Supreme Court 416), do not constitute a fit case to exercise the extraordinary original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution and are thus not maintainable as the same constitutional and legal issues seeking the same relief are pending and being deliberated upon by the respective Provincial High Courts in Lahore and Peshawar, without there being any inordinate delay in the conduct of the proceedings before them. There is no justification to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) to initiate suo motu proceedings or entertain petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, as a single Bench of the Lahore High Court has already decided the matter in favour of the petitioner before the said High Court and the said judgment is still in the field. The intra court appeals (ICAs) filed against the said judgment are pending before the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court (and none of the said petitioners has approached the Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution).\nManzoor Ilahis case PLD 1975 SC 66 and Benzair Bhuttos case PLD 1988 SC 416 ref.\nOnce a constitutional issue is pending before a Provincial High Court, keeping in view the Federal structure of the Constitution the autonomy and independence of the apex provincial constitutional court, should not be readily interfered with rather be supported to strengthen the provincial autonomy and avoid undermining the autonomy of the provincial constitutional courts.\nThere is no inordinate delay in the proceedings pending before the High Courts, infact the present proceedings have unnecessarily delayed the matter before the High Courts. However, considering the importance of the matter it is expected that the respective High Courts shall decide the matters pending before them within three working days from present order.\nEven otherwise matters such as the present matter should best be resolved by the Parliament.\nConstitutional petitions were dismissed and suo motu proceedings were dropped.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=105(3)(a),107,112(2),224(1),224(2),184(3)Elections Act, 2017=57(1)", - "Case #": "Suo Motu Case No. 1 of 2023 and Constitutional Petitions Nos.1 and 2 of 2023, decided on 1st March, 2023.\n(Suo Motu Regarding Holding of General Elections to the Provincial Assemblies of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)\nPer Umar Ata Bandial, CJ, Munib Akhtar and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ; Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ.dissenting (Majority view)heard on: 28th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Munib Akhtar,Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abid S. Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court, Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Ayan Memon, Advocate, Ms. Amna Khalili, Advocate, Agha Ali Durrani, Advocate, Arif Ansari, Advocate for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No. 1 of 2023).\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court, Zahid Nawaz Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court, Ch. Faisal Fareed, Advocate Supreme Court, Safdar Shaheen Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court, Ashfaq Ahmed Kharal, Advocate Supreme Court and Amir Saeed Rawn, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2023).\nOn Court's Notice\nShehzad Ata Elahi, Attorney General for Pakistan, Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional A.G.P., Malik Javaid Iqbal Wains, Additional A.G. assisted by Ms. Mehwish Batool, Advocate, Aitzaz ul Haque, Advocate and Maryam Rasheed, Advocate for Federation of Pakistan.\nSalman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court, Amir Malik, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Malik Ghulam Sabir, Advocate, M. Shakeel Mughal, Advocate, Maqbool Ahmed, Advocate and Sameen Qureshi, Advocate for President of Pakistan.\nKhalid Ishaq, Advocate Supreme Court for Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.\nMustafa Ramday, Advocate Supreme Court, Jahanzeb Awan, Advocate Supreme Court, Rashid Hafeez, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Ms. Zoe K. Khan, Advocate, Ahmed Junaid, Advocate, Akbar Khan, Advocate, Uzair Shafi, Advocate, Barrister Maria Haq, Advocate and Barrister Salman Ahmed, Advocate for Governor of Punjab.\nSajeel Shehryar Swati, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Barrister Saman Mamoon, Advocate, Ms. Kiran Khadijah, Advocate, Zafar Iqbal, Special Secretary, Muhammad Arshad, DG Law, Khurram Shehzad, Additional D.G. Law, Ms. Saima Tariq Janjua, DD (Law), Ms. Bushra Rasheed, Law Officer and Zaighum Anees, Law Officer for Election Commission of Pakistan.\nMuhammad Shan Gul, A.G., Malik Waseem Mumtaz, Additional A.G., Sana Ullah Zahid, Additional A.G. assisted by Khurram Chughtai, Advocate, Usman Ghani, Advocate, Raza Rehman, Advocate and Ahmed Raza Sarwar, Additional Chief Sec. Law (Punjab) for the Government of Punjab.\nAamir Javaid, A.G., Sardar Ali Raza, Additional A.G. and Mian Shafaqat Jan, Additional A.G. for the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.\nAsif Reki, A.G. and M. Ayaz Swati, Additional A.G. for the Government of Balochistan.\nHassan Akbar, A.G., Saifullah, A.A.G. (through V.L. Karachi), Fauzi Zafar, Additional A.G. and Zeeshan Edhi, Additional A.G. for the Government of Sindh.\nJehangir Khan Jadoon, A.G. for ICT.\nHaroon-ur-Rasheed, Advocate Supreme Court, Vice Chairman, PBC, Hassan Raza Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court and Chairman, Executive Council for the Pakistan Bar Council.\nAbid S. Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court, President SCBA, Muqtadir Akhtar Shabbir, Advocate Supreme Court/Secretary SCBA and Malik Shakeel-ur-Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court/Additional Secretary for Supreme Court Bar Association.\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Ch. Faisal Fareed, Advocate Supreme Court, Safdar Shaheen Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court and Ashfaq Kharal, Advocate Supreme Court for PTI.\nFarooq H. Naek, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Barrister Sheraz Shaukat Rajpar for PPPP.\nMansoor Usman Awan, Advocate Supreme Court and Anees Shehzad, Advocate-on-Record for PML(N).\nKamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for JUIP.\nGhulam Mohyuddin Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Jamat-e-Islami.\nAzhar Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for PML (Awami).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION ISLAMABAD through President Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court, Islamabad and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23917", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2367 = 2023 SLD 2367 = 2023 SCMR 1948", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Yzg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) & 498- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Dishonestly issuing a cheque-Pre-arrest bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Cheques given as surety-Petitioner (accused) has placed on record a copy of the suit for rendition of accounts filed by him against the complainant before the Civil Court-Perusal of the same shows that the parties were probably running a business and the cheques were given as a surety and the same were not meant for encashment-Cheques in question are of the year 2019 and according to the crime report the same were dishonoured in the year 2019-If that was so, it was not understandable as to why the complainant kept quiet for three years and did not lodge the FIR on time, which prima facie supports the stance taken by the petitioner-Even otherwise, even if the complainant wants to recover his money, section 489-F of P.P.C. is not a provision which is intended by the Legislature to be used for recovery of an alleged amount-Question whether the cheques were issued towards repayment of loan or fulfillment of an obligation within the meaning of section 489-F, P.P.C. is a question, which would be resolved by the Trial Court after recording of evidence-Maximum punishment provided under the statute for the offence under section 489-F, P.P.C. is three years and the same does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-All the material is in documentary shape; the investigation is complete and the petitioner is no more required for further investigation-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and ad interim pre-arrest bail granted to petitioner was confirmed.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C-For such offences grant of bail is a rule and refusal is an exception.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Absconsion-Absconsion cannot be viewed as a proof for the offence and the same alone cannot be made a ground to discard the relief sought for.\nRasool Muhammad v. Asal Muhammad 1995 SCMR 1373 and Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain PLD 2009 SC 53 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=489Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 294-L of 2023, decided on 24th August, 2023.\n(On appeal against the order dated 01.03.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Misc. No. 80579-B of 2022)heard on: 24th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Zubair Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with Petitioner in person (Via video link from Lahore).\nAftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for the Complainant.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. and Murtaza Bilal, SI for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL RASHEED-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23918", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Y3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2368 = 2023 SLD 2368 = 2023 SCMR 1951", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Y3o", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)-\n-S. 21, proviso- Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, R. 1.8(a)-Disciplinary proceedings initiated three years after retirement of employee (respondent)-Violation of proviso to section 21 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006-Major penalty of recovery of Rs. 5.5 million from the respondents pension-Legality-Proviso to section 21 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA Act, 2006) imposes a mandatory obligation on the competent authority to finalize proceedings against a retired employee not later than two years from the date of his retirement-Proviso to section 21 contains a negative phrase that has an imperative effect, making it mandatory to conclude the proceedings against a retired employee within the prescribed timeframe-Additionally, section 20 of the PEEDA Act, 2006, explicitly provides that the provisions of the Act shall have an overriding effect contrary to any other law for the time being in force-This effectively nullifies any other law that may contradict or seek to supersede the provisions of the PEEDA Act 2006-This negates the argument of the petitioner department that the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent could be initiated under the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules-In the instant case, the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent initiated under Rule 1.8(a) of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules were in violation of section 21 of the PEEDA Act 2006, which is a mandatory provision-Service Tribunal had rightly set aside the departmental order and directed the petitioner authority to grant all pensionary benefits accrued to the respondent-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nProvince of Punjab through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad v. Javeed Iqbal 2021 SCMR 328 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006=21", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 2456-L of 2022, decided on 24th July, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 22.02.2022 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 5342 of 2021).heard on: 24th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Musarrat Hilai, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Baleegh-ur-Rehman, Additional A.G. Punjab, Malik Waseem Mumtaz, Additional A.G. Punjab and Ms. Sehr Chaudhary, Law Officer Irrigation Department Punjab for Petitioners.\nMudassar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHIEF MINISTER through Secretary Government of Punjab, Irrigation Department, Lahore and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD AFZAL ANJUM THOR-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23919", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Y3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2369 = 2023 SLD 2359 = 2023 SCMR 1955", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5Y3k", - "Key Words:": "(a) Jurisdiction-\n-Mentioning of a wrong or inapplicable provision of law or non-mentioning of the applicable provision of law while exercising the jurisdiction or power which is otherwise vested in a court, tribunal or authority, does not by itself have any fatal consequences.\nNaseer Ahmed v. Returning Officer 2023 SCMR 179; Olas Khan v. NAB PLD 2018 SC 40; Saadat Khan v. State 2018 SCMR 387 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Abdul Ghani PLD 2007 SC 308 ref.\n(b) Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003)-\n-S. 3-Contempt of Court-Unqualified/unconditional apology-Effect-Unqualified apology tendered by the person accused of having committed the contempt of court necessarily means that he admits his guilt and submits the apology in the realization of the fact that he has done a wrong, for which he repents and seeks forgiveness-In cases where the accused tenders an unqualified apology, there remains no need of framing the charge and recording the evidence.\nAbdul Hamid v. State PLD 1964 SC 186; Awal v. State PLD 1964 SC 562; Shahid Orakzai v. P.M.L.(N) 2000 SCMR 1969; Sarfraz Hussain v. State 2002 SCMR 1326 and Feroze Akbar v. Government of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 1623 ref.\n(c) Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003)-\n-S. 3-Contempt of Court-Unqualified/unconditional apology-Discharge of accused-General rule-When the accused offers an unqualified apology at an early stage of the contempt proceeding as a sincere and profound remorse, the courts generally drop such proceeding and discharge the accused while warning him to be careful in the future-However, this is not an absolute rule to be followed invariably in all cases-Exceptional facts and circumstances of a case may justify departure from this general rule-Courts may, despite the submission of an unqualified apology, convict the accused in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and may treat his apology only as a mitigating circumstance to impose a lesser punishment.\nAbdul Hamid v. State PLD 1964 SC 186; Awal v. State PLD 1964 SC 562; Masroor Ahsan v. Ardeshir Cowasjee PLD 1998 SC 823; Feroze Akbar v. Government of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 1623; Contempt Proceedings against Islamabad Police Officials PLD 2007 SC 688; Contempt Proceedings against Nehal Hashmi 2018 SCMR 556 and Iftikhar Ahmed v. State 2018 SCMR 1385 ref.\n(d) Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003)-\n-S. 3-Contempt of Court-Assistant Commissioner (appellant) raided official residence of a Qazi (judge) without registration of an FIR, assaulted and arrested him, then took the Qazi barefoot to the Levies Line, instead of the Police Station concerned, and kept him confined there for about 6 hours without registration of any criminal case-Subsequently unqualified/unconditional apology was tendered by the appellant-Held, that in the present case the act of assaulting and manhandling the Qazi, a judge, in the general public while arresting him was a flagrant attempt to undermine and lower the authority of district courts-Majority of the people have recourse to these courts for adjudication of their disputes-It is, therefore, in the public interest to protect the honour and authority of these courts-High Court has taken a lenient view in the matter of imposing punishment on the appellant because of his tendering an unqualified apology at the very early stage of the contempt proceeding and his young age-In the facts and circumstances of the case, the discretion exercised by the High Court in convicting the appellant for contempt and considering his unqualified apology only as a mitigating circumstance for imposing lesser punishment is proper and reasonable, which does not call for any interference-Appeal was dismissed.\n(e) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 203-Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003), S. 4(2)-District judiciary-Duty of the High Courts to protect the judges of the district judiciary-Such duty is inherent in and concomitant with the power to supervise and control vested in them under Article 203 of the Constitution-It is imperative for the High Courts to protect the district judiciary from any executive onslaught or intrusion that may weaken its institutional independence or tends to lower its judicial fiat and brings it into disrespect-Observations recorded by the Supreme Court regarding importance of protecting the judicial independence and safeguarding the prestige and honour of the judges of the district judiciary.\nDistrict Judiciary is the backbone of our judicial system. It is imperative to protect and safeguard the district judiciary from any executive onslaught or intrusion that may weaken its institutional independence or tends to lower its judicial fiat and brings it into disrespect. The need to protect judicial independence and safeguard the prestige and honour of the judges is essential to protect the public confidence and public trust reposed in the judicary. Public confidence and trust in the courts rest on independence, impartiality, neutrality, openness and transparency of the judicial system; it lends the court its high moral authority and its decisions, unquestionable legitimacy. The courts being guardians of the rights of the people must be insulated and walled against any intrusion that weakens its fiat and prestige. This protection applies at all levels of the judiciary, from the constitutional courts to the frontline courts in the district. The Constitution protects the constitutional court judges through the power of contempt under Article 204 of the Constitution and through the Supreme Judicial Council established under Article 209 of the Constitution, while it is Article 203 of the Constitution that safeguards the judges of the district judiciary by placing them under the protective umbrella of the High Court of the respective Province.\nHasnain Raza v. Lahore High Court PLD 2022 SC 7 ref.\nThe primary duty to ensure the protection of district judiciary is of the High Courts under whose supervision and control it functions. This duty is inherent in and concomitant with the power to supervise and control vested in the High Courts under Article 203 of the Constitution. In line with this constitutional mandate, the Legislature has conferred upon the High Courts the power to punish a contempt committed in relation to any court of the district judiciary.\n(f) Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003)-\n-S. 3- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 204-Contempt laws-Purpose-Real purpose of the law of contempt is the protection of the public interest and more importantly public confidence in the justice system.\nState v. Khalid Masood PLD 1996 SC 42 ref.\n(g) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 175(3) & 204-Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003), S. 4(2)-District judiciary-Security-Marshalls of the Court-Importance of district judiciary to have its own security personnel independent from the district administration and police highlighted.\nIt is axiomatic that the independence of the judiciary rests on judicial, financial and administrative autonomy. However, the administrative autonomy has been somewhat wanting over the years in the area of security of judges. The security and protection of judges is not an internal function of the judiciary but is dependent on and in control of the executive. The district judiciary protects the common people at the grassroots level against the misuse or abuse of executive power by the district administration and police. This check has an inherent potential to create tension between the district judiciary and the district administration and police. It is perhaps time for the district judiciary to have its own security personnel, somewhat parallel to the internationally recognized judicial marshals or marshalls of the court. The separation of the judiciary from the executive is a constitutional command and must be actualized in all its facets at the earliest. The district judiciary should be independent in all respects and in particular in the matter of its security from the district administration and police, and the High Courts should take up this matter with the respective Provincial Governments and progressively proceed in establishing their own security agency, like their Process Serving Agency. However, until then the High Courts should take stern action against the district executive officers involved in illegal confrontational acts with the district judiciary under the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003.\nPer Shahid Waheed, J.; agreeing with Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. with his separate note.\n(h) Administration of justice-\n-Criminal liability of a judge for non-judicial acts-Judicial title does not render its holder immune from responsibility even when the criminal act is committed behind the shield of judicial office-Immunity from criminal liability does not extend to non-judicial acts, and thus, a judge cannot in any way escape criminal liability and can be arrested.\nBraatelien v. United States 147 F.2d 888 at 895 ref.\n(i) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 203-District judiciary-Precautionary measures to be observed by the executive while taking action under criminal law against the judges of District judiciary stated.\n(i) If a judicial officer of the District Judiciary is to be arrested for some offence, it should be done under intimation to the nominee of the concerned High Court;\n(ii) If facts and circumstances necessitate the immediate arrest of a judicial officer of the District Judiciary, a technical or formal arrest may be effected; and the facts of such arrest should be immediately communicated to the nominee of the concerned High Court;\n(iii) The Judicial Officer so arrested shall not be taken to a police station, without the prior order or directions of the nominee of the concerned High Court;\n(iv) Immediate facilities shall be provided to the Judicial Officer of communication with his family members, legal advisers and the District and Sessions Judge of his District;\n(v) No statement of a Judicial Officer who is under arrest be recorded, nor any medical tests be conducted except in the presence of the legal adviser of the Judicial Officer concerned or another Judicial Officer of equal or higher rank, if available; and\n(vi) There should be no handcuffing of a Judicial Officer. If, however, violent resistance to arrest is offered or there is imminent need to effect physical arrest to avert danger to life and limb, the person resisting arrest may be overpowered and handcuffed. In such case, immediate report shall be made to the District and Sessions Judge concerned and also to the nominee of the High Court. But the burden would be on the Police/ executive to establish the necessity for effecting the physical arrest and handcuffing of the Judicial Officer, and if it is found that the physical arrest and handcuffing of the Judicial Officer was unjustified, the Police Officers causing or responsible for such arrest and handcuffing would be guilty of misconduct and would also be personally liable for compensation and damages as may be summarily determined by the High Court.\nDelhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and others AIR 1991 SC 2176 ref.\nThe above guidelines oblige each High Court to issue a notification, exercising its powers under Article 203 of the Constitution, for the nomination of a person, not less than the rank/grade of a District and Sessions Judge, who will attend to such criminal proceedings in which a judge of the District Judiciary is found involved, so as to ensure transparency and fair trial.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003=3", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 633 of 2019, decided on 7th June, 2023.\n(Against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, dated 06.11.2019 passed in C.P. No. 141 of 2016)\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J.; Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. agreeing; Shahid Waheed, J. also agreeing but with his separate note.heard on: 7th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Amanullah Kanrani, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nP., M. Ayaz Khan Swati, Additional A.G., Balochistan and Kamran Murtaza, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SULTAN AHMED-Appellant\nVersus\nREGISTRAR, BALOCHISTAN HIGH COURT, QUETTA and others- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23920", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2370 = 2023 SLD 2370 = 2023 SCMR 1972", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTc", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss. 32 & 129-Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, 2010 (the agreement)-Consignments found in excess of the quantities declared at the port of entry-Confiscation of good-Legality-Respondent-company had availed the transit facility pursuant to the Agreement executed between two sovereign States (i.e. Pakistan and Afghanistan)-It is not the case of the department that the consignments were transported in violation of the rules nor that the seals had been tampered with-Only allegation against the respondent-company was that upon examination of the consignments, the consignments of polyester fabric were found in excess of the quantities declared at the port of entry i.e. Karachi-Transit facility was not breached since it is not the case of the department that the rules were violated or an attempt was made to tamper with the seals or pilferage of the goods in transit-Levy and charge of custom duty and taxes are attracted in the case of transit goods if they are unauthorizedly unloaded from the licensed bonded carriers or even if such an attempt is made, or the transit rules are materially breached-In the absence of such acts, the goods in transit are not subject to payment of duties and taxes-In the present case the show cause notice had alleged violations of sections 32 & 129 of the Customs Act, 1969 (Act of 1969), despite no attempt having been made to pilfer the goods in transit and the absence of any actus rea that could have been construed as an intent to use the goods for a purpose other than transit to Afghanistan-Offence under section 32 of the Act of 1969 is relatable to the duty, taxes or charge which has not been levied or has been short levied or has been erroneously refunded-In the case in hand, there is no allegation against the respondent-company of having evaded or of making an attempt to evade the duties, taxes or any charge-Offence under section 32 of the Act of 1969 was, therefore, not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case-It is also not the stance of the petitioner department that the Federal Government, by notification, had prohibited bringing into Pakistan the polyester fabric found in excess of the declared value-Petition for leave to appeal was disposed of and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,129", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 5671 and 5672 of 2021, decided on 24th February, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.06.2021 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Customs References Nos. 5-P and 6-P of 2012)heard on: 24th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Ayesha A. Malik and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nAyaz Shaukat, D.A.G. along with Afnan, Additional Collector for Federation.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, PESHAWAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs NEW SHINWARI LTD. and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23921", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2371 = 2023 SLD 2371 = 2023 SCMR 1977", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Dishonestly issuing a cheque-Bail, grant of- Further inquiry-Admittedly, the petitioner (accused) was tenant of the complainant and prima facie any claim for recovery of rent falls within the domain of Rent Controller-In this view of the matter, the question whether the cheque was issued towards repayment of loan or fulfillment of an obligation within the meaning of section 489-F, P.P.C. is a question, which would be resolved by the Trial Court after recording of evidence-Petitioner is behind the bars for the last about six months-Maximum punishment provided under the statute for the offence under section 489-F, P.P.C. is three years and the same does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-All the material is in documentary shape; the investigation is complete and the petitioner is no more required for further investigation-Case of the petitioner squarely falls within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. calling for further inquiry into his guilt-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was admitted to bail.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Grant of bail in such offences was the rule and refusal thereof an exception.\nTariq Bashir v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Cases of similar nature registered against an accused-Mere registration of other criminal cases against an accused does not disentitle him for the grant of bail if on merits he has a prima facie case.\nMoundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934; Muhammad Rafiq v. State 1997 SCMR 412; Syeda Sumera Andaleeb v. The State 2021 SCMR 1227 and Nazir Ahmed alias Bhaga v. The State 2022 SCMR 1467 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=489-FConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 717 of 2023, decided on 22nd August, 2023.\n(On appeal against the order dated 11.05.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Misc. No. 27358-B of 2023)heard on: 22nd August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Muhammad Saqlain Rizvi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. and Muhammad Asif, SI for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR NAWAZ-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23922", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2372 = 2023 SLD 2372 = 2023 SCMR 1980 = (2024) 129 TAX 179", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTU", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969) - SRO 574(I)/2005 - Vires of Notification\nDetails: The case concerns the validity of SRO 574(I)/2005, which grants the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) the authority to issue a notification affecting the discretion of customs officers in relation to fines for confiscated goods. The appellants argued that SRO 574 was ultra vires section 223 of the Customs Act 1969, claiming it unlawfully restricted the discretion of customs officers under section 181.\nHeld: The majority view held that SRO 574 is not ultra vires section 223. The powers exercised by the FBR under section 181 are distinct from those under section 223. The notification is a valid exercise of legislative authority, and the customs officers discretion under section 181 is not invalidated by the SRO. The appeal was dismissed.\nCitations: M.A. Rahman v. Federation of Pakistan, Tariq Transport Company v. Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service, Messrs Faridsons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan, Dr. Zahid Javed v. Dr. Tahir Riaz, Collector of Customs v. Muhammad Tasleem, Collector Customs v. Salman Khan, Collector of Customs v. Wali Khan, Maqbool Ahmed v. Customs Appellate Tribunal, State Bank of Travancore v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Messrs Central Insurance Co. v. CBR, Collector of Customs v. Askari Cement\nInterpretation of Statutes - Redundancy of Provisions\nDetails: The case discusses the principle that redundancy in statutory provisions should not be lightly imputed. Courts are urged to avoid interpretations that lead to redundancy, and statutory provisions should be read in a manner that maintains their effectiveness and relevance.\nHeld: Redundancy should not be assumed in statutory interpretation. Courts should avoid interpretations that render provisions redundant and strive for interpretations that preserve their purpose.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=181,223", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 24-Q OF 2014\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 20.09.2010 passed by the Balochistan High Court, Quetta in Constitutional Petition No.320 of 2010)\nAND\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 26-Q OF 2018\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 15.07.2013 passed by the Balochistan High Court, Quetta in Custom References Nos. 20 and 23 of 2018)\nCivil Appeal No.24-Q of 2014 and Civil Appeal No. 26-Q of 2018, decided on 26th May, 2021.\nPer Munib Akhtar, J; Umar Ata Bandial, CJ. agreeing; Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. also agreeing but with his own reasons.heard on: 26th May, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Umar Ata Bandial, Justice, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Justice and Munib Akhtar, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naseebullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in both cases, Video-Link, Quetta).\nShakeel-ur-Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.A. 24-Q of 2014).\nIftikhar Raza Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. 26-Q/2018, Video-Link, Quetta).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Haji TOOTI and another-Appellants\nVs\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23923", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2373 = 2023 SLD 2373 = 2023 SCMR 2012", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Gift-\n-Pre-requisites-Pre-requisites of a valid gift are: (i) offer by the donor; (ii) its acceptance by the donee; and (iii) the delivery of possession-Valid gift comes into existence as soon as the three ingredients are completed.\n(b) Gift-\n-Proof-Donor seeking cancellation of gift-Record suggested that upon the oral gift, the mutation in question was effected by the donor in the name of the donee/respondent-Subsequently in a suit for possession through right of pre-emption filed by the donors niece against the respondent, the donor appeared before the court and made a statement under oath, acknowledging that he gifted the disputed property to the respondent and thereafter transferred it to the name of the respondent in the revenue record through the mutation in question-Trial Court held that the respondent was in possession of the property and had declared that it was a result of a valid gift-Said judgment had attained finality and had not been challenged by the donor or his successors till date-Donors statement in the pre-emption suit before the competent court of law proved his bona fide intention, free will, and consent and thereby, confirmed the execution of a valid gift and acceptance of the mutation in question in the previous litigation-Revenue record reflected that the donor himself appeared before the revenue authorities and signed the mutation in question in presence of the revenue authorities and the witnesses-Declaration of gift by the donor gathered strength by the civil transaction between him and the respondent with regard to transfer of the property through the mutation in question-Under such circumstances, the donor could not resile from his deeds, hence, was estopped to challenge the validity of the gift on any ground-Statement of the donor before the Trial Court in the present proceedings revealed that he did not say anything with regard to fraud as alleged by him in the plaint, nor had he produced any evidence in this behalf, as such, the donor was unable to prove the allegation of fraud-In such circumstances successors of the donor were not entitled to seek cancellation/revocation of the valid gift-Appeal filed by successors of the donor was dismissed.\n \n(c) Gift-\n-Revocation-Precondition for revocation of a gift as provided by section 167 of the Muhammadan Law is that it can only be revoked before delivery of possession-It implies that despite declaration of gift by the donor and its acceptance by the donee, the donor may change its mind and may not complete the gift by not delivering the possession.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1551 of 2017, decided on 7th August, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 18.09.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in C.R. No. 44-D of 2011)\nheard on: 7th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nSh. Zamir Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAYAT MUHAMMAD through LRs.-Appellant\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD RIAZ-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23924", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2374 = 2023 SLD 2374 = 2023 PCRLJ 1704", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010), Ss. 3 & 4-Money laundering-Bail, refusal of-Cheating the public at large-Scope-Prosecution case was that the accused persons were involved in receiving money from general public in fraudulent manner on the pretext of investing the same in stocks through a brokerage firm, but instead of investing in stocks they invested the money of general public into some unknown business, hence, committed cheating, misrepresentation and criminal breach of trust-Accused persons were specifically nominated in the FIR with specific role; there was nothing on record to show that the complainant and Investigating Officer had any ill-will/mala fide with the accused persons to falsely implicate them in the case-Accused persons were operating foreign bank accounts to cheat the general public and to camouflage the ill-gotten funds under the garb of dummy business-Prosecution had sufficient evidence in the shape of documentary evidence against the accused persons-Accused persons were not entitled to the grant of bail-Application was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Sarfraz Ansari v. State and others PLD 2021 SC 738 rel.\nAsif Ayubs case 2010 SCMR 1735; Khalid Javed Gillanis case PLD 1978 SC 256 and Syed Lakhat-e-Hasnains case 2010 5CMR 855 ref.\n2015 SCMR 1575; 2016 SCMR 447; 2011 SCMR 1614; 2015 5CMR 1575; 2019 5CMR 1730 and PLD 2021 SC 916 distinguished.\n(b) Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010)-\n-S. 3-Money laundering-Scope-Money laundering is the process by which large amount of illegally obtained money is given the appearance of having originated from the legitimate source-In simple terms it is the conversion of black money into white money.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Each case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances and Courts are required to exercise jurisdiction independently.\nState v. Haji Kabir Khan PLD 2005 SC 364 and Muhammad Faiz alias Bhoora v. The State and another 2015 SCMR 655 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Anti Money Laundering Act, 2010=3,4", - "Case #": "Criminal Bail Application No. 510 of 2022, decided on 9th May, 2022.heard on: 13th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Aftab Ahmed Gorar, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mansoor Ali Ghangro and Fazila Ambar Chachar for Applicants.\nSamiullah Soomro for the Complainant No. 1.\nAkhtar Hussain Shaikh for the Complainant No. 2.\nChoudhary Waseem Akhtar, Assistant Attorney General along with SIP Rahat Khan, FIA CCC.\nVictim Mst. Huma Azfar is in attendance.\nSyed Asad Hussain, Riaz Sabsoi and Irfan Zial for Victims.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RIZWAN RIAZ and another-Applicants\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23925", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2375 = 2023 SLD 2375 = 2023 PCRLJ 1834", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Contradictions and lapses in evidence-Accused was charged for committing murder of his wife/sister of the complainant by firing-As per prosecution case, occurrence took place at 03.00 p.m. on 07.07.2009 in the house of complainant, which was at a distance of1/2 kilometer from the Police Station-Police reached at the place of occurrence and complainant recorded his statement regarding the occurrence at 04.00 p.m. to SI there, which was sent to the Police Station and FIR was recorded-However, SI while recording his statement in the Court clearly stated that he recorded statement of the complainant when he was on patrol duty and thereafter reached at the place of occurrence-So, place of recording statement of complainant for registration of case was under a cloud-In the statement of complainant and FIR, it was mentioned that deceased of the case received firearm shots when she was taking meal/food while sitting on the cot in upper portion of the house and it was not mentioned with exactness that either she was available in the room, veranda or courtyard of said portion of the house-Similarly, it was mentioned in statement that after receiving firearm shots, deceased fell but it was not mentioned that she fell on ground-In Column No.24 of the Inquest Report, it was clearly shown that dead body was found on cot but neither said cot nor any blood of the deceased from said cot was taken into possession during investigation of the case rather blood was statedly secured from the floor-Case of prosecution was that deceased was taking meal/food but neither any residue of food nor any utensil was secured during investigation of the case and even same was not mentioned as available, near or around the dead body of the deceased at the place of occurrence in Columns Nos.22 and 23 of the Inquest Report-Though it was alleged that deceased lady received various firearm shots and as per Post-mortem Examination Report, there were entry and exit wounds yet no empty shell or foreign metallic body fired from any bullet was found from the spot-Any marks of hitting or striking of any such foreign metallic body at cot, floor, wall or roof of the house, were also not found and in that regard in the site plans of the place of occurrence and Columns Nos. 22 and 23 of the Inquest Report, therefore, exact place of occurrence, was also under a cloud-Last worn clothes of the deceased were neither blood stained nor had holes of firearm shots-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused-Appeal against conviction was accordingly dismissed.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Medical evidence contradicting claimed time of death-Accused was charged for committing murder of his wife/sister of the complainant by firing-Post-mortem report of the deceased and statement of Medical Officer clearly showed that death of the deceased was immediate after receipt of injuries hence it was a sudden death, therefore, according to established principles of Medical jurisprudence, onset of rigor mortis was later and its duration was longer-Thus, the opinion given by the Medical Officer regarding time between death and post-mortem as five to six hours was mere ipse dixit and not according to settled principles of Medical jurisprudence on the subject-Thus, when Medical Officer had himself observed that rigor mortis was fully developed, then by no stretch of imagination, time between death and post-mortem of the deceased person could be considered as less than twelve hours-Therefore, medical evidence had negated that occurrence took place at the stated/alleged time and when exact time of occurrence had not been proved by the prosecution, then entire superstructure of the case of prosecution fell-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused-Appeal against conviction was accordingly dismissed.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Ocular account and medical evidence-Contradictions-Accused was charged for committing murder of his wife/sister of the complainant by firing-Though, complainant claimed himself as resident of house of occurrence as well as an eye-witness, yet close scrutiny of the record revealed that complainant in his statement and also during statement before the Court stated that accused fired consecutive shots with pistol upon his sister, which hit her on the bicep of left arm, front side of abdomen, left rib and right bicep but as per Post-mortem Examination Report, no entry wound on front of abdomen and no entry wound on left rib of the deceased was found-If eye-witnesses had themselves opted to narrate exact locale of the entry wounds in their statements and same was not confirmed by medical evidence, then no one else but prosecution had to suffer-So, ocular version deposed by complainant had not been supported/confirmed in stricto sensu by medical evidence-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused-Appeal against conviction was accordingly dismissed.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Dishonest improvements- Scope- Witness, who introduced dishonest improvements for strengthening the case, could not be relied upon.\nMuhammad Arif v. The State 2019 SCMR 631 and Khalid Mehmood and another v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 810 rel.\n(e) Criminal trial-\n-Witness-Reliability-Witness who denied admitted facts could not be termed as reliable witness.\nArshad Masih v. The State 2006 MLD 1078; Muhammad Riaz v. The State 2007 PCr.LJ 446 and Muhammad Ramzan and another v. The State 2008 YLR 1859 rel.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-No justification for the presence of eye-witness at the spot-Chance witness-Accused was charged for committing murder of his wife/sister of the complainant by firing-So far as eye-witness was concerned, he was admittedly not resident of the place of occurrence rather lived 5/6 kms. away from the place of occurrence-Admittedly, said witness did not have any business or office in the area of place of occurrence during the relevant time-So, said eye-witness was a chance witness and no explanation/plausible reason regarding his presence at the time and place of occurrence was mentioned in his statement and FIR-Said witness tried to introduce reason of his presence at the spot as settling a family dispute between deceased and accused and for such purpose three other persons including a neighbor were allegedly present there-Said neighbor did not state such fact-Therefore, testimony of said witness, who was a chance witness, was suspect evidence and could not be accepted without pinch of salt-Furthermore, locale of receipt of firearm shots by deceased i.e. in front of abdomen and left rib as narrated by eyewitness, was not confirmed by medical evidence and entry wounds at right renal area and on breast of the deceased were not mentioned by said eye-witness, hence his version was also not supported/confirmed by medical evidence stricto sensu- So, prosecutions ocular account was neither trustworthy nor confidence inspiring, hence not reliable-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused-Appeal against conviction was accordingly dismissed.\n \nMst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others 2015 SCMR 1142; G. M. Niaz v. The State 2018 SCMR 506; Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652; Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192 and Mst. Mir Zalai v. Ghazi Khan and others 2020 SCMR 319 rel.\n(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Recovery of pistol from the possession of accused-Inconsequential-Accused was charged for committing murder of his wife/sister of the complainant by firing-Record showed that a pistol was recovered from the accused-As per report of Forensic Science Agency, said recovered pistol was not functional-In absence of recovery of any empty from the place of occurrence, said recovery was inconsequential and could not provide any corroboration to the case of prosecution-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused-Appeal against conviction was accordingly dismissed.\n(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Motive not proved-Accused was charged for committing murder of his wife/sister of the complainant by firing-As far as motive was concerned, it was notable that in case of murder of a person by his trusted/closely related person, if any cause of murder was alleged/claimed by the prosecution, same attained vital importance-In the present case, complainant categorically claimed that due to institution of suit for recovery of maintenance allowance in Family Court by the deceased lady, which was decreed in her favour, accused bore a grudge and committed her murder-However, during cross-examination, it came out from the mouth of the complainant that suit for recovery of maintenance allowance was decreed on condition of rehabilitation of his deceased sister with accused-Moreover, it was not mentioned in the statement and FIR that after decree of the suit, whether deceased went to the house of the accused or was residing with him but he did not pay the maintenance allowance and she filed petition for execution of the decree-Without such facts there was no cause of annoyance/grudge for the accused to commit murder of the deceased-Therefore, motive had rightly not been believed by the Trial Court-Even otherwise, when substantive piece of evidence in the form of ocular account had been disbelieved, then motive was of no help to the case of prosecution as the same lost its efficacy-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused-Appeal against conviction was accordingly dismissed.\n(i) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Absconsion of the accused-Accused was charged for committing murder of his wife/sister of the complainant by firing-So far as abscondance of the accused was concerned, suffice to say that it had to be proved like any other fact-However, in the present case, warrant of arrest revealed that it was not issued to any Police Officer or public servant for execution rather through such warrant accused was asked to arrest accused-Similarly, it had not been mentioned in the proclamation that in how much period or till which date, accused had to surrender, therefore, both warrant and proclamation were defective, as mandatory requirements in the same had not been fulfilled and prosecution could not prove this limb of its case-Abscondance was not proof of the charge-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused-Appeal against conviction was accordingly dismissed.\nWajeeh-ul-Hassan v. The State 2019 SCMR 1994; Khalid Mehmood alias Khaloo v. The State 2022 SCMR 1148 and Rohtas Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 566 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),34", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 64331-J and Criminal Revision No. 43121 of 2019, heard on 6th March, 2023.heard on: 6th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Farooq Haider, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Bushra Qamar with Ch. Hamood-ur-Rehman Waseem Zafar for Appellant.\nMs. Nuzhat Bashir, Deputy Prosecutor General along with Haroon Rasheed, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.\nMuhammad Muzaffar Samore for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AFZAL-Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23926", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2376 = 2023 SLD 2376 = 2023 PCRLJ 1823", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-CCTV footage-Forensic test not carried out-Effect-Accused was charged for committing murder of the uncle of the complainant-Prosecution alleged that the accused was involved in the present case through CCTV footage-For proving the murder, video clips/tapes were produced during the evidence through a Police Official-According to said witness, the video clips/tapes were downloaded in USB from the room of deceased and from a Medical Store, but the original video clips/tapes were never produced during the trial-No forensic analysis of the said video clips/tapes was ever carried out, nor any report of expert was ever produced by the prosecution-If original video clips/tapes were delivered to Investigating Officer, then, the forensic test would have been done-Original clips/tapes were not brought on record, thus, an adverse presumption could be drawn that the said clips/tapes were the result of camera trick-Moreover, it was not established by the prosecution that as to when and by whom the video in a USB were prepared/downloaded, so there was possibility that same were prepared in the lab or some film studio-In absence of any forensic report, the genuineness or otherwise of the said video clips/tapes could not be determined and no reliance could be placed on such piece of evidence-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to bring home guilt of accused-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\nAsfadyar and another v. Kamran and another 2016 SCMR 2084 and Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 SC 675 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Admission of accused before the police-Non-admissible-Accused was charged for committing murder of the uncle of the complainant-Admittedly, the admission of accused was before Police, but he was not produced before the Judicial Magistrate, concerned, as admittedly, at that time he was in police custody-Confession made by any person while he was in custody of Police Officials would not be proved against an accused of any offence-In the present case, the accused was arrested on 08.12.2020, while the alleged confession was made before Police on 11.12.2020, which showed delay of about 03 days and hence lost its credibility-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to bring home guilt of accused-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103-Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Recovery of currency from the house of circumstantial witness-Non-associating of private witnesses during recovery proceedings-Effect-Accused was charged for committing murder of the uncle of the complainant-Circumstantial witness deposed that no currency was recovered from his house, while as per recovery memo, Rs.5,42,000/- were recovered from the house of said witness-Alleged recovery was also made in sheer violation of S. 103, Cr.P.C.-Admittedly, the alleged recovery was made in thickly populated area, but none of the inhabitants was made as mushir-As per recovery memo, when the main door of the house was knocked one person came out, who was inquired about said witness, whereafter, he called the said witness, but surprisingly, he was also not associated as mushir to strengthen the prosecution version-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to bring home guilt of accused-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Appreciation of evidence- Material contradictions between the statements of witnesses-Effect-Accused was charged for committing murder of the uncle of the complainant-Record showed that there were material contradictions between the statements of prosecution witnesses-Circumstantial witness in his testimony before the Court deposed that on 06.12.2020, he was present at his shop, in the meanwhile, a witness came there and told that the deceased was lying unconscious in his room; as he knew the deceased, for the last 3/4 years, therefore, he and other witness rushed towards the room of deceased and when he checked the pulse of deceased, the same had stopped; thus, he came out and informed other people-However, the statement of the other witness did not support the version of circumstantial witness, as he did not state a single word with regard to presence of said witness at the place of occurrence, in his testimony before the Court-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to bring home guilt of accused-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22-Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Non-conducting of identification parade of the accused-Effect-Accused was charged for committing murder of the uncle of the complainant-Record showed that the witness, who first visited the room/office of the deceased, where he found him dead, deposed that he saw a young boy there, but after arrest, the prosecution did not conduct identification parade of the accused through said witness, which also gave rise to doubts that why the Investigating Officer did not conduct identification parade-Thus, a presumption could be drawn that the said witness did not support the stance of prosecution-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to bring home guilt of accused-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\n(f) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Principle-If a single circumstance creats reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding guilt of an accused, then the accused will be entitled to such benefit not as a matter of grace and concession, but as a matter of right.\nMuhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Ghulam Qadir and 2 others v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 and Muhammad Zaman v. The State 2014 SCMR 749 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 271 of 2022, decided on 19th June, 2023.heard on: 16th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Abdullah Baloch and Iqbal Ahmed Kasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Alamzaib Nasar and Rehmatullah Momin for Appellant.\nHameedullah Kakar for the Complainant.\nAmeer Hamza Mengal, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUSHTAQ AHMED-Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23927", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2377 = 2023 SLD 2377 = 2023 SCMR 1816", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)-Possession of narcotics- Appreciation of evidence-Allegation against the appellants (three in number) was that a huge quantity of contraband, packed in 920 packets having been placed in secret cavities of truck, was recovered from them-Documentary evidence, duly exhibited by the prosecution, revealed that all the entries as well as Mashirnama of arrest had established the departure and arrival of Police Party to arrest of accused persons, along with huge quantity of contraband, at the spot on the fateful day-Report of the Chemical Examiner was positive showing recovered contraband as Charas and Opium, which (report) further showed that the same was strictly in accordance with the established principles-Though Muharrar of Malkhana was not produced by the prosecution during the evidence, yet the safe custody of contraband for intervening period was proved by the documentary evidence having been duly exhibited in evidence-Even otherwise, such question (non-production of the Muharrar) was not put on the behalf of the appellants (accused persons) to prosecutions witnesses-Prosecution had successfully proved its case against the appellants-Appeals filed by the accused persons were dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nThe State v. Imam Bakhsh 2018 SCMR 2039 and Khair-ul-Bashar v. The State 2019 SCMR 930 ref.\n(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-Ss. 9(c) & 25-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103-Possession of narcotics-Appreciation of evidence-Huge quantity of contraband, packed in 920 packets having been placed in secret cavities of Truck, was recovered from appellants-Applicability of S. 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, regarding association of private person as witness had specifically been excluded by virtue of S. 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997-Alleged contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, relating to raiding party, appeared to be minor in nature, which did not shake their trustworthiness-Prosecution had successfully proved its case against the appellants-Appeals filed by the accused persons were dismissed, in circumstances.\nState/ANF v. Muhammad Arshad 2017 SCMR 283 ref.\n(c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)- Possession of narcotics-Appreciation of evidence-Accused persons were arrested at the spot and a huge quantity of contraband weighing 920 Kilograms (Charas and Opium), packed in 920 packets, was recovered from secret cavities of truck, admittedly driven by the one of the appellants while two appellants were sitting besides him, which had duly been proved by the complainant (Investigation Officer) and had been testified by the other witness/ mashir-It was almost impossible to foist such a huge quantity of narcotics, as such it could not be presumed that they were not in knowledge of such huge quantity of narcotics lying in truck-It could not be said also that two co-accused were travelling in truck-in-question as passengers as a truck was not a public transport vehicle-One of the appellants had admitted in his statement recorded under S. 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 that he was owner of the truck-in-question-Witnesses (Police Officials) narrated the story in true manner and remained consistent despite lengthy cross-examination and their testimony could not be shattered-No circumstance suggested alleged false implication of appellants with such a huge quantity of contraband-Prosecution had successfully proved its case against the appellants-Appeals filed by the accused persons were dismissed, in circumstances.\nNaveed Akhtar v. The State 2022 SCMR 1784 and Liaquat Ali and another v. The State 2022 SCMR 1097 ref.\n(d) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)-Possession of narcotics-Appreciation of evidence-Mala fide of police not proved-Allegation against the appellants (three in number) was that a huge quantity of contraband weighing 920 Kilograms (Charas and Opium), packed in 920 packets having been placed in secret cavities of truck, was recovered from them-In normal circumstances, there was no bar for a police officer to become complainant of the case and also to investigate it unless prejudice was not pleaded by the accused facing trial or if such police officer was having some grudge or vengeance against the accused-Rancor or hostility of the police officer could be perceived from record based on some confidence inspiring substance-Record showed that the appellants had failed to establish any enmity with complainant (Investigation Officer) for alleged false implication in the present crime with such a huge quantity of contraband-Even otherwise, during trial appellants had not moved any application before the competent forum/Court for change of investigation-Prosecution had successfully proved its case against the appellants-Appeals filed by the accused persons were dismissed, in circumstances.\nState through Advocate General, Sindh v. Bashir and others PLD 1997 SC 408 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Hyderabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9(c)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeals Nos. D-07 and D-08 of 2021, decided on 25th January, 2023.heard on: 18th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Karim Khan Agha and Kausar Sultana Hussain, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Altaf Shahid Abro and Bakhtiar A. Panhwar for Appellants.\nShahid A. Shaikh, Additional P.G. Sindh for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed ABDUL MANAN and another-Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23928", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2378 = 2023 SLD 2378 = 2023 PCRLJ 1811", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WXo", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 161- Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7 & 21-H-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34-Act of terrorism, qatl-i-amd, common intention-Bail, refusal of-Confessional statement-Scope-Plea of the petitioner/accused was that a prosecution witness, on whose statement recorded under S. 161 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, he was implicated, had resiled from his statement and had submitted his affidavit to said effect-Validity-Record revealed that although the petitioner/accused was not directly nominated in the FIR but later on the local police had arrested him as suspect of murder of the deceased-During course of investigation , the petitioner/accused confessed his guilt stating that he had committed murder of deceased in presence of a witness; accordingly police arrested said witness and recorded his (witness) statement under S. 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, wherein he had categorically implicated/ involved the petitioner in the present case; thereafter, police had discharged the said witness under S. 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898-Although the petitioner/accused had obtained an affidavit from the prosecution witness after dismissal of his bail by the Anti-Terrorism Court, whereby he resiled from his previous statement recorded under S. 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 by the police as eye-witness-However, at bail stage, evidence of witness recorded by the police could not be kept out of consideration on the basis of affidavit filed by the said witness, hence the evidentiary value of the affidavit-in-question would be considered/evaluated at the time of trial of the petitioner/accused by the Trial Court as deeper appreciation of evidence was not permissible at bail stage-At bail stage, Court was supposed to do tentative assessment of material available on record which was to be different from final appraisement and evaluation of evidence which would be recorded by the Trial Court-Tentative assessment of material, collected by the prosecution during investigation, revealed that petitioners confessional statement under S. 21-H of the Anti-Terrorism, 1997, had been recorded by the Officer of the rank of Superintendent Police, wherein he had admitted, in presence of the witness, that he had committed murder of the deceased; and police had prepared site plan of recovery of weapon of offence on the pointation of the petitioner/accused in presence of independent marginal witness as allegedly the crime weapon was thrown into river/Nallah by him after committing murder of the deceased-Chief Court observed that the petitioner/accused was, prima facie, connected with the commission of offence of murder of the deceased-Bail was declined to the petitioner/accused, in circumstances.\nPLD 1997 SC 347 and 2006 SCMR 1265 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497,161Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7,21-HPenal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,34", - "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No. 106 of 2023, decided on 14th June, 2023.heard on: 31st May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ali Baig, C.J. and Johar Ali, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Burhan Wali for Petitioner.\nMalik Sherbaz, Dy. Advocate General for the State.\nMudassir Hassan for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL NASIR-Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23929", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2379 = 2023 SLD = 2023 SLD", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5WXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)-High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. III, Chapt. 24, Part-B, R. 14-H-Possession of narcotics-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Report of Forensic Science Laboratory not exhibited-Effect-Prosecution case was that four packets of charas weighing 10 kilograms and 200 grams was recovered from the car of the accused-Perusal of the record available on the file reflected that on 22.01.2019, Moharrar handed over sample parcels to the complainant for its submission to the office of Forensic Science Agency, which were deposited there on 23.01.2019-Report of Forensic Science Agency, in that regard, was prepared on 15.02.2019-Though, said report had been annexed with the record of the Trial Court, however, it was not exhibited during the course of trial-Statement of prosecutor dated 17.05.2019 was made before the Court without oath wherein it was incorporated that report of Forensic Science Agency was tendered in evidence-However, original report of Forensic Science Agency available with the record of the Trial Court reflected that it was never exhibited-Exhibit meant a document exhibited for the purpose of being taken into consideration in deciding some question or other in respect of the proceeding in which it was filed-Rule 14-H, Part-B, Chapter-24, Volume III of the High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders provided a self-explanatory procedure for exhibiting a document to be read in evidence, which had been blatantly overlooked in the present case by the Trial Court-In the present case, undeniably, the report of Forensic Science Agency could not be exhibited during the course of trial, therefore the same could not be taken into consideration to maintain conviction of the accused-When no report of Forensic Science Agency could be exhibited during the course of trial to be read in evidence, recovery of entire narcotic substance allegedly recovered from the accused became inconsequential, thus, prosecution case fell to the ground-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\n \nRakhaldas Pramanick v. Sm. Shantilata Ghose and others AIR 1956 Cal. 619 rel.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Principle-A single circumstance creating reasonable doubt, will be sufficient to smash the veracity of prosecution case and is enough to extend the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused, not as a matter of grace or concession but as of right.\nQaisarullah and others v. The State 2009 SCMR 579 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997=9(c)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 39152 of 2019, heard on 20th September, 2022.heard on: 20th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Aalia Neelum and Ali Zia Bajwa, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Naimat Ullah and Nazir Ahmad Asad for Appellant.\nIkram Ullah Khan Niazi, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AZIZ KHAN-Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23930", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5UTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2392 = 2023 SLD = 2023 SLD", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5UTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), Ss. 23 & 24-Unlicensed possession of arms, possession of arms with intent to use for unlawful purposes-Bail, grant of-Non-association of independent witnesses-Further inquiry-Scope-Accused sought bail after arrest in an FIR lodged under S. 23 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, wherein it was alleged that he was apprehended while being in possession of an unlicensed .30 bore pistol with magazine and three live bullets-Accused had been confined in judicial custody since the day of his arrest and the police had submitted the challan against him; hence, he was not required for further investigation-Despite prior information, daylight and roadside occurrence, police had failed to join any private person to witness the search and recovery process-Record was silent as to whether the accused was a habitual or previous convict-All the witnesses were police officials; therefore, there was no apprehension of tampering with the prosecution evidence-Case against accused required further inquiry- Accused was admitted to bail, in circumstances.\n(b) Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013)-\n-Ss. 2(b), 2(c) & 2(d)-Ammunition-Arms-Firearms-Scope-Pistol does not come within the definition of firearm and ammunition but within the definition of S. 2(c).\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Bail-Consideration of likely sentence-Scope-Court while hearing bail application does not have to keep in view the maximum sentence provided by statute but the one which is likely to be entailed in the facts and circumstances of the case.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Sindh Arms Act, 2013=23,24", - "Case #": "Criminal Bail Application No. S-535 of 2021, decided on 13th September, 2021.heard on: 13th September, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Zafar Ahmed Rajput, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shabbir Ali Bozdar for Appellant.\nShafi Muhammad Mahar, Deputy Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DILAWAR-Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23931", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5US8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2394 = 2023 SLD = 2023 SLD", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5US8", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss. 156(1), 156(8)(i), 156(70) & 185-F-Notification SRO No.1017(I)/98, dated 21-7-1998-Smuggling of foreign currency-Appreciation of evidence-Accused was alleged to be carrying illegal foreign currency which was recovered from his possession at airport-Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for five years with fine-Validity-To establish fact of valid possession of foreign currency with accused in the light of clause (e) of Notification SRO No.1017(I)98 dated 21-07-1998, accused produced print out of email sent by Money Exchange Company along with attachment of forex receipt issued in his name; original bank statement evincing banking transaction of personal account of accused; electronic printout of email forwarded by accused to representative of Money Exchange Company-Trial Court erroneously read clauses (d) and (f) with clause (e) of Notification SRO No.1017(I)98 dated 21.7.1998-Provision of clause (e) of Notification SRO No.1017(I)98 dated 21.7.1998 was an independent clause that spoke about the persons not ordinarily residing in Pakistan like accused-Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt, in circumstances-If there is a single circumstance which has created reasonable doubt regarding credibility of prosecution case, the same is sufficient to give benefit of the same to accused-High court set aside sentence and conviction awarded to accused by Trial Court and he was acquitted of the charge-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nLal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846 and Muhammad Rafique and others v. The State and others 2010 SCMR 385 ref.\n2006 SCMR 1609 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=156(1),156(8)(i),156(70),185-F", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 15248 of 2020, decided on 27th September, 2022.heard on: 27th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Shahbaz Ali Rizvi, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Maqbool Hussain Sheikh and Mian Talat Mahmood for Appellant along with Appellant.\nMuhammad Faisal Nawaz for Appellant (in Criminal Miscellaneous Nos. 1 and 2 of 2022).\nMs. Amna Parveen, Special Prosecutor for Customs for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AFZAL NAZIR-Appellant\nVS\nCOLLECTORATE, TAXATION AND ANTI-SMUGGLING, LAHORE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23932", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5UXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2398 = 2023 SLD 2398 = 2023 SLD 1646", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5UXo", - "Key Words:": "West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (XXXI of 1960)-\n-S. 3 [as amended by Punjab Maintenance of Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 2017]-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Alternate and efficacious remedy-Scope-Detention-Public safety-Petitioner assailed detention of her father under S. 3(1) of West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, by the authorities-Plea raised by authorities was that petitioner had an alternate remedy available-Validity-Representation under S. 3(6) of West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 was an alternate remedy but in view of the process involved therein, it in no manner could be termed as efficacious in nature, so as to oust Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court-Order of detention of father of petitioner did not fit into statutory requirement of S. 3 of West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960-High Court set aside the order of detention and detenu was ordered to be released forthwith-High Court observed that in case of any apprehension of future involvement of detenue in activity prejudicial to public safety, the same could be plugged by getting a bond under S. 3(9) of West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 [as amended by Punjab Maintenance of Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 2017] from the detenue-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad v. Mrs. Amatul Jalil Khawaja and others PLD 2003 SC 442 and The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan, Works Division and 2 others PLD 1972 SC 279 ref.\nDr. Muhammad Shoaib Suddle v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Home Department, Sindh Civil Secretariat, Karachi and another 1999 PCr.LJ 747 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1955 of 2023, decided on 6th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ch. Abdul Aziz, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Taimur Altaf Malik and Barrister Faiza Asad for Petitioner.\nAbid Aziz, Assistant Advocate General with Anum Shabbir ASP, Hassan Askari Inspector, Riaz, S.I. and Tassadaq, S.I. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAKHDOOMZADI GAUHAR BANO QURESHI-Petitioner\nVS\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Chief Secretary, Punjab and others- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23933", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5TTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2407 = 2023 SLD 2407 = 2023 PCRLJ 1546", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1F5TTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 364-A, 365-B, 376(2), 452, 148 & 149- Kidnapping, Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, rape, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Delay of four days in lodging FIR-Accused were charged for kidnapping the prosecutrix/ victim along with her minor daughter and raping her-Motive behind the occurrence as alleged in the crime report was that a relative of complainant side had abducted a lady of accused side and in order to take revenge of her abduction, accused persons had committed the occurrence-According to prosecution story crime was reported to police with an extraordinary delay of four days for which no plausible explanation could be furnished-Admittedly, the inter-se distance between the place of occurrence and police station was only 08-km-Extraordinary delay in reporting the alleged occurrence to police clearly suggested that possibility of deliberation, consultation and concoction could not be ruled out-When there was delay in reporting the incident to the police then prosecution was under obligation to explain such delay and failure to do that would badly reflect upon the credibility of prosecution version-Circumstances established that the prosecution had absolutely failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond shadow of reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\nThe State through P.G. Sindh and others v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh and others 2021 SCMR 873; Khair Muhammad and another v. The State through P.G. Punjab and another 2021 SCMR 130 and Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 364-A, 365-B, 376(2), 452, 148 & 149-Kidnapping, Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, rape, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Ocular account-Accused were charged for kidnapping the daughter of the complainant along with her minor daughter and raping her-Ocular account was furnished through the complainant and one of the victims of occurrence, i.e. daughter of complainant-Accused were nominated in the crime report despite the admitted fact that they were not previously known to the complainant of the case-Complainant stated during his cross-examination that accused were not known to him prior to the occurrence-Prosecution could not furnish any explanation as to how complainant got to know the names of accused persons nominated in the crime report-Victim also admitted such fact during her cross-examination that accused persons were not previously known to her-Said sole fact led to the inference that complainant got recorded the FIR after due deliberation and consultation as alleged by the accused side-Implication of all the accused persons by the name by the prosecutrix was also astonishing because it was admitted by her that accused persons were not known to her before the occurrence-Although prosecutrix tried to cover-up that deficiency by stating that she came to know about the names of accused persons during her confinement where they used to call each other by their names but that fact was negated from her own statement-Prosecutrix specifically mentioned in her statement before Trial Court that she was kept there by the accused persons and they committed rape with her without her consent-Prosecutrix failed to explain as to how she got to know about the names of the remaining accused persons because she did not allege that all other accused persons also used to visit the place of her captivity-One could easily infer that she did not get her statement recorded at her own rather same was recorded upon the dictation of her father i.e. complainant of the case, as he admitted in his statement-Prosecution version qua the escape of victim from the confinement of accused persons was also highly unbelievable-According to prosecutrix, when she got herself extricated from the clutches of accused persons and ran away from the place of her confinement, she met her husband and he took her to the police station, where she got recorded her statement and was medically examined thereafter-On the other hand, in her cross examination, she stated that at the time of recording her statement, her father and others accompanied her and that fact had also created doubt about her story regarding her extrication and recording of her statement before the local police especially when it was specifically asserted by the complainant that both the abductees were produced by him before the police and statements of both the abductees were also recorded on his dictation-Moreover, neither the prosecutrix pointed out her place of confinement nor did Investigating Officer visit the same-According to the prosecutrix she and her daughter were taken to the house of some person but astonishingly he was not joined into investigation by the Investigating Officer-Not pointing out the place of occurrence, despite the fact that victim extricated herself from accused persons and came to police station, created serious dent in prosecution case and made it highly doubtful-In the such circumstances, prosecution story qua the abduction of prosecutrix and her daughter and how they became free from the clutches of accused persons was shrouded in mystery and could not be proved by prosecution beyond reasonable doubt-Ocular account was full of doubts and contradiction qua the manner and mode of occurrence, hence, could not be relied upon being result of consultation and deliberation-Circumstances established that the prosecution had absolutely failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond shadow of reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 364-A, 365-B, 376(2), 452, 148 & 149-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)- Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, rape, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Withholding best evidence-One of the abductees not produced as witness-Accused were charged for kidnapping the daughter of the complainant along with her minor daughter and raping her-Surprisingly, whole of prosecutions story was silent about the recovery of minor abductee-No prosecution witness uttered a single word regarding the date, place, time etc. of release of said minor abductee-Astonishingly, minor victim was also not produced as witness in the Court despite the fact that she was a star witnesses of prosecution case being one of the abductees of the occurrence-Silence of prosecution story regarding her recovery and her non-production before the trial Court had raised serious doubts about the prosecution story-Prosecution gave up minor victim because of being a minor-Giving up a witness as unnecessary or won over was prerogative of prosecution and it was at liberty to produce as many witnesses as it thought fit to prove its case against the accused-However, giving up a witness only because she was minor had no legal justification-In the circumstances, minor victim could have been the most natural witness of the occurrence and an adverse inference could legitimately be drawn under Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 that had she been produced, she would have not supported the case of the prosecution-According to crime report there were three other prosecution witnesses, who witnessed the abduction of prosecutrix and her daughter, but they were not produced before the Trial Court, hence prosecution withheld their evidence too-Circumstances established that the prosecution had absolutely failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond shadow of reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\n(d) Qanun-e-Shahdat (10 of 1984)-\n-Arts. 3 & 17-Child witness, competency of-Child is fully competent to depose before a court of law subject to his/her capacity and intellect to understand what he/she deposes about-Whether a child is a competent witness or not and whether he/she passes the rationality test is something which is to be decided by the court in accordance with Art. 3 read with Art. 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, after carrying out voir dire which means speak the truth.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 364-A, 365-B, 376(2), 452, 148 & 149- Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, rape, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Medical evidence-Reliance-Accused were charged for kidnapping the daughter of the complainant along with her minor daughter and raping her-Medical expert was in a better position to confirm the allegation of prosecutrix regarding her alleged rape by the accused persons-Perusal of the statement of Medical Expert i.e. Woman Medical Officer delineated that although she observed two abrasions on upper side of left thigh and three fresh abrasions on the upper side of right thigh but she had specifically stated that she neither saw any suspected spots or stains nor any marks of injury or violence on the body and the pubic area-Further, three vaginal swabs were taken by the Woman Medical Officer and were sent to Chemical Examiner for forensic examination-After receiving the report of Chemical Examiner, Medical Expert had opined that no fresh act of sexual intercourse was done with victim-Chemical Examiner had not observed any semen (spermatozoa) on the vaginal swabs despite the fact that victim had alleged that accused persons committed rape with her regularly for consecutive seventeen days of her confinement-Though Law Officer had tried to justify the absence of semen by contending that as she was medically examined after a considerable span of time as she went to the police station first to get her statement recorded and thereafter got herself medically examined, therefore, seminal material could not be detected from the vaginal swabs, but said fact was not acceptable because Motile Spermatozoa could be found for as long as 100 hours and non-motile for as long as 17 days-Sperms remained motile in the vagina for about two to three hours and non-motile forms were detectible for about twenty four hours and the sperms remained motile in the uterine cavity for 3-4 days- In view of the said facts, absence of any motile and immotile sperm on vaginal swabs and opinion of Medical Expert had negated the version of prosecutrix regarding her alleged gang-rape-Prosecutrix also stated in her testimony that her clothes were fully stained with sperms (spermatozoa) of accused persons who allegedly committed rape with her continuously for seventeen days-Astonishingly those clothes of the prosecutrix were neither produced before the Investigating Officer nor sent for DNA test-Such aspect of the case further adversely hit the veracity of prosecution case and benefit of such doubt would go in favor of none else but the accused persons-Circumstances established that the prosecution had absolutely failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond shadow of reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 364-A, 365-B, 376(2), 452, 148 & 149- Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, rape, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Recovery of weapons of offence and crime empties-Reliance-Accused were charged for kidnapping the daughter of the complainant along with her minor daughter and raping her-Record showed that no crime empty was taken into possession by Investigating Officer from the alleged place of occurrence-Surprisingly, not a single crime empty could be recovered from place of occurrence despite the fact that it was alleged by the complainant that accused persons made indiscriminate firing for about half an hour-Alleged recovery of firearms on the pointing out of accused persons during the investigation remained legally inconsequential because no crime-empty had been secured from the place of occurrence so as to connect the recovered weapon with the occurrence in issue-In these circumstances, recovery of crime weapons was of no avail to the prosecution-Circumstances established that the prosecution had absolutely failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond shadow of reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\n(g) Criminal trial-\n-Recovery of crime weapon-Evidentiary value-Recovery of crime weapon is only a corroborative piece of evidence and same is valueless in the absence of credible direct evidence.\nNaveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600 rel.\n(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 364-A, 365-B, 376(2), 452, 148 & 149- Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, rape, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appreciation of evidence- Acquittal of co-accused on same set of evidence-Rule of consistency-Accused were charged for kidnapping the daughter of the complainant along with her minor daughter and raping her-In the present case, Twenty-two (22) persons were indicted and stood trial-Seven accused were convicted and rest fifteen (15) accused were acquitted-Where same set of witnesses is disbelieved qua number of accused persons implicated in the case, it cannot be made foundation for conviction of rest of the accused persons in absence of strong and independent corroboration, which was conspicuously missing in the present case-Circumstances established that the prosecution had absolutely failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond shadow of reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.\nAltaf Hussain v. State 2019 SCMR 274 rel.\n(i) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt- Principle- Single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding guilt of an accused is sufficient to extend such benefit to accused person(s) not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right without slightest of hesitation.\nThe State through P.G. Sindh and others v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh and others 2021 SCMR 873; Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857; Abdul Jabbar and another v. The State 2019 SCMR 129; Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64; Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652; Gul Dast Khan v. The State 2009 SCMR 431; Daniel Body (Muslim name Saifullah) and another v. The State 1992 SCMR 196 and Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=364-A,365-B,376(2),452,148,149Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=3,17", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeals Nos. 476, 492 and 578 of 2012, heard on 3rd December, 2021.heard on: 3rd December, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Ali Zia Bajwa, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Muhammad Saleem and Sheikh Muhammad Raheem for Appellants.\nAnsar Yasin, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FIDA HUSSAIN and others-Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23934", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6412 = 2022 SLD 6412 = (2022) 126 TAX 371", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Tax Recovery and Stay Orders under Income Tax Ordinance 2001\nDetails:\nThis case involves the recovery of Rs. 88 million by the Revenue authorities from the applicant’s bank accounts while an application for an extension of a stay order was pending before the Appellate Tribunal. The applicant challenged this action, arguing that the recovery was made unlawfully, despite the pending application for stay. The Tribunal had extended the stay order until 26.09.2022, and the recovery was conducted on the same day before the stay application was addressed.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal ruled that the recovery made by the Revenue authorities was unlawful, as the application for stay had not yet been decided. The authorities acted in bad faith and disregarded the Tribunals instructions. The Tribunal directed the revenue authorities to refund the Rs. 88 million recovered within seven days. The matter was referred to the Chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) for an inquiry into the conduct of the concerned officers and potential disciplinary action. The issue of contempt of court was also referred to the Islamabad High Court.\nCitations:\n•\nZ.N. Exports v. Collector of Sales Tax, 2003 PTD 1746\n•\nSun-Rise Bottling v. FOP, 2006 PTD 535\n•\nSaifur Rehman v. Muhammad Ayub, PLJ 1999 Karachi 263\n•\nMCB v. Federation, 2020 CLD 829\n•\nHuawei Technologies Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd v. CIR, 2016 PTD 1799", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=127,131,131(5),132,132(6),137,137(4),138,140,140(1),170,210,214Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003=3", - "Case #": "M.A.Nos.244 to249/IB/2022 in ITA Nos.132 to 137/IB/2022, decided on 28.09.2022, heard on: 28.09.2022", - "Judge Name:": " M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M Ellahi, Advocate, M. Sadique Butt, Advocate and Ms. Jaweria Kokab, G.M (Finance) for the Appellants.\nAshfaq Ahmed Naqvi, Advocate, (Legal Advisor) assisted by Shaheryar Akram, DR, for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CELMORE TECHNOLOGIES (PVT) LTD., ISLAMABAD\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CTO, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23935", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6413 = 2022 SLD 6413 = (2022) 126 TAX 393", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax Act - Assessment, Recovery, and Input Tax Adjustment\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a retailer, had opted to pay turnover tax at a rate of 2% on its total turnover, including exempt supplies, under Section 3(9A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. This option was valid up to June 30, 2021. From July 1, 2019, the turnover tax scheme was abolished, and the appellant was required to pay sales tax at the standard rate of 17%.\nDuring scrutiny of sales tax returns for the period of July and August 2019, it was found that the appellant had improperly adjusted input tax carried forward from previous returns, which was not allowed under the new tax regime. This led to the issuance of a Show Cause Notice.\nThe case was remanded to the department for de novo consideration. The appellant challenged the remand order, contending that the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) lacked the authority to remand cases under Section 45B(3) of the Sales Tax Act.\nHeld:\nJurisdiction Issue: The plea regarding the incompetency of the officer initiating the proceedings was rejected. The appellant’s argument that only the Commissioner Inland Revenue had the jurisdiction was found to be without merit based on recent Supreme Court decisions.\nAudit and Show Cause Notice: If no audit notice under Section 25 and no notice under Sections 38 and 72B are issued, the Show Cause Notice issued under Section 11 and subsequent proceedings would not be sustainable.\nSelf-Assessment and Tax Alteration: Any alteration of self-assessed tax must be done through a fresh assessment under Section 11, which requires the selection of the taxpayer through an audit under Section 25.\nRemand Authority of CIR(A): The Commissioner Inland Revenue Appeals (CIR(A)) was found to lack jurisdiction to remand cases for de novo consideration. This action was deemed illegal, and the remand was set aside.\nInput Tax Deduction: The appellant was entitled to deduct input tax as per Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act. The orders of the authorities below were vacated.\nCase law references:\n2016 PTD 1675\n2020 PTD 297\n2017 PTD 138\nPTCL 2001 CL. 331 (Supreme Court of Pakistan)\n2015 PTD 1 (Lahore High Court)\n2015 PTD 1050 (Tribunal)\n2019 PTD 1108 (Tribunal)\nM/s. Sheikh Enterprises Prop. Muhammad Tahir Sheikh v. CIR Zone-VI, RTO, Lahore (STA No. 408/KB/2015 dated 9.10.2019)\nPrinciples Highlighted:\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue has the authority to issue orders under Section 11 and cannot delegate this power.\nThe CIR(A) does not have the jurisdiction to remand cases for de novo consideration.\nInput tax adjustment is a legal entitlement under the Sales Tax Act, provided the conditions are met.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(9A),7,11,11(2),25,30(2A),38,45-B(3),72B", - "Case #": "M.A. (Stay) No.332/KB/2020 STA No.286/KB/2020 decided on 16.09.2020, heard on: 09-09-2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIF ULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rahim Lakhany & Vishwa Mittar Advocates A.R, for the Appellants.\nAbdul Aziz Memon, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. SANULLAH CORPORATION, (PVT.) LIMITED KARACHI\nVs\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-IV, RTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23936", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 1 = 2024 SLD 1 = 2024 PTD 1 = (2024) 129 TAX 224", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSSs", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Inspection of Offices under Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance\nDetails:\nThe petitioners, officials of the Inland Revenue, challenged letters issued under Section 17 of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, authorizing inspection of their offices. The petitioners contended that the Federal Tax Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to conduct such an inspection without proper notice or investigation into any specific complaints against them.\nFederal Tax Ombudsman’s Role:\nThe court emphasized that the Federal Tax Ombudsman was not tasked with reviewing the legality or unlawfulness of orders, assessments, or decisions directly. Instead, any lawful procedure under Section 10 of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 would require an inquiry into complaints or allegations of maladministration. However, in this case, the petitioners had not been provided with notice about the complaints against them, nor were they given a fair opportunity to respond to any accusations of misconduct.\nExercise of Powers under Section 10:\nThe court observed that while the Federal Tax Ombudsman had the authority under Section 10(9) to summon records, it had failed to exercise this power before resorting to direct inspection of the petitioners offices. No justifiable reason was given for bypassing this procedure.\nHeld:\nThe court set aside the letters issued by the Federal Tax Ombudsman, ruling that the Ombudsman’s actions were beyond the scope of its statutory powers.\nThe constitutional petition was allowed, and the actions of the Federal Tax Ombudsman were declared invalid.\nCase law references:\n2005 PTD 23\n2012 SCMR 455\nPLD 1992 SC 485\nPrinciples Highlighted:\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman must follow prescribed procedures when investigating complaints, including providing proper notice to the concerned parties.\nThe Ombudsman cannot directly inspect offices unless the lawful process under Section 10 of the Ordinance is followed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10,17Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-4079 D-4212, D-4341, D-4353, D-4377 of 2021, decided on 28th March, 2023, heard on: 21st March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Agha Faisal, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abid S. Zuberi, Ayan Mustafa Memon, M. Saad Siddiqui, Ali Abid Zuberi, Agha Ali Durrani, Fayaz Ali Maitlo, Ovais Ali Shah, Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Faooq Mirani and Owais Leghari for Petitioners.\nBarrister Ghazi Khan Khalil, Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Ameer Nausherwan Adil, Abdul Razzaque Panhwar, Abdul Hakeem Junejo and Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAKEEL AHMED KASANA and others\nVs\nFEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN through Registrar Federal Tax Ombudsman and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23937", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2 = 2024 SLD 2 = 2024 PTD 8 = (2024) 130 TAX 319 = 2022 LHC 8442", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSTk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Judicial Review of Authorization Order for Raid and Search under Income Tax Ordinance\nDetails:\nThe petitioner company challenged the issuance of an Authorization Order by the authorities, which allowed for a raid, search, and impounding of documents due to its alleged non-cooperation during an audit under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The company argued that the Authorization Order was invalid.\n(a) Expression of Full and Free Access :\nThe court discussed the scope of the expression full and free access in Section 175(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, emphasizing that it must be fully applied. The term search, used in the heading of Section 175, must be understood in conjunction with full and free access. The court also noted that Section 175(7) of the Ordinance must not be overlooked as it reflects the legislatures intention to enforce compliance without reference to the search requirements under Section 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.\n(b) Authorization Order and Constitutional Petition:\nThe High Court found that it could not review the sufficiency of documents provided by the petitioner, as the satisfaction of the Commissioner was a prerogative. The court noted that the Commissioner, after the petitioner’s failure to cooperate, had a statutory right to invoke Section 175. The Authorization Order contained proper justification and reasoning, and the Court found no illegality in the action taken under Section 175 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The petition was dismissed, as there was no mala fide or misuse of power by the authorities.\n(c) Judicial Review under Article 199:\nThe High Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, as the petitioner had an adequate remedy available under Section 175(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance.\n(d) Maxim Absoluta Sententia Expositore Non Indiget :\nThe court applied the maxim, stating that the plain meaning of Section 175 of the Income Tax Ordinance does not require further exposition. Provisions from other fiscal statutes could not be incorporated into Section 175, as this would contradict its intended meaning.\nHeld:\nThe Authorization Order under Section 175 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was found to be valid and properly justified.\nThe constitutional petition was dismissed.\nThe High Court declined to exercise jurisdiction as an adequate remedy was available to the petitioner under the statutory provisions.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001): Sections 175, 177\nCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): Section 103\nCase law references:\nCollector of Customs, Lahore v. Nestle Milk Pack Limited, 2007 PTD 921\nKhurram Shahzad v. Federation of Pakistan, 2019 PTD 1124\nK.K. Oil and Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federal Board of Revenue, 2016 PTD 2601\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue v. Messrs Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills, 2018 SCMR 1328\nPrinciples Highlighted:\nThe High Court will not intervene when an adequate remedy exists under the statute.\n Full and free access must be given full effect as per the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe interpretation of laws must be in line with their plain meaning, and provisions from other statutes should not be integrated unless explicitly stated.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=175,177,175(1)(a)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=103Sales Tax Act, 1990=11Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 68823 of 2022, decided on 8th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTCE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sarfaraz Ahmad Cheema and Anas Irtiza Awan for Petitioner.\nSheraz Zaka, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nMs. Humaira Bashir Chaudhary for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.\nYasir Islam Chaudhary, Advocate for Respondent No.3.\nMuhammad Nadeem Asad, Deputy Commissioner Audit (LTO), Lahore, in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "OUTFITTERS STORES (PRIVATE) LIMITED THROUGH DIRECTOR\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION, FBR AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23938", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3 = 2024 SLD 3 = 2024 PTD 30", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSTg", - "Key Words:": "Taxation-Recovery proceedings-Appeal pending-Stay of recovery proceedings during pendency of appeal-Petitioner sought a direction to the respondent to decide its pending appeal and, in the meanwhile, restrain the department from initiating recovery proceedings-Validity-There should be an adjudication of the grievance by an independent tribunal-An assessee is entitled to adjudication in respect of its disputed tax liabilities by at least one independent forum outside the hierarchy of the respondent department-Constitutional petition was disposed of with a direction to the respondent to hear and decide the appeal within a period of sixty days, and until then, no coercive measures were to be adopted against the petitioner by the department.\nMehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 1445 rel.\nMessrs Pak Saudi Fertilizers Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2002 PTD 679; Z.N. Exporters (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax 2003 PTD 1746; Brothers Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Appellate Tribunal Sales Tax 2003 PTD 1836 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1825 of 2021, decided on 25th May, 2021, heard on: 25th May, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " AAMER FAROOQ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Asif Khan for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS ISLAMABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED\nVS\nADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23939", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4 = 2024 SLD 4 = 2024 PTD 32", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases-\n-Aetiology-Connotation-Aetiology means investigation or attribution of case or reason for something often expressed in terms of historical or mythical explanation.\n(b) Public functionaries-\n-Appointment-Fitness to hold public office-First Information Report, registeration of-Acquittal on basis of compromise-Mere registration of FIR against any person cannot be used as a definitive test to label him as having a bad character-All acquittals including acquittal on compromise are honorable for the reason that prosecution does not succeed to prove its case against accused on the strength of evidence of unimpeachable character-There can be no acquittals, which may be said to be dishonorable-Law has not drawn any distinction between any types of acquittals.\nJawad Ahmad Mir v. Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan, Vice-Chancellor, University of Swabi, District Swabi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others 2023 SCMR 162; Mumtaz Ali Shah v. Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd., H.Q., Islamabad and 6 others PLD 2002 SC 1060 and (Suo Motu Case No. 03 of 2017) PLD 2018 SC 703 rel.\n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S. 130(3)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Quo warranto-Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue-Judicial Member, appointment of-Pre-conditions-Involvement in criminal case-Effect-Petitioner assailed appointment of respondent as Member Judicial in Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue on the ground that an FIR was registered against him-Validity-No restrictions or conditions were provided under S. 130(3) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 relating to character verification during probationary period of respondent-Mere involvement of a candidate in any criminal case/FIR was not sufficient to bring any clog for appointment of respondent as a Judicial Member of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue-Respondent was never adjudged as guilty of the charges, rather complainant of that case had entered into a compromise with him and he was acquitted on the basis thereof-No other occasion, besides registration of one FIR pertaining to any criminal liability of respondent was brought on record by petitioner-Respondent was appointed as Member Judicial Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue by Federal Government after he qualified the Federal Public Service Commission Exam.-Petitioner was appointed under S. 130(3) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 read with Appointment of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Members Rules, 1998-Office of Member Judicial, Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue by all intents and purpose is a public office which office is created by the State and the statute, and duties attached to the office are of a public nature-Petitioner neither challenged qualifications of respondent, as mentioned in S. 130 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 nor his experience-Respondent was holding public office strictly as per criteria stipulated in S. 130(3) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Such requirement was duly considered by Federal Government at the time of appointment of respondent through notification of his appointment followed by memorandum which was sent to him clearly mentioning terms and conditions mentioned therein-High Court declined to interfere in the appointment of respondent-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMessrs Service Global Industries Limited through Usman Liaqat v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2023 Lahore 471 = 2023 PTD 1120; President National Bank of Pakistan and others v. Waqas Ahmed Khan 2023 SCMR 766; Saqib Ali v. Government of Punjab and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 310; Mirza Shahzeb v. City Police Officer and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 749; Dr. Muhammad Islam v. Government of NWFP and others 1998 SCMR 1993; Malik Muhammad Ejaz Channar v. The State PLD 2022 Lah. 427; Naimat Ullah v. The State 2021 PCr.LJ 1339; Mst. Kulsoom v. Sessions Judge 2018 MLD 1484; Muhammad Qasim v. Muhammad Iqbal 2017 YLR 752; Muhammad Zafar v. Rustam Ali 2017 SCMR 1639; Raja Muhammad Safdar v. District Returning Officer, Rawalpindi 2006 CLC 87; Ismail Ijaz v. The State 2023 PCr.LJ 114; Nadeem Ahmad v. Saif-ur-Rehman 2021 MLD 354 and Muhammad Umais v. Rawalpindi Cantonment Board and others PLD 2022 Lah. 148 ref.\nNisar Khan Khattak v. Haji Adam, Director General (Admin), PEMRA Headquarter, Mauve Area, Islamabad and another 2021 PLC (C.S,) 140; Attaullah Khan v. Ali Azam Afridi and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 182; Mirza Abdul Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2017 PLC (C.S.) 1327; Member (S & R)/Chief Settlement Commissioner, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another v. Syed Ashfaque Ali and others PLD 2003 SC 132; Aftab Iqbal Khan Khichi and another v. Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Ltd. Karachi 1999 SCMR 1326; Lahore Stock Exchange v. Lahore Appellate Bench S & EC 2006 CLD 988; M.U.A. Khan v. Rana M. Sultan and another PLD 1974 SC 228; Akbar Khan v. Said Gul PLD 2020 Pesh. 10; Dr. Farzana Bari v. Ministry of Law, Justice And Human Rights PLD 2018 Isl. 127 and Muhammad Shahid Akram v. Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary and 3 others 2016 PLC (C.S.) 1335 rel.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Writ of quo warranto , issuance of-Principle-Writ of quo warranto should only be issued in exceptional cases and relief should not be allowed in a casual manner, especially when candidates qualifications were thoroughly examined during his appointment.\nAbrar Hassan v. Government of Pakistan and Respondents\nPLD 1976 SC 315 and Asif Hassan and others v. Sabir Hussain and others 2019 SCMR 1720 rel.\n(e) Words and phrases-\n-Public office-Defination.\nMasud-ul-Hassan v. Khadim Hussain PLD 1963 SC 203; M.A.U.Khan v. M. Sultan PLD 1974 SC 228; Blacks Law Dictionary 9th Edition; Pramanatha Aiyars The Advanced Law Lexicon, 4th Edition; Ferris Extraordinary Legal Remedies 72 CWN 64, Vol. 72; V.C. Shukla v. State (1980) Supp SCC 249 and Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. PLD 1975 SC 244 rel.\n heterodoxy, or, as some might say, heresy, is not the more attractive because it is dignified by the name of reform. Nor will I easily be led by an undiscerning zeal for some abstract kind of justice to ignore our first duty, which is to administer justice according to law, the law which is established for us by Act of Parliament or the binding authority of precedent. The law is developed by the application of old principles to new circumstances. Therein lies its genius .11\nLord Denning in Midland Silicons Ltd v Scruttons Ltd. [1962] AC 446, 467-468", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1938 of 2023, heard on 19th September, 2023, heard on: 19th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Tanveer Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and Barrister Usama Tanveer Iqbal for Petitioner with Rizwan Ali Sayal, Petitioner.\nMalik Muhammad Siddique Awan, Additional Attorney General along with Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General, Barrister Asfandyar Khan Tareen with Arslan Saleem Chaudhry for Respondent No.5.\nAbid Aziz Rajori and Jalil Akhtar Abbasi, Assistant Advocates General and Rashid Mehmood, Research Officer, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RIZWAN ALI SAYAL\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23940", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5 = 2024 SLD 5 = 2024 PTD 49", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDSXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 59AA, 59B, Second Sched., Cls. 103A & 103C-Group relief, benefit of-Petitioners / taxpayers claimed that since Cl. 103A in Second Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in its original form, extended benefit to qualifying entities under Ss. 59AA & 59B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, therefore, excising S.59B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, therefrom amounted to discrimination-Validity-It was prerogative of Parliament to confer and withdraw fiscal benefits, in the interests of public at large-Petitioners / taxpayer failed to prove any irrevocable entwining of Cl. 103A of Second Schedule with S. 59B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-There was no discrimination as the exemption could not subsist during tenancy of S.59B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Certain benefits under S.59AA of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, were extended to holding companies and hundred percent owned subsidiaries to be taxed as one fiscal unit-No concept of one fiscal unit existed in S. 59B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, wherein benefits including surrendering of losses was offered to qualifying holding / subsidiary companies-Upon the anvil of intelligible differentia categorization in each provision was demonstrably mutually exclusive-Petitioners / taxpayer did not have any case for discrimination-Provision of Cl. 103C was added to Second Schedule of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 vide Finance Act, 2019 and was omitted therefrom vide Finance Act, 2021-During the subsistence of Cl. 103C to Second Schedule of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, inter-corporate dividends were once again given tax exemption-No exemption under S. 54 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was to be considered in respect of taxation unless provided for in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-No exemption in respect of inter-corporate dividends was available to petitioners / taxpayers as they had availed benefit of relevant exemption during its tenancy-High Court declined to interfere in the matter as no case was made out to perpetuate the benefit ad infinitum especially post conscious withdrawal of such benefit by the Parliament-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMetco Shipbreakers v. Federation of Pakistan 1996 MLD 144; Syed Azam Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1691; CIR Peshawar v. Tariq Mehmood 2021 SCMR 440; Fawad Ahmad Mukhtar v. CIR 2022 SCMR 454; Nagina Silk Mills v. ITO PLD 1963 SC 322; East Pakistan v. Sharafatullah PLD 1970 SC 514; CIT v. EFU Insurance 1982 PLD SC 247; G H Shah v. Chief Land Commissioner 1983 CLC 1585; Al Samrez Enterprises v. Federation of Pakistan 1986 SCMR 1917; WAPDA v. Capt. Nazir 1986 SCMR 96; Chief Land Commissioner v. G H Shah 1988 SCMR 715; Molasses Trading and Export v. Federation of Pakistan 1993 SCMR 1905; Muhammad Hussain v. Muhammad 2000 SCMR 367; Shahnawaz v. Federation of Pakistan 2011 PTD 1558; Zila Council Jhelum v. PTC PLD 2016 SC 398; Al Tech Engineers v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 SCMR 673; Super Engineering v. CIR 2019 SCMR 1111; H M Extraction v. FBR 2019 SCMR 1081 and Anwar Yahya v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 PTD 1069 rel.\n(b) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Amendment in laws-Presumption-Parliament is aware of statutory positions and undertakes an amendment to alter the status, existing prior to amendment having taken place.\nFatima Fertilizer v. SRB [(2021) 123 Tax 122; Pakistan Tobacco v. Karachi Municipal Corporation PLD 1967 SC 241; Chairman District Council v. Ali Akbar 1970 SCMR 105; State Life Insurance Corporation v. Mercantile Mutual Insurance 1993 SCMR 1394 and S. Zafar Ejaz v. Chairman, Steel Mills Corporation 1998 PLC (C.S.) 777 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=59AA,59B", - "Case #": "C.P. No.8569 of 2018 (along with connected petitions), decided on 28th February, 2023. Dates of hearing: 14th, 15th, 16th, 22nd, 23rd, 27th and 28th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jam Zeeshan, Khalid Javed Khan, Farogh Naseem, Ovais Ali Shah, Rashid Anwar, Uzair Qadir Shoro, Umer Akhund, Marium Riaz, Umer Ilyas Khan, Fizzah Bucha, Ameer Haider Khan, Sami-ur-Rehman Khan, Fahad Khan, Ahmed Hussain, Imran Iqbal Khan, Adil Saeed, Salman Aziz, Faiz Durrani, Ghulam Muhammad and Saima Anjum for Petitioners.\nShahid Ali Qureshi, Huma Sodher, Rana Sakhawat Ali, Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, S. Ahsan Ali Shah, Saad Shafiq Siddiqui, Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Tauqeer Ahmed Seehar, Hafeezullah, Fahim Ali, Imtiaz Mansoor Solangi, Sajjad Ali Solangi, Zain Mustafa Soomro, Kashif Nazeer, Manzar Hussain Memon, Irfan Mir Halepota, Faheem Ali, Farha Naz Qazi, Khurram Shehzad, Nadir Hussain Tunio, Bushra Zia, Zubair Qureshi, Ali Tahir Soomro, Tahir Khalil, Barkat Ali Metlo, Imran Ali Metlo, Fayaz Ali Metlo, Arshad Ali Tunio, Muhammad Idrees Rahimoon, Preetam Das, Abdul Mujeeb Zeeshan, Ayaz Sarwar Jamali, M. Taseer Khan, Advocates, G.M. Bhutto (Assistant Attorney General), Qazi Ayazuddin (Assistant Attorney General) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "INTERNATIONAL BRANDS LIMITED AND OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, FBR AND 3 OTHERS\n(And connected matters, particularized in the Schedule1 hereto.)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23941", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 6 = 2024 SLD 6 = 2024 SLD 61", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTc", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss.3 & 47-Sale of Goods Act (III of 1930), S.12-Goods under warranty-Taxable supply-Taxpayer was aggrieved of charging sales tax by authorities with regard to replacement of auto parts under warranty free of charge-Validity-Warranty assured customers of replacement of defective parts within the agreed period or mileage, free of charge-Such fact could not be rejected in the orders of all the forums-Contract of such sale related to composite supply of vehicle and service for replacement of defective parts, both bundled in one contract-Auto parts were supplied free of charge to customers by taxpayer under warranty and at the time of such replacement no separate consideration was charged for the reason that consideration of such parts formed an integral part of price of the contract which was received at the time of sale-Sales tax charged and paid on contractual consideration at the time of supply of motor vehicle included such tax on auto parts to be replaced under warranty-Cost of warranty replacements was incorporated in price of motor vehicle on which sales tax had already been paid-Absent consideration in such transaction, it did not fall under the definition of supply as contained in Sales Tax Act, 1990, at relevant time-High Court answered all questions in affirmative and set aside orders / judgments of Tribunal and forums below, as replacement of auto parts covered by a manufacturers warranty were not taxable at the relevant time-Reference was allowed, in circumstances.\nCommissioner of Sales Tax v. Prem Nath Motors (1979) 43 STC 52 (Delhi); Prem Motors, Gwalir v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gwalior 1986 (61) STC 244; Geo Motors v. State of Kerala (2001) 122 STC 285; Mohd. Ekram Khan & Sons v. Commissioner of Trade Tax UP (2004) 6 SCC 183 and Messrs Tata Motors v. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (SPL) and another (Civil Appeal No.1822 of 2007) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,47Sale of Goods Act, (III of 1930)=12", - "Case #": "S.T.Rs. Nos.93 of 2010 and 85 of 2011, heard on 20th June, 2023, heard on: 20th June, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA AND MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Ishaq, Abid Hussain Sayyal and Wajahat Ali for Applicant.\nMalik Abdullah Raza for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS HONDA ATLAS CARS (PAKISTAN) LIMITED\nVS\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR, LEGAL LTU, LAHORE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23942", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 7 = 2024 SLD 7 = 2024 PTD 71", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTY", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.25-A & 196-Reference-Determination of value-Method applied-Principle-Authorities were aggrieved of order passed by Customs Appellate Tribunal setting aside Valuation Ruling and Order-in-Revision-Validity-For transactional values provision of S. 25(1) of Customs Act, 1969, was inapplicable-Stakeholders never provided any substantial documents to accept such transactional values under S.25(1) Customs Act, 1969-Different values were declared by different importers for the same product; and therefore, next method of valuation i.e. identical goods and similar goods methods, as provided under Ss. 25(5) & (6) of Customs Act, 1969, was also inapplicable in absence of absolute demonstrable evidence of qualities and quantities as well as the commercial level of such values-Next method of valuation was invoked i.e. Deductive Value Method under S. 25(7) of Customs Act, 1969, and the values were determined-Customs Appellate Tribunal wrongly held that values of goods in question were to be determined directly under S. 25(9) of Customs Act, 1969, (Fall Back Method) through Valuation Ruling No.1452 of 2020 dated 24-06-2020 without following the sequential methods as provided under S. 25 of Customs Act, 1969-High Court set aside order passed by Customs Appellate Tribunal-Reference was allowed accordingly.\nT & N Pakistan Private Limited v. Collector of Customs 2022 SCMR 1119; Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd., v. Collector of Customs 2019 SCMR 1124 and Fateh Yarn (Pvt.) Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2021 SCMR 1133. ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25-A,196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Applications Nos.220, 221, 222, 225, 227, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248 and 249 of 2022, decided on 17th March, 2023. Dates of hearing: 28th February, 2nd and 15th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Rajpar for Applicants (in SCRAs. Nos. 233, 235 to 239 of 2022).\nAamir Raza for Applicants (in SCRAs. Nos. 220 to 222, 225, 227 and 234 of 2022).\nIrfan Mir Halepota for Applicants (in SCRAs. Nos. 244 to 249 of 2022).\nKhawaja Shamsul Islam for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, THROUGH DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nMESSRS RAZ TEXTILE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23943", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 8 = 2024 SLD 8 = 2024 PTD 80 = 2024 PTCL 48 = (2025) 132 TAX 239", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTU", - "Key Words:": "The court was asked to decide whether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in annulling audit proceedings against a taxpayer for the tax year 2015 that were initiated under Section 214D after that section had been repealed by the Finance Act, 2018.\nThe key facts were:\nThe taxpayer filed a late return for tax year 2015.\nSection 214D (which provided for automatic audit for late filers) was repealed on 22.05.2018.\nThe tax department initiated an audit under this repealed section and issued a notice to the taxpayer on 08.11.2018.\nThe court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, upholding the Tribunals decision. The core reasoning was:\nThe repeal of Section 214D was effective from 22.05.2018. Since the audit notice was issued months after this date, the department had no legal authority to act under a law that was no longer in existence.\nThe subsequent introduction of Section 214E included an explanation that any audit initiated under the omitted Section 214D shall stand abated, which reinforced the conclusion that such proceedings could not continue.\nThe court rejected the departments argument based on the General Clauses Act (which sometimes saves actions taken under repealed laws), stating that no substantive right had accrued for the department at the time of repeal. In contrast, a substantial right had accrued for the taxpayer to be free from an audit under the repealed provision.\nThe action of the department was deemed a violation of the taxpayers right to be treated in accordance with the law under Article 4 and to due process under Article 10A of the Constitution.\nConclusion: The court answered the legal question against the tax department, confirming that the repeal of Section 214D could not be applied retrospectively to justify initiating audit proceedings for tax year 2015 after the sections omission. The impugned audit notice and subsequent orders were declared invalid.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=33(1),214A,214D", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No.1255 of 2023, heard on 12th October, 2023, heard on: 12th October, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Yahya Johar for Applicant.\nWaseem Ahmad Malik, Syed Nawazish Hussain and Zaki Vohra for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, GUJRANWALA\nVs\nMUHAMMAD KHALID CHAUDHRY" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23944", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 9 = 2024 SLD 9 = 2024 PTD 86", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)-Ss. 2(3)(i)(a), 2(3)(i)(b), 2(3)(i)(c), 2(3)(ii), 9 & 10-Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 13 & Sixth Sched. Serial No.46 (as omitted through Finance (Supplementary) Act, 2022)-FBRs U.O No. 4/I-STB/2022, dated 4th February, 2022-Maladministration-Scope-Imports by diplomats, diplomatic missions and other privileged persons were rendered taxable through Finance (Supplementary) Act, 2022, by omitting relevant Serial No.46 to the 6th Schedule of the Sales Tax, 1990, but FBR unilaterally rendered the said omission inapplicable vide U.O No. 4/I-STB/2022, dated 4th February, 2022 (UO)-Reservations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) were that the said omission could trigger an adverse reaction from other foreign states and international organizations-Validity-Plain reading of UO in question revealed that FBR, on its own, had assumed the review jurisdiction of an Act of Parliament and unilaterally undid the omission and once again granted exemption from the tax levied by the Legislature-While doing so, the FBR had trespassed its legal domain, and issuance of UO, containing an oblique clue to FBRs volta-face, tantamounted to maladministration in terms of Ss. 2(3)(i)(a), 2(3)(i)(b),2(3)(i)(c) & 2(3)(ii)Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, as the omission-in-question having hurriedly been enacted through Finance(Supplementary) Act, 2022 was perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable, unjust, discriminatory and was based on irrelevant grounds-Subsequent unilateral withdrawal through UO was contrary to law ;and even delay and ineptitude was shown by the FBR because summary for Federal Cabinet was moved after about 24 days of raising of alarm by the MOFA and that too at the intervention of Federal Tax Ombudsman (Ombudsman)-Ombudsman directed the FBR to identify the officer responsible for said faux pas , resulting in an embarrassing position for MOFA and that proper legal cover be arranged in place of FBRs U.O No. 4/I-STB / 2022, dated 4th February, 2022-Own Motion was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3)(i)(a),2(3)(i)(b),2(3)(i)(c),2(3)(ii),9,10Sales Tax Act, 1990=13,Sixth Schedule,", - "Case #": "0008/OM/2022, decided on 19th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor Dealing Officer.\nZahid Baig, Second Secretary, (ST&FE) FBR for Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD: In the matter of" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23945", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 12 = 2024 SLD 12 = 2024 PTD 90 = (2025) 131 TAX 510", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTk", - "Key Words:": "Scope of Jurisdiction – Customs Appellate Tribunal – Civil vs Criminal Findings\nDetails:\nThe case involved an importer aggrieved by the Customs Appellate Tribunals findings, which extended into the criminal aspects of a matter that arose during the adjudication of a civil customs appeal. Criminal proceedings had already been initiated separately against the importer and were pending before a competent criminal court.\nThe High Court considered whether the Customs Appellate Tribunal, a civil appellate authority, was justified in making findings or observations on criminal liability, which was not directly within its jurisdiction. The Court observed that although civil and criminal matters might arise from the same set of facts (paramateria), findings in one are neither binding nor conclusive on the other. The Tribunal, being the final fact-finding authority in civil matters, overstepped by commenting on criminal culpability.\nThe Court further noted that such comments could prejudice or influence the outcome of the pending criminal proceedings. Therefore, it held that the Tribunals observations on the criminal aspect were not justified and should be treated as academic only.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that the Customs Appellate Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by discussing criminal aspects of the matter. It declared that any such observations were non-binding and academic, and should not influence the pending criminal trial. The Trial Court was directed to decide the matter independently and in accordance with law. Reference was disposed of accordingly.\nPrinciple: Civil and criminal proceedings, though factually related, operate independently—findings in one do not bind the other.\nTribunals jurisdiction limited to civil adjudication; criminal findings are for the trial court.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32-B,196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 64 of 2019, decided on 30th April, 2022. Heard on: 28th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Irfan Saadat Khan and Mahmood A. Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shahnawaz Memon along with Ms. Fauzia M. Murad for Applicant.\nM. Umar Akhund along with Uzair Qadir Shoro for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE GENERAL INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION (CUSTOMS)\nVersus\nMessrs DIGICOM TRADING (PVT.) LIMITED and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23946", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 13 = 2024 SLD 13 = 2024 PTD 94", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRTg", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss.2(s), 16, 89, 168 & 156(1), Cls. 8 & 89-Imports and Export of (Control) Act (XXXIX of 1950), S. 3-SRO 566(I)/2005, dated 06-6-2005-Smuggling-Seizure and confiscation-Locally manufactured goods alleged to be foreign origin goods-Non-payment of duty and taxes-Customs Department intercepted a container, checking of which resulted into recovery of cloth-Customs Department confiscated the subject goods alleging the same as foreign origin/smuggled cloth-Claim of the appellant/owner was that the seized cloth was locally manufactured-Validity-Local commission was duly appointed on the request of appellant to independently verify the factual position of goods as to whether the confiscated goods were locally manufactured or not-Local Commission Report as well as photographs of the producing manufacturer and certificate of Chamber of Commerce furnished by the appellant/claimant had verified that the seized goods were locally manufactured and were not of foreign origin-Respondent/Department had failed to prove the allegation of foreign origin/ smuggled cloth as leveled in Show-Cause Notice and impugned order-Customs Appellate Tribunal set-aside impugned order-in-original and directed the Respondent/Department to release the impugned cloth to the appellant-Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,89,168,156(1),89", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.H-7255 of 2021, decided on 10th April, 2023.Muhammad Iqbal Riaz for Appellant.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Judge Name:": " Shakil Ahmed Abbasi, Member Judicial-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Iqbal Riaz for Appellant.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAZAL QADEER\nVersus\nThe ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION) QUETTA CAMP OFFICE @ HYDERABAD and 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23947", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 14 = 2024 SLD 14 = 2024 PTD 99 = (2024) 130 TAX 613", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRXo", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Provisions Discussed:\nSection 113:\nDeals with minimum tax on the income of certain persons, outlining the tax liability if the taxpayers normal tax liability falls below a prescribed threshold.\nSection 133(1):\nAllows for a reference to the High Court on a question of law arising out of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal.\nSecond Schedule, Part IV, Clause 45A:\nGrants specific exemptions or concessions in tax rates or liabilities.\nSRO 333(I)/2011, dated 02-05-2011:\nA statutory regulatory order that modifies or clarifies certain provisions, often providing specific reliefs or conditions applicable to taxpayers.\nSection 153(1)(a):\nPertains to withholding tax on payments for goods, services, or contracts.\nSection 153(3):\nDiscusses classification of deductions under withholding tax as final tax.\nCore Legal Issue:\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) erred in law by vacating the lower foras orders while relying on SRO 333(I)/2011 and Clause 45A of Part IV, Second Schedule, and by allegedly ignoring Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance.\nHigh Courts Analysis:\nScope of Withholding Tax Deductions:\nSection 153(1)(a) specifically excludes certain instances of withholding tax deductions, meaning no deductions were allowed in the given circumstances. Consequently, the issue of classifying such deductions as final tax under Section 153(3) did not arise.\nMutual Exclusivity of Tax Regimes:\nThe taxpayers income streams were covered under both normal and final tax regimes. The High Court emphasized that deduction of withholding tax under Section 153(1)(a) and claiming the benefit of the proviso to Clause 45A were mutually exclusive.\nMisconceived Allegations:\nAllegations that withholding tax deductions were used as an adjustment against minimum tax liability were deemed misconceived.\nCorrect Application of Clause 45A:\nThe ATIR correctly applied Clause 45A, which allowed for concessional rates for calculating minimum tax liability. The court found that the ATIR did not overlook Section 113.\nNo Legal Error by ATIR:\nThe High Court held that the ATIR properly interpreted the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance and the relevant SRO, concluding that no illegality or error had been committed.\nOutcome:\nThe High Court declined to interfere with the ATIRs order.\nThe reference was dismissed, upholding the ATIRs decision in favor of the taxpayer.\nReferenced Cases:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s Ch. Khushi Muhammad Prop. Tax Reference No. 09-P of 2016\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II Regional Tax Office, Lahore v. M/s Daewoo Pakistan Motor Way Services (Pvt.) Ltd. (2022 PTD 1019)\nThese cases were cited to support the High Courts reasoning.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113,133(1)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No.77156 of 2022, decided on 18th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Asim Hafeez, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Riaz Begum for Applicant-Department.\nMian Waseem Khurshid and Syed Moazzam Roheel for Respondent taxpayer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, LYALPUR ZONE, FAISALABAD\nVersus\nMessrs M.M. ENTERPRISES (MUNIR AHMAD), FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23948", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 15 = 2024 SLD 15 = 2024 PTD 105 = (2024) 129 TAX 51", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDRXk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Recovery of Government Dues under Federal Excise Act and Constitutional Jurisdiction\nDetails:\nThe petitioner company challenged a recovery notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue to the bank for forcibly recovering government dues from its bank account. The respondents argued that the constitutional petition was not maintainable due to the availability of an alternate remedy and that the petitioner could seek a refund if the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ruled in its favor.\nThe petitioner contended that it was not served with a demand notice after the dismissal of its appeal by the Commissioner Appeals, which was a mandatory requirement under Rule 48(8) of the Federal Excise Duty Rules, 2005. The petitioner was thus denied the opportunity to discharge its liability or seek installment relief before coercive recovery measures were initiated.\nThe court noted that recovery proceedings could not commence within thirty days of adjudication of government dues unless proper notice had been served. The failure to notify the petitioner violated its fundamental right to due process under Article 24 of the Constitution. The petitioner’s deprivation of property without prior notice and due process rendered the recovery proceedings unlawful.\nHeld:\n1.\nThe recovery notice and the forcible recovery from the petitioner’s bank account were declared unlawful and set aside.\n2.\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue was directed to reimburse the amount recovered from the petitioner’s bank account.\n3.\nCoercive measures could not be justified without giving the taxpayer prior notice and an opportunity to satisfy the demand.\n4.\nClaiming a refund after the Tribunal’s decision in favor of the taxpayer was not an adequate or efficacious remedy, as it failed to address the fundamental due process violations.\n•\nCase law references:\no\nHuawei Technologies (Private) Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, 2016 PTD 1799\no\nM/s Tecnimont SpA v. Pakistan, W.P. No. 268/2017\no\nOracle Systems Pakistan (Private) Limited v. FBR, W.P. No. 3876/2021\no\nPakistan Oil Fields Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan, 2016 PTD 1590\nPrinciples Highlighted:\n•\nThe taxpayer must be served with a demand notice after adjudication to ensure compliance before coercive measures are initiated.\n•\nCoercive recovery without prior notice violates constitutional protections under Article 24.\n•\nAvailability of an alternate remedy does not preclude a constitutional petition where due process violations occur.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=14Federal Excise Rules, 2005=48(6),60(1)(b)(d),70(2)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1044 of 2018, decided on 16th August, 2023, date of hearing: 7th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shaheer Roshan Shaikh for Petitioner\nMuhammad Imtiaz Abbasi (Proxy counsel) for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "ORACLE SYSTEMS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED\nVs\nPAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue and Ex Officio Chairman Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 4 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23949", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 16 = 2024 SLD 16 = 2024 PTD 129 = (2024) 130 TAX 304", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTc", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Withholding Obligations and Failure to Provide Information under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe Tax Department initiated proceedings against the taxpayer company alleging failure to provide required information and to discharge withholding obligations under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The taxpayer denied the allegations. The Tribunal concluded that no demand could be generated under Section 161 due to the lack of clarity on whether the requisite information was submitted. However, the Tribunal misunderstood the nature of the demand, mistaking it as one generated under Section 121 (best judgment rule) rather than for failure to meet withholding obligations.\nThe Tribunal also incorrectly found that the Tax Department had not sought a reconciliation statement from the taxpayer, despite this requirement being included in the Show Cause Notice under Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002.\nHeld:\n1.\nThe Tribunal’s order lacked clarity and failed to address the taxpayers obligation to provide records for withholding obligations under Section 161.\n2.\nThe case was remanded to the Commissioner Inland Revenue for re-examination of the record and determination of whether the taxpayer failed to discharge its withholding obligations based on specific transactions.\n3.\nThe Commissioner was directed to consider the taxpayer’s response, the assessment order, and the Tax Department’s database in determining any delinquency and generating a lawful demand if warranted.\nConclusion:\nThe Tribunals order was set aside as it was not sustainable in law. The High Court remanded the matter for proper determination by the Commissioner Inland Revenue in light of the Supreme Court judgment in Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited (2021 SCMR 1325).\nCitations:\n•\nRelevant Case: Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited, 2021 SCMR 1325.\nPrinciples Highlighted:\n•\nThe taxpayer’s obligation to provide records and meet withholding obligations under Section 161.\n•\nThe Tax Departments role in seeking necessary information and identifying specific delinquent transactions to justify any demand.\n•\nThe procedural clarity required for generating demands under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=174,161,133Income Tax Rules, 2001=44(4)", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No.40 of 2021, decided on 27th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan and Babar Sattar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Atif Rahim Burki for Applicant.\nCh. Imran-ul-Haq for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE CORPORATIVE TAX OFFICE, ISLAMABAD\nVersus\nMessrs T.F. PIPES LIMITED COMPANY LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23950", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 17 = 2024 SLD 17 = 2024 PTD 191", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTY", - "Key Words:": "Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)-\n-Ss. 14(1) & 14(2)-Customs Act (IV of 1969), S.80-Federal Excise Duty, determination of-Penalty for evading Federal Excise Duty-Customs Authorities, powers of-Scope-Customs Authorities issued show cause notice to importer that the subject good (E-Liquid) were subject to Federal Excise Duty-Contention of appellant/importer was that Customs Authorities had not been delegated powers to recover any taxes other than customs duty-Held, that the powers given under Ss.14(1) & 14(2) of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, had been vested with the Officer of Inland Revenue who would issue Show-Cause Notice and determine Federal Excise Duty evaded and could impose penalty-However, Customs authorities had no powers in said regard-Impugned Show-Cause Notice was issued without powers and jurisdiction vested under Ss. 14(1) and 14(2) of Federal Excise Act, 2005-Order-in-Original, being illegal and ultra vires, was set-aside-Appeal was accepted.\nC.P. D-5482 of 2017 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise (Amendment) Ordinance, 2011=14(1),14(2)Customs Act, 1969=80", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.K-1898 of 2022, decided on 22nd March, 2023.heard on: 13th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Shakil Ahmed Abbasi, Member Judicial-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Obaydullah Mirza for Appellant.\nSultan, AO for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs FAF ENTERPRISES, KARACHI\nVersus\nThe PRINCIPAL APPRAISER, MCC OF APPRAISEMENT-JIAP, KARACHI and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23951", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 18 = 2024 SLD 18 = 2024 PTD 133", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss. 79, 80, 19, 32(1), 32(2), 32-A, 104 & 156(1), clauses (10-A), (14) & (14-A)-SRO 655(I)/2006 dated 05-06-2006-Mis-declaration-In-Bond Goods, description of-Fiscal fraud-Inadmissible exemption-Scope-Iron and Steel Sheets of assorted sizes were imported as an input raw material for manufacturing of silencers for motorcycles-Importer assailed order-in-original passed by Collector of Customs (Adjudication) following actions taken by Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation-Customs (Directorate)-Allegation against the appellant/importer was that sizes of the imported steel sheets coils mentioned in its Goods Declaration (GD) did not match with the sizes allowed by the Engineering Development Board ( EDB )to the importer as an input material-Submission of the reporting Directorate was that the importer had declared the raw material consumption of 7.99 kgs per unit whereas prevalent per unit consumption was 4.01 kgs-Validity-In the case of In-Bond GD, the goods are warehoused after checking and the goods are cleared after payment of duty / taxes, if any, through Ex-Bond GD being filed under section 104 of the Customs Act, 1969 (the Act, 1969)-Particulars of an invoice, packing list, Bill of lading (B/L) etc., are merged into GD and to check the declaration of an importer, the GD s particulars are to be considered for the purpose of charging a person for mis-declaration within the meaning of S. 32 of the Act, 1969-Further, for charging a person for the violation of S.32-A of the Act, 1969, the Department has to prove the submission of some fake or manipulated or fabricated documents by the declared importer , which is missing in the present case, thus it is neither a case of mis-declaration nor a case of fiscal fraud within the meaning of Ss. 32 & 32-A of the Act, 1969 , rather, prima facie, it is just a case of S. 19 of the Act, 1969 which needs to be examined as per conditions of the SRO 655(I)/2006 dated 05-06-2006-Submission of the respondents impliedly confirms that, instead of sizes, the weight-wise consumption of the imported material / steel-sheets matters for determination of the lawful consumption for exemption ; thus, in case of any variation in sizes, the appellant / importer could not be charged for evasion of duties / taxes in availing inadmissible exemption-EDB had also pointed out the consumption of excessive material, not the sizes, and had asked the Department for recovery of duties / taxes, if any, on misuse of quota after chain audit-Respondent / Department had failed to establish its case and legality of its actions were without jurisdiction-Tribunal set aside the impugned order-in-original passed by the Collector of Customs (Adjudication)-Appeal filed by the taxpayer was allowed, in circumstances.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss. 79, 80, 19, 32(1), 32(2), 32-A, 104 & 156(1), Cls (10-A), (14) & (14-A)-SRO 655(I)/2006 dated 05-06-2006-Mis-declaration-In-Bond Goods, description of-Fiscal fraud-In-admissible exemption-Scope-Importer-cum-manufacturer getting goods manufactured through another sub-manufacturer-Scope-Iron and Steel Sheets of assorted sizes were imported as an input raw material for manufacturing of silencers for motorcycles-Directorate, through contravention report, alleged that importer had shown some other unit as theirs because on their (Directorate) teams visit it was found that importers unit did not exist, rather there was a small industrial unit (with a name other than name of unit given by the importer) employing 810 workers-Validity-Though there was discrepancy of the changed name, but no denial to the fact that the manufacturing facilities of the output goods were available, operational with 810 employees, on the given address of the unit-SRO 655(I)/2006 dated 05-06-2006 (SRO 655(I)/2006) had allowed an importer-cum-manufacturer, like appellant, to get the goods manufactured through another manufacturer (sub-vendor)-Considering the spirit of availing exemption under the SRO 655(I), allegation against the appellant was immaterial, particularly against the imported raw material which had been consumed in manufacturing-Respondent / Department had failed to establish its case and legality of its actions were without jurisdiction-Tribunal set aside the impugned order-in-original passed by the Collector of Customs (Adjudication)-Appeal filed by the taxpayer was allowed, in circumstances.\n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss. 79, 80, 19, 32(1), 32(2), 32-A, 104 & 156(1), Cls. (10-A), (14) & (14-A)-SRO 655(I)/2006 dated 05-06-2006-SRO 486(I)/2007 dated 09-06-2007-Mis-declaration-In-Bond Goods, description of-Fiscal fraud-In-admissible exemption-Scope-Issuance of Flying Invoices for sale of output goods, allegation of-Jurisdiction-Scope-Iron and Steel Sheets of assorted sizes were imported as an input raw material for manufacturing of silencers for motorcycles-Importer assailed order-in-original passed by Collector of Customs (Adjudication) following actions taken by Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-Customs (Directorate)-Validity-Matter of issuance of Flying Invoices related to supply and for that I.R.S authorities had exclusive jurisdiction-Even otherwise, as per the conditions of the SRO 655(I)/2006 the complete round for availing exemption completes on communication to the concerned Collectorate of Customs (Imports), in writing , about the consumption of the input raw material in manufacturing of the specified output article, in term of condition (ix) of the SRO 655 (I)/2006 , which had been complied with by the appellant / tax-payer-According to the condition (x) of the SRO 655 (I)/2006, even if there was an information about evasion of duty / taxes through an in-admissible exemption in that case too , the matter was ought to be communicated to the Collector of Customs, having jurisdiction, who allowed input raw materials release-Collector of Customs was to initiate proceedings for the recovery of duty / taxes, if any, due to non-consumption or mis-appropriation of the imported input goods by an importer-Even an audit or investigation could only be undertaken by the specific person or agency duly designated by the EDB and FBR-Respondents Directorate had failed to produce any authorization in terms of condition (x) of the SRO 655 (I)/2006, thus the actions of the respondents / Directorate were without jurisdiction-Considering Notification SRO 486(I)/2007 dated 09-06-2007 issued under S.3E of the Customs Act, 1969, the officers of Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation-Customs had no jurisdiction to investigate the matters relating to S.19 of the Customs Act, 1969-Respondent / Department had failed to establish its case and legality of its actions were without jurisdiction-Tribunal set aside the impugned order-in-original passed by the Collector of Customs (Adjudication)-Appeal filed by the taxpayer was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=79,80,19,32(1),32-A,104", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.K-96 of 2022, decided on 25th May, 2023.heard on: 19th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Mazhar Ali Ghallu, Member Judicial-II and Abdul Basit Chaudhry, Member Technical-I", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saeed Shahzad for Appellants.\nSaddurddin, Assistant Manager, present for Engineering Development Board (EDB) and Umair Mustafa, A.O. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs ESSA STEEL and another\nVersuS\nThe COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION-II), CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23952", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 19 = 2024 SLD 19 = 2024 PTD 156", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-S. 25-Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005), S. 46-Audit, selection for-Commissioner, powers of-Scope-Plaintiff/taxpayer/company challenged notice issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue under S.46 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 and S. 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, whereby the plaintiff was selected for audit-Central issue raised in the suit was whether under said provisions of law, the Commissioner could select a taxpayer for the purpose of conducting audit without assigning any reason-Held, that issue-in-hand had been answered in negative by the judgments of Indus Motors Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan reported as 2020 PTD 297 as well as Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan reported as 2023 PTD 576 by holding that the Commissioner must frame legitimate mindful queries to the knowledge of a taxpayer after going through the returns by which he must be either satisfied after calling the record or otherwise; in case such mindful queries remained unsatisfied, he then was obliged to give reasons under S.25(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for conducting audit-Plaintiff prayed that present suit might also be decreed in light of the said findings-High Court, while restraining the defendants/FBR from acting upon the impugned audit notice declared that the impugned notice issued by the Commissioner to the plaintiff under S.46 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 and S.25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, selecting the plaintiff for audit was unlawful for failing to disclose reasons and the said notice and also any subsequent follow-up notices were of no legal effect.\nIndus Motors Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 PTD 297 and Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2023 PTD 576 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25Federal Excise Act, 2005=46", - "Case #": "Suit No.298 of 2020, decided on 18th April, 2022.heard on: 18th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hanif Faisal Alam for Plaintiff.\nBilal Khilji, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Defendant No.1.\nMuhammad Aqeel Qureshi for Defendant No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs DALDA FOODS LTD.\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23953", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 20 = 2024 SLD 20 = 2024 PTD 158", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQS8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.133 (1)-Notification SRO No.670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013-Reference-Concessions, grant of-Principle-Input/output ratios of manufacturer-Determination-Dispute was with regard to grant of concession under Notification SRO No. 670(I)/2013 dated 18-7-2013-Validity-Reading of Notification SRO No.670(I)/2013 dated 18-7-2013 in bits and pieces would contravene the intent and purpose of statutory instrument, which purpose was grant of concession but subject to scrutiny regarding determination of input/output ratios of manufacturer-Strict adherence to requirements of Notification SRO No.670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013 would ensure supply of completely assembled bicycles and not the sale of parts of bicycles-This was the mischief sought to be addressed by introducing statutory instrument-Harmonious reading of subject matter conditions would ensure enforcement of Notification SRO No.670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013 in letter and spirit and lawful gaining of advantages / concessions extended thereunder-High Court set aside the order and remanded the matter to Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue which had decided the matter on erroneous construction of subject matter conditions-High Court directed Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue to decide appeal of respondent / registered person afresh upon reading conditions (i) and (ii) of Notification SRO No.670(I)/2013, dated 18-7-2013, conjunctively and not disjunctively-Reference was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1)", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No.72126 of 2022, decided on 26th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Asim Hafeez, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Muhammad Ali, Ms. Maryam Asad, Malik Aziz-ur-Rehman, Muhammad Sharfeen and Abdul Hafeez for Applicant-Department.\nCh. Anwar-ul-Haq for Respondent-Registered person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-IV, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, LAHORE\nVersus\nUNIQUE CYCLE INDUSTRY" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23954", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 21 = 2024 SLD 21 = 2024 PTD 162", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQSs", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss.133, 221 & 239-Reference-Tax adjustment-Authorities were aggrieved of order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue justifying tax claim entitlement of taxpayer-Validity-Provision of S.239(15) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, provided that S.107AA of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, (since repealed) would continue to apply until 30-06-2002-Tax-credit available from pervious assessment year could be adjusted on or after 30-6-2002 which was in conformity with spirit of S. 239(15) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Tax credit was an entitlement linked with making of an investment, and a tax-payer would become entitled to it as soon as an investment as provided in S.107AA of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (since repealed) or for that matter under Ss.107 & 107A is made, whereas its adjustment and deduction in computation of tax payable was a matter of assessment proceedings-Right to claim tax credit came into existence with the making of investment in the purchase of plant and machinery and actual deduction from the tax payable was a matter of implementation only-Respondent / taxpayer was fully entitled to adjust available tax-credit from assessment year 2002-2003, which was available under Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, (since repealed) in its return for tax-year 2003, filed and finalized under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue-Reference Application was dismissed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,221,239", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Application No.D-39 of 2010, decided on 22nd February, 2023.heard on: 22nd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Agha Faisal, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Syed Ahsan Ali Shah for Applicant.\nMuhammad Faheem Bhayo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER (LEGAL DIVISION) INLAND REVENUE\nVersus\nMessrs KOHINOOR SOAP AND DETERGENTS (PVT.) LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "23955", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 22 = 2024 SLD 22 = 2024 PTD 167", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss. 2(25), 3, 14, 33 (14) & 65(b)-Registration-Amount of sales tax prior to registration, charging of-Scope-Contention of the appellant / taxpayer was that the sales tax could not be charged for the period in which the taxpayer was not registered-Validity-Expression registered person appearing in Cl. (b) of S. 65 of the Sales Act, 1990, included the person liable to register as provided in S.2(25) of the Act, 1990-Had there been no need of charging / paying / recovery of sales tax prior to registration, the Legislature should not have prescribed a mechanism for granting exemption in case the person liable to register had failed to collect tax because of inadvertence or some general practice in the relevant sector of economy or a particular area-Legislature never intended to enact that legitimate amount of sales tax pertaining to the tax period prior to actual registration was not recoverable from a person who was liable to register and had been treated by the law as registered person by fiction of law-Appellant / taxpayer had not denied the factum of doing business as wholesaler/ retailer and making taxable supplies-Taxpayer had also not denied purchases of sugar, in the matter-in-hand, from the Sugar Mill as un-registered buyer as confronted in the Show Cause Notice ,rather only claimed to be un-registered person during the alleged period and pleaded the matter mainly on legal premise-Contention of the appellant / taxpayer was misconceived as sales tax could be charged for period prior to compulsory or voluntary registration subject to limitation-Both the authorities below had rightly charged and upheld sales tax demand-Appeal filed by the taxpayer was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMessrs SK Steels case 2019 PTD 1493 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(25),3,14,33(14),65(b)", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Appeal No.161/LB/2023, decided on 16th May, 2023.heard on: 23rd February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Zahid Sikandar, Judicial Member and Ch. Muhammad Tarique, Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Ghafoor Khokar for Appellant.\nZain ul Abideen, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUNAWAR\nVersus\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, SIALKOT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23956", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 23 = 2024 SLD 23 = 2024 PTD 176", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQTg", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss. 36 & 47-Notifications SRO 598(I)/90 dated 7-6-1990 & SRO 553(I)/94 dated 9-6-1994-Sales tax, recovery of-Tax exemption-Show-cause notice-Limitation-Dispute of exemption from payment of sales tax was with regard to product namely Dettol -Applicant / taxpayer contended that the notice was barred by time under S.36 (2) of Sales Tax Act, 1990-Validity-Narration of facts in Show Cause Notice along with supporting evidence determines offence attracted in a particular case-Jurisdictional threshold required for issuing Show Cause Notice under S.36 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, attained importance because of disparate and contrasting character of mischief envisaged in two subsections of S. 36 of Sales Tax Act, 1990-Unless there was deliberate design or an agreement between persons to defraud tax department and the same was clearly and perspicuously laid out in Show-Cause Notice, mere mentioning of S. 36(1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 or mentioning words deliberate act or collusion in Show-Cause Notice would not vest tax department with jurisdiction to invoke S. 36(1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990-Applicability of period of limitation was dependent on facts and circumstances of the case that under which subsection a case would fall when show cause notice was read into with the narration of facts so stated therein-Under law of limitation all were equal before law, whether a citizen or State, and if a law had prescribed period of time for recovery of money, after its lapse recovery was not enforceable through Courts-Requirement of registration under Drugs Act, 1976, had its own implication and merely for such reason it could not become entitled for exemption from sales tax solely on such ground and this was one of the requirements for claiming exemption from sales tax under SRO 598(I)/90 dated 7-6-1990 and SRO 553(I)/94 dated 9-6-1994-Primary condition required to be met was that of a medicinal preparation-This was lacking in the case of applicant / taxpayer, whereas, the product was classified under Pakistan Customs Tariff Code Heading 38.08 as a disinfectant-Issue of the product as to whether it was a disinfectant or a medicinal preparation was settled by classification ruling issued by WCO (World Customs Organization) and no exception could be drawn to such classification-Such classification was a matter of record since 1990 and was not applied retrospectively-Reference was disposed of accordingly.\n1989 SCMR 353; 1985 SCMR 1753; PLD 1970 SC 453; 2002 PTD 955; PLD 1994 Kar. 480; 2008 PTD 1475 and 2004 PTD 2516 distinguished.\nCaretex v. Collector Sales Tax PLD 2013 Lah. 634 and Federation of Pakistan v Ibrahim Textile Mills Limited 1992 SCMR 1898 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, (III of 1951)=36,47", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Application No.399 of 2007, decided on 10th March, 2023.heard on: 15th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Agha Faisal, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja Aizaz Ahsan along with Sami-ur-Rehman for Applicant.\nIrfan Mir Holepota for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs RECKITT AND COLMAN PAKISTAN LIMITED\nVersus\nThe COLLECTOR, COLLECTORATE OF SALES TAX (WEST) and 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23957", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 24 = 2024 SLD 24 = 2024 PTD 183", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQXo", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.138(1)-Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance (XXXVI of 1971), S.4(9)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Interim order in tax or revenue matters-Scope-Petitioner sought judicial review of a public action taken by the FBR through issuance of notices under S. 138(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, read with S. 4(9) of the Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971, for recovery of certain amount of tax and the Workers Welfare Fund-Validity-High Court after hearing arguments of the parties ordered for sending a copy of the writ petition along with all the annexures to the FBR, who would consider it as a representation of the petitioner, carefully look into the FBR Circular No. 4(33)-Rev.Bud./99, dated 17-02-2000 and then decide the issue in hand after providing proper hearing to all the concerned including the petitioner, strictly in accordance with relevant provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as well as Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971, keeping in mind the constitutional provisions and the law, through a speaking order, within two weeks from the receipt of certified copy of the order-In the meanwhile, no coercive measures would be taken against the petitioner for recovery of the disputed amount of tax or Workers Welfare Fund, till decision of representation-Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\nWatan Party and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 997; Workers Welfare Funds, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Islamabad through Secretary and others v. East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt.) Ltd. through G.M (Finance), Lahore and others PLD 2017 SC 28; Commissioner Inland Revenue Multan v. Messrs Allah Wasaya Textile and Finishing Mills Ltd. 2013 PTD 1548; Ramzan Sugar Mills Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2021 PTD 1321; Chenab Flour and General Mills and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division and others PLD 2021 Lah. 343; Ramzan Sugar Mills Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2021 PTD 1321 and Shell Pakistan Limited v. Government of Punjab and others 2020 PTD 1607 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=138(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.40201 of 2021, decided on 23rd June, 2021.heard on: 23rd June, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mansoor Usman Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General along with Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General, Adeel Ahmad Kamra, Assistant Attorney General, Monim Sultan, Assistant Attorney General and Ms. Sadia Malik, Assistant Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan (on Court's call).\nMalik Abdullah Raza for Respondent-FBR assisted by Shahzad Ahmad Cheema and Anas Sheikh (on watching brief)", - "Petitioner Name:": "TETRA PAK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23958", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 25 = 2024 SLD 25 = 2024 PTD 188", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDQXk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss.79 & 81 (4)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Provisional assessment-Finalization-Limitation-Petitioner / importer claimed that after lapse of limitation, provisional assessment of goods imported had become final assessment-Validity-Authorities were supposed to finalize assessment by 15-07-2020 or in such extended period which in no case could exceed 90 days by 14-10-2020, which had not been done-High Court declined to grant any lease, as authorities did not make final assessment after provisional assessment within stipulated period and provisions of S. 81(4) of Customs Act, 1969, were not followed nor complied with by authorities-High Court declared that provisionally assessed goods of petitioner were to be considered as finally assessed-Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\nC.Ps. Nos.D-5491/2021, D-7258/2021, D-7259/2021 and D-7260/2021; C.P. No.D-5674/2020; Special Customs Reference Applications Nos.63/2015 and 64/2015 and C.P. No.D-7271 of 2021 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=79,81(4)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=19", - "Case #": "Constitutions Petition No.D-2184 of 2022, decided on 26th May, 2022.heard on: 25th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Irfan Saadat Khan and Mahmood A. Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aqeel Ahmed Khan for Petitioner.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan (DAG) for Respondent No.1.\nIrfan Mir Halepota for Respondent No.2.\nMuhammad Khalil Dogar for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs SIKANDAR & CO.\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue and 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23959", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 26 = 2024 SLD 26 = 2024 SCMR 63", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODc", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act (XVII of 1976)-\n-Ss. 6(1)(f) & 12(3)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Trial of accused before the Special Court-Supreme Court taking cognizance of the trial and passing certain directions therein-High Court entertaining a writ petition filed by the accused despite Supreme Court having taken cognizance of the trial-Constitutionality and legality-Special Court comprising of three Judges of the High Court conducted the trial of respondent No. 1 at Islamabad and convicted him-During an interim stage of the trial the matter had come up before the Supreme Court, which took cognizance of the trial before the Special Court at Islamabad and gave certain directions to the Special Court (to proceed with the trial in the absence of accused)-However, in complete disregard of the fact that the Supreme Court had taken cognizance of the Special Courts trial at Islamabad and had sustained it the Lahore High Court entertained a writ petition filed by respondent No. 1, and then allowed it (declaring the formation of the special court as violative of law, and devoid of legal sanctity)-Counsel for the applicants submitted that the Lahore High Court had no territorial jurisdiction; that the jurisdiction of special courts is attended to in section 12 of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976 and the purported judgment by the Lahore High Court was in derogation thereof; that the Lahore High Court did not have constitutional jurisdiction under any of the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution; that the purported judgment of the Lahore High Court was ab initio void, illegal, unconstitutional and coram non judice; that the writ petition was not maintainable before the Lahore High Court; that the Lahore High Court assumed jurisdiction which exclusively vested in the Supreme Court, under section 12(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976; and that the Lahore High Court had acted in complete derogation of the Constitution and of the law and that it is the duty of bar associations, bar councils and lawyers to ensure that the Constitution and the law is not violated and, if such illegalities are committed, to bring the same to the notice of the Supreme Court to rectify them-Validity-Supreme Court observed that the said submissions were substantial and legal points which required consideration-Supreme Court directed that the office shall number the present petitions and issue notices to the respondents, except respondent No. 1 who had since passed away, however, the legal heirs of respondent No. 1 may come forward to join these cases; that the record of the writ petition before the Lahore High Court, including the office file directing fixing of the case and constitution of special bench be requisitioned from the Lahore High Court and be put up along with present petitions on the date they are fixed before the Supreme Court for hearing- Applications were allowed accordingly.\n \nLahore High Court Bar Association v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf, 2019 SCMR 1029 and Pervez Musharraf v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 Lah. 285 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976=6(1)(f),12(3)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "1. Civil Misc. Application No. 677/20 in C.P. NIL/20\n[Under Order XXXIII, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 read with Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. for permission to file and argue the titled CPLA]\n2. Civil Misc. Application No. 1875/20 in C.P. NIL/20\n[Under Order XXXIII, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 read with Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. for permission to file and argue the titled CPLA]\n3. Civil Misc. Application No. 1580/20 in C.P. NIL/20\n[Under Article 187 of the Constitution, 1973 read with Order XXXIII, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 for permission to file CPLA]\n4. Civil Misc. Application No. 656-L/20 in C.P. NIL-L/20\n[Under Order V(2)(ii) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 for permitting the present applicant to file the titled CPLA]\nCivil Misc. Application No. 677/20 in C.P. NIL/20, Civil Misc. Application No. 1875/20 in C.P. NIL/20, Civil Misc. Application No. 1580/20 in C.P. NIL/20 and Civil Misc. Application No. 656-L/20 in C.P. NIL-L/20, decided on 10th November, 2023.heard on: 10th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link from Lahore) along with applicant in person for Applicant (in C.M.A. 677 of 2020).\nHaroon-ur-Rasheed, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant (in C.M.A. 1875 of 2020).\nRasheed A. Rizvi, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link from Karachi) for Applicant (in C.M.A. 1580 of 2020).\nApplicant in person (in C.M.A. 656-L of 2020).\nCh. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAUFIQ ASIF and others-Applicants\nVersus\nGeneral (Retd.) PERVEZ MUSHARRAF and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23960", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 27 = 2024 SLD 27 = 2024 SCMR 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODY", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 16, 17(2), 19 & 188-Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002), S. 8(5)-Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 211-Election Rules, 2017, R. 161-Judgment passed by the Supreme Court in respect of Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest/ dharna by members of a religious political party (the Judgment)-Review petitions challenging said Judgment-Formation of a Commission to implement the Judgment-Discrepancies and abnormalities in financial affairs of the protesting religious political party-Different applications filed by the review petitioners to either withdraw their review petitions or to challenge certain observations made in the Judgment-Supreme Court observed that regretfully most of the review petitioners had no explanation as to why it was first decided by them to become a party and seek review of the Judgment and then elect to withdraw the application-Detailed observations and directions recorded by the Supreme Court in respect of the different review petitioners before the Court stated.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=16,17(2),19,188Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2002=5(5)Elections Act, 2017=161", - "Case #": "CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO.266 OF 2019 IN SUO MOTU CASE NO.7 OF 2017, CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS NOS.8270 AND 8288 OF 2023 IN/AND CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO.267 OF 2019 AND CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO.268 OF 2019 IN SUO MOTU CASE NO.7 OF 2017, CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS NOS.3575, 3577, 3579, 3582 AND 3610 OF 2019 IN CIVIL REVIEW PETITIONS NIL OF 2019 IN SUO MOTU CASE NO.7 OF 2017, CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.8526 OF 2023 IN CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 3579 OF 2019 IN SUO MOTU CASE NO.7 OF 2017\nDecided on 1st November, 2023.\nheard on: 1st November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mansoor Usman Awan, AGP, Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional AGP with Brig.(R) Falak Naz, Legal Advisor Ministry of Defence and Lt.Col. Kafeel Khan, Director Legal Ministry of Defence for Petitioners (in C.R.Ps. Nos. 266 and 267 of 2019).\nHafiz S.A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Saleem, Chairman PEMRA, Tahir Farooq Tarar, (Legal Head PEMRA) and Muhammad Tahir, D.G (Operations) PEMRA for Petitioners (in C.R.P. No. 268 of 2019).\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant (in C.M.A. No. 3579 of 2019).\nMehr Khan Malik, Advocate-on-Record for Applicant (in C.M.A. No. 3577 of 2019).\nM.A. Ghaffar-ul-Haq, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant (in C.M.A. No. 3582 of 2019).\nMalik Qamar Afzal, Advocate Supreme Court with Omar Hamid Khan, Secretary ECP, M. Arshad, D.G. (Law) and Masood Akhtar Sherwani, D.G. (P/F) for Applicant (in C.M.A. No. 3610 of 2019).", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23961", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 28 = 2024 SLD 28 = 2024 SCMR 8", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 16, 17(2), 19 & 188-Pakistan Commissions of Inquiry Act (IX of 2017), S. 3-Judgment passed by the Supreme Court in respect of Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest/dharna by members of a religious political party (the Judgment)-Review petitions challenging said Judgment-Application filed by leader of political party to withdraw his review petition-Counsel for the applicant stated that the applicant did not intend to press the present application as the same was filed under a misapprehension-Supreme Court observed that it was surprising that the leader of a political party, a longstanding parliamentarian and one who had held the high office of a Federal Minister filed the application on the basis of a misapprehension, therefore, the Court enquired from him whether he had filed the application on someones behest, but it was reiterated that it had been filed under a misapprehension-Supreme Court directed that a Commission had been constituted by the Federal Government to implement the Judgment under review with a time frame of two months to complete its task and its terms of reference were proposed to be expanded to include this aspect (of misapprehension of applicant) too-Application was dismissed as not pressed.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 16, 17(2), 19 & 188-Judgment passed by the Supreme Court in respect of Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest/dharna by members of a religious political party (the Judgment)-Review petitions challenging said Judgment not fixed for hearing for almost five years-Manipulation in the Supreme Court-In the present case, review petitions and applications were filed in early 2019 but were not fixed for several years-In the interim the other signatory to the Judgment retired-Concerned officers of the Supreme Court submitted a report in this regard-Perusal of said report showed the manipulation resorted to in the Supreme Court by not fixing the review petitions and applications-To set an example for others to follow, the Supreme Court acknowledged the manipulation resorted to in the Supreme Court by not fixing the said petitions and applications-Supreme Court observed that it endeavoured to regain the confidence of the people by acknowledging this, and would be demonstrating that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated; that lack of trust in public institutions engendered autocracy and threatened democracy, and that if individuals began to overshadow the institutions they worked in, they caused irreparable harm, diminished their institution, and rendered them as their alter ego.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=16,17(2),19,188Pakistan Commissions of Inquiry Act, 2017=3", - "Case #": "CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS NO. 3577 OF 2019 AND 9219 OF 2023 IN CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NIL OF 2019 AND CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO.266 OF 2019 IN SUO MOTU CASE NO.7 OF 2017 REVIEW PETITION BY SHEIKH RASHEED AHMED, CHAIRMAN, AWAMI MUSLIM LEAGUE (CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 3577 OF 2019), REVIEW PETITION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 9219 OF 2023)-ApplicantsDecided on 15th November, 2023.heard on: 15th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Raziq, Advocate Supreme Court with Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed in person and Mehr Khan Malik, Advocate-on-Record for Applicant.\nMansoor Usman Awan, Attorney General for Pakistan for Applicant (in C.M.A. 9219 of 2023).", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23962", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 29 = 2024 SLD 29 = 2024 SCMR 12", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODQ", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Employee of National Bank of Pakistan-Proforma promotion-Disallowed-Interference by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction-Not warranted-Respondent-employee had been superseded in 2010 which supersession was not challenged within a reasonable time-Constitutional petition filed by the respondent before the High Court suffered from laches-Further, there was no provision in the relevant service rules of the petitioner-Bank for the right to be granted proforma promotion-This was coupled with fact that the respondent had already retired from service and received all his benefits due to him under the law-As such, interference by the High Court in the matter at the stage that it interfered was not supported either by the relevant law or by any of the service rules which governed the terms and conditions of employees of the Bank-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and impugned judgment of the High Court was set-aside.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 370 of 2021, decided on 11th September, 2023.\n(Against judgment dated 15.12.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No. 1312-P of 2013)heard on: 11th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Mahmood Ghani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nZartaj Anwar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President, Karachi-Petitioner\nVersus\nSAJJAD ALI KAKAKHEL and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23963", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 30 = 2024 SLD 30 = 2024 SCMR 14", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDOC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) & 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-B-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage etc.-Pre-arrest and post arrest bail, grant of-Further inquiry-According to the prosecution case, the alleged victim was abducted-However, according to the petitioners (accused persons), alleged abductee, being sui juris, contracted a marriage with one of the accused of her own free will and volition, and the marriage was duly registered-One of the petitioners, who was now seeking post-arrest bail, was the real brother of the abductee-It was also a matter of record that one of the accused, who claimed to have married the alleged abductee, filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights before the Family Court which was decreed in his favour, whereas the alleged abductee had also filed a suit for jactitation of marriage-In the suit for jactitation of marriage, the alleged abductee admitted that the marriage was solemnized, but under fear and threat-It was a matter of further inquiry to ascertain whether the alleged abductees real brother was in actuality involved in the abduction and whether he aided or facilitated the commission of the heinous crime of rape against his real sister - Question was if the brother of the alleged abductee was involved in the abduction then why was he not nominated in the FIR, and why was he only implicated subsequently on the basis of the statement of the alleged abductee recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C.-No medical examination of the alleged victim was conducted for recovering DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid) despite the serious allegation of rape-Considering that the offence of rape was suspected and reported to the police, the medical examination should have been conducted immediately and without any delay in order to draw DNA samples-Possibility of mala fide intention in lodging the FIR could not be ruled out, and, at present stage, there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused persons were involved; rather, there were sufficient grounds for further inquiry to prove the guilt of the accused persons-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed, ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to two of the accused was confirmed, while the third accused (brother of alleged abductee) was granted post-arrest bail.\nSalman Akram Raja and another v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary and others 2013 SCMR 203 ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Pre-arrest bail, grant of-Grounds-Paramount factors which require consideration while granting pre-arrest bail are whether the arrest will cause humiliation and/or unwarranted persecution or harassment to the applicant for some ulterior motives; or that the prosecution is motivated by malice to perpetrate irreparable injury to the reputation and liberty of the accused.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Pre-arrest and post-arrest bail-Gravity of the offence-While considering the grounds agitated for enlargement on bail, whether pre-arrest or post-arrest, the atrociousness, viciousness and/or gravity of the offence are not, by themselves, sufficient for the rejection of bail where the nature of the evidence produced in support of the indictment creates some doubt as to the veracity of the prosecution case.\n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Expression reasonable grounds as contained under section 497, Cr.P.C.-Scope-Said expression obligates the prosecution to unveil sufficient material or evidence to divulge that the accused has committed an offence falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-However, for seeking the concession of bail, the accused person has to show that the evidence collected against him during the investigation gives rise to clear-headed suspicions regarding his involvement-While deciding bail applications, it is the elementary duty of the courts to apply a judicious mind tentatively to reach a just and proper conclusion on whether reasonable grounds are made out to enlarge the accused on bail-Axiom reasonable grounds connotes and associates those grounds that are legally acceptable and based on reasons that attract the judicial mind, as opposed to being imaginative, fallacious and/or presumptuous.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=365-BConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 1121 and 1128 of 2023, decided on 8th November, 2023.\n(On appeal from the Orders dated 18.09.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Misc. No. 45685-B and Criminal Misc. No. 52486-B of 2023)\nheard on: 8th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal, Advocate Supreme Court, Salman Mushtaq (in person) and Naheed Akhtar (in person) for Petitioners.\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G., Punjab and Fiaz, SI for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SALMAN MUSHTAQ and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE through P.G. Punjab and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23964", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 31 = 2024 SLD 31 = 2024 SCMR 20", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDOCs", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) & 164-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 311, 201, 202 & 34-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd, causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender, intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform, common intention-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Complainant alleged that her daughter was done to death by her husbands brother and his son (the petitioner); that there was a statement of person A recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C. to connect the petitioner with the offence; and that another important circumstantial evidence in the shape of confessional statement of her husbands brother under section 164, Cr.P.C, was available in which he had admitted his guilt of committing the murder and also got recovered the dead body of deceased after making disclosure-Validity-In both statements recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C., the name of the petitioner was not mentioned in any context-There was no other circumstantial evidence available on the record against the petitioner except an application, which was filed by the deceased a few days earlier prior to the occurrence-In that eventuality, the case of the petitioner called for further enquiry falling under subsection (2) of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and petitioner was admitted to bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),164Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,311,201,202,34Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 495 of 2023, decided on 13th September, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 17.04.2023, passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, Abbottabad in Criminal Misc. (B.A.) No. 227-A of 2023)heard on: 13th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nLiaquat Ali Tareen, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.\nAltaf Khan, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sardar Shah, ASI for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAHAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23965", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 32 = 2024 SLD 32 = 2024 SCMR 22", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODk", - "Key Words:": "Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4 & 5-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 23 & 24-Road constructed on private land by the Provincial Government without compensating the owners-Constitutionality-Frivolous litigation by Government departments-No compensation was paid for the land on which the road was constructed nor was it acquired pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act)-Land was taken without compensating the respondents (owners)-Respondents filed a suit and though the suit was dismissed the appeal against the same was allowed and the judgment of the appellate court was upheld through the impugned judgment of the High Court-Held, that the respondents who were deprived of their land must have spent money and time with regard to a case which should have never seen a court of law, provided the petitioners (Provincial Government and its concerned departments) had abided by the Constitution and the law-Present case is a classic example of frivolous litigation, and that too by those whose salaries are paid by the taxpayers of the country-It appears that the ability to take a decision, whether to assail or not a decision does not exist in senior officers-They deemed it fit to challenge a matter of little financial significance and do so contrary to the provisions of the Constitution which guarantees as a fundamental right the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property (Articles 23 & 24), and being oblivious to the fact that a person can only be compulsorily deprived of property provided compensation therefor is paid-Present matter has been brought before the fourth Court before which the Provincial Government is a party, and it pleads by disregarding the Constitution and the law-Not only have public resources been wasted, but also Court time, both of which are a trust held on behalf of the people-Provincial Government and every employee of it, including those in the office of the Advocate-General run on public funds, therefore, one expects a much higher standard from them-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused, and Provincial Government was directed to pay to the owners of the land, requisite compensation, within a period of thirty days and in addition also pay to them one million rupees as costs.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=4,5Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=23,24", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.386-L of 2021, decided on 13th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.10.2020 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in passed in C.R. No.2852 of 2009)heard on: 13th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Baleeg-uz-Zaman, Additional A.G. Punjab for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through the Deputy Commissioner, Collector District Gujranwala and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nZULFIQAR ALI and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23966", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 33 = 2024 SLD 33 = 2024 SCMR 24", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDODg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 39, 42, 54 & 55-Gift-Pre-requisites not established-Suit for declaration, cancellation and permanent and mandatory injunction challenging the gift deed-Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, cancellation and permanent and mandatory injunction pleading that the defendant being his younger brother, was resident of United Kingdom and asked him to execute registered gift deed of the subject as he was required to show some financial as well as monetary strength, therefore, gift deed of house was got registered-Subsequently, after 20 years of gift deed when defendant tried to get the property transferred in his name in the Cantonment record on the basis of gift deed, he filed the suit-Defendant thereafter after more than one year of filing of the plaintiffs suit filed his own suit for possession of the house-First Appellate Court decreed the suit for possession filed by the defendant, which decree was maintained by the High Court-Validity-Admittedly, plaintiff and thereafter his legal heirs were in possession of the suit property till date-Gift deed was unilateral whereas mother of the donor (plaintiff) and alleged donee (defendant) was a witness to the said document-Defendant was admittedly not available in Pakistan at the time of preparation and registration of the said gift deed, therefore, no question of acceptance and offer of gift as well as delivery of possession in favour of donee/defendant arose-Mother was not produced by either of the parties-Defendant pleaded that the suit property was purchased from the funds provided by him sent from United Kingdom in the account of the mother of the parties, however there was no documentary proof available on record to such effect-Though the gift deed was a registered one but the ingredients of a valid gift mentioned in section 149 of Mahomedan Law by D.F Mulla were not fulfilled, therefore, the plaintiff who challenged the gift deed and prayed for cancellation thereof was entitled to a decree-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed, suit filed by plaintiff was decreed; the gift deed stood cancelled, therefore, the decree granted to the defendant by the first appellate court and maintained by the High Court was not sustainable under the law.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 39, 42, 54 & 55-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 3-Gift deed-Suit for declaration, cancellation and permanent and mandatory injunction challenging the gift deed-Limitation-Cause of action, accrual of-Plaintiff filed his suit to challenge the gift deed 20 years after its registration-Admittedly just before filing of the suit the defendant got entered the mutation of gift in his name, on the basis of said impugned gift in the Cantonment record which gave cause of action to the plaintiff-Stance of the plaintiff in this situation is correct and covered the point of limitation when gift deed was first time used against him which gave him the cause of action-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed and suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=39,42,54,44Limitation Act, 1908=3", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 723 and 724 of 2021, decided on 19th October, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.01.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Civil Revisions Nos. 466 and 467 of 2017)heard on: 19th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Muhammad Ghazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Ilyas Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Barrister Talha Ilyas Sheikh, Advocate for Respondent No. 1.\nBabar Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2.\nRespondent No. 4(c) in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. TAHIRA SAMINA and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nJAVED SAEED TARIQ and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23967", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 34 = 2024 SLD 34 = 2024 SCMR 28", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDOHo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail application dismissed as withdrawn-Subsequent/second bail application, filing of-Maintainability-Fresh grounds-Scope-Second bail petition repeating the same grounds that were earlier taken is not competent-Moreover, the grounds raised by an accused in a subsequent bail application which were available at the time of filing of the earlier petition could also not be treated as fresh grounds nor urged for the purposes of seeking the same relief-If the ground on which bail has been sought subsists when a bail petition is withdrawn then such a ground can also not be taken again-However, the exception to this rule is in the case of entitlement of bail on statutory grounds (of delay in conclusion if trial).\nShahbaz Akmal v. The State and another 2023 SCMR 421 and Nazir Ahmed and another v. The State and another PLD 2014 SC 241 ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1), third proviso-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial-Principles-Right (to bail) recognized under the third proviso of section 497(1) cannot be denied to an accused on the basis of discretionary powers of the court to grant bail-Said right has not been left to the discretion of the court, rather, its accrual is subject to the fulfillment of the conditions mentioned under the third proviso of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C.-If any act or omission of the accused has hindered the conclusion of trial within the period specified in the third proviso of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.) then a right, as contemplated thereunder, will not accrue in the latters favour and, therefore, he or she, as the case may be, would not become entitled to be released on bail on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial-Nonetheless, if after the rejection of the plea of bail on statutory grounds, the accused has subsequently corrected himself/herself and has abstained from doing any act or omission in the following period specified under the third proviso, then a fresh ground would accrue to the accused to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for grant of bail-Third proviso to section 497(1) of Cr.P.C. would thus become operative as and when the period specified therein has expired but the trial has not concluded without any fault on part of the accused-In the case in hand, the ground of statutory delay was not available to the petitioner (accused) when he had sought the concession of bail through the two attempts made by him-It was during subsistence of the second bail petition that the period specified under the third proviso had ripened and, therefore, a fresh ground became available to seek bail-Petition before the High Court was dismissed for non-prosecution and such dismissal did not prejudice his right to file a fresh petition before the High Court, which he did-Petition was competent because a fresh ground of delay in conclusion of trial had become available to him-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was admitted to bail.\n \nSyed Ayesha Subhani v. The State and others PLD 2023\nSC 648 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1), third proviso-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 148, 149 & 109-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, abetment-Bail, grant of-Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial-In the present case the two year period specified in the third proviso of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C. has passed-Despite more than two years of continuous incarceration of the petitioner (accused), the trial had not concluded-Delay in conclusion of trial was not attributable to the petitioner nor his counsel, rather, it had been on account of the abscondance of the co-accused and their surrender or arrest at different times-Each time the charge had to be reframed-Petitioner was not at fault and yet he had to suffer the hardship of incarceration of more than two years-Co-accused were stated to be close relatives of the petitioners and, therefore, the prosecution had argued that his complicity could not be ruled out-Legislature had expressly confined the delay under the third proviso to an act or omission of the accused or any person acting on his behalf-Accused cannot be made liable for the acts or omissions of a co-accused regardless of the relationship, except when the prosecution can clearly show, based on undisputed facts that the accused seeking bail was complicit-Latters acts and omissions, or those of a person acting on his behalf, were crucial and could be considered for the court to determine the right to be released on bail on the ground described under the third proviso-Delay caused by the co-accused was not attributable to the petitioner because no act or omission on the latters part nor a person acting on his behalf could be shown-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was admitted to bail.\n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1), third proviso-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial-Quantum of delay attributable to the accused, calculation of-While calculating the quantum of delay attributable to an accused, the court is required to consider whether or not the progress and conclusion of the trial was in any manner delayed by the act and omission on the part of the accused-While ascertaining the delay, the cumulative effect in disposal of the case has to be considered and its assessment cannot be determined on the basis of mathematical calculations by excluding those dates for which adjournments had been sought by the accused or the latters counsel-Main factor for consideration is the attendance of the witnesses and whether, despite the matter having become ripe for the recording of evidence, whether the delay was caused by the defence-Recording of the statement of a last witness would also not defeat the right recognized under the third proviso and it would be unreasonable to conclude that the trial has been completed.\nNazir Hussain v. Zia-ul-Haq and others 1983 SCMR 72; Sher Ali alias Sheri v. The State 1998 SCMR 190; Akhtar Abbas v. State PLD 1982 SC 424; Moundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934; Abdul Rashid v. The State 1998 SCMR 897; Zahid Hussain Shah v. The State PLD 1995 SC 49 and Muhammad Siddique v. Muhammad Behram and another 1998 PCr.LJ 358 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1233 of 2023, decided on 30th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 03.10.2023 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Criminal Misc. No. 53730-B of 2023)\nheard on: 30th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qaiser Imam, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nAli Ahmed Gillani, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab along with Mushtaq, Inspector for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD USMAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23968", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 35 = 2024 SLD 35 = 2024 SCMR 34", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDOHk", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)-\n-S. 19(2)-Punjab Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority Act (X of 2010), S. 20-Appeal before the Service Tribunal-Limitation-Petitioner (employee) filed a Departmental Appeal before the Chairman, TEVTA on 26.02.2020 which remained pending-During the intervening period, the petitioner also filed a representation before the Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab which remained undecided and according to him, in the same period of time, there was also a lockdown due to COVID-19 pandemic-Though the petitioner approached the learned Tribunal on 16.06.2020, record showed that during the pendency of appeal before the Tribunal, the Chairman TEVTA decided the pending departmental appeal of the petitioner vide order dated 30.11.2020-Tribunal dismissed the service appeal of the petitioner predominantly on the ground of limitation and observed in the impugned order that, according to section 19(2) of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 ( PEEDA Act ) the petitioner was required to approach the Tribunal between 26.04.2020 and 26.05.2020, but he filed the appeal in the Tribunal on 16.06.2020 with a delay of 20 days, hence appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed being barred by time-Validity-Before non-suiting the petitioner on the ground of limitation, the fundamental question with regard to the competent authority should have been determined by the Tribunal vis- -vis the claim and assertion of the petitioner whether being a civil servant, he rightly approached the Chief Secretary and, if he was not competent, then which was the competent authority for deciding his departmental appeal under the Punjab Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority Act, 2010 (TEVTA Act)-Tribunal should have also determined another crucial aspect of lockdown due to COVID-19 pandemic which had direct nexus with the plea of limitation in view of the notification, if any, issued from time to time by the Service Tribunal, relaxing the period of limitation during the lockdown period or following any other notification issued by the Federal Government or Government of Punjab and/or the Lahore High Court during the COVID-19 pandemic and then the appeal should have been decided where obviously the question of limitation could also be adverted to by the Service Tribunal whether any relaxation for freezing or immobilizing the period of limitation for filing appeal was available to the petitioner during interacted period attributable to lockdown as a result of COVID-19 or not?-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed, the impugned order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remanded to decide the appeal afresh, preferably within a period of 60 days.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006=19(2)Punjab Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority Act, 2010=20", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 460 of 2022, decided on 21st November, 2023.\n(On appeal from the Order dated 05.01.2022 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 2547 of 2020)heard on: 25th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in person.\nBarrister Muhammad Mumtaz Ali, Additional Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAFAQAT ALI-Petitioner\nVersus\nCHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23969", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 36 = 2024 SLD 36 = 2024 SCMR 40", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDc", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 184(3)-Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution- Scope- Private complaint/ grievance-Alternate remedy, availability of-Application under Article 184(3) of the Constitution filed by the applicant before the Supreme Court leveling serious allegations against the personnel of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) of misusing their office, and committing crimes against the applicant and his family-Maintainability-Nature of a case filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution is different from other cases, for a number of reasons-Firstly, the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution exercises original power, and whenever original power is exercised it must be done cautiously-Secondly, where there exists other forum(s) to attend to the same it is best that they first do so-Thirdly, against the decision of a High Court appeals may come before the Supreme Court under Article 185 of the Constitution-Fourthly, direct intervention by the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution may adversely affect the rights of others-Application filed by the applicant was held to be not maintainable with the observations that as far as the applicants apprehension that his complaint/grievance would not be entertained by the Ministry of Defence, because the respondents had held senior positions in the Armed Forces, the Additional Attorney General assured the Court that the complaint/grievance will be given due consideration; that there was no reason to doubt this statement made on behalf of the Government of Pakistan, therefore, the apprehension of the applicant is misplaced, and that, if the applicant submits a complaint/grievance to the Ministry of Defence of the Government of Pakistan, it shall be dealt with in accordance with law.\nIn Attendance:", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3)", - "Case #": "HUMAN RIGHT CASE NO. 8157-P OF 2023: In the matter of\nHuman Right Case No. 8157-P of 2023, decided on 8th November, 2023.\n(Application in respect of Property Dispute)\nheard on: 8th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafeez-ur-Rehman Ch., Advocate Supreme Court and Shaheryar Tariq, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant along with Moeez Ahmed Khan, Applicant\nCh. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan on Court's call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23970", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 37 = 2024 SLD 37 = 2024 SCMR 43", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDY", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 452, 427, 354, 34, 506, 148 & 149-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty, common intention, criminal intimidation, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly-Bail, grant of-Offences not falling within prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C-Previous enmity between the parties-Accused was nominated in two FIRs-All the offences mentioned in the two FIRs fell out of the prohibition contained in section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.)-Record showed that there was some previous enmity between the parties over the lodging of an FIR-Accused was behind bars for a period of more than five months and his trial in both FIRs had not concluded-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed and accused was granted bail in both FIRs.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=452,427,354,34,506,148,149Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 1174 and 1202 of 2023, decided on 20th November, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 25.09.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Misc. (B.A.) Nos. 2879-P and 2933-P of 2023)heard on: 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Yahya Afridi and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iltaf Samad, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in both cases).\nAltaf Khan, Additional A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Javed, Inspector for the State.\nMst. Nusrat, Maazullah (Husband) in person for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAHEEM ULLAH-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through P.G. Punjab and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23971", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 38 = 2024 SLD 38 = 2024 SCMR 46", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Educational institution-\n-Medical college-Examination Regulations-Judicial review-Scope-Standards prescribed and set out in the regulations relating to academic bodies, determination of eligibility to pursue studies and other related policies are generally not open to judicial review unless they can be clearly shown to contravene the law or to be shockingly unreasonable or perverse.\nCourts are required to exercise utmost restraint in matters relating to policies, discipline and other academic affairs of educational institutions. Refusing to interfere is a rule and deviation therefrom is an exception which can only be justified on the basis of clear and undisputed violation of the law. The reluctance of the courts to interfere with academic affairs is based on the foundational principle that the academicians and educational institutions are the best judges because formulating policies and eligibility criteria falls within their exclusive domain. The standards prescribed and set out in the regulations relating to academic bodies, determination of eligibility to pursue studies and other related policies are generally not open to judicial review unless they can be clearly shown to contravene the law or to be shockingly unreasonable or perverse. The courts are not equipped nor have the capacity to deal with academic matters, let alone substituting opinions formed by experts or professionals.\nMuhammad Hamid Shah v. Pakistan Medical and Dental Council and others 1996 SCMR 1101; Ms. Asma Ghafoor v. Principal, King Edward Medical College and others 2011 SCMR 1311; Munaza Habib and others v. The Vice Chancellor and others 1996 SCMR 1790 and VC University of Punjab v. Mst. Maria Hidayat Khan and others 2007 SCMR 1231 ref.\nEvery citizen is unquestionably entitled and enjoys a right to choose the pursuit of a profession or trade but such a right is not absolute. The regulating authority may set minimum standards in the context of exercising the right in order to safeguard the interests and welfare of the public. Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962 and the regulations made pursuant to powers conferred thereunder regulate the medical profession, including the affairs of the medical education and institutions, to promote the interest and wellbeing of the ultimate stakeholders i.e the public who would repose and rely on the knowledge and skill of medical practitioners. They will be placing their lives in the hands of those students who would be graduating from the medical institutions. In the present case the standards set by the experts under the MBBS/BDS Courses and Conditions for House Job/ Internship/ Foundation Year Regulations, 2013 regarding the determination of eligibility, including the necessary skills and knowledge required to pursue the medical profession are, therefore, not open to judicial review, nor can the court substitute them with its own.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Relief-Scope-Compassion and hardship-It is the duty of every court to implement the enforced laws and to decide the disputes in accordance therewith, rather than on the basis of compassion-Courts cannot grant any relief in breach of the law nor create a right in favour of a litigant which the latter does not possess by or under the law-Compassion and hardship cannot be relevant considerations when there is no scope for it in the relevant laws.\nDirector General, National Savings v. Balqees Begum and others PLD 2013 SC 174 and Aina Haya v. Principal, Peshawar Model Girls High Court and others 2023 SCMR 198 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1354, 355 and 1447 of 2020, decided on 12th October, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 12.02.2020 of the High Court of Peshawar respectively passed in Writ Petitions Nos.219-A of 2018, 258-A of 2019 and 1312-P of 2018)\nheard on: 12th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Shirin Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos. 1354 and 1355 of 2020).\nAmjad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 1447 of 2020).\nAbdul Munim Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SUNDAS and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nKHYBER MEDICAL UNIVERSITY through V.C. Peshawar and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23972", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 39 = 2024 SLD 39 = 2024 SCMR 51", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302, 109 & 34-Qatl-i-amd, abetment, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-Appeal against acquittal-Presence of witnesses at place of incident doubtful-Defective investigation-Conflict between ocular and medical evidence-Ocular testimony in the case was led by the complainant, and two other persons who were residents of a village situated around 30 to 35 kilometers from the place of occurrence-Incident occurred in the night at 8:55 p.m. in the month of October and the testimony of the eye-witnesses remained unsuccessful in establishing any source of light at the scene of the crime-It was only after a lapse of two and a half months of the incident that the respondent (acquitted accused) was implicated in the case-No identification parade was conducted for determining the involvement of the accused persons and the evidentiary value of identification at a belated stage had little value in the eyes of the law, more particularly when the lineaments and physiognomy of the accused were not mentioned anywhere by the complainant or the eye-witnesses-Investigating Officer (I.O.) did not show the place of incident in the site plan through the prosecution claimed that the incident occurred near a hotel; I.O. also admitted that he had not demarcated the place from where the accused had fired at the victim in the rough site plan, nor had the prosecution witnesses shown him the specific place of death of the deceased at the site of the occurrence; I.O. further admitted that he had called upon the inhabitants of the place of occurrence i.e. owners of the nearby haveli and service station, but they could not provide any detail of the occurrence or any description of the assailants-As per the prosecution case, the deceased sustained two firearm injuries, however the postmortem report revealed that only one firearm injury was found on the deceaseds body-High Court rightly held that the prosecution failed to substantiate the case against the respondent-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Presence of eye-witnesses on the spot doubtful-In such a situation, the ocular testimony (of the alleged eye-witness) should be excluded from consideration.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Principle-It is not obligatory or compulsory that there should be several circumstances creating doubts in order to justify the extension of benefit of doubt to the accused; on the contrary, even a simple circumstance creating reasonable doubt vis-a-vis, the guilt of the accused is sufficient to entitle him to such benefit.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Evidence-Multiple conclusions-Preference-If two sensible and judicious conclusions can be drawn keeping in mind the substance of the evidence, then the view which espouses and provides backing towards acquittal must be subscribed and assented to.\n(e) Appeal against acquittal-\n-Double presumption of innocence-Scope-In an appeal against acquittal, the Court would not ordinarily interfere and would instead give due weight and consideration to the findings of the Court acquitting the accused which carries a double presumption of innocence, i.e. the initial presumption that an accused is innocent until found guilty, which is then fortified by a second presumption once the Court below confirms the assumption of innocence, which cannot be displaced lightly.\nGhulam Sikandar and another v. Mamaraz Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 11 and The State and others v. Abdul Khaliq and others PLD 2011 SC 554 ref.\n(f) Appeal against acquittal-\n-Interference in an acquittal judgment by the Appellate Court-Grounds-Courts are slow in interfering with an acquittal judgment, unless it is shown to be perverse, passed in gross violation of law, or suffers from errors of grave misreading or non-reading of the evidence-Such judgments should not be lightly interfered with and a heavy burden lies on the prosecution to rebut the presumption of innocence which the accused has earned and attained on account of his acquittal-Interference in a judgment of acquittal is rare and the prosecution must show that there are glaring errors of law and fact committed by the Court in arriving at the decision, which would result, into grave miscarriage of justice; the acquittal judgment is perfunctory or wholly artificial or a shocking conclusion has been drawn-Acquittal judgment should not be interjected until the findings are perverse, arbitrary, artificial, speculative, and ridiculous-Court of appeal should not interfere simply for the reason that on the re-appraisal of the evidence a different conclusion could possibly be arrived at, and the factual conclusions should not be upset, except when palpably perverse, suffering from serious and material factual infirmities.\n(g) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 10-A-Phrase the accused is the favourite child of law -Connotation-Said phrase does not imply that the Court should grant any unwarranted favour, indulgence or preferential treatment to the accused, rather it was coined to maintain a fair-minded and unbiased sense of justice in all circumstances, as a safety gauge or safety contrivance to ensure an evenhanded right of defence with a fair trial for compliance with the due process of law, which is an integral limb of the safe administration of criminal justice and is crucial in order to avoid erroneous verdicts, and to advocate for the reinforcement of the renowned doctrine innocent until proven guilty .", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,109,34Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 290-L of 2015, decided on 27th October, 2023.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 02.03.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No.89 of 2011)\nheard on: 27th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mukhtar Ahmad Gondal, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD RIAZ-Petitioner\nVersus\nKHURRAM SHEHZAD and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23973", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 40 = 2024 SLD 40 = 2024 SCMR 60", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNC8", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act (XVII of 1976)-\n-S. 12(3)-Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O. XXIII, R. 8, proviso-Appeal against judgment of Special Court filed before the Supreme Court-Office objection-Appeal against-Inordinate delay in fixing appeal against the office objection-Appellant was convicted by a Special Court and the criminal appeal against such judgment was filed within time before the Supreme Court-However, the criminal appeal was not numbered as the Institution Officer of the office of the Supreme Court objected to its filing as the appellant had not surrendered himself-Against the said office objection, Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal ( C. M. Appeal ) was filed which was put up for hearing in Chamber before a Judge of the Supreme Court, who after noting the contentions of the counsel, observed vide his order that it would be appropriate that the points were considered by a Bench of the Supreme Court, therefore the C. M. Appeal be fixed before the Court for hearing-However, said appeal was not fixed in Court till today, and the appellant passed away in the meantime-Held, that it was unfortunate that despite the order of the Judge in Chamber, directing that the C. M. Appeal be fixed in Court this was not done till today, that is, the same was not fixed for a period of over three years and eight months for no discernable reason-For this inordinate delay neither the appellant nor his counsel could be faulted-No one should be made to suffer on account of an act of Court, or as in this matter, on account of inaction-Even otherwise an appeal is the right of every convict-Accordingly, the C. M. Appeal, assailing the office objection, was allowed with the directions that the unnumbered criminal appeal filed by the appellant against his conviction be numbered, and the record of the Special Court be summoned and be put up along with the said appeal for hearing in Court.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976=12(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Misc. Appeal No. 6/2020 in Criminal Appeal No. Nil/2020, decided on 10th November, 2023.\n(Against the order of the Registrar dated 17.01.2020)\nheard on: 10th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Amin-ud-Din Khan\nand Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Safdar, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "General (Retd.) PERVEZ MUSHARRAF-Appellant\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23974", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 41 = 2024 SLD 41 = 2024 SCMR 145", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009-\n-R. 9(1)(a)-Balochistan Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1982, Rr. 3(i)(a) & 3(i)(b)-Contract employees for a project-BPS-16 and above posts-Regularization in service-Case of the Provincial Government/competent authority was that a summary of 43 contract employees into regular service was approved while for BPS-17 and above, the competent authority was not competent to appoint or regularize any contract employee as the same came within the domain of the Balochistan Public Service Commission, however, the High Court incorrectly allowed the writ petition of the respondents (contract employees seeking regularization) purely on the ground of discrimination-Validity-Posts in BPS-16 and above were to be filled through the Public Service Commission-Rule 9(1)(a) of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009 (the AP & T Rules) clearly provides that the appointment to posts in BPS-16 and above or equivalent, if falls within the purview of the Commission, shall be made on the basis of a test and interview to be conducted by the Balochistan Public Service Commission (the Commission)-Similarly, Rule 3(i)(a) of the Balochistan Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1982 (the BPSC Functions Rules), provides that the Commission shall conduct tests and examinations for initial recruitments to civil posts in BPS 16 to 22 connected with the affairs of the province, except those specified in the Schedule appended to the Rules-Sub clause (b) of Rule 3 (i) of the BPSC Functions Rules further empowers the Commission to conduct a test and interview for initial recruitment to any other post which may be referred to it by the Government, which may otherwise not fall within the purview of the Commission-Present respondents fell within the purview of Rule 9(1)(a) of the AP & T Rules and Rules 3(i)(a) and 3(i)(b) of the BPSC Functions Rules-Decision given by the High Court was without any basis and was not sustainable in the eye of law, therefore, the same was set-aside with the directions that the Provincial Government shall refer the posts in question to the Commission for recruitment in accordance with the law through fresh publication on open merit basis; that the respondents shall participate in the fresh recruitment process to be undertaken by the Commission and the Commission shall entertain their applications, and that in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the question, if any, of any age limit shall not be a hurdle in the way of the respondents-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\nProvince of Sindh and others v. Muhammad Taqi Shah 2018 SCMR 1607 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 25-Equality of citizens-Negative equality-Scope-Article 25 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality-Such right can only be claimed when decision is taken in accordance with law-Wrong concession in favour of one person does not entitle any other person to claim benefit of a wrong decision.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Contract employees appointed against project posts-Regularization in service-Scope-As far as the regularization of contract employees subsequent to creation of posts on regular side is concerned, the mere creation of posts on regular side does not confer, in the absence of any statutory support, an automatic right of regularization in favour of the contract employees working against project posts.\nGovernment of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperative Department Peshawar and others v. Saeed-Ul-Hassan and others 2021 SCMR 1376 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1979=9(1)(A)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.441 of 2020, decided on 1st December, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 30.09.2019 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, in C.P. No.1120 of 2017)heard on: 31st October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ayaz Swati, Additional Advocate General, Balochistan for Appellants.\nMuhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Ali Kanrani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN, CIVIL SECRETARIAT, QUETTA and others-Appellants\nVersus\nADEEL-UR-REHMAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23975", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 42 = 2024 SLD 42 = 2024 SCMR 67", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 337-D-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah-Reappraisal of evidence-From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses it is well established that the petitioner/convict had committed the murder of deceased and caused injuries to his son-Ocular account of the occurrence is in line with the medical evidence brought on the record-Prosecution witnesses have not been shattered during cross examination and their evidence is confidence inspiring-In the circumstances, the prosecution has successfully brought home guilt against the petitioner beyond any shadow of doubt-Conviction of petitioner was maintained-Jail petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 337-D-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah-Reappraisal of evidence-Petition seeking enhancement of sentence, dismissal of-Inconsequential recovery-High Court through the impugned judgment has rightly termed the recovery as inconsequential keeping in view the fact that crime empties secured from the place of occurrence were dispatched to the Forensic Science Laboratory after arrest of the petitioner/convict-Judgment passed by the High Court, whereby it reduced the death sentence awarded to petitioner/convict into imprisonment for life, is well reasoned and based on proper appreciation of evidence available on the record-Petition filed by the complainant for enhancement of sentence was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,337-D", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 345 of 2017 and Criminal Petition No. 465 of 2017, decided on 25th September, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 01.11.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Cr. A. No.716/2012 and M.R. No.53 of 2011)heard on: 25th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Liaquat Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in J.P. No.345 of 2017).\nSyed Iqbal Hussain Shah Gillani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in Cr. P. No.465 of 2017).\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SOHAIL AKHTAR and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23976", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 43 = 2024 SLD 43 = 2024 SCMR 71", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNDg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-Ss. 2(xxxiii) & 33-Workman-Scope-Manager of a private Bank-Whether a workman for purposes of Industrial Relations Act, 2012-Held, that record reflected that the petitioner was posted as Manager of a private banks branch and also had the power of attorney of the Bank and two other persons, namely the Operation Manager, and the Chief Teller, both were performing their duties under the petitioners supervision-Petitioner admitted that his functions included managing, coaching and monitoring of staff; it was also his job to physically verify and check vouchers and cash at the time of closing of the Branch every day-During further cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that in light of the powers granted to him in the power of attorney, he used to supervise, cancel and pass instruments during the course of his daily work-Wide ranging and comprehensive powers conferred upon the petitioner were of such nature and responsibility that could only be granted to a person having the status of manager, officer or the person having the category of supervisory duties-All courts below after proper appreciation of facts rightly held that the petitioner was not workman, hence he could not maintain a grievance petition in the NIRC-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n21st Century Dictionary (page 833); Words and Phrases, (Permanent Edition 26 at Pages 366 and 369); Hodges v. Bankers Surety Co., 152 Ill.App. 372; Gillis v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 27 S.E.2d 283, 285, 223 N.C. 470, 150 A.L.R. 1330; Manning v. Lamb, D.C.Mun.App., 89 A.2d 882, 884 and Blacks Law Dictionary, (Tenth Edition), Page 1104 ref.\n(b) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-S. 2(xxxiii)-Workman-Scope-Mere nomenclature of an assigned post is not relevant in determining the status of an employee and assessing whether he is performing the duties of a worker or workman, or a manager, officer or supervisor-Rather the paramount and predominant consideration is the nature of the job, and if any employee claims that he was performing the duties of a worker/workman, the burden lies on him to discharge if he claims contrary to the job description assigned to him separately or by means of appointment letter or subsequently made any change in the job description through up-gradation or promotion which detached or estranged the status of employee from workman to managerial or supervisory post-Litmus test is the nature of job actually being performed rather than the nomenclature of the job simpliciter.\nAbdul Razzaq v. Messrs Ihsan Sons Limited and 2 others 1992 PLC 424; National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court No. 5, Faisalabad and 2 others 1993 SCMR 672; National Bank of Pakistan and another v. Anwar Shah and others 2015 SCMR 434; Habib Bank Limited (HBL) v. Gulzar Khan 2019 SCMR 946 and Muslim Commercial Bank Limited (MCB) and others v. Muhammad Shahid Mumtaz and another 2011 SCMR 1475 ref.\nQazi Jawad Ehsan Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Act, 2012=2(xxxiii),33", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 6117 of 2021, decided on 2nd October, 2023.\n(Against the Order dated 23.09.2021 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No.503-P of 2021)heard on: 2nd October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMAN ULLAH-Petitioner\nVersus\nUNITED BANK LIMITED through President and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23977", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 44 = 2024 SLD 44 = 2024 SCMR 80", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNHo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)-\n-Ss. 5(1) & 7(1)- Charges of inefficiency, misconduct and corruption-Show cause notice-Purpose of a show cause notice and essential elements to which a show cause notice must conform stated.\nA show cause notice is not an accusation made or information given in abstract but an accusation made against an employee in respect of an act committed or omitted, cognizable thereunder. As such, the law intends that a show cause notice must conform to at least seven essential elements, and these include:\n(i) it should be in writing and should be worded appropriately;\n(ii) it should clearly state the nature of the charge(s), date, and place of the commission or omission of acts, along with apportionment of responsibility;\n(iii) it should clearly quote the clause of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA) under which the delinquent is liable to be punished;\n(iv) it should also indicate the proposed penalty in case the charge is proved;\n(v) it should specify the time and date within which the employee should submit his explanation in writing. It is also preferable to add in the show cause notice that if no written explanation is received from the accused within the prescribed date, the enquiry will be conducted ex-parte;\n(vi) it should be issued under the signature of the competent authority; and\n(vii) it should contain the time, date and place of the inquiry and the name of the inquiry officer.\nStrict compliance of the above conditions is vital so that the principle of natural justice is not violated. The charges made in the show cause notice should not be vague. All the acts of commission or omission constituting the charge, and also forming the ground for proceeding against the employee, should be clearly specified because otherwise, it will be difficult for an employee, even by projecting his imagination, to discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the competent authority to be established against him, and thus, it will not only frustrate the requirement of giving him a reasonable opportunity to put up a defence but also amount to a violation of his fundamental right to a fair trial.\nState of Andhra Prdesh and others v. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723; Surath Chandra Chakravrty v. The State of West Bengal AIR 1971 SC 752; Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454 and Anil Gilurker v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetria Gramin Bank and others (2011) 14 SCC 379 ref.\nIn the present case the first charge levelled against the petitioner (retired employee) was corruption, but the alleged acts of omission and commission stated in the notice/order lacked material particular to that charge. It did not mention that the petitioner had accepted a huge bribe from anyone. Therefore, the Inquiry Officer could not have read this charge in the show cause notice/order, and it appears that this is why the Inquiry Officer did not mention this charge in his report. The Inquiry Officer, in his report has not referred to any statement of witness which says the taking of bribe by the petitioner. This charge, therefore, fails on two counts: one, assuming the alleged acts of omission and commission are correct, no case of corruption is made out from there, and two, no evidence has been brought on record to prove the same. So, this charge could not have led to any punishment.\nMian Abdul Qadeer v. Government of Pakistan and others 2005 SCMR 1560 and Muhammad Alamzeb Khan v. Registrar, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and another 2008 SCMR 1406 ref.\nThe petitioner was also charged with misconduct and inefficiency on the basis that he allowed three absentee teachers to join duty without checking the office records and genuineness of their appointment orders and thus, caused a heavy loss to the government exchequer. A perusal of the inquiry report indicates that the Inquiry Officer, instead of proving the charges of misconduct and inefficiency, had put in his energy to establish that the appointment orders of the teachers were not genuine. This fact alone is sufficient to conclude that when the petitioner allowed the teachers to join duty, no complaint or adverse material against them was available. In such a situation, the petitioner was not expected to have checked the genuineness of the appointment orders of the teachers while allowing them to resume duty. So, again, the charges were vague, which vitiates the inquiry proceedings and the resultant punishment.\nLal Muhammad and another v. Government of Sindh 1980 SCMR 850 ref.\nThe charges levelled against the petitioner were laconic, and the Inquiry Officer has taken into consideration non-existing material, and findings of all facts recorded by him cannot be sustained in the eye of law. And so, the punishment awarded also loses the backing of the law.\nAllah Bakhsh, Foodgrain Supervisor (Retd.) v. Director Food, Punjab, Lahore and others 2006 SCMR 403 ref.\nPetition for leave to appeal wass converted into an appeal and allowed, the judgment of the Service Tribunal was set aside, the punishment order was quashed, and the department/respondents were directed to restore the full pension of the petitioner, and refund the amount of Rs.963,467/- along with the amount so far recovered from the pension of the petitioner.\n(b) Public functionaries-\n-Acts performed and orders made by public authorities-Such acts and orders deserve due regard by Courts, and every possible explanation for their validity should be explored, and the whole field of powers in pursuance of which the public authorities act or perform their functions should be examined, and only then if it is found that the act done, order made or proceedings undertaken is without lawful authority should the Courts declare them to be of no legal effect.\n(1) The Chairman, East Pakistan Railway Board, Chitta Gong; and (2) District Traffic Superintendent, Pakistan Eastern Railway, Pahartali, Chitta Gong v. Abdul Majid Sardar, Ticket Collector, Pakistan Eastern Railway, Laksam PLD 1966 SC 725 and Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore through its Chairman v. The Custodian, Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 others and University of the Punjab, Lahore v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 others PLD 1971 SC 811 ref.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Judicial order-Proper adjudication-Judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court or Tribunal has made an effort to resolve the questions involved for their proper adjudication-If the final order does not bear an imprint of such effort and, on the contrary, discloses arbitrariness of thought and action, the inescapable result would be that justice had neither been done nor seemed to have been done.\nGouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006=5(1),7(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1276 of 2020, decided on 17th August, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 11.10.2019 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal in Appeal No. 4309 of 2012)\nheard on: 17th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Afrasiab Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and M. Mehmood Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioner (in person) for Petitioner.\nSanaullah Zahid, Additional A.G., Punjab and Muhammad Imran, Law Officer, School Education Department, Government of Punjab for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SANAULLAH SANI-Petitioner\nVersus\nSECRETARY EDUCATION SCHOOLS and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23978", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 45 = 2024 SLD 45 = 2024 SCMR 89", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JDNHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 23-Protracted litigation-Plaintiff dragging out litigation to continue illegal possession over defendants property-Costs, imposition of-Suit was filed by plaintiffs-petitioners on 16 September 2009 and was dismissed on 30 April 2016, that is, after a period of about 7 years-Perusal of order sheets of the trial court showed that despite repeated opportunities the petitioners-plaintiffs did not come forward to give evidence-Despite having lost thrice (in the for a below) the petitioners deemed it fit to file a frivolous petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court-Petitioners were in possession of the suit property and the apparent reason for dragging out the litigation was that the petitioners-plaintiffs were in illegal possession of land and their possession continued till date-By such tactics the respondents-defendants were deprived of their properties; their fundamental right, enshrined in Article 23 of the Constitution, to hold and dispose of property, violated, and the process of the court abused to procrastinate matters indefinitely by the petitioners who were in possession and had no intention to relinquish possession of the respondents land-Courts must be vigilant that the process of the court is not abused, and ensure that legitimate owners are not deprived of their properties-From the date of filing of the suit till date 14 years had elapsed, and petitioners who were not entitled to the said land continue in possession of it, probably thinking there would no consequences for their actions-Such an impression must be corrected-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs of one million rupees with the direction that such amount shall constitute a charge on the property of the petitioners till such time the said amount was paid, and the petitioners shall handover the peaceful possession of the said land to the respondents.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Costs, imposition of-Courts must impose costs whenever it is required, stem frivolous litigation and stop the abuse of the process of the court in perpetuating wrongdoing.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=23", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1990-L of 2017, decided on 10th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 3 May 2017 passed by Lahore High Court Multan Bench, Multan in Civil Revision No.133-D of 2017)\nheard on: 10th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Muhammad Ali Gillani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAVED HAMEED and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nAMAN ULLAH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23979", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 46 = 2024 SLD 46 = 2024 SCMR 92", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Industrial Relations Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 47(3)-Employee of a private bank-Allegation of negligence and carelessness in performing duties-Demotion to a lower grade with entitlement to all back benefits-Respondent Bank imposed a major penalty on the appellant (employee) and dismissed her from service-Labour Court reinstated her in the Banks service albeit with a lower Grade, and declined to award her any back benefits-Appellate Tribunal, upheld the order of the Labour Court-However, the High Court modified the penalty to compulsory retirement-Validity-Main allegation against the appellant was that she had been negligent in performing her duties by disclosing a secret code to her former Bank Manager, who defrauded the Bank and misappropriated hefty amounts-Impugned Judgment of the High Court appeared to be self-contradictory as the High Court had first observed that the appellant had an unblemished past career, spanning over 28 years, and that her dismissal from service would be a harsh punishment; and yet, the High Court found it appropriate to then observe that the appellant be compulsory retired from service-Such observations of the High Court in fact defeat the ends of justice rather than fostering the same, as awarding compulsory retirement would be equivalent to meting out harsh treatment to her-Given the fact that the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal found the appellant negligent of not properly keeping the secret code but did not see any merit in the allegations of embezzlement, the imposition of a major penalty of compulsory retirement from service would definitely be harsh-Appeal was partly allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court was set-aside, and judgments of the Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal were upheld to the extent of the demotion to a lower grade; with the modification that the appellant will be entitled to all back benefits as available to a Grade-III Officer, from the date of her dismissal to the date of her retirement, and she will also be entitled to all the pensionary benefits as available to the said Grade Officer.\nSaifullah v. Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services 2016 SCMR 1430 and Auditor-General of Pakistan v. Muhammad Ali 2006 SCMR 63 ref.\n(b) Master-servant-\n-Penalty imposed on employee-Proportionality-Penalty should be proportionate to the guilt-Modern notion of proportionality requires that the punishment ought to reflect the degree of moral culpability associated with the offence for which it is imposed.\nDivisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Nadeem Raza 2023 SCMR 803 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010=47(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 836-L and 837-L of 2013, decided on 14th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 16.1.2013 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.Ps. Nos. 25273 and 23756 of 2011)heard on: 14th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants in Person (in C.A. No. 836-L of 2013).\nFarooq Zaman Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Lahore) for Appellants (in C.A. No. 837-L of 2013).\nFarooq Zaman Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Lahore) for Respondents (in C.A. No. 836-L of 2013).\nRespondents in person (in C.A. No. 837-L of 2013).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. SHAHIDA SIDDIQA and others-Appellants\nVersus\nALLIED BANK LIMITED through President and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23980", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 47 = 2024 SLD 47 = 2024 SCMR 97", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Absorption-Valuable right in favour of employee, accrual of-Locus poenitentiae, doctrine of-Respondent was absorbed as Guard Grade-I in Pakistan Railways vide notice dated 06.08.2012, but, after a lapse of six years, he was denied the absorption vide another notice dated 02.08.2018 when certain valuable rights had already accrued in his favour which could not be denied keeping in mind the principle of locus poenitentiae-Record reflects that the department before the Service Tribunal failed to justify the action of rescinding the earlier order issued in favour of respondent, therefore, the Tribunal reached the correct conclusion that the respondent was discriminated against and the action taken against him was illegal and as a consequence thereof, the service appeal was allowed-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Locus poenitentiae, doctrine of-\n-Power of rescission-Scope-Such power remains with the relevant authorities to undo the action till a decisive step is taken or as long as certain rights are not created or the action is found to be patently illegal.\n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXII, R. 1-No abatement by partys death, if right to sue survives-Scope-Deceased person cannot be a party to any legal proceeding and, on his death, legal proceedings are suspended until and unless his legal representatives are impleaded and swapped as party provided that the cause of action survives which is indeed a prime consideration to declare any legal proceedings abated before the final adjudication-By and large, the right to sue survives except the right to sue which is closely associated with the individual or is a personal right of action.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3501 of 2021, decided on 12th July, 2023.\n(Against the Judgment dated 16.04.2021 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, in Appeal No.2137(R)CS/2018 with MPs Nos.2262 of 2018 and 215 of 2019)heard on: 12th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Umer Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN RAILWAYS through Chief Executive Officer/ Senior General Manager, Lahore and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD ASLAM-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23981", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 48 = 2024 SLD 48 = 2024 SCMR 101", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Notification, memorandum, order, etc issued by a Department-Every government servant must mention his name and designation in every notification, memorandum, order, etc.\n(b) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974-\n-Rr. 12(1) & 12(2)-Notification No.SO-II(SGA & CD)5-64/2011 dated 27 July 2020 (the Notification)-Posts advertised by the Provincial Forests and Wildlife Department-Eligibility criteria for candidates-Notification granting 15 years age relaxation-Legality-Rule 12(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 (the Rules) stipulates that the education, qualification, experience and age limit for the post be provided-Rule 12(2) of the Rules states that the stipulated age may be relaxed to the extent mentioned in the Table by the authorities mentioned therein, which provides that upto one year age can be relaxed by the Head of the Department in all grades, for grade 16 and above the power to relax age of one year vests in the Head of the Department, for a period of three years the Secretary of the Department can relax it, upto five years the Chief Secretary can do so and upto 10 years the Minister Incharge or the Chief Secretary (if there is no Minister) can relax age-In the instant case, age has been relaxed by fifteen years, which means that candidates who are about forty-five years may also apply-In such circumstances the following questions arise; (i) If a rule provides a maximum age for a post why should it be relaxed? (ii) If at all age is to be relaxed should it not be in respect of an individual seeking it, provided he could justify it? (iii) Does blanket age relaxation not defeat the intent of the law, and defeat Rule 12(1) of the Rules? (iv) Whether the Notification, granting 15 years age relaxation conforms with the law? (v) Whether the interest of the people of the province is served when age is relaxed, who may only then have the benefit of the selected candidates service for less than 15 years, since the retiring age is 60 years? (vi) Whether age should be relaxed when there is high unemployment and qualified candidates are available? (vii) What is a stipendiary candidate? (viii) The advertisement issued by the Commission stipulated selection of Assistant Conservator of Forests possessing certain educational qualification, and did not mention stipendiary candidates, therefore, why are stipendiary candidates to be selected? (ix) Why, after the publication of advertisement arbitrarily changes were made, and if so why fresh publication was not made?-Case was adjourned with directions to concerned officials and departments to file their concise statements with regard to the questions raised above.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sind Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974=12(1),12(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 231 and 183-K of 2022 and 827 of 2023, decided on 27th November, 2023.heard on: 27th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Aqil Awan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (through Video Link, Karachi) for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 231 of 2022).\nGhulam Sarwar Baloch, Advocate Supreme Court (through Video Link, Karachi) for Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 (in C.P. No. 231 of 2022).\nMiran Muhammad Shah, Additional A.G. (through Video Link, Karachi) for Respondent No. 6 (in C.P. No. 231 of 2022).\nSyed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 16 (in C.P. No. 231 of 2022).\nMiran Muhammad Shah, Additional A.G. and Dr. Abdul Jabbar Kazi, Additional Secretary, Forest and Wildlife (through Video Link, Karachi) for Petitioners (in C.P. 83-K of 2022).\nRespondent No. 7 in person (through Video Link, Karachi) (in C.P. 83-K of 2022).\nSyed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 13 (in C.P. 83-K of 2022).\nSyed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.P. 827 of 2023).\nNemo for Respondents (in C.P. 827 of 2023).", - "Petitioner Name:": "AYAZ and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nSTAFA SAEED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23982", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 49 = 2024 SLD 49 = 2024 SCMR 105", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)-\n-Ss. 2(d) & 13-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Sale-Scope-Transaction in the nature of a gift not a sale-Right of pre-emption arises when the sale of land occurs-Sale, as per the definition provided in section 2(d) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987, does not include a gift-In the present case, the land was first sold to M , and before this sale could be pre-empted by the respondent (pre-emptor), it was further transferred to Ms sons (present appellants) by way of gift mutation-Person is entitled to evade law of pre-emption by all lawful and legitimate devices, like gift, exchange etc.-So, in the given circumstances of the case, respondent (pre-emptor) could not ignore the gift mutation while making his demand-Appropriate course for him was to say, firstly, that the second transaction was a sale (dubbed as a gift), meant to defeat his right of pre-emption; and secondly, that he had made all the requirements of Talbs regarding the second transaction-On the contrary, a perusal of the contents of the plaint showed that neither any Talb was made to pre-empt the second transaction nor any notice of Talb-i-ishhad was sent to the present appellants, which was fatal for his case-Appeal was allowed, and order of Revisional Court, whereby it rejected the plaint of the respondent, was restored.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, (X of 1987)=2(d),13", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 271 of 2015, decided on 20th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 11.09.2014 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench in W.P. No. 326-B of 2013)heard on: 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shah Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nSyed Mastan Ali Shah Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mahmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.\nEx parte Respondents Nos. 2 - 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMIR WAHEED SHAH and others-Appellants\nVersus\nAJMAL KHAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23983", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 50 = 2024 SLD 50 = 2024 SCMR 107", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYy8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XLI, Rr. 1, 3 & 9-Appeal from original decree-Examination of memo of appeal and supporting documents-Jurisdiction, question of-Duty of Court and its staff-Scope-Order XLI, Rules 1, 3 & 9 of C.P.C. emphasize the onerous duty of the Court, including the Officer of the Appellate Court or any staff member of the Court (clerk of court/ chief ministerial officer) who has been authorized and assigned the task to accept the presentation of the memo of appeal before admission to diligently examine the memo of appeal, and judgment and decree, including all supporting documents, to ensure that everything is in order, and, if there is any doubt in the mind of the concerned Court clerk/official with regard to jurisdiction, they should raise the objection(s) and bring it to the attention of the Court to resolve it; and if the Court concludes at the time of admission that the appeal has been filed at the wrong forum, whether due to lack of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, or some other ancillary or incidental reasons, the memo of appeal should be promptly returned to the appellant to elect the right remedy and forum to avoid rendering the decision of the Court coram non judice at the end of the day.\n(b) Jurisdiction-\n-Principle-Parties cannot, by mutual consent, take away the jurisdiction vested in any Court of law, nor can they confer jurisdiction to any Court not vested in it by law.\n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XLI, Rr. 1, 3 & 9-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3 & 5-Choosing or opting the wrong forum to present an appeal-Duty of Court and its staff-Scope-Without a doubt, it is the responsibility of the appellant and, more importantly, of their counsel, being a legal expert, to oversee and ensure after due diligence that the appeal is being preferred before the right forum without any deficiency or oversight of jurisdiction and advise the client accordingly, but at the same time, it is also the bilateral and collaborative responsibility of the concerned Court staff not to sit as a silent spectator, but to also examine the memo of appeal diligently and conscientiously at the time of its first -presentation in the Court i.e. before the stage of admission and raise objections immediately in writing, if any, with regard to jurisdiction and then invite the attention of the Court so that if the Court, after a preliminary hearing of the advocate or appellant, deems it fit to return the memo of appeal for presentation before the competent Court, the exercise should be done immediately rather than devastating or wrecking the residual period of limitation to approach the right forum-In the present case as far as the defect of choosing or opting the wrong forum to present the appeals was concerned, the circumstances reveal that the petitioner was not solely responsible, rather it was due to the inadvertence of the Appellate Courts staff that the question of pecuniary jurisdiction was not highlighted at the very initial stage in order to cure the defect within the period of limitation allowed for filing the appeals-Appellate Court at the final stage of the case when the appeals had, in all respects, ripened for hearing and its logical finale, returned the memos of appeal on its own motion, after a considerable period, for presentation in the High Court and consigned the files to the record room-High Court was required to consider the fault committed by the Appellate Court on account of which the petitioner had been made to suffer and whether the benefit of the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit should be extended or not, and whether the petitioner had made out the case for condonation with sufficient cause or failed to make out a case in terms of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908-Petitioner had been pursuing the matter diligently and his application for condonation of delay was dismissed without any convincing justification-Petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals and allowed, impugned judgment was set-aside and the matter was remanded back to the High Court.\nKhushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 ref.\n(d) Administration of justice-\n-No injury or prejudice should be caused to anyone by any fault, act or omission of the Court.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,3,9", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1877-L and 1878-L of 2016, decided on 26th September, 2023.\n(Against the Judgments dated 09.02.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in R.F.A. No. 459 and R.F.A. No. 460 of 2011)heard on: 26th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Kausar Iqbal Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMian Shahid Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAQIR MUHAMMAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nKHURSHEED BIBI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23984", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 51 = 2024 SLD 51 = 2024 SCMR 117 = 2024 PTD 221 = (2024) 129 TAX 171", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYys", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Jurisdiction of Islamabad High Court in Constitutional Petitions under Article 199\nDetails:\nThe petitioner-company executed cementation works for the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) and paid sales tax on services under applicable provincial laws. The company filed a constitutional petition before the Islamabad High Court, claiming that OGDCL was liable to reimburse the sales tax paid under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011; Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013; and Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015. The petition was based on the premise that the petitioner’s registered office and contract execution occurred in Islamabad. The High Court entertained the petition.\nIssues Raised:\n1.\nWhether the Islamabad High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution when the work was carried out outside Islamabad.\n2.\nWhether the High Courts jurisdiction can be invoked for disputes involving technical and complex contracts or when alternate remedies are available.\nHeld:\n1.\nLack of Jurisdiction:\no\nThe petitioner did not perform any work in the Islamabad Capital Territory, and no federal law was in question that would necessitate the jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court.\no\nJurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked when adequate alternate remedies, such as arbitration clauses or filing a civil suit, are available.\n2.\nLimits of High Court’s Jurisdiction:\no\nHigh Courts do not interpret technical and complex contracts in their constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, nor do they adjudicate on disputed facts requiring evidentiary examination.\n3.\nJurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Agreement:\no\nParties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court if it otherwise lacks jurisdiction by law.\nConclusion:\nThe Islamabad High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the constitutional petition. The petition was declared non-maintainable, and the petitioner was directed to seek alternate remedies. The Supreme Court disposed of the petition for leave to appeal accordingly.\nCitations:\n1.\nFederal Government Employees Housing Foundation v. Muhammad Akram Alizai, PLD 2002 SC 1079.\n2.\nPetrosin Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Oil and Gas Company Ltd., 2007 Corporate Law Decisions 578.\n3.\nNasiruddin Ghori v. Federation of Pakistan, 2010 Pakistan Labour Cases 323.\n4.\nEden Builders Pvt. Ltd. Lahore v. Muhammad Aslam, 2022 SCMR 2044.\nPrinciples Highlighted:\n•\nHigh Court’s Jurisdiction under Article 199: Cannot be invoked for technical contract disputes or when alternate legal remedies are available.\n•\nNon-Conferment of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement when a court lacks jurisdiction by law.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.740 of 2021, decided on 20th October, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 21.01.2021 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.C.A. No.115 of 2019)heard on: 20th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ahmad Qayyum, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nKhurram Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs SPRINT OIL AND GAS SERVICES PAKISTAN FZC, ISLAMABAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nOIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (OGDCL), ISLAMABAD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23985", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 52 = 2024 SLD 52 = 2024 SCMR 122", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzk", - "Key Words:": "Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act (XI of 2016)-\n-Ss. 16 & 17-Allegation of theft of natural gas by tampering of gas meter-Procedure for dealing with theft of gas-Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) approved the Procedure for Dealing with theft of Gas in 2005 (the Procedure) and conveyed the same to its licensees, including the petitioner (gas supply company), for dealing with cases of gas theft-For purposes of present case, Clause (F) of the said Procedure, which is germane to the Assessment of Value of Gas Stolen and Recovery: Meter Tampering Cases , is quite relevant and provides that when any consumer is established to be involved in gas theft either by way of tampering with the meter or instruments installed/mounted on or along the meter (i.e. volume corrector, or pressure-temperature recorder), or any act mentioned in clauses A , C or G , the volume of gas stolen by consumer shall be assessed while taking into consideration certain factors-In the Procedure, one of the paramount factors required to be examined was the connected load based on appliances actually installed and required taking the load of each in comparison to the predetermined load of each appliance which was to be assessed by a three member committee comprising one representative each from Engineering, Sales and Billing Sections-However, in the present case no inventory of the appliances was produced/prepared by the Raiding Team-Neither it was established in evidence by the petitioners department that the Procedure was followed in letter in spirit before fixing the liability of dues, nor it was pleaded that the liability was assessed vis-a-vis the actual load after physical examination and verification of all appliances and equipment installed or in use at the respondents premises-Merely submitting the calculation sheet of the dues on account of alleged pilferage was not sufficient-Question as to whether the liability was assessed according to the sanctioned load or not was to be proved in the Trial Court and a calculation sheet could not be considered as the gospel truth unless the raiding team ascertained the actual load and consumption according to the appliances and equipment being used by the subscriber and confronted the subscriber or their representative at the time of raid in the case of theft of gas or tampered meter-Gas consumption bill challenged by the respondent in his suit was rightly set-aside-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, (XI of 2016)=16,17", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3598 of 2020, decided on 20th September, 2023.\n(Against the Order dated 16.11.2020 passed by Islamabad Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in F.A.O. No.162 of 2019)\nheard on: 20th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Zubair Hussain Jarral, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMalik M. Taimur Naseem, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LIMITED, through General Manager, Rawalpindi-Petitioner\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD ARSHAD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23986", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 53 = 2024 SLD 53 = 2024 SLD 128", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTYzg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-There was no deliberate delay in reporting the matter to the police-Passage of time between the occurrence was sufficiently explained as the victim was injured and taken to the hospital where he succumbed to his injuries-Ocular account of three eyewitnesses remained consistent throughout and confidence inspiring on each and every material point-There was no prior enmity between the parties and the medical evidence fully corroborated the ocular account-There was sufficient and adequate incriminating evidence on the record against the accused and the conviction was rightly upheld by the High Court-Jail petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 6-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Motive not proved-Recovery of crime weapon inconsequential-Quantum of sentence may be reduced from death penalty to imprisonment for life if the prosecution fails to establish motive-This principle is in conformity with Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)-In the absence of premeditation to commit murder where motive is not proved by the prosecution, the same may be considered as a mitigating factor in order to reduce the quantum of sentence in cases involving capital punishment-In the present case the High Court had correctly concluded that the motive was not proved by the prosecution and the recovery of the crime weapon was inconsequential-As such the respondent (convict) was entitled to the benefit of reduction of sentence and the High Court rightly altered his death sentence to imprisonment for life-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n2011 SCMR 593; Iftikhar Mehmood and another v. Qaiser Iftikhar and others 2011 SCMR 1165; 2012 SCMR 267; 2014 SCMR 1464; 2014 SCMR 1658; 2017 SCMR 148; 2017 SCMR 2041; 2017 SCMR 2048; 2018 SCMR 21; 2018 SCMR 149; 2018 SCMR 911; 2022 SCMR 1608 and Zeeshan Afzal alias Shani and another v. The State and another 2013 SCMR 1602 ref.\nKhawar Mahmood Khatana, Advocate Supreme Court (also for the Complainant in J.P. No. 337 of 2018) (via video link from Lahore) for Petitioner (in Criminal Petition No. 476-L of 2018).", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.476-L of 2018 and Jail Petition No.337 of 2018, decided on 1st November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 30.03.2018 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Criminal A. No.1274/2015 and M.R. No.270 of 2015)heard on: 1st November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Nazir Ahmad Kamboh, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in J.P. No. 337 of 2018).\nM. Irfan Zia, D.P.G., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YASIN and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23987", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 54 = 2024 SLD 54 = 2024 SCC 136", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTY3o", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 145-Dispute concerning land likely to cause breach of peace-Proceedings under section 145, Cr.P.C- Nature- Nature of proceedings under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. are more in the nature of an executive function because the right of ownership nor that of possession is adjudicated-Exercise of the powers are subject to fulfilment of the jurisdictional pre-conditions, particularly the satisfaction of the Magistrate that the dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace.\nMuhammad Ishaque Chowdhury and another v. Nur Mahal Begum and others PLD 1961 SC 426; Muhammad Boota and 12 others v. Ch. Faiz Muhammad and 8 others 1970 SCMR 592; Haji Muhammad Akram and others v. Mir Baz and others 1973 SCMR 236; Shera and others v. Mst. Fatima and another 1971 SCMR 449; Shah Muhammad v. Haq Nawaz and another PLD 1970 SC 470; Mirza Abdul Razzaq v. Barkat Ali and others 1985 SCMR 1235; Yar Muhammad and others v. Gul Muhammad 1985 SCMR 1609; Malik Manzoor Elahi v. Lala Bishambar Dass PLD 1964 SC 137; Mehr Muhammad Sarwar and others v. The State and 2 others PLD 1985 SC 240; Muhammad Shafique and others v. Abdul Hayee and others 1987 SCMR 1371; Ganga Bux Singh v. Sukhdin AIR 1959 ALL. 141 and Mukhtar Ahmad and others v. Haji Muhammad Saleem and another 2013 SCMR 357 ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 145 & 107-Dispute concerning land likely to cause breach of peace-Proceedings under section 145, Cr.P.C-Object and purpose of such proceedings stated.\nThe main object and purpose of the powers vested under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. is to prevent a likely breach of the peace and to maintain the status quo. The parties are provided an opportunity to resolve the dispute regarding the title or right of possession before a competent forum. The most crucial factor for undertaking the proceedings is the likelihood of breach of the peace because of the dispute. The dispute must be in respect of land or water or boundaries thereof and the subject matter must be situated within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate who has to exercise the powers. The existence of these factors is a prerequisite for making a preliminary order under subsection (1) of section 145 of the Cr.P.C. and the grounds required to be stated in the order must justify the satisfaction of the Magistrate. The mere existence of a dispute is not sufficient to put the powers in motion. There must be sufficient material giving rise to an imminent danger or a breach of the peace. In the absence of such an apprehension of a breach of the peace the exercise of the power would not be lawful. Moreover, the exercise of powers under section 145 will not be justified if the factor of breach of the peace can be prevented by resorting to powers vested under section 107 of the Cr.P.C. While conducting an inquiry under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate does not have the power or jurisdiction to decide either the question of title of property or the lawfulness of the possession. It merely empowers the Magistrate to regulate the possession of the property in dispute temporality in order to avert an apprehension of breach of the peace. The attachment of the property under the second proviso of section 145(4) is subject to the satisfaction of the Magistrate that a case of emergency has been made out. The Magistrate, while exercising powers under section 145 of the Cr.P.C, is merely required to declare which one of the parties is entitled to remain in possession because the proceedings do not empower undertaking an inquiry relating to ownership or the right to possess.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 145 [as amended by section 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Balochistan Amendment) Act (XV of 2010)]-Dispute concerning land likely to cause breach of peace-Proceedings under section 145, Cr.P.C-Judicial Magistrate, jurisdiction of-Section 145 of the Cr.P.C was amended through the Code of Criminal Procedure (Balochistan Amendment) Act, 2010 with effect from 10.12.2010 and the expression District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate or an Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the Provincial Government in this behalf was inserted by substituting the omitted expression-Judicial Magistrate in the present case was, therefore, bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and to exercise the powers under section 145 of the Cr.P.C.-Notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction, the Judicial Magistrate also did not appreciate that the jurisdictional requirements were not in existence-Respondent, according to his own stance, was not in possession, rather it was handed over to the last tenant-Dispute was not likely to cause a breach of the peace and the respondent, in his complaint, had vaguely made a reference to it without disclosing any justification relating thereto-Protracted proceedings also established that the vague assertion of breach of the peace was merely an attempt to meet the requirement expressly provided under section 145 of the Cr.P.C.-Judicial Magistrate, despite having no jurisdiction to exercise the powers, had virtually adjudicated the title of the property and the right relating to possession in favour of the respondent-Powers exercised in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand were without lawful authority and jurisdiction-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set-aside.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=145,107", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 116 of 2020, decided on 7th December, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 19.11.2019 of the High Court of Baluchistan, Quetta passed in Constitution Petition No.317 of 2019)heard on: 16th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nAbdul Hadi Tareen, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMINULLAH and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nSyed Haji MUHAMMAD AYUB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23988", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 55 = 2024 SLD 55 = 2024 SCMR 142", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTY3k", - "Key Words:": "(a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)-\n-S. 10-Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962), S. 2-Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5 & Sched.-Dower (Mehr), recovery of-Failure of husband to pay dower (mehr)-Compensatory costs imposed on husband-Trial Court directed the husband/petitioner to pay to the wife/respondent the mehr (of Rs. 500,000/- mentioned in the Nikahnama) and maintenance with annual increase of ten percent-Validity-Mehr has to be paid whenever demanded by the wife-Mehr can be demanded during the subsistence of the marriage, and the husband is under an obligation to pay it-In the present case the husband/petitioner had two wives, but he did not fulfil his obligations towards one of them(i.e. respondent) when he failed to pay the mehr demanded by her-Wife had to file a suit for recovery of the mehr and maintenance, and the husband unnecessarily involved the wife in litigation, which reached the Supreme Court after six and half years-Such kind of frivolous litigation was paralysing the judicial system of the country-Husband took up an untenable defence, and perpetuated it probably because costs were not imposed upon him and the courts did not insist that the decision of the Family Court should first be complied with before entertaining a challenge to it-Imposing sufficient costs may have had the salutary effect to make the husband act reasonably-Courts should not hesitate in imposing costs, and compensatory costs too when required-Counsel for the husband stated that the mehr (dower) would be paid to the wife through bankers cheque/pay order/demand draft or will be deposited in the Family Court within one month-Supreme Court directed that in addition to imposing costs throughout it was imposing compensatory costs to the extent of one hundred thousand rupees on the husband considering the decrease in the value of money, and that if the mehr and the said costs were not paid the Family Court shall execute present order, which may include attachment of the properties of the husband-Leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed.\nHoly Quran, (An-Nisa (4) verse 4; Al-Baqrah (2) verses 236-7 and Syed Muhammad v. Mst. Zeenat PLD 2001 SC 128 ref.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-If a decision is challenged (before a higher forum) it does not mean that it becomes ineffective, and need not be complied with.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961=10Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962=2Family Courts Act, 1964=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2734-L of 2023, decided on 20th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 24 May 2023 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No.5278 of 2021)\nheard on: 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Zulfiqar Ali Hagran, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHALID PERVAIZ-Petitioner\nVersus\nSAMINA and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23989", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 56 = 2024 SLD 56 = 2024 SCMR 211", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTc", - "Key Words:": "Balochistan Service Tribunals Act (V of 1974)-\n-S. 5(1)- Service Tribunal, powers of- Scope- Pro forma promotion-Tribunal directed the Provincial Government to create a new post and grant pro forma promotion to a civil servant against such post-Legality-Creation of a new post for the purpose of pro forma promotion is a policy decision and the Service Tribunal(s) cannot exercise such executive authority.\nCreation of a post is a policy decision, based upon the requirements of a department and involves economic factors, which is the sole discretion and executive authority to be exercised by the Government alone. The Tribunal cannot assign to itself such executive function, nor can it grant relief not provided under the law.\n2023 SCMR 803; (2008) 1 SCC 683 ref.\nEven otherwise, promotion of an officer in selection grades is based upon the principle of fitness-cum-seniority, which depends upon multiple factors, as per the service rules based upon the service record of the incumbent. These factors can only be determined by the Board and upon its recommendations, it is the prerogative of the Government to agree or disagree with such recommendations. However, in case of disagreement, reasons must be assigned by the competent authority. Consequently, directing the Government to create a new post and grant pro forma promotion to a civil servant amounts to exercise of power in excess of the Tribunals authority, which is without jurisdiction.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974=5(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 40-Q of 2018, decided on 26th July, 2023.\n(On appeal from the judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal, Quetta dated 25.02.2015 passed in S.A. No. 394 of 2013)heard on: 26th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Amin-ud-Din Khan and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ali Rakhsahani, Additional A.G. and Gohar Yaqoob Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nRespondents ex parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN and others-Appellants\nVersus\nMASOOD AHMED and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23990", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 57 = 2024 SLD 57 = 2024 SCMR 150", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTY", - "Key Words:": "Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)-\n-S. 54-Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 11-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 17(2)(a) & 79-Sale transactions-Proof-Contract with a minor void-Appellants/petitioners claimed that the land in question was purchased by them from the respondents on 02.09.1986 against a sale consideration of Rs.2,45,000/- and since the respondents were reluctant to transfer the same, thus a contract of sale was executed vide the impugned mutation-Validity-Respondent while recording his statement before the trial Court had mentioned his age as 45 years, which indicated that at the time of purchase of land in the year 1986, he was fourteen years of age-Similarly, the other respondent was also a minor in 1986, therefore alleged sale of the land in question in such behalf was void in terms of section 11 of the Contract Act, 1872-Furthermore in 1986, the actual owner of the suit land was predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, but neither any documentary proof of such sale was adduced in evidence nor any witness of the sale transaction was produced during the case proceedings, thus question was as to how could the appellants/petitioners purchase the suit land from the respondents in the year 1986-Appellants/petitioners also failed to prove execution of the impugned mutation by summoning two attesting witnesses i.e. Assistant Collector and the Patwari as per Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-High Court had rightly declared that the respondents were the owners of the suit land, and that the impugned mutation and contract of sale were void-Appeal and petition were dismissed accordingly.\nAbdul Rasheed through L.Rs. and others v. Manzoor Ahmed and others PLD 2007 SC 287 and Muhammad Muneer v. Mst. Feezan PLD 2021 SC 538 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882=54Contract, Act, 1872=11Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=17(2)(a),79", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.17-Q, Civil Petition No.257-Q of 2023 and C.M.A. No.230-Q of 2023, decided on 10th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 20.06.2023 of the High Court of Balochistan, Sibi Bench passed in Civil Revisions Nos.85 and 86 of 2021)heard on: 10th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jahan Zeb Khan Jadoon, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant/Petitioners (in both cases).\nAbdul Sattar Kakar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 - 5 (in both cases).\nMuhammad Zareef, Naib Tehsildar and Shaukat Ali, Patwari for Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NOORULLAH and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nGHULAM MURTAZA and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23991", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 58 = 2024 SLD 58 = 2024 SCMR 154", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTU", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n-S. 135-Partitioning of land-Non-compliance of orders of the Board of Revenue and High Court by revenue officials-Rule of law, undermining of-Respondents had submitted an application under section 135 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 seeking partitioning of certain lands-Application was objected to by the petitioners, however the matter was disposed of by the Member, Board of Revenue with consent of the parties-Subsequently, the petitioners assailed the consent order by filing a writ petition before the High Court, which reproduced the earlier consent and dismissed the writ petition and held that, the petition at the face of it is not only frivolous but vexatious and is dismissed in limine with costs of Rs.50,000/-, which shall be deposited with the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court within thirty days, failing which the same shall be recovered from the petitioners as arrears of land revenue in accordance with law-Held, that to date said costs were neither paid nor recovered-Petitioners had challenged a consent order, which was upheld by the High Court-Respondents had submitted a simple application for partition, which they were entitled under the law, but which for no discernable reason has been resisted by the petitioners-This has resulted in unnecessary litigation and wastage of time-Petitioners, it seems, want to procrastinate matters and by acting most unreasonably have managed to stretch out a simple matter for almost 14 years-Fact that revenue authorities have still not attended to the respondents application and have disregarded the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, indicates the influence the petitioners wield, including over the revenue officers of the area, who have also paid no heed to the order of the Judge of the High Court; they also did not bother to recover the amount of fifty thousand rupees that they had been directed to do in the impugned judgment-Such disobedience and disdain by the revenue officers who are paid out of the public exchequer undermines the rule of law-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs in the sum of one million rupees with the directions that such costs are in addition to the costs imposed by the Judge of the High Court; that the costs shall be deposited with the concerned revenue officer and shall be equally distributed/paid to the respondents, and if not deposited within 30 days, shall be recovered as areas of land revenue from the petitioners, and the concerned revenue officers shall implement the order of the Member, Board of Revenue in accordance with the law.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967=135", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 946 of 2022, decided on 13th November, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 21.12.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Writ Petition No.1325 of 2016)\nheard on: 13th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Amjad Raza Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court with Syed Zeeshan Haider, son of the Petitioner No. 1 for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed GHAZANFAR ALI SHAH-Petitioner\nVersus\nHASSAN BOKHARI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23992", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 59 = 2024 SLD 59 = 2024 SLD", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Ocular account doubtful-Co-accused with similar role acquitted on the same set of evidence-Recovery of weapon inconsequential-Motive not established-Parties were known to each other, therefore, not mentioning the name of the co-accused in the crime report shifted the burden on the shoulder of the prosecution to assign justiciable reasons for non-identification of the co-accused at the time of occurrence, especially when it is an admitted fact that the accused and co-accused did not commit the crime with covered faces-Although the complainant challenged the acquittal of co-accused before the High Court by filing a petition against acquittal but later on withdrew the same, which means that the findings of the Trial Court regarding the acquittal attained finality and the prosecution case to the extent of murder of one of the deceased had been disbelieved-In these circumstances, more caution was needed to decide the case of the accused-During the course of proceedings before the Trial Court, an attested copy of attendance register was placed on record, which showed that on the day of occurrence the complainant was present in his office, which was at a distance of 100 kilometers from the place of occurrence-According to the witnesses, the accused fired at the deceased from a distance of 3/4 karams but the medical record shows that there was blackening and charring around the wounds, which suggested that the injuries were caused from a close range, which further negated the ocular account-There were only two eye-witnesses of the occurrence, who admittedly, had been disbelieved to the extent of the acquitted co-accused, who was alleged to have played a similar role in the occurrence, then the same evidence could not be relied upon to convict the accused on capital punishment unless there was an independent corroboration and some strong incriminating evidence to the extent of his involvement in commission of the offence but the same was lacking in the instant case-Recovery of weapon from the accused was inconsequential because admittedly no crime empty was collected from the place of occurrence-Motive had also rightly been disbelieved by the High Court by holding that it was a vaguely formulated motive and no evidence in support of the same has been placed on record-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was acquitted of the charge by extending him the benefit of doubt.\nNiaz v. The State PLD 1960 SC 387 and Nazir v. The State PLD 1962 SC 269 ref.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Scope-For the accused to be afforded the right of benefit of doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating uncertainty, and if there is only one doubt, the benefit of the same must go to the accused.\nMst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 and Abdul Jabbar v. State 2019 SCMR 129 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 1710-L and 1329 of 2017, decided on 12th October, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 14.11.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Murder Reference No. 414/2014 and Criminal Appeal No. 2278 of 2014)heard on: 12th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Cr. P. 1710-L of 2017).\nAftab Ahmed Bajwa, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mahmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in Cr. P. 1329 of 2017).\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAQSOOD ALAM and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23993", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 60 = 2024 SLD 60 = 2024 SCMR 164", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-S. 2(xxxiii)- Worker and workman-Proof and burden of proof-In order to adjudicate whether a person is performing his duties as a workman or worker, or Manager, Officer and/or duties of supervisory nature, the pith and substance of the adjudication predominantly depends on the nature of duties and not on the basis of the nomenclature of the post-In order to thrash out this controversy, the appropriate appraisal for assistance can be made by dint of oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties in the court of first instance-In case the employee asserts that he was performing duties as workman and such contentions are opposed by the management, then in such eventuality the burden of proof lies upon the employee to substantiate that he was in fact performing the duties of a workman and the mere nomenclature of the post does not affect his status of employment as worker or workman.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Appeal, right of-Scope-Right of appeal is a right of entering into a superior court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the forum below-It is essentially a continuation of the original proceedings as a vested right of the litigant to avail the remedy of an appeal provided for appraisal and testing the soundness of the decisions and proceedings of the courts below-Right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Concurrent findings of fact by fora below-If the concurrent findings recorded by the lower fora are found to be in violation of law or based on flagrant and obvious defect floating on the surface of record, then it cannot be treated as being so sacrosanct or sanctified that it cannot be reversed by the High Court in the Constitutional jurisdiction vested in it by Article 199 of the Constitution-As a corrective measure in order to satisfy and reassure whether the impugned decision is within the law or not and if it suffers from jurisdictional defect, the High Court without being impressed or influenced by the fact that the matter reached it under Constitutional jurisdiction in pursuit of the concurrent findings recorded below, can cure and rectify the defect.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Act, 2012=2(xxxiii)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2997 of 2021, decided on 6th October, 2023.\n(Against the Judgment dated 24.03.2021 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in W.P. No.3312 of 2020)\nheard on: 6th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Umer Abdullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nFaridullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UNITED BANK LIMITED (UBL) through its President and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nJAMIL AHMED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23994", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 61 = 2024 SLD 61 = 2024 SCMR 168", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)-\n-S. 54-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12-Agreement to sell immoveable property-Balance sale consideration-Vendor refusing to receive pay orders of balance sale consideration on the basis that the same were not issued through the personal account of the vendee-Validity-Agreement to sell between the parties did not contain any condition requiring the remaining sale consideration to be paid from personal bank account of vendee (plaintiff)-Vendor and his attorney (defendants) never raised any objection when they received pay orders for earnest money and additional earnest money issued through bank accounts which were not in the name of the vendee-In order to avoid the specific performance of the agreements, the defendants had taken an afterthought plea that had not been impliedly or expressly mentioned in the initial agreement to sell and/or extended agreement-Vendee had already paid/deposited the balance sale consideration in the trial Court-Another aspect of the matter was that the defendants had failed to obtain NOC for the transfer of the subject property by the cut off date mentioned in the initial and the extended agreements and had utilized the earnest money paid to them by the vendee and got interest on that amount from the bank, hence caused huge loss to the vendee and correspondingly got profit/mark up on the advance money from the bank-Defendants failed to produce in evidence any document, which could establish that vendee purchased the subject property for investment or re-sale purposes, or that any fraud or misrepresentation was played by the vendee-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell and the extended agreement was rightly decreed by the trial Court-Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was declined.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12-Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 54-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell immoveable property-Bona fides of vendee-Balance sale consideration deposited in Court-Where the vendor refuses to accept the sale consideration amount, the vendee seeking a specific performance of the agreement to sell is essentially required to deposit the amount in the Court-Vendee has to demonstrate that he has been at all relevant times ready and willing to pay the amount and to show the availability of the amount with him-Vendee cannot seek enforcement of reciprocal obligation of the vendor unless he is able to demonstrate not only his willingness but also his capability to fulfil his obligations under the contract.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882=54Specific Relief Act, 1877=12", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 5632 of 2021, decided on 16th November, 2023.\n(Against judgment dated 22.09.2021, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Regular First Appeal No.324 of 2020)\nheard on: 16th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hassan Raza Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MASOOD AHMAD BHATTI and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nKHAN BADSHAH and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23995", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 62 = 2024 SLD 62 = 2024 SCMR 178", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTk", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 42 & 39-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 115 & 129(g)-Suit for declaration and cancellation of sale mutations-Fraud-Sale of land-Proof and burden of proof-Petitioners claimed that the respondent-lady had allegedly sold the suit land to them-Respondent denied selling her land pursuant to the sale mutations or otherwise, and also denied receipt of sale consideration-Counsel for respondent contended that the burden to establish the sale lay upon the beneficiaries of the sale, i.e., the petitioners in terms of Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984; that respondent was not aware of the sale mutations and upon coming to learn of them filed the suit well within the period prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1908; that the respondents lands were being looked after by her maternal uncle (petitioner No. 7), and as such she was in constructive possession thereof, which fact is further confirmed as she did not claim mesne profits in her suit; that only one of the beneficiaries of the purported sale came forward to testify, that is petitioner No. 2, who admittedly was a child at the time of the sale and as such could not have testified regarding facts thereof; that his father (petitioner No. 1) also testified but stated that the sale consideration was paid by his wife, who did not come forward to testify, and in not doing so an adverse presumption, in terms of Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, would be drawn that if she had testified it would be that she had not paid the sale consideration-Validity-Contentions of the counsel representing the respondent were correct-Furthermore, burden to establish the sales and the sale mutations, lay upon the beneficiaries thereof, i.e. the petitioners, but they failed to discharge it, and when the same was not discharged it may be stated to constitute fraud-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and the revenue authorities of the area were directed to immediately ensure delivery of subject lands exclusive possession to the respondent, as she was deprived of her land.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,39Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=115,129(g)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3030 of 2021, decided on 26th October, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.03.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Civil Revision No. 288-D of 2020)heard on: 26th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahzeb Masud, Advocate Supreme Court and M. Anis Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Yasin Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEHMOOD KHAN and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nSARA AKHTAR-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23996", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 63 = 2024 SLD 63 = 2024 SCMR 181", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)-\n-S. 21-Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S. 4-Police Rules, 1934, R. 12.21-Police official-Order of discharge from service under Rule 12.21 of Police Rules, 1934-Departmental appeal-Whether a departmental appeal could be filed against the order of discharge from service under Rule 12.21 of Police Rules, 1934-After the petitioner was discharged from service under the Rule 12.21, he filed a departmental appeal, which was rejected being not maintainable under said Rule-Petitioner filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal, which was dismissed on the point of limitation-Entire emphasis of the Tribunal was on the fact that, instead of filing a service appeal before the Tribunal, the petitioner filed a departmental appeal before the DIG of Police, which was not appealable before the department in terms of Rule 12.21-Validity-Although no right of appeal against the ,discharge from service is provided under Rule 12.21 of the Police Rules, 1934 but at the same time, one cannot ignore the niceties of section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 wherein it is clearly spelled out that if no provision for appeal or review exists, a civil servant aggrieved by any such order may make a representation to the authority next above the authority which made the order-Likewise, the nitty-gritties of Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 explicate that where an appeal, review or representation to a departmental authority is provided under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, or any rules, against any such order no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal unless the aggrieved civil servant has preferred an appeal of application for review or representation to such departmental authority-In the present case the petitioner filed the departmental appeal and was only non-suited on the ground that no appeal lies against the discharge, but the departmental authority failed to consider that against the order of discharge, representation was maintainable-Departmental Authority should have seen the pith and substance of the grievance lodged by the petitioner rather than focusing solely on the nomenclature of the representation-Both the departmental authority and the Tribunal failed to take into account that if a right of appeal or review was not provided in Rule 12.21 then, in unison, it does not debar or prohibit the civil servant from electing the remedy of filing a representation as of right, which could not be turned down on hyper-technical grounds but should have been decided on merits, rather than rejecting it being non-maintainable as an appeal instead of representation-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed; the impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remanded to the appellate authority (department) where petitioners appeal shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be treated as a representation under section 21(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, and the same shall be decided strictly in accordance with law after due notice to the parties.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Incorrect provision of law cited-Even mentioning an incorrect provision of law does not debar or relieve the competent authority from examining the case according to the remedy provided under the law to an aggrieved civil servant.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Maxim ex debito justitiae-Meaning and scope-Legal maxim ex debito justitiae means as a matter of right or what a person is entitled to as of right-This maxim applies to the remedies that the court is bound to give when they are claimed as distinct from those that it has discretion to grant-Power of a courts to act ex debito justitiae is an inherent power of courts to fix procedural errors.\n(d) Public functionary-\n-Public functionaries are supposed to execute and perform their duty in good faith, honestly and within the precincts of their legally recognized powers so that the person concerned may be treated in accordance with law.\n(e) Civil service-\n-Natural justice, principles of-Right of accused to be heard-Rational and impartial decision making-Principles of natural justice require that the delinquent should be afforded a fair opportunity to converge, explain and contest the claims against him before he is found guilty and condemned-Principles of natural justice and fair-mindedness are grounded in the philosophy of affording a right of audience before any detrimental action is taken, in tandem with its ensuing constituent that the foundation of any adjudication or order of a quasi-judicial authority, statutory body or any departmental authority regulated under some law must be rational and impartial and the decision maker has an adequate amount of decision making independence and the reasons of the decision arrived at should be amply well-defined, just, right and understandable.\nTariq Aziz-ud-Din, Human Rights Cases Nos. 8340, 9504-G, 13936-G, 13635-P and 14306-G to 14309-G of 2009 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1130; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101 and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 1997(7) SCC 622 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 =21Punjab Service Tribunals Act, (IX of 1974)=4Police Rules, 1934=12,21", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3186 of 2020, decided on 5th October, 2023.\n(Against the Order dated 07.10.2020 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 1641 of 2020)heard on: 5th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mahmood Ahmad Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court (Through video link from Lahore) and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nSanaullah Zahid, Additional A.G., Punjab and Syed Intikhab Hussain, DSP for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JUNAID WAZIR-Petitioner\nVersus\nSUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, PRU/ DOLPHIN POLICE, LAHORE- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23997", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 64 = 2024 SLD 64 = 2024 SCMR 188", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWXo", - "Key Words:": "Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973-\n-R. 20A-Deputation-Duration of term-Principles relating to duration of term of a deputationist stated.\nDeputation within a government department holds a significant role, necessitating recruitment under exceptional circumstances when there is a lack of expertise within the department in the relevant subject or field. In such situations, the prescribed procedure outlined in Rule 20-A of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1973, must be adhered to. However, it is imperative to emphasize that deputation should not entail an indefinite period of service but should conform to the specified duration for the deputation. The normal period of deputation is three years and the concerned officer has to report back after completion of his three years period unless it has been extended to further two years and the maximum period is five years in terms of Serial No.27 (iv) of ESTA Code Volume-I (Civil Establishment Code), whereby both the borrowing and lending organization should ensure immediate repatriation of the deputationist. Furthermore, the period of deputation has to be defined specifically and after expiry of the said period, the officer should automatically be relieved from his office duties, unless his period has been extended.\nA deputationist in the absence of any specific provision of law can not ask to serve the total period of deputation and he can be repatriated being a deputationist by the Competent Authority in the interest of exigency of service as and when so desired and such order of the competent authority cannot be questioned. The Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the rules made thereunder as well as ESTACODE are silent about the fact that a deputationist must serve his entire period of deputation and this omission seems deliberate enabling the Competent Authority to utilize the service of an employee in the manner as it may deem fit and proper. The period of deputation can at best be equated to that of an expression of the maximum period which can be curtailed or extended by the Competent Authority and no legal or vested rights whatsoever are available to a deputationist to serve his entire period of deputation in the borrowing Department.\nZain Yar Khan v. Chief Engineer 1998 SCMR 2419; Aslam Warraich v. Secretary, Planning and Development Division 1991 SCMR 2330; Pakistan v. Fazal-ur-Rehman PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 82; Ashraf Khan Niazi v. Chairman Board of Governors Allama Iqbal Medical College 2003 PLC (C.S.) 243; Dr. Shafi-ur-Rehman Afridi v. C.D.A 2010 SCMR 378 and S. Masood Abbas Rizvi v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 SCMR 799 ref.\nOn the last date of the period specified for deputation, the officer automatically stands relieved of his duties unless the orders of the competent authority have been obtained in advance for extending the period of deputation [Serial No.28-A of the ESTACODE, Volume-I (Civil Establishment Code].", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973=20A", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 546 of 2021, decided on 14th September, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 21.12.2020 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunals Islamabad in Appeal No.876 of 2020)heard on: 14th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. G.M. Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with petitioner in person.\nSultan Mazhar Sher Khan, Additional A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Atif Majeed, Dy. Director Technical Pakistan Forest Institute for Respondents Nos. 1 - 3.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney General and Mohsin Saleem Ullah, A.D. (Legal) Ministry of IT & T for Respondents Nos. 4 - 6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHANSHAM DAS-Petitioner\nVersus\nGOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Chief Secretary, Pakistan Forest Institute, Peshawar and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23998", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 65 = 2024 SLD 65 = 2024 SCMR 197", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTWXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. VII, R. 1-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Civil petition filed before the Supreme Court-Title of petition-Acronyms, use of-Mentioning an acronym in the title of the petition does not conform to how a party is to be described in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.).\n(b) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000)-\n-S. 11-National Database and Registration Authority (Pakistan Origin Card) Rules, 2002, R. 10(1)-Pakistan Origin Card (POC), issuance of-Unnecessary litigation by National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) [the Authority]-High Court allowed writ petition of respondents and directed the Authority to issue POC to one of the respondents-Counsel for the Authority stated that the POC has now been issued, therefore, the grievance of the respondents stood redressed-Supreme Court observed that it was unfortunate that the Authority rather than doing its job in the first instance had compelled the respondents to file a writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed; that the decision of the High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court, when certain questions were raised, and only then better sense prevailed and the Authority issued the POC to the respondent; that the Authority was a statutory organization and should have abided by its own law, and not generated unnecessary litigation-Petition was disposed of.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000=11", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3575 of 2020, decided on 22nd November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 23.09.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Writ Petition No. 514-P of 2020)\nheard on: 22nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Afnan Karim Kundi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nBoth Respondents in-person.\nCh. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan on Court's Notice for the Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "REGIONAL MANAGER, NADRA RHO, HAYATABAD, PESHAWAR and another -Petitioners\nVersus\nMst. HAJIRA and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "23999", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 66 = 2024 SLD 66 = 2024 SCMR 202", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTVTc", - "Key Words:": "Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)-\n-S. 54-Sale mutation-Proof-Burden of proof-Petitioners claimed that their predecessor (defendant) had purchased land through a sale mutation attested on 13 June 1994-Respondent-lady (plaintiff) filed a suit for declaration on 6 November 2008 to challenge the said sale mutation-Petitioners contended that the suit of respondent was hopelessly time barred, and that the respondent had simply denied her thumb impression on the said mutation and the report of the Provincial Finger Print Bureau was in itself not sufficient for disproving that the sale mutation bore her thumb impression-Validity-Burden to establish the purported sale lay upon the beneficiary of the sale (i.e. predecessor of the petitioners) but this was not discharged-Respondent was not required to disprove the sale yet she undertook to do so; she came forward and had her purported thumb impression was sent for forensic determination by the Provincial Finger Print Bureau, which submitted a comprehensive report and the witness from Finger Print Bureau was also produced as a witness-It was conclusively established that the thumb impression on the sale mutation was not hers-No evidence was produced to show that the respondent-plaintiff was aware about the sale mutation much before then-Trial Judge had correctly noted that the onus to prove it lay upon the defendant (predecessor of the petitioners)- In attending to the issue of limitation the trial Judge determined that the defendant had not been able to establish prior knowledge-Fifteen years had passed since the suit was filed by the respondent, and at three different forums she succeeded and the petitioners lost-Possession of the subject land remained with the petitioners, who had disregarded all three decisions of the courts and continues to retain the illegal possession of the land-As the petitioners had remained in illegal possession of the said land the Supreme Court imposed compensatory cost in the sum of one hundred thousand rupees-Supreme Court directed that the petitioners shall immediately hand over the subject land to the respondent, and if they failed to do so the concerned revenue officer/official shall ensure that its possession was delivered to the respondent immediately-Petition was dismissed with costs throughout.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882=54", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3465-L of 2022, decided on 20th November, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 25.11.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 4911 of 2016)heard on: 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Seerat Hussain Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court through video link from Lahore Branch Registry for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM FAREED (DECEASED) through his L.Rs., and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nDAULAN BIBI-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24000", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 67 = 2024 SLD 67 = 2024 SCMR 205", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTVTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), 302, 34, 118, 120-B, 109 & 506-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-After registration of FIR, the complainant recorded four supplementary statements-In the first three supplementary statements, the complainant did not nominate the petitioner as an accused-However in her fourth supplementary statement, recorded after a lapse of more than four months of the occurrence, she did nominate the petitioner for the first time-Bare look of the crime report and the subsequent four supplementary statements recorded by the complainant shows that she kept changing her stance-It appears there is no direct evidence against the petitioner and the prosecution case hinges upon circumstantial evidence-Petitioner is behind bars for the last more than 20 months-Case of the petitioner squarely falls within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into his guilt-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and petitioner was admitted to bail.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), 302, 34, 118, 120-B, 109 & 506-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail, grant of-Identification parade-Identification parade was conducted after petitioners nomination by the complainant and in such circumstances, prima facie the sanctity of such test identification parade is open for determination-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and petitioner was admitted to bail.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), 302, 34, 118, 120-B, 109 & 506-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail, grant of-Call Data Record (CDR)-So far as the Call Data Record (CDR) is concerned, in absence of any concrete material the CDR is not a conclusive piece of evidence to ascertain the guilt or otherwise of an accused-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and petitioner was admitted to bail.\n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), 302, 34, 118, 120-B, 109 & 506-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail, grant of-Photographs allegedly connecting the petitioner with the commission of the crime-Nothing is available on record to show that said photographs were ever sent for forensic examination, therefore, it is unsafe to rely upon the same as a piece of evidence in a court of law-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and petitioner was admitted to bail.\nIshtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 SC 675 ref.\n(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Benefit of doubt-Benefit of doubt can even be extended at bail stage.\nMuhammad Ejaz v. The State 2022 SCMR 1271; Muhammad Arshad v. The State 2022 SCMR 1555 and Fahad Hussain v. The State 2023 SCMR 364 ref.\n(f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) & 156-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), 302, 34, 118, 120-B, 109 & 506- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail, grant of-Opinion of police during investigation-Relevance-Although the petitioner was found involved during police investigation but it is settled law that ipse dixit of the police regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused could not be depended upon as the same would be determined by Trial Court on the basis of evidence available on record-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and petitioner was admitted to bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,34,118,120-B,109,506Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 317-L of 2023, decided on 20th September, 2023.\n(On appeal against the order dated 14.02.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 48864-B of 2022)heard on: 20th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Humayoun Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G. and Wahid and Iqbal, SI for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAVEED SATTAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24001", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 68 = 2024 SLD 68 = 2024 SCMR 209", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTVTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail application dismissed as withdrawn-Subsequent/second bail application, filing of-Fresh grounds-Scope-Present criminal petition for leave to appeal had been filed against the impugned order of the High Court wherein it was recorded that the petitioners counsel did not press the (bail) petition in order to approach the Supreme Court-As per counsel of petitioner (accused) this statement was made because earlier the matter had come before the Supreme Court in another petition which was disposed of by recording that petitioners counsel did not press it for the time being; and that a fresh ground had accrued to the petitioner on which bail was sought-Held, that if a fresh ground had become available to the petitioner prior to the passing of the impugned order then counsel should not have withdrawn the petition, but insisted that the petition be decided on merits-Legal position on the present issue was by now well settled by the Supreme Court in the cases reported as Nazir Ahmad v. State (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 241) and Muhammad Aslam v. State (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 41)-At present stage counsel for petitioner stated he did not press present petition as he wanted to avail an alternate remedy-Accordingly present petition was dismissed as withdrawn.\nNazir Ahmad v. State PLD 2014 SC 241 and Muhammad Aslam v. State PLD 2015 SC 41 ref.\n(b) Practice and procedure-\n-Repeated use of word august before the Supreme Court of Pakistan or its alternative August Court-Supreme Court observed that the Supreme Court is mentioned in the Constitution as the Supreme Court of Pakistan, without any prefix or adjective, and everyone should endeavour to abide by the descriptions mentioned in the Constitution.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1294 of 2023, decided on 28th November, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 12 October 2023 passed by Lahore High Court Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi in Criminal Misc. No.2761-B of 2023)heard on: 28th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hassan Raza Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nAgha Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court (on caveat) for Respondent No. 2/Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M TAIMOOR ALI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through P. G. Punjab and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24002", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 69 = 2024 SLD 69 = 2024 PLD 30", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "Balochistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976-\n-S. 2-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 246 & 247 [as amended through Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act (XXXVII of 2018)-Balochistan Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962), Preamble-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10-Notification No.240/ RHC/JM/2019 dated 10-10-2019 issued by the Balochistan High Court-Civil suit filed by a private person where Government is also a party (to the suit)-Maintainability-Suit filed by the plaintiff/ petitioner was returned under O. VII, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, by the Court of Qazi under S. 2 of the Balochistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976 (the Regulation, 1976), which order was maintained by the Appellate Court-Validity-Record revealed that both the Courts below, while not entertaining his claim, had not referred to (suggested) to the petitioner the competent Court having jurisdiction-In the earlier scheme of the Regulation, 1976 where the government functionary was a party to a lis, the Court having jurisdiction was Court of Civil Judge but after promulgation of Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 2018, Art. 246 of the Constitution was inserted/amended, whereby the tribal areas were merged into respective provinces-Regulation, 1976 was applicable in tribal areas of Balochistan, but after the Constitution Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the tribal areas had been merged and made part of the Province of Balochistan, hence the tribal areas were no more in existence ; powers enjoyed by the President of Pakistan in case of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Governor of Balochistan in case of Provincially Administrated Tribal Areas (PATA) were no more available to them under Art. 247(4) of the Constitution-In view of Notification No. 240/RHC/JM/2019 dated 10-10-2019 issued by the Balochistan High Court, the litigations pending before the Qazi Courts and Member Majlis-e-Shoora exercising jurisdiction under the Regulation, 1976, stood transferred to the Civil Courts having original jurisdiction constituted under the Balochistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962-Matters related to the civil disputes were to be adjudicated by the Civil Courts constituted under the Balochistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, thus the petitioner having any civil dispute regarding property might approach a Civil Court having ordinary jurisdiction-Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\nNaimatullah v. Faizullah (C.R.P. No.209 of 2011) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976=2Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=246,247", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. 1076 of 2020, decided on 21st September, 2022.heard on: 23rd August, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Kamran Khan Mulakhail and Shaukat Ali Rakhshani, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Siraj Ahmed for Petitioner.\nMehrullah Khan Kakar for Respondents.\nNusrat Baloch, A.A.G. for Official Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAIDER KHAN-Petitioner\nVs\nSHER KHAN and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24003", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 79 = 2024 SLD 79 = 2024 PLD 13 = 2024 PTD 196 = (2024) 130 TAX 287", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Retrospective vs. Prospective Application of the Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a government contractor, completed works in 1998 and was awarded payment. However, when the payment was released in 2019, 15% was deducted as tax under the Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015. The petitioner challenged this deduction, arguing it was not applicable retrospectively. The High Court ruled that the Act, which came into force on July 1, 2015, did not have retrospective effect. Applying the principle that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed and are generally prospective unless explicitly stated otherwise, the Court concluded that the tax deduction was invalid as it related to work completed before the Acts enforcement. The deduction order was declared void ab initio, and the Court directed a refund of the deducted amount to the petitioner.\nHeld:\n1.\nProspective Application of the Act:\nThe Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015, applies only from its effective date (July 1, 2015) and cannot be applied retroactively to transactions or events preceding its enforcement.\n2.\nStrict Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes:\nFiscal statutes, especially their charging sections, must be construed strictly. A taxpayer cannot be held liable unless their actions clearly fall within the statutory provisions.\n3.\nInvalid Deduction:\nThe deduction of 15% tax for work completed in 1998 was unlawful. The High Court ordered a refund of the amount deducted, declaring the deduction order void.\nCitations:\n1.\nRelevant Case Law:\no\nGovernment of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Public Health Engineering, Peshawar and others v. Abdul Manan, 2021 SCMR 1871.\no\nSardar Sher Bahadar Khan v. Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary, Election Commission, Islamabad and others, PLD 2018 SC 97.\no\nMst. Sarwar Jan and others v. Mukhtar Ahmed and others, PLD 2012 SC 217.\nMaxim:\n Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis — A new law ought to regulate future events, not past occurrences.\nPrinciples of Interpretation of Statutes:\n•\nThe charging section of fiscal statutes imposes tax liability and must be strictly construed.\n•\nTax obligations are enforceable only when explicitly covered by the law, ensuring fairness and preventing retroactive imposition of liabilities.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015=4(2)(a)", - "Case #": "C. P. No. 2026 of 2022, decided on 31st May, 2023.heard on: 10th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Kamran Khan Mulakhail and Sardar Ahmed Haleemi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Atif Faizan Usto for Petitioner.\nTahir Iqbal Khattak, Addl: A.G. for Official Respondent.\nJam Saka Dashti for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs SARA ENTERPRISES GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS through Proprietor -Petitioner\nVs\nSECRETARY FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN, QUETTA and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24004", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 103 = 2024 SLD 103 = 2024 PLD 81 = 2024 PTD 235 = (2025) 131 TAX 275 = 2023 SCP 361", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTSTg", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary: Reimbursement Claims in the Context of Sale of Goods Act, 1930\nLegal Provisions:\nSale of Goods Act, 1930:\nSection 64A – This section addresses the reimbursement of certain taxes, specifically customs duty, central excise duty, and sales tax in contracts for the sale of goods. It does not cover income tax.\nGeneral Conditions of Contract (DDP Basis):\nIncoterms 2010: The contract in question was based on the DDP (Delivery Duty Paid) Incoterm, which shifts the responsibility for taxes, duties, and risks to the seller, meaning the seller is responsible for paying all taxes and duties, including sales tax.\nFacts of the Case:\nA supplier entered into a contract with the Provincial Government for the supply of imported tractors. The supplier paid advance income tax and sales tax during the import process.\nThe supplier sought reimbursement for the advance income tax at the enhanced rate and the sales tax paid at the import stage.\nThe Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the suppliers claim for income tax reimbursement but upheld the claim for sales tax reimbursement.\nThe Division Bench of the High Court dismissed both the suppliers and the Provincial Governments appeals.\nKey Legal Issues:\nApplication of Section 64A of the Sale of Goods Act:\nSection 64A specifically refers to customs duties, central excise duties, and sales tax, but it does not apply to income tax.\nThe supplier’s claim for income tax reimbursement was dismissed correctly because income tax is not covered by Section 64A.\nDDP (Delivery Duty Paid) Basis:\nThe contract was on DDP basis, a term from Incoterms 2010. Under this agreement, the seller is responsible for all costs, duties, and taxes until delivery.\nThe sales tax liability under a DDP contract is typically the responsibility of the seller, regardless of whether the tax was paid at import or domestic stages.\nCourts Analysis:\nIncome Tax Claim:\nSection 64A of the Sale of Goods Act does not cover income tax, so the court correctly dismissed the suppliers claim for reimbursement of the advance income tax.\nIncome tax is not among the taxes covered by Section 64A, and thus, there was no basis for the supplier’s claim in this regard.\nSales Tax Claim:\nThe contract was on a DDP basis, which meant that the seller (the supplier) was responsible for the payment of sales tax and other associated duties or taxes until the goods were delivered.\nThe DDP term maximizes the risks and responsibilities of the seller and minimizes those of the buyer. This meant that the supplier bore the responsibility for paying sales tax on the imported goods.\nClause 26 of the contract stipulated that the contract was on a DDP basis, which aligned with Section 64A, shifting the burden of additional duties and taxes to the supplier.\nSince the sales tax burden was specifically transferred to the supplier under the contract, the supplier was not entitled to claim reimbursement from the Provincial Government.\nConclusion:\nThe Division Bench of the High Court upheld the dismissal of both the supplier’s income tax claim and sales tax claim.\nThe income tax claim was correctly dismissed because Section 64A does not apply to income tax.\nThe sales tax claim was also dismissed because the DDP contract explicitly placed the financial burden for taxes on the supplier, including the sales tax.\nAs a result, the suppliers suit was dismissed, and the appeals were disposed of in favor of the Provincial Government.\nKey Takeaways:\nSection 64A of the Sale of Goods Act only applies to customs duties, central excise duties, and sales tax, and does not cover income tax.\nA DDP contract places the responsibility for paying all duties, taxes, and costs on the seller, including sales tax.\nClaims for reimbursement of taxes must align with the terms of the contract and applicable legal provisions, and the seller cannot claim reimbursement if the contract explicitly assigns the tax liability to them.\nDistinguished Case:\nThe ruling distinguished the case of Pakistan Beverage Ltd. v. Large Taxpayer Unit Karachi (2010 PTD 2673), suggesting that the facts in the present case did not align with the circumstances that would warrant reimbursement under the same legal principles.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sale of Goods Act, (III of 1930)=64A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 477 and 478 of 2021, decided on 25th October, 2023.(On appeal against judgment dated 24.04.2019 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in High Court Appeals Nos. 139 and 109 of 2019).heard on: 25th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ijaz ul Ahsan, Munib Akhtar and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants:\nSibtain Mehmood, Addl. AG, Sindh.\nShahab ud Din Abro, D.G.\nZulfiqar Ali, Focal Person, Agriculture Department, Sindh\n(via Video-Link, Karachi) (in C.A. No. 477 of 2021).\nAli Asad Gondal, Advocate Supreme Court\n(via Video-Link, Karachi) (in C.A. No. 478 of 2021).\nFor the Respondents:\nSibtain Mehmood, Addl. AG, Sindh.\nShahab ud Din Abro, D.G.\nZulfiqar Ali, Focal Person, Agriculture Department, Sindh\n(via Video-Link, Karachi) (in C.A. No. 478 of 2021).\nAli Asad Gondal, Advocate Supreme Court\n(via Video-Link, Karachi) (in C.A. No. 477 of 2021).", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary, Agriculture Department, Government of Sindh and another-Appellants\nVs\nMULTILINE ENTERPRISES and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24005", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 135 = 2024 SLD 135 = (2024) 129 TAX 1 = 2024 PTCL 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JTOHk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Applicability of Automatic Audit Selection under Section 214D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe case pertains to the automatic selection for audit under Section 214D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for the tax year 2015. The taxpayer failed to file the income tax return within the prescribed time but submitted an application under Section 119 for an extension of time. The Commissioner did not respond to this application. The department claimed that the taxpayer automatically came under audit selection as per Section 214D. The taxpayers writ petition challenging the notices was dismissed by a Single Judge in the Lahore High Court. However, an intra-court appeal was allowed, leading the department to file an appeal in the Supreme Court.\nHeld:\n1.\nNon-Applicability of Section 214D Without Written Disposition of Extension Request:\nThe Supreme Court held that Section 214D could not apply until the application for an extension under Section 119 was disposed of through a written order by the Commissioner. The mere filing of an extension request delayed the applicability of Section 214D until the request was either approved or denied in writing.\n2.\nApplication of Thirty-Day Rule:\nThe condition of thirty days in the context of Section 214D begins not from the due date for filing the return but from the date of the written order by the Commissioner granting or refusing the extension.\n3.\nOutcome of the Appeal:\nBased on these observations, the Supreme Court dismissed the departments appeal and upheld the decision of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, ruling in favor of the taxpayer.\n4.\nCase Law:\no\nMuhammad Mujahid Qureshi and others v Federation of Pakistan and others (2019 PTD 535).\no\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue v Independent Newspaper Corp (Pvt) Ltd. (2019 PTD 447).", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=119,119(3),177,214D,214D(3)(4)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.247 of 2021 decided on 02.11.2023, date of hearing: 02.11.2023\n(Against judgment dated 22.4.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in ICA No. 18093/2019.)", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR, SHAHID WAHEED AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ibrar Ahmed, ASC for the Appellant. (via video-link, Lahore).\nMr. Javed Iqbal Qazi, ASC for respondent No.1. (via video-link, Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE\nVS\nM/S. ATTA CABLES (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24006", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 149 = 2024 SLD 149 = 2024 CLD 148", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 3, 9, 22 & 29(2)-Suit for recovery of finance-Cost of funds, non-awarding of-Effect-Suit filed under previous law i.e. Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 was decreed in favour of appellant bank without awarding cost of funds-Validity-In terms of S. 29(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, no decree could lawfully be passed under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 with respect to markup-based finance and only interest-bearing loans could be decreed under S. 15 of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997-If at all decree had to be passed regarding markup-based finance, in all possibility, it had to be under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Provision of S. 29 was the bridge for dealing with adjudication of claims of markup-based finances under the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, notwithstanding institution of suits under provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997-Banking Court committed error of law while declining cost of funds on erroneous assumption that S. 3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had no application-High Court set aside judgment passed by Banking Court to the extent of denying of cost of funds as it was legally defective and result of misconstruction of law-High Court remanded the matter to Banking Court to determine cost of funds in accordance with the mandate of S. 3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\n \nNational Bank of Pakistan through Manager v. Messrs Footcare (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and others 2005 CLD 1114 and Messrs A.M. Rice Corporation through Sole Proprietor and another v. Bank of Punjab through Manager as Attorney 2005 CLD 1569 ref.\nLancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. [1941] 1KB 675; Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Covasjee and 2 others PLD 1995 SC 423; Gulshan Ara v. The State 2010 SCMR 1162 and State of U.P and another v. Messrs Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and another 1991 SCC (4)139 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=3,9,22,29(2)", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 1538 of 2015, decided on 21st September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Asim Hafeez, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Irfan Ali Sheikh for Appellant.\nCh. Muhammad Awais Zafar for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Authorized Attorney-Appellant\nVs\nMessrs BRITE CHEMICALS through Managing Partners and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24007", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 150 = 2024 SLD 150 = 2024 CLD 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYy8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 276 & 277- Company/commercial matters-Resolution of dispute through mediation- Mediation- Scope and benefits-Mediation offers a voluntary and confidential alternative to traditional court proceedings for resolving disputes-In this process, disputing parties willingly engage in discussions facilitated by a neutral third party known as the mediator-Unlike court proceedings, mediation is a more informal and flexible approach, fostering open communication and creative problem solving-Mediators role is not to make decisions but to guide the parties in finding common ground and exploring potential solutions-One of the key advantages of mediation is its cost-effectiveness compared to court proceedings-It also tends to be a faster method of resolution, putting more control in the hands of the parties involved-Informality of mediation contributes to a quicker resolution compared to the often time-consuming nature of court proceedings-Additionally, the process preserves relationships, as parties actively engage in finding mutually agreeable solutions-Flexibility of mediation allows for a more personalized and tailored resolution to the specific needs and concerns of the parties involved.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 6, 276, 277, 280, 282, 286 & 287 & Preamble-Prevention of oppression and mis-management-Resolution of dispute through mediation-Mediation and Conciliation Panel-Early Neutral-Party Evaluation ( ENE ), process of-Doctrine of expeditious resolution of corporate disputes through mediation-Scope-Corporate dispute or petition under Ss. 286 & 287 of the Companies Act, 2017 ( Act ) alleging the mismanagement of members of a company may be resolved through mediation and compromise before passing any determination by the Court with the consent of the parties involved in such dispute-Sections 276 and 277 of the Act can be invoked in order to protect the interest of the Company and the Court can initiate process of Early Neutral-Party Evaluation ( ENE ) and then mediation-In the present case mediation was set forth amongst parties supervised by the regulatory authority i.e. the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan ( SECP ), which mediation worked and was met with desired fruits as well with mutual coordination and cooperation of counsel for the parties-High Court directed that the parties shall adhere to the compromise deed and the SECP , being regulator, shall facilitate them with regard to division of the Company and decide their matter arising out of mediation-Petition was disposed of accordingly.\nMessrs U.I.G. (Pvt.) Limited through Director and 3 others v. Muhammad Imran Qureshi 2011 CLC 758; Messrs ALSTOM Power Generation through Ashfaq Ahmad v. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman and another PLD 2007 Lah. 581 and Mall Road Traders Association v. The Deputy Commissioner, Lahore 2019 CLC 744 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=276,277", - "Case #": "Civil Original No. 6 of 2022, decided on 10th October, 2023.heard on: 10th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Samar Masood, Usman Jilani, Barrister Zainab Nasir Khan, Fatima Midrar and Barrister Aiema Asrar for Petitioners.\nNadeem Ahmad Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court for the Respondents Nos.1 to 3.\nBarrister Osama Amin Qazi for Respondent No.4.\nMuzaffar Ahmad Mirza, Chief Prosecutor/Executive Director, Legal Affairs, SECP along with Fatima Shabbir and Barrister Zunaira Fayyaz for SECP.\nMalik Saqib Mehmood Khalid, Qurraish Mughal and Malik Shaukat Mahmood for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAISAL ZAFAR and another-Petitioners\nVs\nSIRAJ-UD-DIN and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24008", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 151 = 2024 SLD 151 = 2024 CLD 18", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYys", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXVIII, R. 5 & O. XXXIX, Rr. 1, 2-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54-Suit for declaration, injunction and recovery of damages-Encashment of performance guarantee-Attachment before judgment-Proceeds of performance guarantee-Plaintiff company resisted encashing of performance guarantee by defendant Board on the ground that notice of demand was defective-Trial Court declined to issue interim injunction against encashing of performance guarantee-Validity-Proceeds of performance guarantee drawn and resting with defendant Board were not property of plaintiff company, for that would essentially tantamount to rendering judgment for plaintiff company-Essential conditions under O. XXXVIII, R. 5, C.P.C., for attachment before judgment did not demonstrate circumstances to identify that defendant authorities intended to dispose of its assets to defeat any decree that might be passed in favour of plaintiff company-High Court declined to order deposit of the proceeds of performance guarantee with Court, as such order would be practically equivalent to an attachment before judgment and the relief was molded accordingly-High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under S. 94(e), C.P.C., directed defendant authorities to report to Trial Court immediately if and when total net realizable value of its liquid plus near-cash equivalent assets would decline to an amount which was equal (i) the total sum of the provisioning for sums in litigation in its accounts, (ii) plus the sum of plaintiff companys performance guarantee encashed by defendant authorities [if not included in (i)], and (iii) plus 10 percent of the sum of (i) and (ii) above-High Court further allowed that plaintiff company may file an application for appropriate orders, including attachment before judgment, and Trial Court would then pass an order on such application-Application was disposed of accordingly.\nMuhammadi v. Ghulam Nabi 2007 SCMR 761; Ibrahim v. Rahmatullah 1985 SCMR 241; Balgamwala Oil Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Shakarchi Trading AG and 2 others PLD 1990 Kar. 1; Nazar Mohammad v. Ali Akbar PLD 1989 Kar. 635; Synthetic Foams Limited v. Simplex Concrete Piles (India) AIR 1988 Delhi 207; Isgec Heavy Engineering Ltd v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2021) SCC Online Delhi 4748 and Muhammad Athar Hafeez Khan v. Ssangyong and Usmani JV PLD 2011 Kar. 605 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=5,1,2Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 58 of 2022, decided on 11th September, 2023.\nheard on: 17th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nadir Altaf, Abdullah Alim Qureshi and Malik Omair Saleem for Appellant.\nSkandar Bashir Mohmand, Hashim Ali Khan and Barrister Khush Bakht for Respondent No. 1.\nHisham Ali Khan for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SIDDIQSONS ENERGY LIMITED-Appellant\nVs\nPRIVATE POWER AND INFRASTRUCTURE BOARD (PPIB) and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24009", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 152 = 2024 SLD 152 = 2024 CLD 25", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYzk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 2(b), 5, 9, 22 & 27-Recovery suit-Admitting of appeal-Pre-conditions-Stay, grant of-Provisions of S. 22(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Scope-Appellate Court/High Court on request of the respondent/Bank while the counsel of appellant/customer was occupied before another bench, directed him (appellant/customer) to deposit decretal amount (without even granting stay or admitting the appeal)-Appellant/customer moved application to recall/review the said order contending that impugned order had been passed in violation of provisions of the S. 22(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance 2001)-Plea of the respondent/Bank was that the order was rightly passed in view of bar contained in S. 27 of the Ordinance 2001-Validity-Under S. 22(3) of the Ordinance 2001, the Court could consider an order for submitting security at the stage of admitting appeal and a direction for deposit of decretal amount to be issued in the event of grant of stay order, however reasonable order was required to be passed-In the present case, none of said circumstances/pre-conditions existed on the date when the impugned order was passed, or even later than such day/date-Plea of the respondent/Bank was misconceived as the bar contained in S. 27 of the Ordinance 2001 (which was subject to the provision of S. 22 of the Ordinance 2001) would be applicable to Courts and Authorities other than the Banking Courts- Banking Court was defined in S. 2(b) of the Ordinance 2001 in which (i) the claim does not exceed Rs. 100 million (as was in the present case); and for the trial of offences under the Ordinance 2001 the Court established under S. 5 of the Ordinance 2001 and (ii) in respect of any other case, the High Court-Whereas, in the present case, High Court as an Appellate Court was exercising jurisdiction when seized of appeal under S. 22 of the Ordinance 2001, and not of a suit under S. 9 of the Ordinance 2001-High Court on the original side also exercises jurisdiction of a Banking Court; which does not mean that the Appellate Court when seized of an appeal becomes a Banking Court -In the present case, neither the present appeal had been admitted nor any stay order had been sought nor passed-Passing of the impugned order due to an incorrect exposition of law regarding S. 22 of the Ordinance 2001 was untenable and unsustainable-High Court recalled the impugned order-Application to review/recall was allowed, in circumstances.\nM. A. Kareem Iqbal v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court 2003 CLD 1447 and Askari Bank Limited v. DCD Services Limited 2016 CLD 449 ref.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 2(b), 5, 9, 22 & 27-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114 & O. XLVII-Review, exercise of-Powers of the Court-Scope-Appellate Court/High Court on request of the respondent/bank while the counsel of appellant/customer was occupied before another bench, directed him (appellant/customer) to deposit decretal amount (without even granting stay or admitting the appeal)-Appellant/customer moved application to recall/review the said order contending that impugned order had been passed in violation of provisions of the S. 22(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance 2001)-Validity-Power of review can be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law-Court is in fact obliged to correct itself and undo the wrong done to a party by the act of Court through a review/recall of its own order which suffers from an obvious error and is also causing miscarriage of justice-Record revealed the fact that neither the present appeal had been admitted nor any stay order had been sought nor passed-Passing of the impugned order due to an incorrect exposition of law regarding S. 22 of the Ordinance 2001 was untenable and unsustainable-High Court recalled the impugned order-Application to review/recall was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(b),5,9,22,27", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 68 of 2021, decided on 30th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Irfan Saadat Khan, ACJ and Ms. Sana Akram Minhas, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khaleeq Ahmed for Appellant.\nMs. Afsheen Aman and Faraz Mahar for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR HASSAN KHAN-Appellant\nVs\nHABIB BANK LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24010", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 153 = 2024 SLD 153 = 2024 CLD 30", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpYzg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-\n-Ss. 5 & 118-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 249-A & 561-A-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F-Presumptions as to negotiable instrument- Petitioner moved an application under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C., before the Trial Court for his acquittal claiming that the charge against him was groundless and there was no probability of him being convicted of any offence-Said application was dismissed-Decision of the Trial Court was upheld in revision by the Revisional Court-Validity-Petitioner had neither denied his signature on Cheque in question nor the fact that it was drawn on his account-Petitioner had challenged its validity on the premise that it did not conform to the requirements of S. 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881-Cheque in question contained the expression Pay cash or bearer -In view of the said discourse, the contention was repelled-Allegedly, police had found defence plea of petitioner correct during investigation, which might help him during the trial but not at present stage-Investigating Officer had the mandate only to collect the evidence pertaining to the case he was investigating and to dig out the truth and then submit report in terms of S. 173, Cr.P.C.-Said report, however, was not a piece of evidence itself-If the cheque said pay cash and the words or bearer were not scored off, the person in possession of the instrument would be presumed to be a holder in due course-In the instant case, respondent No. 2 (complainant) enjoyed the same presumption in respect of Cheque in question which could be rebutted at a regular trial where the parties have equal opportunity to adduce evidence to prove their respective claims and test the credibility of the witnesses of the other side through cross-examination-Sole opinion of the Investigating Officer could not negate that presumption-Section 249-A, Cr.P.C., reflected a compromise between the collective good of the society and the rights of an individual offender-Idea was to spare the offender the rigors of full trial if the Court at any stage found that the charge was groundless and the prosecution was not likely to succeed, however, present case was not a case in which the provisions of S. 249-A, Cr.P.C., could be invoked-Petition had no merit and was therefore dismissed.\nMuhammad Sultan v. The State 2010 SCMR 806; North and South Insurance Corporation Limited v. National Provincial Bank Limited, [1936] 1 K.B. 328; Cole v. Milsome, [1951] All ER 311; Orbit Mining and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Westminster Bank Ltd., [1963] 1 QB 794; Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others 2006 SCMR 276 and Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer Okara Cantt. and others PLD 2007 SC 539 rel.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 249-A & 561-A- Quashing of proceedings- Inherent jurisdiction of High Court-Scope-In law, S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., did not confer an alternative or additional jurisdiction on the High Court-Said provisions of law merely preserve its inherent jurisdiction to enable it to make such orders as might be necessary to give effect to an order under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 or to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice-Said section could not be used to stifle prosecution-High Court should invoke S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., for quashing the proceedings pending before the Trial Court in exceptional circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=5,118Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=24Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=489-F", - "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous No. 8564/M of 2022, heard on 26th May, 2022.heard on: 26th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Tariq Saleem Sheikh, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ijaz Feroze and Zia Ullah Khan for Petitioner.\nRana Tasawar Ali Khan, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.\nAbdul Khaliq Safrani and Muhammad Awaiz Riaz for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AHMAD FARAN SABIR-Petitioner\nVs\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24011", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 154 = 2024 SLD 154 = 2024 CLD 58", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpY3o", - "Key Words:": "Company-\n-Group of companies-President-Implied contractual obligations-Obligation of loyalty-Obligation to act in good faith-Duty to inform-Remedy for breach-Certain company informed presidents of a group of companies that it was interested in acquiring their group-Presidents did not disclose such information to groups majority shareholders-Presidents purchased shareholders interests in the group and resold them to the company for a profit-Question as to whether presidents non-disclosure of interest expressed by the company in acquiring the group constituted a civil fault and if so, then what was the appropriate remedy.\nTwo presidents of a group of three companies in the insurance industry learned that a major company was interested in acquiring the group. Rather than revealing this to the groups majority shareholders, the presidents decided to buy the whole of the shareholders interests themselves in order to resell them to the company for a substantial profit. Before the resale, the presidents and the purchaser company entered into an undertaking of confidentiality, which prevented the company from dealing directly with the groups majority shareholders. Upon learning of the resale, the shareholders filed a motion to institute proceedings for damages in the Superior Court, claiming approximately $24 million as compensation for the gain they would have made through that transaction of which they were deprived. They alleged that the presidents had breached their contractual and legal obligations and their fiduciary obligations and in particular their obligations to act in good faith, with loyalty and transparency, by failing to inform them of the interest expressed by the purchaser company in acquiring the group. The shareholders argued that, because of the presidents unlawful actions, they were entitled to claim the equivalent of the excess profits made by the presidents. The Superior Court ruled in the shareholders favour and ordered the presidents solidarily to pay them $11,884,743, an amount equal to the profits earned by the presidents on the resale. The court found that, under both the Civil Code of Qu bec (C.C.Q) and the Canada Business Corporations Act, the presidents, in their capacity as directors, owed duties of honesty, loyalty, prudence and diligence to the group. The trial judge found that these same duties could be extended to the shareholders because of an incentive pay agreement entered into by the shareholders and the presidents ( Presidents Agreement ) that governed the parties relationship and entailed implied obligations for the presidents. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judgment and upheld the remedy awarded by the trial judge. However, it was of the view that the trial judge erred in finding that the duties of honesty and loyalty provided for in the Civil Code of Qu bec and the Canada Business Corporations Act could be extended to the shareholders. The court held that the presidents conduct fell within the three criteria set out in Bank of Montreal v. Bail Lt e, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554 and that the presidents breached the obligation of contractual good faith and the obligation to inform they owed to the shareholders.\nThe presidents failure to inform the majority shareholders of the purchaser companys interest in acquiring the group was a breach of the requirements of good faith. They breached the obligation of contractual loyalty linked to good faith, which was an implied obligation under the contract through the combined effect of Arts. 1434 and 1375 C.C.Q. The Presidents Agreement involved an implied obligation to inform that required the presidents to provide the shareholders with all information relevant to making an informed decision about the sale of their shares. This implied obligation flowed from the nature of that agreement, which reflected the presumed intention of the parties, in accordance with Art. 1434 C.C.Q. The presidents were also required to perform the Agreement in accordance with the requirements of good faith, which was included in the contract through imperative law under Art. 1375 C.C.Q. With regard to the remedy, the purpose of damages is to compensate for the gain lost as a result of fault and the quantum must be assessed so as to place the shareholders in the position they would have been in but for the presidents fault. Disgorgement of profits is not available where there has simply been a breach of the obligation of good faith; in principle, it is available only where a person is charged with exercising powers in the interest of another. However, where a breach of the requirements of good faith prevents the aggrieved party from proving the injury sustained, it should be presumed that the injury is equivalent to the profits made by the party at fault. The presidents have shown no palpable and overriding error in the trial judges conclusion that the shareholders lost gain is equivalent to the profits made by the presidents. There is therefore no reason to interfere with the assessment of the quantum of damages.\n \nWith regard to the possible legal bases for the presidents obligation to inform the shareholders of the interest expressed by the purchaser company in acquiring the group, the obligation of maximalist loyalty arising from the exercise of powers in the interest of another, like the one resting on an administrator of the property of others or a mandatory, is not at issue in the present case. The presidents are neither the shareholders mandataries nor administrators of the property of others, which means that they cannot be held to an obligation of loyalty like the one provided for in Arts. 1309 para. 2 and 2138 para. 2 C.C.Q. In addition, the extra contractual obligation to inform related to good faith in the formation of contracts is of only theoretical importance in this case given the contractual relationship that the parties chose to establish with one another. The shareholders do not allege that there was a breach of the requirements of good faith at the pre-contractual stage, nor do they ask that the contracts for the sale of their interests in the group to the presidents be annulled. Rather, their focus is on the good faith performance of the Presidents Agreement, which was fully applicable at the relevant time.\n Lobligation de loyaut dans les services de placement (2012), 3:1 B.D.E. 19, at p. 21; Loyalty (2020), 66 McGill L.J. 121, at p. 122; M. Cantin Cumyn, Le pouvoir juridique (2007), 52 McGill L.J. 215, at p. 223 and Resolute FP Canada Inc. v. Hydro-Qu bec, 2020 SCC 43, at para. 69 ref.\nThe first legal basis for the duty to inform incumbent on the presidents is therefore the implied contractual obligation to inform the shareholders under the Presidents Agreement. Pursuant to Art. 1434 C.C.Q., a contract binds the parties not only as to what they have expressed in it but also as to what is incident to it according to its nature and in conformity with usage, equity or law. In this case, the nature of the Presidents Agreement leads to the conclusion that an implied obligation to inform was incident to it. The Presidents Agreement was the cornerstone of the business relationship between the presidents and the shareholders. The role of each party in this relationship was clear. The Presidents Agreement was a long-term agreement formalizing a mutually beneficial business relationship between the presidents and the shareholders and it required reciprocal contractual loyalty. It reinforced the high level of trust that the shareholders placed in the presidents and it expressly set out incentive pay terms and conditions for the presidents benefit without spelling out reciprocal obligations for them. In light of the very nature of the Presidents Agreement, the presidents had an implied obligation to inform the shareholders of any fact that might enable them to assess the companies profits and value and decide whether to sell their shares and, if so, at what price. The non-disclosure of the purchaser companys interest was a direct breach of this implied obligation.\nP.-A. Cr peau, Le contenu obligationnel dun contrat (1965), 43 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at p. 7; Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp. v. Hydro-Qu bec, 2018 SCC 46, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 101, at para. 74; D. Lluelles and B. Moore, Droit des obligations (3rd ed. 2018), at No. 1542 and Churchill Falls, at paras. 122-23, quoting Provigo Distribution Inc. v. Supermarch A.R.G. Inc., 1997 CanLII 10209 (Que. C.A.), at p. 25 ref.\nThe second legal basis is the obligation to perform the Presidents Agreement in accordance with the requirements of good faith under Art. 1375 C.C.Q. Good faith in Quebec civil law is now an enacted standard of public order. Unlike maximalist loyalty arising from the exercise of legal powers, contractual loyalty is reciprocal because of the mutual nature of good faith. It requires a contracting party to act with loyalty by taking into account, within the limits of reasonable conduct, the interests of the other contracting party. Nevertheless, the obligation of loyalty rooted in contractual good faith in the performance of a contract does not require a contracting party to subordinate their interests to those of the other party. In this case, contractual loyalty tied to good faith did not prevent the presidents from performing the contract to further their self-interest, but it did require them to consider the interests of the other contracting parties. For this reason, it could impose on them a duty to inform. While they did not have to subordinate their interests to those of the shareholders, the presidents could not conceal the purchaser companys interest in the group without incurring contractual liability to the shareholders. By concealing that interest, they breached their obligation of good faith.\n \nS. Grammond, A.-F. Debruche and Y. Campagnolo, Quebec Contract Law (3rd ed. 2020), at para. 327; National Bank of Canada v. Soucisse, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 339; Houle v. Canadian National Bank, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122; Tardif v. Succession de Dub , 2018 QCCA 1639, 51 C.C.L.T. (4th) 54, at para. 75; Provigo, at pp. 20-22; Baudouin, Jobin and V zina, at No. 307; Lluelles and Moore, at No. 2017 and M. A. Gr goire, Libert , responsabilit et utilit : la bonne foi comme instrument de justice (2010), at p. 209; see also Dunkin Brands Canada Ltd. v. Bertico Inc., 2015 QCCA 624, 41 B.L.R. (5th) 1, at paras. 66-70 ref.\nThe interest expressed by the purchaser company satisfies, in the context of the Presidents Agreement, each of the three criteria set out in Bank of Montreal v. Bail Lt e, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554, which serve to determine whether particular information falls within the duty to inform: (1) knowledge of the information, whether actual or presumed, by the party owing the obligation to inform; (2) the fact that the information in question is of decisive importance; (3) the fact that it is impossible for the party to whom the duty to inform is owed to inform itself, or that the creditor is legitimately relying on the debtor of the obligation. With regard to the first criterion, the presidents knew of the purchaser companys interest and were fully aware of the financial value of that information. The second criterion is also satisfied because the purchaser companys interest would have had a major impact on the decision and on the determination of the value of the shareholders shares and the sale price. The last criterion is doubly satisfied given the atmosphere of trust that existed between the parties and the fact that it was impossible for the shareholders to inform themselves of the purchaser companys interest. As a result, the requirements of good faith in the performance of the Presidents Agreement imposed a duty on the presidents to inform the shareholders of the interest expressed by the purchaser company.\nJ.-L. Baudouin, Justice et quilibre: la nouvelle moralit contractuelle du droit civil qu b cois , in G. Goubeaux et al., eds., tudes offertes Jacques Ghestin: Le contrat au d but du XXIe si cle (2001), 29, at p. 33 ref.\nDetermining the appropriate remedy in the present case helps to clarify the boundary between restitution and compensation in civil law. Compensation for the injury caused by a breach of contractual loyalty is distinct from disgorgement of profits arising from non-performance of the obligation of maximalist loyalty in the exercise of powers. Disgorgement of profits without regard to injury is not an appropriate remedy in this case, because it is not in keeping with the compensatory function of civil liability. It is available only where a person is charged with exercising powers in the interest of another and it is meant to ensure compliance with the obligation of maximalist loyalty owed by a person on whom a power is conferred. An award of damages, on the other hand, serves to compensate the victim of a fault for the injury sustained, reflecting a compensatory logic related to contractual loyalty under Art. 1375 C.C.Q. and its purpose is to compensate for the gain lost as a result of fault. To justify an award of damages, the party wronged by a breach of contractual loyalty bears the burden of establishing compensable injury, in accordance with the fundamental principle of restitutio in integrum (or full reparation) that is central to the law of civil liability in Quebec.\nUni-S lect inc. v. Acktion Corp., [2002] R.J.Q. 3005 distinguished.\nRainbow Industrial Caterers, at pp. 14-16; Lamb v. Kincaid (1907), 38 S.C.R. 516, at pp. 539-40; see also Callow, at para. 116; National Bank of Canada v. Corbeil, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 117; Provincial Bank of Canada v. Gagnon, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 98; see also Baxter, at p. 444, citing Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 ref.\nIn the present case, the gain lost by the shareholders is compensable under the rule for assessing damages set out in Art. 1611 C.C.Q. Although the law of civil liability does not, as a general rule, excuse a plaintiff from proving the injury sustained, it is the presidents disloyal conduct that prevents the shareholders from making such proof. The presidents non-disclosure of information to the shareholders was accompanied by efforts to conceal the purchaser companys interest in the group. The presidents cannot be allowed to profit from their breach of the requirements of good faith by arguing that the shareholders failed to prove their injury. In accordance with Biotech Electronics Ltd. v. Baxter, [1998] R.J.Q. 430 (C.A.), the presidents wrongdoing gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the shareholders lost advantage is equivalent to the profits unjustly realized by the presidents. The presumption established in Baxter serves as the basis for a method of calculating damages to compensate the aggrieved party for the injury sustained. It is based on a compensatory objective that is distinct from disgorgement of profits where disgorgement is awarded for a restitutionary purpose in the absence of any injury. The presidents have not rebutted this presumption and the damages owed to the shareholders are equivalent to the difference between the sale price received by the presidents on their resale of the shares to the company and the price received by the shareholders on the initial sale of the shares to the presidents. Appeal was dismissed.\nBiotech Electronics Ltd. v. Baxter, [1998] R.J.Q. 430 (C.A.) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Canada", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "(Appeal from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal 2021 QCCA 1363, [2021] AZ-51794090)\nDecided on 27th October, 2023.\nheard on: 12th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Brown,** Rowe, Kasirer, Jamal and O'Bonsawin, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Audrey Boctor, tienne Morin-L vesque and Laurence Boudreau for the Appellants.\nJean-R mi Thibault, Louis P. B langer and Samuel Nadeau for the Respondents.\nSolicitors for the appellants: IMK, Montr al.\nSolicitors for the respondents: Litige Forseti Inc., Montr al.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ANTOINE PONCE AND DANIEL RIOPEL-Appellants\nVs\nSOCI T D'INVESTISSEMENTS RH AUME LT E, MICHEL RH AUME INVESTISSEMENT LT E, AGENCE ANDR BEAULNE LT E AND 9098-3289 QU BEC INC.-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24012", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 155 = 2024 SLD 155 = 2024 CLD 100", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpY3k", - "Key Words:": "Partnership Act (IX of 1932)-\n-S. 42-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 39, 42 & 54-Suit for declaration, rendition of account, permanent injunction and recovery-Dissolution of partnership-Death of a partner-Interim injunction, refusal of-Scope-Plaintiff claimed that cl. 12 of the Partnership Deed was against the injunction of Islam as a partnership could not continue in the event of death of a partner-Validity-Plaintiffs on the ground that cl. 12 of the Partnership Deed was against injunctions of Islam were not entitled for interim relief on the said ground alone as it was to be decided by Trial Court after thrashing evidence of the parties, as to whether cl. 12 was valid or not, thus, no opinion could be rendered by the Court in that regard-Allegedly, in case the appeal was not accepted the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable loss, however monetary loss did not constitute irreparable loss rather in case a party was found entitled to any fiscal benefit, at the time of final adjudication of the matter, the Court would be empowered to order in that regard but no relief could be granted under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C.-Three ingredients i.e. prima-facie case, balance of inconvenience in favour of the plaintiff and irreparable loss must exist for grant of temporary injunction, which were missing in the case of the plaintiffs-Trial Court had committed no illegality while declining application of grant of temporary injunction- Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nIslamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Zaman Khan and others 1997 SCMR 1508; Khan Muhammad Niazi v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. Assistant Vice-President and Incharge Vigillance Team, President s Secretariat, Habib Bank Annex, Head Office, Karachi and 3 others 1997 MLD 1304; Messrs United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Iftikhar and Company and 6 others PLD 1990 Lah. 111; Iftikhar Siddiqui v. Clifton Cantonment Board and others PLD 1998 Kar. 373; Atif Mehmood Kiyani and another v. Messrs Sukh Chayn Private Limited, Royal Plaza, Blue Area, Islamabad and another 2021 SCMR 1446 and M.S.V. Narayanan Chettiar v. M.S.M. Umayal Achi AIR 1959 Madras 283 ref.\nMuhammad Ashraf Khan v. Abdul Qadar and 3 others 1995 SCMR 296; Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Ganeshi Lal and Sons 2000 PTD 677; Messrs Eastern Medical Technology Services v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2019 Lah. 395; Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. v. PEPSICO Inc. and 4 others 2004 CLD 1530; Irshad Hussain v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 344 and Mrs. Khalida Azhar v. Rustam Ali Bakhshi and others 2007 CLC 339 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Partnership Act, 1932=42Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2Specific Relief Act, 1877=39,42,54", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 73598 of 2021, decided on 15th February, 2022.Dates of hearing: 10th and 15th February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Shujaat Ali Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafeez ur Rehman Ch. assisted by Noor Dad Chaudhry for Appellants.\nRana Shamshad Khan, Additional Advocate General with Ms. Rashida Batool, Registrar of Firm, Sialkot for Respondens.\nMalik Shahbaz Ahmad for Respondent No.1.\nBarrister Osama Ahmad for Respondent No.6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RABEAH HUSSAIN and 3 others-Appellants\nVs\nNUSRAT AFTAB and 6 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24013", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 156 = 2024 SLD 156 = 2024 CLD 106", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Administration of justice-\n-Prevailing law-Applicability-Any action on the basis of existing law, cannot be said to be unlawful if performed under four corners of law.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 15 & 22-Suit for recovery of finance-Execution proceedings-Appellant/borrower defaulted in payment of outstanding installments-For recovery, process was initiated under existing laws-Recovery procedure was adopted in terms of S. 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as available at the relevant time which was only later declared ultra vires-Suit filed by respondent/financial institution was initiated once the matter was set at rest by Supreme Court for recovery under S. 15 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Validity-Suit filed by respondent/financial institution was in time and there was no ambiguity or error in findings of Banking Courts judgment-Two receipts could not form part of account of lease rentals-Definition of S. 2 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 included Leasing Companies for the purposes of defining Financial Institution to invoke jurisdiction of Banking Court-High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Banking Court in favour of respondent/financial institution and against appellant/ borrowers-Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\nNational Bank of Pakistan and 117 others v. SAF Textile Mills Ltd. and another PLD 2014 SC 283 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Hyderabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "First Appeals Nos. 78 and 79 of 2021, decided on 28th September, 2023.heard on: 12th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Arshad Hussain Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Parkash Kumar for Appellants.\nFaiz Durrani, Siraj Ali and Salahuddin for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs QALANDRI FILLING AND CNG STATION SEHWAN through Proprietor and 3 others-Appellants\nVs\nSME LEASING LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24014", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 157 = 2024 SLD 157 = 2024 CLD 113", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Jurisdiction-\n-Every Court prior to taking cognizance and adjudicating upon an issue should first resort to the question of assumption of its jurisdiction and if it comes to the conclusion that jurisdiction can be assumed only then the issue can be adjudicated upon.\nGovernment of Sindh through Secretary Education And Literacy Department and others v. Nizakat Ali and others 2011 SCMR 592 and Fauji Foundation and another v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 ref.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 118 & 119-Shareholders and members-Meaning and scope-Company consists of members, though it has its own separate legal entity and its members are the persons who constitute the company as a corporate body-In the case of a company limited by shares, the shareholders are the members-Terms members and shareholders are usually used interchangeably, being synonymous, as there can be no membership except through the medium of shareholding-Thus, in general, every shareholder is a member and every member is a shareholder-However, there may be exceptions to this statement; a person may be a holder of shares by transfer but will not become its member until the transfer is registered in the books of the company in his favour and his name is entered in the register of members-Similarly, a member who has transferred his shares, though he does not hold any shares yet he continues to be a member of the company until the transfer is registered and his name is removed from the register of members maintained by the company-In a company limited by guarantee, the persons who are liable under the guarantee clause in its Memorandum of Association are members of the company-Likewise, in an unlimited company, the members are the persons who are liable to the company, each in proportion to the extent of their interests in the company, to contribute the sums necessary to discharge in full, the debts and liabilities of the company, in the event of its being wound up.\n(c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 118, 119 & 286- Prevention of oppression and mis-management-Application to Court under S. 286 of the Companies Act, 2017-Maintainability-Purported partners and shareholders in a company-Allegations of companys affairs being run in an unlawful and fraudulent manner-Sections 118 & 119 of the Companies Act, 2017 ( Act ) define the modes of becoming a member of a company; firstly by subscribing to memorandum; secondly by allotment of shares; and, thirdly by entering their name in the register of members of a company in terms of S. 119 of the Act -Though the petitioners in the present case claim themselves as members and shareholders of the subject company but none of the modes, mentioned above, which create obligation upon them, have been fulfilled for invoking S. 286 of the Act-Requirements setting out the essential attributes of a member, cannot therefore, be disregarded-Petitioners never remained the members or shareholders of the company, hence, the prayers made by them cannot be acceded to-Petition under S. 286 of the Act was dismissed.\n(d) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 286- Prevention of oppression and mis-management-Application to Court under S. 286 of the Companies Act, 2017-Scope-Issues with respect to trademark or intellectual property rights cannot be settled through a petition under S. 286 of the Companies Act, 2017.\nNadeem Kiani v. Messrs Americal Lycetuff Pvt. Limited and others 2021 CLD 7 ref.\n(e) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 286-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), Ss. 39 & 40 [since repealed]-Prevention of oppression and mis-management-Proof-Application to Court under S. 286 of the Companies Act, 2017-Maintainability-In the case in hand, the record submitted by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) verifies the stance of the respondents by reporting that a company was registered vide Certificate of Incorporation dated 20.01.2012 and as per Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association, the respondents were reported as subscriber/members/directors having 5100, 4950 and 4950 shares respectively-Further, as per Form 26 dated 28.01.2013, a request was made after passing a special resolution under S. 39 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 ( Ordinance ) for change of name of the company to its current name, which request was acceded to under S. 40 of the Ordinance vide certificate dated 18.02.2013-SECP has also reported that vide Form 29 dated 25.10.2021, received in its office on 31.03.2022, the three respondents were appointed as Directors, with one of them also appointed as the Chief Executive Officer-Notably, the company prior to its name change was registered with the SECP on 20.01.2012 by one of the respondents as sole proprietor but interestingly, the petitioners did not agitate the matter before the concerned forums at the relevant time regardless of the fact that a remedy of rectification of register does lie with the High Court under S. 126 of the Companies Act, 2017 ( Act )-Furthermore, the petitioners could have approached the SECP regarding alleged fraud of the respondents in the affairs of the company and could have gotten information through online service/SDMS portal provided by the SECP or alternatively by lodging complaint or writing an email or even through the phone provided for resolving complaints or even could have contacted through fax; but none of these methods were ever used by the petitioners to strengthen their version and they remained mum for almost ten years and now the present petition has been filed on 21.03.2023 which is also hit by period of laches-Documents annexed with present petition do not show that the affairs of the Company are being conducted in an unlawful and fraudulent manner because the annexed documents includes the deeds of partnership, letter of trademark registry and agreement between the parties; hence the petitioners have not brought on record anything which would constitute and lead to the conclusion that they are the members or shareholders of the company or that its affairs are being conducted in violation of S. 286 of the Act-Petition under S. 286 of the Act was dismissed.\nAbdullah Khan Usmani v. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others 2022 CLD 821 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=118,119,286Companies Ordinance, 1984=39,40", - "Case #": "Civil Original No. 4 of 2023, decided on 19th December, 2023.heard on: 3rd October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saqib Shafique for Petitioners.\nKashif Ali Malik, Advocate Supreme Court with Malik Ghulam Mustafa, Barrister Gulsher Ali and Qaisar Abbas Gondal for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4.\nMirza Muzaffar Ahmed, Chief Prosecutor along with Fatima Shabbir and Shahzad Ali Rana for Respondents-SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ch. SHAUKAT ALI NOON and another-Petitioners\nVs\nTEHZEB BAKERS (PVT.) LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24015", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 158 = 2024 SLD 158 = 2024 CLD 126", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Administration of justice-\n-Heading/caption of an application filed before the Court-Scope-Heading/caption does not matter and it is only the content of the application, which has to be considered by Court.\nAsif Raza Mir v. Muhammad Khurshid Khan 2011 SCMR 1917 rel.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 19 & 22- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12 (2)-Execution of decree- Sale through Court- Fraud and mis- representation, plea of- Appellant/intervener to execution proceedings sought setting aside of judgment and decree by filing application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., but Trial Court dismissed the application-Validity-If fraud was alleged in application filed under S. 12(2), C.P.C., its necessary ingredients must be pleaded, so as to subsequently prove the same-General and bald allegations of fraud and misrepresentation could not form basis to upset a decree, validly passed by a court of competent jurisdiction-Appellant was required to prove that fraud and misrepresentation was done during proceedings in Court; that alleged fraud was due to false statement and concealment of facts and that judgment and decree was collusively obtained on the basis of forged documents, which in the present case were missing-Active concealment and suppression of facts in words and deeds was essential ingredient of fraud, which could not be inferred by mere assertion, rather it was to be proved through strong, independent, clear and convincing evidence and burden was heavier in the cases in which a decree or judgment had been passed by Court of competent jurisdiction under which valuable rights were accrued in favour of opposite-party-Without bringing essential facts on record and evidence in proof of fraud, plea of ignorance and lack of knowledge simpliciter was not sufficient to constitute fraud and dislodge sanctity attached with official acts and judicial proceedings-It was not incumbent on Court to frame issues on every application filed under S. 12(2), C.P.C., especially when particulars of fraud and misrepresentation were missing but it depended upon facts and circumstances of each case-During execution proceedings subject property was auctioned and auction purchaser, pursuant to the directions of Court, deposited entire sale consideration-Right and interest of auction purchaser was created irrespective of the fact that order of confirmation for sale had been passed or not, such right of auction purchaser could not be taken away, as sanctity was attached to judicial sale-High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Banking Court as there was no illegality and/or infirmity in the order-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\n2012 CLC 1891; 2010 YLR 50; PLD 1958 SC 104; PLD 2007 Lah. 341; 2007 MLD 3551; 2007 YLR 2311; PLD 2015 SC 212; PLD 2008 SC 663; 1994 CLC 1044; NLR 1993 SCJ 290; 1993 SCMR 662; 1994 SCMR 782; 1987 SCMR 171; 2007 SCMR 922; 2015 CLD 249; 2014 CLD 390; 2011 CLC 848; 2016 YLR 2246; 2009 CLD 507; 2011 CLC 553; 2017 YLR 138; 2006 YLR 2038; 2015 MLD 57; 1991 SCMR 2063; 2007 SCMR 480; 2015 SCMR 1708; 2006 SCMR 12; PLD 2011 SC 905; PLD 2006 Kar. 278 and 2020 CLC 1835 distinguished.\n2022 CLC 1523; PLD 1976 Kar. 414; 1988 MLD 596; 2003 CLD 552; 2007 CLD 1511; PLD 2005 SC 819; 2019 SCMR 1453; 2019 CLC 389; 2007 SCMR 922; 2014 CLD 390; 2000 MLD 421-424; 2022 CLD 1523; 2017 YLR 1422 and 2003 CLD 1788 ref.\nMst. Nasira Khatoon and another v. Mst. Aisha Bai and 12 others 2003 SCMR 1050; Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Limited and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500; Misbah Khanum v. Kamran Yasin Khan 2022 SCMR 1629 and Mrs. Yasmeen Yaqoob v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and 3 others 2007 CLD 1511 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "Ist Civil Appeal No. 63 of 2018, decided on 19th April, 2023.heard on: 1st March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Irfan Saadat Khan and Arshad Hussain Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abbad-ul-Hasnain for Appellant.\nSyed Aijaz Hussain Shirazi for Respondent No. 1.\nBadar Alam and Khashif Badar for Respondent No. 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASIF MUNAWAR-Appellant\nVs\nBANK ISLAMI PAKISTAN formerly CITI BANK and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24016", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 159 = 2024 SLD 159 = 2024 CLD 137", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Bankers Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891)-\n-S. 4-Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 9 & 10-Suit for recovery-Grant of leave, refusal of-Documents relied by the Bank-General allegations asserted by the customer-Application for grant of leave filed by the customer/ appellants was rejected by the Banking Court-Validity-Record revealed that claim of the respondent/Bank was supported by as many as six documents having been annexed with the plaint, among which the statement of accounts was certified the within the meaning of S. 4 of the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891, therefore, there was no doubt in its authenticity and validity-Appellant/customer disputed the veracity of annexed documents through leave application without any documentary proof, thus, it did not constitute a plausible defense-Appellants failed to present any substantial question of fact or law, which needed to be tried or investigated into-Appellants did not append any proof regarding alleged repayment which were suppressed by the respondent/Bank-In banking suits, the parties had no option to make general allegation/assertions, especially in respect of amounts but must be absolute and specific in said regard-Appellants were rightly held disentitled for grant of leave-No illegality or infirmity was noticed in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court-Appeal filed by the customer was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMessrs New Bhatti Oil Mills through Proprietor and another v. National Bank of Pakistan through Principal Officer and Attorney Holder 2016 CLD 1805; PAK OMAN Investment Company Limited v. CRESOX (Pvt.) Limited 2017 CLD 1659 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Kohinoor Spinning Mills and others 2021 CLD 1112 ref.\n(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 84-Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 9-Suit for recovery-Grant of leave, refusal of-Filing of application for renewal of finance facility, denial of-Appellant/customer denied signatures upon sanction letter regarding renewal of finance facility-Validity-Under Art. 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, the Court enjoined plenary powers to itself compare the signature along with other relevant material to effectively resolve the main controversy-High Court compared the signatures of appellants on relevant sanction letter with admitted signatures on sanction advice and found them similar-Appellants could not deny said similarity on both documents-Thus, the questions regarding non-filing of application for renewal of finance facility and non-execution of other documents did not arise-Appellants were rightly held disentitled for grant of leave-No illegality or infirmity was noticed in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court-Appeal filed by the customer was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMessrs Waqas Enterprises and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and 2 others 1999 SCMR 85 and Dr. Ijaz Ahmad v. Mst. Nasreen Akhtar and others 2005 SCMR 1295 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891=4Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 13 of 2017, heard on 28th November, 2022.\nheard on: 28th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Muhammad Raza Qureshi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Suleman Bhatti for Appellants.\nMuhammad Riaz Kamlana for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs Haji MEHDI HASSAN AND SONS through Partners and 2 others-Appellants\nVs\nALLIED BANK LIMITED through Duly Authorized Attorney/Branch Manager-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24017", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 160 = 2024 SLD 160 = 2024 CLD 141", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 22 & 27-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)-Recovery suit-Fraud or misrepresentation asserted before the Banking Court-Appellant-customer filed an application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. to set aside the judgment and decree- Contention of the appellant/customer was that a fraud had been played on the Banking Court by not mentioning his correct up-to-date address in the title of the plaint, consequently, no valid service was effected on him-Validity-Service might be effected under S. 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO 2001), by any one of the modes mentioned therein-Record revealed that in the present case service was effected through all modes on the appellant/customer, and he was bound to file his leave to defend application within 30 days from service of summons-Section 9 of the FIO, 2001 stipulated that any one of the modes was a valid service provided such service was effected in the manner prescribed by the Appendix to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Appellant/customer did not argue/challenge that service was not affected as provided for in S. 9(5) of the FIO, 2001, in the manner prescribed by the Appendix to the C.P.C., but merely claimed that he did not receive a copy of the summons as the address mentioned in the title of the plaint was incorrect-Appellant/customer did not file leave to defend application and consequently, the Banking Court passed the judgment and decree-Appellant/customer did not prefer any appeal against the said judgment and decree under S. 22 of the FIO, 2001-Appeal filed by the customer was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Amir Safdar v. The Bank Al-Falah Limited through Manager and 2 others 2021 CLC 428 ref.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 22 & 27-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)-Recovery suit-Execution proceedings-Fraud or misrepresentation alleged by the customer/judgment-debtor-Scope-Appellant/customer (defendant/judgment-debtor), during execution proceedings, filed an application under S. 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (C.P.C.) in the Banking Court alleging that fraud had been played on the Court-Validity-Record revealed that after about four (4) years of the passing of the judgment and decree by the Banking Court, the appellant (customer/judgment-debtor) filed an Application under S. 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Under S. 12(2), C.P.C. fraud must be shown by the applicant to have been played upon the Court during the proceedings of the lis-Respondent/Bank sending notices to the last known address of the appellant-customer did not constitute fraud under S. 12(2), C.P.C.-Appeal filed by the customer was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 22 & 27-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)-Recovery suit-Misrepresentation or fraud asserted before the Banking Court by customer (defendant)-Scope-Validity-Application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. did not mention any particulars arguably constituting fraud or misrepresentation which may have been played upon the Banking Court in obtaining judgment and decree from the Banking Court-In absence of any convincing evidence, no misrepresentation or fraud could be alleged to have been contrived by Respondent/Bank to obtain a decision in its favour, which came into being mainly due to the failure of the appellant/customer to put up an appearance before the Banking Court in pursuance of the notices and summons issued to him-Appeal filed by the customer was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMohammad Iftikhar v. Messrs First Dawood Investment Bank Ltd. through Authorized Officer/Attorney and 2 others 2023 CLD 1124 ref.\n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 22 & 27-Recovery suit-Conduct of the appellant-Scope-Conduct of the appellant-customer also did not inspire confidence as no valid grounds had been made out to disturb the orders of the Banking Court-No valid grounds had been made out to hear a time-barred appeal-In the present case, the grounds of appeal remained unsubstantiated, general, vague and bald accusations not supported with any cogent prima facie evidence or material, which might require the issuance of notice to the decree-holder/respondent/ Bank or summoning entire record or admit present appeal in whole or in part-Retaining the present appeal on the docket of the Court would only burden the Court, postpone the inevitable writing on the wall and bring misery for the contesting parties, at least for the decree-holder who was prosecuting execution proceedings against the appellant/customer-No illegality or material irregularity was noticed in the impugned judgments, orders and decrees passed by the Banking Court-Appeal filed by the customer was dismissed in limine, in circumstances.\nColony Textile Mills Ltd. and another v. First Punjab Modarba, 2021 CLD 1212 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22,27Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 80 of 2023, decided on 25th October, 2023.heard on: 25th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zulfiqar Ali Khan for Appellant.\nNemo for Respondent/Faisal Bank Ltd.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SHEHZAD-Appellant\nVs\nFAISAL BANK LIMITED and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24018", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 161 = 2024 SLD 161 = 2024 PCRLJ 147", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpWSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Non-availability of justification for the presence of witness at the time and place of occurrence-Chance witnesses-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant-Ocular account of the prosecution was furnished by complainant and an eye-witness- Both the witnesses were real brothers of the deceased-Said witnesses stated that they were not residents of the village where the occurrence took place rather they were residents of other city situated at a distance of 25/26 kilometers from the place of occurrence-Both the eye-witnesses did not give any specific reason for their visit to the village where the occurrence took place on the relevant day-Complainant conceded that he had neither any business nor residence near the place of occurrence-Eye-witnesses were not residents of the village where the occurrence took place hence they were chance witnesses, therefore, their presence at the spot at the relevant time without establishing any convincing reason was not free from doubt-Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.\nMst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others 2015 SCMR 1142; Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192 and Muhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta and others 2017 SCMR 142 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Delay of nine hours in conducting postmortem examination upon the dead body of the deceased-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant-According to the prosecution case, the occurrence in this case took place on 20.01.2022 at 03:20 p.m.-Complainant himself mentioned in the FIR that his brother (deceased) after receiving injuries died at the spot but according to post mortem report of the deceased, the dead body of deceased was brought in the hospital on 20.01.2022 at 11:50 p.m., and postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased was conducted on 21.01.2022 at 12:10 a.m., i.e., after about nine hours from the occurrence-No plausible explanation had been given by the prosecution that as to why the dead body was brought to the hospital and post mortem examination was conducted with such a delay of about nine hours from the occurrence-Said delay in conducting the postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased was suggestive of the fact that the occurrence was unseen and the delay was consumed in procuring the attendance of fake eye-witnesses-Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Ilyas v Muhammad Abid alias Billa and others 2017 SCMR 54; Khalid alias Khalidi and 2 others v. The State 2012 SCMR 327; Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192; Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326 and Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2012 SCMR 419 rel.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Ocular account and medical evidence-Conflict between-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant-In the contents of the FIR, complainant alleged that the accused gave two brick bat blows which landed on the head and chest of deceased whereas in the post mortem report and pictorial diagrams there was only one injury on the head of the deceased-No injury on the chest of the deceased was noted by the concerned Medical Officer-Both the eye-witnesses stated before the Trial Court that the accused inflicted one brick bat blow on the head and three/four brick bat blows on the chest and shoulder of deceased-Said witnesses were duly confronted with their previous statements and improvements made by them in that respect were duly brought on the record-Moreover, the prosecution witnesses made improvements in their statements while appearing before the Trial Court regarding the number of injuries sustained by the deceased on his chest and shoulder and their improved statements was also in conflict with the medical evidence, therefore, their evidence was not worthy of reliance-Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 137; Irfan Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 840; Usman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Nadeem alias Kala v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 153 and Akhtar Ali and others v. The State 2008 SCMR 6 rel.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Unnatural conduct of eye-witnesses-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant-Record showed that the conduct of the prosecution eye-witnesses of the case was highly unnatural-Complainant and eye-witness were both real brothers of deceased-As per prosecution case the complainant was accompanied by eye-witness, other witness (not produced) and the deceased and as such, the complainant party was comprising of 04-adults members, whereas, the accused was alone but surprisingly they did not try to apprehend the accused after the occurrence nor tried to intervene during the occurrence to save the deceased from the accused-Accused was not armed with any formidable weapon at the time of occurrence and he was only armed with a brick bat-Thus, conduct of the prosecution eye-witnesses, who according to their claim witnessed the occurrence, was highly unnatural, therefore their presence at the spot was highly doubtful and their evidence was not worthy of reliance-Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.\nLiaquat Ali v. The State 2008 SCMR 95; Pathan v. The State 2015 SCMR 315 and Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326 rel.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Motive not proved-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant-Motive of the occurrence as stated in the FIR was that six days prior to the occurrence a quarrel took place between deceased and the accused but the same was patched up with the intervention of the respectables of the locality-No respectable of the locality, who patched up the matter between the parties appeared before the Trial Court in support of the motive part of the prosecution case-Moreover, the complainant while appearing before the Trial Court admitted during his cross-examination that neither he nor other witnesses witnessed the occurrence of motive-Moreover, in his statement recorded by the Trial Court, complainant did not mention any specific date, time or place of occurrence of the motive, whereas, eye-witness did not utter a single word about the motive of occurrence-No reason of the earlier quarrel between the accused and the deceased had been brought on the record-Thus, the prosecution had failed to prove the alleged motive-Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Recovery of weapon of offence-Inconsequential-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant-Record showed that a brick bat was recovered on the pointation of accused-However, recovery memo did not show that brick bat was stained with blood-Moreover, the said brick bat was never sent to the office of Forensic Science Agency to see as to whether the same was stained with blood or not, therefore, it was not safe to rely upon the said piece of evidence of the prosecution-Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(B)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 80274-J of 2022, heard on 4th July, 2023.heard on: 4th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nasir Abbas Zafar Malik, defence counsel for Appellant.\nMs. Asiya Yasin, Deputy District Public Prosecutor with Ibrahim, Sub-Inspector for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "QASIM ALI-Appellant\nVs\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24019", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 206 = 2024 SLD 206 = 2024 PTCL 8", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTc", - "Key Words:": "INCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 (XLIX OF 2001)-Sections 122,177 & 210-The department acknowledges that the order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner but was unable to show from the record that the Deputy Commissioner was given the requisite authority, therefore amended assessment order was passed by an unauthorized officer and it cannot sustained. We enquired from the learned counsel representing the respondent whether the amended assessment order was passed by the Commissioner or an officer on whom the requisite powers had been delegated. The learned counsel for the respondent in presence of Mr. Sohail Ahmed, Additional Commissioner Legal (HQ) RTO, Peshawar, acknowledges that the order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner but was unable to show from the record that the Deputy Commissioner was given the requisite authority. Therefore, we had kept this case aside so that the representative of the respondent could obtain the same if it existed. But when we took up this case again at the end of the day he was still unable to controvert the contention that the amended assessment order was not passed by an unauthorized officer. The impugned orders/judgments of the forums from which this appeal has arisen did not hold that the amended assessment order was passed by a duly empowered Deputy Commissioner nor does the amended assessment order state that he was so authorized.\nTherefore, since the amended assessment order was passed by an unauthorized officer it cannot be sustained. The appellant had urged this point before each of the forums but none of them attended to this nor has any material been placed before us to show that the officer who passed the amended assessment order had been delegated the power to pass such an order. Therefore, this appeal succeeds and the amended assessment order dated 24 October 2014 for the tax year 2009 is set aside being in contravention of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nORDER:", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,177,210", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 51 of 2020, decided on 3rd October, 2020.\n(On appeal from the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 25.09.2019 in Tax Reference No. 29-P/2017).", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA, MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI AND MR. JUSTICE JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Isaac Ali Qazi, ASC.\nRespondent by: Ms. Neelam Azra Khan, ASC along with Mr. Sohail Ahmed, Additional Commissioner Legal (HQ) RTO Peshawar.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AJMAL ALI SHIRAZ.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE PESHAWAR." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24020", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 207 = 2024 SLD 207 = 2024 PTCL 11 = (2024) 129 TAX 176", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Delegation of Statutory Powers for Amendment of Assessment under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe case examines the validity of an amendment to an assessment order made by a Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Deputy Commissioner claimed to have been delegated powers through Order No. 616, dated 5th December 2009, issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Audit-I), Regional Tax Office, Peshawar. The court reviewed whether this order explicitly granted the Deputy Commissioner the statutory authority to amend assessments under Section 122.\nHeld:\n1.\nAbsence of Specific Delegation in Order No. 616:\nThe court held that Order No. 616 did not explicitly refer to Section 122 or provide specific authorization to the Deputy Commissioner for amending assessments. The lack of reference to Section 122 in Column No. 4 of the Table regarding jurisdiction rendered the purported amendment unsustainable.\n2.\nReview Petition Dismissed:\nThe review petition seeking to validate the Deputy Commissioner’s amendment of the assessment was dismissed, as statutory powers under Section 122 remained solely with the Commissioner unless explicitly delegated.\n3.\nTransparency in Notifications:\nThe court emphasized that all notifications or orders delegating powers must be gazetted and displayed on the FBR website for accessibility to FBR officers, tax practitioners, and taxpayers.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No. 426 of 2022, decided on 27th September, 2023. \n[For review of the order dated 03.10.2022 passed by this Court] \nIn Civil Appeal No. 51 of 2020.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. CHIEF JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA. MR. JUSTICE AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND MR. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Ms. Neelam Azra Khan, ASC. a/w Mr. Sohail Ahmed, Additional Commissioner (Legal), FBR. (Through video-link from Peshawar) \nRespondent by: Not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, RTO, PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER.\nVS \nAJMAL ALI SHIRAZ M/S. SHIRAZ RESTAURANT, PESHAWAR." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24021", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 208 = 2024 SLD 208 = 2024 PTCL 15 = (2024) 130 TAX 119", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Assessment of Imported Goods and Applicability of Valuation Rulings under Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThis case focuses on the assessment of imported goods under the Customs Act, 1969. The key issue was whether the value of goods imported before the insertion of the proviso in Section 25A (introduced in 2017) should be determined based on an invoice retrieved from the consignment container under Section 25(1) or according to a Valuation Ruling issued under Section 25A. The Tribunal concluded that the assessment should be based on Valuation Ruling No. 624 of 2013 and not on the retrieved invoice value, thereby remitting fines and penalties imposed on the importer.\nHeld:\nApplicability of Valuation Ruling Prior to 2017:\nGoods imported before the 2017 insertion of the proviso to Section 25A must be assessed based on the existing Valuation Ruling at the time of import. In this case, Valuation Ruling No. 624 of 2013 applied. The proviso to Section 25A, introduced by the Finance Act, 2017, does not have retrospective effect.\nTransactional Value vs. Valuation Ruling:\nThe court ruled that values determined and notified via Valuation Rulings under Section 25A take precedence over transactional values derived from retrieved invoices when a ruling exists. The reliance on the retrieved invoice for assessment under Section 25(1) was incorrect.\nLegal Question Answered:\nThe Tribunal was justified in directing that the assessment of goods imported prior to 2017 be made based on the Valuation Ruling, notwithstanding the higher invoice value retrieved from the consignment. The Tribunals decision was upheld against the Applicant (Customs Department) and in favor of the Respondent (importer).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25", - "Case #": "Special Custom Reference Application No. 220 of 2014, decided on 23rd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE ZULFIQAR AHMED KHAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Nemo.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF APPRAISEMENT (WEST), CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI.\nVS\nACE NUTRITIONS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24022", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 209 = 2024 SLD 209 = 2024 PTCL 21 = 2024 PTD 728 = (2025) 132 TAX 246", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTQ", - "Key Words:": "INCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 (XLIX OF 2001)-Section 113-It is the gross fee and not the gross receipts, which shall be treated as part of turnover for the purposes of commuting the minimum tax liability in terms of Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 113, which excludes reimbursable expenses.- Fundamental question is whether the amounts, comprising of freight charges, terminal charges, shipment handling charges payment of duties and other taxes (‘other amounts’), otherwise distinguishable from the fees paid in lieu of rendering of services in terms of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance of 2001 (Ordinance of 2001), could be treated as gross receipts. Factually, the claim of reimbursement of other amounts is not disputed. If construction proposed by learned counsel for the department is acknowledged - to treat other amounts and the service fees as part of gross receipts-, it would not only render clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 113, redundant but conspicuously distort the meaning and effect of sub-clause (b) of clause (v) of sub-section (7) of section 153 of the Ordinance of 2001. and violates the ratio settled through various judicial pronouncements, wherein the term gross fee” was elucidated.\nThere is no cavil that the term “gross fee”, in the context of rendering of or providing of services, would exclude reimbursable expenses for the purposes of ascertaining the volume of the “turnover”. Accordingly, it is the gross fee and not the gross receipts, which shall be treated as part of turnover for the purposes of commuting the minimum tax liability in terms of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 113, and amounts comprising of freight charges, terminal charges, shipment handling charges payment of duties and other taxes have had to be excluded for the purposes of turnover in terms of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 113 of the Ordinance of 2001.\nWe endorse the determination by Appellate Tribunal, which rightly differed with the determinations by the CIR (Appeals) and Commissioner, which had erroneously treated the amounts, comprising of freight charges, terminal charges, shipment handling charges payment of duties and other taxes, in addition to the gross fee for rendering services, as part of gross receipts.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113,113(3)(a),113(3)(a),120,133,153(1),153(7)(v)(b)", - "Case #": "ITR No. 73773 of 2022, date of hearing: 11th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND MR. JUSTICE ASIM HAFEEZ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Malik Abdullah Raza, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Shoaib Rashid, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, CORPORATE TAX OFFICE, LAHORE.\nVS\nLF LOGISTICS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE & ANOTHER." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24023", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 210 = 2024 SLD 210 = 2024 PTCL 26", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRS8", - "Key Words:": "APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE (APPOINTMENT OF CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS) RULES, 2020 [S.R.O. 1405(I)/2020]\nSee Section 130 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nCONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, 1973\nPreamble\nPreamble of the Constitution envisages equality in opportunities and social justice in the system of Governance under the Constitution.\nArticle 4\nArticle 4 ensures treatment of the qualified person in accordance with law.\nArticle 5\nObedience to the Constitution.-Article 5 imposes obligation of obedience to the Constitution and imposes duty of loyalty to the State upon every citizen. The framers of the Rules, in addition, are under an oath to protect and comply with the Constitution and its command. An oath, in substance, is a holly pledge or promise by keeping the Almighty Divine Authority as witness.\nArticle 27\nArticle 27, safeguard against discrimination to a person qualified for appointment.\nINCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 (XLIX OF 2001)-Section 130-As the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020 were not approved by Federal Cabinet, were declared as ultra vires to the Constitution, the appointments of Members and Chairman of ATIR under these Rules are illegal and without lawful authority.-The words ‘Prime Minister’ as used in existing subsection (2) of Section 130 of the Ordinance of 2001 shall be read as ‘Federal Government’ from the date when this provision was brought in the statute book. The provision is hereby read down accordingly.\nAdmittedly, the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020, were not approved by the Federal Cabinet, therefore, are declared ultra vires to the Constitution and provisions of Section 130(2), as read down.\nTo save the continuity in system, the de facto doctrine is invoked to direct that the Members and Chairman appointed under the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020 are allowed to continue their service, till the appointment of regular incumbents.-Though the appointments, under the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020 are also illegal and without lawful authority, however, to save the continuity in system, the de facto doctrine is invoked to direct that the Members and Chairman appointed under the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020 are allowed to continue their service, till the appointment of regular incumbents, under the Rules, to be framed and promulgated by the Federal Government, in consonance with the law, as laid down in Mustafa Impex Case, reported as PTCL 2017 CL. 456.\nCertain guidelines for the framers of future Rules for appointment of Member and Chairman of ATIR by High Court.- It is important to sensitize, the framers of future Rules for appointments of Members and Chairman in ATIR, that the country is going through its worst economic condition. Only way out is economic stability and consequential tax collection. The economic stability cannot be achieved without certainty in decisions on tax and economic matters by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities. The investment has no nationality, therefore, migrates, like seasonal birds, to a place where conditions are conducive and certain for their survival and growth. Tax Tribunals, are last fact finding independent forum, which must pass prompt and consistent orders, in accordance with the law laid down by Superior Courts. The whole exercise of tax assessment and tax collection in Billions of Rupees, drains, when decision is passed by Members of the Tribunals incompetently or for extraneous consideration. A competent lawyer would never, leave his practice for appointment as Member on contract for few years, in absence of a career in the job and a chance of elevation. To bring certainty in judicial decisions on commercial and taxation matter, the relevant Tribunals and Courts should be the nurseries for picking up, on merits, the Judges for Constitutional Courts. For achieving this goal, the Constitutional Courts should have an overarching or supervisory role, in appointments of Members and Judges of the Commercial Courts and Tribunals. The Constitutional Courts can always gauge the competence of Member or a Judge, when decisions are brought before them in Appellate or Reference Jurisdiction, to elevate from them for Constitutional Courts, based on competence and integrity.\nUnfortunately, these posts are being filled on political basis, by considering the allegiance, to a political party or a group of lawyers, as eligibility criteria.\nThere is no denial that the posts of Members and Chairman of ATIR are in connection with the affairs of the Federation, therefore, under Article 240 of the Constitution, appointments to the posts and the conditions of service should be or under the Act of Majlis-e-Shura (Parliament). Though not decided specifically, however, if it is presumed that Rules to be framed under the Section 130(2) are under the Act of Parliament, the framers of the Rules, has to comply with command of the Constitution. The competitive process, to determine capacity and capability based on eligibility, Public Service Commissions are constituted under Article 242 of the Constitution. The statutes under this mandate are providing an independent forum and procedure, thereunder. The tendency of bypassing this forum would not only deprive the deserving candidates from appointment on merits, but would instill mistrust in the candidates and those who are striving for the future and fortune. They would always look for ‘SIFARISI1 and pledge their ability and competence, in the hands of those who exploit them for political or extraneous purpose.\nSee Section 130 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=130", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 27339 of 2023, decided on 18th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE SHAHID JAMIL KHAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by:\nM/s Shahbaz But and Chaudhary Anwaar-ul-Haq Arif, Advocates. Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General. Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General.\nFederation by:\nRespondent No. 5 by: Respondent No. 6 by:\nBarrister Lamia Niazi, Advocate. Mr. M. Nazeer Chauhan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "LAHORE TAX BAR ASSOCIATION\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24024", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 211 = 2024 SLD 211 = 2024 PTCL 44", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRSs", - "Key Words:": "SALES TAX ACT, 1990-Sections 8 & 73-In cases of refund of input tax, to burden the buyer of goods, with the liability of its registered supplier, actually tantamounts to transferring the responsibility of recovery of sales tax from the department which has failed to take any action, to the registered buyer, as the .lbuyer cannot be punished for the neglect of the department-authority.-The learned two Court have concluded that the petitioner-authority has a remedy against the supplier of the respondent. Insofar as the respondent is concerned, it has taken the requisite steps for paying the dues on its supply, including the input/sales tax through a crossed cheque. In the absence of any official notification in the display by the petitioner’s software, the respondent had no means of establishing whether the sales tax on the supply made by the supplier and recovered from the respondent had been deposited or not. The record is also silent in this respect. Consequently, the petitioner did not have a cause of action against the respondent and its remedy lay against the supplier of the goods. The petitioner-authority appears to have taken no action against the defaulting supplier. For all these reasons, we consider that to burden the respondent buyer of goods with the liability of its supplier which is also registered person actually tantamounts to transferring the responsibility of recovery of sales tax from the petitioner which has failed to take any action, to the respondent. The respondent cannot be punished for the neglect of the petitioner-authority.\nDepartment has no cause of action where it claims that under Section 8(l)(ca) the buyer is not entitled to refund where its supplier fails to deposit sales tax in government treasury as it was the responsibility of department to take action against supplier, the buyer cannot be punished for neglect of department-authority.\nThe department-authority did not have a cause of action against the buyer and its remedy lay against the supplier of the goods.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8,73", - "Case #": "C.P. 1830 to 1847/2022, decided on 4th July, 2022.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.02.2022 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in STRNo. 9-P to 26-P of 2017)", - "Judge Name:": " MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, MR. JUSTICE AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Rehman Ullah, ASC.\nRespondents by: NR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR.\nVS\nM/S GADOON TEXTILE MILLS, SWABI AND ANOTHER." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24025", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 212 = 2024 SLD 212 = 2024 PTCL 67", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTk", - "Key Words:": "CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, 1973-Article 199-See Sections 2(31), 39, 52 & 76 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012.\nPUNJAB SALES TAX ON SERVICES ACT, 2012 Sections 2(31), 39, 52 & 76-Merely because a judgment has been suspended by a Division Bench of High Court cannot be a sole ground not to follow the said judgment for deciding similar matters, as the issue of impugned notices being issued by Authority/officers not validly appointed as regards Section 39(1) read with Section 76 which has already been decided by High Court, the same is to be decided in same terms.-The petitioners have challenged the vires of various show cause notices and other notices (impugned notices), mainly on the ground that the same are not issued by the Competent Authority. It is argued that impugned notices have been issued by various Authorities/Officers mentioned in section 39 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 (Act), however, these Authorities/Officers are not validly appointed through rules, as required under section 39(1) read with section 76 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that this short legal question has already been decided by this Court in various petitions alongwith Writ Petition No. 16217/2020 vide judgment dated 06.6.2023, therefore, submits that these petitions may also be decided in the same terms.\nI have gone through the judgment of this Court dated 06.6.2023 in writ petition No. 16217/2020 and agree with the reasoning recorded and conclusion drawn therein, which is also on all four to the facts and circumstances of these cases. Merely because the said judgment has been suspended by the Division Bench of this Court cannot be a sole ground not to follow the said judgment for deciding similar matters.\nWhen appeal against Single Bench judgment is filed and the operation of judgment is suspended, such suspension operates only inter parties and not as a judgment in rem, hence does not detract from binding effect of judgment as precedent unless judgment is finally set aside.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1962=199Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=2931),39,52.76", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 39463/2023, decided on 9th October, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE ABID AZIZ SHEIKH", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Barrister Asfandyar Khan Tareen, Mr. Arslan Saleem Chaudhry, Mr. Allah Nawaz Khosa, Rana Usman Habib Khan, Mr. M. Fahad Saeed, Ms. Noreen Fouzia, Mr. Omer Wahab, Mr. M. Ahsan Nawaz Sial, Mr. Gul Nawaz, Mr. Mustafa Kamal, Khawaja Aizaz Ahsan, M. Farooq Sh., Mr. Azeem, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Mr. Ahmad Hassan, Mr. Samran Mushtaq Ch., Mr. Qasim Hassan Khan, Advocates. Mr. Ahmed Raza Chattha, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan, Mr. Omer Farooq Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab along with Ghulam Akhtar, Law Officer, Finance Department and Shahbaz Ahmad Sheikh, Law Officer, Finance Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NESTLE PAKISTAN LIMITED ETC.\nVS\nTHE PROVINCE OF PUNJAB ETC.O" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24026", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 213 = 2024 SLD 213 = 2024 PTCL 81 = (2024) 130 TAX 583", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRTg", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Framework:\nSales Tax Act, 1990, Section 10:\nPertains to the refund of excess input tax, particularly for taxpayers involved in zero-rated local supplies or exports.\nSection 10(1): Refund claims must be processed within 45 days. However, claims can undergo pre-refund audits if there is reason to believe the claim is not admissible.\nSection 10(3): Specifies timeframes for concluding pre-refund audits:\nInitial period: 60 days.\nExtension: Up to 120 days by the Additional Commissioner, and up to 9 months by the Board with written reasons.\nNon-adherence to these time limits violates the taxpayers rights under the Constitution.\nSales Tax Rules, 2006 (Rule 30):\nAllows issuance of show-cause notices if further inquiry or audit is deemed necessary.\nThe principle of audi alteram partem (right to be heard) is integral to these proceedings.\nSection 67 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990:\nProvides for additional compensation (KIBOR rate) for delays in refunds.\nCompensation is applicable only after the refund claim is accepted and not during ongoing pre-refund audits.\nConstitutional Articles 23 and 24:\nArticle 23: Right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property.\nArticle 24: Protection against deprivation of property without legal justification.\nNon-adherence to Section 10(3) timelines constitutes a violation of these fundamental rights.\nArticle 199 of the Constitution:\nAllows constitutional petitions against actions or omissions of state functionaries.\nCourts generally do not intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings unless there is an abuse of process or blatant violation of law.\nObservations and Court Directions:\nNon-Adherence to Timelines:\nFailure to adhere to Section 10(3) time limits results in unjust enrichment of the state and deprivation of taxpayer rights.\nThe Federal Government must legislate to introduce consequences for such non-compliance to safeguard taxpayer rights.\nPre-Refund Audit:\nInitiation of pre-refund audit must be based on reason to believe and not mere suspicion.\n Reason to believe must be grounded in tangible and prudent considerations.\nIssuance of Show-Cause Notices:\nShow-cause notices allow taxpayers to address discrepancies and are an implementation of natural justice.\nConstitutional petitions challenging show-cause notices are premature unless the notices are unlawful or abuse the process of law.\nExpeditious Disposal of Claims:\nTax authorities are obligated to conclude audits and refund claims within the statutory timeframe.\nDelays undermine taxpayer confidence and violate constitutional protections.\nPolicy and Legislative Recommendations:\nThe Federal Government is directed to consider legislative amendments to ensure strict adherence to Section 10(3) and impose penalties for delays.\nConclusion:\nThis case reiterates the balance between tax administration and taxpayer rights. While tax authorities are empowered to verify claims, they must do so within stipulated timeframes and with adherence to principles of natural justice. The High Court has emphasized the importance of legislative reform to address systemic delays and ensure the protection of taxpayers fundamental rights.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=23,24,199Sales Tax Act, 1990=10,10(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 41067/2023, announced on 15th December, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE ANWAAR HUSSAIN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Addl. Attorney General, Pakistan. \nMr. Muhammad Anwar Khan, Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. Ahmed Pervaiz, Advocate for the respondent-FBR", - "Petitioner Name:": "AGRITECH LIMITED.\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24027", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 214 = 2024 SLD 214 = 2024 PTCL 106", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRXo", - "Key Words:": "BALOCHISTAN COMPANIES PROFITS (WORKERS PARTICIPATION) ACT, 2022 (XX OF 2022)-Section 3-It is the Balochistan Act, that have to be applied and the workers here would get an amount proportionate to their numbers where the trans-province companies are engaged in manufacturing activities in Balochistan having registered office out side the Province. The question of liabilities under the Balochistan Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 2022, in terms of section 3(b), that a company “pay every year to the Fund not later than nine months after the close of that year five percent of its profits during such year” on the part of trans-province companies or the companies engaged in manufacturing activities in Balochistan but registered offices outside the province is also irrelevant because the law in is province would have to be applied and the workers here would get an amount proportionate to their number, even otherwise, this dispute has been set at rest by the Hon’ble Sindh High Court in Shafiquddin Moinee case, relevant part whereof reads as under:\n In the case of trans-provincial companies, it is the Sind Act that applies, but interpreted, read and applied such that the obligation under the Act is only to make distribution to the workers in this Province, and only of an amount that is proportionate to their number here It is irrelevant where the registered office and/or the industrial undertaking of the trans-provincial company are located i.e. they could be located in this Province or elsewhere. Furthermore, in making the computation, the whole of the profits made by the company are to be used, regardless of where they were earned in the country”\nThe trans-provincial companies should be dealt with in the light of judgment, passed by the Honourable Sindh High Court in the case of Shafiquddin Moinee v. Federation of Pakistan” reported in 2018 CLD 1088 Sindh.\nHigh Court directed Balochistan Revenue Authority to immediately start necessary recoveries from all industrial establishment operating in Balochistan, including those in Hub are required to pay WWF/WPPF being engaged in manufacturing activities within the province.-See Sections 3 & 4 of the Balochistan Worker’s Welfare Fund Act, 2022.\nObservation of High Court on the negligence on the part of Provincial government while implementing the Balochistan Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 2022 and Balochistan Worker’s Welfare Fund Act, 2022 and causing huge loss to the public exchequer. It is strange to observe that the negligence on the part of provincial government while implementing the Acts in question and causing a huge loss to the public exchequer is evident from the fact that the collecting agent i.e. BRA has successfully collected a significant sum of Rs. 51.2 million in just the first three months of the current financial year, and the said amount has been collected from only four establishments. On the contrary, the FBR collected a mere Rs. 11 million for the previous two years from 11 establishments under the previous system.\nSection 5\nHigh Court directed to constitute the committee under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Balochistan Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act 2022.\nBALOCHISTAN WORKER’S WELFARE FUND ACT, 2022-(XXI OF 2022)-Sections 3 & 4-High Court directed Balochistan Revenue Authority to immediately start necessary recoveries from all industrial establishment operating in Balochistan, including those in Hub are required to pay WWF/WPPF being engaged in manufacturing activities within the province.-It is painful to observe that as per report, submitted by the respondents, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) accumulated mere 17 million over past two years on account of WWF and WPPF, with Rs. 11.4 million collected in tax year 2022 and Rs. 5.4 million in tax year 2023, whereas, the Balochistan Revenue Authority (BRA) as a collection agent can easily collect a potential amount, possibly reaching into the billions in contrast to the modest sums collected by FBR. It is also worth mentioning that several companies operating in Hub region have declared themselves as trans-provincial entities, claiming that they are fulfilling their WWF/WPPF obligations to Sindh Revenue Board (SRB) and FBR, however, our Act unequivocally mandates that all industrial establishments operating in Balochistan, including those in Hub, are required to pay WWF/WPPF being engaged in manufacturing activities within the province.\nBaluchistan Revenue Authority (BRA) is directed to immediately start making necessary recoveries from all the establishments in\naccordance with law and the Act in question.\nObservation of High Court on the negligence on the part of Provincial government while implementing the Balochistan Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 2022 and Balochistan Worker’s Welfare Fund Act, 2022 and causing huge loss to the public exchequer.-See Section 3 of the Balochistan Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 2022.\nSection 8\nHigh Court directed to immediately constitute the Governing Body under Section 8(1) of the Balochistan Worker’s Welfare Fund Act, 2022 by notification in the official gazette.\nWorker Welfare Board is restrained from making important decisions, including any sort of appointments till constitution of new governing body under the provisions of Act of2022.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 2022=3,5Balochistan Workers Welfare Fund Act, 2022=3,4", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. 356/2023, decided on 11th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR AND MR. JUSTICE ROZI KHAN BARRECH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. Muhammad Ali Kanrani Advocate.\nRespondent Nos. 1 to Mr. Shai Haq Balochistan, Additional 4 by: Advocate General.\nRespondent No. 5 by: M/s Kaleemullah Quresh and Jehanzaib Majeed, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. Hazrat Ali Kakar son of Abdul Haq resident of Manha, District Ziarat, 2. Rasool Bakhsh Khosa son of Muhammad Nawaz, resident of District Sohbat Pur.\nVs\n1. The Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan, Civil Secretariat, Quetta.\n2. Secretary Labour and Manpower Department/Chairman Worker Welfare Board Balochistan, Civil Secretariat, Quetta. 3. Secretary Finance Department, Government of Balochistan, Civil Secretariat, Quetta. 4. The Chairman Balochistan Revenue Authority (BRA), Civil Secretariat, Quetta. 5. The Secretary Worker Welfare Board Balochistan, Civil Secretariat, Quetta." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24028", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 215 = 2024 SLD 215 = 2024 PTCL 114 = 2024 PTD 1214", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpRXk", - "Key Words:": "SALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)-Sections 11, 25, 30 & 72B-Director General Audit Inland Revenue Receipt ( DGAIRR ) does not fall within categories of the officers as provided under Section 30, therefore on the basis of the audit conducted by the DGAIRR, the assessment order could not have been passed without verification/audit of the invoices/ record of the taxpayers.-The show cause notices were issued to the respondent on the basis of audit conducted by Director General Audit Inland Revenue Receipts (“DGAIRR”), who does not fall within the categories of the officers as provided under section 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Similar issue came up before this Court in STR No. 01-P/2017, which was decided through judgment dated 16.05.2023 in the following manner:-\n“4. In the present case, show cause notice was issued to the respondents on the basis of audit conducted by Director General Audit Inland Revenue Receipts ( DGAIRR ) who has allegedly conducted an audit in respect of sales tax invoices of the respondents for a period from March 2010 to 2013. On the basis of report of DGAIRR, the department has neither conducted any further audit under section 25 nor in terms of section 72B of the Act. Admittedly, DGAIRR does not fall within categories of the officers as provided under Section 30 of the Act, therefore, on the basis of the said audit conducted by the DGAIRR, the assessment order could not have been passed without verification/audit of the invoices/record of the respondents. This issue has been settled by this Court in the case of “Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Peshawar vs. Makk Beverages (Pvt) Ltd, Peshawar (PTCL 2010 CL. 393) . The said judgment of this Court was also affirmed by the Apex Court in Civil Petition No. 1580 of 2008 when admittedly this Court while annulling the assessment order has directed that the Federal Excise and Sales Tax Department may conduct fresh audit of the respondents-unit, if so advised and permissible under the law and in case any contravention is detected, the respondents-unit may be proceeded against in accordance with law.\n5. In view of the above, since the matter has already been settled by this Court as well as by the Apex Court, therefore, there is no occasion to interfere in the matter; hence, this Custom Reference is answered in negative. Copy of this judgment be sent to the appellate tribunal in terms of Section 86(5) of the Act .\nKeeping in view the judicial discipline, we are not inclined to hold a different view. Therefore, these References are answered in Negative.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,25,30,72B", - "Case #": "STR No. 33-P/2022, decided on 10th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE ABDUL SHAKOOR AND MR. JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Ms. Sehrish Munawar Bokhari, Advocate, along with Sharifullah Assistant Director (Legal).\nRespondents by: Mr. Hussain Ahmad Shirazi & Muazzam Ali Butt, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (CORPORATE ZONE), PESHAWAR.\nVS\nM/S. TRIBAL AREAS ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD., PESHAWAR." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24029", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 216 = 2024 SLD 216 = 2024 PTCL 119", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTc", - "Key Words:": "CONVENTION BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME. [NOTIFICATION NO. S.R.O. 187(I)/84, DATED THE 28TH FEBRUARY, 1984]\nCONVENTION BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF MALTA FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME.\n[NOTIFICATION NO. S.R.O. 57(I)/76, DATED THE 20TH DECEMBER, 1976]\nSections 7 & 107-Income arising from container detention charges (“CDC”), container service charges (“CSC”) and terminal handling charges (“THC”) falls within the category of “profits from the operation of ships in international traffic” in the context of double taxation conventions concluded between Pakistan and Denmark, as well as between Pakistan and Belgium.-The question before us is whether income arising from container detention charges (“CDC”), container service charges (“CSC”) and terminal handling charges (“THC”) falls within the category of “profits from the operation of ships in international traffic” in the context of double taxation conventions concluded between Pakistan and Denmark, as well as between Pakistan and Belgium.\nThe High Court, in its decision given in Income Tax References filed by the respondents, concluded that profits arising from CDC, CSC, and THC fell within the scope of the term “profits from the operation of ships in international traffic” as stipulated in Article 8 of the two Conventions. Consequently, such profits were deemed eligible for the benefit of favourable taxation. The Department is now seeking leave to appeal the High Court’s determination, challenging the inclusion of CDC, CSC, and THC under the umbrella of “profits from the operation of ships in international traffic” and their eligibility for beneficial taxation envisaged in Article 8 of the two Conventions.\nThe respondents, being tax residents of Denmark and Belgium, are entitled to the benefits and concessions under the Pakistan- Denmark Convention and the Pakistan-Belgium Convention, as the case may be, in line with the provisions of Section 107 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 (“Ordinance”). Under subsection 2(c) of Section 107 of the Ordinance, the taxability of the respondents’ income is to be determined under the provisions contained in the two Conventions which override the Ordinance.\nCommon to both the Conventions, relates to the nature of profits arising from CDC, CSC, and THC: whether these profits fall within the scope of the term “profits from the operation of ships in international traffic” or not.\nThe issue before us pertains to the characterization of income arising from CDC, CSC, and THC. Let us have a look at the meaning of CDC, CSC, and THC in order to understand the nature of these incomes. The High Court has observed, and there exists no contention between the parties on this point, that CDC is the amount collected on account of rent of container, which is charged if a customer holds the said container beyond the stipulated time required to discharge the goods at the intended port of disembarkation; CSC is collected by shipping lines on account of services in respect of containers which may be required due to discharge of goods at the destination; and THC is collected by shipping lines on account of terminal charges incurred at the port of disembarkation.\nThe expression “profits from the operation of ships in international traffic” therefore also covers profits from activities directly connected with such operations as well as profits from activities which are not directly connected with the operation of the enterprise’s ship in international traffic as long as they are ancillary to such operation - activities that the enterprise does not need to carry on for the purposes of its own operation of ships in international traffic but which make a minor contribution relative to such operation and are so closely related to such operation that they should not be regarded as a separate business or source of income of the enterprise should be considered to be ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic. We also note that since 2017, the UN MC Commentary fully reproduces the OECD guidance.\nThe objective scope of Article 8 of the OECD MC and the UN MC with its reference to “profits from the operation of ships in international traffic” covers not only profits directly obtained by the enterprise from the transportation of passengers or cargo by ships that it operates in international traffic, but also, profits from activities directly connected with such operations as well as profits from activities which are not directly connected with the operation of the enterprise’s ships in international traffic as long as they are ancillary to such operation.\nThe issue in question concerns income arising from three sources: CDC, CSC, and THC. Notably, two of these sources involve charges imposed for services related to containers, whereas the third pertains to charges associated with terminal services for cargo handling. In the context of such income sources. Vogel, a recognized authority, emphasizes the widespread use of containers in international transport. Profits arising from short-term storage of containers or from detention charges for the late return of containers, according to Vogel, are covered within the purview of “profits from the operation of ships in international traffic”. Further, special remuneration for services ancillary to container operations are covered within the ambit of shipping income from international traffic. Income derived from services provided for cargo handling is also considered part of shipping income from international traffic when directly connected or ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic.\nWe thus reach the conclusion that profits arising from CDC, CSC and THC are connected with and ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic. Consequently, these profits squarely fall within the purview of the expression “profits from the operation of ships in international traffic”. Therefore, CDC, CSC, and THC collected by the respondents are part of the revenue earned in shipping in international traffic and are to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Pakistan-Denmark Double Taxation Convention and the Pakistan-Belgium Double Taxation Convention, as the case may be. As a result, we do not feel inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.\nInterpretation of International Tax Conventions.- Notably, the matter at hand involves the interpretation of international tax conventions. Recently, this Court in Snamprogetti Engineering B.V. v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, PTCL 2023 CL. 722 emphasized the distinctiveness of international tax treaties, their specific interpretive framework, and the importance of equitable outcomes in cross-border taxation. International tax treaties, conventions or agreements, given their unique nature, as held in Snamprogetti, require a distinct interpretive approach compared to the one used while interpreting domestic legislation. These agreements being international treaties are governed by the rules of interpretation outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Tax treaties differ from domestic tax laws in language, application, and purpose. These treaties are relieving in nature and seek to avoid double taxation, while domestic tax law imposes tax in specific situations. Tax treaties require a broad purposive interpretation, and their interpretation may be more liberal than domestic law. Treaty interpretation is a separate subject from statutory interpretation, accentuating the need to interpret tax treaties independently of domestic law. The role of a State in a bilateral agreement is more of implementing the terms of such agreement rather than that of interpreting the same and that too in a unilateral manner. Given that the primary purpose of tax treaties is to avoid and relieve double taxation through equitable and acceptable distribution of tax claims between the countries, it is important that the provisions of these treaties are interpreted in a common and workable manner, taking into account international tax language, legal decisions of other countries, model treaties, aloqg with their commentaries, developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the United Nations (“UN”) (United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries), and scholarly academic works where appropriate.\nINTERPRETATION OF STATUTE\nInterpretation of International Tax Conventions.-See Sections 7 & 107 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nNOTIFICATION NO. S.R.O. 57(I)/76, DATED 20.12.1976\nNOTIFICATION NO. S.R.O. 187(I)/84, DATED 28.02.1984", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. 560-K/2019 to C.P. 589-K/2019, decided on 12th January, 2024.\n(Against the consolidated judgment of High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 31.05.2019, passed in ITRAs No. 22 of 2014[1], etc.).", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MR. JUSTICE JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND MR. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by Dr. Shahnawaz, ASC. Mr. Abdul Wahid, Addl. Commissioner, FBR.\nRespondents by Mr. Khalid Javed Khan, ASC (Through V.L Karachi Registry)", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-IV, KARACHI. (IN ALL CASES) \nVS\nM/S. A.P. MOLLER MAERSK.\nM/S. SAFMARINE CONTAINER LINE." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24030", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 217 = 2024 SLD 217 = 2024 PTCL 167 = 2024 PTD 1163", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTY", - "Key Words:": "CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, 1973-Article 199-Where there is a glaring exercise of misuse of powers and authority on the part of FTO, it cannot be overlooked by High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 199.-The FTO, speaking through his Adviser has even failed to consider the reply forwarded by the Petitioner (Officer of Inland Revenue, FBR) to the Agency for onward submission of comments to the office of FTO. This is a glaring exercise of misuse of powers and authority on the part of FTO which cannot be overlooked by High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, which requires High Court to correct such brazenly obvious and notable wrongs committed by the authorities below.\nArticle 199 requires the High Court to correct brazenly obvious and notable wrongs committed by authorities below.\nCUSTOMS ACT, 1969 (IV OF 1969)-Sections 179 & 193-The acts and functions by officers of FBR while performing Qausi-judicial functions under tax laws are not always subject to an administrative control of FBR so as to bring disciplinary proceedings against such officers for passing orders while performing such functions.\nESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN ORDINANCE, 2000-Section 9-Domain and jurisdiction while dealing complaints by Federal Tax Ombudsman as interpreted by Constitutional Courts.-It appears to be a matter of record that time and again the Courts have interpreted the law including the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 (“FTO Ordinance”), as well as the jurisdiction which can and cannot be exercised by FTO; and notwithstanding these judgments, the FTO is passing somewhat similar orders by completely ignoring the dictum laid down by the Courts. Such an act of his office, on the face of it appears to be contemptuous and against the law settled by the Courts. This tendency of his office has to be looked into as time and again the judgments of the Constitutional Courts are being disobeyed as if they are worthless piece of papers for him. it is high time that the office of FTO realizes its domain and jurisdiction while dealing with Complaints and shall not become the supervisory body or authority of all the employees of FBR as they are to be dealt with strictly in accordance with the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder. Per settled law, once the Ordinance or any law has been interpreted by a Constitutional Court, then the office of Ombudsman is bound to accept the same and cannot be said to be aggrieved of, if the powers to redress mal-administration vested in him under the law are modified (enhanced or curtailed) through interpretation of Constitutional Court, whereas, even the Ombudsman has no locus standi to challenge an order passed by the Constitutional Court that interprets its jurisdiction or powers under the law (Wafaqi Mohlasib Secretariat v. SNGPL (PLD 2020 SC 586).\nOnce the Ordinance or any law has been interpreted by a Constitutional Court, then the office of Ombudsman is bound to accept the same and cannot be said to be aggrieved of, if the powers to redress maladministration vested in him under law are modified through interpretations by Constitutional Courts.\nSections 9,10,13 & 14\nThe conduct of Federal Tax Ombudsman whereby, adverse findings have been recorded against the Petitioner (Officer of Inland Revenue, FBR) while deciding a complaint of a taxpayer cannot be sustained as it was done without any notice and without following the principles of natural justice.- Admittedly, while deciding the complaint and recording adverse observations against the Petitioner, he was never ever confronted with any notice or summons for explanation in any manner.\nComing to the FTO Ordinance itself, it can be seen from perusal of Section 10(4) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 (“FTO Ordinance”) that when the FTO proposes to conduct an investigation he is required to issue notice to the Secretary of the Revenue Division, and to the person who is aliened in the complaint to have taken or authorized the action complained of. calling upon him to reply to the allegations contained in the complaint: It is abundantly clear that a notice has to be issued to both i.e. Revenue Division as well as the person against whom the complaint has been filed. It has been admitted bfefore us during arguments by the learned Counsel for FTO, that no notice whatsoever was issued to the Petitioner.\nEven if it appears that there are certain provisions in the FTO Ordinance or for that matter under any other law, which empowers the FTO to initiate any proceedings and action against any person, without notice; but when looked into on the touchstone of Article ‘.0(A) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, it appears that such an action cannot be sustained by the Courts. At east not in the manner as has been done by the FTO in this case.\nThe entire exercise carried out by FTO against the Petitioner, -hereby, his service record has been tarnished and adverse findings have been recorded without any memo of explanation or i: least a notice cannot be sustained under any circumstances, notwithstanding the provisions of the Ordinance and law as noted hereinabove. In fact, the FTO, speaking through his Adviser (as noted from the impugned order) has even failed to consider the reply forwarded by the Petitioner to the Agency for onward submission of comments to the office of FTO. This is a glaring exercise of misuse of powers and authority on the part of FTO which cannot be overlooked by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, which requires this Court to correct such brazenly obvious and notable wrongs committed by the authorities below.\nIn our considered opinion the conduct of FTO whereby, adverse findings have been recorded against the Petitioner while deciding a complaint of a taxpayer cannot be sustained as it was done without any notice and without following the principles of natural justice. Moreover, such an act is also in violation of the judgment(s) of the Constitutional Courts.\nFEDERAL EXCISE ACT, 2005-Sections 14 & 33-The acts and functions by officers of FBR while performing Qausi-judicial functions under tax laws are not always subject to an administrative control of FBR so as to bring disciplinary proceedings against such officers for passing orders while performing such functions.\nFEDERAL OMBUDSMEN INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS ACT, 2013-Section 15-Before taking any adverse action against any person especially in respect of service matters, it is mandatory that a notice shall be issued to that person before initiation of any adverse action.\nIf an Ombudsman intends to invoke the provision of Section 15, he is at least required to pass an order for exercising such powers, as this provision is an exception and not a rule for all cases. He must record his reasons to invoke Section 15 and reasons must be based on fair and judicial exercise of discretion.- We would like to discuss the implication of Section 15 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, on which much stress was laid by the learned Counsel for FTO. From perusal of this provision though it appears that it is not necessary for an Ombudsman to give personal hearing to the parties and the matter may be decided on the basis of available record and written comments filed by the Agency. Now the word parties or party has not been defined in the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013; nor in the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000; however, one can easily draw an inference that it is referring to the Complainant before the Ombudsman, the other party being the Agency is the Revenue Division as defined in Section 2(7) of the Ordinance. Secondly, section 15 ibid further provides that in case no personal hearing is being provided, the matter can be decided on the basis of written comments, and a natural corollary would be that these comments would be coming from the Agency and no one else. The Petitioner before us is neither a Complainant; nor an Agency; hence, this provision would neither apply nor any protection can be claimed thereof while taking an adverse action against the Petitioner; nor even any recommendation for that matter. Moreover, for calling comments it would be mandatory to issue a notice to the Agency, whereas, in this matter, even if it is presumed that the Petitioner being an employee was by himself an Agency, even then he was never ever asked to file any comments by the FTO’s office. It is a matter of commonsense that even for calling comments, it would be mandatory to issue notice to the Agency, and only then the requirement of dispensing with any personal hearing could be made. Lastly, if an Ombudsman intends to invoke the provision of Section 15 of the 2013, Act, he is, at least, required to pass an order for exercising such powers under Section 15 ibid, as this provision is an exception and not a rule for all cases. He must record his reasons to invoke this provision, which reasons must be based on fair and judicial exercise of discretion, whereas, it is not that in every run of a mill case this provision can be invoked to the detriment of any person. Therefore, any protection so claimed on behalf of FTO under s. 15 ibid is of no help, and is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case.\nScope, application and nature of Section 15.\nSection 15 is an exception and not a rule for all cases.\nEven for calling comments, it would be mandatory to issue notice to the Agency, and only then the requirement of dispensing with any personal hearing could be made.\nINCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 (XLIX OF 2001)-Sections 122,127 & 129-The acts and functions by officers of FBR while performing Qausi-judicial functions under tax laws are not always subject to an administrative control of FBR so as to bring disciplinary proceedings against such officers for passing orders while performing such functions.\nSALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)-Sections 11 & 45-B-The acts and functions by officers of FBR while performing Qausi-judicial functions under tax laws are not always subject to an administrative control of FBR so as to bring disciplinary proceedings against such officers for passing orders while performing such functions.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Customs Act, 1969=179,193Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=9Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,127,129Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,45-B", - "Case #": "C. P. No. D-7176/2022, decided on 12th October, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MS. JUSTICE SANA AKRAM MINHAS.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Malik Altaf Hussain, Advocate.\nMr. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General.\nRespondent No 2 by Mr. A Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 by: Nemo\nMr. Agha Zafar Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMRAN QADEER\nVS\n(1) FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, (2) FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN, (3) M/S. HELIUM (PVT.) LTD. & OTHERS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24031", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 218 = 2024 SLD 218 = 2024 PTCL 184", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTU", - "Key Words:": "SALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)-Sections 3 & 73-Prime liability to pay sales tax is on the supplier under Section 3(3)(a) which is independent to the provisions of Section 73 as a supplier has to make payment of sales tax in his sales tax return for a tax period even in case of credit transactions as well.-We have found that as per sacred statute of book, prime liability to pay sales tax is on the supplier under section 3(3)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 which is independent to the provisions of section 73 as a supplier has to make payment of sales tax in his sales tax return for a tax period even in case of credit transactions as well. Since deposit of sales tax by a supplier for any transaction is independent to that of payments made by a buyer under section 73 of the Act therefore; in case of non- compliance of section 73 of the Act, no revenue loss is involved and demanding adjusted amount of input tax back from the buyer despite having it deposited by the supplier would definitely amount to double taxation not permissible under any law of the land. It abundantly clear that in the instant case, no revenue loss is involved particularly when the supplier has already paid output tax in the national exchequer against sales tax invoices pertaining to the tax periods of August, 2016 and January, 2017 therefore, demanding adjusted amount of input tax back from the appellant despite having it deposited by the supplier in the government exchequer would tantamount to double taxation. Entitlement of input tax adjustment against tax paid invoices is a statutory right of a registered person which cannot be defeated merely by technical lapses and procedural omissions.\nSince deposit of sales tax by a supplier for any transaction is independent to that of payments made by a buyer under Section 73 therefore; in case of non-compliance of Section 73, no revenue loss is involved and demanding adjusted amount of input tax back from the buyer despite having it deposited by the supplier would definitely amount to double taxation not permissible under any law of the land.\nDemanding adjusted amount of input tax back from the appellant despite having it deposited by the supplier in the government exchequer would tantamount to double taxation.\nEntitlement of input tax adjustment against tax paid invoices is a statutory right of a registered person which cannot be defeated merely by technical lapses and procedural omissions.\nThere is no denial to the fact that sales tax liability by both the parties Le. supplier and buyer was fully paid hence, there is no loss of revenue involved. The appellant in the capacity of a buyer has only committed procedural lapse by not making payments through banking channel therefore, in our considered opinion, there was no justification for the department to deprive the appellant from statutory right of input tax adjustment.\nSections 33 & 73\nBank payments under Section 73 is just a mode of payment embodied therein for the purpose of documentation of economy and if the same is not complied with due to some bona fide mistake and ignorance of law, it never entails recovery of amount of tax already paid by supplier vis-a-vis buyer by making corresponding entries of sales and purchases respectively in their sales registers and in turn, in their monthly sales tax returns. At worst, the department could have proceeded to impose penalty under Section 33(16) for non- compliance of a procedural formality but not beyond that.- There is no dispute between the parties that supplier has deposited output tax against sales tax invoices issued to the appellant however, the appellant was denied of adjustment of input tax only for the reason that he has failed to make payments to his supplier through banking channel in terms of section 73 of the Act. We are of the firm view that bank payments under section 73 of the Act is just a mode of payment embodied therein for the purpose of documentation of economy and if the same is not complied with due to some bona fide mistake and ignorance of law, it never entails recovery of amount of tax already paid by supplier vis-a-vis buyer by making corresponding entries of sales and purchases respectively in their sales registers and in turn, in their monthly sales tax returns and appellant has, accordingly, met with the rationale of documentation of economy, leaving behind just procedural and technical lapses in violation of statutory provisions of law for which a punitive action can be taken under section 33(16) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 against the person not complying with the same but recovery of sales tax already paid, despite documentation of impugned transactions, would definitely put a naive taxpayer to hot and cold water. At worst, the department could have proceeded to impose penalty for non- compliance of a procedural formality but not beyond that.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,73", - "Case #": "STA No. 2360/LB/2022, decided on 6th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. RIZWAN AHMAD URFI ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MR. NASIR MAHMUD JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Muhammad Adnan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. FEROZE AIR CONTROL SYSTEM, SAMMUNDRI ROAD, FAISALABAD.\nVS\nTHE CIR, CHENAB ZONE, RTO, FAISALABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24032", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 219 = 2024 SLD 219 = 2024 PTCL 192", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTQ", - "Key Words:": "NOTIFICATION NO. S.R.O.1125(I)/2011, DATED 31.12.2011\nSee Section 4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nNOTIFICATION NO. S.R.O. 491(I)/2016, DATED 30.06.2016 See Section 4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nSALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)-Sections 4-The processing of textile goods owned by other persons on job basis against certain dying charges was zero-rated under Sr. No. 2 of Table-II of SRO 1125(I)/2011, dated 31-12-2011 as amended vide SRO 491(I)/2016 dated 30-06-2016.-We are of the considered view that the appellant is engaged in processing of textile goods, rendering services of dying of fabrics, owned by other persons, on job basis against certain dying charges. The processing services extended on job basis against certain processing charges is the vital factor in the instant case that the fabrics, on which processing services rendered by the appellant, in form of dying, were owned by other persons and only processing charges were received for its processing and no tax was chargeable thereon being zero-rated of textile goods/services. The processing of textile goods owned by other persons on job basis against certain dying charges was zero-rated under Sr.No. 2 of Table-II of SRO 1125(I)/2011 dated 31-12-2011 as amended vide SRO 491(I)/2016 dated 30-06-2016 and there is no dispute between the parties to the extent that processing of goods whether owned by registered or unregistered persons was covered under the said notification and sales tax on processing charges received in its respect was zero percent. The SRO 1125(I)/2011 was subsequently amended by SRO 491 (I)/2016 and by virtue of the latter SRO, processing of fabrics owned by other persons have been subjected to zero-rate of tax. In the present case, admittedly processing services of fabrics owned by other persons were rendered after the issuance of SRO No. 491(I)/2016 therefore, cannot be subjected to the levy of sales tax at all. As the said notification clearly states that no sales tax except at zero rate can be charged hence, demand under the impugned show cause notice is illegal and without lawful authority. It is very astonishing to note that despite clear cut directions given by this Tribunal to determine the nature of business & zero-rating status of the appellant, the assessing officer passed a stereotyped order without conducting any inquiry and without verifying the documents filed by the appellant on 20.06.2023 which rendered whole exercise of adjudication illegal and nullity in the eyes of law.\nThe processing services extended on job basis against certain processing charges is the vital factor in the instant case that the fabrics, on which processing services rendered by the appellant, in form of dying, were owned by other persons and only processing charges were received for its processing and no tax was chargeable thereon being zero-rated of textile goods/services.\nThe SRO 1125(I)/2011 was subsequently amended by SRO 491(I)/2016 and by virtue of the latter SRO, processing of fabrics owned by other persons have been subjected to zero- rate of tax.\nSection 11\nThe decision which is not based on reason is not judgment in eyes of law.\nSection 45B\nCIR(A) was not justified in remanding the case back, being violative of Section 45B(3), particularly when the CIR(A) has annulled the order of the assessing officer after holding that the appellant produced all the relevant documents.- Furthermore, the learned CIR(A) was also not justified in remanding the case back, being violative of section 45B(3) of the Act, particularly when the CIR(A) has annulled the order of the assessing officer after holding that the appellant produced all the relevant documents and arguments of the learned AR carry weight. We are of the firm view that remand of the matter for fresh adjudication was not warranted. Such an order is not sustainable and is set aside as the learned CIR(A) was not justified to remand the case back for fresh proceedings despite having powers of further inquiry, as may be necessary, as such the direction is tantamount to give a chance to the department to fill out the lacunas to improve its case. The provisions of section 45B(3) of the Act have authorized the CIR(A) to undertake further enquiries to ascertain the facts rather than remitting the case to a lower forum. The legislative policy behind provisions of section 45B(3) of the Act is to curb prolonged and protracted litigation at the cost and inconvenience of taxpayer. The CIR(A) by not noticing the illegalities committed by the assessing officer has not properly exercised the jurisdiction vested in him. Instead of remanding the case back, the CIR(A) should have decided the appeal on the basis of documentary evidences placed by the appellant. The remand of matter to a lower authority should only be made if the material already available on record is not sufficient to dispose of the issues. A remand order would have meant that the taxpayer would have been subject to another round of cumbersome proceedings which is deprecated in law and such order should not be passed in a routine manner to allow an authority to fill in the lacunas and to improve flagrant errors occurred during adjudication proceedings.\nThe provisions of Section 45B(3) have authorized the CIR(A) to undertake further enquiries to ascertain the facts rather than remitting the case to a lower forum.\nThe legislative policy behind provisions of Section 45B(3) of the Act is to curb prolonged and protracted litigation at the cost and inconvenience of taxpayer.\nThe CIR(A) by not noticing the illegalities committed by the assessing officer has not properly exercised the jurisdiction vested in him. Instead of remanding the case back, the CIR(A) should have decided the appeal on the basis of documentary evidences placed by the appellant.\nThe remand of matter to a lower authority should only be made if the material already available on record is not sufficient to dispose of the issues.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=4", - "Case #": "STA No. 2331/LB/2023, decided on 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Mian Tauqeer Aslam, Chairman and Mr. Muhammad Tahir Accountant Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Adv\nRespondents by: Mr. Yasir Butt, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Al-Madina Dying & Finishing, Faisalabad. \nVS\nCIR, Lyallpur Zone, RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24033", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 220 = 2024 SLD 220 = 2024 PTD 201", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQS8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.148 & 159-Exemption from income tax-Petitioner was a government carriage contractor and running its business in erstwhile Tribal Areas, who sought tax exemption being resident of erstwhile Tribal Areas-Validity-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority with the prior approval of the Government granted exemption from the whole of tax leviable thereunder to the service providers of the erstwhile Federally or Provincially Administered Tribal Area (FATA and PAT A) through a Notification with the conditions, namely; the service providers were the bona fide residents of the area; and their service providing businesses were located in and they were providing service for consumption exclusively within the territory of the said areas-No doubt that the said Notification in explicit, clear and unequivocal terms provided Exemption to all bona fide residents who were providing services for consumption and their businesses were located in the erstwhile Tribal Area-Record transpired that not only the petitioner was the resident of the exempted area but he fulfilled the other two conditions as well-Petitioner was providing services for consumption exclusively within the territory of erstwhile Tribal Area as reflected from his agreement and the letter of respondent No. 4 with the subject (tender for the transportation of imported wheat from Karachi/Gwadar Ports to KPK for the year 2020-21) with further clarification in column No.2 as Provincial Reserve Center as SWAT at serial No. 14, leaving no doubt for fulfillment of all the conditions for getting benefit of Notification-Wording of the Notification was in line with the benefit of SRO 1213(1)12010 dated 05.12.2018 and the Notification of the KPRA dated 15th of March 2019 were same and both held field till 30th June, 2023-Petition was allowed as prayed for.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148,159", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1346-M of 2020, decided on 15th March, 2023, heard on: 15th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR AND MUHAMMAD IJAZ KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Isaac Ali Qazi for Petitioner (through Video Link).\nlshtiaq Ahmad (Junior) through Video Link for Respondent/Tax Department and on behalf of Rehman Ullah for Respondents.\nIftikhar Ahmad (Senior) DAG for Federation.\nRaza Uddin Khan, Additional Advocate General for Provincial Government.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS SARDAR WALI KHAN CARRIAGE CONTRACTOR VILLAGE ZITOOR, CHITRAL THROUGH PROPRIETOR\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH FEDERAL SECRETARY FINANCE AND REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD AND 6 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24034", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 221 = 2024 SLD 221 = 2024 PTD 208", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQSs", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 2 (41), 122A, 122B, 152, 153 & 206-Income Tax Rules, 2002, R.231-A-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition- Avoidance of Double Taxation Treaty-Offshore company-Petitioner was an offshore company and was aggrieved of deduction of tax in presence of Avoiding Double Taxation Treaty (ADTT) between Pakistan and Singapore Governments as the same was applicable to procurement and supply of goods to respondent company-Validity-Federal Board of Revenue was the Regulator who did not meet its statutory obligations and had passed order in question against the provisions and all norms of law-Matter in issue was not timely decided in absolute form as well as common purpose of applications made under different statutory provisions was defeated-Such practice of authorities not only frustrated cause of justice but had also added agonies of parties as well as put additional burden and workload for High Court taking away precious time, energy and sources of machinery of law-Order in question was passed without properly hearing the petitioner or its representative-Remedy of revision under S. 122A or 122B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was available-Order in question was passed against intent, object and spirit of relevant law setting prescribed standards and norms-High Court declined to restrict scope of Constitutional petition merely due to reason that the petitioner could have preferred a revision against order in question-Provisions of Ss.206A & 152(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, were interconnected and in order in question care was not taken that provisions of Ss. 152 & 206A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, were intertwined and were required to be read together simultaneously for purpose of deciding the issue-High Court in order to advance the cause of justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice set aside the order and remitted the matter to Commissioner Inland Revenue to decide the same afresh by providing proper hearing to all concerned including the petitioner- Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nMollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173; Town Committee, Piplan v. Muhammad Hanif and others 2008 SCMR 723; Government of Pakistan through Director- General, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others v. Farheen Rashid 2011 SCMR 1; Messrs United Woollen Mills Ltd. Workers Union v. Messrs United Woollen Mills Ltd. 2010 SCMR 1475; Altaf Ibrahim Qureshi and another v. A AM Log Ittehad and others PLD 2019 SC 745; Chenab Flour and General Mills v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 343; The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan Works Division PLD 1972 SC 279; Sargodha Textile Mills Limited through General Manager v. Habib Bank Limited through Manager and another 2007 SCMR 1240; M.C.R (Pvt.) Ltd. Franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority and others 2021 CLD 639; Mian Asghar Ali v. Government of Punjab through Secretary (Colonies) BOR, Lahore and others 2017 SCMR 118; Shaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan/National Tariff Commission and others 2021 PTD 2126 and Shell Pakistan Limited v. Punjab through The Secretary Ministry of Finance and others 2020 PTD 1607 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(41),122A,122B,152,153,206", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 420 of 2014, heard on 10th October, 2023, heard on: 10th October, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shehbaz Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1 and along with Shaikh Anwar-ul-Haq Law Officer.\nBarrister Raja Jibran Tariq Ali for Respondent No.3.\nArshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS NORDEX SINGAPORE EQUIPMENT LIMITED\nVS\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, CIR AND FFC ENERGY LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24035", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 222 = 2024 SLD 222 = 2024 PTD 226", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.2(s),16, 156(1), Cls. (8), (89), 187 & 196-Smuggling-Seizure of vehicle liable to confiscation-Burden of proof as to lawful owner of vehicle-Negative FSL Report-Scope-Department filed reference application against the judgment/order passed by the Appellate Tribunal whereby the appeal preferred by the owner was a owed- Allegation/contention of the Department was that chassis number of the seized vehicle on the chemical examination of vehicle was found refitted with welded material and was decipherable-Validity- Although the chassis number of vehicle-in-question before and after chemical examination was found different, but it was equally true that initially (before the sale to the respondent) the said vehicle was examined by the Customs Inspector/Examiner who found no tempering in its chassis number and issued NOC for registration of the same in the office of concerned Motor Registrar on Authority (MRA’), after receiving all leviable taxes and duties-After observing all legal and codal formalities, the vehicle was allotted a registration number, thereafter, the said vehicle was sold to the respondent-In said backdrop of the case, submission of documents of the vehicle duly issued by MRA, by the respondent to the Department/Applicant, was substantial compliance of the burden of proof required under the provision of the S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969; tin s shifting burden to the Department, who had to fulfill the legal burden of proof against the respondent to have smuggled the vehicle into Pakistan in violation of the provisions of the Customs Act, 1969, on fulfillment thereof, the burden would shift to the respondent that he was in possession of anything with lawful authority or under a permit or license or any other documents, prescribed by any law for time being in force, the burden of proving such fact that had such license, permit or authority shall be upon him (respondent)-Following said principle of law in the present case, the respondent by producing motor vehicle registration document had successfully discharged his burden which was on his part-Respondent was a bona fide purchaser of the vehicle, documents/registration of which was neither disputed nor challenged-At no stage of the proceedings any iota of evidence was produced that the vehicle was unlawfully imported to Pakistan, there was no burden left upon the respondent that vehicle-in- question was not lawfully imported-High Court maintained the judgment passed by the Tribunal-Reference application filed by the Customs Department was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),156(1),(8),187,196", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.35-P of 2018, decided on 16th February, 2023, heard on: 16th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " S.M ATTIQUE SHAH AND SHAKEEL AHMAD, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ghufran Ullah Shah for Petitioner. Aman Ullah for Respondent No. 1.\nMalik Ahmad Javed for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION) AT MODEL CUSTOMS, COLLECTORATE, ABDARA ROAD, PESHAWAR AND 2 OTHERS\nVS\nHIDAYAT VERSUS ULLAH AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24036", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 223 = 2024 SLD 223 = 2024 PTD 232", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQTg", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 156(1)(2) Cl. (89), 187 & 196-Reference-Confiscation of vehicle-Authorities confiscated vehicle in question alleged to have been smuggled non-duty paid-Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside the order passed by authorities-Validity-It was proved that details provided by respondent / owner matched with details of Excise Department-Customs Appellate Tribunal was justified in vacating show-cause notice as well as Order-in-Original-Documents / evidence remained un-rebutted and there was no justification available with authorities to pass an order with regard to outright confiscation of vehicle in question-Respondent / owner had discharged his burden with regard to ownership of the vehicle-High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Customs Appellate Tribunal which was the last fact finding authority and its decision was on the basis of facts obtained in the matter-Reference was dismissed in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Agents (Licensing) Rules, 1971=156(1)(2)CI,(89),187,196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 12 of 2020, decided on 23th May, 2022, heard on: 24th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND MAHMOOD A. KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Khalil Dogar for Applicant.\nMs. Dil Khurram Shaheen for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The COLLECTOR MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, HYDERABAD\nvs\nSHAFI MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24037", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 224 = 2024 SLD 224 = 2024 PTD 242 = (2024) 130 TAX 601", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQXo", - "Key Words:": "Key Principles:\nDue Process and Notice Requirement:\nSection 138(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, mandates that a notice must be issued to the taxpayer specifying a reasonable timeframe to discharge tax liabilities before resorting to coercive measures under Sections 138(2) or 140.\nA reasonable timeframe for compliance under Section 138(1) is deemed to be no less than seven days, ensuring the taxpayer has sufficient time to respond or exercise the right to appeal.\nProtection of Taxpayer Rights:\nTax authorities have a dual obligation: to collect revenue in accordance with the law and to safeguard the constitutional rights of taxpayers to due process, fair trial, and access to justice.\nFailure to adhere to statutory requirements undermines the legitimacy of recovery actions and violates the principles of lawful governance.\nIllegality of Coercive Measures Without Prior Notice:\nRecovery actions taken without issuing a prior notice under Section 138(1) are deemed unlawful.\nThe High Court has consistently held that such actions violate the statutory framework and are without legal authority.\nHigh Court Ruling:\nThe High Court set aside the recovery notice issued under Section 140, finding it unlawful for failing to comply with the notice requirement under Section 138(1).\nIt directed the tax authorities to reimburse the recovered amounts to the taxpayers bank account or credit them back unless retention was legally justified.\nPrecedents Cited:\nThe court relied on various judgments to reinforce its stance on the principles of due process and adherence to legal formalities:\nMubashir Yameen v. Assistant/Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (2023 PTD 146)\nMessrs Pakistan LNG Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2022 PTD 1763)\nMst. Fouzia Razzak v. Federal Board of Revenue (2021 PTD 162)\nMessrs Huawei Technologies Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2016 PTD 1799)\nAnd others emphasizing the importance of procedural compliance and taxpayer protection.\nImplications:\nFor Tax Authorities:\nThis ruling reinforces the obligation to strictly adhere to procedural safeguards before initiating recovery actions.\nArbitrary or unlawful actions can lead to legal challenges, invalidation of recovery efforts, and potential liability for damages.\nFor Taxpayers:\nTaxpayers are entitled to reasonable notice and time to discharge liabilities or challenge assessments.\nThey can seek redress through constitutional petitions if procedural violations occur.\nThis decision upholds the principles of fairness and lawful governance, ensuring that tax collection efforts do not bypass statutory safeguards designed to protect taxpayers.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=138,140", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 29586 of 2023, decided on 11th December, 2023, heard on: 26th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Islam, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, Assistant Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan.\nBarrister Ahmad Pervez Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.3 to 5.\nUsman Akram Sahi with Hammad Altaf Khan, Chief Legal Officer and Aurangzeb Shami, Manager Legal for Respondent No.6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHINA MACHINERY ENGINEERING CORPORATION, PAKISTAN BRANCH\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24038", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 225 = 2024 SLD 225 = 2024 PTD 253", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpQXk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S. 11-Assessment Order passed beyond Show-Cause Notice- Effect-Record revealed that taxpayer was not confronted with any invoice or allegation-Show-Cause Notice, was totally silent and had not mentioned any allegation which had been mentioned in the Assessment Order-Commissioner Appeals (though partially accepted appeal of the taxpayer yet) also noticed the said illegality and mentioned (the same) on relevant page of his order, and wrote letter to seek opinion of the Department in said regard, however, no one appeared on the behalf of the Department-Thus, the proceedings were initiated and consequently finalized under S. 11(2) of Sales Tax Act, 1990-Proceedings initiated on the basis of illegal notices and superstructure constructed thereon in the shape of amended order under S. 11(2) was nullity in law-Impugned order passed by the Assessing Officer, for having been passed beyond the Show-Cause Notice, was not sustainable in the eyes of law- Tribunal vacated both the orders passed by the both the Authorities below-Appeal filed by the taxpayer was allowed, in circumstances.\n2022 PTD 1153; 2013 PTD 1001; 2010 PTD 451; 2011 PTD 1883 and 2011 PTD 2538 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1922/LB of 2023, decided on 24th November, 2023, heard on: 2nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AEYSHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Hamza for Appellant.\nTalat Mehmood Bosaal, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs REHMANI DAWAKHANA, MAIN BAZAR GANDAM MANDI, KASUR\nvs \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24039", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 226 = 2024 SLD 226 = 2024 PTD 256", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODc", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss.7, 7A, 8, 8B & 10-Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules 2007, R.SH-Sale tax, collection of-Import of machinery-Petitioners were manufacturers of steel products and were aggrieved by imposition and collection of sales tax at the rate of 17% on import of their plant and machinery-Plea raised by petitioners / manufacturers was that they were governed by virtue of S. 7A of Sales Act, 1990 read with R. 58H of Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007, having substitute mechanism at import stage-Validity-Right course available to petitioners / manufacturers was to approach Federal Board of Revenue prior to import of their goods to seek any exemption on import of their plant and machinery-When no response was received, petitioners/manufacturers rushed to High Court with their interpretation regarding R. S8H of Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules 2007, but this was not warranted-Mechanism for refund of excess Input Tax was provided under S. 10 of Sales Tax Act, 1990-If any sales tax paid by petitioners / manufacturers at import stage, otherwise qualified as their input tax within the ambit of Sales Tax Act, 1990 including but not limited to restrictions per Ss. 7 & 8 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, then petitioners / manufacturers had a case to seek refund of any excess input tax in accordance with law-High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to exercise discretion in favour of petitioners-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nAttock Cement Pakistan Ltd. v. Collector of Customs Collectorate of Customs and Central Excise, Quetta and 4 others 1999 PTD 1892; Messrs Daewoo Pakistan Express Bus Services Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and 5 others 2016 PTD 152; Collector of Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise and others v. Messrs Sanghar Sugar Mills Ltd., Karachi and others PLD 2007 SC 517 = 2007 PTD 1902; The Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Karachi v. Messrs Attock Cement Pakistan Limited, Karachi (Civil Appeal No. 1422/2019) and Insaf Cotton Ginning v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 PTD 2585 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7,7A,8,8B,10", - "Case #": "Constitution Petitions Nos.D-8679 of 2018, D-1171, D-1011 and D-3477 of 2019, decided on 11th February, 2023, heard on: 18th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haider Waheed and Abdul Moiz Jafferi for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos.D-8679 of 2018, D-1171, D-3477 andD-1011 of 2019).\nQazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No. 1.\nMuhammad Khalil Dogar, Zafar Hussain holding brief for Aamir Raza, Rashid Ali holding brief for Ghulam Murtaza and Ms. Afsheen Aman for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAWAB BROTHERS STEEL MILLS (PVT.) LTD. THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24040", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 227 = 2024 SLD 227 = 2024 PTD 270", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODY", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-S.221-Rectification application-Maintainability-Matter sub-judice-Effect-While the Reference Application filed by the taxpayer (company/developers) was pending before the High Court, rectification application was moved by the taxpayer before the Assessing Officer purportedly on a new/different ground; previous order-in-original was rectified, yet not satisfied with the rectification done, appeal was filed whereby the Commissioner Appeals passed certain directions to the Officer Inland Revenue regarding rectification order-Taxpayer, still discontented, preferred appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (‘the Tribunal’)-Held, that both the Authorities had passed the orders in complete oblivion of law as once the Appellate Authority had decided the appeal, the order of the lower Authority would have merged into the appellate order-In the present case, not only the Commissioner (Appeals) but the Appellate Tribunal also had finalized the appeal against order-in-original by the Assessing officer and , admittedly, Reference Application was pending before the High Court against the order of the Appellate Tribunal-After exercising original jurisdiction, the Officer Inland Revenue became functuous officio with little window of rectification and that too could be against a mistake apparent and floating on the surface of such order-But after decision of the Appellate Forum, the order-in-original had merged into the order of the Appellate Authority and there remained no authority with the Officer Inland Revenue to rectify his own order-Present case was a clear example of capriciousness on the part of the Taxation Officer as despite the matter having been decided by the Appellate Forums and being pending before the High Court in continuation of the Assessment Order, the Officer Inland Revenue proceeded to rectify the very order-in-original-Further, in doing so, the Officer Inland Revenue had changed the same (order-in-original)-By rectifying order-in-original, the Officer Inland Revenue had nullified all the proceedings / orders having been conducted /passed by the Appellate Forums-Such proceedings carried out by the Officer Inland Revenue should have been dealt strictly by the Commissioner (Appeals), which was not done by him rather he, after examining the merits once again, annulled the order with certain directions to the Officer Inland Revenue and he had indirectly contributed in the error that had been committed by the Assessing Officer in rectification proceedings and completely over sighted the fact that while Reference Application was pending , at that subsequent stage the Officer Inland Revenue had no authority to rectify his order-Thus, passing directions by Commissioner amounted to justifying rectification made by the Assessing Officer-Record revealed that the High Court on Reference Application, had suspended the assessment order subject to deposit of certain amount against charge of Federal Excise Duty (‘FED’) and the Officer Inland Revenue, in rectification, had even re-calculated the payable FED-Both the Authorities below had transgressed their jurisdiction by passing rectification orders in application and appeal which were not sustainable in the eye of law-Tribunal set aside both orders passed in rectification proceedings as being illegal and void ab- initio-Appeal filed by the taxpayer, against certain directions given by the Commissioner Appeals in rectification proceedings was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221", - "Case #": "F.E.A. NO. 08/LB of 2018, decided on 20th November, 2023, heard on: 14th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ikram ul Haq, ITP for Appellant.\nMuhammad Sarim Bhatti, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS URBAN DEVELOPERS\nVS \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO-II, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24041", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 228 = 2024 SLD 228 = 2024 PTD 275", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODU", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S. 73-Adjustment of input tax-Requirement of S. 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, non-compliance of-Question was, whether or not, non-compliance, of requirement of S. 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act, 1990’) would be sufficient for the department to disallow input tax adjustment and for an order for recovery of the principal amount along with default surcharge and penalty-Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal preferred by the taxpayer against disallowance of the input tax adjustment by Assistant Collector, which order was assailed by the Collector / Department by filing Sales Tax Reference-Validity-Record revealed that Assistant Collector disallowed the input tax adjustment of the respondent/registered person on the ground that the payment had not been made in accordance with the requirement of S. 73 of the Act, 1990- Section 73 of the Act 1990 required payment of an amount for a transaction exceeding the value of Rs. 50,000/ = however, in the present case, the amount involved was less than Rs.50,000/=-It was not the case of the applicant / department that the respondent was claiming input tax adjustment against fake invoices or had evaded the payment of tax-Section 73 of the Act, 1990 did not prescribe the penalty of disallowing the input adjustment for failure to show compliance with the requirement of S.73 of the Act, 1990-Appellate Tribunal had upheld the penalty of Rs. 5,000/= imposed on respondent for not showing compliance with the requirement of S. 73 of the Act, 1990-Applicant department had failed to give season for interference of the High Court in the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Sales Tax Reference filed by the department was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=73", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 19 of 2008 and C.M. No. 1054 of 2019, decided on 9th May, 2022, heard on: 9th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB AND ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Riaz Hussain Azam Bopara for Applicant.\nIbrar Hussain, representative for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR, SALES TAX AND FEDERAL EXCISE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, ISLAMABAD\nVS\nCUSTOMS, CENTRAL EXCISE AND SALES TAX, APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, ISLAMABAD AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24042", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 229 = 2024 SLD 229 = 2024 PTD 277", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 3 & 11-Delay in furnishing Sales tax payments-Penalty under S.11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, imposition/recovery of- Scope-Department imposed penalty on the registered person for not depositing sales tax for a period of one and half years-Contention of the appellant (registered person) was that the penalty could not be recovered under S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990-Validity- Commissioner (Appeals) had rightly turned down the said contention / objection as “sales tax” included “penalty” which could only be assessed and recovered under S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990- However, Tribunal reduced the penalty to 10% of amount imposed by Authorities below as penalty-Appeal filed by the registered person against imposition of penalty for late payment of sales tax was disposed of accordingly.\nShahbaz Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 PTD 30 and Messrs Fiza Noor Creations (Pvt.) Ltd. v. CIR, RTO Faisalabad S.T.A. No. I021/LB of 2021 ref.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 3 & 11-Late payment of sales tax-Penalty, imposition/recovery of-Scope-Mens rea of taxpayer, absence of-Willful default- Department imposed penalty on the registered person for not depositing sales tax for a period of one and half years-Contention of the appellant (registered person) was that imposition of penalty in absence of proving any mens rea was not tenable-Held, that the default ,in the present case, in making sales tax payments was for tax periods spanning almost one and half year and for a prudent mind it was not hard to understand that appellant committed willful default-Intention of the party was wholly irrelevant since there was a clear violation of the statutory provisions repetitively-Appellant had willfully violated statutory provisions with impunity-However, the Tribunal reduced the penalty to 10% of amount imposed by Authorities below as penalty- Appeal filed by the registered person against imposition of penalty for late payment of sales tax was disposed of accordingly.\n(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss.3 & 11-Delay in furnishing Sales tax payments-Willful default-Penalty, quantum of-Scope-Department imposed penalty on the registered person for not depositing sales tax for a period of one and half years-Validity-Penalty had to be imposed in compliance with the provisions of law and the quantum must be proportionate to the gravity of default committed by the taxpayer-Once the contravention was established, then the penalty had to follow and only the quantum was discretionary-Penalty provisions had been provided in the statute to ensure compliance , which had never been regarded as a tool to generate revenue-Penalties should be levied after consideration of relevant circumstances and discretion to decide the quantum of penalty should be exercised judiciously-Levy of extreme amount of penalty was not justified in the present case, thus, the Tribunal reduced the penalty to 10% of amount imposed by Authorities below as penalty-Appeal filed by the registered person against imposition of penalty for late payment of sales tax was disposed of accordingly.\n2017 PTD 1579 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,11", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No.1559/LB of 2023, decided on 2nd November, 2023, heard on: 4th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Khalid Younas for Appellant.\nGhulam Hussain Yasir, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS CRESCENT FIBRES LTD.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE LTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24043", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 230 = 2024 SLD 230 = (2024) 129 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpOC8", - "Key Words:": "Automatic Selection for Audit and Extension for Filing Return\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe respondent taxpayer failed to file the income tax return for the tax year 2015 by the due date of 21.01.2016.\n•\nOn that date, the taxpayer filed an application under Section 119 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 seeking an extension of time to file the return. However, the Commissioner did not respond to this request.\n•\nDespite the application, the department claimed that Section 214D applied, and the taxpayer was selected for automatic audit under Section 177.\n•\nThe taxpayer challenged the notices received in this regard through a writ petition before the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed by a single Judge relying on the case of Muhammad Mujahid Qureshi (2019 PTD 535).\n•\nThe taxpayer filed an intra-Court appeal, which was allowed by the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, and the decision favored the taxpayer.\n•\nThe department appealed to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, seeking to reverse the decision of the High Court.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nAppellants Argument (Department):\nThe department argued that the decision in the Independent Newspaper Corp case was erroneous, asserting that the application for extension under Section 119 was not appropriately addressed. They claimed that since the extension request was not granted or refused in writing, Section 214D automatically applied, leading to the audit selection.\n•\nRespondents Argument (Taxpayer):\nThe taxpayers counsel supported the decision of the Division Bench and argued that the taxpayer had filed a timely request for an extension and that the failure of the Commissioner to respond did not trigger the application of Section 214D.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nSection 214D Applicability:\nThe Supreme Court held that Section 214D of the Income Tax Ordinance does not automatically apply unless the application for extension was actually disposed of by an order in writing.\n•\nIn this case, since the Commissioner did not issue any order in writing either granting or refusing the extension, the time limit for filing the return could not be considered as expired, and Section 214D did not apply.\n•\nThe Court further clarified that the 30-day condition under Section 214D should begin from the date the Commissioner’s order granting the extension is issued, not from the due date of the return. If the extension was refused, the section would apply from the refusal date, subject to any legal remedies available to the taxpayer.\n•\nThe writ petition was rightly allowed by the Division Bench, as Section 214D never became applicable under the circumstances.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the departments appeal, affirming the decision of the Lahore High Court Division Bench. The Court held that Section 214D of the Income Tax Ordinance does not apply automatically unless the extension request is explicitly disposed of in writing by the Commissioner. The taxpayers challenge was successful, as the Court ruled that the audit selection was not valid without a response to the extension request.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=119,119(3),177,214-D,214D(3)(4)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.247 of 2021 decided on 02.11.2023, date of hearing: 02.11.2023\n(Against judgment dated 22.4.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in ICA No. 18093/2019.)", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR, SHAHID WAHEED AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ibrar Ahmed, ASC for the Appellant. (via video-link, Lahore).\nMr. Javed Iqbal Qazi, ASC for respondent No.1. (via video-link, Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE\nVS\nM/S. ATTA CABLES (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24044", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 231 = 2024 SLD 231 = (2024) 129 TAX 6", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpOCs", - "Key Words:": "Professional Tax Imposition by Cantonment Boards\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe Cantonment Boards (Faisal and Clifton) levied professional taxes under their general power to tax as granted by Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 and Schedule VII. These taxes were related to professions, trades, callings, and employments, as authorized by Article 163 of the Constitution of Pakistan.\n•\nCivil Appeals No. 1363 to 1365 of 2018 were filed by the Cantonment Boards against a judgment dated 15 July 2017 by the Sindh High Court, which had dismissed the cantonment boards authority to impose such taxes.\n•\nThe Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal on 30 October 2018.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nCantonment Boards Argument (Appellants):\nThe Cantonment Boards argued that after the insertion of Article 140A in the Constitution, which empowers local governments to handle local governance, including the collection of taxes, cantonment boards were empowered to levy professional taxes. They referred to Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, which provides them with a general power to tax and perform local government functions.\n2.\nSindh Governments Argument (Respondent):\nThe Additional Advocate General (AAG) of Sindh countered that Article 163 of the Constitution specifically empowers only the provinces to impose professional taxes. The AAG pointed out that although local governments are authorized by the Sindh Local Government Act, no local government had historically imposed professional taxes in Sindh. The AAG argued that the Cantonment Act’s general power of taxation could not override the specific constitutional provisions of Article 163, which grants provinces the sole authority to levy such taxes.\n3.\nSupport for Impugned Judgment:\nK & N Foods Pvt. Ltd., which was involved in the case, adopted the position of the Sindh Government and argued that the professional taxes imposed by the Cantonment Boards were unconstitutional and violated Article 163.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nArticle 163 and the Constitution:\nThe Supreme Court held that Article 163 of the Constitution is the exclusive provision that empowers provinces to impose professional taxes. The Court rejected the argument that Article 140A, which empowers local governments to perform governance functions, enabled cantonment boards (which fall under federal jurisdiction) to levy professional taxes. The Court emphasized that Article 163 cannot be overridden or diluted by Section 60 of the Cantonments Act.\n2.\nUltra Vires Decision:\nThe Court ruled that Section 60(1) of the Cantonments Act and Schedule VII, which authorize cantonment boards to impose professional taxes, were ultra vires (beyond the legal power) the Constitution. The Cantonment Boards imposition of professional taxes was deemed unconstitutional because it conflicted with the provinces exclusive right under Article 163.\n3.\nRefund of Taxes:\nThe Court concluded that the professional taxes collected by the Cantonment Boards were unconstitutional. Consequently, the taxes should be refunded to the taxpayers, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Pfizer Laboratories Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan case.\n4.\nDismissal of Appeals:\nThe Cantonment Boards appeals were dismissed with costs. The Court emphasized the binding nature of its earlier ruling in the ICI case, which had already settled the issue of the constitutionality of professional taxes imposed by the Cantonment Boards.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Sindh High Court and dismissed the Cantonment Boards appeals, declaring that Article 163 of the Constitution grants exclusive power to the provinces to impose professional taxes. The imposition of such taxes by Cantonment Boards was found to be unconstitutional, and the taxes collected by them must be refunded. This decision reinforced the principle that federal authorities like the Cantonment Boards cannot override the provinces authority in tax matters, particularly when the Constitution clearly delineates the powers between the federal and provincial governments.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023=60,61(1),2(a)(i)Sindh Local Government Act, ( XLII of 2013)=96,137,138Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=27-AConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=AA77,90,99,140,140-A,163", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No.1363 to 1365 of 2018 and Civil Misc. Application No. 4728 of 2023 decided on 13.10.2023\nCivil Appeals No.1363 to 1365 of 2018, heard on: 13.10.2023\n(Against the judgment dated 15.07.2017 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Constitution Petitions No. D- 2892/14, D- 1135 and D-3539/2016) and Civil Misc. Application No. 4728 of 2023 [For impleadment by M/s Zubi International Private Limited, through its Assistant Manager, Hafiz Zahid Hassan]", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ., AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Umer Riaz, ASC, Assisted by Ch. Abubakar for the Appellants:\nMr. Zaki Haider, CEO, Clifton. Mr. Aamir Rashid, CEO, Faisal. Mr. Tanveer Ashraf, Director, ML & C. Mr. Javed Abbasi, Law Officer, ML & C. (Though video-link from Karachi) for the Appellants.\nMr. M. Naeem Sadiq, ASC for the Applicant (In CMA. 4728/23).\nMr. Mansoor Usman Awan, Attorney-General for Pakistan and Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney-General on court’s notice.\nEx-parte for Respondents No. 1-2 (In CA. 1363/18).\nMr. Tahir Ishaq Mughal, ASC and Mrs. Shaista Altaf, ASC. for Respondent No. 1 (In CA. 1364/18).\nMr. Zeeshan Adhi, Additional Advocate-General, Sindh, Mr. Saifullah, Asst. Advocate-General, Sindh, Mr. Ghulam Nabi Shah, Addl. Director\nExcise & Taxation. Mr. Ayaz Ali Mangi, Dy. Director (P-II). (Through video-link from Karachi) for Govt. of Sindh (In CA. 1364 & 1365/18).\nEx-parte for Respondents No. 2, 3 and 5 (In CA. 1364/18).\nEx-parte for Respondents No. 1 and 3 (In CA. 1365/18).", - "Petitioner Name:": "CANTONMENT BOARD FAISAL AND OTHERS\nVS\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, KARACHI AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24045", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 232 = 2024 SLD 232 = (2024) 129 TAX 27", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income from Property and Minimum Tax under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThis case revolves around the tax treatment of rental income from property under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The taxpayer argued that income from property, as identified under Section 15, should be treated as a separate head of income and not included in the minimum tax regime under Section 113. The appeals pertained to Tax Years 2014 and 2015, and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), Lahore, had ruled in favor of the taxpayer, dismissing the departments appeal.\nHeld:\n1.\nIncome from Property Exclusion from Minimum Tax:\nThe court held that rental income from property cannot be excluded from the scope of gross receipts under Section 113, as amended by the Finance Act, 2012. The legislative intent was clear that income from property should be included when calculating turnover for the purposes of the minimum tax regime.\n2.\nInterpretation of Gross Sales and Gross Receipts :\nThe terms gross sales and gross receipts were interpreted broadly. The court emphasized that gross receipts are not limited to the sale of goods but encompass all revenue-generating activities, including rental income.\n3.\nRental Income Not Deemed Income:\nRental income was confirmed as not being deemed income, but it must still be considered when calculating benchmarks for the minimum tax regime.\nThe court upheld the ATIRs decision, affirming that there was no illegality in allowing the taxpayers appeals. The reference applications were decided against the department.\nCase Law: Commissioner of Income Tax Legal Division, Lahore and others v. Khurshid Ahmad and others (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 545).", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=15,15A,113,113(1),113(3),113(3)(a),113(5),169", - "Case #": "ITR No. 2590 of 2023 decided on 30.10.2023, date of hearing: 30.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Jahanzaib Inam and Ahmad Jamal, Advocates for the Applicants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nM/S PAKISTAN CRICKET BOARD, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24046", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 233 = 2024 SLD 233 = (2024) 129 TAX 32", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpODg", - "Key Words:": "Collection of Short Payment of Federal Excise Duty with Additional Duty and Penalty\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThis case revolves around a demand for the collection of federal excise duty amounting to Rs. 8,360,553 issued by the tax department under the Central Excise Act, 1944. This demand was based on an Order-in-Original dated 02.03.2000.\n•\nThe tax department sought to collect the short payment of excise duty along with an additional duty of 2% per month and imposed a penalty for non-compliance with the provisions of the Central Excise Act.\n•\nInitially, the demand was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) on 04.10.2010. However, the High Court in a reference filed by the taxpayer remanded the case back to the Tribunal. After further proceedings, the Tribunal set aside the demand and the order issued by the tax department.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nTax Departments Argument (Appellant):\nThe tax department argued that the Tribunals decision was incorrect. The department contended that the assessment order sought the collection of short payment of excise duty along with additional duty at the rate of 2% per month, in line with Section 3(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. They further imposed a penalty for non-compliance, which the Tribunal wrongly set aside.\nAdditionally, the tax department questioned the authority of the Assistant Collector to issue the letter that accepted the retail price of cement as proposed by the taxpayer, alleging this was an issue of fact and that the Tribunal did not have the authority to overlook this.\n2.\nRespondents Argument (Taxpayer):\nThe taxpayer argued that the Tribunals decision was correct, emphasizing that the product sold, cement in loose form, was a bulk sale, distinct from the retail sale of cement bags. The Tribunal relied on case law that concluded the packaging of a product should be considered when determining the retail price.\nThe Tribunal had also found that once the Collector of Excise had accepted the proposed price for the cement, it could not later be altered, and the tax department could not retroactively charge excise duty based on retail prices for cement bags sold by other traders.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nNo Question of Law:\nThe Supreme Court found that the issue raised by the tax department was a factual question regarding the Assistant Collectors authority to accept the retail price proposed by the taxpayer. This was a factual matter that the Tribunal had already addressed in its order. The Tribunal had referred to a letter from the Assistant Collector dated 08.12.1996, in which the retail price of Rs. 2538.48 per metric ton was accepted, and the tax department could not provide any satisfactory explanation regarding this letter.\n•\nThe Court ruled that the question raised by the tax department was not a question of law, but rather a factual matter that had already been decided by the Tribunal. The Court could not interfere with factual determinations made by the Tribunal in its reference jurisdiction.\n•\nReference Dismissed:\nAs the Court found that there was no question of law arising from the order of the Tribunal, the reference filed by the tax department was dismissed. The Tribunal’s decision to set aside the demand raised by the tax department was upheld.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the tax departments reference, affirming the Tribunal’s decision to set aside the demand for federal excise duty. The Court clarified that the issue raised by the department was one of fact, not law, and the Tribunal had properly considered the evidence and legal principles in its ruling. The demand was therefore invalid, and the tax department’s appeal was rejected.\n________________________________________\nCase Law Referred to:\n•\nCrescent Textile Mills Ltd. Lyallpur v. Member, Central Board of Revenue (Central Excise), Islamabad (1980 SCMR 773)\n•\nCrescent Textile Mills Ltd. Lyallpur v. Member, Central Board of Revenue (Central Excise), Islamabad (1989 CLC 2045 Peshawar)\n•\nSouvenir Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs (1989 CLC 1134)\n•\nGovernment of Pakistan v. Hashwani Hote Limited (PLD 1990 SC 68)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Central Excise Act, (I of 1944)=3(b),4(2)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 213 of 2011 decided on 23.10.2023, date of hearing: 23.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": " AAMER FAROOQ CJ. AND BABAR SATTAR, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Mohammad Abdul Hassan, Advocate for the Appellant.\nHafiz Mohammad Idris and Syed Farid Bokhari, Advocates for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, ISLAMABAD\nVS\nM/S ASKARI CEMENT LIMITED, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24047", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 234 = 2024 SLD 234 = (2024) 129 TAX 36", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpOHo", - "Key Words:": "Issue: Deduction of income tax on payments to non-resident company\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nPetitioner: An offshore company registered in Singapore, engaged in import, export, sale of wind power equipment, and related services.\n•\nIssue: The petitioner entered into an agreement with FFC Energy Limited (FFCEL) for the supply of goods/equipment related to wind power projects. The issue arose regarding the deduction of income tax from the payments made to the petitioner under Section 152 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nThe FBR passed an order on 04.11.2013 directing FFCEL to deduct income tax from payments made to the petitioner. This decision was contested by the petitioner, who filed a Constitutional Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nPetitioners Argument:\no\nThe petitioner argued that it is a non-resident company and does not have a permanent establishment in Pakistan. Therefore, the payments made to it should not be subject to tax deduction under Sections 152 and 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance.\no\nThe petitioner had previously filed an application to the FBR (under Section 206A (i)) requesting an advance ruling, asserting that no tax should be deducted on payments made to it.\no\nThe petitioner contended that the FFC Energy Limited (FFCEL) was incorrectly directed to withhold tax.\n2.\nRespondent’s Argument (FBR):\no\nThe FBR contended that the petitioner had an alternate remedy available by filing a revision under Sections 122A or 122B of the Income Tax Ordinance, and thus the petition before the High Court was premature.\n3.\nFFC Energy Limiteds Argument:\no\nFFCEL, as a subsidiary of Fauji Fertilizer Company, entered into an EPC contract with the petitioner and made payments for the supply of equipment. FFCEL argued that the remittances to the petitioner were subject to tax under Section 152 of the Income Tax Ordinance.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nRight to be Treated in Accordance with Law:\nThe Court highlighted that it is the inalienable right of both the petitioner and FFC Energy Limited to be treated in accordance with the law. No action detrimental to their rights can be taken except as per the relevant legal provisions under the Income Tax Ordinance and the Rules.\n•\nFrustration of Justice:\nThe Court observed that the FBR had not properly met its statutory obligations and that the impugned order was passed in violation of established legal norms. The matter was not decided in a timely manner, frustrating the cause of justice and adding unnecessary burden on the parties involved as well as the judicial system.\n•\nRemand of the Matter:\nThe Court found that the provisions of Sections 206A and 152(5) are interconnected, and the FBR had failed to consider them together in the impugned order. As a result, the Court set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-I) for reconsideration.\no\nThe matter was to be decided afresh in strict accordance with law, considering the EPC contract and providing proper hearing to both the petitioner and FFC Energy Limited within two months from the receipt of the certified copy of the order.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the petitioner by allowing the writ petition, setting aside the FBRs order dated 04.11.2013, and remanding the matter to the Commissioner Inland Revenue for a fresh decision. The decision was based on the failure of the FBR to apply the relevant sections of the Income Tax Ordinance properly and to consider the interconnected provisions of Sections 152 and 206A.\n________________________________________\nCases Referred to:\n•\nMollah Ejahar Ali Versus Government of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1970 SC 173)\n•\nTown Committee, Piplan Versus Muhammad Hanif and others (2008 SCMR 723)\n•\nGovernment of Pakistan through Director- General, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others versus Farheen Rashid (2011 SCMR 1)\n•\nMessrs United Woollen Mills Ltd. Workers’ Union versus Messrs United Woollen Mills Ltd (2010 SCMR 1475)\n•\nAltaf Ibrahim Qureshi and another versus Aam Log Ittehad and others (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 745)\n•\nChenab Flour and General Mills versus Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2021 Lahore 343)\n•\nThe Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. versus Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan Works Division (PLD 1972 SC 279)\n•\nSargodha Textile Mills Limited through General Manager versus Habib Bank Limited through Manager and another (2007 SCMR 1240)\n•\nM.C.R (Pvt.) Ltd. Franchisee of Pizza Hut versus Multan Development Authority and others (2021 CLD 639)\n•\nMian Asghar Ali versus Government of Punjab through Secretary (Colonies) BOR, Lahore and others (2017 SCMR 118)\n•\nShaheen Merchant versus Federation of Pakistan/National Tariff Commission and others (2021 PTD 2126 Lahore)\n•\nShell Pakistan Limited versus Punjab through the Secretary Ministry of Finance and other (2020 PTD 1607)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(41),122a,122b,152(5),152(7)(a),153,206,206-A(i)Income Tax Rules, 2002=231-AConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,5(2),10A,", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.420 of 2014 decided on 10.10.2023, date of hearing: 10.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": " JAWAD HASSAN, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shehbaz Butt, ASC for the Petitioner.\nDr. Farhat Zafar, ASC for the Respondents No.1 and alongwith Shaikh Anwar-ul-Haq Law Officer for the Respondents.\nBarrister Raja Jibran Tariq Ali, Advocate for the Respondent No.3.\nMr. Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S NORDEX SINGAPORE EQUIPMENT LIMITED\nVs\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, CIR AND FFC ENERGY LTD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24048", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 235 = 2024 SLD 235 = (2024) 129 TAX 101", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpOHk", - "Key Words:": "Issue: Exemption from customs duties on the import of a used saloon car\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nRespondent: Mr. Kristof W. Duwaerts, a foreign expert/consultant, imported a Toyota Corolla Axio Car (2012 Model) under HS Code 8703.2290 through clearing agent Oriental Shipping Services on 29.07.2015. The respondent claimed exemption from relevant customs duties and taxes by using the green channel facility.\n•\nHowever, the clearing agent filed the Goods Declaration (GD) in the name of the Embassy of Germany instead of Mr. Duwaerts name, which raised questions regarding the legitimacy of the import and its compliance with the import policy.\n•\nThe car was deemed an older model (2012), and according to the Import Policy Order 2013, the import of vehicles older than three years was not permitted.\n•\nA show-cause notice was issued to Mr. Duwaerts, and the adjudicating authority passed an Order-in-Original on 05.10.2015, ordering the confiscation of the car.\n•\nThe respondent appealed the decision, and the Appellate Forum set aside the Order-in-Original. This decision was also upheld by the Appellate Tribunal on 28.02.2017, which led to the reference application being filed against the order.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nApplicants (Customs Department) Argument:\no\nThe applicant argued that the imported vehicle, being a 2012 model, could not be imported under the Import Policy Order, 2013 as it violated the rule restricting the import of vehicles older than three years.\no\nThe show-cause notice was issued because the GD was filed incorrectly, and the cars import under the name of the embassy was intended to bypass the restrictions.\n2.\nRespondents Argument:\no\nThe respondent contended that he, as a foreign expert working under a grant-in-aid agreement, was entitled to duty and tax exemptions under the relevant provisions, including the HS Code 8703.2319/9903 (which applies to goods imported by privileged personnel).\no\nThe car was imported under the relevant customs codes, and the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) had already granted permission for the import under these exemptions.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nCompetency to Import Without Payment of Duty and Taxes:\no\nThe Court found that Mr. Duwaerts had the competency to import the car without payment of any duties or taxes. He was a foreign expert under the Cooperation in Selected Areas Agreement and therefore qualified for privileged status under the grant-in-aid agreement between Germany and Pakistan.\no\nThe car was imported under HS Code 9903, which allows exemptions for goods imported by privileged personnel/organizations under grant-in-aid agreements. The FBRs permission for the import was valid and stated in the Goods Declaration (GD).\n2.\nApplication of Import Policy Order 2013:\no\nThe Court ruled that the provisions of Annexure-C of the Import Policy Order, 2013 (which restricts the import of older cars) do not apply to privileged personnel who are working under grant-in-aid agreements.\no\nThe respondent had also sought relaxation from the Federal Government to import an older car for personal use, which was permissible under the agreement.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe reference application was allowed in favor of the respondent, and the decision of the Appellate Tribunal was upheld. The Customs Departments claim for the confiscation of the car was rejected. The car was validly imported under the grant-in-aid agreement, and the respondent was entitled to the exemption from customs duties and taxes.\n________________________________________\nKey Points:\n1.\nThe grant-in-aid agreements provide privileged status to foreign experts, allowing them to import certain goods without paying customs duties and taxes.\n2.\nThe Import Policy Order, 2013 does not apply to privileged personnel under such agreements, particularly regarding the import of older vehicles.\n3.\nThe Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) had granted permission for the import of the vehicle, and the Goods Declaration (GD) was filed correctly, ensuring that the import was legal under the relevant customs codes.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19", - "Case #": "SCRA No. 326 of 2017 decided on 26.10.2022, heard on: 29.09.2022", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Masooda Siraj, Advocate a/w Mr. Jawed Hussain, Advocate and Mr. M. Ishaque Pirzada, Advocate for the Applicants.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nMR. KRISTOF W. DUWAERTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24049", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 236 = 2024 SLD 236 = (2024) 129 TAX 117 = 2024 PTD 1360", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDc", - "Key Words:": "Legislative Competence of Provincial Legislature\n________________________________________\nFacts:\nThis case involves a legal challenge by several importers who contested the Infrastructure Fee/Cess levied by the Province of Sindh. The petitioners, who are importers of various goods, were aggrieved by the cess demanded on goods before their release from Customs jurisdiction (either at sea ports or airports).\n•\nThe levy was first introduced by the Sindh Finance Act, 1994, which came into effect on July 1, 1994. The Sindh government later amended and modified the provisions under various versions of the law, including the Sindh Finance Act, 1996, Sindh Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001, and the Sindh Finance Act, 2017.\n•\nThe petitioners argued that the cess was imposed beyond the legislative competence of the provincial government, as imports and exports fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government under the Constitution of Pakistan, specifically Articles 142, 151, and 155, and the Federal Legislative List in the Fourth Schedule.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nPetitioners’ Argument:\no\nThe petitioners contended that the Sindh provincial legislature lacked the authority to levy a fee or cess on imports and exports as these fall under the Federal Legislative List, particularly under Entries 24, 27, and 43 of the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution.\no\nThey argued that only the Federation had the exclusive legislative competence regarding the imposition of duties and taxes on imports and exports under the Customs Act, 1969. Therefore, the provincial imposition of the infrastructure fee violated the Constitution.\n2.\nDefendant’s Argument (Excise and Taxation Department):\no\nExcise and Taxation Departments counsel argued that the petitions were not maintainable since the Sindh government has the prerogative to levy taxes, duties, fees, and cess for the development of infrastructure within the province.\no\nThey further argued that the imposition of the cess does not violate any constitutional rights or exceed the legislative competence of the province.\n3.\nAdvocate General’s Argument:\no\nThe Advocate General highlighted that the judgment in Sanofi Aventis regarding the first four versions of the law had already attained finality, and therefore, the Sindh Finance Act, 2017 was a valid and retrospective law that was within the provincial legislative competence.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nFinality of Sanofi Aventis Judgment:\no\nThe court ruled that the Sanofi Aventis judgment, which had invalidated the previous versions of the Sindh Finance Act, had attained finality. The judgment was binding for the parties involved in that case, but it did not apply to the general public or other petitioners unless directly related to that case.\n2.\nRetrospective Application of the Sindh Finance Act, 2017:\no\nThe Sindh Finance Act, 2017, which was promulgated retrospectively to apply from July 1, 1994, was found to be valid and within the competence of the provincial legislature. The court declared the Sindh Finance Act, 2017 to be legal, and the infrastructure fee/cess imposed by it was held to be valid as a provincial tax for infrastructure development.\n3.\nLegislative Competence of Sindh:\no\nThe court acknowledged the strong presumption against retrospectivity in legislation but found that the Sindh Finance Act, 2017 met the constitutional requirements and had been validated through proper legislative amendments.\no\nThe court emphasized that while the provincial legislature has the power to enact laws for infrastructure development, it cannot encroach upon federal powers as enumerated in the Federal Legislative List. However, the Sindh Finance Act, 2017, was not found to violate any federal competencies in this case.\n4.\nImpact of Previous Versions:\no\nThe court also concluded that the first four versions of the law, as challenged in the Sanofi Aventis case, were not applicable to the petitioners and had no effect on them. The Sindh Finance Act, 2017 superseded those versions and was retrospective in nature, meaning it applied from July 1, 1994, onwards.\n5.\nConstitutionality of the Imposed Levy:\no\nThe infrastructure cess was held to be within the competence of the Sindh province, as it pertains to the development and maintenance of infrastructure within the province. The court did not find any constitutional violations or encroachment upon federal jurisdiction.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe Sindh Finance Act, 2017, which retrospectively imposed an infrastructure fee/cess on goods imported into Sindh, was declared valid and within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature. The petitioners’ challenge was rejected, and the infrastructure cess was upheld as a legitimate provincial tax.\n•\nThe first four versions of the law were held to have no applicability to the petitioners due to the Sanofi Aventis judgment, which had attained finality for the parties involved in that case.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nRetrospective Legislation: Courts have a strong presumption against retrospective legislation, but it can be upheld if it does not interfere with vested rights and is constitutionally valid.\n2.\nLegislative Competence: A province can impose taxes or fees for local purposes (e.g., infrastructure development) as long as it does not conflict with federal law or jurisdiction.\n3.\nFinality of Judicial Decisions: The finality of judicial decisions, such as those in Sanofi Aventis, applies only to the parties involved and does not invalidate laws more broadly unless specifically stated.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Finance Act, 1994=9Sindh Finance Act, 2017=2,3,13,1(3)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=142,151,155", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-3309 of 2011 decided on 04.06.2021, heard on: 26.10.2020, 05.11.2020, 25.01.2021, 15.04.2021 & 28.5.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Hyder Ali Khan, Hussain Ali Almani, Fahad Khan, Rashid Anwar, Ahmed Hussain, Ameen M. Bandukda, Samiur Rehman Khan, Shaheer Roshan Shaikh, Navin Merchant alongwith Salman Yousuf, Faiz Durrani, Samia Faiz Durrani, Ghulam Muhammad, Muhammad Faheem, Umer Akhund, Sofia Saeed Shah, Aijaz Ali and Sobia Mehak, Ghulam Hussain Shah, Muhammad Adeel Awan, Shahan Karimi, Jehanzeb Awan, Karim Abbasi, S. Zeshan Ali, Imran Iqbal Khan, Rafiq Ahmed Kalwar, Nadir Hussain Abro, Rashid Mahar, Shafqat Zaman, Abdul Ahad Nadeem, Zahid Abbas, Yousuf Moulvi alongwith Rafia Murtaza, Taimur A. Mirza, Muhammad Arshad Mehmood, Aijaz Ahmed Zahid, Dr. Muhammad Khalid Hayat, Muhammad Irshad, Wajid Wyne, Shfaqat Zaman, Hamza Waleed, Rashid Mahar, Arshad Shahzad, Naeem Suleman, Asif Ali, Ahmed Hussain, Jawaid Farooqui, Imran Ali Abro, Zubair Ahmed Abro, Adnan Ahmed Zafar, Ajeet Sundar, Waqar Ahmed, Muhammad Adnan Moton, Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Barrister Usman Waleed, Muhammad Inzimam Sharif, Salman Aziz Advocates for the Petitioners.\nM/s. Farooq H. Naek, along with, Zulfiqar Arain, S. Qaim A. Shah, representing Excise & Taxation Dept. Mr. Salman Talibuddin, Advocate General Sindh assisted by Mr. Abdullah Abid, Advocate, Mr. Jawed Dero Additional Advocate General, Mr. Saifullah Assist. Advocate General Khalid Rajpar, Shahid Ali Qureshi, Mohsin Imam Wasti, Muhammad Zubair, Irfan Mir Halepota, Imran Ali Mithani, Muhabbat Hussain Awan, Muhammad Rashid Arfi Okash Mustafa for Muhammad Bilal Bhatti Advocates for Customs department for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S IBRAHIM FIBRES LTD & OTHERS\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24050", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 237 = 2024 SLD 237 = (2024) 129 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDY", - "Key Words:": "Appellant: A limited company engaged in the supply of power\nKey Issues: Amendment of assessment, minimum tax, subsidy, and appeal timelines\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe appellant is a limited company involved in the supply of power. It filed a return of income declaring total business loss and exempt income.\n•\nThe Additional Commissioner amended the original assessment order, taking action under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO 2001) concerning the minimum tax, which the taxpayer had not applied in its return.\n•\nThe first amended assessment was modified by the Commissioner-IR (Appeals) on April 22, 2020, but the second amended assessment was passed by the Additional Commissioner on December 23, 2021, leading to a revised tax demand. The matter was under appeal regarding the first amended order.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nTaxpayer’s Arguments:\no\nThe taxpayer filed an appeal on January 11, 2022, challenging the impugned order passed by the Commissioner-IR (Appeals), which was beyond the statutory period of 120 days.\no\nThe taxpayer argued that the second amended assessment order violated Section 122(4)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance and that it had been made in violation of the provisions of Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which mandates a reasoned, speaking order.\no\nThe taxpayer further contended that the subsidy was not a subsidy to the company but to the general public, and therefore should not be added back to the companys income. Additionally, the tax department’s treatment of staff pensions (gratuity) under Section 34(3) was incorrect, as these were exempt income.\n2.\nRespondent’s Arguments:\no\nThe Departmental Representative (D.R.) argued that the orders of the Additional Commissioner and Commissioner-IR (Appeals) were correct and in line with the law. Therefore, both the amended assessment and appeal order should be confirmed without any modification.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nSecond Amended Assessment:\no\nThe court found the second amended assessment order dated December 23, 2021 to be patently illegal and void because it was passed after the appeal was filed, and thus, the taxpayers case was still pending. This violated Section 122(4)(b), Section 122(5AA), and the appeal process timelines.\no\nThe impugned second assessment was found to be time-barred and thus, was quashed and set aside. The tax demand created by this order was also deleted.\n2.\nSubsidy Addition:\no\nThe court agreed with the taxpayers argument that the subsidy amount cannot be added back to the company’s income. The subsidy is a government benefit intended for end consumers and not the company itself. Therefore, it should not be treated as income for tax purposes.\n3.\nExempt Staff Gratuity:\no\nRegarding the staff gratuity (pension funds), the court agreed that the tax department’s treatment under Section 34(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, which sought to include it as taxable income, was incorrect. The gratuity/pension is exempt income and should not be added back as taxable income.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nSection 122(4)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 limits the ability to amend an assessment once an appeal has been filed, unless done within certain timelines.\n2.\nSection 122(5AA) provides restrictions on amendments and clarifies how and when tax assessments can be altered.\n3.\nSection 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 requires that an order should be a reasoned, speaking order and should not be made arbitrarily without due consideration of the facts and circumstances.\n4.\nSubsidies and Taxation: A subsidy granted to the general public by the government for consumption should not be considered as taxable income of the company unless it is directly provided for the companys benefit.\n5.\nExemption of Pension Funds: Under Section 34(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, certain amounts related to staff gratuity/pension are exempt from taxation, and should not be included in the taxable income.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, quashing the second amended assessment order as illegal, since it was time-barred and violated established procedures. Additionally, the subsidy and staff gratuity were found to be exempt from taxation and should not be included in the taxable income. As a result, the demand raised by the tax authorities was deleted, and the appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=34,34(5),113,114,114(1),122,122(5),122(5AA),129(4)General Clauses Act, 1897=24A", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1640/KB/2022, decided on 23.06.2023, date of hearing: 15.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " M. AMINULLAH SIDDIQUI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MANZOOR ALI JOKHIO, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Mohsin Ali, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Imran Ali Sheikh, D.R., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. SUKKUR ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY LIMITED, SUKKUR\nvs\nTHE CIR AUDIT-II, LTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24051", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 238 = 2024 SLD 238 = (2024) 129 TAX 12", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDU", - "Key Words:": "SRO. 597(I)/2022 - Dated 19.08.2022\nKey Issues: Service of notices, deemed assessment order, best judgment assessment, audit, time limitation, mode of service, salaried person\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe taxpayer is a salaried individual whose case was selected for audit by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through computer balloting.\n•\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) issued an information documents request along with a notice under Section 176 of the Income Tax Ordinance.\n•\nAfter no response from the taxpayer, the DCIR issued a show-cause notice under Section 122(9) regarding the taxability of exempt income.\n•\nThe DCIR proceeded with best judgment assessment under Section 121(1), concluding the proceedings and issuing an assessment order.\n•\nThe taxpayer contended that the order was time-barred as it should have been finalized by June 30, 2020, based on Section 121(3), and was unaware of the order due to poor service of notices via the FBR web portal.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nTaxpayers Arguments:\no\nThe impugned order passed by the DCIR was time-barred under Section 121(3), as the assessment order should have been finalized within five years from the end of the relevant tax year (i.e., by June 30, 2020).\no\nThe taxpayer argued that due to poor internet service, they could not regularly check the FBR web portal, and hence, were unaware of the order uploaded there. The taxpayer contended that the order was not properly served through other means.\n2.\nDepartments Arguments:\no\nThe Department supported the orders of both the DCIR and the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) (Appeals), contending that the appeal should be dismissed as time-barred.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nNon-Compliance of Service Mode:\no\nThe court emphasized that the mode of service under Section 218(1)(a) must be followed as prescribed by law. Since the FBR did not comply with the prescribed service mode (which includes physical delivery or other methods specified in Section 218(1)), the service of the order was ineffective.\no\nThe court held that electronic service would only be valid for taxpayers who have notified their electronic address, and even then, a secondary mode of service (such as by post or another method) should also be used. Failure to do so renders the service invalid, and the period for filing an appeal is only considered from the date of proper service.\n2.\nIntent of the Law:\no\nThe court observed that the intent of Section 218 was to ensure proper service of notices and orders on the taxpayer, which includes a personal service or service via courier. Therefore, relying solely on one mode of service, such as electronic service without using other prescribed methods, is contrary to the legislative intent.\n3.\nTime Bar for Assessment Order:\no\nThe court found that the DCIRs assessment order was passed after the prescribed time limit under Section 121(3). The law clearly states that an assessment under Section 121 must be finalized within five years after the end of the tax year, i.e., by June 30, 2020. Since the DCIR passed the order on June 21, 2021, it was time-barred.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nSection 121(3): An order under Section 121 of the Income Tax Ordinance must be passed within five years from the end of the tax year. Any order passed beyond this period is time-barred and therefore, invalid.\n2.\nSection 218(1): The mode of service of notices and orders must comply with specific procedures. Failure to follow these prescribed methods (including personal service and secondary methods like post or courier) results in invalid service. Proper service is critical for triggering the limitation period for appeals.\n3.\nSection 122(9): Notices under Section 122(9) are part of the process for best judgment assessments and must be served correctly to ensure due process.\n4.\nImportance of Electronic Service: While electronic service is valid for taxpayers who have notified their electronic addresses, the law mandates the use of secondary modes of service (such as post or courier) to ensure that taxpayers are properly informed.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, declaring that the impugned assessment order was time-barred under Section 121(3) as it was issued after the five-year limitation period. Furthermore, the service of the notices and orders was not done in compliance with the prescribed methods under Section 218, rendering the service invalid. Consequently, the orders of both the DCIR and the CIR(A) were quashed and declared without jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed based on these grounds.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),121,121(1),122(9),176,177,218(1)(a)(b)(c),218(1)(d)Income Tax Rules, 2002=74", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1181/KB/2022, decided on 09.12.2022, date of hearing :01.12. 2022", - "Judge Name:": " DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND QAZI ANWER KAMAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Aleem, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Jameel Ahmed, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TARIQ ATTAULLAH KARACHI\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I RTO-II KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24052", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 239 = 2024 SLD 239 = (2024) 129 TAX 22", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Key Issue: Recovery of tax demand, coercive measures, stay application, and grant of stay during appeal\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe appellant/taxpayer filed a miscellaneous application for stay, seeking a stay against the recovery of tax demand. The demand was the subject of an appeal pending before the Tribunal.\n•\nThe taxpayer argued that the actions taken by the taxation authorities were unjust, and thus any coercive action, such as recovery of the assessed amount, would be equally unjust and improper.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nTaxpayers Arguments:\no\nThe taxpayers counsel argued that the order passed by the taxation authorities was unjust and improper, and any coercive action for recovery of the assessed tax would be similarly unjust.\no\nTherefore, the taxpayer requested that a stay be granted against the recovery of the tax demand until the pending appeal before the Tribunal is decided.\n2.\nDepartments Arguments:\no\nThe learned Departmental Representative (DR) strongly opposed the stay application.\no\nThe DR contended that the taxpayers assessment was made in accordance with the law and that the taxpayer was liable to pay the determined outstanding tax.\no\nThe DR prayed for the dismissal of the stay application.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nThe Tribunal decided to grant the stay against the recovery of the impugned tax demand, but subject to the taxpayer depositing 50% of the tax liability in the Government Exchequer.\n•\nThe stay would be effective once the taxpayer provided proof of the deposit of the 50% amount in the court.\n•\nThe stay will remain effective until the main appeal pending before the Tribunal is decided.\n•\nThe department was restrained from taking any adverse action for the recovery of the impugned tax demand until the appeal is decided.\n________________________________________\nCase Referred to:\n•\nM/s. DG Khan Cement Company Limited and another v. The Federation of Pakistan thr. Secretary Revenue Islamabad and others\nC.P. No.1529/2020 dated 26.11.2020\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Tribunal granted the stay in favor of the taxpayer, subject to a 50% deposit of the tax demand. This stay is effective until the main appeal is decided, ensuring that no coercive recovery actions are taken by the tax authorities during the pendency of the appeal.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=130,138(1)", - "Case #": "M.A.(Stay) No.1169/KB/2022 (In ITA No.788/KB/2022) decided on 25.04.2022, date of hearing: 25.04.2022", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHARIF AWAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MRS. RASHIDA SIDDIQUA, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Anwar Kashif, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Naveed Ali, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. SECURE GLOBAL (PVT) LTD, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AUDIT-III, CTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24053", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 240 = 2024 SLD 240 = (2024) 129 TAX 32", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNC8", - "Key Words:": "Key Issue: Recovery of extra tax on confectionery items, scope of tax, and assessment of tax on goods not correctly classified\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe respondent registered person is involved in the manufacturing and supply of a combination of betel nut, aniseed, food, and dates (Tulsi), as well as betel nut (Rasili).\n•\nThe tax officer examined the monthly sales tax returns of the taxpayer and concluded that the products manufactured (Tulsi and Rasili) were confectionery items, which, under Chapter XIII of the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules 2007, should be subject to extra tax.\n•\nThe registered person did not pay the required extra tax, prompting the tax officer to issue a Show Cause Notice (SCN) under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n•\nThe registered person responded to the SCN, but the tax officer was unconvinced, leading to the assessment order being passed under Section 11(2) of the Act.\n•\nThe registered person appealed the decision before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR), who allowed the appeal, ruling in favor of the taxpayer. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the department filed an appeal against the CIRs decision.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nDepartment’s Arguments:\no\nThe learned Departmental Representative (DR) supported the assessment order passed by the DCIR under Section 11(2), arguing that the order was in accordance with the law.\no\nThe DR stated that the CIR (Appeals)s order was both illegal and factually incorrect.\n2.\nTaxpayer’s Arguments:\no\nThe learned AR of the taxpayer supported the CIR (Appeals)s decision, asserting that the department’s grounds of appeal were not clearly stated, making the appeal untenable.\no\nThe AR also referenced a decision by the Lahore High Court, which had declared the levy of extra tax under Chapter XIII of the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007, through SRO 896(I)/2013 dated 04-10-2013 as illegal.\no\nFurthermore, the AR argued that Section 11(2) could not be invoked without an audit, as had been previously established in case law.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nMeaning of “Confectionery”:\no\nThe term confectionery typically refers to products that contain sugar as a substantial ingredient, such as candies, sweets, toffees, and chocolates.\no\nBased on this definition, the Tribunal concluded that Tulsi and Rasili do not contain sugar as a substantial ingredient. Therefore, they cannot be classified as confectionery.\n2.\nTaxability of “Rasili” and “Tulsi”:\no\n Tulsi and Rasili do not meet the criteria for confectionery under ordinary definitions, as they lack sugar, which is a key characteristic of confectionery products.\no\nSince these products do not fall under the definition of confectionery, they should not be subject to extra tax as specified under Chapter XIII of the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007.\n3.\nChargeability of Extra Tax:\no\nThe chargeability of extra tax should be determined based on the description of goods as outlined in the Special Procedure Rules, not solely on the common or ordinary meaning of the terms.\no\nThe tribunal ruled that the extra tax cannot be imposed based on the general understanding of confectionery but must be grounded in the specific description provided in the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007.\n________________________________________\nCases Referred to:\n•\n2002 PTD 14\n•\n2005 SCMR 1166\n•\n2019 PTD 484 (SC)\n•\nMessrs Pakistan Television Corporation v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal), Islamabad and others (2017 SCMR 1136)\n•\nMessrs Citibank NA v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2014 PTD 284)\n•\n2004 PTD 1460 (HC Lah.)\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Tribunal upheld the CIR (Appeals)s decision and ruled that the products “Rasili” and “Tulsi” cannot be classified as confectionery because they do not contain sugar, which is a defining characteristic of confectionery items. Consequently, the imposition of extra tax under Chapter XIII of the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007 was invalid. The appeal filed by the department was dismissed, and the taxpayers position was upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(5),11(2)", - "Case #": "STA No.600/KB/2016, decided on 04.12.2020, date of hearing: 28.10.2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIFULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Tariq Aziz, D.R., for the Appellant.\nS. M. Rehan, FCA for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE E&C, ZONE I, LTU-II, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S. SHALIMAR FOOD PRODUCTS KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24054", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 241 = 2024 SLD 241 = (2024) 129 TAX 189 = 2024 PTD 599", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNCs", - "Key Words:": "Key Issue: Exemption or reduction of tax liability for NTDC regarding procurement of electricity on behalf of DISCOs\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nNTDC (National Transmission & Dispatch Company) is a government body that functions as the agent for procurement of electricity on behalf of DISCOs (Distribution Companies) from GENCOs (Generation Companies) under a license granted by NEPRA (National Electric Power Regulatory Authority).\n•\nFor the tax year 2014, the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) had passed an order against NTDC, which was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The tax department levied minimum tax based on the turnover of NTDC, which it contended was derived from the sale of electricity.\n•\nFor the tax year 2015, the CIR (Appeals) held that NTDC was not liable for the minimum tax on turnover, as the electricity it procured was for DISCOs, not for sale directly by NTDC.\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal dismissed NTDC’s appeal while upholding the departments stance.\n•\nNTDC appealed the matter, arguing that it did not carry out the sale of electricity but acted as an agent for procurement.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nNTDC’s Arguments:\no\nNTDC argued that it acts as an agent for DISCOs, procuring electricity from GENCOs under a license granted by NEPRA. It contended that it does not derive any income from the sale of electricity, and thus, should not be liable for tax on turnover under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\no\nNTDC further contended that the functions of electric power procurement had been carved out from NTDC and transferred to CPPA-G (Central Power Purchasing Agency), which now exclusively handles procurement.\no\nNTDC argued that since it did not carry out the sale of electricity, it should not be taxed on the turnover derived from it.\n2.\nFBR’s (Federal Board of Revenue) Arguments:\no\nThe FBR contested NTDC’s position, asserting that NTDC was engaged in the sale and purchase of electricity and thus should be taxed under the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance.\no\nThe FBR also argued that the documents submitted by NTDC could not be considered at the appeal stage.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nNTDC’s Role as a Transmission Entity:\no\nThe court held that NTDC is a special-purpose vehicle incorporated for the sole purpose of transmission of electricity, as per its NEPRA license. Its mandate is to plan, develop, construct, maintain, and operate the transmission system for the dispatch of electricity.\no\nNTDC is not authorized to engage in the sale or purchase of electricity, and its role is confined to transmission.\n2.\nOnus of Proof on Department:\no\nThe court emphasized that the initial onus of proof rested with the tax department to demonstrate that NTDC was engaged in the sale of electricity and deriving gross receipts from such sales.\no\nThe court found that the department failed to establish that NTDC was involved in the sale of electricity, and thus, NTDC’s receipts from the sale of electricity did not constitute turnover under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance.\n3.\nInterpretation of “Turnover”:\no\nThe court clarified that NTDC’s income from electricity sales bills paid by DISCOs does not qualify as turnover under Section 113. The exemption or reduction of tax liability under the law did not impact this construction.\no\nNTDC is only involved in generating electricity sales bills for DISCOs, and it retains only the Use of System Charges. Therefore, it does not conduct the business of selling electricity to be classified as having a turnover under the tax law.\n4.\nCourts Conclusion:\no\nThe court held that NTDC does not engage in the sale of goods (electricity) and is not subject to the minimum tax on turnover under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\no\nThe Reference Applications filed by NTDC were allowed, and the impugned orders by the tax authorities were set aside.\n________________________________________\nCases Referenced:\n•\nPSO vs. CIT (2018 SCMR 894)\n•\nPLD 1985 SC 109\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe court ruled in favor of NTDC, determining that its activities as an agent for procurement of electricity do not fall within the scope of the minimum tax provisions under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. As NTDC does not engage in the sale of electricity itself, its turnover is not taxable under this section. The orders passed by the tax authorities were set aside, and NTDC was not required to pay the minimum tax on the electricity turnover.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113.122(5-A)Regulation of Generation Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997=17,18(2),20,25", - "Case #": "ITR No.72345 of 2023, decided on 28.12.2023, date of hearing: 18.12.2023", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID KARIM AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shoaib Rashid, Advocate for the Applicant.\nM/s Asma Hamid, Hasan Ali, Noor Ahsan and Sana Azhar, Advocates for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL TRANSMISSION & DESPATCH COMPANY LTD\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24055", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 242 = 2024 SLD 242 = (2024) 129 TAX 210", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDk", - "Key Words:": "Key Issue: Mis-declaration of goods and pre-arrest bail application\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe Applicant is an importer of the goods in question.\n•\nAs per the FIR, the quantity and value of the imported goods were mis-declared. The actual value was reported as US$ 72,709.43, while the declared value was US$ 39,488.77. The actual quantity was also greater than declared.\n•\nThe duties and taxes evaded were computed at Rs. 8,780,094.\n•\nThe Applicant engaged Kazim Rizvi as a clearing agent for the importation process but claimed he was unaware of the mis-declaration of goods.\n•\nThe investigation revealed that the Goods Declaration (GD) was uploaded to the WeBOC system under the Applicant’s ID, and not under the ID of Kazim Rizvi or any other clearing agent.\n•\nThe Applicant could not provide any credentials or identification of Kazim Rizvi and even stated that he had never met him.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nApplicants Argument:\no\nThe Applicants counsel argued that the mis-declaration was due to the actions of Kazim Rizvi, the clearing agent, and that the Applicant was unaware of the discrepancies in the declaration.\no\nHe emphasized that the Applicant had no personal knowledge of the issue, and any error or false declaration was a result of actions taken by the agent, not the Applicant.\n2.\nInvestigations Findings:\no\nThe investigation found that the GD was uploaded under the Applicant’s ID in the WeBOC system, which contradicted the claim of the Applicant that he had delegated the task to a third party (the clearing agent).\no\nMoreover, the Applicant failed to provide any valid identification or credentials of Kazim Rizvi, raising doubts about his involvement.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nPre-arrest Bail:\nThe court reiterated that the grant of pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary relief and is only granted in exceptional cases to protect individuals from being victimized or harassed through misuse of the legal process. It is not meant to be a substitute for post-arrest bail.\n•\nPrimary Test:\nThe primary test for granting pre-arrest bail is the demonstration of malafides (bad faith) or abuse of legal process, which was not evident in this case. The Applicants claims about being unaware of the mis-declaration were not substantiated by the investigation, as the GD was uploaded under his ID, and he could not provide credible evidence of the clearing agent’s role.\n•\nConclusion:\nThe court concluded that the Applicant failed to establish a sufficient case for the grant of pre-arrest bail. Therefore, the bail application was dismissed.\n________________________________________\nCases Referred To:\n•\nRana Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafique (PLD 2009 SC 427):\nThe court referenced this case to reinforce the principle that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy and should only be granted in cases where there is clear evidence of malafides or abuse of legal process.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe application for pre-arrest bail was dismissed, as the Applicant failed to demonstrate the necessary grounds for such a relief, and there was no evidence of malafides underlying the FIR. The court emphasized the exceptional nature of pre-arrest bail and rejected the Applicants claims of ignorance regarding the mis-declaration of goods.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1),32(2),156(1)(14A)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=156(1),497", - "Case #": "Spl. Cr. Bail Application No. 19 of 2023, decided on 24.10.2023, date of hearing: 24.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": " ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Asif Ali Shah, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Ashiq Ali Anwar Rana, Special Prosecutor Customs along with I.O., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KARAMAT HUSSAIN SHAH SON OF SYED KHADIM HUSSAIN SHAH\nVS\nTHE STATE THROUGH DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE & INVESTIGATION CUSTOMS, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24056", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 243 = 2024 SLD 243 = (2024) 129 TAX 213 = 2024 PTD 591", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNDg", - "Key Words:": "Key Issue: False declaration and penalty for misdeclaration related to import duties and home consumption clearance.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe Applicant is challenging the common judgment of the Customs Appellate Tribunal Bench Lahore dated 26.07.2023. The judgment concerns a case of alleged misdeclaration in the importation and clearance of goods for home consumption.\n•\nThe Applicant had made a declaration for in-bonding of goods under Section 79 of the Customs Act, 1969. However, the declaration contained incorrect particulars, specifically regarding the PCT Heading (Pakistan Customs Tariff).\n•\nThe Applicant argued that no penal consequences should be applied since misdeclaration occurred only for in-bonding purposes and that duties should only be determined at the time of clearance (ex-bonding), not at the time of importation.\n•\nThe Respondent department argued that the misdeclaration of the PCT Heading was prejudicial to the correct determination of duties and thus attracted penal consequences under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nApplicants Argument:\no\nThe Applicant’s counsel argued that the misdeclaration made during in-bonding does not constitute an offence under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969.\no\nThe counsel referred to Sections 30(b) and 104 of the Act to assert that the determination of duties should only happen at the time of clearance (ex-bonding) and not during the in-bonding process.\n2.\nRespondents Argument:\no\nThe Respondent contended that the incorrect declaration regarding the PCT Heading resulted in misdeclaration, which prejudiced the duty determination.\no\nThe misdeclaration violated the provisions of Section 79 and thus attracted penalties under Section 32 and Clause 14 of Section 156(1) of the Customs Act, 1969.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nWrong Declaration Constitutes an Offence:\no\nThe court ruled that a wrong declaration made during importation, even for in-bonding, constitutes an offence under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969.\no\nThe Customs Act holds that a person can be charged under Section 32 if they knowingly and intentionally make a false declaration or statement in relation to a customs matter.\no\nMisdeclaration about goods, even if made during in-bonding, falls under the scope of Section 32 of the Act and thus attracts penal consequences.\n2.\nPenalties for Misdeclaration:\no\nThe court further clarified that incorrect declarations made for in-bonding purposes are still subject to penalties under Clause 14 of Section 156(1) of the Customs Act.\no\nThe declaration for in-bonding (which involved incorrect details regarding the PCT Heading) was found to be covered under the term in connection with any matter of customs .\no\nThe misdeclaration was found to be an offence under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, and subject to penalty under the relevant provision, irrespective of whether duties are determined later at the time of clearance.\n3.\nConclusion:\no\nThe question of law raised by the Applicant was answered in the negative — i.e., the penal consequences for misdeclaration can still be invoked, even if the misdeclaration occurs during in-bonding, as it is considered an offence under Section 32 of the Act.\no\nThe Reference Application was decided against the Applicant and in favor of the department.\n________________________________________\nCase Referred To:\n•\nM/s Baba Khan vs. Collector of Customs, Quetta and 2 others (PTCL 2000 CL 688):\nThis case was referenced to reinforce the notion that incorrect declarations can lead to penalties under the Customs Act, regardless of whether they occur at the time of importation or during later stages such as clearance.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Applicants reference application was dismissed, and the penalty for misdeclaration of goods was upheld. The court affirmed that even misdeclarations made during the in-bonding process fall under the scope of Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, and attract penal consequences. The Respondent departments stance was supported, and the case was decided in its favor.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=30(b),32,32(1),79,104,109,156(1)", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.57848 and 57846 of 2023, decided on 12.10.2023, date of hearing: 12.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SAJIDMEHMOOD SETHI AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Omar Arshad Hakeem, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate for Customs Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RESHMA TEXTILE MILLS LTD\nVS\nCUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN LAHORE ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24057", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 244 = 2024 SLD 244 = (2024) 129 TAX 218", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNHo", - "Key Words:": "Key Issue: Forgery and fiscal fraud related to the release of goods on forged documents; Post-arrest bail.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe Applicant seeks post-arrest bail after his initial bail was declined by the Special Judge (Customs, Taxation, and Anti-Smuggling), Karachi, on 14-07-2023.\n•\nThe FIR was lodged on 03-05-2023 by the Directorate of Transit Trade, Karachi. The case involves the release of goods to one Ali Akbar Shah as the auction purchaser, but upon investigation, the underlying documents related to the goods were found to be forged and fabricated.\n•\nThe Accused, identified as Victor Shahbaz, was not initially named in the FIR. However, he was arrested after being implicated in the interim challan dated 23-05-2023. The basis of his involvement was his signature on the delivery order of the goods, which identified him as the Auctioneer for Ashar and Brothers.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nAccused’s Argument:\no\nThe Accused contended that his signature on the delivery order had been forged by someone else, and he was not involved in the function of being an Auctioneer at the time the goods were released.\n2.\nProsecution’s Argument:\no\nThe prosecution argued that the accuseds signature on the forged documents tied him to the illegal release of the goods, implicating him in the fiscal fraud and violation of the Customs Act, 1969.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nLegal Considerations for Post-Arrest Bail:\no\nThe court referred to Clause (40A) of Section 156(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, which deals with the punishment for offences involving forgery or fraudulent activity related to customs duties, where the punishment could extend up to ten years of imprisonment.\no\nThe court also considered Section 497(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which governs the grant of post-arrest bail in cases where the alleged offences fall within the category of further inquiry, and the custody of the accused is not necessary for the further investigation.\n2.\nGrant of Post-Arrest Bail:\no\nThe court found that the case against the Accused appeared to be one where further enquiry was required, and thus, it did not justify continued detention without the necessity of further investigation or the risk of evidence tampering.\no\nThe court emphasized that no evidence was presented to show that the Accused was likely to tamper with evidence or flee, nor was it argued that his custody was required for further investigation.\no\nPost-arrest bail was therefore granted to the Accused, Victor Shahbaz, in FIR No. 02/2023, subject to the provision of a surety as set out in the order dated 07-08-2023.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Accused, Victor Shahbaz, was granted post-arrest bail based on the fact that the case was still under further enquiry and the custody was not deemed necessary for further investigation. His signature on the forged documents was not sufficient grounds to deny bail, as there was no evidence that he posed a flight risk or would tamper with evidence.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=156(1)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)", - "Case #": "Spl. Cr. Bail Application No. 46 of 2023, decided on 05.09.2023, date of hearing: 05.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": " ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Riaz Ahmed Phulpoto and Nusrat Sultan, Advocates for the Applicants.\nMr. Ashiq Ali Anwar Rana, Special Prosecutor Customs for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "VICTOR SHAHBAZ S/O WAFATI DAS\nVS\nTHE STATE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24058", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 245 = 2024 SLD 245 = (2024) 129 TAX 249 = 2025 PTD 101", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1JpNHk", - "Key Words:": "Key Issues: Rectification of mistakes in tax assessments, short payment of tax, application of incorrect tax rate, and appeal process.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe respondent-taxpayer was obligated to pay minimum tax following amendments in Section 113 and Part-III of the 2nd Schedule through the Finance Act, 2010.\n•\nThe taxpayer was issued a show-cause notice for non-payment of the minimum tax, and the already finalized tax assessment was rectified under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on 08.05.2012. The rectification resulted in a determination of the balance payable tax of Rs. 2,406,450.\n•\nThe respondent-taxpayer appealed the order before the Commissioner (Appeals), but the appeal was dismissed on 22.10.2012.\n•\nThe respondent-taxpayer then appealed to the Appellate Tribunal, which accepted the appeal on 28.08.2013.\nThe department challenged this decision, raising the following key questions regarding the rectification of tax assessments:\n1.\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in annulling the order passed under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance and in holding that the provisions of Section 120(3) applied.\n2.\nWhether short payment of tax or incorrect application of tax rates qualifies as a mistake under Section 221.\n3.\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal erred in applying Section 120(3) to exclude the application of Section 221.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nApplicant-Department’s Argument:\no\nThe original return filed by the taxpayer is considered a deemed assessment order under Section 120. The department argues that Section 221 allows for the rectification of a deemed assessment order when a mistake is apparent on record (e.g., short payment or incorrect tax rate).\no\nThe department contends that the Appellate Tribunal did not correctly apply the provisions of Section 221 and failed to properly address the rectification of mistake.\n•\nRespondent-Taxpayer’s Argument:\no\nThe respondent-taxpayer defends the Appellate Tribunal’s decision, asserting that the rectification process was incorrectly applied and that the short payment of tax or incorrect application of tax rate does not fall under the mistakes apparent on the record under Section 221.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\nThe High Court addressed the following points:\n1.\nRectification of Mistakes (Section 221):\no\nSection 221 provides for the rectification of mistakes that are apparent from the record. A mistake must be obvious and apparent on the surface; it should not require detailed investigation or evidence to identify. Only such patent mistakes can be rectified, and they must be so obvious that they immediately strike one when reading the order.\no\nShort payment of tax and incorrect application of the tax rate were not considered mistakes apparent from the record in this case because they involve complex interpretations or controversies that cannot be addressed through a simple rectification process.\n2.\nDeemed Assessment (Section 120):\no\nUnder Section 120(1), a complete return is treated as a deemed assessment order. This means that the return filed by the taxpayer is considered an assessment unless there is a deficiency (e.g., failure to provide necessary information), in which case the Commissioner issues a notice under Section 120(3).\no\nSection 221 does not apply to deemed assessments under Section 120 since these assessments are not considered actual orders passed by the authority, and rectification can only apply to formal orders passed after considering the merits of the case.\n3.\nPowers under Sections 120, 122, and 221:\no\nThe powers under Sections 120, 122, and 221 are distinct and not overlapping. Section 120 relates to the deemed assessment based on the filed return, while Section 122 allows for amendments of assessments. Section 221 pertains to rectifying obvious mistakes in orders passed by the Commissioner.\no\nMistakes that require the exercise of powers under Section 221 must be immediately visible on the record. If the issue requires investigation or reassessment, it is not a mistake that can be corrected under this section.\n4.\nTax Liability and Rectification:\no\nIn the process of rectification, the tax liability of the taxpayer cannot be altered based on matters that were not part of the original assessment. The error must be obvious and floating on the surface, and any substantive changes to the assessment must be handled through other procedures such as reassessment under Section 122.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe High Court agreed with the Appellate Tribunal’s decision and concluded that the rectification order under Section 221 was improperly applied in this case.\n•\nThe short payment of tax and incorrect tax rate were not obvious mistakes and could not be rectified under Section 221.\n•\nThe Reference Application was therefore decided against the department and in favor of the respondent-taxpayer.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nSection 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, allows for rectification of mistakes that are apparent on the record without the need for investigation or evidence.\n2.\nDeemed assessments under Section 120 do not fall under the rectification provisions of Section 221.\n3.\nPowers under Sections 120, 122, and 221 are distinct and apply in different contexts – rectification applies to obvious errors, amendments and reassessments apply to more substantive matters.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113,120,120(1),120(3),120(1A),121,122,122(1),122(4),122(5),122(5A),133,156,177,221,221(2)", - "Case #": "PTR No. 335 of 2013, decided on 27.04.2022, date of hearing: 15.03.2022", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Raja Sikandar Khan and Sohail Zahid Butt, Advocates for the Applicants.\nMr. Mudassar Shujauddin, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, SIALKOT\nVS\nM/S CHAUDHRY STEEL MILLS S.I.E., DASKA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24059", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 246 = 2024 SLD 246 = (2024) 129 TAX 275 = 2024 PTD 1133", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yzc", - "Key Words:": "Constitutional Petitions - Immunity from Sales Tax and Income Tax for Industrial Units in Former FATA - Challenge to Customs General Orders and Circulars\nFACTS: In this case, the petitioners, whose industrial units were located in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), challenged certain Customs General Orders and Circulars issued by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) regarding their tax immunity. Prior to the merger of FATA into the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018, these industrial units enjoyed complete immunity from sales tax and income tax. Following the merger, this immunity was extended for a further five years. However, the petitioners claimed that subsequent circulars, which imposed additional obligations and conditions, were beyond the FBRs authority and violated their constitutional rights to free trade, as guaranteed under Article 18 of the Constitution.\nARGUMENTS: The petitioners contended that:\n•\nThe industrial units in FATA were exempt from sales tax and income tax under Entry No. 151 of the Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n•\nThe immunity should only be subject to the statutory procedure under this Entry, and the impugned circulars issued by the FBR were beyond the legal authority and violated their rights.\n•\nThe impugned circulars introduced new conditions regarding the transportation of goods, restricting the petitioners discretion in choosing where to release goods (e.g., Karachi Port or Dry Port, Peshawar).\nThe FBR defended its actions, arguing:\n•\nThe FBR has the legal authority to issue such circulars as part of its statutory mandate.\n•\nThe purpose of the circulars was to ensure proper monitoring of the import process and prevent leakage of revenue.\n•\nThe circulars did not violate any legal rights or fiscal laws.\nDECISION: The court held that:\n1.\nAuthority of the FBR: The court confirmed that the FBR has the authority to issue circulars or instructions as long as they do not conflict with existing fiscal laws, such as the Sales Tax Act, 1990 or Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The circulars were found to be in line with the Apex Court’s concerns of preventing tax leakage, as seen in previous rulings like Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills.\n2.\nCirculars and Orders Validity: The circulars issued by FBR did not infringe upon any statutory rights of the petitioners. The new policy regarding the transportation of goods was considered a necessary safeguard to ensure the proper movement and control of goods that were exempt from taxes. The court noted that these measures aimed to ensure transparency and compliance with fiscal regulations.\n3.\nDiscretion on Transportation: The court acknowledged the petitioners’ concern about the loss of discretion regarding the release of goods, but it ruled that the FBR’s decision to enforce supervised transportation was a reasonable measure to safeguard revenue.\n4.\nAudit and Delegation: The court highlighted that while the FBR could conduct audits to ensure compliance with fiscal laws, the broad, unbridled discretion for annual audits was deemed excessive and illegal. This unrestrained power was found to amount to excessive delegation, which violates legal norms.\n5.\nClassification of Importers: The FBR had classified industries into two categories based on the value of their imports—those importing goods worth up to Rs. 200 million annually and those importing more. The court held that such classification was within the rights of the legislature and taxing authorities to impose different tax regimes based on the scale of operations.\nConclusion: All the writ petitions were dismissed, with the court ruling that the impugned circulars were not ultra vires and did not violate the constitutional or legal rights of the petitioners. However, the court did take issue with the broad discretion given to FBR regarding annual audits.\nCases Referred to:\n•\nMessrs Taj Packages Company (Pvt) Ltd through Manager vs. Government of Pakistan (2016 PTD 203)\n•\nMessrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd vs. Federation of Pakistan (2016 PTD 1555)\n•\nPakistan through Chairman, FBR vs. Hazrat Hussain (2018 SCMR 939)\n•\nDossani Travels Pvt. Ltd vs. Messrs Travels Shop Pvt. Ltd (PLD 2014 SC 1)\n•\nZaman Cement Company Pvt. Ltd vs. Central Board of Revenue (2002 SCMR 312)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=79,80,83Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148,177", - "Case #": "WP No. 5105-P/2021 with CM No. 125-P/2022 alongwith WP No. 1618-P/2021, WP No. 5119-P/2021, WP No. 5184- P/2021, WP No. 5313-P/2021, WP No. 5361-P/2021, WP No. 1328-P/2021, WP No. 1355-P/2021, WP No. 1516-P/2021, WP No. 1591-P/2021, WP No. 1633-P/2021 and WP No. 5006-P/2021, decided on 09.02.2022, date of hearing: 09.02.2022", - "Judge Name:": " ROOH-UL-AMIN KHAN AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nM/s Aamir Javed, Addl. Attorney General & Ishtiaq Ahmad (Junior), Advocate, along with Arshad Hilali Law Officer Customs Department & Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S APALLO PLASTIC AND CHEMICALS (PVT) LTD MALAKAND\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH FEDERAL SECRETARY, FINANCE AND REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24060", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5YzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 247 = 2024 SLD 247 = (2024) 129 TAX 312", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5YzY", - "Key Words:": "Exemption of Packing Material from Sales Tax as Raw Material for Pharmaceutical Products\n________________________________________\nFACTS:\nThe issue in this case revolved around whether the import of packing material (such as cardboard, glass bottles, clear plastic, and aluminum foil) used in the manufacturing, storing, and marketing of pharmaceutical products qualifies for exemption from sales tax under Entry 105 of the 6th Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which provides an exemption for raw materials used in the manufacture of goods.\nThe appellants (petitioners) argued that packaging materials should be treated as raw materials for the purposes of the exemption, as without such packaging, the pharmaceutical products could not be properly distributed or sold. They relied on the broad interpretation of raw material and cited provisions of the Customs Act, 1969, to support their claim.\n________________________________________\nARGUMENTS:\nThe appellants contended that:\n•\nPackaging materials, being essential for the storage, distribution, and sale of pharmaceutical products, should be treated as raw materials.\n•\nThe exemption under the Customs Act, 1969, supports the view that packaging is integral to the manufacturing process.\n•\nThey argued that the term raw material should be interpreted broadly using a dictionary definition, and suggested that the word and in Entry 105 should be read as or to extend the exemption.\nThe respondents, represented by Mr. Shahid Ali Qureshi, maintained that the judgment in question was correct and there was no merit to the appeal. They emphasized that packaging material does not fall under the statutory definition of raw material as per the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n________________________________________\nDECISION:\n1.\nStatutory Interpretation:\nThe court emphasized the principle of statutory interpretation, which dictates that when a statute provides a definition or explanation, it should be adhered to strictly. The use of a generic dictionary definition for raw material was rejected, as it was not consistent with the specific definitions provided under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The court noted that the statutory definitions within the Act, particularly sections 2(d), (q), and (af), are tailored to the legislative framework and should guide the interpretation of terms.\n________________________________________\n2.\nRole of Courts in Statutory Interpretation:\nThe court affirmed the well-established legal principle that courts are tasked with interpreting laws as they are written, not legislating or making policy decisions. The court cannot add or modify the wording of an Act, even if it may seem reasonable or beneficial. Therefore, the courts cannot read or where and is explicitly mentioned in the statute, nor can they stretch the meaning of raw material beyond its defined scope within the law.\n________________________________________\n3.\nPackaging Material Not Falling Within the Scope of Raw Material:\nThe court concurred with the findings of the learned Single Judge in a previous case (Shazeb), which had ruled that packaging material does not qualify as raw material for the manufacture of pharmaceutical products. Even if the word and was read as or , the court found that packaging material would still not fall under the exemption as raw material. The exemption is specifically intended for materials that are directly involved in the manufacturing process, not for those that are merely used for packaging or distribution.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe court upheld the judgment, ruling that packaging material used for pharmaceutical products does not qualify as raw material under Entry 105 of the 6th Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Therefore, such materials are not exempt from sales tax. The appeal was dismissed, and the statutory framework as provided by the Sales Tax Act was maintained.\n________________________________________\nCase-law Referred:\n•\nThe decision relied on previous case law, particularly Shazeb regarding the exemption status of materials in the manufacturing process.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=31", - "Case #": "HCA 259 of 2019, HCA 272 of 2019, HCA 277 of 2019, HCA 278 of 2019, HCA 279 of 2019, HCA 280 of 2019, HCA 281 of 2019, HCA 282 of 2019, HCA 284 of 2019, HCA 298 of 2019, HCA 320 of 2019, HCA 338 of 2019, HCA 04 of 2020, CP D 6072 of 2017, CP D 7920 of 2017, CP D 2436 of 2018, CP D 2691 of 2018, CP D 4429 of 2018, CP D 2133 of 2019 and CP D 3229 of 2019, decided on 24.12.2021, date of hearing: 06.10.2021 & 06.12.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Vawda, Advocate Mr. Salman J. Mirza, Avocate Mr. Hussain Idris, Advocate Mr. Taha Samad, Advocate Mr. Abdul Ahad, Advocate Mr. Faiz Ahmed, Advocate Mr. Fayaz Ali Melto, Advocate for the Appellants/ Petitioners.\nMr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Deputy Attorney General Mr. Hussain Bohra, Assistant Attorney General for the Respondents.\nMr. Shahid Ali Qureshi, Advocate Dr. Shah Nawaz Memon, Advocate Mr. Khalid Rajpar, Advocate Mr. Rana Sakhawat Ali, Advocate Mr. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui Advocate Mr. Noor Nabi, Advocate Mr. Zafar Imam, Advocate Mr. Shakeel Ahmed, Advocate Ms. Masooda Siraj, Advocate Mr. Ali Qambar Askari, Advocate for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GETZ PHARMA (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24061", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5YzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 248 = 2024 SLD 248 = (2024) 129 TAX 322", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5YzU", - "Key Words:": "Constitutional Petition - Appeal and Stay Application of the Petitioner Pending - Initiation of Recovery Proceedings by Respondent No. 2 in Pursuance of Recovery Notice - Validity\n________________________________________\nFACTS:\nThis is the second writ petition on the subject, filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The petitioner has sought inter alia a direction to respondent No. 3 to decide its pending appeal and stay application, while restraining respondent No. 2 from initiating recovery proceedings.\n________________________________________\nARGUMENTS:\nThe learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned notice is illegal, arbitrary, and against the law. The initiation of recovery proceedings during the pendency of the petitioner’s appeal and stay application is a violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The counsel further contended that this is the second petition on the subject, and the delay in decision is not attributable to the petitioner. Therefore, the recovery notice should be suspended, and the recovery proceedings should be stopped until the final decision of the appeal by respondent No. 3.\n________________________________________\nDECISION:\nThe court held that an assessee is entitled to adjudication regarding disputed tax liabilities by at least one independent forum outside the hierarchy of the respondent department. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case titled Mehram Ali Vs. Federation of Pakistan etc. (PLD 1998 SC 1445) specifically held that there should be adjudication of grievances by an independent tribunal. Additionally, the Lahore High Court in numerous judgments has affirmed that an assessee is entitled to such adjudication.\nIn light of the above, the instant Writ Petition was disposed of with the direction to respondent No. 3 to hear and decide the appeal and stay application within a period of sixty days. Until then, no coercive measures shall be adopted against the petitioner by respondent No. 2.\n________________________________________\nCases Referred to:\n•\nM/s Pak Saudi Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (2002 PTD 679)\n•\nZ.N. Exporters (Pvt.) Ltd Vs. Collector of Sales Tax (2003 PTD 1746)\n•\nBrothers Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd Vs. Appellate Tribunal Sales Tax (2003 PTD 1836)\n•\nMehram Ali Vs. Federation of Pakistan etc. (PLD 1998 SC 1445)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W.P No. 2114 of 2021, decided on 17.06.2021", - "Judge Name:": " AAMER FAROOQ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Muhammad Abbas, Advocate for the Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. MYSON ENGINEERING SYSTEM\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24062", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5YzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 249 = 2024 SLD 249 = (2024) 129 TAX 51", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5YzQ", - "Key Words:": "Definitions - Appointment of Authorities - Recovery of Tax Not Levied or Short Levied\n________________________________________\nFACTS:\nThe appellant was confronted regarding a short payment of Sindh Sales Tax (SST) amounting to Rs. 15,353,363 for various services provided during the tax periods from January 2012 to December 2012. The reply to the Show Cause Notice (SCN) was found unsatisfactory, resulting in the passing of an Order-In-Original (OIO). The appellant filed an appeal before the learned Commissioner Appeals, but no final decision was made within the statutory limitation period. After a considerable delay, the case was transferred to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 59(7) of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011.\n________________________________________\nARGUMENTS:\nThe department argued that all services offered by banks are taxable under main tariff heading 9813.4000 of the Second Schedule to the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011. The services listed under this heading are considered indicative and not exhaustive of the legislative intent regarding the taxability of various services. Furthermore, sub-heading 9813.4990 (others) covers all other services not included under the main heading 9813.4000. However, this interpretation was not reflected in the SCN, which was silent on the specific tariff heading under which tax was being levied and demanded.\n________________________________________\nDECISION:\n(a) Commission/Rebate Earned by the Appellant from Foreign Corresponding Bank Not Taxable Prior to Amendment\nThe Tribunal held that the commission/rebate earned by the appellant from a foreign corresponding bank was not taxable before the amendment introduced in the Second Schedule of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, which took effect from 1st July 2019. The departments argument that commission and rebate were taxable under tariff heading 9813.4990 prior to the amendment was rejected. The sub-heading 9813.4990 is subservient to heading 9813.4900 (Safe Vaults) and applies only to services related to safe vaults. If the departmental interpretation were accepted, it would result in redundancy within the entire tariff scheme, which is not permissible in law.\n________________________________________\n(b) Show Cause Notice Invalid Due to Lack of Specific Tariff Heading\nThe Tribunal also noted that the Show Cause Notice was issued without assigning any specific tariff heading to determine the taxability of the rebate/commission earned by the appellant from the foreign corresponding bank and the State Bank of Pakistan. As such, the appeal was allowed, and the OIO was set aside. Since the departmental case failed on merit, other aspects were not discussed.\n________________________________________\nCases Referred to:\n•\nFederation of Pakistan v/s Haji Muhammad Sadiq (2007 PTD 67)\n•\nM/s Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd v/s Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal) LTU, Islamabad etc. (Civil Appeal No.1509 of 2016)\n•\nM/s Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd and Others v. Federation of Pakistan and Others (2018 SCMR 802)\n•\nM/s Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd. Karachi v/s Collector of Sales Tax, Federal Excise (Appeals) Karachi (2012 PTD (Trib.) 954)\n•\nMessrs CITI BANK NA v. Commissioner Inland Revenue and another (2014 PTD 284)\n•\nCollector Central Excise and Land Customs versus Reham Din (1987 SCMR 1840)\n•\nAssistant Director Intelligence & Investigation, Customs, Karachi versus B. R. Herman (PLD 1992 SC 485)\n•\nM/s Caretex v/s Collector Safe Tax (2013 PTD 1536)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=2(28)(b),34,47,59Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962=7Sindh Sales Tax on Services Rule, 2011=30", - "Case #": "Appeal Nos. AT-26/2022, 27/2022 and 29/2022, decided on 28.12.2023, date of hearing: 25.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": " JUSTICE (R) NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, CHAIRMAN AND SYED TAHIR RAZA ZAIDI, MEMBER TECHNICAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Muhammad Ijaz, Advocate for Appellant.\nMr. Shareef Malik, DC-DR, and Mr. Muhammad Faraz, AC-SRB for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S SAMBA BANK LIMITED, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (UNIT-09), SRB SINDH REVENUE BOARD, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24063", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 250 = 2024 SLD 250 = (2024) 129 TAX 67", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yy8", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Service of Orders and Decisions - Assessment of Tax - Offences and Penalties - Default Surcharge - Recovery of Tax Not Levied or Short Levied - Correction of Clerical Errors\n________________________________________\nFACTS:\nThe appellant was registered with Sindh Revenue Board (SRB) under the service category of “Event Management Service including services by Event Photographers, Event Videographers,” which are subject to levy of Sindh Sales Tax (SST) at the applicable rate of 13%. It was observed that SST amounting to Rs. 3,205,339 was withheld and paid by the service recipients with SRB as per the statutory provisions of the Sindh Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2014. However, the service recipient declared and paid only the net SST, and the appellant had not paid the full amount due. This resulted in the SST remaining outstanding. It was further alleged that the non-payment of the SST amounted to tax fraud under section 2(94) of the Act, which is punishable under section 43 of the Act. The appellant was served with a Show-Cause Notice (SCN) and was asked to explain why penalties should not be imposed.\nThe Assessing Officer (AO) passed an Order-In-Original (OIO) determining SST under section 23 of the Act, along with a default surcharge under section 44, and imposed penalties under section 43. The appellant filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 57(1) of the Act. The appellant had short-paid SST of Rs. 6,555,386 into the Sindh government’s treasury.\n________________________________________\nARGUMENTS:\nDuring the hearing, the appellants advocate argued that the SCN was neither delivered to the appellant nor was any email received regarding the SCN. The appellant also did not receive the hearing notice for the adjudication proceedings. Furthermore, the OIO was time-barred. The advocate contended that penalties were imposed without establishing mens rea (guilty mind), malafide, or willfulness on the part of the appellant.\nOn the other hand, the learned AC submitted that both the SCN and hearing notices were served upon the appellant via email. The OIO was passed within the time allowed by law, and the assessment was made after giving several opportunities to the appellant, who remained absent and failed to present a defense. The default surcharge and penalties were rightly imposed as the appellant willfully failed to deposit the SST received from service recipients.\n________________________________________\nDECISION:\n(a) Neglect of the Department to Serve Notices as per Code of Civil Procedure, 1908\nThe Department failed to serve the appellant personally through an agent or via registered post, despite having two other addresses in the appellants registration profile. The Department also neglected to issue the SCN and hearing notices in the prescribed manner under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The OIO and OIA were passed solely based on email communication.\nService of the SCN and hearing notices is mandatory before passing an OIO against the appellant. Sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Act provides that “no order under sub-section (1) or (1A) shall be made by an officer of the SRB unless a notice to show cause is given to the person in default.”\n________________________________________\n(b) No Order Shall Be Made Unless a Show Cause is Given to the Person in Default\nAs per sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Act, no order under sub-sections (1) and (1A) shall be made unless a show cause notice is given to the person in default. Although a show cause notice was issued, it was returned, and tax liability was created without hearing the appellant. Based on these grounds, the appeal is allowed, and the OIO and OIA are set aside. The Department is at liberty to issue a fresh SCN to the appellant, in accordance with section 75 of the Act, and pass a fresh OIO after providing the appellant with the proper right of hearing and defense.\n________________________________________\nCases Referred to:\n•\nM/s Allah Tawakkal Steel Mill V/s Federation of Pakistan and Others (2016 PTD 1003 (L.H.C))\n•\nThe Assistant Commissioner, SRB V/s M/s Jadoon Flying Coach Services (2020 PTD 1834 (Trib.))\n•\nM/s Zam Zam LPG (Pvt.) Limited V/s Federation of Pakistan and Others (2023 PTD 649 (SHC))\n•\nAssistant Commissioner, (Unit-04), SRB V/s M/s Optimus Capital Management (Pvt.) Limited (2017 PTD 2108 (Trib.))\n•\nMst. Amna Majeed V/s Government of Punjab and Others (2023 PLC (C.S.) 620 (LHC))\n•\nPunjab v. Javed Iqbal (2021 SCMR 328)\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue versus Ali Hassan Metal Works (2018 PTD 108 (DB-LHC))", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=2(94),23,43,44,47(1A),57(1),75,76Sindh Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2014=60", - "Case #": "Appeal No. AT-96/2023, decided on 21.11.2023, date of hearing: 26.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": " JUSTICE (R) NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI CHAIRMAN AND SYED TAHIR RAZA ZAIDI, MEMBER TECHNICAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Saeed-ur-Rehman Dogar, Advocate for the appellant.\nMr. Shareef Malik, DC-DR, SRB along-with Mr. Allah Rakhio Jogi, AC-SRB for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S EVENMENT, LAHORE\nVS\nTHE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (UNIT-02), SINDH REVENUE BOARD (SRB), KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24064", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 251 = 2024 SLD 251 = (2024) 129 TAX 89", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yys", - "Key Words:": "Assessment of Tax and Recovery of Tax Not Levied or Short Levied or Erroneously Refunded - Scope of Tax - Default Surcharge - Distributor/Supplier of Electricity - Sales Tax Return - Difference Found in the Sales Tax Declared for the Tax Period from July 2012 to June 2013 - Show Cause Notice - Charging of Sales Tax on Differential Amount of Sales u/s 11 and Recovery of Penalty Together with Default Surcharge - Dismissal of Appeal by the CIR(A) - Appeal Before Appellate Tribunal - Scope\n________________________________________\nFACTS:\nBrief facts of the case are that the appellant is a distributor/supplier of electricity and is governed by Chapter III of the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007. A comparison of their sales tax returns with income tax returns and audited accounts revealed a significant difference in the sales declared for the tax periods from July 2012 to June 2013, prompting the issuance of a Show Cause Notice. After due proceedings, the concerned Officer charged sales tax on the differential amount of sales under Section 11 and also imposed a default surcharge under Section 34, in addition to recovering the penalty as provided under Section 33.\n________________________________________\nARGUMENTS:\nThe learned counsel for the appellant/taxpayer argued that the impugned Order in Appeal was ultra vires as it had been passed by the learned Commissioner-IR (Appeals) Quetta beyond a period of 120 days from the date of filing of the appeal, thus making it barred by time and unenforceable under the law.\nHe further argued that tax is leviable only on ‘taxable supplies’ and that subsidies/grants provided by the government are a form of compensation rather than revenue, which cannot be classified under taxable supplies. Therefore, the question of levying sales tax on the amount of subsidy received from the government does not arise.\nOn the other hand, the learned D.R. vehemently opposed the appellants contentions, asserting that the orders of the authorities below are well within the framework of law, and no illegality or infirmity exists. Therefore, both orders should be confirmed.\n________________________________________\nDECISION:\nThe subsidy amount, which was not considered as payment for the supply of electricity, is excluded from the collection of sales tax under the Sales Tax Act. The impugned order in Appeal No. ST/25-2016, dated 22.03.17, passed by the Commissioner-IR (Appeals), Quetta/Sukkur in Appeal No. 29 of 2015 for the tax year 2012, is barred by time under Section 45B (2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Furthermore, the subsidy amount is not chargeable to tax, as it does not constitute consideration for the supply of electricity.\nConsequently, the impugned orders of the authorities below are hereby vacated. Therefore, the demand created based on the impugned Order in Appeal and the Sales Tax Order in Original, with regard to the sales tax on subsidy, including default surcharge and the 100% penalty, is hereby deleted.\n________________________________________\nCases Referred to:\n•\nM/s. MFMY Industries Ltd. v. FOP & Others (2015 SCMR 1550)\n•\nM/s. Allah Tawakkal Steel Mill v. FOP & Others (2016 PTD 1003)\n•\nM/s. Collector of Customs v. M/s. Shafiq Traders (2011 SCMR 967)\n•\nKhalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs (2009 SCMR 1881)\n•\nM/s. Shafiq Traders v. Collector of Customs (2007 PTD 2092)\n•\nM/s. Peshawar Electric Supply Co. (PESCO) v. CIR RTO Peshawar (2019 PTCL 731 - 2020 PTD 1068)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(46),3,11,34,45BSales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007=1,14", - "Case #": "STA No. 150/KB/2017, decided on 23.06.2023, date of hearing: 15.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": " M. AMINULLAH SIDDIQUI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MANZOOR ALI JOKHIO, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Mohsin Ali, Advocate for the Appellant.\nImran Ali Sheikh, D.R. for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. SUKKUR ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY LIMITED, SUKKUR\nVS\nTHE CIR ZONE-I, LTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24065", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 252 = 2024 SLD 252 = (2024) 129 TAX 99", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yzk", - "Key Words:": "Assessment of Tax and Recovery of Tax Not Levied or Short Levied or Erroneously Refunded - Scope of Tax - Adjustable Input Tax - Access to Record, Documents, etc.: Offences and Penalties - Discrepancies Found After Scrutiny of Sales Tax Return - Registered Person Made Supply of Taxable Goods to Unregistered Persons - Failure to Pay Further Tax - Excess Input Tax Adjustment Inadmissible u/s 8B(1) - Show Cause Notice - Passing of Order u/s 11(2) for Making Recovery of Sales Tax Along with Default Surcharge u/s 34 and Penalty u/s 33(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 - CIR(A) Confirmed Charging of Further Tax and Demand Created to the Extent of Excess Adjustment Was Deleted, in Appeal - Validity\n________________________________________\nFACTS:\nBrief facts of the case, as gathered from the record, are that the officer pointed out the following discrepancies in the sales tax record of the registered person after scrutiny of the sales tax return for the tax periods July 2016 to June 2017. The registered person made the supply of taxable goods to unregistered persons during the mentioned tax periods but did not pay further tax of Rs. 3,535,161, violating the provision of Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The said amount was recoverable along with default surcharge under Section 34 and penalty under Section 33(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Additionally, the registered person made excess input tax adjustments of Rs. 2,271,137, which was inadmissible under Section 8B(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, read with SRO No. 647(I)/2007 dated 27-06-2007. Consequently, the said amount was recoverable along with default surcharge under Section 34 and penalty under Section 33(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. A show cause notice was issued to the registered person. The authorized representative (A.R.) of the registered person filed a written reply to the show cause notice before the ACIR. After obtaining the necessary replies, proceedings culminated in an order under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nBeing aggrieved and dissatisfied with the treatment meted out by the ACIR, the taxpayer filed an appeal before the first Appellate Authority/CIR(A), who, via his impugned order, confirmed the charge of further tax. The demand created to the extent of excess adjustment was deleted in the appeal. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the learned CIR(A), the appellant/registered person filed an appeal before this forum.\n________________________________________\nARGUMENTS:\nDuring proceedings before this Court, counsel for the taxpayer argued that the issuance of the notice under Section 11(2) of the Act without selection under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act for audit is unauthorized and illegal. He further pointed out that the appellant was already adjudicated for further tax, and a second adjudication for the same issue, same tax period, and same section under Section 11(1) by the same authority is wrong, unjustified, and illegal. He also argued that the impugned order is time-barred as the show cause notice No. 314 was issued on 24-04-2019 and the order No. 58 was issued on 03-10-2019, after the expiry of 120 days. The date declared on the order (19-08-2019) is wrong and fake, as no hearing was held on that date nor any notice was issued for 19-08-2019.\nHe also argued that the appellant is a Distributor/Retailer according to their Sales Tax profile and there is no further tax on sales made to the end consumer on a retail basis according to SRO 648 dated 09-07-2013. This fact was accepted by the department in all other further tax assessment orders for the tax years 2015-2016-2017-2018 and 2019. Hence, charging of further tax on total sales is illegal. He went on to say that the learned CIR(A) has also not supported the Assistant Commissioner on the issue of further tax, introducing his own plea that when the taxpayer has availed the benefit under Section 8B of the Act, he is not entitled to benefit under Section 3(1A) of the Act. This is also unjustified because both sections are independent and different in nature. The learned counsel for the taxpayer further asserted that the show cause notice was issued by the officer Inland Revenue and all proceedings were conducted before him, but the disputed order was issued by another officer who neither issued any notice nor proceeded with the case. He only issued the order, which is also unjustified and illegal.\nOn the other hand, the learned D.R. strongly opposed the contentions made by the learned counsel for the taxpayer. He supported the order passed by the learned CIR(A).\n________________________________________\nDECISION:\n(a) Self-Assessed Amount of Tax: The self-assessed amount of tax due by the taxpayer in its sales tax return can only be altered through fresh assessment of tax under Section 11 of the Act, subject to the process of selection of a taxpayer through audit as provided under Section 25.\n(b) Supplies Not Meeting Requirements for Further Tax: The supplies made by the appellant to end consumers, as discussed in this appeal, were not “taxable supplies” under subsections (1), (1B), (2), (5), (6) of Section 3 or under Section 4 of the Sales Tax Act. Therefore, such supplies did not meet the requirements stipulated in Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act for the levy of further tax, and hence were not subject to further tax.\n(c) Payment of Sales Tax or Further Tax: The payment of any sales tax in terms of Section 3(1) or further tax in terms of Section 3(1A) on local supply of exempt goods to unregistered persons does not arise. The taxpayer challenged the show cause notices issued by the tax department for the recovery of sales tax under Section 3(1) and further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act. As a result, the payment of sales tax or further tax on the local supply of exempt goods to unregistered persons does not arise.\n(d) Re-Adjudication for Same Issue: Re-adjudication for the same issue for the same tax period by the same authority under the same section, time and again, is totally wrong, unjustified, and illegal. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) ignored the fact that the appellant had already been adjudicated for further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and had paid further tax to the extent applicable in response to office order No. 2/2017 dated 26/07/2017. This fact was mentioned in the grounds of appeal before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) but was overlooked in the order.\n(e) Time-Barred Order: The DCIR, while passing the time-barred order-in-original, did not state any reason for the delay. Therefore, the orders of the officers below are not maintainable. The DCIR should have mentioned the reasons for the delay and confronted the taxpayer with any extension granted by the Commissioner Inland Revenue. As per the provisions of Section 11(5), this was required but was not done.\n________________________________________\nIn view of the above, it is the opinion of this Court that the order-in-original passed by the DCIR was time-barred. Therefore, the orders of the officers below are not maintainable and are hereby set aside. The appeal filed by the appellant/taxpayer is hereby allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1),3(1A),8B(1),11,11(1),11(2),11(4),11(5),25,35(5),34,36(3)", - "Case #": "M.A.(A.G.) No. 353/KB of 2020 & STA No.42/KB of 2020, decided on 02.11.2020, date of hearing: 30.09.2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIFULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iqbal Hussain Shaikh, Advocate for the Appellant.\nAbid Aziz Memon, D.R., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. FINE & CO. WINE STORE, LARKANA\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, SUKKUR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24066", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 253 = 2024 SLD 253 = (2024) 129 TAX 221", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Yzg", - "Key Words:": "Taxable Service - Compulsory Registration - Petitioner Engaged in the Distribution of Consumer Goods - Show Cause Notice Issued by the Sindh Revenue Board as to Why Not He Be Compulsorily Registered Since It Is Rendering Taxable Service - Challenge to - Constitutional Petition\n________________________________________\nFACTS:\nThe petitioner, represented as a company engaged in the distribution of consumer goods, has assailed a show cause notice dated 02.02.2023 (“Impugned Notice”). The notice was issued by the Sindh Revenue Board (“SRB”), questioning why the petitioner should not be compulsorily registered under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 (“Act”) since it is allegedly engaged in rendering taxable services that fall within the ambit of the Act. While the Impugned Notice explicitly provides an opportunity and forum for the petitioner to state its case, the petitioner elected to bypass this opportunity and directly approach this Court.\n________________________________________\nARGUMENTS:\nThe petitioner’s learned counsel insists that since the petitioner is already registered with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), the SRB should address the issue of whether the petitioner is rendering services subject to tax under the Act, or not. The petitioner contends that since it is already registered with the FBR, there should be no need for compulsory registration under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act.\n________________________________________\nDECISION:\nThe Court observed that there was no malafide intention behind the issuance of the notice. The principles established in prior case law are squarely applicable to the present facts and circumstances. Importantly, no case of abuse of process or lack of jurisdiction has been made out before the Court. Additionally, no argument has been presented to suggest that the Impugned Notice was mala fide, unjust, or prejudicial towards the petitioner.\nIn light of the above, the Court concluded that the Impugned Notice does not warrant interference under the discretionary writ jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the petition and the listed applications were dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=3,24B,Second Schedule", - "Case #": "CP D-995 of 2023 and CMA No. 4623 of 2023, decided on 06.04.2023, date of hearing: 06.04.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Anwar Kashif Mumtaz advocate for the petitioner along with Mr. M. Usman Alam advocate.\nMr. Shamshad Ahmed, advocate for respondent/SRB.\nQazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S BURQUE CORP PVT LTD\nVs\nPROVINCE OF SINDH OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24067", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Y3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2513 = 2023 SLD 2513", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Y3o", - "Key Words:": "The complaint was filed against the unlawful transfer of the Complainant’s jurisdiction from RTO Quetta to MTO Karachi by FBR. The Complainant, engaged in government construction works, contended that their business did not fall under the builder/developer category as per the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, yet their case was transferred based on this assumption. They requested the jurisdiction be reverted to RTO Quetta and the orders passed by Karachis assessing officers be annulled.\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman found that while the transfer was within FBRs powers, it caused hardship to the taxpayer. It also noted that the classification of contractors and builders/developers needs further review by FBR. The Ombudsman recommended FBR clarify the scope of builders/developers, ensure uniform treatment of similar cases, and address the jurisdiction issue in line with judicial rulings. FBR was instructed to report compliance within 60 days.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10(1),10(4)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=100D(9),100D(9)(a),181", - "Case #": "Complaint Nos. 5709 to 5721/QTA/IT/2022, dated: 28.12.2022", - "Judge Name:": " THE FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN, ISLAMABAD", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer: Mr. Tausif Ahmad Qureshi, Advisor\nAppraisal by: Mr. Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor\nAuthorized Representative: Mr. Amjad Ali Siddiqui, Advocate\nDepartmental Representative: Nemo", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RAKSHANI BUILDERS, AMJAD ALI SIDDIQUI, OFFICE NO.07, SECOND FLOOR, CIVIC BUSINESS CENTER, HALLI ROAD, QUETTA…..COMPLAINANT\nVS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD. ... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24068", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Y3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2514 = 2023 SLD 2514", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5Y3k", - "Key Words:": "A complaint was filed regarding the transfer of the Complainant’s jurisdiction from RTO Quetta to MTO Karachi by FBR. The Complainant, involved in government construction works, argued that they were wrongly categorized as a Builder and Developer, leading to the transfer of jurisdiction. The Complainant claimed that the jurisdiction transfer was unlawful as it occurred before the relevant law (Section 100D) was enacted.\nFindings:\n1.\nJurisdiction Transfer: The FBR had the authority to transfer the cases of builders/developers to specialized units. However, the transfer from Quetta to Karachi created difficulties for the taxpayer.\n2.\nContractors vs. Builders/Developers: The FBR needs to reconsider whether contractors for public sector construction should be treated the same as private builders/developers.\n3.\nSimilar Cases: Some similar cases were transferred back to RTO Quetta, warranting further investigation.\n4.\nUniform Treatment: Identical cases in KPK and Balochistan are pending in judicial forums, and a uniform approach is needed.\nRecommendations:\n•\nReview the Jurisdiction: FBR should review the jurisdiction transfer in light of similar cases and judicial decisions.\n•\nClarify Builders/Developers : FBR should clarify the definition of builders/developers to resolve ambiguities.\n•\nReport Compliance: FBR should report compliance with these recommendations within 60 days.\nThis case also resolves another similar complaint (No. 3510/QTA/IT/2022).", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10(1),10(4)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=100D(9),100D(9)(a),181", - "Case #": "COMPLAINT NO. 3508 & 3510/QTA/IT/2022, dated: 03.08.2022", - "Judge Name:": " THE FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN, ISLAMABAD", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer: Mr. Tausif Ahmad Qureshi, Advisor\nAppraisal by: Mr. Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor\nAuthorized Representative: Mr. Amjad Ali Siddiqui, Advocate\nDepartmental Representative: Munir Ahmed Maher, ACIR RTO Quetta", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. ARBAB ABDUL RAZAQ, AMJAD ALI SIDDIQUI, OFFICE NO 07, SECOND FLOOR, CIVIC BUSINESS CENTER, HALLI ROAD, QUETTA....COMPLAINANT\nVS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD. ... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24069", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 254 = 2024 SLD 254 = 2024 PTCL 243", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTc", - "Key Words:": "Summary of Legal Findings and Interpretations:\nSales Tax Act (Sections 3, 7, 8):\nSection 3: The charging section of the Sales Tax Act, which imposes sales tax on taxable supplies.\nSection 7: A beneficial provision allowing a registered person to adjust input tax paid on taxable supplies. Input tax can only be adjusted against taxable supplies, and not against exempt supplies.\nSection 8: Addresses the non-refund of input tax on exempt supplies. If goods are used to manufacture exempt supplies, input tax paid on raw materials cannot be refunded.\nTribal Areas and Input Adjustment:\nThe Sales Tax Act was not applicable to FATA/PATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) at the relevant time. As a result, sales tax could not be charged or claimed for input adjustment in the region. Thus, the question of input adjustment does not arise in this context, as affirmed by the Supreme Court.\nInput Adjustment on Lost Electricity (Section 7 & 8):\nA company (PESCO) can adjust input tax for electricity produced and supplied, even if lost due to pilferage, distribution losses, or technical reasons. These losses are part of the taxable activities, and the company is entitled to input adjustment based on the tax paid on the goods purchased for generating electricity.\nAdjudication Period (Section 36/11):\nThe period for adjudication, under the earlier Section 36, was 120 days, extendable by 60 days. Failure to conclude adjudication within this time frame renders the proceedings illegal. However, the extension under Section 74 was not time-bound and did not invalidate proceedings, as the apex court ruled in Super Asia case.\nThe period of adjudication should generally be completed within six months, with extensions not exceeding this period.\nJurisdiction and Authority in Sales Tax Matters (Section 30):\nThe Additional Commissioner legally concluded the assessment proceedings at the time when there was confusion regarding the authority of the Collector vs. Assistant Commissioner due to changes in legislation.\nSection 30 was a transitional provision that created confusion during the period of adjudication due to delayed parliamentary approval of related finance laws.\nTime-Barred Appeals (Section 47):\nIf an appellate court is dealing with multiple appeals involving common legal questions, dismissing appeals solely for being time-barred is inappropriate, especially when the issue involves a common legal question.\nKey Legal Interpretations:\nInput Tax Adjustment: Can only be claimed against taxable supplies, not exempt ones.\nJurisdiction in FATA/PATA: Sales tax laws did not apply to these regions at the time, so input adjustment claims were invalid.\nLosses Due to Pilferage/Technical Reasons: Electricity suppliers can claim input tax adjustments for losses incurred during supply, as these are part of their taxable activities.\nAdjudication Timeframe: The adjudication period should be concluded within the specified time (six months), and any delay beyond the statutory period could render the proceedings void.\nAuthority and Jurisdiction: The confusion regarding authority between the Collector and Assistant Commissioner was due to legislative changes during the adjudication period.\nTime-Barred Appeals: Dismissing appeals purely on timing issues without addressing the common legal question is discouraged.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,7,7(1),8,8(1)(a),11,11(4),11(5),13,30,36,36(3),47,59,74Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007=13(1),13(2),13(B)", - "Case #": "STR No. 03-P/2015 with CM Nos. 03/2015, 05/2015, 40/2019, 35/2019 & 12/2021, decided on 18th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE ABDUL SHAKOOR AND MR. JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate along with Sharif Ullah (Assistant Director Legal).\nRespondents by: M/s Hussain Ahmad Sherazi and Mouzzam Ali Butt, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR.\nVS\nM/S. PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY (PESCO), PESHAWAR." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24070", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 255 = 2024 SLD 255 = 2024 PTCL 281 = (2024) 129 TAX 428", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTY", - "Key Words:": "The legal provisions cited pertain to the Constitution of Pakistan, particularly concerning the distribution of legislative powers between the Federation (Federal Government) and the Provinces. The key constitutional articles and legal principles mentioned reflect the framework for taxation powers and their application, including the scope of the Federal Legislative List and specific provisions related to the imposition of taxes.\n1. Distribution of Legislative Powers (Articles 70, 77, 142, and the Fourth Schedule):\n•\nArticle 77 of the Constitution ensures that no tax can be levied for the Federation without an Act passed by the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament). This indicates the Federal Governments authority to impose taxes only when expressly authorized by law.\n•\nArticle 142(a) grants the Parliament the exclusive jurisdiction to legislate on matters listed in the Federal Legislative List (Fourth Schedule), while Article 142(c) limits Parliament’s power to legislate on matters not included in this list, which fall under the jurisdiction of the Provinces.\n•\nThe Fourth Schedule (Federal Legislative List) enumerates the subjects on which the Federation can legislate, and taxes on income, capital, and other specified matters are within its purview.\n2. Taxation as a Distinct Legislative Competence:\n•\nThe Constitution clearly distinguishes between general legislative matters and taxation. Taxation powers are not an ancillary or secondary function but are distinct and governed by specific entries in the Federal Legislative List.\n•\nCase Reference: The case of The State of West Bengal vs. Kesoram Industries Limited (2004) emphasized that the power to tax cannot be deduced from general legislative powers but must be specifically conferred.\n3. Scope of Entries in the Federal Legislative List:\n•\nEntries in the Federal Legislative List should be interpreted broadly, giving them the widest amplitude. This principle has been upheld by the courts, which apply a broad reading unless there is clear overlap or conflict between entries. If overlap occurs, the courts examine the laws pith and substance to determine whether it falls within the ambit of the Federation or the Provinces.\n•\nKey Case References: Cases such as The India Cement Ltd and Union of India vs. H.S. Dhillon affirm the broad interpretation of legislative entries.\n4. Tax on Immovable Property and Capital Value of Assets:\n•\nEntry 50 of the Fourth Schedule restricts the Parliament from imposing income tax on immovable property, thus placing this jurisdiction with the Provinces.\n•\nHowever, Entry 50 does give Parliament the authority to levy taxes on the capital value of assets, meaning Parliament can impose taxes on assets value (movable or immovable), reflecting the broader scope of federal taxation power.\n5. Capital Value of Asset (Article 260):\n•\nThe term capital value of asset is undefined, but it can be interpreted as encompassing both movable and immovable property, akin to the general definition of property in Article 260, which includes rights, titles, and interests in property, whether movable or immovable.\n6. Deeming Income in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979:\n•\nThe Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, especially sections 80C, 80CC, and 80D, includes provisions for presumptive taxation and minimum tax. These taxes are based on the gross revenue or production capacity rather than direct computation of income.\n•\nCase Reference: In Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan (PTCL 1997 CL. 260), the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of presumptive taxes under these provisions. The court interpreted these taxes as a form of capacity tax, meaning that the tax was levied based on an entitys ability to earn rather than a precise calculation of income. The court also examined how these provisions interacted with the Federal Legislative List, particularly Entries 47 and 52, which relate to taxes on income and production capacity, respectively.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe Constitution of Pakistan sets clear boundaries between the legislative powers of the Federation and the Provinces, particularly concerning taxation. The Federation has jurisdiction over matters in the Federal Legislative List, and the Provinces retain authority over residual matters.\n•\nTaxation powers are treated distinctly and cannot be inferred from general legislative authority. Specific entries, such as Entry 50 in the Fourth Schedule, guide what taxes can be levied by the Federation.\n•\nThe interpretation of terms like capital value of asset and presumptive tax must be based on their broader legal meanings and principles of judicial interpretation that aim to reflect the intent of the Constitution and the legislative framework.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=70,77,142,260Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=9,10,11,80C,80CC,80DIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29),7E", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 5327-P/2022, decided on 23rd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE ABDUL SHAKOOR AND MR. JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s Asim Khan, Asad Yousaf, Najmuddin, Najamul Saleheen, Muhammad Tariq, Nadia Gul & Shahid Jan, Advocates.\nRespondents by: M/s Sanaullah Deputy Attorney General, Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Ishtiaq Ahmad (Junior), Barrister Sarwar Muzafar Shah, Advocates along with Asad Bilal Jehangir Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue & Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nM/s Shumail Ahmad Butt & Barrister Syed Mudassir Ameer, Advocates/Amicus Curie.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PETITIONER: LATIF HAKEEM\nVS\nRESPONDENTS: FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH ITS SECRETARY FINANCE, ISLAMABAD AND 2 OTHERS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24071", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2515 = 2023 SLD 2515 = 2023 SCMR 2070", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) – Section 25 and the Constitution of Pakistan (Article 10A):\n•\nRe-examination of records and audit: In this case, the Sales Tax Officer conducted a re-examination of the records, which amounted to an audit under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act of 1990. This audit led to new findings that were distinct from the original allegations mentioned in the show cause notice already issued.\n•\nLegal Implications of New Findings: The fresh observations raised after the audit could not be adjudicated upon without issuing a fresh show cause notice. The company was not given a fair chance to meet these new allegations, as they were not part of the original notice.\n•\nStatutory Requirements for Audit: Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act requires an audit to be conducted before a show cause notice is issued, which was not done in this case. Therefore, the original notice was deemed redundant once the re-examination occurred. The High Court correctly noted that audit procedures must be followed before adjudicating the tax liability, ensuring that the process complies with the law.\n•\nKey Conclusion: The adjudication was flawed because the show cause notice did not reflect the full scope of the findings from the audit, and the taxpayer was deprived of an opportunity to respond to the new allegations.\n________________________________________\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan - Article 10A and Scope of Show Cause Notices in Tax Matters:\n•\nRight to a fair trial and due process: Article 10A guarantees a right to a fair trial, which in the context of tax proceedings, includes the right to know the charges and allegations against a taxpayer clearly and specifically. The show cause notice is a critical document in this regard as it enables the taxpayer to understand and respond to specific allegations.\n•\nImportance of Clarity in the Show Cause Notice: The notice must be issued after proper investigation and must clearly state the allegations without vagueness or ambiguity. If the allegations are not clear, the taxpayer would be prejudiced and denied a fair trial. This ensures the taxpayer is informed of exactly what they need to defend.\n•\nAdjudication within the Scope of the Show Cause Notice: The adjudicating authority can only consider the charges that are clearly mentioned in the show cause notice. Any additional or new charges introduced later, which were not part of the notice, would make the adjudication unlawful. The adjudication authority cannot consider allegations beyond those mentioned in the notice, as this would violate the taxpayers right to be heard on the specific charges they are confronting.\n•\nKey Conclusion: The issuance of a show cause notice is a critical procedural safeguard, and its contents must be precise and clear to allow the taxpayer to prepare a defense. If the proceedings move beyond the scope of the notice, they are unsustainable in law.\n________________________________________\nSummary of Legal Principles:\n1.\nAudit and Show Cause Notice: If the tax authorities conduct an audit that leads to new findings, a fresh show cause notice must be issued to give the taxpayer an opportunity to respond to these new allegations.\n2.\nFair Trial: A show cause notice is central to a fair trial and must be issued after proper investigation, with clear and specific allegations. This allows the taxpayer to prepare and present a defense.\n3.\nScope of Adjudication: The adjudication authority can only adjudicate on the specific charges mentioned in the show cause notice. New charges introduced after the issuance of the notice are invalid.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25,47Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1345-L of 2021, decided on 2nd February, 2023, heard on: 2nd February, 2023. (Against the order dated 12.01.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in STR No. 142 of 2011)", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CHIEF JUCTICE, AYESHA A. MALIK, JUSTICE, ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petition by: Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court, M. Ozair Chughtai, Advocate-on-Record and Syed Hassan Sardar, Additional Commissioner.\nRespondent by: Nemo.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CHENAB ZONE, RTO, FAISALABAD\nV.\nMESSRS ROSE FOOD INDUSTRIES, FAISALABAD AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24072", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 256 = 2024 SLD 256 = 2024 PTD 281 = (2024) 129 TAX 550", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTQ", - "Key Words:": "The text discusses a constitutional petition regarding the appointment of the Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and the vires (validity) of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020 under the Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001). Heres a breakdown of the key legal principles:\nKey Issues:\nAppointment of Chairman and Members of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue:\nThe Petitioner / Tax Bar Association challenged the appointment of the respondent as Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and the vires of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020.\nThe challenge primarily focused on whether the Rules for appointment had been properly approved and whether the appointments were made in compliance with the law.\nInterpretation of Section 130(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001:\nThe High Court held that the words Prime Minister used in Section 130(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 should be read as Federal Government from the time the provision was added to the statute. This reading down was done to make the provision consistent with the existing law and ensure its legality.\nRules Approval and Lawful Authority:\nThe High Court declared the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020 ultra vires (unconstitutional) because these rules had not been approved by the Federal Cabinet.\nAs a result, the appointments made under these rules were also declared illegal and made without lawful authority.\nDe Facto Doctrine:\nDespite declaring the appointments illegal, the High Court applied the de facto doctrine. This doctrine allows the Chairman and Members appointed under the 2020 Rules to continue their service until new appointments are made under valid rules, thus maintaining continuity in the system.\nRequirement for Framing New Rules:\nThe High Court directed the Federal Government to frame new rules for the appointment of the Chairman and Members within 30 days of the judgment.\nThe recruitment process for the positions must be completed within 45 days after the new rules are framed.\nAppointments Under Articles 240 and 242 of the Constitution:\nSince the posts of Members and Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue are related to the affairs of the Federation, Article 240 of the Constitution mandates that appointments to these positions and their conditions of service must be governed by Act of Majlis-e-Shura (Parliament).\nEven if the Rules are framed under Section 130(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, they must comply with the constitutional requirements.\nRole of Public Service Commissions:\nArticle 242 of the Constitution empowers the creation of Public Service Commissions to handle competitive processes for recruitment, ensuring that eligible and qualified candidates are selected based on merit.\nThe High Court criticized the practice of bypassing such commissions for appointments, as it undermines public trust, deprives deserving candidates of opportunities, and prevents a fair competitive process.\nLegal Principles Established:\nInterpretation of Statutes:\nThe High Court emphasized that statutory provisions should be read down to ensure consistency with existing laws, and to give effect to the true intent of the legislation.\nValidity of Rules:\nRules created under an Act must comply with the Constitution and be approved by the Federal Cabinet. If they are not, they can be declared ultra vires (invalid).\nDe Facto Doctrine:\nThis doctrine can be applied to uphold actions taken by individuals in positions of authority where their appointments may be invalid but are necessary to maintain continuity and prevent disruptions in government functioning.\nRole of Public Service Commissions:\nThe Constitution provides for the establishment of Public Service Commissions to ensure that appointments to public offices are made based on merit and are transparent. Bypassing these mechanisms is discouraged as it harms the integrity of the recruitment process.\nTimeliness in Recruitment:\nThe Court emphasized the importance of promptly framing rules and completing the recruitment process to ensure that appointments are made lawfully and efficiently.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court ruled that the appointments made under the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Appointment of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020 were illegal and not in compliance with constitutional requirements. The court applied the de facto doctrine to allow the continuity of the appointed individuals until proper appointments are made under rules that conform to the law. Furthermore, the court directed the Federal Government to frame new rules and complete the recruitment process within specific timelines, while stressing the importance of adhering to constitutional mandates for fair and transparent appointments.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=130,130(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=27,240,242", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 27339 of 2023, heard on 18th December, 2023, date of hearing: 18th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahbaz But and Chaudhry Anwaar-ul-Haq Arif for Petitioner.\nMirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General and Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General for Federation.\nBarrister Lamia Niazi for Respondent No.5.\nM. Nazeer Chauhan for Respondent No.6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "LAHORE TAX BAR ASSOCIATION\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24073", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 257 = 2024 SLD 257 = 2024 PTD 290", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WS8", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis of Sales Tax Exemption Claim for Packaging Material\n________________________________________\nContext:\nThe Appellant company sought exemption from sales tax on packing materials under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, claiming that it should be included as part of the basic raw material for the manufacture of pharmaceutical products. The company also relied on provisions of the Customs Act, 1969, which provides for exemptions from duty on certain goods, including packing materials.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points:\n1.\nInterpretation of Statutory Provisions:\no\nThe intent of the legislature and the language used in the statute are key factors in determining the applicability of provisions.\no\nThe language of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and the Customs Act, 1969 is not the same, meaning that exemptions under the Customs Act do not automatically apply under the Sales Tax Act.\n________________________________________\n2.\nExemption Under Customs Act vs. Sales Tax Act:\no\nThe Customs Act offers an exemption for packing materials, but this provision is distinct from the exemption criteria under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\no\nExemption under the Customs Act pertains to customs duties on goods entering the country, while the Sales Tax Act applies to the domestic taxation of goods and services, including raw materials and packaging.\n________________________________________\n3.\nSixth Schedule, Entry No. 105 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990:\no\nThis provision provides an exemption on raw materials that are used for the basic manufacture of pharmaceutical active ingredients and for the manufacture of pharmaceutical products.\no\nThe exemption, however, is specific to raw materials necessary for producing pharmaceutical products and does not extend to packaging materials, which are considered separately for taxation purposes under the Sales Tax Act.\n________________________________________\n4.\nCourts Ruling:\no\nThe High Court dismissed the claim of the Appellant company, stating that packaging material was not entitled to the same exemption as raw materials for the basic manufacturing of pharmaceutical products under Entry No. 105 of the Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\no\nThe court emphasized that the Sales Tax Act clearly defines raw materials and does not extend the same exemption to packaging materials.\no\nThe High Court ruled that the Sales Tax Act imposes a tax on packaging materials, and therefore, the Appellant’s claim for exemption under Entry No. 105 was invalid.\n________________________________________\n5.\nIntra Court Appeal:\no\nThe Intra Court Appeal filed by the Appellant was dismissed, with the court affirming the legality of the original order.\n________________________________________\nRelevant Case Law:\n•\nCollector of Customs v. Mahboob Industries (2006 PTD 730): In this case, the interpretation of exemption provisions under the Customs Act was considered, distinguishing them from exemptions under other laws such as the Sales Tax Act.\n•\nShazeb Pharmaceutical Industries Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2015 PTD 1532): This case also involved the pharmaceutical sector, reinforcing the specific nature of tax exemptions for raw materials versus packaging materials.\n•\nAdil Propylene Products Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2000 SCMR 1708): It also dealt with the issue of exemption under the Sales Tax Act, highlighting that not all goods used in manufacturing, such as packaging, qualify for tax exemptions.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe High Court found that packing material used in the pharmaceutical industry does not fall under the Sales Tax Act, 1990s exemption provisions for raw materials. Consequently, the claim for exemption was rejected, and the Intra Court Appeal was dismissed. The ruling emphasized that statutory exemptions must be strictly interpreted according to the legislative language, and exemptions provided under the Customs Act for packing materials do not extend to the Sales Tax Act.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=Sixth Schedule, Entry No.105Customs Act, 1969=First Schedule", - "Case #": "High Court Appeals Nos.259, 272, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 284, 298, 320, 338 of 2019, 04 of 2020, Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-6072, D-7920 of 2017, D-2436, D-2691, D-4429 of 2018 and D-2133 and D-3229 of 2019, decided on 24th December, 2021, Dates of hearing: 6th October and 6th December, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE, AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petition by: Muhammad Vawda, Salman J. Mirza, Hussain Idris, Taha Samad, Abdul Ahad, Faiz Ahmed and Fayaz Ali Metlo\nRespondent by: Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Deputy Attorney General, Hussain Bohra Assistant Attorney General, Shahid Ali Qureshi, Dr. Shah Nawaz Memon, Khalid Rajpar, Rana Sakhawat Ali, Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Noor Nabi, Zafar Imam, Shakeel Ahmed, Masooda Siraj and Ali Qambar Askari.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GETZ PHARMA (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24074", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 258 = 2024 SLD 258 = 2024 PTD 299", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WSs", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis on Disclosure of Information by Public Servants under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\n________________________________________\nContext:\nThe plaintiffs filed a civil suit against a private party, and in the course of the proceedings, they sought to summon the Commissioner Inland Revenue Department for the production of certain records related to the case. The Civil Court allowed this request, but the Department claimed immunity under Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Appellate Court subsequently allowed the revision filed by the Department, siding with their claim of immunity.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nSection 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001:\no\nSubsection (2): It imposes a bar on the powers of any court or authority to require the production of records, returns, or documents relating to income tax proceedings or any other declarations made under relevant tax laws (like the Voluntary Declaration of Domestic Assets Act, 2018).\no\nSubsection (3): This provision allows for the disclosure of such records only in civil suits where the Federal Government or income tax authority is a party and the matter is directly related to proceedings under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\no\nSubsection (4): It provides an exception for the production of documents or evidence in court, but this is subject to the regulations outlined in subsection (3).\n________________________________________\n2.\nNature of the Case:\no\nThe civil suit was filed between private parties, and the Commissioner Inland Revenue was not a party to the suit.\no\nThe plaintiffs sought to compel the Department to produce certain tax-related records. However, this was challenged by the Department under Section 216(2), claiming the immunity provisions barred the disclosure of such records.\n________________________________________\n3.\nCourts Analysis:\no\nBar on Disclosure: The court noted that Section 216(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 clearly restricts the disclosure of tax-related records to private parties unless the Federal Government or tax authority is a party to the case.\no\nSuit Between Private Parties: Since the case was inter se private parties, and the Commissioner Inland Revenue was not a party, the statutory bar under Section 216(2) applied, and the court could not compel the production of documents.\no\nException under Section 216(3): The court noted that Section 216(3) allows disclosure only in cases where the Federal Government or the tax authority is a party, which did not apply here.\no\nThe Trial Court failed to account for this statutory bar before ordering the production of records, and as such, its order was in violation of the law.\no\nThe Appellate Court, therefore, correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to set aside the Trial Court’s order, as the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 prohibits the disclosure of such records in the absence of specific circumstances outlined in Section 216.\n________________________________________\n4.\nOutcome:\no\nThe Constitutional Petition filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed as meritless, with the Appellate Courts decision upheld.\n________________________________________\nRelevant Case Law:\n•\nMrs. Khalida Azhar v. Viqar Rustam Bakhshi and others (2009 PTD 1694): This case was referenced to support the argument that Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 imposes a bar on the disclosure of tax-related records, and the court must respect these statutory restrictions when ordering the production of such records.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nIn this case, the Appellate Court rightly applied the provisions of Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to bar the disclosure of tax records in a civil suit between private parties, as the Commissioner Inland Revenue was not a party to the case. The Trial Courts order for disclosure was invalid, and the Appellate Court was correct in setting it aside. The Constitutional Petition was dismissed as it did not have merit.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=216,216(2),216(3),216(4)Specific Relief Act, 1877=42Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=4(4),25A,26A,54,68,75,150,150(4)Code of Civil Procedure of 1882=115", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3868 of 2022, heard on 31st May, 2023, heard on: 31st May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Ghulam Sabir for Petitioners.\nMalik Itaat Hussain Awan for Respondent No.2.\nMalik Shehriyar Qamar Afzal for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SUFI ABDUL QADEER AND 2 OTHERS\nVS\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, RAWALPINDI AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24075", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 259 = 2024 SLD 259 = 2024 PTD 306 = (2024) 130 TAX 548 = 2024 SCMR 457", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTk", - "Key Words:": "This case underscores a fundamental principle of fiscal law regarding the interpretation and application of charging sections and associated schedules or tables. Heres a summary of the legal analysis and implications:\nKey Points:\nCharging Section as the Basis of Levy:\nThe authority to impose and recover any tax or levy must derive explicitly from the charging section of a statute.\nIn this case, Section 10 of the Finance Act, 2018, initially imposed a mobile handset levy exclusively on smart phones, as specified in the corresponding table.\nAmendment by Finance Act, 2022:\nThe Finance Act, 2022, amended the table under Section 10, replacing the term category of smart phones with Mobile Phones having C & F Value (US Dollars). \nThe department argued that this amendment broadened the scope of the levy to include ordinary (non-smart) mobile phones.\nHigh Courts Decision:\nThe High Court held that without amending the charging section, which explicitly limited the levy to smart phones, the amendment to the table could not extend the levy to ordinary phones.\nIt emphasized that the charging section, and not the table, determines the scope and applicability of the levy.\nPrinciple of Law on Fiscal Statutes:\nA charging section is the statutory provision that creates the obligation to pay a tax or levy and defines the subject of taxation.\nA schedule or table serves to elaborate or quantify the levy but cannot extend the scope of the charge to items or classes not contemplated in the charging section.\nIf a tax or levy is to be extended to a new category of goods or services, the charging section itself must be explicitly amended.\nLegality of Amendment:\nThe court concluded that the amendment to the table could not independently create a liability for ordinary phones, as the charging section remained confined to smart phones.\nSuch an interpretation aligns with settled principles that fiscal statutes must be construed strictly, with no tax imposed except by clear and unequivocal legislative intent.\nOutcome:\nThe petitions challenging the High Courts order were dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. The High Courts order was deemed consistent with established principles of fiscal law.\nPractical Implications:\nLegislative Clarity:\nIf the legislature intends to extend a levy to a broader category of goods, it must amend the charging section accordingly.\nAmbiguity or reliance solely on schedules or tables for such changes is legally untenable.\nProtection for Taxpayers:\nThis decision reinforces the protection of taxpayers against unwarranted imposition of levies that are not explicitly sanctioned by the law.\nAdministrative Compliance:\nTax authorities must ensure that any recovery or enforcement aligns strictly with the charging section and does not rely solely on changes to supplemental provisions.\nThis case reaffirms the primacy of the charging section in fiscal statutes and the principle that supplementary provisions cannot create new liabilities beyond the scope of the primary legislative framework.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2018=10", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.890-K to 909-K of 2023, decided on 22nd November, 2023.\n(Against the Order dated 14.03.2023 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.Ps. Nos. 5389, 5245, 5004, 6120, 47, 361, 529, 530, 583, 5069, 5689, 6028, 7470, 7668, 7771 of 2021 and 241, 242, 474, 966 of 2023)", - "Judge Name:": " IJAZ UL AHSAN, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court (in all cases) along with Ms. Ume Kalsoom, D.C. Law East Karachi and Nabeel Siraj, D.C. Customs (both via video link, Karachi) for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND ANOTHER\nVS\nMESSRS YOUNG TECH PRIVATE LIMITED AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24076", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 260 = 2024 SLD 260 = 2024 PTD 309 = (2024) 130 TAX 5", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WTg", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis on Reassessment Proceedings under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\n________________________________________\nContext:\nReassessment proceedings were initiated by the tax authorities based on entries in the bank statement of the respondent/taxpayer. The tax department suspected that the taxpayers income was higher than reported due to certain entries in the bank statement. However, the authorities assumed that all entries in the bank statement represented revenue, without considering refunds made by the taxpayer, which were reflected in the taxpayers tax return.\nThe Commissioner (Appeals) gave the taxpayer an opportunity to explain the entries, which the taxpayer successfully did, leading to the reassessment being set aside. The tax departments reassessment demand was thus found to be flawed, and the Appellate Tribunal upheld this decision. The question then arose whether the basis for initiating reassessment (bank statement entries) constituted definite information as per Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nSection 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001:\no\nThis section allows for reassessment of a taxpayer’s income if the tax authorities have definite information that suggests the income has been understated or the return is incorrect. However, the information must be specific and clear to justify reassessment.\n2.\nSection 133(1):\no\nProvides the framework for initiating proceedings or references related to income tax assessments.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nBank Statement as Basis for Reassessment:\no\nThe tax authorities based their reassessment on the entries in the bank statement of the taxpayer. They assumed that these entries reflected revenue without considering other important factors, such as refunds made by the taxpayer, which were already reflected in the taxpayer’s tax return.\n2.\nCommissioners Decision:\no\nThe Commissioner (Appeals) provided the taxpayer with an opportunity to explain the discrepancies in the bank statement, and the taxpayer successfully demonstrated that the entries did not represent revenue as assumed by the tax authorities. This led the Commissioner (Appeals) to set aside the additional demand generated after reassessment by the Commissioner Inland Revenue.\n3.\nDefinite Information for Reassessment:\no\nThe findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) highlighted that the basis for initiating the reassessment was not based on definite information. The bank statement alone was not sufficient to constitute the definite information required under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, especially after the taxpayer had been given an opportunity to clarify their position.\n4.\nHigh Courts Ruling:\no\nThe High Court declined to interfere with the decision of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, affirming that the bank statement, by itself, did not constitute definite information. The Tribunal’s conclusion that the reassessment was improperly initiated was deemed correct.\n________________________________________\nRelevant Case Law:\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi v. Messrs Khan CNG Filling Station, Rawalpindi (2017 SCMR 1414)\n•\nIncome-Tax Officer and another v. Messrs Chappal Builders (1993 PTD 1108)\n•\nMessrs Central Insurance Co. and others v. The Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others (1993 SCMR 1232)\n•\nMessrs E.F.U. General Insurance Co. Limited v. The Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1997 SC 700)\n•\nInspecting Assistant Commissioner and Chairman, Panel 20 Companies v. Pakistan Herald Ltd. (1997 SCMR 1256)\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Bahawalpur v. Messrs Bashir Ahmed (deceased) through LRs (2021 SCMR 1290)\n________________________________________\nCourts Conclusion:\n•\nThe bank statements, which were the basis for the reassessment, did not constitute definite information as required by Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Commissioner (Appeals) properly afforded the taxpayer an opportunity to explain the discrepancies, and once the taxpayer provided clarification, the additional tax demand was appropriately set aside.\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal did not err in concluding that the reassessment was based on insufficient or indefinite information, leading to the dismissal of the reference.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\nThe reference was dismissed, and the Appellate Tribunal’s decision was upheld, confirming that the bank statement did not provide the definite information required to justify reassessment under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5),122(8),122(9),133(1)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=25,62,65,65(1),65(1),(a),65(1)(b),65(2)", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 60 of 2015, decided on 28th November, 2023, heard on: 14th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AAMER FAROOQ, CJ AND BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Anwar-ul-Haq for Applicant.\nSardar Abdul Wahab for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (LEGAL DIVISION) LEGAL TAXPAYERS UNIT, ISLAMABAD\nVS\nMESSRS KHUDADAD HEIGHTS, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24077", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 261 = 2024 SLD 261 = 2024 PTD 316", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WXo", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis on Customs Duty Assessment and Appeals\n________________________________________\nContext:\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside the additional duties and taxes imposed on the respondents (importers). The authorities challenged this decision, but the question was raised whether the Customs Appellate Tribunal could adjudicate on issues that were not directly and substantially part of the original assessment or show cause notice.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nSection 193 of the Customs Act, 1969:\no\nThis section provides that an appeal can be made to the Collector of Customs (Appeals) against the order-in-original passed by the assessing officer.\n2.\nSection 194-A of the Customs Act, 1969:\no\nThis section allows for an appeal to the Customs Appellate Tribunal against the order-in-appeal passed by the Collector of Customs.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nJurisdiction of the Customs Appellate Tribunal:\no\nThe authorities were aggrieved by the order passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which had set aside the extra duties and taxes imposed on the respondents. The authorities contended that the Tribunal’s decision was erroneous because the issue of the short levy of duties was not raised before the assessing officer.\n2.\nAppeal as a Continuation of Proceedings:\no\nAppeal is not merely a right, but a continuation of proceedings initiated at a lower forum. The appellate forum can only adjudicate upon issues that were directly and substantially raised before the lower forum. The Customs Appellate Tribunal could not consider issues beyond the scope of the show cause notice or issues that were not raised in the original order-in-original.\n3.\nAdjudication Based on Extraneous Considerations:\no\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal addressed issues related to the assessment and levy of duties that were never the subject of the show cause notice. This was viewed as a matter of extraneous consideration, which made the Tribunal’s decision illegal.\n________________________________________\nCourts Conclusion:\n•\nThe High Court held that the Customs Appellate Tribunal had incorrectly decided matters that were not part of the original issue as outlined in the show cause notice. The adjudication was based on matters outside the scope of the original proceedings, making it illegal. The appellate tribunals are limited to adjudicating on issues that have been raised in the lower forum and cannot extend beyond those issues.\n•\nThe High Court declined to interfere with the Customs Appellate Tribunal’s decision, stating that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by addressing issues that were not part of the appealable matters.\n________________________________________\nRelevant Case Law:\n•\nCollector Central Excise and Land Customs and another v. Rahm Din (1987 SCMR 1840)\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Peshawar v. Messrs Pakistan Mineral Water Bottling (Pvt.) Limited, Swabi (2019 PTD 1219)\n•\nAbu Bakar Siddique v. Collector of Customs and others (2002 CLC 1066)\n•\nDr. Muhammad Yousaf v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2006 PTD 590)\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II Regional Tax Office-II v. Messrs Sony Traders Wine Shop (2015 PTD 2287)\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\nThe reference filed by the authorities was dismissed, as the Customs Appellate Tribunal had adjudicated on issues beyond the scope of the show cause notice, rendering the decision illegal.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,32(1),32(1)(a),(3A),156(1)(1)(i),156(1)(1)(14),193,194A,196(5)Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1),3(3)", - "Case #": "Customs References Nos.100-P to 108-P, 181-P and 182-P of 2020, decided on 31st May, 2023, heard on: 31st May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ABDUL SHAKOOR AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ishtiaq Ahmad (Junior) for Petitioner.\nAamir Bilal for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, PESHAWAR\nVS\nMUHAMMAD ARIF AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24078", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 262 = 2024 SLD 262 = 2024 PTD 321", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5WXk", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis on Automatic Selection for Audit under Section 214D of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\n________________________________________\nContext:\nThis case involves the interpretation and scope of Section 214D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance), which dealt with automatic selection for audit. The main issue was whether Section 214D applied to a taxpayer who failed to file a return on time but had filed an application for an extension under Section 119, and if the application was not disposed of by the Commissioner.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nSection 214D (Omitted):\no\nThis section provided for the automatic selection for audit if certain conditions were met, subject to exceptions.\no\nIt bypassed other statutory filters, meaning audit selection occurred without going through the usual process established by the Ordinance.\n2.\nSection 119 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001:\no\nThis section deals with the extension of time for filing tax returns. The Commissioner can grant an extension, but it must be done in writing.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nAutomatic Selection for Audit under Section 214D:\no\nSection 214D applied automatically, but only if the conditions were met precisely. Any deviation from the required conditions would favor the taxpayer. The section bypassed the usual checks and processes, making its application stricter.\n2.\nFailure to File Return:\no\nThe taxpayer in this case did not file the return for Tax Year 2015 by the required due date, which was January 21, 2016. However, on that date, the taxpayer filed an application under Section 119 for an extension, which the Commissioner did not respond to.\n3.\nImpact of Non-Action by the Commissioner:\no\nFor Section 214D to apply, the Commissioner needed to either approve or refuse the extension application in writing. The Commissioner’s failure to act on the application meant that, for the purposes of Section 214D, the application should be regarded as still pending.\no\nAs Section 214D is a strict provision, it could not be applied on an implied basis. There was no deemed refusal of the extension application; thus, the taxpayer was not automatically selected for audit.\n4.\nImpact of the 30-Day Condition:\no\nEven if the Commissioner had granted the extension, Section 214D would have only been applicable after the 30-day period from the extensions approval. Therefore, the audit process could not commence until the extension application was either granted or denied in writing.\n________________________________________\nCourts Conclusion:\n•\nThe Court determined that Section 214D could not apply automatically in this case because the Commissioner did not dispose of the taxpayer’s application for extension in writing.\n•\nSection 214D was a strict provision and needed to be applied exactly as prescribed by law. Any inaction or failure by the Commissioner to address the extension request in writing meant that the application remained pending.\n•\nThus, Section 214D never became applicable, and the appeal filed by the department was dismissed.\n________________________________________\nRelevant Case Law:\n•\nMuhammad Mujahid Qureshi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2019 PTD 535) was declared to be incorrectly decided, as it did not consider the strict application of Section 214D and the requirement for written communication regarding the extension request.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe appeal filed by the tax department was dismissed as the conditions for automatic audit under Section 214D were not met, and the failure to respond to the extension application kept it pending, preventing the automatic audit from applying.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=118,119,119(3),177,214A,214D,214D(3),214D(4)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.247 of 2021, decided on 2nd November, 2023, heard on: 2nd November, 2023. (Against judgment dated 22.4.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.C.A. No. 18093 of 2019)", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR, SHAHID WAHEED AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ibrar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) for Appellant.\nJaved Iqbal Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE\nVS\nMESSRS ATTA CABLES (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24079", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 263 = 2024 SLD 263 = 2024 PTD 325 = (2024) 130 TAX 13", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTc", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis of Customs Act, 1969 – Confiscation of Vehicle Used for Smuggling\n________________________________________\nContext:\nThis case pertains to the confiscation of a vehicle (a tanker) used for transporting smuggled goods—specifically, Iranian-origin High-Speed Diesel (HSD). The issue revolves around the interpretation and application of provisions under the Customs Act, 1969, particularly Sections 2(s), 157(2)(b), 181, and 196, along with SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13.06.2009, regarding the outright confiscation of the vehicle and whether the option of redemption fine could apply.\n________________________________________\nKey Provisions:\n1.\nCustoms Act, 1969:\no\nSection 2(s): Defines smuggling and includes actions related to the illegal transportation of goods.\no\nSection 157(2)(b): Deals with penalties related to smuggling, including the confiscation of goods and conveyances involved.\no\nSection 181: Provides the legal framework for confiscating conveyances used for smuggling, unless specified otherwise.\no\nSection 196: Provides enforcement powers for customs officers regarding the seizure and confiscation of goods.\n2.\nSRO 499(I)/2009 (dated 13.06.2009):\no\nIssued in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 181 of the Customs Act, 1969.\no\nSpecifically states that no option for payment of fine will be available in lieu of confiscation when the conveyance is found exclusively used for transporting smuggled goods.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nSmuggling and Vehicle Confiscation:\no\nThe vehicle-in-question, a tanker, was found transporting a huge quantity (35,000 liters) of smuggled HSD oil. This led to the vehicle being seized by the customs department.\no\nThe question was whether the vehicle could be released unconditionally or whether it must be outright confiscated due to its role in transporting smuggled goods.\n2.\nRedemption Fine vs. Confiscation:\no\nSRO 499(I)/2009 clearly stipulates that no redemption fine is allowed for vehicles involved in the transportation of smuggled goods if they fall under the provisions of Section 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969.\no\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal had previously allowed the unconditional release of the tanker, a decision that was later challenged by the Customs Department.\n________________________________________\nCourts Conclusion:\n1.\nConfiscation of the Vehicle:\no\nThe High Court concluded that once it was established that the vehicle was involved in smuggling (transporting smuggled HSD oil), it was subject to outright confiscation.\no\nSince the vehicle was exclusively used for transporting smuggled goods, the strict provisions of SRO 499(I)/2009 came into play, meaning no fine could be imposed in lieu of confiscation.\n2.\nTribunals Error:\no\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal had incorrectly allowed the release of the vehicle unconditionally. The Court held that once the vehicle was found involved in smuggling, there was no room for redemption under the law.\no\nThe Court determined that the FBR (Federal Board of Revenue) had the authority to enforce outright confiscation of the vehicle and could not grant a redemption option in this case.\n3.\nFinal Ruling:\no\nThe appeal filed by the respondent (the vehicle owner) was dismissed, and the order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal was set aside.\no\nThe vehicle was to be confiscated as per the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 and SRO 499(I)/2009.\n________________________________________\nRelevant Case Law:\n•\nCollector of Customs v. Wali Khan (2017 SCMR 585)\n•\nHaji Tooti v. Federal Board of Revenue (Civil Appeal No.24-Q of 2014, order dated 26.5.2021)\n•\nCollector of Customs v. Muhammad Tasleem (2002 MLD 296)\n•\nCollector of Customs v. Salman Khan (2015 PTD 1733)\n•\nMaqbool Ahmed v. Customs Appellate Tribunal (2009 SCMR 226)\nThese cases were cited to reinforce the understanding that vehicles used for smuggling cannot be released unconditionally, and the law mandates outright confiscation under specific circumstances.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\nThe Special Customs Reference Application was allowed, and the order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal was set aside in favor of the applicant (Customs Department). The vehicle was deemed subject to outright confiscation due to its involvement in the transportation of smuggled HSD oil.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),157(2),(b),162,163,168,177,181,196,196(5),223", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 829 of 2015, decided on 6th September, 2023, heard on: 6th September, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MS. SANA AKRAM MINHAS, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Masooda Siraj along with Saud Hassan Khan, Assistant Director Customs Intelligence for Applicant.\nMs. Dil Khurram Shaheen for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION-FBR\nVS\nMESSRS CUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL BENCH-II, KARACHI AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24080", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 264 = 2024 SLD 264 = 2024 PTD 331", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTY", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis of Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015 – Sales Tax on Services and Goods\n________________________________________\nContext:\nThe petitioners, who were contractors, challenged the notifications issued under the Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015, which imposed sales tax on services and goods. The issue revolves around the rates applied to sales tax on services and the option available to contractors to either apply a standard rate or a lower rate with specific consequences. The petitioners contended that these notifications were binding and affected their ability to bifurcate the taxes on goods and services.\n________________________________________\nKey Provisions:\n1.\nBalochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015:\no\nSection 2(14): Defines sales tax on services as tax levied on services provided or rendered.\no\nSection 2(86): Deals with terms such as input tax and output tax, which are critical for contractors in calculating tax liabilities.\no\nSection 6: Imposes the levy of sales tax on services.\no\nSection 7: Provides mechanisms for the determination of rates for sales tax on services.\n2.\nNotifications:\no\nThe notifications issued by the Government of Balochistan provided contractors with two options for the application of sales tax on services:\n1.\nStandard Rate: Where input tax could be adjusted against output tax.\n2.\nLower Rate: Where contractors could opt for a lower tax rate, but without the benefit of adjusting input tax against output tax.\no\nThese notifications were informational and clarified the provisions of the Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015. They were not binding laws but served to explain the provisions for public information and guidance.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nSales Tax on Services and Goods:\no\nThe petitioners contended that the notifications created confusion in the application of sales tax rates and the bifurcation of sales tax on goods and services. Specifically, they argued that they should be able to separate the sales tax on services from the sales tax on goods in their contracts.\n2.\nEffect of Notifications:\no\nThe High Court ruled that the notifications were simply an explanation of the provisions of the Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015, and did not override the provisions of the Act itself.\no\nThe notifications could not change the legal framework of how the sales tax should be applied under the Act.\n3.\nOption for Contractors:\no\nThe contractors had the option to either:\n\nOpt for the standard rate of sales tax, which would allow for the adjustment of input tax against output tax.\n\nChoose the lower rate, but they would forgo the ability to adjust input tax against output tax.\no\nThe High Court clarified that this choice was open to contractors and that they could select whichever option best suited their business needs.\n4.\nBifurcation of Goods and Services:\no\nThe High Court also noted that it was difficult to bifurcate contracts into goods and services due to the nature of economic activities. Each stage of economic activity often involves both goods and services, making it impractical to separate them clearly. Contractors wishing to separate the sales tax for goods and services could choose the standard rate to enable the adjustment of taxes.\n5.\nGovernments Role:\no\nThe Government of Balochistan was acting as a withholding agent and was involved in the chain of economic activity by utilizing the services of contractors. This played a role in the application of the sales tax.\n________________________________________\nCourts Conclusion:\n1.\nNo Impact of Notifications on Legal Application:\no\nThe High Court held that the notifications were merely explanatory and did not have the force of law to override the provisions of the Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015. The absence or presence of the notifications did not alter the application of the law regarding sales tax on services.\n2.\nRight to Choose Between Tax Rates:\no\nContractors were given a choice between a standard rate and a lower rate of tax, with the latter option forfeiting the ability to adjust input tax. This choice remained within the contractors discretion based on their needs.\n3.\nContractors Must Follow Legal Provisions:\no\nThe contractors had to follow the provisions of the Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015, and were required to file returns for sales tax on goods with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and for sales tax on services with the Balochistan authorities. Those filing both returns had to opt for the standard rate.\n4.\nConstitutional Petition Dismissed:\no\nThe Constitutional petition filed by the contractors was dismissed, as the Court found no merit in the challenge to the notifications, affirming that they did not change the legal application of the Act.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\nThe High Court dismissed the constitutional petition, upholding the application of the Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015, and reaffirming that the contractors had the option to choose between the standard rate and lower rate of sales tax, with the standard rate allowing for input tax adjustment. The notifications were merely explanatory and did not affect the substantive law.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act 2015=2(14),2(86),6,7", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.819 and 1312 of 2020, decided on 27th November, 2023, heard on: 10th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR AND MUHAMMAD AAMIR NAWAZ RANA, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ishaq Nasar for Petitioners (in C.P. No.819 of 2020).\nShai Haq Baloch, Additional Advocate General for Official Respondents (in C.P. No.819 of 2020).\nJam Saka, assisted by Noor-ul-Haq Baloch, Chairman, BRA for Respondent No.2 (in C.P. No.819 of 2020).\nNemo. for Petitioners (in C.P. No.1312 of 2020).\nShai Haq Baloch, Additional Advocate General for Official Respondents (in C.P. No.1312 of 2020).\nJam Saka, assisted by Noor-ul-Haq Baloch, Chairman, BRA for Respondent No.2 (in C.P. No.1312 of 2020).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE AND OTHERS\nVS\nTHE GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24081", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 265 = 2024 SLD 265 = 2024 PTD 340", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTU", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis: Customs Act (IV of 1969) – Smuggling and Declaration of Foreign Currency\n________________________________________\nContext:\nThe applicants, while departing abroad, entered the Customs Hall and presented their baggage and travel documents for inspection. During the inspection, they were questioned under Section 139 of the Customs Act, 1969, regarding the contents of their baggage. Although the applicants declared that they were carrying UAE Dirham 2500, further examination revealed additional foreign currency (8 packets of various currencies and 12 notes of UAE Dirham) which they could not justify with any supporting documents or proof of lawful possession. Consequently, the foreign currency was confiscated, and the applicants were penalized. They appealed this decision, which was ultimately dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal. The applicants then filed a reference application, which was rejected by the High Court.\n________________________________________\nRelevant Provisions of Law:\n1.\nCustoms Act, 1969:\no\nSection 2(s): Defines smuggling, referring to the illegal import or export of goods without payment of duties or compliance with legal requirements.\no\nSection 139: Requires passengers or crew to declare foreign currency they are carrying and mandates that Customs officers inspect baggage for illegal or undeclared items such as narcotics or undeclared currency.\n2.\nKey Legal Requirements:\no\nTravelers are required to declare the foreign currency they are carrying when leaving the country.\no\nFailure to declare foreign currency or the possession of undeclared currency is an offense under customs law, and such currency can be confiscated.\n________________________________________\nKey Issues in the Case:\n1.\nFailure to Declare Foreign Currency:\no\nThe applicants initially declared that they were carrying only UAE Dirham 2500.\no\nUpon examination, undeclared foreign currency (including packets of various foreign currencies and additional UAE Dirham) was found in their baggage.\no\nThe applicants could not provide any supporting documentation to justify the lawful possession or authorized export of this currency.\n2.\nLegal Consequences of Non-Declaration:\no\nUnder Section 139, travelers must provide a written declaration about foreign currency they are carrying, and any failure to do so can lead to confiscation and penalties.\no\nIn this case, since the applicants failed to declare the additional foreign currency and could not show it was obtained lawfully, the Customs authorities proceeded with confiscation and imposed a penalty.\n3.\nFailure to Produce Proof of Lawful Possession:\no\nThe applicants failed to show that the currency was acquired from an authorized dealer or that they had obtained the necessary permission from the State Bank of Pakistan to carry the excess foreign currency.\no\nAs per customs regulations, foreign currency exceeding the limits must be declared and supported by documentation that proves its legality.\n________________________________________\nTribunals Findings:\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal found that the applicants did not declare the foreign currency found in their baggage and failed to produce any evidence of lawful possession.\n•\nThe penalty and confiscation of the currency were justified based on the non-declaration of the currency and the failure to provide supporting documents, as required under the Customs Act.\n•\nThe Tribunals findings were deemed final and not subject to further examination by the High Court.\n________________________________________\nHigh Courts Decision:\n•\nThe High Court examined the reference application and upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal.\n•\nThe Court concluded that the findings of the Tribunal were based on proper legal grounds and that the applicants failure to declare the foreign currency or produce lawful documentation to justify its export was a violation of the Customs Act, 1969.\n•\nThe reference application was dismissed, confirming that the foreign currency could lawfully be confiscated and the applicants penalized for non-declaration.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nViolation of Customs Regulations: The applicants violated the Customs Act by failing to declare the foreign currency they were carrying. They could not provide the necessary documentation to justify the possession or lawful export of the currency, leading to its confiscation and the imposition of a penalty.\n•\nTribunals and High Courts Rulings: Both the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court upheld the decision to confiscate the currency and penalize the applicants, as they did not meet the legal requirements for the declaration of foreign currency under Section 139 of the Customs Act, 1969.\n•\nFinality of Tribunals Findings: The Tribunals findings were upheld as final, and the reference application was dismissed, reinforcing the strict compliance required by customs laws regarding the declaration of foreign currency.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),139,196(5)", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.85 of 2015, decided on 14th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mukhtar Ahmad Awan for Applicants.\nMiss Huriya Fatima, Legal Advisor for Respondent-department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "QAISER IQBAL AND OTHERS\nVS\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (PREVENTIVE), LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24082", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 266 = 2024 SLD 266 = 2024 PTD 342 = (2025) 131 TAX 666", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTQ", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis: Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015 – Sales Tax Recovery and Retrospective Application\n________________________________________\nCase Summary:\n•\nIssue: The petitioner company challenged a recovery notice issued by the Project Director for non-payment of sales tax, which was due under the provisions of the Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015 (BRAA 2015).\n•\nThe petitioner contended that the notice was issued without lawful authority, as only an officer of the Balochistan Revenue Authority (BRA) could initiate recovery proceedings, and not a Project Director.\n________________________________________\nKey Provisions Involved:\n1.\nBalochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015:\no\nSection 14: Deals with the general powers of the BRA to enforce and recover taxes.\no\nSection 53: Provides the enforcement mechanism for the tax recovery under the BRAA, which includes the appointment of officers to enforce recovery of taxes.\n2.\nBalochistan Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2018:\no\nRule 1(4): Specifies that certain agents are responsible for withholding taxes on behalf of the BRA.\no\nRule 3: Imposes responsibility on withholding agents to deduct and remit the sales tax.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issue: Jurisdiction to Initiate Recovery:\n•\nPetitioners Argument: The petitioner argued that the Project Director had no authority under the Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015 to initiate recovery proceedings for tax that had not been withheld. According to the BRAA, the responsibility for enforcing and recovering sales tax lay with the BRA officers, not with a Project Director.\n•\nHigh Courts Ruling:\no\nThe Project Director lacked the jurisdiction or power to initiate recovery proceedings. Section 14 and Section 53 of the BRAA specifically empower BRA officers to enforce tax recovery, and not the Project Director.\no\nThe High Court ruled that even if a withholding agent failed to deduct the applicable tax, the recovery could only be initiated by an authorized officer of the BRA.\no\nThe recovery notice issued to the petitioner was therefore deemed invalid as it was issued by a party without the proper legal authority to enforce such recovery.\n________________________________________\nRetrospective Application of Statutes:\n•\nPetitioners Argument on Retrospective Application: The petitioner contended that the sales tax statute (under the Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015) could not be applied retrospectively to affect past transactions, particularly if such application would prejudice existing rights or disrupt finality of past tax matters.\n•\nCourts View on Retrospective Laws:\no\nThe court upheld that procedural laws can be applied retrospectively, as long as they do not adversely affect existing rights or create injustice. If a procedural statute aims to promote justice or remedy an oversight without disrupting substantive rights, courts tend to favor retrospective application.\no\nHowever, in this case, there was no explicit provision in the BRAA that would make the law applicable retrospectively to prior periods, especially to transactions that had already been closed.\n•\nConclusion on Retrospective Application: The court clarified that even in cases where retrospective laws are permissible, they cannot affect vested rights or create prejudice unless the statute explicitly states so. In this case, the statute lacked express provisions allowing retrospective application to the transactions in question.\n________________________________________\nOutcome of the Case:\n•\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, setting aside the recovery notice issued by the Project Director. The notice was found to be issued without lawful authority, and the procedural rules of the Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015 were misinterpreted.\n•\nConstitutional Petition: The petition was allowed, affirming that only BRA officers had the jurisdiction to initiate tax recovery proceedings and retrospective application of laws should not adversely affect past transactions without express legislative intent.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\n1.\nJurisdiction: Tax recovery proceedings must be initiated by authorized officers of the Balochistan Revenue Authority as per the Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015. Project Directors or other non-designated authorities do not have the legal authority to initiate recovery actions.\n2.\nRetrospective Laws: While procedural statutes can sometimes be applied retrospectively, they should not infringe on substantive or vested rights without clear legislative intent. The Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015 did not provide for retrospective application in this case.\n3.\nSales Tax and Withholding: Withholding agents are required to deduct and remit sales tax. Failure to do so does not give rise to immediate recovery by unauthorized parties. Only BRA officers have the power to enforce such recovery.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Revenue Authority Act, 2015=14,14(1),14(3),53Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=3(1),199Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act 2015=3(1),52(6)Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Rules, 2018=1(4)", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.1261 of 2019, decided on 11th August, 2022, heard on: 17th June, 2022", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR AND ABDUL HAMEED BALOCH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ishaq Nasar for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Ali Rakhshani, Additional Advocate General for Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3.\nJam Saka Dashti for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS NOOR UL HAQ THROUGH ABDUL SAMAD\nVS\nTHE GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY BALOCHISTAN AN 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24083", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 267 = 2024 SLD 267 = 2024 PTD 349", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VS8", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis: Customs Act (IV of 1969) – Classification and Reassessment of Imported Goods\n________________________________________\nCase Summary:\n•\nIssue: The dispute arose between the importer and the Customs Department over the classification of imported goods (aerosol spray paints). The importer declared the goods as Aerosol Spray Paints based on polyamides, while the Customs audit reclassified the goods as being based on acrylic or vinyl polymers, thereby denying the exemption under SRO 659(I)/2007 dated 03-06-2007.\n•\nCore Legal Question: Whether, after clearance of goods, the Customs Department could reassess the goods and alter the classification for the purpose of applying a different rate of tax or exemption.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nCustoms Act, 1969:\no\nSection 32(1): Deals with the classification of goods and defines the process of clearance and assessment.\no\nSection 32(2): Specifies how goods are to be classified for customs duties and the manner in which disputes regarding classification are handled.\no\nSection 3-A: Provides powers for the reassessment of goods post-clearance, under certain conditions.\no\nSection 79: Relates to post-clearance audit and reassessment, which allows the Customs authorities to audit imported goods and reassess their classification.\no\nSection 80: Outlines the procedure for challenging assessments, reclassification, and disputes.\n2.\nSRO 659(I)/2007: Issued to provide exemptions for certain goods, specifically related to the classification of Aerosol Spray Paints.\n________________________________________\nFacts and Legal Issue:\n•\nImporter’s Declaration: The importer declared the goods as Aerosol Spray Paints based on polyamides, and sought exemption under SRO 659(I)/2007, which specifically exempted certain goods from customs duties.\n•\nCustoms Audit Discrepancy: Upon audit, the Customs authorities classified the goods based on a different composition—acrylic or vinyl polymers—and concluded that the goods did not qualify for exemption under SRO 659(I)/2007.\n•\nPost-Clearance Reassessment: The Customs Department attempted to reassess the goods after they had been cleared, based on the audit findings, which questioned the goods initial classification.\n•\nDispute: The core of the dispute was whether, after clearance, the Customs authorities had the power to reassess the classification of the goods and apply a different exemption or duty rate.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Analysis and Decision:\n•\nReassessment Post-Clearance: The Court held that once goods were cleared and released from the Customs charge, no further allegations or reassessments could be made unless there was concrete evidence to justify the need for reassessment.\n•\nBurden of Proof: The Customs Department failed to produce the necessary evidence that would justify the audit’s reclassification of the goods as acrylic or vinyl polymers. The lack of evidence meant that the importers declaration stood as valid, particularly in light of the exemption under SRO 659(I)/2007.\n•\nCorrect Classification: Since the Customs Department failed to substantiate its claim with proper evidence, the Court concluded that the goods were rightfully classified as Aerosol Spray Paints based on polyamides, as per the original declaration.\n•\nLegal Precedents: The decision referenced previous cases such as Eastern Rice Syndicate v. Collector of Customs (PLD 1959 SC 364) and 1991 PTD 551, which established that post-clearance audits and reassessments could not be used to challenge the classification of goods unless supported by clear evidence.\n•\nOrder-in-Original Upheld: The Order-in-Original, which had initially favored the importer, was upheld as well-reasoned and unexceptionable. The appeal by the Customs Department was dismissed.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe Court upheld the original classification and exemption claimed by the importer and dismissed the appeal filed by the Customs Department.\n•\nThe importer’s classification of the goods as Aerosol Spray Paints based on polyamides was deemed correct, and the exemption under SRO 659(I)/2007 was valid.\n•\nKey Point: The Customs Department failed to provide the necessary evidence to challenge the importers classification post-clearance, and the Court found that once goods were cleared, further reassessment could not be done without valid proof.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nPost-Clearance Reassessment: Customs authorities can only reassess goods after clearance if there is sufficient evidence to justify the reassessment.\n2.\nBurden of Proof: The Customs Department must provide adequate proof to support any reclassification of goods for the purposes of duty or exemption, especially when challenging the importers original declaration.\n3.\nCustoms Exemptions: Goods eligible for exemptions under specific SROs should not be reassessed without clear, substantiated evidence showing that the goods do not meet the criteria outlined in the SRO.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1),32(2),32(3A),79,79(1),79(1)(a),79(1)(b),80Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148Sales Tax Act, 1990=7A,34Customs Rules, 2001=433", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-286 of 2018, decided on 7th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Yaqoob, PA for Appellant.\nMohammad Siddiq Zia and Mohammad Aslam for Respondent No.1", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR OF POST CLEARANCE AUDIT THROUGH ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE POST CLEARANCE AUDIT CUSTOMS HOUSE, KARACHI\nVS\nMESSRS ESSEFF TRADER THROUGH EXPERT LAW ASSOCIATE AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24084", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 268 = 2024 SLD 268 = 2024 PTD 355 = (2025) 131 TAX 519", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VSs", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) - Issuance of Fresh/Second Show-Cause Notice\n________________________________________\nCase Summary:\n•\nIssue: The dispute concerns the issuance of a fresh/second Show-Cause Notice by the Inland Revenue Department after the expiry of the 120-day period prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Department argued that due to frequent transfers of officers, they were unable to finalize the matter within the required timeframe.\n•\nCore Legal Question: Whether the issuance of a second Show-Cause Notice after the statutory time limit of 120 days (with a possible extension of 90 days) was legally valid.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nSales Tax Act, 1990:\no\nSection 11(5): Mandates that Sales Tax authorities must pass the Order-in-Original within 120 days of issuing a Show-Cause Notice.\no\nProviso to Section 11(5): Allows an extension of the 120-day period by an additional 90 days for reasons that must be recorded in writing.\n________________________________________\nFacts and Legal Issue:\n•\nShow-Cause Notice: A Show-Cause Notice was issued by the Sales Tax Authorities for non-levy or short levy of sales tax.\n•\nTime Limit Expiry: The 120-day period for passing the Order-in-Original expired, but the authorities failed to pass the order within this time frame.\n•\nIssuance of Second Show-Cause Notice: After the 120 days expired, and without issuing the Order-in-Original, the authorities issued a second Show-Cause Notice.\n•\nDepartment’s Argument: The Inland Revenue Department argued that the delays were due to frequent transfers within the department, preventing the matter from being finalized.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Analysis and Decision:\n•\nMandatory Time Limit: The Court emphasized that under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the Sales Tax Authorities were legally required to pass an Order-in-Original within 120 days of issuing the Show-Cause Notice.\n•\nProviso for Extension: The Court recognized that the proviso allows an extension of up to 90 days. However, the extension could only be granted if the delay was properly justified and recorded in writing. In the present case, there was no such extension within the 90-day window, and the second Show-Cause Notice was issued even after this period expired.\n•\nNo Valid Justification for Delay: The Department’s argument of frequent officer transfers, while acknowledging the delay, did not suffice as a valid legal reason for issuing a second Show-Cause Notice after the expiration of the statutory period. The Court held that State functionaries should not be allowed to make the citizens suffer due to their own administrative delays.\n•\nIssuance of Second Notice: The issuance of the second Show-Cause Notice after the expiry of the statutory period was found to be illegal. The Court ruled that if a time limit is prescribed by law, it must be strictly adhered to. Therefore, the second notice could not be endorsed.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, declaring the second/fresh Show-Cause Notice to be invalid.\n•\nThe Constitutional Petition filed by the petitioner was allowed, and the second Show-Cause Notice was vacated.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nMandatory Time Limit: Statutory time limits, such as those in Section 11(5), must be strictly adhered to. If an Order-in-Original is not passed within the 120-day period, the authorities cannot issue a second Show-Cause Notice.\n2.\nExtension of Time: The extension of the time limit (for up to 90 days) must be properly documented and justified in writing. Without a valid extension, the authorities cannot proceed with any further actions after the expiry of the original time limit.\n3.\nAdministrative Delays: The Court emphasized that delays due to administrative reasons (like officer transfers) cannot be used as a justification to bypass statutory time limits.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe High Court held that the issuance of a second Show-Cause Notice after the expiry of the statutory period was illegal.\n•\nState functionaries must adhere to the legal provisions and ensure that matters are finalized within the prescribed time limits.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,11(5)", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No.D-3945 and C.M.A. No.17732 of 2017, decided on 12th January, 2022, heard on: 12th January, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rahim Lakhani for Petitioner.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, DAG for Respondent No.1.\nShahid Ali Qureshi for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S YAKIN CO. THROUGH PROPRIETOR\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION AND EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24085", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 269 = 2024 SLD 269 = 2024 PTD 358", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTk", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) - Scope of Taxation on Sales of Assets, Scrap, and Allocation of Expenses\n________________________________________\n(a) Sales of Scrap and Assets – Minimum Tax on Turnover:\n•\nIssue: The Inland Revenue charged the taxpayer company minimum tax on the sale of assets and scrap. The company, deriving income from telecom and broadband services, argued that sales of scrap were incidental to their business activities and did not form part of their turnover.\n•\nCourt’s Findings:\no\nScrap Sales: The sale of scrap was part of the companys manufacturing process but did not constitute part of its trading goods or stock-in-trade.\no\nTurnover Definition: According to the court, turnover refers to sales made in the regular course of business activities. As the company was not engaged in the business of selling scrap, the sales of scrap did not contribute to the turnover.\no\nTax on Turnover: The court concluded that scrap sales should not be considered part of the turnover for the purpose of minimum tax computation.\no\nOutcome: The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner’s decision to delete the tax charge on the sale of scrap, dismissing the department’s appeal.\n________________________________________\n(b) Turnover from Sale of Assets and Scrap:\n•\nIssue: The department sought to include the sale of assets in the total turnover of the company. The department argued that the taxpayer’s turnover included all sales, including the sale of fixed assets, which the company claimed was unrelated to its primary business of telecom services.\n•\nCourt’s Findings:\no\nTurnover Definition: The term turnover in Section 113(3)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, refers to gross sales or gross receipts from all sources, excluding sales tax and trade discounts.\no\nFixed Assets and Turnover: The court highlighted that the inclusion of fixed assets in turnover could create confusion. Fixed assets are typically not part of the regular sales cycle and may not qualify as part of business turnover if their sale is incidental.\no\nOverlap in Terminology: The terms gross sales, turnover, and gross receipts often overlap, but their application varies depending on the context.\no\nOutcome: The Tribunal agreed with the Commissioner’s decision, holding that sales of fixed assets were not part of the company’s primary turnover, and dismissed the department’s appeal.\n________________________________________\n(c) Allocation of Expenses Related to Rental Income:\n•\nIssue: The Inland Revenue allocated certain expenses to rental income derived by the company, which was engaged in telecom and broadband services.\n•\nCourt’s Findings:\no\nAllocation of Expenses: The Income Tax Ordinance and Income Tax Rules require expenses to be allocated only if they are directly attributable to the income they are meant to support. In this case, the company claimed the expenses related to rental income were negligible and not substantial enough to warrant allocation.\no\nEvidence for Allocation: The court emphasized that the Inland Revenue did not provide tangible evidence justifying the allocation of expenses to rental income.\no\nOutcome: The Tribunal upheld the Commissioners decision that no allocation of expenses was needed for rental income, and dismissed the departments appeal.\n________________________________________\n(d) Allocation of Expenses for Dividend Income:\n•\nIssue: The company claimed deductions for expenses related to earning dividend income. The Inland Revenue sought to allocate notional expenses, which the company disputed.\n•\nCourt’s Findings:\no\nPrinciple of Actual Expenses: Only actual expenses incurred for earning dividend income can be deducted. The court emphasized that notional expenses or estimates could not be deducted unless specifically justified.\no\nLack of Evidence: The Inland Revenue did not provide any evidence regarding the actual expenses incurred by the company in earning the dividend income.\no\nOutcome: The Tribunal ruled in favor of the taxpayer, maintaining the Commissioner’s decision that only actual expenses related to dividend income should be deducted, and dismissed the department’s appeal.\n________________________________________\n(e) Allocation of Expenses Related to Exempt Capital Gains:\n•\nIssue: The Inland Revenue sought to allocate expenses to exempt capital gains earned by the company.\n•\nCourt’s Findings:\no\nExempt Capital Gains: Income from capital gains is treated separately and does not allow for broad allocation of expenses like other income types.\no\nCapital Gains and Expense Allocation: The court agreed that capital gains, being a separate income block, should not have expenses allocated to them, as they are subject to restrictive expense deductions.\no\nOutcome: The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner’s decision, ruling that no allocation of expenses to exempt capital gains was allowed, and dismissed the department’s appeal.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nMinimum Tax and Turnover: Sales of scrap and fixed assets that are not part of the regular business activities of the company should not be considered as part of the turnover for minimum tax purposes.\n•\nAllocation of Expenses: Expenses should only be allocated to the income they directly relate to, with evidence of actual expenditure being necessary for such allocations. The Tribunal maintained the Commissioner’s decisions in favor of the taxpayer in all cases, and dismissed the department’s appeals.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=15,15A,16,30,67,113,113(3),113(3)(a),120,122(5A),127Income Tax Rules, 1922=13", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1318/LB of 2016, decided on 16th November, 2023, heard on: 3rd October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahsan Tahir, DR for Appellant.\nNone for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, LAHORE\nVS\nMESSRS WORLD CALL TELECOM LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24086", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 270 = 2024 SLD 270 = 2024 PTD 368", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VTg", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) - Section 47 - Reference to High Court on Factual Controversy\n________________________________________\nIssue:\nThe Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), Section 47, governs the process for referring a matter to the High Court from the Appellate Tribunal. The key point of contention in this case was whether the High Court could entertain questions of fact in the context of a reference made under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act.\nCourt’s Findings:\n•\nNature of Reference: Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act allows for the reference of questions of law from the Appellate Tribunal to the High Court.\n•\nScope of High Courts Review: The High Courts jurisdiction in the reference is limited to questions of law. It does not have the authority to re-examine or reassess findings of fact made by the Appellate Tribunal.\n•\nFactual Controversies: When there is a factual controversy—that is, when the dispute involves conflicting evidence or assessments of fact—the High Court cannot interfere. The findings of fact made by the Appellate Tribunal are final and cannot be questioned or revisited by the High Court.\n•\nLegal Review Only: A reference to the High Court is only valid if the issue involves a question of law. This means the High Court can only examine whether the Appellate Tribunal applied the correct legal principles and whether its decision is in accordance with the law. If the issue pertains to the interpretation or application of law, the High Court can intervene. However, if the issue concerns the facts of the case, the High Court cannot reconsider or reassess those findings.\nPrecedents Referenced:\n1.\nMessrs F.M.Y Industries Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Income Tax (2014 SCMR 907): This case reinforces that the High Courts role in a reference is to resolve legal issues and not factual disputes.\n2.\nPakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Assistant Collector, Sales Tax and Central Excise Mardan (2019 SCMR 906): This case similarly upholds the principle that factual findings by the Appellate Tribunal are not subject to examination by the High Court.\nConclusion:\n•\nHigh Courts Role in Reference: The High Court can only entertain legal questions in a reference made under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. It does not have the authority to reconsider factual findings made by the Appellate Tribunal.\n•\nLegal vs Factual Questions: Any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of law can be addressed by the High Court, but the facts of the case as determined by the Appellate Tribunal are conclusive and cannot be revisited.\nThis ensures that Tribunals and lower courts, as fact-finding bodies, have the final say on factual matters, while the High Court focuses on ensuring that legal principles are properly applied.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,7,8,10,11(3),22,23,26,47,47(5),73Sales Tax Rules, 2006=36,38", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 145 of 2016, decided on 28th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND JAWAD HASSAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Legal Advisor for Applicant-department.\nKhubaib Ahmad for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO, FAISALABAD\nVS\nMESSRS CHAWLA ENTERPRISES, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24087", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 271 = 2024 SLD 271 = 2024 PTD 370", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VXo", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis: Sales Tax Rules, 2006 - Rule 36 - Post-Sanction Audit of Refund Claims\n________________________________________\nIssue:\nThe petitioners (companies/registered taxpayers) challenged the impugned notices issued by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue for conducting a post-sanction audit of their Sales Tax refund claims. The petitioners contended that under Rule 36 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, it was the Commissioner Inland Revenue who had the authority to direct such audits, not the Deputy Commissioner. Hence, they argued that the notices were issued without lawful authority.\nCourt’s Findings:\n•\nRule 36 of Sales Tax Rules, 2006: This rule provides a mechanism for post-sanction audit of Sales Tax refund claims. The key point in the rule is that the Commissioner Inland Revenue must have reason to believe that a refund was paid improperly and then issue an order to conduct a manual post-refund scrutiny.\n•\nRole of Deputy Commissioner: The High Court observed that Rule 36 only requires the Commissioner Inland Revenue to issue an order directing the audit. The audit itself does not have to be personally carried out by the Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner can also carry out the post-sanction audit if directed by the Commissioner. Therefore, the fact that the Deputy Commissioner was involved in the audit did not invalidate the process.\n•\nRefund Mechanism: The petitioners had applied for refunds through various online systems like STARR/ERS/FASTER, which facilitated the sanctioning and payment of refunds without a prior audit. However, this did not mean that the refunds could not be audited post-sanction, especially if the Commissioner Inland Revenue had a reason to believe that a refund was incorrectly granted.\n•\nNo Prejudice to Petitioners: The High Court held that selection for audit in itself does not cause harm or actionable injury to the taxpayer. The audit was a routine procedure to ensure the accuracy and validity of refund claims. The fact that the refunds had already been paid did not prevent the audit. Therefore, even if the audit was directed post facto, it did not amount to an adverse order that could harm the petitioners.\n•\nPre-Audit and Post-Audit System: The High Court acknowledged that refunds were traditionally subjected to pre-audit. The online system introduced by the FBR allowed refunds to be processed and paid without the pre-audit, as a convenience for registered persons. However, post-sanction audit remained a valid tool for the tax authorities to ensure correctness of the claims.\n•\nConstitutional Jurisdiction: The High Court emphasized that the audit was a routine administrative step and did not warrant interference through constitutional jurisdiction. There was no legal ground for the petitioners to challenge the audit notices, as they did not demonstrate that the process caused them any direct harm or prejudice.\nPrecedents Referenced:\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Allah Din Steel and Rerolling Mills (2018 SCMR 1328): This case reaffirmed the principle that the audit process by tax authorities is an essential tool to ensure the correctness of claims and does not inherently cause harm to the taxpayer, unless some irregularity in the process is demonstrated.\nConclusion:\n•\nAuthority to Conduct Audit: The Commissioner Inland Revenue had the authority to direct the post-sanction audit, which could be carried out by any relevant officer, including the Deputy Commissioner.\n•\nNo Prejudice to Taxpayer: The fact that the refunds were paid without pre-audit did not negate the validity of post-sanction audit. The petitioners could not demonstrate that the audit process caused them any direct prejudice or injury.\n•\nDismissal of Petitions: As there was no violation of law or prejudicial harm to the petitioners, the High Court dismissed the constitutional petitions filed by the companies/taxpayers.\n________________________________________\nThis judgment underscores the routine nature of post-sanction audits in the Sales Tax system and clarifies that the audit process does not automatically equate to an infringement of rights, especially when it is conducted as part of the regulatory framework for ensuring tax compliance.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Rules, 2006=36", - "Case #": "Constitution Petitions Nos. P-5899, P-6929, P-7455, P-7456 and P-5231 of 2022, decided on 11th January, 2023, heard on: 11th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Shehzad for Petitioners.\nRana Sakhawat Ali for Respondents.\nZubair Hashmi, Advocate and Qazi Ayazuddin, Assistant Attorney General.\nG.M. Bhutoo, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS YUNUS TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED THROUGH AUTHORIZE OFFICER AND OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24088", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 272 = 2024 SLD 272 = 2024 PTD 374", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5VXk", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis: Customs Act (IV of 1969) - Section 179(3) - Statutory Period for Adjudication in Smuggling Cases\n________________________________________\nIssue:\nThe Customs Department challenged the decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal that had set aside the order-in-original on the grounds that it was passed beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969.\nThe Customs Department argued that the delays were due to adjournments requested by the importer and a stay order by the High Court.\nCourt’s Findings:\n1.\nStatutory Period Under Section 179(3):\no\nSection 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 mandates that cases invoking provisions under Section 2(s) related to smuggling must be decided within a 30-day period after the issuance of the Show-Cause Notice.\no\nThe first proviso to Section 179(3) allows for the exclusion of time during which proceedings were adjourned due to:\n\nA stay order, or\n\nAlternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) proceedings, or\n\nAny adjournment not exceeding 30 days.\n2.\nTimeline of Proceedings in the Present Case:\no\nContravention Report was prepared one month before the Show-Cause Notice was issued.\no\nThe Show-Cause Notice was issued after one month, and the order-in-original was passed three and a half months later.\no\nThe order-in-original was therefore passed beyond the prescribed 30-day period for adjudication under Section 179(3).\n3.\nNo Stay Order:\no\nThe High Court found that there was no actual stay order in the case. The High Court had denied interim relief when the constitutional jurisdiction was invoked.\no\nAs no stay order was issued, the period during which proceedings were adjourned could not be excluded from the statutory 30-day timeline for adjudication.\n4.\nEffect of Delay:\no\nThe High Court held that the Customs Appellate Tribunal was correct in setting aside the order-in-original because it had been passed beyond the time limit prescribed by Section 179(3).\no\nThe statutory requirement for adjudicating cases within 30 days was not met, and the delay was not justified by the reasons provided by the Customs Department.\n5.\nPrecedents Referenced:\no\nMessrs Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal (2019 SCMR 1735): This case emphasized the strict adherence to statutory timelines in customs matters, particularly in smuggling cases.\no\nThe Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons (2017 PTD 1756): This case dealt with the interpretation of statutory timelines in the context of sales tax and underscored the importance of following the prescribed periods for adjudication.\no\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders (2022 SCMR 1333): A similar principle was applied in tax-related cases, reinforcing that procedural timelines are to be adhered to.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal correctly set aside the order-in-original as it was passed beyond the statutory 30-day period prescribed under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969.\n•\nThe Customs Department failed to establish valid grounds for the delay, such as the stay order or adjournments that would extend the statutory period.\n•\nThe Customs Departments reference was dismissed by the High Court, confirming that the time-barred decision could not be sustained.\nThis case highlights the importance of adhering to statutory timelines for adjudication in smuggling-related cases under the Customs Act, 1969, and reinforces the principle that procedural delays without justifiable reasons cannot be used to extend statutory deadlines.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),156(1)(8),156(1)(89),179(3),1st proviso,196", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No. 14-P of 2023, decided on 7th March, 2023, heard on: 7th March, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " ROOH-UL-AMIN KHAN AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Behzad Haider for Petitioner.\nFarhat Nawaz Lodhi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (APPRAISEMENT), PESHAWAR\nVS\nMESSRS ALLIED ASSOCIATES, PESHAWAR AND 4 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24089", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 273 = 2024 SLD 273 = 2024 PTD 380", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTc", - "Key Words:": "Legal Analysis: Customs Act (IV of 1969) - Non-Obstante Clause, Valuation Ruling, and the Dispute Over Duty Assessment\n________________________________________\nIssue:\nThe dispute revolves around the Customs Appellate Tribunals decision to set aside the valuation ruling issued by the Customs authorities. The Tribunal had ruled that the Valuation Ruling was only valid for 90 days, and in this case, it had been used beyond that period to fix the duty on the basis of that valuation. The Customs Department challenged the Tribunals decision, which was in favor of the importers.\nThe question centered on the non-obstante clause in Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969, and whether the Valuation Ruling, as applied by the authorities, was consistent with the statutory framework and its intended use.\nCourts Findings:\n1.\nStatutory Framework:\no\nSection 25 of the Customs Act, 1969, provides the general mechanism for determining the value of goods for customs purposes.\no\nSection 25A allows for the issuance of Valuation Rulings by the Director General of Customs Valuation, which must be followed unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise.\no\nNon-obstante clause in Section 25A operates in such a way that it may override conflicting provisions elsewhere in the Act, but it is meant to be used sparingly and in exceptional circumstances.\n2.\nThe Validity of Valuation Ruling:\no\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal held that the Valuation Ruling was valid for only 90 days after issuance. After that period, its application could not be used to assess duty.\no\nThe High Court disagreed with this interpretation and ruled in favor of the importers, stating that reliance on the Valuation Ruling could not be maintained when the importers transaction value was supported by irrefutable documentary evidence.\n3.\nApplication of Non-Obstante Clause:\no\nSection 25A includes a non-obstante clause, which would allow it to override other provisions of the Customs Act. However, this provision is not to be used routinely.\no\nThe High Court observed that the non-obstante clause should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances and cannot be used to justify a prolonged application of a Valuation Ruling beyond what was reasonable, such as the 90-day period.\no\nThe High Court stressed that Valuation Rulings should be based on timely trade practices and, under the statutory provisions, could not remain valid indefinitely.\n4.\nCourt’s Ruling:\no\nThe High Court held that if the transaction value presented by the importer was unquestionable and backed by documentary evidence, it would take precedence over a Valuation Ruling that was used beyond its prescribed validity.\no\nThe Court further clarified that the non-obstante clause in Section 25A was meant to provide flexibility in specific, justified cases, not to be applied routinely. It cannot be used to extend the Valuation Ruling period indefinitely, especially when the market value is clearly supported by evidence.\n5.\nPrecedents Cited:\no\nThe Court relied on previous cases, such as:\n\nSadia Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 PTD 1746): This case dealt with the interpretation of Valuation Rulings and the importance of adhering to time limits.\n\nSky Overseas v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 PTD 1964): This case reinforced the need to follow the prescribed time limits for Valuation Rulings.\n\nDanish Jehangir v. Federation of Pakistan (2016 PTD 702): A case that discussed the limitations of non-obstante clauses.\n\nMessrs Central Insurance Company v. The Central Board of Revenue (1993 SCMR 1232): This case provided guidance on the application of the non-obstante clause within the Customs Act.\n6.\nEffect of Non-Obstante Clause:\no\nNon-obstante clauses serve to clarify the legislatures intention when two provisions might conflict. However, the clause does not automatically override clear, unambiguous provisions if such provisions are capable of being interpreted clearly and grammatically.\no\nThe non-obstante clause in Section 25A was not meant to indefinitely extend the validity of a Valuation Ruling, especially when irrefutable documentary evidence from the importer was available to establish the value of the goods.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25(1),25A,196,196(5)Customs Rules, 2001=107(a)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Applications Nos. 34-63 of 2022, decided on 16th November, 2022, heard on: 7th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Murtaza along with M. Ishaque Pirzada for Applicants.\nShafaqat Mehmood Chohan and Ghulam Nabi Shar and Ms. Falak Naz Fatima for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC (EAST) THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nMESSRS FORTE MARKETING SERVICES AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24090", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 274 = 2024 SLD 274 = 2024 PTD 393", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTY", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary:\nLegal Provisions:\n•\nCustoms Act (IV of 1969) – Sections 32, 168, and 171\n•\nNotification No. 486910/2007 dated 09-06-2007 – Grants seizing powers to certain agencies.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nAn importer was found to have mis-declared the classification of imported goods, which resulted in short-levy of duties and taxes.\n•\nWhile the goods were being examined and seized, the importers online data was scrutinized using the WeBEOC system, which revealed that the importer had used the same modus operandi to clear five previous consignments over the last nine months, evading duties and taxes.\n•\nThe total recoverable amount from these consignments was Rs. 7,458,826, including the seized goods.\n•\nThe Customs Directorate initiated adjudication proceedings, and an Order-in-Original was passed, which was later appealed by the importer before the Customs Appellate Tribunal.\n________________________________________\nIssues:\n1.\nJurisdictional Power: The importer contested that the Directorate had powers under Notification No. 486910/2007 to seize goods, but it did not have powers under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969.\n2.\nCustoms Laboratory Test: The proceedings were conducted without any Customs Laboratory Test for the previous consignments, which were crucial for proving the contravention.\n3.\nValidity of the Seizure: The importer argued that actions were taken on the basis of presumptions without adequate evidence (such as laboratory tests).\n________________________________________\nTribunals Findings:\n1.\nJurisdiction: The Tribunal held that the Directorate, while having powers under Notification No. 486910/2007, did not have the jurisdiction under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, for seizing the goods. The Tribunal found that the actions of the Customs Directorate exceeded its jurisdictional scope.\n2.\nLack of Laboratory Test: The Tribunal noted that no Customs Laboratory Test had been conducted for the previous five consignments. The absence of this test meant that the contravention regarding these consignments was based on mere presumptions and not concrete evidence. The Tribunal emphasized that presumptions were not recognized under the law.\n3.\nSeizure and Contravention: As the seizure of the goods was made without the required laboratory tests or sufficient evidence, the Tribunal set aside the findings regarding the previous consignments. The Tribunal observed that, legally, the contravention could not be established without proper tests and evidence.\n4.\nForwarding of Information: Regarding the Goods Declaration for the consignments where laboratory tests were conducted, the Tribunal stated that it would have been appropriate for the Customs Directorate to forward the relevant information to the respective Collectorate for taking necessary actions as per the law.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe Tribunal ruled in favor of the importer and set aside the findings in the Order-in-Original concerning the previous consignments from the last nine months, which were based on presumptions rather than evidence.\n•\nThe appeal filed by the importer was allowed.\n________________________________________\nLegal Precedents Referenced:\n•\nCivil Petitions Nos. 896-L and 897-L of 2020: These cases helped clarify the procedural requirements regarding Customs seizures and the role of laboratory tests in establishing contravention.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe Tribunals decision underlined the importance of evidence (like laboratory tests) in establishing a customs contravention.\n•\nThe Customs Directorates actions were found to be beyond its jurisdiction, and the Tribunal ruled that presumptions alone were insufficient to justify the seizure or assessment of the goods.\n•\nThe case emphasizes the need for clear evidence in customs proceedings and the adherence to jurisdictional limits when taking actions such as seizing goods.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=14,43,32,32(1),32(2),32(5),79,79(1),80,136(1),136(14),156(1),161,168,168(1),171,181,185A186Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10A,18,24,25", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-767 of 2023, decided on 15th August, 2023, heard on: 10th July, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD ARIF KHAN, CHAIRMAN/MEMBER JUDICIAL AND ABDUL BASIT CHAUDHRY, MEMBER TECHNICAL-I", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Fatima Zahra and Ms. Huriya Fatima for Appellants.\nNemo. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS IBKB (PRIVATE) LIMITED THROUGH DIRECTOR AND ANOTHER\nVS\nTHE DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION CUSTOMS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24091", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 275 = 2024 SLD 275 = 2024 PTD 406", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTU", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary:\nLegal Provisions:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) – Section 116\n•\nIncome Support Levy Act, 2013 – Sections 2(1)(a), 3, and 9\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan – Articles 73(1) and 189\n•\nLaw Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972) – Section 3\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe Appellants (taxpayers) were aggrieved by the Income Support Levy imposed at a rate of 0.5% on the value of net movable assets/wealth exceeding one million Rupees.\n•\nThe taxpayers contested the legality of the Income Support Levy, asserting it was ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the Constitution.\n•\nThe High Court dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants, but the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal. However, the Supreme Court went ahead and decided the matter on merits.\n•\nThe Supreme Courts decision regarding the Income Support Levy became binding as it was pronounced with the intention of settling the law on the matter. According to Article 189 of the Constitution, this ruling had the force of precedent and was binding on all subordinate courts and tribunals, including the High Court.\n________________________________________\nIssues:\n1.\nVires of the Income Support Levy: Whether the Income Support Levy (0.5% on net movable assets exceeding one million Rupees) was valid under the Constitution or if it was ultra vires.\n2.\nEffect of Supreme Courts Decision: The effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling, which declined to grant leave to appeal but proceeded to settle the law on the matter and whether this decision was binding on the High Court.\n3.\nIntra-Court Appeal: Whether the Intra-Court Appeal filed by the taxpayer, following the dismissal of the constitutional petitions, should be allowed, given the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on the Income Support Levy.\n________________________________________\nFindings:\nPer Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, J:\n•\nThe Supreme Courts pronouncement regarding the Income Support Levy was made with the intent to settle the law, and such a decision had the force of precedent under Article 189 of the Constitution.\n•\nWhen the Supreme Court decided a matter on merits, even in the form of a refusal to grant leave, the decision is binding on all courts in Pakistan. Thus, the High Court was bound by the Supreme Court’s decision on the Income Support Levy, regardless of whether the leave was granted or not.\n•\nThe Intra Court Appeal was allowed in favor of the taxpayers, following the Supreme Courts binding ruling.\nPer Asim Hafeez, J:\n•\nIn the Intra Court Appeal, the Appellants (taxpayers) were not challenging the vires (legality) of the Income Support Levy itself but were addressing the demand notices raised based on the lack of an audience and the effect of the appeal.\n•\nThe Supreme Court had already decided the Income Support Levy issue in another case under Article 73 of the Constitution, declaring the levy void and of no legal effect.\n•\nThe Intra Court Appeal was allowed because the Income Support Levy was already deemed invalid by the Supreme Court.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe Intra Court Appeal was allowed in favor of the taxpayers. The Income Support Levy was held to be invalid and of no legal effect based on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement.\n•\nThe Supreme Court’s decision was binding on the High Court and all subordinate courts and tribunals under Article 189 of the Constitution.\n________________________________________\nLegal Precedents Referenced:\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Federal Board of Revenue, Karachi v. Muhammad Mustafa Gifi and others (Civil Petitions Nos.490-K to 561-K and others) – This case provided clarity on the binding effect of Supreme Courts rulings.\n•\nOther precedents related to Income Support Levy and its constitutionality, including cases like Yaqoob Ahmed through Attorney and others v. Federation of Pakistan (2020 PTD 1407), where the vires of similar levies were discussed.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe Supreme Court’s decision had the binding force of law, and the Income Support Levy was declared invalid and of no legal effect. The Intra Court Appeal was allowed, following the principle set forth by the Supreme Court in its previous rulings.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=116Income Support Levy Act, 2013=2 (1)(a),3,9Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=73(1),189Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 1181 of 2016, decided on 11th March, 2022, heard on: 11th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahbaz Butt, Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Muhammad Azhar Khan Joyya, Mian Abdul Ghaffar, Rai Amer Ejaz Kharal, Ch. Rehmat Ali; Omer Wahab, Mansoor Beg (vice Dr. Ikram-ul-Haq, Advocate), Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Shehryar Kasuri, Raza lmtiaz Siddiqui, Jamshaid Alam, Qadeer Kalyar, Sabeel Tariq Mann, M. Humzah Sheikh, Mian Ashiq Hussain, Syed Naveed A. Andrabi, Khurram Saleem, Javed Iqbal Qazi, Barrister Malik Muhammad Kashi Rafique Rajwana, Dr. Muhammad Hafeez Malik, Mudassar Shuja-ud-Din, Hashim Aslam Butt, Usman Ali Bhoon, Muhammad Shabbir Hussain, Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Mian Abdul Sattar Sial, Shahzad Ata Elahi, Ch. Muhammad Ali, Shah Behram Sukhera, Salman Zaheer Khan, Majid Jehangir, H.M. Majid Siddiqui, Jan Muhammad Ch., Habib-ur-Rehman, Hammad-ul-Hassan Hanjra, Saadat Ali Saeed, Usman Latif, Ch. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan, Farhan Shahzad, Mian Mohsin Mehmood, Rafaqat Ali Baig Mirza, Syed Nasir Ali Gillani, Shahbaz Siddique, Mian Muhammad Zubair Waheed, Barrister Hamza Shahram Sarwar, Umair Ahmad, Imran Anjum Alvi, Rizwan Qureshi, Abdul Razaq Chadhar, Shahid Ibrar, Ch. Muhammad Naseer, Dr. Mazhar Ilahi, Omer Iqbal Khawaja, Muhammad Siddique Butt, Mehar Alam Sher, Muhammad Amin Goraya, Barrister Ahmad Pervaiz, Muhammad Fahad Hafeez, Muhammad Waseem Akram, Muhammad Rashid, Muhammad Naeem Munawar, Naeem Khan, Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Yasir Hameed, Azhar Mukhtar, Saood Nasrullah Cheema, Zahid Attique Chaudhry, Sardar Qasim Hassan Khan, Syed Nafees-ul-Hassan, Ch. Sultan Mehmood, Shahbaz Jahanger, Miss Nasreen Aftab, Sheraz Jahangir Mannoo, Barrister Rana Khizar Hayat, Muhammad Ameen Gorayya, Barrister Zargham Lukhesar, Faisal lqbal Khawaja, Muhammad Abubakar, Malik Nadir Ali Sherazi, Asad Jawaid Jutt, Husnain Muqsood, Mian Ijaz Hunain, Ashiq Ali Rana, Muqsit Saleem, Khalil-ur-Rehman, Muhammad Ahmad Qayyurn, Shamail Arif, Hashim Maqsood, Mirza Mubashir Baig, Abdul Waheed Habib, Ch. Samran Mushtaq Ch., Usman Khalil, Ali Ijaz Shah, Shahid Pervez Jawaid, Syed Safdar Hassan Gillani, M. Younas Khalid, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Imran Rasheed, Oneeb Akhtar Ansari, Abdul Waheed, Syed Saqlain Hussain, Ch. Hasham Hayat Wathra, Ghulam Mustafa Umair, Nadeem Shehzad Hashimi, Syed Muhammad Islam Khan, Zulfiqar Ahmad, Azeem Ullah Virk, Rana M. Usman Habib, Ahsan Naqaz Sial, Noureen, Mirza Ilyas Baig, Rana M. Afzal, Nauman Mushtaq Awan, Rana Javed, Muhammad Imran Rashid, A.R.A. Minhas, M. Yasin Khan, Sh. Muhammad Akram, Sheikh Aqeel Ahmad, S.M. Raheel, Farid Adil Ch., Ch. Qamar-uz-Zaman, Muhammad Waqar Akram, Muhammad Khalid, Arif Munir, Rana Asim Zubair, Mustafa Katmal, Muhammad Bilal Pervaiz, Mian Mahmood Rashid, Roohi Saleh, Mian Zulfiqar Ali, Bashir Malik, Rai Inam Qadir, Zeba Munir, Israr Saeed, Asad Abbas Raza, Usman Zia, Ibraheem Hassan, Salman Ahmad, Ch. Muhammad Khaliq, Saith Iftikhar Tayyab, Nasir Khan, M. Rehan Sarwar, Muhammad Mohsin Virk, Sohail Murshid Malik, Syed Ahmad Doud and Malik Muhammad Latif Khokhar for the Appellants.\nNasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General and Azmat H. Khan Lodhi, Assistant Attorney General along with Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan, Commissioner Inland Revenue, Ms. Zarish Fatima, Aftab Raheem and Sheikh Nadeem Anwaar, Assistant Attorney Generals, Barrister Ameer Abbas Ali Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Ch. Shakeel Ahmad, Saba Saeed Sheikh, Shahid Sarwar Chahil, Muhammad Asif Butt, Liaquat Ali Chaudhry, Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Faraz Ansar, Abul Hassan Ch., Aamer Khan, Sahar Iqbal, Ch. Muhammad Yasin Zahid, Ibrar Ahmad, Shahid Usman, Foziya Bukhsh, Rana Sardar Ali, Mian Yusuf Umar, Syed Tassadaq Murtaza Naqvi, Umair Anwar, Abdul Waheed Khan Baloch, Syed Zain-ul-Aabidin Bukhari, Zafar Iqbal Bhatti, M. Saad Bin Ghazi, Malik Abdullah Raza and Falak Sher Khan, Imran Rasool, Samra Malik, Masroor Ahmad Khan, Khawaja Muhammad Nadeem, Muhammad Anwar, Javed Akhtar, Sardar Kalim Ilyas, M. Zafar Iqbal, Mohsin Ali, Barrister Osama Zafar, Riaz Begum, Muhammad Ahmad Pansota, Scherzade Shahyar, Fozia Bukhsh, Ijaz Mahmood Chaudhry, Mian Yousaf Umar, Kausar Parveen, Waqar A. Sheikh, Rana Muhammad Mehtab, Adeel Spahid Krim, M. Yasir Khan, Sardar M.S Tahir, Muhammad Asif, Kashif Ali Zain, Barrister Muhammad Saram Israr, Muhammad Yahya Johar, Syed Zain ul Abidien Bokhari, Malik Rizwan Khalid Awan, Akhtar Ali Monga, Ali Asad Gondal, Sardar Ali Masood Raza Qazilbash and Iyyaz Mahmood Sabir, Advocates Legal Advisors for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SOOFI MUHAMMAD FARRUKH AMIN AND OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY OF FINANCE REVENUE DIVISION, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, STATISTICS AND REVENUE, PAKISTAN SECRETARIAT, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24092", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 276 = 2024 SLD 276 = 2024 PTCL 341 = 2024 LHC 463 = (2024) 129 TAX 364 = 2024 PTD 889", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTQ", - "Key Words:": "1. Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan (Equality before Law):\n•\nArticle 25 ensures equality before the law and prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. However, this provision allows for distinctions to be made between taxpayers if such distinctions are reasonable and based on appropriate legislative authority. The legislature has the power to create different categories of taxpayers and impose taxes accordingly, as long as it does not violate constitutional principles.\n________________________________________\n2. Section 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001:\n•\nSection 7E, which falls under Entry 47 of the Federal Legislative List, relates to the taxation of income other than agricultural income. This provision is seen as not unconstitutional or discriminatory. The distinction made between different taxpayers under this provision is in accordance with the legislative powers vested in the federal government.\n________________________________________\n3. Legislative Competence and Scope of Taxation:\n•\nThe power to impose taxes is considered broad and unrestricted, falling within the competence of the legislature. There are no explicit limitations on the subject matter or scope of taxation as long as the laws do not violate the Constitution.\n•\nThe definition of income in tax law is expansive and should be interpreted broadly, as suggested by the use of the word includes in the Income Tax Ordinance. This inclusive definition means that the term income encompasses a variety of financial gains, not just traditional income, and could include deemed or notional income.\n________________________________________\n4. Interpretation of the Federal Legislative List:\n•\nThe Constitutions Fourth Schedule outlines the Federal Legislative List, including Entry 47 which allows the federal government to tax income (excluding agricultural income). It is emphasized that these entries are to be interpreted liberally, and taxes can emanate from one entry or span across multiple entries. This wide interpretation allows for flexibility in the imposition of taxes.\n________________________________________\n5. Inclusivity in Tax Definitions:\n•\nThe concept of inclusive definitions is crucial here. The term income is not restricted to a narrow meaning but is designed to cover a broader spectrum. The definition in Section 2(29) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, has been expanded over time, particularly with the 2003 Finance Act, which allowed for amounts treated as income under any provision of the Ordinance to be considered taxable income.\n________________________________________\n6. The Nature of Taxation and Judicial Review:\n•\nTaxation, as a governmental power, is essentially unlimited in scope. The judiciary can only intervene if the legislature exceeds its constitutional limits. However, if a tax law falls within the framework of the Constitution, it is generally beyond judicial challenge.\n•\nA tax law may be challenged only if it violates explicit constitutional provisions or exceeds the legislative authority granted by the Constitution.\n________________________________________\n7. Role of Parliamentary Intent:\n•\nCourts may sometimes use parliamentary debates to understand the intention behind ambiguous or unclear legislative provisions. This principle, derived from the case Pepper v. Hart (1992), allows courts to reference parliamentary records to help interpret the intent of the legislation.\n________________________________________\n8. Rule of Reading Down:\n•\nThe text suggests that Pakistan, having a written constitution, does not typically apply the reading down doctrine. This rule is common in countries like the UK, where the courts adjust legislation to conform to constitutional principles. In Pakistan, if a law is deemed unconstitutional, it is struck down rather than modified by the courts.\n________________________________________\n9. Historical Context of Property Taxation:\n•\nHistorically, property taxation was based on the value of land rather than income derived from it. This section reflects the evolution of taxation systems over time, transitioning from value-based taxation to income-based taxation.\n________________________________________\nIn conclusion, this analysis underscores the flexibility of the legislature in creating categories of taxpayers and imposing taxes, as long as these actions align with the constitutional framework. It highlights the broad interpretation of terms like income and emphasizes the importance of legislative competence in matters of taxation. Additionally, it stresses the limited role of the judiciary in interfering with tax laws unless they breach constitutional provisions.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29),7E,7E(2)(d)(i),7E(2)(d)(ii),7E(2)(d)(iii),7E(2)(d)(iv),7E(2)(f),10,11,37,113Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25,70,77,142,189,Fourth ScheduleIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=80C,80D", - "Case #": "ICA No. 35908 of 2023, decided on 25th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE SHAHID KARIM AND MR. JUSTICE RASAAL HASAN SYED AND", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANTS BY: M/s. Syed Moazzam Ali Shah, Abdul Muqtadar Khan, Ms. Asma Hamid, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Malik Abdullah Raza, Barrister Ahmed Pervaiz, Syed Ahmed Hasnain Rizvi, Rana Muhammad Akram, Hassan Ali, Ms. Sana Azhar, Mustafa Khalid, Ms. Samar Masood Soofi, Bakhtawar Bilal Soofi, Shamsher Ali, Shahjahan Khan, Murad Ali Khan Marwat, Raja Abdul Qadeer, Ms. Hina Bandealy, Ms. Foziya Bukhsh, Barrister Ali Umrao, Barrister Scheherzade Shaharyar, Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Syed Zeeshan Haider Zaidi, Muhammad Bilal Munir, Barrister Ahtasham Mukhtar, Falak Sher Khan, Muqtedir Akhtar Shabir, Mirza Shahryar Beg, Muhammad Shabbir Hussain, Muhammad Ali Talib, Nadeem Shahzad Hashmi, Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Barrister Raja Abdul Qadeer Janjua and Muhammad Shafique Baloch, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: M/s Barrister Shaharyar Kasuri, Shahbaz Butt, Syed Muhammad Ijaz, Ali Raza, Sufiyan Zaman, Tanveer Ahmad, Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Muhammad Imran Rashid, Sh. Muhammad Akram, Mian Mahmood Rashid, Syed Naveed A. Andrabi, Khurram Saleem, Abbas Ali Awan, Waqas Qadeer Sheikh, Hasham Maqsood, Ashraf Samar, Sharif Khokhar, Adnan Tariq, Waheed Ahmad, Hafiz M. Adeel Azam, Ashiq Ali Rana, Syed Majid Ali Bukhari, Muhammad Nasir Khan, M. Irfan Aslam Rana, Mian Zahid, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Jamshid Alam, Fasih-ur- Rehman, Abu-ul-Hassan Rana, Muhammad Arshad, Barrister Asad Rahim Khan, Malik Muhammad Abbas Farooq, Syed M. Baqir Ali, Syed Zeeshan Haider Zaidi, Syed Shaukat Ali Shah, Muhammad Ijaz Ali Bhatti, Riaz Ahmad Kharal, M. Tahir Munir, Muhammad Tariq Bashir, Muhammad Kashif Tahir, M. Saqib Jillani, Imran Ashraf Awan, Madiha Farooq Sheikh, Sajid Hussain Qureshi, Waqas Ahmad Aziz, Qamar-ul-Zaman, Arslan Saleem Ch., Qamar-ul-Haq Bhatti, Zain-ul-Hassan Shabbir, Ibrahim Haroon, Muhammad Mahtab Chugtai, Malik Muhammad Sharif Khokhar, Muhammad Mustafa Khalid, Muhammad Shaban, Rana Muhammad Aslam, M. Irfan Aslam Rana, Muhammad Hamza Habib, Shoaib Ilyas, Arfan Ahmad, Ch. Imran Arshad Naro, Muhammad Mustafa Khalid, M. Abubakar Shahzad, Barrister Asad Rahim Khan, Ms. Nimra Arshad, Faiz-e- Azhar, Mohammad Iftikhar Ali, Ms. Faiqa Dawood Barrech, Barrister Ameer Abbas, Hassan Aman, Syed Nasir Ali Gillani, Abuzar Hussain, Muhammad Asif Rana, Rabeel Safdar Tatla, Barrister M. Abubakar, Malik Nadir Ali Sherazi, Muhammad Usman, Zahid Ateeq Ch., Rashid Khan, Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Saqib Qadeer, Yasir Hameed, Muhammad Abrar, Yasir Akram Qureshi, Azeem Suleman, Syed Nasir Ali Shah, Syed Zeeshan Hassan Gillani, Azhar Mukhtar, Qamar-uz-Zaman, Muhammad Khalid, Muhammad Bilal, Arif Munir, Saud Qamar, Zaiba Munir, Ali Raza Cheema, Muhammad Murtaza, Muhammad Naveed Shabbir Goraya, Omer Iqbal Khawaja, Hassan Kamran Bashir, Sikandar Ali, Muhammad Muqadam Sukhera, Muhammad Mansha Sukhera, Zeeshan Asif, Muhammad Ali Awan, Saghir Ahmed, Azeem Ullah Virk, Omer Wahab, Rana Usman Habib, M. Ahsan Nawaz, Muhammad Waqar Akram, Mian Muhammad Zahid, Rana Muhammad Afzal, Hassan Aujla, Farhan Shahzad, Syed Ali Talab, Muhammad Afzal Dharala, Mian Muhammad Zahid, Muhammad Hamza Rauf, Muhammad Siddique Butt, Muhammad Imran Khan, Fahim Khadam, Waseem Ahmad Malik, Iftikhar Nawaz Gujjar, Hafiz Tanveer Nasir, Asif Amin Goraya, Muhammad Zeeshan Sulehria, Rana Munir Hussain, Shahbaz Siddique, Mian Haseeb Tahir, Abdul Majid Azad, Sheikh Aqeel Ahmed, Muhammad Shahid Baig, Muhammad Bilal Pervaiz, Syed Zeeshan Ali, S.M. Raheel, Murtaza Naeem, Uzair Sajid, M. Umer Rafiq, Rana M. Afzal Razzaq Khan, M. Adeel Ch., Abdul Latif, Ghulam Abbas Haral, Syed Ali Tarab, Zohaib Ali Sidhu, Ch. Ali Aqib, Malik M. Zarif and Malik Bashir Khalid, Advocates.\nFEDERATION BY: Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General.\nMr. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General.\nMs. Deeba Tasnim Anwar, Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. M. Zain Ali Qazi, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nMUHAMMAD OSMAN GUL" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24093", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5US8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 277 = 2024 SLD 277 = 2024 PTCL 414 = (2024) 129 TAX 475 = 2024 PTD 865", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5US8", - "Key Words:": "Case related to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001), particularly addressing the provisions of Sections 156A and 170, regarding the refund claim for tax deducted on income derived from petrol pumps situated in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). Below is the analysis of the text with clarity on key points:\n________________________________________\nRefund Claim Rejection:\n•\nTax Deduction under Section 156A:\nSection 156A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 mandates that any person selling petroleum products to a petrol pump operator must deduct tax from the amount of commission or discount paid to the operator. This tax is treated as a final tax on income derived from the sale of petroleum products.\n•\nTax Deduction and Territorial Jurisdiction:\nIn this case, the petrol pumps were situated in FATA, which, at the time of the dispute, was not covered under the Income Tax Ordinance of 2001 due to the non-extension of the ordinance to the territorial limits of FATA. As a result, the provisions of the Ordinance were not directly applicable to the income derived from businesses operating in FATA.\n________________________________________\nKey Points of the Case:\n•\nIncome Derived Outside FATA:\nThe tax deducted under Section 156A was related to transactions that occurred outside FATA. Specifically, the commission paid to the petrol pump operators came from the sale of petroleum products, with the sale and payment taking place outside FATA. The tax was deducted by the seller companies operating in areas where the Income Tax Ordinance was enforced.\n•\nFinal Tax Regime:\nThe tax deducted under Section 156A is part of the final tax regime, which means that once the tax is deducted, it is considered the final tax on the income from the sale. Since the income arose from outside FATA, the tax obligations were rightly applicable under the laws governing areas within Pakistan but outside FATA.\n________________________________________\nImmunity Claim Rejected:\n•\nFATA Business Immunity:\nThe respondents, who operated petrol pumps in FATA, attempted to claim immunity from taxation due to the location of their business premises. However, the court found that immigration from tax payment could not be claimed solely based on the fact that the premises were in FATA.\n•\nBurden of Proof on the Taxpayer:\nIt was emphasized that the burden of proof lay with the taxpayers (respondents) to demonstrate that their income was not derived from areas where the Income Tax Ordinance was applicable. In this case, they failed to establish that their taxable income was not derived from areas where tax provisions applied.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nRefund Claim Rejection:\nThe claim for a refund of tax deducted under Section 156A was rightly rejected because the tax deduction took place outside the FATA region, and the respondents could not prove that their income was not subject to the enforcement of tax laws outside FATA.\n•\nJurisdiction and Tax Applicability:\nThe key principle here is that income earned outside FATA in areas where the Income Tax Ordinance is enforced is subject to tax, irrespective of the businesss physical location. The FATA region itself does not grant immunity from taxation, and the business operations in FATA do not exempt the taxpayer from paying taxes in other areas where the tax laws apply.\n________________________________________\nThis case highlights the importance of territorial jurisdiction and the burden of proof on taxpayers to show that their income is not subject to tax laws, especially in the context of final tax regimes and areas like FATA that were not under the Ordinances scope at the time.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129,133,156A,156A(2),170Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=247(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No.1314 to 1337 of 2014 & Civil Appeals No. 1611 to 1624 of 2013 decided on 19th December, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.05.2014 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in TRs No. DP to 23-P of 2013 and judgment dated 03.07.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar ul Qaza) Swat passed in T.Rs. No. 1-M to 13-M of 2011).", - "Judge Name:": " MR. ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD, MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND MR. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, ASC Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR (in all cases)\nRespondents by: Mr. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, ASC (in CAs.1318, 1616-1624 of 2013)\nMr. Junaid Akhtar, ASC (in CA.1611 of 2013)", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHIEF COMMISSIONER/COMMISSIONER IR ZONE-II/ ZONE-III, RTO, PESHAWAR.\nVS\nM/S AKBAR KHAN FILLING STATION AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24094", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5USs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 278 = 2024 SLD 278 = (2024) 130 TAX 139", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5USs", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary: Mis-declaration and Valuation of Goods\nThis case concerns an importation of goods by the respondent, which were declared as Coconut Acid Oil under HS Code 3823.1990 but, upon examination by the Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation, were found to be RBD Coconut Oil classified under HS Code 1513.1900. This mis-declaration led to proceedings for the recovery of duties and taxes, the confiscation of goods, and the imposition of fines and penalties. The issue was subsequently appealed before the Customs Appellate Tribunal and ultimately brought to the High Court for review.\n________________________________________\nKey Facts:\n•\nMis-declaration: The respondent imported four containers, declaring the goods as Coconut Acid Oil and claiming assessment under HS Code 3823.1990. After the goods were intercepted, it was discovered that they actually consisted of RBD Coconut Oil under HS Code 1513.1900.\n•\nPenalties Imposed: Following this mis-declaration, the Customs Authorities initiated recovery proceedings. The respondent was ordered to pay Rs. 2,535,580 as duties and taxes. Additionally, the goods were confiscated, and a fine of Rs. 1,161,808 was imposed along with a penalty of Rs. 200,000.\n•\nAppeal: The Collector Appeals dismissed the appeal, but the Customs Appellate Tribunal allowed the respondent’s appeal, resulting in a dispute over the Tribunals decision.\n________________________________________\nQuestions of Law Raised:\nThe applicant (Customs Department) raised the following questions of law in reference to the High Court:\n1.\nMis-declaration and Assessment at Lowest Value:\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal erred in law by assessing the mis-declared goods at the lowest value of USD 1022/PMT, despite the established case of mis-declaration.\n2.\nWaiver of Penalty:\nWhether the Tribunal erred in waiving the penalty in a case of mis-declaration, given the relevant provisions under SRO 499(I)/2009 and Section 156(1)(14) of the Customs Act, 1969.\n3.\nValuation of Goods:\nWhether the Tribunal erred in ordering the assessment of goods at USD 1022/PMT despite available higher customs value data averaging around USD 1766/PMT, and in light of Section 25(13)(a) of the Customs Act and Rule 110 of the Customs Rules, 2001.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nApplicants Argument (Customs Department):\nThe Customs Department argued that the Appellate Tribunal had made an error in its decision by disregarding the fact that this was a case of mis-declaration under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969. The Tribunal, they claimed, focused solely on the valuation of goods and failed to properly address the issue of mis-declaration. They also contended that the Tribunal erred in waiving the penalty, as the facts clearly involved an attempt to evade customs duties.\n•\nRespondents Argument:\nThe respondent argued that the issue was not mis-declaration but a wrong shipment by the shipper. They contended that the goods should be assessed under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969, which allows for a value-based assessment. They also asserted that the Tribunal had taken into account the correct data from past imports when determining the appropriate customs value.\n________________________________________\nCourts Analysis:\n•\nAssessment under Section 25:\nThe Court found that for an assessment under Section 25, the importer must provide sufficient evidence to refute allegations of mis-declaration. Since the respondent did not provide satisfactory evidence to explain the mis-declaration, the Court concluded that the assessment should not have been made based solely on the respondents declared value.\n•\nMis-declaration:\nThe Court emphasized that the mis-declaration remained the central issue in this case, and the Tribunal had failed to address this properly. Section 32 of the Customs Act imposes penalties for mis-declaration, and the Tribunal’s ruling, which focused solely on the valuation, was deemed insufficient and irrelevant.\n•\nPenalty and Fine:\nThe Court held that in cases of mis-declaration and attempts at evasion, the penalty and fine provisions should apply as per the relevant rules, including SRO 499(I)/2009 and Section 156(1)(14) of the Customs Act, 1969. The Tribunal had wrongly waived these penalties, which was not in accordance with the law.\n•\nFinal Decision:\nThe High Court set aside the Tribunal’s decision and restored the orders of the lower forums, which had correctly imposed the duties, taxes, fines, and penalties. The Court answered the second and third questions in favor of the Customs Department, finding that the Tribunal had erred in law by waiving the penalty and incorrectly assessing the goods at the low value of USD 1022/PMT.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the Customs Department, restoring the orders of the Collector Appeals and dismissing the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal’s failure to properly address the mis-declaration and its incorrect handling of the valuation and penalties was considered a legal error. The case highlights the importance of adhering to the correct procedures for mis-declaration, penalty imposition, and the assessment of imported goods under the Customs Act, 1969.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=25,25(c),62Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 1968=2(c)Customs Act, 1969=25,25(5),25(5)(d),32,80,196,196(5)", - "Case #": "SCRA No. 243 of 2012, decided on 07.04.2021, heard on: 07.04.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAJFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Asad Raza Khan, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVs\nM/S. PARAMOUNT ENTERPRISES" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24095", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 279 = 2024 SLD 279 = 2024 PTCL 426 = (2024) 129 TAX 459", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTk", - "Key Words:": "The explanation added to Section 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 through the Finance Act, 2021 has a significant impact on the interpretation and procedural framework surrounding the issuance of notices and proceedings under Sections 111 and 122 of the Ordinance.\nKey Points:\n1.\nEffect of the Explanation:\no\nThe explanation inserted into Section 111 clarifies that a separate notice under Section 111 is not required for proceedings under Section 122(9) if the grounds for addition under Section 111 are already included in the notice issued under Section 122(9).\no\nWhile the explanation seems to be declaratory and aimed at removing doubt, it substantially impacts the taxpayers substantive rights. Specifically, it alters the taxpayers entitlement to a separate notice and proceedings under Section 111.\no\nThis is considered an abridgment of the taxpayers rights and thus should apply prospectively, not retroactively. It would not affect cases that relate to tax years before the explanation was introduced.\n2.\nRetrospective vs. Prospective Application:\no\nThe court ruled that a provision that negatively affects vested rights (like the right to a separate notice and proceedings) cannot operate retrospectively unless clearly stated by the legislature.\no\nTax statutes are generally presumed to operate prospectively, unless the legislature explicitly states otherwise. Hence, the explanation to Section 111 applies only to tax years after its introduction.\n3.\nProcedure Under Section 111 and 122:\no\nUnder the original framework (before the explanation), the process required issuing a separate notice under Section 111 to confront the taxpayer with the information collected by the tax authorities. After receiving the taxpayers explanation, the Commissioner would form an opinion that could then lead to an amended assessment under Section 122.\no\nUnder the explanation, a single notice under Section 122(9) can include both the grounds for Section 111 and Section 122, but the proceedings under Section 111 must still be concluded first before action can be taken under Section 122.\n4.\nConsequence of the Explanation:\no\nIf the proceedings under Section 111 are not finalized (i.e., if the Commissioner has not formed an opinion), the proceedings under Section 122(9) cannot be initiated. Thus, while the explanation removes the need for a separate notice under Section 111, it does not change the fundamental sequence of the proceedings. The process under Section 111 must be completed first, and only after that can the proceedings under Section 122 be formally continued.\n5.\nInterpretation of Statutory Explanations:\no\nThe purpose of an explanation in a statute is generally to clarify or remove doubts, not to alter substantive rights unless explicitly intended.\no\nAs established by case law, an explanation is typically not a substantive provision but is meant to clarify ambiguities or ensure proper application of the main provision.\n6.\nCourts Ruling on the Questions of Law:\no\nThe court ruled that the Appellate Tribunal erred in deleting additions made under Section 111 without considering the necessity of a separate notice.\no\nThe scheme of the law requires that Section 111 proceedings must be initiated and finalized before Section 122(9) proceedings can commence. This principle holds for cases prior to the introduction of the explanation in 2021.\nConclusion:\nThe court concluded that the explanation inserted into Section 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 in 2021, although framed as clarificatory, substantively affects taxpayers rights and thus should be applied prospectively. It does not eliminate the requirement for completing proceedings under Section 111 before proceeding with assessments under Section 122. Consequently, taxpayers are still entitled to a separate notice and opportunity to explain the information under Section 111 in cases before the introduction of the explanation, and the explanation’s effect is limited to cases thereafter.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,111(1),111(1)(a),111(1)(b),111(1)(c),111(1)(d),120,121,122,122(1),122(4),122(5),122(5)(i),122(5)(ii),122(5)(iii),122(8),122(9)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 87 to 106 of 2024 in Civil Petitions Nos. 2447-L, 2448-L, 2601-L to 2606-L, 2765-L, 2787-L, 2834-L, 2901-L, 2915-L, 2928-L, 2944-L to 2946-L, 2992-L of 2022 And Civil Petitions No. 646-L & 647-L of 2023 decided on 1st February, 2024.\n(Against the judgment/'order(s) of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 09.06.2022, passed in ITR No. 59534 of 2021, etc. and dated 12.01.2023 passed in ITR No. 79913 of 2022 and ITR No. 1420 of 2023).", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MR. JUSTICE AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND MR. JUSTICE JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the appellant(s): Mr. Ahmad Pervaiz, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Yahya, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Shahzad Cheema, ASC. Muhammad Qasim, Addl. Commissioner. Mr. M. Saeed Tahir, ASC (through V.L. from Lahore) \nFor the Mr. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, ASC. (Through V.L. Lahore Registry) Mr. Shahryar Kasuri, ASC. Assisted by: Muhammad Hassan Ali and Umer A. Ranjha, Law Clerks, Supreme Court of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE \nVS\nM/S. MILLAT TRACTORS LIMITED, LAHORE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24096", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 280 = 2024 SLD 280 = 2024 CLD 153", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UTg", - "Key Words:": "The case provided touches on the interpretation and application of several key principles under the Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), the Arbitration Act (X of 1940), and the Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) in relation to bank guarantees, performance bonds, and interim injunctions. Below is a summary of the key points from the cases and jurisprudence cited:\nAutonomy Principle in Bank Guarantees (Section 13 and 5, Negotiable Instruments Act):\nThe autonomy principle ensures that a bank guarantee or letter of credit is independent of any dispute between the contracting parties. The payment under such instruments must be made if an unconditional undertaking has been provided, regardless of any underlying contractual issues. The key concept here is pay first, sue later .\nFraud Exception in Bank Guarantees:\nA banks obligation to honor a guarantee is generally independent of any dispute between the parties unless fraud is alleged. This exception requires the bank to have notice of the fraud before any injunction can be granted to stop payment under the guarantee.\nGrant of Interim Injunctions in Arbitration Matters (Arbitration Act, Civil Procedure Code):\nCourts retain the power to issue interim injunctions during arbitration proceedings to protect rights or prevent irreparable harm. The applicant must demonstrate a prima facie case, irreparable loss, and that the balance of convenience favors granting the injunction.\nUnconscionability in Bank Guarantees:\nWhile unconscionability can be grounds for an injunction in certain jurisdictions, such as Singapore, it has been met with criticism. Courts must be cautious in intervening to prevent calls on performance bonds or guarantees unless there is strong evidence of unconscionable conduct.\nCourt’s Role in Restraining Calls on Bank Guarantees:\nCourts generally do not interfere with the call on unconditional bank guarantees unless there is clear evidence of fraud or unconscionable conduct. Allegations of breaches of contract are insufficient to warrant an injunction. It must also be proven that damages would not be an adequate remedy.\nPreconditions for Interim Injunctions:\nIn commercial disputes, courts are reluctant to grant interim injunctions unless the applicant can show that fraud exists, irreparable harm will occur, and the balance of convenience supports the injunction. Mere claims of breach of contract are typically insufficient.\nThe EFU General Insurance Limited v. Zhongxing Telecom Pakistan case illustrates the importance of these principles in determining whether interim relief should be granted to restrain the encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee, based on the applicants failure to meet the high thresholds required to override the autonomy principle.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=13,5", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 4534 of 2023, decision dated: 26th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Usman Karim ud Din for Petitioner.\nUmar Sharif for Respondent along with Ahmad Sohail Khakwani, Deputy Chief Law Officer, SNGPL.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S PARAGON TECHNOLOGIES-PETITIONER\nVS\nSUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LIMITED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24097", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 281 = 2024 SLD 281 = 2024 CLD 193", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (1881) - Section 4 and Qanun-e-Shahadat (1984)\n1.\nPromissory Note: According to Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a promissory note requires four essential conditions to be considered valid:\no\nAn unconditional promise to pay.\no\nA certain sum of money.\no\nPayment should be to a specific person or the bearer.\no\nThe maker must sign the note.\n2.\nAttestation of Promissory Notes: The Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, Article 17(2)(a), requires attestation of documents, but promissory notes are exempt from this requirement. Even if a promissory note is attested, the attestation doesnt change its nature; it remains a promissory note, not a bond. Non-attendance of a second witness does not affect its admissibility as evidence if the essential ingredients under the Negotiable Instruments Act are met.\n3.\nLegal Precedents:\no\nSheikh Muhammad Shakeel v. Sheikh Hafiz Muhammad Aslam (2014 SCMR 1562)\no\nMuhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Boota (PLJ 2016 SC 169)\n(b) Stamp Act (1899) - Section 36\n1.\nAdmissibility of Promissory Note: Once a document, including a promissory note, is admitted as evidence, its admissibility cannot be questioned later on grounds of improper stamping. Section 36 of the Stamp Act confirms that a document, once admitted, remains valid for the purposes of the case, and the Court cannot reverse this decision.\n2.\nJudicial Oversight: Courts must decide on the admissibility of documents at the time they are tendered, not after the trial progresses. If a promissory note is admitted into evidence and used in the trial, its admissibility remains uncontestable unless challenged before admission.\n3.\nLegal Precedents:\no\nJaver Chand and others v. Pukhraj Surana AIR 1961 SC 1655\no\nRehmat Ali v. Wahid Bux NLR 1979 Civil (SC) 809\n(c) Burden of Proof in Summary Suits (Civil Procedure Code - Order XXXVII)\n1.\nBurden Shifting: In a summary suit based on a promissory note, if the defendant denies the validity of the note, claiming that it was forged, the burden of proof initially lies with the defendant to provide evidence. Once the defendant provides plausible evidence, the onus shifts to the plaintiff to prove the authenticity and legality of the promissory note.\n2.\nCircumstantial Evidence: The plaintiffs failure to provide consistent or plausible evidence leads to an inference that the promissory note might be forged. In this case, the peculiarities in the handling and execution of the note, such as discrepancies in the ink used and unusual circumstances surrounding the money transfer, weakened the plaintiff’s claim.\n3.\nLegal Precedents:\no\nJohnson v. The Duke of Marlborough (2 Stark. Rep 313)\no\nHenman v. Dickinson (5 Bing. 183)\n(d) Circumstantial Evidence\n1.\nScope and Reliability: Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient for the Court to infer the ultimate facts of the case, provided it leads to reasonable conclusions. It must not be speculative or guesswork.\n2.\nLegal Precedents:\no\nGalloway v. United States 319 US 372\no\nPopken v. Formers Mut. Homes Ins. Co. 180 Neb. 250\nConclusion:\nIn cases involving promissory notes, the Negotiable Instruments Act and Stamp Act ensure that the document’s validity is upheld once admitted into evidence, even if there are concerns about attestation or stamping. The burden of proof in a summary suit lies with the plaintiff once the defendant raises a plausible challenge, with circumstantial evidence playing a crucial role in such determinations. Courts must be cautious to assess the evidence thoroughly at the time of admission and not allow challenges later without proper judicial oversight.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=4Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=17(2)(a)Stamp Act, of 1899=2(5)(b)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.317-L of 2011, decision dated: 6th November, 2023, heard on: 6th November, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 31.03.2008 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in R.F.A. No. 10 of 1997).", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE, SHAHID WAHEED, JUSTICE AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Tabinda Islam, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nMian Shah Abbas, Advocate Supreme Court via video link from Lahore for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEHR NOOR MUHAMMAD-APPELLANT\nVS\nNAZIR AHMED-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24098", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 282 = 2024 SLD 282 = 2024 CLD 202", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5UXk", - "Key Words:": "Summary of Legal Case\n________________________________________\nRelevant Law:\n•\nPublic Procurement Rules, 2004, Rule 19\n•\nCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2\n•\nSpecific Relief Act (I of 1877), Sections 42 & 54\nKey Points:\n•\nThe plaintiff/bidder failed to deposit the required bid amount in favor of the defendant/Port Qasim Authority for auctioned crafts.\n•\nThe plaintiff sought an interim injunction to prevent the defendant from taking action under Rule 19 of the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, and from forfeiting the security bond.\n•\nThe term as is and where is basis was applied, meaning that the tug/craft was to be weighed as is, with no segregation of steel or other components beforehand.\n•\nThe bidding document was not complex and did not require interpretation. The terms were clear, and the plaintiff was unable to establish a prima facie case in its favor.\n•\nThe balance of inconvenience was against the plaintiff, as granting the injunction would cause irreparable loss to the defendant, halting the entire auction process for the vessels.\nDecision:\n•\nThe application for interim injunction was dismissed due to failure to meet the legal requirements for such relief.\n________________________________________\nCase Reference:\n•\nMuhammad Saeed v. State Life Insurance Corporation 2023 PLC (C.S.) 849\n•\nUniversal Insurance Company v. Karim Gul 2021 CLD 1189", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Public Procurement Rules, 2004=19Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54", - "Case #": "Suit No. 174 and C.M.A. 1692 of 2022, decision dated: 4th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Abid Zuberi for Plaintiff.\nAli T. Ebrahim for Defendants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S BISMILLAH METAL IMPEX (PVT.) LTD. THROUGH AUTHORIZED OFFICER-PLAINTIFF\nVS\nPORT QASIM AUTHORITY THROUGH CHAIRMAN AND 3 OTHERS-DEFENDANTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24099", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 283 = 2024 SLD 283 = 2024 CLD 207", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTc", - "Key Words:": "Summary of Legal Case\n________________________________________\nRelevant Law:\n•\nNegotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), Section 118\n•\nQanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Article 60\n•\nCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Order XXXVII, Rules 1 & 2\nKey Points:\n•\nPlaintiffs Claim: The appellant/plaintiff claimed to have arranged a loan of ten million rupees for the respondents/defendants, for which a guarantee agreement and promissory notes were executed.\n•\nDefendants Denial: The respondents/defendants denied the execution of both the agreement and the promissory notes, requesting a forensic examination of the documents.\n•\nForensic Analysis: The Forensic Science Lab (FSL) concluded that the signatures of the respondents did not match the specimen signatures, raising doubts about the authenticity of the documents.\n•\nPresumption under S. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881: The presumption that negotiable instruments are executed for consideration was rebutted by the defendants denial and the FSL findings. The burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove the execution and validity of the promissory notes.\n•\nWeaknesses in Plaintiffs Case:\no\nThe promissory notes indicated a payment in cash at the court premises, which raised suspicions about the transactions authenticity.\no\nThe agreement was not notarized, casting doubt on its validity.\no\nThe Oath Commissioner who attested the documents was not produced.\no\nThe appellant failed to prove the actual payment to the defendants or their capacity to make the payment.\nDecision:\n•\nThe Trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs suit, finding that the appellant failed to prove the execution of the promissory notes or the loan transaction.\n•\nThe appeal was dismissed as there was no error in the reasoning or interpretation of the law by the Trial Court.\n________________________________________\nCase Reference:\n•\nGhulam Murtaza v. Muhammad Rafi 2020 CLD 265", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=118Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=60Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 26 of 2021, decision dated: 24th March, 2023.\nheard on: 22nd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Kamran Khan Mulakhail, JUSTICE and Muhammad Aamir Nawaz Rana, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ajmal Khan Kasi for Appellant.\nAbdul Aziz Achakzai for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL GHAFFAR-Appellant\nVS\nMUHAMMAD AYUB and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24100", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 284 = 2024 SLD 284 = 2024 CLD 212", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTY", - "Key Words:": "Key Points:\n•\nPetitioners Grievance: The petitioner supplied computers to the respondent authorities after competing in an open bidding process. However, despite fulfilling the terms of the contract, the authorities withheld final payments, coercing the petitioners to give rebates of 15% to 20% on the agreed contract prices.\n•\nIllegal Demand for Rebates: The petitioner argued that there was no legal basis for the authorities to force them to provide such rebates on fully executed contracts.\n•\nLegal Justification: The High Court found no legal justification for the demand for rebates and deemed it an arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious action. This violated Rule 62 of the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014, as well as the express terms of the contract.\n•\nPrinciple of Transparency: The Court emphasized that the procurement process must be transparent, ensuring that the lowest bidder, who has successfully performed the contract, is entitled to timely payment. This is also in line with Rule 4 of the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014, which upholds transparency in procurement and safeguards the rights of contractors.\n•\nCoercion and Pressure: The delay in payments, particularly the Second, Third, and Fourth Contracts, was seen as evidence of coercion and blackmail to force the petitioners to comply with the unlawful rebate demands.\n•\nConstitutional Rights: The Court ruled that the rights of the petitioners were protected under Articles 4, 18, 24, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan and Sections 16 and 23 of the Contract Act, 1872.\nDecision:\n•\nThe High Court directed the respondents to immediately release the full contract payments to the petitioners.\n•\nThe Competent Authority was instructed to ensure transparency in public procurement processes.\n•\nThe constitutional petition was allowed, and the illegal demands for rebates were deemed invalid.\n________________________________________\nCase Reference:\n•\nMessrs Ramna Pipe and General Mills (Pvt.) Limited v. Messrs Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines (Pvt.) and others 2004 SCMR 1274", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=16,23Public Procurement Rules, 2004=4,62Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,18,24,25", - "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 28679 and 33077 of 2023, decision dated: 3rd October, 2023.\nheard on: 26th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Abid Hussain Chattha, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hussain Tahir Zaidi, Umer Abdullah, Zarak Zaman Khan and Ahmed Abdullah for Petitioners.\nSikandar Nisar Soroya, Assistant Advocate General, Muhammad Imran, Law Officer for School Education Department, Muneer Ahmad, Administration and Accounts Officer, PMIU, PESRP for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s COMPUTER TIPS through Managing Partner and others-Petitioners\nVS\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB through School Education Department and others- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24101", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 285 = 2024 SLD 285 = 2024 CLD 220", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTU", - "Key Words:": "Key Points:\n•\nAppellant’s Grievance: The appellant, National Highway Authority, challenged the Trial Courts dismissal of its objections against an arbitration award, which was made the rule of the Court.\n•\nLegal Advice: The appellant had received legal advice from experts who assessed the probability of success in challenging the award or a claim. The members of the appellant Authority were expected to document the reasons for deviating from the legal advice if it suggested accepting the award without contesting it further.\n•\nImportance of Accountability: The Court emphasized that the Authority should have provided a clear record of why it chose not to follow legal advice, particularly in cases where the award included ongoing late payment charges that continued to accumulate over time.\n•\nFinancial Consequences: The appellants failure to pay the award on time resulted in the accumulation of significant late payment charges (3% above the State Bank of Pakistans discount rate), leading to a substantial financial burden.\n•\nNegligence and Accountability: The Court criticized the appellants decision to contest the award without sufficient legal grounds, pointing out that in a private organization, the Board of Directors could have been fired for ignoring expert legal advice. The failure to act on legal counsel caused unnecessary financial harm, affecting both the contractors and the appellant’s finances.\n•\nCourts Role: The Court noted that the disputes arising from the appellants actions should not have reached the Courts, as the matter could have been resolved much earlier.\n•\nCourts Decision: The High Court upheld the Trial Courts order making the award rule of the Court and imposed costs on the appellant for its unnecessary contestation of the award.\nDecision:\n•\nAppeal Dismissed: The High Court dismissed the appeal and imposed costs on the appellant/Authority for contesting the award without valid grounds.\n________________________________________\nCase Reference:\n•\nMessrs Joint Venture KG/Rist v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 108\n•\nOil and Gas Development Company Limited v. Messrs Marathon Construction Company and another 2013 CLD 1483\n•\nMian Corporation v. Messrs Lever Brothers of Pakistan Limited PLD 2006 SC 169\n•\nLahore Development Authority v. Khalid Javed Co. 1983 SCMR 718\n•\nDefence Housing Authority, Islamabad v. Multi-National Venture Development Private Limited 2019 CLD 566", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=30,33,39", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 70 of 2022, decision dated: 3rd October, 2023.heard on: 13th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Hassan Alam for Appellant.\nBabbar Ali Khan and Jawad ur Rahim Malik for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY (NHA) through Chairman-Appellant\nVS\nMessrs SARDAR MUHAMMAD ASHRAF D. BALOCH (PRIVATE) LIMITED and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24102", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 286 = 2024 SLD 286 = 2024 CLD 230", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTQ", - "Key Words:": "Relevant Law:\n•\nInterpretation of Statutes:\no\nMandatory Provision\n\nWhenever the intent of a statute is mandatory, it is clothed with a negative command.\n\nKey References:\n\nAtta Muhammad Qureshi v. Settlement Commissioner PLD 1971 SC 61\n\nChaudhry Shujat Hussain v. The State 1995 SCMR 1249\n\nSaadat Khiyali v. City Coordination Officer PLD 2005 Lah. 190\n\nNational Institutional Facilitation Technologies (Pvt.) Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue and others PLD 2020 Isl. 378\n________________________________________\n•\nPublic Functionary Obligations:\no\nPoliticians are not expected to be experts in law, but there is a corresponding obligation placed on public functionaries to ensure that the legal requirements are properly communicated to politicians, especially when compliance with political directives could violate the law.\n________________________________________\n•\nPakistan Environmental Protection Act (1997):\no\nSections 12 & 17(6): Covers the violation of environmental regulations, especially when officials fail to obtain the necessary environmental approvals before proceeding with projects.\no\nWafaqi Mohtasibs Role: The Ombudsman has the constitutional authority under Article 9 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, to investigate maladministration by agencies like the Capital Development Authority (CDA).\n________________________________________\nKey Points:\n1.\nViolation of Environmental Law:\no\nThe Capital Development Authority (CDA) continued construction work without obtaining approval for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) under Section 12 of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997. This was a violation of environmental laws, despite receiving a show cause notice from the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (PEPA).\no\nThe failure of the CDA to comply with mandatory EIA requirements prompted the High Court to intervene, referring the issue of maladministration to the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) for investigation under Article 9 of the Wafaqi Mohtasib Order (1983).\n________________________________________\n2.\nWrit Jurisdiction of High Court:\no\nArticle 199 of the Constitution allows the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction for the protection of fundamental rights. However, the court noted that this jurisdiction is discretionary, and writs are not issued automatically.\no\nThe petitioners, members of the faculty of Quaid-e-Azam University, contested the construction of a road they argued posed an environmental hazard. However, the court found that the construction did not restrict the right to education and noted that PEPA had conducted a public hearing, and approval had been granted for the EIA.\no\nThe petitioners were informed they could challenge the EIA approval through an appeal to the Environmental Tribunal under Section 22(1) of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act. This provided an alternative remedy, and thus the High Court declined to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction.\n________________________________________\n3.\nCompounding of Offenses:\no\nSection 17(6) of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 allows compounding of environmental offenses, but this can only occur with the permission of the Environmental Tribunal or Environmental Magistrate, and upon the application of the accused.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nWafaqi Mohtasibs Investigation: The High Court referred the case of CDA’s violation of environmental laws to the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) for investigation and action.\n•\nDismissal of Constitutional Petition: The petitioners were informed of their right to challenge the EIA approval through an appeal to the Environmental Tribunal, and their constitutional petition was dismissed for lack of merit, given the availability of an alternate remedy.\nCase Reference:\n•\nProf. Zahid Baig Mirza v. The C.D.A. PLD 2022 Isl. 398\n•\nRaja Zahoor Ahmed v. C.D.A. 2022 SCMR 1411\n•\nMurree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan PLD 1971 SC 279\n•\nFederal Government Employees Housing Foundation v. Ednan Syed PLD 2022 Isl. 273\n•\nShahzada Sikandar ul Mulk v. C.D.A. PLD 2019 Isl. 365\n•\nPark View Enclave (Pvt.) Ltd. v. C.D.A. 2018 CLC 947\n•\nImrana Tiwana v. Lahore Development Authority PLD 2015 Lah. 522", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997=12,17,17(6)", - "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 3916, 4077, 4371 and 4543 of 2022, decision dated: 9th December, 2022.\nDates of hearing: 31st October, 4th November, 2nd, 6th and 9th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by:\nKashif Ali Malik, Qaiser Abbas Gondal, Umair Khan and Hisaan Khalil Noon in the instant petition.\nAziz ul Haq Nishtar (in W.P. No. 4077 of 2022).\nBarrister Atif Rahim Barki and Abdul Manan (in W.P. No.4371 of 2022).\nMuhammad Munir Paracha and Noman Munir Paracha for Q.A.U. (in W.P. No. 4543 of 2022).\nRespondents by:\nMunawar Iqbal Duggal, Additional Attorney-General, Syed Ahsan Raza Kazmi, Mian Faisal Irfan, Deputy Attorneys-General, and Azmat Bashir Tarar, Assistant Attorney-General.\nMuhammad Munir Paracha and Noman Munir Paracha for Q.A.U., Dr. Raja Qaiser Ahmed, Registrar and Engr. Bakht Rehman, Dir. (Works) and Sami Ullah Khan, Assistant Registrar Q.A.U.\nHafiz Arfat Ahmed Ch., Muhammad Nazir Jawad, Kashifa Niaz Awan, Muhammad Asim Bhatti, Tariq Zaman Ch., Muhammad Farooq, Miuh Aftab Shah and Auf Rehman Khan for the C.D.A.\nJalil Akhtar Abbasi, Waseem Uddin, Muhammad Furqan Shabbir, Shabbir Mehmood Abbasi and Asad Iqbal for Respondents Nos.10 to 17 (in W.P. No. 3916 of 2022).\nMuhammad Ramzan, A.D. Pak. E.P.A.\nDr. Agha Ghulam Haider, Deputy Director Ministry of F.E.& P.T.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. AZIZ UR REHMAN and others-Petitioners\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Cabinet and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24103", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 287 = 2024 SLD 287 = 2024 CLD", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TS8", - "Key Words:": "Relevant Law:\n•\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)\no\nSections 29 & 22: Pertains to the execution of a decree, including the rights of an auction purchaser following the auction of the property.\n________________________________________\nKey Issues:\n1.\nSale of Property in Auction:\no\nThe appellants, who were judgment debtors, contested the sale of their residential property during auction proceedings.\no\nThey claimed that the sale should be set aside because the suit property was a residential bungalow occupied by family members.\n2.\nFailure to Identify Illegalities:\no\nThe appellants did not present any evidence to suggest irregularities in the proclamation, publication, or conduct of the auction.\no\nNo valid or convincing reason was presented by the appellants or their family members to challenge the auction on the grounds of fraud or irregularity.\n3.\nAuction Purchasers Legal Rights:\no\nThe auction purchaser had followed all the required procedures, including depositing the entire purchase price as mandated under Order XXI, Rule 85 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.).\no\nThe purchaser had adhered to all the steps outlined by the executing court, which had confirmed the completion of the auction proceedings correctly.\n4.\nRefusal to Set Aside Sale:\no\nThe High Court, after reviewing the case, found no legal basis to interfere with the execution of the auction sale.\no\nThe appellants failed to provide sufficient justification to annul the sale, particularly as the auction purchaser had complied with all required procedures and gained legal rights to the property.\n________________________________________\nCourts Decision:\n•\nThe High Court declined to set aside the sale of the property as the appellants failed to provide any legal grounds to challenge the auction.\n•\nThe auction purchaser’s rights were upheld, as they had followed all court orders and procedural requirements. The judgment debtors’ plea that the property should not be sold because it was a family residence was not sufficient to override the purchasers legal rights.\n•\nAs no irregularity or fraud was proven, and the sale was conducted lawfully, the High Court confirmed the decision made by the Executing Court and dismissed the appeal.\n________________________________________\nCase References:\n•\nMessrs Habib and Company and others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited and others 2019 SCMR 1453\n•\nHudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1987 SC 512\n•\nMohammad Attique v. Jami Limited and others PLD 2010 SC 993\n•\nLanvin Traders, Karachi v. Presiding Officer, Banking Court No.2, Karachi and others 2013 SCMR 1419\n•\nMst. Anwar Sultana through L.Rs. v. Bank AL-Falah Ltd. and others 2014 SCMR 1222\n•\nMessrs Abdur Razzaq and Company, through Mian Abrar Ahmed v. Bank of Punjab and others 2005 CLC 1170\n•\nMst. Asma Zafarul Hassan v. Messrs United Bank Ltd. and another 1981 SCMR 108\n•\nGhulam Abbas v. Zohra Bibi and another PLD 1972 SC 337\n•\nZakarai Ghani and 4 others v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon and 8 others PLD 2016 SC 229\n•\nMuhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Zakaria Ghani and others PLD 2005 SC 819\n•\nMrs. Yasmeen Yaqoob v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2007 CLC 1511", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=29,22", - "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No. 137 of 2023, decision dated: 14th December, 2023.\nheard on: 8th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JUSTICE and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Wahab Baloch for Appellant No. 1.\nAbdul Wahab Baloch for Appellant No. 2.\nMehmood Ali for Respondent No. 1.\nMoulvi Iqbal Haider for Respondents Nos. 2 to 5, 7 and 9.\nNemo for Respondent No. 6.\nNemo for Respondent No. 8.\nAbdul Hameed Chohan for Respondent No. 10.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL TILES AND CERAMICS LTD. and another-Appellants\nVS\nSINDH BANK LIMITED and 9 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24104", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 288 = 2024 SLD 288 = 2024 CLD 278", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TSs", - "Key Words:": "Relevant Law:\n•\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)\no\nSection 9: Conditions under which a suit can be filed by a financial institution or customer, particularly in cases of default related to finance obligations.\no\nSections 3, 9, 10, & 17: Governs the conditions for filing suits for the recovery of finance, including the treatment of pre-mature causes of action and the calculation of amounts due.\n________________________________________\nKey Issues:\n1.\nFiling of Suit (Section 9):\no\nA suit by a financial institution or customer can only be filed in cases where there is a default in fulfilling an obligation with respect to any finance. \n2.\nPremature Suit (Section 9):\no\nIf a suit is filed prematurely (before the default is actually due), and the default occurs later during the pendency of the suit, the Banking Court can still grant relief by allowing the suit to proceed.\n3.\nEffect of Default During Pendency of the Suit (Section 3, 9, 10, & 17):\no\nThe defendant company had availed a finance facility from the plaintiff bank, which was restructured multiple times due to defaults.\no\nUnder a Finance Restructuring Agreement, the defendant defaulted again, and the debt matured during the lawsuit.\no\nThe suit was supported by necessary finance and security documents, along with certified statements of accounts, showing no payments made towards principal or mark-up under the restructuring agreement.\no\nAs of February 21, 2019, the total amount due was Rs. 425,792,917.81 (principal + mark-up). No payments had been made since then.\n4.\nCalculation of Amount Due:\no\nThe High Court calculated the due amount by deducting a fine imposed on the bank, reducing the total to Rs. 420,792,917.81.\no\nHowever, the High Court did not allow additional mark-up and only permitted the cost of funds from the date of default, as per Section 3 read with Section 17 of the Ordinance.\n________________________________________\nCourts Decision:\n•\nPremature Suit: Even though the suit was filed before the default actually occurred, the Banking Court used its discretion to allow the suit, as the default eventually matured during the pendency of the case.\n•\nAmount Due: The High Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff bank by confirming the amount due, which was Rs. 420,792,917.81 after adjusting for the fine. The Court allowed the cost of funds but did not permit additional mark-up beyond what was already calculated.\n•\nThe suit was decreed, and the defendant company was ordered to pay the specified amount under the terms of the Finance Restructuring Agreement, including the cost of funds from the date of default.\n________________________________________\nCase References:\n•\nPakistan Mobile Communication Ltd. and others v. Appellate Bench No. III, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others 2016 CLD 76\n•\nLucky Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, Circle-5, Peshawar 2015 SCMR 1494\n•\nAbdur Razaq v. Abdul Hamid 1979 SCMR 534\n•\nPrecision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lah. 290\n•\nManaging Director, Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. v. Syed Najmul Hassan Naqvi 2005 SCMR 890\n•\nVithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India (2005) 4 Supreme Court Cases 315", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,3,10,17", - "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 16637 of 2020, decision dated: 29th November, 2023.heard on: 13th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Abid Hussain Chattha, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Hameed Chohan and Ch. Sohail Khurshid for Plaintiff.\nHasham Ahmad Khan for Defendants Nos. 1 to 10.\nNemo for Defendants Nos. 11 to 15.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SILK BANK LIMITED through Constituted Attorney-Plaintiff\nVS\nMessrs HASEEB WAQAS SUGAR MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and 14 others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24105", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 289 = 2024 SLD 289 = 2024 CLD 106", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTk", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues:\n1.\nAdministration of Justice:\no\nAny action carried out in accordance with existing law cannot be considered unlawful, as long as it is performed within the framework of the law at the time.\n2.\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001):\no\nSections 9, 15, and 22: These sections govern the procedure for filing a suit for the recovery of finance, including the initiation of recovery proceedings, execution, and jurisdiction of the Banking Court.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nAppellant/ Borrower Default:\nThe appellant (borrower) defaulted on the payment of outstanding installments owed to the financial institution.\n•\nInitiation of Recovery Process:\nRecovery proceedings were initiated by the respondent (financial institution) under Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as it was applicable at the relevant time. This process was later declared ultra vires (beyond the powers of the law) by the Supreme Court, but the suit was filed after the matter had been resolved by the Court.\n•\nLeasing Companies as Financial Institutions:\nThe suit was filed by the financial institution as defined in Section 2 of the Ordinance, which included leasing companies. The jurisdiction of the Banking Court was invoked in this case, and the financial institution was allowed to proceed with the suit for recovery.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Findings and Decision:\n•\nValidity of the Suit:\nThe suit filed by the respondent was found to be timely, and there was no ambiguity or error in the findings of the Banking Court. The court emphasized that actions performed under the law at the relevant time cannot be deemed unlawful, even if parts of the law were later deemed ultra vires.\n•\nExecution of Recovery:\nThe recovery procedure was adopted in line with Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as applicable at the time, even though it was later struck down. The court ruled that the proceedings initiated under this law were valid when the suit was filed.\n•\nAccount of Lease Rentals:\nThe court clarified that two receipts could not be included as part of the lease rental account, as per the terms of the financial agreement.\n•\nJurisdiction of the Banking Court:\nThe definition of Financial Institution under Section 2 of the Ordinance included leasing companies, which allowed the jurisdiction of the Banking Court to be invoked in this case. The suit for recovery was therefore correctly filed and proceeded in the appropriate court.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nAppeal Dismissed:\nThe High Court declined to interfere with the Banking Courts judgment and decree, which was in favor of the respondent financial institution and against the appellant borrower.\n•\nFinal Decision:\nThe appeal was dismissed, and the recovery proceedings were upheld as valid under the law at the relevant time.\n________________________________________\nCase Reference:\n•\nNational Bank of Pakistan and 117 others v. SAF Textile Mills Ltd. and another\nPLD 2014 SC 283", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Hyderabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,15,22", - "Case #": "First Appeals Nos. 78 and 79 of 2021, decision dated: 28th September, 2023.\nheard on: 12th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JUSTICE and Arshad Hussain Khan, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Parkash Kumar for Appellants.\nFaiz Durrani, Siraj Ali and Salahuddin for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs QALANDRI FILLING AND CNG STATION SEHWAN through Proprietor and 3 others-Appellants\nVS\nSME LEASING LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24106", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 290 = 2024 SLD 290 = 2024 CLD 301", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TTg", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues:\n1.\nArbitration Act (X of 1940) - Sections 20, 34, and 39:\no\nStay of Proceedings and Specific Relief:\n\nThe case involves a dispute where the appellant/plaintiff sought specific performance of an agreement and other reliefs, including an injunction. The dispute arose out of a contract with the National Highway Authority (NHA) for the construction of a carriageway.\n\nA dispute regarding the arbitration clause in the agreement led to the filing of a suit and an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to stay the civil proceedings in favor of arbitration.\n2.\nArbitration Clause and Stay of Civil Suit:\no\nThe appellant/plaintiff company was awarded the contract but faced issues regarding the completion time, leading to disputes with NHA. Despite the existence of an arbitration clause, the appellant failed to apply for an extension of the completion time. The trial court had initially granted an injunction, but it was set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nContract for Construction:\nThe appellant/plaintiff was awarded a contract for the construction of a carriageway. However, certain differences arose regarding the completion period and other matters, leading to the filing of a civil suit by the appellant.\n•\nFailure to Seek Time Extension:\nThe appellant/plaintiff did not apply to the NHA for an extension of time to complete the project. Had the NHA or its engineer refused to grant a genuine extension, the appellant/plaintiff could have placed blame on NHA for undue delays. However, this was not done, and as a result, the appellant exposed itself to the consequences of failing to complete the project on time.\n•\nArbitration Clause in the Contract:\nThe agreement between the parties contained an arbitration clause. The appellant, after filing the suit, moved for the stay of proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, arguing that the matter should be referred to arbitration.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Findings and Decision:\n1.\nApplication under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act:\no\nThe court emphasized that the application for staying proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, did not need to specify the disputes explicitly. Even without mentioning specific disputes, the court could determine whether the claim in the civil suit fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement.\no\nThe trial court was correct in staying the proceedings under Section 34, as the arbitration agreement in the contract was valid. The court noted that the stay of proceedings was appropriate since the agreement provided for arbitration.\n2.\nDiscretion to Stay Proceedings:\no\nSection 34 provides the court with discretionary powers to stay the proceedings in favor of arbitration. The court held that the primary purpose of the provision is to enforce arbitration agreements, ensuring that disputes are resolved through arbitration rather than judicial proceedings when there is an agreement to arbitrate.\no\nThe court also observed that the appellant/plaintiff did not apply for an extension of time for completing the project, which could have been a valid reason to delay the contract completion. In the absence of such a request, the appellant was exposed to the consequences of delay.\n3.\nNo Mandatory Requirement to Mention Disputes:\no\nThe court clarified that there was no legal requirement under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for the application to specify the disputes in detail. The court could look at the arbitration clause and decide if the dispute should be referred to arbitration.\n4.\nRole of Courts in Enforcing Arbitration Agreements:\no\nThe court emphasized the importance of holding parties to their agreements and promoting the sanctity of contracts. Courts are encouraged to facilitate arbitration when parties have agreed to it, rather than allowing disputes to be settled through judicial adjudication.\no\nWhen an application under Section 34 is filed in a pending suit, the court’s powers to act under the Civil Procedure Code are suspended until the decision is made on the arbitration application.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nStay of Proceedings Upheld:\nThe trial court properly stayed the civil suit proceedings and allowed the parties to pursue arbitration, following the arbitration clause in the contract.\n•\nAppeal Dismissed:\nThe High Court declined to interfere with the trial court’s decision, finding no legal infirmity in the order passed. The appeal was dismissed.\n________________________________________\nLegal Precedents Cited:\n•\nMessrs S.M. Qasim & Co. v. Messrs Ch. Azimuddin (PLD 1962 Lah. 95)\n•\nFarid Virani v. Feroz Virani (PLD 2013 Sindh 386)\n•\nPakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Messrs Pak Saaf Dry Cleaners (PLD 1981 SC 553)\n•\nMessrs Associates Construction Limited v. WAPDA (1989 MLD 206)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=20,34,39Specific Relief Act, 1877=12,42,54", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 119 of 2020, decision dated: 26th July, 2022.Dates of hearing: 26th January, 1st, 10th, 24th February, 10th, 29th March, 8th, 19th April, 11th and 20th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Arbab Muhammad Tahir, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister M. Saad Bhuttar and Tahir Hussain Anchanan for Appellant.\nBarrister Asghar Khan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s SGEC-AMC JV through Authorized Officer-Appellant\nVS\nNATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY through Chairman-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24107", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 291 = 2024 SLD 291 = 2024 CLD 326", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TXo", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues:\n1.\nCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) - Sections 22-A and 22-B:\no\nThe case concerns the powers of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace to direct the registration of an FIR under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. and the applicability of Section 489-F, Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) in cases where cheques are issued as security.\n2.\nSection 489-F, PPC:\no\nSection 489-F of the Penal Code addresses the dishonour of cheques. However, the dispute arose as the cheques in question were allegedly issued as security and not as payment for an existing liability, leading to the dismissal of the request for FIR registration.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nPetitioners Allegation:\nThe petitioner, a company, entered into business dealings with a company whose directors (respondents Nos. 1 and 2) issued three cheques for Rs. 5 million each to settle an outstanding liability. The cheques were dishonoured upon presentation. The petitioner applied to the Ex-officio Justice of Peace for directions to register an FIR against the respondents for dishonouring the cheques under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code.\n•\nEx-officio Justice of Peaces Ruling:\nThe Ex-officio Justice of Peace dismissed the petitioners application, stating that the cheques were issued as security under a distribution agreement, and as such, Section 489-F, PPC was not applicable.\n•\nPetitioner’s Pleading Before High Court:\nThe petitioner stated that it had received the cheques as security under a distribution agreement. However, the petitioners own admissions and documents provided by the respondents showed that the cheques were not issued as payment for specific liabilities but were related to a broader business dispute, including a pending litigation over a separate claim for Rs. 100,439,515/-.\n•\nIssuance of Cheques:\nThe cheques were issued on different dates: one by respondent No. 1 on 13.05.2019 and the other two by respondent No. 2 on 25.01.2020 and 02.07.2020. Importantly, there was no final liability of the respondents’ company at the time the cheques were issued or when they were dishonoured.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Findings and Decision:\n1.\nNature of the Cheques:\nThe Ex-officio Justice of Peace correctly concluded that the cheques were not issued in settlement of any existing liability but rather as security. As such, the requirements under Section 489-F, PPC, which applies to dishonoured cheques issued for the payment of a debt or liability, were not met in this case.\n2.\nAdmissibility of the Petitioners Claim:\no\nThe petitioner admitted that the cheques were issued under the terms of a distribution agreement as security, and the respondents provided documents confirming this.\no\nThe petitioner’s application under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. was found to be legally flawed, as it was based on the erroneous premise that the cheques were issued for payment, which was contradicted by the evidence presented.\n3.\nExistence of Dispute and Litigation:\no\nA broader dispute existed between the parties, with the petitioner owing a substantial amount to the respondents, and there was an ongoing litigation over the Rs. 100,439,515/- claim.\no\nSince the cheques were not linked to a specific transaction that created an enforceable liability but were instead issued as security, the legal framework under Section 489-F, PPC did not apply.\n4.\nAbsence of Legal Grounds for FIR:\nThe High Court upheld the Ex-officio Justice of Peace’s ruling, emphasizing that the cheques, though dishonoured, were not subject to Section 489-F, PPC, as they were issued as security and not for the payment of a debt.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nPetition Dismissed:\nThe petition was dismissed on the grounds that Section 489-F of the Penal Code was not applicable to the cheques, which had been issued as security. The claim for the registration of an FIR was legally untenable.\n________________________________________\nLegal Precedents Cited:\n•\nMalik Safdar Ali v. Syed Khalid Ali and others (PLD 2012 Sindh 464)\n•\nMian Allah Ditta v. The State and others (2013 SCMR 51)\n•\nIndus Airways Private Limited v. Magnum Aviation Private Limited (2014) 12 SCC 539\n•\nSampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited (2016) 10 SCC 458\n•\nSripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand (AIR 2021 SC 5732)\n•\nSunil Todi v. The State of Gujarat (AIR 2022 SC 147)\n•\nDashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel (AIR 2022 SC 4961)\n•\nAhmed Shakeel Bhatti v. The State (2023 SCMR 1)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=22-A,22-BPenal Code (XLV of 1860)=489-F", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3103 of 2023, decision dated: 27th March, 2023.heard on: 27th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Tariq Saleem Sheikh, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Sharjeel Adnan Sheikh assisted by Mian Hassan Raza and Khayyam-ul-Hassan Lodhi for Petitioner.\nKh. Haris Ahmad assisted by Muhammad Zubair Khalid for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nSittar Sahil, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAYAT KIMYA PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED-Petitioner\nVS\nHUMAIR YUSUF and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24108", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 292 = 2024 SLD 292 = 2024 CLD 338", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5TXk", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues:\n1.\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) - Sections 19 & 22:\no\nThe case involves the execution proceedings for recovering finances under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, focusing on the issuance of notices to legal heirs of a deceased judgment debtor.\n2.\nCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908) - Order XXI, Rule 64:\no\nThe issue at hand also relates to the procedural requirement for notices to be sent during execution proceedings under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), specifically Order XXI, Rule 64, which governs the execution of decrees.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nAppellants’ Claim:\nThe appellants were the legal heirs of the deceased judgment debtor and claimed they had not received any notices issued by the Court during the execution proceedings initiated by the decree holder bank. The judgment debtor had passed away in 2017, and the bank had continued execution proceedings as though the debtor was alive.\n•\nIssuance of Notices and Proclamation:\nDespite the judgment debtors death, the Court issued notices and a sale proclamation in 2021 in the name of the deceased. The bank had amended the title of the execution proceedings, but the mandatory requirement of sending notices to all the legal heirs was overlooked. Notices and sale proclamations were only directed to the deceased individual, without notifying the legal heirs.\n•\nFailure to Notify Legal Heirs:\nThe appellant argued that the failure to send notices to the legal heirs of the deceased debtor resulted in procedural unfairness. Moreover, the bank and the Court did not follow the correct procedure, ignoring the mandatory requirement under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance and Order XXI, Rule 64 of the CPC, which necessitates that all legal heirs be notified.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Findings and Decision:\n1.\nMandatory Requirement for Notices to Legal Heirs:\nThe Court acknowledged that, as per Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and Order XXI, Rule 64 of the CPC, it was mandatory for the Court to issue notices to all the legal heirs of the deceased judgment debtor. The failure to do so was a procedural lacuna that compromised the fairness of the execution proceedings.\n2.\nProcedural Oversight:\nThe decree holder bank should have been more vigilant and brought this critical issue (the non-issuance of notices to legal heirs) to the attention of the Court officers. The Court should not proceed with execution when such fundamental procedural requirements are ignored, as it could lead to unfair consequences for the heirs of the deceased debtor.\n3.\nRemand of the Case:\nIn light of the oversight, the High Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the Banking Court. The Banking Court was directed to implead all legal heirs of the deceased judgment debtor, based on the family tree in the Family Registration Certificate (FRC) issued by NADRA. This would ensure the due process of law and fair proceedings for all parties involved.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe appeal was allowed by the High Court, and the matter was remanded to the Banking Court for further proceedings, with clear instructions to implement the mandatory requirement of notifying all legal heirs of the deceased judgment debtor as per the Family Registration Certificate (FRC).\n________________________________________\nLegal Precedents and Citations:\n•\nSection 19 & 22, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001\n•\nOrder XXI, Rule 64, Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)\n•\nFamily Registration Certificate (FRC) issued by NADRA", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=64", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 92 of 2021, decision dated: 28th December, 2023.heard on: 5th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JUSTICE and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nihal Khan Lashari for Appellant.\nMasood Anwar Ausaf for Respondent No. 1.\nNemo for Respondent No. 2.\nAbdul Shakoor and Muhammad Mobeen Khan for Respondent No. 3.\nNemo for Respondent No. 4.\nNemo for Respondent No. 9.\nSyed Farhan A Jaffery for Respondents Nos. 5, 8, 10, 11 and 12.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL KHALID-Appellant\nVS\nHABIB BANK LIMITED and 11 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24109", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 293 = 2024 SLD 293 = 2024 CLD 343", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STc", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues:\n1.\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) - Sections 22 & 23:\no\nThis case revolves around the execution of a decree under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, specifically addressing issues related to mortgage redemption, leasehold rights, and the jurisdiction of the Banking Court.\n2.\nJurisdiction of the Banking Court and Execution Proceedings:\no\nWhether the Banking Court had the authority to declare the allotment of property as void during execution proceedings, and the scope of its jurisdiction under the Ordinance, particularly Section 23(2).\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nBackground of the Case:\no\nThe Banking Court was overseeing the execution of a decree concerning a disputed property.\no\nThe decree holder (the bank) took possession of the property from the lessee in January 2004, following the order of the Court.\no\nThe appellant (the lessee) had been allotted the property in question, but the Banking Court declared this allotment void during the execution proceedings.\n•\nAppellants Claim:\no\nThe appellant argued that the allotment of the property was not void, and the declaration made by the Banking Court was invalid. The appellant claimed rights to redeem the leasehold and regain possession upon satisfaction of the decree.\n•\nDispute over Allotment and Mortgage:\no\nThe lessee sought to redeem the leasehold rights over the property.\no\nThe Banking Court declared the allotment of the property to the appellant as void, citing the execution of the decree.\no\nThe question arose whether the Banking Court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the allotment or if the issue fell outside its purview.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings and Decision:\n1.\nJurisdiction of the Banking Court:\no\nThe Banking Court does not have the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the allotment of the property after the decree has been satisfied.\no\nThe matter of determining whether the allotment was void falls outside the scope of execution proceedings and should be addressed in a court with general jurisdiction.\no\nSection 23(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance was not applicable to the situation at hand. The role of the Banking Court was strictly limited to the enforcement of the decree.\n2.\nEffect of Satisfaction of Decree:\no\nOnce the decree had been satisfied, the effect of the attachment order disappeared, and the parties involved were free to assert their rights before the appropriate forums.\no\nThe lessee and the lessor were each entitled to pursue their claims concerning the legality of the lease and the allotment of the property, independent of the decree holder bank’s actions in execution.\n3.\nRights of the Lessee and Redemption of Lease:\no\nThe lessee had the right to redeem the leasehold rights upon satisfaction of the decree and was entitled to have possession of the property once the lease was redeemed, subject to the terms of the lease deed.\no\nThe legality of the cancellation of the lease would need to be determined independently, not as part of the execution proceedings.\n4.\nHigh Court’s Decision:\no\nThe High Court set aside the Banking Court’s declaration that the allotment of the property in favor of the appellant was void.\no\nThe High Court directed that the lessee and the allottee be allowed to seek remedies in law to enforce their respective claims regarding the leasehold rights and allotment.\no\nThe process of redemption of the property was to be completed, and possession of the property was to be delivered to the lessee.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe appeal was allowed, and the High Court remanded the case to allow the lessee to redeem the leasehold rights and regain possession of the property, while also allowing all parties to seek legal remedies regarding the validity of the allotment and the lease.\n________________________________________\nLegal Precedents and Citations:\n•\nMst. Farhat Fareed Sheikh v. NIB Bank Limited and 5 others 2019 CLD 632\n•\nSiraj Din and 2 others v. Khushi Muhammad through legal heirs 2002 YLR 1643\n•\nMuslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Syed Ataullah Shah and 2 others 2003 CLD 888\n•\nHafizur Rehman and 2 others v. Messrs Fresh Farms (Pvt.) Ltd 2010 CLD 999\n•\nManzoor Ellahi through legal heirs v. Ch. Muhammad Akbar and 2 others 1999 MLD 901\n•\nMst. Irshad Yamin v. Citibank N.A. and others 2005 CLD 1477", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22,23", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 8251 of 2023, decision dated: 14th November, 2023, heard on: 14th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Karim and Asim Hafeez, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Asad Ahmad Ghani for Appellant.\nImran Malik, C.M. Sarwar and Sikandar Javed for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.\nFiaz Ahmad Ranjha for Respondent No. 8.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GUJRANWALA STEEL INDUSTRIES through Partner-Appellant\nVS\nINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and 7 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24110", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 294 = 2024 SLD 294 = 2024 CLD 350", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STY", - "Key Words:": "Legal Issues:\n1.\nSindh Environmental Protection Act (VIII of 2014) - Section 27:\no\nThe case concerns the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process required for a proposed construction project under the Sindh Environmental Protection Act, 2014, and the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2014.\n2.\nCultural Heritage Protection:\no\nThe appellant challenged the EIA Report issued for the construction of a multi-story building, specifically highlighting concerns regarding the impact of the construction on cultural heritage buildings.\n3.\nCultural Heritage Preservation:\no\nThe relevant laws under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, particularly Section 10(1), were cited in relation to the protection of cultural heritage buildings in the area of the proposed construction.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nAppellant’s Concern:\no\nThe appellant organization, concerned with the protection of cultural heritage, contested the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report issued in favor of the respondent (the builder) for the construction of a multi-story building with six basements.\no\nThe appellant’s primary concern was that the Culture, Tourism and Antiquities Department had not issued a no-objection certificate (NOC) or provided clearance for the project, which is a requirement under the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2014, specifically Regulation 9(2)(c).\n•\nEnvironmental and Cultural Concerns:\no\nThe Culture, Tourism, and Antiquities Department is a relevant authority whose clearance is necessary for projects that could potentially impact cultural heritage buildings, as per Regulation 9(2)(c) of the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2014.\no\nThe appellant raised objections regarding the environmental and cultural impact of the proposed construction, specifically whether the project would affect cultural heritage sites or buildings.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings and Decision:\n1.\nRole of Culture, Tourism, and Antiquities Department:\no\nThe Culture, Tourism, and Antiquities Department must provide a no-objection certificate (NOC) or approval for any project that may impact cultural heritage sites or buildings, which is a condition specified under Regulation 9(2)(c) of the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency Regulations, 2014.\no\nThe Court noted that the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) had not considered these objections raised by the appellant regarding the potential impact on cultural heritage in the EIA report.\n2.\nNon-Compliance with Legal Requirements:\no\nThe Sindh Environmental Protection Agency had failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the Culture, Tourism, and Antiquities Department, which is required under the Sindh Environmental Protection Act and its regulations.\no\nThe Court emphasized that the EIA Report could not be validly issued without compliance with all the necessary legal requirements, including obtaining a clearance from the relevant authorities concerned with the protection of cultural heritage.\n3.\nRemand of the Matter:\no\nSince the construction project had not yet commenced, the Court determined that the validity of various provisions of law and the environmental issues could be considered together, after proper compliance with the legal requirements.\no\nThe Sindh Environment Tribunal remanded the matter to the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) to issue a fresh EIA Report, after obtaining the no-objection certificate (NOC) or approval from the Culture, Tourism and Antiquities Department.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe appeal was allowed, and the matter was remanded to the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) for further proceedings, specifically to ensure that the Culture, Tourism, and Antiquities Department issues the required no-objection certificate (NOC) or approval before issuing the final EIA Report.\n________________________________________\nLegal Precedents and Citations:\n•\n2009 SCMR 1435\n•\n1975 SCMR 157\n•\n2011 SCMR 8\n•\n2018 SCMR 1885\n•\n2019 SCMR 859\n•\n2017 SCMR 831\n•\n2008 SCMR 1148\n•\nPLD 2004 SC 261\n•\nPLD 2016 Sindh 31\n•\nPLD 2020 Sindh 85", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Environmental Protection Act, (VIII of 2014)=27", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 2 of 2021, decision dated: 14th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (R) Nisar Muhammad Shaikh, Chairman, Muhammad Arif Khan, Member (Legal) and Abdul Rauf Memon, Member (Technical)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zubair Ahmed for Appellant.\nHamza Hussain Hidayatullah for Respondent No. 2.\nHabib-ur-Rehman Solangi, Deputy Director Law for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CITIZENS FOR ENVIRONMENT through General Secretary-Appellant\nVS\nDIRECTOR GENERAL, SINDH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24111", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 295 = 2024 SLD 295 = 2024 CLD 360", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STU", - "Key Words:": "Legal Issues:\n1.\nExecution of Decree (Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001) - Sections 19, 22, & 23:\no\nThe case revolves around the execution of a decree under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, specifically addressing whether the property in question, not mortgaged to the decree holder, could be included in the execution proceedings.\n2.\nProperty Not Mortgaged - Legal and Factual Position:\no\nThe applicant contended that the property was not part of the mortgaged assets and that if the liabilities of the judgment debtors had not been satisfied, the decree holder bank should have liquidated other mortgaged properties instead of including the non-mortgaged property.\n3.\nJurisdiction and Validity of Compromise Order:\no\nThe validity of the compromise decree and whether the property in question could have been included in the compromise between the decree holder bank and judgment debtors were disputed. The applicant argued that the compromise order was obtained illegally.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nProperty in Dispute:\no\nThe property in question was not mortgaged to the decree holder bank but was mortgaged to another bank. This factual situation was known to the decree holder bank at all material times.\n•\nSale by Other Bank:\no\nThe property was sold in proceedings initiated by the other bank, which was disclosed by the judgment debtors in their leave to defend application.\n•\nCompromise Application:\no\nDespite knowing the property was mortgaged to another bank, the decree holder bank included the property in the compromise application with the judgment debtors. This action was contested as being illegal and void, particularly in light of a previous judicial order dated 4.10.2008, which had already determined the matter.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings and Decision:\n1.\nDecree Holder Banks Knowledge:\no\nThe Court noted that at all material times, the decree holder bank was fully aware that the property was mortgaged to another bank. The decree holder bank chose to include the property in the compromise application despite knowing that it was not part of the mortgaged properties.\n2.\nExecution Proceedings and Jurisdiction:\no\nThe property in question was sold in proceedings initiated by the other bank. The decree holder banks attempt to include the property in its execution proceedings was deemed improper, as the property was not mortgaged to it.\no\nThe Court emphasized that the inclusion of the property in the compromise application was not legally valid, especially since it was done in violation of the Banking Courts order dated 4.10.2008. The decree holder banks action was considered illegal and void ab initio.\n3.\nMisrepresentation in Compromise Decree:\no\nThe Court found that the compromise order and decree concerning the property were obtained through misrepresentation and were not done with bona fide intentions.\no\nThe Court concluded that the compromise order, as it pertained to the property in question, was not valid and could not be enforced.\n4.\nJurisdictional Issue:\no\nThe Court held that the Banking Court lacked jurisdiction to include the property in question in the compromise decree. The inclusion of the property could not be contested in a collateral proceeding but had to be addressed through the statutory process under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe application was allowed, and the compromise decree between the decree holder bank and judgment debtors, specifically regarding the property in question, was set aside due to lack of jurisdiction, misrepresentation, and improper inclusion of the non-mortgaged property.\n________________________________________\nLegal Precedents and Citations:\n•\nAbdul Majeed and another v. Shaukat Ali and others 2012 SCMR 1172\n•\nFarhat Fareed Shaikh v. Messrs NIB Bank Limited and 4 others 2016 CLD 1275\n•\nPunjab and Sindh Bank Ltd., Gujranwala v. Amir Chand and others AIR 1930 Lahore 731\n•\nNational Bank of Pakistan through Attorney and another v. Paradise Trading Company and others 2015 SCMR 319\n•\nMessrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Ltd. and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation Karachi PLD 2002 SC 500\n•\nMessrs Shahtaj Textile Limited v. Messrs J & M Clothing Co. and others 2016 CLD 984\n•\nMisbah Khanum v. Kamran Yasin Khan and another 2022 SCMR 1629", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22,23", - "Case #": "Execution Application No. 25 of 2012 along with Suit No. B-10 of 2007, J.M. No. 33 of 2016 and Suit No. 531 of 2016, decision dated: 13th November, 2023. Dates of hearing: 23rd January, 16th February and 26th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Faisal Kamal Alam, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Lubna Aman and Irfanullah Khan for Decree Holder (in Execution No.25 of 2012, Defendant No.1 in Suit No. 531 of 2016 and Respondent No.1 in J.M. No.33 of 2016).\nJahanzeb Awan, Shahan Karimi, Rashid Mahar, Sarosh Arif and Sauban Tasleem for Applicant (in J.M. No.33 of 2016, for Plaintiff in Suit No. 531 of 2016 and for Objector in Ex. No.25 of 2016).\nRasshid Anwer and S. Mustafa Ali for Respondent No. 11 [in J. M. No.33 of 2016 and for Defendant No.10 in Suit No.B-10 of 2007).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASKARI BANK LIMITED-Plaintiff\nVS\nA. H. INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD. and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24112", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 296 = 2024 SLD 296 = 2024 CLD 369", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STQ", - "Key Words:": "Part (a) - Arbitration Act (X of 1940)\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nMaking Award Rule of Court (Arbitration Act, 1940 - Ss. 14, 17 & 26-A):\no\nPetitioners challenged the decision of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court in making the award rule of court. The petitioners argued that the Court failed to state reasons for making the award a rule of court and that the suit was time-barred.\n2.\nFiling of Objections to Award:\no\nThe petitioners contended that the award should not have been made rule of court as they believed it was time-barred, and the Courts below should have dismissed the suit.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nArbitration Agreement and Proceedings:\no\nThe respondent was appointed as the sole arbitrator by mutual consent of the parties.\no\nBoth parties participated in the arbitration proceedings without raising any objections. The award prepared by the sole arbitrator was signed by both parties without protest.\n•\nObjections Raised Later:\no\nAfter the award was signed, the petitioners raised objections to the validity of the award, particularly focusing on the alleged time-bar and failure of the Court to state reasons for making the award rule of court.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings and Decision:\n1.\nParties Participation in Arbitration:\no\nThe Court noted that the parties had participated in the arbitration proceedings without raising any objections and had signed the award prepared by the arbitrator. This indicated that the petitioners had accepted the arbitration process and the award.\n2.\nSanctity of Arbitration Award:\no\nThe Court emphasized that once the parties had voluntarily signed the award, they could not later challenge its validity based on time limitations, especially when no objection was raised during the arbitration proceedings.\n3.\nLimited Scope of Courts Review:\no\nThe Court clarified that while making the award a rule of court, the Courts review of the award was limited. The Court was required to check the award for validity under the scope defined in Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which allows challenging an award only on specific grounds, such as misconduct by the arbitrator or improper procurement of the award.\n4.\nMinisterial Act of Filing the Award:\no\nThe act of filing the award was deemed ministerial, meaning it was a formal, procedural step that did not require re-evaluation of the merits of the award.\n5.\nValidity of the Award:\no\nThe Court ruled that there was no valid reason to set aside the award, as the petitioners failed to show any misconduct by the arbitrator or any other legal ground for invalidation. The challenge to the award based on time-bar and lack of reasons was dismissed.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe petition was dismissed, and the award was upheld as valid and enforceable.\nLegal Precedents and Citations:\n•\nDr. Khalida Malik v. Mst. Farida Malik 1994 MLD 2348\n•\nChampsey Ghara and Company v. Jivrajh Balloo Spinning and Weaving Company AIR 1923 PC 66\n•\nMian Corporation through Managing Partner v. Messrs Lever Brothers of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 2006 SC 169\n•\nBesrock (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation 2013 CLD 719\n•\n2017 YLR 301, 2020 CLC 1605, 2013 CLD 719, 2018 SCMR 662\n________________________________________\nPart (b) - Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nRevisional Jurisdiction of the High Court (C.P.C., S. 115):\no\nThe petitioners invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) challenging the findings of the Courts below.\n2.\nScope of Revisional Jurisdiction:\no\nThe petitioners argued that the High Court should intervene and correct the errors made by the lower Courts.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings and Decision:\n1.\nLimited Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction:\no\nThe High Court clarified that its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. is narrow and limited. Interference in the decisions of subordinate Courts is only warranted if there is a jurisdictional error, misreading or non-reading of evidence, or the judgment is perverse.\n2.\nNo Jurisdictional Error or Defect:\no\nThe High Court found that the lower Courts had not committed any errors or defects that warranted interference. The revisional jurisdiction was not meant to re-evaluate the evidence or to substitute the lower Courts conclusions.\n3.\nConclusion:\no\nSince the findings of the lower Courts were neither perverse nor based on a jurisdictional error, the petition was dismissed.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe petition was dismissed, affirming the lower Courts decisions.\nLegal Precedent:\n•\n2022 SCMR 933", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=14,17,26-A", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 112 of 2014, decision dated: 13th June, 2022, heard on: 7th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Abdul Hameed Baloch, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Bakhtiar Sherani for Petitioners.\nHameedullah Kakar for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAH MUHAMMAD and another-Petitioners\nVS\nDr. ABDULLAH KHAN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24113", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5SS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 297 = 2024 SLD 297 = 2024 CLD 376", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5SS8", - "Key Words:": "Legal Issues:\n1.\nTransfer of Shares:\no\nThe petitioners challenged the transfer of their shares to the respondents, alleging that the transfer was illegal.\no\nThe petitioners claimed that the respondents failed to comply with the mandatory formalities required under Section 76 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (which has since been repealed) and that the transfer reflected in Form A dated 8.5.2008 was not valid.\n2.\nFailure to Prove Valid Transfer:\no\nThe respondents could not substantiate the claim that the petitioners had made payment for the shares, nor could they demonstrate that the transfer process followed the legal requirements of the Companies Ordinance, particularly the formalities of Section 76.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nForm A Submission:\no\nThe respondents had submitted Form A to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) on 8.5.2008 and later on 19.11.2011, claiming the transfer of shares from the petitioners to the respondents.\n•\nAllegations of Invalidity:\no\nThe petitioners disputed the validity of these transfers, claiming that the required process formalities under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, were not followed. They argued that the respondents failed to prove the completion of the legal transfer process or the payment for the shares.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings and Decision:\n1.\nNon-Compliance with Legal Formalities:\no\nThe Court found that the respondents failed to provide any documents that substantiated their claim that the shares were transferred legally, as per the mandatory requirements of Section 76 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.\no\nSection 76 required a formal process for the transfer of shares, including the execution of a transfer deed and payment for the shares. Since the respondents did not demonstrate that these formalities were followed, the transfer was deemed invalid.\n2.\nInvalidity of Transfer as Reflected in Form A:\no\nThe Court specifically declared that the transfer of shares reflected in Form A submitted by the respondents on 8.5.2008 and 19.11.2011 had no legal sanctity, as it did not comply with the legal requirements for share transfer.\no\nSince no supporting documents were provided to prove the transfer’s validity, the Court ruled that the transfer was null and void.\n3.\nOrder for Reversal:\no\nThe High Court directed the respondents to enter the petitioners names back into the Register of Members of the company and to transmit relevant information to the SECP through the appropriate Form A to correct the records.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe petition was allowed in favor of the petitioners.\n•\nThe transfer of shares was declared invalid, and the respondents were ordered to rectify the records by entering the petitioners names in the Register of Members.\nLegal Precedent:\n•\nOrix Leasing Pakistan Limited v. Colony Thal Textile Mills Limited, PLD 1997 Lah. 443", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=17(2),152Companies Ordinance, 1984=76", - "Case #": "C.O. No. 37 of 2015, decision dated: 13th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Before Shams Mehmood Mirza, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muqtedir Akhtar Shabbir, Mirza Shahryar Baig and Syed Arbab Shah for Petitioner.\nMirza Nasar Hussain Shahid for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR IQBAL-Petitioner\nVS\nG.T. PHARMA (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and 5 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24114", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5SSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 298 = 2024 SLD 298 = 2024 CLD 380", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5SSs", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nAppointment of Evaluator:\no\nThe appellant (defendant, a chemical company) challenged the appointment of an evaluator in the proceedings for the sale of pledged stock (chemicals) via public auction. The appellant claimed that the evaluator lacked the necessary expertise to handle the chemicals, which were highly inflammable and required specialized care.\n2.\nConsent of Parties for Appointment:\no\nThe evaluator was appointed with the consent of the parties involved (the bank and the defendant). The appellant contested the evaluator’s proficiency but failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nPledged Stock and Auction:\no\nThe appellant had pledged chemicals with the plaintiff (a bank), and the stock was in the custody of the banks Muccaddum (custodian). The evaluator was appointed to sell the chemicals via public auction.\n•\nObjection to Evaluators Expertise:\no\nThe appellant objected to the evaluator’s appointment, arguing that the chemicals were highly inflammable and required specialized handling during sampling and evaluation. The appellant feared that improper handling could result in the destruction of the chemicals.\n•\nDismissal of Application for Change of Evaluator:\no\nThe appellant filed an application to replace the evaluator, which was dismissed by the lower court. The appellant contended that the evaluator lacked the proficiency necessary to handle such chemicals.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings and Decision:\n1.\nConsent of the Parties:\no\nThe court noted that the evaluator had been appointed by mutual consent of the parties (the bank and the defendant). Both parties had agreed on the evaluator’s appointment, and there were no objections raised by either the bank or the Muccaddum regarding the evaluator’s qualifications or expertise at the time of the appointment.\n2.\nFailure to Prove Incompetence:\no\nThe appellant failed to provide any documentary evidence or proof to substantiate the claim that the evaluator was unqualified to evaluate the chemicals. The appellant’s objections were based on an assumption without any concrete evidence of the evaluator’s incompetence or potential harm in handling the chemicals.\n3.\nNo Objection from the Bank or Custodian:\no\nThe court emphasized that neither the bank nor its Muccaddum had raised any concerns about the evaluator’s qualifications. This further supported the conclusion that the appointment of the evaluator was valid and should proceed.\n4.\nNo Justification for Removal of Evaluator:\no\nThe appellant’s application for the removal or replacement of the evaluator lacked a plausible justification. Since the evaluator had been appointed with the consent of both parties and no evidence of incompetence was provided, the court found no reason to interfere with the original decision.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe appeal was dismissed, and the appointment of the evaluator was upheld. The appellant’s claim regarding the evaluator’s lack of proficiency was not substantiated by any convincing evidence, and there was no valid reason to replace the evaluator.\n•\nSpecial High Court Appeal by the customer (appellant) was dismissed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22", - "Case #": "Special H.C.A. No. 210 of 2019, decision dated: 6th March, 2023.heard on: 28th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " PRSENT: Irfan Saadat Khan, JUSTICE and Arshad Hussain Khan, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sami Ahsan for Appellants.\nAijaz Hussain Shirazi for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed WAJAHAT HUSSAIN ZAIDI and another-Appellants\nVS\nUNITED BANK LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24115", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 299 = 2024 SLD 299 = 2024 CLD 383", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STk", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nPrinciple of Audi Alteram Partem:\no\nThe case revolves around the principle of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard), which ensures that both parties in a dispute have an opportunity to present their case. The appellants failure to implead a necessary party to the appeal was questioned.\n2.\nNon-Impleading of a Necessary Party:\no\nThe appellant did not include a party involved in the original proceedings when appealing the decision. The Appellate Bench issued a deficiency letter, requiring the appellant to include the necessary party.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nOrder-in-Original:\no\nThe appellant filed an appeal against an order-in-original, but in doing so, failed to implead a party that had been part of the original proceedings.\n•\nDeficiency Letter Issued:\no\nThe Appellate Bench Registry issued a deficiency letter to the appellant, directing them to include the non-impleaded party as a respondent. The appellant objected to this, arguing that the grievances of the non-impleaded party had already been addressed in the original order.\n•\nObjection to Deficiency Letter:\no\nThe appellant filed an objection application challenging the directions of the Appellate Bench to implead the missing party, asserting that their issues had been resolved in the original decision.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings and Decision:\n1.\nApplication of the Principle of Audi Alteram Partem:\no\nThe court emphasized that the principle of audi alteram partem (hear the other side) is a fundamental aspect of procedural fairness. This principle ensures that no party is denied the opportunity to be heard, present evidence, and respond to the arguments raised against them.\n2.\nNecessity of Impleading the Respondent:\no\nThe respondent in the original proceedings was considered a necessary party to the appeal. Not impleading the respondent would undermine the fairness of the proceedings and violate the principle of natural justice. Denying the respondent’s participation in the appeal could infringe upon their rights, especially since they were part of the original proceedings.\n3.\nAvoidance of Delay and Multiplicity of Proceedings:\no\nThe court recognized the importance of avoiding delay and the multiplicity of proceedings. To ensure judicial efficiency and fairness, it was necessary to have the respondent involved in the appeal. If the respondent was not impleaded, the decision of the appeal could be made without hearing from all relevant parties, which would affect the fairness of the proceedings.\n4.\nDirection to the Appellant:\no\nThe Appellate Bench directed the appellant to implead the respondent as a party in the appeal and submit an amended memorandum of appeal within 15 days. If the appellant failed to comply, the appeal would not be registered.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe objection application filed by the appellant was disposed of in favor of impleading the necessary party to the appeal.\n•\nThe Appellate Bench directed the appellant to submit the amended appeal documents with the impleaded party within the given time frame. Failure to comply would result in the appeal not being registered.\nThis decision reinforced the importance of procedural fairness and ensuring that all necessary parties are heard in an appeal.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=40-A,33", - "Case #": "M.As. Nos. 45(14)def/ABR and 45-1(14)def/ABR of 2023, decision dated: 25th August, 2023, heard on: 22nd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Shahzad Javed Panni for Applicant (Jamhex Company (Private) Limited) (in M.A. No. 45(14)def/ABR of 2023).\nBarrister Usman Mughal for Applicant (Nitrokitnya) (in M.A. No.45-1(14)def/ABR of 2023).\nRaja Farukh Ahmad (Additional Joint Registrar), Appellant Bench Registry, SECP for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs JAMHEX COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED and another-Applicants\nVS\nAPPELLATE BENCH REGISTRY-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24116", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 300 = 2024 SLD 300 = 2024 CLD 387", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5STg", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 10-Bankers Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S. 2(8)-Suit for recovery of finance-Leave to appear, refusal of-Penal interest-Scope-Plaintiff bank produced statements of accounts which were duly verified as required under S. 2(8) of Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891 and S. 9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-No counterstatement was filed by defendant company to controvert the statement of accounts-Validity-Mere bald allegations against statement of accounts without backing of law and documented proof had no basis-Statement of accounts of defendant company showed that penal interest was charged from time to time-Such penal interest had no backing of law-Plaintiff bank excluded amount of penal interest from the liability against defendant company-High Court excluded penal interest and markup was charged on the basis of finance agreement only till its expiry-Plaintiff bank was entitled for cost of funds after the date of markup-Claim of plaintiff bank was substantiated by agreement/statement of accounts as well as finance documents-Defendant company was unable to raise any substantial question of law or fact regarding requiring recording of evidence for its resolution-High Court declined to grant leave to appear to defendant company-Suit was decreased accordingly.\nHassan Ali & Co. Cotton (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd and another 2017 CLD 2283; PICIC Commercial Bank Limited v. Spectrum Fisheries Limited 2006 CLD 440; National Bank of Pakistan v. Ali Akbar Spinning Mills Limited and others C.O.S. No.126 of 2011; Muhammad Saleem Khan v. MCB Bank Limited 2020 CLD 737; Trust Investment Bank Limited v. The Bank of Punjab 2021 CLD 1430; IGI Investment Bank Limited through Attorney v. Messrs Admore Gas (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2014 CLD 1354; NIB Bank Limited v. Highnoon Textile Ltd. and 3 others 2014 CLD 763; Messrs Soneri Bank Limited through Attorneys v. Messrs Elite Publishers Limited and 3 others 2011 CLD 755; Baba Fareed Ghee Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and 3 others v. National Bank of Pakistan 2002 CLD 669 and Messrs Mach Knitters (Pvt.) Limited and 3 others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited through Manager 2004 CLD 535 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10Bank of Punjab Act, 1989 =2(8)", - "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 33 of 2015, decision dated: 22nd March, 2023.heard on: 22nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Abid Aziz Sheikh, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Hameed Chohan and Ms. Iqra Riaz for Plaintiff.\nAakif Majeed Butt, Asim Tufail Farooqi and Ms. Shamim Akhtar for Defendants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB BANK LIMITED through Authorized Officer-Plaintiff\nVS\nMessrs CITY STEEL UAE MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED through Chief Executive and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24117", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5SXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 301 = 2024 SLD 301 = 2024 CLD 397", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5SXo", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 10 & 22-Suit for recovery of finance-Leave to defend the suit-Limitation, non-consideration of-Effect-Application for leave to defend the suit filed by appellant/defendant was dismissed due to non-prosecution resultantly Banking Court decreed the suit in favour of respondent/plaintiff-Validity-It was not mandatory for Banking Court to decree the suit in favour of respondent/plaintiff upon default of appellant/defendant due to his absence-Even if appellant/defendant failed to file application for leave to defend or had failed to file it in a timely manner leading to its dismissal unless delay was condoned, it was bounden duty of Banking Court to apply its mind to see if respondent/plaintiff had made out a case for decree of the matter-Appellant/defendants leave application was dismissed by Banking Court simply on account of non-prosecution without considering whether any substantial question of law or fact had arisen therefrom-Banking Court failed to discharge its duty under the law and had adopted procedure alien to the one envisaged in S. 10 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-It was the Banking Court which while considering petition for leave to appear and defend the suit should have considered and rendered its findings as to whether it was timely filed-High Court in appellate jurisdiction declined to determine whether petition for leave to appear and defend the suit was time barred or not, as Banking Court failed to consider petition filed by appellant/defendant-High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Banking Court as it suffered from legal infirmity and the matter was remanded to Banking Court to decide petition for leave to appear and defend the suit afresh-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nMessrs Bahawalpur Cotton Company v. United Bank Limited 2023 CLD 1116; Oil and Gas Development Company Limited v. Muhammad Ilyas Mian 2018 CLC 1666; Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) v. Mst. Naima Ayub 2013 CLC 1191; Abid Aziz Khan v. Bank of Punjab 2007 CLD 997; Syed Asad Abbas v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 2006 CLD 79; Syed Rashid Hussain v. Bank of Punjab 2005 CLD 1823; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs ARK Messrs Ark Garments Industry (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director 2015 CLD 179; Ghulistan Textile Limited v. Askari Bank Ltd. 2013 CLD 2005; Messrs United Bank Limited v. Banking Court No. II 2012 CLD 1556; National Bank of Pakistan v. Pakistan Textile City Limited 2021 CLD 194; Soneri Bank Limited v. Classic Denim Mills (Pvt.) Limited 2011 CLD 408; United Bank Limited v. Mehmood Ilyas Khan 2012 CLD 1372; Admore Gas (Pvt.) Limited v. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2013 CLD 423; Dr. Jamil Masood Usmani v. Messrs Askari Bank Limited 2016 CLD 387; Askari Leasing Limited v. Sher Bahadur 2011 CLD 1186; Ghulam Rasool v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL) through Bank Manager 2005 CLD 1740; Syed Rashid Hussain v. Bank of Punjab through Managing Director 2005 CLD 1823; Asim Hussain Qadri v. Deuteche Bank 2006 CLD 1129 and Messrs Mumtaz Traders v. Messrs Habib Bank Limited 2009 CLD 169 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10,22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 224 of 2023, decision dated: 13th December, 2023.heard on: 21st November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb and Saman Rafat Imtiaz, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Qasim Bhatti for Appellant.\nMs. Aaliya Zareen Abbasi for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALI WAQAR AZEEM-Appellant\nVS\nSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK PAKISTAN LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24118", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5SXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 302 = 2024 SLD 302 = 2024 CLD 415", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5SXk", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-\n-Ss.40-A & 33-Filing of interim financial statements-Non-compliance-Effect-Appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Commission-Appellants were directors and chief executive of the company who contended that favorable order was passed by the High Court in a constitutional petition filed by the appellant-Validity-Company, admittedly, failed to timely transmit its interim financial statements for the default periods which were submitted subsequently-Reliance on the favorable order of the High Court passed in constitutional petition filed by the appellant could not rescue the appellant from the admitted default in transmission of first quarterly financial statements for the period ended March 31st, 2019 as the same was not the subject-matter of direction which was suspended by the High Court, thus drawing a clear distinction between the default period-in-question and the other periods-Bench upheld the impugned order to the extent of period-in-question, however, partially set-aside the same to the extent of two previous default periods, and also reduced the penalty imposed on the appellant to the extent of default period only-Appeal filed by the directors and chief executive of the company was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=40-A,33", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 97 of 2020, decision dated: 25th August, 2023.heard on: 9th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Rabia Hassan, Ms. Asma Irfan, Company Secretary and Syed Taneem Haider, Chief Financial Officer for Appellants.\nAmir Saleem, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP and Sardar Sohaib Amin, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Before Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24119", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 303 = 2024 SLD 303 = 2024 CLD 418", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Federal and Provincial statutes-Conflict between-In case of conflict between federal and provincial law on same subject, the federal law overrides the provincial law or the part of provincial law that is inconsistent with it.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 22(a)-Parks and Horticulture Authority Act (XLVII of 2012), S.12(8)-Financial institutions and other companies Bill boards and sign boards-Charging of fee-Petitioner companies were aggrieved of notice of demand issued by respondent Authority to recover fee for installing their bill boards, sky boards and advertisements-Validity-Notices in question delivered to petitioners by Parks and Horticulture Authority did not contain specific particulars regarding nature of product which was advertised and the date, time and place it was installed/erected-Such generic notices were vague and simply mentioned various categories of outdoor advertisements directing petitioners to pay fee-Due process requirements would be fulfilled after it had afforded opportunity to petitioners to respond to such notices by taking any and all objections available to them for assailed levy of advertisement fee-High Court set aside notices issued to petitioner companies and High Court directed Parks and Horticulture Authority that if fresh notices were to be issued, directions given by High Court in W.P. No. 208309 of 2018 titled Meezan Bank Limited and others v. The Province of Punjab should be followed-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\n \nThe Bank of Khyber v. Municipal Corporation Gujrat PLD 2021 Lah. 108 distinguished.\nMeezan Bank Limited and others v. The Province of Punjab and others Writ Petition No.208309 of 2018 fol.\nSoneri Bank Limited v. Province of Punjab and others PLJ 2020 Lahore 239; Government of Pakistan and others v. Messrs Hashwani Hotel Limited PLD 1990 SC 68; Ameer Nawaz Khan Niazi and another v. Member Board of Revenue Punjab, Lahore and others 2015 CLC 439 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 1325 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=22(a)Parks and Horticulture Authority Act, 2012=12(8)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 366 of 2022, (and other connected Writ Petitions) heard on 20th October, 2023.\nheard on: 20th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Shams Mehmood Mirza, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Muqtadir Khan for Petitioners (in the present Writ Petition and in Criminal Org. No.53313 of 2023).\nAbad ur Rehman for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 40071 of 2022 and 40569 of 2023).\nMuhammad Yousaf Chudhary-I and Samra Malik for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos.41185 of 2021, 34969 of 2022, 35919 of 2021, 48563 of 2022, 48455 of 2022, 24634 of 2021, 22719 of 2021, 58394 of 2021, 8995 of 2022, Criminal Org. Nos.52719, 8972 of 2022, Criminal Org. Nos.18140 and 18124 of 2023).\nShezada Mazhar and Rizwan Rasool for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos.48733, 19400 of 2021, 31310, 22755 and 21886 of 2022).\nMian Asghar Ali for Petitioner (in W.P. No.47699 of 2021).\nZeeshan Hussain Adil and Haider Ali Khan for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos.47243 and 64348 of 2021, Criminal Org. No.76877 of 2021 and Criminal Org. No.46878 of 2020).\nKashif Ali Chaudhary and Usman Haider Toor for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 33403 of 2022, 65585 of 2020, 25050, 28552 and 26425 of 2022).\nMuhammad Asif Ismail for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos.67304, 1881 of 2021, 34303 of 2019, 36182 of 2019, 32901 of 2020, 17224 of 2020, 34304 of 2019 and Criminal Org. No. 7049 of 2021).\nUsman Ejaz Malik for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos.28864 of 2021 and 34979 of 2022).\nSajjad Haider Rizvi for Petitioner (in W.P. No.48798 of 2021 and Criminal Org. No.74982 of 2021).\nEhsan Ahmad Munir for Petitioner (in W.Ps. Nos.45285 of 2021, 20222 and 34204 of 2023).\nMuhammad Mustafa Khalid and Muhammad Gul Nawaz for Petitioners (in W.P. No.67386 of 2021).\nSyed Hoor Ali Shah for Petitioner (in W.P. No.76002 of 2021).\nAbdur Rehman Bajwa for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos.40569, 27784, 27533, 12304, 75280 of 2022, 40530, 62923 of 2021, 56061 of 2022 and Crl. Org. No.30097 of 2023).\nSyed Sajid Ali Shah Bokhari for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos.65261 of 2023, 4675, 60784 of 2021, 16705 and 24515 of 2022).\nRai Ali Shan Marth for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 51800 of 2023).\nMuhammad Yousaf Sabir Chohan for Petitioner (in W.P. No.48715 of 2022).\nAhmad Khamal Khan for Petitioner (in W.P. No.1599 of 2016).\nAshar Elahi and Usman Nawaz Butt for Petitioner (in W.P. No.5536 of 2021).\nAkhtar Hussain Bhatti for Petitioner (in W.P. No.33456 of 2020).\nRaza ur Rehman Asad for Petitioner (in W.P. No.65261 of 2023).\nHaris Azmat, Waqar A. Sheikh and Barrister Hamza Amjad for Respondent/PHA.\nAli Imran Bhutta for Advertisement Contractor PHA Faisalabad, Gujranwala and Multan.\nMs. Shazia Khakil for Respondent No.5.\nMs. Sana Iqbal for PHA Gujranwala (in W.Ps. Nos.18881, 62987 of 2021 and 13310 of 2022).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB BANK LIMITED and others-Petitioners\nVS\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24120", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 304 = 2024 SLD 304 = 2024 CLD 290", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTY", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 2(68)-Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962), S.23(1)-Listed Companies (Substantial Acquisition of Voting Shares and Take-Overs) Regulation, 2017-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2-Suit for declaration and injunction-Interim injunction, refusal of-Subsidiary company-Word form used in S. 23 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962- Scope- Plaintiff companies challenged acquisition of decisive percentage of shareholding in Bank Islami Pakistan Limited by defendant Bank-Plaintiffs sought injunctive order to restrain defendant-bank and/or purported JS Group, from acquiring majority shareholding in Bank Islami Pakistan Limited-Validity-Subsidiary as defined in S. 2(68) of Companies Act, 2017, could only exist in relation to a holding company in which holding company either (i) controlled composition of the Board of the subsidiary or (ii) exercised or controlled more than one half of its voting securities-Word form used in S. 23 of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 envisaged forming of a subsidiary by acquisition either by control of composition of its Board or control of more than half of its shareholding by way of acquisition under Listed Companies (Substantial Acquisition of Voting Shares and Take-over) Regulation, 2017-This was further strengthened by the fact that S. 23(1) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, used term formed in past tense in respect of the subsidiary taken over by Banking Company, so envisaged a subsidiary which was to be formed or was already formed-Generally word form is a flexible word and takes its meaning from the context in which it is used-Word form has to be given a broader rather than a restrictive meaning as has been done by State Bank of Pakistan-Objective behind and mischief sought to be avoided by S. 23(1) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 is to bar more than one commercial banking license within a group save where a subsidiary is engaged in Islamic banking-Whether the subsidiary is a newly formed company or formed by way of acquisition of its majority shareholding, is immaterial to that objective-Provision of S. 23(1) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, places a general restriction on a banking company from forming any subsidiary company except if the essence/subject matter/character of the business of subsidiary company falls within the exceptions provided for in S. 23(1)(a) to (e) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, which exceptions include business of Islamic banking-Regardless and irrespective of whether the word form means to incorporate and / or to acquire, if the nature of business of the subsidiary company in question is neither of the kind provided for in S. 23(1)(a) to (e) of Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, then a banking company is simply prohibited from its incorporation and/or acquisition and that actually is the spirit of the law and not the method of forming one-High Court declined to grant interim injunction as plaintiff companies were not able to make out prima facie case; balance of inconvenience was not in their favour nor would they suffer irreparable loss in case injunction was refused-Application was dismissed, in circumstances.\nPakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan and 4 others 1991 PTD 359; Multan Educational Trust v. Commissioner Inland Revenue PLD 2014 Lah. 57; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 468 US 837 (1984)(SC) at 842-844; President National Bank of Pakistan v. Waqas Ahmed Khan 2023 SCMR 766; Kohinoor Raiwind Mills Limited v. Kohinoor Gujar Khan Mills 2002 CLD 1314; Kohinoor Raiwind Mills Limited v. Kohinoor Gujar Khan Mills 2002 CLD 1747; Muhammad Yasin Fecto v. Muhammad Raza Fecto 1998 CLC 237; United Bank Limited v. Azmat Textile Mills Limited 2002 CLD 542; Anya Knitwear (Pvt.) Ltd. v. United Bank Limited and others 2005 CLD 114; Bank Alfalah Limited v. Callmate Telips Telecom Ltd. 2016 CLD 1202; Farrukh Raza Sheikh v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue 2022 SCMR 1787 and Muhammad Uneeb Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 345 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=2(68)Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962=23(1)", - "Case #": "Suits Nos. 318 and 674 of 2023, decision dated: 5th July, 2023.\nDates of hearing: 19th, 20th and 21st June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Akram Raja assisted by Basil Nabi Mallik along with Bilal Ahmed Khan and Kehar Khan Hyder for Plaintiffs.\nKhalid Jawed Khan along with Umer Akhund for Defendants Nos.1 and 2.\nShahan Karimi for Defendant No.3.\nS. Mustafa Ali along with Dr. Atifuddin for Defendant No.5/State Bank of Pakistan along with Shahbaz Shahid, Joint Director State Bank of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AYUB TAREEN and others-Plaintiffs\nVS\nJS BANK LIMITED through Chief Executive and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24121", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 305 = 2024 SLD 305 = 2024 CLD 435", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases-\n-Security and surety-Distinction-Security refers to freedom from harm or measures taken to prevent harm, while surety refers to a promise to one party to assume responsibility for the debt obligation of another party, if that party defaults.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXVII, Rr. 2 & 3-Leave to defend the suit-Conditional order, non-compliance of-Effect-In summary suit, when defendant does not obtain leave or leave is refused to him, or where defendant fails to comply with conditional order such defendant is precluded from further contesting plaintiffs claim-There is further disability for defendant under O. XXXVII, C.P.C. that allegations in plaint must be deemed to be admitted and plaintiff would be entitled to a decree-Provisions of O. XXXVII, C.P.C. not only provide for abridgement of procedure of suits so covered but restricts and curtails right of defendants in such suits to contest plaintiffs claim-When matter is carried in appeal, the defendant who did not obtain leave or had failed to comply with conditional order continues to suffer under the same disability.\n(c) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-\n-S. 118-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr. 2 & 3-Suit for recovery of money on the basis of negotiable instruments-Presumption-Leave to defend the suit-Conditional order, non-compliance of-Appellant/defendant was granted leave to defend the suit subject to deposit of security in shape of Defence Saving Certificates-Appellant/defendant failed to comply the condition resultantly suit was decreed against him-Validity-Cheques in question had presumption under S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and contents of plaint and allegations made therein were deemed to be admitted-Appellant/defendant did not comply with conditional order, therefore, he was not entitled to challenge the decree before High Court on such grounds that he had taken in application for leave to defend the suit-High Court declined to interfere with judgment and decree passed by Trial Court as the Court did not err in law by passing a decree-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nCol. (Retd.) Ashfaq Ahmed and others v. Sh. Muhammad Wasim 1999 SCMR 2832; Murtaza Haseeb Textile Mills v. Sitara Chemical Industries 2004 SCMR 882 and Haji Ali Khan and Company Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited Abbottabad PLD 1995 SC 362 ref.\nMuhammad Ramzan and others v. Ghulam Qadir 2011 SCMR 659 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2,3Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=118", - "Case #": "Ist Civil Appeal No. S-30 of 2021, decision dated: 6th November, 2023.heard on: 16th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Arbab Ali Hakro, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Niazuddin N. Memon for Appellant.\nAsif Hyder Phulpoto for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM MUSTAFA-Appellant\nVS\nRASHID ALI-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24122", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 306 = 2024 SLD 306 = 2024 CLD 442", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTQ", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018-\n-Reglns. 4(a), 13(7), 6(3)(a), 6(3)(c), 6(4), 6(8) & 7(1)(b)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 40-A & 33-Anti-Money laundering policies-Regulatory requirements, non-compliance of-Scope and effect-Appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Commission-Appellant who was licensed with Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) as a securities broker, was imposed penalty by the Commission for contravention of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018 (the Regulations)-Contention of the appellant/company was that that NADRA Verisys System was non-feasible/unavailable to the stock-brokers-Held, that the appellant had a responsibility to strictly adhere to the relevant requirements outlined in the Regulations, ensuring full compliance in both letter and spirit especially in the context that that anti-money laundry policies had been in existence since the year 2012 under the PSX guidelines-Appellants argument claiming the unavailability of the NADRA Verisys System lacked supporting evidence regarding any efforts made to obtain the said System-Respondent/Commission while passing the impugned order did take into account the factors contended by the appellant and imposed the penalty accordingly-Appellant failed to meet the mandatory requirements set forth in the Regulations-Regulated individuals were expected to demonstrate a high level of vigilance in adhering to Anti-Money Laundry laws and should not have sought excuses to evade compliance-However, recent record indicated a significant reduction in occurrences of non-compliance with the Regulations during the inspection when contrasted with the instances identified in the prior inspection-Persistence of non-compliance observed in the second evaluation suggested that the appellant had undertaken measures to enhance their diligence practices-Bench, under the said circumstances of the present case, considered it justified to reduce the penalty, therefore, the impugned order was modified to the extent that the penalty imposed upon the appellant was reduced from Rs.650,000 to Rs.300,000-Appeal, filed by the Securities Broker, was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018=4(a),13(7),6(3)(a),6(3)(c),6(4),6(8),7(1)(b)Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=40-A,33", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 35 of 2020, decision dated: 31st August, 2023.heard on: 18th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hammad Kehar, Director and Salman Ahmed for Appellant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP and Muhammad Faisal, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs AXIS GLOBAL LIMITED-Appellant\nVS\nEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR/HOD ADJUDICATION I-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24123", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 307 = 2024 SLD 307 = 2024 CLD 445", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 5-Condonation of delay-Object, purpose and scope-Condonation of delay is a matter of concession and cannot be claimed as a matter of absolute right-It is existence of sufficient cause for not filing proceeding in time before proper forum that must be justified to the satisfaction of Court to exercise its power of granting or refusing to grant condonation of delay/extension of time-If such condition is not satisfied, there is no room for applicability of power to condone delay-Where no cause has, at all, been shown that is, where no explanation has been given for filing proceeding out of time, there arises no opportunity of considering sufficiency or otherwise of the reasons for that fact, and there cannot be any room for the exercise of discretion given under the law-If the condition is satisfied, then Court gets a discretionary power to grant or refuse prayer for extension of time-What is sufficient cause is question of discretion, which depends upon facts and circumstances of a particular case.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. VII, R. 10-Return of plaint-Effect-Once a plaint is returned under O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C., a litigant has option to either file the same before proper forum or institute new suit.\nAbdul Shakoor and others v. Mst. Hawabai and others 1982 SCMR 867 and Messrs Pakistan Agro Forestry Corporation Ltd. v. T.C. PAF Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2003 Kar. 284 rel.\n(c) Insurance Act (IV of 1938)-\n-S. 47-B-Insurance claim-Compound interest-Scope-Self-subscribed Group Insurance Scheme-Appellant/Insurance company was aggrieved of judgment passed by Trial Court in favour of respondent/widow by applying compound interest, who was widow of a Sales Manager-Validity-Scheme was under Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and was a voluntary self-subscribed additional group insurance-Scheme was introduced for the benefit of Sales Managers, Sales Officers and Sales Representatives-As per terms of MOU, Sales Managers and Sales Officers were to be automatically included in the Scheme whereas only Sales Representatives were made eligible provided they had completed at least Rs.15,000 (Rs.10,000 after amendment) First Year Premium (FYP) during the previous calendar year-Requirement to complete FYP was not applicable to Sales Managers (like the husband of respondent) or Sales Officers-Rejection of claim by appellant/company was misconceived and flawed-Wrongful repudiation of claim of respondent/widow by appellant/company, after considerable and unexplained delay could not be countenanced-Insurance contract was aimed to help the insured or his legal heirs to bounce back from certain unforeseen disasters such as death-When an insurance company attempted to renege on its obligations, such act was in bad faith, which included unreasonable delay in processing a claim-Delay in intimating rejection/repudiation of claim of respondent/widow resulted into limitation issue for the insured (including his heirs)-Legal as well as equitable obligations to act in good faith towards each other was squarely applicable to the insurer who was required to act in an honest and upright manner to fulfil its promise-Rejection/repudiation of insurance claims on flimsy and baseless grounds offended principles of equity and justice-Appellant/company was estopped from taking undue advantage by retaining the sums that were due and payable to claimant like respondent/widow-Claim of respondent/widow was genuine and should have been allowed well in time-Denying and repudiating the claim with an inordinate delay in itself exhibited lack of bona fide on part of appellant/company-High Court maintained judgment and decree passed by Trial Court to the extent of claim of respondent/widow amounting to Rs.600,000/- along with compensatory costs of Rs.1,000,000 but findings to the extent of award of compound interest on the claim were set aside-Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\nMst. Robina Bibi v. State Life Insurance and others 2013 CLD 477; Mst. Naseem Begum and others v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and others 2014 SCMR 655; Messrs Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another PLD 2023 SC 482; Water and Power Development Authority v. Aurangzeb 1998 SCMR 1354; Abdul Majeed and another v. Ghulam Haider and others 2001 SCMR 1254; Furqan Habib and others v. Government of Pakistan and others 2006 SCMR 460; Syed Athar Hussain Shah v. Haji Muhammad Riaz and another 2022 SCMR 778; Askari General Insurance Company Limited through President/Chief Executive Officer v. Islam Lubricants (Pvt.) Limited through Director and 2 others 2022 CLD 425; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman/Zonal Head/Attorney and others v. Mst. Razia Begum through Legal Heirs/Representative 2022 CLD 1026; Muhammad Asif and others v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another 2018 CLD 239; Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd., Karachi v. Ravi Steel Company, Lahore PLD 2020 SC 324; State Life Insurance Corporation and others v. Mst. Syeda Muzhara Fatima 2021 CLD 479; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Atta Ur Rehman 2021 SCMR 1347; Sahabzadi Maharunisa and another v. Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another PLD 2016 SC 358; Kiramat Khan v. IG, Frontier Corps and others 2023 SCMR 866 and Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 ref.\nDr. Mahmood-ur-Rahman Faisal and others v. Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others PLD 1992 FSC 1 and Dr. M. Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashim and 2 others PLD 2000 SC 225 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=5Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 16370 of 2019, decision dated: 22nd December, 2023.\nDates of hearing: 16th June, 9th, 12 and 19th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Anwaar Hussain, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ibrar Ahmed along with Barrister Hassan Attique, Manager/Legal Officer and Tariq Altaf Tipu, Deputy Manager Legal, State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan for Appellants.\nLiaqat Ali Butt for Respondent.\nHussain Tahir Zaidi, Amicus Curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Zonal Head/Attorney and another-Appellants\nVS\nMst. UNDLUS BEGUM-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24124", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 308 = 2024 SLD 308 = 2024 CLD 462", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RSs", - "Key Words:": "Balochistan Environmental Protection Act (VIII of 2012)-\n-S. 28(2)-Balochistan Environmental Protection Tribunal Rules, 2017, R. 3(2)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Quo warranto, writ of-Member Environmental Protection Tribunal-Appointment-Extension in second tenure-Petitioner/Bar Council assailed extension in appointment of respondent as Member Environmental Protection Tribunal-Validity-Re-appointment of Chairperson or any member was not provided under Balochistan Environmental Protection Tribunal Rules, 2017, except to extend his tenure only once, for a period of three years-Re-appointment of respondent was not supported by any law and rules framed thereunder-Such appointment was an extension of his tenure and there was also no provision in Balochistan Environmental Protection Act, 2012 and Balochistan Environmental Protection Tribunal Rules, 2017, for further (second) extension-Such extension of respondent was violation of law and was unique example of colourful exercise of power by Chief Minister by overlooking summary and relevant law and rules-Second extension of petitioner was nullity in the eyes of law and was ab-initio void-High Court set aside notification of extension of second tenure of respondent-High Court directed Provincial Government to de-notify respondent as Member Balochistan Environmental Protection Tribunal-Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\nMian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore PLD 1969 SC 223 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 272 of 2023, decision dated: 24th November, 2023.\nheard on: 14th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Kamran Khan Mulakhail and Shoukat Ali Rakhshani, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Munir Ahmed Kakar for Petitioner.\nShai Haq Baloch, Additional Advocate General for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nAdnan Basharat and Shaukat Kakar for Respondent No. 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BALOCHISTAN BAR COUNCIL through Vice-Chairman-Petitioner\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN through Chief Secretary Balochistan,\nCivil Secretariat and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24125", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 309 = 2024 SLD 309 = 2024 CLD 474", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTk", - "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-\n-S. 118-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2-Suit for recovery of money on the basis of negotiable instrument-Leave to defend the suit-Conditional order-Non-compliance-Tempering of cheques-Proof-Appellant/defendant was granted leave to defend the suit subject to furnishing solvent surety-Appellant/defendant failed to furnish the surety, resultantly the suit was decreed against him-Contention of appellant/defendant was that the cheques were tempered-Validity-There was no documentary evidence to corroborate such position-Appellant/defendant sought cancellation of underlying agreement which was the basis of his suit for cancellation but such plea did not lie in summary suit-High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court as the same was well-reasoned and proof of dishonored cheques was annexed with plaint-Trial Court rightly observed that presumption regarding cheques in question under S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was to be admitted-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=118Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 61 of 2023, decision dated: 14th November, 2023.\nheard on: 6th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Sher Afzal for Appellant.\nSardar Abdul Hameed for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUZZAMMIL through Attorney-Appellant\nVS\nKHURRAM SAEED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24126", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 310 = 2024 SLD 310 = 2024 CLD 480", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RTg", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018-\n-Reglns. 6(3)(c), 6(10), 13(1) & 14(3)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 40-A & 33-Regulatory requirements, non-compliance of-Scope and effect-Appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Commission-Appellant ,having been licensed with Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) as a securities broker, was imposed penalty by the Commission for contravention of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018 (the Regulations)-Plea of the appellant was that nothing was done with intention and no mens rea was involved and that by obtaining the tax return/wealth statement of the client, the appellant had rightly determined the profile of the client in compliance of the Regulations-Validity-Arguments/pleas of the appellant were not tenable as the appellant was required to comply with the applicable requirements of the Regulations-Appellant should have been vigilant enough to follow the Regulations-Novice status of the customer did not match the unusual transactions pattern of the customers profile-Appellant erred in its determination of the profile as the same did not correspond with the trading pattern of the client-Appellant failed to update the customer profile and report the transaction based on unusual and unexpected activities in violation of the Regulations-Thus, Appellate Bench viewed that appellant had failed to maintain the record as required under the law-No reason had been found for interference in the impugned order-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018=6(3)(c),6(10),13(1),14(3)Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=40-A,33", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 10 of 2022, decision dated: 25th August, 2023.\nheard on: 25th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Farid Alam, Chief Executive Officer, Naveed Anjum, Head of Compliance and Mudassir Ijaz, Manager Compliance for Appellant.\nMuhammad Faisal, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I, SECP and Hammad Ahmed, Management Executive, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs AKD SECURITIES LIMITED-Appellant\nVS\nDIRECTOR/HOD, ADJUDICATION-I, SECP ISLAMABAD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24127", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 311 = 2024 SLD 311 = 2024 CLD 484", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RXo", - "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-\n-S. 114-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2-Suit for trade mark infringement-Interim injunction-Bona fide owner and prior use-Proof-Trade mark in question was owned by partnership concern and prior or bona fide usage of the trade mark by respondent/plaintiff was denied by appellant/defendant in written statement-Intellectual Property Tribunal restrained appellant / defendant from using trade mark in question-Validity-Interim injunction, by its nature, is a preventive relief preserving status quo of subject matter till final conclusion of the suit-After ascertaining prima facie case, by assessing relevant documents if available, Courts must see existence of remaining two factors of balance of convenience and irreparable loss or injury-Preventive relief, in such circumstances and in the cases of unregistered marks, should not be granted as a matter of course and it is suitable when existence of right by prior use or its creation as well as its infringement are demonstrated with some clarity-High Court set aside order passed by the Tribunal as three ingredients required for grant of interim injunction were not co-existing-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nMessrs Unique School v. Messrs Unique Group of Institutions 2015 CLD 1297; Pioneer Cement Limited through Company Secretary v. Fecto Cement Limited through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others 2013 CLD 201; Qadeer Ahmed v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, The Trade Marks Registry and another 1999 YLR 96; Muhammad Kashan v. Coca Cola Export Corporation through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others 2015 CLD 1513; Yaqoob v. Additional Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and 2 others 1973 SCMR 116 and Kohinoor Soap and Detergents (Private) Ltd through Chief Executive of the Company v. Basra Soap Factory and 4 others 2002 CLD 1223 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001=114Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 7892 of 2020, decision dated: 13th December, 2023.heard on: 8th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hasan Irfan Khan, Saqib Asghar, Mudassar Hassan and Ms. Mahnoor for Appellants.\nSyed Salman Ali Mohsin for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs SAMSARA COUTURE HOUSE (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive and another-Appellants\nVS\nSyeda KHADIJA BATOOOL and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24128", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 312 = 2024 SLD 312 = 2024 CLD 488", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5RXk", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 & 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 89 & 90-Execution of decree-Highest bidder-Vested right-Re-auction-Appellant was the highest bidder who had only deposited 25% of bid money and did not deposit remaining amount-Appellant was aggrieved of order passed by Executing Court to re-auction mortgaged properties-Validity-Appellant as the highest bidder did not assume vested right at such stage-Even acceptance of offer was not a vested right which had to pass through the rigorous of O. XXI, Rr. 89/90, C.P.C. etc.-Merely on the strength of a highest bid, appellant cannot insist for acceptance of its offer and/or confirmation when material available before the court was sufficient to justify order of re-auction of properties both moveable and immoveable which had been ordered to fetch the maximum amount-Unless and until bid was confirmed and sale certificates were issued the absolute rights of highest bidder could not surface-High Court declined to interfere in the matter-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=89,90", - "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No. 288 of 2018, decision dated: 29th December, 2023.heard on: 21st December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Rasool Korai for Appellant.\nBahzad Haider for Respondents Nos. 1 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PSRM STEELS PRIVATE LIMITED-Appellant\nVS\nASKARI BANK LIMITED and 5 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24129", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 313 = 2024 SLD 313 = 2024 CLD 491", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTc", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S. 20-Arbitration-Award made rule of the Court-Petitioner/contractor resisted payment of balance contractual amount and invoked arbitration clause-Trial Court appointed arbitrator who announced the award which was made rule of the Court-Validity-According to agreement, petitioner/contractor was required to make payment of balance amount in ten equal installments on monthly basis on first day of each month but not later than 10 of same month and the last final installment was due on 30-11-2002-Petitioner/contractor deposited an amount of Rs. 890,000/- with Pakistan Tobacco Board and an amount of Rs. 7,200,000/- along with penalty was to be paid-When petitioner/contractor was directed by the Board to deposit outstanding installment, he invoked arbitration clause of the agreement by way of filing an application under S. 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940-Question of loss suffered by petitioner/contractor on account of exemption letter issued by Pakistan Tobacco Board was properly determined in the agreement-Where two views were possible with regard to powers of an arbitrator and the ground upon which arbitration award could be set aside, the Court could not interfere with the award adopting its own interpretations-High Court declined to interfere in the matter-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\n2018 SCMR 662 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=20", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 747 and Civil Revision No. 201 of 2020, decision dated: 26th May, 2021.\nheard on: 19th May, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Ejaz Swati and Rozi Khan Barrech, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Adnan Ejaz for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No. 747 of 2020 and Civil Revision Petition No. 201 of 2020).\nSyeda Tehmina Samad for Respondent No. 1 (in Constitutional Petition No. 747 of 2020 and Civil Revision Petition No. 201 of 2020).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MALIK & COMPANY through Proprietor-Petitioners\nVS\nCHAIRMAN PAKISTAN TOBACCO BOARD, PESHAWAR and others- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24130", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 314 = 2024 SLD 314 = 2024 CLD 496", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTY", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 280, 281, 282, 283 & 285(8)-Scheme of Arrangement-Rights of parties-Petitioners sought approval of understandings and arrangements reached at between borrower and financers/creditors-Validity-High Court could not sit as Court of appeal over and above wisdom disclosed by borrower and creditors while agreeing to certain terms of repayment, provided it was within the frame of company law and within the contours of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-To such extent High Court was bound to watch and commercial wisdom of participant of the Scheme could not be pierced by a Bench who might have its own opinion-Company jurisdiction of High Court in such matters was peripheral and supervisory and not of an appellate authority-By taking into confidence all stakeholders, a policy was devised to settle and pay liabilities of all secured creditors in a befitting manner-To achieve such goal, charged assets of petitioner company were put to sale through Assets Sale Committee consisting of representatives of banks-High Court set aside all objections and approved the Scheme of Arrangement-Petition was allowed, in circumstances.\nGulistan Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Al Baraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2018 CLD 737 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=280,281,282,283,285(8)", - "Case #": "heard on: 4th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Shoaib Rashid and Shahid Iqbal Rana for Petitioner No. 1.\nMs. Heer Memon for Petitioners Nos. 2 to 10.\nWaqar Ahmed for Objector PAIR Investment Company Limited.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GULISTAN SPINNING MILLS LIMITED and 9 others: In the matter of\nJudicial Company Misc. No. 15 of 2019, decision dated: 30th October, 2023." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24131", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 315 = 2024 SLD 315 = 2024 CLD 502", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-\n-S. 39-Registration of copyrights-Word may -Scope-Words may and shall in legal parlance are interchangeable, depending upon the context in which they are used but legislative intent is to be seen and given effect to-Registration of copyrights in terms of S. 39 of Copyright Ordinance, 1962, is not mandatory but optional with the author, publisher, owner or other person interested in the copyright.\n(b) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-\n-S. 39-Registration of copyrights-Object, purpose and scope-Purpose of registration of copyright is to protect interest of a person who has invented or prepared a particular work as against a person who wants to take undue advantage of the same in order to deceive the unwary public-Mere failure to get copyright registered does not invalidate or impair copyright nor destroys the right to sue for copyright infringement.\nMessrs Ferozesons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dr. Col. Retd. K.U. Kureshi and others 2003 CLD 1052; Rabia Bai v. Zeeshan Farooqi 2004 CLD 1163; Digital Medial Solutions Private Limited through Company Secretary v. Warid Telecom Private Limited through Faisal Saeed 2012 CLD 858 and Glaxosmithkilne Services Limited v. Anfords Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited SBLR 2017 Sindh 1537 rel.\n(c) Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012)-\n-S. 2(h) & Schedule Entry 2-Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), S. 39-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9 [as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab) (Amendment) Act (XIV of 2018)], O. VII, R. 10-Suit for recovery of damages-Intellectual property-Copyrights-Jurisdiction of Courts-Principle-Special and general laws-Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs for recovery of damages was returned by Trial Court to be filed before competent forum-Lower Appellate Court on appeal filed by respondents/plaintiffs remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh-Validity-Court which is specialized and exclusive on a particular subject would be more equipped and focused to deal with special subject which may involve interpretation of specialized legal terms and concepts, as compared to an ordinary Court of civil jurisdiction-Such stance also finds its support from the latest amendment regarding jurisdiction of Civil Courts in Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and as per Province of Punjab Amendment brought in S. 9, C.P.C. [as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab) (Amendment) Act (XIV of 2018), dated 20.3.2018]-jurisdiction of Courts provided in the C.P.C. is barred where a general or special law is in force-Respondents/plaintiffs could not insist to pursue their claim before Civil Court-Term Intellectual Property Laws was defined in S. 2(h) of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012, to mean laws specified in its Schedule- Provision of Entry 2 of Schedule to Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012, duly mentioned Copyright Ordinance, 1962 - Where Legislature created a Special Court that would deal with all matters relating to Intellectual Property Laws including matters relating to intellectual property rights along with matters concerned therewith or incidental thereto notwithstanding that suit involved other non-IP related matters-High Court set aside order passed by Lower Appellate Court and plaint of respondents/plaintiff would stand returned for its presentation before concerned Intellectual Property Tribunal-Revision was allowed accordingly.\nMuhammad Multazam Raza v. Muhammad Ayub Khan and others 2022 SCMR 979 and Messrs Shaheen Chemist through Proprietors and 3 others v. Zahid Mehmood Chaudhry and another 2023 CLD 1 rel.\nMessrs Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant 1987 SCMR 1090 ref.\nIslamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Railways and others 2011 SCMR 1836; Mst. Zeeshan Nadeem v. Omer Aziz 2002 CLD 706; Messrs Fact Finders (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. CNBC Pakistan and others 2022 CLC 1397; Reckitt and Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc and others (1990) 1 All ER 873 and Krishika Lulla and others v. Shyam Vithalrao Devkatta and another Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeals Nos.258 and 259 of 2013 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Copyrights Ordinance, 1962=39", - "Case #": "C.R. No. 43193 of 2022, heard on 18th October, 2023.\nheard on: 18th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Farooq Amjad Meer and Ahmad Farooq Meer for Petitioners.\nMudassar Raza Butt, Sajawal Javaid Butt and Muhammad Muazzam Akram for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NESTLE PAK LIMITED, LAHORE through Authorized Signatory and another-Petitioners\nVS\nSHEHRYAR KURESHI and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24132", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 316 = 2024 SLD 316 = 2024 CLD 513", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTQ", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 3(2), 9 & 22-Recovery of finance-Cost of funds-Determination-Appellant/borrower was aggrieved of cost of funds determined by Banking Court and included in decree passed in favour of respondent/financial institution-Validity-Cost of funds of financial institution payable under S. 3(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were as certified by State Bank of Pakistan from time to time-There was no need for Banking Court to exercise its discretion and apply its own formula of cost of funds and not those certified by State Bank of Pakistan-Division Bench of High Court declined to determine rate of cost of funds of commercial banks and there was no basis provided for bifurcating period for which cost of funds was due and payable-High Court set aside the criterion adopted by Banking Court for calculating cost of funds-High Court set aside cost of funds imposed against appellant/borrower and remanded the matter to Banking Court for calculation afresh-Appeal was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=3(2),9,22", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 88 of 2016, decision dated: 8th November, 2023.\nheard on: 8th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Aslam for Appellant.\nRespondent No. 1 in person.\nNemo for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE COMPANY LTD. through Manager Law-Appellant\nVS\nMajor MUHAMMAD ABDUL AZIZ and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24133", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 317 = 2024 SLD 317 = 2024 CLD 518", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QS8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9, 10 & 22-Suit for recovery of finance-Finance facility, non-availing of-Proof-Suit filed by respondent/financial institution was decreed against appellants/customers-Validity-Bald denial of execution of finance and security documents was not convincing when numerous documents were otherwise available on record to substantiate the claim-Board Resolution for seeking renewal of CF-Facility, loan application, acceptance of terms of facility offer letter, execution of documents, finance and security, registration of charge with SECP were sufficient to dismiss applications for grant of leave to defend-Mere institution of suit by appellants/customer, seeking various declarations and grant of unconditional leave to defend to respondent/financial institution did not entitle appellants/customers for grant of leave to defend in suit by respondent/financial institution, as rule of the thumb-High Court maintained judgment and decree passed against appellants/customers, as no illegality was found to justify interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction-Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\nPICIC Commercial Bank Limited v. Spectrum Fisheries Limited 2006 CLD 440; Messrs Muzamil Brothers and another v. Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Limited through Manager 2006 CLD 1546; Jamal Tube (Pvt.) Ltd, Lahore through Chief Executive Officer and others v. First Punjab Modarba, Lahore 2021 CLD 1372; Decent Builders and Developers v. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2021 CLD 130; Obaid Associates through Proprietor and another v. United Bank Limited 2021 CLD 1019; Messrs First Dawood Investment Bank Limited through Authorized Officers/Attorneys v. Mrs. Anjum Saleem and 3 others 2016 CLD 920; Pak Oman Investment Company Limited v. Chenab Limited and 9 others 2016 CLD 1903; The Bank of Punjab v. Arif Ali Shah Bukhari 2016 CLD 1301; Bank of Punjab v. International Ceramics Ltd. and others 2013 CLD 1472; Soneri Bank Limited v. Classic Denim Mills (Pvt.) Limited and 3 others 2011 CLD 408; Nusrat Textile Mills Ltd and 8 others v. United Bank Ltd. through Attorney 2005 CLD 1421; Messrs C.M. Textile Mills Pvt. Limited through Chairman and 5 others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; The Bank of Punjab v. Fazal Abbas and another 2020 CLD 977; NIB Bank Limited through Authorized Officer and Special Attorney v. Messrs Venus Chemicals Private Limited and others 2020 CLD 1227; Zeeshan Energy Ltd. and others v. Faysal Bank Ltd. 2014 SCMR 1048; Muhammad Nawaz v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through Manager and 2 others 2013 CLD 1390; Messrs Dhrala Oil Mills through Partners/Guarantors and 4 others 2014 CLD 153; Elblow Room and another v. MCB Bank Limited 2014 CLD 985; National Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Amna Export (Private) Limited and 2 others 2020 CLD 1243; Habib-ur-Rehman and another v. Judge Banking Court No.4, Lahore and another 2006 CLD 217; Messrs United Dairies Farms (Pvt.) Limited and 4 others v. United Bank Limited 2005 CLD 569; Nand Lal v. Askari Bank Ltd and others 2018 CLD 1176; Messrs M.A. Chaudhry and 3 others v. National Bank of Pakistan, Faisalabad through General Attorney 2005 CLD 875; National Bank of Pakistan and 117 others v. SAF Textile Mills Ltd and another PLD 2014 SC 283 and Apollo Textile Mills and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. 2012 CLD 337 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10,22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 30994 of 2022, decision dated: 11th November, 2023.\nheard on: 25th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Asim Hafeez, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, Barrister Sajid Ikram Siddiqui, Aakif Majeed, Asim Tufail Farooqi and Sajid Hussain Qureshi for Appellants.\nAmbreen Moin and Zain-ul-Abideen for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD JAVED SHAFI and others-Appellants\nVS\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24134", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 318 = 2024 SLD 318 = 2024 CLD 525", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QSs", - "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since reapealed]-\n-Ss. 305 & 309-Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3-Intra Court Appeal-Winding up proceedings-Auction purchaser, rights of-Ad-interim order-Appellant was auction purchaser and aggrieved of proceedings with regard to recovery of government dues during winding up proceedings-Validity-Judge in Chambers of High Court was likely hear the matter and would examine conclusions/issues assailed in ad-interim order, after giving opportunity of hearing to all parties including appellants who would file written reply, counter-affidavit and rejoinder, as the case would be-It was best that the appellant defends the proceedings and once for all puts to rest the challenges raised against auction-purchasers-Remarks made by Judge in Chambers of High Court were tentative subject to re-hearing of all parties and stakeholder-Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in interim order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as interim measures were to be decided by the Single Judge at the time of passing of final order- Appeal was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=305,309", - "Case #": "High Court Appeals Nos. 171 and 172 of 2021, decision dated: 15th November, 2023.\nheard on: 19th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Chaudhry Atif Rafiq for Appellant (in H.C.As. Nos.171 and 172 of 2021).\nAssistant A.G. Abdul Jalil Zubedi for Respondent No. 1 (in H.C.As. Nos.171 and 172 of 2021).\nNemo for Respondent No. 2 (in H.C.As. Nos.171 and 172 of 2021).\nDr. Waseem Iqbal, Official Assignee.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NEW DADU SUGAR MILLS (PVT.) LTD. through Authorized Person and another-Appellants\nVS\nSINDH SUGAR CORPORATION LTD. and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24135", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 319 = 2024 SLD 319 = 2024 CLD 431", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTk", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 122-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 144-Insurance claim-Claim amount already received by the widow/nominee, recovery of-Judgment being per incuriam-Effect-Insurer availed policy in the year 1995 but died in the year 1998-Insurance Tribunal dismissed application of the widow/nominee of the insurer, however, her claim amount was decreed by the High Court, and in execution she received part amount in the year 2010-After lapse of more than three years, State Life Insurance Corporation (the Corporation) filed, in the execution before the Insurance Tribunal, an application under S. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for the restitution of the claim amount already paid to the widow/respondent-With reference to the case titled Mst. Robina Bibi v. State Life Insurance reported as 2013 CLD 477 (judgment-in-question), the petitioner (Corporation) contended that all the judgments passed by the Division Benches of the High Court were declared to be per incuriam in which the insurance policies were issued prior to the promulgation of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, thus the same was applicable in case of the respondent (widow/nominee)-Plea of the widow/respondent was that when the High Court accepted appeal in her favour allowing her claim, the judgment-in-question was not in field, and that she being a lady of advanced age had already consumed the(received) claim amount for her day to day life-Validity-In the present case though the judgment passed by the High Court in favour of respondent(widow/nominee) was ,no doubt, declared to be per incuriam but the respondent/widow had already received the claim amount much before the judgment-in-question was passed-It was only a technical question which resulted in the judgment-in-question to be per incuriam-Respondent husband was insured by the petitioner/Corporation and respondent as nominee was entitled to his death claim for which she suffered rigors of litigation over decades-Merits of respondents case were also held in her favour by the High Court in appeal preferred by her-No mala fide or fraud could be attributed to the respondent (widow/nominee)-Application filed by the State Life Insurance Corporation under S. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for restitution/refund of the claim amount having been received by the respondent (widow/nominee) of the insurer, being meritless, was dismissed.\nPLD 2008 SC 2013; PLD 2008 SC 522 and 2021 CLD 686 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=144", - "Case #": "Application No. 7 of 2023, decision dated: 25th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Justice (Retd.) Muhammad Khalid Alvi, Chairperson and Syed Ali Abbas District and Sessions Judge, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mst. Robina Bibi v. State Life Insurance 2013 CLD 477 distinguished.\nQazi Mansoor Ahmed for Petitioner.\nUsman Ali Butt for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN through Authorized Officer/Attorney-Petitioner\nVS\nMst. RIFFAT ASGHAR-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24136", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 320 = 2024 SLD 320 = 2024 CLD 413", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)-\n-Ss. 13, 15, 19 & 22-Eviction petition-Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of-Oral tenancy-Scope-Petitioner (eviction petitioner)claimed that respondent /tenant had acquired possession of the premises from the purported previous owner, who had sold the premises to the petitioner through a sale-deed and purported previous owner at the time of sale told respondent/tenant that from then onwards he (occupant) would be tenant of the petitioner, who acknowledged the same-Eviction petition filed by the petitioner against the respondent (tenant) was concurrently dismissed-Stance of respondent (tenant/occupant) was that he was tenant of someone else who was original owner of the demised-property on the strength of an agreement in writing, drawn on stamp paper and registered with Rent Registrar-Validity-In order to prove the issue as to the existence of landlord and tenant relationship, the petitioner had adopted a certain claim/stance, however, in the entire ejectment petition no name of witness was mentioned in the presence of whom the alleged statements were made by purportedly previous owner or respondent/tenant-Nevertheless, the petitioner later introduced two witnesses of the said fact, who tendered their affidavits but one of the said witnesses had contradicted various parts of the very statement of the petitioner as a witness and failed to answer most of the important questions and kept stating that he had no knowledge as to those questions or facts; he though stated that respondent /tenant had acknowledged the tenancy or payment of the future rent to petitioner but contradicted the statement of petitioner as to the time of the alleged oral acknowledgement as well as number of persons present at that time-Not only the petitioner failed to mention names of witnesses of oral tenancy / acknowledgment by respondent / tenant in his leave and led evidence beyond his pleadings but at the same time the only witness produced by the petitioner had contradicted him, causing further damage to his case-Said witness further admitted that he was nephew of the petitioner and gave clear impression that he had stated as such only on account of that relationship-One other person who was also stated to be present at the material time was not produced for cross-examination, claiming that respondent-side had won him over-It was alleged by the petitioner that rent of two months (in the year 2012) was paid by respondent/tenant but he failed to prove the same through oral or documentary evidence-Falsehood to the extent of oral tenancy between petitioner and respondent/tenant or any acknowledgment of respondent/tenant in said regard was amply clear-On the contrary, the respondent/tenant, in support of his claim, brought on record rent-agreement and got the same duly exhibited, which registered document carried presumption of correctness, and the same was further supported by cogent and confidence inspiring evidence of his two witnesses-Thus, there was nothing available on record to establish that the purported previous owner and respondent/tenant had landlord and tenant relationship-Oral tenancy between the two was pleaded to make out the case that the petitioner had stepped into shoes of said previous owner, however, said oral tenancy could not be proved by producing any receipt or leading independent evidence-No illegality or irregularity had been noticed in the impugned judgments and orders passed by both the Courts below-Constitutional petition filed by the eviction petitioner was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)-\n-Ss. 2(d), 2(l), 13, 15, 19 & 22-Eviction petition-Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of-Rent dispute-Rent Tribunal, jurisdiction of-Scope-Petitioner (eviction petitioner) on the strength of sale deed and mutation, claimed that previous owner of demised premises, who had rented out the premises to respondent , had sold out the premises to the petitioner-Eviction petition filed by the petitioner against the respondent (tenant) was concurrently dismissed on the basis that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties-Contention of the petitioner was that both the Courts below had ignored S. 2(d) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (the Act, 2009) which recognized that any person having ownership of the premises or part thereof or share in joint khata, where the premises was situated could file ejectment petition-Validity-Combined reading of Ss. 13 & 15 of the Act, 2009 as well as definitions of landlord and tenant as per Ss. 2(d) & 2(l) of the Act, 2009 reflects that remedy of eviction under the Act, 2009 was available only when the landlord of the premises could first establish that one sought to be evicted had a relationship of tenant with such landlord-Eviction petition could be maintained upon expiry of tenancy, failure of payment of rent, breach of terms and conditions of tenancy agreement, violation by tenant of obligation under S.13 of the Act, 2009 and unauthorized use of premises or subletting without written consent, while all the grounds given in S.15 of the Act, 2009 required some violation by the tenant-If a person was not a tenant of the ejectment petitioner that meant no ground was available to such person to seek eviction of tenant-Jurisdiction of Rent Tribunals was provided to regulate the relationships of landlords and tenants, to provide a mechanism for settlement of their disputes in an expeditious and cost effective manner and for the matters connected thereto-Said jurisdiction was not available as an alternate to other jurisdictions provided in law or claims of possession through partition or disputed title or for that matter other claims that were required to be resolved by the Civil Courts-No illegality or irregularity had been noticed in the impugned judgments and orders passed by both the Courts below-Constitutional petition filed by the eviction petitioner was dismissed, in circumstances.\nCh. Abdul Waheed through L.Rs. v. Zahida Parveen alias Nagina and 5 others 2021 YLR 1973 ref.\nMst. Badarun Nisa v. Dr. Abdul Rehman and others PLJ 2017 SC 457 distinguished.\n(c) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)-\n-Ss.13, 15, 19 & 22-Eviction petition-Grounds-Property required for personal use-Not a ground in the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009-Eviction petitioner had set-up the number of grounds of eviction in relevant paragraph of his eviction-petition in which he had included the ground of requirement of property for personal use also, which (ground) was not available in the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 whereas other grounds of default in payment of rent etc.were dependent on the relationship of landlord and tenant-Petitioner failed to establish said relationship between himself and respondent-Petitioner alleged that respondent was tenant of previous owner but he could not prove the same by leading dependable evidence-No illegality or irregularity had been noticed in the impugned judgments and orders passed by both the Courts below-Constitutional petition filed by the eviction petitioner was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 =13,15,19,22,2(d),2(f),13,15,19,22", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.25062 of 2020, heard on 22nd May, 2023.\nheard on: 22nd May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Kashwer Naheed for Petitioner.\nShehzada Mazhar for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL REHMAN-Petitioner\nVS\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24137", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 321 = 2024 SLD 321 = 2024 CLD 408", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QXo", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 48-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 181- Execution petition-Limitation-Doctrine of merger-Scope-Execution petition filed by the petitioners was dismissed as being time barred-Validity-Suit filed by the petitioner culminated in dismissal at first instance, prompting the petitioner to file Civil Appeal, where judgment was entered in her favour with the impugned judgment and decree being set aside and suit was decreed as prayed-Appellate decree was then drawn up accordingly on 04.07.2011- Respondent filed Civil Revision Application which was dismissed on 18.09.2018, without any interim order for stay or suspension of the Appellate decree having ever been made during pendency of the matter-In that backdrop the Execution Application came to be filed by the petitioner on 20.04.2019-Case of the petitioner turned on the assertion that the doctrine of merger extended to the proceedings of the revisional forum, and that as the Appellate Decree merged into the final order/judgment of the revisional Court, the period of limitation began to run from the date of disposal of the Revision Application-Held, that revision was dismissed on 18.09.2018 for non-prosecution and no order had been made during the proceedings for stay or suspension of the Appellate Decree-As such, the doctrine of merger sought to be relied upon by the petitioner would not apply-Petition was dismissed accordingly.\nMuhammad Nazir v. Qaiser Ali Khan 2003 SCMR 436; Muhammad Umar Gul v. Ikram Ullah Khan 1997 MLD 1917 and Bakhtiar Ahmed v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2013 SCMR 5 ref.\nMaulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Ali Asghar Shah 1992 SCMR 241; Balakanat v. Mst. Munni Dail AIR 1914 PC 65 and Sahabzadi Maharunisa and another v. Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another PLD 2016 SC 358 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=48Limitation Act, 1908=181", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. 4940 of 2021, decision dated: 11th November, 2022.\nheard on: 21st September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh, C.J. and Yousuf Ali Sayeed, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Wajid Wyne for Petitioner.\nSyed Hassan M. Abidi for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZEBA ILYAS-Petitioner\nVS\nKARACHI METROPOLITAN CORPORATION through Administrator and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24138", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 322 = 2024 SLD 322 = 2024 CLD 396", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5QXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)-\n-S. 54-Sale-Defined-Sale means transaction of any land with permanent transfer of title/ownership against payment of price in shape of money-Sale is transfer of ownership of immovable property in exchange for a price paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised-For such transaction, payment of price must be contemplated; same must be followed by delivery of possession-Mere registration of document of sale deed and attestation of mutation in favour of vendee amounts to mature title of vendee which is merely a subsequent event for fiscal purpose or to update official record.\nBlacks Law Dictionary; Muhammad Khuibaib v. Ghulam Mustafa (deceased) through LRs 2020 CLC 1039 and Muhammad Nazeef Khan v. Gulbat Khan and others 2012 SCMR 235 rel.\n(b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-Ss. 5 & 13-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Right of pre-emption-Talb-i-Ishhad, notice of-Proof-Withholding of evidence-Presumption-Respondent/pre-emptor filed suit for possession through pre-emption which was concurrently decreed in his favour by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court-Validity-Witness of respondent/pre-emptor neither stated that he was handed over any notice/letter to affect service upon petitioner/defendant nor served the same upon him-Respondent/pre-emptor failed to prove service of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad- Non-production of acknowledgment receipt (A.D) amounted to withholding of material evidence and such flaw had grave adverse effect on the case of respondent/pre-emptor-Witness of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad was also not produced by respondent/pre-emptor nor any explanation was furnished in that regard, which amounted to withholding of the best evidence and it would be legally presumed that had the witness been produced in evidence, he would have deposed unfavourably against respondent/pre-emptor and presumption under Art. 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, would go against him-Respondent/pre-emptor failed to prove service of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad-Both the Courts below committed misreading and non-reading of evidence and had also failed to apply correct law which rendered such dicta as not sustainable in the eyes of law-High Court under S. 115 C.P.C, had jurisdiction to interfere in perverse concurrent judgments and decrees of two lower fora-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below and dismissed the suit filed by respondent/pre-emptor-Revision was allowed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Hashim v. Sona Khan and 5 others 2015 CLC 223; Muhammad Mansha and another v. Muhammad Nawaz 2014 MLD 1346; Allah Ditta through LRs and others v. Muhammad Anar 2013 SCMR 866; Munawar Hussain and others v. Afaq Ahmed 2013 SCMR 721; Muhammad Riaz v. Muhammad Ramzan 2023 SCMR 1305; Bashir Ahmed v. Ghulam Rasool 2011 SCMR 762; Sardar Muhammad (deceased) through LRs v. Taj Muhammad (deceased) through LRs and others 2023 SCMR 1113; Hafeez Ahmad and others v. Civil Judge, Lahore and others PLD 2012 SC 400; Naseem Ahmad and another v. Air Botswana (Pty) Ltd. and 5 others 1993 SCMR 647 and Nazim-ud-Din and others v. Sheikh Zia-Ul-Qamar and others 2016 SCMR 24 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882=54Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991=5,13Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=129(g)", - "Case #": "C. R. No. 550-D of 2016, decision dated: 13th October, 2023.\nheard on: 27th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Muhammad Asif and Waqas Sher Afzal for Petitioners.\nSh. Ahsan-ud-Din and Sh. Zulfiqar Ali for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAHID KHAN and others-Petitioners\nVS\nMUHAMMAD AHSAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24139", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5ODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 323 = 2024 SLD 323 = 2024 CLD 392", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5ODc", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497, third and fourth provisos-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 377 & 506-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act (XIII of 2010), S. 53-Unnatural offences and criminal intimidation if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt etc.-Bail, refusal of-Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial-Contributory delay-Gravity of the act alleged-Scope-Although the delay in conclusion of trial was floating on the surface of the record, however, it had to be determined that delay-in-question was, prima facie, willful and deliberate and could only be attributed to the prosecution or the same was a contributory delay in which the defence was equally responsible to delay the conclusion of the event followed by its adjudication on its merits-Record revealed that there was a contributory delay, in conclusion of trial, either on the part of the petitioner/accused, prosecution, or otherwise due to the strikes etc.-Even the trial had been adjourned, for considerable number of dates of hearing, on the Reader-Note for the want of Presiding Officer-Periods of contribution in delay-in-question could not be attributed to a single functionary of the Court i.e prosecution or defence or otherwise, rather it was a contributory delay, on which score alone, it would be un-wise that, while holding the prosecution responsible, the petitioner/accused be allowed a walk-over or a chance to encash the delay and not to shoulder the responsibility of the contributory delay-Petitioner/accused had allegedly been charged for committing unnatural act with a minor/victim-Fourth proviso of S. 497 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was fully attracted in petitioners case, therefore, he could not be extended the benefit of third proviso of S. 497 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898-Bail was declined to the petitioner/accused, in circumstances.\n \nAllah Wasaya v. The State and others PLD 2022 SC 541 and Rehmat Ullah v. The State and another 2011 SCMR 1332 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=377,506", - "Case #": "B.A. No. 237-M of 2023, decision dated: 20th April, 2023.heard on: 20th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Shahid Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Amin Khan for Petitioner.\nSyed Sultanat Khan, Assistant A.G. and Imran Khan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SALMAN KHAN-Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24140", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5ODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 324 = 2024 SLD 324 = 2024 MLD 387", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5ODY", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 42 & 54-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2-Suit for declaration and injunction-Interim injunction, grant of-Dispute with regard to demarcation of suit land and right of way-Creating third party interest over the strip of land in question could prejudice right of plaintiff insofar as ingress and egress of the plaintiff over the plot through main Jinnah Avenue and its service lane (if so determined) was concerned-Such determination required evidence as to what the original plan of defendant/Civil Aviation Authority was; whether the strip was included within the land that was granted to defendant/Civil Aviation Authority and if so for what purpose that strip of land was left for, as it was adjacent to a huge land and owners access could not be blocked; and whether subject plot as disclosed to have been bounded from the northern side by Jinnah Avenue Road could still be objected as far as right of way was concerned, on the count of security etc.-Plaintiff had to demonstrate only an arguable case-Plaintiff had shown prima facie case-Buying property on as is where is basis did not conclude that it was purchased with an understanding that there was no right of way from the northern side (Jinnah Avenue)- High Court granted interim injunction to the extent that defendant/Civil Aviation Authorities was restrained from creating third party interest over the strip of land that bifurcated plot in question and Jinnah Avenue-Application was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "Suit No. 2020 of 2021, C.M.As. Nos. 15030 and 15031 of 2021 decided on 22nd March, 2023.Dates of hearing: 14th, 23rd September, 2022, 1st, 3rd, 10th, 20th, 27th February and 6th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ayan Memon and Ali Zuberi for Plaintiff.\nKhurram Rasheed for Defendant No. 2.\nSandeep Malani, Assistant Advocate General and Ms. Mahreen Ibrahim, Assistant Attorney General for Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs FORTUNE FOUR LLP through Designated Partner-Plaintiff\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Aviation Division and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24141", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5ODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 325 = 2024 SLD 325 = 2024 CLD 359", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5ODU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34-Police Rules, 1934, R. 24.5(1)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Delay of one hour and fifteen minutes in lodging the FIR-Consequential-Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing-Incident took place on 28.06.2017 at 6.00 p.m. in the area which was at a distance of three farlang from the place of occurrence-Complainant reported the incident through written complaint at Police Station, after that FIR was registered at 07.15 p.m.-Complainant took one hour and fifteen minutes to report the incident to the police-Complainant deposed during cross-examination that after about fifteen minutes of the occurrence, he went to bazaar and got drafted a written complaint-Said witness deposed that police arrived at the place of occurrence after about one and half/two hours after the occurrence-Upon arrival of the police, complainant got written the application for registration of case and went to police station and then police came at the spot and brought the dead body-Investigating Officer deposed during examination-in-chief that on receiving the complaint, moved by complainant, on his dictation, FIR was generated through the computer system-However, the written complaint was not recorded in the FIR register, which threw doubt on the time of reporting the incident to the police-Police did not register FIR in the book/register kept for registration of cases and instead entered the complaint in the computer and assigned a number-No explanation had been furnished regarding how the FIR registration number and E-tag number appeared on that document-Said fact led to only one inference that the document was prepared later-Evidential value of the FIR would be reduced if it was made after the unexplained delay, particularly when the same was not entered in the printed Form as provided under R. 24.5(1) of Police Rules, 1934-Thus, the mandatory provisions of the law were departed from which created doubt about the truthfulness of the allegation levelled in the FIR-When the incident was reported to the police and unexplained holes were left in the prosecution story, the benefit of same must accrue to the accused-Circumstances established that the prosecution had badly failed to bring home a charge against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Presence of eye-witnesses at the spot not proved-Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing-Investigating Officer prepared an inquest report, wherein the names of the complainant and eye-witness had not been mentioned in column No.4, and the inquest report was not signed by any of the eye-witnesses or the complainant-Although, the Investigating Officer had categorically asserted that he recorded the statements of the witnesses under S. 161 of Cr.P.C. and also made the investigation, which showed that the witnesses were not present at the place of occurrence-Complainant, after half an hour after the incident, went to the market and got drafted a complaint, and after that, he went to the police station to report the incident-Said deposition of the complainant revealed that before reporting the incident to the police, complainant managed two witnesses-Admittedly, one witness belonged to another district, which was about 70/80 kilometers, whereas other witness belonged to a place, which was 5/7 kilometers from the place of occurrence-Presence of both the said witnesses at the time of preparation of the inquest report at 07:15 p.m. on 28.06.2017 suggested that the FIR had been registered after due consultation and deliberation by the complainant and also created doubt regarding the actual time of proceedings of inquest taken by the Investigating Officer, as they were called by the complainant through a telephone call from their respective places- Circumstances established that the prosecution had badly failed to bring home a charge against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Delay of ten hours and forty five minutes in conducting the post-mortem examination not explained-Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing-On perusal of complaint, FIR, it revealed that the same was lodged at 07:15 p.m. on 28.06.2017, and postmortem was conducted by Medical Officer on 29.06.2017 at 06:00 a.m., with a delay of about 10 hours and 45 minutes from the time of registration of FIR-Prosecution did not explain the delay in conducting the postmortem examination-Circumstances established that the prosecution had badly failed to bring home a charge against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\nIrshad Ahmed v. The State 2011 SCMR 1193 rel.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Interested and related witnesses, evidence of-False implication-Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing-Admittedly, the prosecution witnesses were interested and inimical towards the accused-Accused was the son of co-accused and brother of two acquitted accused persons-Complainant deposed during cross-examination that about six months earlier to the occurrence, he lodged FIR under S. 364, P.P.C., regarding the abduction of a witness against the co-accused and his sons-Similarly, the eye-witness deposed during cross-examination that a criminal case was registered against accused and his father etc regarding his abduction-Said case was registered by the complainant of the present case-So, all these facts suggested that both the prosecution witnesses were not only inimical towards the accused persons but were also closely related to the deceased, and they had reasons to implicate the accused persons falsely-Circumstances established that the prosecution had badly failed to bring home a charge against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Recovery of weapon of offence and crime empties-Inconsequential-Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing-Per the prosecution case, the Investigating Officer deposed that on 28.06.2017, he collected 13 crime empties of 9MM pistol which were secured from the place of occurrence and on the same day he handed over a sealed parcel of the 13 crimes empties to Head Constable for onward transmission to the office of Forensic Science Agency-HC deposed that he handed over a sealed parcel of the 13 crimes empties to the Investigating Officer, on 03.07.2017-Investigating officer deposed that on 03.07.2017, he received a sealed parcel of the 13 crimes empties from Head Constable and deposited the same on the same day with the office of Forensic Science Agency-Investigating Officer deposed that he arrested accused on 14.08.2017-On 24.08.2017, accused got recovered a pistol 9-MM along with two magazines and two live bullets and on the same day, the Investigating Officer handed over a sealed parcel of the pistol 9-MM (P-4) to Head Constable for onward transmission to the office of Forensic Science Agency-Head Constable deposed that he handed over a sealed parcel of the pistol 9-MM to the Investigating Officer on 29.08.2017-Investigating Officer deposed that on 29.08.2017, he received a sealed parcel of pistol 9-MM from Head Constable and deposited the same on the same day with the office of Forensic Science Agency-Sealed parcel of case property was handed over to the Investigating Officer, but he had not stated that he received back pistol 9-MM and the 13 crimes empties from the office of Forensic Science Agency-Entire prosecution evidence was silent on that aspect of the case-Thus, there was no link evidence to prove that the pistol 9-MM recovered from the accused and 13 crime empties secured from the place of occurrence were again received back from Investigating Officer or any other Police Officer by the moharrar Malkhana, and the same were re-deposited in the Malkhana or handed over to the Moharrar-On 01.09.2018, 13 crime empties and on 15.11.2018, the pistol 9-MM were produced in the testimony of witnesses-Head Constable or any other prosecution witness had not stated that they collected 13 crime empties and pistol from the office of Forensic Science Laboratory and re-deposited the same with the malkhana-Thus, it casted doubt whether it was the same case properties i.e. pistol and crime empties respectively, that were recovered from the accused and secured from the place of occurrence, and, after that sent to Forensic Science Laboratory or whether it was case property of some other case-Prosecution did not prove that case property 13 crime empties and pistol were kept in safe custody and its benefit would go to the accused-Circumstances established that the prosecution had badly failed to bring home a charge against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34-Qanun-e-Shahdat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Bullet pulled from dead body not sent for forensics-Consequential-Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing-Record showed that the Medical Officer, who conducted the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased, recovered one metallic bullet from the left lung and handed it over to the police-Said metallic body was neither sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for its comparison with the pistol recovered at the pointing of the accused nor the same was exhibited in evidence of the prosecution-Thus, it was established from the evidence of Police Constable and postmortem report that Medical Officer recovered the metallic body from the left lung of the deceased and handed it over to the police, therefore, an adverse inference was to be drawn that had the metallic body been sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for its comparison then the said report would have been unfavorable to the prosecution-Circumstances established that the prosecution had badly failed to bring home a charge against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\n(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Motive not proved-Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing-Motive behind the incident was that brother-in-law of the complainant was a Police Officer and was martyred in 2010-Property left by said Police Officer was illegally possessed and usurped by co-accused and his sons, and the issues relating to said property were being looked after by the widow of the deceased and brother of the complainant/ deceased; and due to said grudge, all the accused persons, with a common object, murdered the deceased-Prosecution case in that regard was vague and could hardly inspire confidence-Complainant disclosed during cross-examination that some other litigation was pending before the Court-About 15/20 days earlier to the murder of the deceased, a compromise was effected before District Collector regarding land left between the parties-Documentary evidence on the record revealed that no litigation was pending between the accused persons and the widow of deceased-Investigating Officer admitted during cross-examination that he had not interrogated widow of the deceased-Investigating Officer deposed during cross-examination that the motive was stated to be the property of widow of deceased but he did not record the statement of that widow in support of motive part-Complainant deposed during cross-examination that both wives of deceased and his children were alive but they did not state any of them as his witness; that however, they produced one of the wives of deceased during the proceedings before the police-Thus, an adverse inference was to be drawn within the meaning of Art. 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 that had widow of deceased appeared in the witness box she would have been unfavourable to the prosecution-Alleged motive was an afterthought and had not been proved by any credible evidence-Circumstances established that the prosecution had badly failed to bring home a charge against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\nLal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846 and The State and others v. Abdul Khaliq and others PLD 2011 SC 554 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,34Police Rules, 1934=24.5(1)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 27767, P.S.L.A. No. 41181 and Murder Reference No. 241 of 2019, decision dated: 26th June, 2023.\nheard on: 14th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Aalia Neelum and Asjad Javaid Ghural, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Ashraf Kamboh, Amer Shahbaz Siddiqui, Ms. Maryem Yasin Khan and Sajid Hussain Chaudhary for Appellant.\nRana Ahsan Aziz, Additional Prosecutor General with Ashraf, ASI for the State.\nNasir-ud-Din Khan Nayyar for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAHA AZAAM ULLAH and others-Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24142", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5NDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 339 = 2024 SLD 339 = 2024 SLD 238", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5NDk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(5)-Bail, cancellation of-Principle-Bail can only be cancelled if bail granting order appears to be perverse and gross illegality has been committed.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(5)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 337-A(i), 337-D & \n337-F-Murderous assault-Petition for cancellation of bail-Complainant mentioned the time of occurrence as 01:00 p.m., whereas, the FIR was registered at 05:20 p.m., which showed delay of about 04 hours and 20 minutes without giving any explanation, as such, element of due deliberation and consultation in nomination of accused persons by the complainant could not be ruled out-Record further indicated that a civil dispute over the construction of wall/house existed between the parties- Medical certificate of injured showed that only one injury was observed and the same at the most came under definition of S. 337-A(i), P.P.C., which was bailable in nature-Prima facie Ss. 337-D & 337-F, P.P.C. were not attracted in the present case-Trial Court had given valid reasons for confirmation of ad-interim pre-arrest bail of accused persons-Allegation of abusing or misusing the concession of bail by the accused persons was not supported by affidavit of any witness-Petition for cancellation of bail was dismissed, in circumstances.\n2005 SCMR 1539; 2009 SCMR 786; Jamal-ud-Dins case 1983 SCMR 1979 and Meeran Bux v. State PLD 1989 SC 347 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(5)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=337-A(i),337-D", - "Case #": "Criminal Bail Cancellation Application No. 484 of 2022, decision dated: 4th April, 2023.heard on: 17th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Iqbal Ahmed Kasi, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Amanullah Tareen for Applicant.\nNasrullah, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State/ Respondent No. 1.\nMirwais Khan Tareen for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NISAR AHMED-Applicant\nVS\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24143", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5NDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 340 = 2024 SLD 340 = 2024 MLD 225", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5NDg", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 25 & 199-Educational institution-Admission to medical college-Discrimination-Petitioners/candidates were aggrieved of eligibility criteria determined for admissions to Medical College for Overseas Pakistanis and others-Validity-Classification for candidates who had studied abroad for a mere 2-year period, no matter where that may be, were considered to be at an academic advantage compared to candidates who had acquired their education in Pakistan-Such classification amounted to a damning indictment of the overall state of education in country-While a distinction might be drawn for purposes of admission between local Pakistanis and persons who are overseas Pakistanis, the latter genre cannot be broadened vide impugned classification in question merely on the basis of two-years of foreign education, so as to encompass persons who are Pakistani citizens and otherwise possess qualifications and thus preclude them from applying for general merit seats-High Court set aside classification in question as the same was unreasonable and could not be introduced in the prospectus as a device to put an otherwise eligible Pakistani citizen beyond the pale of consideration-Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.\nAbdul Baqi and others v. Muhammad Akram and others PLD 2003 SC 163 and Mst. Attiyya Bibi Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary of Education (Ministry of Education, Civil Secretariat, Islamabad and others 2001 SCMR 1161 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25,199", - "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos. D-692 and D-1098 of 2022, decision dated: 14th November, 2022.\nheard on: 14th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Ali M. Shaikh, C.J. and Yousuf Ali Sayeed, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aaqib Rajper for the Petitioners (in C. P. No. D-692 of 2022).\nNazir Ahmed Shar for the Petitioner (in C. P. No. D-1098 of 2022).\nZeeshan Abdullah for the Pakistan Medical Commission.\nAbdul Waheed Syal for Jinnah Sindh Medical University.\nMuhammad Wasiq Mirza and Syed Israr Hussain for Respondents/Dow University of Medical and Health Science, Karachi.\nTalha Abbasi for Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto Medical University, Larkana, Muhammad Jawwad Dero, Additional Advocate General, Sindh and Kazi Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, DAG.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAWAL and others-Petitioners\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24144", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5NHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 341 = 2024 SLD 341 = 2024 MLD 225", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5NHo", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 25 & 199-Educational institution-Admission to medical college-Discrimination-Petitioners/candidates were aggrieved of eligibility criteria determined for admissions to Medical College for Overseas Pakistanis and others-Validity-Classification for candidates who had studied abroad for a mere 2-year period, no matter where that may be, were considered to be at an academic advantage compared to candidates who had acquired their education in Pakistan-Such classification amounted to a damning indictment of the overall state of education in country-While a distinction might be drawn for purposes of admission between local Pakistanis and persons who are overseas Pakistanis, the latter genre cannot be broadened vide impugned classification in question merely on the basis of two-years of foreign education, so as to encompass persons who are Pakistani citizens and otherwise possess qualifications and thus preclude them from applying for general merit seats-High Court set aside classification in question as the same was unreasonable and could not be introduced in the prospectus as a device to put an otherwise eligible Pakistani citizen beyond the pale of consideration-Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.\nAbdul Baqi and others v. Muhammad Akram and others PLD 2003 SC 163 and Mst. Attiyya Bibi Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary of Education (Ministry of Education, Civil Secretariat, Islamabad and others 2001 SCMR 1161 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25,199", - "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos. D-692 and D-1098 of 2022, decision dated: 14th November, 2022.\nheard on: 14th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Ali M. Shaikh, C.J. and Yousuf Ali Sayeed, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aaqib Rajper for the Petitioners (in C. P. No. D-692 of 2022).\nNazir Ahmed Shar for the Petitioner (in C. P. No. D-1098 of 2022).\nZeeshan Abdullah for the Pakistan Medical Commission.\nAbdul Waheed Syal for Jinnah Sindh Medical University.\nMuhammad Wasiq Mirza and Syed Israr Hussain for Respondents/Dow University of Medical and Health Science, Karachi.\nTalha Abbasi for Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto Medical University, Larkana, Muhammad Jawwad Dero, Additional Advocate General, Sindh and Kazi Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, DAG.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAWAL and others-Petitioners\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24145", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5NHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 342 = 2024 SLD 342 = 2024 MLD 203", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1J5NHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Foodstuffs (Control) Act (XX of 1958)-\n-S. 3-Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011, First Schedule, Column-III, Sr. No. 12-Standing Operating Procedure dated 21.9.2022 issued by Director Food Punjab, Clause VI-Wheat release milling policy 2022-2023 dated 19.09.2022-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 18-Standing Operating Procedure dated 21.09.2022 (the SOP), Clause VI, vires of-Restriction that no wheat quota to any flour mill would be issued during the days of Army grinding-Legality-Rights of trade and business-Scope-Contention of the petitioner/Mill was that the Clause-VI of the SOP patently contradicted the Wheat Release Milling Policy 2022-2023 dated 19.09.2022 (the Policy) and also that the SOP issued by the respondent/Director Food Punjab lacked sanction of the respondent/Secretary Food Department-Validity-Pertinently, Director Food, Punjab, being the head of attached department of Food Department fell under First Schedule, Column-III, Sr. No. 12 of the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011 (the Rules)-Food Department had the mandate to legislate, formulate policy and plan as a measure of food security through wheat procurement, construction and maintenance of storage accommodation, storage of wheat, financial arrangements with the banks, transportation of wheat and release of wheat and its overall monitoring-For the release of wheat stock available and to ensure its uninterrupted supply and stabilization of its price in market, the Food Department introduced the Policy under S. 3 of the Punjab Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958 with certain terms and conditions-Petitioner/Mill had failed to point out solid reasons to declare the SOP as an act without lawful authority or violative of fundamental rights, which otherwise had been issued by the lawful Authority-Constitutional petition filed by the flour mill was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Punjab Foodstuffs (Control) Act (XX of 1958)-\n-S. 3-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 18-Wheat release milling policy 2022-2023 dated 19.09.2022-Standing Operating Procedure dated 21.09.2022 issued by Director Food Punjab, Clause VI-Petitioner being flour mill invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court challenging Clause-VI of the SOP on the ground that said clause patently contradicted the Wheat release milling policy 2022-2023 dated 19.09.2022 (the Policy)-Contention of the respondents was that though no restriction on private grinding had been imposed upon the flour mills, yet it was bound to submit monthly grinding schedule to the District Food Control for issuance of subsidized wheat quota under the Policy, which the petitioner/mill had failed to provide-Validity-Clauses of the SOP revealed that the flour mills grinding private wheat for the Army, were bound to submit monthly grinding schedule to the concerned District Food Controller duly approved by the Ministry of Defence for the issuance of subsidized wheat quota from the Government of Punjab under the SOP-Petitioner/Mill despite complying with the SOP for getting subsidized wheat quota was reluctant to provide the grinding schedule merely stating that the respondents were not issuing the wheat quota which infringed its fundamental rights of trade and business under Art. 18 of the Constitution-Though Art. 18 of the Constitution promoted the rights of trade/business of every citizen to carry out lawful trade but said rights were subject to certain qualifications as prescribed by the law and the law in the present case was the SOP issued in pursuance of the Notification by the Food Department under the Rules-When a law described or required a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all-SOP under challenge envisaged that the petitioner/mill was only obligated to submit monthly grinding schedule to the concerned District Food Controller duly approved by the concerned authority of Pakistan Army and not the information with regard to sale or purchase of stores, which might amount to breach of certain terms and conditions of the contract executed between the petitioner/mill and the Pakistan Army-Moreover, the petitioner/mill had not brought on record specific grinding days of Pakistan Army in a month for the release of government wheat quota-Letter issued by the concerned District Food Controller had required the petitioner/mill to submit information in terms of days specified for grinding of Pakistan Army but the petitioner/mill failed to provide such information pursuant to which the petitioner/mill was refused government wheat quota during the days of Pakistan Army grinding-Petitioner/Mill had failed to point out solid reasons to declare the SOP as an act without lawful authority or violative to fundamental rights, which otherwise had been issued by the lawful authority-Constitutional petition filed by the flour mill was dismissed, in circumstances.\nAttaullah Khan v. Ali Azam Afridi and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 182 ref.\n(c) Punjab Foodstuffs (Control) Act (XX of 1958)-\n-S. 3-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 5, 18 & 199-Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011, First Schedule, Column-III, Sr. No.12- Standing Operating Procedure dated 21.09.2022 issued by Director Food Punjab, Clause VI-Wheat release milling policy 2022-2023 dated 19.09.2022-Standing Operating Procedure dated 21.09.2022 (the SOP), Clause VI, vires of-Restriction that no wheat quota to any flour mill would be issued during the days of Army grinding-Legality-Rights of trade and business-Scope-Petitioner being flour mill invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court challenging Clause-VI of the SOP on the ground that said clause patently contradicted the Wheat release milling policy 2022-2023 dated 19.09.2022 (the Policy)-Contention of the respondents was that though no restriction on private grinding had been imposed upon the flour mills yet it was bound to submit monthly grinding schedule to the District Food Control for issuance of subsidized wheat quota under the Policy, which the petitioner/mill had failed to provide-Validity-Writ is for enforcement of fundamental rights and not for the entitlement of rights and if any equitable relief is sought from the Court then it can only be granted subject to provision of relevant law-Admittedly the petitioner/mill had approached the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution seeking directions against the respondents and while seeking such directions, Arts. 4 & 5 of the Constitution had to be kept in mind-It is inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law as envisaged by Art. 4 of the Constitution but it is subject to Art. 5 of the Constitution which casts duty and inviolable obligation on every citizen to obey the Constitution and the law, and the relevant law, in the present case, was the SOP issued by the respondent/Food Department in the light of Policy introduced by the Food Department under the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011 (the Rules)-Petitioner/Mill had failed to point out solid reasons to declare the SOP as an act without lawful authority or violative to fundamental rights, which otherwise had been issued by the lawful authority strictly under the Rules-Petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nAsadullah Mangi and others v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and others 2005 SCMR 445 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Food Stuffs Control Act, 1958=3", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3042 of 2022, heard on 17th October, 2023.\nheard on: 17th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Qamar Afzal, Advocate Supreme Court with Malik Sheharyar Afzal for Petitioner.\nMalik Amjad Ali, Additional Advocate General along with Abid Aziz Rajori, Assistant Advocate General and Muhammad Ramzan, DFC, Attock for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AL-KHALID FLOUR MILLS-Petitioner\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24146", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 343 = 2024 SLD 343 = 2024 SLD 197", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 337-H(2), 337-L(2) & 34-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 417(2)-Qatl-i-amd, rash and negligent act, causing hurt, common intention- Appreciation of evidence-Appeal against acquittal- Benefit of doubt- Implication through supplementary statement-Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which two persons were hit, out of which one died-Record showed that neither names of accused persons were mentioned in the FIR nor their features had been given and they were introduced by complainant and witnesses in their further statements without disclosing the source of information-Said improvements clearly showed that supplementary statement was made after due consultation and deliberation to falsely involve the accused-Complainant had lodged FIR with consultation and due deliberation and the names of accused/respondents did not transpire therein, hence, the credibility of further statement of complainant in this case did not arise at all-To sustain conviction in an offence of capital punishment, evidence of unimpeachable nature was required which was not available in this case-Prosecution failed to produce reliable evidence before Trial Court-Trial Court for sound reasons disbelieved prosecution evidence-Several circumstances were present in the case which created reasonable doubt in the prosecution case-In cases of circumstantial evidence strong evidence was required for convicting the accused, which was lacking in this case-Even complainant party had failed to prove any sinister motive against accused/respondents to strengthen his case-Circumstances established that the acquittal recorded by Trial Court in favour of respondents/accused in impugned judgment was based upon sound reasons, which required no interference-Appeals against acquittal being without merits were dismissed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Rafique and others v. The State and others 2010 SCMR 385 rel.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 417-Appeal against acquittal-Interference-Scope-Judgment of acquittal is not to be interjected until findings are perverse, arbitrary, speculative and ridiculous.\n(c) Appeal against acquittal-\n-Double presumption of innocence-Interference-Scope-Scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is narrow and limited because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty-In an acquittal the presumption of innocence is doubled.\nThe State and others v. Abdul Khaliq and others PLD 2011 SC 554 rel.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 337-H(2), 337-L(2) & 34-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 417(2)-Qatl-i-amd, rash and negligent act, causing hurt, common intention-Appreciation of evidence-Appeal against acquittal-Benefit of doubt-Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which two persons were hit, out of which one died-So far as the case of one of the accused/respondent Mr. F was concerned, he at the time of pronouncement of judgment remained absconder and his case was kept on dormant file and later on he joined the trial-During proceedings, said accused filed an application under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., which was allowed by Trial Court and he was acquitted of the charge on the ground that co-accused persons who had faced full-fledged trial had already been acquitted and there was no tangible evidence or concrete material available on record from which guilt of said accused could be deduced and charge against him was groundless and even if case against him was proceeded, it would not entail into conviction rather sheer wastage of time-Thus, there was no merit in present appeal against acquittal of the respondent/accused-Acquittal recorded by Trial Court in favour of respondent/accused in the impugned judgment and order was based upon sound reasons, which required no interference-Appeals against acquittal being without merits were dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(B),337-H(2),337-L,34Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=417(2)", - "Case #": "Criminal Acquittal Appeals Nos. D-148 and D-214 of 2019, decision dated: 18th November, 2022.\nheard on: 26th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Naimatullah Phulpoto and Abdul Mobeen Lakho, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iftikhar Ali Arain for Appellant/Complainant.\nNusrat Ali Memon for Respondents Nos.2 and 3 (in Criminal Acquittal Appeal No.D-148 of 2019).\nSyed Sardar Ali Shah, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NADEEM-Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24147", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 344 = 2024 SLD 344 = 2024 MLD 183", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzY", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court-Scope-Factual controversy-Title, determination of-Appreciation of evidence-Principle-Petitioners were aggrieved of non-transfer of suit plot by Lahore Development Authority in favour of person to whom it was sold-Validity-Questions regarding title of a person in a property fell outside the ambit of Constitutional jurisdiction, hence, could not be decided in exercise of powers under Art. 199 of the Constitution-Evaluation of evidence necessary to decide such questions could not be undertaken by Constitutional Court and invocation of such jurisdiction could only be made when there was no stigma or defect alleged on the title of litigant-Such defect could only be adjudicated by Courts of plenary jurisdiction-Existence of or even undetermined allegation of such facts precluded petitioners from seeking issuance of a writ-Contentions of petitioners themselves pointed towards an alleged blot on their title-When title itself was undetermined, High Court could not proceed on an assumption of existence of any vested right, sufficient to enable High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 199-Right of petitioners to use and dispose of their property, contingent upon existence of a valid title was a private law right, which once established would give rise to public law duty of Lahore Development Authority to not cause any hindrance in the exercise of such right-Petitioners tried to cross the bridge before reaching it and had sought issuance of a writ for enforcement of a public law right without first establishing their private law right from a Court of ordinary jurisdiction-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nDhani Khan v. M.Z. Khan (Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan) and another PLD 1963 Lah. 583; Ex-parte Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch.D. 458; National Steel Rolling Mills and others v. Province of West Pakistan 1968 SCMR 317(2); Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others PLD 2004 SC 583; Liaqat Ali v. City Nazim and others 2003 MLD 1635; Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex through Managing Director v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 4 others 2011 PTD 2260; Regine (John MEvoy) v. Dublin Corporation (1879) 2 L.R.Ir. 371; Ch. Zafar Hussain and 5 others v. Border Area Committee through Chairman and 6 others 2012 MLD 1538; Anjuman Fruit Arhtian and others v. Deputy Commissioner, Faisalabad and others 2011 SCMR 279; The Province of East Pakistan v. Kshiti Dhar Roy and others PLD 1964 SC 636; Mst. Zuhra Begum v. Syed Sajjad Hussain and 7 others 1971 SCMR 697; Ataur Rehman Khan v. Dost Muhammad and others 1986 SCMR 598; Anjuman-e-Ahmadiya, Sargodha v. (1) The Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha and (2) The Government of West Pakistan, through the Secretary Colonies, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1966 SC 639; Davy v. Spelthorne B.C (1983) 3 All ER 278; OReilly v Mackman [1983] UKHL 1; Cocks v Thanet District Council (1983) 2 AC 286 and Roy v. Kensington (1992) 1 All ER 705 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 47140 of 2022, decision dated: 3rd August, 2022.\nheard on: 3rd August, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shan Gul, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Yasir Ibrahim for Petitioners.\nMohammad Usman Khan, A.A.G. for Respondents.\nBarrister Bushra Saqib, Friend of the Court on Court's call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. ANEEQA SOHAIL and others-Petitioners\nVS\nLAHORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY through Chairman and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24148", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 345 = 2024 SLD 345 = 2024 MLD 180", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzU", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code ( XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 34-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to qatl-i-amd and common intention-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Multiple versions about one occurrence-Nomination through the statement recorded under S. 164, Cr.P.C.-Delay in recording S. 164, Cr.P.C. statement-Record revealed that the occurrence had taken place at midnight i.e. 01:00 hours and initially nobody was directly charged by complainants for double murder-Complainants in their statements recorded under S. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, nominated the petitioner, along with co-accused, for the death of the deceased persons, however, none of them had disclosed the source on the basis of which they got satisfied about the complicity of the petitioner/accused in the commission of offence-There was a delay of about 16 days in recording said statement (under S. 164, Cr.P.C, 1898), which had not been plausibly explained-Evidentiary value of such statements would be determined during trial and no explicit reliance could be placed on said statements at the bail stage-Occurrence was unseen one and, so far, no witness having seen the petitioner/accused while committing the alleged offence had come forward before the Investigating Officer to depose regarding his involvement in the deaths of the deceased-Petitioner/accused was allegedly injured too in the (same) occurrence for which a report was also lodged-After the nomination of the petitioner, along with co-accused, the Investigating Officer prepared two other/more site plans in addition to one already prepared for the other version-Three different reports in respect of the same alleged occurrence had been lodged, therefore, it was yet to be proved during trial that which one amongst the three versions would be correct by proving through convincing and reliable evidence-Case of the petitioner/accused was one of further inquiry into his guilt-Bail was granted to the petitioner, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,34", - "Case #": "Criminal Misc. B.A. No. 318-B of 2023, decision dated: 20th June, 2023.\nheard on: 16th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Fazal Subhan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Rashid Khan Dhirma Khel for Petitioner.\nInamullah Khan Kakki for Respondent.\nHafiz Muhammad Hanif, Additional A.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AFRASIAB KHAN-Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24149", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 346 = 2024 SLD 346 = 2024 MLD 172", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell-Revenue record-Entry in Roznamcha (Daily Book)-Proof-Registered agreement to sell-Effect-Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was decreed by Trial Court in their favour and appeal filed by petitioners/defendants was dismissed by Lower Appellate Court-Validity-Roznamcha attained no presumption of truth, unless and until its maker was produced to prove the same-Revenue officer who attested alleged mutation was not produced and hence no probative value could be attached to the Report incorporating mutation in question-There were overwhelming features in support of registered agreement to sell in favour of respondents/plaintiffs coupled with concurrent judgments of two Courts below in their support-High Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below-Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nJehangir v. Mst. Shams Sultana and others 2022 SCMR 309; Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21; Muhammad Naeem Khan and another v. Muqadas Khan (decd) through L.Rs. and another PLD 2022 SC 99; Zulfiqar and others v. Shahdat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582; Khalil Ahmad v. Abdul Jabbar Khan and others 2005 SCMR 911; Mohammad Hussain v. Allah Ditta 2017 YLR 1249; Eada Khan v. Mt. Ghanwar and others 2004 SCMR 1524; Muhammad Akram alias Raja v. Muhammad Ishaque 2004 SCMR 1130 and Muhammad Ibrahim (deceased) through LRs and another v. Taza Gul and others 2020 SCMR 2033 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12", - "Case #": "C.R. No. 1080-D of 2020, heard on 7th June, 2022.heard on: 7th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Shan Gul, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Tahir Mehmood for Petitioners.\nSyed Tajammal Hussain Bukhari and Khawar Habib Gujjar for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAZEER AHMAD and others-Petitioners\nVS\nZAKIR HUSSAIN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24150", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 347 = 2024 SLD 347 = 2024 MLD 161", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYy8", - "Key Words:": "National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-\n-Ss. 9(a), 10 & 32-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 431-Corruption and corrupt practices-Appreciation of evidence-Death of accused-Appeal, status of-Accused was convicted by Trial Court and sentenced to imprisonment and fine-Accused died during pendency of appeal and his widow appeared to contest sentence of fine imposed on deceased accused-Validity-On death of accused during pendency of appeal against conviction, appeal finally abated, except an appeal from sentence of fine-Legal heir/widow of deceased accused challenged conviction against deceased accused to the extent of sentence of fine-Bank statements were not sent to handwriting expert-Deceased accused was posted as typist in the Bank and there was no office order to show that deceased was working as ledger keeper in the Bank-Bank statement with effect from 01-02-1999 till year 2003, were fake and contained signatures of deceased accused-Deceased accused was transferred from concerned branch of bank to another branch on 4.9.2001 and it was not possible for deceased accused to prepare Bank statements for the period for which he was not posted in branch in question-Prosecution failed to prove its case against deceased accused at trial-Such was case of acquittal against deceased accused but as accused had already expired proceedings against him stood abated-High Court set aside sentence of fine imposed by Trial Court-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nSheikh Iqbal Azam Farooqui through his legal heirs v. The State through Chairman NAB 2020 SCMR 359 fol.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "National Accountability Ordinance, 1999=9(a),10,32Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=431", - "Case #": "Criminal Accountability Appeal No. 21 of 2017, decision dated: 18th November, 2021.\nheard on: 11th November, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Naimatullah Phulpoto and Abdul Mobeen Lakho, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Matloob Hussain for Appellant.\nRiaz Alam, Special Prosecutor NAB for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sheikh RIZWAN AHMED JILLANI-Appellant\nVS\nNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) through Director General-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24151", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 348 = 2024 SLD 348 = 2024 MLD 153", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYys", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 148 & 149-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 417-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appeal against acquittal-Appreciation of evidence-Withholding material evidence-Accused were charged for committing murderous assault upon the complainant and his brother, due to which, they received injuries, however, brother of complainant died at the spot-Motive was dispute over landed property-Record showed that the Investigating Officer admitted that one independent witness was allegedly present on the spot and his statement was recorded under S. 161, Cr.P.C-Name of said witness was neither mentioned in the murasila/FIR nor he had been examined in the case as prosecution witness-Said witness could have strengthened the case of the prosecution, but his non-production as prosecution witness had adversely affected prosecutions case in view of the provisions of Art. 129, Illustration (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-For not producing material witnesses, an inference could be drawn that had they stepped into the witness box, they would have not supported the prosecutions case-Circumstances established that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond shadow of any doubt-Appeal against acquittal was accordingly dismissed.\nMuhammad Rafique and others v. State and others 2010 SCMR 385 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 148 & 149-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 417-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appeal against acquittal-Appreciation of evidence-Dishonest improvements by witnesses-Accused were charged for committing murderous assault upon the complainant and his brother, due to which, they received injuries, however, brother of complainant died at the spot-Complainant and his father took the stance that they were empty handed, therefore, could do nothing-However, during cross-examination reference was made to statement under S. 161, Cr.P.C, wherein, it was mentioned that the accused took away his licensed pistol and produced the same to Investigating Officer-Complainant improved his statement and repeatedly mentioned that he was semi-conscious-Thus, there was no second opinion at all rather it was settled that when a witness improved his version to strengthen the prosecution case, his improved statement could not be relied upon as the witness had improved his statement dishonestly, therefore, his credibility became doubtful-Improvements once found deliberate and dishonest cast serious doubt on the veracity of such a witness-Circumstances established that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond shadow of any doubt-Appeal against acquittal was accordingly dismissed.\nFarman Ahmad v. Muhammad Inayat and others 2007 SCMR 1825 rel.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 148 & 149-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 417-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appeal against acquittal-Appreciation of evidence-Injured witness, testimony of-Scope-Accused were charged for committing murderous assault upon the complainant and his brother, due to which, they received injuries, however, brother of complainant died at the spot-No doubt, complainant sustained injuries on his person during the occurrence but that fact alone could not be considered sufficient to hold that he was speaking the whole truth-Circumstances established that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond shadow of any doubt-Appeal against acquittal was accordingly dismissed.\nSaid Ahmad v. Zumured Hussain 1981 SCMR 795 and Ghulam Sarwar v. The State PLD 1993 Pesh. 152 rel.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Medical evidence-Scope-Medical evidence could in no way pin point the accused nor could it establish the identity of the accused-Medical evidence could never be considered to be a corroborative piece of evidence and at the most could be considered a supporting evidence only to the extent of specification of seat of injuries, the weapon of offence, duration, the cause of death, etc.\nMuhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Tariq Hussain and another v. The State and 4 others 2018 MLD 1573 rel.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 148 & 149-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 417-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appeal against acquittal-Appreciation of evidence-Motive not proved-Accused were charged for committing murderous assault upon the complainant and his brother, due to which, they received injuries, however, brother of complainant died at the spot-Motive alleged by the prosecution was dispute over landed property-Burden to prove the motive part of the occurrence was upon the prosecution but record of the case would reveal that the same had not been proved-So merely alleging a motive would not be sufficient to accept and rely upon the same-Circumstances established that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond shadow of any doubt-Appeal against acquittal was accordingly dismissed.\n(f) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Single circumstance, creating reasonable doubtin a prudent mind about the guilt of accused, makes him entitled to its benefit, not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right.\nMuhammad Akram v. State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,148,149Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=129(g)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=417", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 50-D of 2019, decision dated: 19th December, 2022.heard on: 19th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Faheem Wali and Shahid Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saif-ur-Rahman Khan for Appellant.\nAhmad Ali for Respondents Nos. 1 to 8.\nRahmatullah, Assistant A.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZESHAN AZIZ-Appellant\nVS\nHIZBULLAH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24152", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 349 = 2024 SLD 349 = 2024 MLD 145", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5, Sched.-Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance of minor-Rights of minor-Maintenance allowance of minor, waiving of-Scope-Agreement (Punchayat Nama) was entered into between the parties by which custody of minor girl was to be handed over to her mother on the condition that she (mother) would not demand the maintenance allowance of the minor girl-Said agreement/Punchayat Nama (document-in-question) was signed by the grandfather of minor girl-Held, that the rights of minor can not be waived by the mother or any of the blood relatives-Allah has specifically fixed the responsibility of maintaining the minor (suckling baby) to the father and the mother has been given responsibility of feeding the child-Where the father is not alive or not in a position to pay maintenance, then the responsibility will be shifted to mother if she can bear the same, or to the other family members (like grandfather) as given in S. 370 of the Muhammadan Law-Document-in-question would not disentitle the minor from her Shari right of maintenance allowance-High Court upheld the maintenance allowance to the minor having been rightly awarded to the minor by the Family Court-Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\n(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5, Sched.-Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance of the minor and mother/lady-Maintenance allowance for the period when wife is not living with the husband-Past maintenance allowance-Fostering period of the child-Scope-Family Court granted the maintenance allowance for the iddat period to the lady/plaintiff in wake of her divorce-Family Court though granted the maintenance allowance to the minor-girl (suckling baby) but denied the same to her mother/plaintiff (for fostering period) on the basis that she had left the house of her husband, not performing her matrimonial obligations-Held, that though a disobedient lady living separately without any reason should be refused payment of maintenance allowance for that period as she has not performed her matrimonial obligations, but the situation in the present case was different as the petitioner (plaintiff-lady) had been feeding the minor during such period, thus the respondent (father of the minor) was under obligation to provide the maintenance to her (petitioner) who was feeding his child-Welfare of the minor is supreme, even if the mother has left her husbands house herself or she is expelled from the house-As per Sharia the father is duty bound to maintain his wife who is feeding his child and maintenance allowance of such mother cannot be stopped in any way, however, after that period the Court can assess the evidence adduced by the parties and then appropriate order can be passed-Under the Islamic Law , the feeding period has been fixed by Fiqa as two and half (2-1/2) years, therefore, petitioner (plaintiff/mother) was also entitled for the past maintenance allowance from date of her desertion till the time of conclusion of feeding/fostering period of the minor (i.e. two and half years)-High Court modified impugned judgment and decree to the extent of grant of the past maintenance allowance to the petitioner (plaintiff/mother) for the said period at the rate the minor had been granted maintenance allowance-Constitutional petition was disposed off accordingly.\n(c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5, Sched.-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 151-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Maintenance allowance of minor, enhancement of-Constitutional petition-Maintainability-Mother invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to seek enhancement of maintenance allowance on the ground of daily growing requirements of minor-Held, that the Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction to pass an order on the application (under S. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) for enhancement of the maintenance allowance even after the passing the final judgment and decree-Petitioner might move the application under S. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for enhancement of the minor before the Court of jurisdiction-Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\nLt. Col. Nasir Malik v. Additional District Judge Lahore 2016 SCMR 1821 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=5", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 18625 of 2016, decision dated: 13th January, 2022.\nMiss Kashwar Naheed for Petitioners.", - "Judge Name:": " Safdar Saleem Shahid, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Miss Kashwar Naheed for Petitioners.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. FARIDA BIBI and others-Petitioners\nVS\nJUDGE FAMILY COURT and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24153", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 350 = 2024 SLD 350 = 2024 MLD 134", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDYzg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 324, 353, 186 & 34-Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7-Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions, common intention, possession of illicit weapon, act of terrorism-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-General allegations-Common intention not established-Prosecution case was that an encounter took place between the police and four assailants, due to which, one of the accused received a firearm injury on his left shoulder-Record showed that allegations levelled against the accused A were collective, i.e. that the four assailants attacked upon the police party-Only general allegations surfaced after a perusal of the testimonies of the witnesses as well and nothing was brought on record to establish a solid role played by the present accused in the commission of the offence-Present accused was empty handed when he was apprehended and prosecution failed to prove that he had any connection whatsoever with the other assailants who had attacked upon the police party-Mere presence of an accused person at the place of incident could never be sufficient to establish that said accused shared common intention in the commission of an offence unless evidence was brought on record to prove so-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden against the said accused beyond reasonable shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction against the said accused was accordingly allowed.\nTariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Asmatullah and others v. The State 2018 PCr.LJ 1042; Muhammad Tufail v. The State 2017 SCMR 1845 and Asif and another v. The State 2020 SCMR 610 ref.\nHassan v. The State 1969 SCMR 454 and Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 324, 353, 186 & 34-Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7-Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions, common intention, possession of illicit weapon, act of terrorism-Appreciation of evidence- Recovery of weapons-Reliance-Prosecution case was that an encounter took place between the police and four assailants, due to which, one of the accused received a firearm injury on his left shoulder-In the present case, the allegations against accused persons F & Y were that they had actively participated in the attack on the police party and they were arrested on the spot and police recovered a .30 bore pistol each from their possession-Complainant had recovered a total of 4 empties of the same bore as the pistols recovered from the present accused persons-In the absence of a solid ocular account entailing a specific role for each assailant, the only pieces of evidence available were circumstantial evidence-Incriminating piece of evidence available against the accused F and Y was the recovery of the weapons itself-Putting FIRs in juxtaposition with the Forensic Science Laboratory Report, showed that the relevant weapons recovered from the said accused persons had rubbed numbers-Said fact was mentioned in the FIR, the memo of recovery and in the Forensic Science Laboratory Report, which to an extent suggested that the weapons originally recovered from the said accused persons were the same which later on were received by the Forensic Laboratory-Thus, it had been proved that the accused F and Y had in fact shot their 30 bore pistols at the place of incident-As such, the elements of S. 353, P.P.C, were satisfied along with S. 23(i)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act 2013-In such circumstances, the conviction of present accused persons under S. 353, P.P.C and under S. 23(i)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 were maintained with modification in the sentence awarded to them which was converted to one already undergone by them.\nZahid and another v. The State 2020 SCMR 590 rel.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Circumstantial evidence-Scope-Circumstances of the case should make an unbroken chain of events which on one end leads to the body of the crime and the other to the neck of the culprit.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 324, 353, 186 & 34-Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7-Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions, common intention, possession of illicit weapon, act of terrorism-Appreciation of evidence-Conviction under S. 324, P.P.C. set aside-Prosecution case was that an encounter took place between the police and four assailants, due to which, one of the accused received a firearm injury on his left shoulder-In the present case, the allegations accused persons F & Y were that they had actively participated in the attack on the police party and they were arrested on the spot and police recovered a .30 bore pistol each from their possession-Complainant in his cross-examination had admitted that when he had stopped the accused persons they instead of stopping had started aerial firing-Thus, it hardly appeared rational to believe that someone looking to commit another persons murder would fire aerially rather than shooting directly at them-As such, S. 324, P.P.C., was not applicable in the circumstances-Conviction under S. 324, P.P.C, was set-aside, in circumstances.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 324, 353, 186 & 34-Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7-Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions, common intention, possession of illicit weapon, act of terrorism-Appreciation of evidence-Minor contradictions-Inconsequential-Prosecution case was that an encounter took place between the police and four assailants, due to which, one of the accused received a firearm injury on his left shoulder-In the present case, the allegations accused persons F & Y were that they had actively participated in the attack on the police party and they were arrested on the spot and police recovered a .30 bore pistol each from their possession-Evidence of all the witnesses was consistent on all material particulars of the case-Although there were minor contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses, the same were not material and certainly not of such materiality so as to affect the prosecution case-Defence could not point out any material discrepancy in the evidence of the eye-witnesses besides the few minor ones like the registration number of the police mobile which appeared as a typographical error and found proper mentioning in the letter sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory Examiner-Circumstances established that the prosecution succeeded in proving its case against the said accused under S. 353, P.P.C, therefore, conviction of said accused persons under S. 353, P.P.C and under S. 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 were maintained with modification in the sentence awarded to them which was converted to one already undergone by them, whereas the remaining convictions were set aside.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 324, 353, 186 & 34-Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7-Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions, common intention, possession of illicit weapon, act of terrorism-Appreciation of evidence-Act alleged not an act of terrorism-Conviction under S. 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 set aside-Prosecution case was that an encounter took place between the police and four assailants, due to which, one of the accused received a firearm injury on his left shoulder-Allegations accused persons F & Y were that they had actively participated in the attack on the police party and they were arrested on the spot and police recovered a .30 bore pistol each from their possession-As far as the conviction of the present accused under S. 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act wass concerned, suffice it to say that the same could not be sustained-All acts mentioned under subsection (2) of S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, if committed with design/motive to intimidate the government, public or a segment of the society, or alternatively where evidence had been collected by the prosecution to suggest that the aforesaid aim was either achieved or otherwise appeared as a by-product of the said terrorist activities were to be dealt with under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997-Nothing was brought on record of present case to suggest that the present accused persons possessed the intention, design or purpose to cause terror to any part of the society-Thus, the alleged offence could not be equated with terrorism-In such circumstances, the conviction under S. 7, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was set-aside.\nGhulam Hussain and others v. The State and others PLD 2020 SC 61; Ali Gohar and others v. Pervez Ahmed and others PLD 2020 SC 427 and Muhammad Farhan alias Irfan v. The State 2021 SCMR 488 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=324,353,34Sindh Arms Act, 2013=23(1)(a)Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7", - "Case #": "Special Criminal Anti-Terrorism Jail Appeal Nos. 199, 205 and Criminal Anti-Terrorism Jail Appeal No. 212 of 2020, decision dated: 2nd March, 2022.heard on: 23rd February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Mohammad Karim Khan Agha and Khadim Hussain Tunio, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Habib-ur-Rehman Jiskani for Appellant (in Special Criminal Anti-Terrorism Jail Appeal Nos. 199, 205 and Criminal Anti-Terrorism Jail Appeal No. 212 of 2020).\nAbrar Ali Khichchi, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State (in Special Criminal Anti-Terrorism Jail Appeal Nos. 199, 205 and Criminal Anti-Terrorism Jail Appeal No. 212 of 2020).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDULLAH and others-Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24154", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 351 = 2024 SLD 351 = 2024 MLD 130", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDY3o", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)-\n-Ss.4(1)(b)(vi), 13(4), 16 & 17-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Penalty awarded to employee- Constitutional petition-Maintainability-Alternate remedy, availability of-Petitioner was Naib Qasid rendering services with the University ,who was dismissed from the service by the Registrar-Petitioner invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court against the penalty imposed against him-Validity-Record revealed that proceedings under the provisions of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (the Act 2006) were initiated against the petitioner; he, after issuance of Show Case Notice under S. 13(4) of the Act 2006, was provided personal hearing and then he was awarded major penalty of dismissal from service in terms of S. 4(1)(b)(vi) of the Act 2006 vide order passed under S. 13 of the Act 2006-Petitioner availed remedy of appeal provided under S. 16 of the Act 2006 before the respondent (the Registrar), which (appeal) was dismissed-Specific remedy of revision was available to the petitioner before the Chancellor being an Appellate Authority under S. 17 of the Act 2006 against the order of dismissal of appeal-High Court, before granting relief to the petitioner by exercising its constitutional jurisdiction, must satisfy itself regarding the non-availability of any alternate remedy; or even in case the Court is inclined to grant relief in presence of alternate remedy, it should be satisfied that circumstances of the case had made the other remedy inadequate-In presence of an alternate efficacious remedy having been available to the petitioner/litigant, jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution could not be invoked-Petitioner, instead of availing said remedy, had invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, however, High Court, on the request of the petitioner, remitted the contents of the present petition, along with relevant record, to the Chancellor to treat the same as a revision in terms of S. 17 of the Act 2006, for its decision-Constitutional petition was disposed of.\nIndus Trading and Contracting Company v. Collector of Customs (Preventive) Karachi and others 2011 SCMR 842; Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813 and Muhammad Abbasi v. SHO Bhara Kahu and 7 others PLD 2010 SC 969 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006=4(1)(b)(vi)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2477 of 2021, decision dated: 6th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Asif Khwaja for Petitioner.\nM.D. Shahzad for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IRFAN MEHMOOD-Petitioner\nVS\nUNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB through Registrar, Quaid-e-Azam Campus,Lahore and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24155", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 352 = 2024 SLD 352 = 2024 MLD 120", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDY3k", - "Key Words:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)- Narcotic substance, recovery of-Appreciation of evidence-Chras weighing 42 kilograms and Opium weighing 13.20 kilograms were recovered from the possession of accused persons-Trial Court convicted both the accused person and sentenced one for imprisonment for life and the other for six years-Validity-When prosecution was able to prove its case on its salient features then unnecessary technicalities could not be allowed to hamper the very purpose of law on the subject-Recovery of huge quantity of narcotics, separating samples from each packet in a prescribed manner and sending them to Chemical Examiner, report of Chemical Examiner and statements of prosecution witnesses conjointly left no room to a different conclusion than what had been arrived at by Trial Court-High Court declined to interfere in conviction and sentences awarded by Trial Court to accused persons-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nShazia Bibi v. The State 2020 SCMR 460; Salah-ud-Din v. State 2010 SCMR 1962; Zafar v. The State 2008 SCMR 1254; Kashif Amir v. State PLD 2010 SC 1052; Anwar Shamim and another v. The State 2010 SCMR 1791; Muhammad Shabbir and others v. The State 2020 SCMR 1206; Faisal Shahzad v. The State 2022 SCMR 905; Ajab Khan v. The State 2022 SCMR 317; Matti Ullah v. The State 2020 SCMR 1222; Aijaz Ali Rajpar v. The State 2021 SCMR 1773 and Mian Khalid Perviz v. The State through Special Prosecutor ANF and another 2021 SCMR 522 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9(c)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeals Nos. 215 and 209 of 2021, decision dated: 15th August, 2022.\nheard on: 1st August, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Tariq Mehmood Jahangiri and Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zaheer Ullah Jan and Shan Zeb Khan for Appellants Nos. 1 and 2.\nRana Zulfiqar Ali, S.S.P. ANF for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. NAZO BIBI and another-Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24156", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 353 = 2024 SLD 353 = 2024 MLD 115", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTc", - "Key Words:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act (V of 1990)-\n-S. 21- Educational institution-Center of examination, change of-Constituting new examination center-Petitioner/candidate sought establishment of new examination center for him on the plea that his father had enmity in the area where center assigned to him was located-Validity-There was a distinction between change of center of examination and constituting a place as center of examination-Former was governed by Chapter-XII, while the latter by Chapter-XIV of the Rules made under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1990-Center of examination could be changed for a student from one place to another, provided the latter was also a duly constituted center of examination-Such center could not be allowed to be changed from one place to another, if the latter was not so constituted at the time of such change-Seeking such change by petitioner/candidate amounted to seeking constitution of a place as center-Constituting an examination hall was the function of authorities, who may exercise the discretion in the manner as warranted under rules, which cannot be interfered with unless it has infringed on fundamental rights of students-High Court declined to interfere in the matter as petitioner/candidate failed to point out as to what prejudice was cased to him by not constituting his desired place as center of examination-There was no mala fide on the part of authorities for allocation of center to petitioner/candidate-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nKhyber Medical University and others v. Aimal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 92 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhawa Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1990=21", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 361-B of 2023, decision dated: 31st May, 2023.heard on: 31st May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Fazal Subhan and Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Farhan Ullah Gran for Petitioner.\nRespondents: in Motion.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AFAQ KHAN-Petitioner\nVS\nBOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, KOHAT through Chairman/Chairperson and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24157", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 354 = 2024 SLD 354 = 2024 MLD 110", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149-Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly-Appreciation of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Motive not proved-Accused were charged for committing murder of father and maternal uncle of the complainant by firing-Old enmity between the deceased and the accused was stated to be motive behind the occurrence-Record showed that prosecution succeeded to prove its case against the accused persons for the reasons that the occurrence in the case had taken place in broad daylight at 11:00 a.m.-Eye-witnesses had explained their presence at the time of incident-Ocular evidence was supported by the medical evidence-Delay in lodging of FIR had been fully explained-Parties were known to each other-Despite lengthy cross-examination, not a single major contradiction had been brought on record-Complainant, in his evidence had deposed that absconding accused used to say that due to old enmity he would kill his father-According to the FIR, motive was against absconding accused-On the conclusion of trial, circumstance of the specific motive was not put to the accused persons in their statements under S. 342. Cr.P.C, for their explanation-Finding of the Trial Court regarding motive were against the record-Complainant in his FIR and in evidence before Trial Court attributed motive against absconding accused-Appeal against conviction was dismissed, however, the sentence of death of the accused was reduced to imprisonment for life, in circumstances.\nMst. Nazia Anwar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 911 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Sentence, reduction in-Motive not proved-If prosecution asserts a motive in the FIR but fails to prove the same then such failure on the part of the prosecution may react against a sentence of death passed against a convict on the charge of murder.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),148,149", - "Case #": "Criminal Jail Appeal No. D-61 and Confirmation Case No. 11 of 2021, decision dated: 16th November, 2022.\nheard on: 16th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Naimatullah Phulpoto and Abdul Mubeen Lakho, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rukhsar Ahmed Junejo and Aisha Saeed for Appellants.\nUbedullah Ghoto for the Complainant.\nZulfiqar Ali Jatoi, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAWAB alias THARO GADANI and another-Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24158", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 355 = 2024 SLD 355 = 2024 MLD 105", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTU", - "Key Words:": "Balochistan Public Procurement Rules, 2014-\n-R. 4-Public Sector Development Program-Public procurement-Criteria set for procurement, violation of-Petitioner was aggrieved of bidding process finalized in violation of criteria for selection of beneficiaries without receiving applications for drilling and development of bores to provide water for agriculture purposes-Contention of authorities was that identification of sites and beneficiaries would be done after bidding process-Validity-Earlier a judgment was passed from High Court as well as from Supreme Court on the same issue and the petition was accepted-Procurement process for installation of bore for agriculture purpose in the area concerned was neither in accordance with guidelines provided by Planning Commission of Pakistan nor in accordance with the criteria laid down by authorities in the light of decision of Provincial Cabinet-High Court directed the authorities not to include vague projects in Public Sector Development Programs (PSDPs) in violation of guidelines provided by Planning Commission of Pakistan as well as law settled by High Court and Supreme Court-High Court set aside procurement process in question-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nRaja Parvaiz Ashrafs case PLD 2014 SC 131 and Abdul Raheem Ziaratwal v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 SCMR 873 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. 2137 of 2022, decision dated: 26th May, 2023.\nheard on: 11th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " Naeem Akhtar Afghan, C.J. and Muhammad Aamir Nawaz Rana, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naseebullah Tareen, Zia-ul-Haq Kakar and Fida Baloch Essazai for Petitioner.\nZahoor Ahmed Baloch, Additional Advocate General assisted by Munir Ahmed, Deputy Director, Agriculture on Farm Water Management Ziarat (Respondent No. 5) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NOOR UL HAQ-Petitioner\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN through Chief Secretary Civil Secretariat, Quetta and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24159", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 356 = 2024 SLD 356 = 2024 MLD 212", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Carrier of the murasila not produced-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant by firing-In the present case, neither the murasila was signed/thumb impressed by the complainant, nor Constable, who allegedly brought the murasila to the police station, was cited in the calendar of witnesses-Said fact had created a serious dent in the prosecution case-Sub-Inspector stated before the Court that he transmitted murasila to the police station through Constable-Moharrir also stated that actually the murasila was brought by said Constable, but that alone was not sufficient to believe that actually the murasila (not signed or thumb impressed) was brought to the police station by said Constable, when his name did not figure in the calendar of witnesses, what to talk of his appearance in the witness box-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\nJaved and 2 others v. The State 2020 YLR 311 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Ocular account and medical evidence-Contradictions-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant by firing-Complainant narrated almost same story as mentioned in the FIR, however, he added that they identified the accused in the light of a bulb lit at that moment-Stance of the complainant was that at the time of occurrence, the deceased was ahead of them, who was fired at by the accused from front, but his deposition was totally in conflict with the medical evidence because the concerned Medical Officer noted a lacerated wound over scalp, an entry wound on the back of head with its exit on left side of nose with visible brain matter-If the accused had fired upon the deceased from front side, surely all the bullets should have landed on front of the deceased, which was not the case here-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\nMansab Ali v. The State 2019 SCMR 1306 rel.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Presence of the complainant at the time and place of occurrence not proved-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant by firing-Record showed that arranging transport for shifting the deceased then injured to the hospital was not mentioned in the FIR-Even the complainant while testifying before the Court in his examination-in-chief did not mention the source of transportation of the dead body from the spot to the hospital, however, he stated during cross-examination that the dead body was transported to the hospital in a pickup-One Mr. R was the driver of pickup through which the injured was transported to the hospital and said Mr. R was attracted there because they heard fire shots, however, said Mr. R had not been cited as witness in the present case to support stance of the complainant-Astonishingly, the dead body of the deceased was received by one Mr. M at the hospital after postmortem examination, but said Mr. M was abandoned by the prosecution-Said witness stated that the distance between the place of occurrence and Masjid was about 6/7 paces, which was negated by the Investigating Officer, who stated that the Masjid was far away from the place of occurrence, thats why he had not noted/shown the same in the site plan-Complainant further testified that blood was oozing from the body of injured which might had stained the cot as well, however, that stance was not supported by the Investigating Officer, who stated that he did not remember that whether the hands of the complainant and the witness were besmeared with the blood of deceased-Complainant stated that there was an electric bulb installed on western side of the wall of a shop, however, he admitted that he had not stated in his initial report about the installation of bulb on the said shop-Even otherwise, stance of the complainant was negated by other witness, who stated that when the police reached the spot the bulb was lit, the Police Officials later brought a search light during spot inspection and the bulb was not lit at that time-Even otherwise, the bulb was produced by witness in pieces-Scanning of statement of said witness showed that it remained a mystery that where the deceased breathed his last-Keeping in view the alleged motive, the complainant was at the mercy of the accused, but he was not fired at, rather as per stance of the complainant, before firing the accused raised lalkara at his brother-Accused sparing the complainant to create evidence against himself was nothing but a mystery in itself because the accused had every opportunity to settle the score keeping in view the alleged motive-In view of the said situations, it was concluded that the complainant was not present at the time of occurrence and the events of the incident narrated by him were not in line with the story mentioned in the FIR-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Eye-witness abandoned by the prosecution-Effect-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant by firing-In the present case, other alleged eye-witness was abandoned by the prosecution-Presumption would be that, had he been produced, he would have not supported the prosecution case-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Defective investigation-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant by firing-Investigating Officer stated that Constable, who brought the post-mortem documents and garments of the deceased was not examined under S. 161, Cr.P.C-Said witness admitted that name of said Constable was not mentioned in the calendar of witnesses-Admittedly, Investigating Officer had not recorded the statement of any Police Official who took the crime articles including the alleged recoveries to the Forensic Science Laboratory-Admittedly, Investigating Officer had not verified the status of ownership of any shop where bulb was installed-Investigating Officer did not remember that who took the empties and pistol to the Forensic Science Laboratory-Admittedly, pistol was recovered on 31.08.2017, whereas it was received in the Forensic Science Laboratory on 14.09.2017, however, Investigating Officer had not annexed any documents on file regarding safe custody of the said articles-Investigating Officer admitted that he did not annex the daily diary regarding his departure and arrival to the police station-In view of such discrepancies, such statement could not be made the basis to sustain conviction on a capital charge-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Recovery of pistol from the possession of the accused-Doubtful-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant by firing-Regarding recovery of pistol, marginal witnesses i.e. Head Constable and SHO were examined-Head Constable during cross-examination admitted that except SHO, the Investigating Officer had not associated any other notable person from the area in connection with recovery, but nothing of the sort was forthcoming from the statement of said witness-Similarly, the other marginal witness to the recovery stated that he made entry in daily diary of the even date but the same was not available on the judicial file-During course of cross-examination of said witness, the parcel was de-sealed on the request of defence counsel and some sharp object on the body beside the trigger was found on the pistol allegedly recovered from the accused, but astonishingly as per recovery memo .30 bore pistol without number having fit magazine containing five rounds of .30 bore was allegedly recovered from the accused-In that view of the matter, recovery of pistol from the accused was disbelieved-Such type of pistols could easily be procured and after making some fire shots, the same along with empties were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory to make the prosecution case a success-Needless to mention that why the empties allegedly recovered from the spot were not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, rather same were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory after arrest of the accused-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\n(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Safe custody of the recovered crime empties and pistol not proved-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant by firing-Record showed that the empties were collected on 10.8.2017, but the same were not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory after they were recovered-Even there was nothing on the record which could suggest that the same remained in safe custody till those were received in the Forensic Science Laboratory on 14.9.2017 along with .30 bore pistol allegedly recovered on 31.8.2017, on the date at which the accused was arrested-In that view of the matter, the positive Forensic Science Laboratory report could not be taken into consideration for sustaining conviction-Besides, when the ocular account of the prosecution case had been disbelieved, mere recovery of the pistol and crime empties, would not be sufficient for recording conviction-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\nMst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaisar Pervez and others 2015 SCMR 1142 rel.\n(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Recovery of incriminating material-Inconsequetial-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant by firing-Recovery of blood from the spot, the last worn blood-stained garments of the deceased and unnatural death of the deceased with firearm as per postmortem report, proved the factum of murder of the deceased, but never told the name(s) of the culprit/killer-Such pieces of evidence were always considered as corroborative pieces of evidence and were taken along with direct evidence and not in isolation-Record showed that there was no eye-witness to be relied upon, then there was nothing, which could be corroborated by the recovery-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.\nRiaz Ahmeds case 2010 SCMR 846; Ijaz Ahmeds case 1997 SCMR 1279; Asadullahs case PLD 1971 SC 541 and Saifullah v. The State 1985 SCMR 410 rel.\n(i) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Motive not proved-Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of the complainant by firing-Motive for the offence was stated to be a dispute over the landed property-So far as motive was concerned, it was always considered a double-edged weapon which cut both sides-Motive could be a reason for involvement of an accused and the same could be a reason for false implication of an accused-In the present case, although motive was stated to be a dispute over landed property, but the evidence in that respect was deficient, therefore, same could not be taken into consideration-Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt-Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 3-D with Criminal Miscellaneous No. 2-D of 2021, decision dated: 17th May, 2022.\nheard on: 17th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " Ishtiaq Ibrahim and Muhammad Faheem Wali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saleemullah Khan Ranazai for Appellant.\nAdnan Ali, Assistant A.G. for the State.\nMuhammad Ismail Alizai for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ARSHAD ALI-Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24160", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 357 = 2024 SLD 357", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=14,25,25(2),30,38,38(1),40,40A,45A,45B,46,46(1),46(1)(b)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=94,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=175Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=51,130,131,132,165,181General Clauses Act, 1897=24ASales Tax Rules, 2006=92Customs Act, 1969=194", - "Case #": "STA No. 489/LB/2024, date of hearing: 28.03.2024, date of order: 29.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, Judicial Member and CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by:\nMr. Khurram Shahzad, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Suleman, DR alongwith Mr. Nouman Malik, CIR and Mr. Abudl Muqtadir Khan, LA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Abdullah Plastic, Prop:Mr. Muhammad Ghar Suleman, Sheikhupura.…Appellant\nVs\nCIR, Zone-III, RTO, Lahore etc.…Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24161", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 358 = 2024 SLD 358", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),8,8A,11(2),11(3),21,21(2),25,26(1),46Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12(a)(i)General Clauses Act, 1897=3(47),24AConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,9,10A,18,23,24,25", - "Case #": "STA No. 401/LB/2024, M.A(Stay) No. 1277/LB/2024, date of order: 14.03.2024, date of hearing: 07.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, Judicial Member AND CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Babar Zaman, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Mazhar Ali, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s F.A Traders, Lahore.........Applicant\nVs\nCIR, RTO, Lahore..........Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24162", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 359 = 2024 SLD 359", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=39,111,114,120,122,122(5A),Clause (86) of Part-IV of Second Schedule", - "Case #": "ITA No. 26/LB/2022, (Tax Year 2015), date of hearing: 19-07-2023, date of order:\n24-07-2023", - "Judge Name:": " NASIR MAHMUD, Judicial Member, RIZWAN AHMED URFI, Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: by: Mudassar Shuja-ud-din, Adv.\nRespondent(s) by: Mr. Yousaf Ismail, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAQIR MUHAMMAD SABIR, 18-19, A BLOCK, JOHAR TOWN, LAHORE\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24163", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 360 = 2024 SLD 360", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2033/IB/2023, (Tax year 2017), date of hearing: 22.12.2023, date of order: 01.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": " TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN, SAJID NAZIR MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by:\nMr. Zahid Masood Chatha, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S GREEN BASE SOLUTIONS (PVT.). LTD., ISLAMABAD.\nVS\nTHE CIR, CTO, ISLAMABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24164", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 361 = 2024 SLD 361", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(63),18(1),21,21(l),111,111(1)(a),113,120(1),122,122(1),122(2),122(4),122(5A),122(9),148(7)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=63Sales Tax Act, 1990=32(3)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2715/LB/2015 (Tax Year 2011), ITA NO.2716/LB/2015 (Tax Year 2012), ITA NO.3684/LB/2019 (Tax Year 2011), date of Order: 25.01.2024, date of Hearing: 10.01.2024", - "Judge Name:": " AEYSHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER, SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Javed Iqbal Khan, FCA.\nRespondent by: Ms. Qayyum Rani, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. UNITED IRON & STEEL (PVT) LTD, LAHORE. NTN:0786501-5\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, LAHORE." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24165", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2004 3097 = 2004 SLD 3097 = 2004 YLR 1658", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDWXk", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) - S.42 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115 Suit for declaration seeking invalidation of mutation Plea of insanity Impersonation, fraud and misrepresentation Plaintiffs father before his death had made two sales; one through mutation and the other through registered sale deed Plaintiff challenged the sales through two suits Pleas of insanity, impersonation, fraud, misrepresentation were taken Both the suits were dismissed and appeals were also dismissed Validity Medical certificate indicating that the deceased suffered from Schizophrenia nine years back was unreliable Positive symptoms were treatable and in acute illness most patients recover and in negative chronic symptoms few patients recover completely Said disease could not be equated with insanity No misreading or non reading of evidence was found Revision petition was dismissed in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115", - "Case #": "Civil Revisions Nos.390 D and 184 D of 1998, heard on 28th January, 2004", - "Judge Name:": " Muhammad Sair Ali, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Muzaffar Hussain for Petitioner.\nJehangir Akhtar Jhojha for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. HAYAT BIBI - Petitioner\nVs\nNASEER UD DIN and 2 others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24166", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2002 3476 = 2002 SLD 3476 = 2002 AIR 520 = 2002 SCC 481", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Appeal (crl.) 1404-05 of 1999, DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/01/2002", - "Judge Name:": " BENCH: D.P. Mohapatra & K.G. Balakrishnan", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "PETITIONER: JASSA SINGH & ORS.\nVs.\nRESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24167", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2010 3267 = 2010 SLD 3267 = 2010 AIR 3580 = 2010 SCC 477", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 227 OF 2007, JULY 9, 2010.", - "Judge Name:": " Bench: R.M. Lodha, D.K. Jain", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "SIKANDAR SINGH & ORS. - APPELLANTS\nVs\nSTATE OF BIHAR - RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24168", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2008 4330 = 2008 SLD 4330 = 2008 YLR 408", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-S. 302- Qatl-i-amd-Intention-Determining factors-Principles-Intention is the primary consideration showing aim and objective of an offender-Where an offender with the intention of causing death or with intention of causing bodily injury to a person, by doing an act which, in the ordinary course of nature, is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death of such person, is said to commit Qatl-i-Amd-Where a person by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, causes death of any person whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, such an act committed by the offender shall be liable for Qatl-i-Amd-Weapon used for commission of an offence has to be considered for the purpose as an act with intention to cause harm to the body or mind of any person resulting into his death by means of a weapon or the act which in the ordinary course is not likely to cause death, does not constitute offence punishable under section 302, P.P.C.-Intention, therefore, is the primary consideration which shows aim and objective of an offender.\n \n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-Ss.302, 315 & 316-Appreciation of evidence-Parties were closely related to each other and no serious dispute or enmity between them was brought on record-Complainant party had come to the house of the accused where exchange of hot words resulted into a sudden free fight-Sticks were used in the occurrence-No premeditation was exhibited by the conduct of accused that they intended to commit the offence of qatl-i-amd-Case of accused, thus, was covered by section 315, P.P.C. punishable under section 316, P. P. C., as it was not established as to who was responsible for giving fatal blow to the deceased-Accused were consequently convicted under section 316, P.P.C. and sentenced to .seven years R.I. each and to pay amount of Diyat calculated as Rs. 7, 65, 750 to the legal heirs of the deceased as per their shares in accordance with law.", - "Court Name:": "Shariat Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeals Nos. 64 and 67 of 2006, decided on 14th June, 2007.", - "Judge Name:": " Syed Hussain Mazhar Kaleem, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Majeed Mallick for Appellants.\nAdditional Advocate General for the State.\nCh. Ali Muhammad for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL GUFTAR and 2 others-Appellants\nVs\nTHE STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24169", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2516 = 2023 SLD 2516 = (2023) 127 TAX 834 = 2025 PTD 377", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Burden of Proof and Validity of Show Cause Notice in Customs Case\nDetails:\nThe applicant challenged the order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, which upheld the vacation of a Show Cause Notice issued to a distributor of Hascol Petroleum Limited regarding the purchase of High-Speed Diesel. The adjudicating authority had dismissed the Show Cause Notice after confirming the transactions with Hascol Petroleum Limited. The appellate tribunal supported the adjudication decision, leading to this reference application.\nHeld:\nNo Question of Law Identified:\nThe Court ruled that no substantial question of law arose from the Appellate Tribunals order as the adjudicating authoritys findings were based on factual determinations, specifically the confirmation from Hascol Petroleum Limited, which remained uncontroverted.\nReference Application Dismissed:\nThe Court deemed the reference application misconceived and dismissed it, declining to interfere with the tribunals findings.\nCitations:\nDeputy Collector of Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise (Adjudication) Quetta at Hyderabad v. Nak Muhammad and Others (C.A # 1585 of 2006).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=187Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=117,119,121", - "Case #": "SCR 502 of 2016 decided on 15.03.2021, date of hearing: 15.03.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shakeel Ahmed Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Aamir Ali Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nPOWER LINK PETROLEUM SERVICES & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24170", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2517 = 2023 SLD 2517 = (2023) 127 TAX 837 = 2025 PTD 538", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Suspension of Sales Tax Registration Without Show Cause Notice\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the suspension of its Sales Tax Registration, which was brought to its knowledge via newspapers and issued without a Show Cause Notice. The suspension was initially dated 26.04.2018, purportedly based on a notice issued under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and later adjudicated against the petitioner. However, the suspension was found to have been made under Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2001, which had already been declared ultra vires by the Court in an earlier judgment.\nIn appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) remanded the case. The petitioner sought the Courts intervention to have the suspension order set aside.\nHeld:\nSuspension Without Show Cause Notice Declared Invalid:\nThe suspension order was deemed unlawful as it was issued without a Show Cause Notice, violating procedural requirements.\nRule 12 Declared Ultra Vires:\nThe Court reiterated its previous judgment in Saleem Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan (C.P. No. D-8101 of 2017 & others), where Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2001, was declared ultra vires.\nSuspension Order Set Aside:\nThe Court annulled the suspension order dated 26.04.2018, allowing the petition in favor of the petitioner.\nCitations:\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Section 11(2).\nSales Tax Rules, 2001: Rule 12 (declared ultra vires).\nCase Referred:\nSaleem Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan & Others (C.P. No. D-8101 of 2017 & others).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)Sales Tax Rules, 2001=12", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-3378 of 2018 and Misc No.15291 of 2018 decided on 04.03.2021, date of hearing: 04.03.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Amani, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nMuhammad Ahmar, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHELL PAKISTAN LTD\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24171", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2518 = 2023 SLD 2518 = (2023) 127 TAX 840", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVSs", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Exemption on Imported LED Panel Lights Under Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe Director of Post Clearance Audit and Collector of Customs filed Reference Applications challenging the Customs Appellate Tribunal’s order allowing exemption benefits to respondents for importing LED Panel Lights under HS Code 9405.1090. The respondents claimed customs duty benefits as per Sr. No. 24 of Part I of the Fifth Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969, and tax exemptions under related provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. However, the customs authority alleged the goods did not qualify for exemptions since they were not designed to work with renewable energy sources like solar or wind energy and operated on alternate current (AC).\nThe original show-cause notices and Orders-in-Original penalized the respondents. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, however, overturned these decisions, extending the exemptions.\nHeld:\nMisdeclaration Allegations Not Established:\nThe Customs Tribunal ruled that there was no substantial evidence to support allegations of misdeclaration under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nFBR’s Interpretation Rejected:\nThe Tribunal found the applicant department’s reliance on the Federal Board of Revenues (FBR) interpretation inconsistent with the statutory provisions.\nTribunal’s Findings Upheld:\nThe High Court agreed with the Tribunal’s reasoning and conclusions, observing no justifiable basis for challenging its decision.\nNo Question of Law Involved:\nThe High Court determined that the case did not raise any substantial questions of law.\nReference Applications Dismissed:\nThe Reference Applications were dismissed in limine as misconceived.\nCitations:\nCustoms Act, 1969: Sections 12(1)(c), 19, 32, 79(1)(b), 81, and 196(5).\nCase Law Referred:\nMessrs Ihsan Sons (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Federation of Pakistan (2006 PTD 2209).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=12(1)(c),19,32,32(1)(c),79(1)(b),81,196(5)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 448/2019 along with SCRA Nos. 332 to 337, 449, 451, 452, 453 & 469 of 2019 decided on 17.02.2021, date of hearing: 17.02.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khalid Mahmood Rajpar, Advocate for the Applicants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE DIRECTOR THROUGH ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR OF PCA (LAW) & COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (LAW)\nVS\nM/S. R.J. CORPORATION AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24172", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2519 = 2023 SLD 2519 = (2023) 127 TAX 848 = 2025 PTD 395", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Alleged Smuggling of Vehicle Under Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe applicant challenged the decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal regarding a vehicle allegedly smuggled into Pakistan. The vehicle was linked to the Sindh Engineering Company Ltd., a manufacturer and seller of Mazda Trucks. The applicant argued that the respondent failed to provide import documents or a goods declaration to prove the vehicles legality. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondent, stating the vehicle was legally imported. The applicant filed a Special Customs Reference Application in the High Court to challenge the Tribunals decision.\nHeld:\nVehicle Proven to Be Legally Manufactured and Sold Domestically:\nRecords confirmed the vehicle was sold by Sindh Engineering Company Ltd., a domestic manufacturer and seller of Mazda Trucks.\nA verification letter dated 25.10.2018 from the manufacturer supported the respondent’s claim.\nFactual Findings Upheld:\nThe Customs Tribunals decision was based on factual verification, with no evidence to the contrary presented by the applicant.\nNo Legal Question Arises:\nThe High Court held that the matter was purely factual, properly addressed by the Tribunal.\nNo substantial question of law warranted review.\nApplication Dismissed:\nThe Special Customs Reference Application was dismissed as misconceived, along with all pending applications.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196(5)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 446 of 2019, CMA No. 2501 of 2019 and CMA No. 2502 of 2019, decided on 04.02.2021, date of hearing: 04.02.2021", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Rashid Arfi, Advocate for the Applicant.\nAbdul Latif Chandio Advocate files Vakalatnama for respondent, which is taken on the record.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR DIRECTORATE I&I-FBR\nVS\nMUHAMMAD BILAL" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24173", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 2520 = 2023 SLD 2520 = (2023) 127 TAX 179", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NDVTg", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Suspension and Blacklisting under Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a registered textile manufacturer, was charged with tax fraud for purchasing goods from a supplier under investigation for tax fraud. The CIR (Chenab Zone), Faisalabad issued a Show Cause Notice for suspending the appellants sales tax registration under Section 21(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and later issued another notice for blacklisting on the FBR e-portal. The appellant challenged these actions, arguing the suspension and blacklisting lacked legal basis as no independent inquiry or material evidence of tax fraud was presented.\nHeld:\nSection 21(2) Action Not Warranted for Violations Under Section 8:\nSection 21(2) only applies to cases involving issuance of fake invoices or proven tax fraud.\nViolations under Section 8 or non-payment of tax require an assessment and recovery order under Section 11(2), not suspension or blacklisting.\nAssessment Procedures Supersede Registration Actions:\nWhere tax payment is deficient, the proper recourse is an assessment under Sections 33 and 34 for tax, penalties, and default surcharge.\nSuspension or blacklisting is not legally justified unless proven tax fraud is established through a valid audit or inquiry.\nLack of Evidence of Tax Fraud:\nNo audit or inquiry was conducted to substantiate allegations of tax fraud or issuance of fake invoices.\nThe burden of proof rests on the tax department, which failed to provide material evidence to support its actions.\nImpugned Orders Declared Void:\nThe suspension of sales tax registration and blacklisting were declared illegal and void ab initio.\nThe appellant’s registration status was ordered to be restored retroactively to the original registration date.\nDecision:\nActions for suspension and blacklisting under Section 21(2) are unlawful unless supported by evidence of tax fraud or fake invoices.\nThe appellant’s suspension and blacklisting orders are set aside, and the FBR is directed to restore the appellant’s registration.\nCitations:\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Sections 2(37), 8, 11(2), 21, 21(2), 33, 34, and Rules 12(a), 12(b)(i), 12(i)(g).\nRelevant Cases:\n1985 SCMR 365\n2003 SCMR 370\n2007 PTD 2188\n2016 SCMR 550\nM/s Imran Ali Lubricants vs. Federation of Pakistan (PTCL 2018 CL. 570)\nPTCL 2019 CL. 476", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),8,11(2),21,21(2),33,34,46(1)(b)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1837/LB/2022, decided on 17.10.2022, date of hearing: 04.10.2022", - "Judge Name:": " DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Waseem Khursheed, Advocate for the Appellant. \nMr. Ahmad Taimoor, DR., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. DATA FABRICS, FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24174", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2594 = 2024 SLD 2594 = (2024) 129 TAX 325", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYzY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Tax Treatment of Federal Government Grant under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThis appeal concerns the tax treatment of grants provided by the Federal Government to the respondent, Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan (Private) Limited. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and the High Court held that such grants do not constitute taxable income under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court granted leave to evaluate whether its prior decision in CIT vs. Smith, Kline & French of Pakistan Ltd. applied and to assess the correctness of a Lahore High Court judgment in CIT vs. Tourism Development Corporation Punjab (TDCP), Lahore.\nHeld:\nConsistent View of Non-Taxability:\nThe Court upheld the Tribunals and High Courts findings that the grant provided by the Federal Government to the respondent is not taxable income.\nExemption Not Dependent on Clause 102A:\nAlthough clause (102A), exempting government subsidies, was added to the Second Schedule in 2006, its absence before this date does not automatically render such grants taxable.\nTax liability must be established through a charging section, not merely the absence of an explicit exemption.\nLegislative Intent:\nThe insertion of clause (102A) reflects the Legislatures intent to avoid unnecessary tax assessments on grants meant for public welfare.\nNo Contrary Precedents Presented:\nThe appellant failed to provide relevant precedents to challenge the concurrent findings of the lower forums.\nAppeal Dismissed:\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that grants for subsidizing essential commodities cannot be treated as taxable income.\nDecision:\nGrants provided by the Federal Government for public welfare purposes, such as subsidies for essential commodities, are not taxable income under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Sections 53, Clause (102A) of Part-I, Second Schedule.\nRelevant Cases:\nCIT vs. M/s Smith, Kline & French of Pakistan Ltd.\nCIT vs. Tourism Development Corporation Punjab (TDCP), Lahore.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=53,clause (102A),Part-I,Second Schedule", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.169 of 2017, Civil Petition Nos.1397, 1398, 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402 and 1403 of 2021 decided on 03.10.2022, date of hearing: 03.10.2022\n(On appeal from the judgment of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad dated 23.02.2016 passed in ITR No.18 of 2013 and judgment dated 11.01.2021 passed in ITR Nos.75 of 2008, 29 of 2007, 350/2007, 42 of 2007, 71 of 2009, 73 of 2009 and 87 of 2015)", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, YAHYA AFRIDI AND JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC along with Mr. Khurram, Additional Commissioner FBR and Ms. Farah Khan, Deputy Commissioner FBR (in CA 169 & CPs 1397 to 1403) for the Appellant/Petitioners.\nMr. Safdar Sial, Law Officer Utility Stores (in CA 169/17) for the Respondent.\nMr. Aswad Deed, Assistant Director, National Book Foundation (in CP 1403/2021).\nMr. Ayaz Shoukat, DAG on behalf of Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE LTU ISLAMABAD\nVS\nM/S UTILITY STORES CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24175", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2595 = 2024 SLD 2895 = (2024) 129 TAX 329", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYzU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Constitutionality of Section 7E of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nSection 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, inserted via the Finance Act, 2022, was challenged on the grounds that it violates the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The section imposes a tax equal to 5% of the fair market value of immovable assets by deeming income from such assets. Petitioners argued that this provision is ultra vires as it infringes upon Articles 23, 24, 25, and 199 and exceeds the Federal Legislatures authority under the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution.\nHeld:\nTax on Deemed Income, Not Immovable Property:\nThe provision creates a legal fiction by presuming income from immovable property, making the tax applicable to deemed income rather than the property itself.\nThe Parliament has legislative competence under Entry No. 47 of the Fourth Schedule to levy income tax, including on deemed income.\nUnreasonableness and Confiscatory Nature:\nRequiring a resident taxpayer to pay tax on non-income-generating assets (e.g., gifted properties) is unreasonable and may force taxpayers to liquidate assets to meet tax liabilities.\nViolation of Article 23 of the Constitution:\nImposing tax on 5% of the fair market value of assets assumes ownership equates to income, which is confiscatory and infringes upon the right to hold property.\nImpact of High Court Rulings:\nA law struck down by one High Court has universal application as its judgment is in rem, effectively invalidating the law nationwide.\nSection 7E Declared Ultra Vires:\nSection 7E was deemed confiscatory, discriminatory, and contrary to Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution.\nThe provision was struck down as being void ab initio.\nDecision:\nSection 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is declared ultra vires the Constitution and struck down as unconstitutional.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Sections 2(29), 7E.\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973: Articles 23, 24, 25, 199.\nEntries No. 47 & 50, Fourth Schedule to the Constitution.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29),7EConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=23,24,25,199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 213 of 2023, decided on 19.02.2024, date of hearing: 15.01.2024", - "Judge Name:": " AAMER FAROOQ, CHIEF JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Mr. Usman Kiyani, Mian Haseeb Ali Bhatti, Mr. Muhammad Aslam Hayat, Mr. Muhammad Naeem Siddique Bhatti, Mr. Asif Farid, Mr. Sajid Naseem, Mr. Usman Ahmed Ranjha, Ms. Sabila Daraz Khan, Syed Ali Murtaza Abbas, Mirza Saqib Siddique, Mr. Waqar Javed, Ms. Fatima, Ms. Aiema Asrar, Malik Nasir Abbas Awan, Mr. Asif Saeed Mughal, Mr. Muhammad Musawar Gill, Mr. Khalil ur Rehman, Mr. Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Mr. Faisal Jaffar Khan, Mr. Imran Ul Haq, Ms. Shazia Nadeem Malik and Mr. Hamid Jalal, Advocates for the Petitioners.\nMr. Ejaz Hussain Rathore, Petitioner in person.\nMr. Ghulam Qasim Bhatti, Syed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi, Barrister Atif Rahim Burki and Barrister Sohail Nawaz, Advocates. Syed Ahsan Raza Kazmi, Deputy Attorney General for the Respondents.\nAssisted by Ms. Maheen Zeeshan Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAHEED ASHRAF AND OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24176", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2596 = 2024 SLD 2596 = (2024) 129 TAX 117", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: De-registration of Sales Tax Registration for Retailer\nDetails:\nThe appellant was registered as a retailer under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 since 18.10.2014. The appellant applied for de-registration on the grounds that he did not fall under any category specified in SRO 608(I)/2014, dated 02.07.2014. The Tax Department rejected the application, and the CIR(A) upheld the decision, stating that the appellant was lawfully registered. The appellant filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.\nHeld:\nContradiction in Registration under SRO:\nThe Appellate Tribunal observed that maintaining the registration of the appellant under SRO 608(I)/2014 was legally flawed, as it contradicted the findings of the tax department’s own report.\nUpholding Registration Based on Shop Area:\nThe CIRs decision to uphold the registration based solely on the area of the appellant’s shop was not legally justified. If the appellant did not fall within any category specified in SRO 608, then his registration should not have been upheld.\nCancellation of CIRs Order:\nThe Tribunal cancelled the order of the CIR dated 05.01.2023, and ruled that the registration of the appellant should not be maintained.\nFresh Registration Process:\nThe Tribunal directed that the tax authorities should initiate fresh registration proceedings in line with Section 2(43A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as amended by the Finance Act, 2022. The tax department must confront the appellant in writing about the basis for the registration before proceeding with the registration.\nDecision:\nThe order of CIR to uphold the registration was cancelled.\nThe appeal was disposed of, with directions for the tax authorities to proceed with fresh registration, considering the legal framework outlined.\nCitations:\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Sections 2(43A), 3(9A), 14, 46(1).\nSales Tax Rules, 2006: Rules 4(a) to (e).\nSRO 608(I)/2014, dated 02.07.2014.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(43A),3(9A),14,46(1),46(1)(b)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=4(a),4(b),4(c),4(d),4(e)", - "Case #": "STA No. 126/IB/2023, decided on 21.08.2023, date of hearing: 21.08.2023", - "Judge Name:": " MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Nasir Nawaz, Advocate for the Appellant. \nMr. Niaz Ahmed, D.R, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAHID NAWA SINDHU, SARGODHA\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, SARGODHA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24177", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2597 = 2024 SLD 2597 = (2024) 129 TAX 126", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYy8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Imposition of Penalty on Clearing Agent for Fiscal Fraud in Customs Clearance\nDetails:\nThe case involves M/S Novamed Pharmaceutical (Pvt) Ltd, which imported Pharmaceutical Packing Material 10ML Ampole Clear under PCT heading 7010 1000. The goods were cleared through the Green Channel, but upon post-clearance scrutiny, it was found that the importer evaded RD (Regulatory Duty) and ACD (Additional Customs Duty) by failing to apply the correct valuation ruling and by not paying the appropriate duties. A penalty was imposed on both the importer and the clearing agent, and the importer was directed to pay the evaded duty and taxes. The clearing agent appealed the penalty before the Customs Tribunal.\nHeld:\nPenalty on Clearing Agent:\nThe Tribunal held that a penalty cannot be imposed on the clearing agent without proof of mens rea (intent), connivance, or beneficial interest. The appellant, in this case, only filed the Goods Declaration (GD) as per the documents provided by the importer and had no direct involvement in the evasion of duties.\nThe Tribunal found that the penalty imposed on the clearing agent, in this case, was not maintainable because the necessary legal requirements, including the proof of malafide intention or involvement in the fraud, were not established.\nAdjudication Officers Decision:\nThe order passed by the Adjudicating Officer against the importer was upheld, and the evaded amount of duty and taxes amounting to Rs. 1,345,687 was directed to be paid along with the penalty imposed on the importer.\nThe penalty of Rs. 100,000 imposed on the clearing agent was set aside by the Tribunal due to lack of evidence of connivance or malintent.\nDecision:\nThe penalty imposed on the clearing agent was set aside, as the required elements of connivance or mens rea were not proven.\nThe order of the Adjudicating Officer regarding the importer’s duty evasion and penalty was upheld.\nCitations:\nCustoms Act, 1969: Sections 32, 32A, 79(1), 80, 83, 156(1)(14).\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Sections 3, 6, 7.\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Section 148.\nSROs 840/2021 and 845/2021.\nCase Law Referenced:\nPTD 2022 410\n2022 PTD (Trib.) 639 (M/s Abdul Aziz Savul & Co., vs GD, I & I, Karachi & others)\n2022 PTD 656 (Collector of Customs, Islamabad vs Israr & others)", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,32(1)(2),32A,79(1),80,83,156(1)(14)Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,7Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-497/2022, decided on 30.11.2022, date of hearing: 10.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ghulam Yaseen, Consultant for the Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S BUSINESS LINK (C.H.A.L NO-3060), CLEARING & FORWARDING AGENCY, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, (ADJUDICATION-I) CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24178", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2598 = 2024 SLD 2598 = (2024) 129 TAX 140", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYys", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Withholding Tax on Offshore Supplies and Double Taxation Treaty Compliance\nDetails:\nThe case involves a dispute over withholding tax obligations under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 concerning payments made for importing plant and machinery under an offshore contract with Hydrochina Corporation (HC) and an onshore contract with Hydrochina International Engineering Company Limited Pakistan (HIECLP).\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) issued an order treating the appellant as an assessee in default for failing to deduct withholding tax under Section 161(1), arguing that the contracts were bifurcated to avoid tax liability. The CIR (Appeals) upheld this view, prompting the appellant to appeal to the Tribunal.\nHeld:\n(a) Applicability of Withholding Tax on Non-Residents:\nPayments to non-residents for business activities outside Pakistan are subject to withholding tax only if the income is chargeable in Pakistan, as per long-standing principles since the 1922 Act.\n(b) Exemption Certificate under Section 152(5):\nThe payer is not obligated to obtain an exemption certificate for payments outside Pakistan if the payment falls under Section 152(7), as clarified by the provisions of the Finance Act, 2018.\n(c) Offshore and Onshore Contracts:\nThe CIR(A)’s attempt to merge offshore and onshore contracts to attribute tax liability lacked jurisdiction under Section 109. The Tribunal found no evidence supporting the CIR(A)’s claim that the contracts were split to evade taxes.\n(d) Prospective Application of Amendments:\nChanges introduced through the Finance Act, 2018, such as the concept of “cohesive business operation,” cannot be applied retrospectively.\n(e) Double Tax Treaty (DTT) Overrides Domestic Law:\nThe provisions of the Double Tax Treaty (DTT) take precedence over domestic tax laws in cases of conflict. Under Article 7 of the DTT, business profits of non-residents are taxable in Pakistan only if attributable to a Permanent Establishment (PE) in Pakistan. The Tribunal found no PE in this case.\n(f) Misinterpretation of PE under Article 5 of DTT:\nThe CIR(A) incorrectly inferred that the relationship between HC and HIECLP constituted a PE. The Tribunal clarified that a PE requires a fixed place of business for conducting operations, which was absent in this case.\n(g) Force of Attraction Rule Misapplied:\nThe Tribunal noted that the force of attraction rule is inapplicable to Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) Contracts, particularly when offshore supplies are involved.\n(h) Reimbursement of Expenses and Withholding Tax:\nIssues concerning withholding tax on reimbursement of expenses and related grounds were remanded for re-examination in light of relevant laws and details.\nDecision:\nTax Liability under Section 161:\nTax levied on payments for imported plant and machinery from HC was deleted.\nCorresponding default surcharge and penalty were also set aside.\nRemand for Reimbursement Issues:\nIssues related to withholding tax on expenses and commissions were remanded for further review.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Sections 2(41), 101(3), 109, 152(5), 152(7), 161(1), 205.\nDouble Taxation Treaty: Articles 7(1), 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b), and 7(1)(c).\nCase Law Referenced:\nHigh Court of Sindh’s judgment in IGI Insurance (2018 PTD 114).\nTribunal decision in ITA No. 723/KB/2018 (19 March 2021).", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(41),107,101(3),109,129,152,152(5),152(7),152(7)(ii),152(7)(a)(iii),161,161(1),163,205Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=163", - "Case #": "ITA No. 377/KB/2019, decided on 24.08.2021, date of hearing: 28.01.2021", - "Judge Name:": " SAIF ULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND AMINA NAZEER ANSARI, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Usman Ali Khan, Advocate for Appellant.\nSaleem-ur-Rehman, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. ARTISTIC ENERGY (PRIVATE) LIMITED, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER-IR, ZONE-II, CTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24179", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2599 = 2024 SLD 2599 = (2024) 129 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVIS1NTYzk", - "Key Words:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman’s Recommendations on Time-Barred Assessment and Revision\nDetails:\nThe case pertains to a complaint filed with the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) regarding a time-barred assessment order issued under Section 121 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the inaction of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) on a revision application filed under Section 122A.\nKey Facts:\nAn assessment order under Section 121 was issued on 23 June 2021, which the complainant contended was time-barred under Section 121(3), as it was required to be finalized by 30 June 2020.\nThe complainant filed a revision application under Section 122A with the CIR on 7 November 2022, requesting the cancellation of the allegedly time-barred order.\nDespite repeated requests, no action was taken on the application, leading the complainant to approach the FTO for necessary directions.\nDepartments Position:\nThe department defended the validity of the order, asserting it was issued on merit.\nIt highlighted that the complainant, being an owner of Gulberg Green Farm Houses, had not declared or filed income tax returns for Tax Years 2014 and 2015.\nHeld:\n(a) Order under Section 122A:\nThe order issued by the Commissioner under Section 122A on 20 June 2023 was deemed contrary to law.\nThe FTO found the Commissioners actions to constitute maladministration under Section 2(3)(i)(a) of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000.\nRecommendations:\nThe FTO directed the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to:\nRecall and Revise Order:\nDirect the concerned CIR to recall the order passed under Section 122A and issue a fresh order in accordance with the directions and the spirit of the law within 30 days.\nCompliance Report:\nSubmit a report on compliance with these directions within 45 days.\nCitations:\nFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000: Section 10.\nFederal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013: Section 9.\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Sections 121, 121(3), 122A.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3)(i)(a),9(1),9(2),10(1),10(4)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121,121(3),122AFederal Ombudsmen Institutional Reform Act, 2013=9", - "Case #": "Complaint No.4585/ISB/IT/2023 decided on 23.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": " DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Naseer Butt, Advisor for the Dealing Officer.\nAppraised by Mr. Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor.\nMr. Muhammad Nasir Nawaz for Authorized Representative.\nMr. Sami Ullah Khan, ADCIR, RTO, Islamabad for Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAHEELA NASEER, ISLAMABAD\nVERSUS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24180", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2744 = 2024 SLD 2744 = (2024) 130 TAX 487 = 2024 PLD 1168", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTY", - "Key Words:": "Constitutionality of Amendments to Tax Credit Provisions under Section 65B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThis case involved a challenge to the amendments made to Section 65B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO) by the Finance Act, 2019, which altered the tax credit benefit for companies investing in industrial plant and machinery.\nKey Amendments and Issues Raised:\nOriginal Provision (2010–2018):\nSection 65B allowed a 10% tax credit for companies investing in plant and machinery for industrial purposes.\nThe eligible period was extended multiple times by successive Finance Acts, culminating in an ending date of 30 June 2021.\nAmendments by Finance Act, 2019:\nReduced the tax credit rate from 10% to 5% for the tax year 2019.\nMoved the ending date for eligibility back to 30 June 2019.\nChallenges by Taxpayer Companies:\nCompanies with investments made before 30 June 2019, but installed by 30 June 2021, argued that the amendments violated their vested rights and fundamental rights under the Constitution.\nTwo categories of taxpayers were identified:\nFirst Category: Companies that purchased and installed machinery before 30 June 2019.\nSecond Category: Companies that purchased machinery before 30 June 2019 but installed it by 30 June 2021.\nQuestions for Determination:\n(i) Did the amendments violate vested rights?\n(ii) Did the second category of taxpayers have vested rights to the tax credit?\n(iii) Were transactions of the first category past and closed ?\n(iv) Did the amendments infringe upon fundamental rights under Articles 18, 23, 24, and 25 of the Constitution?\nHeld:\n(i) Vested Rights and Legislative Authority:\nThe High Court erred in holding that vested rights cannot be vitiated by retrospective amendments.\nPrinciple: Legislative amendments can revoke vested rights unless explicitly barred by the Constitution.\n(ii) Second Category of Taxpayers:\nCompanies in this category did not acquire vested rights because the benefit was conferred through legislation, and amendments were also made legislatively.\nThe doctrine of promissory estoppel was inapplicable since it does not operate against legislative actions.\n(iii) First Category of Taxpayers:\nTax credit transactions for the first category were not past and closed as the legislative intent to reduce the rate was clear in the 2019 amendments.\nThe proviso expressly reduced the tax credit rate from 10% to 5% for 2019.\n(iv) Fundamental Rights:\nThe proviso reducing the tax credit infringed the right to equality (Article 25) of the first category of taxpayers, as it discriminated against them.\nHowever, the amendments to the ending year (subsection 2) did not violate the fundamental rights of the second category of taxpayers.\nDecision:\nThe proviso to subsection (1) of Section 65B (reducing the tax credit rate to 5%) was struck down for violating Article 25.\nThe amendments to subsection (2) (changing the ending year) were upheld as constitutional and applicable to the second category of taxpayers.\nThe appeals were partly allowed, and the High Courts decision was modified accordingly.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Section 65B.\nRelevant Statutes: Finance Acts (2010, 2016, 2018, and 2019).\nConstitution of Pakistan: Articles 18, 23, 24, and 25.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=65B,65B(1)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=107General Clauses (Amendment) Act, 1997=6Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,142", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A.824-K of 2023 decided on 18.09.2024, heard on: 03.07.2024\nC.P.L.A.824-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8385/2019), C.P.L.A.825- K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8373/2019), C.P.L.A.826-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-2456/2020), C.P.L.A.827-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-2210/2020), C.P.L.A.828-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-659/2020), C.P.L.A.829-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6792/2020), C.P.L.A.830-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No. D- 6729/2020), C.P.L.A.831-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6823/2020), C.P.L.A.832-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6822/2020), C.P.L.A.833-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-04/2021), C.P.L.A.834-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-05/2021), C.P.L.A.835-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-140/2022), C.P.L.A.836-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-993/2022), C.P.L.A.837-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No. D- 139/2022), C.P.L.A.838-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-141/2022), C.P.L.A.839-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-1613/2022), C.P.L.A.840-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-1614/2022), C.P.L.A.841-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No. D- 1517/2022), C.P.L.A.842-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-1518/2022), C.P.L.A.843-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-665/2019), C.P.L.A.844-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-2208/2019), C.P.L.A.845-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 6729/2020), C.P.L.A.846-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8273/2019), C.P.L.A.847-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-2661/2019), C.P.L.A.848-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8396/2019), C.P.L.A.849-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8368/2020), C.P.L.A.850-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8277/2019), C.P.L.A.851-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8367/2020), C.P.L.A.852-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8376/2019), C.P.L.A.853-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8372/2019), C.P.L.A.854-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8394/2019), C.P.L.A.855-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8370/2019), C.P.L.A.856-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8371/2019), C.P.L.A.857-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8164/2019), C.P.L.A.858-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8369/2019), C.P.L.A.859-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8278/2019), C.P.L.A.860-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8345/2019), C.P.L.A.861-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8390/2019), C.P.L.A.862-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8434/2019), C.P.L.A.863-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8375/2019), C.P.L.A.864-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8417/2019), C.P.L.A.865-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8539/2019), C.P.L.A.866-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8452/2019), C.P.L.A.867-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8470/2019), C.P.L.A.868-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8374/2020), C.P.L.A.869-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 1351/2019), C.P.L.A.870-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-359/2019), C.P.L.A.871-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-2209/2019), C.P.L.A.872-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8389/2019), C.P.L.A.545-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8343/2019), C.P.L.A.546-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8344/2019), C.P.L.A.547-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8416/2019), C.P.L.A.548-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8428/2019), C.P.L.A.549-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8534/2019), C.P.L.A.550-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8540/2019), C.P.L.A.551-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8552/2019), C.P.L.A.552-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-357/2020), C.P.L.A.553-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 358/2020), C.P.L.A.554-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6807/2020), C.P.L.A.582-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-2429/2019), C.P.L.A.583-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8561/2019), C.P.L.A.584-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 444/2021), C.P.L.A.585-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8447/2019), C.P.L.A.586-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8507/2019), C.P.L.A.587-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8528/2019), C.P.L.A.588-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8446/2019), C.P.L.A.589-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8242/2019), C.P.L.A.590-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8449/2019), C.P.L.A.591-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6727/2019), C.P.L.A.592-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8275/2019), C.P.L.A.593-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8247/2019), C.P.L.A.594-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8271/2019), C.P.L.A.595-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8397/2019), C.P.L.A.596-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8546/2019), C.P.L.A.597-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8235/2019), C.P.L.A.598-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8276/2019), C.P.L.A.599-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8272/2019), C.P.L.A.600-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 05/2021), C.M.A.4002/2023, C.P.L.A.601-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8559/2019), C.P.L.A.602-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8547/2019), C.P.L.A.603-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8560/2019), C.P.L.A.604-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8281/2019), C.P.L.A.605-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8282/2019), C.P.L.A.606-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8506/2019), C.P.L.A.607-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8274/2019), C.M.A.4003/2023, C.P.L.A.608-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8431/2019), C.P.L.A.609-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8432/2019), C.P.L.A.610-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8525/2019), C.M.A.4384/2023, C.P.L.A.611-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8543/2019), C.P.L.A.612-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8500/2019), C.P.L.A.613-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8544/2019), C.P.L.A.614-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8530/2019), C.P.L.A.615-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8526/2019), C.P.L.A.616-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8244/2019), C.P.L.A.617-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8508/2019), C.P.L.A.618-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8527/2019), C.P.L.A.619-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8517/2019), C.P.L.A.620-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8442/2019), C.P.L.A.621-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8241/2019), C.P.L.A.622-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8450/2019), C.P.L.A.623-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8246/2019), C.P.L.A.624-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8246/2019), C.P.L.A.625-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8518/2019), C.P.L.A.626-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8243/2019), C.P.L.A.627-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8240/2019), C.P.L.A.628-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8238/2019), C.P.L.A.629-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8403/2019), C.P.L.A.630-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8433/2019), C.P.L.A.631-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8279/2019), C.P.L.A.632-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8451/2019), C.M.A.4004/2023, C.P.L.A.633-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8502/2019), C.P.L.A.634-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8280/2019), C.M.A.4005/2023, C.P.L.A.635-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8443/2019), C.P.L.A.636-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8245/2019), C.P.L.A.637-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8545/2019), C.P.L.A.638-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8531/2019), C.P.L.A.639-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6728/2020), C.P.L.A.640-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-355/2020), C.P.L.A.641-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 6771/2020), C.P.L.A.642-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6583/2020), C.P.L.A.643-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-93/2020), C.P.L.A.644-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6682/2020), C.P.L.A.645-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 60/2020), C.P.L.A.646-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-3615/2020), C.P.L.A.647-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-2652/2020), C.P.L.A.648-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-356/2020), C.P.L.A.649-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 6582/2020), C.P.L.A.650-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-94/2020), C.P.L.A.651- K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-09/2021), C.P.L.A.652-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-36/2022), C.P.L.A.653-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-1830/2022), C.P.L.A.654-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-1829/2022), C.P.L.A.655-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-955/2022), C.P.L.A.656-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 8453/2022), C.P.L.A.657-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6815/2022), C.P.L.A.658-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-63/2022), C.P.L.A.659-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-52/2022), C.P.L.A.660-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 114/2022), C.P.L.A.661-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-115/2022), C.P.L.A.662-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-61/2022), C.P.L.A.663-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-3049/2022), C.M.A.4006/2023, C.P.L.A.664-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-1718/2022), C.M.A.4007/2023, C.P.L.A.665-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-7540/2020), C.P.L.A.666-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 54/2022), C.P.L.A.667-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-464/2022), C.P.L.A.668-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-357/2022), C.P.L.A.669-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6814/2022), C.P.L.A.670-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 08/2021), C.P.L.A.671-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-55/2022), C.P.L.A.672- K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-65/2022), C.P.L.A.673-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-113/2022), C.P.L.A.674-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-112/2022), C.P.L.A.675-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-53/2022), C.P.L.A.676-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-111/2022), C.P.L.A.677-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 62/2022), C.P.L.A.678-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-06/2022), C.P.L.A.679- K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-335/2022), C.P.L.A.699-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6487/2020), C.P.L.A.700-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6498/2020), C.P.L.A.701-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8529/2019), C.P.L.A.702-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-6497/2020), C.P.L.A.703-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D- 7/2021), C.P.L.A.704-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-7/2021), C.P.L.A.705- K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8503/2019), C.P.L.A.706-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-2494/2022), C.P.L.A.707-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8237/2019), C.P.L.A.708-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-1828/2021), C.P.L.A.1020-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8236/2019), C.P.L.A.1021-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8448/2019), C.P.L.A.1022-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-1517/2022), C.P.L.A.1023-K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-1518/2022), C.P.L.A.1066- K/2023 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D-8443/2019) & C.M.A.7911/2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shah Nawaz, ASC.\nMr. M. Tariq Arbab, Member (L) FBR, Mir Badshah Khan, Member (Operation) FBR, Fahad Faizan, CIR, FBR, Dr. Sohail Ahmed Fazlani, Addl. Comm. FBR, Abdul Wahid, Addl. Commissioner, LTO, Malik Waqas Nawaz, ADC/DR CTO, FBR.\nMr. Rashid Anwar, ASC, Mr. Irfan Mir Halipota, ASC, Mr. Abid Hussain Shaban, ASC, Mr. Hussain Ali Almani, ASC, Mr. Hyder Ali Khan, ASC, Mr. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, ASC, Ms. Lunba Pervez, ASC, Mr. Muhammad Nadeem Qureshi, ASC, Mr. Arshad Hussain Shahzad, ASC, Mr. Naeem Suleman, ASC, Mr. Taimur Mirza, ASC.\nMst. Abida Parveen Channar, AOR and Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, AOR.\nMr. Rashideen Nawaz Kasuri, Addl. AGP and M. Ibrahim Khan, L.O. (AGP office).", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nMEKOTEX (PVT) LIMITED & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24181", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2745 = 2024 SLD 2745 = 2024 SCMR 556", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTU", - "Key Words:": "Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-Ss. 51(1) & 62-Returning Officer of a constituency changed by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) on medical grounds-Single Judge of High Court passing an ad-interim ex-parte order suspending the notification of ECP whereby the returning officer was changed-Legality-ECP, for justifiable reasons, had issued the notification substituting the returning officer-It is also the responsibility of the ECP to conduct elections-Moreover, no allegation against the newly appointed returning officer was made-Therefore, it cannot be stated that the exercise of discretion by the ECP was in any manner illegal or unconstitutional-Supreme Court observed with concern that an ad interim ex-parte order was passed by the Judge of the High Court without issuance of notice to or hearing the ECP; which would adversely affect the election programme and jeopardise the elections to be held in the said constituency-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed; the impugned order was set-aside with the directions that since the stipulated date for the scrutiny of nomination papers of candidates could not be completed on account of the ad-interim ex-parte order, the scrutiny of the nomination papers of candidates, including the respondents, whose scrutiny of nomination papers had not taken place be undertaken as per the given fresh schedule.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=51(1),62", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4522 of 2023, decided on 2nd January, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 27.12.2023 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in W.P. No. 6194-P of 2023)\nheard on: 2nd January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Afnan Karim Kundi, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record along with Zafar Iqbal Hussain, Spl. Secretary, M. Arshad, DG Law and Falak Sher, Legal Consultant for Petitioner.\nSyed Sikandar Hayat Shah, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Peshawar) for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Islamabad-Petitioner\nVS\nDAWOOD SHAH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24182", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2746 = 2024 SLD 2746 = 2024 SCMR 464", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 427, 148, 149, 337-A(ii) & 337-F(ii)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail, grant of-As per the contents of the crime report, the allegation against the petitioner (accused) is of generalized nature-Two co-accused of the petitioner, who were ascribed similar role, have been acquitted by the court of competent jurisdiction after fulfilling all the legal requirements whereas three accused out of the seven have been acquitted on the basis of compromise between the parties-Hence, the bulk of the prosecution case has already been decided by the court of competent jurisdiction-Only allegation against the petitioner that remains in the field is that he remained absconder for five years-Nothing incriminating has been recovered from the possession or on the pointation of the petitioner-In these circumstances, coupled with the fact that the case of the petitioner is at par with the co-accused, since acquitted, the petitioner has made out a case for concession of bail-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and petitioner was admitted to bail.\n \n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail-Abscondence of accused-No doubt abscondence does constitute a relevant factor when examining question of bail-However abscondence is not to be considered in isolation to keep a person behind bars for an indefinite period-Person who is named in a murder case, rightly or wrongly, if he becomes fugitive from law, his conduct is natural.\nState v. Malik Mukhtar Ahmed Awan 1991 SCMR 322; Rasool Muhammad v. Asal Muhammad 1995 SCMR 1373 and Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain PLD 2009 SC 53 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,427,148,149,337-A(ii),337-F(ii)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 104-P of 2023, dated 21st September, 2023.\n(On appeal against the order dated 19.06.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Misc. B.A. No. 1706-P of 2023)\nheard on: 21st September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Yahya Afridi, Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shabbir Hussain Gigyani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nAltaf Khan, Additional A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.\nSuleman, son for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAID NABI-Petitioner\nVS\nAJMAL KHAN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24183", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2747 = 2024 SLD 2747 = 2024 SCMR 468", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S. 214D [since omitted]-Automatic selection for audit-Scope-In the ordinary course, and in terms of other provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance), selection for audit is not automatic but is a result that comes about after going through various statutory filters, including such as are set out in various circulars issued by the Federal Board of Revenue-Section 214D, inasmuch as it applied automatically (subject to certain exceptions contained in its subsections (3) & (4)) and therefore bypassed the filters otherwise built into the Ordinance before an audit could be undertaken, had therefore to be construed and applied strictly-More particularly, the conditions that had to exist for the section to be attracted had to apply precisely-Any deviation or discrepancy, howsoever minor, slight or even inconsequential it may otherwise appear to be would apply, and go, in favor of the taxpayer.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S. 214D [since omitted]-Automatic selection for audit-Scope-Taxpayer had not filed its return for tax year 2015 within the date required-Date for filing the return was 21.01.2016-On that date the respondent-taxpayer properly filed an application under section 119 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance) for extension of time-Commissioner did not respond to said request-On such basis, the department claimed that the respondent came within the ambit of section 214D-Validity-In the present case, section 214D would have applied if the Commissioner had, under section 119, extended the period for filing the return (subject to a thirty day condition) and the return was not filed within such extended period-Now, the fact of the matter was that the Commissioner never took any action on the application, which was otherwise properly filed, for extension-Subsection (3) of section 119 specifically requires the Commissioner to grant the extension in writing-Since section 214D had to be applied exactly, this meant that for purposes of this provision the refusal of the Commissioner also had to be in writing-In other words, any inaction on the part of the Commissioner, or a failure to reject or refuse the application for extension in any manner other than in writing, would mean that for the purposes of section 214D the application would be regarded as pending-There could be no refusal or denial of extension by implication-For a provision as harsh and severe as section 214D to apply merely by way of implication or on a deemed basis would be incorrect-Clearly therefore, until the application for extension was actually disposed of by an order in writing the section would not become applicable-Furthermore, the condition of thirty days would have to apply, in the context of section 214D, not from the due date for the filing of the return, but the date of the order made by the Commissioner granting an extension-Of course, if the Commissioner refused the extension in writing, then the section would apply from the date of such order, subject to any remedies available to the taxpayer to challenge such refusal-Therefore, in the facts and circumstances presented in this case, section 214D never became applicable-Appeal filed by the department was dismissed.\nMuhammad Mujahid Qureshi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2019 PTD 535 declared to be incorrectly decided.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=214D", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.247 of 2021, decided on 2nd November, 2023.\n(Against judgment dated 22.4.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.C.A. No. 18093 of 2019)heard on: 2nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ibrar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) for Appellant.\nJaved Iqbal Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE-Appellant\nVS\nMessrs ATTA CABLES (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24184", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2748 = 2024 SLD 2748 = 2024 SCMR 472", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) International Islamic University Ordinance (XXX of 1985)-\n-S. 38-Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3(2), proviso-Decision of the Board of Governors-Intra Court Appeal-Maintainability-Section 38 of the International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985 (Ordinance of 1985) provides for the remedy of appeal or review before the Board of Governors against any order punishing a teacher or other employees of the university-Original order in the present case was an order by the Board of Governors discontinuing incentives which order was first challenged by the respondents by way of a departmental appeal and then subsequently in a writ petition-Respondents admittedly availed the remedy of appeal provided against the original order by the Board of Governors in terms of section 38 of the Ordinance of 1985-Consequently, the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 created a bar on the remedy of appeal for the petitioners (University)-As there was a remedy of appeal available under the Ordinance of 1985, hence the impugned judgment of the High Court was correct in dismissing the Intra Court Appeal-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nMst. Karim Bibi and others v. Hussain Bakhsh and another PLD 1984 SC 344 applicable.\nMuhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Centre-I, Lahore PLD 1985 SC 107 ref.\n(b) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)-\n-S. 3(2), proviso-Intra Court Appeal (ICA)-Maintainability-Proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972-Scope-Essential requirement to invoke the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 is to see whether the remedy of at least one appeal, review or revision is available under the law against the original order, in the proceedings in which the law is applicable to decide the ICA on merit-Law must prescribe for the remedy of appeal, review or revision, and if so section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 will be applicable, notwithstanding whether that remedy is available to the person filing the ICA.\nMuhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Centre-I, Lahore PLD 1985 SC 107 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985=38Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.835 of 2021, decided on 16th November, 2023.\n(Against judgment dated 18.01.2021 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in I.C.A. No. 1100 of 2013)heard on: 16th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Yahya Afridi, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rehan-ud-Din Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD through Rector and another-Petitioners\nVS\nSyed NAVEED ALTAF and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24185", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2749 = 2024 SLD 2749 = 2024 SCMR 476", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 120-B, 201 & 109-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act (XXIII of 2013), S. 15-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd, criminal conspiracy, causing disappearance of evidence of offence, abetment, possession of illegal weapon-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Name of the petitioner-accused was not mentioned in the FIR which was against some unknown persons-There was also no eye-witness of the incident-Pistol was recovered in the absence of the petitioner, from his brother, for which a separate FIR had been lodged-Even if the empties recovered from the scene of the crime were matched, it was to be seen by the Trial Court after recording evidence whether the bullets were shot by the petitioner or not-Reliance on a single picture captured from a CCTV system could not be treated as a substantial piece of evidence at bail stage, rather it was subject to the evidence, as may be recorded by the Trial Court, whether it had any nexus to the scene of crime-FIR was lodged on 11.12.2002 against unknown persons but on 15.12.2022 the complainant, by means of statement recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C., implicated the petitioner on the ground that there was a quarrel between the deceased and the petitioner, which alleged incident was in the knowledge of the complainant, but no such indication or disclosure was made while lodging the FIR-Case of petitioner required further inquiry to prove his guilt which could only be thrashed out after recording of evidence in the Trial Court-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was granted post-arrest bail.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 161 & 497(2)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 38, 39 & 40-Confession made by accused before the police-Such confession is not admissible.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Further inquiry-Scope-Further inquiry is a question which must have some nexus with the result of the case for which a tentative assessment of the material on record is to be considered for reaching a just conclusion-It pre-supposes the tentative assessment which may create doubt with respect to the involvement of the accused in the crime.\n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Principles-Expression reasonable grounds used in section 497, Cr.P.C-Meaning-Expression reasonable grounds as contained under section 497, Cr.P.C., necessitates the prosecution to show that it is in possession of sufficient material or evidence to demonstrate that accused had committed an offence falling within the prohibitory limb of section 497, Cr.P.C.-However for seeking the concession of bail, the accused person has to show that the material or evidence collected during investigation against him creates reasonable doubt or suspicion in the prosecution case-While deciding bail applications, it is the foremost duty of the Courts to apply judicious mind tentatively for reaching the just and proper conclusion regarding whether reasonable grounds are made out or not to enlarge the accused on bail, and the expression reasonable grounds signifies and corresponds to the grounds which are legally rational, acceptable in evidence and attractive to the judicial mind, as opposed to being imaginative, fallacious and/or presumptuous-Whenever reasonable doubt ascends with regard to the involvement of an accused person in the crime or about the certainty or probability of the prosecution case and the evidence proposed to be produced in support of the charge in Court during trial, the accused should not be deprived of the benefit of bail and it would be better to keep him on bail than in jail.\n(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Principles-Principle that prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt-Said principle applies at all stages including the pre-trial stage, and even at the time of deciding whether the accused is entitled to bail or not.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,120-B,201,109", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1054 of 2023, decided on 23rd October, 2023.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 09.08.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal M (B.A) No.2414-P of 2023)\nheard on: 23rd October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sher Aman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nAltaf Khan, Additional A.G., Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Ziarat Gul, SI, Mardan for the State.\nRespondent No. 1 in Person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AKHTAR-Petitioner\nVS\nKHWAS KHAN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24186", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2750 = 2024 SLD 2750 = 2024 SCMR 481", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 18, 19, 20 & 21-Land acquisition-Reference to Court-Pre-requisites-Conditions mentioned under sections 18 to 21 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) have to be fulfilled before the Collector is empowered to make the reference, and then alone the Court has any jurisdiction to entertain the reference-Matter (of landowner seeking enhancement for compensation of his land) goes to Court only upon a reference made by the Collector-It is only after such a reference is made that the Court is empowered to determine the objections made by a claimant to the award-In fact, it is the order of reference which provides the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the objections referred to it-Section 18(1) of the Act does not authorise or permit or provide for a person aggrieved, to make an application directly to the Court.\nThe appellant (land owner), after having received partial compensation directly filed an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) in the Court of District Judge, praying therein to enhance the compensation of land, by setting aside the award announced by the Land Acquisition Collector. The District Judge entertained this application, registered it as a suit, and proceeded with its trial. Question was whether it was open to the land owner-appellant to have directly made an application under section 18 of the Act before the District Judge.\nThere are certain conditions which have to be fulfilled before the Collector is empowered to make the reference, and then alone the Court has any jurisdiction to entertain the reference. These conditions are:\n(a) A written application should be made before the Collector;\n(b) The person applying should be one interested in the subject matter of the reference, but who does not accept the award;\n(c) The grounds of objection as to the measurement, or the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested should be stated in the application; and\n(d) The application should be within the period prescribed under the provisos (a) and (b) to section 18 of the Act.\nAbove are all matters of substance, which may be conveniently called jurisdictional facts, and their compliance is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of reference under section 18 of the Act. The matter goes to Court only upon a reference made by the Collector. It is only after such a reference is made that the Court is empowered to determine the objections made by a claimant to the award. In fact, it is the order of reference which provides the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the objections referred to it. The Court is bound by the reference and cannot widen the scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which are not referred to it. It is thus, not within the domain of the Court to entertain any application under the Act pro interesse suo (that is, according to his interest) or in the nature thereof.\nPrayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahavi Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran and others AIR 2003 SC 2302; Shyamali Das v. Illa Chowdhry and others AIR 2007 SC 215 and The Land Acquisition Collector, Pak-Arab Refinery Limited and others v. Khan (deceased) and others 2019 MLD 968 ref.\nRemedy by filing an application under the Act directly to the Court of District Judge was clearly misconceived, inasmuch as section 18(1) of the Act does not authorise or permit or provide for a person aggrieved, to make an application directly to the Court, and the Trial Court had no jurisdiction whatsoever to decide the points arising in the application; therefore, the proceedings of the District Judge were void ab-initio. Appeal was dismissed.\n(b) Jurisdiction-\n-Principle-Whenever jurisdiction is given by a statute and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein, it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with, the jurisdiction does not arise.\nNusserwanjee Pestonjee and others v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wullud (1885) 6 MIA 134 and Mansab Ali v. Amir and others PLD 1971 SC 124 ref.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Purpose of law is to settle down and not to devise means to multiply contest between the parties.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=18,19,20,21", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.13-Q of 2020, decided on 8th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.11.2020 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Circuit Bench at Turbat in R.F.A. No. (T)01 of 2017)\nheard on: 8th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nMuhammad Ayyaz Swati, Additional A.G. with Qamar Abbas, Focal Person for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GUL ZAMAN-Appellant\nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER/COLLECTOR GWADAR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24187", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2751 = 2024 SLD 2751 = 2024 SCMR 486", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Hebeas corpus, writ of-Scope-Invocation and passing of the writ of habeas corpus is subject to the satisfaction of the High Court that no adequate remedy is provided by the law.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Ss. 7 & 25-Habeas corpus, writ of-Scope-Custody of minor-Whatever the inter se relations between the parents may be, the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus when it comes to the production of a child is to ensure that the child is, at any given moment, capable of being produced before a Court of law-However, there can be no question that a writ of habeas corpus is not to be issued as a matter of course, particularly when the writ is sought against a parent for the custody of a child-Clear grounds must be made out and the writ must only be issued in favour of a person who is entitled to custody of the child-Issuing of such a writ is subject to the satisfaction of the High Court that a minor is not being held in custody without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner-Before issuing writ of habeas corpus the High Court should be satisfied that seeking remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, or any other law for the time being in force, would not be an adequate remedy; that the production of the child before the High Court is in the best interests of the child/minor; and, that handing over custody of the minor/child to the person petitioning the High Court is in the best interests of the child/minor.\nDushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal AIR 1981 SC 1026 ref.\n(c) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)-\n-Ss. 7 & 25-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Hebeas corpus petition-Maintainability-Alternate remedy, availability of-Incompetently filed petition-Interim custody of minor girl restored to mother-Mother contracting second marriage-High Court awarding custody of minor girl to paternal grandmother as an interim arrangement after mother contracted second marriage-Legality-Grandmother, no matter the love she may have for her grandchildren, is not the parent of a child for the purposes of the law and must clearly specify why a writ of habeas corpus must be issued for the production of her grandchild(ren), especially so when it is admitted that the grandchild is in the custody of one or both parents-Paternal grandmother failed to aver that she was filing the writ petition in her capacity as a friend of the minor-At no point had the paternal grandmother averred that she was authorised by her son (minors father) to file the writ petition-No correspondence whatsoever was produced before either the High Court or the Supreme Court which could show that the paternal grandmother was authorised to file the writ petition as a representative of the minors father-Mere assertion in her petition that paternal grandmother wants to properly look after the detenue was insufficient to show that she was interested in the welfare of the child-In the absence of a competently filed writ petition and the presence of an alternative remedy for the paternal grandmother under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, the High Court ought to, in the first place, have satisfied itself that despite these shortcomings, it was still in the best interests of the minor that she be produced before the High Court more so: (i) when it was admitted by paternal grandmother in her petition that the minor was in the custody of her real mother; and (ii) an absence as to how the minor being in the custody of her own mother was without lawful authority which necessitated the production of the minor before the Court-Ordering of the divestment of custody by the impugned judgment/order was without lawful authority-In the presence of an adequate remedy, the High Court was constitutionally barred from exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution-All proceedings in the paternal grandmothers writ petition were declared to be without lawful authority and the writ was liable to be dismissed-Appeal was allowed accordingly with the direction that the Guardian Court, seized of the guardian petition filed by the mother would proceed with the matter expeditiously.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Ss. 7 & 25-Hebeas corpus, writ of-Custody of minor-Friend of minor-Scope-Where a person entitled to custody is shown to be incapable of approaching the Court or where no such person exists, the question of the right of a friend to make such an application arises-In such a situation, the friend of the minor must show that (i) no one who is legally entitled to the custody of the minor or to represent him/her exists, or that such a person, if any, is present and available but unable to file a habeas corpus petition; and (ii) the friend is interested in the welfare of the child.\nRaj Bahadur v. Legal Remembrancer AIR 1953 Cal. 522 ref.\n(e) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Ss. 7 & 25-Hebeas corpus, writ of-Scope-Custody of minor-Tendency of the High Courts to readily issue writs of habeas corpus in custody matters-Observations recorded by the Supreme Court deprecating such tendency stated.\nThe tendency of the High Courts to readily and unhesitatingly resort to extreme measures by involving law enforcement agencies in family matters cannot be appreciated, especially so where no element of criminality is there and the child is in the lawful and rightful custody of the parent. Such actions cause unnecessary trauma and harassment for the concerned parent, specially where the concerned parent is the real mother of the child. The High Court must exercise extreme care, caution, and circumspection in such matters. Only in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, where all other methods and measures fail and an element of criminality, forced removal, kidnapping and/or abduction of the child is involved, the High Court may exercise its constitutional jurisdiction.\nIssuance of a writ of habeas corpus in a custody matter should be an exception, and not the rule, as the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 provides the Guardian Court with all requisite powers to pass and enforce its orders in matters of custody of the child(ren). It is, inappropriate for a constitutional court to encroach upon and arrogate itself the powers of a Guardian Court, which is the court of competent jurisdiction under the law, to decide all matters relating to custody of child(ren).\n(f) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)-\n-Ss. 7 & 25-Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Arts. 1 & 16-United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Arts. 9 & 37-Custody of minor-Mother contracting second marriage-Mother remarrying does not automatically bar her under the law from the custody of her children-Holistic reading of the relevant Islamic principles, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women leads to the conclusion that there is no legal justification for separating a mother from her child if the mother remarries.\nShabana Naz v. Muhammad Saleem 2014 SCMR 343; Muhammad Owais v. Nazia Jabeen 2022 SCMR 2123 and Najaat Welfare Foundation v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2021 FSC 1 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199(1)(b)(i)Guardians and Wards Act, 1890=7,25", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3718 of 2023, decided on 13th December, 2023.\n(Against the order/judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 21.09.2023 passed in Writ Petition No.59365 of 2023)\nheard on: 13th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Ijaz Ul Ahsan, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iftikhar Ahmad Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with Petitioner in person.\nZafar Iqbal Klasoon, Advocate Supreme Court (via V.L. Lahore) for Respondent No. 3.\nBaleeghuz Zaman, Additional A.G. Punjab for Respondent Government.\nNemo for other Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. QURAT-UL-AIN-Petitioner\nVS\nSTATION HOUSE OFFICER, POLICE STATION SADDAR JALALPUR JATTAN, DISTRICT GUJRAT and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24188", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2752 = 2024 SLD 2752 = 2024 SCMR 508", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDSXk", - "Key Words:": "Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 62-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 62(1)(d), (e), (f) & (g)-Elections for seat of National Assembly-Nomination papers-Nomination papers of petitioner (candidate) rejected by the High Court on the ground that she was the wife of a proclaimed offender-Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no provision under the Constitution or the Elections Act, 2017 that deprived the petitioner from contesting elections on this ground-Validity-Counsel for the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) had not been able to show the Court any such provision of law-Article 62(1) (d), (e), (f) and (g) of the Constitution was not self-executory and served as guidelines for the voters in exercising their right to vote-Operation of the impugned order of the High Court was suspended with the direction that the nomination paper of the petitioner shall stand provisionally accepted and the ECP shall continue taking all the steps required in the electoral process including printing of the ballot papers, allocation of symbol etc., in view of present order.\nHamza Rasheed Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal and others Civil Appeal No. 982 of 2018 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=62Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=62(1)(d)(e)(f)(g)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 151 of 2024, decided on 26th January, 2024.heard on: 26th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Arshad, DG (Law) and Falak Sher, Consultant Law for the ECP.\nShoukat Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court along with Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAZ TAHIR-Petitioner\nVS\nKAFAYAT ULLAH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24189", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2753 = 2024 SLD 2753 = 2024 SCMR 510", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Departmental inquiry-Object and purpose-Standard of proof-Object of a departmental inquiry is to investigate allegations of misconduct in order to maintain discipline, decorum, and efficiency within the institution, and strengthening and preserving public confidence-In a departmental enquiry, the standard of proof is that of balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence but not proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is a strict standard required in a criminal trial, where the potential penalties are severe.\n(b) Sindh Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1988-\n-S. 4(b)(v)-Police official-Allegation of unfair and dishonest investigation in a rape case involving a minor girl-Dismissal from service-According to the statement of allegations, the Medico-Legal Report declared that the hymen of the victim was freshly torn and bleeding, the chemical analysis report confirmed the presence of human sperm in the vaginal swab and shalwar of the victim-In the disciplinary proceedings, the competent authority concluded that there was no justification for the petitioner (police official) to insert section 511, P.P.C. based solely on the statement of a seven-year-old minor girl, recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C., while ignoring the ocular testimony of the victims father who caught the accused with the help of neighbors committing the act of rape and handed him over to the police-Even the victim in her recorded statement under section 164, Cr.P.C. did not absolve the accused but the petitioner prematurely added section 511, P.P.C to provide advantage to the accused during his prosecution-Police force is a disciplined force with significant accountability and the responsibility of maintaining law and public order in the society-Therefore, any person who wants to be part of the disciplined force should be a person of utmost integrity and uprightness with an unimpeachable, spotless character, and clean antecedents-In the case in hand, disciplinary action was taken against the petitioner after complying with due process of law and on the basis of self-evident and self-explanatory documents-Enquiry officer, rightly found the petitioner guilty in his report for further necessary action-Dismissal from service order passed against the petitioner was maintained-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nSughra Bibi v. State PLD 2018 SC 595; Gajoo v. State of Uttarakhand (2012) 9 S.C.C. 532; Babubhai v. State of Gujrat and others (2010) 12 SCC 254 and State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai (2014) 5 SCC 108 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 940-K of 2022, decided on 19th December, 2023.\n(Against the Judgment dated 31.03.2022 passed by the Sindh Service Tribunal at Karachi in Appeal No. 473 of 2020)\nheard on: 19th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Javed Ahmed Chhtari, Advocate Supreme Court and Mazhar Ali B. Chohan, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nSaleem Akhtar, Additional P.G., Sibtain Mehmood, Additional A.G. and Malik Qasim S.P. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IKRAMUDDIN RAJPUT-Petitioner\nVS\nINSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, INDH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24190", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2754 = 2024 SLD 2754 = 2024 SCMR 518", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-Ss. 58 & 85-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. IX, R. 13-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5-Ex-parte judgment-Deliberately abstaining from joining proceedings-Dismissal order was challenged by the respondent (employee) before the Labour Court, which was subsequently transferred to the National Industrial Relations Commission ( NIRC )-Petitioner (department) failed to appear before the NIRC-Resultantly ex-parte judgment was passed in favour of respondent (employee)-Application was filed by petitioner under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C., accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, to set aside the said ex-parte judgment, however both said applications were dismissed by the Member NIRC, the Full Bench of NIRC, and by the High Court-Validity-Section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 ( IRA ), stipulates that any person aggrieved by a decision given by any Bench of the NIRC may, within thirty days of such decision, prefer an appeal to the NIRC; and, the appeal shall be heard and adjudicated by the Full Bench of the NIRC-Aggrieved person is required to file the said appeal within thirty days of such order-So, the petitioner, if feeling aggrieved by the said ex-parte judgment dated 09.11.2018 of the member NIRC, should have filed an appeal by 09.12.2018-It is a matter of record that the petitioner did not file any appeal, and the prescribed period of limitation for filing the appeal under section 58 of IRA expired; therefore, the said ex-parte judgment is final between the parties on the basis of the principle of res judicata-To justify the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte judgment, the petitioner, in the application for condonation of delay, asserted that he did not receive any notice or information regarding the pendency of the grievance petition filed by the respondent; he claimed to have knowledge about the ex-parte judgment on 10.12.2018 when he received an application from a former employee-However, this stance of the petitioner is self-contradictory as the record indicates that he, initially, appeared and participated in the proceedings before the member NIRC and opposed the grievance petition by filing a contesting written reply-Petitioner deliberately chose to abstain from joining the proceedings and displayed non-cooperation with the NIRC-Therefore, petitioner had no right to request its (NIRC) indulgence and seek the setting aside of the ex-parte decree passed against him-Petitioner chose to file an application to set aside the ex-parte judgment instead of filing an appeal under section 58 of IRA-Having failed in the attempt to set aside the ex-parte judgment, the petitioner cannot subsequently venture into other concurrently or coexisting available remedies, such as the remedy of an appeal under section 58 of IRA against the said ex-parte judgment-Petitioner did not file any application for condonation of delay under section 85 of the IRA read with section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 along with his appeal before the Full Bench of NIRC-Had the said application been filed, his appeal could have been decided on its merits rather than solely on the point of limitation-Appeal filed by petitioner was rightly dismissed by the Full Bench of NIRC, and by the High Court-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nPir Bakhsh v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145 and Mukhtiar Hussain v. Mst. Shafia Bibi 2023 SCMR 159 ref.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 11 & O. II, R. 2-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 114-Concurrent or co-existent actions or remedies-Choice of aggrieved person-Doctrine of election-Scope-When an aggrieved person intends to commence any legal action to enforce any right and or invoke a remedy to set right a wrong or to vindicate an injury, he has to elect and or choose from amongst the actions or remedies available under the law-Choice to initiate and pursue one out of the available concurrent or coexistent actions or remedy from a forum of competent jurisdiction vests with the aggrieved person-Once the choice is exercised and the election is made then the aggrieved person is prohibited from launching another proceeding to seek relief or remedy contrary to what could be claimed and or achieved by adopting other proceeding/action and or remedy, which in legal parlance is recognized as doctrine of election-Giving a choice to select a remedy from among several coexistent and/or concurrent remedies prevents the recourse to multiple or successive redressals of a singular wrong or impugned action-It also provides an opportunity for an aggrieved person to choose a remedy that best suits the given circumstances-Such a rule of prudence has been developed by courts of law to reduce the multiplicity of proceedings-As long as a party does not avail of the remedy before a Court of competent jurisdiction all such remedies remain open to be invoked-Once the election is made then the party generally, cannot be allowed to hop over and shop for one after another coexistent remedies.\nTrading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Limited and others PLD 2018 SC 828 ref.\n(c) Limitation-\n-Principles-Law of limitation provides an element of certainty in the conduct of human affairs-Law of limitation is a law that is designed to impose quietus on legal dissensions and conflicts; it requires that persons must come to Court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence-Therefore, the limitation cannot be regarded as a mere technicality-With the expiration of the limitation period, valuable rights accrue to the other party.\nGhulam Rasool and others v. Ahmad Yar and others 2006 SCMR 1458; Collector Sales Tax (East), Karachi v. Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi and another 2008 SCMR 435 and Messrs SKB-KNK Joint Venture Contractors through Regional Director v. Water and Power Development Authority and others 2022 SCMR 1615 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Act, 2012=58,85Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=13Limitation Act, 1908=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1787-L of 2022, decided on 16th January, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 26.04.2022 of the Lahore High Court\nLahore passed in W.P. No.77743 of 2019) heard on: 16th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Muhammad Javaid, Advocate Supreme Court and Abdus Sattar, Director, HR (via video link at Lahore) for Petitioners.\nShuja-ud-Din Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER NPGCL, GENCO-III, TPS MUZAFARGARRAH-Petitioner\nVS\nKHALID UMAR TARIQ IMRAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24191", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2755 = 2024 SLD 2755 = 2024 SCMR 527", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Contractual employees-Regularization in service-Principles-Once the contractual services are regularized, the appointment can become substantive or permanent and cannot be terminated without due process-Therefore, the regularization of a contractual employee is a fresh appointment into the stream of regular appointment.\nProvince of Punjab through Secretary, Livestock and Dairy Development, Government of Punjab v. Dr. Javed Iqbal 2021 SCMR 767 ref.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Contractual employees-Regularization in service-Parameters for regularization in service-Institutional autonomy-Scope-Any institution opting for regularization of its employees must be either mandated by law or must carry out regularization through a well-thought out policy of the institution concerned laying down the criteria and the process for regularization; performance evaluation of the contractual employee must be assessed to determine if the employee meets the standards required for a regular position; there must be availability of positions that match the skills and experience of the contractual employee; the budgetary considerations and financial implication of a regular employee be weighed and considered-There must be a fair assessment of the employees qualifications, performance and merit, so as to ensure only competent and committed employees be granted permanent employment status-Regularization is, therefore, not a ritualistic and mechanical exercise-It requires fresh assessment of the candidature of the contractual employee by the competent authority before he is made a regular employee as any such act carries long term financial implications on the institution concerned-Process of regularization is grounded in principles of fairness, openness, transparency, non-discrimination and public interest-Regularization therefore has a close nexus with institutional policy and autonomy.\nHadayat Ullah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1691; Syed Mubashir Raza Jaffri v. Employees of Old Age Benefits Institution 2014 PLC 428 and Ikhlaq Ahmed v. Chief Secretary, Punjab 2018 SCMR 1120 ref.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Contractual employees-Regularization in service-Principles-There is no vested right to seek regularization for employees hired on contractual basis unless there is any legal or statutory basis for the same-Process of regularization requires backing of any law, rules or policy-It should adhere to the relevant statutory provisions and government policies-In the absence of any of the same, a contractual employee cannot claim regularization-Any regularization without the backing of law offends the principles of fairness, transparency and meritocracy and that too at the expense of public exchequer.\nFaraz Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 PLC 198; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Sher Aman and others 2022 SCMR 406; Vice Chancellor, Bacha Khan University Charsadda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Tanveer Ahmad 2022 PLC (C.S.) 85; Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Samiullah 2021 SCMR 998; Messrs Sui Northern Gas Company Ltd. v. Zeeshan Usmani 2021 SCMR 609; Khushal Khan Khattak University v. Jabran Ali Khan 2021 SCMR 977; Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Samiullah 2021 SCMR 998; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Saeed-ul-Hassan 2021 SCMR 1376; Muzaffar Khan v. Government of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 304; Government of Balochistan, Department of Health v. Dr. Zahid Kakar 2005 SCMR 642; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Workers Welfare Board v. Raheel Ali Gohar 2020 SCMR 2068; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Intizar Ali 2022 SCMR 472 and Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director Telephone Industries of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 1257 ref.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 25-Civil service-Contractual employees-Regularization in service-Principle of similarly placed employees-Scope-Where a contractual employee wishes to be regularized, he must demonstrate statutory basis for such a claim, in the absence of which, relief cannot be granted solely on the principle of similarly placed persons -Article 25 of the Constitution has no application to a claim based upon other unlawful acts and illegalities-It comes into operation when some persons are granted a benefit in accordance with law but others, similarly placed and in similar circumstances, are denied that benefit-But where a person gains, or is granted, a benefit illegally, other persons cannot plead, nor can the court accept such a plea, that the same benefit must be allowed to them also in violation of law.\nDeputy Director Finance and Administration FATA v. Dr. Lal Marjan 2022 SCMR 566 and Muhammad Yasin v. D.G. Pakistan, Post Office 2023 SCMR 394 ref.\n(e) Civil service-\n-Contractual employees-Regularization in service-Policy matter-Non-interference by Courts-Institutional autonomy-Process of regularization is a policy matter and the prerogative of the Executive which cannot be ordinarily interfered with by the Courts especially in the absence of any such policy-It does not befit the courts to design or formulate policy for any institution, they can, however, judicially review a policy if it is in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution-Wisdom behind non-interference of courts in policy matters is based on the concept of institutional autonomy.\nWaqas Aslam v. Lahore Electric Supply Company Limited 2023 SCMR 549 and Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore v. Prof. Dr. Javed Iqbal 2022 SCMR 897 ref.\n(f) Civil service-\n-Public sector University-Contractual employees-Regularization in service-Policy matter of the University-Non-interference by Courts-Institutional autonomy, concept of-Wisdom behind non-interference of courts in policy matters is based on the concept of institutional autonomy which is defined as a degree of self-governance, necessary for effective decision making by institutions of higher education regarding their academic work, standards, management, and related activities-Institutional autonomy is usually determined by the level of capability and the right of an institution to decide its course of action about institutional policy, planning, financial and staff management, compensation, students, and academic freedom, without interference from outside authorities-Autonomy of public institutions is not just a matter of administrative convenience, but a fundamental requirement for the effective functioning of a democratic society, as public sector organizations are guardians of the public interest-Democracy, human rights and rule of law cannot become and remain a reality unless higher education institutions and staff and students, enjoy academic freedom and institutional autonomy-Courts must sparingly interfere in the internal governance and affairs of educational institutions i.e., contractual employments; this is because the courts are neither equipped with such expertise, nor do they possess the relevant experience that would allow for interference in such policy matters-Under this autonomous realm, educational institutions are entitled to deference when making any decisions related to their mission-At the same time, any transgression by Courts would amount to the usurpation of the power of another, which would be against the spirit of Article 7 of the Constitution as it is not the role of the Courts to interfere in policy decisions.\nChapter V, Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel (1997) UNESCO < <https:// en.unesco. org/about-us/legal-affairs/recommendation-concerning - status - higher-education-teaching-personnel?>>; OECD, Governance and Quality Guidelines in Higher Education: A Review of Governance Arrangements and Quality Assurance Guidelines (2005); Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan PLD 2022 SC 92; Principles, Values and Responsibilities, Magna Charta Universaitum (2020); Waqas Aslam v. Lahore Electric Supply Company Limited 2023 SCMR 549; Hafsa Habib Qureshi v. Amir Hamza and others 2023 SCP 388; Abdul Hameed and others v. Water and Power Development Authority 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1439; Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Healy v. James 408 U.S. 169 (1972); R v. Dunsheath; Ex parte Meredith [1950] 2 All ER 741; Thorne v. University of London [1966] 2 All ER 338; Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal (1990) 2 SCC 746; Bhushan Uttam Khare v. Dean, B. J Medical College (1992) 2 SCC 420 and Basavaiah v. H. L. Ramesh AIR (2010) 8 SCC 372 ref.\n(g) Void order-\n-When the basic order is without lawful authority, then the entire superstructure raised thereon falls to the ground automatically.\nPakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 574 and Atta-ur-Rehman v. Sardar Umar Farooq PLD 2008 SC 663 ref.\n(h) Civil service-\n-Contractual employees-Regularization in service-Prospective effect-Regularization takes effect prospectively, from the date when a regularization order is passed-This is because regularization is based on several considerations which help guage not only the competence and ability of the employee, proposed to be regularized, but also the financial impact and long term legal obligations on the employer institution-It is a conscious decision to be taken by the employer institution at a particular time and therefore cannot be given a retrospective effect.\nProvince of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore v. Prof. Dr. Javed Iqbal 2022 SCMR 897 and Province of Punjab through Secretary, Livestock and Dairy Development, Government of Punjab v. Dr. Javed Iqbal 2021 SCMR 767 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos.2270, 4783 and 4784 of 2019, C.Ps. Nos.1228 to 1230, 1295 to 1298, 1555, 1781 to 1783, 1807, 456-P and 496-P of 2020, C.P. No. 5871/2021, C.P. No. 5872/2021, C.P. No. 2291/2022, C.P. No. 2782/2022, C.P. No. 3811/2022 to C.P. No. 3813/2022 and C.P. No. 1438/2019, decided on 17th January, 2024.\n(Against the order(s)/judgment(s) of Peshawar High Court Peshawar dated 02.04.2019, passed in W.P. No. 956-P of 2018 dated 11.02.2020, passed in W.P. No.3799-P/2019 dated 13.02.2020, passed in W.P. No.4433-P/2019 dated 13.02.2020, passed in W.P. No.4088-P/2019 dated 06.02.2020, passed in W.P. No.3253-P/2019 dated 06.02.2020, passed in W.P. No.4507-P/2019 dated 06.02.2020, passed in W.P. No. 1568-P/2019 dated 06.02.2020, passed in W.P. No. 1512-P/2019 dated 12.03.2020, passed in W.P. No.3091-P/2019 dated 12.03.2020, passed in W.P. No.3582-P/2019 dated 12.03.2020, passed in W.P. No.3583-P/2019 dated 12.03.2020, passed in W.P. No. 5318-P/2019 dated 12.03.2020, passed in W.P. No. 5893-P/2018 dated 04.06.2020, passed in W.P. No.4875-P/2019 dated 29.06.2020, passed in W.P. No. 3538-P/2019 dated 23.09.2021, passed in W.P. No. 1762-P/2020 dated 14.10.2021, passed in W.P. No.3788-P/2020 dated 10.05.2022, passed in W.P. No.2699-P/2020 dated 01.06.2022, passed in W.P. No. 1561-P/2021 dated 12.03.2020, passed in W.P. No.4526-P/2019 dated 12.03.2020, passed in W.P. No.4729-P/2019 dated 12.03.2020, passed in W.P. No.3679-P/2019 dated 07.03.2019, passed in W.P. No.3125-P/2017)heard on: 17th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naveed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court along with Jahan Bakht, V.C. and Muhammad Rizwan, Registrar for Petitioners.\nMs. Tahmina Ambreen, Advocate Supreme Court, Hafiz S.A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Shahid Saleem Khel, Advocate Supreme Court, Jehanzeb Mahsud, Advocate Supreme Court, Niaz Wali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Ijaz Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Asif Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court, Zartaj Anwar, Advocate Supreme Court, Nasrum Minallah, Advocate Supreme Court, Waseem ud Din Khattak, Advocate Supreme Court, Amjad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court, Khaled Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record, Wakeel Khan in person, Shafique, in person and Sultan Mazhar Sher, Additional A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Respondents.\nUmer A. Ranjha, Law Clerk, Research Assistance.", - "Petitioner Name:": "VICE-CHANCELLOR AGRICULTURE UNIVERSITY, PESHAWAR and others-Petitioners\nVS\nMUHAMMAD SHAFIQ and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24192", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2756 = 2024 SLD 2756 = 2024 SCMR 538", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 25-Civil service-Employees of Solicitor Office, Law Department, Peshawar (the respondents)-Special allowance and utility allowance, denial of-Discrimination-Two allowances in question were also drawn by the respondents but later payment of such allowances was discontinued by the Government on the ground that the employees of the Solicitor Office were not part of the Civil Secretariat, therefore, not entitled for such allowances-Legality-High Court rightly allowed said allowances to the respondent by holding that that the classification so made by the Government qua granting of said two allowances to specified employees while denying the same to other employees who were also posted inside the walled premises of the Civil Secretariat, could not be termed as reasonable and amounted to offend the principle of equity before the law-High Court correctly noted that the office of the Solicitor having a separate entity in the Law Department was situated within the premises of the Civil Secretariat, therefore, the employees of the Solicitor Office were similarly placed and were entitled to the grant of special allowance and utility allowance-Counsel for the Provincial Government could not point out any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment of the High Court, which was maintained-Resultantly, appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 894 of 2015, decided on 29th November, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 24.04.2015 passed by\nthe Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in Writ Petition No.2095-P of 2008)\nheard on: 29th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid Yousaf Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nMuhammad Asif Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SECRETARY FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA,\nPESHAWAR and another-Appellants\nVS\nSyed JEHANGIR SHAH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24193", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2757 = 2024 SLD 2757 = 2024 SCMR 541", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRS8", - "Key Words:": "Fundamental Rules-\n-F.R. 54-Civil Service Regulations (C.S.R.), Art. 417-A-Pensionary benefits-Pensionary benefits for intervening period before reinstatement into service-F.R. 54 of the Fundamental Rules provides that in the case of reinstatement of dismissed or removed employee, only the revising or appellate authority may grant him his pay for the period of his absence from duty, and if he is honourably acquitted then, the full pay to which he would have been entitled to, and his period of absence from duty will be treated as a period spent on duty-Though this Rule is not germane to the present controversy, but at the same time, it is a ground reality that neither the department placed anything on the record to show that the Divisional Superintendent, Postal Service Kohat, was actually the revising or appellate authority, nor any document was submitted to show that he was authorised to issue any such letter or take any such decision in the capacity of a revising or appellate authority under the exactitudes of F.R. 54-Petitioner was deprived of his pay for the intervening period, from 01.09.2013 to 17.05.2015, in view of F.R. 54(a) merely on the ground that he was not honourably acquitted by the Tribunal, and the major penalty was modified in view of the judgment passed on 25.05.2016-Still, in tandem, the department is ignoring that the same Tribunal in the same judgment also set aside the impugned orders, and the petitioner was reinstated into service with consequential back benefits-In another judgment in the case of the same petitioner by the same Tribunal on the very next date, i.e., 26.05.2016, the major penalty of withholding of two steps increment for two years without future effect was modified into withholding one increment for one year only-However, in the judgment dated 25.05.2016, the reinstatement order was passed with consequential back benefits, which order is in the field-When the Tribunal has passed the reinstatement order with consequential back benefits, then, in this particular situation, the revising or appellate authority cannot undo or make ineffective the order or judgment passed by the Tribunal for the payment of consequential back benefits-Penalty imposed on the petitioner was only confined to withholding of an increment for a certain period, which does not otherwise mean to withhold his pay for the period he actually rendered his services to the department, and the principle of no work, no pay is not applicable when consequential back benefits have been accorded by the Tribunal-Petitioner retired on 18.05.2015 and the letter for withholding his emoluments from 01.09.2013 to 17.05.2015 was issued to him on 14.02.2019, whereas, under Article 417-A of the Civil Service Regulations (C.S.R.), the pending disciplinary proceedings could not continue if the officer attains the age of superannuation before the completion of the inquiry-Therefore, in that context too, the pending proceedings if any were abated and there was no justification to issue the letter after considerable period of retirement for withholding the salary with retrospective effect which was totally unjustified and unwarranted-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal and the directions issued by the Divisional Superintendent, Postal Service Kohat for withholding the pay of the petitioner were set aside, and he was held entitled to be paid for the period from 01.09.2013 to 17.05.2015 accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1066 of 2022, decided on 24th November, 2023.\n(Against the Judgment dated 28.01.2022 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 848(P)CS/2019)\nheard on: 24th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Misbah Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional A.G.P. and Shahid Akhtar, D.S. Kohat for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAHIMULLAH KHAN-Petitioner\nVS\nDEPUTY POSTMASTER GENERAL, SOUTHERN POSTAL REGION, KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24194", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2758 = 2024 SLD 2758 = 2024 SCMR 548", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRSs", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 295-B-Defiling of Holy Quran-Reappraisal of evidence-Serious lapses in investigation-Allegation against the accused was that he was found burning verses of the Holy Quran-There are serious lapses on the part of the investigating officer; for instance, the machis or matchbox has been introduced at a later stage, which appears to have been done to strengthen the prosecutions case-Strikingly, neither the initial written complaint of complainant, nor the proceedings recorded by the police official on the written complaint mentions the machis or matchbox-Similarly, the body of the recovery memo, which was stated to have been prepared at the spot, does not mention the machis or a matchbox-In fact, the word machis appears to have been inserted at a later stage, and that too, only on the heading of the recovery memo, and not in the body thereof, while other recovered items have clearly been mentioned therein-Furthermore, on closer examination of the said recovery memo, it was noted that the word machis has been written with a different pen-To compound the above investigational transgressions, the complainant, has, in his evidence, not mentioned the recovery of the machis or matchbox from the accused at the place of the crime-This being so, the prosecution has not been able to prove: firstly, the willful act of the accused; and secondly, that he was burning the verses of the Holy Quran at the time of his arrest-No specific description of the verses of the Holy Quran has been made at any stage of the proceedings-Complainant in his written complaint, recovery witnesses in their statements recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C., the recovery memo, and even all of the prosecution witnesses remained silent about the description of the recovered verses of the Holy Quran-Verses of the Holy Quran, which, as per prosecution, were alleged to have been recovered at the place of occurrence, should have had an identifiable description to a degree of certainty dispelling any doubt-Holy Quran has an identifiable description in the form of any of its 30 Paraas, 114 Surahs and 6666 Ayats-Lack of description of the recovered verses of the Holy Quran raises serious doubts about what was actually recovered from the place of occurrence, and thereby renders its very admissibility in legal peril-For a serious offence the investigation was not at par with what was required keeping in view the nature of the offence, and the severity of the punishment prescribed therefor-Appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence of accused were set aside, and he was acquitted of the charge framed against him.\nZulifqar and another v. The State 1970 PCr.LJ 47 and Hayatullh v. State 2018 SCMR 2092 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=295-B", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 597 of 2018, decided on 3rd April, 2019*.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 29.02.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Criminal Appeal No. 27-J of 2013)heard on: 3rd April, 2019.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Manzoor Ahmad Malik and Yahya Afridi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saghir Ahmed Qadri, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nCh. Muhammad Sarwar Sidhu, Additional P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ZAFRAN-Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24195", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2759 = 2024 SLD 2759 = 2024 SCMR 553", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTk", - "Key Words:": "Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 62-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 62(1)(d), (e), (f) & (g)-Elections for seat of National Assembly-Nomination papers-Nomination papers of petitioner (candidate) rejected by the High Court on the ground that he was a proclaimed offender in a criminal case-Validity-There was no provision either in the Constitution or in the Elections Act, 2017 that made a proclaimed offender disqualified from contesting the election, and the courts cannot on their own create such additional disqualification, without any backing of the law-Further, in this particular case, the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender in a criminal case, however, he obtained a protective bail in the case by surrendering himself to the court; he, therefore, could not be considered a proclaimed offender-Furthermore Article 62(1)(d), (e), (f) and (g) was not self-executory and served as guidelines for the voters in exercising their right to vote, hence even being a proclaimed offender did not attract the disqualification under the said provisions- Petition was converted into an appeal and the same was allowed; the impugned order of the High Court was set aside and the nomination paper of the petitioner for the seat of a Member of the National Assembly stood accepted with the direction to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to ensure that all the necessary steps to be taken in the electoral process were completed forthwith so that the petitioner could contest the election on the scheduled date for the seat in question, without fail.\nHamza Rasheed Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal and others Civil Appeal No. 982 of 2018 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=62Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=62(1)(d)(e)(f)(g)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 159 of 2024, decided on 26th January, 2024,\n(Against the order of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 12.1.2024, passed in Writ Petition No.2224 of 2024)\nheard on: 26th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Zahid Nawaz Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nRashid Hanif, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehr Khan Malik, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.\nFalak Sher, Consultant Law for ECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UMAR ASLAM KHAN-Petitioner\nVS\nELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24196", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2760 = 2024 SLD 2760 = 2024 SCMR 605", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRTg", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975-\n-R. 12-Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006), S. 17-Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S. 4-Revision-Scope-No vested right to file a revision is available under Section 17 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 and Rule 12 of Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975-Powers of revision in both the aforesaid provisions are suo motu i.e. on its own motion and not on application of any aggrieved person - However, one thing is common in both the aforesaid provisions that in the case of any enhancement of sentence or punishment intended in exercise of revisional powers, the said authority may provide opportunity of showing cause to such person as to why the punishment should not be enhanced-In case of any adverse findings or punishment or enhancement of punishment imposed in exercise of suo motu powers of revision within the time frame, the aggrieved person may approach the service tribunal for redress but the fact remains that revision cannot be filed as a matter of right and in case of rejection or dismissal of departmental appeal, the aggrieved employee should file the appeal before the Tribunal rather than filing revision petition or waiting for the decision of revision by the competent authority which is in fact detrimental and prejudicial to the own interest of such person who despite having in hand an adverse order passed against him in the departmental appeal, prefers to file revision petition which is not a vested right but such provision is provided to exercise suo motu powers and is not based on the condition of application of any aggrieved person-In case any adverse order is passed under suo motu powers of revision against any person then obviously, he can approach the Tribunal against the adverse order being an original one but it is not meant as a remedy to cure the orders passed by the competent authority in the departmental appeal to hear it as a second appeal for which the direct remedy in the form of appeal is already provided before the concerned Service Tribunal.\nAhmad Ali v. Inspector-General, Punjab Police and others 1990 SCMR 1450 and Muhammad Yaqoob v. District Police Officer, District Sahiwal and others 2006 SCMR 310 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975=12Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006=17Punjab Service Tribunals Act, (IX of 1974)=4", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 152 of 2022, decided on 23rd November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 17.11.2021 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 1674/2021).heard on: 23rd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Shahid Tasawar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (Via Video Link from Lahore).\nMalik Waseem Mumtaz, Addl. A.G., Punjab and Ata-ul-Mustafa, Office Superintendent for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAQAS SHAHZAD-Petitioner\nVS\nINSPECTOR GENERAL POLICE PUNJAB, LAHORE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24197", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2761 = 2024 SLD 2761 = 2024 SCMR 559", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRXo", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)-\n-S. 4(1)(b)(vi)-Contractual employee of Punjab Employees Social Security Institution, Lahore (the PESSI)-Reinstatement in service from date of dismissal with all back benefits-With regard to the allegation levelled against the respondent (employee) regarding his poor performance from 06.11.2011 to 21.08.2020, the fate of the said allegation could only be decided after conducting a thorough probe/regular enquiry-Said allegation stood belied from the remarks recorded by the Reporting Officer in the Personal Evaluation Reports of the respondent from the years 2009 to 2020, wherein his performance had been shown as satisfactory-Conduct of the petitioners (departmental authorities) established mala fide on their part to dispense with the services of the respondent as all penal actions against the respondent were initiated by them after filing of writ petitions and contempt petitions/applications by the respondent-As regards the allegation against the respondent of not following duty timings properly, it was apparent from the record that without specifying days when the respondent did not attend the office on time supported the plea of the respondent that he performed his duties to the entire satisfaction of his superiors-Moreover, the Reporting Officer while recording the remarks in the column of Punctuality did not give any adverse remarks against the respondent-Last allegation in the show cause notice that despite previous enquiries initiated against the respondent his behaviour remained very irresponsible during his service, no incident or untoward situation during the service of the respondent had been pointed out or referred to by the petitioners-High Court rightly reinstated the respondent in service from the date of his dismissal with all back benefits, and gave directions to the departmental authorities to take up the matter regarding regularization of services of the respondent with the relevant authority and upon fulfilment of codal formalities to ensure decision within a period of six months positively-Petitions were dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006=4(1)(b)(vi)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2007-L of 2023, C.M.A. No. 2782-L of 2023 in\nC.P. No.2007-L of 2023, C.P. No.2008-L of 2023 and C.M.A. No.4417-L of 2023 in C.P. No.2008-L of 2023, decided on 18th January, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 30.03.2023, passed by the Lahore\nHigh Court, Lahore in Writ Petitions Nos.33961 of 2022 and 178510 of 2018)\nheard on: 18th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aftab Raheem, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Shoaib Tabish, Law Officer (via video link from Lahore) for Petitioner/ Applicants (in both cases).\nM. Irian Khan Ghaznavi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (in both cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "The PUNJAB EMPLOYEES SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION, LAHORE through Commissioner and others-Petitioner/Applicants\nVS\nJAVED IQBAL and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24198", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2762 = 2024 SLD 2762 = 2024 SCMR 563", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDRXk", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 212(2), proviso, 212(3) & 142-Order of a Tribunal created by a Provincial law-Appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution-Maintainability-Whether an appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) against an order of a Tribunal created by a Provincial law to which the proviso to Clause (2) of the Article 212 has not been made applicable-[Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. (Majority view): Proviso to clause (2) does not apply to clause (3) of Article 212 of the Constitution-Appeals against orders of the Provincial Administrative Tribunals are competent before the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution-Supreme Court over ruled the law declared in such regard in the judgment reported as Gomal Medical College v. Armaghan Khan (PLD 2023 SC 190)]-[Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. (Minority view): As Article 212(1) of the Constitution itself confers jurisdiction on the Provincial Legislature to establish the Provincial Tribunal under Article 212(1), the Constitution also confers appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court from a judgment, decree, order or sentence of the said Provincial Tribunal-Discussion of the majority opinion in the instant matter on Entry 55 of the Federal Legislative List (FLL), is not relevant to the dispute at hand]\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. (Majority view)\nClause (2) of Article 212 of the Constitution is merely an ouster clause and not a jurisdiction clause. In case of Federal Tribunals, it provides that no other court can take jurisdiction over any matter which falls under the subject matter of the Administrative Tribunal established under Article 212(1). If clause (2) has not been made applicable to a Provincial Tribunal, it at best means that there are other forums also available to redress the grievance of the officers, e.g., the High Court under Article 199 or the Civil Courts under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. In the absence of clause (2), all the judicial forums in a Province have concurrent jurisdiction along with the Provincial Administrative Tribunal. Once a civil servant invokes the jurisdiction of the Provincial Tribunal, the remedy of an appeal by leave against any decision of the Provincial Tribunal before the Supreme Court becomes alive. Remedy of appeal under clause (3) will not be available if the civil servant approaches the High Court or the Civil Court for the redressal of his grievance. Applicability of clause (2) to a Provincial Tribunal is totally insignificant as it has no effect on the remedy of appeal against the decision of the Provincial Tribunal before the Supreme Court which is ensured under clause (3).\nClause (3) is the third part of Article 212, which provides than an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from a judgment, decree order or sentence of the Administrative Tribunal, and the Supreme Court shall grant leave if the Supreme Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law of public importance arises in the case. Clause (3) has no correlation whatsoever with the ouster clause of clause (2). Whether a Provincial Tribunal enjoys the ouster clause or not, does not affect the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Clause (3) is independently connected with all the administrative Tribunals, including Provincial Tribunals, established under Article 212(1). The appeal to the Supreme Court is available against orders of both the Federal and Provincial Administrative Tribunals by a special constitutional scheme provided under Article 212, which due to the non obstante clause is over and above any sub-constitutional legislation under the regular constitutional scheme.\nThe law declared in the judgment reported as Gomal Medical College v. Armaghan Khan (PLD 2023 SC 190) that unless and until the proviso to Article 212(2) of the Constitution is activated, appeal against an order of a Provincial Tribunal is not available before the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution, and that in the absence of such a law passed by the Parliament, the decision of a Tribunal established under the Provincial law is to be challenged under Article 199 of the Constitution, is not correct and is therefore overruled.\nDean/Chief Executive, Gomal Medical College, Medical Teaching Institution, D.I. Khan v. Muhammad Armaghan Khan PLD 2023 SC 190 overruled.\nPer Ayesha A. Malik, J. (Minority view)\nArticle 212(3) of the Constitution is the constitutional mandate which prescribes that leave to appeal before the Supreme Court for the Tribunal established under Article 212(1) of the Constitution can be filed directly, meaning thereby, the Constitution itself provides for the remedy of appeal before the Supreme Court. Both Sub-Articles (1) and (3) of Article 212 of the Constitution are exceptions to the legislative authority contained in Article 142 of the Constitution as the Constitution itself authorizes and permits the Federal and Provincial Legislature, irrespective of the authority given in Article 142 of the Constitution read with the Federal Legislative List (FLL), to establish the Tribunal and to allow its leave to appeal directly before the Supreme Court. Article 212(2) merely ousts the jurisdiction of other courts or fora. Resultantly, even though the Tribunal is established under Article 212(1), the ouster of jurisdiction of other courts is automatically triggered by Article 212(2) of the Constitution and with respect to federal courts but for the provincial courts it is necessary that the Provincial Assembly activate the proviso to Article 212(2) of the Constitution. In such case, the Tribunal will be an exclusive forum, which totally and completely ousts the jurisdiction of all other courts or fora with respect to the special subject-matters contained in sub Articles (a), (b) and (c) of Article 212(1) of the Constitution. However, if the proviso is not activated, meaning there is no resolution by the Provincial Legislature (followed by an Act of Parliament) the ouster of jurisdiction will not be triggered. Consequently, a litigant will have the option to avail its remedy before any other forum including the remedy before the Supreme Court.\nThe law declared in the judgment reported as Gomal Medical College v. Armaghan Khan (PLD 2023 SC 190) appears to read exclusivity and ouster as synonymous, because it relies on the principle that the Provincial Legislature cannot act upon the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without intervening Federal legislation, hence, in order for the Tribunal to have exclusive jurisdiction, the proviso must be activated. This in turn means that if the proviso is activated, then the exclusivity of the Tribunal will mean ouster of the jurisdiction as well. However, exclusivity will not per se oust the jurisdiction of other courts without an express provision stating so as exclusivity of jurisdiction does not imply the ouster of jurisdiction. For ouster of jurisdiction to take effect an express provision is required which is precisely what Article 212(2) of the Constitution does. In other words, the proviso does not act as a bridge between Sub-Articles (1) and (3) of Article 212, rather it allows and empowers the Provincial Legislature to decide whether, for the purposes of the establishment of the Provincial Tribunal, remedy should lie exclusively to the Supreme Court or, in the alternate, giving more options to the litigant.\nThe discussion of the majority opinion in the instant matter on Entry 55 of the Federal Legislative List (FLL), is not relevant to the dispute at hand. The issue before the Court in this matter is simply whether the remedy of appeal as provided in Article 212(3) of the Constitution is available to the petitioners. The answer to this question is in the affirmative as this remedy has been provided, specifically and categorically, by the Constitution itself, and not by way of any ordinary legislation. Therefore, there is no issue pertaining to legislative competence under Entry 55 of the FLL.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 167-P and 391 of 2022, decided on 15th January, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 18.12.2021 passed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal in Service Appeal No.06-P of 2021)\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J; Amin-ud-Din Khan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ. agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. also agreeing with regard to maintainability of present petitions but not with the reasons given for the same [Majority view]heard on: 15th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Amin-ud-Din Khan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail,\nAyesha A. Malik and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in -person (in C.P. 167-P of 2022).\nHafiz S. A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. 391 of 2022).\nSyed Hamid Ali Shah, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rafaqat H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.P. 391 of 2022).\nHasan Nawaz Makhdoom, Additional A.G.P., Ch. Amir Rehman, Additional A.G.P., Ayyaz Shoukat, A.G. (Islamabad), Khalid Ishaq, A.G. (Punjab), Sanaullah Zahid, Additional A.G. (Punjab), Baleeghuzzaman, Additional A.G. (Punjab), Malik Waseem Mumtaz, Additional A.G. (Punjab), Sultan Mazhar Sher Khan, Additional A.G. (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), M. Ayyaz Khan Swati, Additional A.G. (Balochistan) and Barrister Zeeshan Adhi, Additional A.G. (Sindh) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed ASGHAR ALI SHAH and another-Petitioners\nVS\nKALEEM ARSHAD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24199", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2763 = 2024 SLD 2763 = 2024 SCMR 581", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Employee of Pakistan Railways-Advance increments to officials for possessing/attaining higher education qualifications, entitlement to-Federal Service Tribunal held that the respondent (employee) was entitled to receive advance increments from the date of acquiring the higher qualification of L.L.B. (Legum Baccalaureus/Bachelors in Law)-Legality-Perusal of the relevant Standing Instruction (SI.) No.32, available at page 1043 of the Estacode (2007 Edition), Volume-II and the two relevant Office Memorandums (O.M.) pertaining to the advance increments policy of the appellant-department showed that the policy of granting advance increments on acquiring L.L.B. degree was only available to the employees of the courts, and two advance increments were allowed on acquiring L.L.B. degree, being equal to a M.A./M.Sc. degree, to all the officials working in the organizations which were either dispensing justice or directly connected with the work of dispensing justice, with immediate effect-Counsel for the respondent neither argued that the respondent was ever engaged in or assigned any duty which was directly related to court work or directly connected with the work of dispensing justice, nor was she able to highlight that any other persons were granted advance increments on qualifying L.L.B. in addition to, or in spite of already having been granted advance increments on qualifying M.A./M.Sc.-Admittedly the respondent had been allowed the benefit of two increments on attaining the qualification of M.A. in accordance with the instructions contained in SI. No.32-Scheme conferring advance increments to law graduates was introduced purposely keeping in view the assignment of jobs in the field of law, and with the rider that if advance increments had been granted on Master Degrees then no further increment shall be allowed on law graduation-Appeal was allowed and judgment of Federal Service Tribunal was set-aside.\n(b) Judicial review-\n-Policy decisions of the Executive-Interference by Courts-Scope of judicial review of Government policies stated.\nThe ambit and purview of judicial review of government policies is now well settled and defined and thereunder the Court can neither act as an appellate authority with the aim of scrutinizing the propriety, suitability, and/or adequacy of a policy, nor may it act as an advisor to the executive on matters of policy which they are entitled to formulate. The object of judicially reviewing a policy is to ascertain whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens, or is at variance to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision, or demonstrably arbitrary or discriminatory. The court may invalidate laws, acts and governmental actions that are incompatible with a higher authority, or an executive decision for being unlawful which maintains a check and balance. Such a declaration can be sought on the ground that the decision-maker misdirected itself in law, exercised a power wrongly or improperly or purported to exercise a power that it did not have, which is known as acting ultra vires; a decision may be challenged as unreasonable if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, or due to a failure to observe the statutory procedures. The dominance of judicial review of the executive and legislative action must be kept within the precincts of the constitutional structure so as to avoid any misgivings or apprehension that the judiciary is overstepping its bounds by engaging in unwarranted judicial activism.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 512 of 2021, decided on 20th November, 2023.\n(Against the Judgment dated 17.09.2018 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No.848 (R) CS/2016)\nheard on: 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jawad Mehmood Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court (Via video-link from Lahore) for appellants.\nMs. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SENIOR GENERAL MANAGER, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS and others-Appellants\nVS\nMUHAMMAD PERVAIZ-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24200", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2764 = 2024 SLD 2764 = 2024 SCMR 509", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 395-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Dacoity-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-FIR stated that three sub-machine guns and one pistol, gold ornaments and mobile phones were stolen when the dacoity was committed-In view of the fact that the description of the petitioner (accused) was not mentioned in the FIR, it brought into question the identification parade-None of the stolen goods were recovered from the petitioner which made the present case one of further inquiry-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and petitioner was granted bail.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 9, 25 & 184(3)-Arms Rules, 1924, Sched. 1 [since repealed]-Prohibited bore weapons, license for-Issuing authority-Discrimination in issuing licenses-During hearing of a petition filed by the petitioner (accused) seeking bail in a dacoity case, the Supreme Court asked the Investigating Officer (IO) whether he had inquired from the complainant or the owner of the stolen firearms to produce their licenses and the Supreme Court was informed that the same was not done-To establish that his stolen weapons were licensed the complainant produced a piece of paper issued by a Deputy Inspector General of Police, which purportedly was a license of a sub-machine gun (SMG) which was a prohibited bore weapon-Supreme Court observed that notifications were also issued by the government exempting the requirement of obtaining licenses or permitting licenses for prohibited bore weapons to certain categories of persons, including Chief Justices, Judges, Ministers, Parliamentarians, as mentioned in Schedule I of the Arms Rules, 1924 (since repealed)-Supreme Court further observed that the present case raised the following questions; first, under what legal authority had the Deputy Inspector General of Police, issued the document which purported to be a license to carry an SMG, which was a prohibited bore weapon?; second, whether licenses of SMG and other prohibited bore weapons could be issued?; third, if the answer to second question was in the affirmative, the applicable law and procedure, and the person(s) who could issue exemptions/ licenses?; fourth, the number of licenses, including permits, issued with regard to SMGs and other prohibited bore weapons?; fifth, the approximate number of SMGs and other prohibited bore weapons in private use in the country?; sixth, whether exempting certain categories of persons or granting them the right to obtain licenses for SMGs and other prohibited bore weapons accorded with Article 25 of the Constitution, which mandates that all citizens are equal before the law?; and seventh, whether enabling the easy availability of SMGs and other prohibited bore weapons accords with Article 9, the Fundamental Right to life guaranteed by the Constitution?-Since the present matter prima facie was one of public importance with regard to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, including Articles 9 & 25 of the Constitution, therefore, the Supreme Court directed office to make a separate file and title it Sub Machine Guns and other Prohibited Bore Weapons and register it as a constitution petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution and the same be placed for consideration of the Committee constituted under Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=395Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 188-P of 2023, decided on 17th January, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.11.2023 passed by the\nPeshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Misc. (BA) No.3997-P of 2023)\nheard on: 17th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shabbir Hussain Gigyani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nComplainant in person.\nAltaf Khan, Additional A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KASHIF-Petitioner\nVS\nIMRAN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24201", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2765 = 2024 SLD 2765 = 2024 SCMR 594", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTU", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 34-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail, cancellation of-Misuse of bail-Extending threats to complainant party-Accused (respondent) had been nominated in the FIR with a specific role and the recovery of weapon used in commission of offence had been effected from him-Medical evidence fully supported the stance taken by the prosecution-Complainant and the eye-witnesses fully implicated the accused for the offence while deposing that the accused with the intent to kill the deceased has made straight firing upon him-Furthermore, after registration of FIR, the investigation was handed over to a Police Inspector, who failed to investigate the case fairly/impartially and became partisan with the accused persons and gave his opinion regarding non-involvement of the accused persons in the offence-Complainant filed a private complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, which was, accordingly forwarded to the Additional Sessions Judge, who subsequently found that sufficient incriminating material was available against all the accused persons-As regards the accused being a highly influential person who was extending threats of dire consequences to the complainant, the same amounted to misuse of concession of bail-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and bail granted to accused was recalled/cancelled.\nAmir Faraz v. The State 2023 SCMR 308 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,34Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 528-L and 1068-L of 2023, decided on 15th January, 2024.\n(Against orders dated 05.05.2023 and 06.09.2023, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Miscellaneous Nos.22217-B and 41247-B of 2023)\nheard on: 15th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Irfan Sadiq Tarar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in Criminal P. No. 528-L of 2023).\nCh. Waseem Ahmed Gujar, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link Lahore) for Petitioner (in Criminal P. No.1068-L of 2023).\nJaved Imran Ranjha, Advocate Supreme Court (through video link Lahore) for Respondent No. 2 along with Petitioner Respondent (in Criminal P. No.528-L of 2023).\nIrfan Sadiq Tarar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2 (in Criminal P. No.1068-L of 2023).\nMuhammad Jaffar, Additional P.G. Punjab (through video link Lahore) for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAUKAT ALI and another-Petitioners\nVS\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General, Punjab, Lahore and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24202", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2766 = 2024 SLD 2766 = 2024 SCMR 599", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Supreme Court Rules, 1980-\n-O. XXV, R. 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R. 10-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 209(5)(b) & 184(3)-Proceedings against a Judge of the Supreme Court before the Supreme Judicial Council-Constitutional petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution filed by the Judge, and the complainant/informers of the complaints against the Judge-Whether the informers of the complaints against the Judge on the basis of which the Supreme Judicial Council was proceeding against the Judge were necessary or proper party as respondents in the petitions filed by the Judge, and whether the Judge was also to be impleaded as a respondent in the petitions of the complainant/informers or not-Held, that as the informers had been attending the proceedings of the Supreme Judicial Council and were directed to substantiate their complaints with evidence, therefore, at least they were proper party for adjudication of the present petitions before the Supreme Court-If with regard to any of the complaints any observation was made by the Supreme Court or even as per the pleadings of the petitioner-Judge it was presumed that same were mala fide, frivolous and politically motivated, to consider these pleadings on the basis of which prayer for quashment of proceedings before Supreme Judicial Council was claimed, these could be considered only if complainants/informers were party before the Supreme Court-In the interest of justice, it was necessary in the peculiar circumstances of the present case that the complainants/informers who filed complaints before the Supreme Judicial Council against the petitioner-Judge being proper person be made party as respondent and be heard to satisfy the maxim that no one should be condemned unheard, if the Supreme court wanted to comment upon their complaints-When all the pleadings in the body of the present petitions revolved around the complaints/information by the informers, their impleadment as respondent in these petitions would serve the purposes of justice-Supreme Court gave directions for impleading the complainants/ informers and the Judge as respondents in their relevant petitions.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=209(5)(b),184(3)", - "Case #": "Constitution Petitions Nos.43 to 46 of 2023, decided on 9th January, 2024.heard on: 9th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Constitution Petitions Nos. 43 and 44 of 2023).\nAnwar Mansoor Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court,\nPervaiz Abid Haral, President District Bar Gujranwala, Mrs. Bushra Qamar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in Constitution Petition No. 45 of 2023).\nNemo for Petitioners (in Constitution Petition No. 46 of 2023).\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional A.G. for Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JUSTICE SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JUDGE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN and others-Petitioners\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24203", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2767 = 2024 SLD 2767 = 2024 SCMR 805", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 147, 148, 149, 427 & 504-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace-Ad-interim pre-arrest bail, confirmation of-Further inquiry-Possibility of fabricated injuries-There were inconsistencies between the injuries mentioned in the FIR and the initial medico-legal report-In the FIR, the petitioner (accused) had been assigned the specific role of causing a firearm injury to the injured, however in the final medico legal report, the alleged injuries were said to have been caused by a sharp cutting object, and subsequently the injured was examined by the Special Medical Board, which, vide a medico-legal report found the injuries to be fabricated-Even the Investigation Officer ( IO ) informed the Court that he did not find the petitioner guilty and also submitted a report under Section 168 Cr.P.C to the Station House Officer ( SHO ), but the SHO ignored the report without any rhyme or reason and a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted in the Trial Court-Based on the divergence and obvious contradiction in the initial medico-legal report vis- -vis the seat of injury mentioned in the FIR, as well as the opinion subsequently rendered by the Special Medical Board comprising six doctors, and the statement of the IO made before the Court (which was not controverted by the complainant or the prosecution ), it appeared that the case of the petitioner required further inquiry and there were reasonable grounds to confirm his pre-arrest bail-So far as the culpability of the petitioner in the commission of offence, if any, was concerned, that would be better adjudged by the Trial Court after production of pro and contra evidence-However, at present stage, on the basis of a tentative assessment of the material placed before the Court, the possibility of mala fide intention or ulterior motive on the part of the complainant to implicate the petitioner in the case could not be ruled out and required further inquiry-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to the petitioner by the Supreme Court was confirmed.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Pre-arrest bail-Principles and grounds-Grounds for grant of pre-arrest bail stated.\nWhile considering the petition for bail, the Court has to ascertain the gravity and seriousness of the accusation. The precise role of the accused must be determined and the Court must also gauge the existing material in order to reach a tentative assessment on whether the accused has been indicted with the object of injuring, demeaning or disgracing his image and reputation. No doubt, anticipatory bail can be granted in the exceptional circumstances. The jurisdiction to consider the grounds of bail in pre-arrest and post-arrest are different. The remedy of pre-arrest bail is meant to safeguard and shelter an innocent person who has been dragged into a case with mala fide intention or ulterior motives by the complainant or prosecution. While entreating the exercise of discretion of the Court for the grant of anticipatory bail, the accused is obligated to demonstrate that the case against him is based on mala fide and must divulge reasonable grounds to substantiate that he is not guilty of the offence and that sufficient grounds are available to lead further inquiry. The concepts of mala fide, ulterior motives or false implication are elementary and indispensable constituents for enlarging the accused on pre-arrest bail with the imminent apprehension of his arrest if the bail is declined. The mere gravity of the allegation does not impede the grant of prearrest bail if reasonable grounds are otherwise available on a tentative appraisal of the evidence.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=324,147,148,149,427,504Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.705 of 2023, decided on 22nd November, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 24.05.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Hyderabad Bench, in Cr.B.A. No. S-421 of 2023).heard on: 22nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nPetitioner in-person (via video link from Karachi).\nZafar Ahmed Khan, Addl. PG Sindh, Ali M. Bajeer, SI, Yar Muhammad, ASI and M. Hussain, ASI for the State.\nComplainant in person (via video link from Karachi).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MIR MUHAMMAD-Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General Sindh-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24204", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2768 = 2024 SLD 2768 = 2024 SCMR 766", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQSs", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O.II, R. 2-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Civil service-Regularization in service-Second constitutional petition filed on the basis of the same cause of action which was decided in the first constitutional petition-Maintainability-Respondents (employees) had sought their regularization from the date of their appointment in the first constitutional petition (the first petition) filed before the High Court, which was disposed of by the High Court directing that the respondents be regularized in terms of the said judgment-If the respondents were not satisfied with the said judgment they should have appealed the same or if the same was not implemented they should have sought its implementation, which could have been by invoking the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court-In any event on the same cause of action, and one which had been decided pursuant to the judgment in the first petition, another constitutional petition (the second petition) was not maintainable, and as no fresh cause of action had accrued to the respondents-This critical aspect of the case was overlooked by the Single Judge of the High Court who passed the order in the second petition-Though this is not the respondents case, if for the sake of argument it is assumed that in the first petition the respondents had only sought their regularization, and after they were regularized they wanted the regularization to take effect from the date of their initial appointment on contract basis, they could not seek this relief subsequently in the second petition because of the restriction in Order II, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and the second petition filed by the respondents was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1974-L of 2020, decided on 1st February, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 22.09.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.C.A. No.128925 of 2018).\nheard on: 1st February 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister M. Mumtaz Ali, Addl. AG Punjab for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 1 to 21.\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos.22 to 29 and 31 to 35.\nJunaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.30.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Secretary, Population Welfare Department, Lahore and others-Petitioners\nVS\nSHEHZAD ANJUM and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24205", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2769 = 2024 SLD 2769 = 2024 SCMR 770", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Partnership Act (IX of 1932)-\n-Ss. 7, 32(1)(c) & 32(2) & 32(3)-Suit for recovery along with profits against a partner-Partnership at will-Retirement of partner-Procedure provided for retirement not followed-Trial Court held the respondent (defendant in the suit) liable to pay the suit amount and passed a preliminary decree in favour of the appellant (plaintiff) against the respondents to the extent of Rs. 2,38,00,000/- - Admittedly, the appellant, who was a third party, was the sufferer as he made a huge investment in the (partnership) firm-Since in the instant case no deed of contract had been brought on record determining the period of partnership and determination of partnership, therefore, the High Court rightly observed that the provision of Section 7 of the Partnership Act, 1932 (Act) would apply, and hence the nature of the partnership was a partnership at will-High Court however erred in deciding the manner of retirement of the respondent-Section 32 (1) (c) of the Act explicitly mentions the precondition of issuing a notice by a retiring partner in writing to all other partners of his intention to retire, which was not issued by the respondent/ retiring partner in the present case-High Court in its reasons applied the procedure of retirement of a partner as given in Section 32 (2) of the Act, which states that the a retiring partner has the obligation of entering into an agreement with the third party and partners of reconstituted firm to discharge him from the liabilities of the partnership before retirement, however there was no agreement available in this case-Further, even if the respondent had fulfilled the requirements of Section 32 (1) (c) and Section 32 (2) of the Act, he would still not be discharged from the liabilities against a third party until a public notice was given by him or by any partner of the reconstituted firm as required under Section 32 (3) of the Act, but in the present case no such public notice was issued-Appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment passed by the High Court was set aside and consequently the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was restored.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-When the law requires that a particular thing should be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner and not otherwise.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Partnership Act, 1932=7,32(1)(c),32(2),32(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.499 of 2017, decided on 26th January, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 19.01.2017 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in R.F.A. No.65-P of 2012).\nheard on: 24th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Mastan Ali Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nIsmail Khan Khalil, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1.\nEx parte for Proforma Respondents Nos.2-3.\nFida Gul, Advocate Supreme Court for Proforma Respondents Nos.4-6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NADIR KHAN-Appellant\nVS\nQADIR HUSSAIN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24206", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2770 = 2024 SLD 2770 = 2024 SCMR 775", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 17(2), 19, 62 & 63-Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 62-Elections-Right to vote for a candidate of ones choice-Scope-Interpretation of elections laws in favour of enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement-Nomination papers for elections-Acceptance or rejection-Principles.\nThe courts, in their role as guardians of democracy and fundamental rights, should approach electoral matters with circumspection, ensuring that their interventions uphold the democratic principles upon which the nation thrives and the fundamental rights of citizens to contest elections and vote for the candidates of their choice. The right to vote freely for the candidate of ones choice is the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. The working of democracy depends on whether the people can decide the fate of the elected form of government. It depends on the choices that people make in different ways. This choice of people cannot be compromised, as their mandate in elections changes the destinies of government. Through the electoral process and voting, citizens participate in democracy. By voting, citizens take part in the public affairs of the country. Thus, citizens by voting enjoy their right to choose the composition of their government by exercising their choice and ability to participate.\nReynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533 and Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 161 ref.\nThe right to form or be a member of a political party under Article 17(2) of the Constitution includes not only the right to contest elections but also the right to vote for the candidate of ones choice. When viewed against the backdrop of the constitutional value of political justice, Article 17(2) remains hollow unless it also recognizes the right of citizens to choose their representatives fairly and freely from amongst the candidates. The right of citizens to participate in national elections as voters is the core of the democratic form of government. This right is also an expression of the choice of the citizens, which finds further support under Article 19 of the Constitution. In exercise of these fundamental rights, citizens shape their destiny by forming the government they want.\nWesberry v. Sanders (1964) 376 U.S. 1; Javed Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2003 SC 955; Pakistan Muslim League (Q) v. Chief Executive of Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 2002 SC 994; Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473; Province of Sindh v. M.Q.M. PLD 2014 SC 531; Nasir Iqbal v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2014 SC 72 and Arshad Mehmood v. Delimitation Authority PLD 2014 Lah. 221 ref.\nIt is in this context of both the right of the candidates to contest the election and the right of the voters to vote for the candidate of their choice that the qualification and disqualification of a candidate become material. The aim of prescribing qualifications and disqualifications for candidacies to contest elections is to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the political process. They are designed to ensure that individuals holding public office meet certain standards. In a well functioning democracy, the criteria for qualifications and disqualifications are clearly defined, publicly known and uniformly applied. Qualifications and disqualifications of a candidate for the electoral process must therefore be clearly spelled out in the Constitution or the law. Otherwise, electoral laws must be interpreted in favour of enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement so that maximum choice remains with the voters to elect their future leadership. With this approach rooted in the high constitutional rights and values, the courts are to deal with the matters of acceptance or rejection of the nomination papers filed for contesting elections.\n(b) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-Ss. 62, 231 & 232-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 62 & 63-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 87-Elections for seat of National Assembly-Nomination papers-Proclaimed offender-Nomination papers of petitioner (candidate) rejected by the High Court on the ground that he was a proclaimed offender in a criminal case-Validity-Counsel for the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) could not show any proclamation issued against the petitionerunder Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 ( Cr.P.C. )-Objector, too had no document to establish that the petitioner was a proclaimed offender-In the absence of proceedings taken under Section 87, Cr.P.C, an accused cannot be said or treated to be a proclaimed offender-Further, as the rule of declining discretionary reliefs to a proclaimed offender is one of propriety when the same is confronted with a right, it is the right, not the rule of propriety, that prevails-The disadvantage, if any, forbeing a proclaimed offender ordinarily relates only to the case in which a person has been so proclaimed, and not to the other cases or matters which have no nexus to that case, for instance the civil right of a person to contest an election-In the absence of any contrary provision in the Constitution or the Elections Act 2017 ( Act ), status of being a proclaimed offender in a criminal case does not affect said right of a person-Counsel for the ECP could not point out any provision either in the Constitution or in the Act that empowers the Returning Officers to reject the nomination papers of the candidates on the ground of their being proclaimed offenders-Since there is no law that makes a proclaimed offender disqualified from contesting election, the Returning Officers, the Appellate Tribunals or the Courts cannot on their own create such additional disqualification, without the backing of law-Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution read with Sections 231 and 232 of the Act provide for qualification and disqualification of a candidate, which does not mention that a proclaimed offender is disqualified from being elected or from being a member of Parliament-Grounds provided for rejection of a nomination paper in Section 62(9) of the Act also do not empower the Returning Officers to reject the nomination paper of a candidate on the ground of his being a proclaimed offender-Petitions were converted into appeals and the same were allowed; the impugned orders of the High Court were set aside and the nomination paper of the petitioner for the seat of a Member of the National Assembly stood accepted.\nParvez Elahi v. E.C.P. 2024 SCP 41; Khan Mir v. Amal Sherin 1989 SCMR 1987; Muhammad Shafi v. State 2016 SCMR 1593 and Nawazish Ali v. E.C.P. 2018 CLC 1301 and Umar Aslam v. E.C.P. 2024 SCP 40 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=17(2),19,62,63Elections Act, 2017=62", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 150 and 152 of 2024, decided on 29th January, 2024.\n(Against the judgments of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 16.01.2024, passed in W.Ps. Nos. 2974 and 2994 of 2024).\nheard on: 29th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Arshad, DG (Law) and Falak Sher, Consultant Law for the ECP.\nSyed Azmat Ali Bokhari, Advocate Supreme Court and Faisal Ali, in person (for the objector).", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAHIR SADIQ-Petitioner\nVS\nFAISAL ALI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24207", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2771 = 2024 SLD 2771 = 2024 SCMR 781", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-\n-Ss. 15 & 18-Change of ownership-Willful default by tenant in payment of rent-Scope-Despite acquiring knowledge about the change of ownership of subject tenement, the petitioner (tenant) avoided/neglected/refused to pay the rent to the respondent (new owner) rather he continued to deposit the rent amount in the name of previous landlady in the Court of the Rent Controller Karachi which constituted a willful default on the part of petitioner (tenant)-Petition filed by tenant was dismissed.\nGhulam Samdani v. Abdul Hameed 1992 SCMR 1170 ref.\n(b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-\n-Ss. 8, 15 & 18-Change of ownership-Intimation of such change to the tenant-Substantial compliance of section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (the Ordinance)-Scope-Institution of an application for determination of fair rent by the new landlord under section 8 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 would be deemed to be sufficient intimation to the tenant regarding change of ownership i.e. substantial compliance of the provisions of Section 18 of the Ordinance-Even institution of application for eviction would be deemed to be substantial compliance of the provisions of Section 18 of the Ordinance.\nSyed Azhar Imam Rizvi v. Mst. Salma Khatoon 1985 SCMR 24 ref.\n(c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-\n-S. 8-Fair rent, fixation-Four factors to be considered by the Court provided under section 8 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (the Ordinance)-It is not necessary for a landlord to prove hike in respect of all four factors as detailed in section 8 of the Ordinance-Moreover it is not necessary that all these four factors must co-exist in each and every case seeking fixation of fair rent, rather one or two grounds are sufficient.\nState Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another v. Messrs British Head and Footwear Store and others 2018 SCMR 581 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=15,18", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1278-K of 2023, decided on 7th February, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 30.08.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No-S-1405 of 2019).\nheard on: 7th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Yahya Afridi, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in person\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALAY JAVED ZAIDI-Petitioner\nVS\nHABIBULLAH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24208", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2772 = 2024 SLD 2722 = 2024 SCMR 788 = 2024 PTD 637 = (2024) 130 TAX 380", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDQXk", - "Key Words:": "Taxation of Notional Gains and Jurisdiction of Taxation Officer\nDetails:\nThis case addressed two critical issues:\nWhether the increase in the fair market value of shares held by a taxpayer as a long-term investment is taxable under Section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nWhether the Taxation Officer had the jurisdiction to amend an original assessment order under Sections 122(5) and 122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nKey Legal Issues and Courts Analysis:\n(a) Taxability of Notional Gains (Section 18(1)(d)):\nTwo-Pronged Test for Income from Business :\nFirst Requirement: Any benefit or perquisite must have a fair market value, not necessarily convertible into money.\nSecond Requirement: The value must arise from a business relationship—past, present, or prospective.\nApplication to Shares Held as Investment:\nThe notional gain from increased fair market value may qualify as a benefit.\nHowever, for this to be taxable, the investment must be connected to the carrying on of the taxpayers business.\nCourt’s Conclusion:\nThe Revenue failed to provide evidence that the investment was made in furtherance of or connected to the taxpayers business.\nThe gain derived from the investment in the subsidiary company could not be treated as business income under Section 18(1)(d).\n(b) Jurisdiction for Amending Assessment Orders (Sections 122(5) and 122(9)):\nPreconditions for Assuming Jurisdiction:\nThe Taxation Officer must obtain definite information from an audit or other sources.\nBased on this information, the Taxation Officer must establish that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment or been undervalued.\nCourt’s Findings:\nIn this case, the Taxation Officer relied solely on information provided in the taxpayers original return and documents.\nNo new or definite information was obtained, and the Officer merely reanalyzed the existing data, reaching a different conclusion from the original assessment.\nThis reanalysis did not meet the statutory requirements for invoking jurisdiction under Sections 122(5) and 122(9).\nConsequently, the notice issued and the subsequent order were deemed void.\n(c) Jurisdictional Principle:\nUniversal Principle: Jurisdiction granted by a statute must adhere strictly to the terms specified therein. Failure to comply with these terms renders the exercise of jurisdiction invalid.\nCitations:\nKey Cases Referenced:\nCalifornian Copper Syndicate (Limited and Reduced) v. Harris (5 TC 159).\nUnited Liner Agencies of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi v. Miss Mahenaee Agha (2003 SCMR 132).\nNusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mrioodeen Khan (1885 UK PC 15).\nRelevant Statutes:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Sections 18(1)(d), 122(5), and 122(9).\nHeld:\nThe increase in the fair market value of shares held as a long-term investment is not taxable as income from business under Section 18(1)(d).\nThe Taxation Officers notice and order amending the original assessment were void due to the absence of definite information, rendering the jurisdiction improperly assumed.\nThe appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=18(1)(d),30,39,101,120(1),122(5),122(9),133", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.2434 of 2016, decided on 1st November, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 25.11.2014 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Income Tax Reference No.04 of 2014).\nheard on: 1st November, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Lahore)", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ISLAMABAD-Appellant\nVS\nMessrs FAUJI FOUNDATION and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24209", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2773 = 2024 SLD 2773 = 2024 SCMR 795", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 42-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 3 & First Sched., Art. 120-Suit for declaration-Limitation-In the instant case, the impugned mutation regarding the disputed property was entered on 03.04.1984, which led the appellant to file the suit in 1998 seeking declaration of ownership, recovery of possession and permanent injunction-In the suit filed by the appellant, the reliefs for recovery of possession and permanent injunction are consequential ones, dependent on the main relief of declaration of ownership of the disputed property, which in the present case was filed after 14 years, and thus, goes clearly beyond the six-year period of limitation provided under Article 120 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908-When the main relief of declaration of ownership is barred by time, the consequential reliefs, even if within time, would be of no legal avail-Appeal was dismissed.\nMuhammad Din v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner 2022 SCMR 1481 and Javaid Shafi v. Rashid Arshad PLD 2015 SC 212 ref.\n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 3-Co-owner-Denial of right in property-Limitation to challenge such denial-Co-owner of the joint property who, despite possessing knowledge of an actual denial of his right , refrains from challenging the said invasion of his right within the stipulated period of limitation, is denuded of the right to challenge the same-Similarly, in cases of joint property, where the third party interest is created and reflected in subsequent revenue records (Jamabandi), the same would not give rise to a renewed cause of action since it amounts to the actual denial of his right.\nHaji Muhammad Yunis v. Mst. Farukh Sultan 2022 SCMR 1282 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42Limitation Act, 1908=120,3", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.43-Q of 2018, decided on 24th January, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 28.11.2014 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in C.R. No.234 of 2006).\nheard on: 24th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Yahya Afridi and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Habib-ur-Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nKamran Murtaza, Sr.Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.3.\nNemo for other Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM MUSTAFA-Petitioner\nVS\nMst. MAH BEGUM and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24210", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2774 = 2024 SLD 2774 = 2024 SCMR 800", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODY", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 109, 148, & 149-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Case of cross versions-Discharge report prepared in favour of accused-On the recommendation of the Regional Standing Board (RIB) of police, the investigation was changed and fresh investigation was conducted by the Inspector-RIB under the supervision of the SP-RIB-Investigating agencies on the basis of the material available on the record came to the conclusion that both the petitioners (accused persons) and other co-accused be discharged, final report whereof was submitted to the trial Court-Prosecution confirmed the discharge of the petitioners by the Regional Investigation Branch (RIB)-Law Officer for the prosecution supported the contentions of the counsel for the petitioners qua exoneration/discharge of the petitioners by the Regional Standing Board (RIB) and confirmation of the approval of the final report by the District Police Officer (DPO) concerned-Present case was a case of two versions one narrated by the complainant party in the FIR and the second by the investigating agencies on behalf of the State after conducting fresh investigation under the supervision of an SP and the final report had been approved by the DPO concerned-Petitioners had made out a case for grant of bail as their case squarely fell within the purview of Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.-Consequently, petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and the petitioners were admitted to post arrest bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,109,148,149Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.1329 of 2023, decided on 19th January, 2024.\n(Against order dated 11.10.2023, passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in Criminal Miscellaneous Nos.6567-B of 2023 and 6296-B of 2023).\nheard on: 19th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa, Sr.Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nAftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for the Complainant.\nMuhammad Jaffar, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab, Amjad Khalid, Inspector and Kazam Munir, SI for the State (via video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUJAHID HUSSAIN and another-Petitioners\nVS\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General, Punjab, Lahore and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24211", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2775 = 2024 SLD 2775 = 2024 SCMR 757", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-A, 201 & 34-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)-Kidnapping or abduction for ransom-Petition against acquittal of accused-Re-appraisal of evidence-Test identification parade-Lapses-Combined and joint identification parade-Belatedly conducted identification parade-Though the Magistrate managed to make five rows consisting of under-trial prisoners and each of the respondents (accused persons), but the fact remained that they all were present in the same premises under one roof-Manner in which the Magistrate managed to conduct the identification parade lead to the conclusion that it was a combined and joint identification parade, which is a nullity in the eyes of law-Persons who abducted the abductee and those who received the ransom amount were not known to the witnesses prior to the identification parade, therefore, it was necessary for the witnesses to have given some features of each of the respondents, with their specific role, during the investigation, before the identification parade, enabling the Magistrate to manage the person of identical features for the purpose of including them in identification parade as dummies-Admittedly the witnesses did not disclose any such fact in respect of the respondents-Moreover, in order to maintain secrecy, it was the responsibility of the concerned police to ensure that the accused were not seen by the witnesses while in police station lock-up or in police custody-Police was required to have taken every precaution to conceal the identity of the detainees before conducting the identification parade-All these precautions should not only be taken, but must have been proved to have been taken-There was nothing on the record to prove that any step was taken by the police in this behalf-Before conducting the identification parade, the respondents had raised an objection before the Magistrate that the witnesses saw them in the lockup and their photographs were published in the newspapers in connection with some other case-Prosecution did not deny this objection-Magistrate was required to record the objection and to decide its fate, but he ignored the objection and instead, continued to complete the process of identification parade-Identification was conducted after a lapse of more than two years of the occurrence, therefore, it was hard to believe that the witnesses could still have momentary glimpse of the respondents-Respondents were picked up in the identification parade, but the role attributed to them was not stated by the witnesses-Identification parade in the circumstances was not in line with Article 22 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, hence, was of no evidentiary value and could not be relied upon-High Court after proper appraisal of the record and scanning the evidence in its true perspective, had reached a correct conclusion by acquitting the respondents of the charge-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nGulfams case 2017 SCMR 1189; Shafqat Mehmoods case 2011 SCMR 537; Mian Sohail Ahmeds case 2019 SCMR 956 and Nazir Ahmads case 2011 SCMR 527 ref.\n(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-A, 201 & 34-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)-Kidnapping or abduction for ransom-Petition against acquittal of accused-Re-appraisal of evidence-Alleged ransom amount recovered from house of the accused persons-Not consequential-Prosecution relied upon the amount recovered after more than two years of the occurrence from the respective houses of the respondents (accused persons)-It was unbelievable that someone would retain the crime amount for such a long time-Even otherwise, the recovered currency notes admittedly did not contain any identification mark nor had the prosecution given any description or denomination thereof at the time they were allegedly delivered by the complainant to the respondents-It is a common practice that most people retain some cash amount in their houses, therefore, it is not safe to consider the recovered amount in the present case to be a part of the ransom amount-Prosecution had failed to prove that the recovered amount was actually a portion of the ransom amount, allegedly paid by the complainant to the alleged abductors, hence, such recovery could not be believed or relied upon for the purpose of convicting the respondents-High Court after proper appraisal of the record and scanning the evidence in its true perspective, had reached a correct conclusion by acquitting the respondents of the charge-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused with the direction that the amount recovered from the respondents should be returned to them.\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 10-A & 37(d)-Inordinate and unreasonable delay in conclusion of criminal trials and appeals/petitions-Observations, recommendations and directions issued by the Supreme Court to address the issue of such delay stated.\nAn issue faced by the litigants is the inordinate and unreasonable delay in conclusion of criminal trials and appeals/petitions, without any substantial progress, which is a crucial challenge to the Administration of Criminal Justice System in our country. Such delay is antithetic to the foundational principles of liberty, fair trial and due process. Under such circumstances, it is the primary duty of the investigating agencies and every judge of the country to take into account such fundamental rights of persons, whose cases are brought before them by strict adherence to law. When the legal machinery fails to deliver justice within a reasonable time, it not only violates the constitutional mandate, but also leads to frustration. Thus, an inexpensive and timely justice is a requirement of the Constitution, which must be observed by all stakeholders in all circumstances without any excuse.\nThere is no doubt that the prosecuting agencies and the courts are over-burdened because of increase in the number of cases as a result of population explosion and lack of basic facilities, necessary for early dispensation of justice, but still they are under constitutional and legal obligations to conduct and conclude fair investigation and fair trial within a stipulated period to the extent possible, or in a reasonable period where there is no time limit provided by law for doing so. Within the prevailing system, it is difficult to achieve the desired results, but some improvements could be made into the system by proper management in order to streamline the investigation and judicial proceedings. Such goal cannot be achieved without the cooperation of investigating agencies, complainants, lawyers, prosecutors and all relevant persons/authorities. It is incumbent upon investigating officers, lawyers and prosecutors to follow the law and cooperate with courts so as to avoid unnecessary and unjustified delays in early disposal of the cases. Likewise, cooperation between investigating agencies and prosecutors/complainants is essential in order to pursue the matter to ensure timely and fair conclusion of the cases.\nTo address the deficiencies in prosecutions cases, and to avoid unreasonable delays in the timely conclusion of criminal trials and appeals, it is an obligation of the State under Article 37(d) of the Constitution to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice. In this behalf, the vacancies of judicial officers across the country must be filled on merits without any delay; increase in the number of judges should be considered, wherever it is so required; modern techniques, equipment, devices and tools should be introduced to ensure upgradation of the investigation mechanism; regular and fruitful training courses for investigating officials should be conducted; independence of judiciary and investigating agencies should be ensured; basic facilities and friendly and workable atmosphere should be provided to the Courts and the investigating agencies, ensuring safety and protection of the judicial officers, and investigating officials and witnesses. The Government must also take steps to curb the trend of registration of false and frivolous litigation; and ensure that frivolous litigants are not let off scot-free for such acts. For taking all such measures, certain laws are required to be amended or certain legislation is required, which may be considered by the Government and the Parliament/Assemblies. Till the time, such a policy is devised or necessary enactments are made, the courts must exercise their powers already granted to them by available laws to do complete justice and to discourage frivolous and malicious litigation.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=365-A,201,34Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=22Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl. Petition No. 235-L of 2015, decided on 27th October, 2023.\n(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur dated 13.01.2015 passed in Crl. Appeal No. 4/ATA of 2011, Crl. Appeal No. 05/ATA of 2011 and Crl. Appeal No. 06/ATA of 2011).\nheard on: 27th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Azeem Sarwar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. (Via video link Lahore)\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEHBOOB HASSAN-Petitioner\nVS\nAKHTAR ISLAM and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24212", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2776 = 2024 SLD 2776 = 2024 SCMR 614", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Lien against a post-Meaning and scope-In the context of service law, the term lien has a statutory connotation and refers to a legal right of a civil servant to hold a particular post, typically a higher one, to which they have been promoted or transferred, while still retaining a right on their original post, based on provisions provided for the same under the rules or regulations framed by the appropriate Government-Hence, simply put, lien in service law is a right of a civil servant to return to his original position, based on the fulfilment of the conditions set out in the rules or regulations framed by the appropriate Government.\n(b) Civil Servants (Confirmation) Rules, 1993-\n-Rr. 6(2) & 5-Balochistan Civil Servants (Confirmation) Rules, 2012, R. 7(2)-Acquiring and termination of lien against a post-Reading of Rules 5 & 6(2) of the Civil Servants (Confirmation) Rules, 1993 ( Rules of 1993 ) clearly stipulates that a civil servant shall forfeit his lien against a post, when accepting an appointment in an autonomous body under the control of Federal Government, as is the situation with the petitioner in the present case-As per Rule 6(2) of the Rules of 1993, a civil servant who takes up an appointment on selection, other than by way of transfer on deputation, to a position in an autonomous body under the control of Federal Government, Provincial Government, local authority or a private organisation, effectively undergoes a change of status from that of a civil servant to a different employment category-Crucially, this transition results in the forfeiture of his lien against the post in his parent department or authority-Lien, representing the legal right to return to his former position within the civil service, is thus relinquished when he moves, on his own accord, to a non-governmental body and accepts an appointment therein on selection-While transfers within various Government departments (whether Federal or Provincial) do not alter the fundamental status of a civil servant, a move to an autonomous body under the control of Government, except by way of transfer on deputation, signifies a substantive change in the nature of employment-This change is of such a magnitude that it necessitates the relinquishment of specific rights and privileges inherent to his previous civil service position, including the lien-As to the subject office order, wherein the petitioner was to retain his lien against the post of Junior Scale Stenographer in S & GAD till his confirmation in NADRA is concerned, the same is blatantly in violation to the then applicable Rules of 1993, and in particular, the provisions of Rule 6(2)-Petitioner in this case was appointed in NADRA, an autonomous body under the control of Federal Government, and therefore, this would lead to the cessation of any lien against a previously held position in the S & GAD, Government of Balochistan-This conclusion aligns with the stipulations of Rule 6(2) of the Rules of 1993 and Rule 7(2) of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Confirmation) Rules, 2012-Given the subject office order is devoid of any legal sanction, it could not be made an anchor sheet for the petitioner to claim his lien against the post in the parent Department-Petition was dismissed.\nSajjad Hussain v. Secretary, Establishment Division 1996 SCMR 284; Muhammad Israrullah v. Assistant Director, Manpower 2005 SCMR 716 and Government of N.W.F.P v. Syed Zafarmand Ali 2005 SCMR 1212 distinguished.\nFarid Muhammad v. Secretary, Ministry of Food 1996 SCMR 818 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.M.A. No.145-Q of 2022 in Civil Petition No. 61-Q of 2018, decided on 21st December, 2023.\n(For restoration of C.P. No. 61-Q of 2018 against the judgment dated 13.12.2017 of the Service Tribunal Balochistan, Quetta passed in S.A. No. 273 of 2016).heard on: 21st December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Yahya Afridi and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Usman Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court and Gohar Yaqoob Yousafzai, Advocate-on-Record for Applicant.\nAmir Zaman Jogazai, Addl. AG and Noor Hussain Baloch, Addl. Secretary for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SALEEM-Petitioner\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN through Chief Secretary and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24213", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2777 = 2024 SLD 2777 = 2024 SLD 622", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDOC8", - "Key Words:": "Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act (XIII of 1975)-\n-S. 4(2)(f)-Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977, Clasues 10 & 11-Evacuee trust properties-Tenants-Assessment/re-assessment of rent-Amendment to clauses 10 and 11 of the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977, (the Scheme), vide SRO No.13KE/2006 dated 13th of February, 2006-Vires of-Evacuee Trust Property Board (Board) is empowered under section 4(2)(f) of the Act, to assess or reassess the rent of the evacuee trust properties-Although it is not specifically mentioned in the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, nevertheless, it is implied that the rent payable by the tenant shall be just, equitable, impartial, dispassionate, uncoloured and objective-It is desirable that some protection should be provided to the tenants in order to ensure that they are not exploited-At the same time, the rent has to be revised periodically, as it is normal for the market rent to become marginal or insignificant every three to four years with the prevailing rate of inflation-Protection of legitimate expectation is present in the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977 (Scheme), and its existence brings procedural fairness in two ways: first, a policy or practice that dictates a particular procedure to be followed gives rise to the right of the tenant to demand that the procedure for assessment or reassessment of rent be followed; and secondly, if there is a legitimate expectation of a reasonable benefit, it may give rise to a right for a fair procedure before the benefit is withheld-It is clear from clauses 10 and 11 of the Scheme that the District Officer is mandated to fix the rent of the evacuee trust property, keeping in view the market rent and rent of other properties in the vicinity in similar circumstances-This means that his powers are not unbridled; he cannot act on his whims while assessing the rent; he is bound to observe the standards mentioned in the Scheme, so as to eliminate any improper motive and possibility of coercion-It is also evident that to bring transparency in the rent assessment procedure, the existing clause 10 ensures that not only the proposed assessment is open to inspection by the tenant but also provides them an opportunity for objections and hearings-An additional measure to prevent unfairness in the determination of rent is provided by empowering the Chairman of the Board or the Administrator concerned to suo moto examine the correctness or propriety of the determination of rent- At that, it has been mandated to periodically reassess the rent every six years and increase it at the rate of eight per cent per annum-Clauses 10 and 11 of the Scheme (as amended) are neither arbitrary nor oppressive or unreasonable-Appeals were allowed.\nMuzzafar Khan v. Evacuee Trust Property 2002 CLC 1819 and McInnes v. Onslow-Fane (1978) 1 WLR 1520 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975=4(2)(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 248, 249, 250, 251, 252 of 2014 and C.M.A. No.5086 of 2022 in Civil Appeal No.250 of 2014, decided on 29th November 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgments dated 09.10.2013 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench in Writ Petitions Nos.104-A, 159-A, 165-A of 2007 and 183-A/2008 and 685-A of 2010).heard on: 29th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Ahsan Ahmed Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in all cases).\nSabir Hussain Tanoli, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (L.Rs of Respondent No.2 in C.A. No. 248 of 2014).\nZulfiqar Ali Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (Nos. 1-19 in C.A. No. 248, Respondent No.1 in C.As. Nos. 249 and 252 of 2014).\nCh. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1, 4, 7, 10, 19, 21 and 26 (in C.A. No. 250 of 2014).\nNemo for other Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHAIRMAN, EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD, LAHORE and others -Appellants\nVS\nSufi NAZIR AHMED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24214", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2778 = 2024 SLD 2778 = 2024 SCMR 628", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDOCs", - "Key Words:": "Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003)-\n-Ss. 3 & 4-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.204-Contempt of High Court-Employees of a company-Termination from service-Judgment issued by the High Court directing reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits-Non-compliance by the company (employer)-Whether company (employer) made substantial compliance with the judgment of the High Court?-Held, that seemingly, the directions issued by the High Court for reinstatement in service with all benefits, which the petitioners (employees) were entitled to at the date of termination of their services, were not complied with-Therefore, the petitioners filed an application in the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings for the non-compliance of judgment-However, the High Court declined to initiate contempt proceedings based on the statement of the alleged contemnors (company) that substantial compliance of the judgment had been made-Impugned order of the High Court did not reflect whether any verified statement of accounts was filed in the High Court by the alleged contemnors to demonstrate compliance and payments, if any, made to the petitioners-Additionally, no due diligence was made by the High Court to ensure compliance with its own judgment-Despite the High Court passing various harsh and deterrent orders on different dates of hearing for ensuring compliance and implementation of its judgment, the contempt application was disposed of precipitously and inconsiderately, and the sole observation was that substantial compliance had been made-What substantial compliance was allegedly made should have been reflected in the order to determine whether due compliance had been achieved or not-So, in all fairness, it was not enough for the High Court to dispose of the contempt application on the ground that if the petitioners had any substantial claim against the respondent (company), they were at liberty to seek a remedy, if any, under the law-Court has to assess the contempt and its gravity and may also purge it if an unqualified apology is tendered by the contemnor; however, there is no concept or parameter to relieve or emancipate the contemnors on the notion that substantial compliance has been made, which had not been demonstrated in the present case-Court has to evaluate the compliance of its judgment in its entirety and not the ratio or percentage of compliance-In the present case denial of exercising jurisdiction proactively in the contempt proceedings for revitalising and assuring the compliance of judgment not only rendered the main judgment worthless and inconsequential, but for all practical purposes, also undermined the writ of the Court and watered down the efficacy of the orders passed by different benches in the same proceedings for ensuring compliance-Petitions were converted into an appeal and allowed; the impugned Order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the High Court for deciding the contempt application afresh and for examining whether the judgment had been implemented as per the directions issued by the High Court or not.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003=3,4Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=204", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 175-K, 176-K and 177-K of 2022, decided on 22nd December, 2023.\n(Against order dated 30.11.2021, passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad on M.A. No. 1719 of 2020 moved in C.P. No.D-217 of 2001).\nheard on: 22nd December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners in Person.\nRespondent not Represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE and others-Petitioners\nVS\nMessrs ZEAL PAK CEMENT FACTORY LTD.-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24215", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2779 = 2024 SLD 2779 = 2024 SCMR 634", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Family Courts Rules, 1965-\n-R. 6-Dissolution of marriage by way of khula-Marriage solemnized in a foreign country (United States of America)-Wife a dual citizen of Pakistan and USA-Wife residing in USA at the time of institution of suit for dissolution of marriage by way of khula-Family Courts in Pakistan, jurisdiction of-In terms of proviso to Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, the rigours of normal rule providing for territorial jurisdiction for trial of cases in Family Court have been relaxed in favour of a female filing a suit for dissolution of marriage or recovery of dower-Words Ordinarily resides and shall also have jurisdiction used in the said proviso demonstrate the intention of parliamen to facilitate things for the wife and off-set her handicap-Therefore, the option of instituting such suits vests with the wife and the Court is bound to take into account her convenience subject to law-In the present case, although the wife (respondent) was living in the USA at the time of the institution of the suit through her duly constituted attorney, however, the respondent usually came to Pakistan; acquired her education in Karachi and visited her family in Karachi from time to time-Hence, Family Courts in Pakistan had jurisdiction to entertain the matter and the trial court had rightly exercised the same-Petitions were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\n(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-Ss. 10(3) & 10(4)-Dissolution of marriage by way of khula-Pre-trial proceedings-Scope-Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 imposes a legal obligation on the Family Courts to make a genuine attempt for reconciliation between the parties-Trial Court shall remain instrumental and make genuine efforts in resolving the dispute between the parties-In case if despite of genuine efforts, reconciliation fails, the Trial Court under proviso of section 10(4), without recording evidence is empowered to pass a decree of dissolution of marriage forthwith-At this juncture if the court observes that the wife without any reason is not willing to live with her husband, then under the said proviso the Court is left with no option, but to dissolve the marriage-Islam does not force on the spouses a life devoid of harmony and happiness and if the parties cannot live together as they should, it permits a separation.\n(c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 10(4)-Dissolution of marriage by way of khula-Preliminary decree passed by Family Court-Application for withdrawal of suit in respect of remaining prayer clauses filed by wife after passing of preliminary decree-Effect-On failure of reconciliation proceedings, an order for the dissolution of marriage by way of Khula was passed by the Family Court and preliminary decree was prepared on the same day-Subsequently suit was fixed for evidence in respect of certain prayer clauses, when the wife (respondent) filed a statement supported with an affidavit of her attorney for the withdrawal of the suit in respect of said prayer clauses-Suit was disposed of as withdrawn by the trial court-Thus, preliminary decree already passed/prepared shall be deemed to be the final decree as the respondent had already withdrawn the suit to extent of remaining prayer clauses-Petitions were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=6", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 488-K and 489-K of 2023, decided on 20th December, 2023.\n(Against order dated 06.02.2023 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No. S-262 of 2021 and C.P.No. S-457 of 2021).heard on: 20th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in-person.\nNemo for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "SOHAIL AHMED-Petitioner\nVS\nMst. SAMREENA RASHEED MEMON and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24216", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2780 = 2024 SLD 2780 = 2024 SCMR 640", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDODg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Preamble-Arbitration, concept of-Minimal interference by courts in international commercial arbitration-Minimal interference and support for the arbitration by the courts as an alternate mode of dispute resolution, explained.\nThe idea of arbitration is that of binding resolution of disputes accepted with serenity by those who bear its consequences because of their special trust in chosen decision makers. It is difficult for courts to achieve this kind of acceptance; public justice tends to be distant and impersonal. Arbitration is a private initiative. The idea of Arbitration is freedom reconciled with law. The philosophical premise is that people are free to arrange their private affairs as they see fit, provided that they do not offend public policy or mandatory law. Arbitration thus embodies the principles of autonomy and voluntariness, respecting the parties freedom to design a process that best suits their needs. It reflects a philosophical shift towards self-governance in dispute resolution, allowing parties to choose their arbitrators and the applicable law, thereby creating a more tailored and potentially equitable outcome. The role of courts in the context of arbitration has therefore evolved with a trend towards minimal interference.\nJan Paulsson, Idea of Arbitration, Oxford University Press (2013) ref.\nMore significant is the minimal interference in international commercial arbitration that stands as a cornerstone in the resolution of cross-border commercial disputes, offering a preferred alternative to litigation in national courts for businesses worldwide. One of the foundational aspects of international commercial arbitration is its emphasis on neutrality, expeditiousness, efficiency and the ability to provide solutions tailored to the needs of international business transactions. International commercial arbitration plays a crucial role in resolving disputes arising from cross-border trade and commerce, expeditiously and efficiently. The global view on international commercial arbitration is therefore overwhelmingly positive, with businesses and legal professionals alike recognizing its benefits over traditional litigation.\n(b) Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention )-\n-Art. I-International commercial arbitration-Pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention for enforcing foreign awards, explained.\nThe New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 plays a pivotal role, underpinning the global enforcement regime for foreign awards that has made arbitration a linchpin in international commerce. The Convention facilitates the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards across its member States, significantly reducing the uncertainty and complexity associated with cross-border dispute resolution. The role of courts in the context of international commercial arbitration has thus evolved to support and complement the arbitration process. Courts are no longer seen as competitors to arbitration but as essential partners in ensuring the effectiveness and integrity of the process. Their duty is to support, not to supplant, the arbitral process.\nThis approach of minimal interference and support for the arbitral process is enshrined in the concept of pro-enforcement bias , which refers to the inclination of legal frameworks, such as the New York Convention and national laws, to facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards. This bias underscores the commitment to uphold the integrity of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes by limiting the grounds on which enforcement can be refused and placing the burden of proof on the party resisting enforcement. The courts role is to interpret these provisions narrowly to promote certainty and predictability in international transactions. This bias is not about unjustly favoring one party over another but is aimed at promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. The pro-enforcement bias underscores the commitment of the legal system, embodied in international conventions, like the New York Convention, to respect and uphold the parties agreement to arbitrate and to ensure that the outcome of such arbitrations (the arbitral awards) are recognized and enforced with minimal interference. This bias is critical in providing parties with the confidence that their decisions to arbitrate disputes will be supported by courts around the world, thus enhancing the attractiveness of arbitration as a method of resolving international commercial disputes. This enforceability is crucial for the fluidity of international trade, providing businesses with the certainty and security needed to engage in cross-border transactions.\n(c) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 2(b), 2(c) & 2(e) -International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Scope-Whether an award made in a Contracting State, in pursuance to an arbitration agreement governed by the law of Pakistan, is a foreign arbitral award for applicability of the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and Foreign Award Act 2011?-Held, that as per the definitions provided in sections 2(b), 2(c) & 2(e) of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (the 2011 Act), an arbitral award made in a State which is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 or in such other State as may be notified by the Federal Government in the official Gazette, is a foreign arbitral award for applicability of the 2011 Act-Nothing more is required to make an award the foreign arbitral award for applicability of the provisions of the 2011 Act-Law governing the main contract between the parties, the law governing the arbitration agreement, and the law governing the arbitration proceedings are all irrelevant and extraneous in determining the status of an arbitral award under the 2011 Act-In defining a foreign arbitral award for applicability of the 2011 Act, the legislature has adopted a pure territorial approach and has made in this regard the seat of arbitration the sole criterion-Not only the governing laws but also the nationality of the parties to the award are irrelevant in determining the status of an arbitral award under the 2011 Act-In the present case the Award had been made in a Contracting State, i.e., Singapore-Nothing more was required to make it a foreign arbitral award, for applicability of the 2011 Act-In this regard, the facts that the main contract between the parties and the arbitration agreement were governed by the law of Pakistan, did not have any effect.\n(d) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Repealed law-Scope-Court cannot administer a repealed law, except to the extent specified by the legislature itself in the repealing law or some other general law providing the effect of the repeal of laws.\n(e) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Expression means used in a statute to define any word, term or expression-When the legislature employs the verb means in defining any word, term or expression, the definition provided is restrictive and exhaustive, and nothing else can be added to the same-Such definition being itself the most authentic expression of the legislatures intent as to the meaning of a particular word used in the law enacted by the legislature is binding on the courts and leaves no room for them to discover by way of interpretation some other intent of the legislature.\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Khurshid Ahmad PLD 2016 SC 545 ref.\n(f) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Prospective and retrospective effect of a law-Principles stated.\nA new law that only deals with the procedure and does not in any way affect the substantive rights of the parties applies both prospectively to future proceedings as well as retrospectively to pending proceedings. However, a law that takes away or abridges the substantive rights of the parties only applies prospectively unless either by express enactment or by necessary intendment the legislature gives to it the retrospective effect. The notable point is that even a procedural law that affects, though indirectly, the substantive rights of the parties is to be applied only prospectively, in the absence of any contrary provision therein, such as the right to institute an action for the enforcement of a substantive right or the right to appeal arising from that action as an appeal is considered a continuation of the original action. Denial of the remedy, it is said, is destruction of the right. Without remedy, there is no right; it is the remedy that makes the right real. The proper approach, therefore, to the construction of a statute as to its prospective or retrospective applicability, in the absence of legislatures express enactment or necessary intendment, is not to decide what label to apply to it, procedural or otherwise, but to see whether the statute if applied retrospectively to a particular type of case would impair existing rights and obligations. Such an examination, however, is needed only where the legislature has not, by express enactment or necessary intendment, provided for retrospective effect; as the legislature can by express enactment or necessary intendment also affect the existing rights and obligations. The legislature which is competent to make a law also has the power to legislate it retrospectively and can by legislative fiat take away even the vested rights.\nState v. Jamil PLD 1965 SC 681; Alam v. State PLD 1967 SC 259; Adnan Afzal v. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187; Abdullah v. Imdad Ali 1972 SCMR 173; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Asbestos Cement Industries 1993 SCMR 1276; Gul Hasan & Co. v. Allied Bank 1996 SCMR 237; Tariq Badr v. National Bank 2013 SCMR 314; Controller General of Accounts v. Abdul Waheed 2023 SCMR 111; PTCL v. Collector of Customs 2023 SCMR 261; Yew Bon v. Kenderaan 1983 PSC 1200 (Privy Council); Commissioner of Income Tax v. Asbestos Cement Industries 1993 SCMR 1276; In re: Joseph Suche & Co. Limited (1875) 1 Ch. D. 48; Sutlej Cotton Mills v. Industrial Court PLD 1966 SC 472 (5-MB); Shohrat Bano v. Ismail Soomar 1968 SCMR 574; Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Siddiq PLD 1981 SC 249; The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving 1905 AC 369; Iftikhar Ahmed v. State 2018 SCMR 1385; Hassan Nawaz v. Muhammad Ayub PLD 2017 SC 70; Mubeen-Us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602; F.A. Khan v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 520; Shahmir Transport Company v. Board of Revenue PLD 1964 Lah 710; Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhury PLD 1957 SC (Ind.) 448; National Bank v. SAF Textile PLD 2014 SC 283; Shahida Zaheer v. President of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 632; Yew Bon Tev v. Kenderaan Bas Mara 1983 PSC 1200 (Privy Council); Haider Automobile v. Federation of Pakistan 1969 SC 623; Molasses Trading v. Federation of Pakistan 1993 SCMR 1905 and Annoor Textile v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 568 ref.\n(g) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 1(3) & 4-Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S. 34-International commercial arbitration-Scope of section 1(3) as to the retrospective effect of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (the 2011 Act) on arbitration agreements-As for subsection (3) of Section 1 of the 2011 Act, which states that the Act shall apply to arbitration agreements made before the date of commencement of the Act, it only applies for the purpose of Section 4 of the 2011 Act to stay the legal proceedings in respect of a matter which is covered by the arbitration agreement and to refer the parties to arbitration-Notable point, however, is that because of the retrospective effect given by Section 1(3) of the 2011 Act, all courts in Pakistan are to recognize and enforce arbitration agreements, wherein the parties have agreed to have the arbitration held in a Contracting State, within the scope of the provisions of Section 4 of the 2011 Act, not of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (the 1940 Act), despite that such agreements have been made before the commencement of the 2011 Act.\n(h) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 1(4) & 10(2)-Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) [since repealed], S. 2-International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Scope of Section 1(4) as to the retrospective effect of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 on foreign arbitral awards expounded.\nSubsection (4) of Section 1 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (the 2011 Act) states that the Act shall not apply to foreign arbitral awards made before 14 July 2005 and thus by necessary intendment gives the Act retrospective effect on foreign arbitral awards that have been made on or after the said date.\nAs per subsection (2) of Section 10 of the 2011 Act, notwithstanding its repeal the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (the 1937 Act) is to continue to have effect in relation to foreign arbitral awards made before the date of commencement of this Act and within the meaning of section 2 of the 1937 Act, which are not foreign arbitral awards within the meaning of section 2 of the 2011 Act.To come within the compass of the saving provisions of Section 10(2) of the 2011 Act, a foreign arbitral award must therefore fulfill both the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b), i.e., (a) it must have been made before the date of commencement of the 2011 Act, and (b) it must fall within the meaning of foreign award as defined in Section 2 of the 1937 Act.\nIn section 10(2)(b) of the 2011 Act the phrase which are not foreign arbitral awards within the meaning of section 2 of this Act is like a proviso to the saving provisions and has qualified them in their scope and applicability. This phrase has exempted from the purview of the saving provisions those foreign awards which though fulfill both the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 10(2) but they are also foreign arbitral awards within the meaning of Section 2 of the 2011 Act. It means that an award which is a foreign arbitral award within the meaning of Section 2 of the 2011 Act shall not come within the scope of the saving provisions and shall therefore be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the 2011 Act, not of the 1937 Act.\nThe object of the saving provisions of Section 10(2) of the 2011 Act, is to save certain foreign arbitral awards, after the repeal of the 1937 Act, from falling within the scope of the Arbitration Act, 1940.\n(i) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Preamble-Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011), Preamble-International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Non-applicability of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (the 1940 Act)-Since, the 1940 Act relates, in pith and substance, to domestic arbitration, its status after the 18th amendment to the Constitution is that of a provincial law-The 1940 Act, a provincial law after the 18th amendment that came into force on 19 April 2010, cannot deal with international arbitration and any award made therein-So, in no way the remedies available to a party, before the 18th amendment, under the 1940 Act in relation to the Award made in an international arbitration would continue to be so after the 18th amendment, and more so, after the enactment of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 by the Federal Legislature.\nShahbaz Garments v. Government of Sindh 2021 SCMR 1088 ref.\n(j) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 2(c)-Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention ), Arts. III & V-International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Non-interference by domestic courts in Pakistan-Exceptions -The New York Convention implemented in Pakistan by the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (the 2011 Act), contains no ground as to the invalidity of a foreign award or its being against the law of the Contracting States, to refuse its recognition and enforcement and thus leaves no room for the courts of a Contracting State to enter into the exercise of examining the merits of a foreign award on the points of facts or law-In accordance with its objective, the New York Convention grants the Courts of the Contracting States the discretion to refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award only on the grounds listed in Article V of the Convention and places the burden to prove those grounds on the party opposing the recognition and enforcement of the award-Article V(1) provides five grounds whereby the recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused at the request of the party against whom it in invoked, and Article V(2) lists two further grounds on which the Court may refuse enforcement on its own motion-Ultimate burden of proof, however, remains on the party opposing recognition and enforcement-It is, therefore, only when the party against whom the award is invoked discharges this burden that a challenge may be sustained against the recognition and enforcement of an award-Language of Article V for refusing recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is permissive and not mandatory, and the exceptions stated therein are exhaustive and construed narrowly in view of the public policy favouring the enforcement of such foreign arbitral awards-Courts may nonetheless recognize and enforce the award even if some of the exceptions exist.\nGary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 3418-24 (2nd ed. 2014); Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 3413, 3418 and 3428 (2nd ed. 2014); Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 3413 (2nd ed. 2014); Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th ed. 2015); Albert Jan van den Bergs The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (1981); Russel on Arbitration, Sweet & Maxwell (24th ed. 2015) and Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 3410 (2nd ed. 2014) ref.\n(k) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 2(c)-Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention ), Art. V-International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Non-interference by domestic courts in Pakistan-Exceptions-Public policy-Objectives sought to be achieved by the New York Convention underscore the pro-enforcement bias informing the Convention, guiding the Courts towards a narrow reading of the grounds of defence listed in the Convention, particularly, the public policy ground-Ground of defence that the arbitrators decision is erroneous in law or fact is, therefore, not provided in the Convention; it cannot be read into in any ground of defence provided in the Convention, particularly, the public policy ground, by a liberal reading instead of a narrow reading thereof-An expansive construction of the public policy ground would vitiate the Conventions basic effort to remove preexisting obstacles to enforcement-Recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may be refused by the courts of Pakistan on the public policy ground only where it would violate the most basic notions of morality and justice prevailing in Pakistan-Public policy ground cannot be used to examine the merits of a foreign arbitral award or to create more grounds of defence that are not provided for in the Convention, such as misapplication of the law of Pakistan by the arbitrator in making the award or the arbitrators decision being contrary to the law of Pakistan.\nParsons and Whittemore v. Societe Generale, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.1974) and Orient v. SNGPL 2021 SCMR 1728 ref.\n(l) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Prospective and retrospective effect of a law-Principles-While interpreting a provision of law or construing its effect, a constitutional court only declares what the law is and does not make or amend it-Law so declared by the court, therefore, as a general principle applies both prospectively to future cases and as well as retrospectively to pending cases, including the one in which it is declared-It is only as an exception to this general principle that while considering the possibility of some grave injustice or inconvenience due to the retrospective effect, the courts sometimes provide for the prospective effect of their judgments from such date as they think just and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case-But this exception cannot be invoked in a case where its effect would be tantamount to negation of the legislatures intent.\nMalik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 161 and Muhammad Khan v. Haider PLD 2020 SC 233 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 722 of 2012 and Civil Appeal No. 2649 of 2016, decided on 28th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Athar Minallah and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid F. Ebrahim, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in C.A. No. 722 of 2012) and the Respondent (in C.A. No. 2649 of 2016).\nUzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court, Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record, Sheikh Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Ali Uzair Bhandari, Advocate for Respondent (in C.A. No. 722 of 2012) the Appellant (in C.A. No. 2649 of 2016)\nCh. Aamir ur Rehman, Addl. A.G.P. for the Federation (On Court's call).\nAssisted by Muhammad Hassan Ali and Umer A. Ranjha, Law Clerks.\nDate of hearing: 22nd February 2024.\nTable of Contents\nPreface 650\nFacts 651\nProceedings of the courts below in Civil Appeal No. 722 of 2012 .. 652\nProceedings of the courts below in Civil Appeal No. 2649 of 2016 652\nCompeting contentions of the parties 653\n(i) Whether the Award is a foreign arbitral award 653\nRelevancy of Hitachi .. 654\nDefinition of \"\"foreign arbitral award\"\" in the 2011 Act 654\nEffect of word \"\"foreign\"\" in definition clause and option of reciprocity in the Convention 655\nThe definition in Section 2(e) of the 2011 Act is restrictive and exhaustive . 657\nThe Award is a foreign arbitral award . 657\n(ii) Whether the 2011 Act applies retrospectively to the Award made in arbitration proceedings commenced before its enforcement . 657\nPrinciples for construing a law as to its prospective and retrospective effect . 658\nScope of Section 1(3) as to the retrospective effect of the 2011 Act on arbitration agreements . 659\nScope of Section 1(4) as to the retrospective effect of the 2011 Act on foreign arbitral awards .. 660\nEffect of the 2011 Act on remedy under Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act .. 662\nEffect of the change of legislative power on the subject of arbitration by the 18th Amendment to the Constitution .. . 663\nNo remedy in the 2011 Act against the misapplication of the law of Pakistan in making an award . 665\nPro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention 666\nThe 2011 Act applies retrospectively to the Award made in arbitration proceedings commenced before its enforcement .. 670\nProspective or retrospective applicability of the construction of the 2011 Act 670\nDecision in Civil Appeal No. 722 of 2012 . 671\nDecision in Civil Appeal No. 2649 of 2016 .. 672", - "Petitioner Name:": "Civil Appeal No. 722 of 2012\n(Against the judgment of Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 14.5.2012, passed in Civil Revision No.691/2012)\nand\nCivil Appeal No. 2649 of 2016.\n(Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi, dated 07.10.2016, passed in HCA No.99/2015)\nTAISEI CORPORATION and another-Appellants\nVS\nA.M. CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24217", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2781 = 2024 SLD 2781 = 2024 SCMR 673", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDOHo", - "Key Words:": "Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1975 (V of 1976)-\n-Ss. 2(x), 2(xii) & 2(xiv)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 25-Persons working in the Government departments, autonomous bodies, local authorities and private firms or companies-Whether provisions of Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1975 [PEC Act] are applicable to such persons-Conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court-Post of Executive Engineer (BS-18)-Case reported as Fida Hussain v. The Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division, Islamabad (PLD 1995 SC 701) [Fida Hussains case] provides that if the Government employs a professional engineer as defined in the PEC Act for performing professional engineering work as envisaged by the PEC Act in section 2, the provisions of the PEC Act would be attracted and not otherwise-Whereas the case reported as Maula Bux Shaikh v. Chief Minister Sindh and others (2018 SCMR 2098) [Maula Bux Shaikhs case] introduces a cautionary note and explicitly dictates the Government regarding postings and transfers of Executive Engineer (BS-18) and directs that the Government shall not allow or permit any person to perform professional engineering work as defined in the PEC Act, who does not possess accredited engineering qualification from the accredited engineering institution and his name is not registered as a registered engineer or professional engineer under the PEC Act-This cautionary note raises critical concerns about the permissibility of employing engineers not licensed by the PEC for professional engineering tasks, which, according to the PEC Act, should only be undertaken by licensed professionals-Effect of these cases creates a scenario: where a person, on the one hand, is eligible to be promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (BS-18), but on the other hand, is denied to perform professional engineering works entailed for an Executive Engineer (BS-18)-This raises a very serious issue that may lead to creating different classes of employees within the same cadre, one who is eligible to perform professional engineering works, while the other is denied the same, and thus, exposing the current position to be against the principle of equality and nondiscrimination provided under Article 25 of the Constitution-Accordingly, it would be safe to hold that, while both cases, Fida Hussains case and Maula Bux Shaikhs case, affirm that it is the domain of the Government concerned to decide, whether a particular academic qualification of a civil servant employee is sufficient for promotion from one Grade to another higher Grade-However, the questions which still alludes a definite determination are: whether any governmental policy regarding promotion can be given effect if the same can lead to the violation of the PEC Act or any other statute or expose the person who benefited from such policy to a criminal liability; and whether denying an Executive Engineer (BS-18) to perform professional engineering works entailed for an Executive Engineer (BS-18) creates different classes of employees within the same cadre, thereby violating the principle of equality and nondiscrimination provided under Article 25 of the Constitution-In the circumstances, the present case warrants further consideration but before a larger bench of the Supreme Court-Supreme Court directed Office to place the present case before the Committee constituted under section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 for fixation of the case before an appropriate bench.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Engineering Council Act, (V of 1976)=2(x)2(xii)2(xiv)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 84-K of 2023, decided on 7th February, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 28.01.2021 passed by the Sindh Service Tribunal, at Karachi in Appeals Nos. 19 and 20 of 2020).\nheard on: 7th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Yahya Afridi, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Salam Memon, Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nSibtain Mehmood, Addl. A.G., Ms. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record, M. Nawaz, Secretary, Works and Altaf Hussain Memon, D.S. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM ABBAS SOOMRO-Appellant\nVS\nThe PROVINCE OF SINDH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24218", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2782 = 2024 SLD 2782 = 2024 SCMR 684 = 2024 PTD 772 = (2024) 130 TAX 79 = 2024 PTCL 420", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDOHk", - "Key Words:": "Tax Liability on Workers’ Profit Participation Fund (WPPF) Contributions\nDetails:\nThe case addressed whether amounts transferred by a company to the Workers’ Profit Participation Fund (WPPF), as mandated under the Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 1968, were subject to tax under Section 25(c) of the now-repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner argued that such transfers were not taxable since they represented statutory liabilities rather than trading profits.\nKey Legal Issues:\nAre transfers to the WPPF taxable under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?\nShould a special statute override general tax provisions?\nCourt’s Analysis and Findings:\n(a) Nature of WPPF Contributions:\nContributions to the WPPF arise as a statutory obligation under the Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 1968.\nThese contributions are not derived from trade or trading activities but fulfill a mandatory legal requirement.\nConsequently, such amounts are exempt from taxation under Section 25(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.\n(b) Application of Special vs. General Law:\nThe principle of harmonious interpretation dictates that a special law (the Companies Profits Act) takes precedence over a general law (the Income Tax Ordinance).\nThis ensures statutory obligations mandated by special laws are not undermined by general taxation provisions.\n(c) Exemption Validity:\nThe exemption is justified because the statute (Companies Profits Act) explicitly governs the treatment of WPPF contributions, prioritizing statutory compliance over tax imposition.\nCitations:\nRelevant Case Law: Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. v. Soneri Bank (2018 CLD 203).\nStatutes Referenced:\nCompanies Profits (Workers’ Participation) Act, 1968: Sections 2(c) & 9.\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979 (repealed): Section 25(c).\nHeld:\nAmounts transferred to the WPPF are not taxable under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, as they represent statutory liabilities, not profits.\nThe principle of harmonious interpretation affirms that the Companies Profits Act, being a special statute, overrides the general provisions of tax law.\nThe petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Profits (Workers Participation) Act, 1968=2(c),9Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=25(c)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3200-L of 2019, decided on 19th February, 2024, heard on: 19th February, 2024. (Against the Order dated 12.9.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in P.T.R. No. 142 of 2009).", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Munib Akhtar, Justice, Shahid Waheed, Justice and Irfan Saadat Khan, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Yusuf Umar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via Video link, Lhr.)\nAli Sibtain Fazli, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (via Video link, Lhr.)", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE-Petitioner\nVS\nMessrs RIAZ BOTTLERS (PVT.) LTD. (Now Lotte Akhtar Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd.) -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24219", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2783 = 2024 SLD 2783 = 2024 SCMR 689", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDc", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)-\n-S. 8(6)(a)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 212(1)-Retired civil servant-Pro-forma promotion on a selection post sought-Ouster of jurisdiction of the High Courts and Civil Courts-Post to which the respondent wanted (pro-forma) promotion was a selection post and such post according to Section 8 (6) (a) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 could only be filled on the basis of merit and not on seniority-Furthermore Article 212 of the Constitution ousts the jurisdiction of the High Courts and Civil Courts in the matters relating to the terms and conditions of a civil servant as the bar in the Constitution is absolute-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 =8(6)a)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1893-L of 2021, decided on 17th January, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 13.09.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, in W.P. No.3963 of 2021).heard on: 17th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Muhammad Mumtaz Ali, Addl. AG, Punjab along with Ms. Saima Jehan, Sr, Law Officer and Nasir Ali, Law Officer for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Naveed Farhan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Secretary (Primary and Secondary Healthcare Department), Lahore and others-Appellants\nVS\nHafiz MUHAMMAD KALEEM-UD-DIN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24220", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2784 = 2024 SLD 2784 = 2024 SCMR 692", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-S. 13(1)(a)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Talb-i-Muwathibat-Pre-emptors, two in number, making joint Talb-i-Muwathibat in the same meeting-One of the pre-emptors announcing his right to exercise right of pre-emption one or two minutes after the other pre-emptor-Delay of one or two minutes in the making of Talb-i-Muwathibat by one of the pre-emptors-Effect-Fatal for the pre-emption suit-Record of the present case showed that one of the pre-emptors waited for the other pre-emptor to complete his declaration of Talb-i-Muwathibat before making his own declaration, resulting in a brief delay of one or two minutes-As soon as the pre-emptors acquire knowledge of the sale of the pre-empted property, they should make an immediate demand of their desire and intention to assert their right of pre-emption without the slightest loss of time-Pre-emptor in question failed to prove the validity of his Talb-i-Muwathibat for exercising his right of pre-emption over the suit land-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed and judgment of the trial Court dismissing the suit of pre-emptors was restored.\nMian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs. and others PLD 2007 SC 302; Muhammad Nazeef Khan v. Gulbat Khan and others 2012 SCMR 235; Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Zaman 2021 SCMR 134 and Mst. Rooh Afza v. Auranazeb and others 2015 SCMR 92 ref.\n(b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-S. 13(1)(a)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Talb-i-Muwathibat-Proof-Complete chain of source of information-Person who conveys the information of the fact of sale must be a person who has observed the fact of sale and it is he who can then pass on the said fact to another person(s)-Thus, the chain of information regarding the sale, starting from the very first person with direct knowledge and passing it on to the person who lastly informs the pre-emptor, must be complete-Only the complete chain of the source of information of the sale can establish the essential elements of Talb-i-Muwathibat, which are: (i) the time, date and place when the pre-emptor obtained the first information of the sale, and; (ii) the immediate declaration of his intention by the pre-emptor to exercise his right of pre-emption, then and there, on obtaining such information-In the present case, such chain of the source of passing on the information, as to the fact of the sale of the suit land has not been proved as person B in his evidence categorically stated that he refused to meet and share the information about the sale of the suit land with the informer-Entire case of the pre-emptors (respondents) regarding the issuance of Talb-i-Muwathibat built on the hearsay evidence of the informer faIls to the ground due to an incomplete chain of information about the sale of the suit land-Therefore, the trial court correctly observed that when the source of information provided by the informer is not proved, the transmission of this information to the pre-emptors also becomes highly doubtful-Pre-emptors failed to prove the validity of Talb-i-Muwathibat made by them for exercising their right of pre-emption over the suit land-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed and judgment of the trial Court dismissing the suit of pre-emptors was restored.\nFarid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 ref.\n(c) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-S. 13-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Two pre-emptors-One of the pre-emptors failing to appear before the trial Court to substantiate his claim-Effect-Fatal for the pre-emption suit-Pre-emption is a personal right and a pre-emptor is required to prove it through his own statement-One of the pre-emptors did not appear as a witness before the trial court to substantiate his claim nor did he attempt to produce an attorney on his behalf-It was also not the case of said pre-emptor that he was suffering from some disability to appear before the court-Therefore, his failure to appear in the witness box would adversely affect his right of pre-emption-Clearly the evidence of said pre-emptor, which would have been the best evidence has been withheld by the pre-emptors-Consequently, in accordance with Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, an adverse inference can also be drawn against him-Although one of the pre-emptors appeared as a witness, but it did not provide any help to the pre-emptor who did not appear-Suit, to the extent of non-appearing pre-emptor, is liable to be dismissed, therefore, no partial or full decree can be passed in favour of the other pre-emptor-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed and judgment of the trial Court dismissing the suit of pre-emptors was restored.\nDilshad Begum v. Mst. Nisar Akhtar 2012 SCMR 1106; Nawab Din through L.Rs. v. Faqir Sain 2007 SCMR 401 and Abdul Qayyum v. Muhammad Sadiq 2007 SCMR 957 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991=13(1)(a)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2148-L of 2022, decided on 25th January, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 15.04.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No.2108 of 2014).\nheard on: 25th January 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Jawad Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore).\nHaroon Dugal, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents..", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD RIAZ-Appellants\nVS\nMUHAMMAD AKRAM and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24221", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2785 = 2024 SLD 2785 = 2024 SCMR 700 = 2024 PTD 483", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 111 & 122 (as it existed prior to amendment by the Finance Act, 2020)-Unexplained income or assets-Amendment of an assessment-Notices issued under Sections 111 & 122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ( Ordinance )-Whether a separate notice is required under Section 111 of the Ordinance or whether a notice under Section 122(9) is enough to initiate proceedings for amendment of the assessment on the grounds mentioned in Section 111 of the Ordinance-Held, that the proceedings under Sections 111 & 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ( Ordinance ) are different and distinguishable in nature and cannot be subsumed-Before an assessment can be amended under Section 122 on the basis of Section 111, the proceedings under Section 111(1) are to be initiated, the taxpayer is to be confronted with the information and the grounds applicable under Section 111(1) through a separate notice under the said provision, and then the proceedings are to be culminated through an appropriate order in the shape of an opinion of the Commissioner-This then becomes definite information for the purposes of Section 122(5), provided the grounds mentioned in Section 122(5) are applicable-The taxpayer is then to be confronted with these grounds through a notice under Section 122(9) and only then can an assessment be amended under Section 122.\nThe initiation and culmination of proceedings under Section 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Ordinance) becomes necessary before action can be taken under Section 122 to amend assessments on the basis of proceedings undertaken under Section 111. The information available with the department under Section 111(1) is mere information. It is only after the taxpayer is confronted with this information through a separate notice by calling for an explanation, and when no explanation is offered or the explanation is not satisfactory in the opinion of the Commissioner under Section 111(1), that it transforms or crystallizes into definite information for the purposes of action under Section 122(5) for amendment of assessment under Section 122. The taxpayer will then be confronted with the grounds applicable under Section 122(5) through a notice under Section 122(9) of the Ordinance. As such, where the Commissioner has formed an opinion against the taxpayer as to the fulfilment of one of the grounds mentioned in Section 111(1)(a) to (d) of the Ordinance, and is of the view that any of the grounds in Section 122(5) is applicable, the process under Section 122 is to be initiated to amend assessments through a notice under Section 122(9). Thus, unless the proceedings under Section 111(1) are initiated and completed, Section 122(5) cannot be given effect to and no notice under Section 122(9) can be issued for the purposes of amending an assessment through an addition contemplated under Section 111. After the amendment introduced in Section 122(5) of the Ordinance through the Finance Act, 2020, the words definite information acquired from an audit or otherwise have been substituted with audit or on the basis of definite information . Therefore, the interpretation rendered above as to the applicability of Section 122(5) may not be applicable to cases post 2020 and the effect of the substituted expression will have to be determined in an appropriate case in the future.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Bashir Ahmed 2021 SCMR 1290; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Faqir Hussain 2019 PTD 1282; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Ranipur CNG Station 2017 PTD 1839 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Muhammad Shafique 2015 PTD 1823 ref.\nBefore an assessment can be amended under Section 122 on the basis of Section 111, the proceedings under Section 111(1) are to be initiated, the taxpayer is to be confronted with the information and the grounds applicable under Section 111(1) through a separate notice under the said provision, and then the proceedings are to be culminated through an appropriate order in the shape of an opinion of the Commissioner. This then becomes definite information for the purposes of Section 122(5), provided the grounds mentioned in Section 122(5) are applicable. The taxpayer is then to be confronted with these grounds through a notice under Section 122(9) and only then can an assessment be amended under Section 122. A notice under Section 111 can be simultaneously issued with a notice under Section 122(9), however, proceedings under Section 111 have to be finalized first in terms of an opinion of the Commissioner so as to constitute definite information, as is required under Section 122(5) of the Ordinance.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Falah 2021 PTD 192; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Faqir Hussain 2019 PTD 1828; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Ranipur CNG Station 2017 PTD 1839 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Bashir Ahmed 2021 SCMR 1290 ref.\nEven where a notice under Section 111 is issued simultaneously with a notice to amend an assessment under Section 122(9) of the Ordinance, no proceedings can be undertaken under the latter until the proceedings under Section 111 are finalized and result in an opinion against the taxpayer. This is because, even if some basis for action under Section 111 is mentioned in a notice under Section 122(9), it cannot constitute definite information for the purposes of Section 122(5). The proceedings under the notice issued under Section 122(9) can only be formally initiated when the requirement of definite information is satisfied under Section 122(5) after finalization of the proceedings under Section 111 through an opinion of the Commissioner. Therefore, where no opinion is formed against the taxpayer under Section 111, the proceedings under both provisions i.e., Sections 111 and 122 would lapse, and the notice under Section 122(9) would be of no legal effect. Where, however, there is an opinion formed against the taxpayer as definite information for the purposes of Section 122(5), the proceedings on the notice issued under Section 122(9) can formally proceed and shall be deemed to have commenced. It must also be noted that where the opinion formed against the taxpayer under Section 111 is materially different from what has been confronted to the taxpayer through the notice already issued under Section 122(9), and the Commissioner is of the view that another or different ground under Section 122(5) is applicable, a fresh or supplementary show cause notice under Section 122(9) must be issued to the taxpayer by confronting such ground(s) to the taxpayer. This is in view of the right to be treated in accordance with the law, and the principles of fair trial and due process enshrined in Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution, respectively, and in terms of settled law that once a show cause notice is issued, the original adjudication on the said show cause notice can only be based on the grounds and allegations levelled therein.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. RYK Mills 2023 SCMR 1856; Collector Central Excise v. Rahm Din 1987 SCMR 1840 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Rose Food Industries 2023 SCMR 2070 ref.\nTwo provisos have been added after Section 122(9) through the Finance Act, 2021 and further amended through the Finance Act, 2022, which provide for a time period from the date of issuance a show cause notice for making an order under Section 122. The said time period is to be considered as commencing on the day that the taxpayer is confronted with the opinion formed by the Commissioner under Section 111(1), as it is only then that the proceedings under Section 122 are to be formally taken up. This reconciliation harmonizes Section 111, its Explanation and Section 122(5) of the Ordinance.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 111, Explanation & 122-Explanation introduced in Section 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Ordinance) pursuant to the Finance Act, 2021-Effect-On a plain reading of the said Explanation, it appears that it is couched in clarificatory and declaratory terms for removal of doubt -However, the intention behind the Explanation and the effect of adding the Explanation is to take away the right to a separate notice and proceedings under Section 111 if the grounds under Section 111(1)(a) to (d) are confronted to the taxpayer through a notice under Section 122(9) of the Ordinance-Therefore, in essence, it abridges the right to a separate notice and proceedings under Section 111 of the Ordinance, which was the requirement of the law-As a consequence, the Explanation takes away a substantive right of separate proceedings of the taxpayer, which otherwise existed prior to the introduction of the Explanation in Section 111-Explanation added in Section 111 of the Ordinance divests and affects a substantive right of the taxpayer to a separate notice and proceedings under Section 111, thus, the same would not have retrospective effect and would apply prospectively-Effect of the Explanation, therefore, is only to dispense with the requirement of a separate notice under Section 111, however, it cannot subsume two different and distinguishable proceedings under Sections 111 & 122-As such, while the Explanation dispenses with the requirement of a separate notice under Section 111, it does not dispense with the requirement that in case proceedings are initiated under Section 122(5) on the basis of definite information to be provided through Section 111, the proceedings under Section 111 are to be concluded first in the manner provided under the law and till such time, the proceedings under Section 122(9) cannot be given effect to-Therefore, as far as the cases prior to the Explanation are concerned, a separate notice is required to be issued under Section 111 before proceedings can be initiated under Section 122-Simultaneity of notices issued under Sections 111 & 122(9) is not of much consequence and the proceedings under Section 111 have to proceed first and be finalized before proceedings under Section 122 are formally taken up-After the introduction of the Explanation in Section 111 in the year 2021, a notice encompassing both the grounds under Section 111(1) and Section 122(5) can be issued under Section 122(9), however, the proceedings under Section 111 still have to be concluded first and thereafter the remaining part of the notice under Section 122(9) can be given effect to.\n(c) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Explanation to an enactment-Rationale and scope-Purpose of an Explanation is ordinarily to explain some concept or expression or phrase occurring in the main provision-It is not uncommon for the legislature to accord either an extended or restricted meaning to such concept or expression by inserting an appropriate Explanation-Such a clarificatory provision is to be interpreted according to its own terms having regard to its context and not as to widen the ambit of the provision-As a general rule, an explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the word itself shows, it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory provision-Object of adding an Explanation to a statutory provision is only to facilitate its proper interpretation and to remove confusion and misunderstanding as to its true nature-It is relied upon only as a useful guide or in aid to the construction of the main provision-It is in this view of its effect that courts have normally given retrospective effect to such clarificatory or declaratory provisions in the shape of an Explanation-However, where the effect of the Explanation warps out of its normal purpose explained above, and acts as a substantive enactment or deeming provision, or enlarges substantive provisions of law or creates new liabilities, such an Explanation cannot be given retrospective effect unless the express language of the Explanation warrants such an interpretation.\nM.N. Rao and Amita Dhanda in N S Bindras - Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition, 2016); Rehman Cotton Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 PTD 1256; M. P. Tandon - Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition, 2019); Rehman Cotton Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 PTD 1256; Hussain Patel v. Habib PLD 1981 SC 1; Chief Administrator Auqaf v. Koura PLD 1991 SC 596; Hamid Ashraf v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2020 SCMR 843; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Asbestos Cement Industries 1993 SCMR 1276; Kohinoor Sugar Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 PTD 821; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Trillium Pakistan 2019 SCMR 1643 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Nazir Ahmed and Sons 2004 PTD 921 ref.\n(d) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Retrospective and prospective application of law-Principles-A change in substantive law which divests and adversely affects vested rights of the parties shall always have prospective application unless by express word of the legislation and/or by necessary intendment/ implication such law has been made applicable retrospectively-As a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes, tax statutes operate prospectively and not retrospectively unless clearly indicated by the legislature, therefore, retrospectivity cannot be presumed-Where an insertion or deletion of any provision in the rules or the law is merely procedural in nature, the same would apply retrospectively but not if it affects substantive rights which already stood accrued at the time when the un-amended rule or provision was in vogue-A provision curtailing substantive rights does not have retroactive operation unless the legislature elects to give it retrospective effect-Thus, where existing rights are affected or giving retroactive operation causes inconvenience or injustice, the Court will not favour an interpretation giving retrospective effect even where the provision is procedural.\nController General of Accounts v. Abdul Waheed 2023 SCMR 111; Tariq Badar v. National Bank of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 314; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Eli Lilly Pakistan 2009 SCMR 1279; Hassan v. Fancy Foundation PLD 1975 SC 1; Province of East Pakistan v. Sharafatullah PLD 1970 SC 514; Nagina Silk Mill v. Income Tax Officer PLD 1963 SC 322; Rajby Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 1407; Member (Taxes) Board of Revenue v. Qaisar Abbas 2019 SCMR 446; Zila Council Jhelum v. Pakistan Tobacco Company PLD 2016 SC 398; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Eli Lilly Pakistan 2009 SCMR 1279; Manzoor Ali v. United Bank 2005 SCMR 1785; Badshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2015 SCMR 43; Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187 and Gul Hasan v. Allied Bank of Pakistan 1996 SCMR 237 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,122", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.87 to 106 of 2024 in Civil Petitions Nos.2447-L, 2448-L, 2601-L to 2606-L, 2765-L, 2787-L, 2834-L, 2901-L, 2915-L, 2928-L, 2944-L to 2946-L, 2992-L of 2022 and Civil Petitions Nos. 646-L and 647-L of 2023, decided on 1st February, 2024.\n(Against the judgment/order(s) of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 09.06.2022, passed in ITR No.59534 of 2021, etc. and dated 12.01.2023 passed in ITR No. 79913 of 2022 and ITR No. 1420 of 2023).heard on: 1st February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Yahya, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Shahzad Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Qasim, Addl. Commissioner and M. Saeed Tahir, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (through V.L. from Lahore).\nImtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court (Through V.L. Lahore Registry)\nShahryar Kasuri, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.\nAssisted by Muhammad Hassan Ali and Umer A. Ranjha, Law Clerks, Supreme Court of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE-Appellant\nVS\nMessrs MILLAT TRACTORS LIMITED, LAHORE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24222", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2786 = 2024 SLD 2786 = 2024 SCMR 719", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-Ss. 2(xxxiii) & 33-Individual grievance of a worker, who has been terminated, removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed from employment in a trans-provincial establishment-Redressal-Competent forum-Appropriate forum of redressal for a workman who is terminated, removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed from service in a trans-provincial establishment is NIRC, as provided under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA of 2012)-Said provision states that a worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law-Competent forum for the redressal of personal grievance of a worker/ workman of a trans-provincial establishment is NIRC, and the mode and manner of enforcing any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law has been provided under section 33 of the IRA of 2012.\n(b) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-Ss. 2(xxxiii) & 33-Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.2(i) & Sched., S.O. 12(3)-Individual grievance of a worker, who has been terminated, removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed from employment in a trans-provincial establishment-Redressal-In case a workman is terminated, removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed from service in a trans-provincial establishment, he would be required to first prove that he fulfills the conditions precedent of a workman provided under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA of 2012), to render his individual grievance maintainable under Section 33 of the IRA of 2012-Once, the grievance petition is held to be filed by the legally competent person, then in order to enforce his rights under Standing Order 12(3) of Schedule to the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), the aggrieved petitioner would have to prove that he is a workman envisaged under section 2(i) of the said Ordinance.\n(c) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-Ss. 2(xxxiii) & 33-Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. 2(i)-Grievance of an aggrieved worker-Whether a worker-Onus of proof-Regarding the onus of proof, it is trite law that the initial onus is on the person asserting a fact for seeking a relief-In the present case initial onus was upon the aggrieved worker to prove that he was a workman under both statutes i.e. the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.\nShahi Bottles (Pvt.) Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1993 PLC 587; National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court 1993 PLC 595; Sadiq Ali Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1994 PLC 211; Granulars (Pvt.) Limited v. Muhammad Afzal 2002 PLC 1; Muslim Commercial Bank v. Ehtasham ul Hassan 1997 PLC 24 and MCB v. Rizwan Ali 2024 SCMR 360 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Act, 2012=2(xxxiii),33Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968=2(i)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 34 of 2022, decided on 30th January, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 17.12.2021 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Writ Petition No. 4481 of 2021).\nheard on: 30th January 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Yahya Afridi and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahid Anwar Bajwa, Advocate Supreme Court and Raheel Zafar, S.M. (L) for Petitioner.\nBarrister Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs PAK TELECOM MOBILE LIMITED-Appellant\nVS\nMUHAMMAD ATIF BILAL and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24223", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2787 = 2024 SLD 2787 = 2024 SCMR 734", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 39 & 42-Gift deed, cancellation of-Suit for declaration and cancellation of registered gift deed-Property in question was originally owned by the plaintiffs (respondents) father, who gifted it to the respondent vide a gift deed and also handed over its possession-Thereafter, plaintiff raised construction on the land and also executed a power of attorney in the name of his father for administration and supervision of the property, but the father (attorney) gifted the property in question to the petitioner (defendant) vide another gift deed-Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and cancellation of the registered gift deed in favour of petitioner with the plea that his father (attorney) due to his old age and cardiac issues, was not in a proper frame of mind, therefore, the gift deed in favour of petitioner was the result of connivance and disingenuousness-Validity-Property in question was gifted to the petitioner through the general attorney of plaintiff-Neither is anything reflected from the record that the general attorney obtained permission or consent from his principal for transferring the property in question by means of gift to the petitioner, nor was it ever pleaded that the earlier gift in favour of plaintiff was revoked for any reason-All the more so, the petitioner pleaded in his defense that he purchased the property in question against valuable consideration, but at the same time, he was also claiming the property as a lawful donee-Both pleas are mutually destructive if considered in juxtaposition-If it was a case of gift, then the plea of sale was misleading and erroneous, and if the property was purchased against valuable consideration, then there was no logical reason for the execution of a gift deed rather than a conveyance deed to unveil a straightforward sale transaction-As far as the proof of possession of plaintiff is concerned, it clearly transpires from the documents exhibited in the Trial Court that though the petitioners special attorney averred that at the time of transfer of property, possession was also delivered, but subsequently, it was snatched by the plaintiff, which assertion was belied and in support of thereof, the plaintiff produced copies of Form P.T.I, and a bunch of electricity and gas bills to corroborate and substantiate the factum of possession-Petitioner filed a complaint under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 against the plaintiff and his special attorney, but the Trial Court acquitted them, which was upheld by the High Court-One more important aspect that cannot be lost sight of is that plaintiff has two sons and four daughters, and seemingly, there was no rhyme or reason on record to divulge why the plaintiff deprived his own offspring, and conveyed his attorney to gift the property to the petitioner-An attorney or agent may gift the property on express permission and instructions of his principal, however in the present case nothing was presented on record through cogent evidence that the attorney ever asked for the permission or consent of his principal to gift the property in question to the petitioner; therefore, such a gift was not validated by the courts below in three concurrent judgments-Suit filed by the plaintiff had been rightly decreed-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nJamil Akhtar and others v. Las Baba and others PLD 2003\nSC 494; Muhammad Ashraf and 2 others v. Muhammad Malik and others PLD 2008 SC 389; Mst. Naila Kausar and another v. Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh and others 2016 SCMR 1781 and Allan Ditta and others v. Manak alias Muhammad Siddique and others 2017 SCMR 402 ref.\n(b) Islamic law-\n-Gift-Pre-requisites-Doner should be compos mentis, meaning thereby a person who is of sound mind and has the mental capacity to understand the legal implications of his act of making a gift, and he must be of age and also the owner of the property intended to be gifted; the thing gifted should be in existence at the time of making hiba; the thing gifted should be such that benefitting from it is lawful under the Shariah; the donor must be free from any coercion/duress or undue influence while making a gift; the thing gifted should come into the possession of the donee himself or through his representative/guardian for an effective hiba-Under Muslim law, the constituents and components of a valid gift are tender, acceptance and possession of property-It is also obligatory that the donor divest and dissociate himself from the dominion and ownership over the property of the gift and put into words his categorical intention to convey the ownership to the donee distinctly and unambiguously with the delivery of possession of the property and ensure that donee has secured physical ascendency over the property to constitute the delivery of possession\nAbid Hussain and others v. Muhammad Yousaf and others PLD 2022 SC 395 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=39,42", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 5972 of 2021, decided on 24th January, 2024.heard on: 24th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Muhammad Yasin, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nRespondents not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BABAR ANWAR-Petitioner\nVS\nMUHAMMAD ASHRAF and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24224", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2788 = 2024 SLD 2788 = 2024 SCMR 741 = 2024 PTD 662", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.107-Treaties for the avoidance of double taxation, interpretation of-Scope-International tax treaties, conventions or agreements, given their unique nature, require a distinct interpretive approach compared to the one used while interpreting domestic legislation-These agreements being international treaties are governed by the rules of interpretation outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties-Tax treaties differ from domestic tax laws in language, application, and purpose-These treaties are relieving in nature and seek to avoid double taxation, while domestic tax law imposes tax in specific situations-Tax treaties require a broad purposive interpretation, and their interpretation may be more liberal than domestic law-Treaty interpretation is a separate subject from statutory interpretation, accentuating the need to interpret tax treaties independently of domestic law-Role of a State in a bilateral agreement is more of implementing the terms of such agreement rather than that of interpreting the same and that too in a unilateral manner-Given that the primary purpose of tax treaties is to avoid and relieve double taxation through equitable and acceptable distribution of tax claims between the countries, it is important that the provisions of these treaties are interpreted in a common and workable manner, taking into account international tax language, legal decisions of other countries, model treaties, along with their commentaries, developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) and the United Nations ( UN ), and scholarly academic works where appropriate.\nSnamprogetti Engineering B.V. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue 2023 SCMR 1055 ref.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S. 107-Convention between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Kingdom of Denmark for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, Art. 8-Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, Art. 8-Income arising from container detention charges ( CDC ), container service charges ( CSC ) and terminal handling charges ( THC )-Such income falls within the category of profits from the operation of ships in international traffic in the context of double taxation conventions concluded between Pakistan and Denmark, as well as between Pakistan and Belgium.\nThe Commentary on Article 8 of the OECD Model Convention ( OECD MC ) provides guidance about qualifying activities and related profits with respect to income falling under the head of profits from the operation of ships in international traffic . The expression profits from the operation of ships in international traffic also covers profits from activities directly connected with such operations as well as profits from activities which are not directly connected with the operation of the enterprises ship in international traffic as long as they are ancillary to such operation - activities that the enterprise does not need to carry on for the purposes of its own operation of ships in international traffic but which make a minor contribution relative to such operation and are so closely related to such operation that they should not be regarded as a separate business or source of income of the enterprise should be considered to be ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic.\nThe objective scope of Article 8 of the OECD MC and the UN Model Convention ( UN MC ) with its reference to profits from the operation of ships in international traffic covers not only profits directly obtained by the enterprise from the transportation of passengers or cargo by ships that it operates in international traffic, but also, profits from activities directly connected with such operations as well as profits from activities which are not directly connected with the operation of the enterprises ships in international traffic as long as they are ancillary to such operation. Activities are to be considered ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic if (i) the enterprise does not need to undertake them for the purposes of its own operation of ships in international traffic but which otherwise (ii) make a minor contribution relative to such operation and (iii) are so closely related to such operation that they should not be regarded as a separate business or source of income. Article 8 OECD and UN MC therefore applies not only to profits directly obtained in international traffic e.g. transport of passengers or cargo, sales of tickets of the enterprise, leasing of ships, but also to profits directly connected with international traffic and to profits ancillary to international traffic e.g. inland transport, interest, code sharing and slot chartering, haulage services and catering services, provision of goods and services to other enterprises, sales of tickets on behalf of other enterprises, advertising on behalf of other enterprises, letting of immovable property, rental of containers.\nGeorg Kofler, in Reimer and Rust (eds), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (5th edn 2021) vol 1, art 8, paras 33, 35 ref.\nProfits arising from short-term storage of containers or from detention charges for the late return of containers, are covered within the purview of profits from the operation of ships in international traffic . Further, special remuneration for services ancillary to container operations are covered within the ambit of shipping income from international traffic. Income derived from services provided for cargo handling is also considered part of shipping income from international traffic when directly connected or ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic.Thus, profits arising from container detention charges ( CDC ), container service charges ( CSC ) and terminal handling charges ( THC ) are connected with and ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic. Consequently, these profits squarely fall within the purview of the expression profits from the operation of ships in international traffic . Therefore, CDC, CSC, and THC collected by the respondents (non-resident cargo shipping companies incorporated in Denmark and Belgium) are part of the revenue earned in shipping in international traffic and are to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Pakistan-Denmark Double Taxation Convention and the Pakistan-Belgium Double Taxation Convention, as the case may be.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=107", - "Case #": "C.Ps. Nos. 560-K to 589-K of 2019, decided on 12th February, 2024.\n(Against the consolidated judgment of High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 31.05.2019, passed in ITRAs No.22 of 2014, etc.).heard on: 12th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shahnawaz, Advocate Supreme Court and Abdul Wahid, Addl. Commissioner, FBR for Petitioner (in all cases).\nKhalid Javed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (Through V.L. Karachi Registry) (In all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-IV, KARACHI-Appellants\nVS\nMessrs A.P. MOLLER MAERSK and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24225", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2789 = 2024 SLD 2789 = 2024 SCMR 749", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFDNDk", - "Key Words:": "National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-\n-Ss. 33-E & 9-Application for return of surety, dismissal of-Accused was convicted by NAB Court and was sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.61,79,238/-.-Said order further stipulated that the fine shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue in accordance with Section 33-E of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999-High Court maintained the conviction, but reduced the sentence from ten years to the period already served and with this modification, the appeal was disposed of, but for all practical purposes, the liability of the payment of the fine remained intact and unremitting-During the pendency of trial before the NAB Court, the appellant applied for bail before the Supreme Court which was allowed subject to the deposit of the entire amount of his liability-Counsel for the accused, on instructions, conveyed that the accused voluntarily proposed and was ready to deposit the entire amount of his liability and not as surety-On this offer, the prosecution extended its no objection and post-arrest bail was granted subject to depositing the entire liability-Consequently the applicant (son of the accused) deposited sixteen original Defence Savings Certificates with the Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court to cover up and secure the fine amount commensurate to the bail order-Nothing in the bail order of the Supreme Court reflected that the accused was called upon to furnish the surety, but he showed willingness to deposit the entire amount of liability-Accused tendered the amount in lieu of availing the discretionary relief of bail and the same liability/fine was fixed against him in the NAB Court affirmed by the High Court-Had the accused been acquitted by the High Court in appeal, he could have asked for the refund or release of the full amount deposited by him-However, the High Court maintained the conviction to the extent of the already undergone sentence without upsetting or affecting the quantum of the fine imposed upon the appellant by the NAB Court-There was no logical justification to call upon the NAB to start from scratch and initiate proceedings under Section 33-E of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, after returning the amount to the accused-Allowing it would amount to defrauding and deceiving the Court to first secure bail through misrepresentation and, after finalization and affirmation of the judgment of the conviction by the Trial Court and Appellate Court, implore the release of the amount deposited-In such circumstances the application for the withdrawal of surety was misconceived and injudicious-Application was dismissed with the directions that office shall hand over the Defence Savings Certificates to the NAB after fulfilling all requisite formalities for the encashment of liability determined by the NAB Court and affirmed by the High Court to attain finality in the matter; however, on encashment of the Defence Savings Certificates by the NAB, if any excess amount was found over and above the quantum of liability on account of any accumulated profit/increase, the same shall be refunded back to the applicant after adjusting the liability/fine.\nShamraiz Khan v. The State 2000 SCMR 157 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "National Accountability Ordinance, 1999=33-E,9", - "Case #": "C.M.A. 501-K in C.A. No. 85-K of 2018, decided on 29th December, 2023.\n(Application for Return of Surety)heard on: 29th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ashraf Kazi, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Applicant.\nSattar Mohammad Awan, DPG (NAB) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUMTAZ ALI-Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE through Chairman NAB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24226", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2021 6414 = 2021 SLD 6414 = 2021 PLC 1309", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Master and servant-Employment dispute-Remedy-Expression master and servant is not in any manner demeaning nor connotes a degrading status-Such refers to a generic legal phrase having specific consequences-Employment disputes in such relationship are not amenable to jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution-When such relationship exists between an employer and employee then in case of termination the latter cannot claim a right to be reinstated but is entitled to ask for damages, if he/she is able to establish his wrongful removal.\nThe Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v. Muhammad Shoab Qureshi PLD 1984 SC 170; Sindh Road Transport Corporation through its Chairman v. Muhammad Ali G. Khokhar 1990 SCMR 1404; Raziuddin v. Chairman, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 531; Muhammad Umar Malik v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through its President, Karachi and 2 others 1995 SCMR 453; Pakistan Red Crescent Society and another v. Syed Nazir Gillani PLD 2005 SC 806; Chairman, WAPDA and 2 others v. Syed Jamil Ahmed 1993 SCMR 346; Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1984 SC 194; Gohar Ali and another v. Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Limited 2009 PLC (C.S.) 464 and Messrs Malik and Haq and another v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury and 2 others PLD 1961 SC 531 rel.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-Art.199-Constitutional petition-Employment of public sector entities-Scope-Employees of public sector entities, which are established through legislation by Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) are regulated by codes, regulations or rules made under statutes- Statute determines nature of relationship between employer and employee-Such relationship does not fall short of fundamental tenets of the Constitution nor infringes any rights.\n(c) Interpretation of statutes-Court, powers of-Principle-Court is not empowered to legislate but only to interpret law-Fundamental principle of interpretation is to discover and determine intent of the legislature-While interpreting a provision, statute has to be read as a whole in its context-Object and purpose of statute is of paramount importance and a provision cannot be read and interpreted in isolation-Guiding principles.\nFollowing are the granting principles:\ni. There is presumption in favour of Constitutionality and a law must not be declared unconstitutional unless statute is placed next to the Constitution and no way can be found in reconciling the two;\nii. Where more than one interpretation is possible, one which makes the law valid and the other void, Court must prefer the interpretation which favours validity;\niii. Statute must never be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt and reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of statute being valid;\niv. Court should abstain from deciding Constitutional question, if a case can be decided on other or narrower grounds;\nv. Court should not decide a larger Constitutional question than is necessary for determination of the case;\nvi. Court should not declare a statute unconstitutional on the ground that it violated spirit of Constitution unless it also violates letter of the Constitution;\nvii. Court should not be concerned with wisdom or prudence of Legislation but only with its Constitutionality;\nviii. Court should not strike down statutes on the principles of republican or democratic government unless those principles are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the Constitution; and\nix. Mala fides should not be attributed to Legislature .\nPepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart (1992) 3 WLR 1032; Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others PLD 2006 SC 602; Zahoor Ahmed and 5 others v. The State and 3 others PLD 2007 Lah. 231; Afzal Khan Shinwari v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2019 Isl. 422; Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Chairman, Fourth Wage Board and Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others 1993 SCMR 1533; Middleton v. Texas Power and High Co. 249 U.S. 152; Radice v. People of the State of New York 264 US 292; The State v. Zia-ur-Rehman PLD 1973 SC 49; Sh. Liaqat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 504; Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.W.F.P and another PLD 1995 SC 66; A. K. Fazalul Qader Chaudhry v. Syed Shah Nawaz and others PLD 1966 SC 105; Al-Jehad Trust through Habibul Wahab Al-Khairi, Advocate and 9 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad and 3 others 1999 SCMR 1379; Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582 and Lahore Development Authority through D.G. and others v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others 2015 SCMR 1739 rel.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art.199-Constitutional petition-Judicial review-Wisdom of Legislature-Scope-Wisdom of Legislature is beyond the scope of judicial review.\n(e) National Command Authority Act (V of 2010)-\n-Ss.3(6), 11, 8 & 15 proviso [as inserted by National Command Authority (Amendment) Ordinance (I of 2016)]-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Law laid down by Legislature and Court- Applicability- Contractual employment-Regularization- Procedure- Petitioners were contract employees of National Command Authority, which was a strategic organization- Petitioners sought regularization of their services on the basis of judgment passed by Supreme Court- Plea raised by petitioners was that insertion of amendment in law could not affect the law laid down by Supreme Court- Validity- As proviso was inserted in S.15 of National Command Authority Act, 2010, competently and validly therefore, High Court could not refuse to enforce it even if result of it was to nullify a judgment- Petitioners after availing all remedies available under S.11 of National Command Authority Act, 2010 or Rules made thereunder had a grievance of exceptional or extraordinary nature based on the ground of mala fide or coram non judice then the latter could submit a representation before the Authority and the Authority was to constitute a Committee pursuant to powers conferred under S.3(6) of National Command Authority Act, 2010, for consideration of grievances- Petitioners were regulated and governed under non-statutory rules and were not amenable to jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution- Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.\nShafique Ahmed Khan and others v. NESCOM through Chairman, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 377; Mustafa Impex, Karachi and others v. The Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 808; Pakistan Medical and Dental Council through President and 3 others v. Muhammad Fahad Malik and 10 others 2018 SCMR 1956; Muhammad Tariq Badr and another v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 314; Contempt Proceedings Against Chief Secretary, Sindh and others 2013 SCMR 1752; Messrs State Oil Company Limited v. Bakht Siddique and others 2018 SCMR 1181; Syed Faisal Ali and 16 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Water and Power Development Authority Islamabad and 4 others 2019 PLC (C.S.) 751; Pir Imran Sajid and others v. Managing Director/General Manager (Manager Finance) Telephone Industries of Pakistan and others 2015 SCMR 1257; Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through Chairman and others v. Samina Masood and others PLD 2005 SC 831; The Chairperson, National Commission for Human Development and others v. Abdul Jabbar Memon and others 2018 PLC (C.S.) 73; Haji Ghulam Rasul and others v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Auqaf Department, Lahore 2003 SCMR 1815; Zaman Cement Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue and others 2002 SCMR 312; Messrs Mamukanjan Cotton Factory v. The Punjab Province and others PLD 1975 SC 50; Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and justice and others PLD 2012 SC 923; Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 1984 SC 194 and Pakistan Red Crescent Society and another v. Syed Nazir Gillani PLD 2005 SC 806 ref.\nThe State v. Zia-ur-Rehman PLD 1973 SC 49 fol.\nMessrs Mamukanjan Cotton Factory v. The Punjab Province and others PLD 1975 SC 50; Messrs Nizam Impex and another v. Government of Pakistan and others 1990 SCMR 1187; Al-Samrez Enterprise v. Federation of Pakistan 1986 SCMR 1917; Government of Pakistan and others v. Muhammad Ashraf and others PLD 1993 SC 176; Molasses Trading and Export (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1993 SCMR 1905; Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad and others 2000 SCMR 367; Fecto Belarus Tractor Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan through Finance, Economic Affairs and others PLD 2005 SC 605; Income Tax Officer, Central Circle II, Karachi and another v. Cement Agencies Ltd. PLD 1969 SC 322 and Baz Muhammad Kakar and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and Justice and others PLD 2012 SC 923 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199National Command Authority Act, 2010=3(6),5,8,11", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1502 of 2019, decided on 6th May, 2021, heard on: 30th March, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " Athar Minallah, CJ, Mohsin Akhtar Kayani and Fiaz Ahmad Anjum Jandran, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Sajee Sheryar Swati, Syed Saif Ur Rehman Shah Bukhari, Ali Murad Baloch, Nauman Munir Paracha, Sifat Ullah, Ehsan Ali Qazi, Zubair Shah, Asim Shafi, Ms. Shireen Imran, Mudassar Hussian Malik, Syed Amar Hussain Shah, Muhammad Rizwan, Amir Mehmood, Junaid Iftikhar Mirza, Khalid Munir, Ammad Nasir Kundi, Ms. Saira Khalid Rajput, Ms. Aqsa Zahid, Rashid Hafeez, Saad Khan Akhunzada, Aamir Abbasi, Aftab Alam Yasir, Syed Shahbaz Shah, Rana Liaqat, Syed Umer Sohaib Shah, Abid Majeed, Riaz Hussain Azam Bopera, Faisal Iqbal Khan, Raheel Azam Khan Niazi, Malik Nasir Abbas Awan and M. Umair Baloch for Petitioners.\nGhulam Murtaza Dahar, M. Saleem Shahzad, Akhtar Zaman, Usman Naveed, Alaud Din, Muhammad Afzal, Abdul Hameed, Nisar Bhatti, Shayal Islam, Munawar Ahmed, Rashid Maqsood Ahmed, Raja M. Sarfraz, Raja Mansoor Ul Haq, Mumtaz Ali, Ashiq M. Hanif, M. Ismail Gill, Syed Atif Mehmood, Gohar Rehman, Bilal Zaman, Abdul Rehman, Naveed Ali, Aurangzeb Abbasi, Farman Ullah, Akhtar Mehmood, M. Waqas Qureshi, M. Naseer Ashraf and Intizar Hussain Petitioners in person.\nAhmer Bilal Soofi, Barrister Iqbal Khan Nasir, Masood Ahmed Khattak, Usman Jillani, Ms. Bakhtawar Bilal Soofi, Ms. Zainab N. Khan, Ali Ahmed Bhatti and M. Majid Bashir for Respondents.\nM. Umer Asghar Pasha, A.M. (Legal), PMO, NESCOM., Naveed Aslam, Law Officer, YNDC., Khalid Mehmood, Law Officer, PAEC., Obaid, Law Officer, MTC., Cdr. Hussain Shahbaz, Law Officer, SPD and Zaheer Ud Din Babar, SPTO, KRL for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAQAS RAFI AWAN\nVs\nNATIONAL ENGINEERING AND SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION, ISLAMABAD through Chairman and 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24227", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2828 = 2024 SLD 2828 = 2024 PTD 440 = (2025) 131 TAX 236", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUTk", - "Key Words:": "Turnover – Inclusion of Federal Government Subsidy in Taxable Turnover\nDetails:\nThe case involved companies engaged in the distribution of electricity (Discos) that received subsidies from the Federal Government. The tax authorities treated these subsidies as part of the companies turnover under Section 113(3)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which was disputed by the taxpayers. The taxpayers argued that since there was no sale to the Federal Government, the subsidy should not be included in turnover.\nHeld:\nThe court ruled in favor of the tax authorities, holding that the term turnover under Section 113(3)(a) includes gross receipts from all sources, not just from direct sales. It was sufficient that sales were made to consumers, and both the amount recovered from consumers and the subsidy received from the government formed part of the revenue receipts. Thus, these amounts were taxable under the definition of turnover in Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The High Court allowed the reference in favor of the tax authorities and against the taxpayers.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Cases Nos. 10 to 89 decided on 28-09-2023 \nCIR v. M/s QESCO 2022 PTD 1844 (relied upon)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113,113(3)(a),133", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 73049 of 2022, heard on 6th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID KARIM AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Riaz Begum, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Malik Abdullah Raza, Falak Sher Khan, Shahid Sarwar Chahil, Liaqat Ali Chaudhry, Syed Zain ul Abideen Bokhari and Waqar A. Sheikh for Applicants (in ITR No.73049 of 2022).\nMalik Kashif Rafiq Rajwana, Malik Asif Rajwana, Ehtisham ud Din Khan, Malik Rizwan Khalid, Muhammad Umer Rafiq, Muhammad Adeel Chaudhry, Rana Tahir Mahmood, Abdul Latif, Qari Zuhaib ur Rehman Zubairi, Muhammad Afzal Dharala for Respondents/for Applicants (in ITRs Nos.74710 and 74708 of 2017, ITRs Nos.59530, 76238 and 76250 of 2023).\nMalik Muhammad A'rshad Hameed for Respondent (in ITR No.82911 of 2017).\nMain Ashiq Hussain, Muhammad Arshad, Waqas Ahmad Aziz, Shehzad Ahmad and Mian Muhammad Naeem Wattoo for Respondents/for Applicants (in ITRs Nos. 14774 and 14763 of 2023).\nSamar Masood Soofi, Shamsher Ali, Arslan Saleem and Rana Muhammad Mehtab for Respondents in CIR reference applications.\nAsad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTO, LAHORE\nvs\nMessrs GUJRANWALA ELECTRIC POWER CO. (GEPCO)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24228", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2829 = 2024 SLD 2829 = 2024 PTD 503", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUTg", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 2(s), 16, 156(1), Cls. (8) & (9), 157(1) & 157 (2)-Imports and Exports Control Act (XXXIX of 1950), S. 3(1)-SRO 566(I)/2005 dated 06-06-2005-Smuggling, charge of-Report of physical examination of the goods, non-submitting of-Allegation was that on physical examination of goods (Bitumen grade 60/70 of Iranian origin 217 drums) the same differed from quality-Adjudication Officer ordered outright confiscation of goods and an option was given to the owner of vehicle to redeem the same on payment of redemption fine, and penalty was also imposed on the owner of vehicle-Appellant assailed order-in- original on the ground that the impugned goods were easily and readily available in the local market and the same were purchased by them from a wholesaler-Validity-Record revealed that though the Goods Declaration (GD) possessed by the appellants was produced before the Customs Department but the genuineness of the GD was not challenged by the Department-Contention of the Department was that, on physical examination, goods-in-question differed from quality, however in order to corroborate the same, no such examination report had been brought on record before the Customs Appellate Tribunal- Whereas the appellants produced a commercial invoice and a Challan issued by MCC Hyderabad-Import showing bona fide import and purchase of impugned goods-Therefore, appellants had shifted initial burden of proof upon the shoulders of respondent / department- Hence, it could not be considered that seized goods were smuggled ones-Moreover, it was found that appellants were not importers rather they had made the purchases from the local market, therefore, the Department had failed to justify any smuggling in said regard- Furthermore, it was also noted that the seized goods were recovered from an area which was more than five miles away from the border- In the present matter, the appellants had proved their case to the hilt that the goods were neither smuggled nor there was any discrepancy in the GD furnished by them nor there was any violation of the provisions of the Customs Act, 1969-Thus, in wake of charge of smuggling having not been established upon the appellants, carrier of goods (transporter / lawful owner) could not be held liable to pay redemption fine and personal penalty-Therefore the action of the respondents/Department on said count was found and held to be illegal and unwarranted on the facts and circumstances of the case- Customs Appellant Tribunal set-aside the charge of smuggling of goods and directed the release of the goods of appellants unconditionally and also to refund the amount of fine and penalty imposed and paid by the owners of vehicle (appellants) forthwith-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,156(1)(8),156(1)8),157(1),157(2)Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. H-1860 of 2023, decided on 2nd January, 2024, heard on: 28th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Usman Malik for Appellants.\nHumayun Naseer, Inspector for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUDASIR AND ANOTHER\nVS\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION) QUETTA AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24229", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2830 = 2024 SLD 2830 = 2024 PTCL 466 = (2024) 129 TAX 559", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: High Court’s Jurisdiction and Limitation Period under Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe case involved the High Courts jurisdiction to review factual findings concerning the limitation period under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The specific issue was whether an Order-in-Original passed beyond the mandatory period of 120 days could be sustained, particularly when the Appellate Tribunal had already determined the lapse.\nKey Issue:\nCan the High Court examine the factual determination by the Appellate Tribunal regarding the expiration of the statutory limitation period for passing an Order-in-Original under Section 11(5)?\nCourts Analysis and Findings:\n(a) Role of the Appellate Tribunal:\nThe Appellate Tribunal, as the final fact-finding authority, reviewed the matter and concluded that the Order-in-Original was issued after the mandatory 120-day period, rendering it time-barred.\n(b) High Court’s Jurisdiction:\nThe High Court does not have the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to re-examine factual determinations made by the Tribunal. The High Court’s role is limited to addressing questions of law or jurisdictional errors.\n(c) Limitation Period under Section 11(5):\nSection 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, prescribes a mandatory 120-day limitation period for passing an Order-in-Original. If this period lapses, any subsequent extension or decision may not hold legal validity unless granted within the stipulated timeframe.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court affirmed that it could not interfere with or review the Appellate Tribunal’s factual findings, particularly when it had conclusively held that the Order-in-Original was time-barred.\nHeld:\nThe High Court declined to examine the factual aspect of whether an extension for passing the Order-in-Original was obtained within the mandatory 120-day period, as this was within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal as the final fact-finding body.\nCitations:\nRelevant Provisions:\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973: Article 199.\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Section 11(5).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,11(5),30,31,47(5)", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Application No. 542 of 2020. decided on 22nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE ZULFIQAR ALI KHAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, CRTO, KARACHI NOW THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL, LTO, KARACHI.\nVS\nM/S. GULL METAL (PVT.) LIMITED." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24230", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2831 = 2024 SLD 2831 = 2024 PTCL 469", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTUXk", - "Key Words:": "SALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)-Sections 2(25), 14 & 25-Every person engaged in making taxable supplies in Pakistan, including zero-rated supplies, in the course or furtherance of any taxable activity carried on by him, if already not registered, is required to be registered in any of specified categories as enumerated in Section 14 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act provides that sales tax registration shall be regulated through rules as notified by the Board.—From bare perusal of above quoted provisions of law, it becomes clear and obvious that every person engaged in making taxable supplies in Pakistan, including zero-rated supplies, in the course or furtherance of any taxable activity carried on by him, if already not registered, is required to be registered in any of specified categories as enumerated in section 14 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act provides that sales tax registration shall be regulated through rules as notified by the Board (FBR). Accordingly, the Board in exercise of powers conferred inter alia by the sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act prescribed the rules known as the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 and Chapter-1 of the said rules prescribed the procedure for registration, compulsory registration and de-registration. Rule 6 of the said rules specifically prescribed the procedure for compulsory registration of any person and according to sub-rule (1) and (3) of the Rule 6 that if the department is of the opinion that a certain person is liable to be registered but is not voluntarily obtaining sales tax registration, it has to resort to the above procedure in order to assign sales tax registration number to a person liable to be registered. It is also a fact that without pin code, password and sales tax registration number, a person liable to be registered cannot file sales tax return, pay sales tax or be subjected to audit under section 25 of the Act hence, charging sales tax by the department without assigning compulsory sales tax registration number do not find any support from the Rule 6 which explained and laid down the procedure for carrying out the spirit of the Statute. If a person could not register himself voluntarily, thereafter, it was duty of sales tax department to register the defaulting person compulsorily as per the provisions of Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 at the material time. If the provisions of section 2(25) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 are dilated upon, it would indicate two conditions (i) a person who is registered (ii) or liable to be registered. The person liable to be registered falls within the scope of compulsory registration. The sales tax registration rules indicate that this job is to be done by the sales tax department. The wordings of Rule 6 are also quite clear that if the department, “is satisfied that such person is required to he registered, it shall issue notice to such person Thus, Rule 6 itself carries the interpretation of section 2(25) of the Act by stipulating that if department is of the opinion that a person is liable to be registered then a notice has to be issued. It has also been seen that sub-rule (4) of Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules. 2006 highlighted above, clearly and expressly provides for its provisions to take effect from the date of compulsory registration. This being so. there can be no cavil to its applicability commencing from the date of compulsory registration and not for any tax period prior thereto. Be that as it may be. the effect of compulsory sales tax registration of a person cannot be made from the date he became liable for sales tax registration. Therefore, liability of sales tax created against the appellant for the tax periods prior to its sales tax registration is illegal and against the expressed provisions of law.\nBoard in exercise of powers conferred inter alia by sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act prescribed the rules known as the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 and Chapter-1 of the said rules prescribed the procedure for registration, compulsory registration and de-registration.\nIf the provisions of Section 2(25) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 are dilated upon, it would indicate two conditions (i) a person who is registered (ii) or liable to be registered. The person liable to be registered falls within the scope of compulsory registration. The sales tax registration rules indicate that this job is to be done by the sales tax department.\nIt is also a fact that without pin code, password and sales tax registration number, a person liable to be registered cannot file sales tax return, pay sales tax or be subjected to audit under Section 25 of the Act.\nSections 26 & 33\nIf the appellant was liable to be registered w.e.f. 3rd June, 2011 when the exemption was withdrawn by the Federal Government then why the sales tax department has not asked the appellant for non-filing of sales tax returns pertaining to the tax periods from June-2011 to December- 2014.— Furthermore, there is considerable merit in the contention raised by the learned AR that if the appellant was liable to be registered w.e.f. 3rd June. 2011 when the exemption was withdrawn by the Federal Government then why the sales tax department has not asked the appellant for non-filing of sales tax returns pertaining to the tax periods from June-2011 to December-2014 and even no proceedings for imposition of penalty for non-filing of sales tax returns has been initiated against the appellant till to date which shows that the department was also unaware from withdrawal of exemption by the Federal Government vide S.R.O. No. 480(I)/2011 dated 03-06-2011 on account of agricultural machinery, equipments, instruments and parts.\nNo proceedings for imposition of penalty for non-filing of sales tax returns has been initiated against the appellant till to date which shows that the department was also unaware from withdrawal of exemption by the Federal Government vide S.R.O. No. 480(I)/2011 dated 03-06-2011 on account of agricultural machinery, equipments, instruments and parts.\nSALES TAX RULES, 2006 - Rule 6- Board in exercise of powers conferred inter alia by sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act prescribed the rules known as the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 and Chapter-1 of the said rules prescribed the procedure for registration, compulsory registration and de-registration.\nRule 6 specifically prescribed the procedure for compulsory registration of any person and according to sub-rule (1) and (3) of the Rule 6 that if the department is of the opinion that a certain person is liable to be registered but is not voluntarily obtaining sales tax registration, it has to resort to the above procedure in order to assign sales tax registration number to a person liable to be registered.\nIf a person could not register himself voluntarily, thereafter, it was duty of sales tax department to register the defaulting person compulsorily as per the provisions of Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 at the material time.\nSub-rule (4) of Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 clearly and expressly provides for its provisions to take effect from the date of compulsory registration. This being so, there can be no cavil to its applicability commencing from the date of compulsory registration and not for any tax period prior thereto.\nBe that as it may be, effect of compulsory sales tax registration of a person cannot be made from the date he became liable for sales tax registration. Therefore, liability of sales tax created against the appellant for the tax periods prior to its sales tax registration is illegal and against the expressed provisions of law.\nCharging sales tax by the department without assigning compulsory sales tax registration number do not find any support from the Rule 6 which explained and laid down the procedure for carrying out the spirit of the Statute.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(25),14,14(3),25,26,33Sales Tax Rules, 2006=6(1),6(3)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 157/LB/2015 & 878/LB/2016, decided on 1st December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER) AND MR. RIZWAN AHMAD URFI (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Adrian, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. BATALA AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES, MAQBOOL ROAD, FAISALABAD.\nVS\nTHE CIR (RTO), FAISALABAD, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24231", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2832 = 2024 SLD 2832 = 2024 PTCL 480", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTTTc", - "Key Words:": "CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, 1973-Article 199-Petitions are maintainable as the show cause notices are based on the same issue which are now before High Court by way of income tax reference application against the Tribunals Order. Resort to statutory remedies below the Tribunal level would therefore be a mere formality.- As to maintainability of connected petitions we are satisfied that the petitions are maintainable in the circumstances of the present case. As correctly contended by learned Counsel for the petitioners, the impugned show cause notices for tax years 2010, 2011, 2013 & 2014 are based squarely on the same issue which is now before us by way of ITRA against the Tribunals order and the Department obviously would be bound to follow this order in respect of that petitioners other tax years, and in the case of other petitioners similarly placed. Resort to statutory remedies below the Tribunal level would therefore be a mere formality. Furthermore, the Tribunals order is itself before this Court in Income Tax References. In these circumstances, the petitions cannot, and ought not, to be dismissed as not maintainable (Engro Vopak Terminal Ltd vs. Pakistan (2012 PTD 130).\nINCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 (XLIX OF 2001)-Section 12; and Second Schedule—Part-III—Clause (1)-The two separate heads of income (Clinical Supplement and Clinical Incentive) of the Applicants fall within the definition of salary and entitled for rebate under sub-clause (2) of Clause (1) of Part-III of the Second Schedule.—The precise question before us in this matter is only to the extent that whether the two separate heads of income (Clinical Supplement and Clinical Incentive) of the Applicants fall within the definition of salary as provided under Section 12 of the Ordinance or not. When section 12 is examined as a whole, it appears that the salary has been given a very exhaustive meaning and means/includes any amount received by an employee from any employment, whether of a revenue or capital nature, including any pay, wages or other remuneration provided to an employee, including leave pay, payment in lieu of leave, overtime payment, bon us, commission, fees. gratuity or work condition supplements such as for unpleasant or dangerous working conditions, any perquisite, whether convertible to money or not. In fact, it goes on to include all sorts of other heads of income which one can imagine.\nFor that it was only required to see that the Applicants were engaged in any other employment; or had any other source of income; or were engaged in any private practice. All these have already been addressed and answered in favor of the Applicants. The only issue then is that whether the income earned by the Applicants by way of performing their job in respect of consultation and other related matters, exclusively with AKUH could be termed as salary or and income on their own from rendering professional services.\nOn perusal of the record and without any specific finding to the contrary, according to us, the consultation which they are required to conduct within AKUH is not their independent practice as wrongly assessed by the forums below. It is within the control and administration of their employer; as neither the Applicants incur any expenditure; nor anybody is taken into employment by them for providing such services; nor do they pay any rent to AKUH for using any of the facilities required for performing this job.\nIt is nothing but salary; may be in un-quantified manner on a monthly basis. But for that the law is clear, it includes various types of such payments, like commission, fee and bonus payments to the employees under the head of salary. It appears that since rebate is admissible to the Applicants in respect of taxation to this kind of salary, the department has gone to this extent, whereby it has acted against the very definition of salary provided under the Ordinance. Merely for the reason that these two heads of income are variable and not fixed; it could not be treated as income from professional services.\nThis in our considered view was an incorrect approach and the authorities below including the Tribunal have seriously erred as the definition of salary does not require that it shall always be fixed in nature. It covers a host of different payments made to the employees including bonus, fees, commission etc etc. and mostly are not necessarily fixed; rather are variable. It also has nexus with the performance of the employee as it is paid either at the end of a particular period; or mostly at the end of the year. Merely for this reason that since this is variable in nature, it could not ipso-facto be treated as an income other than salary. The law does not support this stance of the department.\nScope of salary.\nSecond Schedule-Part-III—Clause (1)-The proviso inserted in sub-clause (2) of Clause (1) of Part-III of the Second Schedule shows the intent of the legislature that the benefit/rebate was admissible at least prior to Finance Act, 2019.—It appears that pending these proceedings before us, and after passing of the impugned order by the Tribunal, through Finance Act, 2019, a proviso has been inserted in sub-clause (2) of clause (1) of Part-III of the Second Schedule to the Ordinance which now provides that this clause shall not apply to teachers of medical profession who derive income from private medical practice or who receive share of consideration received from patients. On a plain reading, it clearly shows that now the intention of the legislature is that from 2019 onwards such income of the Applicants has been excluded from the purview of admissible rebate; and further shows that the earlier it was not excluded. If it had not been admissible earlier, there would have been no need for inserting this proviso for exclusion of this particular income. The legislative intent by not giving retrospective effect to this proviso shows that what was not excluded earlier has now been excluded; however, with effect from Finance Act, 2019. A legislature is deemed to be aware of the previous state of the law and if knowing this it makes a change when repealing it and re-enacting some of its provisions the intention is clearly to effect a change (Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Karachi Municipal Corporation (PLD 1967 SC 241). The proviso therefore, (though not under consideration for the present purposes), clearly shows by the intent of the legislature itself that even otherwise, the benefit/rebate was admissible at least prior to Finance Act, 2019.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=12", - "Case #": "ITRA No. 276 of 2018, date of announcement 19th April, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicants by: M/s. Hussain Ali Almani, Sami-ur-Rehman Khan,\nSameen Hayat, Mustafa Naqvi and Aitzaz Manzoor Memon, Advocates AKUH.\nRespondents by: Mr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi & Mr. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DR. ZAFAR SAJJAD\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE- III, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24232", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2021 2833 = 2021 SLD 2833 = 2021 PLC 1120", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFTTTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Posts of Primary School Teachers-Eligibility criteria-Preference of one diploma over the other-Under the recruitment policy, a Regular Institute of Technical Education (R.I.T.E) diploma holder was to be given preference over other candidates-However, such preference was only to be given when the candidate had equal marks as the other competing candidate on merit-Therefore, a distinction must be drawn between a R.I.T.E diploma holder who had equal marks as other candidates on the merit list and was thereby given preference on the basis of his qualification, and a R.I.T.E diploma holder who scored significantly lower marks than competing candidates-Latter candidate was not to be given preference merely by virtue of the diploma-Accordingly, the respondent-candidate, who possessed a R.I.T.E diploma, could not be given preference over the candidates appointed against the respective posts when his overall marks were significantly lower than those who were appointed on merit-Appeal was allowed.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Posts of Primary School Teachers-Recruitment process-Proposed policy of five extra marks for field experience-Contention of respondent-candidate that he should be appointed against the advertised post based on the five additional marks for his field experience-Held, that the, marks obtained by the respondent were 51.89 and even if the additional five marks for experience were added, his overall marks would be 56.89-On the other hand, the candidates who had been appointed against the respective posts had obtained 58.826, 58.84 and 67.832 marks respectively-Therefore, even if the respondent was granted the additional five marks, he would still not have similar marks as those of the three candidates who had been appointed-Furthermore respondents own witness admitted during his cross-examination that the said policy for granting additional marks for experience had not yet been implemented in practice and that only a mere proposal regarding it had been circulated-In the absence of any concrete policy in place, the respondent could not get any relief on account of his five years of experience in the field of education-Appeal was allowed.\n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 115-Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in a civil revision petition was purely discretionary and rather limited-However, such discretion must be exercised in a lawful and valid manner on the basis of well entrenched principles of the exercise of such discretion-High Court should not arbitrarily refuse to exercise its discretionary powers, rather, it must satisfy itself as to whether jurisdiction had been exercised properly and whether the proceedings of the subordinate Court suffered from any illegality or irregularity.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 178 of 2020, decided on 3rd February, 2021.\n(Against judgment dated 07.11.2019 of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Civil Revision No. 127-B of 2016)\nheard on: 3rd February, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Gulzar Ahmed, C.J., Ijaz ul Ahsan and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Atif Ali Khan, Additional A.G., Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Appellants.\nTariq Javed Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent along with Respondent in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Secretary Elementary and Secondary Education, Peshawar and others\nVs\nLATIF ULLAH KHAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24233", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFpYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2833 = 2024 SLD 2833", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFpYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c),21(l),21(m),111,111(1)(a),111(1)(d),122(1),122(9),159,174(2),177,177(1),221", - "Case #": "MA(R) No. 225/LB/2023 & MA(R) No. 205/LB/2023 \nIN \nITA No. 992/LB/2023 (Tax Year 2020), date of hearing: 12.06.2023, date of order: 24.07.2023", - "Judge Name:": " AEYSHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER, CH. MUHAMMAD TARQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Bashir Ahmad Malik, Advocate a/w Ch. Anwar-ul-Haq, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Adnan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. WATAN INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD., FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR, UTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24234", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFpNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2927 = 2024 SLD 2927 = (2024) 129 TAX 503", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFpNDg", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Revision of Income Tax Returns and Retrospective Application of Amendments\nDetails:\nThe case concerned the retrospective application of the third proviso to Section 114(6) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, inserted via the Finance Act, 2015. The issue involved applications for revision of income tax returns for tax years 2010, 2012, and 2013, filed in 2015. The central question was whether the Commissioner was required to pass an order for revision within 60 days and whether failure to do so automatically granted approval for revision.\nKey Issue:\nWhether the amendment applied retrospectively to pending proceedings and whether the Commissioners inaction within 60 days constituted deemed approval.\nCourts Analysis and Findings:\n(a) Deemed Approval for Inaction:\nThe third proviso stipulates that if the Commissioner does not issue a written order of approval for revision within 60 days, the approval is deemed to have been granted, rendering clause (ba) conditions inapplicable.\n(b) Retrospective Application of Amendment:\nThe court rejected the view that the amendment was substantive and limited to post-2015 tax years. Instead, it held that the amendment applied to all pending proceedings before the Commissioner, irrespective of the tax year.\n(c) Error in the Learned Single Judges Order:\nThe Single Judges decision, which excluded tax years prior to 2015 from the amendments scope, was deemed erroneous. The amendment focused on the Commissioners procedural obligations, not the tax years themselves.\n(d) Decision on Pending Applications:\nFor the tax years in question (2010, 2012, 2013), the Commissioner failed to act within 60 days, and approval for revision of the returns was deemed to have been granted.\nHeld:\nThe appeal was allowed, and the impugned order by the learned Single Judge was set aside. The court held that:\nThe third proviso to Section 114(6) applies to all pending proceedings, including those from tax years prior to 2015.\nIn cases where the Commissioner failed to act within 60 days, approval for revision of returns is deemed granted.\nCitations:\nRelevant Provisions:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Section 114(6).\nLaw Reforms Ordinance, 1972: Section 3.\nFinance Act, 2015", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114(6)Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "ICA No. 55195 of 2020, decided on 17.01.2024, date of hearing: 17.01.2024", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE AND RASAAL HASSAN SYED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAUJI FRESH AND FREEZE LTD.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24235", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFpNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2928 = 2024 SLD 2928 = (2024) 129 TAX 505 = 2024 PTCL 538 = 2025 PTD 954", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFpNHo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Competency of Cantonment Boards to Levy Property Tax\nDetails:\nPetitioners challenged the Cantonment Boards imposition of taxes based on the annual rental value of immovable properties. They asserted that property tax jurisdiction lies solely with the provinces post-18th Constitutional Amendment and the restoration of the Constitution, rendering such levies by the Cantonment Boards ultra vires. The Cantonment Boards, however, claimed authority to impose such taxes under the Cantonment Act, 1924, and other federal statutes.\nArguments Presented:\nPetitioners Counsel (Mr. Ayan Mustafa Memon):\nFollowing the omission of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, property taxation is now a provincial domain.\nThe Fourth Schedule does not explicitly allow taxation on annual rental value.\nCited case precedents, including the Benazir Bhutto case, to argue against the Cantonment Boards jurisdiction.\nRespondent (Clifton Cantonment Board):\nPresented the historical evolution of Cantonment Boards from colonial times, asserting their legal authority to levy taxes.\nBarrister Farogh Naseem argued that the levy was not a tax but an expenditure and, therefore, outside the purview of constitutional tax entries.\nAdvocate General Sindh:\nProperty tax has historically been a provincial matter under the Government of India Act, 1935, and subsequent constitutional frameworks.\nCourts Findings:\n(a) Exclusion of Federation from Property Taxation Post-18th Amendment:\nTaxes on immovable properties are within the exclusive domain of the provinces. Cantonment Boards lack authority to levy such taxes under federal laws, including the Cantonment Act, 1924, and the Cantonments Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainment Duty Order, 1979.\n(b) Ultra Vires Nature of Taxation by Cantonment Boards:\nThe legal basis for property taxation by the Cantonment Boards conflicts with constitutional competence and is declared ultra vires.\n(c) Unified Regulation of Property Valuation:\nEmphasized the need for a singular regulatory authority to ensure consistent property valuation methodologies.\n(d) Tax Characterization as Property-Based:\nSection 80 of the Cantonment Act clarifies that the tax is imposed on the property itself, not on the income derived from it, aligning with the definition of a property tax.\n(e) Limits of Section 60 of the Cantonment Act:\nPrior to its amendment, Section 60 only permitted Cantonment Boards to impose taxes specified therein, excluding fees or other levies.\n(f) Lack of Power Post-Constitutional Amendments:\nThe Presidential Order of 1979 no longer shields such taxation post-18th Amendment, reaffirming the Cantonment Boards lack of competency to levy taxes on immovable property.\nHeld:\nThe court declared that, following the 18th Amendment, neither the Federation nor the Cantonment Boards possess the authority to impose, levy, or recover taxes on immovable properties, including taxes based on annual rental value. These taxes fall exclusively within provincial jurisdiction, rendering the actions of the Cantonment Boards unconstitutional.\nCitations:\nRelevant Constitutional Provisions: Articles 7, 140A, 142, 270A.\nStatutes:\nCantonment Act, 1924: Sections 60, 80, 106, 200.\nCantonment (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainment Duty) Order, 1979.\nWest Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958.\nCase Laws Referred:\nNirmaljit Singh Hoon and Jalkal.\nBenazir Bhutto Case.\nGovernment of India Act, 1935.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Cantonments Act, 1924=60,80,106,200", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-132 of 2019 and 126 other connected petitions as per annexure “A”, decided on 06.01.2024, dates of hearing: 17.10.2023, 24.10.2023, 25.10.2023, 30.10.203, 01.11.2023, 06.11.2023, 10.11.2023, 13.11.2023, 15.11.2023, 20.11.2023, 21.11.2023, 28.11.2023, 04.12.2023, 13.12.2023 and 14.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE AND JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Messrs. Ayan Mustafa Memon assisted by Ali Zuberi, Habibullah Masood, Amna Khalil, Nawaz Khan and Shahreen Chugtai, (Khwaja Shamsul Islam along with Imran Taj, Imtiaz Ali Shah & Khalil Awan, in C.P. No. D- 2603/2023), (Ms. Naheed A. Shahid & Daniyal Ellahi in C.P. No. D-71/2022 & 848/2023), (Ali John, Altamash Arab, Advocate in C.P. No. D- 6819/2022), Abdul Wajid Wyne, (M. Rafi Kamboh, in C.P. No. D- 6396 & 6397 of 2020), Arif Khan, (M. Saad Siddiqui and Sahibzada Mubeen in C.P. No. D- 840/2022, 5861/2021, 3246/2021, 2970/2020, 1494/2019), Farhan Zia Abrar, (Zain A. Jatoi, Muhammad Mustafa Mumdani, Advocate in C.P. No. D- 2521/2022), (Ghulam Haider Shaikh in C.P. No. D- 1251/2021), (Abid Hussain and Zahid Mehmood in C.P. No. D- 3170 & 3171 of 2021), (Fahad Arif Khilji in C.P. No. D- 3763 and 3764/2021), Ahmed Mujtaba in C.P. No. D- 3803/2022, Naeem Suleman, Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Waseem Farooq, Tauqir Randhawa, Kashan Ahmed, (Mian Mushtaq Ahmed in C.P. No. D- 4306 to 4327 of 2017 and 3532/2018), Hanif Faisal Alam, (Hassan Khursheed Hashmi in C.P. No. D- 5521/2022), (Salman Mirza and Ahmed Magsi in C.P. No. D- 132/2019, 3135/2021 and 3359/2021), Abdul Qayoom Abbasi, Raja Muhammad Safeer (Syed Maqbool Hussain Shah in C.P. No. D- 2797/2021, Syed Noman Zahid Ali, Arsal Rahat Ali, (Mehmood Ali for IBA and Behzad Haider in C.P. No. D- 5459/2022), (Ahmed Madni & Peer Ali in C.P. No. D- 446 of 2023), (Ms.Sadia Sumera in C.P. No. D- 4184/2022), (Ahmed Nizamani in C.P. No. D- 3246/2021), Dr. Rana Khan, (Rajesh Kumar in C.P. No. D- 5673/2021), (Malik Khushhal Khan in C.P. No. D- 3987/2018 & 946/2022), Muhammad Naved, (Fazal Mehmood Sherwani in C.P. No. D- 4159/2020), Masood Ali, Advocates for Petitioners.\nMessrs. (Abdullah Munshi, Shajeeuddin Siddiqui and Imdad Ali Bhatti for Clifton Cantonment Board in C.P. No. D-4985/2018, 5391/2018, 3426/2018, 5166/2018, 5167/2018, 6506/2020 & 1251/2021), (Farooq Hamid Naek assisted by Syed Qaim A. Shah, G.Murtaza Bhanbhro and Saad H. Ammar in C.P. No. D- 132/2019 and 1220/2023 for Respondent No.2), Dr. Farogh Naseem, Ahmed Ali Hussain, S. Zaeem Hyder, Aman Aftab, M. Aizaz Ahmed, Syed Shohrat Hussain Rizvi for Karachi Cantonment Board, Aqib Hussain, (Afnan Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, Iftikhar Hussain, Zohra Ahmed for CBC in C.P. No. D- 1228/2019, 1949/2019 & 946/2022), (Dr. Shahab Imam & Syeda Abida Bukhari for CBC in C.P. No.D- 1220 and 2603/2023), Ashraf Ali Butt, Rehmatunnisa, Sohail H.K. Rana, Ms.Huma F. Bhutto, Fahim Haider Moosvi, (Zain A. Soomro for Respondent No.2 in C.P. No. D- 1661 and 249 of 2021), Akhtar Hussain Shaikh, Syed M. Ghazen, Shahid Ahmed for KW&SC, K, A. Jahangir in C.P. No. D- 3100/2023 for CBC, (Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi in C.P. No. D- 4606/2020), (Shahid Hussain Korejo in C.P. No. D- 6803/2022 for respondent No.2), (Saqib Soomro and Ahmed Mujtaba in C.P. No. D- 6806/2022 for respondent No.2), (Ameer Ali Soomro in C.P. No. D- 6805/2022 for respondent No.2), (Asif Amin for Respondent No.2 in C.P. No. D- 1333/2021), Fozia M.Murad for Respondent in C.P. No. D- 132/2019, 3023, 3669, 7318, 7460 of 2015, (Mr.Talha Abbasi for DHA in C.P. No. D- 4985/2018), Advocates for Respondents.\nM/s. Zeeshan Adhi Addl.AG, Saifullah and Sandeep Molani, Asst.AG, Qazi Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, DAG, Khaleeq Ahmed DAG, Malik Sadaqat Khan Addl. Attorney General and Qazi Ayazuddin, Asst. Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S MILLENNIUM MALL MANAGEMENT CO.\nVS\nPAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24236", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFpNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2929 = 2024 SLD 2929 = (2024) 129 TAX 566", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFFpNHk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Property Tax Exemption for State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), challenged the imposition of property tax by the Chaklala Cantonment Board under Section 60 of the Cantonment Act, 1924. The SBP argued that its properties should be exempt from such taxes, invoking Article 165 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 and Section 99(2)(f) of the Cantonment Act. The SBP claimed that it performs sovereign functions on behalf of the Federal Government, as per the State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956, and therefore qualifies for tax exemptions.\nArguments Presented:\nSBPs Counsel (Salman Ajaib, Advocate):\nSBP is a corporation owned by the Federal Government, performing sovereign functions, and is therefore exempt from property taxes.\nProvisions of Article 98 of the Constitution further establish that SBPs functions are delegated by the Federal Government.\nGranting exemption would not cause discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution.\nRespondents:\nThe petitioner failed to exhaust alternate remedies, rendering the writ petition premature.\nReference to the judgment in State Bank of Pakistan v. Director, Military Lands and Cantonments (PLD 1990 SC 827) was cited to assert this position.\nCourts Findings:\n(a) Provincial Taxation Exemption:\nUnder Section 60 of the Cantonment Act and the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, property tax cannot be imposed on Federal Government properties, including SBPs properties.\n(b) No Estoppel Against the Law:\nPrior payment of property tax by the SBP does not negate its statutory right to exemption, as no estoppel operates against the law.\n(c) Writ Jurisdiction:\nThe High Court held that despite the availability of alternate remedies, a writ petition could be entertained if the order of a statutory body was without lawful authority, partial, or based on malafide intent.\nHeld:\nThe court ruled in favor of SBP, affirming that the properties of the State Bank of Pakistan, being Federal Government properties, are exempt from property tax under Article 165 of the Constitution and Section 99(2)(f) of the Cantonment Act. The levy of property tax was declared unlawful.\nCitations:\nPrimary Legal References:\nCantonment Act, 1924: Sections 60 & 99(2)(f).\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973: Articles 165 & 199.\nState Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956.\nCase Laws Referred To:\nUnion Council, Ali Wahan, Sukkar v. Associated Cement (Pvt.) Limited (1993 SCMR 468).\nState Bank of Pakistan v. Director, Military Lands and Cantonments (PLD 1990 SC 827).\nThe Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan (1979 PLD SC 279).\nSindh Revenue Board v. Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan (2017 SCMR 1344).\nExpo Lahore (Pvt.) Limited v. Excise and Taxation Department, Punjab (2018 CLC 1602).\nAllama Iqbal Open University v. Ministry of Interior (2010 YLR 1339).\nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Executive District Officer (Revenue), Multan (2015 CLC 1618).", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Cantonments Act, 1924=60,99(2((f)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=165,199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1026 of 2018, decided on 26.09.2022, date of hearing: 26.09.2022", - "Judge Name:": " JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Salman Ajaib, Advocate alongwith Raza Mohsin Qazilbash, Director Legal and Muhammad Nazir Rana, Law Officer for State Bank of Pakistan for Petitioners. \nMr. Muhammad Sajid Khan Tanoli, Deputy Attorney General alongwith Mr. Asif Ikram, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents.\nMr. Waqar-ul-Haq Sheikh, ASC alongwith Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob, ASC for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and four others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24237", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2930 = 2024 SLD 2930 = (2024) 129 TAX 217", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yzc", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\n•\nM/s. Glitter House electronically filed a Goods Declaration (GD), which was selected for scrutiny by the Customs department.\n•\nDuring the physical examination, it was revealed that the consignment contained empty glass bottles meant for Nail Polish, printed with OPI and Farsali brands.\n•\nThe Customs Department issued a show cause notice for alleged infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR) due to the unauthorized use of the trademarks.\n•\nThe importer did not have registration for these brands in Pakistan and could not rebut the charges during the hearing.\n•\nThe Customs Department ordered the outright confiscation of the consignment and imposed a penalty.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nImporter’s Defense: The importer claimed that the Goods Declaration only mentioned the import of empty bottles, and they were surprised to find that the bottles contained trademark labels. The importer denied responsibility for applying these trademark labels and offered to remove them to resolve the issue.\n•\nAppeal to Collector (Appeals): The Collector (Appeals) accepted the offer from the importer to remove the trademark labels from the bottles and ordered the release of the consignment after the removal of the labels.\n•\nAppeal by Customs Department: The Customs Department challenged this decision, arguing that removing the labels would not absolve the importer of the intellectual property rights violation, and therefore, the confiscation and penalty should stand.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nThe Tribunal upheld the decision of the Collector (Appeals) Karachi, finding that the order did not warrant interference.\n•\nThe Tribunal emphasized that the action taken by the Customs Department was Suo Motu (initiated by the department itself) and was not based on any formal complaint from the intellectual property owner.\n•\nTherefore, the Tribunal concluded that the Customs Department’s action was not legally justified and maintained the order of the Collector (Appeals), allowing the consignment to be released after the removal of the trademark labels.\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=9,15,79,80,56(1)(9)", - "Case #": "Custom Appeals No. H-1046/2022 decided on 19.11.2022, date of hearing:17.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III, KARACHI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "None present for the Appellant\nMr. Malik Basheer & Mr. Liaquat present for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, through Assistant Collector of Customs, Collectorate of Customs (Appraisement-East), Custom House, Karachi\nVs\nM/S GLITTER HOUSE, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24238", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5YzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2931 = 2024 SLD 2931 = (2024) 129 TAX 223", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5YzY", - "Key Words:": "SUMMARY OF CASE\nLaw & Sections\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001:\no\nSections 74, 120, 122B, 122C, 122, 132, 161, 170, 172, 177, 182, 205, 214B, 221\no\nRules 1(3) & 1(5) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002\no\nPart III, Sixth Schedule\no\nArticles 4 & 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan (Right to fair treatment and due process)\n________________________________________\nKey Points\n•\nFacts of the Case:\no\nThe appellant, a private limited company providing transportation services to corporate clients, filed its return of income supported by audited accounts. The officer initiated proceedings to monitor withholding taxes by issuing notice under section 161(1A).\no\nThe taxpayer challenged the initiation of proceedings, claiming the officer failed to follow the proper procedure by not issuing a notice under section 176 read with Rule 44(4) first. The taxpayer argued that the withholding tax notice was invalid, as it did not identify the parties from whom taxes should be deducted, and that average withholding tax rates had been applied incorrectly.\no\nThe CIR(A) dismissed the appeal, stating that a sufficient period of 15 months was allowed for the completion of the monitoring process.\no\nThe taxpayer appealed to this forum, seeking to cancel the decisions of the authorities.\n________________________________________\nArguments\n•\nAppellants Arguments:\no\nThe appellant contended that the notice issued under section 161(1A) was invalid, as the proper procedure required first issuing a notice under section 176 read with Rule 44(4), followed by the section 161(1A) notice.\no\nIt was argued that the notice did not comply with the criteria set forth in legal precedents, such as the need to identify the parties from whom tax should be deducted, and that it applied average withholding tax rates, which is not permissible.\no\nAdditionally, the appellant pointed out that diesel purchases were incorrectly subjected to withholding tax, as they fall under clause (43C) of Part IV of the Second Schedule, which excludes such payments from withholding tax.\n•\nRespondents Arguments:\no\nThe DR supported the orders of both the DCIR and CIR(A), asserting that the process followed was legally sound.\n________________________________________\nDecision\n1.\nNotice Issued under Section 161 (1A):\no\nThe Tribunal ruled that the notice issued under section 161 was essentially a notice under section 176, read with Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, and could not be classified as a valid notice under section 161(1A). This violated the procedural requirements under the law.\n2.\nPenalty Provisions:\no\nThe Tribunal noted that penalties under section 161 cannot be applied unless an order in writing is passed by the Commissioner (or higher authorities), after providing the concerned party an opportunity to be heard.\n3.\nIdentification of Parties for Withholding Tax:\no\nThe Tribunal emphasized that for tax defaults under section 161, the names and addresses of the parties from whom tax should have been deducted must be clearly identified. The failure to do so invalidated the order.\n4.\nTax Under Section 161 on Consolidated Figures:\no\nThe Tribunal held that tax under section 161 cannot be applied on a consolidated or average basis. The tax default must be established individually for each case, which was not done here.\n5.\nLegal Precedents and Errors:\no\nThe Tribunal pointed out that the order passed by the IRO (Inland Revenue Officer) was in complete disregard of established legal principles set by the Supreme Court, rendering it legally flawed and untenable.\n6.\nWithholding Tax on Diesel Purchases:\no\nThe Tribunal agreed with the appellant that payments for diesel purchases were not subject to withholding tax under clause (43C) of Part IV of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n7.\nAppeal Decision:\no\nBased on the above findings, the Tribunal ruled that the orders of both the DCIR and CIR(A) were legally and factually unsustainable, and therefore, they were cancelled. The appeal was allowed.\n________________________________________\nKey Sections Referenced:\n•\nSection 161: Tax default for failure to deduct or collect taxes\n•\nSection 176: Procedure for monitoring withholding taxes\n•\nSection 122B, 122C: Amendment and revision of assessments\n•\nSection 132: Powers of the tax authorities\n•\nArticle 4 & 10A of the Constitution: Right to fair treatment and due process", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=74,120,122B,122C,122,132,161,170,172,177,182,205,214B,221,Rule 1(3),1(5), Part III, Sixth ScheduleConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10A", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1406/KB/2019, decided on 26.01.2021, date of hearing: 24.09.2020", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIFULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. S.M. Rehan, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Abid Aziz Memon, D.R for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. IBS LOGISTICS (PVT) LTD KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, CRTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24239", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5YzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2016 3948 = 2016 SLD 3948 = 2016 PLJ 69", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5YzU", - "Key Words:": "Summary of Case:\n________________________________________\n1. Maintenance Allowance:\n•\nScope of Maintenance Allowance: The court emphasizes that a husbands responsibility to maintain his wife and children is a fundamental duty. In this case, the wife and her two daughters are entitled to maintenance allowance from the husband as it is the husbands duty to provide for them.\n________________________________________\n•\nWife Leaving the Husbands House: Although the wife left the husbands house, the court clarifies that her departure was not due to her own will but due to the husbands behavior, including misbehavior, abuse, and disrespect. Such conduct amounts to cruelty, justifying her refusal to live with him. As a result, the wife is entitled to maintenance allowance, even though she left the house of her own volition.\n________________________________________\n2. Restitution of Conjugal Rights:\n•\nScope of Restitution: The wife had not sought a dissolution of the marriage. This suggests that there is still hope for reconciliation, and the spouses and children may be reunited. This provides grounds for a restitution of conjugal rights.\n________________________________________\n•\nAppeal Decision: The appellate court, after examining the evidence and circumstances, granted a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, contingent on the payment of the wife’s outstanding dower and maintenance allowance. If the wife refused the reunion, she would be disqualified from future maintenance.\n________________________________________\n3. Constitutional Petition and Judgment:\n•\nConstitutional Petition: A constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan was filed, challenging the validity of the compromise decree. However, the court found that the appellate courts judgment was well-reasoned.\n________________________________________\n•\nValidity of Compromise Decree: The appellate court’s decree for restitution of conjugal rights was upheld because it considered both the outstanding dower and maintenance allowance. Upon the wife’s refusal to reunite, she would be disqualified from claiming future maintenance, which was in line with legal principles regarding maintenance.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nAppellate Courts Decision: The decision made by the appellate court is justified and reasonable, as it balances the husbands duty to maintain his wife and children with the consequences of the wife’s refusal for a reunion. The petition challenging this decision was dismissed, as no legal exceptions were found against the appellate court’s judgment.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 410-B of 2013, decided on 26.3.2015, date of hearing: 26.3.2015.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: IKRAMULLAH KHAN AND MUHAMMAD YOUNIS THAHEEM, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shahid Khan Bangesh, Advocate for Petitioner.\nHaji Gul Diaz Khan Wazir, Advocate for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed NOBAHAR SHAH-Petitioner\nvs\nMst. SALMA BIBI and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24240", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5YzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2932 = 2024 SLD 2932 = 2024 SCMR 929", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5YzQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Delay of about four hours in reporting the matter to the police-Consequential-There was a delay of about four hours in reporting the crime to the Police whereas Police Station was situated at a distance of about 20 kilometers from the place of occurrence-No explanation at all was furnished for causing delay in reporting the crime to the Police-Contention that approximately four hours delay in lodging the FIR is a normal thing does not appeal to the mind-Had the matter been reported within reasonable time, the police would have easily reached at the place of occurrence within about an hour-Why the matter had not been reported immediately by the eye-witnesses was a question which could not be satisfactorily explained by the witnesses during their evidence-In the circumstances, chances of deliberations and consultations before reporting the matter to the Police could not be ruled out-Appeal was allowed; the judgments passed by the Trial Court and High Court were set aside to the extent of the appellant; and he was acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Co-accused persons acquitted on the same evidence-Effect-On the same set of evidence, the co-accused persons had been acquitted of the charges, whereas the appellant (accused) had been convicted and sentenced-Benefit of the same should have also been extended to the appellant-Injured, shown as a witness in the calendar of witnesses in the charge sheet, had not been produced by the prosecution for evidence in support of its case without any cogent and plausible reason, thus the prosecution had withheld the best evidence-Case of the prosecution was on weak footings and the benefit of doubt arose in favour of the appellant (accused)-Appeal was allowed; the judgments passed by the Trial Court and High Court were set aside to the extent of the appellant; and he was acquitted of the charge.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Cr. Appeal No.425 of 2019 and Cr. Petition No.632 of 2020, decided on 14th March, 2024, heard on: 14th March, 2024. (Against the judgment dated 23.02.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Crl. Appeal No. 492 of 2011).", - "Judge Name:": " JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JUSTICE AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ansar Nawaz Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant/Petitioner (in Crl.A. No. 425 of 2019).\nMalik Waheed Anjum, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2 (in Crl. A. 425 of 2019).\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAUKAT HUSSAIN-APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE STATE THROUGH PG PUNJAB AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24241", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2933 = 2024 SLD 2933 = 2024 SCMR 809", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yy8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Civil Servants Pay Revision Rules, 1977-\n-R. 8(3)-Civil service-Graduate Primary Teachers regularized in service (the respondents)-Selection grade, grant of-Legality-Respondents could not show any policy of the Government which entitled the Graduate Primary Teachers for the grant of selection grade-They solely relied on Rule 8(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants Pay Revision Rules, 1977 and a notification-Rule 8 (3) of the Rules of 1977 provides that where, for a class of posts, apart from the ordinary pay scale, a higher pay scale has been sanctioned for a percentage of the number of said posts, then, in such an eventuality, the higher pay scale shall be admissible to the holders of the post in BS-1 to BS-16, subject to a minimum length of two years service in the ordinary pay scale of the said posts-Higher pay scale was never sanctioned for the post of Graduate Primary Teacher and, therefore, Rule 8(3) was not attracted in the case of the respondents-Even the notification in question does not include the post of Graduate Primary Teacher for the purposes of grant of selection grade-Government had not formulated any policy regarding the grant of selection grade for the post of Graduate Primary Teacher-Tribunal, in the absence of a policy specifically covering the grant of selection grade for the post of Graduate Primary Teacher was not competent to purportedly create a right in favour of the respondents-Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal was set aside.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Selection grade, grant of-Scope-Grant of selection grade is not an appointment against a post in the mode of promotion-Selection grade is thus not an appointment against a higher post but is meant to extend financial benefits of a higher grade-Selection grade is meant to financially compensate a civil servant who, despite serving against a particular post for a considerably long period, does not have the prospect of being promoted to a higher post-It is within the exclusive domain of the Government to consider and decide whether a civil servant is to be compensated for serving on a post without having the prospects of being promoted to a higher post-It is an executive function performed through formulating a policy in the case of each post-Grant of selection grade and its eligibility criterion is thus necessarily governed under a policy which has to be formulated by the Government-It is not one of the terms and conditions of the civil servant under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 nor the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules,1974, or the Punjab Civil Servants Pay Revision Rules, 1977-A right, therefore, does not accrue in favour of a civil servant to claim selection grade in the absence of a specific policy that has been competently formulated by the Government-No court or tribunal has the power and jurisdiction to compel the Government to make a policy, or to interfere with a policy which has been competently made in relation to a specified post-As a corollary, the tribunal is bereft of jurisdiction to assume that a right exists in favor of a civil servant for the grant of selection grade unless the Government has formulated a policy.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 928-L to 930-L of 2021, decided on 19th December, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 12.02.2021 of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore passed in Appeals Nos. 1137, 1138 and 1139 of 2020).\nheard on: 19th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD, ACJ, SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Mumtaz Ali, Additional Advocate General, Punjab along with Akram, Litigation Officer and M. Zahid Aslam, DEO (SE), Khanewal for Petitioners (in all cases)\nRespondents in person. (in all cases)", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE SECRETARY SCHOOL EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nRIAZ AHMED AND 2 OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24242", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2934 = 2024 SLD 2934 = 2024 SCMR 814", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yys", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324 & 337-F(i)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah-Re-appraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Mitigating factors-Single fire shot-Non-repetition of fire shot-Parties were close relatives and known to each other, therefore there was no possibility of misidentification or substitution-Prosecution was able to prove its case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt through convincing evidence duly supported by medical evidence-However, as far as the quantum of punishment was concerned, it was prosecutions own case that the appellant hit the deceased with his pistol on the left side of his body below armpit-He was also not attributed any injury to the injured witnesses-Co-accused, who was attributed fatal injuries to deceased was, however, acquitted by the Trial Court-Despite having ample opportunity to cause more injuries to the deceased, the appellant fired only once causing single injury to the deceased-Medical Officer, who conducted post-mortem examination, observed a solitary firearm injury with its corresponding exit on the dead body of the deceased-Certainly, this fact serves as a mitigating circumstance where penalty of death was unjustified rather a legal sentence i.e. life imprisonment was apt-As far as the conviction and sentences of the appellant qua other deceased and injured witnesses were concerned, the appellant had ample opportunity to repeat the fire on the deceased and also to fire on the other persons but he refrained from doing so, therefore, he could not be convicted for the murder/injuries to those persons, especially when the co-accused who were alleged to have caused the death/injuries to them had been acquitted by the courts below-Appeal was partly allowed; the conviction awarded to the appellant under Section 302(b), P.P.C. was maintained, however, sentence of death on two counts was altered to life imprisonment on single count, with the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C.; and, the amount of fine of Rs.200,000/- imposed upon the appellant by the Trial Court remained intact-Rest of the sentences were set aside and the appellant was acquitted of the charge to the extent of all remaining offences.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,337-F(i)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No.558 of 2019, decided on 18th March, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 09.03.2016, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 52 and 176 of 2012 and Murder Reference No. 12 of 2012).\nheard on: 18th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Talat Mahmood Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Sharif Janjua, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nAltaf Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant/ Respondent.\nIrfan Zia, DPG, Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE-APPELLANT\nVS\nMUHAMMAD IMRAN AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24243", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2935 = 2024 SLD 2935 = 2024 SCMR 819", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yzk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 60(2)(b)-Election Rules, 2017, R. 51-Election for seat of Provincial Assembly-Nomination papers, acceptance of-Joint bank account for elections expenses-Permissibility-It is not mandatory for the bank account opened or dedicated for the purpose of election expenses to be a single signature account-However, the Election Commission of Pakistan ( ECP ) exercising its delegated power under section 239 of the Elections Act, 2017 ( the Act ) amended Rule 51 of the Election Rules, 2017 ( the Rules ) with the effect that the bank account so opened for the purpose to document election expenditure should not be a joint signatory account-Stipulation in Rule 51 that the bank account so opened or dedicated should not be a joint signatory account is inconsistent with the express provision of section 60(2)(b) of the Act-Since Rule 51 (as amended) travels beyond the ambit of the Act, it is ultra vires and cannot be given any effect, and resultantly, based on it the nomination papers could not be rejected-Leave petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the orders of the fora below were set aside with the result that the nomination papers of the petitioner for PP-150 (Lahore) were deemed accepted and her name was deemed included in the final list of candidates for the General Elections of 2024.\nSanaullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools 2024 SCMR 80 ref.\n(b) Delegated legislation-\n-Rules made under a statute-Scope-If a rule goes beyond the rule-making power conferred by the statute or if a rule supplants any provision for which power has not been conferred, it becomes invalid-Delegated power to legislate by making rules cannot be exercised to bring into existence substantive rights, obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the statute.\n(c) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-Ss. 60(2)(b) & 62(9), Proviso (ii)-Election Rules, 2017, R. 51-Election for seat of Provincial Assembly-Nomination papers, acceptance of-Joint bank account for elections expenses-Permissibility-Column No.3 of the declaration, provided in the nomination papers, by which a candidate is required to declare his/her bank account-Interpretation-Tenor of column No.3 of the declaration provides two options for a candidate-First, the candidate has to declare that he/she has opened an exclusive single signatory account, which means that before filing nomination papers, the candidate has opened an exclusive single signatory account for the purpose of documentary evidence of election expenses-If, for any reason, the candidate cannot open an exclusive single signatory account before filing the nomination papers, the other option for him/her is to declare that he/she will use his/her existing account for the purpose of election expenses-This implies two things: firstly, the existing account may be single or joint, and secondly, a candidate is given the opportunity, if their account is joint, to have it converted into a single signatory account for the purpose of election expenses later on-This option seems to be for those candidates who, due to some exigencies including illness, imprisonment, etc., cannot open their exclusive single signatory bank account or convert their existing joint account to a single signatory account before filing nomination papers-Purpose of providing such a facility can only be to ensure that the citizens are not deprived of their fundamental right, that is, to contest election freely-So the objection, if any, in the present case with regard to the joint bank account declared by the petitioner (candidate), it could not be held to be a defect which was substantial in nature as the petitioner had the option, as stated above, to rectify it under proviso (ii) to subsection (9) of section 62 of the Act, and convert it into single signatory account-This aspect of the matter escaped consideration of the High Court, and so, it misdirected itself while declining the petitioner s prayer-Leave petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the orders of the fora below were set aside with the result that the nomination papers of the petitioner for PP-150 (Lahore) were deemed accepted and her name was deemed included in the final list of candidates for the General Elections of 2024.\nMiss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 418 ref.\n(d) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 62(9)-Election for seat of Provincial Assembly-Nomination papers, acceptance of-Nomination papers of the petitioner-candidate, who was an under trial prisoner, were rejected by the High Court on the ground that her signatures and thumb impression on nomination papers, Form-B and the Affidavit were not properly attested and, therefore, not genuine-Validity-Scope of inquiry under section 62(9) of the Elections Act, 2017 does not permit the Returning Officer ( RO ) to get the signature of the petitioner verified from the jail authorities, nor the non-verification or attestation of the nomination papers by the jail authorities is a condition precedent, nor was the difference in the candidate s signature a valid reason for rejecting the nomination papers, particularly when the petitioner/candidate filed an appeal admitting her signature, and then a constitutional petition-Thus, it could not be used as a basis to draw the inference that signatures were not genuine and to reject the nomination papers-Leave petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the orders of the fora below were set aside with the result that the nomination papers of the petitioner for PP-150 (Lahore) were deemed accepted and her name was deemed included in the final list of candidates for the General Elections of 2024.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=60(2)(b)Elections Rules, 2017=51", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 184 of 2024, decided on 26th January, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 12.01.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.P. No. 2467 of 2024).\nheard on: 26th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR, SHAHID WAHEED AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shazib Masud, Advocate Supreme Court, Moiz Tariq, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Mian Ali Ashfaq, Ahad Khokhar, M. Fiaz Kandwal, Advocates and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nZafar Iqbal, Special Secretary, Muhammad Arshad, DG\nLaw, Mansoor Akhtar Sherwani, DG Political Finance, Khurram Shahzad, Addl. Director and Falak Sher, Legal Consultant (on Court's call).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SANAM JAVAID KHAN THROUGH ATTORNEY-APPELLANT\nVS\nELECTION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, PUNJAB AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24244", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2936 = 2024 SLD 2936 = 2024 SCMR 826", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Yzg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Employees Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)-\n-S. 22 & Preamble-Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976-Liberal interpretation-Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 is a beneficial statute intended to provide security and old-age benefits to employees of industrial, commercial or other organizations covered by it and, therefore, its provisions have to be construed liberally in order to advance its objective.\nDon Basco High School v. The Assistant Director EOBI, PLD 1989 SC 128 and Lahore Race Club v. Deputy Director EOBI, 1998 SCMR 1571 ref.\n(b) Employees Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)-\n-S. 22(2)-Old age pension-Exception under Section 22(2) of the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 ( the EOB Act, 1976)-Applicability-Stage when the exception under Section 22(2) of the EOB Act, 1976 becomes applicable-To avail the exception under Section 22(2) of the the EOB Act, 1976, the insured person must satisfy that he was in employment in the industry or establishment on the first day of July 1976 or on the day the Act became applicable to such an industry or establishment and was of the age mentioned in Section 22(2)(i) and (ii) of the Act.\nSection 22(1) of the Employees Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 ( the Act ) provides that an insured person is entitled to monthly old-age pension if (i) he is over sixty years of age, or over fifty-five years of age in the case of a woman, and (ii) the contribution in respect of such insured person was paid by the employer for not less than fifteen years. It is only when both these conditions are fulfilled that an insured person is entitled to monthly old-age pension under the said provision. An exception is provided under Section 22(2) of the Act whereby the number of years of contribution paid by the employer on behalf of the insured person is reduced to seven and five years, respectively instead of fifteen years under section 22(2) if on the first day of July, 1976 or on any day thereafter on which the Act becomes applicable to an industry or establishment; (i) the insured person is over forty years of age, or over thirty-five years of age in the case of a woman or (ii) the insured person is over forty-five years of age, or over forty years in the case of a woman.\nThe first cut-off date i.e., first day of July 1976 is the date when the Act was implemented. As per section 9 of the Act, the first contribution was paid by the employer on the said date. The second cut-off date is when the Act becomes applicable to an industry or establishment. Section 1(4) of the Act provides three different modes through which the Act becomes applicable to an industry or establishment. It is at these two points in time when the age of the insured person in terms of Section 22(2)(i) and (ii) becomes relevant for invoking the exception of reduced years of contribution under the said provision. The age of the insured person alone is not the determining factor for the case to fall within the exception under\nSection 22(2) but it is also that the age must be so at the relevant cut-off dates mentioned above. As such, an insured person cannot avail the exception under Section 22(2) if he was employed after the cut-off date, i.e., first day of July 1976 or after the date when the Act became applicable to the industry or establishment under Section1(4) of the Act. Therefore, to avail the exception under Section 22(2)\nof the Act, the insured person must satisfy that he was in employment\nin the industry or establishment on the first day of July 1976 or on\nthe day the Act became applicable to such an industry or establishment and was of the age mentioned in Section 22(2)(i) and (ii) of the Act.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Employees Old Age Benefits Act, 1976=22,22(2)", - "Case #": "C.P. No.3531 of 2021, C.Ps. Nos. 408, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473 of 2023 and C.P. No. 3495 of 2023, decided on 18th February, 2024.\n(Against the judgment of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad dated 27.04.2021 passed in W.P. No. 2502 of 2020 etc.)\nheard on: 18th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner(s):\nHaroon Irshad Janjua, Advocate Supreme Court.\nCh. Akhtar Ali (in C.P. No. 3531 of 2023).\nMuhammad Tariq, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 3495 of 2023).\nMuhammad Umer Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court.\nKhurram M. Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court\nBarrister Abu Bakar along with Muhammad Amin, Deputy Director General, EOBI and Abdul Ahad, Director (Law) EOBI.\nGhulam Muhammad, Director (Operations), EOBI (in C.P. No. 408 of 2023, C.P's Nos. 2451-2458 of 2023 and C.P's Nos. 2469-2473 of 2023).\nFor the \nMukhar Ahmed Maneri, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 3531 of 2023 and C.P. No. 3495 of 2023).\nRaja Muhammad Rafiq Janjua, Advocate High Court along with Private Respondents (in C.Ps. Nos. 408, 2451-2458 and 2469-2473 of 2023).", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMIR SULTAN AND 2 OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nADJUDICATING AUTHORITY-III EOBI, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24245", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Y3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2937 = 2024 SLD 2937 = 2024 SCMR 833", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Y3o", - "Key Words:": "(a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S. 54-Land acquisition-Compensation, award of-Appellant-company, for whom the land was acquired, was aggrieved of the enhancement of compensation by the Referee Court and hence filed an appeal before the High Court-Maintainability-Such an appeal was maintainable in terms of section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.\n(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 23(2) & 28A & 34-Land acquisition-Compensation, quantum of-Compulsory charges and additional compensation-Acquisition of land in favour of appellant-company for a public purpose-Referee Court enhanced the compensation from Rs. 95,000/- per acre to Rs. 120,000/- per acre-Propriety-Appellant-company itself leased and used the acquired-property before it was acquired-Since the appellant-company negotiated and set the rent, the possibility for manipulation of the potential value of the demised property would be minimal-Furthermore, the time period that had lapsed between the issuance of Section 4 notification and the passing of the Award in respect of the acquired-property that was already leased by the appellant-company does not render the amount of compensation adjudged to be unreasonable-Compensation for the property being acquired must not only be based on its market value but also the potential value thereof-In the peculiar circumstances of the present case, the compensation adjudged appears to have been reasonably determined-In the present case, the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, declared the acquisition to be made for a public purpose, and thus, the compensation awarded to the landowners requires correction-Accordingly, the compulsory charges payable by the appellant-company to the respondents/landowners is reduced from 25% to 15% of the market value of the acquired-property-Moreover section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, has been omitted through Section 4 of the Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act XVI of 2010)-Thus, it would be safe to state that in view of the present legislative dispensation, the appellant-company cannot be burdened with the payment of additional compensation to the landowners under Section 28-A of the Act-Finally, it was admitted that prior to the commencement of the acquisition proceedings for the acquired-property in 1985, the same was leased by the appellant-company-Appellant-company kept on paying the lease-money to landowners till 1995-Appellant-company in these circumstances cannot simultaneously be taxed to pay the lease amount and also the interest on the compensation for the acquired property since 1985-Therefore, in all fairness, the private-respondents/landowners are entitled to interest on the compensation amount only after they ceased to receive the lease money for the acquired-property-Accordingly, the appellant-company is only liable to pay interest on the compensation awarded to the private respondents/landowners from the time they stopped paying rent until the full compensation for the acquired property was paid-Appeals were allowed accordingly.\nLand Acquisition Collector v. Mst. Surraya Mehmood Jan 2015 SCMR 28 and Dilawar Hussain v. Province of Sindh PLD 2016 SC 514 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=54,23(2),28A,34", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1653 to 1655 of 2007, decided on 7th February, 2024.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 31.08.2007 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Hyderabad Circuit in 1st Appeals Nos. 22, 23 and 24 of 2005).\nheard on: 7th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " YAHYA AFRIDI, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hussain Ali Almani, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Mehmood Abbas, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nAzhar Farid, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "B.P. PAKISTAN EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION, INC-APPELLANTS\nVS\nASHIQUE HUSSAIN HALEPOTO AND 2 OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24246", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Y3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2938 = 2024 SLD 2938 = 2024 SCMR 840", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5Y3k", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975-\n-Rr. 14 & 12 [as it existed prior to being amended by Notification No.6206-EXEC-II dated 16th of March, 2023, issued by the Provincial Police Officer]-Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974), S. 21-Police official-Dismissal from service-Departmental appeal, filing of-Limitation-Notwithstanding Rule 14 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, where no time period for filing an appeal has been provided, the time frame specified under section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, is to be followed, which is sixty days.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975=14,12", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No.1593-L of 2020, decided on 14th March, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 01.09.2020 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.2313 of 2020).\nheard on: 14th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nBaleegh-uz-Zaman Ch., Addl. A.G., Punjab along with Nasrullah Khan, DSP for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALI RAZA-PETITIONER\nVS\nREGIONAL POLICE OFFICER AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24247", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2939 = 2024 SLD 2939 = 2024 SCMR 843", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 221-Charge, framing of-Scope, significance and purpose of framing of charge against an accused explained.\nFraming of charge is the foundation of trial, with a purpose and object to enable accused to know the exact nature of allegations and the offences with which he is charged, so that he is given reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and defend himself. Similarly, it enables the prosecution to produce relevant evidence in support of its case against the accused in order to prove the charge. Framing of proper charge is, therefore, significant for the court concerned to be cautious regarding the real points in issue, so that evidence could be confined to such points and to reach a correct conclusion.\nSection 221 of the Cr.P.C. has provided an elaborate procedure for framing of charge. It requires that all material particulars as to time, place, as well as specific name of the alleged offence, if any; the relevant law, its applicable section(s), subsection(s) and clause(s) in respect of which the offence is said to have been committed, shall be mentioned in the charge. Where any particular section of law with which a person is intended to be charged contains several parts, the relevant part of that section which depicts from the police report and the material available on record, should be mentioned therein. It is the responsibility of the Trial Judge to take all necessary and possible steps to ensure compliance of law with regard to framing of proper and unambiguous charge. Steps should also be taken to explain the charge to the accused to a possible extent, enabling him to fully understand the nature of allegations against him. If necessary ingredients of the offences with which the accused is charged, are not mentioned in the charge, or it is framed in an incomplete, defective or vague manner, it might mislead the accused, which would be a failure of justice. It is, however, to be noted that every omission in a charge cannot be regarded as material illegality or irregularity, unless the accused is in fact misled by such error or omission and it has occasioned a failure of justice, as provided by section 225 of the Cr.P.C.\n(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-Ss. 11-H(i) & (ii) & 11-F(i)-Fund raising for a proscribed organization-Re-appraisal of evidence-Defective and vague framing of charge-Effect-Failure of justice-Trial Court while framing the charge, did not specify as to which of the sub-clause of section 11-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ( ATA of 1997 ) was applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case-There was no evidence on the record to suggest that the petitioner (accused) was guilty of an offence either under section 11(1)(a) or 11(1)(b) of the ATA of 1997-FIR, the police report and the other material available on the record were insufficient for the Trial Court to frame charge against the petitioner under any of the clauses of section 11-H of the ATA of 1997, yet defective and vague charge was framed under the stated offences, without mentioning in detail the purported act of the petitioner, which constituted an offence-In absence of relevant information and evidence to prima facie constitute an offence, it was incumbent upon the Trial Court to have refrained itself from framing of charge against the petitioner-In the FIR, in the police report, the documents attached therewith and the evidence available on the record, there was nothing to establish that the petitioner was busy in collecting the money, nor was there any allegation with regard to his intent that money recovered from him was the outcome of the donation he collected, and was to be used or had reasonable cause to suspect that it may be used for the purpose of terrorism or by a terrorist or by an organization concerned in terrorism-It was alleged that the petitioner was arrested having a donation book on which name of a proscribed organization was printed and leaves of it contained his signature, along with an amount of Rs.1500/- were recovered from him-Admittedly, the petitioner did not sign any leaf of the book in presence of the witnesses-Moreover, no leaf of it having the alleged signatures of the petitioner was sent to the forensic laboratory for obtaining expert s opinion to verify the signatures-First Information Report was registered upon an information received by the complainant from DIG CTD, but it too did not disclose commission of the offence under section 11-H of the ATA of 1997, against the petitioner at the relevant time-Rather it was just a presumption and apprehension of the DIG that the petitioner belonged to a proscribed organization Daesh, and collected donations and funding for the said organization and the said money was potentially used in carrying out terrorist activities across the country-Admittedly, neither the DIG nor any officer of DIG s office participated in the investigation nor did they appear before the Trial Court as a witness, to substantiate the contents of the FIR-There is no detail in the FIR as to the date, time, place and manner of collecting such money by the petitioner, nor his intention or any reasonable cause on his behalf to suspect that the amount shall be or may be used for terrorist activities-Before registration of the FIR, the petitioner s name was included in Fourth Schedule to the ATA of 1997 and he was regularly appearing before the concerned police-Had he indulged in any criminal activity, an FIR could have been registered against him under the relevant provision of law for any of his specific act, but the needful was not done for the reason that the concerned police officials did not find him involved in any such activity-Fact remains that there was lack of ingredients of any of the subsections of section 11-H of the ATA of 1997, the prosecution continued to produce irrelevant evidence in this behalf-Witnesses produced by the prosecution did not establish the commission of an offence, but still the petitioner was held guilty of offences under sections 11H(i) and (ii) of the ATA of 1997 and was sentenced for a period of ten years by the fora below, without specifying the sentence separately for each subsection-This act of the Trial Court had seriously prejudiced the petitioner by convicting him for an offence, which was not committed by the petitioner, nor was it mentioned in the charge framed against him, hence, it was a failure of justice-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was acquitted of the charge framed against him.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=221", - "Case #": "Crl. Petition No. 29-K of 2022, decided on 29th December, 2023.\n(On appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Sindh Karachi dated 19.01.2022 passed in Spl. Criminal A.T. Appeal No. 100 of 2020).\nheard on: 29th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja Naveed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSaleem Akhtar, Addl. P.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAIN SHAHID-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24248", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2940 = 2024 SLD 2940 = 2024 SCMR 853 = 2024 PTD 1085 = (2024) 130 TAX 685", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interim Orders by the High Court and Supreme Court Interference\nConstitution of Pakistan, Arts. 185(3) & 199\nPrinciple:\nThe Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere in interim orders passed by High Courts. Intervention is justified only in exceptional cases involving:\n1.\nFlagrant violation of the law.\n2.\nClear wrongful exercise of jurisdiction.\n3.\nManifest grave injustice.\nKey References:\n•\nAttiq ur Rehman v. Tahir Mehmood (2023 SCMR 501)\n•\nProvince of Sindh v. Sartaj Hyder (2023 SCMR 459)\n________________________________________\n(b) Super Tax and Constitutional Compliance in Interim Orders\nIncome Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Section 4C [as amended by the Finance Act 2023]; Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199(4)\nPrinciple:\nArticle 199(4) mandates strict compliance when granting interim relief that impacts public revenue. Interim orders without adherence to the following are illegal and without jurisdiction:\n1.\nNotice of the application for interim relief must be given to the prescribed law officer.\n2.\nThe court must provide the officer or authorized person an opportunity to be heard.\n3.\nThe court must record reasons in writing, ensuring the order/proceeding under suspension lacks jurisdiction on its face.\nCase Summary:\nThe High Court’s interim order against the collection of super tax violated the mandatory requirements of Article 199(4) as:\n•\nNo notice was served to the Attorney-General.\n•\nNo opportunity of hearing was provided.\n•\nThe High Court failed to record findings and reasons justifying the suspension.\nThis constituted a flagrant violation of the law and a wrongful exercise of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals, set aside the impugned orders, and directed the High Court to:\n1.\nAfford a fair and reasonable hearing as per Article 199(4).\n2.\nIdentify the challenged order or proceedings in line with Article 199(4)(b)(ii).\n3.\nAddress the issue of suspending legislation through interim orders based on applicable laws.\n________________________________________\n(c) Interpretation of Statutes and Provisions in Negative Language\nLegal Interpretation Principle\nPrinciple:\nWhen a statute employs negative language requiring a specific act to be performed in a prescribed manner, any deviation renders the act illegal and without jurisdiction.\nKey References:\n•\nAtta Muhammad v. Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1971 SC 61)\n•\nShujat Hussain v. State (1995 SCMR 1249)\n•\nProvince of Punjab v. Javed Iqbal (2021 SCMR 328)\n________________________________________\nGeneral Observations:\nThe cases collectively emphasize strict adherence to procedural and constitutional mandates in judicial proceedings, particularly when interim relief affects public revenue or involves statutory obligations framed in negative language.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3),199Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3472 to 3475 of 2023, decided on 29th February, 2024.\n(Against the orders of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, all dated 08.08.2023 passed in W.Ps. Nos. 2436 to 2439 of 2023).\nheard on: 29th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTCE, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Asma Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Hassan Ali and Mustafa Khalid, Advocates and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nSalman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LARGE TAXPAYERS OFFICE, ISLAMABAD -PETITIONER\nVS\nPAKISTAN OILFIELDS LTD., RAWALPINDI AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24249", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2941 = 2024 SLD 2941 = 2024 SCMR 858", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTU", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S. 156A-Sale of petroleum products to petrol pump operators operating in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)-Deduction of tax from the amount of commission or discount allowed to the operator-Refund, claim for-Applicability of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Enforcement of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ( Ordinance of 2001 ) was not extended to the territorial limits of FATA and, therefore, its provisions were not attracted to the income arising therein-It is not disputed that the respondents are operating petrol pumps in FATA-Section 156 A of the Ordinance of 2001 provides that every person selling petroleum products to a petrol pump operator shall deduct tax from the amount of commission or discount allowed to the operator at the rates specified in Division VI A of Part III of the First Schedule-Tax deductible under subsection (1) shall be a final tax on the income arising from the sale of petroleum products-Obligation of deduction of tax is on the person selling the petroleum products to the operator of the petrol pump while the said deduction is relatable to the commission paid to or discount allowed by the latter-In the present case the respondents assert to be operators of petrol pumps and they were claiming refund of the tax deducted from their commission by the persons who had sold the petroleum products to them-Factum of income having been accrued was on account of the commission paid to the respondents for the sale of petroleum products and not the sale of the petroleum products to the consumers at the petrol pumps operated in FATA-Deduction of tax fell under the final tax regime-Admittedly, the contractual arrangement for the sale of petroleum products, the actual sale and payment as well as deduction of the tax had taken effect in the areas of Pakistan outside the territorial limits of FATA and, therefore, the transactions and the income arising from such sale were not immune from the enforcement of the provisions of the Ordinance of 2001-Income derived by the respondents was on account of commission paid to them by the seller companies outside FATA-Immunity from the payment of taxation under the Ordinance of 2001 shall not be claimed merely on the basis that the business premises have been established in FATA, rather the onus was on the tax payer to establish the fact that taxable income was not being derived from the area where the statute was enforced and applicable-This crucial factum could not be successfully established by the respondents and their refund claims were, therefore, justifiably rejected by the taxation officer-Claim of refund of the tax deducted under section 156A of the Ordinance of 2001 was not tenable and, therefore, rightly rejected-Appeals were allowed accordingly.\nC.I.T. v. Gul Cooking Oil and Vegetable Ghee (Pvt.) Ltd. 2008 PTD 169 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=156A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1314 to 1337 of 2014 and Civil Appeals Nos.1611 to 1624 of 2013, decided on 19th December, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.05.2014 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in T.Rs. Nos. 1-P to 23-P of 2013 and judgment dated 03.07.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar ul Qaza) Swat passed in T.Rs. Nos.1-M to 13-M of 2011).\nheard on: 19th December, 2023", - "Judge Name:": " SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD, ACJ, SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant (in all cases).\nZulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 1318, 1616-1624 of 2013).\nJunaid Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 1611 of 2013).", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHIEF COMMISSIONER/COMMISSIONER IR ZONE-II/ZONE-III, RTO, PESHAWAR-APPELLANT\nVS\nMESSRS AKBAR KHAN FILLING STATION AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24250", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2942 = 2024 SLD 2942 = 2024 SCMR 862", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199(3)-Employees of Canteen Stores Department (CSD)-Not in the service of the Armed Forces-Bar contained under Article 199(3) of the Constitution does not apply In the present case the letters of appointment of the employees of CSD showed that the posts offered to them were private, and they were not subject to any law relating to Armed Forces of Pakistan-With respect to the terms and conditions of its employees, the CSD cannot put forward the bar contained in clause (3) of Article 199 of the Constitution before the High Court.\nGeneral Manager, Canteen Stores Department, Karachi v. Abdul Rashid 1983 SCMR 487 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199(5)-Employees of Canteen Stores Department (CSD)-CSD does not comewithin the meaning of person provided in clause (5) of Article 199 of the Constitution-CSD is neither a body politic nor corporate nor an authority; as such, a petition against it by its employees before the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction is not competent.\nCanteen Stores Department (CSD) is not a body politic or corporate. It has not come into being by a statute or under a statute. Entire capital of CSD belongs to it and does not form part of the government money or government funds. It has independent financial resources and is run by its own funds, receives no funds from any source of the Government and is completely autonomous in its internal administration. The Public Accounts Committee does not scrutinise its accounts to include the same in the Public Fund Account of the Federal Government. It is a private commercial organization and does not perform any function of the Government. CSD cannot be held as an authority of the Government.\nThe list of Government Departments is provided in Schedule III to the Rules of Business, 1973. It is important to note that only that can be termed a (Government) Department whose name is mentioned in Schedule III. Since CSD is not mentioned in Schedule III to the Rules of Business, 1973, it cannot be called a government department.\nIt is clear that CSD is neither a body politic nor corporate nor an authority or Government Department; as such, a petition against it by its employees before the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction is not competent.\nThe rules contained in the CSD Revised Instructions and Procedures Manual (2006) are non-statutory because these have not been framed under the authority of the Constitution or any statute. In the present case since the respondents were employed when the CSD had ceased to be a government department or undertaking, the inter se relationship of the respondents and CSD was governed by the ordinary law of Master and Servant, and, as such, it follows that respondents being employees of CSD, which does not come within the meaning of clause (5) of Article 199 of the Constitution, could not maintain their writ petition before the High Court to obtain an order of their reinstatement. Under Article 199 of the Constitution, their petition was incompetent. Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199(3),199(5)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.515 of 2015, decided on 22nd November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 15.12.2014 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi in I.C.A. No. 127 of 2013 in W.P. No. 1516 of 2011).\nheard on: 22nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR, SHAHID WAHEED AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Sultan Mansoor, Advocate Supreme Court, Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record and Brigadier (Retd.) Farasat Ali Khan, Legal Consultant for Appellants.\nAbdul Rahim Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.1-10.\nRaja Shafqat Mehmood Abbasi, Deputy Attorney General for Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF CONTROL, CANTEEN STORES, HQ, RAWALPINDI AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nMUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24251", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2943 = 2024 SLD 2943 = 2024 SCMR 876", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WS8", - "Key Words:": "Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002-\n-R. 102(1)-Mining lease agreements with the Provincial Government-Notification that has received ex-post facto approval by the Provincial Cabinet-No retrospective applicability-Secretary Mines and Minerals Department, Government of Balochistan by virtue of a notification No. SOT(MMD)4-1/2017/748-68 dated 06.09.2017 ( impugned notification ) revised and enhanced the rates of application fee relating to mineral titles and mineral concessions mentioned in the first schedule, rates of annual rentals mentioned in the second schedule, and the royalties mentioned in the third schedule, part II and part III of the Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002. ( Rules of 2002 )-Legality-Perusal of the record reveals that neither the Chief Minister nor the Cabinet made any decision regarding price fixation prior to the issuance of the impugned notification which was solely passed by the Secretary Mines and Mineral Department, Government of Balochistan-Subsequently, on 01.02.2022, the Cabinet authenticated the impugned notification through ex-post facto approval-High Court had correctly determined that the impugned notification takes effect from the date of authentication/approval by the cabinet, i.e. 01.02.2022-This interpretation aligns with the principle that if the provincial cabinet provides ex-post facto approval, the validity of the notification is recognized from that date of approval and cannot be applied retrospectively-Petitions were dismissed and leave was refused.\nMessrs Mustafa Impex Karachi and others v. The Governmet of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 808 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002=102(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 167-Q and 168-Q of 2023, decided on 14th March, 2024.\n(Against Judgment dated 17.04.2023 passed by the High Court of Balochistan Quetta in C.P.No.1294 of 2017 and C.P.No.1826 of 2021).\nheard on: 4th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ayaz Sawati, Addl. A.G. Balochistan for Petitioners.\nUmar Soomro, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINES AND MINERALS DEPARTMENT AND ANOTHER-PETITIONER\nVS\nATTOCK CEMENT PAKISTAN LIMITED AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24252", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2944 = 2024 SLD 2944 = 2024 SCMR 880", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WSs", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 209(5)(b) & 209(6)-Code of Conduct for Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, Arts. II, III, IV & VI-Complaints filed before the Supreme Judicial Council ( SJC ) against a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court, who resigned during pendency of the proceedings before the SJC-Misconduct-Violation of the Code of Conduct for Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts-Removal from the office of Judge-Purchase of properties and construction raised thereon without having sufficient declared income/money in income tax returns/wealth statement-Purchase of property at half its market price to deprive minor co-owners of their share in the property-Misuse of office to exercise influence over government officials-Grant of undue favours to a businessman to buy properties from him at heavily discounted prices-Judge in question ( the accused ) bought a property knowing that it was co-owned by children, and that without a Guardian Court granting permission to sell it he could not have bought it-Accused did not produce any notice published in any newspaper, which prudent buyers do by inviting public objections by publishing the same in prominent newspapers-Accused also elected not to testify, and by not doing so an adverse presumption could be drawn against him-Accused did not disclose his tax filings nor came forward to testify; he also did not disclose how much he had earned over the years and/or the income tax paid thereon-It was also not stated when he started filing tax returns and paying income tax-Since the accused did not make the requisite disclosure nor testified the SJC was not in a position to determine whether or not he had sufficient income tax paid/declared money to justify the purchase of the properties bought by him-A property developer through his company, paid Rupees fifty million to the seller as portion of the sale consideration for a property bought by the accused-A judge accepting such largesse from a property developer, who claimed that he hardly knew the accused-Judge, raised very serious questions of propriety-Since no viable explanation for paying the said fifty million rupees was forthcoming the SJC was left to assume that such incomprehensible generosity to a Judge was with the expectation that it would be handsomely recompensed-Furthermore, documents on record established that the accused applied for and was allotted four properties by the Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation ( the Foundation) and the Supreme Court Employees Cooperative Housing Society-Within a period of less than two years after being administered oath as a Judge of the Supreme Court, the accused got four properties, while serving as a Judge of the Supreme Court-Organizations from whom he got the four propertips were set up for providing housing to its members-Accused did not explain why he obtained four properties, surely he could not reside in all of them-Judge of the Supreme Court should not want to deprive others, which would be the result of actions of the accused-Two sons of the accused were given properties at heavily discounted prices in projects owned by a property developer-Said property dealer admitted in his testimony that each of the sons was given the properties of which they only paid ten percent of their price; that he had not given similar allotment to any other judge or his children; and that he had also sent 5,000 to the daughter of the accused in a foreign country-Accused violated his oath of office which required him to abide by the Code of Conduct for Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts ( the Code of Conduct ) by violating a number of the provisions of the Code of Conduct-Accused could not be said to be untouched by greed, and so violated Article-II of the Code of Conduct-It also cannot be stated that he was above reproach, and so had violated Article-III of the Code of Conduct-Conduct of accused was also not free from impropriety expected of a Judge in his official and private affairs, and to such extent he also violated Article-III of the Code of Conduct-It is clear that actions of accused were swayed by consideration of personal advantage, and so he violated Article-IV of the Code of Conduct-He knowingly deprived minors of their valuable property, and so violated Article-VI of the Code of Conduct-By receiving substantial unexplained gifts, the accused violated Article-VI of the Code of Conduct; the gifts included receiving fifty million rupees, his sons receiving two commercial plots and two residential plots at a nominal price and his daughter receiving UK pounds 5,000-Accused was guilty of misconduct and should have been removed from the office of Judge-Number of instances of misconduct committed by the accused had damaged the reputation of the judiciary-SJC directed that as the accused should have been removed for having committed serious misconduct, the honorific Justice or Judge should not henceforth be used with the name of the accused.\nS. No\nTitle and No. of Complaint\nDate filed\non\n1.\nMian Dawood\nAgainst\nMr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan\nNo. 586/2023/SJC\n24.02.2023\n2.\nPML (N) Lawyers Forum Punjab, through its General Secretary Zahid Hussain Malik, Additional Secretary Khalid Nawaz Ghumman and Vice-President Rushda Lodhi, Advocates High Court\nAgainst\nMr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan\nNo. 589/2023/SJC\n06.03.2023\n3.\nPakistan Bar Council through its Vice-Chairman and Chairman, Executive Committee, Supreme Court\nBuilding Islamabad\nAgainst\nMr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan\nNo. 592/2023 /SJC\n10.03.2023\n4.\nGhulam Murtaza Khan\nAgainst\nMr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqyi, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan\nNo. 595/2023/SJC\n21,03.2023\n5.\nKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council through its Vice- Chairman and Chairman Executive committee Bar Council\nAgainst\nMr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan\nNo. 596/2023/SJC\n01.04.2023\n6.\nBalochistan Bar Council through its Vice-Chairman Executive Committee and Member Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Baiochistan)\nAgainst\nMr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan\nNo. 597/2023/SJC\n03.04.2023\n7.\nPunjab Bar Council through its Vice-Chairman and Chairman Executive Committee\nAgainst\nMr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan\nNo. 600/2023/SJC\n13.04.2023\n8.\nIslamabad Bar Council through its Vice-Chairman and Chairman Executive Committee\nAgainst\nMr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan\nNo. 601/2023/SJC\n13.04.2023\n9.\nSindh Bar Council through its Vice-Chairman, Karachi\nAgainst\nMr. Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan\nNo. 609/2023/SJC\n27.04.2023", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Complaints Nos. 586, 589, 592, 595, 596, 597, 600, 601 and 609 of 2023/SJC, decided on 4th March, 2024.Dates of hearing: 27th October, 20th, 21st, 22nd November, 14th December of 2023, 11th January, 15th, 16th, 29th February and 1st March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJP, SCP, CHAIRMAN, SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD, JUDGE, SCP, MEMBER-I, SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUDGE, SCP, MEMBER-II, MUHAMMAD AMEER BHATTI, CJ, LHC, MEMBER-III AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, CJ, HCB, MEMBER-IV", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN RE: JUSTICE SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JUDGE, SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24253", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2945 = 2024 SLD 2945 = 2024 SCMR 913", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTk", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S. 9(1), Sr. No. 3(c)-Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, R. 4(2)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Possession and transportation of 1420 grams charas-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Delay in sending samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory-Safe custody of samples with the police not established-Accused was arrested on the same day of the registration of the FIR-As per the report of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency, the sample of the charas was received by Forensic Science Laboratory after a delay of more than a month-Provisions relating to the sending of samples to the forensic Science Laboratory were provided in Rule 4(2) of Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, which provides that the samples may be dispatched for analysis under cover of Test Memorandum specified in Form-I at the earliest, but not later than seventy-two hours of the seizure-There was nothing on record to show to whom the alleged recovered narcotics were handed over at the police station for safe custody during that period-Fact of the safe custody of the recovered narcotic substance is to be established or proved by the prosecution during the trial; however, the unreasonable delay of more than one month in the present case could be considered at the time of deciding the bail, which made the case of the petitioner (accused) one of further inquiry-Accused was behind the bars since his arrest and the trial had not concluded so far, even after a considerable period had elapsed-Moreover, the maximum sentence for the alleged offence was fourteen years, and as such, it did not attract the bar of Section 51 of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997-Petition was converted into an appeal and the same was allowed, and the petitioner was allowed bail after arrest.\nSaeed Ahmed v. State through P.G. Punjab and another PLJ 2018 SC 812 and Abbas Raza v. The State 2020 SCMR 1859 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997=9(1)Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001=4(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1241-L of 2023, decided on 13th March, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 20.10.2023 of the Lahore High Court Lahore passed in Cr.Misc. No. 62731-B of 2023).\nheard on: 13th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Akhtar Nawaz Raja, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link Lahore) for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G. and Muhammad Mushtaq, S.I. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAGHEER AHMED-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24254", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2946 = 2024 SLD 2946 = 2024 SCMR 916", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 25-Release deed/Relinquishment deed, authenticity of-Fraud and misrepresentation by brother to deprive his sisters of their share in inheritance-Subject property devolved upon all the legal heirs-Brother (respondent No.2) took the other legal heirs to district court in the guise of making transfer of the property in the name of all legal heirs-Copy of a public notice published in the newspaper was available on case file which demonstrated that the legal heirs of the deceased had moved an application for transfer of the subject property in their name-This public notice showed that the application was made for a joint transfer and not in the sole name of the brother-It was asserted by the brother that he gave an extra amount of Rs. 3,75,000/- after selling a plot owned by his father and gave the share of the plaintiffs (sisters) amounting to Rs. 75,000/- from the another plot-If the brother paid the inheritance share of his sisters in some other property, it does not allow or absolve the brother from paying their share in other properties of their deceased father-Brother was in a dominant position and all title documents were in his possession-So far as the veracity or authenticity of the release deed was concerned, both marginal witnesses contradicted the version of the brother-Defence witness deposed that he did not know that the release deed was made, while the other defence witness admitted that the signatures were not made in his presence-Both the marginal witnesses deposed during the cross examination that they were told that the release deed was meant for distribution amongst siblings and that the property was being distributed-No family settlement was produced on record to show the distribution of shares amongst the legal heirs for the estate of their predecessor-Item No. 55 of Schedule 1 and Section 29(a) of the Stamp Act 1899 Act are germane to the deed of release-Indenture of the release is required to be registered compulsorily and for the purposes of stamp duty, the assessment should be made on the basis of the amount of the claim or value of the property-Neither anything on record showed that any consideration was paid to the sisters against the suit property nor any individual specific share of each releasor was carved out or specified in the release deed which was allegedly relinquished by them in favour of the brother-No stamp duty was assessed or paid on the part of the relinquished share or the value of the property-No logical conclusion could be drawn as to why both sisters, who had their own children and husbands, executed a release deed out of love and affection in favour of their brother and deprived their own children-If everything was done with free will and consent or there was a conscious abandonment of rights, then the best marginal witnesses to the deed would be the husbands of both sisters, but this was avoided by the brother, which also transpired that the sisters had no independent advice to understand the nature of the document to safeguard their interest but they signed it in good faith on the understanding that the property was being transferred in the name of all legal heirs-Record reflects that neither the joint sub-registrar was summoned by the defendant nor one of the sisters ever appeared before the Tehsildar/sub-registrar for any such purpose which fact was admitted by the brother in his cross examination-Trial Court, after proper assessment and comprehension of the entire evidence, reached the correct conclusion that the preparation of the release deed, its execution, signatures of the plaintiffs (sisters) over the same, and the appearance of the plaintiffs before the joint sub-registrar was doubtful and the release deed and subsequent transfer was declared void ab-initio and ineffective-On account of misrepresentation and deception, the share of the sisters was siphoned off/divested from the estate of their deceased father which devolved upon them according to Muslim Law of inheritance-Release deed was secured in bitter violation and contravention of Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872, and rightly declared invalid by the Trial and Appellate Courts-Appeal was allowed; impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court and Appellate Court in favour of the sisters were restored.\nGhulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1; Muhammad Shamim through Legal heirs v. Mst. Nisar Fatima through Legal Heirs and others 2010 SCMR 18; Sadar Din v. Mst. Khatoon and others 2004 SCMR 1102 and Mirza Abid Baig v. Zahid Sabir (Deceased) through LRs and others 2020 SCMR 601 ref.\n(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 25-Legal heirs-Release deed/ Relinquishment deed-Scope-Substratum of the indenture of the Release Deed or the Relinquishment Deed encompasses the conveyance of right, title, or interest in the immovable property by the legal heirs in the joint property by which, often, a co-owner, renounces his rights in favour of another legal heir with consideration or even without consideration or on account of some family settlement, but the parties to a relinquishment deed must be the co-owners/co-sharers-The deed of release or relinquishment should be cautiously put in order which must encapsulate, the date when the right to the property was given up; purpose of giving up the right; consideration, if any; consent of the party giving up the right in the property, etc. with the aspiration to put an end to any unresolved or unsettled issue or differences between the parties to prevent future litigation.\nBlacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1990 (Pages 1289-1290) ref.\n(c) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)-\n-Ss. 123 & 129-Islamic law-Gift-Scope and principles-Transfer of Property Act, 1882, has no application to the gift envisioned and encapsulated under the Muslim Law and for this reason, Sections 123 and 129 of the Transfer of Property Act can neither surpass nor outweigh or preponderate the matters of gifts contemplated under the Muslim Law-However, the donor should be of sound mind and understand the legal implications of making the gift, free from any coercion, duress, or undue influence-Under the Muslim Law, the constituents of a valid gift are tender, acceptance, and possession of property-Muslim can devolve his property under Muslim Law by means of inter vivos (gift) or through testamentary dispositions (will)-Islamic law does not make any distinction between movable or immovable property regarding the conception of gift, rather any property may be gifted by any person having ownership and dominion over the property intended to be gifted on fulfilling requisite formalities.\n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-Ss. 100 & 115-Revision-Second appeal-Scope-High Court has the powers to reevaluate the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the lower courts in appropriate cases but cannot upset such crystalized findings if the same are based on relevant evidence or without any misreading or non-reading of evidence-If the facts have been justly tried by two courts and the same conclusion has been reached by both the courts concurrently then it would not be judicious to revisit it for drawing some other conclusion or interpretation of evidence in a second appeal under Section 100 or under revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C., because any such attempt would also be against the doctrine of finality.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=25", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.1012 of 2018, decided on 18th March, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 13.06.2018 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in C.R.No.35 of 2016).\nheard on: 6th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ilyas Shaikh, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nAgha Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Shajjar Abbas Hamdani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nKhalid Mehmood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (Via video link from Lahore) for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. FARZANA ZIA AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nMST. SAADIA ANDALEEB AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24255", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2947 = 2024 SLD 2947 = 2024 SCMR 1078", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5 & Sched.-Dower (mehr), recovery of-Entry in column No.17 of the Nikahnama-Interpretation-Free consent and freedom of the bride to settle the terms of her Nikah Nama-Significance-Entitlement of divorced wife to immoveable property described in column 17 of the Nikah Nama-Form of Nikah Nama nor its headings are conclusive or sacrosanct-It is the intent of the parties which would be the determining factor-In the present case the description of the plot in column 17 of the Nikah Nama is explicit and not disputed-However, there is no condition stipulated in the column except the description of the plot-Petitioner (husband) had filed his written statement in response to the plaint and had expressly admitted the description of the property but he had taken the stance that the plot was meant for the construction of a house and the respondent (wife) was to live in it for as long as the marriage subsisted-However, a plain reading of the description of the property, as mentioned in column 17, does not indicate nor supports such a stance-If such an interpretation is accepted then the property would not form part of the dower separately mentioned in columns 13 to 16 of the Nikah Nama-Copy of the Nikah Nama showed that no condition has been stipulated in column 17 except describing the property-It is not the case of the petitioner (husband) that the columns were filled by the respondent (wife) or pursuant to meaningful consultation carried out with her before or at the time of execution of the Nikah Nama-No such evidence was brought on record-Onus was on the petitioner (husband) to establish that the property described in column No. 17 was not meant nor intended by the parties to be part of the dower-Ambiguity, if any, cannot be construed against the interests and rights of the respondent (wife) in the facts and circumstances of the present case-Moreover, accepting the stance of the petitioner (husband) would amount to reading in the Nikah Nama something not provided therein-Courts cannot construe the Nikah Nama and its entries as having the effect of applying a stipulation not expressly provided therein-High Court had correctly interpreted the columns of the Nikah Nama and declared the respondent (wife) entitled to the plot described in column 17 of the Nikah Nama-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5 & Sched.-Dower (mehr)-Entries in columns of the Nikah Nama-Interpretation-Free consent of the bride and her freedom to settle the terms and conditions of the Nikah Nama-Significance-Courts, while interpreting the contents and terms and conditions of a Nikah Nama, also have to take into consideration the factor of free consent of the bride and her freedom to settle the terms and conditions as a person having an informed understanding of her rights-This is crucial in the context of the social and cultural norms generally prevalent in the society-If an ambiguity or doubt arises in relation to the terms and conditions of the Nikah Nama, an entry or column thereof, then the benefit ought to go in favor of the wife if there does not exist preponderance of evidence on record to establish that she had been informed of her rights, she understood each column of the Nikah Nama, and she had the freedom to negotiate and settle the terms and conditions out of free consent-In case the columns of the Nikah Nama have been filled by others without her meaningful consultation then a doubt or ambiguity cannot be interpreted against her rights or interests-It is implicit in the expression free consent that the wife, at the time of executing the Nikah Nama, had the freedom to settle the terms and conditions as an informed person competent to enter into a contract-Paternal tendencies of the society and dominance of the male members in relation to deciding the terms and conditions on behalf of the bride has generally been accepted as a cultural and social norm of the society-It places a bride in a disadvantageous position, inevitably adversely affecting her capacity to execute the contract with free consent-Weakness or creation of an ambiguity in a Nikah Nama cannot be interpreted against the interest and rights of a wife if it cannot be established that she had the freedom to settle the terms and conditions and had exercised her free will.\nHaseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Beugm and others PLD 2022 SC 686 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2673 of 2022, decided on 6th April, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 31.5.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Writ Petition No.34 of 2017).\nheard on: 6th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja Muhammad Imtiaz, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMs. Farhana Qamar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussian Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.1.\nNot represented other respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YOUSAF-PETITIONER\nVS\nHUMA SAEED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24256", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2948 = 2024 SLD 2948 = 2024 SLD 934", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5WXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S. 9(c)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)-Possession of narcotics-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Counsel for the petitioner (accused) contended that it was surprising that in the month of May at 6 pm during daylight hours at a popular public park, the only witnesses were policemen, none of whom made a video recording, nor took any photographs of the seizure and arrest-Validity-Facts and circumstances of the instant case made it a case of further inquiry-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed and accused was granted bail.\n(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-Ss. 9 & 25-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 103 & 497-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 164 & 165-Narcotics cases-Use of video recording and photographs by the police and members of the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) when search, seizure and/or arrest is made-If the police and ANF were to use their mobile phone cameras to record and/or take photographs of the search, seizure and arrest, it would be useful evidence to establish the presence of the accused at the crime scene, the possession by the accused of the narcotic substances, the search and its seizure-It may also prevent false allegations being levelled against ANF/police that the narcotic substance was foisted upon the accused for some ulterior motives.\nSection 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (the Act) excludes the applicability of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which requires two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality to be associated when search is made. However, it was not understandable why the police and members of the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) do not record or photograph when search, seizure and/or arrest is made. Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 specifically permits the use of any evidence that may have become available because of modern devices or techniques, and its Article 165 overrides all other laws.\nIn narcotic cases the prosecution witnesses usually are ANF personnel or policemen who surely would have a cell phone with an in-built camera. In respect of those arrested with narcotic substances generally there are only a few witnesses, and most, if not all, are government servants. However, trials are unnecessarily delayed, and resultantly the accused seek bail first in the trial court which if not granted to them is then filed in the High Court and there too if it is declined, petitions seeking bail are then filed in the Supreme Court. If the police and ANF were to use their mobile phone cameras to record and/or take photographs of the search, seizure and arrest, it would be useful evidence to establish the presence of the accused at the crime scene, the possession by the accused of the narcotic substances, the search and its seizure. It may also prevent false allegations being levelled against ANF/police that the narcotic substance was foisted upon them for some ulterior motives.\nSupreme Court directed that copy of present order be sent to the Secretary Ministry of Narcotics Control, Government of Pakistan, Director-General, Anti-Narcotics Force, the Secretaries of the Home Departments of all the provinces, Inspector Generals of Police of all the provinces and of the Islamabad Capital Territory; that they may also consider whether they want to amend the ANF/Police rules to ensure making video recordings/taking photographs whenever possible with regard to capturing, preserving and using such evidence at trial.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),103,497Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997=9(c),9,25Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=164,165", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1192 of 2023, decided on 22nd November, 2023.\n(Against the order dated 20.09.2023 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Criminal Misc. No. 1285-B of 2023).\nheard on: 22nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nCh. Rifaqat Ali, State Counsel, Islamabad along with Daud Sabir, SI for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAHID SARFARAZ GILL-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24257", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2949 = 2024 SLD 2949 = 2024 SCMR 938", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTc", - "Key Words:": "Islamic law-\n-Inheritance-Oral gift deed-Proof-Brother depriving sister from her share in inheritance-Deceaseds son (respondent) sold part of the disputed property in which the daughter (appellant) had a 1/3rd inheritance share-Suit filed by the daughter was decreed, however the High Court directed the son to pay the daughter 1/3rd of the sale proceeds instead of 1/3rd share in the property-Legality-Legal heirs inherit property to the extent of his/ her share the very moment his/ her predecessor passes away-In the present case the inheritance mutation was procured in favour of the son (respondent) by fraud after the exclusion of the daughter (appellant) from the inherited property, with connivance of the revenue officials by concealing the fact of existence of the appellant-Hence, the son could not make out a case claiming ownership of the entire property of his late father to the exclusion of the daughter-Appellant being daughter of deceased, could not be deprived of her right in inherited property by any illegal mutation sanctioned at the behest of male heirs-High Court completely failed to apply the law and granted only 1/3rd share out of the sale price of Rs. 13,00,000/- to the daughter- Grant of 1/3rd share out of the sale price and exclusion of the daughter from the inheritance was against the law-Supreme Court cancelled the inheritance mutation and all subsequent mutations attested on the basis of the same, and gave directions that the revenue authorities shall mutate the entire property of late father of the parties afresh among his legal heirs i.e. son and the daughter, strictly in accordance with law, and that the property already sold out by the son shall be made part of his share while mutating the estate of the late father-Appeal was allowed.\nFarhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and another 2021 SCMR 179 and Shahro and others v. Mst. Fatima and others PLD 1998 SC 1512 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.26-Q of 2017, decided on 1st December, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 06.10.2017, passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Sibi Bench, in Civil Revision No.22 of 2016).\nheard on: 1st December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAHID WAHEED AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahoor-ul-Haq Chishti, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nEx-parte: For Respondents Nos.1 and 3.\nMir Talal Rind, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. SEHAT BIBI-APPELLANT\nVS\nBAHAR KHAN AND 2 OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24258", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2950 = 2024 SLD 2950 = 2024 SCMR 942", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTY", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 184(3) & 188-Chairman and Managing Director of Pakistan Television Corporation ( PTV )-Appointment, salary and allowances-Legality-Purported financial loss caused to PTV, recovery of-By way of judgment under review [which was heard and decided under Article 184(3) of the Constitution) the appointment of petitioner as Chairman and Managing Director of PTV was declared illegal and directions were given to recover the purported loss to PTV from four persons, i.e., the petitioner, the then Minister for Information, Minister for Finance and Secretary to the Prime Minister-Validity-Article 184(3) of the Constitution is an extraordinary power bestowed by the Constitution on the Supreme Court and it may be invoked when Fundamental Rights of the people are under attack or are being undermined-It is questionable whether the emoluments of a single individual would justify invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3)-Applicability of the Articles 18 and 25 is also not self evident, and it has not been explained in the judgment under review, how either of these two provisions were attracted-Factual determination of the purported loss was arbitrary and also incorrect-Petitioner was paid just a little more than his predecessor, which if inflation is factored in would be justified-It was a material error to assume that petitioners programmes air time was lost revenue; it could also be contended that his programme contributed towards PTVs earnings-It would not be fair to penalize someone on the basis of mere conjecture-There is no evidence to suggest that an amount of Rs.197,867,491 was paid to the petitioner or that he had caused such a loss to PTV-As regards the salary of one million and five hundred thousand rupees being paid to the petitioner is concerned, it was just a little over what was paid to the previous MD, which was an important fact which was overlooked and also the fact that the petitioners increased salary a few years later could be justified on account of inflation-In these circumstances, to seek the recovery of an arbitrarily determined loss was neither legally permissible nor factually correct-Moreover, to make liable the then Minister for Information, Minister for Finance and the Secretary to the Prime Minister with regard to half the purported loss amount, and to pay it, had no legal basis, was without precedence and was not justified, and to do so when there was nothing on record to suggest that they had financially benefited from petitioners appointment nor was there any proof of nepotism on the record-Review petitions were allowed and the judgment under review was recalled.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3),188", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No. 835 of 2018 in HRC No. 3654 of 2018, Civil Review Petitions Nos. 866, 867 and 868 of 2018, C.M.As. Nos. 11306 and 11172 of 2018, decided on 21st March, 2024.\nheard on: 21st March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ, IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Zafar Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in C.R.P. No. 835 of 2018).\nSalman Aslam Butt, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court and Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.R.P. No. 866 of 2018).\nFawad Hassan Fawad, In-person (in C.R.P. No. 867 of 2018).\nMuhammad Akram Sheikh, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.R.P. 868 of 2018).\nMuhammad Nazir Jawwad, Advocate Supreme Court (on behalf of PTV).", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 835 OF 2018 IN HRC NO. 3654 OF 2018\n(FOR REVIEW OF ORDER DATED 8.11.2018 OF THIS COURT PASSED IN HRC NO.3654 OF 2018)\nAND\nCIVIL REVIEW PETITIONS NOS. 866, 867 AND 868 OF 2018\n(APPOINTMENT OF MANAGING DIRECTOR, PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION).\nIN\nC.M.AS. NOS. 11306 AND 11172 OF 2018\nPERVAIZ RASHEED AND 3 OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nPAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24259", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2951 = 2024 SLD 2951 = 2024 SCMR 947", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014-\n-Rr.27 & 56-Tenders for construction works-Bidding documents-Additional performance security imposed by procuring agency-Legality-Bidding documents should comply with the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014 (Rules) especially Rules 27 and 56-Procuring agency cannot introduce additional security in violation of the Rules-Procuring agency cannot require the bidder to pay additional performance security over and above the bid security and performance guarantee provided under Rules 27 and 56 of the Rules.\nThe imposition of additional security not only disincentivizes the contractors trying to submit competitively low bids, but it also defies logic as the successful bidder has to give lesser security than the lowest bidder, who might not be a successful bidder, eventually. Where the lowest bidder becomes the successful bidder, he will have to furnish two securities while any other bidder who is not the lowest bidder, but has been declared successful bidder, must only furnish one security. This incongruence in the bidding documents leads to discrimination and offends the principles of public procurement. Therefore, compliance to the regulator framework becomes mandatory in public procurement to uphold the foundational principles of public procurement. Therefore, in the present case the insertion of additional performance security in the Bid Document and the follow up clauses dealing with the consequence of non-payment of additional performance security in the bidding document are beyond the scope of the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014 (Rules) being inconsistent with Rules 27 and 56 of the Rules. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the demand raised for the payment of additional performance security by the procurement agencies as being unlawful and violative of the Rules, and directed that any additional security to be imposed on a contractor can only be introduced through Rules to be framed by the Government so that the principles of procurement are met and there is transparency, level playing-field and non-discrimination in public procurement.\n(b) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014-\n-R.68-Procurement-Bidding documents, dispute over-Mediation- Significance of mediation and pro mediation bias of courts explained.\nCourts must encourage out of court settlements through Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR), in particular mediation. The essence of mediation lies in its voluntary and confidential process, where a neutral third party, the mediator, assists disputants in reaching a consensus. Unlike in litigation, where the outcome is often a zero-sum game, mediation thrives on the principle of win-win solutions, preserving relationships and allowing for creative resolutions that legal parameters might not accommodate.\nJustice Sandra Day OConnor, Speech at the Minnesota Conference for Women in the Law, April 1985 ref.\nMediation, as a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), has garnered widespread acclaim for its efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and ability to facilitate amicable settlements. In contrast to the adversarial nature of litigation, mediation embodies a collaborative approach, encouraging parties to find mutually beneficial solutions. The courts should not only encourage mediation but also exhibit a pro-settlement bias and a pro-mediation bias. Pro-mediation bias or pro-settlement bias means a predisposition or preference within the legal system for resolving disputes through mediation rather than through litigation or other forms of dispute resolution. This bias is not about favoring one party over another but rather about favoring the process of mediation itself as a preferred method of dispute resolution. This bias is grounded in the belief that settlements are generally more efficient and satisfactory for all parties involved compared to outcomes determined by a court. Courts may exhibit a pro-settlement bias by encouraging parties to settle even before the case goes to trial or during the litigation process.\nBy fostering a pro-settlement bias, courts can contribute to a more harmonious and efficient dispute resolution landscape, where parties are empowered to resolve conflicts collaboratively and constructively. Encouraging mediation aligns with the broader goals of justice systems worldwide: to resolve disputes in a manner that is fair, efficient, and conducive to the long-term well-being of all involved parties.\nFinal Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales, HMSO, July 1996 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014=27,56", - "Case #": "C.P.L.As. Nos. 2226-L of 2021 to C.P.L.A. No. 2241-L of 2021, C.P.L.As. Nos. 2253-L of 2021 to C.P.L.A. No. 2255-L of 2021, C.P.L.A. No. 2270-L of 2021, C.P.L.A. No. 2277-L of 2021, C.P.L.As. Nos. 371-L of 2022 to C.P.L.A. No. 373-L of 2022 and C.P.L.A. No. 3396-L of 2022, decided on 20th February, 2024.\n(Against the judgment(s) of Lahore High Court Lahore all dated 30.09.2021, passed in I. C.A. No.18231 of 2021, etc.).\nheard on: 20th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Samia Khalid, Addl. A.G. Pb., Zakir Shah, SLO, C&W., Rana Azhar, S.E. Highway and Muhammad Usama, XEN, Mian Muhammad Kashif, Advocate Supreme Court, Assisted by: Ms Alizeh Akbar, Advocate (in C.P. No. 2277-L of 2021) and Ch. Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 3396-L of 22) for Petitioners.\nMian Muhammad Kashif, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.P. No. 2228-L of 2021).\nMuhammad Younis, Contractor (In person)", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY C&W, LAHORE AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nMESSRS HAROON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24260", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2952 = 2024 SLD 2952 = 2024 SCMR 956", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Educational institution-\n-Admissions policy-Eligibility criteria-Judicial review-Scope-In the affairs of admission and examination in educational institutions, the concerned authorities are vested with the powers and jurisdiction to lay down the eligibility criteria in their own rules, regulations, or prospectus-They are independent to follow their own policy for admission, and in other affairs, therefore, the academic, administrative, and disciplinary autonomy of a university must be respected-Interference by the courts in the admission policy would give rise to glitches for the said institutions to administer the matters harmoniously and efficiently-Educational institutions are competent to manage their own affairs without any outside intervention from executive or judicial organs unless they contravene or disregard the compass of their authority or act in breach of applicable statutes or admission policies as laid down in the prospectus.\nNoor Muhammad Khan Marwat v. Vice Chancellor, Gomal University PLD 2001 SC 219; Muhammad Ilyas v. Bahauddin Zakariya University 2005 SCMR 961; Secretary Economic Affairs Division, Islamabad v. Anwarul-Haq Ahmed 2013 SCMR 1687; Murad Ali Khan v. Vice Chancellor, University of Health Sciences, Lahore 2016 SCMR 134 and Khyber Medical University and others v. Aimal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 92 ref.\n(b) Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1975 (V of 1976)-\n-Ss. 10 & 14-Regulations for Engineering Education in Pakistan, 1985 (issued via Notification S.R.O.1142(I)/85 dated 20-11-1985), Art. 2(c)(ii)-B.Tech. (Hons.) degree and B.Sc. Engineering degree-Distinction-B.Tech. (Hons.) qualification is not equivalent to B.Sc. Engineering degree-According to Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC), B.Tech. courses are implementation oriented and B.Sc. engineering courses are design and research oriented-Both qualifications are also regulated internationally through two separate accords-Bachelor of Science in Engineering emphasizes theories and advanced concepts, while an Engineering Technology degree emphasizes hands-on application and implementation with the major difference that B.E. is more knowledge based while B.Tech. is skill-oriented.\nMuhammad Sadiq and others v. University of Sindh and another PLD 1996 SC 182; Fida Hussain v. The Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division, Islamabad PLD 1995 SC 701 and Maula Bux Shaikh and others v. Chief Minister Sindh and others 2018 SCMR 2098 ref.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Appointment- Eligibility criteria- Judicial review- Scope-Discretion of employer-Essential qualifications for appointment to any post is the sole discretion and decision of the employer-Employer may prescribe required qualifications and the preference for appointment of candidate who is best suited to his requirements-Court cannot set down the guidelines or conditions of eligibility or fitness for appointment or promotion to any particular post-In no case can the Court, in the garb of judicial review, seize the chair of the appointing authority to decide what is best for the employer and impose conditions in internal recruitment matters, unless there is a grave violation of applicable law, rules and regulations-In the private sectors, the employer is free to decide the criteria of appointment and promotions and other terms and conditions of employment and for this purpose, may set down its business strategy, H.R. policies, and progression plans-Whereas for the appointment, transfer and promotion in the civil service, the Appointment, Promotion and Transfer Rules framed by the Federal Government and Provincial Governments separately under their Civil Servants Acts prevail and are followed, and in case of statutory bodies, appointments and promotions are made in accordance with their statutory requirements, rules and regulations; but in all such circumstances, it is within the domain of the competent authority to prescribe required qualification and experience in the recruitment and promotion process-Courts cannot force to accept or interchange any other qualification equivalent to the specific post with specific qualification advertised for inviting applications for recruitment or setting benchmark for promotion of employees to any particular post or grade on attaining any particular length of service.\nFida Hussain v. The Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division, Islamabad PLD 1995 SC 701 and Maula Bux Shaikh and others v. Chief Minister Sindh and others 2018 SCMR 2098 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1471 of 2013 and Civil Appeal No.53 of 2014, Civil Appeals Nos. 187 to 191 of 2018 and C.M.A.5008 of 2014 in C.A. No.1471 of 2013, decided on 15th February, 2024..\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1471 OF 2013 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO.53 OF 2014\n(AGAINST THE JUDGMENTS DATED 21.02.2013 PASSED IN W.P. NO.1124 OF 2006 AND DATED 07.10.2013 IN F.A.O.71 OF 2011 BY PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR).\nCIVIL APPEALS NOS.187 TO 191 OF 2018\n(AGAINST THE JUDGMENTS DATED 17.01.2017 PASSED IN I.C.AS. NOS.157 AND 275 OF 2011 BY LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN BENCH, MULTAN).\nC.M.A.5008/ 2014 IN C.A.1471 / 2013\n(IMPLEADMENT)heard on: 15th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants:\nWaseem-ud-Din Khattak, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1471 of 2013).\nRashdeen Nawaz Qasoori, Addl.AGP (in C.A. No. 53 of\n2014).\nAbdul Razzaq Raja, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 187 and 188 of 2018).\nHafiz Hafiz ur Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 189 and 190 of 2018).\nMuhammad Akram Shaikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 191 of 2018).\nFor the Applicants:\nFarooq Malik, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 5008 of 2014).\nFor the Federation:\nRashdeen Nawaz Qasoori, Addl.AGP\nFor FPSC:\nHaroon Rasheed, Dy. Dir. FPSC\nFor Respondent No. 1:\nAftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 187 and 189 of 2018).\nFor Respondents Nos. 1-2:\nDr. Khalid Ranjha, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 188, 190 and 191 of 2018).\nFor Respondents Nos. 5-9:\nAbdul Razzaq Raja, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 189 of 2018 and for Respondents Nos. 7-10 in C.A. Nos. 190 of 2018 and for Respondent No. 5 (in C.A. No. 191 of 2018).", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN ENGINEERING COUNCIL THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nMUHAMMAD SADIQ AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24261", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2953 = 2024 SLD 2953 = 2024 SLD 978", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VS8", - "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 215-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 39 & 42-Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 42-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 24(1) & 188-Review petition-Suit for declaration and cancellation of sale mutations-Attorney misusing the power-of-attorney to sell land-Depriving a female/woman of her immoveable property-Extra care to be exercised by Courts-Power-of-attorney was executed in favour of F (attorney) by his sister (predecessor of the respondents) which was used by F to purportedly sell 109 kanals of land to his four sons-Power-of-attorney did not specifically authorize the sale of the land in favour of the attorney or his sons, and F had misused it-Sister repudiated the sale transactions and filed a suit for declaration and cancellation-Suit was decreed and the decision of the Trial Court was upheld throughout-Validity-Conduct of the attorney, F , and his four sons, the purported buyers, was deplorable and reprehensible as a sister and aunt was illegally deprived of her land-Often vulnerable members of society are exploited and deprived of their properties by such dubious methods, and then they spend a lifetime to regain what is rightfully theirs-Sister was entangled in a web of perpetual litigation, and, even though all the decisions were in her favour, she remained deprived of the land and its produce throughout her lifetime- F and his sons violated Article 24(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law-Purported sale/transfer of the subject land was effected in derogation of section 42 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, and of the judgments of the Supreme Court which stipulate that extra care must be exercised with regard to the property of women-Revenue officers/officials were either complicit in recording the illegal mutations or were incompetent-Review petition was dismissed with the directions that the petitioners shall immediately hand over the possession of the subject land to the respondents (legal heirs of the sister), and if they do not do so the concerned revenue authorities should immediately dispossess the petitioners therefrom, and that on account of the petitioners most unreasonable conduct they shall pay to the respondents one million rupees as costs, and till payment is made such amount shall constitute a charge on the landholding of the petitioners.\nMuhammad Rafiq v. Mst. Ghulam Zoharan Mai 2023 SCMR 988; Tahsinullah v. Mst. Parveen 2022 SCMR 346; Mst. Parveen LRs v. Muhammad Pervaiz 2022 SCMR 64; Ghulam Qasim v. Mst. Razia Begum PLD 2021 SC 812; Atta Muhammad v. Mst. Munir Sultan 2021 SCMR 73; Farhan Aslam v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen 2021 SCMR 179; Mirza Abid Baig v Zahid Sabir 2020 SCMR 601 and Muhammad Naeem Khan v Muqadas Khan PLD 2022 SC 99 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=215Specific Relief Act, 1877=39,42Land Revenue Act, 1967 (XVII of 1967)=42Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=24(1),188", - "Case #": "Civil Misc. Application No. 6336 of 2023 in Civil Review Petition No. 272 of 2022, decided on 3rd November, 2023.\nCivil Misc. Application no. 6336 of 2023\n(for restoration of CRP which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 27.04.2023 by this court)\nIn\nCivil Review Petition no. 272 of 2022\n(for review of the order dated 25.05.2022 passed by this court in c.p. NO. 2627 OF 2019)\nheard on: 3rd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J., AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Saleem Iqbal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court along with Ghulam Sajjad Khan, P. No. 9(b) for Applicants.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUMTAZ KHAN (DECEASED) THROUGH L.RS. AND OTHERS-APPLICANTS\nVS\nMST. SIRAJ BIBI (DECEASED) THROUGH L.RS. AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24262", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2954 = 2024 SLD 2954 = 2024 SCMR 982", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)-\n-S. 3(2), proviso-Intra Court Appeal (ICA)-Maintainability-Test to determine whether remedy of ICA is available-Main test to determine whether an ICA is available under the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 ( the Ordinance ) is to see whether the proceedings, in which the original order has been passed, provide for an appeal, revision or review (collectively referred to as appeal, for convenience) to any Court, Tribunal or authority against the original order-Applying this test what needs to be seen and verified is whether the proceedings provided for an appeal against the original order and not whether parties to the proceedings enjoyed the right to appeal against the original order-Proviso under Section 3(2) of the Ordinance is proceedings specific and not parties specific-So it matters less if one of the parties to the proceedings is not entitled to right of appeal against the original order passed in the said proceedings.\nKarim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh PLD 1984 SC 344 and Muhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Centre-I, Lahore PLD 1985 SC 107 ref.\n(b) National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973-\n-R. 40-Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3(2), proviso-Intra Court Appeal (ICA) filed by the bank-Maintainability-In the instant case, the proceedings under the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973, provide for an appeal under Rule 40 against the original order-This is sufficient to disentitle the parties to maintain an intra-court appeal, irrespective of the fact that one or more of the parties to the proceedings did not have a right of appeal against original order-Therefore, ICA is not maintainable in the present case-Petition was dismissed and leave was declined.\nNational Electric Power Regulatory Authority v. Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Ltd. PLD 2015 Lah. 661 disapproved.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3(2)", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 1800-L of 2018 and C.P.L.A. No. 1364 of 2023, decided on 13th March, 2024.\n(Against the judgment of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 06.06.2018, passed in I. C.A. No. 179944 of 2018 and order dated 06.02.2023 passed in I.C.A. No. 17830 of 2021).\nheard on: 13th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Umer Abdullah, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. 1800-L of 2018) and Junaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 1364 of 2023) for Petitioners.\nUmer Abdullah, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 1364 of 2023) and Junaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 1800-L of 2018) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN THROUGH PRESIDENT AND ANOTHER-PETITIONERS\nVS\nMUHAMMAD ADEEL AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24263", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2955 = 2024 SLD 2955 = 2024 SCMR 985", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 22-A & 22-B-Misuse of provisions of sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.-It is the prime duty of the Court that such misuse be taken care of and an application filed under 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. should not be lightly entertained and decided in a mechanical manner for issuing direction to the police to lodge an FIR, conduct investigation in the matter and prosecute the accused.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 22-A & 22-B-Application filed under sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C-Mala fide of applicant-In the present case both the parties to the lis belonged to the legal fraternity and were contesting bar elections on yearly basis against each other-Animosity amongst them was an admitted fact-In earlier elections both the groups had resorted to a brawl-Allegation levelled against the respondent (accused) was that on his instigation the co-accused had committed the offence-Before the High Court, counsel for the petitioner (applicant) admitted that the respondent (accused) was not present when the occurrence took place-Even otherwise from the comments filed by medical officer before the trial Court, it had been found that he had provided treatment to the petitioner but no medical certificate was issued in this regard on the ground that the petitioner had failed to furnish the police letter-Common culture prevailing within our society and often chosen by the legal fraternity is to settle disputes by converting them into criminal prosecution against each other which, was (also) apparent on the record of the present case owing to cases running in Court inter se the parties-After having received kicks and fists blows at the hands of the accused and co-accused persons, the petitioner had remained successful in seeking a direction for lodging an FIR from the trial Court, whereas another FIR was also lodged against the petitioner in a similar context by some Advocates of accused/respondents group-Trial Court had taken into consideration all material aspects of the matter and rightly dismissed the application under sections 22-A(6)(1) & 22-B, Cr.P.C. on the ground that the same was tainted with mala fide, which order was upheld by the High Court through the impugned order-Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was declined.\nMst. Sughran Bibi v. The State PLD 2018 SC 595 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=22-A,22-B", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.31-K of 2022, decided on 8th April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 14.02.2022, passed by the High Court of Sindh, Bench at Sukkur in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.S-644 of 2020).\nheard on: 8th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " MUNIB AKHTAR AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in person.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUNAWAR ALAM KHAN-PETITIONER\nVS\nQURBAN ALI MALLANO AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24264", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2956 = 2024 SLD 2956 = 2024 SCMR 997", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 218 & 225-Expressions election and conduct the election as used in Articles 218 & 225 of the Constitution-Meaning-Both expressions have been used in Articles 218 & 225 of the Constitution in a wide sense to connote the entire election process consisting of several steps starting with the issuance of the election programme and culminating with the declaration of the returned candidate, which includes filing of the nomination papers, scrutiny of the nomination papers, withdrawal of the candidates, holding the poll, counting of the votes, consolidation of the result and declaration of the returned candidates, etc.-In this wide sense, the process of conducting the election starts with the issuance of the election programme and stands completed on the publication of the names of the returned candidates in the official gazette.\nElection Commission v. Javaid Hashmi PLD 1989 SC 396 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 4,17(2), 218(3) & 222(d)-Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 8(c)-Election Commission-Powers and duties as to conducting elections-Law enacted by Parliament to regulate duties and power of the Election Commission-Scope-Under Article 218(3) of the Constitution the Election Commission does not have such general and inherent power which is absolute or superior to the law enacted by the Parliament-General power under Article 218(3) of the Constitution and section 8(c) of the Elections Act, 2017 can be exercised by the Election Commission within two parameters: (i) during the election process, which starts with the issuance of the election programme and culminates with the publication of the name of thereturned candidates in the official gazette, and (ii) when there is no express provision in the law enacted by the Parliament to deal with the matter or issue that arises during the performance of constitutional duty of conducting the elections honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law-Scope of the general powers of the Election Commission under Article 218(3) of the Constitution and section 8(c) of the Elections Act, 2017 stated.\nReading of clause (d) of Article 222 of the Constitution makes it clear that the Parliament can enact a law that regulates the conduct of elections and such law would consequentially also regulate the constitutional duty and power of the Election Commission to conduct the election. However, Parliament cannot, by enacting a law, confer any of the duties and functions of the Election Commission entrusted to it under Part VIII of the Constitution to any other executive or judicial authority or office, either entirely or partly.\nProvince of Sindh v. M.Q.M. PLD 2014 SC 531 and Election Commission v. Province of Punjab PLD 2014 SC 668 ref.\nSo far as the general power of the Election Commission under Article 218(3) is concerned, the expression and in accordance with law used in that very Article clearly suggests that it is to be exercised to ensure that the election is conducted in accordance with the law enacted by the Parliament, and not in suppression thereof. The Election Commission, thus, cannot exercise its general power in a manner that would make the conduct of election otherwise than in accordance with the law enacted by the Parliament, that is, in violation or breach of such law. Therefore, a law enacted by the Parliament that regulates the conduct of elections and consequentially the constitutional duty and power of the Election Commission to conduct the election, is not hit by the provisions of the latter part of Article 222 of the Constitution; as the requirement for the Election Commission to conduct the election in accordance with law while performing its constitutional duty has been prescribed by the Constitution itself, not by a law enacted by the Parliament.\nHowever, where the law enacted by the Parliament does not cover an unforeseen matter or issue that may arise during the election process, the Election Commission is to exercise its general power under Article 218(3) of the Constitution, in the same manner as all other discretionary powers are exercised, that is, fairly, reasonably and judiciously in accordance with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. While exercising its general power in such a situation, the Election Commission must remember the fundamental principle that the general, plenary and inherent powers are exercised to supplement, not supplant or supersede, the law. Such powers cannot be exercised to defeat the express provisions of law but are invoked only when there is no specific provision of law on the matter or issue that needs to be dealt with.\nMessrs Conforce v. Syed Ali PLD 1977 SC 599; Roazi Khan v. Nasir 1997 SCMR 1849 and Muhammad Sadiq v. Bashiran PLD 2000 SC 820 ref.\nAccepting the contention that the Election Commission has such general and inherent power under Article 218(3) of the Constitution which is absolute or superior to the law enacted by the Parliament, would be tantamount to going against the constitutional mandate of the rule of law ensured under Article 4 of the Constitution. In the matter of elections, the right of the citizens to vote and contest elections cannot be entirely left to be dealt with at the discretion of the Election Commission under its general and inherent power by construing such power to be above the law enacted by the Parliament.\nProvince of Sindh v. M.Q.M. PLD 2014 SC 531 and Javed Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2003 SC 955 ref.\nThus, on the question of the status of the general power of the Election Commission under Article 218(3) of the Constitution vis- -vis a law enacted by the Parliament, it is safe to conclude that this power operates in the area uncovered by such law. Alike is the scope and applicability of the powers of the Election Commission under Section 8(c) of the Elections Act, 2017 which is also evident from the opening words of Section 8, Save as otherwise provided . These words indicate that if something otherwise is provided in the Elections Act, then this Section will not apply. Further, the amplitude of the power of the Election Commission under Section 8(c), like its general power under Article 218(3) of the Constitution, is extended to the performance of its executive duty to conduct the election and thus it can be exercised only at any stage of the election process, not after the completion thereof. In other words, one can say, the general power under Article 218(3) of the Constitution and Section 8(c) of the Elections Act can be exercised by the Election Commission within two parameters: (i) during the election process, which starts with the issuance of the election programme and culminates with the publication of the name of thereturned candidates in the official gazette, and (ii) when there is no express provision in the law enacted by the Parliament to deal with the matter or issue that arises during the performance of constitutional duty of conducting the elections honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law.\nMohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner AIR 1978 SC 851; A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai AIR 1984 SC 921; Kanhiya Lal v. R.K. Trivedi AIR 1986 SC 111; Special Reference No.1 of 2002 AIR 2003 SC 87; Bartha Ram v. Lala Mehar 1995 SCMR 684 and Muhammad Salman v. Naveed Anjum 2021 SCMR 1675 ref.\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 4 & 187(1)-Power of the Supreme Court to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it-Scope-No person, authority, tribunal or court exercising executive or judicial powers can take any action against any person in contravention of the law-Said principle equally applies to the Supreme Court in exercising its general and inherent power under Article 187(1) of the Constitution-Under Article 187(1), the Court can issue any direction, order or decree to do complete justice between the parties in any case or matter pending before it, but cannot pass an order in contravention of any of the fundamental rights or any constitutional provision or any relevant statutory law.\nDossani Travels v. Travels Shop PLD 2014 SC 1 and Prem Chand v. Excise Commissioner AIR 1963 SC 996 ref.\n(d) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-Ss. 8(c), 9(1) & 88-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 218(3)-Election Commission, powers of-Tampering with the election record-Order for re-poll at certain polling stations after the consolidation of the final result of the poll by the Returning Officer-Legality-Whether the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has the power to order a re-poll in one or more polling stations or in the whole constituency, under Article 218(3) of the Constitution read with section 8(c) or section 9(1) of the Elections Act 2017, on the ground of tampering made with the election record (polling bags, ballot papers, etc.) after the consolidation of the final result of the poll by the Returning Officer under Section 95 and the publication of the name of the returned candidate in the official gazette under section 98 of the Elections Act, 2017.\nElection Commission made an order ( impugned order ), under Article 218(3) of the Constitution read with Section 8(c) of the Elections Act, 2017('Elections Act') to hold a re-poll in the 20 polling stations of which record had been tampered with. The Election Commission passed the impugned order after the consolidation of the final result of the poll by the Returning Officer under Section 95 of the Elections Act and the publication of the name of the appellant as a returned candidate in the official gazette under Section 98 of the Elections Act, when the election process has been completed. But as the notification of the appellant as a returned candidate had been issued under the interim order of the Supreme Court, the same could not have concluded the election process to create a bar on the exercise of its general power by the Election Commission under Article 218(3) of the Constitution read with Section 8(c) of the Elections Act. The objection that the Election Commission exercised its power in the present case after the completion of the election process is, therefore, not sustainable.\nThe matter of directing a re-poll or a fresh poll by the Election Commission in the process of conducting the election has expressly been dealt with in the Elections Act. There are three provisions in the Elections Act that deal with this matter in relation to the duty and power of the Election Commission to conduct the election , which are Sections 9, 88 and 121 of the Elections Act. As the matter of directing a re-poll by the Election Commission in the process of conducting the election has expressly been dealt with in the Elections Act, the Election Commission was not justified to invoke and exercise its general power under Article 218(3) read with Section 8(c) of the Elections Act in the present matter.\nA reading of Section 88 of the Elections Act shows that the tampering with the ballot box referred to therein relates to the polling day, not thereafter. Secondly, the power of the Election Commission to direct a fresh poll at the relevant polling station is not to be exercised if the Election Commission is satisfied that the result of the election has been determined by the polling that has already taken place at that polling station (before stopping the poll by the Presiding Officer), along with the result of the polling at other polling stations in the same constituency. In the present case, as per the report of the Returning Officer as well as the report of the Inquiry Committee constituted by the Election Commission, the tampering with the election record had taken place not on the polling day, rather it was made after the consolidation of the final result of the poll by the Returning Officer under Section 95 of the Elections Act. The impugned order passed by the Election Commission can, therefore, not sustain within the scope of the provisions of Section 88 of the Elections Act.\nIn the present case, as the illegality of tampering with the election record had been committed after the consolidation of the final result of the poll by the Returning Officer under Section 95 of the Elections Act, the Election Commission could not have invoked and exercised its power under Section 9(1) of the Elections Act; for such illegality had not affected the result of the poll already consolidated by the Returning Officer under Section 95 of the Elections Act. Further, the fact that who, the appellant or the respondent, was responsible for the tampering made with the election record after the consolidation of the final result of the poll, could not have been decided, nor has it been decided, by the Election Commission within the scope of summary enquiry under Section 9(1) of the Elections Act. This fact could only have been decided by the Election Tribunal in a full-fledged trial. Without deciding that fact, ordering a repoll in 20 polling stations is tantamount to punishing the appellant without determining his fault, and awarding the suspected culprit, if he were the respondent. In such an uncertain situation, the Election Commission should not have vitiated the official acts of the election officials, which were the counting of votes and the consolidation of the final result of the poll, as they had a presumption of regular performance as per Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984. The impugned order is, therefore, not sustainable under Section 9(1) of the Elections Act. The re-poll held in pursuance of the impugned order and the subsequent notification of the respondent as a returned candidate are quashed. The respondent shall be de-notified, while the appellant re-notified, as a returned candidate. Appeal is allowed.\nBehram Khan v. Abdul Hameed PLD 1990 SC 352; Ejaz Shafi v. Ashraf Shah 1996 SCMR 605 and Jam Madad Ali v. Asghar Ali Junejo 2016 SCMR 251 ref.\n(e) Administration of justice-\n-Wrong or inapplicable provision of law mentioned by the Court-Effect-Mentioning of a wrong or inapplicable provision of law or non-mentioning of the applicable provision of law while exercising a jurisdiction or a power which is otherwise vested in a court, tribunal or authority, does not by itself have fatal consequences.\nNaseer Ahmed v. Returning Officer 2023 SCMR 179; Olas Khan v. NAB PLD 2018 SC 40; Saadat Khan v. State 2018 SCMR 387 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Abdul Ghani PLD 2007 SC 308 ref.\n(f) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-Ss.9(1), 139, 142 & 154(1)(b)(i)-Power of the Election Commission to declare a poll void-Scope of section 9 of the Elections Act, 2017 stated.\nThe opening expression used in Section 9(1) of the Elections Act, 2017 ('the Elections Act'), Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act , shows that the jurisdiction of the Election Commission under this Section has an overriding effect against any other provision of the Elections Act. Thus, the Election Commission is competent to exercise its jurisdiction under this Section, notwithstanding the availability of the remedy of the election petition under Section 139 read with Section 142 and the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal to grant the same relief under Section 154(1)(b)(i) of the Elections Act. To the extent of the grounds specified in Section 9(1) upon which the Election Commission can exercise its power to order a re-poll, the jurisdiction of the Election Commission and the Election Tribunal is, therefore, concurrent. The Election Commission can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 9(1) of the Elections Act, to order a re-poll if:\ni. There have been grave illegalities or violations of the provisions of the Elections Act or the Rules made thereunder;\nii. Such illegalities or violations are evident from facts apparent on the face of the record; and\niii. Such illegalities or violations have materially affected the result of the poll at one or more polling stations or in the whole constituency.\nAftab Mirani v. Muhammad Ibrahim PLD 2008 SC 779 ref.\nAlthough the ground of grave illegalities or violations of the provisions of the Elections Act or the Rules made thereunder in the election process is common for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions by the Election Commission and the Election Tribunal, the difference lies in the nature of proof of those illegalities and violations, and in the scope of enquiry. The words from facts apparent on the face of the record used in Section 9(1) restrict the jurisdiction of the Election Commission to such grave illegalities or violations of the Elections Act or the Rules which are evident from the facts apparent on the face of the record . The Election Commission can, therefore, exercise its jurisdiction under Section 9(1) only when the allegation or issue of grave illegalities or violations of the Elections Act does not require a full-fledged trial and recording of pro and contra evidence of the contesting parties, which can only be undertaken by the Election Tribunal.\nSalahuddin Tirmizi v. Election Commission PLD 2008 SC 735 ref.\nKhurshid Kasuri v. Returning Officer 1994 CLC 296 approved.\nAlthough the Election Commission has the power, under Section 9(1) of the Elections Act, to conduct such enquiry as it may deem necessary for its satisfaction about the alleged grave illegalities or violations, in addition to the facts apparent on the face of the record , but before initiating such inquiry by the Election Commission the facts apparent on the face of the record must prima facie indicate the commission of some grave illegality or violation of the Elections Act or the Rules made thereunder, during the election process. The Election Commission cannot initiate a roving enquiry to search for some illegalities or violations, on bald and vague allegations unsupported by prima facie proof, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 9(1) of the Elections Act.\nFurther, the enquiry which the Election Commission can conduct under Section 9 can only be of a summary nature, notwithstanding the omission of the word summary in Section 9(1), as the Election Commission can make an order for re-poll under this Section before the expiration of sixty days after publication of the name of the returned candidate under Section 98 of the Elections Act, not thereafter. Where the Election Commission does not finally dispose of a case initiated under Section 9(1) within the said period, the proceedings stand abated and the election of the returned candidate is deemed to have become final, subject to the decision of the Election Tribunal on the election petition, if any, as per section 9(3) of the Elections Act. Moreover, as the dismissal of a petition or the abatement of proceedings of a case under Section 9 by the Election Commission does not bar the reagitation before and trial by the Election Tribunal, of the same grounds of grave illegalities or violations of the Elections Act or the Rules made thereunder, the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended two full-fledged trials of the same issue before both forums: the Election Commission and the Election Tribunal. Therefore, the enquiry to be conducted by the Election Commission under Section 9(1) can only be of a summary nature, notwithstanding the omission of the word summary in this Section.\nAftab Mirani v. Muhammad Ibrahim PLD 2008 SC 779 ref.\nThe second restriction on the exercise of power under Section 9(1) by the Election Commission is that by reason of the grave illegalities or violation of the provisions of the Elections Act or the Rules, the result of the poll at one or more polling stations or in the whole constituency must have been materially affected. Any illegality or violation which does not relate to holding and conducting the poll in the election process, and has thus not affected the result of the poll, cannot form the basis for invoking and exercising the power under Section 9(1) by the Election Commission. The grave illegalities or violations must be such that have materially affected the result of the poll. Although such illegalities or violations may have been committed at any stage of the election process, but not later than the final consolidation of the result of the poll by the Returning Officer under Section 95 of the Elections Act; as any illegality or violation committed after the consolidation of the final result by the Returning Officer cannot be said to have materially affected the result of the poll. It, therefore, does not fall within the scope of the provisions of Section 9(1) of the Elections Act and cannot be a subject of enquiry by the Election Commission to exercise jurisdiction under this Section.\nMuhammad Salman v. Naveed Anjum 2021 SCMR 1675 ref.\nAny fact-finding enquiry or departmental regular enquiry may be got conducted by the Election Commission, in the matter of any illegality or violation committed after the consolidation of the final result to take appropriate administrative or criminal action against the delinquent election officials, but not for an action under Section 9(1) of the Elections Act.\n(g) Appeal-\n-Scope-If a court, tribunal or authority not having jurisdiction wrongly assumes and exercises such a jurisdiction and makes an order without jurisdiction, an appeal lies from that order in the same manner as an appeal lies from an order with jurisdiction.\nMuhammad Ashfaq v. State PLD 1973 SC 368; Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad PLD 1995 SC 66; MEPCO v. Muhammad Ashiq PLD 2006 SC 328 and Naseer Ahmed v. Returning Officer 2023 SCMR 179 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=218,225,4,17(2),218(3),222(d)Elections Act, 2017=8(c)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 142 of 2019 and Civil Petition No. 1369 of 2019, decided on 2nd November, 2022.\nCivil Appeal No. 142 of 2019\n(Against the order (notification) dated 18.01.2019, of the Election Commission of Pakistan).\nCivil Petition No. 1369 of 2019\n(Against the order of the Islamabad High Court, dated 15.02.2019, passed in W.P. No. 312/2019).\nheard on: 2nd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J., SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahzad Shaukat, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nMuhammad Arshad, DG Law for Respondent No. 1 (Election Commission).\nMian Abdul Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court and Mubeen-ud-Din Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 6 (Amir Sultan Cheema).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZULFIQAR ALI BHATTI-APPELLANT\nVS\nELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24265", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2957 = 2024 SLD 2957 = 2024 SCMR 1021", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980-\n-O.XIII, R.1 & O.XXXIII, R.6-Government as petitioner before the Supreme Court-Time barred petition filed by the Government-Plea that administrative delays due to lengthy procedure prevented the Government from filing the petition within the limitation period-Such plea cannot be considered sufficient cause or a reasonable ground in every case for condonation of delay-No preferential treatment can be accorded to Government Departments for condoning the delay.\nOftentimes cases concerning the Federal and Provincial Governments and autonomous bodies are instituted after the lapse of the period of limitation postulated by the law and the plea taken for condoning the delay is invariably and inevitably that the time was spent in fulfilling inter-departmental procedures and seeking final instructions from the competent authority. Even private sector/organizations have begun to take a similar plea, with delays being attributed to Board Resolutions, non-availability of the concerned head or officer, delay in the law department etc., despite the aforesaid entities having full-fledged legal departments and internal law officers. Seemingly, applications for condonation of delay are being filed as a routine matter while adopting a callous approach which fails to recognize that the delay cannot be condoned without the presence of sufficient cause or explaining the delay of each and every day. The mechanical and unpersuasive justification of administrative delays has almost become a trend which is consistently pleaded for condonation of delay through stereotypical and generalized applications, which in our point of view cannot be considered sufficient cause or a reasonable ground in every case. On the contrary, it illustrates the recklessness and inefficiency of the concerned department in deciding whether they want to challenge the decision in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court or not. In the case of an individual, all decisions rest solely on him with regard to the procurement of advice for challenging the decision at higher forum; the decision to challenge; the engagement of an advocate; supplying the relevant documents to the advocate for the preparation of the appeal/petition and then following the case religiously; however, in the case of the Government or any of its departments, the party has at its disposal the assistance of its own legal department; the help and support of the Attorney Generals Office, or the Advocate Generals Office as the case may be. Therefore, immediately upon receiving a copy of the judgment/order, the Government departments may move for instructions rather than waiting for the lapse of the period of limitation provided for approaching the higher Courts. At times this cavalier attitude and approach smears and smacks mala fide and leads to the belief that the appeal is intentionally being presented belatedly only as a formality in order to provide an undue advantage to the other side, rather than due to any genuine intent to challenge the judgment or order.\nMessrs SKB-KNK Joint Venture Contractors through Regional Director v. Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and others 2022 SCMR 1615; Food Department, Gujranwala through Deputy Director and others v. Ghulam Farid Awan 2010 SCMR 1899; Khuda Bakhsh and others v. Muzaffar through L.Rs. and others 2007 SCMR 1032; Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Works and another v. Messrs Malbrow Builders, Contractor, Sialkot 2006 SCMR 1248; Province of Punjab v. Sh. M. Riaz Shahid 2005 SCMR 1435; Province of Punjab through Secretary Education v. Kishwar Qudus Paul 2004 SCMR 571; Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and another v. Muhammad Rafique Siddiqui 2004 PLC (C.S.) 962; Chairman/ Secretary, Pakistan Railways, Ministry of Railways, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Sharif Javaid Warsi PLD 2003 SC 6 and Chairman, District Evacuee Trust, Jhelum v. Abdul Khaliq through L.Rs. and others PLD 2002 SC 436 and PLD 2003 Journal 95 ref.\nWhile considering the grounds for condonation of delay, whether rational or irrational, no extraordinary clemency or compassion and/or preferential treatment may be accorded to the Government department, autonomous bodies or private sector/organizations, rather their case should be dealt with uniformly and in the same manner as cases of ordinary litigants and citizens. No doubt the law favours adjudication on merits, but simultaneously one should not close their eyes or oversee another aspect of great consequence, namely that the law helps the vigilant and not the indolent.\nIn the present case nothing has been articulated in the application moved by the petitioner (police department) for condonation of delay to ascertain where the delay was actually caused; when legal advice was received or sought; when the matter was referred to the competent authority or person in charge for the necessary instructions; who was responsible for the delay; and what punitive or disciplinary action was taken against the person who was instrumental in causing the delay. On the face of it, present petition is barred by 31 days but no plausible or satisfactory explanation has been propounded by the petitioner for the delay of each and every day; except a sweeping statement that the time was consumed in the lengthy procedure and formalities, which could have been followed and completed with due diligence within the period of limitation. Consequently the application for condonation of delay is dismissed and, as a consequence thereof, the Civil Petition is also dismissed. Supreme Court directed that Office shall transmit a copy of present judgment to the Office of the Attorney General of Pakistan, Advocates General of all the Provinces, including Islamabad Capital Territory, as well as the Federal and Provincial Law Secretaries for information and compliance.\nManaging Director, Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. Karachi v. Ghulam Abbas and others PLD 2003 SC 724; Government of Balochistan through Secretary Board of Revenue, Balochistan Quetta and others v. Muhammad Ali and 11 others 2007 SCMR 1574; Muhammad Bashir and another v. Province of Punjab through Collector of District Gujrat and others 2003 SCMR 83 and Deputy Collector of Customs and 2 others v. Muhammad Tahir and another PLD 1989 SC 627 distinguished.\n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 3-Limitation, question of-Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 it is the inherent duty of the Court to delve into the question of limitation, regardless of whether it is raised or not.\n(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 5-Condonation of delay-Grounds-Carelessness, intentional or obvious sluggishness, or dearth of bona fide are no reason for condonation of delay.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 469-L of 2023, decided on 14th September, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 27.07.2022 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.564 of 2021).\nheard on: 14th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Muhammad Mumtaz Ali, Addl. AG, Punjab for Petitioners.\nDil Muhammad Khan Alizai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "REGIONAL POLICE OFFICER, DERA GHAZI KHAN REGION AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nRIAZ HUSSAIN BHUKHARI-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24266", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2958 = 2024 SLD 2958 = 2024 SCMR 1037", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5VXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Time limit for performing a certain act under a statute-When a statute is silent about limitation, a reasonable time limit is to be supplied by the Courts.\nFederal Land Commission v. Habib Ahmed PLD 2011 SC 842 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Yasmeen Bano 2020 SCMR 1120 ref.\n(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4, 5 & 17(1)-Land acquisition-Preliminary notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( Act )-Addendum or corrigendum notification to a preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act-Time limit-Where any notification is issued to amend, vary or add to the earlier (preliminary) notification issued under section 4 of the Act, the same is to be issued within a reasonable time which shall be determined according to the specific facts and circumstances of the case-Furthermore addendum or corrigendum to a notification under section 4 can only be issued before the next step in the acquisition process is undertaken i.e. before the issuance of a notification under section 5 or under section 17(4) of the Act, though fresh acquisition proceedings can be initiated by issuing a fresh notification under section 4 of the Act if some more land is needed or likely to be needed later for the same purpose.\nAnwar Ali Sahto v. Federation of Pakistan 2002 PLC (C.S.) 526; Phoenix Security v. Pir Muhammad 2020 SCMR 132 and Khyber Zaman v. Governor, State Bank 2005 SCMR 235 ref.\n(c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4, 5 & 17(1)-Land acquisition-Date of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( Act )-Scope-Said date will not necessarily be the date of the first notification issued under section 4 of the Act, instead, it will be whenever the complete and final land is notified-In instances where addendums or corrigenda to a notification under Section 4 are issued, the indicator of the finality of the land notified would be when, after the issuance of an addendum or corrigendum, the public functionaries move forward with the acquisition proceedings by either issuing a notification under section 5 or under section 17(4) of the Act-Therefore, the date of the last addendum or corrigendum issued in relation to the notification under section 4 of the Act before any step is taken to advance the acquisition proceedings to the next stage, is deemed to be the date of the notification under section 4 of the Act for the purposes of the acquisition proceedings under the Act-This is because the complete land under the said provision becomes finally notified through the addendum or corrigendum and, after this, the state functionaries take the next step in the acquisition proceedings.\n(d) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4 & 23-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 23 & 24-Land acquisition-Compensating land owners-Interpretation and applicability of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must be in consonance with the spirit of Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution and the object of the Act, which require properly and adequately compensating landowners whose lands are being acquired thereunder.\nFederal Government v. Mst. Zakia Begum 2023 SCP 57; Land Acquisition Collector v. Iqbal Begum PLD 2010 SC 719 and Nisar Ahmad v. Collector, Land Acquisition PLD 2005 SC 25 ref.\n(e) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4 & 23-Land acquisition-Preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( Act )-Addendum or corrigendum notification, issuance of-Market value of land, determination of-Where a notification under Section 4 of the Act is subsequently amended, varied or added to through an addendum or corrigendum, the date of the publication of the intial notification under Section 4 cannot be taken as the material date for the purposes of considering the market value of the land for determining compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act-Such an interpretation would not only be against the Constitutional mandate by upsetting the balance the Constitution seeks to maintain through adequately and properly compensating the owners of the land that is being acquired, it would also be against the object of the Act to that effect-Instead, in such circumstances, the date of publication of the subsequent addendum or corrigendum, finally notifying the complete land under Section 4 of the Act, must be considered to determine the market value of the land for the purposes of compensation.\n(f) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4, 18 & 23-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Land acquisition-Compensation for land owners-Interference by High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction-Scope-Interference on the matter of determination of fair compensation is not ordinarily warranted under the judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution and such matter is best decided by a civil court in its reference jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after recording the respective evidence of the parties-However, where the acquisition authorities under the Act have misdirected themselves on a point of law, which does not require any factual determination, the High Court must intervene to correct the legal error and set the course of law right.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=4,5,17(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1441 to 1449 of 2021, decided on 11th September, 2023.\n(Against the order of judgment of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 02.02.2021, passed in W.P. No.2038 of 2020 and other connected matters).\nheard on: 15th February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " AUTHOR: Present: Umar Ata Bandial, C.J., Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Qasim Chohan, Addl. A.G. Punjab, Sh. Moeen-ud-Din, Chief Potohar, Sehar Ch., Law Officer, Irrigation, Mumtaz Watoo, XEN Small Dam and Syed Farhat Abbas, SDO for Petitioners.\nSardar Abdul Raziq Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.P. No. 1441 of 2021).\nMrs. Hifza Ibrar Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.2 (in C.P. No. 1444 of 2021).\nKhurram Masood, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.P. No. 1446 of 2021).\nAtiq-ur-Rehman Kayani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1-9 (in C.P. No. 1449 of 2021).\nNemo (for all other respondents)\nAssisted by: Waqas Ali Mazhar, Research Officer, SCRC and Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI/ PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB and others-Petitioners\nVs\nNASEER AHMED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24267", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2959 = 2024 SLD 2959 = 2024 SCMR 1049", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTc", - "Key Words:": "Cantonments Act (II of 1924)-\n-S. 60(1) [as amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act (XLVII of 2023)] & Sched. VII-Cantonments (Amendment) Act (XLVII of 2023), S. 2(a)(i)-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 140A, 163 & Fourth Sched., Pt.1, Entry 2-Rules of Business, 1973, Second Sched., Entry 7(a)(ii)-Cantonment Boards-Professional tax-Cantonment Boards are not empowered to impose professional tax on those engaged in professions, trades, callings or employments in cantonment areas-Professional tax mentioned in Article 163 of the Constitution recovered by the Cantonment Boards is unconstitutional-Section 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 [as amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023] and its Schedule VII to the extent that they may authorize the imposition of the professional taxes are ultra vires the Constitution.\nSection 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 dealing with general power of taxation was amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023, which also made additions to Schedule VII of the Cantonments Act, 1924 and included therein the professional taxes. The administrative division mentioned in section 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 is defined in section 2(a)(i) of the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023, as: administrative division means the division to which business of cantonments stands allocated. The Second Schedule to the Rules of Business, 1973, stipulates that the business of cantonments stands allocated to the Defense Division. The aforesaid change meant that, previously the sanction of the Federal Government was required to be obtained for cantonment boards to impose taxes but now it has been delegated to a Division. This downgrading the power of the Federal Government does not seem to conform to democratic principles and obfuscates transparency.\nArticle 163 of the Constitution alone authorizes the provinces to impose the professional taxes, and the Supreme Court has already decided this very issue in the case reported as ICI Pakistan Ltd. v. Tehsil Council (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 428) (the ICI case). The attempt to distinguish the ICI case on the ground that, after the insertion of Article 140A into the Constitution it changed the existing constitutional scheme, is not correct. Neither has Article 163 been made redundant nor has Article 140A empowered the Federation, including cantonment boards, to impose the professional taxes. It is also not correct to state that since the second entry of the Federal Legislative List mentions local self-government and cantonment areas the Federation has been authorized to impose the professional taxes. Article 163 of the Constitution specifically empowers the provinces to impose the professional taxes; it is the only provision in the Constitution which permits or authorizes this, and it must be given effect to; it cannot be disregarded or whittled down by untenable submissions.\nICI Pakistan Ltd. v. Tehsil Council PLD 2007 SC 428 fol.\nSection 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 [as amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023] and its Schedule VII to the extent that they may authorize the imposition of the professional taxes are ultra vires the Constitution. The professional taxes mentioned in Article 163 of the Constitution recovered by the Cantonment Boards is unconstitutional, consequently, they cannot be retrained, which should be refunded and would have to be refunded. Appeals were dismissed with costs throughout.\nPfizer Laboratories Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 64 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Cantonments Act, 1924=60(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1363 to 1365 of 2018 and Civil Misc. Application No. 4728 of 2023, decided on 13th October, 2023.\nCivil Appeals Nos. 1363 to 1365 of 2018\n(Against the judgment dated 15.07.2017 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Constitution Petitions Nos. D-2892/14, D- 1135 and D-3539 of 2016).\nAnd\nCivil Misc. Application No. 4728 of 2023\n[For impleadment by Messrs Zubi International Private Limited, through its Assistant Manager, Hafiz Zahid Hassan]\nheard on: 13th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J., AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants:\n(In all cases)\nMuhammad Umer Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court.\nAssisted by Ch. Abubakar.\nZaki Haider, CEO, Clifton.\nAamir Rashid, CEO, Faisal.\nTanveer Ashraf, Director, ML & C. and Javed Abbasi, Law Officer, ML & C.\n(Through video-link from Karachi)\nFor the Applicant:\nM. Naeem Sadiq, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 4728 of 2023).\nOn Court's Notice:\nMansoor Usman Awan, Attorney-General for Pakistan and Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney-General.\nRespondents Nos. 1-2:\nEx-parte (in C.A. No. 1363 of 2018).\nFor Respondent No. 1:\nTahir Ishaq Mughal, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Shaista Altaf, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1364 of 2018).\nFor Govt. of Sindh:\nZeeshan Adhi, Additional Advocate-General, Sindh.\nSaifullah, Asst. Advocate-General, Sindh.\nGhulam Nabi Shah, Addl. Director Excise and Taxation.\nAyaz Ali Mangi, Dy. Director (P-II).\n(Through video-link from Karachi) (in C.As. Nos. 1364 and 1365 of 2018)\nRespondents Nos. 2, 3 and 5:\nEx-parte (in C.A. No. 1364 of 2018).\nRespondents Nos. 1 and 3:\nEx-parte (in C.A. 1365 of 2018).", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN C.A. 1363 OF 2018\nCANTONMENT BOARD FAISAL AND ANOTHER-APPELLANTS\nVS\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, KARACHI AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS\nAND\nIN C.A. 1364 OF 2018\nCANTONMENT BOARD CLIFTON, KARACHI-APPELLANT\nVS\nK & N FOODS (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS\nAND\nIN C.A. 1365 OF 2018\nCANTONMENT BOARD CLIFTON, KARACHI-APPELLANT\nVS\nMESSRS VENUS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24268", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2960 = 2024 SLD 2960 = 2024 SCMR 1059", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)-\n-S. 7(iv)(c)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 148 & 149 & O.VII, R.11-Court fee-Deficiency in payment-Rejection of plaint-Direction of Trial Court to make good court fee deficiency by next date of hearing-Non-compliance by plaintiff-By it order dated 27.04.2010 (the Order) Trial Court allowed the plaintiff time to make the court fee deficiency good with the rider that, in case of non-payment of court fee by the next date of hearing, the plaint would be deemed as rejected-On the next date of hearing i.e. 13.05.2010, without any request from the plaintiff the Trial Court granted the plaintiff a last opportunity to deposit the court fee-Revisional Court, as well as the High Court, both concurrently held that the Order granting time for making good the deficiency was a conditional order and, since the order was not complied with, the plaint was deemed to have been rejected automatically and thereafter the Trial Court could not extend the time and had become functus officio-Legality-On 27.04.2010, time was allowed under Section 149, C.P.C. by the Trial Court to pay the court fee by 13.05.2010, failing which the plaint shall be deemed to have been rejected, however on 13.05.2010, although the court fee stood unpaid, the Trial Court extended the time for payment of court fee without even fixing any time frame in the extension order, and that too without any oral or written request showing any plausible or sufficient cause by the plaintiff/petitioner for not complying with the Order within the stipulated timeframe-Trial Court, without considering the sanctity of its previous order in which the non-compliance of the order impacted an automatic rejection of the plaint and without enquiring or questioning the reasons for non-compliance, extended the time in a slipshod manner on its own motion without realizing the repercussions and consequences of its earlier Order-By passing a conditional order, the Trial Court had not only surrendered and abandoned its jurisdiction of enlargement of time under Section 148, C.P.C., but also closed the doors for the plaintiff in the event of non-compliance of the Order-Supreme Court deprecated practice and tendency of passing such conditional orders and directed that if any act is not complied within the time stipulated in the C.P.C. or time granted by the Court, the most appropriate legal action or step would be for the Court to take up the matter at the end of the expiry period and pass an appropriate order for non-compliance and if the party at default applies for the enlargement of time to comply with the direction(s) due to some sufficient cause(s) including force majeure circumstances which prevented compliance within time, then of course on such request the Court may further extend or enlarge time for compliance-Trial Court had passed the Order for enlargement of time with a perfunctory approach which was unjustified and unwarranted, hence the Revisional Court rightly set aside the Order and the High Court rightly maintained the same-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nMuhammad Wahid and another v. Nasrullah and another 2016 SCMR 179 and Shujat Ali v. Muhammad Riasat and others PLD 2006 SC 140 ref.\n(b) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)-\n-Ss. 4 & 6-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 149-Court fees-Power to make up deficiency of court-fees-Discretion of Court-Scope-Section 149, C.P.C. is an exception to the command delineated under Sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 ( Court Fees Act )-Exercise of discretion by the Court at any stage is, as a general rule, expected to be exercised in favour of the litigant on presenting plausible reasons which may include bona fide mistake in the calculation of the court fee; unavailability of the court fee stamps; or any other good cause or circumstances beyond control, for allowing time to make up the deficiency of court fee stamps on a case to case basis, and the said discretion can only be exercised where the Court is satisfied that sufficient grounds are made out for non-payment of the court fee in the first instance.\n(c) Words and phrases-\n-Maxim Functus officio -Meaning and scope- Functus officio denotes that once the competent authority has finalized and accomplished the task for which it was appointed or engaged, its jurisdiction and authority is over and ended or, alternatively, the jurisdiction of the competent authority is culminated once it has finalized and accomplished its task for which it was engaged-If the Court passes a valid order after providing an opportunity of hearing, it cannot reopen the case and its authority comes to an end and such orders cannot be altered save for where corrections need to be made due to some clerical or arithmetical error-Doctrine of functus officio is applicable to both judicial and quasi-judicial authorities, and, if it is not adhered to, it may result in turmoil for the litigating parties-If the authorities or the judges would be able to alter, change or modify orders capriciously and variably then resultantly it will leave no certainty and firmness to any order or decision passed by any Court or authority-It is imperative for a sound judicial system to result in finality and certitude to the legal proceedings.\nBlacks Law Dictionary, (Tenth Edition, Page 787); While P. Ramanatha Aiyars Advanced Law Lexicon, (Third Edition, Page 1946); Whartons Law Lexicon, (Fifteenth Edition, Page 720) and Corpus Juris Secundum, (Volume 37, Page 1401) ref.\n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 148-Enlargement of time-Court, discretion of-Scope-No doubt the time allowed for doing a thing can be enlarged by the Court under Section 148, C.P.C., in its discretion from time to time, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired, but this discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or whimsically, rather such discretion must be exercised and structured in a reasonable and judicious manner.\n(e) Jurisdiction-\n-Neither the Court should assume or take on the jurisdiction not vested in it by law, nor the Court should abdicate or renounce a jurisdiction so vested in it by law.\n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-Preamble-Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ( C.P.C. ) is a consolidatory law which is primarily procedural in nature and may be defined as a branch of law administering the process of litigation-Sections and Rules framed in the C.P.C. are aimed at the advancement of justice as a body of general law-Any construction which renders the statute or any of its sections or components redundant should be avoided and must be so construed so as to make it effective and operative.\n(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O.VII, R. 13-Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), Ss. 4 & 6-Rejection of plaint due to non-payment of court fees-Fresh plaint, presentation of-Permissibility-Under Order VII, Rule 13, C.P.C., the rejection of a plaint on any of the grounds mentioned in Order VII shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action-Meaning thereby that, where the plaint is rejected due to non-payment of court fee and not for any other cause such as limitation, a pathway is open to the plaintiff to invoke the remedy provided under Order VII, Rule 13, C.P.C. by presenting fresh plaint within the prescribed period of limitation rather than wasting time or contesting the matter up to the Supreme Court.\nAbdul Hamid and another v. Dilawar Hussain alias Bhalli and others 2007 SCMR 945; Muhammad Ali and others v. Province of Punjab and others 2009 SCMR 1079 and Mian Khan v. Aurang Zeb and 12 others 1989 SCMR 58 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Court-Fees Act, 1870=7(iv)(c)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=148,149,11", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2351 of 2019, decided on 10th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.04.2019, passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in W.P. No. 6785 of 2011).\nheard on: 17th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " YAHYA AFRIDI, SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mahmood Ashraf Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Chaudhry Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nAftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents,\nNot represented Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KH. MUHAMMAD FAZIL-PETITIONER\nVS\nMUMTAZ MUNNAWAR KHAN NIAZI (DECEASED) THROUGH L.RS. AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24269", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2961 = 2024 SLD 2961 = 2024 SCMR 1071", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Articles 4, 9, 10A, 25 & 185(3)-Bail-Rule of consistency-Benchmark for applying the rule of consistency in granting bail to an accused stated.\nThe rule of consistency applied in bail matters is premised on the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan. This right to equality before the law ensures that persons similarly placed in similar circumstances are to be treated in the same manner. In other words, among equals the law should be equally administered; the like should be treated alike. Article 25 of the Constitution does not prohibit different treatment to persons who are not similarly placed or who are not in similar circumstances. To claim equality before the law an accused person must therefore show that he and his coaccused who has been granted bail are similarly placed in similar circumstances. In other words, he must show that the prosecution case, as a whole, against him is at par with that against his co-accused who has been granted bail, and not distinguishable in any substantial aspect. The rule of consistency is also pillared on Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution ensuring that level playing field and fairness is maintained in adjudicating cases of co-accused. The right to liberty under Article 9 of the Constitution has to be extended fairly and without discrimination to an applicant seeking bail. The rule of consistency in bail matters is fundamental to ensuring fairness, reducing arbitrary decision-making, and maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system. Its a key aspect of the rule of law, ensuring that all individuals are treated equally under the law.\nFida Hussain v. State PLD 2002 SC 46; Abdul Jalil v. N.W.F.P. Forest Development Corporation 2010 SCMR 1933 and Tariq Nawaz v. Government of Pakistan 2001 PLC (C.S.) 57 ref.\nThe rule of consistency in bail matters is attracted and applied after the grant of bail to a co-accused. Grant of bail by a court considers several factors like the contents of the FIR, the incriminating material collected by the police during investigation, the past history of the accused, etc. The grounds which form the basis for the grant of bail to a co-accused is thus the benchmark for grant of bail to the accused under the rule of consistency. The benchmark for applying the rule of consistency is not only the role attributed to the accused in the FIR but also the material collected in the investigation. Therefore, the court has to assess whether the role of the accused in the FIR, examined in the background of the material collected by the Police is the same as that of the co-accused, who has been granted bail. It is this congruence in the case of the co-accused and the accused that attracts the rule of consistency.\nTo decide upon the applicability of the rule of consistency for granting bail under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., the courts have to examine the whole material available on the record of the case. Without doing so, it cannot be determined whether the accused who claims the benefit of this rule and his co-accused who has been granted bail are similarly placed in similar circumstances.\nShahid Farooq v. State 2011 SCMR 1619 ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Offences falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1), Cr.P.C.-In the offences that fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497,(1), Cr.P.C., the post-arrest bail is granted on three grounds: (i) under the first proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., on the ground of the accused being a minor, or a woman, or a sick or infirm person; (ii) under the third proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial beyond the period prescribed for no fault of the accused; and (iii) under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., on the ground that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the offence, but rather there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt.\nRaza Bukhari v. State PLD 2022 SC 743 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Whether or not there exist any reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the alleged offence-For the determination of the question under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., as to whether or not there exist any reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the alleged offence, the courts have to appraise although tentatively the whole material available on the record of the case-This question cannot be determined by merely examining the contents of the FIR-Essentially, it is the tentative assessment of the evidence collected in the investigation both for and against the accused that is determinative of the said question.\nManzoor v. State PLD 1972 SC 81 and Khalid Gillani v. State PLD 1978 SC 256 ref.\n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 148 & 149-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly-Bail, refusal of-Rule of consistency not applicable-Courts below have granted the post-arrest bail to the two co-accused persons under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C. after making a tentative assessment of the evidence collected in the investigation both for and against them-Tentative assessment of that evidence has led them to the finding that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the said co-accused have committed the offence of murder of the complainants son, but rather there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into their guilt-Material collected in the investigation in the case of two co-accused shows that they were not present on the scene of the crime-This is not so in the case of the petitioner/accused-Therefore, material collected in the investigation against the present petitioner is different from that collected against them-Ground on which they have been granted bail is not available to the petitioner-Case against the petitioner is therefore not at par with that against those co-accused persons but rather is distinguishable in a substantial aspect-Allegation made against the petitioner of being present on the spot and having made fires on the deceased sons of the complainant by his firearm is not only supported by the statements of the eye-witnesses but also corroborated by the recovery of the weapon of offence effected from him in the investigation-There is, as such, sufficient incriminating material available on the record of the case to connect the petitioner with the commission of the alleged offence, and his case does not come within the scope of the provisions of Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., nor does the rule of consistency apply to him-High Court had righty refused post-arrest bail to the petitioner-Petition for leave to leave was dismissed, leave was refused and petitioner was refused bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,9,10A,25,185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl.P. No. 298 of 2023, decided on 31st October, 2023.\n(Against the order of Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 16.03.2023, passed in Crl. Misc. No.3167-B of 2023).\nheard on: 31st October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Usman G. Rashid Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nCh. Muhammad Sarwar Sidhu, APG, Punjab, along with Asghar Ali, Investigating Officer for the State.\nMudassar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATIF-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24270", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2962 = 2024 SLD 2962 = 2024 SCMR 1123", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 22-A-Justice of Peace - Powers and function-Under section 22-A, Cr.P.C, it is not the function of the Justice of Peace to punctiliously or assiduously scrutinize the case or to render any findings on merits but he has to ensure whether, from the facts narrated in the application, any cognizable case is made out or not; and if yes, then he can obviously issue directions that the statement of the complainant be recorded under Section 154, Cr.P.C.-Such powers of the Justice of Peace are limited to aid and assist in the administration of the criminal justice system-He has no right to assume the role of an investigating agency or a prosecutor but has been conferred with a role of vigilance to redress the grievance of those complainants who have been refused by the police officials to register their reports-If the Justice of Peace will assume and undertake a full-fledged investigation and enquiry before the registration of FIR, then every person will have to first approach the Justice of Peace for scrutiny of his complaint and only after clearance, his FIR will be registered, which is beyond the comprehension, prudence, and intention of the legislature-Minute examination of a case and conducting a fact-finding exercise is not included in the functions of a Justice of Peace but he is saddled with a sense of duty to redress the grievance of the complainant who is aggrieved by refusal of a Police Officer to register his report.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 154, 155 & 200-Officer Incharge of a Police Station-Receipt of information about commission of an offence-Any time, an Officer Incharge of a Police Station receives some information about the commission of an offence, he is expected first to find out whether the offence disclosed fell into the category of cognizable offences or non-cognizable offences-There is no provision in any law, including Section 154 or 155 of the Cr.P.C., which authorizes an Officer Incharge of a Police Station to hold any enquiry to assess the correctness or falsity of the information before complying with the command of the said provisions-He is obligated to reduce the same into writing, notwithstanding the fact whether such information is true or otherwise-Condition precedent for recording an FIR is that it should convey the information of an offence and that too a cognizable one-Remedy of filing a direct complaint cannot measure or match up to the mechanism provided under section 154, Cr.P.C., in which the Officer Incharge of a Police Station is duty bound to record the statement and register the FIR if a cognizable offence is made out-If in each and every case it is presumed or assumed that instead of insisting or emphasizing the lodgment of an FIR, the party may file a direct complaint, then the purpose of recording an FIR, as envisaged under section 154, Cr.P.C., will become redundant and futile and it would be very easy for the police to refuse the registration of an FIR with the advice to file direct complaint-However, in some exceptional circumstances, the alternate remedy in the shape of direct complaint may be availed but not in every case.\nMuhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt. PLD 2007 SC 539 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 156-Investigating Officer, duty of-Scope-Investigating Officer plays a crucial role in the administration of the criminal justice system and the constituent of investigation report and its worth keeps hold of plenteous value and repercussions on the outcome of any criminal case-Tainted investigations can become an acute obstacle in the administration of justice.\nSughra Bibi v. State PLD 2018 SC 595 and Babubhai v. State of Gujrat and others (2010) 12 SCC 254 ref.\n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 561-A-Jurisdiction of High Court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C.-Scope-Inherent jurisdiction conferred under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., cannot be deemed to be an alternative jurisdiction or additional jurisdiction and cannot be exploited to disrupt or impede the procedural law on the basis of presumptive findings or hyper technicalities, but it is meant to protect and safeguard the interest of justice to redress grievances of aggrieved persons for which no other procedure or remedy is provided in the Cr.P.C.\nGhulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan PLD 1967 SC 317 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=22-A", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.99-K of 2018, decided on 2nd April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 20.7.2018 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi, Skkur Bench in Crl. M. As Nos.S-531/2016, 81, 29, 63 and 61 of 2017).\nheard on: 2nd April, 2024", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record along with Petitioner in person and Syed Salman (alleged abductee)\nHakim Ali Shah, Addl. A.G. Sagheer Abbasi, Addl A.G., Saleem Akhtar, Addl. P.G., K. A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record, Dr. Sumair Noor, SSP Ghotki, Mushtaq Abbasi, AIG Legal and SIP Zaheer Hussain, SHO Police Station Ghotki for Official Respondents\nMalik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 8.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED QAMBER ALI SHAH-PETITIONER\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24271", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5US8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2963 = 2024 SLD 2963 = 2024 SCMR 1085", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5US8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Petition for leave to appeal challenging acquittal of accused-Contradictions in evidence of witnesses-Interested witnesses-Presence of witnesses at place of occurrence not explained-Admittedly, the deceased was assaulted by a non-lethal weapon (sota); yet being his real brother, and sitting beside the deceased, the petitioner (complainant) sustained no injury, nor was he able to prevent the assault on the deceased-Contradictions and discrepancies in the ocular account of the eye-witnesses diluted the story of the prosecution, whose case rested on the statement of eye-witnesses, who all were closely related to the deceased-Ocular account of the prosecutions interested witnesses was uncorroborated by the available evidence-No one else was present at the place of occurrence-This creates doubt in their testimony, because both the petitioner and the other eye-witness, resided in different villages, that too, at a considerable distance and their joint arrival at the Dera of the deceased, on foot, in the early morning of the last week of December remained unexplained-Presence of these witnesses at the crime scene was highly doubtful and questionable-As to the other two eyewitnesses, they were also interested witnesses due to their close relationship with the deceased-Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of respondent beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nNur Muhammad v. Falak Sher PLD 1976 SC 607 ref.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Interested witness, evidence of-Reliance-Testimony of an interested witness should be scrutinized with care and caution-Independent corroborating evidence is essential to test the validity and credibility of the testimonies of interested witnesses-Capital punishment cannot be given on the testimony of an interested witness uncorroborated by any independent evidence.\nAli Ahmed v. The State PLD 1962 SC 102; Dalmir v. The State 1970 SCMR 840; Muhammad Sharif v. Tahirur Rehman 1972 SCMR 144; Hazratullah v. The State 1969 PCr.LJ 138 and Nazir v. The State PLD 1962 SC 269 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Petition for leave to appeal challenging acquittal of accused-Recovery of weapon (sota)-Not consequential in absence of a forensics report-An important aspect of the prosecutions case was the recovery of the weapon (the sota). Respondent (accused) was arrested on 30.12.2007, whereas the said weapon was recovered on 01.01.2008 from his residence 6 days after the occurrence of the crime-According to the Investigating Officer (IO), the weapon was lying under a cot, and it was not stained with blood-Admittedly, the prosecution had not placed anything on the record to show whether the said weapon was sent to the forensic science laboratory for examination-Hence, no significance could be attributed to the recovery of the sota as it was not established as the murder weapon-It was the responsibility of the IO to have presented the sota for forensics to establish that the blows inflicted on the deceased were from the recovered sota, or if any blood or other evidence could have been found on the said weapon, that may have strengthened the story of prosecution-Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of respondent beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nChamkaur Singh v. State of Punjab (20.02.2017 - PHHC): MANU/PH/0266/2017 ref.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Forensic science-Importance of forensic science in the criminal justice system stated.\nForensic deals with the application of scientific techniques to provide objective, circumstantial evidence. Forensic is a science of interest to the legal system, whose objective is to ascertain what happened in the recent past. Forensic science means nothing more than the science which is used in the courts of law for the purposes of detection and prosecution of crime. This science plays a significant role in the criminal justice system by providing data that can be used to assess the degree of guilt of a suspect. For the purposes of our criminal justice system, investigating agencies have to move towards scientific evidence to establish a crime, and proper care and caution must be taken to preserve and protect the crime scene. The tendency to rely on outdated investigative methods places a big question mark on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Crime scenes that are not managed well and do not rely on science will lead to poor-quality evidence and erroneous acquittal. Hence, the police force must make a concerted effort to shift its investigation techniques to include and rely on forensic science and accordingly, train specialized officers in this field.\nH. J. WALLS, FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC CRIME DETECTION (Sweet & Maxwell 2nd) (1974); DONALD A. WILSON, FORENSIC PROCEDURES FOR BOUNDARY AND TITLE INVESTIGATION (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) (2008), 1-2; Mahmood Ahmed. Dr. Abdul Razzak and Imdad Khan, Implementation of Forensic Science in Pakistans Legal Justice System: A Critical Legal Perspective: The Importance of Forensic Evidence and its Principal Function, 5 Pakistan Journal of International Affairs 3 (2022), 742-751 <https://pjia.com.pk/index.php/pjia/article/view/785>; Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 5 SCC 509] (Dharam Deo Yadav) and Ali Haider v. Jameel Hussain PLD 2021 SC 362 ref.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Petition for leave to appeal challenging acquittal of accused-Motive for the crime not established-In relation to the motive of the crime, the impugned judgment of the High Court did not accept that respondent (accused) murdered the deceased because he suspected illicit liaison between the deceased and his wife-Record showed that respondent had already divorced his wife some two years ago-Prosecution had not established the motive given that there was no explanation of the delay-If the respondent did have motive to kill the deceased, then why didnt he do the same in the past when he had suspicions and why did he wait for two years-Thus, the view of the High Court was correct that in the absence of any other corroborating evidence, it did not appear to be a sound and reasonable motive as stated by the prosecution for the commission of the offense-Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of respondent beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.887-L of 2013, decided on 17th April, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 04.07.2013 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Appeal No.613 of 2009 along with M.R. No. 193 of 2009).heard on: 17th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, AYESHA A. MALIK AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Saleem Iqbal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nKhurram Khan, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD RAMZAN-PETITIONER\nVS\nKHIZAR HAYAT AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24272", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5USs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2964 = 2024 SLD 2964 = 2024 SCMR 1096", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5USs", - "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n-S. 52-Land revenue record-Presumption of truth-Oral exchange of land-Proof-Inheritance mutation, legality of-According to section 52 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967, presumption of truth is attached to the entries made in the periodical record of rights i.e. jamabandis/khasra girdawari until contrary is proved-In the present case the jamabandis of the years 1949-50, 1953-54, 1957-58, 1969-70 and 2001-02 as well as khasra girdawari reveal that the exchange of pieces of land by the predecessor of the parties was given effect in the periodical record of rights by entering their names in the column of cultivators-After death of their predecessor, the names of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were also entered in the column of cultivators for the suit land in the jamabandis/khasra girdawari of different years which were not challenged by the predecessor of the petitioners in his lifetime as well as by the petitioners till filing of civil suit by the respondents in March 2005-Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of truth attached with the long standing jamabandis/khasra girdawari for the suit land existing in the names of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 due to exchange transaction-On the contrary, apart from producing confidence inspiring oral evidence, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have also proved the exchange transaction through the exchange deed dated 01.10.1980 which bears thumb impressions of the predecessor of petitioners and his brother, the signatures of respondent No. 1, respondent No. 3 and thumb impression of respondent No. 2-Taking undue advantage of the existence of the name of their predecessor in the column of ownership for the suit land in the jamabandis, after his death, the petitioners managed impugned inheritance mutation dated 21.04.1991 in their names by concealing the factum of exchange of the suit land as well as long standing cultivating possession of the respondents over the suit land since the year 1945-Appellate Court and Revisional Court had rightly decreed the suit of the respondents and dismissed that of the petitioners-Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nAbdul Ahad v. Roshan Din PLD 1979 SC 890; Hakim Khan v. Aurangzeb 1979 SCMR 625; Aurangzeb v. Muhammad Jaffar 2007 SCMR 236 and Muhammad Amir v. Mst. Beevi 2007 SCMR 614 ref.\n(b) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n-S. 42-Mutation entries-Scope-Mutation by itself does not create title and it carries a rebuttable presumption.\nGhulam Sarwar v. Ghulam Sakina 2019 SCMR 567; Fazal Ellahi v. Zainab Bi 2019 SCMR 1930 and Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar 2022 SCMR 1054 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.394-P of 2010, decided on 15th March, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 07.05.2010 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in C.R. No. 456 of 2009 with C.M. No. 691 of 2009).\nheard on: 15th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ, IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Zahoor Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for the Petitioners (Through video link from Peshawar).\nZiaur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (Through video link from Peshawar)\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 4 to 12.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. JEHAN BANO AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nMEHRABAN SHAH AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24273", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2965 = 2024 SLD 2965 = 2024 SCMR 1103", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTk", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 34, 109, 406, 419, 420, 467, 468 & 471-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Banking scam-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Accused was alleged to be one of the beneficiaries of a banking scam, who had received part of the misappropriated amount-Petitioner (accused) was not named in the list of 287 account holders who were nominated in the alleged unlawful transactions-Sole allegation against the petitioner was that his bank statements indicated receipt of a certain amount in his account as a beneficiary from an account holder of the bank-However, it was notable that the account holder in question from whom the amount was transferred to the petitioner was not implicated or nominated in the FIR-Furthermore, the alleged amount was not transferred to the petitioners account at the bank where the scam occurred but was received allegedly in an account maintained by the petitioner at another bank, which was registered in the name of a business-Mere receipt of funds in a bank account could not be construed as proof of involvement in the scam at present stage as there was insufficient and incomplete material available on the record to establish any connection of the petitioner-Petitioners criminal liability could only be determined after recording of evidence by the Trial Court-Mere nomination of the petitioner in the FIR without substantive material and without nominating the account holder by whom the amount was allegedly transferred in the bank account of the petitioners company was insufficient to justify his further detention-Petitioner was behind the bars for more than nine months, and there was no likelihood of progress in the trial-Case of the petitioner was one of further inquiry-Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, and the petitioner was granted bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=34,109,406,419,420,467,468,471Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 155 of 2024, decided on 21st March, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 14.02.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. No. 5258-B of 2023).\nheard on: 21st March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Asim Ali Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMughees Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan and M. Sheraz, I.O. FIA for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED SAKHAWAT HUSSAIN-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24274", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2966 = 2024 SLD 2966 = 2024 SCMR 1106", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UTg", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)-Specific performance of oral agreement to sell-Suit decreed on the purported statement of the defendants attorney-Legality-Suit seeking specific performance of the oral agreement was filed on 25 January 1996 and summons were issued to the defendant for 19 February 1996-But, on 29 January 1996, a person came forward stating that he was the attorney of the defendant and that he had no objection if the suit was decreed-Suit was accordingly decreed-Defendant on coming to know of the decree filed an application under section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which was allowed by the trial Court, and such order was maintained upto the High Court-Validity-Suit filed by the plaintiff (petitioner) should never have been decreed-Suit was filed on 25 January 1996 and the return date for the summons issued to the defendant was 19 February 1996, however, only after four days, that is, on 29 January 1996, the suit was decreed-No application for ante-dating the date, that is, 19 February 1996, was submitted in the suit, and no order was passed ante-dating the date already fixed-Order of 29 January 1996 stated that the counsel for the defendant was in attendance, but it was not explained when service of summons was effected and who engaged the counsel to represent him, nor who had signed his vakalatnama-Suit was decreed on the statement of the purported attorney, therefore, it was incumbent upon the Judge to satisfy himself as to his identity, to ensure that he was the duly constituted attorney of the defendant and that the power of attorney authorized the attorney to agree to the suit being decreed, but none of these aspects were noted by the Judge-Stated power of attorney was also not exhibited, and, if its photocopy was produced then the Judge had to see the original thereof and exhibit it, after comparing it with the original and noting that it was a true copy thereof-Since none of the aforesaid aspects were considered the judgment and decree dated 29 January 1996 was not sustainable-Application of defendant under section 12(2), C.P.C. was maintainable and was rightly allowed-Consequently, leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed with costs imposed on the petitioner throughout.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 630-L of 2014, decided on 17th April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 27.02.2014 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Writ Petition No.6807 of 2012).\nheard on: 17th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Shah Abbas, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "EJAZ AHMAD-PETITIONER\nVS\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, PASROOR AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24275", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2967 = 2024 SLD 2967 = 2024 SCMR 1109", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UXo", - "Key Words:": "Police Rules, 1934-\n-R. 19.25-Police force-Proforma promotion-Litigation by police officials for promotion and other service-related benefits-Propriety-As per Rule 19.25 of the Police Rules, 1934, officers have to undergo various courses (A, B, C and D) to qualify for promotion-Training of upper subordinates, being Inspector, Sub-Inspector (SI) and Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI), is a mandatory requirement of law for the purposes of promotion in terms of Rule 19.25 of the Rules-Focus of Rule 19.25 of the Rules is capacity building in order to develop knowledge, skill and the necessary traits required for the post and rank-Being a disciplined force, the tendency to focus on promotions of juniors is totally irrelevant within the police department, where the primary focus and emphasis for promotion purposes should be training and capacity building-Hence, for all intents and purposes, promotion from the date of the promotion of juniors is not possible for upper subordinates in terms of the clear provisions of Rule 19.25-An officer must complete the required course(s) before seeking promotion-Furthermore, ante-dated promotion upsets the training requirement-Institution of police cannot thrive if it is consistently consumed in litigation for promotion and other service-related benefits-Hence, it is imperative that officers should focus on building institutional credibility and trust in the eyes of the public and develop an effective system of governance on service-related matters so as to end the trend of litigation on such matters.\nSyed Hammad Nabi v. Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 584; Muhammad Amjad v. The Director General, Quetta Development Authority 2022 SCMR 797; Kashif Aftab Ahmed Abbasi v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1618 and Naveed Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 SCMR 1133 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Police Rules, 1934=19.25", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.3-L of 2016, decided on 17th April, 2024.\n(Against order dated 04.03.2015 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.39 of 2014).\nheard on: 17th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, AYESHA A. MALIK AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister M. Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate General, Punjab with Ms. Rubina, D.S.P. for Appellants.\nZafar Hussain Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record for L.Rs. of Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, PUNJAB AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nWARIS ALI (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24276", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2968 = 2024 SLD 2968 = 2024 SCMR 1116", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5UXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Petition for leave to appeal challenging acquittal of accused-High Court, while acquitting the accused persons, had rightly observed that there were marked improvements in the depositions of the witnesses which were not in conformity with the medical evidence and these evidences were neither reliable nor confidence aspiring-Statement recorded by the petitioner (complainant) under section 161, Cr.P.C. , and the ones made by her during the trial and her cross-examination were at variance with each other which put a dent in the case and cast a shadow of doubt about the veracity of the events-High Court had also noted that as per the FIR the incident took place in the early hours of the morning i.e. 05:00am, when there was hardly any light and that there was darkness with no source of light-Two female witnesses of the occurrence were never produced during the investigation-Moreover, the High Court rightly observed that if the enmity between the parties was with regard to murder of person H , the elder brother of the petitioner, then why the respondents (accused persons) would murder person I i.e. the deceased and why not son of the deceased, who was stated to be nominated in the murder of person H and was on bail-Investigating Officer had recommended discharge of the respondents-Present case appeared to be fraught with many doubtful circumstances, benefit of which would naturally extend to the respondents-Impugned judgement of the High Court did not warrant any interference-Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and petition was accordingly dismissed.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Principle-For giving benefit of doubt there may not be many circumstances, as a single doubt is enough to give benefit of the same to the accused.\nTariq Parvez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. The Sate 2009 SCMR 230; Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857; Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048; Abdul Jabbar v. The State 2019 SCMR 129 and Maqsood Alam v. The State 2024 SCMR 156 ref.\n(c) Appeal against acquittal-\n-Double presumption of innocence-Scope-Scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is most narrow and limited, because in an acquittal the presumption of innocence is significantly added to the cardinal rule of criminal jurisprudence, that an accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty; in other words, the presumption of innocence is doubled-Courts are very slow in interfering with such an acquittal judgment, unless it is shown to be perverse, is passed in gross violation of law, or suffers from the errors of grave misreading or non-reading of the evidence.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 412-L of 2014, decided on 18th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.2.2014 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No.1163 of 2010 with Murder Reference No. 284 of 2010).\nheard on: 18th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": " MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, AYESHA A. MALIK AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN,JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Shah Abbas (via video link, Lahore) for Petitioner.\nKhurram Khan, Addl. PG, Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SARDARAN BIBI-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24277", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5TTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 2969 = 2024 SLD 2969 = 2024 PLD 576", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5TTc", - "Key Words:": "Rules of Business, 1973-\n-R. 5(15)-Secretariat Instructions, 2005, Instruction Nos. 65, 66, 67, 67-A & Appendix F, Clauses 1, 4-Housing (Askari Colonies Management) (Askari Housing) [ the petitioner ]-Advocate On Record (AOR) filed present Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal (CPLA), without first ascertaining the petitioners legal status; he assumed that the Authority Letter issued by an Assistant Director of Askari Housing was sufficient, and, on its basis also engaged an Advocate Supreme Court (ASC)-Underlying assumption of the AOR being that the executive authority of the Federation can be exercised by Askari Housing through its Assistant Director-Question was whether Askari Housing is a legal entity established by law and whether it has the locus standi to initiate and defend legal proceeding-Held, that neither Askari Housing nor its Officer Incharge is a separate entity-In the present case the requisite authorisation to initiate/defend legal proceedings was also not obtained-If the High Courts judgment was to be challenged it had to be done by one of the legal entities which have been arrayed as respondents herein, and after obtaining requisite approval/permission-Petitioner arraying them as respondents suggests that the respondents were satisfied with the judgment of the High Court, which has been assailed herein-As regards the query whether the petitioner (Askari Housing) could engage a private counsel the Supreme Court did not receive any answer from the counsel-Askari Housing is a component of the Federal Government and has no independent legal status-Private counsel can only be engaged as stipulated in the decision in Rasheed Ahmeds case reported as Rasheed Ahmad v. Federation (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 121)-Present CPLA has been filed without complying with the Rules of Business, 1973 and the Secretariat Instructions 2005, and permission to engage private counsel was also not obtained in terms of Rasheed Ahmeds case-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.\nRasheed Ahmad v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2017 SC 121 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Rules of Business, 1973=5(15)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1026 of 2021 along with C.M.A. No. 5076 of 2021, decided on 25th October, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 2.11.2020 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Const. P. No.D-2890 of 2018), (C.M.A. seeking special permission to argue the case on behalf of respondents Nos.5 to 8)).\nheard on: 25th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J., AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abid S. Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.\nNemo for Applicant (in C.M.A. No. 5076 of 2021).", - "Petitioner Name:": "OFFICER INCHARGE ARMY HOUSING DIRECTORATE, KARACHI- PETITIONERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND OTHERS-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24278", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5QTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3006 = 2024 SLD 3006 = 2024 SCMR 1049 = 2024 PTD 798", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFF5QTg", - "Key Words:": "Cantonments Act (II of 1924)-\n-S. 60(1) [as amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act (XLVII of 2023)] & Sched. VII-Cantonments (Amendment) Act (XLVII of 2023), S. 2(a)(i)-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 140A, 163 & Fourth Sched., Pt.1, Entry 2-Rules of Business, 1973, Second Sched., Entry 7(a)(ii)-Cantonment Boards-Professional tax-Cantonment Boards are not empowered to impose professional tax on those engaged in professions, trades, callings or employments in cantonment areas-Professional tax mentioned in Article 163 of the Constitution recovered by the Cantonment Boards is unconstitutional-Section 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 [as amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023] and its Schedule VII to the extent that they may authorize the imposition of the professional taxes are ultra vires the Constitution.\nSection 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 dealing with general power of taxation was amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023, which also made additions to Schedule VII of the Cantonments Act, 1924 and included therein the professional taxes. The administrative division mentioned in section 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 is defined in section 2(a)(i) of the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023, as: administrative division means the division to which business of cantonments stands allocated. The Second Schedule to the Rules of Business, 1973, stipulates that the business of cantonments stands allocated to the Defense Division. The aforesaid change meant that, previously the sanction of the Federal Government was required to be obtained for cantonment boards to impose taxes but now it has been delegated to a Division. This downgrading the power of the Federal Government does not seem to conform to democratic principles and obfuscates transparency.\nArticle 163 of the Constitution alone authorizes the provinces to impose the professional taxes, and the Supreme Court has already decided this very issue in the case reported as ICI Pakistan Ltd. v. Tehsil Council (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 428) (the ICI case). The attempt to distinguish the ICI case on the ground that, after the insertion of Article 140A into the Constitution it changed the existing constitutional scheme, is not correct. Neither has Article 163 been made redundant nor has Article 140A empowered the Federation, including cantonment boards, to impose the professional taxes. It is also not correct to state that since the second entry of the Federal Legislative List mentions local self-government and cantonment areas the Federation has been authorized to impose the professional taxes. Article 163 of the Constitution specifically empowers the provinces to impose the professional taxes; it is the only provision in the Constitution which permits or authorizes this, and it must be given effect to; it cannot be disregarded or whittled down by untenable submissions.\nICI Pakistan Ltd. v. Tehsil Council PLD 2007 SC 428 fol.\nSection 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 [as amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023] and its Schedule VII to the extent that they may authorize the imposition of the professional taxes are ultra vires the Constitution. The professional taxes mentioned in Article 163 of the Constitution recovered by the Cantonment Boards is unconstitutional, consequently, they cannot be retrained, which should be refunded and would have to be refunded. Appeals were dismissed with costs throughout.\nPfizer Laboratories Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 64 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Cantonments Act, 1924=60(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1363 to 1365 of 2018 and Civil Misc. Application No. 4728 of 2023, decided on 13th October, 2023.\nCivil Appeals Nos. 1363 to 1365 of 2018\n(against the judgment dated 15.07.2017 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Constitution Petitions Nos. D-2892/14, d- 1135 and d-3539 of 2016).\nAnd\nCivil Misc. Application no. 4728 of 2023\nheard on: 13th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J., AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants:\n(In all cases)\nMuhammad Umer Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court.\nAssisted by Ch. Abubakar.\nZaki Haider, CEO, Clifton.\nAamir Rashid, CEO, Faisal.\nTanveer Ashraf, Director, ML & C. and Javed Abbasi, Law Officer, ML & C.\n(Through video-link from Karachi)\nFor the Applicant:\n M. Naeem Sadiq, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 4728 of 2023).\nOn Court's Notice:\nMansoor Usman Awan, Attorney-General for Pakistan and Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney-General.\nRespondents Nos. 1-2:\nEx-parte (in C.A. No. 1363 of 2018).\nFor Respondent No. 1:\nTahir Ishaq Mughal, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Shaista Altaf, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1364 of 2018).\nFor Govt. of Sindh:\nZeeshan Adhi, Additional Advocate-General, Sindh.\nSaifullah, Asst. Advocate-General, Sindh.\nGhulam Nabi Shah, Addl. Director Excise and Taxation.\nAyaz Ali Mangi, Dy. Director (P-II).\n(Through video-link from Karachi) (in C.As. Nos. 1364 and 1365 of 2018)\nRespondents Nos. 2, 3 and 5:\nEx-parte (in C.A. No. 1364 of 2018).\nRespondents Nos. 1 and 3:\nEx-parte (in C.A. 1365 of 2018).", - "Petitioner Name:": "[FOR IMPLEADMENT BY MESSRS ZUBI INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LIMITED, THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT MANAGER, HAFIZ ZAHID HASSAN]\nIN C.A. 1363 OF 2018\nCANTONMENT BOARD FAISAL AND ANOTHER-APPELLANTS\nVERSUS\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, KARACHI AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS\nAND\nIN C.A. 1364 OF 2018\nCANTONMENT BOARD CLIFTON, KARACHI-APPELLANT\nVERSUS\nK & N FOODS (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS\nAND\nIN C.A. 1365 OF 2018\nCANTONMENT BOARD CLIFTON, KARACHI-APPELLANT\nVERSUS\nMESSRS VENUS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24279", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFJ5TTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3007 = 2024 SLD 3007 = 2024 PTD 573", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFJ5TTQ", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.32, 32-A, 80 & 83-SRO 1125(I)/2011 dated 31.12.2011-Public Notice No. 0312014(A) dated 25-06-2014-Mis-declaration-Imported goods, classification of-Goods cleared under S. 83 of the Customs Act, 1969-Post-release stage-Recovery of sales tax-Legality- Clearance / Adjudication Collectorate, jurisdiction of-Scope-Both the consignments, in the present case, were physically examined and the Examination Report confirmed the product to be Thermoplastic Rubber (TPR) in granule form (Styrene Butadiene Styrene) of Sofpen Brand imported from Italy-In both the consignments, the description was accepted as Synthetic Rubber classified under PCT heading 4002.9900 and the Respondent /Collectorate granted benefit of zero rating of sales tax under Notification SRO 1125(I)/2011 dated 31.12.2011 (‘the SRO’)-After release of the goods in the years 2016 and 2017, the Show-Cause Notice was issued in the year 2018 for recovery of sales tax and income tax-Both the Clearance Officer and the Adjudicating Officer had no jurisdiction to recover the amount of sales tax and income tax when the goods declaration were assessed under S.80 of the Customs Act, 1969 and gated out under the provisions of S.83 of the Customs Act, 1969-Respondent /Collectorate was applying the provision of Public Notice No.03/2014(A) dated 25-06-2014 (‘the Public Notice ’) on presumption basis that the goods- in-question (in both the Goods Declarations) were never tested in Customs House Laboratory or in other Laboratory while the goods covered in the Public Notice was tested in the PCSIR Laboratory and found to be Compounded Rubber-Thus, provision of the Public Notice could not be applied on presumption basis that the Appellant/Importer had imported Compounded Rubber of PCT heading 4005.1090 instead of his declarations -Clearance Collectorate as well as Adjudication Collectorate had no jurisdiction to adjudicate / recover sales tax at post release stage-Sales tax was not recoverable from the appellant / importer as no mis-declaration was made out-Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside Show-Cause .Notice and the impugned Order-vi- Original passed by the Collector of Customs (Adjudication ) and remitted the penalty having been imposed upon the Appellant /Importer-Appeal filed by the Importer was allowed, in circumstances.\nNestle Pakistan Ltd. v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2023 PTD 527 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,32-A,80,83", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-281 of 2019, decided on 31st May, 2023, heard on: 22nd March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Abbas for Appellant.\nQasim Rabbani, AO for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS WARESA INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. \nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, PORT MUHAMMAD BIN QASIM, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24280", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFJ5TS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3008 = 2024 SLD 3008 = 2024 PTD 595 = (2025) 131 TAX 514", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFJ5TS8", - "Key Words:": "Mis-declaration – Measurement Controversy in Bicycle Imports – Burden of Proof on Customs Authorities\nDetails:\nThe case involved the alleged mis-declaration of goods by an importer of CKD (Completely Knocked Down) bicycles, with specific controversy surrounding the measurement and sizing of bicycle frames. The goods were initially confiscated, but the importer was offered redemption of goods upon payment of 35% fine under SRO 499(I)/2009, along with applicable duties and taxes.\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal ruled in favour of the importer, finding that there was no guilty intention and that the size discrepancy arose due to differing measurement styles—one used by the Customs Authorities, and another by the consigner and importer. The importer had attempted to explain their method, but Customs Authorities disregarded the explanation and failed to establish any statutory or regulatory basis for their method of measurement.\nThe Tribunal found that:\nThe goods were imported by weight (kilograms), not by frame size, making the authorities basis for mis-declaration invalid.\nThe onus to prove mis-declaration was on the Customs Department, which they failed to discharge.\nNo discrepancy in description was found when viewed under the appropriate standard of measurement.\nUpon reference by the Customs Department challenging the Tribunal’s decision, the High Court upheld the Tribunal’s findings, holding that no case of mis-declaration was made out.\nHeld:\nNo mis-declaration was established as the discrepancy arose solely due to measurement methods. The Customs Authorities failed to provide a legal basis for their claims. The Customs reference was dismissed, and the findings of the Tribunal were affirmed.\nSRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13-06-2009 – permitting redemption of confiscated goods on payment of 35% fine\nPrinciple: Burden of proof in cases of mis-declaration lies with the Customs Department; differing measurement methods, without regulatory backing, cannot support allegations of mis-declaration.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19A,32(1),32(2),79(1),156 (1),156(1)(14)General Clauses Act, 1897=24A", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.20 and C.M.As. Nos.396, 428 of 2022, decided on 27th April, 2022, heard on: 27th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": " IRFAN SAADAT KHPN AND MAHMOOD A. KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aamir Raza for Applicant.\nNone for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (LAW), MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE\nVS\nMESSRS HKL TRADERS, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24281", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFJ5TSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3009 = 2024 SLD 3009 = 2024 PTD 644 = (2025) 131 TAX 329", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFJ5TSs", - "Key Words:": "Interpretation of Recorded Value and Imposition of Capital Value Tax (CVT) under the Punjab Finance Act, 2012\nDetails:\n(a) The case involved the interpretation of the term recorded value under Section 6(2)(g) of the Punjab Finance Act, 2012. The court clarified that the term covers situations where the recorded value is less than the property value specified in the valuation table notified by the district collector. This interpretation also applies to cases where the recorded value or consideration amount is absent. The court emphasized that any other interpretation would undermine the statutes intent and could lead to fraudulent use.\n(b) The second issue concerned the imposition of Capital Value Tax (CVT) on lease deeds for immovable properties extending for twenty years or more. The petitioners contended that such leases should be charged under Article 35 of Schedule-I to the Stamp Act, 1899, rather than Article 23. The High Court noted that the Chief Revenue Authority, as defined under Section 2(8) of the Stamp Act, 1899, has the jurisdiction to examine and determine the proper duty under Sections 56 and 57. The court refrained from giving an opinion on the chargeability of instruments, opting to follow the statutory procedure. It referred the matter to the Chief Revenue Authority to decide on the applicable stamp duty and clarify whether the instruments fall under Article 23 or 35.\nHeld: The High Court disposed of the constitutional petition by referring the question of stamp duty chargeability to the Chief Revenue Authority and outlined specific questions for determination, including the amount of duty payable under Article 35 and whether the lease instruments could be covered under Article 23.\nCitations: Punjab Finance Act, 2012 (XLI of 2012), Section 6(2)(g); Stamp Act, 1899 (II of 1899), Sections 2(8), 56, 57, Schedule-I, \nArticles 23 & 35.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Stamp Act, of 1899=2(8),56,57,Schedule-1,Arts.23,35Punjab Finance Act, 2012 =6,6(2)(g)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 229002 of 2018, decided on 12th January, 2024, heard on: 21st December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": " ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Ansar Hussain for Petitioners.\nNadeem Saeed and Muhammad Mustafa Khalid for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 249094, 249098 and 249095 of 2018).\nNoraiz Ismail Gondal, Khalil-ur-Rehman and Ali Ashraf Mughal for Petitioners (in connected petitions).\nRizwan Khalid Awan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 256421/2018).\nBarrister Hassan Safdar Khan and Rana Muhammad Ansar for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 73615/2023).\nMian Imran Mushtaq for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 9665/2019).\nCh. Muhammad Aslam for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 2846/2019).\nRana Ahmad Tayyab Shahid for Petitioner (in W.Ps. Nos. 198788/2018, 150099/2018 and 198785/2018).\nZahid Manzoor Awan, Riaz Ahmad Tahir, Rana Shahzad Khalid, Abida Abdul Khaliq and Mian Najam-us-Saqib for Petitioners (in connected petitions).\nCh. Muhammad Aslam for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 2846/2019).\nShehzad Hassan Pervaiz for Petitioner (in W.P. No.7650/2023).\nMudassar Abbas Maghiana and Faheem Ali Sipra for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 38252/2021).\nRizwan Khalid Awan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 256421/2018).\nShahzad Haq Pervaiz for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 7650/2023).\nNadeem Ahmad Saeed for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 2093/2020).\nFaheem Ali Sipra for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 38252/2021).\nSameer Iqbal Awan and Aamir Saleem Khan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 35714/2021).\nMalik Muhammad Afzal Khokhar for Petitioner (in W.P. No.8285/2020).\nFalak Sher Khan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 194099/2018).\nMian Imran Mushtaq for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 9665/2019).\nDr. Bibi Saira Nbuman and Muhammad Nouman Shamas Qazi for Petitioner.\nSajid Hussain Qureshi, Abrar Ahmad Chaudhary and Ch. Muslim Abbas for Petitioner.\nMalik Shah Muhammad Ali Awan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 16323/2019 and W.P. No.50440/2019).\nTariq Hussain Maken for Petitioner.\nRana Nasr Ullah Khan for Petitioners (in connected petitions). For Respondents.\nWaqar Saeed Khan, Assistant A.G.\nCh. Imtiaz Elahi, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan along with Muhammad Rana Khalid Masood, Assistant Secretary (Tax- II), Board of Revenue.\nMuhammad Junaid, Senior Inspector of Stamps Board of Revenue Punjab.\nKhalid Mehmood Tipu, Secretary Taxes Board of Revenue Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. ZUMARAD SIDDIQUE AND OTHERS \nVS\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24282", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFJ5TSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3009 = 2024 SLD 3009 = 2024 PTD 644 = (2025) 131 TAX 329", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVITFJ5TSs", - "Key Words:": "Interpretation of Recorded Value and Imposition of Capital Value Tax (CVT) under the Punjab Finance Act, 2012\nDetails:\n(a) The case involved the interpretation of the term recorded value under Section 6(2)(g) of the Punjab Finance Act, 2012. The court clarified that the term covers situations where the recorded value is less than the property value specified in the valuation table notified by the district collector. This interpretation also applies to cases where the recorded value or consideration amount is absent. The court emphasized that any other interpretation would undermine the statutes intent and could lead to fraudulent use.\n(b) The second issue concerned the imposition of Capital Value Tax (CVT) on lease deeds for immovable properties extending for twenty years or more. The petitioners contended that such leases should be charged under Article 35 of Schedule-I to the Stamp Act, 1899, rather than Article 23. The High Court noted that the Chief Revenue Authority, as defined under Section 2(8) of the Stamp Act, 1899, has the jurisdiction to examine and determine the proper duty under Sections 56 and 57. The court refrained from giving an opinion on the chargeability of instruments, opting to follow the statutory procedure. It referred the matter to the Chief Revenue Authority to decide on the applicable stamp duty and clarify whether the instruments fall under Article 23 or 35.\nHeld: The High Court disposed of the constitutional petition by referring the question of stamp duty chargeability to the Chief Revenue Authority and outlined specific questions for determination, including the amount of duty payable under Article 35 and whether the lease instruments could be covered under Article 23.\nCitations: Punjab Finance Act, 2012 (XLI of 2012), Section 6(2)(g); Stamp Act, 1899 (II of 1899), Sections 2(8), 56, 57, Schedule-I, \nArticles 23 & 35.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Stamp Act, of 1899=2(8),56,57,Schedule-1,Arts.23,35Punjab Finance Act, 2012 =6,6(2)(g)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 229002 of 2018, decided on 12th January, 2024, heard on: 21st December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Ansar Hussain for Petitioners.\nNadeem Saeed and Muhammad Mustafa Khalid for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 249094, 249098 and 249095 of 2018).\nNoraiz Ismail Gondal, Khalil-ur-Rehman and Ali Ashraf Mughal for Petitioners (in connected petitions).\nRizwan Khalid Awan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 256421/2018).\nBarrister Hassan Safdar Khan and Rana Muhammad Ansar for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 73615/2023).\nMian Imran Mushtaq for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 9665/2019).\nCh. Muhammad Aslam for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 2846/2019).\nRana Ahmad Tayyab Shahid for Petitioner (in W.Ps. Nos. 198788/2018, 150099/2018 and 198785/2018).\nZahid Manzoor Awan, Riaz Ahmad Tahir, Rana Shahzad Khalid, Abida Abdul Khaliq and Mian Najam-us-Saqib for Petitioners (in connected petitions).\nCh. Muhammad Aslam for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 2846/2019).\nShehzad Hassan Pervaiz for Petitioner (in W.P. No.7650/2023).\nMudassar Abbas Maghiana and Faheem Ali Sipra for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 38252/2021).\nRizwan Khalid Awan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 256421/2018).\nShahzad Haq Pervaiz for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 7650/2023).\nNadeem Ahmad Saeed for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 2093/2020).\nFaheem Ali Sipra for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 38252/2021).\nSameer Iqbal Awan and Aamir Saleem Khan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 35714/2021).\nMalik Muhammad Afzal Khokhar for Petitioner (in W.P. No.8285/2020).\nFalak Sher Khan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 194099/2018).\nMian Imran Mushtaq for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 9665/2019).\nDr. Bibi Saira Nbuman and Muhammad Nouman Shamas Qazi for Petitioner.\nSajid Hussain Qureshi, Abrar Ahmad Chaudhary and Ch. Muslim Abbas for Petitioner.\nMalik Shah Muhammad Ali Awan for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 16323/2019 and W.P. No.50440/2019).\nTariq Hussain Maken for Petitioner.\nRana Nasr Ullah Khan for Petitioners (in connected petitions). For Respondents.\nWaqar Saeed Khan, Assistant A.G.\nCh. Imtiaz Elahi, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan along with Muhammad Rana Khalid Masood, Assistant Secretary (Tax- II), Board of Revenue.\nMuhammad Junaid, Senior Inspector of Stamps Board of Revenue Punjab.\nKhalid Mehmood Tipu, Secretary Taxes Board of Revenue Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. ZUMARAD SIDDIQUE AND OTHERS \nVS\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24283", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3011 = 2024 SLD 3011 = 2024 PTD 736 = (2025) 132 TAX 366", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDRTg", - "Key Words:": "This legal case concerns a Constitutional Petition filed by importers under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The petitioners sought interim relief from the High Court, specifically requesting that the court order the customs authorities to release their imported consignments upon payment of duties based on their declared transactional values, while securing the differential amount.\nThe Courts Decision: Dismissed the Petition.\nKey Reasons for Dismissal:\nExistence of Alternate and Efficacious Remedies: The Court emphasized that the Customs Act, 1969, provides a complete statutory framework to challenge a Valuation Ruling (issued under Section 25-A). The available remedies are:\nA Revision before the Director General (Valuation) under Section 25-D.\nAn Appeal before the Customs Appellate Tribunal under Section 194-A.\nA final Reference to the High Court itself under Section 196.\nSince these specific remedies exist, directly invoking the High Courts constitutional jurisdiction is barred by law.\nInterim Relief Would Pre-empt the Statutory Process: The Court reasoned that granting the interim relief sought by the petitioners would effectively decide the main issue (the validity of the Valuation Ruling) before the specialized statutory forums could hear it. This would amount to the High Court overstepping its constitutional jurisdiction and frustrating the statutory remedial process.\nDiscretionary Nature of Constitutional Jurisdiction: The power under Article 199 is discretionary and is not to be used as a substitute for statutory appeals, especially in routine matters like this. It is typically invoked only when no other legal remedy exists.\nAdequacy of Final Remedy: The Court noted that if the petitioners are ultimately successful in challenging the Valuation Ruling through the proper statutory channels, they have the right to claim a refund of any excess duties and taxes paid. Therefore, they are not without a remedy.\nConclusion: The High Court refused to exercise its discretionary constitutional power to grant interim relief, stating that the petitioners must first exhaust the alternate remedies specifically provided by the Customs Act, 1969.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25-A,25-D,194-A,196Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Constitution Petitions Nos.D-4972 D-1573, D-5966 and D-5626 of 2023, decided on 31st January, 2024. dates of hearing: 5th, 19th and 20th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND ZULFIQAR AHMED KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saad Shafiq Siddiqui, Imran Iqbal Khan, Muhammad Adeel Awan, Aneel Zia, Saima Syed, Asadullah Jan and Rana Sakhawat Ali for Petitioners (in all Petitions)\nSardar Zafar Hussain, Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Fahim Raza Khuhro, Ghulam Mujtaba Sahito, Alqamah Bin Mehmood and Muhammad Ishaq Pirzada for Respondents (in all Petitions).\nQazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General.\nKhalid Jawed Khan, Amicus Curiae.\nMuhammad Nauman Tashfeen, Additional Director (Valuation), Azka Zafar Rana, Deputy Director (Valuation), Tariq Aziz, Assistant Collector (SAPT Collectorate), Amin Haider Shah, Deputy Collector (West Collectorate) and Rahat Naseem, Assistant Collector, (SAPT Collectorate).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAMIM AHMED AND ANOTHER\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24284", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3012 = 2024 SLD 3012 = 2024 PTD 747", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDRXo", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 2(s), 9, 16, 17, 80, 90, 139, 156(1) Cl. (8), 168 & 196-Imports and Exports (Control) Act (XXXIX of 1950), S. 3-Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947), Preamble-SRO No. 566(I)/2005, dated 06-06-2005-State Bank Notification No. F.E.2/2017-SB, dated 30-08-2017 issued by the State bank of Pakistan-Smuggling of Pakistani currency-Seizure-Scope-Allegation against the passenger (Afghan National) was that Pakistani currency of Rs.330,0000/= was recovered from his possession concealed in a pillow, for which he failed to produce documentary proof-Said currency, however, was released vide order-in-original, which order was maintained by the Appellate Tribunal-Validity-Record revealed that the Appellate Tribunal had upheld the judgment/order of the Adjudicating Officer only in view of the factual position of the case that nothing had been brought on record which could remotely suggest that the respondent/ accused had ever entered in the NLC Baggage Hall of the concerned Customs Station, since despite installation of CCTV Cameras therein, no photographs or film was brought on the record which could suggest that he was therein at the relevant time-Applicant / Customs Department could not bring on the record the copy of passport showing that a visa was imposed thereon by the concerned Consulate showing the respondent/ accused in fact was proceeding to Afghanistan with huge amount of currency which was not permitted to be taken along and amounted to smuggling in terms of provisions of the Customs Act, 1969-Thus, question of law had not arisen out of the impugned judgment / order passed by the Tribunal, for the determination of High Court-Reference application filed by the Customs Department was declined, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),9,16,17,80,90,139,156(1)(8),156(1)168,156(1)196Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947=Preamble", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.52-P of 2022, decided on 23rd November, 2022, heard on: 23rd November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUSARRAT HILALI AND ABDUL SHAKOOR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Javaid Akhtar for Petitioner.\nQazi Babar Irshad for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (ENFORCEMENT), CUSTOM HOUSE, JAMRUD ROAD, PESHAWAR\nVS\nMESSRS SHAH WALI AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24285", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3013 = 2024 SLD 3013 = 2024 PTD 754 = (2025) 131 TAX 72", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDRXk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Valuation – Authority to Determine Values of Imported Goods\nCustoms Act, 1969 – Sections 25, 25-A, 25-D\nFinance Act, 2019 (Amendments to the Customs Act, 1969)\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, an importer, challenged the authority of the Assistant Collector of Customs in issuing a Circular/Notification titled Assessment Alert regarding the valuation of imported goods. The Assistant Collector argued that the Assessment Alert was issued with the approval of the Collector of Customs. The key issue before the court was whether the Collector of Customs or Assistant Collector had the authority to determine and notify values of imported goods, particularly after amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2019.\nHeld:\nThe High Court ruled that, post-Finance Act, 2019, under Section 25-A of the Customs Act, 1969, only the Director of Valuation has the authority to determine values of imported goods and notify them. Any aggrieved party may seek revision under Section 25-D. The Collector of Customs can only make a reference to the Director of Valuation but cannot issue valuation rulings or notifications. The impugned Assessment Alert was not a Valuation Ruling but merely a Valuation Advice, which has no binding force under Section 25. The High Court declared the circular/notification invalid, holding that assessments must be made strictly under Section 25, and any determination outside its framework is unauthorized. The constitutional petition was allowed.\nRelevant Case Law:\nKings Pen Company v. Collector of Customs (2005 PTD 118)\nHabib ur Rehman & Company v. Collector of Customs (2005 PTD 69)\nM.M.M. Traders v. Deputy Collector of Customs (2006 PTD 313)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25-A,25-D", - "Case #": "C.P. No.D-205 of 2023, decided on 18th January, 2023.heard on: 18th January, 2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Nabi Shar for Petitioner.\nShah Nawaz Sahto for Respondents.\nQazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General.\nSardar Amin Farooqui, Assistant Collector.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UNIVERSAL RECYCLING THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION/CHAIRMAN FBR AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24286", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3014 = 2024 SLD 3014 = 2024 PTD 764", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTc", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.187, 2(s), 16, 156(1)(8), 156(1)(89), 168 & 171-Smuggling-Vehicle, confiscation of-Self-made /fake-digits chassis number, allegation of- Not proved-Plea of the owner of vehicle (crane)was that manual punching of the chassis number did not suggest any act of tampering/manipulation of the chassis as the concerned local auto manufacturing/assembling company invariably inscribed the chassis numbers on its locally produced chassis frames by way of manual proficiency-Validity-Appellant ( owner of vehicle in question) ,at the initial stage of adjudication, had discharged his burden of proof by placing on record the basis of registration of the vehicle-in-question evidencing that the same was purchased from the concerned local manufacturing / assembling company, which (company) invariably used to punch / inscribe the chassis numbers on locally produced vehicles by way of manual proficiency-Appellant had openly offered , at adjudication proceedings, to get documents and said aspect (manual punching) checked from the company but the needful was not done, and even, in memo. of appeal and verbally, he had reiterated his offer-Respondent / Collectorate had not come forward to respond to said offer, which indicated deviation from provision / principle provided under S.187 of the Customs Act, 1969-With the appellant having discharged his burden of proof, it was on the respondents /Collectorate to controvert the same-Respondents had failed to negate the registration of vehicle with the concerned Registration Authority as sufficient proof, and also that as per Laboratory Report no new chassis number was deciphered-Evidence produced by the appellant in form of various certificates confirmed that such local manufacturers (assemblers) did punch / inscribe the chassis numbers through manual proficiency (by hand) and not through computerized machine-Even Forensic Science Laboratory, as incorporated in relevant Show-Cause Notice, did not suggest any act of tampering-In absence of any report that digits of the chassis were disturbed by making any tampering with it, the confiscation of locally assembled vehicle was not in accordance with law and facts-Customs Appellate Tribunal set-aside impugned Show-Cause Notice as well as Order-in-Original while directing the respondents to release the vehicle-in-question (crane) unconditionally-Appeal, filed by the owner of vehicle, was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,156(1)(8),156(1)(89),168,171,187", - "Case #": "Custom Appeal No.H-1281 of 2023, decided on 3rd October, 2023, heard on: 19th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mazhar Ali Khan for Appellant.\nNone present for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAHIR SHAH\nVS\nTHE STATE THROUGH DEPUTY DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION-FBR AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24287", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3015 = 2024 SLD 3015 = 2024 PTD 808 = (2024) 129 TAX 631", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Non-Profit Organization – Exemptions and Privileges\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a company claiming the status of a Non-Profit Organization (NPO) under Section 2(36) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, sought tax exemptions and privileges. However, it was found that the petitioner engaged in transactions conferring private benefits, which undermined the core requirements for NPO status. These included:\n1.\nUnder-priced loan arrangements.\n2.\nInjection of equity through purchasing shares of Kashf Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd. at a premium price (seven times the face value).\n3.\nSubsequent offloading of shares in a Microfinance Bank, suggesting profit-oriented motives rather than strengthening its corporate footing.\nThe transactions were deemed inconsistent with the strict conditions for NPO exemptions, as outlined in Rule 217 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, and Section 2(36) of the Ordinance.\nHeld:\nThe High Court upheld the authorities orders, concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to the claimed exemptions due to violations of the prescribed limitations aimed at preventing private benefit. The court found no jurisdictional defect in the enforcement of Rule 217(1)(b) and dismissed the constitutional petition.\nCitations:\n•\nPrimary References:\no\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Section 2(36).\no\nIncome Tax Rules, 2002: Rule 217(1)(b).\n•\nCase Laws Distinguished:\no\nJaipur Charitable Trust v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1981) 127 ITR 620.\no\nHamdard Laboratories India v. Assistant Director of Income Tax.\no\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce 1965 AIR 1281.\no\nCommissioner of Taxation v. Word Investments Limited 2007 FCAFC 71; 164 FCR 194.\no\nCongregational Union of NSW v. Thistlethwayte (1952) 87 CLR 375.\no\nStratton v. Simpson (1970) 125 CLR 138.\no\nTreat Corporation Ltd. v. ELMAC Ltd. 2011 YLR 2825.\no\nAhmad Khan Bhatti v. Masooda Fatimia PLD 1981 Kar. 398.\no\nPak Arab Fertilizers v. Dawood Hercules PLD 2015 Sindh 142.\no\nShariq ul Haq and others v. PIA 2018 PLC (C.S.) 975.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(36),80Income Tax Rules, 2002=217,217(1)(b)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.79632 of 2022, decided on 17th January, 2024, heard on: 27th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shehbaz Butt, Mehak Zafar, Ibrahim Shahbaz, Khurram Shahbaz, Asfand Yar Waheed and Sara Majeed for Petitioner.\nCh. Imtiaz Elahi, Deputy Attorney General.\nCh. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal and Osama Zafar for Respondents Nos.l and 2.\nBilal Munir, Advocate for respondent No.3 - FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KASHF FOUNDATION THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE \nVS\nCHIEF COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24288", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3016 = 2024 SLD 3016 = 2024 SCMR 1202", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 62-Election for seat of Provincial Assembly-Nomination papers, acceptance of-Proclaimed offender-Fugitive from law-Right to contest elections-Disadvantage, if any, for being a proclaimed offender ordinarily relates only to the case in which a person has been so proclaimed, and not to the other cases or matters which have no nexus to that case-For instance, a proclaimed offender is not disentitled to institute or defend a civil suit, or an appeal arising therefrom, regarding his civil rights and obligations-Same is the position with the civil right of a person to contest an election; in the absence of any contrary provision in the Constitution or the Elections Act 2017 ( Act ), his status of being a proclaimed offender in a criminal case does not affect his said right.\nTahir Sadiq v. Faisal Ali and others 2024 SCMR 775 ref.\n(b) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-Ss. 62(9)(c) & 62(9)(d)-Election for seat of Provincial Assembly-Nomination papers, acceptance of-Mismatching of signatures-Returning officer rejected the nomination paper of the petitioner (candidate) for the reason that his signature on the paper did not match that on his CNIC-Validity-Petitioner had appeared throughout in the proceedings regarding his nomination, up to the Supreme Court, and had owned the nomination paper as filed-At no stage did he disown or repudiate the same or the signature thereon-Returning officer had the jurisdiction to reject a nomination paper in terms of section 62(9) of the Elections Act, 2017 (Act) after a summary enquiry-Clause (d) of subsection (9) allows for rejection if the returning officer is satisfied that the signatures of either the proposer or the seconder are not genuine -Clause (d) (which deals specifically with the issue of signatures) does not at all speak of the candidate-Rejection of the petitioners nomination paper for an alleged mismatch between his signatures as on the nomination paper and on his CNIC was therefore not possible in terms of this clause-Candidate does sign the nomination paper, which has to be in the form as set out in Annex A to the Act-As presently relevant, Form A relates to section 60(2)-Clause (c) of subsection (9) of section 62 allows for the rejection of the nomination paper if the returning officer is satisfied that any provision of section 60 or section 61 has not been complied with or the candidate has submitted a declaration or statement which is false or incorrect in any material particular -Thus, the matter of the alleged mismatch could, if at all, have been considered only in terms of this provision-Said provision was, however, not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case-First part thereof, namely that any provision of section 60 had not been complied with, was clearly not attracted: the nomination paper was signed by the petitioner who had never repudiated or disowned the same-Latter part, namely that any declaration or statement had been made which was false or incorrect in any material particular, was also not applicable-Firstly, the candidates signature is neither a declaration nor a statement within the meaning of either this provision or section 60-Secondly, and more importantly, the falsity or incorrectness has to be material -It is a mandatory legal obligation for the returning officer to apply his mind to the test of materiality and record appropriate reasons in this regard-Order in the present case showed no such thing-Furthermore, the alleged mismatch in signatures was in any case not material-This conclusion is bolstered by a reference to para (ii) of the proviso to section 62(9)-Clearly, any mismatch in signatures could be remedied forthwith within the meaning thereof, and anything capable of being so dealt with (regardless of whether or not it is actually so rectified) cannot be material within the meaning of clause (c)-Thus, on any view of the matter, the objection ought to have been overruled by the returning officer instead of being sustained-Petitioner was entitled to participate in the general election to the Punjab Assembly as a candidate for PP 254-Leave petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the orders of the fora below were set aside with the result that the nomination papers of the petitioner/appellant for PP-254 were deemed accepted and his name was deemed included in the final list of candidates for the General Elections of 2024.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=62,62(9)(c),69(9)(d)", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 244 of 2024, decided on 30th January, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 12.01.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.P. No. 2435 of 2024.).\nheard on: 30th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUNIB AKHTAR, SHAHID WAHEED AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Umair Majeed Malik, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Abdullah Sajid, Advocate and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nKhurram Shehzad, Addl. D.G. Law and Falak Sher, Legal Consultant for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MALIK AHMAD USMAN NAWAZ-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (ELECTIONS ACT, 2017) FOR PP-254 (BAHAWALPUR-X), BAHAWALPUR AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24289", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3017 = 2024 SLD 3017 = 2024 SCMR 1146", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7(e)-Kidnapping for ransom-Re-appraisal of evidence-No Call Data Record (CDR) produced-Delay in lodging FIR-Dishonest improvements by alleged abductee and complainant-Despite allegation of repeated contacts by the petitioner (accused) with the complainant and his son on cell phones as well as through a Public Call Office (PCO) number, no Call Data Record ( CDR ) with regard to the alleged phone calls had been produced at the trial-Complainant had not furnished any explanation for inordinate delay of two days in registering the FIR-Alleged abductee as well as the complainant had fabricated/made improvements during investigation regarding items allegedly snatched from the alleged abductee-Possibility of foisting the above articles upon the petitioner to create incriminating circumstantial evidence could not be ruled out of consideration-Alleged abductee had not mentioned as to who was driving the car when he was put on the rear seat of the car after his hands were tied-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7(e)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Kidnapping for ransom-Reappraisal of evidence-Relevant witnesses not produced during trial by the prosecution-Effect-Adverse presumption against the prosecution-One of the prosecution witnesses was a business partner and nephew of the complainant-Version of said witness about narration of the occurrence by the alleged abductee to his father was lacking independent corroboration-Another witness, in whose presence the alleged abductee had narrated the details of the occurrence to the complainant, had not been produced by the prosecution at the trial-Son of the complainant who had allegedly received calls of the accused to arrange for the ransom at the earliest was neither associated during investigation nor produced at the trial as a prosecution witness-Under Article 129 (g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 the Court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavorable to the person who withholds it-Hence, adverse inference was drawn to the effect that had the above witnesses been produced at the trial, they would not have supported the prosecution case-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the charge.\nMuhammad Jabran v. The State 2020 SCMR 1493 and 2022 SCMR 1398 ref.\n(c) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7(e)-Kidnapping for ransom-Reappraisal of evidence-Currency notes paid as ransom allegedly recovered on pointation of accused-Not proved-No bank record had been produced by the complainant at the trial to prove encashment of ransom amount i.e. rupees three million-Recovery of rupees two hundred and forty thousand from the house of the petitioner (accused) on his pointation in pursuance of his disclosure after more than twenty days of his arrest was lacking independent corroboration as no notable or inhabitant of the area was associated during the alleged recoveries-Allegedly recovered cash was identified by the complainant in the police station in absence of Special Judicial Magistrate-Complainant had failed to explain as to how he identified the currency notes-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the charge.\n(d) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7(e)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22-Kidnapping for ransom-Reappraisal of evidence-Test identification parade-Infirmities-Role of accused not specified-Identification parade of the petitioner (accused) was held under supervision of Special Judicial Magistrate, wherein the alleged abductee identified the petitioner as the accused-During cross-examination Special Judicial Magistrate admitted that the petitioner had raised objection before the identification parade proceedings that he was shown to the abductee in the office of a police official-Contents of the identification parade memo reveal that during identification parade, the alleged abductee did not specify the role played by the petitioner in the alleged occurrence-Identification of an accused person without reference to the role allegedly played by him during the occurrence is shorn of any evidentiary value-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the charge.\nSabir Ali alias Fauji v. The State 2011 SCMR 563; Shafqat Mehmood v. The State 2011 SCMR 537; Muhammad Fayyaz v. The State 2012 SCMR 522; Azhar Mehmood v. The State 2017 SCMR 135 and Kamal Din alias Kamala v. The State 2018 SCMR 577 ref.\n(e) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Scope-Even if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of an accused, he/she shall be entitled to such benefit not as a matter of grace and concession but as of right.\nTariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048; Abdul Jabbar v. The State 2019 SCMR 129; Sarfraz v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 and Barkhurdar v. The State 2023 SCMR 1791 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7(e)Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=129(g),22", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 238 of 2008, decided on 20th April, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 04.06.2008 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. A. No. 1743 of 2006).heard on: 15th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, MUSARRAT HILALI AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, Addl.P.G., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL QADEER-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24290", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3018 = 2024 SLD 3018 = 2024 SCMR 1155", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQS8", - "Key Words:": "Civil service-\n-Appointment orders, withdrawal of-Legality-Drastic action of withdrawing appointments letters and terminating service was carried out without issuing any show cause notice and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the terminated employees-In the present case, nothing was articulated to allege that the respondents (employees) by hook and crook managed their appointments or committed any misrepresentation or fraud or they were not eligible for the posts on which their appointment was recommended by the Departmental Recruitment Committee of five members where each case was considered diligently, and after a burdensome exercise, the names were recommended by the Departmental Recruitment Committee-Therefore, it cannot be construed that the respondents were appointed without fulfilling the codal formalities-Rather, due to their appointments with due process, some vested rights had been created in their favour which could not have been withdrawn in a perfunctory manner-Record reflected that the advertisement was published on 30.07.2016; the last date of submission of the application was 22.08.2016; the date of test/interviews was fixed on 19th and 20th September, 2016, and the applicants were again informed through a notice published in the newspaper on 27.08.2016, and a meeting of the Departmental Recruitment Committee was convened on 29.08.2016-If the process was allegedly initiated wrongly, then why were the concerned government departments under a deep slumber or ignorance?; why, at very initial stage, was the entire recruitment process not scraped?; why was the Departmental Recruitment Committee constituted?; why were appointment orders issued with postings?; and why were service books made?-All of these questions were shrouded in mystery and no logical justification was pleaded as to why the entire recruitment process was undone suddenly-Petitions filed by the recruiting department were dismissed and leave was declined.\nInspector General of Police, Quetta and another v. Fida Muhammad and others 2022 SCMR 1583 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 183-Q to 195-Q of 2023, decided on 15th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 03.05.2023 passed by Balochistan Service Tribunal, Quetta in S.As. Nos. 475, 524, 564, 569, 570, 582, 587 of 2018, 101, 484 of 2019, 96-98 of 2020, 222 of 2021).heard on: 15th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, AYESHA A. MALIK AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. A.G., Balochistan for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN THOUGH SECRETARY FOREST AND WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT, QUETTA AND ANOTHER-PETITIONERS\nVS\nGHULAM RASOOL AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24291", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3019 = 2024 SLD 3019 = 2024 SCMR 1160", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQSs", - "Key Words:": "Civil service-Technical Cadre and Executive Cadre of police department-IT cadre of police-Post of ASI (Computer)-Counsel for the respondents (police employees) stated that an advertisement was issued for the recruitment of candidates for the post of ASI (Computer) and pursuant thereto 113 individuals were appointed in the year 2004, however all the ASIs (Computer) were not assigned any computer related work, rather they served in the Executive Branch of the police; that the respondents underwent training of ASI courses, obtained practical training (A, B, C, D Courses), as was imparted to ASIs of Executive Police; that most of the ASIs had dealt with a number of criminal cases independently and out of 113 ASIs, presently 65 were in service; that some of them had even embraced martyrdom, and that the respondents should be treated at par with ASIs Executive Police keeping in view their experience of more than twenty (20) years while performing their duties as ASIs Executive-Validity-Supreme Court directed that the 65 ASls including the respondents who were appointed as ASI (Computer) in 2004 and filed the petition before the High Court shall continue to perform their service in the Executive Branch of the Police Department but this practice shall not be cited as a precedent in future-However, their seniority and promotion shall be dealt with strictly in accordance with law, rules and regulations-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\nGul Hassan Jatoi and others v. Faqir Muhammad Jatoi and others 2016 SCMR 1254 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 928 of 2020 and C.M.A. No.500-K of 2023 in C.A. No.928 of 2020, decided on 15th April, 2024.\n(Against Judgment dated 17.12.2019 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No. D-4329 of 2019).heard on: 15th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, MUSARRAT HILALI AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh at Islamabad, Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record at Islamabad, Adil Memon, AIG Legal, Pir Muhammad Shah, DIG, Establishment (via video link from Karachi) for Appellants.\nMalik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.\nAbid Shahid Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Karachi) for Applicants (in C.M.A. 500-K of 2023).", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF SINDH AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nMUHAMMAD TAHIR KHAN CHANDIO AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24292", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3020 = 2024 SLD 3020 = 2024 SCMR 1164", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTk", - "Key Words:": "Civil service-\n-Two advance increments, entitlement to-Acquiring or possessing higher qualification-Office Memorandum No.F.1(9)-Imp.II/91-Pt.(G) dated 04.10.1992 (Office Memorandum of 1992) issued by the Government of Pakistan, Finance Division (Regulations Wing), interpretation of-Dispute revolved around the applicability of the Office Memorandum of 1992 which granted advance increments on higher qualification to those employees who possessed or acquired higher .qualification over and above that prescribed qualification for the post-By way of the subsequent clarifications issued in 2011 and 2019, the Finance Division clarified that those employees who were promoted on seniority-cum-fitness basis to a higher post who did not necessarily possess the higher qualification of that post but acquired it during this time were entitled to advance increments-There was no dispute to the fact that the respondents qualification was that of matriculation and he acquired his intermediate on 27.12.1994 while he was working with the petitioner-department-Respondent was promoted on seniority-cum-fitness basis in 1989 first to the post of UDC and then in 1994 to the post of Supervisor-During this time, he acquired the educational qualification of intermediate (F.A) which was the prescribed qualification for the post of UDC as per SRO.657(I)/82 issued in pursuance of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 (Rules) for the purposes of direct recruitment, hence, respondents case squarely fell within the ambit of the Office Memorandum of 1992 read with clarifications of 2011 and 2019-Tribunal had rightly granted the two advance increments to the respondent vide the impugned judgment-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nSenior General Manager. Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Pervaiz 2024 SCMR 581 distinginguished.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4513 of 2023, decided on 15th April, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 18.10.2023 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Lahore Bench, Lahore in Appeal No. 289 (L) of 2022).\nheard on: 15th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, AYESHA A. MALIK AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz S.A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHIEF COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, BAHAWALPUR AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nBAQA MUHAMMAD LASHARI-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24293", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3021 = 2024 SLD 3021 = 2024 SCMR 1169", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 6-Terrorism, offence of-Pre-requisites-For an act to be classified as terrorism, it must have a political, religious, or ideological motivation aimed at destabilizing society as a whole-While heinous crimes may shock society, if they are driven by personal motives, they do not qualify as terrorism-Mere severity of an offence does not make it terrorism-In order to determine whether an offense falls within the scope of Section 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ( ATA ), it is imperative to have a glance over the allegations levelled in the FIR, the case record, and the surrounding circumstances-It is crucial to assess whether the elements of the alleged offence are connected to the objectives outlined in Sections 6, 7, and 8 ATA-Assessment of whether a specific act constitutes terrorism depends on examining its motivation, objective, design, or purpose-It is essential to ascertain whether the act in question has instilled a sense of fear and insecurity in the public, a specific community, or any sect.\nWaris Ali and 5 others v. The State 2017 SCMR 1572; Ghulam Hussain s case PLD 2020 SC 61; Muhammad Mushtaq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others PLD 2002 SC 841 and Fazal Dad v. Col. (Rtd.) Ghulam Muhammad Malik and others PLD 2007 SC 571 ref.\n(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7(e)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860). Ss. 365-A, 392 & 148-Kidnapping for ransom-Reappraisal of evidence-Whether provisions of section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ( ATA ) were attracted-Held, that it was evident from the record of present case that the accusation of kidnapping for ransom involved five individuals allegedly motivated solely by financial gain-Present incident was alleged to be a short term kidnapping for ransom that lasted only for 5 to 6 hours and the abductee was released allegedly upon receipt of the demanded ransom amount-Petitioners (accused persons) lacked a prior criminal history, therefore, this did not meet the criteria for terrorism as the two fold requirement of mens rea was missing-Moreover, the statement of one of the petitioners under Section 342, Cr.P.C., revealed that an enmity existed between the parties on account of agricultural lands and he also produced defence evidence in this regard, however, the Trial Court failed to appreciate the same-Hence, it had no connection with the act of terrorism-As the intention of the petitioners was not at all to create sense of insecurity or to destabilize the public at large or to advance any sectarian cause, the design or purpose of the present offence as contemplated by the provisions of Section 6 ATA was not attracted-Consequently Section 7(e) ATA became inapplicable-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the petitioners-Petitions were converted into appeals and were allowed, and the accused persons were acquitted of the charge.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 365-A, 392 & 148-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(e)-Kidnapping for ransom-Reappraisal of evidence-There was no eye-witness to the abduction-First Information Report was registered after the recovery of abductee who had previous acquaintance with the petitioners (accused persons)-Despite such fact abductee did not disclose the names of accused persons rather he nominated them at a belated stage through a supplementary statement, which spoke volumes about the deliberations and consultations on the part of complainant and victim-Major contradictions were found in the statements of the abductee-Abductee claimed that injections were administered to him by the petitioners, however, no medical examination of the abductee was conducted to verify this fact-Moreover, no traces of said injections were recovered either from car of the abductee or from the possession of petitioners-Abductee in his testimony had admitted that his mobile phone which was used by petitioners for demanding ransom was recovered by the police however no recovery memo was available on record-Complainant deposed that the call for ransom was received by him on his phone number, however, he did not provide any Call detail Record (CDR) to substantiate his statement-Complainant went alone to the agreed location for delivering the demanded ransom amount to the petitioners, hence, the incident of delivery of ransom money was also not witnessed-Furthermore, the complainant did not mention any particulars, colour, model, etc., of the car in which the petitioners came to receive the ransom amount or the car in which he went to handover the ransom money-All the recovery witnesses were either police officials or complainant and his relatives-All prosecution witnesses were interested and no independent witness was associated to recovery proceedings-Recoveries of motorcycle, pistols and part of the ransom money at the instance of petitioners could not be safely relied upon-So far as motorcycle was concerned, no such detail was disclosed in the FIR Recoveries of weapon was also not of much help to the prosecution as no particulars of said weapons were mentioned in the FIR rather it was only stated that all accused were duly armed with pistols-Giving of Rs.1,000,000/- (ten lacs) to the petitioners side was not proved by the complainant as no denomination of currency notes was disclosed either in the FIR or before the Trial Court-When the fact of giving Rs.1,000,000/- (ten lacs) by the complainant for the release of abductee was not proved, the alleged recoveries of part of the ransom amount at the instance of the petitioners were inconsequential and could not be relied for maintaining the conviction and sentence of the petitioners-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the petitioners-Petitions were converted into appeals and were allowed, and the accused persons were acquitted of the charge.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=6,7(e)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=365-A,392,148", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 1690-L and 1691-L of 2016, decided on 27th March, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 16.11.2016, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1701 of 2015 and 1578 of 2015).heard on: 27th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Akram Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in both cases) (via video link from Lahore).\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G., Punjab for the State.\nSikandar Zulkarnain Saleem, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.2 (in Crl.P.No.1690-L) (via video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMTIAZ LATIF AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nTHE STATE THROUGH PROSECUTOR GENERAL, PUNJAB, LAHORE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24294", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3022 = 2024 SLD 3022 = 2024 SCMR 1184", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973-\n-R. 8-A-Promotion-Past service rendered in another government department, benefit of-Appellant remained in the employment of National Highways and Motorways Police as a Senior Patrolling Officer (BS 16) with effect from 26.11.2001 to 01.03.2011-Subsequnetly he applied for the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (BS-17) in Pakistan Public Works Department (PWD) through proper channel and pursuant to the recommendations of Federal Public Service Commission, the appellant was appointed in PWD on 02.03.2011-Bone of contention relates to the promotion from Assistant Executive Engineer BS-17 to Executive Engineer BS-18 in terms of the criteria of promotion as set out in SRO No. 897(I)184 dated 11.10.1984, which was subsequently amended vide SRO No.855(I)/91 dated 25.07.1991 in which basic condition for promotion from Assistant Executive Engineer BPS-17 to Executive Engineer (BPS-18) was requirement of 05 years service experience in BPS-17 with the qualification of passing Departmental Examination as well as the application of Statutory Instruction (SI) No. 157 of Chapter 2 of ESTACODE (Volume 1) [Edition 2013]-According to the appellant, having been appointed in BPS-17, the petitioner was entitled to the one half of his service in BPS-16 for consideration towards his promotion in BPS-18 in terms of Rule 8-A of the Civil Service (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 and Statutory Instruction No.157 issued thereunder-However, despite attaining the sufficient years for consideration for promotion to BPS-18, the petitioner was not considered-Therefore, he submitted a representation, which was not answered, which compelled him to approach the Federal Service Tribunal ( Tribunal )-Tribunal held, through the impugned judgment, that service in another department cannot be taken into consideration-Contentions of the appellant were that the stated observation of the Tribunal was not contained in Statutory Instruction No. 157 and as such the Tribunal had erred in law; that though the petitioner was subsequently promoted in Grade 18 (without being granted the benefit of Statutory Instruction No.157) but the issue remains alive because he would be denied the benefit of Statutory Instruction No. 157 when he is considered for promotion to Grade 19 in view of the said determination in the impugned decision-Validity-Present case related to the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal which being an ultimate fact-finding forum was constituted to redress the lawful grievances of civil servants and ventilate their sufferings-So for all intent and purposes, the Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter relating to the terms and conditions of service of the Civil Servants and could go into all the facts of the case and the relevant law for just and proper decision-Appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh strictly in accordance with law preferably within a period of three months.\n(b) Appeal-\n-Scope-Appellate Court, jurisdiction of-Appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings-Under appellate jurisdiction the court is always obligated to delve into not only the questions of law but also questions of facts-Whole case reopens in the appellate jurisdiction to explore and consider all questions of fact and law, whether the same were rightly adjudicated by the lower fora or not-Therefore, the verdict of the appellate court either allowing or dismissing the appeal or modifying the order of lower fora, ought to bring to light conscious and proper application of mind.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973=8-A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 56-K of 2021, decided on 2nd April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 02.10.2019, passed by Federal Service Tribunal Islamabad (Karachi Bench) in Appeal No. 410(K)/CS of 2015).heard on: 2nd April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nZiaul Haq Makhdoom, Additional Attorney General for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 3 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SIRAJ NIZAM-APPELLANT\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24295", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3023 = 2024 SLD 3023 = 2024 SCMR 1191", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDQXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Occurrence was reported to the Police on the same day just one and half hours of its happening on the basis whereof formal FIR was chalked out-Complainant and eye-witnesses corroborated one another on all material aspects of the case and their evidence was straightforward, trustworthy, and confidence-inspiring-All of them had established their presence at the spot at the time of occurrence-Prosecution successfully proved its case against the petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt-High Court had already taken a lenient view and converted the death sentence awarded to the accused into life imprisonment-Petition challenging conviction was dismissed.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Admittedly, all the eye-witnesses were related inter se and no independent witness from the locality came forward to substantiate their version even though the incident, as per the version of the prosecution, took place in the street-Complainant and other witnesses did not allege any motive, previous enmity or grudge against the petitioner (accused) for the murder of the deceased-Petitioner was probably included in the story because he was the brother of the main accused-Possibility of the complainant throwing a wider net to implicate the petitioner could not be ruled out-During investigation nothing had been recovered from the petitioner-Weapon of offence/pistol was allegedly recovered on the pointation of the co-accused while he was on physical remand-Report of the Punjab Forensic Science Laboratory ( PFSL ) disclosed that parcel of crime empties, which was taken into custody by the Investigating officer from the place of occurrence on 28.05.2012 vide the recovery memo, was received in the office of PFSL on 31.07.2012 for comparison after the recovery of alleged weapon of offence i.e. pistol-Such delayed submission of crime empties, especially after the recovery of the weapon of offense, was not warranted under the law-Evidence presented for establishing motive was rightly not believed by the appellate court for valid reasons-Prosecution case against the petitioner was doubtful-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Witnesses closely related to the deceased, evidence of-Reliance-Testimony of witnesses who are not only closely related to the deceased but also have a strong motive to falsely implicate the accused has to be appreciated carefully.\nMuhammad Zaman v. The State and others 2014 SCMR 749 and Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2022 SCMR 1527 ref.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Principle-Once a single loophole/lacuna is observed in the case presented by the prosecution, the benefit of the same automatically goes in favour of an accused.\nDaniel Boyd (Muslim Name Saifullah) and another v. The State 1992 SCMR 196; Gul Dast Khan v. The State 2009 SCMR 431; Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652; Abdul Jabbar and another v. The State 2019 SCMR 129; Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64 and Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 ref.\n(e) Criminal trial-\n-Defence plea-Scope-All the factors favouring belief in the accusation must be placed in juxtaposition to the corresponding factors favouring the plea in defence and the total effect should be estimated in relation to the questions viz. is the plea/version raised by the accused satisfactorily established by the evidence and circumstances appearing in the case?-If the answer is in the affirmative, then the Court must accept the plea of the accused and act accordingly-If the answer to the question is negative, then the Court will not reject the defence plea as being false but will go a step further to find out whether or not there is yet a reasonable possibility of the defence plea/version being true-If the Court finds that although the accused has failed to establish his (defence) plea/version to the satisfaction of the Court but the plea might reasonably be true, even then the Court must accept his plea and acquit or convict him accordingly.\nFaiz and others v. The State 1983 SCMR 76; Ashiq Hussain alias Muhammad Ashraf v. The State PLD 1994 SC 879; Sultan Khan v. Sher Khan and others PLD 1991 SC 520; Muhammad Asghar v. Muzammal Khan and 2 others 2004 SCMR 747; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2006 SCMR 1815; Sabir Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 629; Ahmad Nawaz and another v. The State 2011 SCMR 593 and Ali Ahmad and another v. The State and others PLD 2020 SC 201 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 1288-L and 1354-L of 2017, decided on 29th March, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 11.09.2017, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Murder Reference No. 198 of 2014 and Criminal Appeal No.967 of 2014).heard on: 29th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. P. No. 1288-L of 2017).\nMajid Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. P. No. 1354-L of 2017) (via video link from Lahore)\nMirza Abid Majeed, DPG, Punjab for the State.\nMajid Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. (in Crl.P.No.1288-L of 2017) (via video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ BAIG AND ANOTHER-PETITIONERS\nVS\nTHE STATE THROUGH PROSECUTOR GENERAL, PUNJAB, LAHORE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24296", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3024 = 2024 SLD 3024 = 2024 SCMR 1021", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980-\n-O.XIII, R.1 & O.XXXIII, R.6-Government as petitioner before the Supreme Court-Time barred petition filed by the Government-Plea that administrative delays due to lengthy procedure prevented the Government from filing the petition within the limitation period-Such plea cannot be considered sufficient cause or a reasonable ground in every case for condonation of delay-No preferential treatment can be accorded to Government Departments for condoning the delay.\nOftentimes cases concerning the Federal and Provincial Governments and autonomous bodies are instituted after the lapse of the period of limitation postulated by the law and the plea taken for condoning the delay is invariably and inevitably that the time was spent in fulfilling inter-departmental procedures and seeking final instructions from the competent authority. Even private sector/organizations have begun to take a similar plea, with delays being attributed to Board Resolutions, non-availability of the concerned head or officer, delay in the law department etc., despite the aforesaid entities having full-fledged legal departments and internal law officers. Seemingly, applications for condonation of delay are being filed as a routine matter while adopting a callous approach which fails to recognize that the delay cannot be condoned without the presence of sufficient cause or explaining the delay of each and every day. The mechanical and unpersuasive justification of administrative delays has almost become a trend which is consistently pleaded for condonation of delay through stereotypical and generalized applications, which in our point of view cannot be considered sufficient cause or a reasonable ground in every case. On the contrary, it illustrates the recklessness and inefficiency of the concerned department in deciding whether they want to challenge the decision in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court or not. In the case of an individual, all decisions rest solely on him with regard to the procurement of advice for challenging the decision at higher forum; the decision to challenge; the engagement of an advocate; supplying the relevant documents to the advocate for the preparation of the appeal/petition and then following the case religiously; however, in the case of the Government or any of its departments, the party has at its disposal the assistance of its own legal department; the help and support of the Attorney Generals Office, or the Advocate Generals Office as the case may be. Therefore, immediately upon receiving a copy of the judgment/order, the Government departments may move for instructions rather than waiting for the lapse of the period of limitation provided for approaching the higher Courts. At times this cavalier attitude and approach smears and smacks mala fide and leads to the belief that the appeal is intentionally being presented belatedly only as a formality in order to provide an undue advantage to the other side, rather than due to any genuine intent to challenge the judgment or order.\nMessrs SKB-KNK Joint Venture Contractors through Regional Director v. Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and others 2022 SCMR 1615; Food Department, Gujranwala through Deputy Director and others v. Ghulam Farid Awan 2010 SCMR 1899; Khuda Bakhsh and others v. Muzaffar through L.Rs. and others 2007 SCMR 1032; Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Works and another v. Messrs Malbrow Builders, Contractor, Sialkot 2006 SCMR 1248; Province of Punjab v. Sh. M. Riaz Shahid 2005 SCMR 1435; Province of Punjab through Secretary Education v. Kishwar Qudus Paul 2004 SCMR 571; Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and another v. Muhammad Rafique Siddiqui 2004 PLC (C.S.) 962; Chairman/ Secretary, Pakistan Railways, Ministry of Railways, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Sharif Javaid Warsi PLD 2003 SC 6 and Chairman, District Evacuee Trust, Jhelum v. Abdul Khaliq through L.Rs. and others PLD 2002 SC 436 and PLD 2003 Journal 95 ref.\nWhile considering the grounds for condonation of delay, whether rational or irrational, no extraordinary clemency or compassion and/or preferential treatment may be accorded to the Government department, autonomous bodies or private sector/organizations, rather their case should be dealt with uniformly and in the same manner as cases of ordinary litigants and citizens. No doubt the law favours adjudication on merits, but simultaneously one should not close their eyes or oversee another aspect of great consequence, namely that the law helps the vigilant and not the indolent.\nIn the present case nothing has been articulated in the application moved by the petitioner (police department) for condonation of delay to ascertain where the delay was actually caused; when legal advice was received or sought; when the matter was referred to the competent authority or person in charge for the necessary instructions; who was responsible for the delay; and what punitive or disciplinary action was taken against the person who was instrumental in causing the delay. On the face of it, present petition is barred by 31 days but no plausible or satisfactory explanation has been propounded by the petitioner for the delay of each and every day; except a sweeping statement that the time was consumed in the lengthy procedure and formalities, which could have been followed and completed with due diligence within the period of limitation. Consequently the application for condonation of delay is dismissed and, as a consequence thereof, the Civil Petition is also dismissed. Supreme Court directed that Office shall transmit a copy of present judgment to the Office of the Attorney General of Pakistan, Advocates General of all the Provinces, including Islamabad Capital Territory, as well as the Federal and Provincial Law Secretaries for information and compliance.\nManaging Director, Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. Karachi v. Ghulam Abbas and others PLD 2003 SC 724; Government of Balochistan through Secretary Board of Revenue, Balochistan Quetta and others v. Muhammad Ali and 11 others 2007 SCMR 1574; Muhammad Bashir and another v. Province of Punjab through Collector of District Gujrat and others 2003 SCMR 83 and Deputy Collector of Customs and 2 others v. Muhammad Tahir and another PLD 1989 SC 627 distinguished.\n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 3-Limitation, question of-Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 it is the inherent duty of the Court to delve into the question of limitation, regardless of whether it is raised or not.\n(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 5-Condonation of delay-Grounds-Carelessness, intentional or obvious sluggishness, or dearth of bona fide are no reason for condonation of delay.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=3,5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 469-L of 2023, decided on 14th September, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 27.07.2022 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.564 of 2021).heard on: 14th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Muhammad Mumtaz Ali, Addl. AG, Punjab for Petitioners.\nDil Muhammad Khan Alizai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "REGIONAL POLICE OFFICER, DERA GHAZI KHAN REGION AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nRIAZ HUSSAIN BHUKHARI-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24297", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3025 = 2024 SLD 3025 = 2024 SCMR 1037", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Time limit for performing a certain act under a statute-When a statute is silent about limitation, a reasonable time limit is to be supplied by the Courts.\nFederal Land Commission v. Habib Ahmed PLD 2011 SC 842 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Yasmeen Bano 2020 SCMR 1120 ref.\n(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4, 5 & 17(1)-Land acquisition-Preliminary notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( Act )-Addendum or corrigendum notification to a preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act-Time limit-Where any notification is issued to amend, vary or add to the earlier (preliminary) notification issued under section 4 of the Act, the same is to be issued within a reasonable time which shall be determined according to the specific facts and circumstances of the case-Furthermore addendum or corrigendum to a notification under section 4 can only be issued before the next step in the acquisition process is undertaken i.e. before the issuance of a notification under section 5 or under section 17(4) of the Act, though fresh acquisition proceedings can be initiated by issuing a fresh notification under section 4 of the Act if some more land is needed or likely to be needed later for the same purpose.\nAnwar Ali Sahto v. Federation of Pakistan 2002 PLC (C.S.) 526; Phoenix Security v. Pir Muhammad 2020 SCMR 132 and Khyber Zaman v. Governor, State Bank 2005 SCMR 235 ref.\n(c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4, 5 & 17(1)-Land acquisition-Date of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( Act )-Scope-Said date will not necessarily be the date of the first notification issued under section 4 of the Act, instead, it will be whenever the complete and final land is notified-In instances where addendums or corrigenda to a notification under Section 4 are issued, the indicator of the finality of the land notified would be when, after the issuance of an addendum or corrigendum, the public functionaries move forward with the acquisition proceedings by either issuing a notification under section 5 or under section 17(4) of the Act-Therefore, the date of the last addendum or corrigendum issued in relation to the notification under section 4 of the Act before any step is taken to advance the acquisition proceedings to the next stage, is deemed to be the date of the notification under section 4 of the Act for the purposes of the acquisition proceedings under the Act-This is because the complete land under the said provision becomes finally notified through the addendum or corrigendum and, after this, the state functionaries take the next step in the acquisition proceedings.\n(d) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4 & 23-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 23 & 24-Land acquisition-Compensating land owners-Interpretation and applicability of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must be in consonance with the spirit of Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution and the object of the Act, which require properly and adequately compensating landowners whose lands are being acquired thereunder.\nFederal Government v. Mst. Zakia Begum 2023 SCP 57; Land Acquisition Collector v. Iqbal Begum PLD 2010 SC 719 and Nisar Ahmad v. Collector, Land Acquisition PLD 2005 SC 25 ref.\n(e) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4 & 23-Land acquisition-Preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( Act )-Addendum or corrigendum notification, issuance of-Market value of land, determination of-Where a notification under Section 4 of the Act is subsequently amended, varied or added to through an addendum or corrigendum, the date of the publication of the intial notification under Section 4 cannot be taken as the material date for the purposes of considering the market value of the land for determining compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act-Such an interpretation would not only be against the Constitutional mandate by upsetting the balance the Constitution seeks to maintain through adequately and properly compensating the owners of the land that is being acquired, it would also be against the object of the Act to that effect-Instead, in such circumstances, the date of publication of the subsequent addendum or corrigendum, finally notifying the complete land under Section 4 of the Act, must be considered to determine the market value of the land for the purposes of compensation.\n(f) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4, 18 & 23-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Land acquisition-Compensation for land owners-Interference by High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction-Scope-Interference on the matter of determination of fair compensation is not ordinarily warranted under the judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution and such matter is best decided by a civil court in its reference jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after recording the respective evidence of the parties-However, where the acquisition authorities under the Act have misdirected themselves on a point of law, which does not require any factual determination, the High Court must intervene to correct the legal error and set the course of law right.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=4,5,17(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1441 to 1449 of 2021, decided on 11th September, 2023.\n(Against the order of judgment of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 02.02.2021, passed in W.P. No.2038 of 2020 and other connected matters).\nheard on: 15th February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): UMAR ATA BANDIAL, C.J., SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Qasim Chohan, Addl. A.G. Punjab, Sh. Moeen-ud-Din, Chief Potohar, Sehar Ch., Law Officer, Irrigation, Mumtaz Watoo, XEN Small Dam and Syed Farhat Abbas, SDO for Petitioners.\nSardar Abdul Raziq Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.P. No. 1441 of 2021).\nMrs. Hifza Ibrar Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.2 (in C.P. No. 1444 of 2021).\nKhurram Masood, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.P. No. 1446 of 2021).\nAtiq-ur-Rehman Kayani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1-9 (in C.P. No. 1449 of 2021).\nNemo (for all other respondents)\nAssisted by: Waqas Ali Mazhar, Research Officer, SCRC and Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI/ PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nNASEER AHMED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24298", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3026 = 2024 SLD 3026 = 2024 SCMR 1049", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODU", - "Key Words:": "Cantonments Act (II of 1924)-S. 60(1) [as amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act (XLVII of 2023)] & Sched. VII-Cantonments (Amendment) Act (XLVII of 2023), S. 2(a)(i)-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 140A, 163 & Fourth Sched., Pt.1, Entry 2-Rules of Business, 1973, Second Sched., Entry 7(a)(ii)-Cantonment Boards-Professional tax-Cantonment Boards are not empowered to impose professional tax on those engaged in professions, trades, callings or employments in cantonment areas-Professional tax mentioned in Article 163 of the Constitution recovered by the Cantonment Boards is unconstitutional-Section 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 [as amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023] and its Schedule VII to the extent that they may authorize the imposition of the professional taxes are ultra vires the Constitution.\nSection 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 dealing with general power of taxation was amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023, which also made additions to Schedule VII of the Cantonments Act, 1924 and included therein the professional taxes. The administrative division mentioned in section 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 is defined in section 2(a)(i) of the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023, as: administrative division means the division to which business of cantonments stands allocated. The Second Schedule to the Rules of Business, 1973, stipulates that the business of cantonments stands allocated to the Defense Division. The aforesaid change meant that, previously the sanction of the Federal Government was required to be obtained for cantonment boards to impose taxes but now it has been delegated to a Division. This downgrading the power of the Federal Government does not seem to conform to democratic principles and obfuscates transparency.\nArticle 163 of the Constitution alone authorizes the provinces to impose the professional taxes, and the Supreme Court has already decided this very issue in the case reported as ICI Pakistan Ltd. v. Tehsil Council (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 428) (the ICI case). The attempt to distinguish the ICI case on the ground that, after the insertion of Article 140A into the Constitution it changed the existing constitutional scheme, is not correct. Neither has Article 163 been made redundant nor has Article 140A empowered the Federation, including cantonment boards, to impose the professional taxes. It is also not correct to state that since the second entry of the Federal Legislative List mentions local self-government and cantonment areas the Federation has been authorized to impose the professional taxes. Article 163 of the Constitution specifically empowers the provinces to impose the professional taxes; it is the only provision in the Constitution which permits or authorizes this, and it must be given effect to; it cannot be disregarded or whittled down by untenable submissions.\nICI Pakistan Ltd. v. Tehsil Council PLD 2007 SC 428 fol.\nSection 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 [as amended by the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 2023] and its Schedule VII to the extent that they may authorize the imposition of the professional taxes are ultra vires the Constitution. The professional taxes mentioned in Article 163 of the Constitution recovered by the Cantonment Boards is unconstitutional, consequently, they cannot be retrained, which should be refunded and would have to be refunded. Appeals were dismissed with costs throughout.\nPfizer Laboratories Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 64 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Cantonments Act, 1924=60(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1363 to 1365 of 2018 and Civil Misc. Application No. 4728 of 2023, decided on 13th October, 2023.heard on: 13th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J., AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants:\n(In all cases)\nMuhammad Umer Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court.\nAssisted by Ch. Abubakar.\nZaki Haider, CEO, Clifton.\nAamir Rashid, CEO, Faisal.\nTanveer Ashraf, Director, ML & C. and Javed Abbasi, Law Officer, ML & C.\n(Through video-link from Karachi)\nFor the Applicant:\nM. Naeem Sadiq, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 4728 of 2023).\nOn Court's Notice:\nMansoor Usman Awan, Attorney-General for Pakistan and Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney-General.\nRespondents Nos. 1-2:\nEx-parte (in C.A. No. 1363 of 2018).\nFor Respondent No. 1:\nTahir Ishaq Mughal, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Shaista Altaf, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1364 of 2018).\nFor Govt. of Sindh:\nZeeshan Adhi, Additional Advocate-General, Sindh.\nSaifullah, Asst. Advocate-General, Sindh.\nGhulam Nabi Shah, Addl. Director Excise and Taxation.\nAyaz Ali Mangi, Dy. Director (P-II).\n(Through video-link from Karachi) (in C.As. Nos. 1364 and 1365 of 2018)\nRespondents Nos. 2, 3 and 5:\nEx-parte (in C.A. No. 1364 of 2018).\nRespondents Nos. 1 and 3:\nEx-parte (in C.A. 1365 of 2018).", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIVIL APPEALS NOS. 1363 TO 1365 OF 2018\n(AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 15.07.2017 OF THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, KARACHI PASSED IN CONSTITUTION PETITIONS NOS. D-2892/14, D- 1135 AND D-3539 OF 2016).\nAND\nCIVIL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 4728 OF 2023\n[FOR IMPLEADMENT BY MESSRS ZUBI INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LIMITED, THROUGH ITS ASSISTANT MANAGER, HAFIZ ZAHID HASSAN]\nIN C.A. 1363 OF 2018\nCANTONMENT BOARD FAISAL AND ANOTHER-APPELLANTS\nVS\nHABIB BANK LIMITED, KARACHI AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS\nAND\nIN C.A. 1364 OF 2018\nCANTONMENT BOARD CLIFTON, KARACHI-APPELLANT\nVS\nK & N FOODS (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS\nAND\nIN C.A. 1365 OF 2018\nCANTONMENT BOARD CLIFTON, KARACHI-APPELLANT\nVS\nMESSRS VENUS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24299", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3027 = 2024 SLD 3027 = 2024 SCMR 1059", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)-\n-S. 7(iv)(c)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 148 & 149 & O.VII, R.11-Court fee-Deficiency in payment-Rejection of plaint-Direction of Trial Court to make good court fee deficiency by next date of hearing-Non-compliance by plaintiff-By it order dated 27.04.2010 (the Order) Trial Court allowed the plaintiff time to make the court fee deficiency good with the rider that, in case of non-payment of court fee by the next date of hearing, the plaint would be deemed as rejected-On the next date of hearing i.e. 13.05.2010, without any request from the plaintiff the Trial Court granted the plaintiff a last opportunity to deposit the court fee-Revisional Court, as well as the High Court, both concurrently held that the Order granting time for making good the deficiency was a conditional order and, since the order was not complied with, the plaint was deemed to have been rejected automatically and thereafter the Trial Court could not extend the time and had become functus officio-Legality-On 27.04.2010, time was allowed under Section 149, C.P.C. by the Trial Court to pay the court fee by 13.05.2010, failing which the plaint shall be deemed to have been rejected, however on 13.05.2010, although the court fee stood unpaid, the Trial Court extended the time for payment of court fee without even fixing any time frame in the extension order, and that too without any oral or written request showing any plausible or sufficient cause by the plaintiff/petitioner for not complying with the Order within the stipulated timeframe-Trial Court, without considering the sanctity of its previous order in which the non-compliance of the order impacted an automatic rejection of the plaint and without enquiring or questioning the reasons for non-compliance, extended the time in a slipshod manner on its own motion without realizing the repercussions and consequences of its earlier Order-By passing a conditional order, the Trial Court had not only surrendered and abandoned its jurisdiction of enlargement of time under Section 148, C.P.C., but also closed the doors for the plaintiff in the event of non-compliance of the Order-Supreme Court deprecated practice and tendency of passing such conditional orders and directed that if any act is not complied within the time stipulated in the C.P.C. or time granted by the Court, the most appropriate legal action or step would be for the Court to take up the matter at the end of the expiry period and pass an appropriate order for non-compliance and if the party at default applies for the enlargement of time to comply with the direction(s) due to some sufficient cause(s) including force majeure circumstances which prevented compliance within time, then of course on such request the Court may further extend or enlarge time for compliance-Trial Court had passed the Order for enlargement of time with a perfunctory approach which was unjustified and unwarranted, hence the Revisional Court rightly set aside the Order and the High Court rightly maintained the same-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nMuhammad Wahid and another v. Nasrullah and another 2016 SCMR 179 and Shujat Ali v. Muhammad Riasat and others PLD 2006 SC 140 ref.\n(b) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)-\n-Ss. 4 & 6-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 149-Court fees-Power to make up deficiency of court-fees-Discretion of Court-Scope-Section 149, C.P.C. is an exception to the command delineated under Sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 ( Court Fees Act )-Exercise of discretion by the Court at any stage is, as a general rule, expected to be exercised in favour of the litigant on presenting plausible reasons which may include bona fide mistake in the calculation of the court fee; unavailability of the court fee stamps; or any other good cause or circumstances beyond control, for allowing time to make up the deficiency of court fee stamps on a case to case basis, and the said discretion can only be exercised where the Court is satisfied that sufficient grounds are made out for non-payment of the court fee in the first instance.\n(c) Words and phrases-\n-Maxim Functus officio -Meaning and scope- Functus officio denotes that once the competent authority has finalized and accomplished the task for which it was appointed or engaged, its jurisdiction and authority is over and ended or, alternatively, the jurisdiction of the competent authority is culminated once it has finalized and accomplished its task for which it was engaged-If the Court passes a valid order after providing an opportunity of hearing, it cannot reopen the case and its authority comes to an end and such orders cannot be altered save for where corrections need to be made due to some clerical or arithmetical error-Doctrine of functus officio is applicable to both judicial and quasi-judicial authorities, and, if it is not adhered to, it may result in turmoil for the litigating parties-If the authorities or the judges would be able to alter, change or modify orders capriciously and variably then resultantly it will leave no certainty and firmness to any order or decision passed by any Court or authority-It is imperative for a sound judicial system to result in finality and certitude to the legal proceedings.\nBlacks Law Dictionary, (Tenth Edition, Page 787); While P. Ramanatha Aiyars Advanced Law Lexicon, (Third Edition, Page 1946); Whartons Law Lexicon, (Fifteenth Edition, Page 720) and Corpus Juris Secundum, (Volume 37, Page 1401) ref.\n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 148-Enlargement of time-Court, discretion of-Scope-No doubt the time allowed for doing a thing can be enlarged by the Court under Section 148, C.P.C., in its discretion from time to time, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired, but this discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or whimsically, rather such discretion must be exercised and structured in a reasonable and judicious manner.\n(e) Jurisdiction-\n-Neither the Court should assume or take on the jurisdiction not vested in it by law, nor the Court should abdicate or renounce a jurisdiction so vested in it by law.\n(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-Preamble-Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ( C.P.C. ) is a consolidatory law which is primarily procedural in nature and may be defined as a branch of law administering the process of litigation-Sections and Rules framed in the C.P.C. are aimed at the advancement of justice as a body of general law-Any construction which renders the statute or any of its sections or components redundant should be avoided and must be so construed so as to make it effective and operative.\n(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O.VII, R. 13-Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), Ss. 4 & 6-Rejection of plaint due to non-payment of court fees-Fresh plaint, presentation of-Permissibility-Under Order VII, Rule 13, C.P.C., the rejection of a plaint on any of the grounds mentioned in Order VII shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action-Meaning thereby that, where the plaint is rejected due to non-payment of court fee and not for any other cause such as limitation, a pathway is open to the plaintiff to invoke the remedy provided under Order VII, Rule 13, C.P.C. by presenting fresh plaint within the prescribed period of limitation rather than wasting time or contesting the matter up to the Supreme Court.\nAbdul Hamid and another v. Dilawar Hussain alias Bhalli and others 2007 SCMR 945; Muhammad Ali and others v. Province of Punjab and others 2009 SCMR 1079 and Mian Khan v. Aurang Zeb and 12 others 1989 SCMR 58 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Court-Fees Act, 1870=7(iv)(c)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=11", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2351 of 2019, decided on 10th November, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.04.2019, passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in W.P. No. 6785 of 2011).\nheard on: 17th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YAHYA AFRIDI, SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mahmood Ashraf Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Chaudhry Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nAftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents,\nNot represented Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KH. MUHAMMAD FAZIL-PETITIONER\nVS\nMUMTAZ MUNNAWAR KHAN NIAZI (DECEASED) THROUGH L.RS. AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24300", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3028 = 2024 SLD 3028 = 2024 SCMR 1071", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDOC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Articles 4, 9, 10A, 25 & 185(3)-Bail-Rule of consistency-Benchmark for applying the rule of consistency in granting bail to an accused stated.\nThe rule of consistency applied in bail matters is premised on the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan. This right to equality before the law ensures that persons similarly placed in similar circumstances are to be treated in the same manner. In other words, among equals the law should be equally administered; the like should be treated alike. Article 25 of the Constitution does not prohibit different treatment to persons who are not similarly placed or who are not in similar circumstances. To claim equality before the law an accused person must therefore show that he and his coaccused who has been granted bail are similarly placed in similar circumstances. In other words, he must show that the prosecution case, as a whole, against him is at par with that against his co-accused who has been granted bail, and not distinguishable in any substantial aspect. The rule of consistency is also pillared on Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution ensuring that level playing field and fairness is maintained in adjudicating cases of co-accused. The right to liberty under Article 9 of the Constitution has to be extended fairly and without discrimination to an applicant seeking bail. The rule of consistency in bail matters is fundamental to ensuring fairness, reducing arbitrary decision-making, and maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system. Its a key aspect of the rule of law, ensuring that all individuals are treated equally under the law.\nFida Hussain v. State PLD 2002 SC 46; Abdul Jalil v. N.W.F.P. Forest Development Corporation 2010 SCMR 1933 and Tariq Nawaz v. Government of Pakistan 2001 PLC (C.S.) 57 ref.\nThe rule of consistency in bail matters is attracted and applied after the grant of bail to a co-accused. Grant of bail by a court considers several factors like the contents of the FIR, the incriminating material collected by the police during investigation, the past history of the accused, etc. The grounds which form the basis for the grant of bail to a co-accused is thus the benchmark for grant of bail to the accused under the rule of consistency. The benchmark for applying the rule of consistency is not only the role attributed to the accused in the FIR but also the material collected in the investigation. Therefore, the court has to assess whether the role of the accused in the FIR, examined in the background of the material collected by the Police is the same as that of the co-accused, who has been granted bail. It is this congruence in the case of the co-accused and the accused that attracts the rule of consistency.\nTo decide upon the applicability of the rule of consistency for granting bail under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., the courts have to examine the whole material available on the record of the case. Without doing so, it cannot be determined whether the accused who claims the benefit of this rule and his co-accused who has been granted bail are similarly placed in similar circumstances.\nShahid Farooq v. State 2011 SCMR 1619 ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Offences falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1), Cr.P.C.-In the offences that fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497,(1), Cr.P.C., the post-arrest bail is granted on three grounds: (i) under the first proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., on the ground of the accused being a minor, or a woman, or a sick or infirm person; (ii) under the third proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial beyond the period prescribed for no fault of the accused; and (iii) under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., on the ground that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the offence, but rather there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt.\nRaza Bukhari v. State PLD 2022 SC 743 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Whether or not there exist any reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the alleged offence-For the determination of the question under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., as to whether or not there exist any reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the alleged offence, the courts have to appraise although tentatively the whole material available on the record of the case-This question cannot be determined by merely examining the contents of the FIR-Essentially, it is the tentative assessment of the evidence collected in the investigation both for and against the accused that is determinative of the said question.\nManzoor v. State PLD 1972 SC 81 and Khalid Gillani v. State PLD 1978 SC 256 ref.\n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 148 & 149-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly-Bail, refusal of-Rule of consistency not applicable-Courts below have granted the post-arrest bail to the two co-accused persons under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C. after making a tentative assessment of the evidence collected in the investigation both for and against them-Tentative assessment of that evidence has led them to the finding that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the said co-accused have committed the offence of murder of the complainants son, but rather there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into their guilt-Material collected in the investigation in the case of two co-accused shows that they were not present on the scene of the crime-This is not so in the case of the petitioner/accused-Therefore, material collected in the investigation against the present petitioner is different from that collected against them-Ground on which they have been granted bail is not available to the petitioner-Case against the petitioner is therefore not at par with that against those co-accused persons but rather is distinguishable in a substantial aspect-Allegation made against the petitioner of being present on the spot and having made fires on the deceased sons of the complainant by his firearm is not only supported by the statements of the eye-witnesses but also corroborated by the recovery of the weapon of offence effected from him in the investigation-There is, as such, sufficient incriminating material available on the record of the case to connect the petitioner with the commission of the alleged offence, and his case does not come within the scope of the provisions of Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., nor does the rule of consistency apply to him-High Court had righty refused post-arrest bail to the petitioner-Petition for leave to leave was dismissed, leave was refused and petitioner was refused bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,9,10A,25,185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl.P. No. 298 of 2023, decided on 31st October, 2023.\n(Against the order of Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 16.03.2023, passed in Crl. Misc. No.3167-B of 2023).\nheard on: 31st October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Usman G. Rashid Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nCh. Muhammad Sarwar Sidhu, APG, Punjab, along with Asghar Ali, Investigating Officer for the State.\nMudassar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATIF-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24301", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3029 = 2024 SLD 3029 = 2024 SCMR 1078", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDOCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-S. 5 & Sched.-Dower (mehr), recovery of-Entry in column No.17 of the Nikahnama-Interpretation-Free consent and freedom of the bride to settle the terms of her Nikah Nama-Significance-Entitlement of divorced wife to immoveable property described in column 17 of the Nikah Nama-Form of Nikah Nama nor its headings are conclusive or sacrosanct-It is the intent of the parties which would be the determining factor-In the present case the description of the plot in column 17 of the Nikah Nama is explicit and not disputed-However, there is no condition stipulated in the column except the description of the plot-Petitioner (husband) had filed his written statement in response to the plaint and had expressly admitted the description of the property but he had taken the stance that the plot was meant for the construction of a house and the respondent (wife) was to live in it for as long as the marriage subsisted-However, a plain reading of the description of the property, as mentioned in column 17, does not indicate nor supports such a stance-If such an interpretation is accepted then the property would not form part of the dower separately mentioned in columns 13 to 16 of the Nikah Nama-Copy of the Nikah Nama showed that no condition has been stipulated in column 17 except describing the property-It is not the case of the petitioner (husband) that the columns were filled by the respondent (wife) or pursuant to meaningful consultation carried out with her before or at the time of execution of the Nikah Nama-No such evidence was brought on record-Onus was on the petitioner (husband) to establish that the property described in column No. 17 was not meant nor intended by the parties to be part of the dower-Ambiguity, if any, cannot be construed against the interests and rights of the respondent (wife) in the facts and circumstances of the present case-Moreover, accepting the stance of the petitioner (husband) would amount to reading in the Nikah Nama something not provided therein-Courts cannot construe the Nikah Nama and its entries as having the effect of applying a stipulation not expressly provided therein-High Court had correctly interpreted the columns of the Nikah Nama and declared the respondent (wife) entitled to the plot described in column 17 of the Nikah Nama-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5 & Sched.-Dower (mehr)-Entries in columns of the Nikah Nama-Interpretation-Free consent of the bride and her freedom to settle the terms and conditions of the Nikah Nama-Significance-Courts, while interpreting the contents and terms and conditions of a Nikah Nama, also have to take into consideration the factor of free consent of the bride and her freedom to settle the terms and conditions as a person having an informed understanding of her rights-This is crucial in the context of the social and cultural norms generally prevalent in the society-If an ambiguity or doubt arises in relation to the terms and conditions of the Nikah Nama, an entry or column thereof, then the benefit ought to go in favor of the wife if there does not exist preponderance of evidence on record to establish that she had been informed of her rights, she understood each column of the Nikah Nama, and she had the freedom to negotiate and settle the terms and conditions out of free consent-In case the columns of the Nikah Nama have been filled by others without her meaningful consultation then a doubt or ambiguity cannot be interpreted against her rights or interests-It is implicit in the expression free consent that the wife, at the time of executing the Nikah Nama, had the freedom to settle the terms and conditions as an informed person competent to enter into a contract-Paternal tendencies of the society and dominance of the male members in relation to deciding the terms and conditions on behalf of the bride has generally been accepted as a cultural and social norm of the society-It places a bride in a disadvantageous position, inevitably adversely affecting her capacity to execute the contract with free consent-Weakness or creation of an ambiguity in a Nikah Nama cannot be interpreted against the interest and rights of a wife if it cannot be established that she had the freedom to settle the terms and conditions and had exercised her free will.\nHaseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Beugm and others PLD 2022 SC 686 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2673 of 2022, decided on 6th April, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 31.5.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Writ Petition No.34 of 2017).\nheard on: 6th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja Muhammad Imtiaz, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMs. Farhana Qamar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussian Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.1.\nNot represented other respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YOUSAF-PETITIONER\nVS\nHUMA SAEED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24302", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3030 = 2024 SLD 3030 = 2024 SCMR 1085", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Petition for leave to appeal challenging acquittal of accused-Contradictions in evidence of witnesses-Interested witnesses-Presence of witnesses at place of occurrence not explained-Admittedly, the deceased was assaulted by a non-lethal weapon (sota); yet being his real brother, and sitting beside the deceased, the petitioner (complainant) sustained no injury, nor was he able to prevent the assault on the deceased-Contradictions and discrepancies in the ocular account of the eye-witnesses diluted the story of the prosecution, whose case rested on the statement of eye-witnesses, who all were closely related to the deceased-Ocular account of the prosecution s interested witnesses was uncorroborated by the available evidence-No one else was present at the place of occurrence-This creates doubt in their testimony, because both the petitioner and the other eye-witness, resided in different villages, that too, at a considerable distance and their joint arrival at the Dera of the deceased, on foot, in the early morning of the last week of December remained unexplained-Presence of these witnesses at the crime scene was highly doubtful and questionable-As to the other two eyewitnesses, they were also interested witnesses due to their close relationship with the deceased-Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of respondent beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nNur Muhammad v. Falak Sher PLD 1976 SC 607 ref.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Interested witness, evidence of-Reliance-Testimony of an interested witness should be scrutinized with care and caution-Independent corroborating evidence is essential to test the validity and credibility of the testimonies of interested witnesses-Capital punishment cannot be given on the testimony of an interested witness uncorroborated by any independent evidence.\nAli Ahmed v. The State PLD 1962 SC 102; Dalmir v. The State 1970 SCMR 840; Muhammad Sharif v. Tahirur Rehman 1972 SCMR 144; Hazratullah v. The State 1969 PCr.LJ 138 and Nazir v. The State PLD 1962 SC 269 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Petition for leave to appeal challenging acquittal of accused-Recovery of weapon (sota)-Not consequential in absence of a forensics report-An important aspect of the prosecution s case was the recovery of the weapon (the sota). Respondent (accused) was arrested on 30.12.2007, whereas the said weapon was recovered on 01.01.2008 from his residence 6 days after the occurrence of the crime-According to the Investigating Officer (IO), the weapon was lying under a cot, and it was not stained with blood-Admittedly, the prosecution had not placed anything on the record to show whether the said weapon was sent to the forensic science laboratory for examination-Hence, no significance could be attributed to the recovery of the sota as it was not established as the murder weapon-It was the responsibility of the IO to have presented the sota for forensics to establish that the blows inflicted on the deceased were from the recovered sota, or if any blood or other evidence could have been found on the said weapon, that may have strengthened the story of prosecution-Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of respondent beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nChamkaur Singh v. State of Punjab (20.02.2017 - PHHC): MANU/PH/0266/2017 ref.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Forensic science-Importance of forensic science in the criminal justice system stated.\nForensic deals with the application of scientific techniques to provide objective, circumstantial evidence. Forensic is a science of interest to the legal system, whose objective is to ascertain what happened in the recent past. Forensic science means nothing more than the science which is used in the courts of law for the purposes of detection and prosecution of crime. This science plays a significant role in the criminal justice system by providing data that can be used to assess the degree of guilt of a suspect. For the purposes of our criminal justice system, investigating agencies have to move towards scientific evidence to establish a crime, and proper care and caution must be taken to preserve and protect the crime scene. The tendency to rely on outdated investigative methods places a big question mark on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Crime scenes that are not managed well and do not rely on science will lead to poor-quality evidence and erroneous acquittal. Hence, the police force must make a concerted effort to shift its investigation techniques to include and rely on forensic science and accordingly, train specialized officers in this field.\nH. J. WALLS, FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC CRIME DETECTION (Sweet & Maxwell 2nd) (1974); DONALD A. WILSON, FORENSIC PROCEDURES FOR BOUNDARY AND TITLE INVESTIGATION (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) (2008), 1-2; Mahmood Ahmed. Dr. Abdul Razzak and Imdad Khan, Implementation of Forensic Science in Pakistans Legal Justice System: A Critical Legal Perspective: The Importance of Forensic Evidence and its Principal Function, 5 Pakistan Journal of International Affairs 3 (2022), 742-751 https://pjia.com.pk/index.php/pjia/article/view/785; Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 5 SCC 509] (Dharam Deo Yadav) and Ali Haider v. Jameel Hussain PLD 2021 SC 362 ref.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Petition for leave to appeal challenging acquittal of accused-Motive for the crime not established-In relation to the motive of the crime, the impugned judgment of the High Court did not accept that respondent (accused) murdered the deceased because he suspected illicit liaison between the deceased and his wife-Record showed that respondent had already divorced his wife some two years ago-Prosecution had not established the motive given that there was no explanation of the delay-If the respondent did have motive to kill the deceased, then why didn t he do the same in the past when he had suspicions and why did he wait for two years-Thus, the view of the High Court was correct that in the absence of any other corroborating evidence, it did not appear to be a sound and reasonable motive as stated by the prosecution for the commission of the offense-Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of respondent beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.887-L of 2013, decided on 17th April, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 04.07.2013 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Appeal No.613 of 2009 along with M.R. No. 193 of 2009).heard on: 17th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, AYESHA A. MALIK AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Saleem Iqbal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nKhurram Khan, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD RAMZAN-PETITIONER\nVS\nKHIZAR HAYAT AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24303", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3031 = 2024 SLD 3031 = 2024 SCMR 1096", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDODg", - "Key Words:": "(a) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-S. 52-Land revenue record-Presumption of truth-Oral exchange of land-Proof-Inheritance mutation, legality of-According to section 52 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967, presumption of truth is attached to the entries made in the periodical record of rights i.e. jamabandis/khasra girdawari until contrary is proved-In the present case the jamabandis of the years 1949-50, 1953-54, 1957-58, 1969-70 and 2001-02 as well as khasra girdawari reveal that the exchange of pieces of land by the predecessor of the parties was given effect in the periodical record of rights by entering their names in the column of cultivators-After death of their predecessor, the names of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were also entered in the column of cultivators for the suit land in the jamabandis/khasra girdawari of different years which were not challenged by the predecessor of the petitioners in his lifetime as well as by the petitioners till filing of civil suit by the respondents in March 2005-Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of truth attached with the long standing jamabandis/khasra girdawari for the suit land existing in the names of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 due to exchange transaction-On the contrary, apart from producing confidence inspiring oral evidence, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have also proved the exchange transaction through the exchange deed dated 01.10.1980 which bears thumb impressions of the predecessor of petitioners and his brother, the signatures of respondent No. 1, respondent No. 3 and thumb impression of respondent No. 2-Taking undue advantage of the existence of the name of their predecessor in the column of ownership for the suit land in the jamabandis, after his death, the petitioners managed impugned inheritance mutation dated 21.04.1991 in their names by concealing the factum of exchange of the suit land as well as long standing cultivating possession of the respondents over the suit land since the year 1945-Appellate Court and Revisional Court had rightly decreed the suit of the respondents and dismissed that of the petitioners-Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nAbdul Ahad v. Roshan Din PLD 1979 SC 890; Hakim Khan v. Aurangzeb 1979 SCMR 625; Aurangzeb v. Muhammad Jaffar 2007 SCMR 236 and Muhammad Amir v. Mst. Beevi 2007 SCMR 614 ref.\n(b) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n-S. 42-Mutation entries-Scope-Mutation by itself does not create title and it carries a rebuttable presumption.\nGhulam Sarwar v. Ghulam Sakina 2019 SCMR 567; Fazal Ellahi v. Zainab Bi 2019 SCMR 1930 and Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar 2022 SCMR 1054 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.394-P of 2010, decided on 15th March, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 07.05.2010 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in C.R. No. 456 of 2009 with C.M. No. 691 of 2009).\nheard on: 15th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ, IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Zahoor Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for the Petitioners (Through video link from Peshawar).\nZiaur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (Through video link from Peshawar)\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 4 to 12.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. JEHAN BANO AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nMEHRABAN SHAH AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24304", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3032 = 2024 SLD 3032 = 2024 SCMR 1103", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDOHo", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 34, 109, 406, 419, 420, 467, 468 & 471-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Banking scam-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Accused was alleged to be one of the beneficiaries of a banking scam, who had received part of the misappropriated amount-Petitioner (accused) was not named in the list of 287 account holders who were nominated in the alleged unlawful transactions-Sole allegation against the petitioner was that his bank statements indicated receipt of a certain amount in his account as a beneficiary from an account holder of the bank-However, it was notable that the account holder in question from whom the amount was transferred to the petitioner was not implicated or nominated in the FIR-Furthermore, the alleged amount was not transferred to the petitioners account at the bank where the scam occurred but was received allegedly in an account maintained by the petitioner at another bank, which was registered in the name of a business-Mere receipt of funds in a bank account could not be construed as proof of involvement in the scam at present stage as there was insufficient and incomplete material available on the record to establish any connection of the petitioner-Petitioners criminal liability could only be determined after recording of evidence by the Trial Court-Mere nomination of the petitioner in the FIR without substantive material and without nominating the account holder by whom the amount was allegedly transferred in the bank account of the petitioners company was insufficient to justify his further detention-Petitioner was behind the bars for more than nine months, and there was no likelihood of progress in the trial-Case of the petitioner was one of further inquiry-Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, and the petitioner was granted bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=34,109,406,419,420,467,468,471Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 155 of 2024, decided on 21st March, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 14.02.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. No. 5258-B of 2023).heard on: 21st March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Asim Ali Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMughees Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan and M. Sheraz, I.O. FIA for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED SAKHAWAT HUSSAIN-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24305", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3033 = 2024 SLD 3033 = 2024 SCMR 1106", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDOHk", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-S. 12-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)-Specific performance of oral agreement to sell-Suit decreed on the purported statement of the defendant s attorney-Legality-Suit seeking specific performance of the oral agreement was filed on 25 January 1996 and summons were issued to the defendant for 19 February 1996-But, on 29 January 1996, a person came forward stating that he was the attorney of the defendant and that he had no objection if the suit was decreed-Suit was accordingly decreed-Defendant on coming to know of the decree filed an application under section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which was allowed by the trial Court, and such order was maintained upto the High Court-Validity-Suit filed by the plaintiff (petitioner) should never have been decreed-Suit was filed on 25 January 1996 and the return date for the summons issued to the defendant was 19 February 1996, however, only after four days, that is, on 29 January 1996, the suit was decreed-No application for ante-dating the date, that is, 19 February 1996, was submitted in the suit, and no order was passed ante-dating the date already fixed-Order of 29 January 1996 stated that the counsel for the defendant was in attendance, but it was not explained when service of summons was effected and who engaged the counsel to represent him, nor who had signed his vakalatnama-Suit was decreed on the statement of the purported attorney, therefore, it was incumbent upon the Judge to satisfy himself as to his identity, to ensure that he was the duly constituted attorney of the defendant and that the power of attorney authorized the attorney to agree to the suit being decreed, but none of these aspects were noted by the Judge-Stated power of attorney was also not exhibited, and, if it s photocopy was produced then the Judge had to see the original thereof and exhibit it, after comparing it with the original and noting that it was a true copy thereof-Since none of the aforesaid aspects were considered the judgment and decree dated 29 January 1996 was not sustainable-Application of defendant under section 12(2), C.P.C. was maintainable and was rightly allowed-Consequently, leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed with costs imposed on the petitioner throughout.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 630-L of 2014, decided on 17th April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 27.02.2014 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Writ Petition No.6807 of 2012).\nheard on: 17th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Shah Abbas, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "EJAZ AHMAD-PETITIONER\nVS\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, PASROOR AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24306", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3034 = 2024 SLD 3034 = 2024 SCMR 1109", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDc", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview:\nThis case involves litigation by police officials regarding promotion and other service-related benefits within the police force under the Police Rules, 1934. Specifically, the dispute revolves around the promotion procedures in the police department, with a focus on Rule 19.25, which regulates proforma promotions and the mandatory training required for promotion. The core issue was whether officers could be promoted ante-dated (backdated) and the implications of such promotions.\n________________________________________\nLegal Provisions:\n1.\nPolice Rules, 1934 (Rule 19.25)\no\nRule 19.25 outlines the mandatory training for police officers—Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors (SI), and Assistant Sub-Inspectors (ASI)—as a precondition for promotion. The rule emphasizes the importance of completing specific training courses (A, B, C, and D) in order to qualify for promotion.\n2.\nProforma Promotion\no\nProforma promotion is typically an administrative process where officers are given a formal promotion for record-keeping purposes, often for seniority or position requirements, but without the corresponding training required under the rules.\n________________________________________\nFactual Background:\n•\nThe petitioner (a police officer) was involved in litigation regarding their promotion and other service-related benefits.\n•\nThe dispute arose because the officer sought ante-dated promotion, based on the promotion date of junior officers, despite not having completed the required courses as per Rule 19.25.\n•\nThe Police Rules clearly state that officers must complete certain mandatory courses for promotion, particularly for ranks such as Inspector, Sub-Inspector, and Assistant Sub-Inspector.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nMandatory Training Requirement for Promotion:\no\nRule 19.25 clearly mandates that police officers must complete designated courses (A, B, C, and D) for promotions. These courses are meant to build the capacity and knowledge required for the post.\n2.\nPropriety of Ante-dated Promotions:\no\nThe case raises the issue of whether promotions can be granted retroactively (ante-dated) for officers who have not undergone the necessary training.\n3.\nImpact of Litigation on Police Force:\no\nThe court emphasized the negative impact of excessive litigation within the police force, especially regarding promotions and service-related benefits. Such litigation undermines the discipline and institutional credibility of the police force.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Analysis and Decision:\n1.\nTraining and Capacity Building:\no\nThe court highlighted that the purpose of Rule 19.25 is to ensure training and capacity building of police officers. This is critical for the development of knowledge and skills needed for higher ranks within the police force.\no\nThe rule is not focused on junior officers promotions but rather on ensuring that officers meet specific training requirements to qualify for advancement in rank.\n2.\nIneligibility for Ante-dated Promotion:\no\nThe court ruled that ante-dated promotions are not permissible under Rule 19.25, as they would upset the training requirement necessary for the position.\no\nThe promotion of junior officers is irrelevant when it comes to the promotion of upper subordinates. The latter must complete the mandatory training courses before being eligible for promotion, irrespective of the promotion dates of their juniors.\n3.\nInstitutional Integrity Over Litigation:\no\nThe court stressed that the police force must not be consumed by litigation over promotion issues and should focus on building institutional credibility and an effective system of governance in service-related matters.\no\nA litigation-driven environment can harm the discipline of the police force and divert attention from public service responsibilities.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nTraining as a Precondition for Promotion:\no\nIn the police force, the focus for promotion should be on training and development. Officers must complete the necessary training to qualify for promotion, and promotions should not be based solely on seniority or the promotion of juniors.\n2.\nAnti-Litigation Stance in Service Matters:\no\nThe court emphasized that the police department should not be engaged in litigation for promotions, which distracts from its primary role of serving the public and maintaining discipline.\n3.\nProforma Promotions and Institutional Discipline:\no\nThe court ruled against the practice of granting proforma promotions or ante-dated promotions without completing the necessary training, which could undermine the institutional integrity and discipline within the police force.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe court upheld the provisions of Rule 19.25 of the Police Rules, 1934, stating that mandatory training is a requirement for promotion and that ante-dated promotions cannot be granted to officers who have not undergone the necessary training. The court also stressed that the police force should focus on institutional development rather than engaging in litigation over promotions, as such practices harm the credibility and efficiency of the police institution.\nThe decision highlights the importance of discipline, training, and capacity building for effective police service and sets a precedent against the misuse of promotions as a means to bypass legal and procedural requirements.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Police Rules, 1934=19.25", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.3-L of 2016, decided on 17th April, 2024, heard on: 17th April, 2024.\n(Against order dated 04.03.2015 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.39 of 2014).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE, AYESHA A. MALIK, JUSTICE AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister M. Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate General, Punjab with Ms. Rubina, D.S.P. for Appellants.\nZafar Hussain Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record for L.Rs. of Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, PUNJAB AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nWARIS ALI (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24307", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3035 = 2024 SLD 3035 = 2024 SCMR 1116", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDY", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview:\nThis case involves a petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal of certain accused persons under Section 302(b) (Qatl-i-Amd) of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), challenging the decision of the High Court, which had acquitted the accused. The appeal contested the findings related to the reappraisal of evidence, inconsistencies in witness statements, and the benefit of doubt.\n________________________________________\nLegal Provisions:\n1.\nPakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)\no\nSection 302(b): Deals with murder (Qatl-i-Amd), prescribing punishment for the intentional killing of a person.\n2.\nCriminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.)\no\nSection 161: Relates to the recording of statements of witnesses by the police during an investigation.\n________________________________________\nFactual Background:\n•\nThe complainant (petitioner) had accused the respondents (accused persons) of the murder of her brother (deceased person I).\n•\nThe High Court had acquitted the accused, highlighting several issues in the case:\no\nMarked improvements in the testimony of witnesses, which were not consistent with the medical evidence.\no\nContradictions in the statements of the complainant during investigation and trial.\no\nThe darkness during the time of the incident (early morning, 05:00 AM), which questioned the witnesses’ ability to identify the accused.\no\nTwo important female witnesses were never produced during the investigation.\no\nEnmity related to the earlier murder of the complainants elder brother (H), which raised doubts about the motive behind the current murder of the deceased (I).\no\nThe Investigating Officer had recommended the discharge of the accused, suggesting there was insufficient evidence.\nGiven these inconsistencies, the High Court concluded that there were many doubtful circumstances, and the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused, leading to their acquittal.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nRe-appraisal of Evidence in Appeal:\no\nWhether the evidence was sufficient to challenge the acquittal, and if the High Court had correctly evaluated the inconsistencies in the testimony.\n2.\nBenefit of Doubt:\no\nThe principle that the benefit of doubt may be granted to the accused if there is a reasonable doubt, even if it is only one doubt.\n3.\nScope of Interference in Appeal Against Acquittal:\no\nThe courts limited scope to interfere with an acquittal and the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.\n________________________________________\nCourts Analysis and Decision:\n1.\nRe-appraisal of Evidence:\no\nThe High Court rightly observed that the testimony of the witnesses was inconsistent and lacked corroboration with the medical evidence. The FIR claimed the murder occurred in the early morning hours, when it was dark and there was no clear source of light. Given these conditions, the court found it unlikely that the witnesses could have identified the accused with certainty.\no\nThe complainants testimony was not consistent with her earlier statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., which cast doubt on the veracity of the entire case.\no\nThe High Court also questioned the motive behind the murder, particularly if the enmity between the parties was related to the murder of person H (the complainants brother), as the accused might have targeted the deceased person I in an unrelated manner.\n2.\nBenefit of Doubt:\no\nThe principle of benefit of doubt was crucial in this case. The High Court found there were enough doubts in the case that required the extension of the benefit of doubt to the accused. It reiterated that one doubt was sufficient to favor the accused, as established in previous cases:\n\nTariq Parvez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345)\n\nMuhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230)\n\nAyub Masih v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 1048)\n3.\nScope of Interference in Appeal Against Acquittal:\no\nThe court clarified that the presumption of innocence is strengthened in cases of acquittal. In other words, when an accused is acquitted, they are presumed innocent until proven guilty, and this presumption is doubled in the case of an acquittal.\no\nThe scope for interference in such judgments is narrow and limited. Courts are generally reluctant to disturb acquittals unless it can be shown that the decision was perverse or involved a gross misreading of evidence. In this case, the High Court’s acquittal was based on the detailed assessment of the evidence, and no such errors were found.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nBenefit of Doubt:\no\nA single doubt in the case is sufficient to grant the benefit of doubt to the accused, ensuring that they are not convicted in the face of uncertainty.\n2.\nLimited Scope of Interference in Acquittals:\no\nWhen an acquittal is made, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Courts are very reluctant to overturn acquittals unless there are grave errors in law or significant misreadings of evidence.\n3.\nRe-appraisal of Evidence:\no\nCourts must carefully assess the reliability of witnesses, consistency of their statements, and the corroboration with medical evidence when deciding on the sufficiency of evidence.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused persons was upheld. The High Courts decision was based on sound reasoning, taking into account the doubts surrounding the evidence and the testimonies, which justified the extension of benefit of doubt to the accused. Additionally, the scope of interference in an acquittal is extremely limited, and the presumption of innocence remains intact unless there is a clear and gross misreading of the evidence, which was not found in this case. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.412-L of 2014, decided on 18th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.2.2014 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No.1163 of 2010 with Murder Reference No. 284 of 2010).heard on: 18th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE, AYESHA A. MALIK, JUSTICE AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Shah Abbas (via video link, Lahore) for Petitioner.\nKhurram Khan, Addl. PG, Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SARDARAN BIBI-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24308", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3036 = 2024 SLD 3036 = 2024 SCMR 1123", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDU", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview:\nThis case involves the interpretation of various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), particularly relating to the functions and powers of the Justice of Peace, the Officer Incharge of a Police Station, and the Investigating Officer in the criminal justice system. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., is also discussed, emphasizing its role in safeguarding justice and addressing procedural issues.\n________________________________________\nLegal Provisions:\n1.\nSection 22-A, Cr.P.C. – Justice of Peace:\nThe Justice of Peace has the authority to ensure that a cognizable offence is made out based on the facts narrated by the complainant. They do not scrutinize the merits of the case but ensure that the police act in accordance with the law.\n2.\nSections 154, 155 & 200, Cr.P.C. – Officer Incharge of a Police Station:\nThese sections govern the registration of an FIR and the duties of the Officer Incharge of a Police Station regarding the receipt of information about cognizable or non-cognizable offences.\n3.\nSection 156, Cr.P.C. – Investigating Officer:\nThis section deals with the role and duties of an Investigating Officer in handling the investigation of a cognizable offence.\n4.\nSection 561-A, Cr.P.C. – Inherent Jurisdiction of High Court:\nProvides the High Court with the power to exercise inherent jurisdiction in cases where no other remedy is available, and justice requires intervention.\n________________________________________\nKey Points and Legal Analysis:\n(a) Role and Powers of the Justice of Peace (Section 22-A, Cr.P.C.)\n•\nPrimary Function:\nThe Justice of Peace is not meant to scrutinize or investigate the merits of a case. His role is to ensure that the complainant’s allegations disclose a cognizable offence. If so, the Justice of Peace can direct that the police register an FIR under Section 154, Cr.P.C.\n•\nLimited Role:\nThe Justice of Peace cannot act as an investigator or prosecutor. His role is primarily to assist in the administration of criminal justice by ensuring that the police act promptly in cases where they refuse to register an FIR. If the Justice of Peace were to conduct an in-depth investigation or scrutiny of every complaint before the FIR is registered, it would lead to delays and inefficiencies, which would contradict the legislative intent behind Section 154, Cr.P.C.\n(b) Officer Incharge of a Police Station (Sections 154, 155, & 200, Cr.P.C.)\n•\nDuties of the Officer Incharge:\nThe Officer Incharge of a Police Station must record the information provided about an offence, particularly if it is cognizable. There is no requirement for the officer to assess the correctness or falsity of the information at this stage. His duty is to reduce the information into writing and register an FIR if the information indicates a cognizable offence.\n•\nPurpose of FIR:\nThe FIR serves as an official record of the complaint, and the registration of an FIR cannot be circumvented by suggesting that the complainant should file a direct complaint instead. The mechanism of registering an FIR is an essential part of the criminal justice system, and bypassing it would undermine the purpose of having a formal record of the offence.\n(c) Duty of the Investigating Officer (Section 156, Cr.P.C.)\n•\nCrucial Role:\nThe Investigating Officer plays a significant role in the criminal justice system. The quality of their investigation directly impacts the outcome of the case. An investigation that is not thorough or is tainted can create significant barriers to achieving justice.\n•\nConsequences of Tainted Investigations:\nThe judgment refers to previous cases, including Sughra Bibi v. State (PLD 2018 SC 595), which emphasize that unprofessional investigations can significantly affect the prosecutions case. Therefore, it is vital that the Investigating Officer performs his duties impartially and comprehensively.\n(d) Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court (Section 561-A, Cr.P.C.)\n•\nScope of Inherent Jurisdiction:\nThe High Courts inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A is not an alternative jurisdiction or an opportunity to disrupt procedural law. It should be used sparingly to safeguard justice in situations where no other remedy is available or when an issue of justice arises that cannot be addressed by the standard procedural remedies.\n•\nPurpose:\nThe inherent jurisdiction is intended to protect the interests of justice, especially when there is no specific procedural remedy available. It should not be used based on presumptive findings or hyper-technicalities. As referenced in the case Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan (PLD 1967 SC 317), the High Court should only exercise this jurisdiction when necessary to ensure fairness.\n________________________________________\nConclusions:\n1.\nJustice of Peaces Role: The Justice of Peace is tasked with ensuring that a cognizable offence is disclosed and the police register an FIR. His role is limited to overseeing the registration process and cannot involve investigation or evaluation of the case merits.\n2.\nPolice Officers Duty: The Officer Incharge must record the information about an offence and register an FIR if it pertains to a cognizable offence, without assessing its truthfulness at this stage.\n3.\nInvestigating Officers Importance: Investigations are crucial to the criminal justice process, and an improper investigation can hinder the proper administration of justice.\n4.\nInherent Jurisdiction of High Court: The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A is limited to protecting justice and cannot be used to disrupt established procedural law based on assumptions or technicalities.\nThese interpretations ensure that the procedural mechanisms in the criminal justice system work effectively and in line with the legislative intent, safeguarding both the rights of the complainant and the fair trial rights of the accused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=22-A", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.99-K of 2018, decided on 2nd April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 20.7.2018 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi, Skkur Bench in Crl. M. As Nos.S-531/2016, 81, 29, 63 and 61 of 2017).\nheard on: 2nd April, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record along with Petitioner in person and Syed Salman (alleged abductee)\nHakim Ali Shah, Addl. A.G. Sagheer Abbasi, Addl A.G., Saleem Akhtar, Addl. P.G., K. A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record, Dr. Sumair Noor, SSP Ghotki, Mushtaq Abbasi, AIG Legal and SIP Zaheer Hussain, SHO Police Station Ghotki for Official Respondents\nMalik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 8.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED QAMBER ALI SHAH-PETITIONER\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24309", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3037 = 2024 SLD 3037 = 2024 SCMR 1133", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview:\nThe case involves a petition for leave to appeal challenging the acquittal of the respondent (accused) in a murder case under Section 302(b) of the Penal Code (Qatl-i-amd). The trial court acquitted five co-accused persons, and the High Court upheld the acquittal of the respondent, citing issues with the prosecutions evidence and its failure to substantiate key allegations. The petitioner, in this case, challenged the acquittal decision, arguing that the evidence was sufficient to convict the respondent.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points and Analysis:\n(a) Reappraisal of Evidence:\n•\nProsecutions Story:\nAccording to the prosecution, seven persons allegedly beat the deceased, witnessed by both the sons of the deceased. However, there was a lack of clarity regarding the exact nature of the injuries and the circumstances of the event. No firearms were used, only blunt objects like dandas and sotas. A major inconsistency arose because the sons of the deceased, despite being witnesses, did not intervene during the attack but remained spectators.\n•\nAcquittal of Co-accused:\nThe five acquitted co-accused were implicated for murder without substantial evidence. Their acquittal by the trial court indicated the lack of proof against them, suggesting that the prosecutions case was flawed or possibly included false implicatory statements.\n•\nMotive:\nThe prosecution set up a motive based on a litigation between the parties, claiming that the deceased was pursuing a case. However, no solid proof was provided that the deceased was involved in this litigation, making the motive highly questionable.\n•\nInconsistencies in the FIR:\nThe FIR provided a detailed narrative of the incident, including specific injuries attributed to the co-accused and the respondent. However, such a photographic description raised doubts about the authenticity of the witness accounts, particularly given that the complainant and witnesses were not present at the scene. This suggested that their testimony was fabricated.\n•\nOcular Testimony vs. Medical Evidence:\nThe ocular testimony (witnesses statements) did not align with the medical evidence, particularly concerning the fatality of the injury attributed to the respondent. The medical officer had stated that the injury attributed to the respondent was not fatal, which contradicted the prosecutions narrative.\n•\nFailure to Corroborate:\nThe witnesses testimony about the involvement of the co-accused was found to be false, undermining their reliability. The testimony was not corroborated by any independent or strong evidence, rendering it insufficient to convict the respondent.\n•\nHigh Courts Decision:\nThe High Court acquitted the respondent, stating that the evidence against him was tainted and lacked corroboration. The Court observed that no additional credible evidence was available to support the claim of the respondents involvement in the murder.\n•\nPetition for Leave to Appeal:\nThe petition challenging the acquittal was dismissed, as the High Court’s decision was based on reasonable doubts and inconsistencies in the evidence.\n________________________________________\n(b) Legal Principles for Conviction Based on Witness Testimony:\n•\nTestimony of Witnesses:\nWhen witnesses are found to have falsely implicated co-accused persons, their testimony cannot be blindly relied upon for convicting the other accused unless there is sufficient corroboration from strong, independent, and unimpeachable evidence. This principle is based on the idea that tainted evidence cannot be the sole basis for a conviction.\no\nCases Cited:\n\nGhulam Sikandar v. Mamaraz Khan (PLD 1985 SC 11): Established that the false implication of a co-accused undermines the reliability of the evidence unless corroborated.\n\nMunawar Ali v. The State (PLD 1993 SC 251): Reinforced the rule that witnesses’ testimony must be corroborated to convict an accused.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nAcquittal of the Respondent:\nThe High Courts decision to acquit the respondent was based on a comprehensive analysis of the evidence, revealing significant inconsistencies, lack of corroborative evidence, and contradictions between the ocular and medical evidence. Therefore, the Court found no reason to interfere with the acquittal.\n•\nImportance of Corroborated Evidence:\nThe legal principle emphasized that when witnesses are unreliable or their testimony is tainted, it cannot be used as the sole basis for conviction without strong corroboration. The prosecution’s failure to provide such corroboration in this case led to the dismissal of the petition.\n•\nFinal Decision:\nThe petition for leave to appeal was rejected, and the acquittal of the respondent was upheld due to the absence of a reliable and coherent case against him.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1390-L of 2013, decided on 18th April, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 18.11.2013 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 159/09).\nheard on: 18th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JUSTICE, MUSARRAT HILALI, JUSTICE AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Irfan Akram, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link Lahore).\nS.M. Nazim, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.2 (via video link Lahore).\nIrfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD IQBAL-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24310", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3038 = 2024 SLD 3038 = 2024 SCMR 1137", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNC8", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview:\nThe Supreme Court of Pakistan issued important directions in relation to encroachments on public roads and pavements by various authorities, including federal and provincial governments, as well as individuals. The Court emphasized that public roads and pavements are meant for public use and that no one, including government bodies, has the right to block or occupy these spaces. Additionally, the Court addressed the need for climate change mitigation through the plantation of trees on pavements.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points and Directions:\n(a) Encroachments on Public Roads and Pavements:\n•\nEncroachment by Governments and Private Individuals:\no\nIt was noted that while citizens encroachments on public roads and pavements are typically demolished, the government bodies—both federal and provincial—are also guilty of encroaching upon these spaces. Some government officials and property owners treat the pavements in front of their properties as their private property, blocking them for various purposes, such as the installation of generators or the use of shipping containers to block roads.\n•\nRight to Public Access:\no\nPublic roads and pavements are meant for the free use of the public. Access to and use of these spaces cannot be restricted or blocked by any individual or government authority.\no\nThe Court emphasized that those paid out of the public exchequer (i.e., government employees) serve the people and must adhere to the rule of law, avoiding any misplaced sense of exceptionalism that allows them to use these spaces for their own purposes.\n•\nShipping Containers Blocking Roads:\no\nA specific example was given where shipping containers are brought in to block roads and pavements, often used to stop protestors. These containers are left on public roads and pavements after they have served their purpose, effectively obstructing public use.\no\nThe Court directed that once such containers have served their purpose, they must be removed promptly from public spaces.\n•\nCourt’s Directives:\no\nThe federal and provincial governments are directed to clear all encroachments from public roads and pavements within three days.\no\nIf the encroachments are not cleared, the relevant authority must demolish or remove them, and the costs incurred will be recovered from those who placed the encroachments.\no\nFor government buildings, the costs will be recovered from the senior-most officer in charge of the property in front of which the encroachments are made.\n•\nNationwide Application:\no\nThis order applies nationwide, and the government is directed to advertise this order in newspapers and ensure it is broadcast as a public service message by PEMRA-licensed media outlets.\n(b) Climate Change and Tree Plantation on Pavements:\n•\nImportance of Trees for Climate Change Mitigation:\no\nThe Court highlighted the benefits of trees, particularly in urban areas where scorching heat and pollution are significant issues during summer months.\no\nTrees are effective in absorbing pollutants and producing oxygen, which can have a substantial impact on combating climate change.\n•\nUnderutilized Potential of Pavements:\no\nPavements are an underutilized space that can be utilized for tree plantation. However, this has been neglected by local governments.\n•\nCourt’s Directives:\no\nThe local governments across Pakistan are directed to conduct a survey of pavements and immediately plant trees on them, ensuring the care and maintenance of these trees.\no\nThe Court emphasized that having trees on pavements would not only contribute to environmental sustainability but also encourage more people to use these pavements, improving overall urban living conditions.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court issued critical directives aimed at protecting public spaces and improving urban environments. The key points of the ruling are:\n1.\nRemoval of Encroachments: Governments and individuals, especially those in official positions, are ordered to clear public roads and pavements of encroachments within three days, with costs to be recovered from the responsible parties.\n2.\nClimate Change Mitigation: Local governments are instructed to plant trees on pavements as a way to combat climate change, reduce pollution, and enhance public access to green spaces. This initiative also aims to improve public health and comfort, particularly during harsh summer conditions.\nThese directions underscore the importance of adhering to the rule of law, respecting public spaces, and taking immediate action to address environmental challenges like climate change through practical, community-oriented measures.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3)", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No.9/2010, Criminal Original Petition No.7-K/2017, C.M.A. No. 6206/2013, Criminal Original Petition No. 9-K/2021, C.M.As. Nos. 441-K, 1083-K, 1112-K, 774-K/2017, Crl.M.A. No. 59-K/ 2018, C.M.As. Nos. 1062-K, 1064-K/2021, 941-K/2020, 1114-K, 775-K, 698-K, 1000-K/2021, 74-K, 86-K, 711-K/2020, Civil Review Petition No. 57-K/2021, Criminal Original No. 8- K/2021, C.M.A. No. 391-K/ 2020, C.M.As. Nos. 424-K, 437-K, 438-K, 515-K/2021, Crl. M.A. No. 229-K/2018, C.M.As. Nos. 621-K/2021, 167-K, 367-K, 177-K/ 2020, C.M.As. Nos. 1004-K/2021, 770-K/2020, Crl.M.A. No. 52-K/ 2018, C.M.As. Nos. 631-K/2019, 78-K, 523-K, 83-K, 512-K, 594-K/ 2020, 617-K, 889-K/2019, Civil Review Petition No. 28-K/2020, C.M.As. Nos. 1087-K, 1095-K, 1129-K/2021, 940-K/2020, Crl.M.As. Nos. 121-K/ 2017, 38-K/2018, C.M.As. Nos. 423-K/2019, 179-K/2020, CPLA No. 422-K/2020, C.M.A. No. 767- K/ 2020, CPLAs Nos. 92-K, 93-K/ 2020, Criminal Original Petition No. 19-K/2017, Crl.M.As. Nos. 124-K, 132-K/2017, 111-K, 243-K, 8-K, 19-K, 20-K, 72-K/2018, C.M.As. No. 59-K, 349-K, 875-K, 933-K/2019, C.M. Appeal No. 139/ 2020, C.M.As. Nos. 202-K, 281-K/2020, Crl.MA Nos. 32-K/2018, 1-K/ 2019, 34-K/2020, C.M.As. Nos. 761-K, 808-K/2020, 782-K/2021, C.P.L.A. No.599-K/2021, C.M.As. Nos. 1014-K, 966-K, 1006-K, 1040-K, 971-K/ 2021, Criminal Original Petition No. 10-K/2021, C.M.As. Nos. 1097-K, 1164-K/2021, Crl.M.As. Nos. 71-K, 95-K, 214-K/2018, 2-K/2019, C.M.As. Nos. 521-K, 527-K/ 2019, 162-K, 193-K, 762-K/ 2020, 425-K/ 2019, Criminal Original Petition No. 5-K/2020, C.M.As. Nos. 809-K, 82-K, 336-K/2020, Criminal Original Petition No.1-K/ 2020, C.M.As. Nos. 510-K/2021, 300-K, 414-K/2020, Report No. 7-K, 76-K/2021, C.M.As. Nos. 1248-K, 1249-K, 1252-K, 1259-K, 1260-K, 1262-K/2021, 6-K, 12-K, 40-K, 83-K, 93-K, 94-K, 95-K/2022, Civil Review Petition No. 1-K/2022, C.M.As. Nos. 27-K, 112-K, 126-K/ 2022, Civil Review Petition No. 4-K/2022, C.M. Appeal No. 18/2022, C.M.As. Nos. 145-K, 141-K/2022, Criminal Original Petition No. 18-K/ 2021, Civil Review Petitions Nos. 13-K, 11-K/2022, C.M. Appeal No. 26/2022, Civil Review Petition No. 23-K/2022, C.M.As. Nos.395-K, 403-K, 452-K/2022, Criminal Original Petition No. 10-K/2022, C.M.A. No. 644-K/2022, Crl.M.A. No. 1-K/2022, C.M. Appeal No. 1-K/2022, Criminal Original Petition No. 11-K/2022, C.M.As. Nos. 790-K, 1085-K, 1108-K/2023, C.M. Appeal No. 2-K/2024 and C.M.A. No. 293-K/2024, decided on 25th April, 2024, heard on: 25th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, CHIEF JUSTICE, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Attendance:\nMukesh Kimar G. Karara, Advocate Supreme Court, Murtaza Ali, in-person, Kh. Shamsul Islam, Advocate Supreme Court, Javed Kumbo, Additional Secretary, Finance (in C.M.A. No. 941-K/2020, in C.M.A. No. 521-K/2019 in C.P. No. 9/2010).\nFarhad Younus Memon, Intervenor in person (in C.M.A. No. 177-K/2020).\nAbdul Basit Afridi, Advocate, Asim Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court, Farmanullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Shabbir Ahmed and Gul Khitab (in C.M.As. Nos. 1130-K and 1083-K/2021).\nMuhammad Raees, Abdul Haleem Siddiqui, Syed Dilshad Hussain Shah, Spl. Prosecutor, NAB (in Crl.M.A. No. 20-K/2018 in C.M.As. Nos. 767-K/2020 and 933-K/2019 in C.M.A. No. 1004-K/ 2021).\nMazhar Ali B. Chohan, Advocate-on-Record (in CRP No. 57-K/ 2021, Crl.M.As. Nos. 132-K/2017, 72-K/2018, 1-K/2019, C.M.As. Nos. 971-K and 510-K/2021).\nM. Saleem Mangrio, Advocate Supreme Court, Shoa-un-Nabi, Advocate Supreme Court and Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.A. No. 1087-K/2021 in C.M.A. No.32-K/2018 in C.M.As. Nos.933-K/2019, 767-K, 367-K, 391-K/2020, Crl.O.P. No.8-K, 10-K/ 2021, C.M.A. No. 782-K/2021 and 452-K/2022).\nObaidur Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court, Najamuddin Sehto, D.G., Malir Development Authority, Muhammad Irfan Baig, Director Legal Affairs, MDA and Zakir Hussain Khaskheli, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 438-K/2021 in Crl.OP No. 7-K/2017).\nZakir Hussain Khaskheli, Advocate Supreme Court (in Crl.M.As. Nos. 132-K/2017 and 72-K/2018).\nSyed Ashikue Raza, Advocate Supreme Court, M. Hasan Akbar, Advocate General, Sindh and Syed Mohsin Hussain Shah, A.A.G. (in C.M.A. No. 367-K/2022 in C.P. No. 9/2010).\nSyed Ashikue Raza, Advocate Supreme Court (in Crl.M.As. Nos. 8-K, 16-K and 243-K/2018).\nSyed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi (in Crl.OP No. 1-K/2020 and C.M.A. No. 82-K/2020).\nMs. Nahid Naz, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.A. No. 1085-K/2023).\nMurtaza Ali, in-person (in C.M.As. Nos. 521-K, 661-K/2019 and 36-K/2022).\nCh. Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 1087-K/2021).\nM. Imran Siraj, in-person (in C.M.A. No. 1095-K/2021).\nZeeshan Zaman, Legal Officer, Pakistan Rangers, Sindh (in C.P. No. 9/2010).\nMuhammad Nasir Khalily, D.S. Pak. Railway, Imran Faisal, Dy. D.G. Pak. Railway Property and Land, Rao Moinuddin, A.D.L.A, Raja Qasit Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Afsheen Amar, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 9/2010).\nMst. Sabiha Parveen, in-person (in Crl.OP No. 7-K/2017).\nWaseem Shahid, Director Military Land, Muhammad Hayat, Cantt. E.O. Muhammad Zubair, Cantt. E.O. Syed Irfan Haider, Cantt. E.O. and Mansoor Alam Khan, M.E.O. (in C.M.A. No. 770-K/2020 in C.P. No. 9/2010).\nSyed Hasan Naqvi, Commissioner Karachi and Khalid Maroof, A.C. Revenue (in C.P. No. 9/2010).\nSyeda Maria Raza (in Crl.OP No. 9-K/2021).\nM. Umer Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court, Lahore (in C.P. No. 9/2010).\nMuhammad Afzal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 1108-K/2023).\nM. Yaqoob Khan, Curator and Naveed Sandal Khan, Technical Officer, National Museum Pakistan (in C.P. No. 9/2010).\nAmir Mughal, G.M. and Shahab Sarki, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 770-K/2021).\nSyed Salahuddin Ahmed, M.D./CEO, KWSB (in C.P. No. 9/ 2010).\nSyed Shujaat Hussain, D.G. KDA, Mirza Sarfraz Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Shabihul Hassan, D.G, LDA (in C.P. No. 9/2010).\nZulifqar Gul Memon, Chief Transport and Communication, Minister of P.D. and Spl. Initiative, Islamabad and Zia-ul-Haq Makhdoom, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan (in C.P. No. 9/ 2010).\nObaidur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Faisal Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court (video link, Islamabad) (in C.M.A. No. 438-K/2021).\nMunir Ahmed Malik, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court and K. A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.A. 1062-K/21, C.M.A. No. 40-K/ 22 and C.M.A. No. 93-K/22).\nArshad M. Tayebaly, Advocate Supreme Court and K. A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.A. No. 1064-K/21 and C.M.A. No. 94-K, 40-K/22).\nKhalid Javed, Advocate Supreme Court and Mukesh Kumar G. Karara, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 941-K/22).\nAbid S. Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court and Mirza Sarfaraz Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court, K. A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.A. No.86-K/ 2020).\nSalahuddin Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 437-K/21 and C.M.A. No. 300-K/20).\nMuhammad Umar Lakhani, Advocate Supreme Court and Murtaza Wahab, Mayor Karachi (in C.M.A. No. 1129-K/21).\nSyed Haider Imam, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 1014-K/21).\nMs. Razia Danish, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 1062-K/20).\nMuhammad Hassan Akbar, Advocate-General, Sindh and Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate-General, Sindh (in C.R.P. No.23-K/22).", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAIMATULLAH KHAN, ADVOCATE AND OTHERS-PETITIONER\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24311", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3039 = 2024 SLD 3039 = (2024) 129 TAX 5", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNCs", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary:\nThe issue in this case revolves around low-paid employees at the Bahauddin Zikria University, and their complaints regarding the taxation system under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Specifically, it pertains to the difference in tax rates applied to these employees, as compared to temporary or visiting faculty members at the same university.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions Involved:\n•\nFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 – Section 9\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Sections 12, 149, and 153\n________________________________________\nBackground:\nThe complainants, who were low-paid employees of the university, were subject to higher tax rates of 10% or 20% compared to their counterparts—temporary or visiting faculty members—who were being taxed at a lower rate.\nThe President of Pakistan had already extended relief to low-paid employees, but the employees found themselves still facing disparities in the taxation system, leading to the filing of a complaint with the Federal Tax Ombudsman (F.T.O.).\n________________________________________\nKey Points of the Case:\n1.\nTax Rate Discrepancy:\no\nLow-paid employees were facing a higher tax burden compared to visiting faculty members at the university, who were taxed at a more favorable rate.\n2.\nRelief Extended to Low-Paid Employees:\no\nThe President of Pakistan had already granted relief to low-paid employees with regard to their tax rates under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\no\nThe relief was aimed at reducing the tax rates for employees with lower income.\n3.\nComplaint to Federal Tax Ombudsman:\no\nIn spite of the relief, the low-paid employees continued to face the discrepancy in tax rates and filed a complaint with the Federal Tax Ombudsman.\no\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman (F.T.O.) examined the complaint under the relevant provisions of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, which grants authority to the Ombudsman to investigate complaints relating to tax practices.\n4.\nDepartmental Legal Practice:\no\nThe Departmental legal practice continued to apply the higher tax rates for low-paid employees, which had led to the complaints.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues and Decision:\n•\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman examined the matter and upheld the relief granted to the low-paid employees, noting that the President of Pakistan had already extended relief to them in relation to their tax rates.\n•\nThe F.T.O. emphasized the need for uniformity in taxation, particularly concerning the tax treatment of low-paid employees versus temporary faculty members.\n•\nThe validity of the complaint to the Federal Tax Ombudsman was confirmed, and it was decided that the relief granted by the President should be extended to ensure fair tax treatment of these employees.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe case underscores the importance of fair and equitable tax treatment for low-paid employees and highlights the role of the Federal Tax Ombudsman in addressing discriminatory tax practices. The President’s relief was confirmed, and it was ruled that low-paid employees should receive equitable tax treatment, extending the relief granted to them.\nIn essence, the Federal Tax Ombudsman has jurisdiction to review and address complaints where there is a discrepancy in tax treatment, especially when it leads to an unequal tax burden on employees based on their pay scale or status. The decision confirms the extension of relief for low-paid employees and ensures that tax practices align with constitutional principles of fairness and justice.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=12,149,153Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=9", - "Case #": "Complaint Nos.0002 to 0009/lnfrml/2023 decided on 19.1.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Khalil Ahmad Advisor for Dealing Officer.\nMr. Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor for Appraisement Officer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AZEEM AND 8 OTHERS C/O INSTITUTE OF FOOD SCIENCES & NUTRITION, BAHAUDDIN ZAKARIYA UNIVERSITY, MULTAN\nVS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24312", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3040 = 2024 SLD 3040 = (2024) 129 TAX 258", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDk", - "Key Words:": "SUMMARY OF CASE\nLaw & Sections\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Sections 111, 120, 122, 140, 176(4), 182(1) & 205\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979: Sections 62 & 65\n•\nQanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: Article 117\n________________________________________\nKey Points\n•\nFacts of the Case:\no\nThe appellant, an individual taxpayer, filed an income tax return for Tax Year 2018. The Commissioner IR received definite information about the appellants undeclared assets. The DCIR issued a show-cause notice, resulting in an order in original that included additions, 100% penalty, and default surcharge. The appellant appealed the decision, but the CIR(A) confirmed the DCIRs decision. The appellant then appealed to the Appellate Tribunal.\n________________________________________\n•\nArguments:\no\nThe appellant’s Advocate argued that the order was without jurisdiction, illegal, and void ab initio, as the DCIR did not provide definite information for amending the assessment. The appellant claimed that no separate notice under section 111 was issued, making the additions unlawful.\no\nThe department, represented by the DR and DCIR, argued that the received information was credible and formed a valid basis under section 122 of the Ordinance for making the additions to income. The DR further emphasized that under the Finance Act, 2021, no separate notice under section 111 was necessary if the information had been confronted through a notice under section 122(9).\n________________________________________\n•\nDecision:\no\nExplanation by Finance Act, 2021: The explanation to section 111 added by the Finance Act, 2021, could not be applied retrospectively, as fiscal statutes apply prospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise. Hence, the additions made under section 111(1)(b) were found to be without jurisdiction and illegal.\no\nAdditions to Income: The Tribunal concluded that the addition could only be made in the tax year to which the investment related. Since the investment involved funds from previous tax years (before 2000), the additions made in Tax Year 2018 were ruled unlawful. Therefore, the additions under section 111(1)(b) regarding the FSSA Trust Singapore were deleted.\no\nPenalty and Default Surcharge: Since the additions were annulled, the penalty and default surcharge were also abated and stood deleted.\n________________________________________\nConclusion\nThe appeal was decided in favor of the appellant. The impugned additions, penalty, and surcharge were deleted, and the decisions of the lower authorities were annulled.\n________________________________________\nKey Sections Referenced:\n•\nSection 111(1)(b): Pertains to the assessment of unexplained income or assets.\n•\nSection 122: Deals with the amendment of assessments.\n•\nSection 182(1): Imposition of penalties.\n•\nSection 205: Default surcharge.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,120,122,140,176(4),182(1),205Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=62,65Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=117", - "Case #": "ITA No. 372/KB/2022, decided on 30.08.2022, heard on: 10.08.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHARIF A WAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND RASHIDA SIDDIQUA, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdul Ahad Nadeem & Mr. Hassan Abbas, Advocates for the Appellants.\nMr. Imran Falak Sher, DR., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. FAROOK BANGALI, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AEOI, ZONE, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24313", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3041 = 2024 SLD 3041 = (2024) 129 TAX 285", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNDg", - "Key Words:": "SUMMARY OF CASE\nLaw & Sections\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990): Sections 8(2), 11(2), 25, 31, 33, 34\n•\nSRO. 68(I)/2006, dated 28.01.2006\n•\nSRO. 69(I)/2006, dated 28.01.2006\n•\nSales Tax Rules, 2006: Chapter-IV\n________________________________________\nKey Points\n•\nFacts of the Case:\no\nThe respondent is a Public Limited Company involved in extracting raw edible oil from imported seeds. The DCIR passed an order under section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act for the tax period July 2010 to June 2013, creating a tax demand of Rs. 94,088,000 based on the information provided by the Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation. The order involved disallowing inadmissible input tax adjustments, along with default surcharge and penalty. The respondent appealed to the CIR(A), who annulled the order. The department then filed an appeal.\n________________________________________\n•\nArguments:\no\nDRs Argument: The DR argued that the DCIRs order was legally valid and supported by the law. He contended that the CIR(A)s annulment was unjustified and that the case should have been decided on its merits.\no\nARs Argument: The AR supported the CIR(A)s annulment of the order, asserting that the decision was in accordance with the law.\n________________________________________\n•\nDecision:\no\nJurisdictional Issue: The Tribunal ruled that the DCIR’s order was without jurisdiction, as the sales tax audit did not apply to the taxpayer in question, according to explicit circulars issued by the Board in March 2008 and July 2008. Therefore, the order passed by the DCIR was void.\no\nMisapplication of Law: The Tribunal further observed that the DCIR had incorrectly disallowed the input tax adjustment without properly apportioning it between taxable and exempt supplies. Specifically, the crude oil extracted was taxable, while the meal was exempt under the Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act. The DCIR failed to justify the apportionment of input sales tax between these two supplies, which was a significant misapplication of the law.\no\nTax Paid at Import Stage: The Tribunal noted that the registered person had already paid the sales tax at the import stage on both the oil and the meal, as per SRO 69(I)/2006, which meant no further sales tax was due. This disregard was another glaring error in the DCIR’s order.\no\nSpeaking Order Requirement: The Tribunal emphasized that every order by the OIR should be a speaking order, showing that the officer had applied his mind to the issues. The DCIRs order was found to be arbitrary and failed to meet this requirement.\no\nConclusion: The appeal was dismissed due to the lack of merit, and the Tribunal reiterated the need for careful attention to avoid negligence in future decisions.\n________________________________________\nKey Sections Referenced:\n•\nSection 8(2): Input tax adjustment.\n•\nSection 11(2): Assessment of tax and recovery.\n•\nSection 31: Powers of audit and investigation.\n•\nSection 33: Penalty for failure to comply with tax laws.\n•\nSection 34: Default surcharge.\n•\nSRO. 68(I)/2006: Exemption for meal products.\n•\nSRO. 69(I)/2006: Payment of input tax on import.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(2),11(2),25,31,33,34", - "Case #": "STA No.221/KB/2016 decided on 22.11.2021heard on: 17.11.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MS. SHAKER BANO WALAJAHI ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND QAZI ANWER KAMAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Fouz Khalid, D.R., for the Appellant.\nMr. Sanaullah Khan, ITP, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-IV, LTU, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S. KARACHI GRAIN (PVT) LTD., KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24314", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3042 = 2024 SLD 3042 = (2024) 129 TAX 293", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNHo", - "Key Words:": "SUMMARY OF CASE\nLaw & Sections\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001:\no\nSections 21(1), 111, 114, 120, 122, 149, 161, 165, 177 & 205\no\nSection 122(5A) - Powers of the Commissioner to amend assessment orders if deemed erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue\n________________________________________\nKey Points\n•\nFacts of the Case:\no\nThe appellant, a private limited company involved in the manufacture and sale of motorcycle and rickshaw parts, filed a return for the tax year declaring a loss of Rs. 614,274. This return constituted a deemed assessment order under section 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\no\nThe Additional Commissioner (ADCIR) considered the deemed assessment order erroneous, as it was prejudicial to the revenue, and issued a show-cause notice under section 122(5A) to amend the assessment.\no\nThe taxpayer filed a revised return, reporting an income of Rs. 30,189,702 instead of the declared loss. However, the explanation provided by the taxpayer was deemed implausible by the ADCIR, who amended the assessment.\no\nThe taxpayer appealed to the CIR(A), who upheld the ADCIR’s decision. The taxpayer then filed an appeal to this forum.\n________________________________________\n•\nArguments:\no\nDRs Argument:\n\nThe DR argued that the notice was issued based on the errors found in the returns and WHT (Withholding Tax) statements, which caused prejudice to the revenue. The DR contended that the CIR(A) erred in observing that only one notice was issued for clarification and that no reconciliation was provided by the taxpayer for the discrepancy between the accounts and WHT statements.\no\nTaxpayers Argument:\n\nThe taxpayer’s counsel argued that the conditions under section 122(5A) (i.e., that the assessment must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue) were not met. The Additional Commissioner could not invoke section 122(5A) without satisfying both conditions. Moreover, the taxpayer’s counsel asserted that seeking additional details, documents, and explanations during the proceedings went beyond the scope of section 122(5A), which should only be invoked to rectify errors prejudicial to revenue, not for conducting an audit.\n________________________________________\n•\nDecision:\no\nErroneous and Prejudicial Conditions:\nThe Tribunal held that both conditions—erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue—must simultaneously exist for an amendment under section 122(5A) to be valid. If one condition is absent, the proceedings are null and void.\no\nLimited Power of ADCIR:\nThe Tribunal clarified that the Additional Commissioner does not have unlimited discretion to invoke section 122(5A) for every assessment order. The section is meant to correct assessments that have caused a direct revenue loss due to violations of law or factual errors.\no\nPurpose of Section 122(5A):\nThe Tribunal emphasized that section 122(5A) should only be invoked to address distortions or errors that directly affect revenue. It is not a tool for the Commissioner to conduct a broad review or audit of an assessment.\no\nSeeking Additional Documents Not Permitted:\nThe Tribunal ruled that requesting additional documents or evidence under section 122(5A) is not permissible. If the ADCIR required more details to prove that the assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to revenue, it indicated that the initial assessment was not truly erroneous before the show-cause notice was issued.\n________________________________________\nKey Sections Referenced:\n•\nSection 122(5A): Conditions for amending an assessment order if found erroneous or prejudicial to revenue.\n•\nSection 120: Deemed assessments.\n•\nSection 21(1): Deductions not allowed.\n•\nSection 111: Unexplained income or assets.\n•\nSection 177: Audit powers of the tax authorities.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(1),111,114,120,122,149,161,165,177,205", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1020/KB/2020 decided on 12.01.2021, heard on: 05.03.2020", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIF ULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdul Rehman Khilji, D.R., LTU, for the Appellant.\nMr. Vishno Raja & Syed Riazuddin, Advocates for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE ZONE-III, LTU, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S. NJ AUTO INS. (PVT) LTD. KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24315", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3043 = 2024 SLD 3043 = (2024) 129 TAX 629", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FDNHk", - "Key Words:": "Legal Summary:\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Article 199: Constitutional Petition\nIn this case, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the implementation of an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) in STA No. 44/MB/2024, dated 04.03.2024. The petitioner argued that the Department was legally obligated to implement the decision, but despite multiple attempts, the Department had failed to do so.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe petitioner sought the implementation of the Appellate Tribunals Order dated 04.03.2024.\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal had passed an order in STA No. 44/MB/2024, and the petitioner contended that since no injunctive order was in place, the Department was bound to implement it.\n•\nDespite repeated efforts by the petitioner, the Department had not acted upon the order.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nPetitioner’s Argument:\no\nThe petitioner’s counsel argued that since there was no injunctive order against the Appellate Tribunals decision, the Department was obligated to implement it.\n•\nRespondent’s Argument:\no\nThe counsel for the respondents (the Department) filed a reply and acknowledged that a Reference Application had been filed against the Appellate Tribunals order, but also admitted that no injunctive order was in effect.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nImplementation of the Tribunal’s Order:\no\nThe Court observed that the Department could implement the order conditionally but could not avoid it. Since there was no injunctive order suspending, varying, or setting aside the decision, the Department was legally required to implement the order in accordance with the law.\n•\nTimeframe for Implementation:\no\nThe Court directed the Department to implement the order within seven days from the date of the ruling.\n•\nReference Application:\no\nRegarding the Reference Application filed by the Department, the Court noted that the Department could proceed with the application, but this should not prevent the implementation of the Appellate Tribunals order.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Constitutional Petition was disposed of with the direction that the Department must implement the Appellate Tribunals Order within seven days, unless the order is suspended or set aside by a higher authority. The Reference Application could proceed separately, but it should not delay the implementation of the existing order.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 3690 of 2024 decided on 28.03.2024, heard on: 28.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate for the petitioner.\nMalik Aamir Javed Bhutta, Assistant Attorney General on Court’s call. Mr. Tariq Manzoor Sial, Advocate for respondents No.2 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S AL-MADINA DRY FRUIT TRADERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24316", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3044 = 2024 SLD 3044 = (2024) 129 TAX 643", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzc", - "Key Words:": "Legal Summary:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Sections 138, 139, 140, and 227 & Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Articles 10A & 19A\nIn this case, the petitioner filed a Constitutional Petition challenging the withdrawal of an amount from his personal bank account under Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The petitioner argued that the action was taken without proper information and violated his fundamental rights.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe petitioner was aggrieved by the withdrawal of funds from his personal account, which was done by invoking Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue justified the action, stating that the tax demand was against a company of which the petitioner was a director, and that a notice under Section 139 had been served on the petitioner.\n•\nHowever, the petitioner contended that the notice served on the bank lacked details of the demand under any assessment order against him, and this lack of information led to the withdrawal of funds from his account.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nPetitioner’s Argument:\no\nThe petitioner’s counsel argued that the notice to the bank was insufficient because it did not contain the necessary details of the demand under an assessment order.\no\nFurthermore, the Commissioner Inland Revenue was not justified in invoking Section 140 without giving proper notice or explanation.\n•\nRespondent’s Argument:\no\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue defended the action, stating that the demand was against the company where the petitioner was a director and that notice under Section 139 was issued to the petitioner prior to taking action.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nViolation of Fundamental Rights:\no\nThe Court held that the action taken under Section 140 violated the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Article 10A (Right to Fair Trial) of the Constitution. The due process was not followed, as the notice issued did not contain adequate details about the demand.\no\nArticle 19A of the Constitution, which ensures the right to information, was also violated. The Court emphasized that all notices must contain sufficient information regarding the proceedings and the basis for taking coercive measures for tax recovery.\n•\nProvisions of Section 140:\no\nThe Court observed that the provisions of Section 140 are intended to be used in situations where the Commissioner believes the taxpayer may evade the tax demand, making it irrecoverable. The Court pointed out that invoking this provision against an active taxpayer, who is not attempting to evade the demand, amounts to robbing the taxpayer, especially if due process is not followed.\n•\nMisconduct Under Service Laws:\no\nThe Court also held that Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance must be invoked with caution and that the Commissioner should seek prior approval from the FBR before proceeding with such recovery actions. Failure to comply with the Constitutional mandates (Articles 10A and 19A) and binding judgments could be considered misconduct under service laws.\n•\nRecovery of Illegally Withdrawn Amount:\no\nThe amount withdrawn from the petitioner’s account was ordered to be returned within 15 days.\no\nThe Court emphasized that the FBR has the responsibility to ensure that such actions are conducted in good faith and in compliance with Constitutional rights. It also held that the FBR could initiate disciplinary proceedings if fundamental rights are violated or court judgments are ignored.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe Constitutional Petition was allowed, with the Court directing the return of the illegally withdrawn amount within 15 days.\n•\nThe FBR was reminded of its duty to ensure compliance with Constitutional rights and due process in the recovery of taxes under Section 140.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=138,139,140,227Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A,19A", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.71690 of 2023 decided on 07.12.2023, heard on: 07.12.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Muhamad Afzal, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nSyed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General for the Federation.\nMr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocate, M/s Malik Abdullah Raza and Hassan Safdar Khan, Advocates, Dr. Shazia Gull, Commissioner Inland Revenue, Syeda Lubna Shah Deputy Commissioner, Inland Revenue and Mr. Akhtar Suraj, ADCIR, Lahore for Respondent-Departments", - "Petitioner Name:": "SARDAR WASEEM ILYAS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24317", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3045 = 2024 SLD 3045 = (2024) 129 TAX 682", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzY", - "Key Words:": "Legal Summary:\nCustoms Act, 1969 – Sections: 12, 25A, 32, 80, 179 & 195, Customs Rules, 2001 – Rule 107(A)\nThis case involves a Special Customs Reference Application filed by the department questioning the decision of the Appellate Tribunal in relation to the levy of customs duties and taxes, particularly focusing on valuation rulings and recovery actions related to the non-application of correct customs value during the clearance of goods.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe department filed a Special Customs Reference Application against the Appellate Tribunal’s decision, which involved:\no\nThe timing of the appeal filed after 395 days from the issuance of the Order-in-Original.\no\nWhether no recovery action could be taken against an importer when duty/taxes were short levied due to the incorrect application of customs value (based on Valuation Rulings).\no\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to dispose of an appeal related to an Order-in-Original passed under Section 179 of the Customs Act, which had already attained finality prior to the amendment under Section 194-A(1) of the Act.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nDepartments Argument:\no\nThe department argued that the Appellate Tribunal wrongly entertained the appeal filed after a significant delay (395 days).\no\nThe department contended that the Valuation Rulings (Nos. Misc/11/2007-IVC-1537 and Misc/11/2007/1343) should apply to the goods clearance, even though the rulings were issued after the 90-day period for clearance.\n•\nRespondent’s Argument:\no\nThe respondent maintained that the appeal was filed within the permissible time frame and that the Valuation Rulings should not be applied beyond their validity period (90 days).\no\nThe respondent also argued that the clearance of goods occurred under the earlier regime, prior to the amendment to Section 25A of the Customs Act in 2010, which introduced stricter valuation rules.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nProceedings under the Garb of Valuation Ruling:\no\nThe Court found that the proceedings conducted under the pretext of applying a Valuation Ruling were unsustainable under the Customs Act. The correct legal recourse for challenging the assessment order should have been via an appeal under the relevant provisions of the Customs Act. The actions taken under the valuation ruling were not supported by proper legal procedures.\n2.\nApplication of Valuation Ruling:\no\nThe Court noted that the Finance Act 2010, which amended Section 25A of the Customs Act, introduced the 90% data regime (pre/post), which was applicable by the time the goods were cleared.\no\nThe Valuation Ruling (Misc/11/2007-IVC-1537 and Misc/11/2007/1343) issued after the Finance Act 2010 came into effect could not be retroactively applied to the clearance of goods that occurred prior to its enforcement. Additionally, the show-cause notice was not clear about the date of clearance of the goods, which further weakens the claim of applying the later valuation rulings.\n3.\nTime for Filing the Appeal:\no\nThe Appellate Tribunal had entertained the appeal filed after the 395-day delay. The Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision to condone the delay, asserting that the delay was justified based on the facts of the case.\n4.\nFinal Judgment:\no\nIn light of the above reasoning, the Court ruled in favor of the respondent, confirming that the Appellate Tribunals decision was correct. The Special Customs Reference Application was dismissed along with any associated applications.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe Special Customs Reference Application was dismissed because:\no\nProceedings under the Valuation Ruling were found to be unsustainable without proper legal recourse.\no\nThe Valuation Ruling issued after the 2010 amendment to Section 25A could not be applied retroactively to goods cleared before its introduction.\no\nThe Appellate Tribunals decision to entertain the appeal despite the delay was upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=12,25A,32,80,179,195Customs Rules, 2001=107(A)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 1233 of 2015 decided on 07.12.2021, heard on: 07.12.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE AND MAHMOOD A. KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Iqbal M. Khurram for applicant.\nNone for respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nMS. SHAZIA AMAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24318", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3046 = 2024 SLD 3046 = 2024 PTD 776 = (2025) 131 TAX 248", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzU", - "Key Words:": "This case deals with the power of revenue officers under the Federal Excise Act, 2005, to conduct raids/searches without obtaining a search warrant, and the requirement to have local recovery witnesses present during such actions. The authorities were aggrieved by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenues decision, which had set aside the assessment orders because the raid was conducted without proper warrants and without recovery witnesses from the locality.\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nThe revenue authorities conducted a raid/search on premises involved in alleged tax evasion under the Federal Excise Act, 2005.\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue set aside the assessment orders, holding that the raid was carried out without obtaining the proper search warrants and that the recovery witnesses from the locality were not associated during the search.\n•\nThe revenue authorities contested this decision, asserting that the raid was lawful under certain exceptional circumstances.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nRevenue Authorities Argument:\no\nThe revenue authorities argued that under the Federal Excise Act, they had the discretionary power to conduct raids without obtaining search warrants if they reasonably believed that such an action was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence or the escape of the accused.\no\nThe authorities asserted that the primary responsibility of the revenue officers is to protect state revenue, and as such, the requirement for obtaining search warrants could be waived in exceptional circumstances.\no\nThe officers also contended that the absence of local recovery witnesses did not invalidate the search, as the raid was necessary to preserve the evidence.\n•\nAppellate Tribunals Argument:\no\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue found the search and raid to be invalid because no search warrants had been obtained and the required recovery witnesses from the locality were not involved. The Tribunals decision rested on the procedural technicalities, which were not followed during the raid.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nSearch Without Warrant in Exceptional Circumstances:\no\nThe High Court observed that while obtaining search warrants and conducting a search in the presence of two witnesses are critical safeguards, there are exceptions.\no\nIf the authorized officer of the revenue department reasonably believes that obtaining a warrant could result in the destruction of valuable evidence, then the officer may conduct the search/raid without a warrant in exceptional circumstances.\no\nSuch actions are aimed at protecting state revenue and ensuring that evidence is preserved, particularly when tax evasion is suspected.\n2.\nPurpose of Recovery Witnesses:\no\nThe requirement to have recovery witnesses from the locality is primarily to ensure transparency and accountability during the search. However, in cases where it is impractical or impossible to involve such witnesses, this requirement could be waived, especially if the circumstances demand immediate action.\n3.\nHigh Courts Ruling:\no\nThe High Court set aside the findings of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, asserting that the revenue authorities acted within their powers by conducting the raid without obtaining a search warrant.\no\nThe Court held that the authorities primary duty was to protect state revenue, and in this case, the actions of the officers were justified under the law.\n4.\nPrecedents Cited:\no\nThe High Court relied on several precedents, including decisions in cases like Collector of Customs, Peshawar v. Noor Sher Ali (2021 PTD 822) and Messrs Islam Soap Industries (2020 PTD 1520), to reinforce the idea that search actions could be taken without search warrants under certain circumstances.\n5.\nFinal Judgment:\no\nThe reference was disposed of in favor of the revenue authorities, and the Appellate Tribunals decision was set aside. The Court upheld the actions taken by the revenue officers under the Federal Excise Act, 2005.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the revenue authorities, affirming that the raid conducted without a search warrant was valid under exceptional circumstances. The absence of local recovery witnesses did not invalidate the search. The primary responsibility of the authorities to protect state revenue justified their actions, and the Appellate Tribunals decision was overturned.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009=19(11),26Federal Excise Act, 2005=29Sales Tax Act, 1990=47Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=94,103,529", - "Case #": "Sales Tax References Nos.5-P, 6-P, 7-P and 8-P of 2020, decided on 21st June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR, JUSITCE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri along with Sharifullah Law Officer for the Petitioner. \nTajdar Faisal Khan Marwat for Respondents. Date of hearing: 21st June, 2023.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, PESHAWAR ZONE\nVS\nMESSRS MANERI INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO COMPANY, DISTRICT SWABI AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24319", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3047 = 2024 SLD 3047 = 2024 PTD 818 = (2025) 132 TAX 257", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview:\nThe petitioners, running industrial units in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), sought exemption from income tax after the 25th Constitutional Amendment. The authorities disputed this claim, arguing that since the petitioners’ products were sold in settled areas, they were not entitled to a blanket exemption. The petitioners contested the demand for income tax and extra taxes under the Sales Tax Act, asserting their eligibility for exemption.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points:\n1.\nConstitution of Pakistan (Art. 247)\no\nPertains to the jurisdiction and governance over areas like FATA, prior to the 25th Constitutional Amendment.\n2.\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Sections 3, 159, 235, & 109A)\no\nSection 109A: Introduced through the Finance Act, 2019, provides specific exemptions for permanent residents of the former FATA who are generating income from businesses or taxable activities within FATA/PATA.\n3.\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (Sections 3 & 14)\no\nSection 14 relates to registration under the Sales Tax Act, which was an issue for the petitioners in the case.\n4.\nFinance Act, 2019\no\nProvided a specific tax exemption for residents of FATA who were conducting business or generating income from FATA.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nExemption from Income Tax\no\nThe petitioners sought income tax exemptions based on their manufacturing units being situated in the erstwhile FATA, now merged into KP after the 25th Amendment.\n2.\nAuthority’s Objection\no\nThe authorities contended that the petitioners’ goods were sold in settled areas, which disqualified them from a blanket tax exemption unless their taxable activities were verified.\n3.\nValidity of the Objection Post-25th Amendment\no\nBefore the Amendment, FATA residents enjoyed immunity from income tax. After the Amendment, Section 109A of the Income Tax Ordinance applied exemptions to residents of the newly merged areas, provided their income was generated within the region or from taxable activities within FATA/PATA.\n________________________________________\nCourt Decision:\n1.\nIncome Tax and Sales Tax Demands\no\nThe Court ruled that the demand for income tax/advance income tax under the Income Tax Ordinance and extra tax/further tax under the Sales Tax Act was illegal and without lawful authority. This was because the petitioners met the necessary conditions for the exemption under Section 109A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and were registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n2.\nExemption Conditions Fulfilled\no\nThe Court emphasized that the petitioners had their businesses situated in the former FATA/PATA and had active tax profiles on the FBR portal, qualifying them for the exemption as outlined under the Finance Act, 2019.\n3.\nDirection to Electricity Distribution Companies\no\nThe Court directed PESCO/TESCO not to demand income tax under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and extra taxes under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, from the petitioners.\n________________________________________\nCase Reference:\n1.\nPakistan through Chairman FBR v. Hazrat Hussain (2018 SCMR 939)\n2.\nCommissioner Income Tax, Peshawar v. M/s. Gul Cooking Oil and Vegetable Ghee (Pvt.) Ltd. (2008 PTD 169)\n3.\nMessrs Taj Packages Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Government of Pakistan (2016 PTD 203)\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe constitutional petition was allowed. The demand for taxes from the petitioners was deemed illegal as they fulfilled the criteria for tax exemptions under the new provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance (Section 109A) and the Sales Tax Act.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=53,159,235,109ASales Tax Act, 1990=3,14Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=247", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 505-P of 2023, decided on 25th May, 2023, heard on: 25th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shumail Ahmad Butt for Petitioners.\nSanaullah DAG, Ishtiaq Ahmad (Junior) and Asad Jan for Respondents along with Sharifullah, Assistant Director (Legal).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS SHAH STEEL INDUSTRY AND OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH FEDERAL SECRETARY FINANCE AND REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24320", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3048 = 2024 SLD 3048 = 2024 PTD 846 = 2024 PTD 1121", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYy8", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview: The petitioner, an importer and distributor of drugs, challenged the withholding of benefits under Entry 81 of the Eighth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, due to Notification SRO 526(I)/2021, issued on April 30, 2021. The authorities justified this decision by citing the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012, and the Medical Devices Rules, 2017. The petitioners claim was that the Notification was inconsistent with the parent law, and thus, the withholding of benefits was unlawful.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points:\n1.\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (Eighth Schedule, Entry No. 81)\no\nEntry 81 provides specific tax benefits for certain drugs, which were the subject of the dispute in this case.\n2.\nDrug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 (Sections 23, 32 & 36)\no\nSection 23 grants the authority to issue rules and regulations, under which Notification SRO 526(I)/2021 was issued.\no\nSections 32 & 36 govern the authority’s powers over medical devices and drug regulation.\n3.\nMedical Devices Rules, 2017 (Rule 52)\no\nDeals with the regulation of medical devices in Pakistan. The rules are relevant as the notification was framed under these rules.\n4.\nNotification SRO 526(I)/2021, dated 30-04-2021\no\nIssued under the powers of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act and Medical Devices Rules, the notification caused the petitioner to lose benefits under Entry 81 of the Eighth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nVires of Notification SRO 526(I)/2021\no\nThe primary issue was whether Notification SRO 526(I)/2021, issued under the Drug Regulatory Authority Act, 2012, and Medical Devices Rules, 2017, was valid.\no\nThe authorities claimed that the notification was issued under Section 23 of the Drug Regulatory Authority Act, but the petitioner contended that it was inconsistent with the Sales Tax Act and unjustly withheld their tax benefits.\n2.\nScope of Removal of Difficulties Clause\no\nThe removal of difficulties clause in legislative provisions is typically used for limited purposes. It should not alter the fundamental scope of the parent law.\no\nThe authorities argued that the removal of difficulties clause allowed the issuance of the notification, but the Court ruled that such a clause could not change the substance of the parent law.\n3.\nConflict Between Rules and Parent Statute\no\nThe Court emphasized that subordinate legislation (rules issued under a statute) cannot override the provisions of the parent statute.\no\nIf there is a conflict between the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and the subordinate rules, the Sales Tax Act must prevail. The Court also noted that if the rules are inconsistent with the parent statute, they must be struck down.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision:\n1.\nSubordinate Legislation vs. Parent Statute\no\nThe Court ruled that the Notification SRO 526(I)/2021 was inconsistent with the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\no\nRules made under a statute are subordinate and delegated legislation, and they cannot override the provisions of the parent statute. In this case, the rules issued under the Drug Regulatory Authority Act could not alter or conflict with the provisions of the Sales Tax Act.\n2.\nRemoval of Difficulties Clause\no\nThe Court clarified that the removal of difficulties clause can only be used for specific and restricted purposes. It cannot be invoked to change the scope or intent of the parent statute, as done in this case.\n3.\nValidity of Notification\no\nThe Court allowed the constitutional petition filed by the petitioner, declaring the withholding of tax benefits under Entry 81 of the Eighth Schedule as illegal and without lawful authority. The Notification SRO 526(I)/2021 was struck down as being inconsistent with the Sales Tax Act.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nInterpretation of Statutes and Delegated Legislation\no\nRules and regulations made under a statute are subordinate and cannot override the parent law.\no\nTo determine whether delegated legislation is valid, the Court must assess if it fits within the powers granted by the parent statute and aligns with the general purpose of the statute.\n2.\nScope of Removal of Difficulties Clause\no\nThe removal of difficulties clause cannot be used to change the scope or purpose of the parent law. It is only for resolving procedural or administrative challenges, not for altering the fundamental legal framework.\n________________________________________\nCase References:\n1.\nGovernment of Balouchistan v. Shah Muhammad (PLD 2023 SC 609)\n2.\nFarrukh Raza Sheikh v. The Appellate Tribunal, Inland Revenue and others (2022 SCMR 1787)\n3.\nAbbu Hashmi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2021 Sindh 492)\n4.\nMessrs Pakistan Television Corporation Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal) LTU, Islamabad and others (2019 SCMR 282)\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Constitutional Petition was allowed, and the Notification SRO 526(I)/2021 was deemed invalid as it was inconsistent with the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The petitioner was entitled to the tax benefits under Entry 81 of the Eighth Schedule.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-3049 of 2023, decided on 6th November, 2023, heard on: 6th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND ABDUL MOBEEN LAKHO, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Makhdoom Ali Khan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Fahad Khan and Sami-ur-Rehman for the Petitioner.\nMuhabbat Hussain Awan, Advocate for Respondent No. 1.\nKhaleeq Ahmed, D.A.G. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "POPULAR INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LIMITED THROUGH DULY AUTHORIZED OFFICER\nVS\nPAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, REVENUE AND EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24321", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3049 = 2024 SLD 3049 = 2024 PTD 858", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYys", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview: The petitioner, a company, filed a constitutional petition challenging the show-cause notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR). The notice alleged that the petitioner sold or transferred its taxable activity to an unregistered company, thus making the petitioner liable to pay sales tax under Section 49(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The petitioner contended that the transfer of assets took place under a Court order, and therefore Section 48 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 did not apply to the transaction. The petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the DCIR to issue the show-cause notice.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points:\n1.\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (Sections 48 & 49(1))\no\nSection 48: Deals with the transfer of taxable activity in the context of sales tax.\no\nSection 49(1): Imposes a tax liability when there is a transfer of taxable activity to an unregistered person.\n2.\nConstitution of Pakistan (Article 199)\no\nArticle 199 of the Constitution provides for the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs, including for the enforcement of fundamental rights and judicial review of administrative decisions.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nJurisdiction of Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR)\no\nThe core issue was whether the DCIR had the jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice regarding the transfer of taxable activity.\no\nThe petitioner claimed that the sale or transfer of assets was based on a Court order, and hence Section 48 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 did not apply.\n2.\nMaintainability of the Constitutional Petition\no\nThe petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue to issue the show-cause notice.\no\nThe question was whether the Constitutional petition was maintainable at this stage, considering that the matter was already pending before the DCIR and an appeal could be filed under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision:\n1.\nJurisdiction of Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue\no\nThe Court held that the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue had the jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\no\nThe show-cause notice was issued based on an alleged violation of Section 49(1), but whether the provisions of Section 49 were applicable to the petitioner’s transaction was not determined at this stage.\n2.\nMaintainability of Constitutional Petition\no\nThe Constitutional petition was not maintainable as the matter was pending before the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue.\no\nThe petitioner had already filed a reply to the show-cause notice, and the matter was under review. Any order passed by the DCIR could be appealed under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\no\nThe Court emphasized that the issue should be raised in the appeal process, as provided for in the Sales Tax Act, and not through a Constitutional petition.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nJurisdiction of Tax Authorities\no\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue has the authority to issue show-cause notices regarding the sale/transfer of taxable activity under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\no\nDisputes regarding the applicability of the tax provisions, including Section 49, can be addressed through the normal adjudication process, including appeal under the relevant tax laws.\n2.\nAppeal Mechanism under the Sales Tax Act\no\nSales Tax Act, 1990 provides a structured mechanism for addressing disputes, including appeals against orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue.\no\nConstitutional petitions should not be filed in cases where there is an alternative remedy available under the Sales Tax Act.\n________________________________________\nCase Reference:\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Jahangir Khan Tareen and others (2022 SCMR 92)\no\nThis case was referred to highlight that the Constitutional petition was not maintainable when the matter could be addressed through the regular appeal process under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Constitutional petition was dismissed, as the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue had the jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice. Additionally, the matter was pending before the DCIR, and any future orders could be appealed under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, making the constitutional route inappropriate at this stage.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=48,49(1)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 76380 of 2023, decided on 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Sabtain Fazli, Abad-ur-Rehman, M. Umar Tariq Gill, Isa Ahmad Jalil and Kairan Hussain Mir for Petitioner.\nSheraz Zaka Assistant Attorney General on Court’s Call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS RIAZ BOTTLERS (PVT.) LTD. \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24322", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3050 = 2024 SLD 3050 = 2024 PTD 861", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzk", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview: The Collector of Customs filed an appeal against the order-in-original passed by the Adjudicating Authority. The order allowed the importer (respondent) to release the consignment after paying the leviable duties and taxes but imposed only a personal penalty without applying a redemption fine. The department contended that the redemption fine was required under the Customs Act, 1969, and SRO 499(I)/2009, considering the goods were undeclared.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nCustoms Act, 1969 (Section 181)\no\nSection 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 deals with the seizure and confiscation of goods, as well as the payment of fine for the release of such goods. This section provides the legal basis for imposing fines and penalties on imported goods found to be undeclared or unlawfully imported.\n2.\nSRO 499(I)/2009 (dated 13-06-2009)\no\nClause (c) & (d) of SRO 499(I)/2009 provide the redemption fine mechanism for the release of undeclared goods. These clauses specifically outline that a redemption fine must be paid when undeclared goods are imported, and this fine is calculated as a percentage (in this case, 35%).\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nImposition of Redemption Fine\no\nThe key issue was whether the Adjudicating Authority erred by releasing the undeclared consignment without applying the required redemption fine, even though the importer admitted to importing undeclared items and paid the duties and taxes.\n2.\nValidity of Departments Appeal\no\nThe Collector of Customs appealed against the order, arguing that the redemption fine was applicable, and the consignment should not have been released without the fine, as per the Customs Act and SRO 499(I)/2009.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision:\n1.\nAdmission of Undeclared Items by the Importer\no\nThe importer accepted the import of the undeclared item and paid the necessary duties and taxes on the goods, but did not pay the redemption fine.\n2.\nValidity of the Appeal\no\nThe Collector of Customs contention was upheld. The court found that the release of the consignment without the redemption fine was not justified under Clause (c) & (d) of SRO 499(I)/2009, which clearly stipulates the imposition of a redemption fine for the release of undeclared goods.\n3.\nTribunals Ruling\no\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside the order-in-original passed by the Adjudicating Authority and directed that the redemption fine at 35% should be imposed on the importer, in addition to the personal penalty already levied.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nDuty of Customs Authorities in Case of Undeclared Goods\no\nWhen undeclared goods are imported, the Customs authorities are authorized and required to impose a redemption fine under the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 and SRO 499(I)/2009. The release of such goods is contingent upon the payment of this fine.\n2.\nApplicability of Redemption Fine\no\nThe redemption fine must be imposed in cases where undeclared goods are admitted by the importer. The fine is a mandatory requirement and cannot be waived or disregarded, even if duties and taxes are paid.\n3.\nRole of the Appellate Tribunal\no\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal has the authority to review decisions made by the Adjudicating Authority and ensure compliance with the relevant legal provisions. In this case, the Tribunal upheld the imposition of the redemption fine in accordance with the law.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Collector of Customs appeal was allowed, and the Customs Appellate Tribunals order was upheld, directing the imposition of a redemption fine at 35% on the respondent in addition to the personal penalty. The release of the consignment without the fine was deemed not justified under the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 and SRO 499(I)/2009.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=181", - "Case #": "Custom Appeal No. K-06 of 2020, decided 6n 22nd May, 2023, heard on: 11th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL BENCH-ILL", - "Lawyer Name:": "Asif Shah, AO present for Appellant.\nNone present for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE\nVS\nMESSRS S. STAR SHINWARI TRADING" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24323", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3051 = 2024 SLD 3051 = 2024 PTCL 714", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTYzg", - "Key Words:": "This case revolves around the legality of various charges and orders concerning sales tax, with particular emphasis on the following issues:\n1.\nTime Barred Assessment Order (Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990):\no\nThe show cause notice was issued on 17-03-2022, and the Assessment Order dated 07-11-2022 was received by the appellant on 28-11-2022, 255 days after the show cause notice.\no\nAccording to legal principles, an assessment order must be passed within 120 days of the show cause notice. In this case, the order was time-barred, and the extension granted by the Commissioner was without valid reason and without providing the appellant an opportunity for a hearing. Therefore, the extension was deemed illegal.\no\nIt is established that if an order is time-barred on its face, there is no need to discuss the merits of the case.\no\nAs a result, the Assessment Order was declared invalid, and the show cause notice, along with the orders from both authorities, were vacated.\n2.\nViolation of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897:\no\nThe appellant raised an objection regarding overstatement of figures (Rs. 22.26 Billion), but neither the Assessing Officer nor the CIR(A) provided findings on this objection, which was a violation of Section 24-A.\no\nThe law requires that judicial or quasi-judicial orders be supported by proper reasons. The failure to address this objection rendered the order legally invalid.\n3.\nNon-Apportionment of Input Tax (Rule 25 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006):\no\nThe appellant provided documentary evidence showing proper apportionment of input tax under Rule 25 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006. However, the department misinterpreted the procedure and issued charges of non-apportionment.\no\nThe appellant’s calculation chart and supporting evidence demonstrated that the proper procedure was followed, and the charges were deemed illegal.\no\nThe appellant also raised the issue of overstatement of figures, but the department failed to address it, violating Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897.\n4.\nInterpretation of Statutes:\no\nThe fiscal provisions of the statute are to be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer. In case of any doubt, the interpretation should favor the taxpayer or registered person. This principle was applied in favor of the appellant.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe Assessment Order was time-barred and illegal due to the failure to meet the 120-day requirement.\n•\nThe extension granted by the Commissioner was invalid as no opportunity for hearing was provided to the appellant.\n•\nThe charges regarding non-apportionment of input tax were found to be illegal, as proper apportionment was substantiated by the documentary evidence provided by the appellant.\n•\nThe appeal was accepted, and the orders from both the Assessing Officer and CIR(A) were vacated as illegal and void ab-initio.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,11(2),11(5),14(2),33(5),56Sales Tax Rules, 2006=25,25(2),25(3)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "STA No. 153/PB/2024, decision dated: 30-04-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. M. ABDULLAH KHAN KAKAR JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. SHAH KHAN ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hussain Ahmad Sherazi, Mr. Mouzzam Ali Butt, Advocate. \nRespondent by: Mr. Amaad Alam, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD. (PESCO), PESHAWAR.\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, (AUDIT-9/E&C-18), CORPORATE ZONE, RTO, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24324", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3052 = 2024 SLD 3052 = 2024 PTD 869 = (2025) 131 TAX 18", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTY3o", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview: The petitioner, who was the daughter of a deceased taxpayer, sought access to her deceased fathers tax returns from the Commissioner Inland Revenue. The request was rejected by the Commissioner, who cited Section 216(3)(m) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance). The Commissioner argued that the petitioner needed to approach a civil court to obtain the required information. The petitioner challenged the decision, asserting that as the legal representative of her deceased father, she had the right to access the tax returns to determine her share of the properties left by her father.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Section 216(1) & 216(3)(m))\no\nSection 216(1) prohibits the disclosure of any taxpayer’s information, including tax returns, unless the disclosure is authorized under certain conditions.\no\nSection 216(3)(m) provides an exception to this bar for civil court proceedings involving the Federal Government or any income tax authority, where the information may be disclosed as evidence in those proceedings.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nRight of Legal Representative to Access Tax Returns\no\nThe key issue was whether the petitioner, as a legal representative of her deceased father, had the right to access his tax returns under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to determine her share of the inheritance.\n2.\nApplication of Section 216(3)(m)\no\nThe Commissioner argued that under Section 216(3)(m), the petitioner had to go through the civil court to obtain the required information. The question arose as to whether this provision was applicable in this case, especially when the petitioner was seeking the information for inheritance purposes and not for any ongoing civil litigation involving the Federal Government or income tax authority.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision:\n1.\nProvision of Tax Returns to Legal Representatives\no\nThe High Court ruled that Section 216(3)(m) did not prevent the legal representative of a deceased taxpayer from accessing the tax returns of the deceased. The Court noted that the legal representative (in this case, the petitioner) had the right to access the tax returns to assert her entitlement to the inheritance under Islamic law.\n2.\nIncorrect Interpretation by the Commissioner\no\nThe Court found that the Commissioners reliance on Section 216(3)(m) was misplaced. The provision does not support the reasoning that the petitioner needed to approach the civil court to obtain the tax returns. It only applies to proceedings pending in a civil court involving the Federal Government or an income tax authority, which was not the situation in this case.\n3.\nLegal Entitlement to Tax Information\no\nThe Court highlighted that legal representatives of a deceased taxpayer, such as the petitioner, are entitled to obtain the tax returns to settle the tax affairs of the deceased. This is essential for determining the deceased’s assets and ensuring the correct distribution of inheritance.\n4.\nOrder Set Aside\no\nThe impugned order of the Commissioner was set aside by the High Court, which directed the Commissioner to provide the requested tax returns of the deceased father to the petitioner.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nLegal Representative’s Right to Access Tax Returns\no\nA legal representative of a deceased taxpayer has the right to access the tax returns of the deceased to claim their entitlement to the deceaseds assets, particularly for the purposes of inheritance under applicable laws (such as Islamic inheritance law).\n2.\nLimits of Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\no\nSection 216(3)(m) is intended to allow the disclosure of taxpayer information in the context of civil court proceedings involving the Federal Government or income tax authority. However, it does not prevent a legal representative from accessing the tax records when the purpose is to deal with inheritance matters.\n3.\nDispute Resolution Without Court Involvement\no\nThe Court emphasized that the legal representative does not need to initiate a civil suit to access the tax records; they can directly request the relevant tax authority for the documents necessary for the settlement of the deceased’s estate.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Constitutional petition filed by the daughter of the deceased taxpayer was allowed, and the Commissioners decision was set aside. The Commissioner Inland Revenue was ordered to provide the tax returns of the deceased father to the petitioner, recognizing her right as a legal representative to obtain such information for inheritance purposes.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=216(1),216(3)(m)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 17688 of 2024, decided on 28th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Osama Asif for Petitioner.\nSyed Zain ul Aabedin Bukhari for Respondent/FBR.\nSheraz Zaka and Muhammad Humzah Sheikh, Assistant Attorney Generals.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. SADIA ISHFAQ \nVS\nCHIEF COMMISSIONER AND 6 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24325", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3053 = 2024 SLD 3053 = 2024 PTD 872 = (2025) 131 TAX 219", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTY3k", - "Key Words:": "The petitioner (importer) challenged the judgment of the Tribunal which referred the matter to the National Tariff Commission for de novo determination under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act (XIV of 2015). The petitioner also filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which was dismissed by the High Court. The petitioner argued that the decision of the Tribunal was based on misrepresentation and fraud, and that the rights of the petitioner were violated as a result.\nThe High Court declined to interfere with the Tribunals decision, ruling that the petitioner had an alternate remedy available under Section 70 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act (2015), and therefore the constitutional petition was dismissed.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nAnti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 (Section 36, 39, & 70)\no\nSection 36: Deals with the determination of anti-dumping duties and related matters.\no\nSection 39: Concerns the time limit and procedure for the imposition of anti-dumping duties.\no\nSection 70: Provides the procedure for appeals against decisions made under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015.\no\nSection 70(13): States the appeal process and limitations in raising new grounds in the appeal.\n2.\nCivil Procedure Code (CPC) 1908 (Section 12(2) & Section 100)\no\nSection 12(2): Allows a party to apply to the court for the setting aside of a judgment obtained through misrepresentation or fraud.\no\nSection 100: Deals with second appeals and the restriction on raising new grounds during the appeal.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nWhether the Tribunals Referral to the National Tariff Commission was Justified\no\nThe petitioner challenged the Tribunal’s decision to refer the matter to the National Tariff Commission for de novo determination, arguing that the decision was based on fraudulent misrepresentation.\n2.\nApplicability of Section 12(2), CPC (Fraud/Misrepresentation)\no\nThe petitioner sought to set aside the decision by filing an application under Section 12(2) of CPC, arguing that the decision was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, and should therefore be declared void.\n3.\nAvailability of Alternate Remedy Under Section 70 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015\no\nThe High Court examined whether the petitioner could bypass the alternate remedy of filing an appeal under Section 70 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, and directly file a constitutional petition.\n4.\nTimeframe for Determination under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act\no\nThe issue of whether the timeframe for determination under Sections 36 and 39 was mandatory or discretionary was raised. The Court determined that the timeframe was discretionary.\n5.\nRaising New Pleas in Appeal under Section 70(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act\no\nThe Court clarified that, under Section 70(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, new pleas or grounds cannot be raised during the appeal, mirroring the restrictions under Section 100 of the CPC.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision:\n1.\nDismissal of the Constitutional Petition\no\nThe High Court dismissed the constitutional petition filed by the petitioner, holding that Section 70 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 provided an alternate remedy that the petitioner had already availed. The petitioner had the opportunity to raise their grievances before the Tribunal, and the High Court declined to interfere.\n2.\nReferral to the National Tariff Commission\no\nThe Court upheld the Tribunals decision to refer the matter to the National Tariff Commission for de novo determination, as the petitioner had not sufficiently demonstrated that the referral was made based on fraud or misrepresentation.\n3.\nSection 12(2), CPC – Application for Setting Aside Judgment\no\nThe application under Section 12(2), CPC was dismissed because the High Court found that the misrepresentation or fraud claim was not sufficient to set aside the judgment, especially since the petitioner had an alternate remedy available.\n4.\nDiscretionary Nature of Timeframe\no\nThe Court held that the timeframe provided in Sections 36 and 39 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 was discretionary and not mandatory. There is no penalty or consequence specified for failure to meet the prescribed time limit.\n5.\nAppeal under Section 70(13) of Anti-Dumping Duties Act\no\nThe Court ruled that the appeal under Section 70(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 follows the same restrictions as a second appeal under Section 100, CPC, and no new grounds can be raised during such an appeal.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nAlternate Remedy Requirement\no\nThe High Court emphasized that when an alternate remedy is available under the relevant statute (in this case, Section 70 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015), the constitutional petition should not be entertained unless there are exceptional circumstances.\n2.\nDiscretionary Timeframes\no\nThe Court clarified that when no specific consequence is prescribed, the timeframe for actions under Sections 36 and 39 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act is discretionary and not mandatory.\n3.\nRestrictions on Raising New Grounds in Appeal\no\nThe Court reinforced that the appeal under Section 70(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 cannot introduce new pleas or grounds beyond what was raised in the original proceedings.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe constitutional petition was dismissed by the High Court as the petitioner had an available alternate remedy under Section 70 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015. The Tribunals decision to refer the matter to the National Tariff Commission for de novo determination was upheld, and the application under Section 12(2), CPC was rejected. The Court also clarified that time limits under the relevant provisions of the Act are discretionary and that new grounds cannot be raised in an appeal under Section 70(13).", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 4643 of 2022 and C.M.As. Nos. 96, 162, 165, 169 of 2022 and 04 of 2023, decided on 8th March, 2024, heard on: 7th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shafqat Mehmood Chohan, Muhammad Immad Qamar, Shabbir Ali Khokhar and Rana Shahid Abbas for Petitioner.\nSaifullah Khan, Waqas Amir and Muhammad Azfar for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SOHAIL & COMPANY THROUGH PROPRIETOR AND OTHERS\nVS\nANTI-DUMPING APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24326", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3054 = 2024 SLD 2054 = (2024) 129 TAX 691", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTWTc", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview:\nThis case involves a review petition regarding a Supreme Court judgment where the petitioner challenged the delegation of powers by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR) to the Assistant Commissioner of Inland Revenue (ACIR) under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Specifically, the petitioner questioned whether the CIR could delegate powers under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance to the ACIR to amend or further amend an assessment, which is traditionally within the exclusive domain of the CIR.\nThe Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal against the Single Judges decision, and the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, making an observation regarding the failure of the petitioner’s counsel to bring an earlier judgment to the Court’s notice. This review petition seeks the expunction of the observation made in the footnote of the Supreme Courts order.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Sections 2(13), 120, 122, 127, & 210)\no\nSection 122(5A): Deals with the amendment of assessments by the ACIR.\no\nSection 210: Relates to the delegation of powers by the CIR to other officers, such as the ACIR.\n2.\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973 (Article 188)\no\nGrants the Supreme Court the power to review its judgments and orders.\n3.\nSupreme Court Rules, 1980\no\nRegulates the procedures for review petitions in the Supreme Court.\n________________________________________\nFactual Background:\n•\nThe petitioner filed a case questioning whether the CIR could delegate its powers under Section 210 to the ACIR for making amendments to an assessment under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance. The Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court both ruled against the petitioner.\n•\nThe Supreme Court refused leave to appeal but made an observation that the petitioners counsel failed to bring an earlier unreported judgment (The Bank of Punjab v. Commissioner Inland Revenue) to the Courts attention during the arguments.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nThe petitioner’s counsel contended that the observation made in the footnote of the order, suggesting that the counsel had not informed the Court of the earlier judgment, was incorrect.\n•\nThe counsel referred to Paragraph No. 6 of CPLA No. 6-L/2023, where the earlier judgment was indeed cited and argued for its relevance to the case at hand.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nThe Supreme Court reviewed the matter and agreed with the petitioner’s position.\n•\nThe footnote portion of Paragraph No. 9 of the impugned order, which stated that the petitioner’s counsel had not brought the earlier judgment to the Courts notice, was expunged from the record.\n•\nThe Review Petition was disposed of accordingly, and no objection was raised by the respondents regarding the expunction of the observation.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Takeaways:\n1.\nDelegation of Powers under Section 210\no\nThe case raises significant questions about the delegation of powers by the CIR to other officers, particularly the ACIR, and whether such delegation can extend to amending assessments under Section 122(5A).\n2.\nRole of Counsel in Highlighting Relevant Precedents\no\nThe case emphasizes the importance of counsel bringing all relevant precedents and judgments to the Court’s attention during the arguments. In this case, the petitioner’s counsel had indeed mentioned the earlier judgment, but the Supreme Court initially overlooked it.\n3.\nExpunction of Incorrect Observations\no\nThe Supreme Court allowed the expunction of the incorrect observation regarding the failure of the counsel to cite an earlier judgment, highlighting the Court’s willingness to correct such errors in the interest of justice.\n4.\nReview Jurisdiction\no\nThe case illustrates the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 188 of the Constitution to review its own decisions, particularly when there are incorrect observations in the order that can affect the parties involved.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe review petition was disposed of favorably for the petitioner, with the Supreme Court expunging the incorrect observation made in the footnote of the earlier order. The case underscores the importance of proper legal representation and the Court’s ability to rectify errors that may have impacted the fairness of the proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(13),120,122,122(5A) ,127,210Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=188", - "Case #": "C.R.P. 783/2023 in C.P.L.A. 6-L/2023 decided on 04.06.2024, heard on: 04.06.2024. (Against the order dated 23.05.2023 passed by the Court)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Ikramul Haq, ASC, for the Petitioner. (Through video link from Lahore).\nMs. Asma Hamid, ASC, for the Respondents. (Through video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALLIED BANK LIMITED\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24327", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3055 = 2024 SLD 3055 = (2024) 129 TAX 693", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTWTY", - "Key Words:": "Legal Summary:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Section 107: Application of Tax Treaties (Pakistan-Denmark and Pakistan-Belgium Conventions)\nThe case involves non-resident companies operating through M/s Maersk Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. and claiming tax benefits under Article 8 of the tax conventions between Pakistan and Denmark, and Pakistan and Belgium. The dispute centers around whether profits arising from Container Detention Charges (CDC), Container Storage Charges (CSC), and Terminal Handling Charges (THC) are covered under Article 8, which deals with profits from the operation of ships in international traffic.\n________________________________________\nKey Findings:\n1.\nInterpretation of Tax Treaties:\no\nTax treaties have a different purpose and interpretation compared to domestic tax laws. The primary aim of treaties like those between Pakistan and Denmark, or Belgium, is to avoid double taxation and prevent fiscal evasion.\no\nTax treaties are meant to be broadly interpreted, considering their relief-focused purpose. Such treaties should be interpreted in a manner that is equitable and practical, while also taking into account international tax principles, OECD and UN guidelines, and scholarly interpretations.\n2.\nExemption from Permanent Establishment Principle:\no\nUnder the OECD Model Convention (MC) and the UN MC, profits arising from the operation of ships in international traffic are not subject to the permanent establishment (PE) rule, which typically applies to other business profits.\no\nThe profits from operating ships or aircraft in international traffic are governed by a separate provision in the convention, and the PE principle does not apply to such profits.\n3.\nScope of “Profits from the Operation of Ships in International Traffic”:\no\nArticle 8 of the OECD and UN MC refers to profits not only directly earned from the transportation of passengers or cargo but also ancillary activities related to such operations.\no\nAncillary activities may include services like inland transport, leasing of ships, interest, sales of tickets, catering services, advertising, and sale of goods. These activities, though not directly connected with the operation of the ships themselves, are still considered ancillary because they support or are closely related to international traffic operations.\n4.\nProfits from Activities Ancillary to International Traffic:\no\nCDC, CSC, and THC are categorized as ancillary profits since they are related to the operation of ships in international traffic. These charges arise from services that support the movement of containers and cargo but are not directly part of the transportation itself.\no\nThe UN MC and OECD guidelines clarify that activities such as short-term storage, detention charges, inland transport, and certain port services are considered ancillary and thus fall within the scope of profits from the operation of ships in international traffic.\n5.\nCDC, CSC, and THC are Included:\no\nThe court concluded that profits arising from Container Detention Charges (CDC), Container Storage Charges (CSC), and Terminal Handling Charges (THC) should be included under the tax exemption provided by Article 8 of the respective tax conventions between Pakistan and Denmark, and Pakistan and Belgium.\no\nThese profits are sufficiently connected to the operation of ships in international traffic, as they arise from the logistics and operational services related to the handling, storage, and detention of containers used in international shipping.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe High Court concluded that profits arising from CDC, CSC, and THC fall within the scope of Article 8 of the Pakistan-Denmark and Pakistan-Belgium Conventions as profits from the operation of ships in international traffic.\n•\nThese profits are ancillary to the operation of ships and therefore should be exempt from Pakistani taxation under the provisions of the conventions.\n•\nThe Departments refusal to recognize these profits as falling under the tax treaty was deemed incorrect, and the High Court’s decision upheld that these charges are part of the broader concept of profits from the operation of ships in international traffic .\n________________________________________\nCase-law Referenced:\n•\nThe case relied on international tax guidelines and precedents, particularly the OECD Model Convention and UN Model Convention, as well as interpretations and commentaries regarding the treatment of profits from shipping and air transport operations in international traffic.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=107Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=8", - "Case #": "C.P.560-K/2019 to C.P.589-K/2019 decided on 12.01.2024, heard on: 12.01.2024. (Against the consolidated judgment of High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 31.05.2019, passed in ITRAs No.22 of 2014, etc.)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shahnawaz, ASC for the petitioners.\nMr. Abdul Wahid, Addl. Commissioner, FBR.\nMr. Khalid Javed Khan, ASC (Through V.L. Karachi Registry) for the respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-IV, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S A.P. MOLLER MAERSK AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24328", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3056 = 2024 SLD 3056 = (2024) 129 TAX 702 = 2024 PTD 1271", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1FTWTU", - "Key Words:": "Legal Issue:\nThe primary legal issue in this case revolves around the retrospective application of Section 4C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which imposes a super tax on higher-earning individuals. The petitioners challenged the provision, claiming that its retrospective application to the tax year 2022 was discriminatory and unconstitutional, violating the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution.\nFacts:\n•\nRetrospective Application of Section 4C: The learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court upheld the retrospective application of Section 4C to the tax year 2022, despite objections raised by taxpayers. The appellants (taxpayers) argued that imposing super tax in this manner created unjust discrimination against certain individuals and sectors without an intelligible basis for distinction.\n•\nConstitutional Petitions: In their constitutional petitions, the appellants argued that creating a separate class of persons (higher earners) and taxing them at a higher rate without a rational basis violated Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law.\n•\nAppeal Against Judgment: The petitioners and the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) both appealed against the judgment. The appellants contended that the creation of a separate class for super tax imposition was in violation of constitutional mandates, while FBR upheld the judgment.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nArgument by Appellant’s Counsel (Ms. Asma Hamid):\no\nThe appellants counsel argued that the learned Single Judge did not properly address certain key documents placed on record. These documents were used to argue that the creation of a separate class for taxation was constitutionally permissible under Article 25.\no\nThe counsel emphasized that the tax structure, though creating a distinction between income earners, was justified by certain legal and fiscal considerations.\n2.\nArgument Against Retrospective Taxation:\no\nThe appellants contended that the retrospective application of Section 4C (to the tax year 2022) was improper because it changed the legal landscape after the end of the tax year, impairing the rights that had already been conferred on them.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nDiscrimination in Taxation:\no\nThe court found that certain sectors or individuals could not be isolated and taxed at a higher rate without an intelligible criteria. Such arbitrary classification was considered unconstitutional and contrary to the rule of law. This finding was consistent with previous rulings from the Sindh High Court and Islamabad High Court, where similar challenges were brought against the super tax provisions.\n2.\nRetrospective Application of Taxation:\no\nThe retrospective application of Section 4C to the tax year 2022 was declared invalid. The court ruled that the rights conferred upon taxpayers at the end of the tax year 2022 (on June 30, 2022) were past and closed transactions. Therefore, these rights could not be impaired or affected by the introduction of the super tax retroactively.\no\nSuper tax under Section 4C could not be imposed on taxpayers for the tax year 2022. This ruling applies to appellants with a special tax year as well.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe appeals by the appellants were allowed.\n•\nThe part of the impugned judgment that upheld the retrospective application of Section 4C for the tax year 2022 was set aside.\n•\nThe super tax under Section 4C could not be imposed on the appellants for the tax year 2022.\n________________________________________\nCases Referred To:\n•\nMehreen Zebun Nisa v. Land Commissioner Multan (PLD 1975 S.C .397)\n•\nMuhammad Hussain v. Muhammad and others (2000 SCMR 367)\n•\nH.M Extraction Ghee & Oil Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FBR (2019 SCMR 1081)\n•\nAl-Samrez Enterprise v. Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917)\n•\nMolasses Trading & Export (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan & others (1993 SCMR 1905)\n•\nSecretary of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliff [1991] 2 All ER 712\n•\nCompania General de Filipinos v. Collector of Internal Revenue (1927) 275 US 87, 100)\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Peshawar v. Messrs Islamic Investment Bank Ltd. (2016 SCMR 816)\n•\nFawad Ahmad Mukhtar and others v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-11), Regional Tax Office, Multan and another (2022 SCMR 426)\n•\nLonas v. State (1871) 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 287, 306-307\n•\nShahnawaz (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director v. Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another (2011 PTD 1558)\nThis case serves as a precedent for challenges against the retrospective imposition of taxes and the need for a rational basis for creating distinct tax classes.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C,Division IIB of Part-I of First ScheduleConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "ICA No. 48745 of 2023, decided on 04.06.2024, date of hearing: 16.05.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE AND RASAAL HASAN SYED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Salman Akram Raja, Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Imtiaz Rasheed Siddiqui, Shahzad Ata Elahi, M. Ajmal Khan, Shahbaz Butt, Waseem Ahmad Malik, Shahryar Kasuri, M. Shoaib Rashid, Mustafa Kamal, M. Mansha Sukhera, Naveed A. Andrabi, Ali Sibtain Fazli, Shazib Masood, Hasham Ahmad Khan, Jawad Jamil Malik, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Haris Irfan, Umair Ahmad, H.M. Majid Siddiqui, Jamshed Alam. M. Abubakar, Basharat Ali, Faisal Rasheed, Furqan Naveed Chaudhry, Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Nadir Ali Sherazi, Mian Abdul Bari Rashid, Usman Khalil, Asfandyar Khan Tareen, Javed Iqbal Qazi, Malik Bashir Ahmad Khalid, Hafiz M. Shahzad, Abdul Waheed, M. Hamzah, Sheikh Aqeel Ahmad, Waqas Ahmad Mir, Salman Zaheer Khan, Mudassar Shujauddin, Muhammad Ijaz Ali Bhatti, Hassan Kamran Bashir, Rafae Naguib Saigal, Shahid Pervez Jami, Muhammad Zulqanain, Sumair Saeed Ahmad, Muhammad Asif, Qamar uz Zaman, Khalil ur Rehman, Farhan Shahzad, Muhammad Javed Arshad, Naeem Munawar, Ghulam Mujtaba, Muhammad Asif Rana, Muhammad Idrees Aslam, Muhammad Shaban, M. Mubashir Baig, Talib Hussain Chaudhry, Waleed Khalid, Adil Umar Bandial, Muhammad Arslan Raza, Muhammad Bilal Pervaiz, Mian Muhammad Arshad Iqbal, Uzair Sajid, Rana Muhammad Afzal Razzaq Khan, Mohsin Majeed, Hammad Khan, Hafeez Ullah Maan, Ch. Razzaq Ahmad Muhammad Rashid Ali, Syed Imtiaz Hussain Shah, Nazakat Abbas Bhatti, Tanveer Ahmad, Muhammad Usman Akram Sahi, Khawaja Omer Ghias, Muhammad Mussadiq Islam, Hassan Maqsood Ahmad, Nadeem Shahzad Hashmi, Barrister M. Bilal Ramzan, Malik Tanveer Ahmad Awan, Asad Rahim Khan, Muhammad Iftikhar Ali, Faiz-e-Azhar, Ms. Nimra Arshad, Khalil Ahmad Bhulla, Arslan Saleem Chaudhry, M. Siddique Butt, Dr. Murtaza Elahi, M.A Rizwan Kamboh, Mian Zulfiqar Ali, Azeem Ullah Virk, Omer Wahab, Rana Usman Habib, Ahsan Sial, Ms. Naureen Fauzia, Ray Mukhtar, Alamdar Hussain, Mahmood Arif, Asmar Tariq, Syed Nawazish Hussain, Hafiz M. Tanveer Nasir, Iftikhar Nawaz Gujjar, M. Waqr Akram, Sajjad Ali, Zohaib Hashim, Khurram Saleem, Ibrahim Hassan, Hammad Hussain, Muhammad Muqaddam Sukhera, Saqib Qadeer, Muhammad Shabbir Hussain, Asad Buttar, Tourqeer Ahmad Ranjha, Raja Hamza Anwar, Abad ur Rehman, M. Umer Tariq Gill, Hamza Shahram Sarwar, Asad Zameer Tarar, Madiha Farooq Sheikh, Ashiq Ali Rana, Ali Hussain Gillani, Muhammad Hussain, Syed Fadil Hashmey, Jahangir Hassan Dogar, Ch. Waseem Akram, Zeeshan Asif Warraich, Mehar Saghir Ahmad, Saqib Qadeer, Muhammad Abrar, Yasir Hamid, Azeem Suleman, Jawwad Jamil Malik, Muhammad Hameed Bukhsh, Dr. Rizwan Ahmad, Hassan Pervaiz, Faisal Anwar Minhas, Asif Amin Goraya, Shahzaib ul Hassan Chattha, Malik Muhammad Zarif, Ghulam Abbas Haral, Ali Ijaz Shah and Zeeshan Ijaz, Advocates for Appellants/Taxpayers.\nMs. Asma Hamid, Syed Muazzam Ali Shah, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Malik Abdullah Raza, Ahmad Pervaiz, Ms. Scheherzade Shaharyar, Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Muhammad Yahya Johar, Sohaib Aziz, Muhammad Bilal Munir, A.W. Butt, Imran Rasool, Shahjahan Khan, Ms. Riaz Begum, Sardar Muhammad Sadiq Tahir, Ms. Samra Malik, Mohsin Ali, Barrister Ahtsham Mukhtar, Omer Iqbal Khawaja, Muhammad Danish Zubairi, Anas Irtiza Awan, Muhammad Ashraf Nawaz Cheema, Qadeer Ahmad Kalyar, Jahanzeb Inam, Raja Abdul Qadeer, Muhammad Akram Awan, Ch. Imtiaz Elahi, Rana Irfan Ali, Humaira Bashir Chaudhry, Murad Ali Khan Marwat, Yasir Islam Chaudhry, Ali Umrao, Jawwad H. Tarar, Hassan Safdar Khan, Ahad Asif, Sidra Qamar, Ikhlaq Ahmad, Ahsan U1 Haq, Falak Sher Khan, Hassan Ali, Ms. Sana Azhar, Mustafa Khalid, Khadija Amjad Wazir, Shahram Anwar, Rana Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Haseeb Rana and Nasir Abbas Zafar Malik Advocates for Respondents/Departments.\nMr. Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G with Muhammad Majid Chaudhry, C.I.R Lahore and Tehsin Sadiq Tarar, Addl. Commissioner, RTO Gujranwala for Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SERVICE GLOBAL FOOTWEAR LIMITED & OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24329", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JDNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3173 = 2024 SLD 3173 = 2024 PTD 989 = (2025) 131 TAX 319 = 2025 PTCL 558", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JDNHk", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Show-Cause Notices without Due Inquiry under the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012\nDetails: The petitioners, who were taxpayers, challenged the issuance of show-cause notices under Section 24(2) of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012, by the respondent authority. The primary issue was the legality of issuing show-cause notices without assessing tax liability and conducting the necessary inquiry as required under Section 52 of the Act. The court held that the purpose of Section 52 was to establish a justified basis for tax liability through a proper inquiry. The impugned notices lacked the necessary inquiry and did not consider the objections raised by the petitioners in their replies. Consequently, the court found the notices to be legally unsustainable.\nHeld: The High Court set aside the show-cause notices, remanding the matter to the authority to conduct a proper inquiry as per Section 57, after allowing the petitioners an opportunity to submit their replies. The constitutional petition was allowed.\nCitations: Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 (XLII of 2012), Sections 24, 52, 57; Constitution of Pakistan, Article 199; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Messrs Millat Tractors Limited, Lahore and others, 2024 SCMR 700.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=24,24(2),48,49,52,69Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4290 of 2023, heard on 1st April, 2024. Dates of hearing: 18th March and 1st April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Advocate Supreme Court with Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Faizan Ahmed Mirza, Hassan Askari Kazmi, Bilal Kayani and Faisal Khurshid Awan for Petitioner (in this petition and connected W.P.No.751 of 2024).\nCh. Naeem ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court with Ch. Imran ul Haq and Ch. Faheem ul Haq for Petitioners (in connected W.Ps. Nos.3957, 3958, 3959, 3961, 4102, 4103, 4104, 4104, 4106, 4107, 4198, 4199, 4200, 4255, 4256 of 2023, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 243, 301, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450,451, 606, 607 and 851 of 2024).\nSyed Farid Bukhari, Faisal Khurshid Awan and M. Bilal Bukhari for Petitioner (in connected W.P.No.4228 of 2023).\nMuhammad Musawar Gill for Petitioners (in connected W.Ps. Nos. 4244 of 2023 and 123 of 2024).\nNasir Muhammad Malik for Petitioners (in connected W.Ps. Nos. 129, 130, 131 and 141 of 2024).\nMalik Muhammad Aslam for Petitioner (in connected W.P.No. 214 of 2024).\nGhazala Nazir Qiireshi for Petitioners (in connected W.Ps. Nos.361, 362, 363, 364 and 365 of 2024).\nMuhammad Taimur Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in connected W.Ps. Nos.385, 386, 387 of 2024).\nKhalid Jamshed Khattak for Petitioner (in connected W.P.No.453 of 2024).\nAtif Waheed and Ahmad Shahzad for Petitioners (in connected W.Ps. Nos.569, 570 and 571 of 2024).\nHassan Kamran Basheer, Advocate Supreme Court with Abdul Wakeel for Respondents/PRA (in connected W.Ps.Nos.3958, 3959, 4104 and 4256 of 2023, 77 and 130 of 2024) with Ms. Nadia Murad, Legal Officer, PRA and Finance Department, Government of Punjab, Lahore.\nZeeshaan Zafar Hashmi, for Respondents-PRA (in W.Ps. Nos.3150, 3151 of 2022, 4153 and 4228 of 2023, 76, 84, 129, 301, 363, 385, 449, 450, 570 and 606 of 2024).\nAsim Waqar for Respondents (in connected W.Ps. Nos.4198, 4199, 4200, 4244 of 2023, 141, 364, 387, 446 and 571 of 2024).\nMuhammad Hussam for Respondent-PRA (in connected W.Ps. Nos.4105, 4106, 4107 and 4255 of 2023).\nRaja Umair Mustafa for the Respondent-PRA (in connected W.Ps.Nos.3961, 4102 and 4103 of 2023).\nMuhammad Baqir Hussain and Nauman Ali Malik for Respondent-PRA (in connected W.Ps. Nos. 123, 243, 362, 447, 453 and 569 of 2024).\nMalik Amjad Ali, Additional Advocate General with Abid Aziz Rajori, Assistant Advocate General.\nArshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General.\nRashid Mehmood, Research Officer, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAHAT CAFE, RAWALPINDI \nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY FINANCE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24330", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3174 = 2024 SLD 3174 = 2024 PTD 997", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzc", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-S.196-Customs Rules, 2001, R. 564(4)-Custom General Order 12 of 2002, dated 15-6-2002 [as amended vide Custom General Order 6 of 2010, dated 20-8-2010 para. 25A-Reference-Afghan Transit Trade- Short supply beyond one percent-Dispute between the parties was with regard to levy of duties and taxes in respect of loss of consignment due to transit evaporation beyond one percent and loss due to terrorism- Validity-Damage caused by any event including terrorism, Customs Appellate Tribunal was the last fact finding forum and until such stage not a single incident of act of terrorism was established-Carriers of the consignment were not absolved from their responsibilities and were liable to pay duties and taxes as act of terrorism did not cause any damage to consignments on their way to Afghanistan-Carriers transporting such goods could not establish that loss was due to evaporation rather it was due to ill will of carriers who took advantage of such concession and gained commercially on such count-In absence of such understanding, loss could not be counted against carriers who were entitled to one percent concession and were saddled with responsibilities of duties and taxes over one percent-None of the clauses of paragraph 25A added to Customs General Order 12 of 2002 absolved importer / carrier from payment of duties and taxes beyond one percent whereas concession of one percent would remain intact- Reference was disposed of accordingly.\nAl-Haj Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Customs 2017 SCMR 1598 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196Customs Rules, 2001=558,564(4)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 1339 of 2015 (and others connected cases), decided on 7th May, 2024. Dates of hearing: 29th September, 2021 and 26th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Arif for Applicants (in SCRAs Nos.31 to 38 of 2012 and 192 of 2019).\nM. Khalil Dogar for Respondents (in SCRAs Nos.31 to 38 of 2012 and 192 of 2019).\nM. Khalil Dogar for Applicants (in SCRA No.329 of 2013).\nUmer Akhund for Respondents (in SCRA No.329 of 2013).\nM. Khalil Dogar for Applicants (in SCRAs Nos.44 to 67 and 268 to 283 of 2014).\nDarvesh K. Mandhan for Respondents (in SCRAs Nos.44 to 67 and 268 to 283 of 2014).\nShahid Ali Qureshi for Applicants (in SCRAs Nos. 1339 to 1349 of 2015).\nMuhammad Arif for Respondents (in SCRAs Nos. 1339 to 1349 of 2015).\nM. Khalil Dogar for Applicants (in SCRAs Nos.793 to 801 of 2017).\nMuhammad Mustafa Mamdani holds brief for A. Jatoi for Respondents (in SCRAs Nos.793 to 801 of 2017).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF PREVENTIVE \nVS\nMESSRS VENUS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24331", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3175 = 2024 SLD 3175 = 2024 PTD 1009", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzY", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)-Ss. 11(1) & 133(5)-Reference-Word ‘accrues or arises’-Sticky loan-Accounting system-Interest, maintaining of-Dispute was with regard to method of maintaining accounts by respondent / banks whereby interest against sticky loans were debited to a separate account (mark-up suspense account)-Plea raised by authorities was that same interest should be offered for calculating income tax liability as accrued income of that tax year-Validity-Mere fact that interest becomes receivable to a bank against its sticky loan does not necessarily become its income when banks are maintaining their accounts on mercantile base or even maintaining a hybrid method of accounting- Such interest becomes subject to impost of tax when it is offered for taxation by’ bank or lending institution as per mercantile practice- High Court declined to interfere in observation of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue that taxpayer had a choice to adopt or maintain a third system of maintaining its account i.e. hybrid method where elements of both the systems were present and was a recognized method of accounting-Word ‘accrues or arises’ as it occurred in S. 11(1)(a)(ii) of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, for the purpose of counting total income by a banking company or lending institution was to be applied keeping in view recognized accounting method adopted by the institution and thus interest entry debited in account of customer relating to non-performing assets would be subject to impost of tax when the same had actually become recoverable and as such was offered for taxation by the bank-Reference was disposed of accordingly.\nKerala Financial Corpn. v. CIT AIR 1994 SC 2416; Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal), Islamabad v. Messrs Askari Commercial Bank Limited, Rawalpindi 2018 PTD 1089 and Deputy\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Circle C-4, Karachi v. National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi 2019 SCMR 1011 rei.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=11(1),11(1)(a)(ii),23,23(1) (xxi),62,111(2)(a),133(3),133(5)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=66(a)", - "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 04 of 2006 (and other connected References), decided on 2nd May, 2023, heard on: 2nd May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Shoaib Jally for Petitioner.\nBarrister Syed Mudassir Ameer for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX/WEALTH TAX COMPANIES ZONE, PESHAWAR\nVS\nISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK LTD. PESHAWAR CANTT." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24332", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3176 = 2024 SLD 3176 = 2024 PTD 1017 = (2024) 130 TAX 204", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzU", - "Key Words:": "Recovery of Tax During Pendency of Appeal - Constitutional Petition\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Sections 127 & 140\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 199: Constitutional jurisdiction for challenging actions of public authorities\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\n•\nPetitioner: The petitioner is a taxpayer whose tax liability was deducted from his bank account during the pendency of an appeal under Section 127 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nThe petitioner had filed an appeal under Section 127 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 against an amended assessment by the tax authorities, which was still pending.\n•\nIssue at hand: The tax authorities proceeded to recover the tax amount by deducting money from the petitioner’s bank account. This action occurred despite the fact that the appeal was still in process, and the petitioner had not been asked to pay the prescribed 10% of the disputed tax amount under Section 140(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nThe petitioner challenged the recovery of the tax amount, arguing that the authorities had no lawful authority to deduct more than 10% of the tax due during the pendency of the appeal.\n________________________________________\nLegal Arguments:\n•\nPetitioner’s Argument:\no\nThe petitioner argued that the recovery of tax from his bank account was unlawful as it was being done without first asking him to pay 10% of the disputed amount, which is a requirement under Section 140(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, during the pendency of an appeal under Section 127.\no\nThe petitioner contended that any recovery beyond 10% of the disputed tax was without lawful authority and violated the provisions of the law, as the appeal was still pending.\n•\nRespondent’s (Tax Authorities) Argument:\no\nThe tax authorities did not present any valid legal justification for the recovery beyond the stipulated 10% of the tax due, as prescribed by law in the case of pending appeals.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nViolation of Legal Provisions:\no\nThe High Court held that the tax authorities had no lawful authority to deduct more than 10% of the tax liability from the petitioner’s bank account while the appeal under Section 127 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was still pending.\no\nThe Court referred to the provisions of Section 140(1), which require the authorities to seek payment of only 10% of the disputed tax amount in the event of an appeal being filed, not more.\n2.\nRefund Ordered:\no\nThe Court directed that the amount recovered by the tax authorities from the petitioner’s bank account, over and above the 10% of the tax liability, should be reimbursed to the petitioner. The authorities were instructed to deduct only the 10% of the disputed amount and refund the excess sum that was unlawfully deducted.\n3.\nConstitutional Petition Allowed:\no\nThe constitutional petition was allowed, and the actions of the tax authorities were declared unlawful with respect to the recovery exceeding 10% of the disputed tax during the pendency of the appeal.\n________________________________________\nCase Law Referred to:\n1.\nChina Machinery Engineering Corporation, Pakistan Branch v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2024 MTD 242\n2.\nMessrs Pak Saudi Fertilizers v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2002 PTD 679\n3.\nZ.N. Exporters (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax 2003 PTD 1746\n4.\nBrothers Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Appellate Tribunal Sales Tax 2003 PTD 1836\n5.\nMessrs Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and others 2024 PTD 30\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points:\n1.\nSection 140(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 restricts tax authorities from recovering more than 10% of the disputed tax amount while an appeal is pending under Section 127.\n2.\nThe High Court held that any recovery exceeding the 10% limit during the pendency of the appeal was without lawful authority.\n3.\nThe petitioner was entitled to a refund of the excess amount deducted by the authorities.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nPetition allowed: The High Court directed the authorities to refund the amount recovered from the petitioner’s bank account in excess of the 10% of the disputed tax liability, as per Section 140(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=127,140,140(1)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 34736 of 2024, decided on 3rd June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naveed Zafar Khan for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Mansoor Ali, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan (On Court’s call).\nCh. Muhammad Ashfaq Bhullar for Respondent-FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS RADIANT MEDICAL (PVT.) LIMITED \nVS\nTHE FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24333", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3177 = 2024 SLD 3177 = 2024 PTD 1021", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 3, 7, 8 & 47-Reference-Input tax-Adjustment-Packing material-Zero rated supply-Petitioner / company was aggrieved of bar imposed on input tax credit or refund on packing material purchased by registered person whose taxable supplies were zero ‘ rated-Validity-Provision of S. 3 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, is a charging section, whereas S. 7 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, allows input adjustment to a registered person for the purpose of determining tax liability in respect of taxable supplies, when such person has paid input tax for the purpose of taxable supplies made or to be made by him from the output tax i.e. due from him-Mandate of S. 7(1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 is allowing input adjustment on such goods which are used for the purpose of taxable supplies-Federal Government, under S. 8(b) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, has been given power to notify any other goods in official Gazette against which input adjustment cannot be allowed- Federal Government has no jurisdiction to create and insert a new class in the regime of Sales Tax Act, 1990, which can disentitle input adjustment which is otherwise allowable to a registered person under a statutory dispensation i.e. S. 7 of Sales Tax Act, 1990-Input adjustment to a registered person against goods, which are or would be used for taxable activities, has been allowed under S. 7 of Sales Tax Act, 1990-Packing material purchased by petitioner / company was used for the purpose of taxable supplies, therefore, petitioner / company was entitled to adjust input tax against its output tax- Reference was disposed of accordingly.\nSheikhoo Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and another 2001 SCMR 1376; The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi v. Messrs Attock Cement Pakistan Limited, Karachi 2023 SCMR 279; Ghandhara Nissan Diesel Ltd., through- Sr. General Management Finance, Karachi v. Collector, Large Tax Payers Unit, Government of Pakistan, Karachi and 2 others 2006 PTD 2066; The Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others v. Sheikh Spinning Mills Limited, Lahore and others 1999 SCMR 1442; Messrs Sheikh Spinning Limited v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance, Federal Secretariat Islamabad through Secretary and 2 others 2002 PTD 2959; Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad 5 others v. Aryan Petro Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Peshawar and others 2003 SCMR 370; National Electric Power Regulatory Authority v. Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Limited 2016 SCMR 550 and L.T-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty and others PLD 1961 SC 119 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,3(1A),7,7(1),8,8(1)(b),8(b),47,73", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No.26-P of 2023, decided on 19th September, 2023, heard on: 19th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ishtiaq Ahmad for Petitioner.\nSharif Ullah, Assistant Director (Legal) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS GADOON TEXTILE MILLS LTD. \nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER IR (AUDIT-05), INLAND REVENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24334", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3178 = 2024 SLD 3178 = 2024 PTD 1029 = (2024) 130 TAX 706 = 2024 LHC 2543", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYy8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Applicability of Amended Sections 177(6) and 177(6A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001), Sections 120, 122 & 177(6A); Finance Act, 2019\nPrinciple:\nSubstituted subsection (6) and newly inserted subsection (6A) of Section 177, introduced through the Finance Act, 2019, apply prospectively to cases where audits are incomplete or ongoing after 01.07.2019. The amendments do not have retrospective effect.\nCase Summary:\nThe taxpayer was selected for audit on 09.05.2019, and a show-cause notice for amending the assessment was issued on 25.02.2021. Audit proceedings were still pending when the amendments became effective on 01.07.2019.\nThe Court ruled that:\n1.\nSubsection (6) mandates the Commissioner to issue an audit report and obtain the taxpayers explanation before amending the assessment.\n2.\nThe amendments do not apply retrospectively to cases where audit proceedings had concluded before 01.07.2019.\n3.\nIn this case, since the audit was pending completion after 01.07.2019, the amended provisions applied.\nThe plea by the department asserting retrospective applicability was dismissed, and the taxpayer’s stance was upheld.\nReferences:\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Asif Kamal (2022 PTD 965)\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot v. Messrs Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills (2018 SCMR 1328)\n________________________________________\n(b) Issuance of Audit Report and Retrospective Application\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001), Sections 120, 122 & 177(6A); Constitution of Pakistan, Article 10-A\nPrinciple:\n1.\nIssuance of an audit report is a prerequisite for amending an assessment under Section 122.\n2.\nCompliance with due process under Article 10-A requires providing the taxpayer an opportunity of being heard.\n3.\nSubsection (6A) applies prospectively, except where audit proceedings were already completed prior to the enactment.\nCase Summary:\nThe department issued an amended assessment order without issuing the audit report. The Court found this non-compliance with Section 177(6A) and Section 122(9) invalid, as issuance of the audit report is a sine qua non for the amendment of assessments.\nThe department’s argument for retrospective application was rejected. The impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal was upheld in favor of the taxpayer.\n________________________________________\n(c) Interpretation of Statutes—Retrospective Effect\nLegal Principle of Statutory Interpretation\nPrinciple:\n1.\nIn the absence of explicit language, amendments affecting substantive rights are presumed to apply prospectively.\n2.\nRetrospective operation is disfavored if it prejudices vested rights or past transactions.\nKey Observations:\n•\nA statute operates prospectively unless expressly stated otherwise.\n•\nRetrospective effect may be implied if antecedent requisites form part of its application but do not affect vested rights.\nReferences:\n•\nNagina Silk Mill v. Income Tax Officer (PLD 1963 SC 322)\n•\nAdnan Afzan v. Capt. Sher Afzal (PLD 1969 SC 187)\n•\nMuhammad Tariq Badr v. National Bank of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 314)\n•\nKashif Mahmood v. Additional District Judge (2022 MLD 1762)\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaway:\nThe Court consistently emphasizes that statutory amendments affecting substantive rights must be applied prospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise. Retrospective application, if claimed, requires clear legislative intent and should not impair vested rights.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122,122(4),177,177(6),177(6A)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 36 of 2022, decided on 22nd May, 2024, heard on: 22nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Muhammad Akmal Khan for Applicant.\nNiaz Ahmed Khan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nZIA-UR-REHMAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24335", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3179 = 2024 SLD 3179 = 2024 PTD 1037", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYys", - "Key Words:": "(a) Assets Declaration Ordinance (III of 2019)-Ss. 3, 6 & 14-Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 11-Declaration of undisclosed assets, sales and expenditures-Tax periods, non-determination of-Effect-Proof of payment of tax not given by the registered person-Effect-Company got itself registered in sales tax on 24-12-2-18 and agreed to deposit certain amount voluntarily-Later registered person filed declaration of amnesty on 03-07-2019 under Assets Declaration Ordinance, 2019 (‘the Ordinance 2019’)- Assessing Officer taxed the entire undeclared sales shown in amnesty on the basis that since there was no proof of payment of tax paid by the taxpayer under the claimed amnesty, which order was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals)-Company (registered person) assailed both orders before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue-Validity- Clause (b) of S. 3 of the Ordinance, 2019 stipulated that any person might declare undisclosed sales made upto 30th June 2018-Phrase “upto 30th June 2018”, being relevant, suggested that any sales prior to said date could be declared under the amnesty scheme-Sales could be of any period which were made till 30th June 2018, which could be one month old, one year old or more than five years old-Under the said provision the appellant declared sales of certain amount made without specifically bifurcating the tax-periods involved in making sales- Department took the entire un-disclosed sales from the claim and taxed it without even making any effort to determine through probe the tax period involved in said sales-Under the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990, there were certain time limitations provided for making any assessment which were mandatory to be followed-Recovery of tax was only possible after the tax had been duly assessed and the amount of ‘tax due’ was determined under S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990-No determination of the tax periods involved in sales, in the present case, was gathered by the Department-Benefits available to any person under the law could not be overridden by use of unbridled powers, and when the law specifically provided that proceedings could only be initiated within five years from the relevant date of default then without even determining the relevant date of default, any issuance of notice was vague, void and illegal-Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue declared the impugned orders passed by both the Authorities below to the extent of alleged whole undeclared supplies as unlawful and void, therefore, same were set-aside, however, tax charged on sales of amount for period of July 2018 to November 2018 was confirmed- Appeal filed by the company (registered person) was partly allowed accordingly.\n(b) Assets Declaration Ordinance (III of 2019)-Ss. 3, 6 & 14-Declaration of undisclosed assets, sales and expenditures-Tax payment, proof of-Confidentiality-Scope- Company got itself registered for sales tax on 04-12-2018 and agreed to deposit certain amount voluntarily-Later registered person filed declaration of amnesty on 03-07-2019 under Assets Declaration Ordinance, 2019 (‘the Ordinance 2019’)-Assessing Officer taxed the entire undeclared sales shown in amnesty on the basis that since there was no proof of payment of tax paid by the taxpayer under the claimed amnesty, which order was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals)- Company (registered person) assailed both orders before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue-Appellant (registered person) took the plea of confidentiality against claimed amnesty given under S.14 of the Assets Declaration Ordinance, 2019 (‘the Ordinance, 2019’) for not providing any payment proof-Validity-Section 14 of the Ordinance 2019 primarily was restrictive for the Department for making any disclosure of amnesty claimed by any person-Appellant could not hide behind said provision to not show proof of payment to the Department while still availing benefit when S. 6 of the Ordinance 2019 envisaged that in case of non-payment of tax , the amnesty declared shall be void-Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue declared that impugned orders passed by both the Authorities below to the extent of alleged whole undeclared supplies were, unlawful and void, therefore, were accordingly set-aside, however, tax charged on sales of amount for period of July 2018 to November 2018 was confirmed- Appeal filed by the company(registered person) was partly allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Assets Declaration (Procedure and Conditions) Rules, 2019=3,6,14Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,11(5)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No.358/LB of 2022, decided on 16th August, 2023, heard on: 19th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahbaz Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nTallat Mahmood, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS PUNJAB ALUMINUM EXTRUSION\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24336", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3180 = 2024 SLD 3180 = 2024 PTD 1044", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 25 & 25-A-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4 & 25-Goods declaration-Assessment-Tyres, import of-Valuation Ruling- Judgment previously passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’)-Order in rem-Discrimination-Previously, in multiple appeals preferred by various importers, the Tribunal declared as illegal certain Valuation Ruling regarding tyres, to which (proceedings) the appellant was not a party-Appellant/importer, relying on said order/judgment, sought the same benefit but was denied-Stance of the respondents /Collectorate was that the appellant was not given benefit of the previous order passed by the Tribunal as the same was an order -in-personam and not in rem-Held, that the stance of the Department was misconceived as in said previous order the Tribunal, while setting aside Valuation Ruling, set forth a principle meaning thereby that the Valuation Ruling-in-question contained patent illegalities-Therefore, Valuation Ruling-in-question was set-aside in rem, setting a principle that, once it was set-aside declaring it illegal, the Valuation Ruling-in-question was to be deemed as “not in field” for everyone importing those category of goods-Valuation Ruling-in-question was set-aside in general-Admittedly, the goods of other importers, like the appellant, were being assessed on the declared transactional values of other importers , which tantamount to violation of the fundamental rights of the appellant since action of discriminatory treatment by the Collectorate had infringed his fundamental rights of equal protection of law guaranteed under the Constitution-Customs Appellate Tribunal set-aside impugned Order-in-Appeal against the appellant, and directed the respondents/Collectorate to finalize the assessment of the appellant on the same values as ordered by the Tribunal vide previous judgment relied upon by him (appellant)-Appeal filed by the importer, was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25(1),25(5),25AConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,25,117,121Customs Rules, 2001=110", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-1275 of 2023, decided on 16th October, 2023, heard on: 3rd October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Obaydullah Mirza for Appellant.\nShahid Hasan, AO for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS TRADEMATICS INTERNATIONAL, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC APPRAISEMENT-WEST GROUP-III, CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI and 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24337", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3181 = 2024 SLD 3181 = 2024 PTD 1049", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTYzg", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss.179, 197 & 196-Order passed beyond the mandatory prescribed period-Extension of time sought by the authorities-Scope-Taxpayer / company approached the Appellate Tribunal contending that the original order had been passed against it beyond the period of limitation-Department filed Reference Application against acceptance of appeal filed by the taxpayer-Validity-Applicant / Department remained unable to submit / file any documentation regarding any extension granted by the Collector or FBR for purposes of Ss. 197 & 179 of the Customs Act, 1969-Assertion of the applicant was that the Department no longer possessed the original record in the matter-It was for the applicant to satisfy the Court that the original order, which was sought to be upheld in the Reference jurisdiction, was a legal order passed within the time prescribed under S. 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, but the same had not been done-Record revealed that the original order was passed 41 days beyond the period prescribed for undertaking the assessment after issuance of the Show-Cause Notice- An order passed beyond the mandatory period prescribed will not sustain in the eyes of law, and such legal objection can be raised by a party at any point-High Court viewed that that the Reference was based on an order which was not sustainable in the eyes of law therefore the same (Reference) was not maintainable-Reference was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No. 11 of 2012, decided on 5th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR AND SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nouman Ameen Farooqi for Applicant.\nFarhat Nawaz Lodhi for Respondent No.1", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE THROUGH ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR\nVS\nMESSRS KHYBER TEA AND FOOD COMPANY IMPORTERS, EXPORTERS AND GENERAL ORDER SUPPLIERS KATCHERY GATE, PESHAWAR and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24338", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3182 = 2024 SLD 3182 = 2024 SLD 3182 = 2024 PTD 1051", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTY3o", - "Key Words:": "Anti-Dumping Duties Act (XIV of 2015)-Ss.39, 64 & 70-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Anti-Dumping Duties-Determination-Alternate and efficacious remedy-Factual controversy-Petitioners / companies assailed order of National Tariff Commission deciding to continue definitive Anti-Dumping Duties for another period of five years- Validity-Provision of S. 70 of Anti-Dumping Duties^ Act, 2015, is an exhaustive provision, which does not only provide substantive right of appeal and time limitation for preferring and decision of the same but it also lays down procedural requirements for carrying out whole appellate procedure-Comprehensive scheme of exercising Appellate Jurisdiction by Appellate Tribunal constituted under S.64 of Anti- Dumping Duties Act, 2015, has been provided in law against appeal preferred by an interested party either against initiation of investigation, preliminary determination or final determination and also provides limitation-It also provides procedure for hearing the same including chalking out requirements for a decision of Tribunal- Substantive right of appeal against decision of Appellate Tribunal to High Court has been laid down in S. 70(13) of Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015-This whole scheme of remedial procedure is clearly suggestive of the fact that a Determination even though a Final Determination under S. 39 of Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, is not absolute and is open for scrutiny before Appellate Tribunal if any interested party, dissatisfied with the same, prefers an appeal before it-High Court declined to interfere in the matter as adequate alternate remedy of appeal was available-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nShaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan/National Tarif Commission and others 2021 PTD 2126; Rana Aftab Ahmad Khan v. Muhammad Ajmal PLD 2010 SC 1066 and Mian Azam Waheed and 2 others v. The Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs, Karachi 2023 PTD 1571 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015=20,23,24,37,39,41,52,64,70Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.26907 of 2024, decided on 2nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Afzal Awan for Petitioners.\nCh. Imtiaz Elahi, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan (On Court’s Call).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS A&A PIPE INDUSTRIES AND OTHERS \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24339", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2010 3269 = 2010 SLD 3269 = (2010) 322 ITR 158 = 2010 AIR 1881", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL No. 2463 of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27161 of 2008) on 17 March, 2010", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench: Mukundakam Sharma, V.S. Sirpurkar", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "C.I.T., Ahmedabad .... Appellant\nvs \nReliance Petroproducts Pvt.Ltd .... Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24340", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6415 = 2022 SLD 6415", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1316/LB/2019. Date of hearing; 04.08.2022. Date of order 18.08.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; NASIR MUHAMUD, JUDICAL MEMBER AND ANWAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Abdul Waheed,Advocate\nRespondent by; Mr. Zahid Mehmood, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Asad Machinery Store, Gujranwala\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Gujranwala" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24341", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3183 = 2024 SLD 3183 = (2024) 130 TAX 18", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTY", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 - Condonation of Delay and Input Tax Adjustment\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990): Sections 2(14)(d), 2(22A), 26, & 74\n•\nSRO No. 814(I)/2016 and SRO No. 212(1)/2014, dated 26.03.2014 – These notifications deal with the input tax adjustment, sales tax return filing, and the condonation of time limits for revising returns.\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\n•\nThe petitioner is a non-resident company engaged in the exploration and production of petroleum products in Pakistan, with operations mostly carried out in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). The petitioner claims to have discharged its liabilities for paying sales tax on services to the provincial government under the KPK Finance Act, 2013.\n•\nSince July 2013, the FBRs electronic sales tax portal was structured in a manner that made it inadmissible for the petitioner to claim input tax adjustment for sales tax paid on services through electronic returns. Therefore, the petitioner filed manual returns for the relevant periods. However, no adjudication was made regarding the petitioner’s entitlement for the input tax adjustment.\n•\nThe petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 636/2014 before the Lahore High Court, which directed the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU), Islamabad to pass a decision on the petitioner’s application.\n•\nThe FBR issued a letter on 11.09.2020, condoning the time limit for filing revised returns under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. This allowed for a carry forward amount of Rs. 1,372,141,637 but did not include the carry forward amount of Rs. 1,807,599,241 concerning the provincial sales tax. This carry forward amount was subject to ICA No. 105/2019.\n•\nThe petitioner’s consultant requested the FBR on 14.01.2021 to issue necessary directions to file revised returns with respect to the remaining amount of Rs. 1,807,599,241, based on the decision in ICA No. 105/2019. However, the FBR rejected the petitioner’s application in a letter dated 31.05.2021, leading to the filing of the current petition.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nPetitioner’s Argument:\no\nThe petitioner argued that the FBR’s rejection of its request was unjustified. The application was not a request for condonation of delay, as the delay had already been partially condoned by FBR in September 2020.\no\nThe petitioner contended that the law had been misapplied by the FBR when rejecting the request for the carry forward amount of Rs. 1,807,599,241. The rationale for bifurcating the period prior to and after 01.07.2016 was no longer valid, based on the judgment in Hub Power Company Limited vs. Federation of Pakistan.\n•\nFBR’s Argument:\no\nThe FBR rejected the petitioner’s application for revised returns and stated that the carry forward amounts could not be processed due to the petitioner’s failure to adhere to prescribed timelines and procedures under the Sales Tax Act.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nBifurcation of Period Prior to and After 01.07.2016:\no\nThe FBR’s rationale for bifurcating the period before and after 01.07.2016 was found to be no longer valid. The court emphasized that the petitioner’s application dated 14.01.2021 was not a request for condonation of delay but rather a request for filing revised returns concerning the carry forward amounts.\no\nThe FBR had partially allowed the condonation of delay with respect to the amount of Rs. 1,372,141,637 but rejected the carry forward of Rs. 1,807,599,241, which was related to provincial sales tax for the period before 01.07.2016. The Court ruled that the FBR had failed to correctly appreciate the legal context, particularly in light of the judgment in Hub Power Company Limited case.\n2.\nReconsideration of Petitioner’s Application:\no\nThe court directed the FBR to reconsider and decide the petitioner’s application for filing revised sales tax returns with respect to the period from April 2018 to October 2020. This decision should consider the carry forward amount of Rs. 1,807,599,241 as input tax, in accordance with the law laid down in the Hub Power Company Limited case.\no\nThe decision should be in line with the principle established in the case of Treet Corporation Limited, and it will be subject to the final outcome of the intra-court appeal filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue in the case of Treet Corporation.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points:\n1.\nCondonation of Delay: The court clarified that the application filed by the petitioner on 14.01.2021 was not a request for condonation of delay, but a request to file revised returns. The delay had already been partially condoned earlier.\n2.\nBifurcation of Period (Pre and Post 01.07.2016): The reasoning for bifurcating the period before and after 01.07.2016 was no longer valid, as established in the Hub Power Company Limited case.\n3.\nReconsideration of Sales Tax Returns: The FBR was directed to reconsider the petitioner’s application for revised returns and input tax adjustment for the relevant period, based on legal precedents.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe writ petition was disposed of, directing the FBR to reconsider the petitioner’s request and decide on the filing of revised sales tax returns for the specified period, in light of the Hub Power Company Limited case. The final decision would be subject to the outcome of the intra-court appeal filed in the Treet Corporation case.\n________________________________________\nCase Referred to:\n•\nTreet Corporation Limited through Company Secretary and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and others (2014 PTD 1285).\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14)(d),2(22A),26,74", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 4355 of 2021 decided on 09.12.2022, dates of hearing: 17.05.2022 and 16.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Shehryar Kasuri and Muhammad Humzah, Advocates for the Petitioners.\nMr. Manzoor Hussain, Advocate for respondents No.l to 4/F.B.R and Mr. Amjad Hussain Zada, Second Secretary. (ST.OPS-I), F.B.R., for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOL PAKISTAN OIL AND GAS COMPANY\nVS\nTHE FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24342", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3184 = 2024 SLD 3184 = (2024) 130 TAX 64", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTU", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act, 1969 - Mis-declaration and Confiscation of Goods\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nCustoms Act, 1969 (IV of 1969): Sections 2(kka), 16, 32, 32A, and 79(1) – These sections deal with the powers related to the importation and exportation of goods, mis-declaration, and penalties associated with fiscal fraud and contravention of customs law.\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\n•\nA Contravention Report was generated by the Principal Appraiser at the Model Customs Collectorate of PaCCS, Karachi. The report indicated that a consignment had been imported with mis-declaration.\n•\nBased on the Contravention Report, a Show Cause Notice was issued, which led to the outright confiscation of the goods and the imposition of a penalty on the respondents.\n•\nThe respondents had imported Diesel Oil under the guise of “Residue of Petroleum”, which was allegedly their ongoing practice. This act of mis-declaration led to the customs authorities taking strict action.\n•\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondents, reducing or remitting the penalty, and the applicant (Customs Department) filed a Reference Application to the High Court, challenging the Tribunals decision.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nApplicants Argument (Customs Department):\no\nThe Customs Department argued that the respondents had engaged in a continuous practice of importing Diesel Oil under the false declaration of “Residue of Petroleum”.\no\nThe Department contended that the respondents had attempted to evade taxes and duties by mis-declaring the goods and that the penalty and confiscation were justified based on previous mis-declarations.\n•\nRespondents Argument:\no\nThe respondents, through their legal counsel, argued that they did not claim ownership of the goods as noted in the Order-in-Original.\no\nThey contended that previous proceedings, which were not part of the current case, could not be used to justify the penalties and confiscation. They also referenced an FIR that had been quashed earlier under Section 265K of the Cr.P.C (Criminal Procedure Code).\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nBill of Lading and Mis-declaration:\no\nThe High Court clarified that the Bill of Lading would only become a customs document when it is annexed with the Goods Declaration as required under Section 79 of the Customs Act.\no\nIf there are discrepancies between the Bill of Lading and the actual goods imported, a case of mis-declaration under Section 32 can be made. However, the Bill of Lading alone is not sufficient to establish mis-declaration without it being part of the Goods Declaration.\n•\nReliance on Previous Consignments:\no\nThe High Court found that the adjudicating authority had mis-directed itself by relying on previous consignments where similar mis-declarations were allegedly made. However, those previous consignments were not part of the current Show Cause Notice.\no\nThe Court noted that relying on past cases that were not part of the proceedings at hand was an error and could not justify the confiscation or penalty in the present case.\n•\nTribunals Order:\no\nThe Tribunals decision was upheld by the High Court. The CIR(A) had correctly reduced or remitted the penalty because the mis-declaration was not sufficiently substantiated by evidence in the Bill of Lading and Goods Declaration.\no\nThe High Court found that the Tribunal had appropriately appreciated both the law and facts and concluded that the penalty imposed was not justified under the given circumstances.\n•\nOutcome:\no\nThe High Court dismissed the Reference Applications filed by the Customs Department, agreeing with the Tribunals decision. It concluded that there was no substantial question of law arising from the Tribunals order and that the mis-declaration claim based solely on the Bill of Lading was not sufficient to uphold the confiscation and penalty.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points:\n1.\nCustoms Documents and Bill of Lading: A Bill of Lading becomes a Customs document only when it is properly annexed with a Goods Declaration under Section 79 of the Customs Act. Discrepancies between the Bill of Lading and the actual goods can be grounds for mis-declaration, but this must be demonstrated with proper documentation.\n2.\nMis-declaration and Past Consignments: The reliance on previous consignments to justify penalties or confiscation in the current case was deemed incorrect. Only the goods related to the current Show Cause Notice should be considered in the adjudication.\n3.\nPenalty and Confiscation: The Tribunals decision to remit the penalty and reduce the confiscation was upheld, as the mis-declaration could not be sufficiently substantiated.\n________________________________________\nFinal Outcome:\n•\nThe High Court dismissed the Reference Applications from the Customs Department, thereby upholding the Tribunals decision to reduce or remit the penalty and confiscation. The Court found no substantial question of law that required further intervention.\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(kka),16,32,32A,79(1)", - "Case #": "SCRA 468 to 474 of 2011 decided on 13.04.2021, date of hearing: 13,04,2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iqbal Khurram, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMian Abdul Salam, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nGREAT EASTERN TRADING CO. AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24343", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6416 = 2022 SLD 6416", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No.131/MB/2021 Date of hearing 15.07.2022 Date of order 15.07.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; MIAN ABDUL BASIT ,JUDICIAL MEMBER, DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By; Mr. M. Imran Ghazi, Adv\nrespondent By; Mr. Arslan Qadoos Bukhari, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Fatima Enterprises Limited\n487-A, Mumtazabad, Vehari Road,\nMultan NTN# 0101073\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue,\nLTO, Multan\nAppellant\nVs\nRespondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24344", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6417 = 2022 SLD 6417", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.165/MB/2022. Date of hearing 15.07.2022 . Date of order 15.07.2022\nMA (ST A Y) No.607 /M B/2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; MIAN ABDUL BASIT, Judicial Member. DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, \nAccountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate.\nRespondent by; Mr. Muhammad Amjad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Paradise Filling Station, Kot Addu\nSTRN # 0400132829715\nVersus\nThe CIR, Multan-Zone, RTO, Multan\n... Appellant\n... Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24345", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6418 = 2022 SLD 6418", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.1725/IB/2022. Date of hearing 01.09.2022. Date of order 01.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M.Akram, Judicial Member. Muhammad Imtiaz, Accountant member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Muhammad Nasir Nawaz.\nRespondrent By: Mufti, Advocate, Mr. Usman Asghar, Dr.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Sajid Manzoor, Old Ghalla Mandi , KHushab.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue RTO, Sargodha." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24346", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6419 = 2022 SLD 6419", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.165/MB/2022\nMA (ST A Y) No.607 /M B/2022. Date of hearing 15.07.2022. Date of order 15.07.2022 .", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, Judicial Member. DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM,\nAccountant Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate.\nRespondent By: Mr. Muhammad Amjad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Paradise Filling Station, Kot Addu\nSTRN # 0400132829715\nVersus\nThe CIR, Multan-Zone, RTO, Multan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24347", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6420 = 2022 SLD 6420", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 550/MB/2022. Date of hearing 18.08.2022. Date of order 18.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, Judicial Member. DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM,\nAccountant Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran GHazi, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Qaswer Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Waqas Edible Oil Product (pvt) Limited, Adda Billi Wala, Bahawalpur Road, Multan, NTN 7259326\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue Corporate Zone RTO, Multan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24348", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6421 = 2022 SLD 6421", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 263/IB/2021. Date of hearing , 30.06.2022. Date of order, 30.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMTIAZ AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER. SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Waqas Iqbal Malik, ITP.\nREspondent by: Mrs. Naheed AKhtar Durrani, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muddassir Ikhtiar Qureshi,Rawalpindi.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24349", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6422 = 2022 SLD 6422", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTWXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1508/IB/2022. Date of hearing 01.09.2022. Date of order 01.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M.AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Imran, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Usman Asghar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shagufta Naz, House NO.17, service Road I-8/2, Islamabad.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-III), RTO,Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24350", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6423 = 2022 SLD 6423", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO.4599 OF 2021.Date of Hearing : 12.05.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA A. MALIK, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners : Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, ASC a/w\nNaeem Hussain,\nSecretary (Lit.), FBR\nRespondents : N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II,\nRegional Tax Officer (RTO), Mayo Road,\nRawalpindi and another …Petitioners\nVersus\nM/s Sarwaq Traders, 216/1-A, Adamjee\nRoad, Rawalpindi and another …Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24351", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6424 = 2022 SLD 6424", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Case No. STR No. 9296 of 2019. Date of hearing,18.02.2019.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUDGE. SHAHID JAMAL KHAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Mushtaq Ahmed Toor, Advocate for the applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Ramzan. Versus \nCommissioner Inland Revenue etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24352", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6425 = 2022 SLD 6425", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Original No. 227628 of 2018, heard on 16th March, 2022, heard on: 16th\nMarch, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Before Jawad Hassan, J\nOmar Tariq Shamim, Muhammad Umer Qureshi, Barrister Maryam Hayat, Ms. Saira Khalid Lodhi and\nMuhammad Imran Shamsi for Petitioners.\nIbrar Saeed, Special Public Prosecutor/Director Law, SECP with Ruman Bilal, Hafiz Talha and Mian Ijaz\nYousaf, Advocates/Legal Advisors for the SECP the Respondent No.1.\nSalman Mansoor, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Abdul Majeed and Usman Gulzar for the\nRespondents Nos. 2, 3 and 7.\nEx parte Respondent No.4.\nMs. Sadia Malik, Assistant Attorney General for the Respondent No.5/Ministry of Religious Affairs,\nIslamabad.\nShezada Mazhar, Advocate Supreme Court/Amicus Curiae assisted by Shahrazi Sajid, M. Jawwad Khan\nLodhi, Khawaja Haseeb Ahmad and Raja Shamsher for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDULLAH KHAN USMANI-Petitioner\nVersus\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF\nPAKISTAN and others-Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24353", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6426 = 2022 SLD 6426", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "FEA NO. 41/LB/2021. Date of hearing, 06.06.2022. Date of order, 06.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD ,JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mirza Bilal Zafar, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Zahid Mehmood, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Badami Bagh Steel, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR,CTRO,Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24354", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6427 = 2022 SLD 6427", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-1359, 1360, 1361, 1362, 1363, 3190, 3191, 3192, 3193,\n3194, 1484, 1485, 1486, 1487, 1548, 1549, 1550, 1551, 1552, 1560, 1561, 1562, 1563,\n1564, 1615, 1616, 1617, 1819, 1843, 1844, 1845, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1944, 1945,\n1946, 1947, 4300, 4301 and 4302 all of 2021 decided on 11th February, 2021, date of\nhearing: 21st January, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE.\nARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN, JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Saleem Mangrio for Petitioner (in C.Ps. Nos.D-1359, 1360, 1361, 1362 and 1363 of 2021).\nTaimoor Ahmad Qureshi for Petitioner (in C.Ps. Nos.D-1484, 1485, 1486 and 1487 of 2021).\nMuhammad Faheem Bhayo for Petitioner (in C.Ps. Nos.D-1548, 1549, 1550, 1551, 1552, 1560, 1561,\n1562, 1563, 1564, 1615, 1616, 1617, 1819, 1843, 1844 and 1845 all of 2021).\nAbdul Rahim Lakhani for Petitioner (in C.Ps. Nos.D-3190, 3191, 3192, 3193, 3194, 1906, 1907, 1908,\n1909, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 4300, 4301 and 4302 all of 2021).\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan (DAG) (for respondent No.l in all C.Ps.) for\nRespondents.\nAmeer Bux Maitlo (for the Department /respondents Nos.2 and 3 /2, 3 and 4 in all C.Ps) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS SAKRAND SUGAR MILLS\nLIMITED THROUGH AUTHORIZED\nREPRESENTATIVE/MANAGER FINANCE\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN\nTHROUGH FEDERAL SECRETARY REVENUE\nDIVISION PAKISTAN SECRETARIAT, ISLAMABAD\nAND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24355", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6428 = 2022 SLD 6428", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 758/LB/2015. Date of hearing 16.03.2022. Date of order 05.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Asif , DR.\nRespondent by: Mr. Mohsin Virk, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, WHT Zone, RTO-II, Lahore.\nvs\nM/s. Millennium Cables Industries, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24356", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6429 = 2022 SLD 6429", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1725/IB/2022. Date of hearing 01.09.2022. Date of order 01.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M.AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Nasir Nawaz Mufti, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Usman Asghar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Sajid Manzoor, Old Ghalla Mandi, khushab.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue RTO, Sargodha." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24357", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6430 = 2022 SLD 6430", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1691-L of 2018, date of hearing: 21.09.2021 (Against the orders of\nLahore High Court, Lahore dated 05.03.2018 passed in W.P. No. 133023 of 2018).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):\nMR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL\nMR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH\nMR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, ASC. (video-link - Lahore) a/w Mr. Naeem Hassan, Secy\n(Lit.) FBR.\nFor the Nemo.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE,\nZONE-IV, LAHORE\nVersus\nM/S PANTHER SPORTS & RUBBER\nINDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD, ETC" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24358", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6431 = 2022 SLD 6431", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "In the matter of File No. 344/KENNOL/OFT/CCP/2019, decided on 25th August, 2021. Dates of hearing:\n30th March, 29th April, 25th May and 22nd June, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AUTHOR(S): Ms. SHAISTA BANO AND Ms. BUSHRA NAZ MALIK, MEMEBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Melanie Gaboriau International Sale Developer and Saad Nasrullah, Advocate High Court for Kennol\nPerformance Oil.\nQasim Iqbal, Advocate High Court for Kennol Petroleum (Pvt.) Limited, Japan Lube Petroleum and Dewan\nOil Store", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs KENNOL PETROLEUM (PVT.) LIMITED AND OTHERS:" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24359", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6432 = 2022 SLD 6432", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTVXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 868/LB/2022.\nSTA NO. 919/ LB/2022. Date of hearing 27.05.2022. Date of order, 22.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD TAHIR , ACCOUNT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Iqbal Anwar Mehndi,ITP.\nRespondant by: Mr. Talent Mehmood, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. jahagir Sons The Collection, Lahore.\nvs \nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24360", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6433 = 2022 SLD 6433", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 419 of 2020, decided on 6th June, 2022. (Against the judgment of\nPeshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat dated 13.11.2019, in C.R.\nNo.382-M of 2018) heard on: 6th June, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Tariq Masood and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Judge", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Muhammad Hanif, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Sharif Janjua, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PRESIDENT, ZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LIMITED, HEAD\nOFFICE, ISLAMABAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nKISHWAR KHAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24361", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6434 = 2022 SLD 6434", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 651/LB/2020. Date of hearing 30.08.2021. Date of order 27.01.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD AZAM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Fawad Mir ITP,\nRespondent by: Mr. Khawer Siddique,DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Tandlawala Sugar Mills, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24362", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6435 = 2022 SLD 6435", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. NO. 50314 of 2022. Date of hearing 01.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA,JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "CH. Anwar ul Haq Arif, Advocate for the petitioner.\nSyed Sajjad Rizvi, Assistant attomey General for Pakistan.\nMr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ranjha, Assistant Advocate General Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zaka Uddin Malik. \nvs \nFederation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24363", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6436 = 2022 SLD 6436", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P.No.3979/2017 . Date of hearing 12.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUDGE .", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for the petitioner.\nMr. Bilal Haider Khan respondent No.2’s representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Raja Riffat Pervaiz\nVs.\nAssistant Commissioner Inland Revenue and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24364", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6437 = 2022 SLD 6437", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO.436/MB/2022. Date of hearing 06.07.2022. Date of order 11.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID MASOOD MAZAR, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Akram Khan , Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Qaswar Hussain (DR).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Younas, Multan.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24365", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6438 = 2022 SLD 6438", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-6796 of 2021, decided on 28th February, 2022, heard on: 17th\nFebruary, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Before Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro and Kausar Sultana Hussain, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ali Ahmed Zaidi for Petitioners.\nIrfan Ahmed Memon, D.A.G. along with I.O., SI, Sabeen Ghori, FIA for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN MICROFINANCE BANK LIMITED through\nAuthorized Representative and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary\nInterior and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24366", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6439 = 2022 SLD 6439", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2832 of 2018, decided on 18th February, 2022. (On appeal against the\njudgment dated 09.02.2018 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in C. R.\nNo. 212/2015) heard on: 18th February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa andAmin-ud-Din Khan, Judge", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for\nPetitioners.\nNemo for Respondent No. 1.\nM. Nazir Jawwad, Advocate Supreme Court and Ahmed Nawaz Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record (absent)\nfor Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAZAR HUSSAIN and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nSyed IQBAL AHMAD QADRI (DECEASED) through his\nL.Rs and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24367", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6440 = 2022 SLD 6440", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P No.3437 of 2022. Date of hearing 16.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Jahanzeb Awan and Mr. Uzair Shafie,\nAdvocates for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited.\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24368", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6441 = 2022 SLD 6441", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-5604 of 2018, decided on 4th November, 2021, heard on: 23rd September, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Before Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Faisal Kamal Alam, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Behzad Haider for Petitioner.\nKhursheed Javed, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No.1.\nMuhammad Sarfraz Sulehry for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WEST WHARF WAREHOUSE COMPANY (PRIVATE)\nLIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-\nRespondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24369", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6442 = 2022 SLD 6442", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTUXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 214476 of 2018, decided on 31st March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Before Shams Mehmood Mirza and Rasaal Hasan Syed, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja M. Ajmal for Appellant.\nIftikhar Ullah Malik for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION-\nAppellant\nVersus\nAMIR RAFI and others-Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24370", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6443 = 2022 SLD 6443", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-6796 of 2021, decided on 28th February, 2022, heard on: 17th February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Before Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro and Kausar Sultana Hussain, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ali Ahmed Zaidi for Petitioners.\nIrfan Ahmed Memon, D.A.G. along with I.O., SI, Sabeen Ghori, FIA for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN MICROFINANCE BANK LIMITED through\nAuthorized Representative and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary\nInterior and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24371", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6444 = 2022 SLD 6444", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 467-L of 2019, decided on 26th March, 2021. (On appeal against\norder dated 19.12.2018 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No.\n134878 of 2018) heard on: 26th March, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present: Umar Ata Bandial, Sajjad Ali Shah and Munib Akhtar, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Ashiq Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nIbrar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT\nAUTHORITY (WAPDA), WAPDA HOUSE, LAHORE-\nPetitioner\nVersus\nThe COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE and others-\n-Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24372", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6445 = 2022 SLD 6445", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 354 of 2008, decided on 12th October, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE. ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: Mian Yousaf Umer.\nRespondent(s) by: Shahbaz Butt for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX\nVersus\nMESSRS GRAYS LEASING LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24373", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6446 = 2022 SLD 6446", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 900/LB/2014. Date of hearing 20.04.2022. Date of oreder 20.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER. SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Mayla Jaffery Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Suleman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ms. Huda Sugar Mills, Nankana Sahib.\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-II,RTO,Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24374", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6447 = 2022 SLD 6447", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Applications Nos.527 to 538 of 2020, decided on 27th\nJanuary, 2021.heard on: 27th January, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Before Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Agha Faisal, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Masooda Siraj for Applicant.\nAsad Raza Khan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The DIRECTOR CUSTOMS VALUATION, KARACHI\nVersus\nMessrs USMAN TRADER and 11 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24375", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6448 = 2022 SLD 6448", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ICA No.50591/2021. Date of Hearing 20.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Anwaar Hussain J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Jahangir Ahmad, Advocate\nRespondents No.03 and 04 By:\nMr. Shahid Sarwar Chahil, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shahbaz Hussain\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan etc.." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24376", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6449 = 2022 SLD 6449", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 313 of 2015, heard on 7th October, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE. ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Foziya Bakhsh for Applicant.\nKh. Muhammad Saeed for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II,\nREGIONAL TAX OFFICE, LAHORE\nVERSUS\nMESSRS DAEWOO PAKISTAN MOTORWAY\nSERVICES (PVT.) LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24377", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6450 = 2022 SLD 6450", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 976/LB/2021. Date of hearing 31.01.2022. Date of order 22.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHKHOAR< JUDICIAL MEMBER. Dr. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hashim Aslam Butt, Advocate.\nREspondent by: Syed Hassan Sardar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Affaq Steel MIlls (Pvt) Ltd, Lakhdehar Road, Shadipua, Lahore,\nvs\nCIR,CTO(Enforcement), Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24378", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3185 = 2024 SLD 3185 = (2024) 130 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTXo", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act, 1969 – Appeal Against Confiscation and Penalty for Misclassification of Goods\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nCustoms Act, 1969 (IV of 1969): Sections 15, 16, 32, 79(1), 80, 81, 179 & 193 - Powers regarding prohibitions, false statements, adjudication, and penalties related to the importation and exportation of goods.\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\n•\nThe appellant declared full cream milk powder with 28% butter fat under a concessionary sales tax rate of 10%.\n•\nThe goods were sought to be cleared through a clearing agent.\n•\nThe appellant classified the goods under PCT 0402.1000, but the correct classification should have been PCT 0402.2900.\n•\nThis misclassification led to the evasion of duties and taxes amounting to Rs. 1,344,229.\n•\nA show cause notice was issued, questioning the classification and the legitimacy of the claimed concessionary rate.\n•\nThe adjudicating authority passed an order penalizing the appellant for wilful evasion of duties and for misclassification.\n•\nThe appellant filed an appeal against the order, arguing that there was no mens rea (criminal intent) and the misclassification was inadvertent.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nAppellants Argument:\no\nThe appellant argued that the claim for concessionary rate was made in good faith and was inadvertent, without any malafide intention.\no\nThey contended that Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 (which allows recovery of sales tax) was inapplicable to their case, as there was no willful evasion of duties.\no\nThe appellant emphasized that they had already paid the additional duty and taxes due, and had successfully got the consignment released.\n•\nRespondents (Departments) Argument:\no\nThe Department maintained that the goods were classified correctly under the appropriate PCT heading, and the penalty imposed was reasonable.\no\nThey argued that the appellants admission of paying the additional duties and taxes meant that the appellant was estopped from challenging the imposition of the taxes.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal found that there was no evidence of mens rea (criminal intent) or willful default on the part of the appellant or the clearing agent.\n•\nThe penalty imposition was found to be inappropriate because the appellants action was deemed to be inadvertent rather than deliberate evasion.\no\nPenalties imposed on the appellant and clearing agent were set aside:\n\nThe penalty on the appellant (Rs. 200,000) and the clearing agent (Rs. 100,000) was nullified due to the absence of wilful connivance or intentional wrongdoing.\n•\nDespite this, the admission of paying the additional duties and taxes by the appellant was acknowledged, which contributed to the Tribunal’s finding that the penalty should be reconsidered.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe appeal was partially successful:\no\nThe penalties imposed on the appellant and the clearing agent were set aside due to lack of mens rea or willful connivance.\no\nThe Tribunal accepted that the misclassification of goods and the resulting duty evasion were not done intentionally.\nKey Legal Points:\n•\nMens Rea (Criminal Intent): Penalties for customs violations require proof of intent (mens rea) to evade duties. If the misclassification or error is inadvertent or unintentional, the penalties may not be justified.\n•\nConcessionary Rates: Claims for concessionary duty rates should not result in penal action if the claim is made in good faith without any intention to evade duties.\n•\nConsistency in Penalty: The rule of consistency in penalties requires similar cases to be treated similarly, and in this case, the Tribunal found no evidence to justify the penalties imposed on the appellant.\n________________________________________\nCases Referenced:\n•\n2011 PTD 2837 (relating to customs penalties)\n•\nState Cement Corporation of Pakistan v. Collector of Customs & Others (2002 MLD 180)\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=15,16,32,79(1),80.81,179,193", - "Case #": "Custom Appeals No. K-1449/2016, decided on 24.11.2022, date of hearings: 15.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III, KARACHI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Darwesh, Advocate present for the Appellant.\nMr. Muhammad Raheel, AO. present for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S I A NASIM & CO, KARACHI AND ANOTHER\nVS\nTHE ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, (ADJUDICATION), KARACHI AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24379", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3186 = 2024 SLD 3186 = (2024) 130 TAX 8", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTTXk", - "Key Words:": "Appeal and Stay Application Against Reassessment Proceedings\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990), Section 46 - Appeal to Appellate Tribunal and Assessment of Tax\n•\nSection 46: Provides for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal against decisions made by the CIR(A) concerning tax assessments and recovery of tax.\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\n•\nThe registered person (the taxpayer) had filed an appeal against the remand order issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR(A)) in Appeal No. 65/2021 dated 05.04.2021.\n•\nThe taxpayer’s appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal.\n•\nMeanwhile, the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) initiated reassessment proceedings through Show Cause Notice (C No. 709) dated 25.05.2021 and issued a sealing order dated 28.07.2021 for the taxpayer’s business premises in connection with the remand order.\n•\nThe taxpayer filed a miscellaneous application seeking to stay the operation of the reassessment proceedings and sealing order, arguing that the proceedings are unjustified at this stage.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nCounsel for the taxpayer:\no\nArgued that the appeal against the remand order is pending before the Appellate Tribunal, and no final decision has been made.\no\nThe department’s action of initiating reassessment proceedings and sealing the business premises is causing unnecessary hardship and frustration of the taxpayers right to appeal.\no\nThe penalty imposed by the department had already been vacated due to the remand, and no liability currently exists.\no\nContended that the department should wait for the Tribunal’s decision and refrain from initiating reassessment proceedings in the interim.\n•\nDepartment’s Representative (DR):\no\nArgued that the actions of the department in initiating reassessment proceedings and sealing the premises are justified and should not be stayed.\no\nRequested the rejection of the stay application.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal observed that:\n1.\nThe taxpayer’s appeal challenging the remand order issued by the CIR(A) is still pending for decision.\n2.\nThe department should wait for the decision of the Appellate Tribunal on the appeal, as the taxpayer has come to the Tribunal in second appeal.\n3.\nThe initiation of reassessment proceedings at this stage is not justified, considering the case was remanded by the CIR(A) for de novo consideration and no demand is currently outstanding.\n4.\nThe sealing of the business premises based on the reassessment proceedings is also found to be unjustified.\n•\nThe Tribunal granted the stay for 30 days, suspending the operation of the Show Cause Notice dated 25.05.2021 and vacating the sealing order dated 28.07.2021.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe stay application filed by the registered person was granted.\n•\nThe Tribunal suspended the reassessment proceedings and the sealing of the business premises, finding the department’s actions to be premature and unjustified while the appeal remains pending.\nKey Legal Points:\n•\nStay of Proceedings: When an appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal, the department should refrain from initiating or continuing proceedings that may frustrate the taxpayer’s right to appeal.\n•\nRemand Orders: In cases where the CIR(A) has remanded a matter for further consideration, reassessment proceedings initiated by the department may not be justified until the remand process is completed and no outstanding tax liability exists.\nCases Referred to:\n•\nWrit Petition No.7636 of 2017 (dated 15.03.2017)\n•\n2005 PTD 678\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46", - "Case #": "M.A (Stay) No. 6364/LB/2021, decided on 30.07.2021, date of hearing: 30.07.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abuzar Hussain, Advocate for the Applicant.\nAtif Bashir, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. SHAUKAT FABRICS, FAISALABAD\nVS\nCIR, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24380", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3187 = 2024 SLD 3187 = (2024) 130 TAX 11", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTc", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 - Appeal Against Tax Assessment and Amendments\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001): Sections 111, 120, 122, 174, and 214C - These sections address amendments in assessments, unexplained income, selection of cases for audit, and failure to maintain complete books of accounts.\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\n•\nThe taxpayer is an individual who declared Rs. 340,817 as income from a general store and Rs. 95,817 from property for the tax year 2015.\n•\nThe case was selected for audit under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance.\n•\nThe Inland Revenue Department (IRD) issued an Income Tax Department (IDR) request to the taxpayer, who responded but failed to provide complete books of accounts as required under Section 174 of the Ordinance.\n•\nDiscrepancies were identified, and the taxpayer was confronted under Section 122(9) and Section 111(1)(b) regarding unexplained income.\n•\nThe taxpayer failed to substantiate their version with appropriate documentary evidence.\n•\nThe deemed assessment order was amended by the assessing officer under Section 122(1), resulting in the following:\n1.\nBusiness income: Rs. 245,000\n2.\nProperty income: Rs. 95,817\n3.\nAddition on purchases: Rs. 461,600\n4.\nAddition on P & L expenses: Rs. 5,600\n5.\nIncome from other sources under Section 111(1)(b): Rs. 1,731,000\n6.\nTotal taxable income: Rs. 2,539,017\n7.\nTax payable: Rs. 357,254\n8.\nTax paid under Section 235: Rs. 3,570\n9.\nBalance tax payable: Rs. 353,684\n•\nDissatisfied with this order, the taxpayer filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), who reduced the following additions:\no\nPurchases: Reduced from Rs. 461,600 to Rs. 200,000\no\nP & L Expenses: The addition of Rs. 5,600 was deleted\no\nAddition under Section 111(1)(b): The addition of Rs. 1,731,000 was deleted\n•\nThe Department filed an appeal against the CIR(A) order, challenging the reduction and deletions.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nDepartments Argument (DR):\no\nThe Department Representative (DR) argued that the original assessment should be upheld, particularly the additions related to purchases, P & L expenses, and the unexplained income under Section 111(1)(b), as the taxpayer failed to provide documentary evidence to substantiate the claims.\n•\nTaxpayers Argument (Mr. Muneeb Ahmed, ITP):\no\nThe taxpayer supported the CIR(A)s decision, arguing that:\n\nThe mutation deeds produced by the taxpayer for the property in question (dated 16.06.2014 and 09.12.2016) were valid and supported the claimed source of investment.\n\nThere was no willful attempt to evade taxes, and the discrepancies noted in purchases and P & L expenses were not substantial enough to warrant such high additions.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal reviewed the arguments and the CIR(A)s decision.\no\nThe CIR(A) had deleted the addition under Section 111(1)(b), reasoning that the taxpayer had provided mutation deeds as evidence of the source of investment. These deeds (dated 16.06.2014 and 09.12.2016) were deemed sufficient proof to explain the source of income.\no\nThe CIR(A) had also reduced the addition for purchases from Rs. 461,600 to Rs. 200,000. The Tribunal agreed with the CIR(A)s reasoning that the Departments estimate for purchases was not supported by solid evidence.\no\nThe addition of Rs. 5,600 for P & L expenses was deleted by CIR(A) as it was made on an estimate without any clear evidence, and the Tribunal upheld the CIR(A)s decision on this matter as well.\n•\nConclusion:\no\nThe Tribunal upheld the CIR(A)s order, confirming that the CIR(A) had correctly evaluated the case and made reasonable adjustments based on the available evidence. The order of CIR(A) was considered just and proper.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points:\n•\nUnexplained Income (Section 111(1)(b)): The Tribunal found that the taxpayer had provided adequate evidence in the form of mutation deeds, which supported the source of income and did not amount to unexplained income.\n•\nAssessments and Amendments (Section 122): The Departments estimated additions (for purchases and expenses) were found to be insufficiently substantiated, and the reductions made by CIR(A) were justified.\n•\nRole of Documentary Evidence: The case emphasized the importance of presenting proper documentary evidence to support declared income and investments. The mutation deeds provided by the taxpayer played a crucial role in proving the legitimacy of the income.\n________________________________________\nFinal Outcome:\n•\nThe Departments appeal was dismissed, and the CIR(A)s order was upheld. The Tribunal found the reductions and deletions in the taxpayers favor to be appropriate based on the available evidence.\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,111(1)(B),120,122,122(1),174,214C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 288 (PB) of 2017, decided on 01.02.2021, heard on: 01.02.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIR BADSHAH KHAN IVAZIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dost Muhammad, DR for the Appellant.\nMuneeb Ahmed, ITP for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, MARDAN ZONE, MARDAN\nVS\nMUHAMMAD RAEES, GENERAL STORE, JEHANGIRA DISTRICT, NOWSHERA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24381", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3188 = 2024 SLD 3188 = (2024) 130 TAX 15", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTY", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax on Manufacturing and Supply of Cables and Exemption Claims\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990), Sections: 2(41), 3(1), 7, 8, 11 & 13\n•\nSerial No. 52A of the Sixth Schedule\n•\nSales Tax Rules, 2006, Rules: 2(1), 24 & 25\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe appellant is a business registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and engaged in the manufacturing and supply of cables, conductors, and allied products. For the tax periods July 2014 to June 2015 and July 2015 to June 2016, the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) issued a show cause notice under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act for discrepancies in the appellants tax filings. Following this, the DCIR issued an order raising sales tax along with default surcharge and penalties under Sections 33 and 34 of the Act.\nThe appellant filed an appeal with the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR(A)), who decided many of the issues in favor of the appellant or remanded the matter for reconsideration. However, the CIR(A) upheld the disallowance of input tax adjusted by the appellant on the grounds that the input tax was attributable to exempt supplies. The appellant challenged this specific aspect of the order in their appeal.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nAppellant’s Argument:\no\nThe appellant argued that the DCIR and CIR(A) erred by disallowing the input tax credit attributed to exempt supplies. According to the appellant, they were exclusively engaged in taxable supplies, and their supplies to hospitals (specifically cables) should be considered exempt under Serial No. 52A of the Sixth Schedule.\no\nThe appellant argued that the goods (cables) became exempt only when supplied to hospitals, but the input tax on these goods should still be allowed since they were not directly exempted at the time of manufacture.\no\nThe appellant also cited Rule 25 of the Sales Tax Rules, which provides a mechanism to calculate residual input tax, as supporting their claim for the input tax credit.\n2.\nDepartment’s Argument:\no\nThe Department opposed the appellants claims, arguing that the appellants supplies of cables were taxable when sold to hospitals, and the appellant should not have claimed input tax on goods later supplied as exempt.\no\nThe Department maintained that the appellant had supplied goods in both taxable and exempt categories, and that the claim for input tax credit on the exempt portion was incorrect.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nScheme of the Act - Distinction between Taxable and Exempt Goods:\no\nThe Sales Tax Act distinguishes between taxable and exempt goods and supplies. The Court observed that even if the appellants goods were taxable when sold, they became exempt when supplied to hospitals under Serial No. 52A of the Sixth Schedule.\no\nIt was held that input tax can be allowed for goods that become exempt only after they are supplied to hospitals, as this is consistent with the exemption policy under the Sixth Schedule.\n2.\nExemption Entitlement:\no\nThe Court ruled that the appellant was entitled to the benefits of supplying goods as exempt under Serial No. 52A, which allows for the supply of certain goods to hospitals without the application of sales tax.\no\nThe appellant’s claim that they were entitled to the input tax credit for goods later supplied as exempt was accepted, as this conformed with the exemption provisions under the Act.\n3.\nConsequences of Exemption:\no\nThe Court explained that the appellant had to accept the consequences of treating supplies to hospitals as exempt, which meant they could not claim input tax for the portion of their supplies that were exempt.\no\nHowever, the Court also confirmed that input tax on goods supplied for taxable purposes could be claimed by the appellant in accordance with the Sales Tax Act.\n4.\nAdjustment of Input Tax:\no\nThe Court clarified that the input tax can only be adjusted against taxable supplies. Therefore, the appellant’s claim for input tax adjustment on exempt supplies to hospitals was not valid, as those goods were classified as exempt when supplied to hospitals under Serial No. 52A.\n5.\nPrevious Case History:\no\nThe appellant cited a previous disallowance of input tax in a similar case for the period July 2010 to June 2011, where the CIR(A) had ruled in favor of the appellant, and the department did not pursue an appeal.\no\nHowever, the Court noted that the previous decision did not apply to the current situation, and the principles outlined in Rule 25 and Serial No. 52A were followed.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Court upheld the CIR(A)’s decision and dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The appellant was not entitled to the input tax credit for goods supplied to hospitals that were exempt under Serial No. 52A of the Sixth Schedule. The appellant was also reminded that they could claim input tax only for taxable supplies and that the provisions of the Sales Tax Act were clear regarding the treatment of exempt supplies.\nKey Legal Principles:\n•\nExempt and Taxable Goods: The distinction between exempt and taxable goods is critical in determining eligibility for input tax credit.\n•\nSerial No. 52A Exemption: Supplies of goods to hospitals under Serial No. 52A are exempt, and the input tax associated with these supplies cannot be claimed.\n•\nInput Tax Adjustment: Input tax can only be adjusted against taxable supplies, not exempt supplies.\nOutcome:\n•\nThe appeal by the taxpayer is dismissed.\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(41),3(1),7,8,8(1),8(1)(a),8(2),11,13Sales Tax Rules, 2006=24,25,25(1),25(3),25(4)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 520/KB/2018, decided on 19.01.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAWED ZAKARIA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAIFULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. PIONEER CABLES LTD. KARACHI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER-IR, ZONE-IV, LTU, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24382", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6451 = 2022 SLD 6451", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "I.T.R NO.51/2020. Date of Hearing : 18.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by : Mr. Rehan Seerat and Ch. Kamil Hayat,\nAdvocates.\nRespondent by : Hafiz Muhammad Idrees, Syed Farid\nBukhari and Faizan Ahmed Mirza,\nAdvocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (LEGAL) CORPORATE\nTAX OFFICE, RTO, ISLAMABAD.\nVS.\nFOUNDATION POWER COMPANY (DHARKI) LTD. 68, TIPU\nROAD, RAWALPINDI." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24383", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6452 = 2022 SLD 6452", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1695/LB/2020. Date of hearing 17.02.2022. Date of order 03.03.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAR UL HAQUE< ACCOUNTANT MEMBER. NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Rehan Yousaf, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Asif, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Siddique, Din Garh, Kasur.\nvs\nThe CIR CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24384", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6453 = 2022 SLD 6453", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STR No.155 of 2015.heard on: 21.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant-department by: Ms. Saba Saeed Sheikh, Advocate / Legal\nAdvisor.\nRespondent-taxpayer by: Mr. Abuzar Hussain Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Regional Tax\nOffice, Faisalabad\nVersus\nM/s. Ahmad Straw Board Private Limited,\nFaisalabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24385", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6454 = 2022 SLD 6454", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CP No.D-6084 of 2017, heard on: 08.09.2022.\nDate of decision : 30.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Irfan Saadat Khan,\n Zulfiqar Ahmed Khan,JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Respondent No.1 : through Mr. G.M. Bhutto,\n Assistant Attorney General.\nFederal Board of Revenue,\nRespondent No.2 :\nAssistant Commissioner, IR\nRespondent No.3 :\nCommissioner, IR\nRespondent No.4 : through Mr. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi,\n Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Reliance Petrochem Industries\n(Pvt.) Ltd.,\nPetitioner : through Mr.Ovais Ali Shah,\n Advocate.\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24386", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6455 = 2022 SLD 6455", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 1308/LB/2020. Date of hearing 16.03.2022. Date of order 23.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Naveed A. Andrabi, Advocate. Mr. Khurram Saleem, Advocate.\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Etihad Sugar Mills Limited, Lahore.\nvs\nCIR LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24387", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6456 = 2022 SLD 6456", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STR No.155 of 2015.heard on: 21.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant-department by: Ms. Saba Saeed Sheikh, Advocate / Legal\nAdvisor.\nRespondent-taxpayer by: Mr. Abuzar Hussain Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Regional Tax\nOffice, Faisalabad.\nVersus\nM/s. Ahmad Straw Board Private Limited,\nFaisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24388", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6457 = 2022 SLD 6457", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 2143-L, 2144-L and 2145-L of 2020, decided on 4th February,\n2022. (Against the order dated 20.10.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore\nin P.T.Rs. Nos. 131, 132 and 133 of 2006) heard on: 4th February, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa and Yahya Afridi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Shakeel, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nDr. Ikram-ul-Haq, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE-\nPetitioner\nVersus\nThe BANK OF PUNJAB, LAHORE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24389", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6458 = 2022 SLD 6458", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 884/LB/2022. Date of hearing 21.06.2022. Date of order 06.07.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD , JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abad-ur- Rehman, ADvocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Zahid Mehmood,DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. H.W. Dairies(Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24390", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6459 = 2022 SLD 6459", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 243 of 2011 and Civil Appeal No. 1136 of 2018, decided on 31st May,\n2022. (On appeal against order dated 23.12.2010 and 05.10.2017 passed by the\nPeshawar High Court, Peshawar in Custom Reference No.68/2010 with C.Ms. Nos.\n29/2010, 108/2010 and Sales Tax Reference No.68-P of 2007) heard on: 31st\nMay, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):IJAZ UL AHSAN, MUNIB AKHTAR AND SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Bahadur Sher Afridi, dditional Commissioner, FBR,\nPeshawar for Appellant (in both cases).\nFarrukh Jawad Panni, Advocate Supreme Court and Ahmed Nawaz Ch., Advocate-on-Record for\nRespondent No. 1 (in C.A. No.243 of 2011).\nSales Tax Case\nMasoor ur Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mahmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record for\nRespondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 1136 of 2018).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, PESHAWAR-\nAppellant\nVersus\nMessrs PAKISTAN TOBACCO COMPANY (LTD.),\nISLAMABAD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24391", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6460 = 2022 SLD 6460", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 362/KB/2018. Date of hearing 09.06.2021. Date of order 09.06.2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. M.M. AKRAM, J.M., JUDICAIL MEMBER.\nDR. TAUQEER IRTIZA, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Muhammad Munib & Mr. Kamran Rizvi, Advocates.\nRespondent by: Sardar Abdul Rab, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Quetta Electric Supply Company, Limited, (QESCO), Head Office, Zarghoon Road, Quetta.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue.\nZone-I, LTU, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24392", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6461 = 2022 SLD 6461", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 2092 of 2019\n(Against the judgment dated 07.02.2018\npassed by Peshawar High Court,\nPeshawar in Writ Petition No. 359-P of\n2016).\nDate of Hearing: 14.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):\nMr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa.J,\nMr. Justice Yahya Afridi.J.\nMr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar.J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR\nFor Govt. of KPK:\nFor Respondent No. 3:\nMr. Shumail Ahmed But, AG KPK\nMr. Atif Ali Khan, Addl. AG KPK\na/w Eid Badsha, Director, Excise &\nTaxation, KPK\nMr. Sabah-ud-Din Khattak, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Lucky Cement Ltd thr. its General Manager,\nPeshawar\n…Appellant\n Versus\nKhyber Pakhtunkhwa thr. Secretary Local\nGovernment and Rural Development, Peshawar &\nothers …Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24393", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6462 = 2022 SLD 6462", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-1079 of 2022, heard on: 22.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):\nMr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan. J.\nJustice Mrs. Rashida Asad. J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner : Mr. Mushtaq Hussain Qazi Advocate\nFor the respondent No.1 : Pir Riaz Muhammad Shah, Deputy\nAttorney General for Pakistan\n(DAG). .\nFor the respondents No.2 to 4 : Dr. Shah Nawaz Advocate. .", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Zam Zam LPG (Pvt.) Limited.\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan and 03 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24394", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6463 = 2022 SLD 6463", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4599 of 2021, decided on 12th May, 2022. (Against the order\ndated 01.06.2021, passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in Sales\nTax Reference No.02 of 2013) heard on: 12th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): UMR ATA BANDIAL, C.J. AND AYESHA A. MALIK , JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court along with Naeem Hussain, Secretary (Lit.), FBR for\nPetitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II,\nREGIONAL TAX OFFICER (RTO), MAYO ROAD,\nRAWALPINDI and another-Petitioners.\nVersus\nMessrs SARWAQ TRADERS, 216/1-A, ADAMJEE\nROAD, RAWALPINDI and another-Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24395", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6464 = 2022 SLD 6464", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 965/LB/2022. Date of heaing 28.02.2022. Date of order 04.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abdul Hannan, ITP.\nRespondent by: Syed Hassan Sardar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Tanvir, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24396", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6465 = 2022 SLD 6465", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITR No.41041 of 2022.heard on: 22.09.2022,", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Syed Zain-ul-Abidein Bokhari, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II, RTO, Gujranwala.\nVersus\nM/s Crystal Distributors, Gujranwala." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24397", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6466 = 2022 SLD 6466", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1481/LB/2022. Date of hearing 29.04.2022. Date of order 06.05.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICAIL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ch. Qamar-uz- Zaman, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Tallent Mahmood, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. 56 Security Guards (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR,CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24398", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6467 = 2022 SLD 6467", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.625 of 2019, decided on 23rd May, 2022. Date of\nhearing: 13th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187 rel.\nQazi Umair for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Ali Rakhshani, Additional Advocate General for Respondent No.1.\nJam Saka for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "INDUS MOTORS COMPANY LIMITED\nVersus\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN, FINANCE\nDEPARTMENT and 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24399", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6468 = 2022 SLD 6468", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTRXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 18 of 2021, heard on: 12.09.2022, 20.09.2022 and 21.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Arshad Tayebaly and Ms. Heer Memon for petitioners.\nM/s. Omer Soomro, Danish Nayyer and Zahid Hussain Sahito for\nrespondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NP Waterproof Industries (Private) Ltd. & others.\nVersus\nNP Spinning Mills Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24400", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6469 = 2022 SLD 6469", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No.35 of 2009, heard on: 16.08.2022 and 13.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "None for petitioner SECP.\nMr. Zeeshan Abdullah along with Mr. Adnan for legal heirs of\napplicant/purchaser Asim.\nMr. Habib Ahmed for auction purchaser.\nMr. Younus Memon holds brief for Mr. S. Nouman Zahid for\napplicant Standard Chartered Bank.\nMr. Darvaish Mandhan for applicant Nadeem H. Sheikh.\nMr. Muhammad Akram Tariq for applicant Ms. Shehnaz Sheikh.\nMr. Ch. Waseem Iqbal, Official Assignee/Liquidator.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Securities & Exchange Commissioner of Pakistan.\nVersus\nNatover Lease Refinance Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24401", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6470 = 2022 SLD 6470", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference Application No.05 of 2021, decided on 6th June, 2022. Dates\nof hearing: 20th and 30th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR AND ABDUL HAMEED BALOCH, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sohail Ansari, Assisted by Khalid Aziz, Assistant Director, RTO Quetta for Applicant.\nKhalid Sultan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-I,\nREGIONAL TAX OFFICE, QUETTA.\nVersus\nMessrs QUETTA ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY\nLIMITED, ZARGHOON ROAD, QUETTA." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24402", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6471 = 2022 SLD 6471", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-6831, D-7016, D-7646 of 2018, D-395, D-396, D-686,\nD-804, D-1187, D-1188, D-1358, D-1359, D-1369, D-1524, D-1562, D-1586, D-1842,\nD-1960, D-1995, D-1996, D-2090, D-2339, D-2340, D-2610, D-2770, D-3010, D3421, D-3722, D-4091, D-4741, D-4743, D-4769, D-6117 of 2019, D-987, D-988, D1167, D-1485, D-4443, D-4774, D-4775, D-5805, D-6089 of 2020 and D-1364 of 2021, decided on 2nd March, 2021. Dates of hearing: 16th February and 2nd March,\n2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hyder Ali Khan along with Ghulam Hussain Shah, Shaheer Roshan Shaikh, Ms. Nehl Chamdia, Samiur-Rehman, Qazi Umair Ali, Naeem Suleman, Arshad Hussain Shahzad, Nadir Khan Burdi, Mazharul\nHassan, Jawaid Farooqui, Taha Samad, Muhammad Yousuf, Nazia Hanjrah, Mansoor Ali Ghanghro,\nMohsin Ali, Ahmed Madani and Imran Ahmed for Petitioners.\nGhulam Murtaza Korai, Shamshad Ali Narejo along with Zamir Khalid, Commissioner and Syed Zainul-Abidin, Deputy Commissioner, SRB and Aamir Ali Shaikh for Respondents.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, DAG (For Federation). Jawad Dero, Addl. A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SUMMIT BANK LTD. and others.\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF SINDH and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24403", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6472 = 2022 SLD 6472", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1651/LB/2022. Date of hearing 04.04.2022. Date of order 28.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asim Zulfiqar Ali, F.C.A.\nREspondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syeda Perwin Babar Ali, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24404", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6473 = 2022 SLD 6473", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P No.3764 of 2022. Date of hearing 07.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Umer Aslam Khan and Uzair Bin\nShafie, Advocates for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s OGDCL Employees Trust.\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24405", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6474 = 2022 SLD 6474", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No.541/LB of 2019, decided on 4th February, 2020.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD WASEEM CHAUDHARY, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khubaib Ahmad for Appellant.\nMrs. Sehar Aftab, (DR) for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs CHAWALA ENTERPRISES, FAISALABAD\nVersus\nThe COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE(A), RTO,\nFAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24406", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6475 = 2022 SLD 6475", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 2092 of 2019 (Against the judgment dated 07.02.2018 \npassed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Writ Petition No. 359-P of\n2016). Date of Hearing: 14.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):\nMr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa. J. Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi. J. Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar.J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR. For Govt. of KPK: For Respondent No. 3:\nMr. Shumail Ahmed But, AG KPK Mr. Atif Ali Khan, Addl. AG KPK\na/w Eid Badsha, Director, Excise & Taxation, KPK\nMr. Sabah-ud-Din Khattak, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Lucky Cement Ltd thr. its General Manager, Peshawar\n Versus\nKhyber Pakhtunkhwa thr. Secretary Local Government and Rural Development, Peshawar &\nothers ." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24407", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6476 = 2022 SLD 6476", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 3986/LB/2021. Date of hearing 16.03.2022. Date of order 31.03.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Mansha Sukhera, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Umair Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Shafqat Riasat, 213,2nd Floor, Eden Centre, Jail Road, Lahore, Data Gunj Bukhsh Town.\nvs\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24408", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6477 = 2022 SLD 6477", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil PetitionS No.4963 & 5021 of 2018 (Against the judgments of the islainabad igh Court both H ,dated 04.102018 passed in Wt PetifiO No.1015/20i8 & 2132/2018). Date ofHearing: 17.05.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN,J. MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For PESCO: Mr. Asad Jan, ASC. Mir Adam Khan, AOR.\nFor WAPDA: Syed Mozam Ali Rizvi, ASC. Mr. Mehr Khan Malik, AOR/\nFor Respondent: Ms. Farhan Naz Marwat, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "Chief Executive Officer, PeshawarElectric and power Company (PEPCO). (in CP No.4963/201, WAPDA thr. its Chairman & others (inCPNo.502h/20B.\nvs\nSajeeda Begum & others (in CP No4963/20, Gui Farah Jaan & others\n(in CP No.5021/20" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24409", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6478 = 2022 SLD 6478", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTQXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2903/LB/2021. Date of hearing 24.01.2022. Date of order 06.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Babar Niaz, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Kashif Azhar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Asghar, Lahore.\nvs \nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24410", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6479 = 2022 SLD 6479", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA (Stay) Interin No. 1558/IB/2022. Date of hearing 06.10.2022. Date of order 10.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Samad Sajjad, ITP.\nRespondent by: Mr. Osama Idrees, DR>", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Nisar Ali, House No. P-1205, Mohallah Syed Pur Road, Rawalpindi.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24411", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6480 = 2022 SLD 6480", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Ist Appeal 85 of 2022. Date/s of hearing: 19.10.2022. Date of announcement: 19.10.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, J. Agha Faisal, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. M. Ashraf Chohan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Tahir Hussain Siddiqui\n vs. \nLearned XII AD&SJ Karachi West & Others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24412", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6481 = 2022 SLD 6481", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C. P. No. D-4322 of 2018, heard on: 19.10.2022. Date of Order: 19.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Mr. Justice Agha Faisal .", - "Lawyer Name:": "Respondent No. 1: Federation of Pakistan. Through Mr. S. Yasir Ahmed Shah, Assistant Attorney General.\nRespondent Nos. 2 to 4: The Chairman, State Life Insurance\nCorporation & others, Through Mr. Waqas Asad Sheikh,\nAdvocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Niaz Ahmed Shaikh & others. Through Mr. Abdul Salam Memon and\nMs. Rabya Javed, Advocates." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24413", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6482 = 2022 SLD 6482", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "EFA No.19288 of 2022. Date of Hearing 27.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by Mr. Iftikhar Ullah Malik, Advocate.\nRespondent No.1 by Mr. Majid Ali Wajid, Advocate.\nRespondents No.2 to 5 Proceeded against ex-parte.\nRespondent No.6 by Mr. Ahsan Masood, Advocate.\nRespondent No.7 by M/s Nadeem Irshad, Najia Noreen & Irfan Khalid Bhatti,\nAdvocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Al-Hadi Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., etc.\nVersus\nMCB Limited, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24414", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6483 = 2022 SLD 6483", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTOC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STR NO. 80 of 2016. Date of Hearing: 17.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Jamil Khan, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: M/s Waqar A. Sheikh and Rana. Muhammad Mehtab, Advocates.\nRespondent(s) by: Mr. Hassan Kamran Bashir, Advocate, assisted by Sikandar Ali, Asim Bin Majeed, and Afzal Hussain Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nVs\n M/s Lahore Rubber Store." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24415", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6484 = 2022 SLD 6484", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTOCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal Nos. 354 to 356 of 2020. (On appeal from the judgments of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 08.10.2019 passed in Customs Reference. Nos.56-P, 57-P and 58-P of 2019). Date of Hearing: 12.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa, J. Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi, J. Mr. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants: Syed Hamid Ali Shah Bukhari, ASC. Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR. (in all appeals)\nFor the Respondent: Mr. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, ASC. (Through video link from Peshawar).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s A.J. Traders through its proprietor. Muhammad Ilyas (in all appeals)\nVersus\nThe Collector of Customs (Adjudication). Islamabad & others (in all appeals)." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24416", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6485 = 2022 SLD 6485", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 5256/LB/2021. Date of hearing 27.01.2022. Date of order 26.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD WASEEM CH. JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sajjad Ali , Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Imran, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Rashid Iqbal Malik, Lahore. \nvs\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24417", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6486 = 2022 SLD 6486", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1806/LB/2022. Date of hearing 20.09.2022. Date of order 12.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Khurshid, Advocate. Mr. Naeem Qasim Gill, \nAdvocate.\nRespondent by: Mr, M. Qamar Minhas, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Arshad, Faisalabad. \nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24418", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6487 = 2022 SLD 6487", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTOHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "M.A.Nos.244 to 249/IB/2022. IN, ITA Nos.132 to 137/IB/2022. (Tax Years 2014 to 2018).Date of Hearing: 28.09.2022. Date of Order: 28.09.2022 .", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ,\nACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. M Ellahi, Advocate. Mr. M. Sadique Butt, Advocate\nMs. Jaweria Kokab, G.M (Finance). \nRespondent By: Ashfaq Ahmed Naqvi, Advocate, Mr. Shaheryar Akram, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CELMORE TECHNOLOGIES (PVT) LTD. PLOT NO.3, NAQEEB PLAZA, TULIP ROAD, SECTOR A, DHA-PHASEII, ISLAMABAD, APPELLANT.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CTO, ISLAMABAD, RESPONDENT ." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24419", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6488 = 2022 SLD 6488", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTOHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46(1)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1837/LB/2022. Date of hearing 04.10.2022. Date of order 17.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Khursheed, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahmad Taimoor, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Data Fabrics, 124JB, Base Line, Rehman Abad, Factory Area, Ghulam Muhammad Abad, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24420", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6489 = 2022 SLD 6489", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "PTR No.280 of 2013, heard on: 28.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J. SHAHID JAMEEL KHAN, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant(s) by: M/s Syed Zain-ul-Abidein Bokhari, Raja. Sikandar Khan, Ibrar Ahmed, Shahid Sarwar. Chahil, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Kausar Parveen, Foziya Bakhsh, Riaz Begum, Muhammad Yahya Johar, Imran Rasool and Naeem Khan, Advocates / Legal Advisors. Hafiz Muhammad Arshad, Inspector, FBR, and Hafiz M. Fahad, LDC.\nRespondent(s) by: M/s Muhammad Mohsin Virk, Muhammad Shaban, Saood Nasrullah Cheema, Syed Tassadaq Mustafa Naqvi, Ahmad Nawaz Khurram, Muhammad Ijaz Ali Bhatti, Farhan Shahzad, Zohaib Ali Sidhue, Ahmad Wasim and Sardar Azeem Afrasiyab, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, LTU, Lahore.\nVersus\nM/s Marwat Enterprises Pvt. Limited, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24421", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6490 = 2022 SLD 6490", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46", - "Case #": "STA No. 1711/LB/2021. Date of hearing 10.03.2022. Date of order 15.03.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abdul Sattar, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Hassan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Adur Rehman Corporation(Pvt) Ltd, Faisalabad. \nvs\nCIR, RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24422", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6491 = 2022 SLD 6491", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148,(8), 148(7),148(1),2(29)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No.63 of 2015. Date of Hearings 28-04-2022 and 13-10-2022. Date of Decision 13-10-2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Babar Sattar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicants by: Mr Ali Sibtain Fazli, Advocate. Sardar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, Advocate. Mr Saad M. Hashmi, Advocate. Mr Abad Ur Rehman, Advocate. Mr Naeem Ahmed, Advocate. Mr Umer Tariq Gill, Advocate. Mr. Hamza Tahir, Advocate. \nRespondent by: Mr Saeed Ahmed Zaidi, Advocate. Ms Shazia Bilal, Advocate. Mr. Imran Kazmi, Member (Legal), Mr. Amjad Zubair, Chief Commissioner, Ms. ShabanMumtaz, Commissioner Inland Revenue, Mr. Naeem Hassan, Commissioner Inland Revenue, Mr. Shah Bahar, Dy. Commissioner, LTU, Islamabad.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Telenor Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.\nVersus\nAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenue & 3 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24423", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6492 = 2022 SLD 6492", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122(9),122(5A)", - "Case #": "CASE NO. : W.P. NO.1495-2017, heard on: 11.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s Abad Ur Rehman and Naeem Ahmad Awan, Advocates\nRespondents by: Syed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s The Attock Oil Company Limited.\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24424", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6493 = 2022 SLD 6493", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 2342 of 2019. Date of order 13.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ATHAR MINALLAH, CHIEF JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr Muhammad Usman Shaukat, Advocate, for the petitioners.\nM/s Saeed Ahmed Zaidi, Babar Bilal and Tariq Bilal, Ch. Naeem ul Haq Advocates, for the\nrespondents.\nMr Masood Akhtar, Commissioner/Audit, LTO, Isb.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Pakistan Mobile Communication Ltd.\nVs\nFOP, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24425", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6494 = 2022 SLD 6494", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4048 of 2022. Date of order 28.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Faheem Ul Haq, Advocate for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Rawat Oil & Ghee Mills Pvt. Limited.\nVS\nAssistant/Deputy Commissioner (Enforcement) Inland Revenue, Islamabad, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24426", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6495 = 2022 SLD 6495", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=14", - "Case #": "FEA No. 36/LB/2021. Date of hearing 21.02.2022. Date of order 18.05.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER. RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shuja, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Ghulam Hussain Yasir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Chaudhry Sugar Mills Limited, Lahore. \nvs\nThe CIR, Enforcement, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24427", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6496 = 2022 SLD 6496", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal Nos. 174 to 177 of 2012. (Against the judgment dated 11.12.2003 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Writ Petitions No. 1980/1999, 1/2000, 120/2000, and 6/2001)\nAND Criminal Original Petition No. 59/04 (Against non-compliance of the order dated. Date of Hearing: 13.09.2022.\n26.02.2004 passed by this Court)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE QAZI ISA. Mr. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI. Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants: Mr. Raashid Anwer, ASC. (in all cases)\nFor Respondent No. 1: Mr. Shumail Ahmad Butt, Advocate-General, KP. Mr. Imtiaz Ahmed, E.T.O., Mardan. Mr. Saeed Gul, E.T.O., Nowshera. (in all cases)\nFor the Respondent No. 2: Mr. Rashideen Nawaz Qasoori, ASC.\n(in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Lakson Tobacco Company Limited (in CA 174 & 175 of 2012). Pakistan Tobacco Company, etc. (in CA 176 of 2012). F.S. Tobacco Co. (Pvt) Ltd. (in CA 177 of 2012). Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. (in Crl.Org.P. 59 of 2004)\nVersus\nNWFP through Secretary Finance, etc. (in CA 174 & 175 of 2012). \nNWFP through Secretary Excise & Taxation Department, etc. (in CA 176 & 177 of 2012). Attaullah Khan (in Cr.O.P. 59 of 2004) ." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24428", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6497 = 2022 SLD 6497", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1026 of 2018. Date of hearing 26.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by Mr. Salman Ajaib, Advocate along with Raza Mohsin Qazilbash, Director Legal, and Muhammad Nazir Rana, Law Officer for State Bank of Pakistan.\nRespondent(s) by Mr. Muhammad Sajid Khan Tanoli, Deputy Attorney General along with Mr. Asif Ikram, Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Waqar-ul-Haq Sheikh, ASC along with Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "State Bank of Pakistan\n V/S\n Federation of Pakistan and four others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24429", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6498 = 2022 SLD 6498", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JTNHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4048 of 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Faheem Ul Haq, Advocate for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Rawat Oil & Ghee Mills Pvt. Limited\nVS\nAssistant/Deputy Commissioner (Enforcement) Inland Revenue, Islamabad, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24430", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6499 = 2022 SLD 6499", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11", - "Case #": "STA No. 471/LB/2022. Date of hearing 30.05.2022. Date of order 29.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD WASEEM CH. JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hamza Ashraf, FCA\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad ALi, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Metro Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore.\nvs\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24431", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6500 = 2022 SLD 6500", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,32", - "Case #": "Special Customs Appeal No. 63 of 2002, heard on: 29.09.2022.\nDate of judgment: 03.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan. Mr. Justice Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant : Through Mr. Ammar Yasser, Advocate.\nRespondent Nos.1,2 & 4 : Through Mr. G.M Bhutto, AAG.\nRespondent No. 3 : Through Mr. Sarfaraz Khan Marwat, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Xavier Company.\n Versus\nCustoms, Excise & Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24432", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6501 = 2022 SLD 6501", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=2(viv)Insurance Ordinance, 2000=75Contract, Act, 1872=51/52", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No.1064 of 2011, heard on: 04.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID BILAL HASSAN-J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant(s): M/s Syed Ali Zafar (ASC), Talib Hussain, Jahanzeb Sukhera, Mehak Zafar and Ali Hur Jamal, Advocates.\nM/s Waqar A. Sheikh, Tassawar Sohail, Humair Afzal, Faisal G. Meeran, Syed Ali Zakir, Mian Ijaz Latif & Ms. Hina Bandealy, Advocates for the respondent No.1. M/s Mushtaq Ahmad Khan (ASC) and Zahid Mehmood Arain, Advocates for\nrespondent No.3/HBL.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Premier Insurance Limited.\nVersus\nM/s Ihsan Yousaf Textile Private Ltd. etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24433", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6502 = 2022 SLD 6502", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 698/IB/2022. Date of hearing 31.10.2022. Date of order 31.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMTIAZ AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER. SHAHID MASOOD MANZAR, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Imran Ul Haq, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mithial Traders, Rawalpindi.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Rawalpindi," - }, - { - "Case No.": "24434", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6503 = 2022 SLD 6503", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=170", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 317/2022. (Against the judgment dated 01.12.2021 of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench passed in ITR. No. 1-A/2019). Date of Hearing: 31.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA. Mr. JUSTOCE YAHYA AFRIDI. Mr. JUSTICE JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHIL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Riaz Hussain Azam, ASC. \nFor the Respondents: Mr. Zahid Idris Mufti, ASC. Mr. Anis M. Shehzad, AOR.\n.On Court’s notice: Mr. Ayaz Shoukat, DAG Mr. Ayaz Swati, AAG Balochistan Mian Shafaqat Jan, AAG KP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Tahir.\nVersus\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office, Abbottabad and another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24435", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6504 = 2022 SLD 6504", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4048 of 2022. date of order 28.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Faheem Ul Haq, Advocate for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Rawat Oil & Ghee Mills Pvt. Limited.\nVS\nAssistant/Deputy Commissioner (Enforcement) Inland Revenue, Islamabad, etc.." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24436", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6505 = 2022 SLD 6505", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122(9),122(5A)", - "Case #": "CASE NO. : W.P. NO.1495-2017, heard on: 11.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s Abad Ur Rehman and Naeem Ahmad Awan,\nAdvocates.\nRespondents by: Syed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s The Attock Oil Company Limited.\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24437", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6506 = 2022 SLD 6506", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpYzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P No.67112 of 2021. Date of Hearing. 11-10-2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONERS BY: M/s Salman Akram Raja, Arslan Riaz, Malik Bashir. Ahmad Khalid, Khalil ur Rehman, Mian Mehmood Rashid, Mrs. Roohi Saleh, Moiz Tariq, Kashif Rafiq Rajwana, Shakeel Ahmad Basra, Haider Ali Chohan, Majid Ali, Ch. Umer Hayat Kamran Rajoka,\nMuhammad Saqib Badar, Muhammad Naveed Amjad, Mian Zulfiqar Ali, Nadeem Shehzad Hashmi, Islam Khan, Usman Ali Bhoon, Riasat Noor Zaman, M.A. Rizwan Kamboh, Muhammad Usman Sheikh, Ashiq Ali Rana, Mustafa Kamal, Syed Alamdar\nHussain, Hamida Haq, Malik Zahid Manzoor Awan, Ch. Babar Waheed, Faisal Anwar Minhas, Rana Sajid Rasool and Syed Kamal Ali Haider, Advocates. \nRESPONDENTS BY: M/s Haris Azmat and Maryam Hayat, Advocates for SNGPL. M/s Ahmad Pervaiz and Schehrazade Shahryar, Advocates for OGRA. Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan with Imran Javed, Deputy Chief Officer Law, SNGPL.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ghazi Fabrics International Ltd. & 34 others.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24438", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6507 = 2022 SLD 6507", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002=12", - "Case #": "Diary No. 149609/22 dated 11.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr.Saif ur Rehman Jasra, Advocate for petitioner. Mr. Muhammad Jehan Zaib, A.A.G., Hassan Khalid Ranjha, Ahmad Hassan Khan Khichi, Syed Sabahat Hussain Hamdani and Alamdar Hussain\nAdvocates. Mir Haroon ur Rasheed, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Akeel Ahmad.\n Vs.\n Chairman, Punjab Public Service Commission, Lahore, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24439", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6508 = 2022 SLD 6508", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=80D", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.630 of 2010.\n(Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 03.3.2009, passed in Tax Ref. No.8/2008). and Civil Appeal No.159 to 161 of 2013. (Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar. dated 15.2.2012, passed in ITR No.92 to 94/2008) and\nCivil Appeals No.162 & 163 of 2013 (Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 07.4.2011, passed in ITR No.116 & 117/2010) and \nCivil Appeals No.164 to 167 of 2013\n(Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 03.3.2011, passed in ITR No.86 to 89/2010) and \nCivil Appeals No.168 to 175 of 2013.\n(Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar\ndated 30.6.2011, passed in ITR No.41 to 48/2011)\nand\nCivil Appeals No.176 to 178 of 2013.\n(Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 27.9.2011, passed in ITR No.127 to 129/2010) and\nCivil Appeals No.300 to 306 of 2013.\n(Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar\ndated 26.10.2011, passed in ITR No.54 to 60/2011) and\nCivil Appeals No.529 to 531 of 2013.\n(Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 18.1.2012, passed in ITR No.83 to 85/2010) and\nCivil Appeal No.1211 to 1214 of 2014.\n(Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar\ndated 28.5.2014, passed in ITR No.115, 111, 112 & 122/2010) and\nCivil Appeals No.1414 to 1418 of 2014.\n(Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar\n10.7.2014, passed in ITR No.113/2010, 05, 08, 09 & 10/2011)\nand\nCivil Petitions No.1152 & 1153 of 2017.\n(Against the judgment of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar\ndated 24.1.2017, passed in ITR No.06/2011 & 39-P/2013)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE UAMR ATA BINDIAL, J. Mr. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA, J. Mr. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the appellant(s)/: Mr. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, ASC. Petitioner (in all cases except CA-529-531/13) Mr. Jamroz Khan Afridi, ASC (in CA-529-531/13) Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR (in CA-630/2010) Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR (in CA-159-178/13) Mr. Bahadur Sher Afridi, Addl.Comm. FBR. \nFor the Mr. Amjad Hameed Ghori, ASC (in CA-161, 300-306/2013 & 1416-1418/2014). Mr. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, ASC (thr. video-link). (in CA-162-163/2013). Mr. Aftab Alam Yasir, ASC (in CA-168-175/2013). Sh. Mehmood Ahmed, AOR (in CA-176-178/2013)", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner of Income Tax (in all cases)\nVersus\nM/s Dye Chemical Industries (Pvt) Ltd (in CA-630/2010)\nM/s Universal Plastic Industry (Pvt.) Ltd (in CA-159 & 160/2013)\nM/s Syntron (Pvt.) Ltd (in CA-161/2013)\nCA-630/2010 etc 2\nM/s Utman Ghee Industries (Pvt.) Ltd (in CA-162, 163/2013)\nM/s Veynal Industries (in CA-164/2013)\nM/s Alpha Veynal Industries (in CA-165, 166/2013)\nM/s M.Y Electronics Pvt. Ltd (in CA-167/2013)\nM/s Al-Karam Lamps (Pvt.) Ltd (in CA-168 to 175/2013)\nM/s Dye-Chem Industries (Pvt.) Ltd (in CA-176 to 178/2013)\nM/s Syntron (Pvt.) Ltd (in CAs-300 to 306/2013 & 1416 to1418/2014)\nM/s Crown Lighting (Pvt.) Ltd (in CA-529 to 531/2013)\nM/s Gandaf Steel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd (in CA-1211 & 1414/2013)\nM/s Vencraft (Pvt.) Ltd (in CA-1212 to 1214 & 1415/2014)\nM/s Alpha Vinyl Industries (Pvt,) Ltd (in CP-1152/2017)\nM/s Master Polymar Industries (Pvt.) Ltd (in CP-1153/2017)\n…" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24440", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6509 = 2022 SLD 6509", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),133,122(1),122(3),210,211", - "Case #": "ITR No.63041 of 2022, heard on: 20.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Mansoor Beg, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Muhammad Yahya Johar, Advocate (on Court’s\ncall).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Allied Bank Limited.\nVersus\nAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24441", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6510 = 2022 SLD 6510", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 241/MB/2022. Date of heraing 22.03.2022. Date of order 21.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Imran Ghazi, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Qaswar Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sheikh Parvaiz Akhtar, Multan. (NTN: 363020485667)\nvs\nCIR, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24442", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6511 = 2022 SLD 6511", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=236D,236", - "Case #": "W.P.No.228757 of 2018. Date of hearing 11.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: M/s Abdullah Dogar, Shahbaz Butt, Abad-ur-Rehman, Farhan Shahzad, Muhammad Mohsin Virk, Raja Hassam\nKayani, Nawab Saeed Ullah Khan, Asad Abbas Raza, Muhammad Ahsan Mahmood, Shamail Arif, Muhammad Usman Zia, Ibrahim Hassan, Javed Iqbal Bhatti, Muhaammad Shahid Baig, Ahtisham-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Nouman Sarwar, Usman Khalil, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Farrukh Gulzar Awan, Chaudhary Hasham Hayat Wathra, Mian Talat Mahmood, Sardar Azeem Afrasiab, Kashif Akbar Bandesha, Mirza Mubashir Baig, Ch. Zulfiqar Ai, Wasif Javed Sipra, Afzal Hussain, Mazhar Elahi and Muhammad Bilal Parvez, Advocates. \nRespondents by: Federation: Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General, and Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral for Pakistan. Province: Barrister Shehryar Riaz, Assistant\nAdvocate General Punjab. Department: M/s Adeel Shahid Karim, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Malik Abdullah Raza, Syed Zain-ul-Abidin Bukhari, Ibrar Ahmad, Ijaz Mehmood Chaudhary,\nKausar Parveen and Foziya Bukhsh, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Rao Tariq Islam, etc. \nVersus. \nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24443", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6512 = 2022 SLD 6512", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25(1)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application Nos.34-63 of 2020.heard on: 07.11.2022. Date of order: 16.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE IRFAN SAADAT KHAN. Mr. JUSTICE ZULFIQAR AHMED KHAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicants : Through Mr. Ghulam Murtaza, Advocate alongwith Mr. M. Ishaque Pirzada, Advocate\nRespondents : Through M/s. Shafqat Mehmood Chohan and\nGhulam Nabi Shar, Advocates. Ms. Falak Naz Fatima, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Collector of Customs, MCC (East)\n v.\nM/s. Forte Marketing Services (in SCRA Nos.34 to 42 of 2020)\nand M/s. Rak Trading Company (in SCRA Nos.43 to 63 of 2020) ." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24444", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6513 = 2022 SLD 6513", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19", - "Case #": "Ex.A.No.50-B of 2016. Date of order 14.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Khalid Ishaq, ASC, Qazi Misbah-ulHassan, Advocate with Faizan Ahmad, Advocate for the applicants/judgment debtors. Mr. Muhammad Naeem Sehgal, ASC, and Waseem Ahmad, Advocate for the decree-holder. Mr. Aamir Saeed Raan, ASC, Barrister Mian Belal Ahmad, ASC with Barrister Ali Fayyaz, Mirza Abdul Maalik Baig, and Rai Usama Sultan, Advocates for Auction Purchaser.\nM/s. Ashiq Hussain Hanjra and Qaisar Mehmood, Advocates/court auctioneers. Mr. Majid Ali Wajid, ASC/Amicus Curiae. Mr. Ruman Bilal, Advocate for SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faysal Bank Limited.\n V/S \nHaris Steel Industry (Pvt.) Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24445", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6514 = 2022 SLD 6514", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25D,81,80,193", - "Case #": "Case No. W. P. No. 57607 of 2022. Date of Hearing: 29.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Jamil Khan, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: M/s Umar Ahmad Khan and Irum Naz, Advocates.\nRespondent(s) by: Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nRana Muhammad Mehtab, Advocate for the respondent department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Al-Ghani Chain Industries.\n(Pvt.) Ltd.\nVersus Federation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24446", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6515 = 2022 SLD 6515", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1524/IB/ 2021. Date of hearing 06,10,2022. Date of order 07.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Akhtar, ACMA &\nRespondent by: Rao Shahzad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Naseer Ali Khan 44-K, Block VI, PECHS, Karachi East.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-AEOI), LTU, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24447", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6516 = 2022 SLD 6516", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=57,47", - "Case #": "STR No. 162977 of 2018, heard on: 03.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant-department by: Mr. Liaquat Ali Chaudhry, Advocate.\nRespondent-taxpayer by: Mr. Khurram Shehbaz Butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lyallpur Zone, RTO, Faisalabad.\nVersus\nM/s. Ideal Sweets, Bakers and Nimko, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24448", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6517 = 2022 SLD 6517", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Suit No.B-02 of 2017, heard on: 16.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Salman Hamid, advocate for intervener/applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Bankers Equity Limited.\nVersus\nGaladari Cement (Gulf) Limited and other." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24449", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6518 = 2022 SLD 6518", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpWXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1524/IB/2021. Date of hearing 06.10.2022. Date of order 07.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Akhtar, ACMA &\nRespondent by: Rao Shahzad, Dr.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Naseer Ali Khan, 44-K,Block VI, PECHS, Karachi East.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-AEOI), LTU, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24450", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6519 = 2022 SLD 6519", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C P D 255 of 2022. Date/s of hearing: 22.11.2022. Date of announcement: 22.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, J. AGHA FAISAL, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Muhammad Mazan Buladi, Advocate\nFor the Respondent: Mr. Syed Yasir Ahmed Shah Assistant Attorney Sindh. Mr. Shaukat Ali Chaudhry, Advocate Syed Asif Ali, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sakhib Zar\n vs.\nK-Electric Ltd. & Others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24451", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6520 = 2022 SLD 6520", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(6)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2444/2012. DATE OF HEARING: 10.02.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIIONERS BY: Malik Qamar Afzal and Ms. Sonia Yaseen, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Barrister Atif Rahim Burki, Dr. Farhat Zafar and Sheikh Anwar-ulHaq, Advocates for FBR. Mr. Muhammad Asif Khan, Advocate for IESCO. Syed Kazim Hussain Kazmi and Mr.\nNaeem Ahmed Awan, Advocates for PESCO. Mr. Farrukh Shahzad Dall, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Nomee Industries & others.\nVs.\nGovernment of Pakistan through Secretary Finance & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24452", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6521 = 2022 SLD 6521", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9),122(5A)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3186/2020. DATE OF HEARING: 24.02.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONER BY: Hafiz Muhammad Idris and Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Syed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi and Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Gondal, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Polish Oil and Gas Company, Islamabad, through its Deputy Managing\nDirector.\nVs.\nAdditional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit-II, Islamabad & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24453", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6522 = 2022 SLD 6522", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=138(1)", - "Case #": "Case No. W. P. No. 62961 of 2021. Date of Hearing: 11.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID JAMEEL KHAN, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: Syed M. Ijaz, M. Hamza Rauf, M. Imran Khan and M. Fahim Khadim, Advocate. M/s Muhammad Shahbaz Butt, Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Barrister Shehryar Kasuri, Mansoor Usman Awan, Barrister Hamza Shehram Sarwar, Umair Ahmad Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Waqqas Ahmad Mir, Ahmad Hassan, Shamail Arif, Hashim Aslam Butt Afzal Hussain, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Jamshid Alam Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Haris Irfan, Muhammad Younas Khalid, Hamza Rauf, Sardar Azeem Afrasiab, Rizwan Afzal Tarrar, M. Rashid, Abrar Mubarak, Ahmad Yar Khan, Basharat Ali Awan, Usman Khalil, Touqeer Ranjha, Shahzaib ul Hassan Chattha, Mirza Mubashir Baig, Kashif Akbar Bandesha, Asghar Leghari, Mustafa Kamal Syed Saqlain Hussain, Ghulam Murtaza, Hafiz Hamid Aziz Ahsan, Muhammad Akbar, Farooq Raza, Muhammad Faisal, Muhammad Abbas Wattoo, Muddasir Ijaz Asad Abbas Raza, Muhammad Ahsan Mehmood, Muhammad Usman Zia, M. Ibrahim Hasan,\nMuhammad Abrar, Yasir Hameed, Azeem Suleman, Mian Shahzeb Qaddous, MHamzah Sheikh, Sabir Tariq Manan, Shahid Sharif, Mian Talat Mehmood and Rizwan Afzal Tarar Advocates for the\npetitioners in connected petitions. Respondent(s) by: Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan. Mr. Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. M/s Barrister Ahmed Pervaiz, Malik, Rizwan Khalid Awan, Abdul Muqtadir Khan, Kausar Parveen, Adeel Shahid Karim, Muhammad Yahya Johar, Barrister Ahtasham Mukhtar and Barrister Saffi ul\nHassan, Advocates for the respondentsFBR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Synthetic Products Enterprises Limited .\nVersus\n Federal Board of Revenue, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24454", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3189 = 2024 SLD 3189 = 2024 SCMR 1323", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 9 & 25-Land acquisition-Compensation, quantum of-Referee Court, powers of-Only when the requirements of issuing notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( the Act ) are validly complied with, the penal, stringent, and restrictive provisions of Section 25 of the Act, limiting the amount of compensation to be awarded to the landowners become applicable-Therefore, it is imperative to fulfill the preceding requirements; otherwise, invoking or enforcing Section 25 to constrain the Referee Court, within the amount of compensation claimed before the Collector, as provided under Section 25(1) or within the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector as provided under Section 25(2) of the Act would be inappropriate.\nHyderabad Development Authority v. Karam Khan Shoro 1985 SCMR 45 and Land Acquisition Collector, National Highway Authority, Lahore v. Javed Malik 2009 SCMR 634 ref.\nMalik Nasim Ahmad Aheer v. WAPDA PLD 2004 SC 897 and Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad v. Gul Muhammad PLD 2005 SC 311 distinguished.\n(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 9, 18, 23 & 25-Land acquisition-Compensation, quantum of-Power of the Referee Court to enhance the rate of compensation beyond the amount claimed by the landowner in the reference application filed before the Referee Court-Referee Court, while determining the rate of compensation has to consider: firstly, that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( the Act ), and in particular, those that provide the landowners to assert their objections to the acquisition of their property and the fair value thereof have been strictly followed; and in cases, where there is a failure of strict compliance of the said provisions of the Act, and in particular Sections 9 and 25, then the Referee Court may proceed to adjudge the compensation for the acquired property beyond the amount claimed by the landowners in the reference applications, if the evidence produced by the parties justifies such enhancement in accordance with Section 23 of the Act.\n(c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S. 23-Land acquisition-Compensation, quantum of-Future potential/value of the acquired land-In the present case the Referee Court, after confirming the report of a local commission, enhanced the amount of compensation for acquired land to Rs. 7,000,000 per kanal along with 15% compulsory acquisition charges and 6% simple interest per annum on enhanced amount of compensation from the date of taking possession of the land-High Court maintained the order passed by the Referee Court-Validity-Award determined by the Collector not only acknowledged the high value of the land, but also recorded that the land under acquisition could serve both residential and agricultural purposes-And yet, the sole reliance of the Collector on a one-year average price to determine the amount of compensation overlooked the distinctive attributes and future potential of the acquired property-While the one-year average price may be a factor in determining the market value of the land, it cannot be the sole determinant-In assessing compensation, the Collector must consider not only the current market value of the land but also its potential value-Market value is to be taken up as one existing on the date of taking possession of the land (in case of Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), while the potential value is the value to which similar lands could be put to any use in future-Thus, in determining the quantum of compensation, the exercise may not be restricted to the time of taking possession of the land, but its future value shall also be taken into account-This crucial aspect was strikingly lacking in the award determined by the Collector in the present case-Determination of the value of the acquired property by the local commission was not arbitrary but was supported by reliable material, making it a credible basis for assessment of compensation-Local commission meticulously examined the site, considering factors like location, accessibility, and potential land use-Referee Court exercised its discretion prudently in arriving at a fair compensation award, and thus, the High Court had rightly declined to interfere in it-Appeals were dismissed.\n(d) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S. 23(1)-Land acquisition-Compensation, quantum of-Future potential/utility of acquired land-Matters to be considered in determining compensation-Several factors are to be considered, while determining the amount of compensation to be paid to the landowners for the acquisition of their land: the value of similar land nearby is considered; additionally, any increases in land value during the acquisition process may be factored in; and most importantly, the future utility of the acquired land, keeping in view the availability of facilities for its said utilization, are considered to assess its potential value-There is no single formula for the determination of the compensation due to the landowners for the compulsory acquisition of their land-Instead, different factors relevant to each situation are used together to determine the market value as defined in Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Courts are increasingly recognizing the potential for future development when determining fair compensation for acquired land, reflecting a more holistic approach.\nSarhad Development Authority v. Nawab Ali Khan 2020 SCMR 265 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=9,25,18,23,23(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1980 to 2012 of 2023 and C.M.As. Nos.12660, 12662, 12664, 12666, 12668, 12670, 12672, 12674, 12676, 12678, 12680, 12682, 12684, 12686, 12688, 12690, 12692, 12694, 12696, 12698, 12700, 12702, 12704, 12706, 12708, 12710, 12712, 12714, 12716, 12718, 12720, 12722, 12724 of 2023, decided on 8th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 25.09.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench in Regular First Appeal No. 161-A/2023 with C.M. No.353-A/2023, C.M. No.228-A/2023 and C.M. No.372-A/ 2023).heard on: 8th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Javid Iqbal Wains, Addl. Attorney General, Brig (R) Falak Naz, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Defense and Sharafat Hussain, Law Officer, assisted by Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants/Appellants\nMuhammad Ayub, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 12660/23 in C.A. No. 1980/2023).\nTariq Aziz Advocate-on-Record, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.M.A. No. 12664/23 in C.A. No.1982/2023 and C.M.A. No. 12688/23 in C.A. No. 1994/23).\nNasrullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1-8, 25-40 in C.M.A. No. 12672/23 in C.A. No. 1986/23 in C.M.A. No. 12678/23 in 1989/23, C.M.A. No. 12680/23 in C.A. No. 1990/23 in C.M.A. No. 12682/23 in C.A. No. 1991/23 in C.M.A. No. 12692/23 in C.A. No. 1996/23 in C.M.A. No. 12694/23 in C.A. No. 1997/23 in C.M.A. No. 12706/23 in C.A. No. 2003/23 in C.M.A. No. 12708/23 in C.A. No. 2004/23 in C.M.A. No. 12712/23 in C.A. No. 2006/23 and C.M.A. 12720/23 in C.A. No. 2010 of 2023).\nQazi Ghulam Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court and Junaid Ammar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.M.A. No. 12702/23 in C.A. No. 2001/23).", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Defence,\nRawalpindi Military Estates Officer, Hazara Circle, Abbottabad and another (in all cases)-Appellants\nVersus\nMst. AYESHA BIBI (WIDOW) and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24455", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3190 = 2024 SLD 3190 = 2024 SCMR 1210", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Customs Act (IV of 1969), Ss. 2(s), 16, 157(1) & 178-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Pilferage and stealing of Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) through a concealed pipeline-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Petitioner (accused) had been assigned the role of a pilot to a vehicle in which the stolen POL was stored for transporting it to some other destination-Admittedly the High Court granted bail to four co-accused persons-Petitioner was a low paid employee like the said co-accused persons who had been granted bail by the High Court-First Information Report indicated the case of joint recovery of stolen POL from several persons including the petitioner and four other persons who had already been extended the benefit of bail by the High Court-It was not the case of the prosecution at present stage that the petitioner was found stealing or pilfering the POL but he was attributed the role of a pilot-Whether he was involved directly or vicariously or with the group of persons with common intention to commit the crime of alleged smuggling was something that could not be decided without recording evidence to prove his guilt, and required further inquiry-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; and the petitioner was granted bail.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Further inquiry-Principles-Case of further inquiry pre-supposes the tentative assessment which may create doubt with respect to the involvement of the accused in the crime whereas the expression reasonable grounds refers to grounds which may be legally tenable, admissible in evidence, and appealing to a reasonable judicial mind as opposed to being whimsical, arbitrary, or presumptuous-Prosecution has to demonstrate that it is in possession of sufficient material/evidence, constituting reasonable grounds that accused had committed an offence falling within the prohibitory limb of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, while for attaining bail, the accused has to show that the evidence/material collected by the prosecution and/or the defence plea taken by him created reasonable doubt/suspicion in the prosecution case and he is entitled to the benefit of bail-For all intents and purposes, the doctrine of further inquiry denotes a notional and exploratory assessment that may create doubt regarding the involvement of the accused in the crime.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Rule of consistency-Scope-Rule of consistency, or in other words, the doctrine of parity in criminal cases, including bail matters, encapsulates that where the incriminated and ascribed role to the accused is one and the same as that of the co-accused then the benefit extended to one accused should be extended to the co-accused also on the principle that like cases should be treated alike but after accurate evaluation and assessment of the co-offenders role in the commission of the alleged offence-While applying the doctrine of parity in bail matters, the Court is obligated to concentrate on the constituents of the role assigned to the accused and then decide whether a case for the grant of bail on the standard of parity or rule of consistency is made out or not.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,157(1),178Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.35-K of 2024, decided on 4th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 14.3.2024 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Spl. Cr. Bail Appeal No.17 of 2024).heard on: 4th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nisar Ahmed Bhanbhro, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nKhaleeque Ahmed, D.A.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ATTAULLAH-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24456", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3191 = 2024 SLD 3191 = 2024 SCMR 1215", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTk", - "Key Words:": "Karachi Development Authority Order (V of 1957)-\n-Art. 52-A & Preamble-Amenity plot-Matter pertaining to illegal allotment of plots in land earmarked and designated as a public park (Bagh-e-Ibn-Qasim)-When Karachi Development Authority (KDA) realized that the allotment orders were illegal and had been issued in respect of a park, and were issued by changing the designated land use to commercial use, the same were cancelled after issuance of requisite show cause notices-Some of the allotees filed constitutional petitions before the High Court, which ordered that the allottees be compensated by offering alternate property in their respective favour without any further delay, in order to maintain balance and to do complete justice-Legality-Allottees were granted relief by the High Court which they had not even asked for-Karachi Development Authority Order, 1957 in its Preamble specifically mentioned the protection of public amenities like parks, gardens and playgrounds, etc.-Article 52-A of the Karachi Development Authority Order, 1957, which whilst undergoing changes, does and always did prohibit the conversion of amenity plots and to change their designated use-Amenity plots cannot be changed to commercial use-What was reserved for the public could also not have been converted for private benefit, nor could the park be used for commercial use-Private use and/or profit cannot negate or undermine public use and benefit-Relief granted by the High Court was beyond what had been asked for, and it could not have been granted to do complete justice-On the contrary, the relief which was granted was in violation of the Master Plan of the City and the applicable law-Before any lease had been executed by KDA the illegality which had been committed was realized and KDA cancelled the allotment orders, after show cause notices were issued to the allottees-KDA had also not elected to retain/forfeit amounts paid by the allottees rather it had offered to refund the same-Impugned judgment of the High Court was not sustainable, and was accordingly set-aside-Appeal was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Karachi Development Authority Order, (5 of 1957)=52-A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 231-K of 2010, decided on 26th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 13.01.2009 of the High Court of Sindh Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-1153 of 2005).\nheard on: 26th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Sarfraz, Advocate Supreme Court, Ms. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record and Syed Shujat Hussain, D.G. K.D.A. for Appellant.\nMuhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.\nSibtain Mehmood, Addl. Advocate General on Court's Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CITY DISTRICT GOVERNMENT, KARACHI-Appellant\nVersus\nAKRAM NABI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24457", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3192 = 2024 SLD 3192 = 2024 SCMR 1218", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXI., Rr. 84 & 90-Suit for possession through partition-Execution of decree-Auction proceedings-Objection petition-Pursuant to preliminary decree, the Trial Court appointed a Court Auctioneer to conduct an auction of the subject house-Petitioner (one of the legal heirs) filed objections on the report submitted by the Court Auctioneer, but the same was dismissed on account of petitioners failure to deposit the 20% (twenty percent) of the sum realized at the sale-Petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order before the High Court which also met the fate of dismissal-Plea of petitioner was that his objection application was made under Order XXI, Rule 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( C.P.C. ) but it was decided within the limits of Order XXI, Rule 90-Validity-Such plea of petitioner was not tenable in eyes of law-It is clear from a bare reading of Order XXI, Rule 84, C.P.C. that the purchaser is required by law to immediately pay twenty-five percent of purchase money and there is no word that suggests objections to auction proceedings may be filed by the owner/legal heirs of the owner of the subject property under this rule-Moreover, petitioner in this case, was not a purchaser but his predecessors in interest were the owner of the subject property, hence, he could not have invoked Order XXI, Rule 84, C.P.C.-Trial Court deemed the objections filed by petitioner as an application under Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C.-Trial Court directed the petitioner to deposit twenty percent of the sale proceeds but he failed to do so-Neither he made any application for an extension of time nor showed any willingness to deposit such an amount-Trial Court has rightly observed that there had been an inordinate delay in the execution of the decree and six years had already elapsed-Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nMuhammad Attique v. Jami Limited and others PLD 2010 SC 993 ref.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXI., R. 90-Execution of decree-Auction proceedings-Objection petition-Conditions required to be satisfied under Order XXI, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( C.P.C. )-Sale may be set aside on the grounds of material irregularity or fraud under Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C. wherein the applicant has to establish substantial injury sustained by him owing to such material irregularity or fraud in the sale by public auction-Additionally, applicant has to comply with the second proviso to this rule by depositing twenty percent of the sum realized at the sale-Rationale behind the second proviso is to discourage frivolous objections frustrating the execution of the decree.\nMst. Samrana Nawaz and others v. MCB Bank Ltd and others PLD 2021 SC 581 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=84,90", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4194 of 2023, decided on 19th April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 27.09.2023 passed by Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in F.A.O. No. 104 of 2023).\nheard on: 19th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, Musarrat Hilali and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ikram Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TARIQ ZUBAIR KHAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nMst. TABASSUM KHAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24458", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3193 = 2024 SLD 3193 = 2024 SCMR 1224", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Ocular account presented by witnesses not proved-Unnatural conduct of witnesses-According to the version of prosecution witnesses they along with the deceased came out in the street from a Haveli, belonging to the deceased, and were proceeding towards horse stable of deceased when they were fired upon in the street by the petitioner (accused)-Site map produced by the prosecution at the trial did not mention the point/place where the horse stable of deceased was situated nor it mentioned the distance between the Haveli of deceased and his stable-Site map did not mention about the Haveli of deceased-In the site map Haveli of person MA had been shown in occupation of deceased-Neither the prosecution witnesses had stated that deceased was residing in Haveli of MA nor the prosecution had produced MA at the trial to prove that deceased was residing in his Haveli and if so, in what capacity-From the testimony of prosecution witnesses and contents of the post mortem regarding time of death of deceased persons, it was clear that the first deceased remained lying injured at the place of occurrence for half an hour and the second deceased remained lying injured at the place of occurrence for one hour but prosecution witnesses, claiming to be the eye-witnesses, made no efforts to immediately shift both the injured to hospital-Had prosecution witnesses been present at the place of occurrence with the deceased, being close relatives of one of the deceased, they would have immediately taken both the injured to the hospital to save their lives- Unnatural conduct of prosecution witnesses created serious doubts about their presence at the place of occurrence with the deceased-Prosecution witnesses had not explained as to how they escaped firearm injuries despite indiscriminate firing by five accused persons from a close range-Said aspect also created doubt about presence of the alleged witnesses at the place of occurrence-It was not believable that by killing a person in presence of his close relatives, the petitioner (accused) would not attempt to cause any injury to the prosecution witnesses leaving them for giving evidence against him-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner of committing murder of the deceased beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and petitioner was acquitted of the charge under section 302(b), P.P.C.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S.302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Medical evidence-Nature of injuries-Postmortem report in conflict with prosecution version-Prosecution witnesses had failed to furnish any explanation as to if the deceased was fired upon by a rifle of 222 bore from a distance of 5.5 feet, how his entrance wound was surrounded by blackened and burnt area-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner of committing murder of the deceased beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and petitioner was acquitted of the charge under section 302(b), P.P.C.\nModis Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (21 Edition) at page 354; Mir Muhammad v. The State 1995 SCMR 610; Amin Ali v. the State 2011 SCMR 323 and Muhammad Zaman v. The State 2014 SCMR 749 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Crime empties, recovery of-Infirmities in the site plan-In the site map it had been mentioned that seven crime empties were recovered from point I of the place of occurrence but the site map did not mention any point I -Admittedly no crime empty was recovered from near point E i.e. wherefrom the petitioner (accused) had allegedly fired upon the deceased-According to the version of the prosecution witnesses and site map, the seven crime empties should have been recovered from six different places/points from the place of occurrence but surprisingly the prosecution witnesses had mentioned about recovery of seven crime empties from one place i.e. point I (which had not been mentioned in the site plan)-Prosecution witnesses including Investigating Officer had not furnished any explanation in such regard-In his report, the firearm expert of Punjab Forensic Science Agency had identified two crime empties having been fired from 222 caliber rifle-About the third crime empty, the firearm expert had not given any definite opinion-Remaining three crime empties had been held not suitable for comparison by the firearm expert-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner of committing murder of the deceased beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and petitioner was acquitted of the charge under section 302(b), P.P.C.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Alleged eye-witness to the occurrence not produced during trial-Adverse presumption-Prosecution had not produced witness MN at the trial who was allegedly accompanying other alleged witnesses and deceased at the time of occurrence-Under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 adverse inference was to be drawn to the effect that had he been produced by the prosecution at trial, he would not have supported the prosecution case-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner of committing murder of the deceased beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and petitioner was acquitted of the charge under section 302(b), P.P.C.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.708-L of 2018, decided on 16th April, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 21.05.2018 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Crl. Appeal No. 1591 of 2014 and M.R. No.315 of 2014)\nheard on: 16th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, Musarrat Hilali and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Safdar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nIrfan Zia, Addl. P.G. Punjab for the State.\nMuhammad Afzal (in person)", - "Petitioner Name:": "RIASAT ALI and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24459", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3194 = 2024 SLD 3194 = 2024 SCMR 1233", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpVXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Arts. 95 & 119-Power of Attorney, authenticity of-Burden of proof-Presumption as to Power of Attorney-Since entirety of the case of the respondents (plaintiffs) hinged on the fact that the allegedly fraudulent Power of Attorney was the root cause of the present lis, thus, the burden to prove such fraud, laid upon them-However, they failed to prove the same, rather the veracity of the Power of Attorney was not even challenged at the evidence stage-Power of Attorney was duly testified by the Consulate General of Pakistan in Malaysia and was then registered in Pakistan, therefore it qualified for the presumption of execution and authentication available as per Article 95 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-Therefore, the Power of Attorney in favour of the appellants (defendants) enfolded a presumption of truth and genuineness and its admissibility could not be doubted as there existed no proof on record pointing towards it being forged-Appeal was allowed.\nZiauddin Siddiqui v. Mrs. Rana Sultana 1990 CLC 645; Iqbal Ahmad Sabri v. Fayyaz Ahmad 2007 CLC 1089 and Shahnaz Akhtar v. Syed Ehsan ur Rehman 2022 SCMR 1398 ref.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 42-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 3 & First Sched., Art. 120-Suit for declaration-Limitation-Respondents (plaintiffs) questioned transactions made in 1990 by their father after a period of almost 13 years, 7 months, and 6 days; when admittedly the respondents, who reside in Malaysia, had visited Pakistan after 1990 a number of times-Thus, reliance of the respondents on the Power of Attorney given by them to one IH in 1998 when the mutation entries in the name of the present appellants (defendants) had already been made in the revenue records in the year 1990, in accordance with the Power of Attorney given by the respondents to GS ( the late father of the appellants), appeared to be wholly unwarranted and misconceived-It was also an undeniable position that GS passed away in the year 1993 whereas the mutation entries were made in the year 1990 and no effort was made by the late GS to challenge the mutation entries in his life time-Moreover, the statement of IH that he came to know about the mutation entries in the year 2004 also appeared to be misconceived as admittedly the Power of Attorney was given to him by the respondents, who live abroad, in the year 1998; and it was quite strange that ever since then he made no effort to verify the mutation entries and only came to know about the same in the year 2004 when he examined the revenue record-It was also beyond comprehension that for over a decade the respondents were not aware of an alleged fabricated Power of Attorney and then sought a declaration as owners of the subject Khasras-Hence, keeping in mind such aspects, the action taken by the respondents was hit by limitation, and no lease in this regard could be given to them and thus the matter was hopelessly time barred-Appellants were declared to be the owners of the subject Khasras-Appeal was allowed and the impugned judgement and decree was set aside.\nMuhammad Bashir v. Mst. Sattar Bibi PLD 1995 Lah. 321; Kala v. Kamo Begum 2013 SCMR 1558 and Hajid Muhammad Younis (Deceased) v. Farukh Sultan 2022 SCMR 1282 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=95,119Specific Relief Act, 1877=42Limitation Act, 1908=3,120", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.1229 of 2018, decided on 1st February, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 18.5.2016 passed by Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench in Civil Revision No.222-A of 2005).heard on: 1st February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rashid-ul-Haq Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nJunaid Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. IQBAL BIBI and others-Appellants\nVersus\nKAREEM HUSSAIN SHAH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24460", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3195 = 2024 SLD 3195 = 2024 SCMR 1250", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Service Tribunals Act (XV of 1973)-\n-S. 3-B-Judicial officers of subordinate judiciary-Service appeal filed by judicial officer before the (Sindh) Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal against order of Administrative Committee of the (Sindh) High Court-Maintainability-When any issue crops up in respect of the terms and conditions of service of members of the subordinate judiciary including grievance against dismissal from service, compulsory retirement, wrong fixation of seniority, or grievance against any minor or major penalty, then recourse is to be made to the Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, which is the ultimate fact-finding forum available and they are not supposed to file civil suits in the Civil Court or the writ petitions in the High Court to challenge the adverse departmental or disciplinary actions against them-Judicial officers who file Service appeals before the (Sindh) Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal against orders of Administrative Committee of the (Sindh) High Court cannot be non-suited on the ground of maintainability.\nGul Taiz Khan Marwat v. Registrar Peshawar High Court PLD 2021 SC 391 and Bashir Ahmed Badini, D & SJ and others v. Honble Chairman and Member of Administration Committee and Promotion Committee of Honble High Court of Balochistan 2022 SCMR 448 = 2022 PLC (C.S.) 610 ref.\n(b) Sindh Service Tribunals Act (XV of 1973)-\n-S. 3-B-Judicial officers of subordinate judiciary-Service appeals filed by judicial officers before the (Sindh) Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal-Appeals kept pending for many years-Adverse consequences-As a result of long pendency and no decision on the appeals, certain developments are made by the efflux of time which makes the entire purpose of filing of appeals infructuous and worthless-If appeals against minor and major penalties will remain pending for an indefinite period during the service tenure, it will also become a cause of mental stress and exasperation-Another possibility that cannot be ruled out is that when the matter is taken up for hearing for a final decision, though after several years, the appellant (judicial officer) may not be in judicial service anymore or may not be actively pursuing the case or may have passed away-In such eventuality, the second phase of litigation for impleading the legal heirs will be triggered keeping in mind the nitty-gritties of service appeal to decide the question of, firstly, whether the right to sue survives to the legal heirs or not?-With an eye to overcome and resolve this distressing and disquieting situation, it would be most advantageous and strategic if the Chief Justice, Sindh High Court, and the Chairman of the Tribunal, formulate any Standing Instructions to settle down a reasonable timeline for making decisions of pending service appeals before the Tribunal according to ageing from the date of institution.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973=3-B", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 653-K of 2022, decided on 8th April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 05.03.2022 passed by Sindh Subordinate Judicial Service Tribunal, High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in S.A. No.15 of 2003).heard on: 8th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Amer Raza Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSibtain Mehmood, Addl. A.G. Sindh and Asim Majeed, Acting Registrar, SHC for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDULLAH CHANNAH-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24461", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3196 = 2024 SLD 3196 = 2024 SCMR 1258", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Suo motu jurisdiction-High Court does not possess any suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.\nDr. Imran Khattak v. Ms. Sofia Waqar Khattak, PSO to the Chief Justice 2014 SCMR 122; Jahanzaib Malik v. Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority through Chairman Board of Directors and others 2018 SCMR 414; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others v. Muhammad Habib Wahab Al-Khairi and others 2000 SCMR 1046; Raja Muhammad Nadeem v. The State and another PLD 2020 SC 282; Mian Irfan Bashir v. The Deputy Commissioner, Lahore and others PLD 2021 SC 571 and Messrs Sadiq Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others PLD 2023 SC 236 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Vires of law-Judicial review-Scope-If the constitutionality of any law is challenged in the High Court, the Court can scrutinize and survey such law and also strike it down if it is found to be offending the Constitution for absenteeism of law-making and jurisdictive competence or is in violation of fundamental rights-Where the vires of a law are challenged, the burden always rests upon the person making such challenge to show that the same was violative of any pf the fundamental rights or the provisions of the Constitution and where more than one interpretation is possible, the Court must prefer the interpretation which favours the validity without attributing mala fide to the legislature.\nLahore Development Authority through D.G. and others v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others 2015 SCMR 1739 ref.\n(c) Sindh (Regularization of Ad-hoc and Contract Employees) Act (XXV of 2013)-\n-S. 3-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 10-A & 199-Deputy District Attorneys, posts of-Regularization in service-High Court exercised suo motu powers under Article 199 of the Constitution to declare the Sindh (Regularization of Ad-hoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013 (the 2013 Act)to be ultra vires-Constitutionality-Case record showed that neither the petitioners (contract employees) approached the High Court to challenge the vires of the 2013 Act nor did any other person challenge it-On the contrary, the 2013 Act was in field since 2013 and under the same law, various cases of numerous contractual or ad-hoc employees must have been dealt with by the government-In order to examine the competency and antecedents of the contractual employees, Scrutiny Committees were also constituted-It was also not disputed by the Government that the petitioners in the High Court claimed to have been performing their contractual obligations since 2009 regularly-Petitioners approached the High Court for regularization on the backing of the 2013 Act, therefore, the observation of the High Court deducing the relationship of master and servant is not the correct exposition of law-When a notice under Order XXVII-A, C.P.C., was issued to the Advocate General, Sindh, on the issue of maintainability, he allegedly argued that the 2013 Act is ultra vires despite knowing the fact that it is not a new law but is in field since 2013 and various employees have acquired the benefit of this law-High Court by striking down the 2013 Act in its suo motu jurisdiction has, in fact, passed a judgment in rem which literally binds the world as opposed to affecting only the rights and judgments inter parties-Importantly, High Court under Article 199 could not assume suomotu jurisdiction-Case before the High Court was to consider whether the petitioners are entitled for regularization of their services and obviously, if no case was made out, the petitions could have been dismissed-However, not only were the petitions dismissed but the law was also declared ultra vires which disturbed and traumatized a long chain of employees who are regularized or were being regularized since 2013 by the Government of Sindh in its different departments/ministries under the same law-Impugned judgment has deprived a long chain of employees and virtually made them jobless without providing any right of audience to them which was a grave violation of Article 10-A of the Constitution and also amounts to the contravention of the principle of natural justice and due process of law-Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the High Court for deciding the Constitution Petitions afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to all the parties-Appeals were allowed.\n(d) Jurisdiction-\n-Judicial overreach-Jurisdiction of every Court is delineated and established to adhere to and pass legal orders-Transgressing or overriding the boundary of its jurisdiction and authority annuls and invalidates the judgments and orders-Courts commit judicial overreach when they exercise powers beyond the compass of powers and jurisdiction entrusted to the courts through the law and the Constitution.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,10-A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 26-K to 38-K of 2021, C.M.As. Nos. 7436 and 3498 of 2021 in C.P.L.A. No. Nil of 2021 decided on 29th December, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 08.04.2021 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-6241, D-6229, D-2732, D-4271 of 2017, D-5995, D-9016 of 2018, D-4107, D-7376 of 2019, D-4292 and D-4902 of 2020).heard on: 29th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abid S. Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court, Abdul Salam Memon, Advocate Supreme Court, Malik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record, K. A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record, Anjum Badar and Saba Wakeel, in-person for Appellants.\nSoulat Rizvi, Addl. A.G. Sindh, Shafiq Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court, Bhuromal, LO (Focal Person), Abdul Razzaq, Dy. Secretary, Abdul Samih, Dy. Dir. (L), Ahmed Ali, SO and Ms. Tehmina Rahman, F.P. (WDD) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDULLAH JUMANI and others-Appellants\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF SINDH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24462", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3197 = 2024 SLD 3197 = 2024 SCMR 1271", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Evidence-\n-Civil proceedings-Burden of proof-Principles and scope-In civil proceedings, an issue is to be decided by preponderance of evidence and in the case where there is a word against a word; it is the party (beneficiary) on whom the burden must fail-Question of the burden of proof becomes material only where the Court finds the evidence so evenly balanced that it can come to no definite conclusion-Where the whole of the evidence is before the Court and it has no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion , it becomes unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of the question of placing of burden on the parties.\nAllah Din v. Habib PLD 1982 SC 465; Mst. Surraya Begum and others v. Mst. Susan Begum and others 1992 SCMR 652; Muhammad Amir v. Khan Bahadur and another PLD 1996 SC 267 and Mst. Khatun v. Malla 1974 SCMR 341 ref.\n(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 117-Existence of any fact-Burden of proof-Principles-As per Article 117 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, when a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, the burden of proof lies on that person-Said Article is based on the rule, ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that the burden of proving a fact rests on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue and not upon the party who denies it because a negative is usually incapable of proof-Burden of proving a fact always lies upon the person who asserts and until such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case-Court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom the burden lies has been able to discharge his burden-However, the above rule is subject to the general principle that things admitted need not be proved.\n(c) Evidence-\n-Burden of proof-Legal burden and evidential burden-Distinction-Phrase burden of proof has two meanings - one the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading, that is legal burden and the other, the burden of establishing a case, that is evidential burden-Former is fixed as a question of law on the basis of the pleadings and is unchanged during the entire trial, whereas the latter is not constant but shifts as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favour-Thus, the legal burden would always remain on the plaintiffs and the evidential burden would shift to the defendants if they (plaintiffs) discharged their initial burden-Evidence required to shift the evidential burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e. oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by the opposite party,it may comprise of circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact.\nRaja Khurram Ali Khan and 2 others v. Tayyaba Bibi and another PLD 2020 SC 146 ref.\n(d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Arts. 85(5) & 129(e)-Registered document-Proof-Standard of evidence and burden of proof-Scope-Standard of evidence is not uniform when challenging a registered document as compared to challenging an unregistered document-In disputes relating to registered documents, a common misconception may arise when an executant attempts to dispute the validity of the document through mere denial-Act of registration is not a perfunctory formality but rather a deliberate and legally binding process-When a document is registered, it becomes an official record available to the public-This adds credibility to the authenticity and legal purpose of the transaction-On the other hand, unregistered documents lack the same level of legal endorsement-While they may carry evidentiary weight, their value is inherently lessor as compared to the registered document-Absence of registration renders unregistered documents vulnerable to challenges regarding their authenticity and enforceability-Moreover, a document duly registered by the Registration Authority in accordance with the law becomes a legal document that carries a presumption as to the genuineness and correctness under Articles 85(5) and 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 and which cannot be dispelled by an oral assertion that is insufficient to rebut the said presumption-Mere denial by the executant of a registered sale deed is insufficient to shift the burden onto the beneficiary of the registered document-Executant must establish his assertion of fraud or forgery, etc. by producing some evidence other than his denial to shift the burden onto the beneficiary to prove the valid execution of the registered document-This legal principle reflects the recognition of the high evidentiary value attached to registered documents as compared to unregistered documents.\n(e) Fraud-\n-Fraud vitiates all actions and no Court can uphold a right on fraud.\n(f) Fraud-\n-Proof-It is very easy to assert fraud but it is difficult to prove the same-No law provides a special quantum of evidence for the establishment of fraud-While it is true that the Courts should be careful in coming to a finding of fraud and should normally satisfy themselves that the finding is based on reliable evidence, it cannot be said that any special number of witnesses or any special nature of evidence is needed to establish fraud-It is for the Court which is to decide this question to be satisfied that the evidence adduced before it is such that it can believe it-Nonetheless, when a party alleges fraud it becomes its duty to prove the same and generalized allegations or for that matter, mere bald assertions without evidence cannot shift the initial burden.\nGhulam Ghous v. Muhammad Yasin and another 2009 SCMR 70 and Mst. Bhano and another v. Mian A.M. Saeed and others 1969 SCMR 299 ref.\n(g) Islamic law-\n-Guardian of a minor-Immoveable property-Well-established principle of Muslim Law is that a de facto guardian of a minor has no power to transfer any right to or interest in the immovable property of the minor-Even the principle of estoppel is inapplicable in the case of a minor.\nPrinciples of Muhammadan Law by Mulla, 17th Edition at p.299; Ahmad Khan v. Rasul Shah and others PLD 1975 SC 311; Mehr Manzoor Hussain and others v. Muhammad Nawaz and another 2010 SCMR 1042; Abdul Ghani and others v. Mst. Yasmeen Khan and others 2011 SCMR 837 and Yar Muhammad Khan and others v. Sajjad Abbas and others 2021 SCMR 1401 ref.\n(h) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 84-Trial Court-Power to visually compare signatures on property documents-Scope-Court in certain eventualities, enjoins plenary powers to itself compare the signature along with other relevant material to effectively resolve the main controversy-Thus, a visual comparison of signatures on sale deeds conducted by the trial court is in consonance with the law.\nZar Wali Shah v. Yousaf Ali Shah and 9 others 1992 SCMR 1778; Ahmed Hassan Khan v. Naveed Abbas and another 1998 SCMR 346 and Messrs Waqas Enterprises and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan and 2 others 1999 SCMR 85 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=117,85(5),129(e),84", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.81-K of 2022, decided on 5th December, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 02.06.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, bench at Sukkur in Civil Revision No.S-42 of 2012).heard on: 5th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Ijaz ul Ahsan, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mukesh Kumar G. Karara, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nMirza Sarfaraz Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent Nos. 1-3.\nRespondents Nos.4-7: Ex-parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. NAZEERAN and others-Appellants\nVersus\nALI BUX and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24463", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3198 = 2024 SLD 3198 = 2024 SCMR 1284", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail petition before the Supreme Court-Material available on record, appraisal of-Scope-At bail stage Court cannot indulge in the exercise of a deeper appraisal of the material available on record of the case but is to determine it only tentatively by looking at such material.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Official Secrets Act (XIX of 1923), Ss. 5 & 9-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 34-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Communicating information contained in a secret classified Cypher Telegram received from Pakistans Ambassador to a foreign country to unauthorized persons, common intention-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Right of bail for political leaders and political workers during elections period-Scope-[Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J: There was no sufficient incriminating material available, at present stage, which could show that the petitioner (former Prime Minister) communicated the information contained in the Cypher Telegram to the public at large with the intention or calculation, directly or indirectly, in the interest or for the benefit of a foreign power nor the disclosed information related to any of the defence installations or affairs, nor did he disclose any secret official code to the public at large-There were no reasonable grounds for believing, at present stage, that the petitioners (former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister) committed the offence punishable under clause (b) of Section 5(3) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 ( Act ) but rather that there were sufficient grounds for further inquiry into their guilt of the said offence, which was to be finally decided by the Trial Court after recording of the evidence of the parties]-[Per Athar Minallah, J: Incarceration of a political competitor during the period of elections, except when it is necessary due to exceptional circumstances, gravely affects the fundamental rights of the voters and prejudices the genuineness and integrity of the elections-As far as the question as to why political leaders and political workers should be extended preferential treatment, the answer is that there is a higher and greater interest of the people at large involved which is always given preference over other interests-There cannot be a greater public interest than ensuring genuine elections and if the incarcerated person intends to contest elections or the standing of a political party is dependent upon the latter then this ought to be considered a ground for the grant of bail during the election period-Concession of bail in such an eventuality should be considered favorably as a rule and declined in exceptional circumstances-Pakistan s unflattering electoral history and oppressive treatment of political dissidents during the period of elections necessitates considering the grant of bail favorably as a rule-In the present case the petitioners were alleged to be involved in an offence which does not fall under the category of offences that threaten the society such as rape, child abuse, homicide etc.-Investigation has been completed and trial is in progress-Trial is entirely dependent on documentary evidence-Incarceration of the petitioners will not serve any useful purpose-Moreover, their release on bail during the period of elections would ensure genuine elections and thus enable the people to exercise the right to express their will effectively and meaningfully-There were no exceptional circumstances to decline the concession of bail ]-Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, and bail applications of the petitioners were accepted.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497,497(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)Official Secrets Act, 1923=5,9Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=34", - "Case #": "Crl. Ps. Nos. 1276 and 1320 of 2023, decided on 22nd December, 2023.\n(Against the orders of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, dated 27.10.2023 passed in Crl. Misc. No. 1354-B of 2023 and dated 08.11.2023 passed in Crl. Misc. No. 1664-B of 2023).heard on: 22nd December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Tariq Masood, ACJ, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners:\nHamid Khan, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court (Through V.L. Lahore Registry)\nSalman Safdar, Advocate Supreme Court.\nSyed Mohammad Ali Bokhari, Advocate Supreme Court.\nNiazullah Khan Niazi, Advocate Supreme Court, Qamar Inayat Raja, Advocate Supreme Court, Barrister Tamur, Advocate.\nBarrister Faiza, Advocate.\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record.\nFor the Respondents:\nJavaid Iqbal Wains, Addl.AGP.\nRaja Rizwan Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court.\nMudassar Hussain Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Zulifqar Abbas Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court.\nShah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court.\nMian Sabir, I.O.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMRAN AHMED KHAN NIAZI and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24464", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3199 = 2024 SLD 3199 = 2024 SCMR 1292", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUS8", - "Key Words:": "Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 17A-Interim maintenance-Father failing to comply with order for payment of maintenance to the minors-Contumacious conduct-Costs, imposition of-Family Court, in accordance with Section 17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964, had the lawful authority to strike off the defence of the petitioner (father) and decree the suit for maintenance on the basis of averments in the plaint and other supporting documents on record of the case, once the petitioner failed to pay the interim maintenance allowance by fourteenth day of each month during the pendency of proceedings-Petitioner was also put to notice by the Family Court to clear the arrears of interim maintenance allowance otherwise the provisions of Section 17-A of the Act would be invoked, which the petitioner failed to comply with-Moreover, the determination of the amount of maintenance by the Family Court was neither arbitrary nor capricious-Hence, the High Court had rightly declined to interfere with the findings of the Family Court with regard to the quantum of maintenance allowance-In view of the callous disregard of the petitioner for the court order to pay interim maintenance and his attempts to delay the payment of decreed maintenance allowance for his minor children, the Supreme Court imposed costs on the petitioner in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one hundred thousand only) to deter such conduct in the future with the direction that the costs shall be recovered by the executing court as part of the decree for maintenance-Petition was accordingly dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=17A", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3155-L of 2023, decided on 30th April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 11.09.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.P. No.47965 of 2023).\nheard on: 30th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aftab Mustafa, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Lahore).\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAHZAD AMIR FARID-Petitioner\nVersus\nMst. SOBIA AMIR FARID and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24465", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3200 = 2024 SLD 3200 = 2024 SCMR 1295", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)-\n-Ss. 12 & 25-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Custody of minors, issue of-Interim orders passed by Guardian Court and upheld by the High Court challenged before the Supreme Court-Maintainability-Application of the petitioner (father) under section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 for permanent custody of minors was still pending decision before the Guardian Judge-Orders of the Courts below assailed by the petitioner in the instant petitions were interim in nature-Ordinarily interim orders passed by the High Court are not interfered with by the Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution and such intervention is warranted only in exceptional circumstances involving flagrant violation of law, wrongful exercise of jurisdiction or manifest grave injustice-All the present petitions arising out of interim orders passed by the Courts below were, thus, not maintainable-Moreover, the impugned interim orders passed by the Courts below were in accordance with law and had not caused any injustice to the petitioner or prejudice to the application of the petitioner for permanent custody of minors which was pending decision before the Guardian Judge-Leave to appeal was refused and all petitions were dismissed.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 185(3) & 199-Interim orders passed by the High Court challenged before the Supreme Court-Maintainability-According to the established practice, settled principles of law and policy of the Supreme Court, ordinarily interim orders passed by the High Court are not interfered with by the Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution and such intervention is warranted only in exceptional circumstances involving flagrant violation of law, wrongful exercise of jurisdiction or manifest grave injustice.\nMultan Development Authority v. Muhammad Ramzan PLD 1989 SC 629; Salah-ud-Din v. Zia Farhat 1996 SCMR 1528; Dossani Travels Pvt. Ltd. v. Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2014 SC 1; Federation of Pakistan v. Shafiq ul Hassan 2020 SCMR 2119; Abdul Baqi v. Khan Muhammad PLD 2022 SC 546; Province of Sindh v. Sartaj Hyder 2023 SCMR 459 and Attiq ur Rehman v. Tahir Mehmood 2023 SCMR 501 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Guardians and Wards Act, 1890=12,25Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.1708-L, 3435-L of 2022, 2672-L, 3152-L of 2023, 219-L and 303-L of 2024, decided on 27th March, 2024.\n(On appeal against the orders dated 04.03.2022 in W.P. No.67705/2021, 31.08.2022 in W.P. No. 46078/2022, 16.05.2023 in I.C.A. No.31988/2023, 23.05.2023 in W.P. No.27299/2023, 23.10.2023 in W.P. No.69300/2023 and 05.12.2023 in W.P. No.52736/2023, respectively, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore).heard on: 27th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Irfan Saadat Khan and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in person.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Khawaja ADNAN ZAFAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nHINA BASHIR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24466", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3201 = 2024 SLD 3201 = 2024 SLD 1303", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Holy Quran (Printing and Recording) Act (XIII of 2011) [as amended by the Punjab Holy Quran (Printing and Recording) (Amendment) Act, 2021]-\n-Ss. 7 & 9-Penal Code (XLV of 1860) Ss. 295-B & 298-C-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 12(1)-Charges, deletion of-Distributing/disseminating a proscribed book, defiling, etc., of Holy Quran, person of Qadiani group calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith-Counsel for petitioner (accused) submitted that distributing/disseminating a proscribed book was made an offence by the Punjab Holy Quran (Printing and Recording) (Amendment) Act, 2021 in the year 2021 whereas the FIR alleged that the petitioner had committed the alleged act in 2019-Validity-Contention of the counsel that the said offence was incorporated into the law in 2021 was correct-Article 12(1) of the Constitution stipulates that a person cannot be charged for something which was not an offence when it was done-Therefore, since in the year 2019 the distribution/dissemination of a proscribed book was not an offence, the petitioner could not have been charged for it-Furthermore, counsel representing the complainant read out the FIR, but nothing was stated therein to constitute the offences under sections 298-C and 295-B of the P.P.C.-Challan was also silent in this regard-Charge framed by the Additional Sessions Judge to the extent of charging the petitioner for the offences under sections 298-C and 295-B of the P.P.C. did not accord with the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ( the Code ), which pertain to charge-Present case was also not one wherein the charge could be altered or where the petitioner could have been convicted of a lesser offence to those under sections 298-C and 295-B of the P.P.C.-Holy Quran requires that all matters of significance should be pondered over and reflected upon-All those concerned with the present case should have done so, instead they were eager to demonstrate that the Holy Quran was desecrated and that God s Last Messenger (peace and blessings of Almighty Allah be upon him) was denigrated-If only the functionaries of the State had heeded the Holy Quran, considered the Constitution and examined the law then the FIR would not have been registered in respect of the abovementioned offences-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed by setting aside the impugned order and by deleting section 7 read with section 9 of the Punjab Holy Quran (Printing and Recording) Act, 2011 and sections 298-C and 295-B of the P.P.C. from the charge framed against the petitioner.\nSurah An-Nahl (Chapter 16), verse 44; Surah Yunus (Chapter 10), verse 24 and verse 9 of Surah al-Hijr (Chapter 15) ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Criminal Law Amendment Act (XXIII of 1932), S. 5-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 9, 10A & 185(3)-Dissemination of contents of proscribed document-Bail, grant of-Accused remaining in jail for a period longer than the sentence prescribed for the offence he is charged with-Violation of his Fundamental Rights-Petitioner (accused) remained incarcerated for thirteen months, which was more than double the permissible punishment under section 5 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932-Trials in respect of offences where the maximum sentence of imprisonment was relatively short must be conducted promptly or the accused should be granted bail-However, bail was declined to the petitioner by the Additional Sessions Judge without considering that the petitioner had already served out the maximum prescribed imprisonment for the said offence-High Court also dismissed the petitioner s bail application, through the impugned order by overlooking this crucially important aspect of the case-Therefore, since the petitioner had already served out the maximum imprisonment of six months prescribed for the offence if he was found to be guilty of having committed it, keeping him incarcerated would violate a number of his Fundamental Rights, including Articles 4, 9 & 10A of the Constitution-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed by setting aside the impugned orders and it was ordered that the petitioner be immediately released upon provision of a personal bond in the sum of five thousand rupees in respect of the case arising out of the FIR.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=295-B,298-CConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=12(1)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 1054-L and 1344-L of 2023, decided on 6th February, 2024.\n(Against the orders dated 16.10.2023 and 27.11.2023 respectively of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Revision No. 68011 of 2023 and Crl. Misc. No. 41772-B of 2023).\nheard on: 6th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, C.J. and Musarrat Hilali, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Usman Karim-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in both cases).\nAhmed Raza Gillani, Additional Prosecutor-General, Punjab along with Shabraiz, DSP for the State (in both cases).\nM. Shahid Tasawar Rao, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant (in both cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUBARIK AHMAD SANI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24467", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3202 = 2024 SLD 3202 = 2024 SCMR 1310", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Benefit of doubt-According to the statements of alleged eye-witnesses recorded at the trial, they both did not inform the police about the occurrence-None of the prosecution witness had disclosed at the trial as to who had informed the police about the occurrence or how the police reached at the place of occurrence when neither any relative of deceased nor any inhabitant of the area had informed the police about the occurrence-Time of taking the dead body to the hospital as claimed by a prosecution witness was contradicted by the Medical Officer-Site map mentioned only one door of the room of deceased but alleged eye-witnesses had stated that the room of deceased had two doors-Statements of alleged eye-witnesses and other prosecution witnesses contained material contradictions and discrepancies which shook veracity of their testimony-Alleged eye-witnesses failed to furnish any convincing reason for stay of two such witnesses in a room adjacent to that of the deceased on the night of the occurrence-Alleged eye-witnesses claimed that they saw the deceased being strangled to death but they put no resistance against the accused nor took any step to save the life of deceased-Plea of alleged eye-witnesses that they did not put up resistance as the accused persons threatened them with firearms lacked corroboration as during investigation no firearms were recovered from the accused and acquitted accused-Unnatural conduct of alleged eye-witnesses revealed that they were not present in the house of deceased at the time of occurrence-Dishonest improvements made by alleged eye-witnesses in their statements at the trial had rendered their testimony unworthy of reliance-Occurrence of the death of deceased by strangulation was unwitnessed; the conduct of investigating officer was not fair and impartial; fabrication had been made during investigation by an alleged eye-witness with the connivance of the investigating officer to falsely implicate the accused persons by planting himself and others as eye-witnesses of the occurrence-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against both the accused beyond reasonable doubt-Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, and both the accused persons were acquitted of the charge under sections 302(b) & 34, P.P.C.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Witness, statement of-Dishonest improvements-Dishonest improve-ments made by a witness in his statement to strengthen the prosecution case casts serious doubt about veracity of his statement and makes the same untrustworthy and unreliable.\nSardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed 2017 SCMR 344; Muhammad Arif v. The State 2019 SCMR 631 and Naveed Asghar v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 181 of 2016 along with Criminal Petition No. 154-L of 2016, decided on 14th May, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 02.12.2015 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. A. No. 150-J of 2014 along with M.R. No. 497 of 2011).heard on: 17th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, Musarrat Hilali and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Liaquat Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in J.P. No. 181 of 2016).\nCh. Nisar Ahmed Kausar, Advocate Supreme Court (Through video link from Lahore) (in Crl. P. No. 154-L/2016).\nComplainant in person.\nIrfan Zia, Addl.P.G., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. SAIMA NOREEN and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24468", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3203 = 2024 SLD 3203 = 2024 SCMR 1319", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 42-Suit for declaration-Failure to establish that power of attorney was a forged document-Suit for declaration was filed by respondent/plaintiff claiming that he be declared owner of the suit plot, as the plaintiff never appointed defendants as his attorney nor he transferred the suit property in their favour through any document-Validity-Plaintiff/respondent had not specifically challenged the execution and registration of power of attorney in his pleadings when his case was that he had seen the said document in the office of City Development and Municipal Department-Further plaintiff himself produced the copy of said document as an exhibit and failed to discharge initial onus of negation of the registration of the document-It was very easy and simple for the plaintiff to get his signatures and thumb impression upon the impugned document compared with his sample signatures and thumb impressions but he had not opted to initiate this legal process-In these circumstances, when plaintiff failed to discharge initial onus, no question of shifting of onus upon the vendee/defendant or attorney arose, who had fully supported that he being validly constituted attorney of the plaintiff, sold the plot to defendant No. 3, who was initially not made party to the suit and was subsequently made party and further that defendant No. 3 sold the plot to defendant No. 1, i.e. the present petitioner-Plaintiff also failed to plead and produce evidence that why he had not raised any objection with regard to construction of house by the petitioner/defendant No.1 upon the suit plot-Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit for declaration filed by the plaintiff/respondent-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, impugned judgments of revisional court as well as first appellate court were set-aside and that of Trial Court dismissing the suit was restored.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 39 & 42-Suit for declaration-Scope-Power of attorney challenged as being a forged document-When registered power of attorney by plaintiff in favour of defendant stood proved, the plaintiff should have challenged such document through filing a suit for cancellation of document under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and not a suit for declaration filed under section 42 of the Act-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,39", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3877 of 2023, decided on 9th May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 25.09.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in C.R.No.1153-P of 2019).\nheard on: 9th May 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Afnan Karim Kundi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nJahanzeb Mahsud, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1.\nNaseer ud Din, Advocate Supreme Court via video link from Peshawar on behalf of Respondent Nos. 2-5.\nNemo for Respondent No. 6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAH MADAR KHAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nTARIQ DAUD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24469", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3204 = 2024 SLD 3204 = 2024 SCMR 1208", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpUXk", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O.XXXVII, R. 2-Suit for recovery on the basis of a pro-note-Record revealed that execution of pro-note was admitted by the petitioner (defendant)-In the agreement between the parties, the petitioner unequivocally confirmed the execution of the pro-note and also undertook that if arbitrators decided the matter against him, he would have no objection-This clearly indicated that pro-note was executed against due consideration by the petitioner voluntarily-It appears that cheque along with the pro-note was given to arbitrators for redetermination and reconsideration of amount due and once the Arbitrators confirmed the amount of Rs. 6,000,000/- as due to the respondent (plaintiff) from the petitioner, the pro-note was handed over back the respondent along with a cheque executed by the petitioner-Petitioner had neither challenged the decision of the arbitrators nor the agreement for appointment of arbitrators or execution of cheque and pro-note-Moreover, perusal of the testimony of the petitioner in his examination in chief clearly indicated that he himself admitted the liability to pay and voluntarily issued the pro-note and cheque-Suit for recovery was rightly decreed in favour of the respondent-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.760 of 2024, decided on 15th April, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 18.01.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court in R.F.A. No. 66727 of 2020).heard on: 15th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, Musarrat Hilali and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Matee Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nN.R. for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHIZAR HAYAT-Petitioner\nVersus\nMalik AKHTAR MEHMOOD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24470", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3205 = 2024 SLD 3205 = 2024 SCMR 1338", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTc", - "Key Words:": "Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003)-\n-S. 3-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 19 & 204-Press conferences by a Senator and a Member of the National Assembly ( MNA )-Malicious allegations against the Judiciary-Comments on the Judges of the superior courts-Speaking about sub judice cases-Contempt proceedings against the Senator and MNA-Issuance of show cause notices-Press conferences in question were streamed on the internet and social media forums and extracts from them were published in different newspapers-Article 19 of the Constitution grants to every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression but places restrictions, amongst others, with regard to contempt of Court-Prima facie what was said by the Senator and the MNA appeared to be contempt of Court-Supreme Court issued show cause notices to both of them and granted them an opportunity to submit their explanation/ reply within two weeks of the receipt of the show cause notice-Supreme Court directed that television channels and all those who broadcast, re-broadcast and/or publish material constituting contempt of Court may also be committing contempt of Court, therefore, they should desist from doing so, failing which they may also be proceeded against for contempt of Court.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003=3Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=19,204", - "Case #": "IN RE: CRIMINAL ORIGINAL PETITION NO. 06 of 2024\nCriminal Original Petition No.06 of 2024, decided on 17th May, 2024.\n(Contempt proceedings against Senator Faisal Vawda on account of his press conference in the National Press Club, Islamabad on 15.05.2024).\nheard on: 17th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Irfan Saadat Khan and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. Attorney General and Raja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, D.A.G. (On Court Notice).\nCh. M. Younas, Member Executive, Asim Ali Bokahri, Member Executive Committee and Rifaqat Islam Awan, Finance Secretary (On behalf of SCBA).", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24471", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3206 = 2024 SLD 3206 = 2024 SCMR 1341", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Appointment and promotion-Criteria and qualifications, setting of-Discretion and decision of the employer/appointing authority-Non-interference by Courts-Scope-Required qualifications for appointment to any post is the sole discretion and decision of the employer and it is in its realm to prescribe criteria and the preference for appointment of a candidate who is best suited to its requirements in which the court has no sphere of influence to arbitrate or set down the course of action or put forward the conditions of eligibility or fitness for appointment or promotion until and unless the relevant laws and rules prescribing the well-defined and straightforward benchmark of appointment or promotion seems to have been violated.\n(b) Judicial review-\n-Scope-No doubt, it is within the dominion of the Court to exercise its power of judicial review to evaluate and weigh upon the legislative and executive actions in order to maintain and sustain the rule of law, to check and balance and render null and void an unlawful action or decision, and with the same spirit and frame of mind, the Court may also invalidate and strike down laws, acts, and governmental actions if found unlawful and beyond the scope of power and jurisdiction-Judicial review can be sought if the decision maker was misdirected in terms of the law, exercised a power wrongly, or improperly purported to exercise a power that it did not have, which is known as acting ultra vires.\n(c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act (XVIII of 1973)-\n-S. 9-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989, R. 3(2)-Promotion quota, amendment of-Discretion of employer/appointing authority-Non-interference by Courts-Scope-Petitioners were appointed as Soil Conservation Assistants (BPS-17)-Through the impugned notification, the 100% promotion quota reserved for the petitioners was reduced to 75% and the remaining 25% quota was allocated to the cadre of Field Assistants which allegedly affected seniority and promotion of the petitioners-Petitioners filed a Departmental Appeal but no response was received, hence they filed appeals before the Tribunal which were dismissed by means of the impugned judgment-Validity-Policy decision made up by dint of the impugned notification of reducing 25% promotion quota and allocating it for the progression of Field Assistants according to the exigency, was not ultra vires to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973 or the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989, but seemingly, with the aim of harmonizing the promotion criteria and path of progression, the department allocated a quota for accommodating the Field Assistants-Impugned notification did not infringe or contravene the fundamental rights nor was it against the public interest or the law-Neither the impugned notification was ex facie discriminatory nor was it capable of being administered in any discriminatory manner-It was also not unjust or oppressive-On the contrary, the competent authority was empowered to establish the yardsticks for determination of eligibility and fitness which was sine qua non for promotion, and devising and structuring the recruitment policy fell within its exclusive line of work and adeptness and in case of exigency and expediency, it may enact and amend the relevant rules-There was no illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment of the Tribunal which may warrant any interference-Petitions were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nGovernment of Punjab v. Muhammad Awais Shahid 1991 SCMR 696; Fida Hussain v. The Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division, Islamabad PLD 1995 SC 701; Maula Bux Shaikh v. Chief Minister Sindh 2018 SCMR 2098; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Hayat Hussain 2016 SCMR 1021; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Muhammad Javed 2015 PLC (C.S.) 962; Zafar Iqbal v. Director Secondary Education 2006 SCMR 1427 and Federal Public Service Commission through Chairman, Islamabad and another v. Shiraz Manzoor and others 2024 PLC (C.S.) 18 ref.\n(d) Civil service-\n-Promotion-Scope-Though consideration for promotion is a right, yet promotion itself cannot be claimed as of right-There is no vested right in promotion or rules determining the eligibility for promotion.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, (XVIII of 1973)=9", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 2074 to 2082 of 2023, decided on 17th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 20-1-2023 passed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Peshawar in Service Appeals Nos. 534, 535, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543 and 544 of 2020).\nheard on: 17th April,2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Ayesha A. Malik and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Noor Muhammad Khattak, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NASEEM KHAN and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Chief Secretary Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24472", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3207 = 2024 SLD 3207 = 2024 SCMR 1347 = (2024) 130 TAX 71 = 2024 PTD 1070", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTU", - "Key Words:": "Discriminatory Treatment of Manufacturing Units in FATA and PATA\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 - Sixth Schedule, Entry No. 152\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 25\n•\nCustoms General Order No. 8 of 2021 (CGO No. 8 of 2021) dated 31.08.2021, paras (a) & (b)\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe petitioners, who are manufacturing units in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), challenged the discriminatory provisions in Customs General Order No. 8 of 2021. The provisions of this order provided preferential treatment in the clearance and transshipment of imported goods, but this preferential treatment was only granted to bulk importing edible oil manufacturers in the merged districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (formerly FATA and PATA). The petitioners, who were not bulk edible oil importers, were denied these beneficial provisions.\nThe petitioners argued that this discriminatory treatment violated the Constitutional rights under Article 25, which guarantees equality before the law. The petitioners were denied the same preferential treatment given to bulk edible oil manufacturers, which they contended was unjustifiable, as it created an unfair distinction between various types of businesses in the same region.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nPetitioners’ Argument:\no\nThe petitioners argued that the preferential treatment in CGO No. 8 of 2021 was discriminatory, as it was only granted to bulk importing edible oil manufacturers and not to other businesses in the merged districts or even other edible oil manufacturers who did not engage in bulk imports.\no\nThey contended that such discriminatory treatment violated the right to equality guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, as the preferential provisions were not based on any rational classification but on arbitrary distinctions.\n2.\nRespondent’s Argument:\no\nThe respondents (Government of Pakistan) defended the provisions, arguing that the preferential treatment given to bulk importing edible oil manufacturers was justified based on specific economic or administrative criteria. However, they did not provide a valid rationale for treating other manufacturers differently or for creating the distinctions within the merged districts.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\nThe Supreme Courts Four-Member Bench in the AK Tariq Foundry case (Civil Petitions Nos. 159 to 178 of 2023) had already adjudicated a similar issue, declaring that creating a sub-class within businesses in the merged districts and providing exemptions to some businesses (bulk edible oil importers) while denying it to others violated Article 25 of the Constitution.\nThe Court found that the preferential treatment given to bulk edible oil manufacturers in the merged districts was discriminatory because it did not apply equally to all businesses in the region, regardless of whether they were bulk importers or not. The Court emphasized that such discriminatory treatment violated the right to equality guaranteed by Article 25 of the Constitution, which mandates that all citizens are equal before the law.\nGiven that the AK Tariq Foundry case had already addressed similar issues and concluded that such discriminatory provisions were unconstitutional, the present Bench was bound by that precedent. The provisions of CGO No. 8 of 2021 that created such distinctions were found to be unconstitutional.\nOutcome:\n•\nThe petitioners petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, meaning that the discriminatory provisions in CGO No. 8 of 2021 were struck down.\n•\nThe Court ruled that all manufacturing units in the merged districts should be treated equally, and no preferential treatment should be given to one class of business over another unless there was a valid, non-arbitrary reason for doing so.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nEquality Before the Law (Article 25, Constitution of Pakistan):\no\nThe right to equality is a fundamental principle in the Constitution. Discriminatory treatment of businesses based on arbitrary classifications, such as bulk importing versus non-bulk importing manufacturers, violates this constitutional guarantee.\n2.\nPrecedent of the Supreme Court:\no\nThe Supreme Court’s judgment in the AK Tariq Foundry case set a precedent, which was followed in this case. The Court found that creating distinctions among businesses in the merged districts based on arbitrary factors like bulk imports was discriminatory and unconstitutional.\n3.\nDiscriminatory Fiscal Policies:\no\nThe Court ruled that fiscal policies, such as exemptions or preferential treatment, must apply equally to all businesses, unless a rational basis for differentiation exists.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court ruled that the provisions of CGO No. 8 of 2021, which granted preferential treatment to bulk importing edible oil manufacturers in the merged districts, were discriminatory and violated Article 25 of the Constitution. The petitioners appeal was allowed, and the discriminatory provisions were struck down, ensuring equal treatment for all businesses in the merged districts.\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=Sixth ScheduleConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=25,247Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007=4", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1896, 1897 and 1900 of 2022, decided on 17th May, 2024, heard on: 2nd May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 09.02.2022 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Writ Petition No. 5184-P of 2021).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 4.\nGhulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 10.\nSyed Fazle Samad, FBR, Najeeb Arjumand, D.C. Customs, Fahad, A.C. FBR and Sharif Ullah, Asst. Director, R.T.O. for Departments", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs TAJ WOOD BOARD MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others-Petitioners\nVs\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Federal Secretary Finance and Revenue Division, Islamabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24473", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3208 = 2024 SLD 3208 = 2024 SCMR 1354", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTQ", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-\n-S. 2(i)-Expressions rent and such other charges which are payable by the tenant used in section 2(i) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979-Scope-Monthly maintenance charges not mentioned in the lease deed-In the present case there was no express or implied covenant incorporated in the agreement which may impose any obligation on the tenant/respondent for the payment of the alleged monthly maintenance charges-Counsel for the landlord company/ appellant could not satisfy as to how, without an express condition in the tenancy lease or agreement, the appellant could assert the default on account of non-payment of maintenance charges-No doubt, the definition of rent includes water charges, electricity charges, and such other charges which are payable by the tenant but are unpaid-But in the present case the foundation of the appellants ejectment case was on account of default in the payment of maintenance charges taking into consideration the residue fragment of the definition of rent i.e., and such other charges which are payable by the tenant but are unpaid -Before invoking any default in the aforesaid residuary segment, there must be something agreed in writing between the landlord and tenant-Had the condition of making payment for any monthly maintenance charges been jotted down and agreed between the parties, then of course, that could be considered a binding agreement and the tenant/ respondent could not get rid of it without payment and obviously, in the event of default, that cause of action would have been available to the appellant to seek ejectment on the ground of default including the non-payment of maintenance charges; but in the present case the situation was altogether different as no such condition was ever pressed nor incorporated in any lease/tenancy agreement-Expression such other charges which are payable by the tenant would not come into field automatically or mechanically to rescue the landlord unless and until the condition of making payment for such charges was itemized in the agreement with proper details-High Court rightly dismissed the ejectment petition-Appeal was dismissed.\nHakim Ali v. Muhammad Salim and another 1992 SCMR 46 and Mst. Fakhra Begum and others v. Mst. Sadia Ashraf and others 2012 SCMR 1931 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=2(i)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 90-K of 2023, decided on 3rd April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 16.02.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Const. P. No. S-999 of 2020).\nheard on: 3rd April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salahuddin Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nZain-ul-Abedin Jatoi, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Younus, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KARACHI PROPERTIES INVESTMENT COMPANY (PVT.) LTD.-Petitioner\nVersus\nHABIB CARPETS (PVT.) LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24474", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3209 = 2024 SLD 3209 = 2024 SCMR 1354", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTS8", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-\n-S. 2(i)-Expressions rent and such other charges which are payable by the tenant used in section 2(i) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979-Scope-Monthly maintenance charges not mentioned in the lease deed-In the present case there was no express or implied covenant incorporated in the agreement which may impose any obligation on the tenant/respondent for the payment of the alleged monthly maintenance charges-Counsel for the landlord company/ appellant could not satisfy as to how, without an express condition in the tenancy lease or agreement, the appellant could assert the default on account of non-payment of maintenance charges-No doubt, the definition of rent includes water charges, electricity charges, and such other charges which are payable by the tenant but are unpaid-But in the present case the foundation of the appellants ejectment case was on account of default in the payment of maintenance charges taking into consideration the residue fragment of the definition of rent i.e., and such other charges which are payable by the tenant but are unpaid -Before invoking any default in the aforesaid residuary segment, there must be something agreed in writing between the landlord and tenant-Had the condition of making payment for any monthly maintenance charges been jotted down and agreed between the parties, then of course, that could be considered a binding agreement and the tenant/ respondent could not get rid of it without payment and obviously, in the event of default, that cause of action would have been available to the appellant to seek ejectment on the ground of default including the non-payment of maintenance charges; but in the present case the situation was altogether different as no such condition was ever pressed nor incorporated in any lease/tenancy agreement-Expression such other charges which are payable by the tenant would not come into field automatically or mechanically to rescue the landlord unless and until the condition of making payment for such charges was itemized in the agreement with proper details-High Court rightly dismissed the ejectment petition-Appeal was dismissed.\nHakim Ali v. Muhammad Salim and another 1992 SCMR 46 and Mst. Fakhra Begum and others v. Mst. Sadia Ashraf and others 2012 SCMR 1931 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=2(i)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 90-K of 2023, decided on 3rd April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 16.02.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Const. P. No. S-999 of 2020).heard on: 3rd April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salahuddin Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nZain-ul-Abedin Jatoi, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Younus, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KARACHI PROPERTIES INVESTMENT COMPANY (PVT.) LTD.-Petitioner\nVersus\nHABIB CARPETS (PVT.) LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24475", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3210 = 2024 SLD 3210 = 2024 SCMR 1361", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTSs", - "Key Words:": "Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1991 (I of 1992)-\n-Ss. 2(2), 9 & 10(3)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9-Provincial Ombudsperson, jurisdiction of-Mal-administration-Matter relating to allocation of an amenity plot to a charitable institution-After issuance of show cause notice by Karachi Development Authority (KDA) the allocation of the plot was cancelled by KDA-Appellant (charitable institution) submitted a complaint to the Provincial Ombudsman under the Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1991 (the Act)-Ombudsman decided that KDA in not issuing the allotment letter/order to the appellant and not putting the appellant into possession of the plot constituted maladministration, and directed KDA to do the needful-Decision of the Ombudsman was assailed before the Governor who dismissed the representation filed by KDA-High Court set aside the decision of the Ombudsman and that of the Governor-Legality-Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction and the appellants complaint was not maintainable, as what was complained of did not constitute maladministration-Appellant had asserted purported transgression or non- fulfilment of its contractual rights which the appellant could only do by the filing of a suit-However, the Ombudsman assumed the powers, which vest in civil court, under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Ombudsman did what the law neither envisaged nor permitted-This aspect was not considered by the Ombudsman, and the Governor dismissed KDAs representation on technicalities-Moreover, the complaint was submitted to the Ombudsman seventeen years after KDA had issued its (offer) letter to the appellant for the allocation of amenity plot, whereas section 10(3) of the Act stipulates a period of three months within which a complaint may be preferred-There was also nothing on the record to show that the appellant had accepted KDAs offer letter, let alone that it did so within the period of one week mentioned therein-Requisite payment was also not made within the stipulated period, and only half of the occupancy value was ever paid-Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction and his decision was coram non judice-Governor should have set aside the illegal decision of the Ombudsman, but instead dismissed KDAs representation on technicalities-Therefore, it was left to the High Court to set aside the decision of the Ombudsman and that of the Governor-No illegality was found with regard to the impugned judgment of the High Court-Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2(2),9,10(3)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=9", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 182-K of 2015, decided on 23rd April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 15.05.2014 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-262 of 2009).\nheard on: 23rd April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Muhammad Farough Naseem; Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad lqbal Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nMuhammad Umer Lakhani, Advocate Supreme Court Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.\nSibtain Mehmood, Addl. A.G. (R-2)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs KANPUR OLD BOYS ASSOCIATION-Appellant\nVersus\nMessrs KARACHI METROPOLITAN CORPORATION and another -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24476", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3211 = 2024 SLD 3211 = 2024 SCMR 1365", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTk", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 409 & 34-Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5(2)-Criminal breach of trust by public servant, common intention, criminal misconduct-Reappraisal of evidence-According to the prosecution version, an accused was granted post arrest bail subject to furnishing surety in the sum of Rs.100,000/-; that the surety (acquitted by the Appellate Court) furnished bail bond for the accused which was accompanied with two Defence Saving Certificates (DSCs) amounting to Rs.50,000/- each; that subsequently the petitioner KSA along with the surety availed both DSCs from petitioner AH (junior clerk in the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge) on the pretext of getting photocopies of the same but did not return; and that the two DSCs were encashed by the surety-Held, that the beneficiary of encashing the two DSCs i.e. the surety had been acquitted of the charge by the Appellate Court and his acquittal had not been challenged by the State-Record transpired that neither the bail bond of surety was forfeited by the Court nor fresh surety bond was availed by Court from the accused-As per record, after getting released on bail on the basis of surety bond submitted by the surety and despite encashing the two DSCs by the surety, the accused did not jump bail and after conclusion of trial proceedings, he was acquitted of the charge by the Court-Evidence available on record reveals that the accused had facilitated the surety for getting the two DSCs encashed but surprisingly accused was not arrayed as an accused/put on trial in present FIR-Record did not reveal any mens rea of the petitioner AH nor it revealed of any illegal consideration having been received by him from the petitioner KSA or from the acquitted surety-There was nothing on record to show that the petitioner AH as well as petitioner KSA had dishonestly misappropriated the two DSCs or had converted the same for their own use-Hence no case for criminal breach of trust punishable under sections 409/34, P.P.C. read with section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was made out against both the petitioners-Conviction and sentence of both the petitioners under sections 409/34, P.P.C. read with section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, could not be sustained-Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, and petitioners were acquitted of the charge.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=409,34Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=5(2)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos.194 and 29-K of 2024, decided on 27th May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.02.2024, passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in Criminal Appeals Nos. 638, 620 and 631 of 2022).\nheard on: 20th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. P. No.194 of 2024).\nMuhammad Nadeem Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. P. No. 29-K of 2024).\nSaleem Akhtar Buriro, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL HAMEED and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24477", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3212 = 2024 SLD 3212 = 2024 SCMR 1369", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTTg", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)-\n-S. 24-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Plaintiff to deposit in Court 1/3rd of the sale price of the property-Period of thirty days for depositing, commencement of-Plaintiff/pre-emptor is required to deposit the 1/3rd amount within 30 days from the date of filing/ institution of suit.\nMalik Tariq Mahmood and others v. Ghulam Ahmed and others PLD 2017 SC 674; Hasnain Nawaz Khan v. Ghulam Akbar and another PLD 2013 SC 489 and Hafiz Muhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Bakhsh PLD 2012 SC 764 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991=24", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 138-L and 139-L of 2010, decided on 8th May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 21.02.2007 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.P. No. 18465 of 2005 and W.P. No. 18466 of 2005).\nheard on: 8th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Junaid Anwar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nTariq Ahmed Mian, Advocate Supreme Court via video link from Lahore for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ARSHAD (deceased) through L.Rs.-Appellants\nVersus\nBASHIR AHMAD (deceased) through L.Rs. and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24478", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3213 = 2024 SLD 3213 = 2024 SCMR 1372", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTXo", - "Key Words:": "Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 9-Election for seat of Provincial Assembly-Re-polling on some polling stations-Abnormally high voter turnout-Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) ordered re-polling on 4 polling stations due to an abnormal turnout-Validity-According to the consolidation of the results by the Returning Officer for the constituency in question issued by dint of Form-48, for the polling stations which are the subject matter of the present controversy, it is revealed that out of the total 1234 registered voters in first polling station, 1089 votes were cast which makes total turnout of 88%-Similarly, in the second polling station, the total registered voters were 1524, with 1214 total votes cast, which makes a total turnout of 79%, while in the third polling station, out of 1746 registered voters, 1340 votes were cast, making a 76% turnout; whereas, in the fourth polling station, the total registered voters were 1304, out of which 1286 votes were cast showing a turnout of 99%-After considering the entire record and the report of the Returning Officer and hearing the concerned parties, the ECP reached the conclusion that turnout at said four (4) polling stations was unnatural due to some illegalities and irregularities which have ultimately affected the final results, and in exercise of powers conferred under sections 4, 8(c) and 9(1), (3) & (4) of the Elections Act, 2017 (Act), it ordered for re-poll at the four polling stations-Present case is predominantly focused on an abnormal or unrealistic turnout of votes at 04 polling stations which does not commensurate with or is not in consonance with the overall turnout behavior of voters in the entire constituency-Counsel for the appellant-candidate did not deny the inflated or outlandish turnout of votes-There was no illegality or perversity in the impugned order of re-polling on 4 polling stations passed by the ECP-Appeal was dismissed.\nKhalid Hussain Magsi v. Mir Abdul Rahim Rind and others 2016 SCMR 900 and Ali Asjad Malhi v. Ms. Syeda Nosheen Iftikhar and others PLD 2023 SC 1 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=9", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.292 of 2024 along with C.M.A. No. 3467 of 2024, decided on 22nd April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 01.04.2024 passed by the Election Commission of Pakistan in Case No. 7(502) of 2024 LAW-III (GE).heard on: 22nd April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Amin-Ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nKamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.\nCh. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan on behalf of ECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Nawab JANGAIZ KHAN MARRI-Appellant\nVersus\nMir NASEEBULLAH KHAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24479", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3214 = 2024 SLD 3214 = 2024 SLD 1381", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpTXk", - "Key Words:": "Allotment-\n-Legality-Master Plan-Land designated on the Master Plan for Future Use -Connotation-Writ petitions were filed before the High Court alleging that the Capital Development had illegally and unlawfully changed the Master Plan and created certain new plots in a closed end street, which the CDA could not do so and that it be restrained from approving the building plans in respect of the said plots and be directed to adhere to the Master Plan-High Court allowed the said petitions, cancelled the said plots, and further directed CDA to initiate departmental action against those who had violated the Master Plan-Validity-Counsel for respondents (petitioners before the High Court) was not able to point out any legal restriction preventing the plots in question from being allotted, particularly when the said land was designated on the Master Plan for Future Use-Master Plan, the layout plans and Google map data which had been filed showed the location of the said plots, and there was no question of obstruction of light and air with respect to the plots of the respondents-Counsel for respondents could not show what particular rights of theirs had been violated in allotting the said plots nor did he refer to any law which prevented CDA from utilizing, for the benefit of earlier allottees, land designated for Future Use-Term Future Use did not mean that the land was to be left open nor did it mean that it was to be used for amenity purposes, which may, have prohibited their allotment-Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, impugned judgments of the High Court were set-aside and the cancelled allotments were restored.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.993 of 2014, C.M.As. Nos. 7061 of 2016, 1850 of 2015 and 3500 of 2014 in C.P.L.A. No. 993 of 2014), decided on 13th May, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 30.4.2014 passed by Islamabad High Court in W.P. No. 4191 of 2013).\nCivil Petition No.1117 of 2014 and C.M.A. No. 3678 of 2014 in C.P.L.A. No. 1117 of 2014\n(Against the judgment dated 27,5.2014 passed by Islamabad High Court in I.C.A. No.249 of 2014).heard on: 13th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Irfan Saadat Khan and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Nazir Jawwad, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 993 of 2014).\nMuhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 1117 of 2014).\nMalik Nasrullah Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.1 to 8 along with Ms. Mehnaz Nadeem, Respondent No. 4 and Syed Shozab Zamir son of Respondent No.7 (in C.P. No. 993 of 2014)\nMalik Nasrullah Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.2 to 9 (in C.P. No. 1117 of 2014).\nNemo for Applicants (in C.M.A. No. 7061 of 2016).", - "Petitioner Name:": "CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, ISLAMABAD through Chairman and others -Petitioners\nVersus\nM. SAJID PIRZADA-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24480", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3215 = 2024 SLD 3215 = 2024 SCMR 1385", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpSTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 115-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Interim order challenged in revisional jurisdiction or constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-When a party challenges any interim order during the pendency of a suit under revisional jurisdiction or constitutional jurisdiction vested in the revisional court or the High Court, the court has to exercise the jurisdiction keeping in view that it is an interim order, as every interim order need not be challenged at that stage because it is now settled that when a suit is finally decided by the trial court, all the interim orders become open in appeal; if there is a defect in the interim order that is open to scrutiny at the stage of final appeal, as the first appeal is continuation of a trial and first appellate court is a court of fact and law-But, if a party to the suit opts to challenge an interim order when it is passed through appellate jurisdiction, revisional jurisdiction or constitutional jurisdiction, while exercising such jurisdiction the scope of jurisdiction vested in the Court must be in the view of the party challenging the same and while dealing with the interim order the court must also keep in view the scope of jurisdiction to scrutinize the interim orders.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Interim order challenged in constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Petitioners-defendants moved applications for summoning revenue officers etc as witness, but same were dismissed by the Trial Court, which was challenged through revision petition and revision also met with the same fate-Petitioners challenged the said two orders of the Trial Court and the revisional court through constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, however, the writ petition was also dismissed-Validity-Suit was filed on 27.05.2004 which was still pending and due to the petitioners-defendants matter was being delayed-Counsel for the petitioners was unable to state whether the witnesses i.e. Patwari who entered the mutation in the year 1956 challenged through the suit were alive or not-In these circumstances, the High Court had rightly dismissed the writ petition when there was no jurisdictional defect in the orders passed by the fora below-Leave was refused and petition was dismissed.\n(c) Supreme Court Rules, 1980-\n-O.XX, R. 1-Petition for leave to appeal or an appeal filed before the Supreme Court-Proceedings pending before the Trial Court-Effect-Execution proceedings as well as the proceedings before the Trial Court do not automatically get stayed when a petition is filed before the Supreme Court unless an injunctive order is granted by the Supreme Court-It is observed that when an injunctive order is not granted by the Supreme Court the parties to the proceedings apply for stay of the proceedings or execution without any injunctive order from the Supreme Court and in some eventualities after refusal of injunctive order from the Supreme Court the parties to the proceedings before the trial court apply for stay of execution or proceedings in the suit which is not only a clear cut abuse of process of law but also contempt of court-If this practice is carried on by the parties or even the Trial Court i.e. sine die adjourning the proceedings or staying the proceedings of the suit without any injunctive order, they will face the consequences of such an illegal order.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.925-L of 2018, decided on 29th April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated, 30.01.2018 passed by the Lahore High Court in W.P. No. 40075 of 2015).heard on: 29th April 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Muhammad Kalim Ahmad Khurshid, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RASHID BAIG and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD MANSHA and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24481", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3216 = 2024 SLD 3216 = 2024 SCMR 1390", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpSTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 91-Judicial proceedings-Presumption as to documents produced as record of evidence-Scope-Possession of land delivered after parties entering into a compromise before the High Court-Compromise, legitimacy of-Assertion of attorney of the (late) defendant that he had neither entered into a compromise nor had appeared before a Court of law was nothing but an after thought on his part-Said attorney had admitted that it was he who had been hiring the counsel right from the Trial Court to the Supreme Court, as an attorney on behalf of the defendant, but stated that he had never asked from those counsel, appointed by him, about the fate of those matters, which appeared to be an unbelievable story-When the attorney was asked by the Trial Court regarding the whereabouts of the original Power of Attorney, he stated that he had no knowledge about the same but strangely enough submitted that the signatures on the photocopy of the Power of Attorney, produced as secondary evidence before the trial Court, were not his, which, created heavy doubts about the veracity of the statements made by him-It was also strange to note that the defendant passed away in the year 1988, whereas the compromise was entered in the year 1979, and he never uttered a single word during his lifetime either with regard to the veracity of the compromise entered by his attorney before the Court or with regard to the genuineness of the Power of Attorney given by him in his lifetime to the attorney and it was only after his death that his legal heirs filed the applications under section 12(2), C.P.C. questioning the compromise or lesser payment of Zar-e-Shufa by agitating that the decree obtained by the (late) appellant/plaintiff was by way of fraud or misrepresentation-It was also strange on the part of the legal heirs of the defendant or for that matter his brother, that they kept mum for a number of years i.e. 1979 to 1987 and, thereafter, agitated the matter either by filing of a suit for possession or through applications under section 12(2), C.P.C. claiming possession over suit land without realizing that the matter with regard to possession and ownership of the land comprising part of the suit land had already been laid to rest in an earlier round of litigation-Appellants were successful in showing that the findings arrived at by the fora below were erroneous, especially in view of the sanctity attached to the compromise entered before a Judge of the High Court-Appeals were allowed and respondents were restrained from interfering and dispossessing the appellants from the suit land or any building constructed by them on such land.\nMuhammad Ramzan v. Lahore Development Authority, Lahore 2002 SCMR 1336; Fayyaz Hussain v. Akbar Hussain 2004 SCMR 964; Waqar Jalal Ansari v. National Bank of Pakistan 2008 SCMR 1611 and Abdul Aziz v. Abdul Hameed 2022 SCMR 482 ref.\n(b) Appeal-\n-If an Order of the lower Court merges in the order of the higher Court, the order of the lower Court is to be deemed as an order of the higher Court.\nSahabzadi Maharunisa v. Ghulam Sughran PLD 2016 SC 358 and Bashir Ahmed Badini v. Chairman and Member of Administration Committee and Promotion Committee of High Court of Balochistan 2022 SCMR 448 ref.\n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 12(2)-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 181-Application under section 12(2), C.P.C., filing of-Limitation-In the present case applications under section 12(2), C.P.C. were filed in the year 1990, i.e. after almost 11 years of the compromise between the parties before the Court-Though it was averred that these applications were filed after the entries of jamabandi made in 1987 and hence were in time, but it was equally true that in those applications the main question agitated on behalf of the respondents was with regard to the entering into the compromise in a defective manner and thereafter, obtaining the decree by way of fraud or misrepresentation by the present appellants-Under the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 no specific time has been prescribed for filing of application under section 12(2), C.P.C., therefore, Article 181 of Limitation Act, 1908 being residuary will govern such proceedings according to which maximum period of three years has been prescribed for filing the application under section 12(2), C.P.C.-Therefore, even in a hypothetical sense, if one were to count the period of limitation from the year 1987, the applications under section 12(2), C.P.C. were time-barred-In the instant matter, the respondents were fully aware about the date and facts of the compromise entered between the parties in 1979 but filed the applications under section 12(2), C.P.C. only in the year 1990-Appeals were allowed and the applications under section 12(2), C.P.C. against the appellants were found to be bereft of any merits.\nSarfraz v. Muhammad Aslam Khan 2001 SCMR 1062 and Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Hussain PLD 2019 SC 504 ref.\n(d) Administration of justice-\n-No one should suffer on account of a lapse on the part of a Court.\nAbid Jan v. Ministry of Defence 2023 SCMR 1451; General Retd. Pervez Musharraf v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 SCMR 60 and Faqir Muhammad v. Khursheed Bibi 2024 SCMR 107 ref.\n(e) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 185-Appeal before the Supreme Court-Concurrent findings of lower courts, interference in-Scope-Usually concurrent findings of the lower Courts are not to be disturbed and interfered with, but in cases where such findings are found to be erroneous and perverse, they are liable to be struck down if based on misreading or non-reading of the material available on the record or the evidence and are a result of miscarriage of justice.\nSardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1454; Muhammad Rashid Ahmed v. Muhammad Siddique PLD 2002 SC 293; Abdul Sattar v. Mst. Anar Bibi 2007 SC 609; United Bank Limited v. Tamil Ahmed 2024 SCMR 164; Brig. R Sher Afghan v. Mst. Sheeren Tahira 2010 SCMR 786; Nabi Bakhsh v. Fazal Hussain 2008 SCMR 1454 and Mst. Kulsoom Bibi v. Muhammad Arif 2005 SCMR 135 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=91Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)Limitation Act, 1908=181", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1429 to 1433 of 2014, decided on 3rd June, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 27.3.2014 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench in C. Rs. Nos. 342-A, 341-A of 2009 and C.M. Petition No.234-A of 2014).\nheard on: 19th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Irfan Saadat Khan and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saad Umar Buttar, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mahmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in all cases)\nBarrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM (deceased) through L.Rs. and another-Appellants\nVersus\nMolvi MUHAMMAD ISHAQ (deceased) through L.Rs. and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24482", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3217 = 2024 SLD 3217 = 2024 SCMR 1408", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpSTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9-Possession of narcotic-Safe custody and transmission of samples-Significance-In the cases under Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, it is the duty of the prosecution to establish each and every step from the stage of recovery, making of sample parcels, safe custody of sample parcels and safe transmission of the sample parcels to the concerned laboratory-This chain has to be established by the prosecution and if any link is missing, the benefit of the same has to be extended to the accused-Prosecution is under a bounded responsibility to drive home the charge against an accused by proving each limb of its case that essentially includes production of the witness tasked with the responsibility of transmitting the samples to the office of Chemical Examiner and failure to do the same can cast away the entire prosecution case.\nJaved Iqbal v. The State 2023 SCMR 139; Mst. Sakina Ramzan v. The State 2021 SCMR 451; Qaiser Khan v. The State 2021 SCMR 363; Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2022 SCMR 819; Muhammad Shoaib v. The State 2022 SCMR 1006; Khair ul Bashar v. The State 2019 SCMR 930; The State v. Imran Bakhsh 2018 SCMR 2039; Taimoor Khan v. The State 2016 SCMR 621; Ikram Ullah v. The State 2015 SCMR 1002 and Amjad Ali v. The State 2012 SCMR 577 ref.\n(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)-Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules 2001, R. 4(2)-Police Rules, 1934, R. 22.70-Possession and transportation of charas-Reappraisal of evidence-Safe custody and transmission of the samples to the Forensic Laboratory not established-In the instant case, statements of a Head Constable and Investigating Officer revealed that the seven sample parcels of the charas allegedly recovered on 27.05.2021 were handed over to a Sub-Inspector for transmission to office of the lab on 31.05.2021 i.e. much beyond the seventy two hours of the seizure in violation of Rule 4(2) of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules 2001 ( Rules of 2001 ) for which no plausible explanation had been offered by the prosecution-According to statement of the Head Constable, he handed over the seven sample parcels to the Sub-Inspector for onward transmission to office of the Lab on 31.05.2021-In order to prove safe transmission of the sample parcels to office of the Lab, the prosecution had not produced said Sub-Inspector before the Trial Court for recording his statement and in this regard no explanation had been offered by the prosecution-During his cross-examination, Head Constable was confronted by the defence counsel with Form 22.70 of Register No.XIX maintained as per Rule 22.70 of the Police Rules, 1934 wherein admittedly no date, month and year had been mentioned in the relevant column No.3 pertaining to the case property/sample parcels of the instant case and in this regard as well no explanation had been offered by the Head Constable or by the Investigating Officer-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt-Conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioners by the Trial Court and maintained by the Appellate Court was result of misreading and mis-appreciation of the evidence available on record-Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court respectively were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted of the charge.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997=9", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1602 of 2023, decided on 31st May, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 29.11.2023 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Crl.A. No. 159 of 2023).heard on: 22nd May 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and\nNaeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nIrfan Zia, A.P.G., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASIF ALI and another-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General Punjab-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24483", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3253 = 2024 SLD 3253", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpOHo", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Appeal – Private LPG Company\nTopic: Appeal Against Sales Tax Assessment Order\n________________________________________\nDetails:\n•\nThe taxpayer (a private LPG company) filed an appeal against Order-in-Original No. Unit-07/375 dated 28.06.2024, passed by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR), Lahore.\n•\nThe taxpayer was audited for the period July 2021 – June 2022, and provided all required records.\n•\nThe assessing officer raised multiple observations and created a demand of Rs. 432,444,011/-, which the taxpayer challenged before the tribunal.\n•\nThe tribunal found discrepancies in the assessment and decided the case on legal and evidentiary grounds after hearing both parties.\n________________________________________\nHeld:\n1. Disallowance of Input Tax (Rs. 2,784,531/- under Section 8 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990)\n•\nThe assessing officer disallowed input tax on purchases from Elite Metal Tek (Pvt.) Ltd.\n•\nThe taxpayer provided evidence (sales tax invoices, online slips, and cheque copies) proving that LPG cylinders were an essential part of the business.\n•\nTribunal’s Decision: Observation dropped and deleted.\n2. Further Tax (Rs. 5,850,409/- under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990)\n•\nThe assessing officer did not provide calculations or specific invoices to justify further tax.\n•\nThe taxpayer is a retailer integrated with the FBR POS system, which exempts them from further tax under SRO 648(I)/2013.\n•\nTribunal’s Decision: Further tax illegally assessed, dropped and deleted.\n3. Disallowance of Input Tax (Under Section 8(1)(m) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990)\n•\nThe assessing officer disallowed all input tax without calculating tax liability on a pro-rata basis.\n•\nThe tribunal ruled that fiscal matters cannot be based on estimations, citing: \no\nATIR decision in ITO No. 2254/LB/2015\no\nSupreme Court ruling in PLD 2017 SC 99\n•\nTribunal’s Decision: Assessment order declared illegal, observation dropped.\n4. Violation of Section 73(4) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\n•\nThe assessing officer alleged input tax violations on sales to unregistered persons exceeding Rs. 100 million/year or Rs. 10 million/tax period.\n•\nThe officer failed to identify any specific unregistered person exceeding these limits.\n•\nTribunal’s Decision: Observation was baseless, dropped and deleted.\n5. Penalty (Rs. 37,600/-)\n•\nThe tribunal upheld the penalty imposed on the taxpayer.\n________________________________________\nFinal Decision:\n•\nEntire assessment order (except penalty) annulled.\n•\nTax demand of Rs. 432,444,011/- dismissed.\n•\nAppeal succeeds as indicated.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\n1.\nTax assessments must be based on evidence, not estimations.\n2.\nFurther tax cannot be charged arbitrarily without specific calculations.\n3.\nFiscal laws must be applied precisely; vague or excessive use of taxing powers is unlawful.\n4.\nSales tax input cannot be disallowed without legal justification.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A),8,8(1)(m),23,73(4)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1592/LB/2019 (Tax Period July 2021 to June, 2022), Date of Hearing: 07.08.2024, Date of Order: 16.08.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, MEMBER JUDICIAL, MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, MEMBER JUDICIAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Aurangzeb, Advocate\nRespondent By: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. GASCO LPG (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE. NTN: 7242343- 1 ....APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, ZONE-I, CTO, LAHORE. ….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24484", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3254 = 2024 SLD 3254", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1JpOHk", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Assessment - Best Judgment and Household Expenses under Sections 121(1)(d) and 111(1)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, engaged in the manufacturing and sale of bakery items, filed a return for Tax Year 2012 declaring taxable income of Rs. 190,000/-. The case was selected for audit under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Statutory notices were issued, and the taxpayer provided trading and profit & loss accounts, wealth statements, expenditure details, bank statements, and other supporting documents. However, the taxpayer allegedly failed to provide books of accounts, leading the assessing officer to issue a show-cause notice under Section 121(1)(d) read with Section 177(10). The assessing officer eventually made a best judgment assessment, estimating sales at Rs. 5,000,000/- and adding Rs. 400,000/- under Section 111(1)(c) for household expenses.\nOn appeal, the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) [CIR(A)] partially modified the assessment, reducing the estimated sales to Rs. 4,000,000/- but upheld the Rs. 400,000/- addition for household expenses. The taxpayer challenged this decision before the Appellate Tribunal.\nHeld:\n•\nThe Tribunal held that the assessing officer erred in invoking Section 121(1)(d) without any supporting material or independent verification of estimated sales. Since the taxpayer had submitted supporting financial documents, the best judgment assessment was unjustified.\n•\nThe Tribunal further ruled that the addition of Rs. 400,000/- under Section 111(1)(c) was unlawful. The assessing officer failed to identify any specific unexplained expenditure incurred by the taxpayer. Additionally, the taxpayer’s claim of shared household expenses within a joint family setup remained undisputed.\n•\nThe Tribunal set aside the orders of both the assessing officer and CIR(A), allowing the taxpayer’s appeal in full.\nCitations:\n•\nPTCL 2003 CL. 461\n•\nPTCL 2002 CL. 50\n•\n2017 PLD (SC) 99\n•\n2019 PTD 144\n•\n2017 PTD 880\n•\n2016 PLD (SC) 398\n•\n2002 SCMR 356\n•\n2018 PTD 1413\n•\n2008 PTD 686/868\n•\n2019 PTD 776 (TRIB)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(c),120(1),121(1)(d),174,177,177(10),177(11)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2254/LB/2015 (Tax Year 2012), heard on: 14-09-2021. Date of order: 14-09-2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): (MIAN ABDUL BASIT) Judicial Member, (RIZWAN AHMAD URFI) Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Sheikh M. Irfan Ayub, Adv.\nRespondent by: Ms. Farzana Gohar, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. KHALIL AHMAD, PROP: NEW SHANGRILLAH BAKERS AND GENERAL STORE, KHANEWAL- APPELLANT\nVS\nCIR, RTO, MULTAN - RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24485", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5STU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6523 = 2022 SLD 3317", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5STU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "STR No.35 of 2022.heard on: 23.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant-department by: Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti,\nAdvocate / Legal Advisor.\nRespondent by: M/s Mian Khalid Hussain Mitru and\nInayat-ur-Rehman, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, LTO, Multan\nVersus\nM/s Usman Trade Linkers, New Central Jail Road, Multan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24486", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5STQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6524 = 2022 SLD 6524", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5STQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=74", - "Case #": "W.P.No.4355 of 2021.Dates of Hearing: 17.05.2022 and 16.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s Shehryar Kasuri and Muhammad\nHumzah, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Mr. Manzoor Hussain, Advocate for\nrespondents No.1 to 4 / F.B.R.\nMr. Amjad Hussain Zada, Second\nSecretary (ST.OPS-I), F.B.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOL Pakistan Oil and Gas Company\nVersus\nThe Federal Board of Revenue and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24487", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5SS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6525 = 2022 SLD 6525", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5SS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4596 of 2022. Date of order 09.12.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMAR FAROOQ, CHIEF JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Advocate for the\npetitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Pakistan Television Corporation Limited\nVS\nDeputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, Islamabad, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24488", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5SSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6526 = 2022 SLD 6526", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5SSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Central Excise Act, (I of 1944)=7,9,52,174,176,226,236,238", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 458 of 2017. (Against the judgment dated 04.10.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Excise Tax\nReference No. 02 of 2009).Date of Hearing: 19.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa. Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi. Mr. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail .", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mian Ashiq Hussain, ASC (through video-link, Lahore).\nFor the Respondents: Mrs. Kausar Parveen, ASC Mr. Naeem Hassan, Secy. Litigation, FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Pakistan WAPDA Foundation.\nVersus\nThe Collector of Customs, Sales Tax, Lahore, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24489", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5STk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6527 = 2022 SLD 6527", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5STk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=205", - "Case #": "W.P. No.1937-2016. Date of order 14.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMAR FAROOQ,CHIEF JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Jawad Hassan, Advocate for petitioner. Barrister SuhailNawaz, Advocate for respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mari Petroleum Company Limited\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24490", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5STg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6528 = 2022 SLD 6528", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5STg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=35C", - "Case #": "ICA No. 203-2022. Date of order 27.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMAR FAROOQ, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi and Ms. Arooj Zeb Abbasi, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Jawad Khan Lodhi, Advocate for respondent No. 1. Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate for respondent No. 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, TRU, Islamabad.\nvs\nM/s Sungi Development Foundation Employees Provider Fund Trustees etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24491", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5SXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6529 = 2022 SLD 6529", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5SXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=236-D", - "Case #": "ICA No. 77638/2022. Date of order 07.12.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUDGE. SHAHID KARIM, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdul Muqadir Khan, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa Dy. Attorney General on Court's call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FBR \nvs\nRao Tariq Islam etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24492", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5SXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6530 = 2022 SLD 6530", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5SXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO. 2056 OF 2022. (Against the judgment dated 27.04.2022. passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in E.F.A.No.35845/2020).Date of Hearing: 04.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD. MR. JUSTICE AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN. MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner Mr. Iftikhar Ullah Malik, ASC Mr. Anis Muhammad Shahzad, AOR For Respondents: N.R..", - "Petitioner Name:": "Summit Bank Limited, Lahore.\n VERSUS\nM/s M.M. Brothers, Proprietorship Concern, through its proprietor.Mehboob Elahi Qadri Ansari and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24493", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6531 = 2022 SLD 6531", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2403/LB/2022. Date of hearing 15.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD WASEEM CH., JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Zafar Iqbal Mian, Advocate. \nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Ali, Dr", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ch. Arshad Javaid Warraich, Sialkot Cantt. \nvs\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24494", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6532 = 2022 SLD 6532", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ petition no. 4027/ 2022. Date of order 15.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRRSENT: SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Asad Ladha, Advocate for the petitioners in instant and the\nrelevant petitions.\nBarrister Haroon Dugal and Mr. Muhammad Shahrukh Sheikh,\nAdvocates for the petitioners in connected WP nos. 4454 and\n4457 of 2022.\nSyed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi, Advocate for the respondents in\nrelevant petitions.\nSyed Mumtaz Mazhar, Advocate for respondent no.2 FBR.\nMs. Asma Hamid, Advocate for respondent no.3 Commissioner,\nInland Revenue.\nHafiz Ahmad Rasheed, learned A.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited and another\nVS\nFOP through Secretary, Revenue Division, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24495", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6533 = 2022 SLD 6533", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,162", - "Case #": "Case No. W. P. No. 81107 of 2021. Date of Hearing: 01.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Jamil Khan, J:", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Salman Akram Raja, Advocate. \nRespondents by: Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney\nGeneral for Pakistan. Mr. Anas Sheikh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Pepsi Cola International\n(Pvt.) Limited.\nVersus Federation of Pakistan, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24496", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6534 = 2022 SLD 6534", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(43A)", - "Case #": "STA No. 868/LB/2022. STA No. 919/LB/2022. Date of hearing 27.05.2022. Date of order 22.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER. MUHAMMAD WASEEM CH. JUDICAIL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Iqbal Anwar Mehndi, ITP.\nRespondent by: Mr. Talat Mehmood, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Jahangir Sons The Collection, Lahore\nvs\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24497", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6535 = 2022 SLD 6535", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=51", - "Case #": "HCA No. 357 of 2017. Dates of Hearing : 05.10.2022 & 20.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants through : Mr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Advocate. Mr. M. Ishaque Pirzada, Advocate.\nJust to let you know, respondent through : Mr. Aijaz Ahmed Zahid, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue Services (AEC) & others\nvs\nM/s. Clariant Pakistan Limited" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24498", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6536 = 2022 SLD 6536", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24499", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6537 = 2022 SLD 6537", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24500", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 6538 = 2022 SLD 6538", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4(c)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 83505/2022. Date of order 30.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate fpr petitioner. Mr. Sheraz Zaka, Assistant Attonery General. Mr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocates for FBR on court\"\"s call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "National Fertilizer Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt) Limited.\nvs\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24501", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6539 = 2023 SLD 6539", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(16)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1274/LB/2022. Date of hearing 10.11.2022. Date of order 16.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD WASEEM CH. , JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Farooq Sheikh, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Usman Azam Bhatti, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s K.S.F. Tri-Zone Industries (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, Audit-I, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24502", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6540 = 2023 SLD 6540", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5RXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=34,33(5),3,6,7,22,23,26,2(20),2(25),2(33),2(35),2(39),2(41),2(46)", - "Case #": "STA No. 900/IB/2022. Date of hearing 21.12.2022. Date of order 03.01.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nabeel Ahmed Sheikh, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate. Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Rehman Commission Shop, Rall Bazar, Sargodha.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Sargodha." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24503", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6541 = 2023 SLD 6541", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=7E", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 161 of 2023. Date of order 04.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Anwar Bhatti Advocate for the petitioner. Syed Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General (on court\"\"s call). \nMrs. Riaz Begum, Advocate for the respondent- FBR (on court\"\"s call).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Abdullah Mudasir.\nvs\nThe Federation of Pakistan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24504", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6542 = 2023 SLD 6542", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=36", - "Case #": "Const. P. 5899/2021, heard on: 11.01.2023. Date of Order: 11.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners: Through Mr. Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Advocate.\nRespondents: Through Mr. Rana Sakhawat Ali, Advocate. Mr. Zubair Hashmi, Advocate. Mr. Qazi Ayazuddin, Assistant \nAttorney General. Mr. G. M. Bhutto, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Younus Textile Mills Ltd.\n VS\n Fed. of Pakistan and Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24505", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6543 = 2023 SLD 6543", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=66", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1422 of 2019. (Against the judgment dated 20.08.2018 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, in Sales Tax Appeal No. 01 of 2005). Date of Hearing: 09.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA. Mr. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI. Mr. JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Syed Mohsin Imam, ASC.\nFor the Respondent: Mr. Mansoor Ali Ghanghro, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Karachi.\nVersus\nM/s Attock Cement Pakistan Limited, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24506", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6544 = 2023 SLD 6544", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47,2(37),Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12(5)", - "Case #": "STR No.18 of 2010, heard on: 09.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE. SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUDGE. SHAHID JAMEEL, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant-department by: M/s. Sh. Nadeem Anwaar, Waqar A. Sheikh. Izharul Haque Sheikh, Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema, Rana Muhammad Mehtab, Ch. M. Imtiaz Elahi, Javed Athar, Syed Zain ul Abidein Bokhari, Malik Abdullah Raza,\nKausar Parveen, Sheikh Nadeem Anwaar, Waqas B. Khokhar, Mohsin Ali vice Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Noor Muhammad Khan Chandia, Mian Yusuf Umar, Sardar Ali\nMasood Raza, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Ch. Muhammad Yasin Zahid, Sultan Mehmood, Advocates.\nRespondent-taxpayers by: M/s. Asad Raza, Syed Saqlain Hussain, Muhammad Fayyaz Mansab, Saood Nasrullah Cheema, Azhar Mukhtar, Muhammad Asghar, Hashim Aslam Butt, Abdul Sattar, Muhammad Naeem Munawar, Imran Rasool, Shah Behram Sukhera, Sumair Saeed Ahmad, M. Hafeez Uppal, Khurram Ahmad Saeed, Mumtaz Hussain Bhutta, Imran Rashid, Mian Abdul Bari Rashid, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Legal Division, Regional Tax Office, Lahore.\nVersus\nM/s. Rafaqat Marketing, Lahore & another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24507", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6545 = 2023 SLD 6545", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C, 4B", - "Case #": "CP D 5842 of 2022. Dates of hearing: 23.11.2022 28.11.2022 05.12.2022. 06.12.2022. 07.12.2022. 08.12.2022. 12.12.2022. 14.12.2022. 15.12.2022. 19.12.2022. 20.12.2022. 22.12.2022. \nDate of announcement : 22.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUDGE. AFGHA FAISAL, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Messrs. Khalid Jawed Khan, Ovais Ali Shah, Farogh Naseem, Salman Akram Raja, Ijaz Ahmed Zahid. Advocates for petitioners.\nMessrs. Faisal Siddiqi, Shah Nawaz Memon, Ghazi Khan Khalil, Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Ameer Nausherwan Advocates for respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shell Pakistan Limited.\nvs.\nFederation of Pakistan & Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24508", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6546 = 2023 SLD 6546", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=236DConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=18", - "Case #": "W.P.No.228757 of 2018. Date of hearing 11.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: M/s Abdullah Dogar, Shahbaz Butt, Abad-ur-Rehman, Farhan Shahzad, Muhammad Mohsin Virk, Raja Hassam Kayani, Nawab Saeed Ullah Khan, Asad Abbas Raza, Muhammad Ahsan Mahmood, Shamail Arif, Muhammad\nUsman Zia, Ibrahim Hassan, Javed Iqbal Bhatti, Muhaammad Shahid Baig, Ahtisham-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Nouman Sarwar, Usman Khalil, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Farrukh Gulzar\nAwan, Chaudhary Hasham Hayat Wathra, Mian Talat Mahmood, Sardar Azeem Afrasiab, Kashif Akbar Bandesha, Mirza Mubashir Baig, Ch. Zulfiqar Ai, Wasif Javed Sipra, Afzal\nHussain, Mazhar Elahi and Muhammad Bilal Parvez, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Federation: Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional\nAttorney General and Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Province: Barrister Shehryar Riaz, Assistant Advocate General Punjab. Department:\nM/s Adeel Shahid Karim, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Malik Abdullah Raza, Syed Zain-ul-Abidien Bukhari, IbrarAhmad, Ijaz Mehmood Chaudhary, Kausar Parveen and Foziya Bukhsh, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Rao Tariq Islam, etc. \nVersus. \nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24509", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6547 = 2023 SLD 6547", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=185-F,79", - "Case #": "Special Criminal Acquittal Appeal Nos. 32 & 33 of 2021, heard on: 16.01.2023. Date of Order: 16.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, Mr. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant in both Appeals: The Collector of Customs, MCCAppraisement (West) Through Mr. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Advocate. \nRespondent (s): Zafar Iqbal (Spl. Cr. Acquittal Appeal No. 32/2021) Mehmood Iqbal (Spl. Cr. Acquittal Appeal No. 33/2021.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24510", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6548 = 2023 SLD 6548", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2582/IB/2022. Date of hearing 11.01.2023. Date of order 11.01.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Anwar-ul-Haq, ACA.\nRespondent by: Ms. Sobia Mazhar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Capital Food (Private) Limited, 15-E, Naseerabad, Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi. \nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, CTD, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24511", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6549 = 2023 SLD 6549", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Cost and Management Accountants Regulation, 1990=87(2)", - "Case #": "Write Petition no. 4227/2022. Date of order 17.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR IJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for petitioner. Mr. Sameer Khosa, Advocate for respondents. Hafiz Ahmed Rashid, learned A.A.G. Shehzad Ahmed, President ICMAP. Abdul Hafeez Qazi, Director ICMAP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian Muhammad Ramzan and others. \nvs\nFederation of Pakistan and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24512", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6550 = 2023 SLD 6550", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5QXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,153(7)", - "Case #": "MA (CONDONATIOON) No. 209/IB/2022. Date of hearing 13.12.2022. Date of order 16.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER. DR. FAHEEM MOHAMMAD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Masood Akhtar, ITP.\nRespondent by: Syed Zubair Shah, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Frontier Flour Mills, Village Khailan Bala, Sharah e Resham, Haripur. (REG No. 3187483-5)\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Abbottabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24513", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6551 = 2023 SLD 6551", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=142(c),260,s 141, 142 (c), 143, 144, 264", - "Case #": "W.P. No.50314/2022, heard on: 22.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Ch. Anwaar Ul Haq, Advocate. M/s Shahbaz Butt, Muhammad Ahsan Mahmood, Asad Abbas Raza.\nRespondents by: Mr. Sheraz Zaka, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Mr. Muhammad Awais Ahsan Joiya, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zaka Ud Din Malik.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24514", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6552 = 2023 SLD 6552", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=72B", - "Case #": "W.P. No.2928 of 2017. Date of Hearing: 11.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Muhammad Usman Shaukat, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Adnan Haider Randhawa, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Wi-Tribe Pakistan Limited.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24515", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6553 = 2023 SLD 6553", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(3A),Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1)(b),33(5)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148,182", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITIONS NO. 389, 696 TO 742 OF 2022. (Against the judgment dated 01.12.2021 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in Custom Reference Nos.270-P to 317-P/2020). Date of Hearing: 06.07.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ. MR. JUSTICE AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN. MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Sr. ASC.\nFor the Respondents: N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar (In all cases).\nVERSUS\nWaseef Ullah and another etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24516", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6554 = 2023 SLD 6554", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3739 of 2019. (Against the order of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad dated 26.07.2019 passed in WP No. 1228/2016). Date of Hearing: 20.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH. Mr. JUSTICE JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL. Mr. JUSTICE SHAHID WAHEED.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: (Through V.L. Karachi Registry) Ms. Shazia Bilal, ASC. Syed Salahuddin Gillani, Addl. Commissioner.\nFor Respondent No.1: Mr. Jahanzeb Awan, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Federal Board of Revenue thr. its Chairman, Islamabad\n& others.\nVersus\nM/s Hub Power Company Ltd & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24517", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5OC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6555 = 2023 SLD 6555", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5OC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25", - "Case #": "C. P. NO. D-205 / 2023, heard on: 18.01.2023. Date of Order: 18.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR. Mr. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: Universal Recycling, Through Mr. Ghulam Nabi Shar, Advocate. \nRespondents: The Federation of Pakistan & Others, Through Mr. Shah Nawaz Sahto, Advocate. Mr. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Sardar Amin Farooqui, Assistant Collector.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24518", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5OCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6556 = 2023 SLD 6556", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5OCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "ITR No.02 of 2022. Date of order, 23.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI, JUDGE. MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate / Legal Advisor for applica11t-department. Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate for\nrespondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, LIO, Multan.\nVs.\n M/s Hafeez Ghee & General Mills (Pvt.) Limited, Multan," - }, - { - "Case No.": "24519", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6557 = 2023 SLD 6557", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 1044 of 2018. Date of order 02.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr M Shaheer Roshan Sheikh Advocate for the Petitioner.\nMs Hajira Zakir Shah Advocate vice learned counsel for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Oracle System Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.\nVs\nPakistan and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24520", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6558 = 2023 SLD 6558", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5ODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2022=8(2)(b)", - "Case #": "W.P. No.50314/2022, heard on: 22.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Ch. Anwaar Ul Haq, Advocate. M/s Shahbaz Butt, Muhammad Ahsan Mahmood, Asad Abbas Raza,\nRespondents by: Mr. Sheraz Zaka, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Mr. Muhammad Awais Ahsan Joiya, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zaka Ud Din Malik.\n Versus\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24521", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5OHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6559 = 2023 SLD 6559", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5OHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=159", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 226-M/2021. Date of hearing 25.05.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Imran Javed, Advocate for Petitioner.\nMr. Nasim Gul, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent/ Federal Government. Mr. Ishtiaq Ahmed (junior) Advocate for Respondent/Tax DEpartment through Video Link.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Matin Khan, M/s. Haji Mateen Khan, Government Contractor Village Meena Khwar, P.O Dir.\nvs\nGovt. of Pakistan through Federal Secretary, Finance and Revenue Division, Islamabad and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24522", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5OHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2012 3384 = 2012 SLD 3384 = 2012 AIR 1140 = 2012 SCC 566", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5OHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 735 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 33851 of 2009", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): P. SATHASIVAM AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JUSTICE(S)", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "State of U.P. & Ors. .... Appellant (s)\nVs\nAmbrish Tandon & Anr. .... Respondent(s)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24523", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6560 = 2023 SLD 6560", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 12 of 2018. Date of order 21.01.2020.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RASAAL HASSAN SYED, JUDGE. JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Agha Muhammad Akmal Khan, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. M. Imran Ghazi, Advocate for respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nvs\nM/s Ali Aqib & Company." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24524", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6561 = 2023 SLD 6561", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "ITR No.02 of 2022. Date of order 23.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate / Legal Advisor for applica11t-department.\nMr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate for\nrespondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, LIO, Multan.\nVs.\n M/s Hafeez Ghee & General Mills (Pvt.) Limited, Multan ." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24525", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6562 = 2023 SLD 6562", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=182,119(4),182(1)", - "Case #": "I.T.R.A NO. 654 OF 2010, heard on: 02.12.2011. Date of order: 02.12.2011.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE FAISAL ARAB. Mr. JUSTICE AQEEL ABBASI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: Commissioner (Legal) Inland Revenue, Large Taxpayers Unit, through Mr.Muhammad Altaf Mun, Advocate.\nvs\nRespondent: M/s Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24526", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6563 = 2023 SLD 6563", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1),111(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2641/LB/2022, heard on: 19.09.2022. Date of order: 03.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER. NASIR MEHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Mr. Abuzar Hussain along with Mr. Baber Zaman, Advocates.\nRespondent by: Mr. Hassan Mabroor, D,R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Haroon Brothers Steel, Gujranwala,\nvs\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24527", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6564 = 2023 SLD 6564", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,9,38", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 50725 of 2022. Dates of Hearing 30.08.2022, 31.08.2022, 13.09.2022, 23.09.2022, 15.09.2022, 20.09.2022, 03.10.2022, 04.10.2022, 05.10.0222, 06.10.2022, 10.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ALI BAQAR NAJAFI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners By: Mr. Muhammad Azhar Siddique, advocate.\nM/s Khalil-ur-Rehman, Qamar-uz-Zaman Cheema.\nRespondents By: Mr. Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney\nGeneral, and Ch. Usman Ghani, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Azhar Siddique.\n Vs. \nFederation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24528", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6565 = 2023 SLD 6565", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=20", - "Case #": "Suit No. B-39 of 2021. Date of Hearing: 10.11.2022, 11.11.2022 and 07.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff: Through Mr. Bahzad Haider Advocate.\nDefendant: Through Ms. Alizeh Bashir Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Bank of Punjab.\nVersus\nM/s Hascol Petroleum Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24529", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6566 = 2023 SLD 6566", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 50725 of 2022. 30.08.2022, 31.08.2022, 13.09.2022, 23.09.2022, 15.09.2022, 20.09.2022, 03.10.2022, 04.10.2022,\n05.10.0222, 06.10.2022, 10.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ALI BAQAR NAJAFI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners By Mr. Muhammad Azhar Siddique, advocate.\nM/s Khalil-ur-Rehman, Qamar-uz-Zaman Cheema, \nRespondents By Mr. Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney\nGeneral, and Ch. Usman Ghani, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Azhar Siddique.\n Vs\n. Federation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24530", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6567 = 2023 SLD 6567", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,205,122(5),111(1)", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.33-K OF 2018 (On appeal against judgment dated 25.07.2017 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Karachi Bench in Appeal No.191(K) CS/2015). Date of Hearing: 26.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL. MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR. MR. JUSTICE SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants: Mr. Irfan Mir Halepota, ASC Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, AOR.\nFor the Respondent: Malik Naeem Iqbal, ASC Mr. Ghulam Rasool Mangi, AOR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Federation of Pakistan through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue FBR House, Islamabad and others.\nVERSUS\nZahid Malik." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24531", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6568 = 2023 SLD 6568", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4145 of 2022 (Against the judgment dated 06.09.2022 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Customs Reference No. 21-P/2022).Date of Hearing: 06.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA. Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. Yousaf Ali, ASC.\nFor the Respondents: N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs, MCC (E&C) Customs House, Peshawar and another.\nVersus\nZain ul Abidin and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24532", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6569 = 2023 SLD 6569", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1J5NHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1461 of 2016. Date of order 08.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMAR FAROOQ, CHIEF JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Farid Bukhari, Advocate for the petitioner. Barrister Atif Rahim Burki and Mr. Ahsan Hameed Dogar, Advocates for the respondents. Mr. Fazal Ur Rehman Khan Niazi, learned Deputy\nAttorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Askari Bank Limited.\n Vs\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24533", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6570 = 2023 SLD 6570", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(d)", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITIONS NO.648-L, 649-L and 650-L OF 2021. (Against the order dated 26.01.2021 passed by the passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.Rs. No.4919, 4922 and 4923/2021.)Date of Hearing : 31.05.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN. MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR AND Mr. JUSTICE SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Ch. Muhammad Shakeel, ASC Mr. Naeem Hassan, Secretary (Litigation), FBR (in all cases).\nFor the Respondent : Syed Mansoor Ali Bukhari, ASC (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office, (RTO) Lahore.\nvs\nMian Liaqat Ali Proprietor, Liaqat Hospital, House No.6, Street No.6, Lal Pul, Panj Pir Road, Mughalpura, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24534", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6571 = 2023 SLD 6571", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "W.P.No.1567/2017. Date of order. 08.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Hyder Ali Khan, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Riaz Hussain Azam Bopara, Advocate for respondents No.2 and 3. Mr. Azmat Bashir Tarar, learned AAG.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited.\nVs.\nPakistan and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24535", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6572 = 2023 SLD 6572", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.52 of 2016, heard on: 02.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Abad-ur-Rehman, Advocate.\nRespondent-Department by: Mr. Izhar-ul-Haq Sheikh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Basfa Textile (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore.\nVersus\nDeputy Director (Customs), Lahore & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24536", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6573 = 2023 SLD 6573", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.52 of 2016, heard on: 02.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Abad-ur-Rehman, Advocate.\nRespondent-Department by: Mr. Izhar-ul-Haq Sheikh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Basfa Textile (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore.\nVersus\nDeputy Director (Customs), Lahore & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24537", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6574 = 2023 SLD 6574", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 10403 of 2019. Date of hearing 24.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ SALEEM SHEIKH, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Junaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate. \nFor the Respondents: Mian Azhar Saleem, Advocate, with Hamza\nKhalid Randhawa, Legal Head of The Bank of Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Bashir Ali Shahzad.\nVs.\nThe Bank of Punjab etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24538", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6575 = 2023 SLD 6575", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)Companies Ordinance, 1984=231", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO.3263 OF 2022. [Against judgment dated 06.06.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court Islamabad in W.P. No.2607/2012] Date of Hearing : 02.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA A. MALIK, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Salman Aslam Butt, Sr.ASC Mr. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, ASC.\nFor the Respondent(s) : Mr. Sultan Mazhar Sher Khan, ASC\nMr. Ibrar Saeed and Syed Asif Ali Public Prosecutors (SECP).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Saif Power Limited.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Civil Secretariat Islamabad and others ." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24539", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6576 = 2023 SLD 6576", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=105, 224, 218(3),101(3)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.5851 of 2023. Dates of Hearing 30.01.2023, 03.02.2023, 09.02.2023 and 10.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by Senator Barrister Syed Ali Zafar, ASC, Uzair Karamat Bhandari, ASC, Barrister Ahmad Pansota, ASC.\nRespondent(s) by Mr. Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat, ASC with\nMuhammad Nasir Chohan, ASC, Rana Asadullah, ASC,", - "Petitioner Name:": "Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf through its General Secretary Asad Umar.\nV/S \nGovernor of Punjab and another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24540", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6577 = 2023 SLD 6577", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDYzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 10403 of 2019. Date of hearing 24.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ SALEEM SHEIKH, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Junaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate.\nFor the Respondents: Mian Azhar Saleem, Advocate, with Hamza\nKhalid Randhawa, Legal Head of The Bank of Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Bashir Ali Shahzad.\nVs.\nThe Bank of Punjab etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24541", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6578 = 2023 SLD 6578", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "P.T.R No.173 of 2013. Date of Hearing. 12-01-2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPLICANTS BY: M/s Liaqat Ali Chaudhry, Shehzad Ahmad\nCheema, Malik Abdullah Raza and Rohil Ahmad Khan, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: M/s Syed Muhammad Ijaz, Mansoor Beg,\nMuhammad Hamza Rauf, Mohsin Ehsan Warraich, Muhammad Imran Khan, Ghulam Ahmad Ansari, Ashiq Ali Rana and Fahim Khadim, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nVersus\nM/s Prime Commercial Bank Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24542", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6579 = 2023 SLD 6579", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=34", - "Case #": "Misc. Appeal No. 02 of 2022. Date of Hearing: 06.12.2022, 20.12.2022 and 18.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Through Mr. Mayhar Kazi Advocate.\nRespondent: Through Mr. S. Imran Ali Shamsi, Law Officer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mckinsey & Companies Pakistan (Private) Limited.\nVersus\nSecurities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24543", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6580 = 2023 SLD 6580", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No. 3134 and 3135 of 2022. (Against the judgment dated 22.06.2022 of the High Court of Blochistan, Quetta passed in Sales Tax Reference Applications No. 03 and 04 of 2021). Date of Hearing: 30.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Ahsan Ahmad Khokhar, ASC. (In both cases) Khalid Aziz, Assistant Director, RTO, Quetta.\nFor the Respondent: Mr. Tariq Mahmood, Sr. ASC. (In CP. 3134/22) (has filed caveat)\nFor the Respondent: Not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, (in both cases)\nRegional Tax Office, Quetta.\nVersus\nM/s Hajvairy Steel Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Quetta. (in CP. 3134/22)\nM/s Ghazi Steel Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Quetta." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24544", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6581 = 2023 SLD 6581", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947=23C(4)", - "Case #": "Case No. W.P.No.36748/2022. Date of order 01.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Waqas Ahmad Mir, Mian Tariq Hassan, Hassan Ali and\nJahangir Dogar, Advocates for the petitioner. M/s Rehan Nawaz and Dr. Shahid Raza, Advocates for respondent-SBP. Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Jan Muhammad Tayab.\n Vs \nFederation of Pakistan & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24545", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6582 = 2023 SLD 6582", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 35 of 2022. Date of Hearing: 12.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR IJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Advocate\nRespondents by: Barrister Atif Rahim Barki, Advocate for respondents no.2 to 4. Ch. Tahir Mehmood, A.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Fairdeal Exchange Company (Private) Limited.\nVS\nFOP through Ministry of Finance and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24546", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6583 = 2023 SLD 6583", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C", - "Case #": "C.P.3282-L, 3401-L TO 3403-L, 3449-L, 3450-L, 3504-L TO 3516-L, 3535-L TO 3537-L, 3521-L, 3534-L, 3538-L, 3573-L OF 2022 AND 9-L OF 2023. Date of Hearing : 06.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ MR. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner(s) : Mrs. Asma Hamid, ASC. Mr. Aamir Yasir, DC\nMr. Badshah Chief Commissioner video link from Lahore.\nFor the Respondent(s) : Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC in CP No.3282-L, 3449-L, 3516-L) Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR Mr. Shazib Masud, ASC video link from Lahore in C.P.3401-L/2022 Mr. Mansoor Usman Awan, ASC video link from Lahore in CP No.3402-L, 3403-L, 3450-L, 3506-L) Mr. Shahbaz Butt, ASC video link from Lahore in CP No.3405-L, 3511-L, 3514- L, 3515-L) Mr. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, ASC in CP No.3510-L Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Khan, ASC video link from Lahore in CP No.3534-L.", - "Petitioner Name:": "C.P.3282-L/2022 (Against the order dated 29.09.2022 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in WP No. 58672/2022) The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore.\n v.\n Service Industries Limited, Lahore, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24547", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6584 = 2023 SLD 6584", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=XXVII-A", - "Case #": "Write Petition No. 605 of 2023. Date of order 17.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SULTAN TANVIR AHMED, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate for the petitioner. Qazi Muhammad Nauman Sarwar, Assistant Advocate General on Court\"\"s call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Kamran Khan \nvs\nFederation of Pakistan & 3 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24548", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6585 = 2023 SLD 6585", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA No.81/PB/2018 (Tax Period July 2013 to June 2017). Date of Hearing: 09.01.2023. Date of Order: 20.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate.\nRespondent By: Mr. Saeed Ullah Bhatti,DR .", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Cherat Cement Company Ltd., Lakarai Nowshera.\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (AuditIV),Corporate Zone, RTO, Peshawar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24549", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6586 = 2023 SLD 6586", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No. 2016 and 2017 of 2022. Date of hearing 16.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicant: Mr. Shahzada Mazhar, ASC. \nFor the Respondent: Mr. M. Nadeem Qureshi, ASC. Ms. Sannia Rasool Bhuuto, Asst. Collector.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Middle East Construction Company, Karachi.\nvs\nThe Collector of Customs Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24550", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6587 = 2023 SLD 6587", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1116/KB of 2022. Date of hearing 21.11.2022. Date of order 20.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER. AAMIR MASOOD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Aleem, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Abdul Wahid Sher, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Sadruddin Gilani, Karachi.\nvs\nThe Commissioner-IR, Zone-III, LTO, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24551", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6588 = 2023 SLD 6588", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121(1)/129,114(4)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1057/LB/2010. Date of hearing. 09.09.2011. Date of order 02.11.2011.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD NAWAZ BAJWA, JUDICIAL MEMBER. ABDUL RAUF, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mrs. Nawal Sheikh, D.R.\nRespondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR (RTO), Sialkot.\nvs\nMr. Muhammad Yasin S/o Sadiq Ali, Through Mst Shehnaz Kausar W/o Muhammad Yasin(Agent), Noor Kot, Shakergarh N.T.N 59 Audit 04-TR-263." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24552", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6589 = 2023 SLD 6589 = 2025 PTD 292", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDWXk", - "Key Words:": "Suspension and Blacklisting of Sales Tax Registration – Due Process\nThe appellant, a textile mill, was initially suspended and later blacklisted by the tax authorities on the grounds that it was non-existent at its registered address and that its declared closing stock was not available. However, physical verification reports conducted twice by the department confirmed the appellant’s existence at the given address, and online verification of the taxpayer’s profile was also on record. The department failed to initiate proceedings under S. 11(2) or S. 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, before blacklisting the appellant and ordering tax recovery. Instead, the blacklisting was done first, and recovery proceedings were initiated afterward. The Commissioner (Appeals) later annulled the recovery order, confirming that no sales tax demand was outstanding against the appellant.\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue annulled the blacklisting order, holding that the blacklisting was unjustified and due process was not followed. The appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,11(2),22,24,25,38,38(2),38(3),46Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 217/KB of 2021, decided on 29th August, 2022. Date of hearing: 17th August, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND AAMIR MAQSOOD, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faraz Haroon for Appellant.\nQarib Abbas, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MURTAZA A. HASSAN\nVs\nThe COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ENFORCEMENT II CTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24553", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6590 = 2023 SLD 6590", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.15880/2021. Date of hearing 27.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners/Appellants by: M/s Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Raza Imtiaz\nSiddiqui, Shehryar Kasuri and Humzah Sheikh, Advocates. \nRespondents by: M/s Ahmed Pervaiz, Ahtasham Mukhtar and Saffi ul Hassan, Advocates Malik Khalid Shafique, AAG-Pk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited etc.\nVs.\nThe Federal Board of Revenue etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24554", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6591 = 2023 SLD 6591", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,282", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 04 of 2022. Date of Hearing: 30.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners: Through Mr. Muhammad Abdur Rahman, Advocate.\nSECP: Through Syed Ibad, Law Officer, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "In the matter of The Chancellor Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford.\nAnd\nOxford University Press Pakistan (SMC-Private) Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24555", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6592 = 2023 SLD 6592", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Spl. HCA No.210 of 2019. Date of Hearing: 28.02.2023. Date of Decision 06.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE IRFAN SADAT KHAN. Mr. JUSTICE ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants Through Mr. Sami Ahsan, Advocate\nRespondent Through Mr. Aijaz Hussain Shirazi, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed Wajahat Hussain Zaidi & another.\n Vs.\n United Bank Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24556", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6593 = 2023 SLD 6593", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D- 34 of 1995. Constitution Petition No. D- 2659 of 1994. Constitution Petition No. D- 81 of 1995, heard on: 09.02.2023. Date of Judgment: 08.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR. Mr. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners: M.F.M.Y Industries Limited (in C.P No. D-34/1995)\nThrough Mr. Imran Iqbal Khan, Advocate. M/s. Sapphire Textile Mills Ltd. (in C.P No. D-2659/1994) M/s. Gatron (Industries) Limited (in C.P No.D-81 of 1995) Through Mr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Advocate. \nRespondent No. 1: Federation of Pakistan Through Mr. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General\nRespondents: Pakistan through Secretary & others Through M/s. S. Mohsin Imam Wasti, Muhammad Rashid Arfi and As", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24557", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6594 = 2023 SLD 6594", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25C,13(a)", - "Case #": "SCRA 141 & 142 of 2010, heard on: 23.02.2023. Date of announcement: 14.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUDGE. AGHA FAISAL, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicant : Mr. Pervaiz Ahmed Memon, Advocate Mr. Muhammad Rashid Arfi, Advocate\nFor the Respondent : Mr. Daniyal Muzaffar, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs, MCC PaCCS.\nvs. \nAbdul Wahid & Co." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24558", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6595 = 2023 SLD 6595", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=2", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO.409-L OF 2021. (Against the judgment dated 12.11.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in STA.No.13/2005). Date of Hearing: 20.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA. MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI.\nMR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, ASC. (Through Video Link from Lahore)\nFor the Respondent : N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Lahore. \nVersus\nM/s Qadbros Engineering (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24559", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6596 = 2023 SLD 6596", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.15880/2021. Date of hearing 27.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUDGE. MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners/Appellants by: M/s Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Raza Imtiaz\nSiddiqui, Shehryar Kasuri and Humzah Sheikh, Advocates.\nRespondents by: M/s Ahmed Pervaiz, Ahtasham Mukhtar and Saffi\nul Hassan, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited etc.\nVs.\nThe Federal Board of Revenue etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24560", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6597 = 2023 SLD 6597", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(c),111(3)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 512/IB/2023. MA(Stay No. 452/IB/2023. Date of hearing 09.03.2023. Date of order. 09.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Hafiz Muhammad Idrees, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Sami-Ullah Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ayesha Atta, House No. 276-A, Main Sumbal Road, F-10/4, Islamabad.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, South Zone, RTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24561", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6598 = 2023 SLD 6598", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2018=10", - "Case #": "CP D 5389 of 2022. Date/s of hearing: 14.03.2023. Date of announcement: 14.03.2023,", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AFHA FAISAL, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Messrs. Sardar Muhammad Ishaque, Amjat Hayat, Muhammad Faisal Qasmi, Umer Akhund, Yasir Ali, Uzair Qadir Shoro and Rana Sakhawat Ali, advocates for the petitioners.\nMessrs. Irfan Mir Halepota, Khalid Rajpar, Masooda Siraj, \nDr. Shah Nawaz, Dr.. Huma Sodher, Mohabbat Hussain Awan, Faheem Raza, Muhammad Rashid Arfi, Asif Ali Siyal, Ghulam Mujtaba Sahito, Mirza Nadeem Taqi, Fozia M. Murad, Sheza Malik, Aamir Raza, Tassaduq Nadeem, Aamir Ali Shaikh,\nAsad Ali Khan Sherwani, advocates, G.M. Bhutto (Assistant Attorney General), Muhammad Farooq Khan (Law Officer) and Faraz Ahmed (Appraising & Valuation Officer), for the respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Young Tech (Pvt.) Limited.\nvs.\nThe Federation of Pakistan & Others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24562", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6599 = 2023 SLD 6599 = 2025 PTD 267", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDVXk", - "Key Words:": "Selection for Audit under Income Tax Ordinance\nDetails:\nTaxpayers challenged audit notices issued under Section 214D (inserted in 2015, deleted in 2018) read with Sections 177 & 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, arguing that after its deletion, audit proceedings could not continue.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the petitions, ruling that:\nAudit proceedings were valid under existing provisions S. 177 & S. 122.\nOmission of S. 214D did not impact ongoing audits, as it merely explained audit selection.\nNo vested right accrued to taxpayers due to its deletion.\nConclusion:\nThe audit notices were upheld as lawful, and the constitutional petitions were dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=118,119,122,122(9),137(1),177,214A,214D(1)(a),214(1)(b)", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-412, D-147, D-278, D-279, D-1411, D-1142, D-3266 of 2021 and D-8009 of 2022, decided on 15th March, 2023. Date of hearing: 9th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR. Mr. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ovais Ali Shah, Maryum Riaz, Fizzah Bucha, Muhammad Mushtaq and Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Taseer Khan and Ayaz Sarwar Jamali for Respondents.\nQazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S UNITED CARPETS LTD. THROUGH DIRECTOR \nVERSUS\nPAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY (REVENUE DIVISION) EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24563", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6600 = 2023 SLD 6600", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=3, 4, 9, 10-A, 14, 18, 24,25", - "Case #": "Suit No. 08 of 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AMJAD ALI SAHITO, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff : Syed Tahir Imam Rizvi through M/s. Khawaja Shams-ul-Islam, Shahzad Mehmood and Imtiaz Ali Shah, Advocates\nDefendants 1 to 25 : Province of Sindh & Others through Mr. Asad Iftikhar,\nAssistant Advocate General, Sindh along with Mr. Farrukh Aziz,\nAssistant Director (Legal) SPPRA Defendants 4-A & 5-A : M/s. Sarmad Hani and Zarar Qadir Shoro, Advocates along with\nMr. Zain-ul-Abideen Ansari, Projector Director PMIU, Sindh\nBasic Education Program.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed Tahir Imam Rizvi .\nVS\n Province of Sindh & Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24564", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6601 = 2023 SLD 6601", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No.2582/IB/2022. Date of Hearing: 11.01.2023. Date of Order: 11.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Anwar-ul-Haq, ACA\nRespondent By: Ms. Sobia Mazhar, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Capital Foods (Private) Limited, 15-E, Naseerabad, Peshawar Road,\nRawalpindi.\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, CTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24565", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6602 = 2023 SLD 6602", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,7,14,22,23,26", - "Case #": "STA No. 223(IB) 2022. Date of hearing 16.02.2023. Date of order 16.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER, M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Abbasi Enterprises, Sunny Bank, Murree.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24566", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6603 = 2023 SLD 6603", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA (Stay) No.1514 (IB) 2022 In: ITA No. 1624/IB/2022. Date of Hearing 22.03.2023. Date of Order 22.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER. M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Taxpayer by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate.\nDepartment by: Mrs. Misbah Noreen, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sheikh Naseem Akhtar, Raja Ba zar, Rawalpindi.\nVersus\nRespondent Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24567", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6604 = 2023 SLD 6604", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(43A), 3(9A)", - "Case #": "STA No.172/IB/2023. MA (Stay) STA No.110/IB/2023, Date of hearing \n22.03.2023. Date of order 22.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. .AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr.Ahsan Iftikhar, ITP & Mr.Zahid. Shafique, Advocate\nMr.Naiz Ahmed, D.R\nRespondent by: Mr.Naiz Ahmed, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Comfy Shoes, Shop No.8/2 B, Grace Plaza, market, NTN:1249295 Commercial Rawalpindi. \nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue City Zone, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24568", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6605 = 2023 SLD 6605", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2359(IB) 2023, MA (AG) No. 10(IB) 2023, Date of hearing 01.03.2023, Date of order 06.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER. M.M.AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Medpoint Distributors, Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24569", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6606 = 2023 SLD 6606", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=414", - "Case #": "C.M.No.02 of 2018 IN C.O.No.39619 of 2017. Date of order 12.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. M. Asad Buttar, Advocate for Applicant. M/s Adil Umar Bandial and Hashim Rathore, Advocates for the Petitioner-SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Deputy Registrar of Companies.\n V/S \nMukhtar Textiles Mills Limited and 8 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24570", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6607 = 2023 SLD 6607", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.175411 of 2018. Date of hearing 16.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff(s) by: M/s Adil Umar Bandial, Sajjad Ali, Kh. Fahad Ahmad, Asad Farzand and Muhammad Waqas, Advocates. \nDefendant(s) by Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, ASC with Akif Majeed and Hassan Ismail, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB Bank Limited.\n V/S\n Tanveer Spinning and Weaving Mills and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24571", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6608 = 2023 SLD 6608", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2016=103A", - "Case #": "CP D 8569 of 2018. Dates of hearing : 14.02.2023 15.02.2023. 16.02.2023. 22.02.2023 23.02.2023 27.02.2023. 28.02.2023. Date of announcement : 28.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUDGE. AGHA FAISAL, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Messrs. Jam Zeeshan, Khalid Javed Khan, Farogh Naseem, Ovais Ali Shah, Rashid Anwar, Uzair Qadir Shoro, Umer Akhund, Marium Riaz, Umer Ilyas Khan, Fizzah Bucha, Ameer Haider Khan, Sami-ur-Rehman Khan, Fahad Khan, Ahmed Hussain, Imran Iqbal Khan, Adil Saeed, Salman Aziz, Faiz Durrani, Ghulam Muhammad & Saima Anjum, Advocates for Petitioners. Messrs. Shahid Ali Qureshi, Huma Sodher, Rana Sakhawat Ali, Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, S. Ahsan Ali Shah, Saad Shafiq Siddiqui, Muhammad Aqeel\nQureshi, Tauqeer Ahmed Seehar, Hafeezullah, Fahim Ali, Imtiaz Mansoor Solangi, Sajjad Ali Solangi, Zain Mustafa Soomro, Kashif Nazeer, Manzar Hussain Memon, Irfan Mir Halepota, Faheem Ali, Farha Naz Qazi, Khurram Shehzad, Nadir Hussain Tunio, Bushra Zia for Zubair Qureshi, Ali Tahir Soomro, Tahir Khalil, Barkat Ali Metlo, Imran Ali Metlo, Fayaz Ali Metlo, Arshad Ali Tunio, Muhammad Idrees Rahimoon, Preetam Das, Abdul Mujeeb Zeeshan, Ayaz Sarwar Jamali, M. Taseer Khan Advocates, G.M. Bhutto (Assistant Attorney General), Qazi Ayazuddin (Assistant Attorney General) for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "International Brands Limited.\nvs.\nFederation of Pakistan & Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24572", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6609 = 2023 SLD 6609", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDUXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 774/KB/2022. Date of hearing 27.02.2023. Date of order 20.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMTIAZ ALI SOLANGI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nadeem Jatoi, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Abdul Karim,DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Ashraf, Karachi.\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue. Zone-III,RTO-I, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24573", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6610 = 2023 SLD 6610", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9)", - "Case #": "WRIT PETITION NO.1760 OF 2021, heard on: 29.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by : Mr. Muhammad Imran ul Haq Advocate, in all petitions.\nRespondents by : Ali Nawaz Kharal Advocate in all petitions.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Rawat Oil & Ghee Mills Private Ltd.\nVS.\nAdditional Commissioner (Audit-I) Inland Revenue, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24574", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6611 = 2023 SLD 6611", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "E.F.A.No.20277 of 2023. Date of order 27.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE. JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Imran Mohammad Naeem, Advocate for the Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Humaira Mehboob.\n V/S\n Summit Bank Limited etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24575", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6612 = 2023 SLD 6612", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "ICA No. 18654 of 2023. Date of order 20.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, JUDGE. MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, \nJUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Nadeem Ahmad Sheikh, Advocate for appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. Asma Abdul Waris.\nvs.\nState Bank of Pakistan & 04 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24576", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6613 = 2023 SLD 6613", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=62", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Application Nos. 973 to 977 of 2008. Date of Hearing: 28.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicants: Through Mr. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi Advocate.\nRespondent: Through Mr. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commission (Legal Division).\nVersus\nState Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24577", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6614 = 2023 SLD 6614", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "I.C.A No.83099 of 2022. Date of Hearing. 08-03-2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUDGE. RAHEEL KAMRAM, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANTS BY: M/s Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Shahryar Kasuri,\nRaza Imtiaz Siddiqui and Muhammad Hamza, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: M/s Ahmad Pervaiz, Saffi ul Hassan Advocates.\nMr. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Millat Tractors Limited.\nVersus\nFederal Board of Revenue & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24578", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6615 = 2023 SLD 6615", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=224(2)", - "Case #": "CONSTITUTION PETITION NO.5 OF 2023. Dates of hearing : 27.03.2023, 28.03.2023, 29.03.2023. 30.03.2023, 31.03.2023 & 03.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ. Mr. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN. Mr. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner(s) : Syed Ali Zafar, ASC. Mr. Gohar Ali Khan, ASC\nassisted by Syed Haider Ali Zafar, Adv. For the Federation : Mr. Mansoor Usman Awan, Attorney General for Pakistan. assisted by\nMs. Mehwish Batool Sardar, Adv. Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. AGP.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Addl. AG. Mr. Hamood Uz Zaman Khan,\nSecretary Defence Mr. Aamir Mehmood, Addl. Sec. Finance.For ECP : Mr. Sajeel Shehryar Swati, ASC. Mr. Irfan Qadir, ASC. \nMr. Omer Hamid Khan, Sec. ECP. Mr. Zafar Iqbal Hussain, Spl. Sec. ECP. Mr. M. Arshad, DG Law ECP. Mr. Khurram Shehzad, ADG(L) ECP. Mr. Ms. Saima Tariq Janjua, Dy. Dir. ECP. Mr. Falak Sher, Legal Consultant. For Govt. of KPK : Mr. Aamir Javed, AG KP Mian Shafaqat Jan, Addl. AG KP. For Govt. of Punjab : Mr. Shangul, AG Punjab (thr. Video Link from Lahore)Mr. Wasim Mumtaz Malik,\nAddl. AG Punjab. Mr. Sanaullah Zahid, Addl. AG. Barrister M. Mumtaz Ali, Addl. AG", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mohammad Sibtain Khan & others …Petitioner(s) .\nVersus\nElection Commission of Pakistan thr. Chief Election Commissioner,\nIslamabad and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24579", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6616 = 2023 SLD 6616", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "PTR No.147 of 2013, heard on: 29.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.UDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Imran Rasool, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Hameed Bukhsh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, LTU, Lahore.\nVersus\nM/s Shezan International Ltd., Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24580", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6617 = 2023 SLD 6617", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA(Cond) No. 19/MB of 2022. ITA No. 381/MB of 2022 & M.A (Stay) No. 125/MB of 2023, In ITA No. 381/KB of 2022, U/S 131-5.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Shabir Fakhar-uddin, ITP.\nRespondent by: Mr. Qaswar Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Muhammad Yousaf Shah, Multan\nvs\nThe CIR RTO, MUltan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24581", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6618 = 2023 SLD 6618", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C. P. No. D-7029 of 2021, heard on: 17.02.2023 and 30.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AHMED ALI M. SHAIKH, CJ. and YOUSAF ALI SAYEED, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Maria Ahmed, Advocate, for the Petitioners in C. P. No. D-7029/21.\nRashid Mureed, Advocate, for the Petitioner in C. P. No. D-452/22.\nKazi Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, DAG. Khalid Rajper, Advocate for the Collectorate of Customs Appraisement (East), Karachi .", - "Petitioner Name:": "Salman Talibuddin.\nVersus\nThe Government of Pakistan & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24582", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6619 = 2023 SLD 6619", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDTXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=30,31", - "Case #": "W.P. No.4201/2018. Date of Hearing : 15.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR, JUDGE.sales tax a", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by : Ms Zainab Janjua, Advocate.\nRespondents by : Mr Abdullah Aleem Qureshi, Advocate. Malik Umair Saleem, Advocate. Mr Manzoor Hussain, Advocate. Mr Khalid Mehmood Dhoon, Asstt. Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Guarantee-Salex-Thales Joint Venture.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24583", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6620 = 2023 SLD 6620", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "STR No.97 of 2013, heard on: 12.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.UDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant-department by: Mr. Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Advocate / Legal Advisor.\nRespondent-taxpayer by: Mr. Abdus Salam Sajid, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Large Taxpayers, Karachi.\nVersus\nM/s Adam Sugar Mills Ltd., Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24584", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6621 = 2023 SLD 6621", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "Ist Civil Appeal No.63 / 2018. Date of Hearing: 01.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE IRFAN SAADAT KHAN. Mr. JUSTICE ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant Through Mr. Abbad-ul-Hasnain, Advocate\nRespondent-1 Through Syed Aijaz Hussain Shirazi, Advocate\nRespondent-4 Through M/s.", - "Petitioner Name:": "[Asif Munawar.\n Vs. \nBank Islami Pakistan and 02 other." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24585", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6622 = 2023 SLD 6622", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=294(3A), 3(9A)", - "Case #": "STA No. 172/IB/2022. MA(Stay) STA No. 223/IB/2022. Date of hearing 09.03.2022. Date of order 09.03.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Furqan Ansari, H-No-B-1054, B-Block, Sattelite Town, Rawalpindi, (Wrongly mentioned by the department M/s P & J Emporium, Civic Centre, Phase-4, Bahria Town, Rawalpindi.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (City Zone), RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24586", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6623 = 2023 SLD 6623", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=140", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 2510/2017. Date of decision. 22.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONER BY: Mr. Waheed Shahzad Butt, Advocate.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Mr. Adnan Hiader Randhawa, Advocate for the respondents. Mr. Aqeel Akhtar Raja, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MASUD REZA, S/o. Naseem Asghar Naqvee, 24-A, Model Town, Lahore.\nvs\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through PRESIDENT (Appellate Authority under Section 32 of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Odinance, 2000), President's Secretariat (public), Awan-e- Saddar, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24587", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6624 = 2023 SLD 6624", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(d)", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITIONS NO.648-L, 649-L and 650-L OF 2021. (Against order dated 26.01.2021 passed by the passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.Rs. No.4919, 4922 and 4923/2021.) Date of Hearing : 31.05.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN. MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR. \nMr. JUSTICE SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner : Ch. Muhammad Shakeel, ASC Mr. Naeem Hassan, Secretary (Litigation), FBR (in all cases) For the Respondent : Syed Mansoor Ali Bukhari, ASC (in all cases)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office, (RTO) Lahore (in all cases)\nvs \nMian Liaqat Ali Proprietor, Liaqat Hospital, House No.6, Street No.6, Lal Pul, Panj Pir Road, Mughalpura, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24588", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6625 = 2023 SLD 6625", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1539/KB-2022. Date of hearing 21.09.2022. Date of order 03.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. TAUQEER IRTIZA, A.M,.QAZI ANWER KAMAL, J.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Waleed, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Masood Alam, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Swift Management Services, Karachi.\nvs\nThe Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Zone-III,RTO-II,Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24589", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6626 = 2023 SLD 6626", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=136(2)", - "Case #": "Income Tax Cases No.233 to 238 of 2001. Date of Hearing: 03.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, Mr. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Through Mr. Munawwar Ali Memon Advocate.\nRespondent: Through Mr. Abdul Khaliq Khatri Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Income Tax.\nVersus\nKarachi Stock Exchange (G) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24590", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6627 = 2023 SLD 6627", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No.3286 to 3289 of 2017. (Against the consolidated judgment of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad dated 15.06.2017, passed in ITR Nos.160 of 2016, etc.), heard on: 02.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench-I: Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, CJ. Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Munib Akhtar.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner: Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC. (In all cases) Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR.\nFor the respondents: Mr. Babar Bilal, ASC. (In all cases) a/w Shahid Soomro, Commissioner (Legal).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Snamprogetti Engineering B.V. thr. its Special Attorney (in all cases).\nVersus\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue Zone-II, L.T.U, Islamabad, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24591", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6628 = 2023 SLD 6628", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reform Act, 2013=10)4)", - "Case #": "COMPLAINT No. 1345/SB/IT/2023. Date of order 27.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. ASIF MEHMOOD JAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer: Mr. Muhammad Naseer Butt, Advisor.\nAppraised by: Mr. Muhammad Tariq Akhtar, Advisor.\nAuthorized Representative: Mr. Tariq Abdul Majid.\nDepartmental Representatives: Mr. Haider Abbas, DCIR, RTO, Islamabad.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Abdul Majid, House No. 2, Street No. 50, F-7/4, Islamabad.\nvs\nThe Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24592", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6629 = 2023 SLD 6629", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46Sales Tax Rules, 2006=3(9A), 40C", - "Case #": "STA No. 227/LB/2023. Date of hearing 03.05.2023. Date of order 03.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abdul Waheed, Advocate, Along with, Mr. Adnan ur Rehman, ITP,\nRespondent: Mr. Zain Ul Abideen, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Tez Raftar Metro Centre,\nvs\nCIR, RTO, Gujranwala" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24593", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6630 = 2023 SLD 6630", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2011/LB/2022. Date of hearing 23.08.2022, Date of order 31.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ashraf Qamar, Advocate. \nRespondent by: Ch. Murtaza Ali, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Khurram Shakoor Proprietor of Naz Telecom, Data Gunj Bakhsh Town, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24594", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6631 = 2023 SLD 6631", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(c),9", - "Case #": "W.P.No.15549 of 2013, heard on: 14.12.2016.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Kaleem Ullah Qureshi, Advocate\nRespondents No.2 & 3 by: Mr. Muhammad Saleem Iqbal, Advocate\nRespondents No.4 by: M/s. Syed Fayyaz Hussain Zaidi & Syed M. Nabi, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Shandar Vegetable & Ghee Mills.\nVersus\n Learned Judge Banking Court No.II, Multan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24595", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6632 = 2023 SLD 6632", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1740/KB/2022. Date of hearing 06.03.2023. Date of order 08.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. M. AMINULLAH SIDDIQUI, J.M. DR. ABDUL LATEEF MIAN, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Mehtab Khan, Advocate and Mr. M. Hasham Khan, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Altaf HUssain Memon. D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABID HUSSAIN, kARACHI.\nvs\nThe CIR Zone-I, RTO-II, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24596", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6633 = 2023 SLD 6633", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "ICA No.1197 of 2021. Date of Hearing: 05.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: M/S Waqar A. Sheikh and Rana Mehtab, Advocates for Appellant-department.\nRespondents by: M/S Ali Sibtain Fazli, Abad-ur-Rehman and Hasham Ahmad Khan, Advocates for the", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Collector of Customs, Dry Port, Lahore.\nV/S \nBilal Akbar etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24597", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6634 = 2023 SLD 6634", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No.53 of 2014. DATE OF HEARING: 06.12.2016.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANTS BY: Malik Sajjad Haider Maitla, Advocate.\nRESPONDENT No.1 BY: Mr. Muhammad Shakil Ch., Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. Tasleem Fatima, etc. \nVs\nThe Bank of Punjab, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24598", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6635 = 2023 SLD 6635", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=140", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2622/2022. DATE OF HEARING: 15.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONER BY: Mr. Uzair Shafie, Advocate.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Sheikh Anwar ul Haq, Advocate for FBR. Mr. Farrukh Shahzad Dall, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Pakistan LNG Limited through its duly Authorized Representative.\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan through the Secretary Revenue Division, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24599", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6636 = 2023 SLD 6636", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10(1)", - "Case #": "Complaint No.11 O5IQTAICUST12O23.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. ASIF MEHMOOD JAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer Mr TausifAhmad Qureshi, Advisor\nAppraisement Officer : Dr. Arslan Subuctageen, Advisor\nAuthorized Representative Mr Muhammad Rahim Mandokhail, Advocate\nDepartmental Representative Mr. lnamullah Wazir, D.D l&l-Customs Karachi", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Noor Ahmed sb Ghulam Muhammad, do Mazhar All Khan, Advocate, Sadbar Jan Law Associates, Office 1-25/20 Entrance Jinnah Cloth Market, Jinnah Road, Quetta.\nVersus\nThe Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24600", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6637 = 2023 SLD 6637", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10(1)", - "Case #": "Complaint No.52341QTA1lT!2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr.ASIF MEHMOOD JAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer : Mr. TausifAhmad Qureshi, Advisor\nAppraisement Officer Mr. Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor\nAuthorized Representative complainant in person\nDepartmental Representatives Mr. Shoaib Hashmi, ACIR, RTO, Quetta", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad lkram, Office No. 4-5, Al Rehman Center, Model-TownrQuettar—\nVersus\nThe Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24601", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6638 = 2023 SLD 6638", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1)", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No.64481 of 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPLICANT BY Raja Sikandar Khan, Advocate.\nRESPONDENT BY Mr. Shahbaz Butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nVersus \nMuhammad Afzal Cheema." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24602", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6639 = 2023 SLD 6639", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDRXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46(1)(b)", - "Case #": "STA No. 811/LB/2023. Date of hearing 04.04.2023. Date of order 04.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Asad Ur Rehman, DR . along with Mr. Tariq Baig, ACIR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Fine Industries (pvt) Ltd. Al-Hamad Industrial Estate, Faisalabad.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTo, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24603", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6640 = 2023 SLD 6640", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=218", - "Case #": "ITA No. 825/MB/2022. Date of hearing 23.11.20232. Date of order 29.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shabbir Fakhar-ud-Din, ITP,\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Qaswar Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Rasheed, Multan\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Multan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24604", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6641 = 2023 SLD 6641", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.6-L of 2023. [Against the judgment dated 20.10.2022, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in ITR No.63041 of 2022]. Date of Hearing : 23.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR SHAH. Mr. JUSTICE SYED HASSAN AZHAR RIZVI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner(s) : Dr. Ikram ul Haq, ASC\nFor the Respondent(s) : Ch. Muhammad Shakeel, ASC Naveed Akhtar, DC", - "Petitioner Name:": "Allied Bank Limited\nVersus\nThe Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24605", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6642 = 2023 SLD 6642", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal, Sindh Revenue Board", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=3,8,9,17", - "Case #": "Appeal No. AT-175/2022. Date of filling of appeal 18.01.2023. Date of hearing 15.02,2023 and 20.04.2023. Date of order 31.05,2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr, Rizwan Khan, ACMA for Appellant.\nMr. Shareef Malik, DC-DR, SRB and Mr. Sahil Kumar, SSTO-SRB for respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. First Women Bank Limited, (SNTN: S00700268-8) 20/2, C1-10, Syedna Tahir Saifuddin Memorial Foundation, Beamont Road, Karachi.\nvs\nAssistant Commissioner Sindh Revenue Board, (SRB), 02nd Floor Shaheen Complex, M.R. Kyani Road, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24606", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6643 = 2023 SLD 6643", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9", - "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No.01 of 2022. Date of hearing 07.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRRSENT: JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff(s) by Barrister Sardar Umer Aslam, ASC assisted by Hassan Matiullah, Advocate. \nDefendant(s) by Mr. Umar Hanif Khichi, Advocate for the Defendants No.1&2. Agha Muhammad Ali Khan, ASC/Amicus\nCuriae assisted by Waqar Khalid Khawaja, Advocate.\nMr. Rashid Mehmood, Research Officer, Lahore High Court, (Rawalpindi Bench).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB Bank Limited.\nV/S \nAdeel Shahbaz Steel Mills and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24607", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6644 = 2023 SLD 6644", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=202", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.196-P OF 2014. (Against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar dated 22.09.2010 passed in Write Petition No.2064/2010). Date of Hearing: 30.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN. MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR. \nMR. JUSTICE JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Khan, AOR/ASC (via video link from Peshawar) \nRespondents 1-4: Mr. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, ASC (via video link from Peshawar)\nRespondent No.5: Nemo On Court Notice: Raja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, DAG", - "Petitioner Name:": "Writ Petition No.2064/2010) Allied Bank Limited\nVERSUS\nFederation of Pakistan thr. Collectorate of Customs, Peshawar & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24608", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6645 = 2023 SLD 6645", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=7E", - "Case #": "C.P. 1442-K TO 1460-k/2022. Date of hearing 22.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIYAL, CJ. Mr. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI. Mrs. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioners: Mr. Muhammad Saleem Mangrio, ASC. Mr. Abid Hussain Shaban, ASC. Ms. Lubna Parvez, ASC video link from Karachi.\nFBR: Dr. Shah Nawaz, ASC. Mr. Asim Majeed, Memmber Legal.\nFederation. Ch. Aamri Rehman, Addl. AG.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sher Muhammad Mughari, etc.\nvs\nThe Federation of Pakistan through secretary Finance Islamabad and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24609", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6646 = 2023 SLD 6646", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 481(IB) 2023. Date of hearing 15.06.2023. Date of order 15.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Zahid shafique, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Saleem Raza, Rawalpindi.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24610", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6647 = 2023 SLD 6647", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 432/IB/2023. Date of hearing 29.05.2023. Date of order 29.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate & Ch. Iftikhar Ahmed, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Zameer, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Jade (Private) Limited, Office No. 204, Golden Heights, Business Aquare, Gulberg Green, Islamabad.\nvs" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24611", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6648 = 2023 SLD 6648", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=119", - "Case #": "ITA No. 228/KB/2023. Date of hearing 27,04,2023. Date of order 31.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA, A.M. MR. AAMIR MAQSOOD, J.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Kamran Rizvi, Advoacte.\nRespondent by: Mr. Kamran, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Advance Saeed Corporation, Tando Allayar.\nvs\nThe Commissioner-IR, RTO, Hyderabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24612", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6649 = 2023 SLD 6649", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDQXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1696/IB/2022. Date of hearing 15.06.2023. Date of order 15.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mujib Ur Rehman, W 570, Novelty Cinema, Ratta Road, Rawalpindi.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Range-II,RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24613", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6650 = 2023 SLD 6650", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2537 of 2020. [Against the judgment dated 20.07.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Civil Revision No.399-P of 2020]. Date of Hearing : 03.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, ASC Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR\nFor Respondent No.1 : In person", - "Petitioner Name:": "Allied Bank Limited.\nVersus\nHabib-ur-Rehman and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24614", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6651 = 2023 SLD 6651", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,153(1)(a)Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 77610/2022. Date of order 07.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUDGE. ANWAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ibrar Ahmed, Advocate for the applicant. Mr. Aqib Ali, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nvs\nPunjab Medical Store." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24615", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6652 = 2023 SLD 6652", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1998/IB/2021. MA(AG) No. 72/IB/2022. Date of hearing 06.07.2022. Date of order 15.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Wilayat Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Ahmed, Prop: Zarar Traders, Ghalla Mandi, G.T. ROad, Lalamusa.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Gujrat Zone), RTO, Sialkot." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24616", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6653 = 2023 SLD 6653", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9),111(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1773/IB/2022. MA(AG) No. 211/IB/2022. Date of hearinf 22.09.2022. Date of order 22.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESNT: M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Sheheryar Akram, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sheikh Tariq Masood, Plot No.177/178, Industrial Area, 1-9, Islamabad.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24617", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6654 = 2023 SLD 6654", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDOC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No.1870-2023. Date of order 07.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMAR FARROQ, CHIEF JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Saqib Siddique, Advocate for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mushtaq Ahmed.\nVs.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Islamabad etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24618", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2006 3814 = 2006 SLD 3814 = 2006 YLR 1126", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDOCs", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-O.X, R.4 & O,XVII, Rr.2 & 3-Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199-Constitutional petition-Dismissal of suit for non-production of evidence-Application for restoration was allowed-Contention of defendant was that trial Court, after dismissing the suit, had become functus officio, and, therefore, was left with no jurisdiction to restore the suit-Validity-Court had become conscious of its error that it should have proceeded ex parte instead of dismissing the suit for non-production of evidence and that was why, when plaintiff moved application for restoration of suit, which in substance was a review application, it allowed the application-Mere fact that application for restoration was not captioned as review application and that Court had also not kept the review provisions into view while passing the order, would not make much difference because quoting a wrong provision would not disentitle a party to the grant of correct relief which was the duty of the Court-Court though had not given enough reasons to reflect that it was exercising its review power but legal position undoubtedly remained that Court was not functus officio, rather it has retained the power to set aside its earlier order under O,XVII, R.3 C.P.C.-Plaintiff being negligent in pursuing the matter, constitutional petition was accepted with costs.\n \nSyed Arshad Naeem and 5 others v. Atta Rabbani and 2 others 1999 MLD 2267 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=O.X,R.4 & O,XVII, Rr.2,3", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.410 of 2006, heard on 17th January, 2006, heard on: 17th January, 2006.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mian Saqib Nisar, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ijaz Qutab for Petitioner.\nSyed Kabeer Mahmood for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FATEH MUHAMMAD NAEEM-Petitioner\nVs\nMst. IMAM SAIN and 10 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24619", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6655 = 2023 SLD 6655", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=52", - "Case #": "W.P No.16217 of 2020. Date of Hearing. 06-06-2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHSHID KARIM, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONERS BY: M/s, Imtiaz Rasheed Siddiqui, Barrister Shehryar\nKasuri, Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Ch. Anwar ul Haq Arif.\nRESPONDENTS BY: M/s Waqas Ahmad Mir, Ahmad Hassan, Momna Taufeeq, Sajid Ijaz Hotiana, Tanzil ur Rehman Hotiana.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Nishat Hotels & Properties Ltd. & another.\nVersus\nProvince of Punjab & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24620", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6656 = 2023 SLD 6656", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=10(2),10(2)(a)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No. 444 & 445 of 2017. (Against the judgment of the Competition Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad, dated 25.01.2017, passed in Appeal No. 03/2016), heard on: 10 May 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH. Mr. JUSTICE SYED HASSAN AZHAR RIZVI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the appellant: Mr. Hasan Irfan Khan, ASC assisted by Mr.Saqib\nAsghar, Advocate. (in C.A. 445/2017) Mr. Azid Nafees, ASC a/w Syed Rifaqat Hussian Shah, AOR. (in C.A. 444/2017)\nFor the respondents: Barrister Haris Azmat, ASC and Mr. Azid Nafees, ASC. (in C.A. 445/2017) Mr. Hasan Irfan Khan, ASC and Mr. Azid Nafees, ASC. (in C.A. 444/2017)", - "Petitioner Name:": "A. Rahim Foods (Pvt) Limited (in C.A. 445/2017)\nCompetition Commission of Pakistan (in C.A. 444/2017)\nVersus\nK&N’s Foods (Pvt) Limited and others (in C.A. 445/2017)\nA. Rahim Foods (Pvt) Limited and another (in C.A. 444/2017)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24621", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6657 = 2023 SLD 6657", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDOHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 200/MB/2022. Date of hearing 10.03.2022. Date of order 13.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Tahir Bhatti, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Shabbir Feed Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Multan.\nvs\nThe CIR, CTO, Mutan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24622", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6658 = 2023 SLD 6658", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDOHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=4(a),4(c)", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITIONS NO. 4700, 310-K TO 314-K, 423-K TO 426-K, 553-K & 493-K OF 2021. Date of Hearing: 01.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ. MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR. MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. Arshad Shahzad, ASC Mr. Nadeem Qureshi, ASC, (Video link from Karachi) For Respondent: Dr. Shah Nawaz, ASC Irfan Mir Halepota, ASC Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, AOR (Video link from Karachi).", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. M/s Rajby Industries Karachi (CP.4700/2021)\n2. M/s Multinational Export (CP.310-K/2021)\n3. M/s NFK Exports (Pvt.)Ltd. & others (CP.311-K/2021)\n4. M/s International Textile Limited (CP.312-K/2021)\n5. M/s Proline Private Limited (CP.313-K/2021)\n6. M/s Mustaqim Dyeing & Printing (CP.314-K/2021)\n7. M/s Liberty Mills Limited & others (CP.423-K/2021)\n8. M/s Gatron Ind. Ltd. & another (CP.424-K/2021)\n9. M/s Orient Textile Mills & others (CP.425-K/2021)\n10. M/s Mima Knit (Pvt.) Limited (CP.426-K/2021)\n11. M/s Adamjee Enterprises (CP.553-K/2021)\n12. M/s Aferoz Textile Industries Pvt. Ltd. (CP.493-K/2021)\nvs\nFederation of Pakistan and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24623", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6659 = 2023 SLD 6659", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 47033/2023. Date of order 14.07.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD RAZA QIURESHI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/S Salman Akram Raja and Maik Bashir Ahmed Khalid, Advocates for the petitioners.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Quetta Textile Mills Limited etc.\nvs\nFederation of Pkistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24624", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6660 = 2023 SLD 6660", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 23960 of 2023. Date of Hearing 21.06.2023, 23.06.2023, 26.06.2023 and 27.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ALI BAQAR NAJAFI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners By Mr. Salman Akram Raja, Mr. Arslan Riaz, Rai Amer\nIjaz Kharal, Mr. Rabeel Safdar Tatla.\nRespondents By Mr. Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, Mr. Badar Munir Malik, Deputy Attorney General and Ch. Usman Ghani, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Arzoo Textile Mills Ltd. etc.\n Vs. \nFederation of Pakistan etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24625", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6661 = 2023 SLD 6661", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9),122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 155/MB/2023, heard on: 29.05.2023. Date of order: 12.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER. DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shabbir Fakhruddin, ITP.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Qaswar Hussaion, Dr.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Choudhry Muhammad Rafiq, Lahore\nvs\nThe CIR, Multan-Zone, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24626", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6662 = 2023 SLD 6662", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121(1)/129", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1047/LB/2010, heard on: 09.09.2011. Date of order: 02.11.2011.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD NAWAZ BAJWA, JUDICIAL MEMBER. ABDUL RAUF, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mrs. Nawal Sheikh, DR.\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR (RTO), Sialkot.\nvs\nMr. Muhammad Yasin S/o Sadiq, Ali. Through Mst. Shehnaz Kausar W/o Muhammad Yasin (Agent), Noor Kot, Shakargarh, N.T.N 50, Audit 04-TR-263" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24627", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6663 = 2023 SLD 6663", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16", - "Case #": "Special Criminal Bail Application No. 38 of 2023. Date of hearing 14.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zia-Ul-Haq Makhdoom, Advocate for the applicant. Mr. Khalid Rajpar, Special Prosecutor Custom Intelligence along with Zubair Ranjha (Preventive Officer) Investigating officer and Ms. Abeer JAwaid, Deputy Director on behalf of Directorate of Investigation & Mr. Muhammad Ahmed, DAG.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mustafa sikandar.\nvs\nThe State." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24628", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6664 = 2023 SLD 6664", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45-B", - "Case #": "STA No. 150/KB/2017. Date of hearing 15.06.2023. Date of order 23.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. M. AMINULLAH SIDDIQUI, J.M. MR. MANZOOR ALI JOKHO, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Mohsin Ali, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Imran Ali Sheikh, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sukhur Electronic Power Company Limited, \nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-I, LTO, Karachi," - }, - { - "Case No.": "24629", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6665 = 2023 SLD 6665", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 134 of 2017, decision & hearing dated: 11th\nDecember, 2018.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MOHSIN AKHTAR KAYANI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: Adnan Haider Randhawa and Ms. Saima Naqvi.\nRespondent(s) by: Syed Tanseer Bukhari.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR (I&I) (INLAND REVENUE), ISLAMABAD AND\nOTHERS.\nVs.\nNAEEM SIDDIQUE." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24630", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6666 = 2023 SLD 6666", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24631", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6667 = 2023 SLD 6667", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NDNHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24632", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6668 = 2023 SLD 6668", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221(4)", - "Case #": "MA (Rectification) No. 34/MB/2022, heard on: 25.08.2022. Date of order: 01.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): present : MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Qaswar Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Sun Crop Pesticides, 4-C khayabane Sarwar, D.G Khan, NTN 347581-9\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24633", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6669 = 2023 SLD 6669", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=81", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No. 565/2011, 772 to 780/2012, 768 to\n772/2014, 1070/2015, 132 to 156/2017. Date of Hearing: 06.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ. MR. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA. MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants: Mr. M. Khalil Dogar, ASC (in CAs. 565/11, 132-156/17) (through Video Link, Karachi) (in CAs. 565/11, 765-772/14, Mr. K. A. Wahab, AOR 1070/15, 132-156/17) (through Video Link, Karachi) (in CAs. 772-780/12, 768-772/14, Raja Muhammad Iqbal, ASC 1070/15) \nFor the Respondents: Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC (in CAs .772-780/12) Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR (in CAs. 768-772/14) Qari Abdur Rasheed, AOR (in CAs. 132-156/17) Mr. Khalid Javed Khan, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division/Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad (in CA. 565/11) \nvs\nSus Motors (Pvt.) Ltd. (in CA. 565/11)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24634", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6670 = 2023 SLD 6670", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "S.T.R No.93 of 2010. Date of Hearing 20.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Applicant. M/s Khalid Ishaq, Abid Hussain. Sayyal and Wajahat Ali, Advocates.\nFor Respondents Malik Abdullah Raza, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Honda Atlas Cars (Pakistan) Limited.\nVs.\nAdditional Collector, Legal, LTU, Lahore etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24635", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6671 = 2023 SLD 6671", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "E.F.A No.22133 of 2023. Date of Hearing 03.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Appellant Syed Zeeshan Haider Zaidi, Advocate.\nFor Respondent Mr. Moiz Tariq, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s G.A Traders (Sole Proprietorship).\nvs.\nAllied Bank of Pakistan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24636", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6672 = 2023 SLD 6672", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 299 of 2022, heard on: 20.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Rao Riasat Ali Khan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Farooq.\nVERSUS\nZarai Taraqiati Bank Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24637", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6673 = 2023 SLD 6673", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10(1)", - "Case #": "COMPLAINT NO.301 9ILHPJIT12O23. Date of order. 01.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer Mr. Khalid Javed, Advisor\nAppraised by Mr. Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor\nAuthorized Representative : Mr. Muhammad Farooq, Advocate\nDepartmental Representative : Mr. Sarim Bhatti, ADCIR WHT RTO Lahore", - "Petitioner Name:": "MIs Adsum, Office 10-F, Hajvery Tower, Chuburji Chwok, Data Ganj Baksh Town, Lahore. \nvs\nThe Secretary,Revenue Division, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24638", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6674 = 2023 SLD 6674", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO.2682 OF 2022. (Against Judgment dated 17.05.2022\npassed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Customs Reference No.106- P/2019). Date of Hearing : 11.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD. MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, ASC (Video Link from Peshawar)\nMr. Muhammad Sharif Janjua, AOR For the Respondents: N.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar.\nVersus\nMuhammad Ismail and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24639", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6675 = 2023 SLD 6675", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTYzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.25808 of 2023, heard on: 27.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s. Hassan Iqbal Warraich and Arslan Abbas Buttar, Advocates.\nRespondents by: M/s. Salman Mansoor, Muhammad Nadeem\nIqbal Zahid and Abdul Majeed Abid, Advocates. Mr. Muhammad Zain Qazi, Assistant Attorney General along with Ziarukh Jan,\nDeputy Director (Legal).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Pir Muhammad Construction Company Private Limited\nVersus\nWater and Development Authority through its Chairman, Lahore\n& others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24640", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6676 = 2023 SLD 6676", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,205", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITIONS NO.1920 TO 1924 OF 2022 Against the Judgment dated 09.03.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in I.T.R. Nos. 205, 208, 206, 209, 207/2015). Date of Hearing: 10.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ. MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Haseeb Shakoor Paracha, ASC (In all cases)\nFor the Respondents: Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR\n(In all cases) Mr. Naeem Hasan Secretary (Lit), FBR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited (IESCO) through its Finance Director, Islamabad (In all cases)\nVERSUS\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (H.Q), Islamabad through its Chairman and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24641", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6677 = 2023 SLD 6677", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=179(3)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) Nos. 1137 & 1138 of 2015, heard on: 07.08.2023. Date of Judgment: 07.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant: Collector of Customs, MCC Appraisement (East) Through Mr. Khalid Rajpar, Advocate.\nCreative Electronics Limited. Nemo; though duly served.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24642", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6678 = 2023 SLD 6678", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2451/LB/2023, heard on: 15.05.2023, 29.05.2023, 05.06.2023, 08.06.2023, Date of order: 18.07.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asim Zulfiqar FCA.\nRespondent by: Mr. Sufian Ahmed Mian(ACIR)", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Adamjee Insurance Company Limited, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24643", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6679 = 2023 SLD 6679", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Admiralty Suit No. 16 of 2003. Date of Hearings: 02.05.2023, 03.05.2023, 05.05.2023, 09.05.2023. Date of Decision: 07.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff : Amsa Marine Aid through Mr. Fasih-uz-Zaman Abbasi, Advocate.\nDefendants : M.V. Tolmi and another Zaheer Uddin Ahmed, Representative / Attorney of Defendant No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Amsa Marine Aid.\nvs\n MV “TOLMI” and Another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24644", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6680 = 2023 SLD 6680", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.58683 of 2022. Dates of hearing 08.03.2023, 09.03.2023, 16.03.2023, 20.03.2023, 21.03.2023, 22.03.2023,\n29.03.2023, 30.03.2023, 31.03.2023, 03.04.2023, 04.04.2023, 05.04.2023, 06.04.2023, 07.04.2023, 10.04.2023, 11.04.2023 and 12.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by M/s. Salman Akram Raja, ASC, Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Arslan Riaz and Barrister Raja Hamza Anwar, Advocates in WPs No.58672, 64994, 67221, 65025 of 2023. \nRespondent(s) by Mr. Nasir Javed Ghumman, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No.1. Mr. Khalid Ishaq, ASC, Nida Aftab,\nAdvocate, Ahmad Pervaiz, ASC, Jawad H. Tarar and Syed Zain-ul-Abidin Bukhari, Advocates for Respondent No.2/FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Service Global Footwear Limited and another.\nV/S\n Federation of Pakistan and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24645", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6681 = 2023 SLD 6681", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A),3(5)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.67081 of 2022. Date of hearing 10.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s. Qamar-uz-Zaman Cheema and Mehr Ahsan, Advocate.\nFederation by: Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General.\nRespondents by: Mr. Abdul Muqtadir Khan, Advocate/Legal Advisor.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dawat Saraye.\nVs. \nFederation of Pakistan and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24646", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6682 = 2023 SLD 6682", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-A", - "Case #": "SCRA No. 38 of 2022. Dates of Hearing : 17.11.2022 & 01.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZULFIQAR AHMED KHAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant/Department through : M/s. Sarfaraz Ali Metlo, Barkat Ali\nMetlo, Khalid Rajpar, Pervez Ahmed Memon, Masooda Siraj, Javed\nHussain, Khalil Dogar, Tahir Khalil Dogar, Bilal Bhatti, M. Ishaque\nPirzada & Sania Zubair, Advocates. Petitioners/Respondents\nthrough : M/s. Naveen Merchant, Aqeel Ahmed Khan, Nadeem Qureshi, Muhammad Salman Khan, Salman Yousuf, Samil Malik Khan, Muhammad Usman Ahmed & Alqamah Bin Mehmood, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "[Collector of Customs.\nvs \nM/s. Salman Paper Products (Pvt) Ltd]." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24647", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6683 = 2023 SLD 6683", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2032 (IB) 2022.ITA No. 2033 (IB) 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naeem Qasim GillRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Zameer, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. QisaerAli. Malik FAisal Autos, Talagang.\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24648", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6684 = 2023 SLD 6684", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "WRIT PETITION NO. 1044 OF 2018. Date of Hearing : 07.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, J.UDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by : Mr. Shaheer Roshan Shaikh, Advocate.\nRespondents by : Mr. Muhammad Imtiaz Abbasi, Advocate. (Proxy counsel)", - "Petitioner Name:": "ORACLE SYSTEMS PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED.\nVERSUS\nPAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY REVENUE & EXOFFICIO CHAIRMAN FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24649", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6685 = 2023 SLD 6685", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 51804 of 2023. Date of order 16.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rai Ameer Ijaz Kharal, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan (on court's call)", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sufi Trading Company.\nvs\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24650", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6686 = 2023 SLD 6686", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=161)A)", - "Case #": "COMPLAINT NO.301 9ILHPJIT12O23. Dated 01.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer Mr. Khalid Javed, Advisor\nAppraised by Mr. Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor\nAuthorized Representative : Mr. Muhammad Farooq, Advocate\nDepartmental Representative : Mr. Sarim Bhatti, ADCIR WHT RTO Lahore", - "Petitioner Name:": "MIs Adsum, Office 10-F, Hajvery Tower, Chuburji Chwok, Data Ganj Baksh Town, Lahore\nVersus\nThe Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24651", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6687 = 2023 SLD 6687", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTWXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10A", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No.1842-L & 1843-L of 2022, heard on: 11.11.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench-I: Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, CJ. Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah Mr. Justice Athar Minallah. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioners(s): Ms. Saba Saeed, ASC (thr. video-link, Lahore)\nFor the respondent: Mr. Shehbaz Butt, ASC (thr. video-link, Lahore)\nAssisted by: Muhammad Hassan Ali, Law Clerk, Supreme\nCourt of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue (in both cases).\nVersus\nM/s RYK Mills (in both cases)." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24652", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6688 = 2023 SLD 6688", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=151", - "Case #": "Banking Suit No.B-45 of 2022. Dates of Hearing: 22.05.2023, 23.05.2023. Date of Order: 21.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff Bank: Mr Behzad Haider and Mehmood Ali, Advocates\nDefendant Customer: Ms Alizeh Bashir, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Bank of Punjab.\n v. \nHASCOL Petroleum Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24653", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6689 = 2023 SLD 6689", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Suit No.319 of 2023. Date of Hearing: 01.06.2023. Date of Judgment: 23.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Plaintiff : Maxco (Pvt.) Ltd. through Mr Omer Memon Advocate\nDefendant : Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan through M/s Syed Ebadur RehmanLaw Officer along with Shahrukh Arfani Additional Joint Director and Imran Ali Shamsi, Additional Joint Director, SEC" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24654", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6690 = 2023 SLD 6690", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Rules, 2001=125", - "Case #": "Civil petition No. 323-L TO 326-L OF 2014.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ. Mr. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH. Mrs. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Mr. Sarfaraz Ahmed Cheema, ASC ( in all cases).\nFor Respondent No. 1: Mr. Shahid Tanveer Rao, ASC.\nRespondent No.1: Ex-parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and another \nvs\nM/s Wasim Radio Traders, Lahore, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24655", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6691 = 2023 SLD 6691", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO. 3121 TO 3125 OF 2021. Date of hearing 10.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL. Mr. MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR. Mrs. AYESHA A. MALIK.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Ms Shazia Bilal, ASC. Kamranullah, Additional Commissioner.\nFor Respondent: Syed Ali Zafar, ASC. Mr. Zahid Nawaz Cheema, ASC (through video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner of Income Tax Companies Zone, Islamabad\nVs\nM/s Fauji Foundation Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24656", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6692 = 2023 SLD 6692", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(5)", - "Case #": "Const P. 7493/2021, heard on: 24.08.2023. Date of Order: 24.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: M/s. Muhammad Tariq Masood, Syed Aijaz Hussain Shirazi, Shams Mohiuddin Ansari, Naeem Suleman, Zafar Hussain, .\nFor the Respondents: M/s. Syed Ahsan Ali Shah, Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Aamir Ali Shaikh, Zulfiqar Ali Mirjat, Bilal Bhatti.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AUS Food.\nVS \nFed. of Pakistan and Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24657", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6693 = 2023 SLD 6693", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001=2(i)Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=4", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No. 329-K to 391-K of 2022. Date of Hearing: 28.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR. Mr. JUSTICE SYED HASSAN AZHAR RIZVI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Jahanzeb Awan, ASC. Assisted by M/s. Rasheed Mehar & Subhan Tasleem, Advocates Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, AOR.\nFor the Respondents: N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Telenor Microfinance Bank Limited (In all cases).\n Versus\nShamim Bano & others. Rehana Sabir & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24658", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6694 = 2023 SLD 6694", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1013/KB-2023. Date of hearing 25.05.2023. Date of order 24.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. TAUQEER IRITZA, AM. MR. AAMIR MAQSOOD, JM.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Riffat Naeem, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Imran Yousaf, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Khalid Hussain, Quetta.\nVS\nThe Commissioner, RTO, Quetta." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24659", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6695 = 2023 SLD 6695", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177(2),122(9), 122(1)(5)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 700/LB/2016, heard on: 07.03.2023. Date of order: 04.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None.\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Imran, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Muhammad Afzal, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24660", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6696 = 2023 SLD 6696", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 299 of 2022, heard on: 20.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Rao Riasat Ali Khan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Farooq.\nVERSUS\nZarai Taraqiati Bank Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24661", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6697 = 2023 SLD 6697", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTVXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO.414 OF 2021, CMA NO.1963 OF 2021 IN C.P.414 OF 2021, CIVIL PETITIONS NO.1188 TO 1259, 475-K, 476-K, 1422 TO 1430, 2819, 317-K TO 389-K OF 2021, 579 AND 777 OF 2022. Dates of Hearing : 29.9.2022, 03.10.2022, 04.10.2022, 05.10.2022, 07.10.2022, 11.10.2022 and 12.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, CJ. Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mrs. Justice Ayesha A. Malik.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Uzair Karamat Bhandari, ASC Mr. Anis M. Shahzad, AOR (in CP.414 and CMA.1963 of 2021). \nFor the Respondent(s) (Labour & Manpower Supply Providers):\nMakhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC Saad Hashmi, Advocate Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR (in CPs.320-K, 324-K, 330-K, 337-K, 340-K, 342-K, 345-K to 347-K, 351-K, 353-K, 356-K, 361-K, 366-K, 377-K, 378-K, 380-K and 385-K of 2021)\nOther Respondents Nemo (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sindh Revenue Board through its Secretary Government of Sindh, Karachi.\n Vs.\n M/s Quick Food Industries (Pvt) Limited and another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24662", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6698 = 2023 SLD 6698", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "S.T.R No.93 of 2010. Date of Hearing 20.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Applicant. M/s Khalid Ishaq, Abid Hussain Sayyal and Wajahat Ali, Advocates.\nFor Respondents Malik Abdullah Raza, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Honda Atlas Cars (Pakistan) Limited.\nVs.\nAdditional Collector, Legal, LTU, Lahore etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24663", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6699 = 2023 SLD 6699", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)(5)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2089/LB/2014, heard on: 01.03.2023. Date of order 05.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Imran, DR.\nRespondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, Zone-XI, RTO-II, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s Tayyaba Affan Gora, Kasur." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24664", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6700 = 2023 SLD 6700", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=458(3)", - "Case #": "STA No. 493/LB/2017. Date of hearing 27.03.2023. 28.03.2023. Date of order 03.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. MUHAMMAD WASEEM CH. (CHAIRMAN).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran Anwar Saeed, DR. Ms. Shiraza Hameed, DR.\nRespondent by: Mr. Pervaiz Iqbal,Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone IV, Large Taxpayer Unit. Lahore \nVS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24665", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6701 = 2023 SLD 6701", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NOS.23 and 24 OF 2017, heard on: 08.12.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, HCJ. Mrs. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK. Mr. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the appellants: Mr. Rashdeen Nawaz Qasuri, Addl.Attorney General (In CA 23/17) Mr. Ghulam Shoaib Jolly, ASC (In CA 24/17)\nFor respondent No.1-5: Mr. Muhammad Raza Khan, ASC. \nRespondent Nos.6-7: Ex-parte", - "Petitioner Name:": "Director General Central Directorate of Savings. & others … (In CA 23/17) Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue Islamabad. … (In CA 24/17)\n Versus\nAbid Hussain and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24666", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6702 = 2023 SLD 6702", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196(1)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 123 of 2016, heard on: 31.08.2023. Date of Order: 31.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant: Director, Directorate of Post Clearance Audit (Customs), Customs House, Karachi. Through Mr. Muhammad Rashid Arfi, Advocate.\nRespondent: M/s. Century Paper and Board Mills Ltd. Through Mr. Arshad Siraj Memon, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24667", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6703 = 2023 SLD 6703", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No.1089 to 1090 of 2015. Dates of hearing: : 30.01.2019 & 10.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial. Mr. Justice Munib Akhtar. Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the appellant: : Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC. Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR. Mr. Abdul Hameed Anjum, Secy. Legal FBR.(C.A.1089-1090/15) For the contesting \nrespondents: Mr. Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, ASC. (C.A.1089-1090/15)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Federal Board of Revenue (in both cases).\nvs\nDewan Salman Fiber Ltd and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24668", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6704 = 2023 SLD 6704", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.1032 OF 2018, heard on: 14.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, HCJ. Mrs. Justice Ayesha A. Malik. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mrs. Asma Hamid, ASC \nFor the Mr. Ghulam Rasool Mangi, ASC/AOR (via video-link, Karachi).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-IV, Large Taxpayer Unit, Karachi.\nVersus\nM/s Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd. A-39, Manghopir Road, SITE, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24669", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6705 = 2023 SLD 6705", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NOS.5671 AND 5672 OF 2021, heard on: 24.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, HCJ. MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK. MR. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner: Mr. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Sr.ASC\nFor the Federation: Mr. Ayaz Shaukat, DAG a/w Afnan, Addl.Collector\nFor the Respondents: Nemo", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs, Peshawar.\n Versus\nM/s New Shinwari Ltd. & another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24670", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6706 = 2023 SLD 6706", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO.1345-L OF 2021, heard on: 02.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, HCJ. Mrs. Justice Ayesha A. Malik. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mrs. Kausar Parveen, ASC M.Ozair Chughtai, AOR.\nSyed Hassan Sardar, Addl. Commissioner\nFor the respondents: Not represented", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Chenab Zone, RTO, Faisalabad.\nVS\nM/s Rose Food Industries, Faisalabad & another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24671", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6707 = 2023 SLD 6707", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTUXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977=31,43Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition Nos.388-P, 389-P, 395-P, 396-P, 397-P & 399-P of 2016, heard on: 10.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, HCJ. Mrs. Justice Ayesha A. Malik. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Tariq Khan Kakar, ASC (in all cases). \nFor the Qazi Jawad Ehsanullah, ASC. Mr. Ghulam Mehboob Khokhar, ASC. Mr. Aftab Alam Yasir, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The State thr. Director A.N.F. Peshawar. The State thr. Director A.N.F. Peshawar.Force Commander ANF, Peshawar. Federal Govt./State through ANF, Peshawar. The State thr. Director A.N.F. Peshawar. \nVS\nShereen Shah and another. Hanif Gul Jadoon, decd. thr. LRs and others. Rahim and others . Haji Umar Afridi decd. thr. LRs and others. Gul Anwar and others. Malik Gul Bahadur decd. thr. LRs and others ." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24672", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6708 = 2023 SLD 6708", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2793/LB/2023. Date of hearing 25.05.2023. Date of order: 29.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Aurangzeb, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Iftikhar Masood, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Imran, Faisalabad.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24673", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6709 = 2023 SLD 6709", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977=31,43,44Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition Nos.388-P, 389-P, 395-P, 396-P, 397-P & 399-P of 2016, heard on: 10.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, HCJ. Mrs. Justice Ayesha A. Malik. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Tariq Khan Kakar, ASC (in all cases).\nFor the Qazi Jawad Ehsanullah, ASC. Mr. Ghulam Mehboob Khokhar, ASC. Mr. Aftab Alam Yasir, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The State thr. Director A.N.F. Peshawar.\nVersus\nShereen Shah and another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24674", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6710 = 2023 SLD 6710", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.1032 OF 2018, heard on: 14.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, HCJ. Mrs. Justice Ayesha A. Malik. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mrs. Asma Hamid, ASC.\nFor the Mr. Ghulam Rasool Mangi, ASC/AO. (via video-link, Karachi).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-IV, Large Taxpayer Unit, Karachi.\nVersus\nM/s Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd. A-39, Manghopir Road, SITE, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24675", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6711 = 2023 SLD 6711", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161/205", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2500 & 2501/LB/2022. Date of hearing 22.03.2023. Date of order: 03.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: None.\nRespondent by: Ms. Kehkshan Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Advanced Pain Centre (pvt.) Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CRTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24676", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6712 = 2023 SLD 6712", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,283,505(i)(c)", - "Case #": "J. C. M. No. 06 of 2022, heard on: 22.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NADEEM AKHTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners : 1. B.R.R. Investment (Private) Limited,\n2. BRR Guardian Limited and\n3. B.R.R. Guardian Modaraba,\nthrough Mr. Abdul Qayyum Abbasi Advocate.\nRespondent : SECP through Syed Hafiz Ibad, Law Officer, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24677", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6713 = 2023 SLD 6713", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=136(1), 133(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No. 94 to 106/2008.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial, CJ. Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa.\nMr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Ms. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, ASC. Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR. Sh. Mehmood Ahmed, AOR. Hafiz Ahsan Ahmad Khokhar, ASC. Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR. \nFor the Respondent: Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC (in all cases) Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR assisted by M/s Saad Hashmi and\nKhawaja Aizaz Ahsan, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner of Income Tax.\nVS\nM/s. Inter Quest Informatics Services." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24678", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6714 = 2023 SLD 6714", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1), 122(9), 122(1)/(5)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1729/ LB/ 2014. Date of hearing 29.05.2023. Date of order 01.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zaheer-ud-Din Babar, FCA.\nRespondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. R.Y.K Mills Ltd, Lahore. NTN: 2934487-5\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24679", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6715 = 2023 SLD 6715", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25", - "Case #": "STA No. 22/KB/2023. Date of hearing 01.06.2023. Date of order 20.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA, A.M. MR. AAMIR MAQSOOD, J.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. A.S. Jafri & Mr. Kamran Rizvi, Advocates.\nRespondent by: Mr. Akhtar Hussain, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Habibullah Coal Mining Co. Hyderabad.\nVS\nZone-II,RTO, Hyderabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24680", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6716 = 2023 SLD 6716", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 264/LB/2012. Date of hearing 19.09.2022. Date of order 03.10.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abuzar Hussain along with Mr. Hassan Mabroor, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Haroon Brothers Steel, Gujranwala.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24681", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6717 = 2023 SLD 6717", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTTXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1890/LB/2022, heard on: 28.03.2023. Date of order 11.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI( JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shoaib Hassan Butt, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Suleman, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Zhengbang Agriculture Pakistan, (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24682", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6718 = 2023 SLD 6718", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "ITA NO.3609/LB/2020. Date of Hearing: 01.09.2021. Date of Order: 03.09.2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Aftab Hussain Nagra, Advocate, Qari Hablb-ur-Rehman Zubair, Advocate,\nRespondent by: Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad, Commissioner Inland\nRevenue, alongwith Rao Shehzad Akhtar Ali Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. M. Munir Butt, Sialkot.\nVersus\nCIR, Sialkot, Zone, RTO, Sialkot." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24683", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6719 = 2023 SLD 6719", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161, 161(1A), 165, 174, 174(3), 214AIncome Tax Rules, 2002=29(4), 44(4)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1691-L of 2018, date of hearing: 21.09.2021\n(Against the orders of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 05.03.2018 passed in W.P. No. 133023 of 2018).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL. MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH. MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, ASC. (video-link - Lahore) a/w Mr. Naeem Hassan, Secy (Lit.) FBR. \nFor the Nemo.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-IV, LAHORE\nVS\nM/S PANTHER SPORTS & RUBBER INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD, ETC" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24684", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6720 = 2023 SLD 6720", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=2 (72C)", - "Case #": "Const. Petition Nos.D-2421/2016 a/w 4524/2015, 1070, 1585,\n2247, 2687 & 3462 of 2016, 2167, 2532 & 2800 of 2017, heard on: 08.05.2017. Date of judgment : 18.08.2017.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. JUSTICE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI. Mr. JUSTICE NAZAR AKBAR.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Aminuddin Ansari, advocate for the petitioners. Mr. Khalid Javed Khan, advocate for petitioner in C.P.No.D- 2167\nof 2017. Mr. Amjad Jawaid Hashmi, advocate for petitioner in C.P.No.D3462/2016. Mr. Muhammad Younus, advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Taimur Ali Mirza, advocate for the petitioner in C.P.No.D2800/2017. Mr. Farooq H. Naek, advocate for respondent No.2 in C.P.No.D2167/2017.\nMr. Mohsin Qadir Shahwani, advocate for the respondent in C.P.Nos.4524 of 15, 1070, 2687 and 3462 of 2016.\nMr. Muhammad Najeeb Jamali, advocate for the respondent in\nC.P.Nos.1585 & 2421 of 2016.\nMr. Muhammad Sarfaraz Ali Metlo, advocate for the respondent.\nMr. Saifullah, AAG\nMr. Mir Hussain, Assistant Attorney General.\nSyed Zainul Abdin, Deputy Commissioner (Legal), SRB", - "Petitioner Name:": "Young’s (Private) limited and others.\nVersus\nProvince of Sindh and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24685", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6721 = 2023 SLD 6721", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 621/LB/2022. Date of hearing; 18.08.2023. Date of order 21.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD( JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Sh. Ahsan-ul-Haq, Adv.\nRespondent by: Ms. Zainab Asad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. Atique Ahmed, H. No. 65-X, Farid Town, Sahiwal.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, RTO-II, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24686", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6722 = 2023 SLD 6722", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=65B", - "Case #": "W.P No. 6127-Pl20L9. Date of Hearing: 07.06.2023. Date of Announcement: 07 .09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED ARSHAD ALI. JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner (s): IWs Salman Akram Raja & Qazi Ghulam Dastagir, Advocates. For the Respondent (s): IWs Sanaullah DAG, Rehmanullah & Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocates, along with Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IWs Gadoon Textile MiUs and 02 others .\nvs.\n Federation of Pakistan and 02 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24687", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6723 = 2023 SLD 6723", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45B", - "Case #": "STA No. 558/IB/2023. Date of hearing; 24.08.2023. Date of order; 24.08.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN BASIT (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mirza Saqib Siddique, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Rizwan Ali, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. AG Sons, Office No. 09, Mezzanine Floor, Taimoor CHAMBERS, Blue Area, Islamabad.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24688", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6724 = 2023 SLD 6724", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(5)", - "Case #": "Const. P. 7493/2021, heard on: 24.08.2023. Date of Order: 24.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR. JUSTICE MS. SANA AKRAM MINHAS.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: M/s. Muhammad Tariq Masood, Syed\nAijaz Hussain Shirazi, Shams Mohiuddin Ansar,\nFor the Respondents: M/s. Syed Ahsan Ali Shah, Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Aamir Ali Shaikh,", - "Petitioner Name:": "AUS Food .\nVS \nFed. of Pakistan and Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24689", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6725 = 2023 SLD 6725", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 4259/LB/2023. Date of hearing 18.08.2023. Date of order 08.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER. RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waheed Shahzad Butt, Advocates.\nRespondent by: Mr. Rao Shahzad, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Hassan Nazir Aujla, Gujranwala.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Gujranwala." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24690", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6726 = 2023 SLD 6726", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(25A), 2(43A)", - "Case #": "STA No. 598/LB/2023, heard on: 05.04.2023. Date of order: 05.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Farhan Shahzad, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Zubair Khan, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Rizwan Garments, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24691", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6727 = 2023 SLD 6727", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1692 OF 2021, heard on: 29.03.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ. MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH. MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Faisal Siddiqui,ASC. For Syed M. Feisal Hussain Naqvi, ASC. For Federation: Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. AG.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Competition Commission of Pakistan and others.\nVS\nDalda Foods Limited, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24692", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6728 = 2023 SLD 6728", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "S.T.R No. 07 of 2013. Date of order. 01.02.2017.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUDGE. SHAHID KARIM, JUDGE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Tariq Rasheed Qamar and Shahid Iqbal, Advocate for petitioner.\nMr. Tanvir Ahmad and Furqan Ahmad Khan, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Special Zone, Regional Tax\nOffice, Multan.\nVersus\nM/s. Hafeez Ghee & General Mills (Pvt) Ltd, Bahawalpur\nRoad, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24693", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6729 = 2023 SLD 6729", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(kk), 17", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO. 539/LB/2021, heard on: 8.2.2022. Date of order: 4.3.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER, MEMBER(TECHNICAL).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Afzal Aslam, Advocate.\nFor respondents: Mr. Muhammad Awais Kamboh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Qamar Abbas s/o Ghaus Muhammad r/o Mohallah Mandiyal Town, Joharabad, Tehsil and District Khushab.\nVS\n1. Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Faisalabad. 2. Director, Intelligence & Investigation, FBR, Faisalabad. 3. Additional Director, Intelligence & Investigation, FBR, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24694", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6730 = 2023 SLD 6730", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 672/LB/2016, heard on: 30,05,2023. Date of order: 31.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s P.D.H Lahboratories (Pvt) Ltd. 9.5 KM, Sheikhupura Road, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24695", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6731 = 2023 SLD 6731", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=4,32,80,192", - "Case #": "Spl. Cust. Ref. A368/2019, heard on: 19.09.2023.\nDate of Order: 19.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar.\n Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicants: Through Mr. M. R. Sethi, Advocate.\nFor the Respondents: Through Mr. Pervaiz Iqbal Kansi,\nAdvocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs.\nVS \nM/s. Excel Health Care Laboratories (Pvt) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24696", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6732 = 2023 SLD 6732", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177(2), 121(1)(d)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2763/LB/2017, heard on: 26.05.2023. Date of order: 29.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICUIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "appellant by: Mr. Usman Zafar, Adv, Respondent by: Mr. Ali Asjid, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Malik Amir Traders, 220 GT Road, Baghbanpura, Lahore.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24697", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6733 = 2023 SLD 6733", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 805 of 2015. Date of order: 19.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Nasim Sikandar, Nudrat Sultana Alvi Advocates for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 805/2015, 806/2015, 826/2015, 1041/2015. Mr. Haseeb Shakoor Paracha Advocates for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos.905/2015, 1028/2015, 1029/2015. Nemo for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 768/2015, 1008/2015, 1132/2015. M/s Babar Bilal Advocate for FBR in W.P. Nos. 768/2015, 905/2015, 1008/2015, 1028/2015. Mr Usama Shahid Advocates for FBR, in W.P. Nos. 805/2015, 806/2015, 826/2015 and 1041/2015.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Oil and Gas Development Company Limited.\nVs\nThe Federal Board of Revenue, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24698", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6734 = 2023 SLD 6734", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=74", - "Case #": "ITA No. 293/MB/2021, heard on: 18-03-2022. Date of order: 13-04-2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AMINA NAZEER ANSARI, JUDICIAL MEMBER. DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Imran Ghazi, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Abdul Razzaq Khan, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Abdullah Muhsin, Mian Channu.\nVERSUS\nThe CIR Multan Zone, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24699", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6735 = 2023 SLD 6735", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "MA(Cond.) No. 261/LB/2022, ITA No. 3324/LB/2022, heard on: 21.09.2022. Date of order: 21.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Mehmood, DR alongwith Mr. Usman Khalil, LA. Mr. Tariq Naseer, LA, Respondent by: Mr. Mansoor Baig, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, CTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s Kohinoor Energy Ltd, Lhr." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24700", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6736 = 2023 SLD 6736", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 200/MB/2022, heard on: 10.03.2022. Date of order: 13.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RIZWAN AHMED URFI (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER), SARFARAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Tahir Bhatti, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Shabbir Feed Mills (Pvt.) Ltd, Multan.\nVS\nThe, CIR, CTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24701", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6737 = 2023 SLD 6737", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTRXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7,8,8(1)(a)", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Application No. 192 of 2006, heard on: 21.09.2023. Date of order: 21.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicant:Dr. Shah Nawaz Memon, Advocate\nFor the Respondent: M/s. Abdul Rahim Lakhani, Suneel Ali Memon and Atta Mohammad Qureshi, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Sales Tax & Federal Excise,LTU, Karachi .\nVS\nM/s. Hilton Pharma (Pvt) Limited" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24702", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6738 = 2023 SLD 6738", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "211/LB/2014, heard on: 25.04.2022. Date of order: 27.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER MEMBER (TECHNICAL)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Present for the Appellant: Mr. Muzamil Kamboh Advocate.\nPresent for the Respondent:: Mr. Imtiaz Elahi, Advocate & Mr. Muhammad Khalid Ch.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Frontier Enterprises and others.\nVS\nAdditional Collector of Customs (Adjudication) Faisalabad, Camp office at Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24703", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6739 = 2023 SLD 6739", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=218", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1167/LB/23, heard on: 27.03.2023. Date of order: 27.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Nasir Ali Gilani, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Gulfam Afzal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Asifa Zahid, H.No. 136Q Block, DHA Phase-2, Lahore.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, RTO-II, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24704", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6740 = 2023 SLD 6740", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=182(2)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1883/IB/2023, heard on: 14.09.2023. Date of order: 14.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nazir Abdul Wajid, Advocate.\nRespondent by; Ms. Maria Sharif, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Anjum Khalid Malik, House No. 02, Street No. 16E, Sector C Bahria Enclave, Islamabad.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Cant Zone, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24705", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6741 = 2023 SLD 6741", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(kk),168(1)", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO. 135/LB/2022, heard on: 25.04.2022. Date of order: 27.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER, MEMBER (TECHNICAL).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Present for the Appellant: Rana Rehan, Advocate.\nPresent for the Respondent: Ch. Imtiaz Elahi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sadam Khan.\nVS\nAdditional Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Lahore. Collector, Model Customs Collectorate, Sambrial. Assistant Collector, ASO, MCC, Sambrial. Superintendent, ASO, MCC, Sambrial." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24706", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6742 = 2023 SLD 6742", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=179(3)", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO. 178/LB/2017, heard on: 30.03.2022. Date of order: 11.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER, MEMBER (TECHNICAL).", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Arif Mehmood, Advocate. \nFor the Respondent: Mr. Muhammad Awais Kamboh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Shafi Sportwear, Sialkot.\nVS\nCollector of Customs, MCC, Sialkot. Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24707", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6743 = 2023 SLD 6743", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 873/LB/2016, heard on: 11.05.2023. Date of order: 29.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shahbaz Hussain, ACA.\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahsan Tahir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24708", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6744 = 2023 SLD 6744", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO. 529/LB/2009, heard on: 24.03.2022. Date of order: 11.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER, MEMBER (TECHNICAL).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Present for the appellant: Mirza Farhan Ahmed in person.\nPresent for the Respondent: Mr. Muhammad Khalid Ch. Advocate. Mr. Maqsood Ahmed, Superintendent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mirza Farhan Ahmed.\nVS\nCollector of Customs (Appeals), Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24709", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6745 = 2023 SLD 6745", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(46),3,3(1A),6,7,22,23,26", - "Case #": "STA NO. 661/LB/2016, heard on: 13.06.2023. Date of order 02.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Akmal, DR.\nRespondent by: Mr. Ikram-ul-Haq, Advocate along with, Syed Haider Iqbal, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO-II, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Waqar Plastic (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24710", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6746 = 2023 SLD 6746", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No. 426 of 2022. In Civil Appeal No. 51 of 2020. Date of Hearing: 27.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa, CJ. Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Ms. Neelam Azra Khan, ASC. a/w Mr. Sohail Ahmed, Additional Commissioner (Legal), FBR. (Through video-link from Peshawar).\nFor the Respondent: Not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, RTO, Peshawar and another.\nVersus\nAjmal Ali Shiraz M/s Shiraz Restaurant, Peshawar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24711", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6747 = 2023 SLD 6747", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTQXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=72B", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1052/LB/2016, heard on: 20.06.2023. Date of order: 15.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Zil-e- Huma, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Fazal Kareem, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Faisalabad.\nVS\nM/s. Magna Textile Industries Pvt. Ltd. Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24712", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6748 = 2023 SLD 6748", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=157", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) No. 829 of 2015, heard on: 06.09.2023. Date of Judgment: 06.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas,", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: The Director, Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, Regional Office, Karachi, Through Ms. Masooda Siraj, Advocate along with Mr. Saud Hassan Khan, Assistant Director Customs Intelligence. Respondent No.2: M/s. Sun Shine Company Airport Road, Gawadar.Through Ms. Dil Khurram Shaheen, Advocate." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24713", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6749 = 2023 SLD 6749", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=71,3(1)(a)(b)(2),4(b)(1),8", - "Case #": "CP D-6211/2016.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR. MR. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioners: M/s. Arshad Hussain Shahzad, Naeem Suleman, Ameen M. Bandukda.\nFor the respondents: M/s. Ameer Baksh Metlo, Pervaiz Ahmed Memon, Dr. Raana Khan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Liberty Mills ltd and others.\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24714", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6750 = 2023 SLD 6750", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 1977=3,4", - "Case #": "I.C.A No.61692 of 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS BY: M/s Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Shehzad A.\nElahi, Ali Sibtain Fazli, Waseem Ahmad Malik, Shahryar Kasuri, Hasham Ahmad Khan.\nRESPONDENTS BY: M/s. Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G & Ijaz Rehmat Basra and Mr. Muhammad Zain Qazi, Asst. Attorney Generals.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Hamza Sugar Mills Ltd. & others.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24715", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6751 = 2023 SLD 6751", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=176", - "Case #": "ITA No. 4252/LB/2023, heard on: 17.08.2023. Date of order: 21.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID SIKANDAR: JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Muhammad Mansoor, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Mazhar ALi, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Farrukh Ishaq.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24716", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6752 = 2023 SLD 6752", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTOC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=140,138,4(C),4C(2),114(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2413/KB/2023, heard on: 29.08.2023. Date of order: 30.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. M. AMINULLAH SIDDIQUI, J.M. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Samiullah Khan, FCA.\nRespondent by: Mr. Mukhtar Ali, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. TOURISM PROMOTION SERVICES (PAKISTAN) LTD,\nKARACHI.\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-VI,LTO, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24717", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6753 = 2023 SLD 6753", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTOCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122C", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 239/LB/2014, heard on: 25.05.2023. Date of order: 19.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Ahad Malik, DR.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Ali Tariq, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, Zone-I, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nMr. Muhammad Rafique, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24718", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6754 = 2023 SLD 6754", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=3,29", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No.1538/2015. Date of order: 21.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD, JUDGE. ASIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Irfan Ali Sheikh, Advocate for the appellant.\nCh. Muhammad Awais Zafar, Advocate for respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "National Bank of Pakistan.\nVersus \nM/s Brite Chemicals, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24719", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6755 = 2023 SLD 6755", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=34,33,13(2)(a)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=205(1)", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO. 335/LB/2019, heard on: 25.04.2022. Date of order: 28.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER MEMBER, TECHNICAL.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Adnan Moton, Advocate.\nFor the Respondent: Mr. Muhammad Asif Butt, Advocate, Mr. Ameer Haider, Deputy Collector, and Mr. Sajjad Bukhari, Inspector.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Style Textile (pvt) Ltd, Lhore.\nVS\n1- Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Lahore. 2- Collector, MCC (Appraisement and Facilitation), Lahore. 3- Deputy Collector (MBCO), MCC (Appraisement and Facilitation), Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24720", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6756 = 2023 SLD 6756", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTOHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1300/IB/2023, heard on: 06.10.2023. Date of order: 06.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Safeer Ahmed, Advocate & Muhammad Musawar, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Sidra Shafique, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Fazal Dall and Food Mills, Plot No. 23, I-10/3, Islamabad.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue RTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24721", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6757 = 2023 SLD 6757", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTOHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7(2)(i)(ii), 8(1)(a)(g)(l),", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1475/LB/2023, heard on: 11.09.2023. Date of order: 12.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Mehtab Haider, ACCA/FCCA. Respondent by: Mr. Hussain Shamim, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Hunza Sugar Mills, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24722", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6758 = 2023 SLD 6758", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4859/LB/2021, heard on: 31.07.2023. Date of order: 01.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Farooq Sheikh, Advocate & Mr. Mukarram Farooq Sheikh, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Yousaf Ismail, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Imran Rahim Alrai, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-RTO-II, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24723", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6759 = 2023 SLD 6759", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),36(i)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 102/LB/2013, heard on: 08.11.2022. Date of order: 04.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Ahmed Malik, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Asad Munir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Olympia Industries Ltd., Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24724", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6760 = 2023 SLD 6760", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45B", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1421/LB/2023, heard on: 22.06.2023. Date of order: 17.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Arslan, ITP.\nRespondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Zubaida Associates, Gulberg-III, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24725", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6761 = 2023 SLD 6761", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 518/LB/2016, heard on: 21.02.2023. Date of order: 26.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Taxpayer represented by: Mr. Nadeem Ashraf, FCA.\nDepartment by: Mr. Mati ur Rehman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mitchells Fruit Farm Ltd.\nVS\nCIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24726", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6762 = 2023 SLD 6762", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2244/LB/2023, heard on: 12.05.2023. Date of order: 17.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abul Hanan, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Asim Raza, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Kashif Brothers Prop: Mr. Kashif Ijaz, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24727", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6763 = 2023 SLD 6763", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "MA (Cond) NO. 1862/KB of 2023. IN ITA NO. 1542/KB of 2023, heard on: 10.10.2023. Date of order: 10.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM. CHAIRMAN. MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, A.M,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Irshad Alam, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Nasir Khan, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "Manzoor Hussain, Prop: Al-Fakhar Packages, Karachi.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Quetta." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24728", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6764 = 2023 SLD 6764", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11", - "Case #": "STA NO. 575/IB/2023, heard on: 02.10.2023. Date of order: 02.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hassan Akhtar, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Naseer Ahmed, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. SGS Electrical Company, GT Road, Gujrat.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Sialkot." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24729", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6765 = 2023 SLD 6765", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1192/LB/2016, heard on: 07.08.2023. Date of order: 03.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None. Respondent by: Ms. Hina Mustafa, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Odeon Cinema, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO-II, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24730", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6766 = 2023 SLD 6766", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1), 196(5),32,79,156(1)", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.57848/2023. Date of order: 12.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi. Judge.Asim Hafeez, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Omar Arshad Hakeem, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate for Customs Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Reshma Textile Mills Ltd. \nVs \nCustoms Appellate Tribunal Through its Chairman Lahore. etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24731", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6767 = 2023 SLD 6767", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQ1NTNHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=19A", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3532/ 2023. Date of Hearing: 27.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. J ustice Qazi Faez Isa, CJ. Mr. J ustice Amin- ud-Din Khan. Mr. J ustice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: I n-person. For Respondent No. 1: In-person On Court’s Call: Mr. Mansoor Usman Awan, Attorney-General \nCh. Aamir Rehman, Addl. AGP", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mukhtar Ahmad Ali.\nVersus\nThe Registrar, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24732", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6768 = 2023 SLD 6768", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2008/LB/2022, heard on: 15.06.2023. Date of order: 08.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None. Respondent by: Mr. Ahmed Akmal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Rehan, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24733", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6769 = 2023 SLD 6769", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3338/LB/2023, heard on: 15.06.2023. Date of order: 19.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. M. Nouman Shahzad, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ahmed Akmal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Muhammad Parvez, Kasur.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24734", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6770 = 2023 SLD 6770", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No.1719 of 2021. Dates of Hearing: 16.11.2022, 17.01.2023 and 28.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Tahir Mahmud, Advocate. Respondents by: Syed Ahsan Raza Kazmi and Mr. Arshid Mehmood Kiyani, learned Deputy Attorney-General. Mr. Saeed Ahmad Zaidi, Advocate for FBR. M/s Abdul Rehman Goher and Muhammad Salman Malik, Section Officers, Establishment Division.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. Muhammad Naeem.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24735", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6771 = 2023 SLD 6771", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.377 of 2014. Date of Hearing: 12.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Sardar Tariq Masod.Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant(s) Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, ASC Mr. M. Sharif Janjua, AOR. For Respondent No. 1: Mr. Abdul Hafeez Amjad, ASC Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, AOR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muslim Commercial Bank Limited.\nVersus\nMuhammad Anwar Mandokhel etc.." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24736", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6772 = 2023 SLD 6772", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION No.2732-L OF 2016. Date of Hearing: 05.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ MR. JUSTICE AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN. MR. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner: Ch. Zafar Iqbal, ASC with Mr. Rab Nawaz,\nAssistant Commissioner, (via video link from Lahore} \nFor the responrlent: Sh. Zafar-u l-Islam , ASC assisted by Mr. Tanveer Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue Multan.\nVersus\nSh. Muhammad Amin Arshad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24737", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6773 = 2023 SLD 6773", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 137/LB/2023, heard on: 02.08.2023. Date of order: 02.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Umair Ashraf, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Safina Foods (pvt.) Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24738", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6774 = 2023 SLD 6774", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1938 of 2023. Date of hearing 19.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by Mr. Tanveer Iqbal, ASC and Barrister Usama\nTanveer Iqbal, Advocate with Rizwan Ali Sayal, Petitioner. \nRespondent(s) by Malik Muhammad Siddique Awan, Additional Attorney General alongwith Mr. Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Rizwan Ali Sayal.\nV/S \nFederation of Pakistan and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24739", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6775 = 2023 SLD 6775", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDYzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1280/LB/2016, heard on: 03.03.2023. Date of order: 18.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mrs. Ayesha Ranjha, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Zulqarnain Tirmzy, ITP a/w. Mr. Saim Raza Zaidi, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Honda Canal Bank (pvt.) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24740", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6776 = 2023 SLD 6776", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1337/LB/2019, heard on: 25.05.2023. Date of order: 18.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Javed Iqbal Qazi, Adv. Respondent by: Mst. Zil e Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Fazal Tyre Corporation.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24741", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6777 = 2023 SLD 6777", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2141 of 2023. Date of order: 20.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ MEHMOOD JAHANGIRI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Raja Abdul Qadeer Janjua, A. Ahad Khokher, Malik Muhammad Fiaz Kandwal and Tahir Hussain Anchan, Advocates for the petitioner. Raja Rizwan Abbasi, Advocate / Special Prosecutor, F.I.A. Malik Muhammad Iqbal Kallue, learned Assistant Attorney General. Syed Rizwan Shah, Deputy Director, F.I.A., C.B.C., Islamabad. Muhammad Nadeem Abbasi, Assistant Director, F.I.A., C.B.C., Islamabad.\nMir Fakhar Abbas, A.S.I., F.I.A./C.B.C", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faisal Maqbool Shaikh.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 02 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24742", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6778 = 2023 SLD 6778", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=3(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.740 of 2021. Date of Hearing: 20.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa, CJ. Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Muhammad Ahmad Qayyum, ASC.\nFor the Respondent: Mr. Khurram Mumtaz Hashmi, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Sprint Oil and Gas Services Pakistan FZC, Islamabad.\nVersus \nOil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24743", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6779 = 2023 SLD 6779", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1341/LB/2023, heard on: 14.06.2023. Date of order: 25.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Zulqarnain Tirmizi, ITP. Mr. Saim Raza, FCA. Respondent by: Mr. Ali Khalid, DR>", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Reliable Engineering Services (pvt.) Ltd. Khana Flyover Toll Plaza Office, Defence Road.\nVS\nCIR. CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24744", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6780 = 2023 SLD 6780", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=127", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1374/LB/2023, heard on: 31.07.2023. Date of order: 24.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Suleman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ali Zeeshan, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24745", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6781 = 2023 SLD 6781", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(1)(b)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1349/LB/2016, heard on: 21.06.2023. Date of order: 25.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asim Raza, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Popular Sugar Mills, Pvt Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24746", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6782 = 2023 SLD 6782", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=214C", - "Case #": "WRIT PETITION NO.56 OF 2020. Date of Hearing: 18-10-2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, J.UDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by : Mr. Adeel Wahid, Advocate. Respondents by : Mr. Babar Bilal, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Orient Petroleum Pty. Limited.\nVS.\nFederal Board of Revenue and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24747", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6783 = 2023 SLD 6783", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA (AG) NO. 373/KB/2023, heard on: 18.09.2023. Date of order: 30.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, J.M. SYED MAROOF GILANI, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr, Irshad Alam, Advocate, Respondent by: Mr. Imran Ali Shaikh, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dewan Cement Ltd, Karachi.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, LTO, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24748", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6784 = 2023 SLD 6784", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45B(3)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1562/LB/2023, heard on: 20.07.2023. Date of order: 26.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None. Respondent by: Mr. Yousaf Ismail, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Hasnain Plastic, Al-Habib Market, Shahalam Market, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24749", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6785 = 2023 SLD 6785", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2322/LB/2015, heard on: 25.05.2023. Date of order: 18.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICAIL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shoaib Hassan Butt, Adv, Respondent by: Mst. Zil-e-Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Aziz Industries.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24750", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6786 = 2023 SLD 6786", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3241/LB/2022, heard on: 22.08.2022. Date of order: 22.08.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Hamza Sajid, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ali Raza Gillani, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Zeeshan Steel Ind. Landa Bazar, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24751", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6787 = 2023 SLD 6787", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDWXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(1)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1167/LB/2022, heard on: 31.08.2023. Date of Order: 19.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naeem Munawar, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Sunhail Anjum, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Monno Industries Ltd., Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24752", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6788 = 2023 SLD 6788", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=132(1)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1841/LB/2022, heard on: 10.01.2023. Date of order: 23.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Kamran Haider, ACA. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. LESCO, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24753", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6789 = 2023 SLD 6789", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1013/KB-2023, heard on: 25.05.2023. Date of order: 24.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. TAUQEER IRTIZA, AM. MR. AAMIR MAQSOOD, JM.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Riffat Naeem, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Imran Yousaf, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Khalid Hussain, Quetta.\nVS\nThe Commissioner, RTO, Quetta." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24754", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6790 = 2023 SLD 6790", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Rules, 2006=25", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2369/LB/2022. STA NO. 1955/LB/2022, heard on: 19.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAMHUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shujauddin, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Naveed Akhtar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Kausar Ghee Mills Limited, 12C New Muslim Town Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, Audit-I, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24755", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6791 = 2023 SLD 6791", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=26Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1341/LB/2023, heard on: 14.06.2023. Date of order: 25.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Zulqarnain Tirmzi, ITP. Mr. Saim Raza, FCA. Respondent by: Mr. Ali Khalid, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Reliable Engineering Services (Pvt.) Ltd. Kahna Flyover Toll Plaza Office, Defence Road, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24756", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6792 = 2023 SLD 6792", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2)", - "Case #": "MA (Cond) No. 352/LB/2023. STA NO. 1666/LB/2023. MA(Stay) No. 6447/LB/2023, heard on: 27.07.2023. Date of order: 27.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Nauman Yahya, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Umair Shafaqat, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. M. Adnan Abbas, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24757", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6793 = 2023 SLD 6793", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3648/LB/2020, heard on: 08.08.2023. Date of order: 22.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Javed Iqbal Qazi Advocate. respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Karamat Brothers steel Re-Rolling Mills, Daroghawala, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR Zone-IV CTRO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24758", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6794 = 2023 SLD 6794", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=127", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4897/LB/2023, heard on: 22.08.2023. Date of order: 23.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nawab ur Rehman Mian, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Faiza Sadaf, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Muhammad Sajid Sajjad Bhatti, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24759", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6795 = 2023 SLD 6795", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Central Excise Act, (I of 1944)=3(b),4(2)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No.213 of 2011. Date of Decision : 23.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRSENT: Babar Sattar, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by : Mr. Mohammad Abdul Hassan, Advocate.\nRespondent by : Hafiz Mohammad Idris and Syed Farid Bokhari, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTU, Islamabad.\nVersus\nM/s Askari Cement Limited, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24760", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6796 = 2023 SLD 6796", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25", - "Case #": "STA NO. 743/LB/2023, heard on: 31.05.2023. Date of order: 18.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Hafiz N. Bin Javed, Adv. Respondent by: Mst. Zil e Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Abdul Hafeez, \nVS\nCIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24761", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6797 = 2023 SLD 6797", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDVXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO.2997 OF 2021. Date of Hearing: 06.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI. MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Umer Abdullah, ASC.\nFor Respondents: Mr. Faridullah, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "United Bank Limited (UBL) through its President and others.\n VERSUS\nJamil Ahmed and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24762", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6798 = 2023 SLD 6798", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=152", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.420 of 2014. Date of hearing 10.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by Mr. Shehbaz Butt, ASC. Respondent(s) by Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC for the Respondents No.1 and alongwith Shaikh Anwar-ul-Haq Law Officer. Barrister Raja Jibran Tariq Ali, Advocate for the Respondent No.3.\nMr. Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Nordex Singapore Equipment Limited.\nV/S\n Federal Board of Revenue, CIR and FFC Energy Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24763", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6799 = 2023 SLD 6799", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=309", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.171 of 2021, heard on: 19.10.2023. Date of decision: 15.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui & Jawad Akbar Sarwana JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant in New Dadu Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., HCA No.171/2021: through Mr Chaudhry Atif Rafiq, Advocate\nAppellant in New Thatta Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. HCA No.172/2021: through Mr Chaudhry Atif Rafiq, Advocate\nRespondent No.1 in: Sindh Sugar Corporation Limited.\nHCA Nos. 171 and 172/2021: Assistant A.G., Mr Abdul Jalil Zubedi, Advocate Respondent No.2: Mehran Sugar Mills Ltd., Nemo HCA Nos. 171 and 172/2021: Nemo\nDr. Waseem Iqbal, Official Assignee", - "Petitioner Name:": "New Dadu Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.\nv.\nSindh Sugar Corporation Ltd. and Another and High Court Appeal No.172 of 2021 New Thatta Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.\nv.\nSindh Sugar Corporation Ltd. and Another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24764", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6800 = 2023 SLD 6800", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "RFA No.30994/2022, heard on: 25.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants by: M/s Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, Barrister Sajid Ikram Siddiqui, Aakif Majeed, Asim Tufail Farooqi and Sajid Hussain Qureshi Advocates. Respondent by: M/s Ambreen Moin and Zain-ulAbideen, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Javed Shafi, etc.\nVersus\nNational Bank of Pakistan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24765", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6801 = 2023 SLD 6801", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(3),(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4938/LB/2022, heard on: 07.03.2023. Date of order: 26.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD AKHTAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Adeel Anwar, ACA. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Imran, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Tanveer Cotton Mills. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24766", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6802 = 2023 SLD 6802", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO: 728/MB/2023, heard on: 23.08.2023. Date of order: 26.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shabbir Fakhar ud Din, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Haroon Rasheed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Ghulfam Shabbir,\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-Multan, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24767", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6803 = 2023 SLD 6803", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5817/LB/2022, heard on: 01.12.2022. Date of order: 08.02.2023", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Rana Muhammad Afzal, Advocate. Respondent by: Mrs. Mehreen Yousaf, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Stylers Plus (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24768", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6804 = 2023 SLD 6804", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=72B,25", - "Case #": "M.A. (R) NO. 375/LB/2022 In STA No. 353/LB/2015, heard on: 29.03.2023. Date of order: 29.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Malik Usman, Advocate. Mr. Saifullah Butt, ITP. Respondent by: Ms. Naima Shumail, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. S & S Corporation, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24769", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6805 = 2023 SLD 6805", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=18", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.13-Q OF 2020. Date of Hearing : 08.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Munib Akhtar. Mr. Justice Shahid Waheed. Ms. Justice Musarrat Hilali.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Kamran Murtaza, Sr. ASC. For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Muhammad Ayyaz Swati, Addl. AG with Qamar Abbas, Focal Person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Gul Zaman.\n Versus\nDeputy Commissioner/Collector Gwadar & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24770", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6806 = 2023 SLD 6806", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=136(1)", - "Case #": "I. T. R. No. 755 of 2000, heard on: 04.09.2023. Date of Order: 20.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: M/s. Qazi Carpets, Through Mr. Arshad Siraj,\nAdvocate.\nRespondent: The ITO, Service Unit No. 2,Circle 4, Hyderabad, Through Mr. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Advocate." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24771", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6807 = 2023 SLD 6807", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDUXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA NO. 194/LB/2023, heard on: 09.08.2023. Date of order: 28.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Muhammad Bilal, Adv. respondent by: Muhammad Qamar Minhas, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Qaiser Liaqat.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24772", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6808 = 2023 SLD 6808", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,4,6,7,8,11,22,23.26", - "Case #": "STA NO. 148/LB/2016, heard on: 30.06.2023, Date of order: 06.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Usman Ijaz Rathore, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Ahmed Nawaz Khurram, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore. \nVS\nM/s. Janana De Malucho Textile Mills Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24773", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6809 = 2023 SLD 6809", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(5)", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Application No.542 of 2020, heard on: 22.11.2023. Date of Order: 22.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: The Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Zone-II, CRTO, Karachi now The Commissioner Inland Revenue,\nLegal, LTO, Karachi. Respondent: M/s. Gull Metal (Pvt) Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24774", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6810 = 2023 SLD 6810", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=40", - "Case #": "W.P. NO. 35281/2023. Date of order: 15.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHAIKH, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Yasir Hameed, and Azeem Suleman, Advocates for the Petitioners. Mr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocate for Respondents M/S Humera Bashir Ch. and Yasir Islam Ch, Advocates for the respondents in connected matter.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Bin Tariq (pvt.) Limited.\nVS\nThe Federation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24775", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6811 = 2023 SLD 6811", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 538/LB/2015, heard on: 26.07.2023. Date of order: 03.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Yousaf Ismall, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO-II, Lahore.\nVS\nM/S Teknica Data com System," - }, - { - "Case No.": "24776", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6812 = 2023 SLD 6812", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(a),177,177(1),177(6),122,111,122(1)/(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2240/LB/2022, heard on: 28.11.2022, 08.12.2022, 20.12.2022, 31.01.2023. 08.02.2023. 28.02.2023, 17.05.2023, 24.05.2023, 02.06.2023, and 08.06.2023. Date of order: 14.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Saqib, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmed DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Mian Amer Mahmood, 36-E Model Town, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, AEOI Zone, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24777", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6813 = 2023 SLD 6813", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25", - "Case #": "STA NO. 788/LB/23, heard on: 05.09.2023. Date of order: 18.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Jamil Akhtar Baig, FCA. Respondent by: Mr. Mazhar Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mumtaz Metal Care (pvt,) Ltd. \nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24778", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6814 = 2023 SLD 6814", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Act, 2012=54(i)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2842 of 2017/RWP, heard on: 16.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shujaat Ali Khan,judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Raja Muhammad Riaz Satti, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Malik Amjad Ali, Additional Advocate\nGeneral.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ghulam Mustafa.\nVersus\nPunjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24779", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6815 = 2023 SLD 6815", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "STR No.77498/2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi. judge. Asim Hafeez, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zain-ul-Abidien Bokhari, Advocate for the Applicant-department.\nMr. Waseem Ahmad Malik, Advocate\nassisted by Ms. Najia Noreen Maitla,\nAdvocate for respondent-taxpayer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal-Zone-LTO, Lahore.\nVersus \nM/s Rasool Nawaz Sugar Mills Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24780", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6816 = 2023 SLD 6816", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8B", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1120/LB/2017, heard on: 06.10.2023. Date of order: 16.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None. Respondent by: Mr. Salman Naeem, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s A.A. Chappal Sole Manufacturer, Main Billo Street, Umer Perk, Outfall Road, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24781", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6817 = 2023 SLD 6817", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDTXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2700/LB/2023, heard on: 20.07.2023. Date of order: 12.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANT BY: Mr. Farhan Ahmed, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ali Ahsan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Lal-Din Engineering Pvt. Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24782", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3317 = 2024 SLD 3317", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-A,194-B", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3391 of 2024, date of order & hearing: 09.08.2024, (Against order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 28.06.2024 passed in W.P No.20130/2024)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench-II:\nMr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah\nMr. Justice Athar Minallah\nMr. Justice Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Abdul Rehman Khan, ASC, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR\nFor the Raja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, DAG, Saleem Ahmed Malik, Superintendant Customs Enforcement, Lahore Huriya Fatima, Legal Advisor, FBR Waheed Iqbal Bhatti, Inspector\nMr. Nadeem Mehmood Mian, ASC (for private respondent) (From Lahore via video-link)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Khalid alias Muhammad Khalid and others … Petitioner(s)\nVs\nCollector of Customs (Adjudication), Custom House, Lahore, etc. ... .Respondent(s)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24783", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6818 = 2023 SLD 6818", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=99D", - "Case #": "Writ petition no.3926/2023. Date of order: 29.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN: JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Salman Akram Raja and Asad Ladha, Advocates for the petitioners. Mr. Osama Shahid, Advocate for respondent no.2 FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Askari Bank Limited and another.\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24784", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6819 = 2023 SLD 6819", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221(2)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1957/LB/2023, heard on: 23.11.2023. Date of order: 23.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran Khan Advocate & Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Shaheryar Akram, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. M Zest (Private) Limited, Jinnah Park, Near District Court, Rawalpindi.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II, CTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24785", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6820 = 2023 SLD 6820", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2022=5(53)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=37A", - "Case #": "W.P. No.20679/2023.Date of order: 27.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Mian Ashiq Hussain, Muhammad Arshad and Najia Noreen Maitla, Advocates for petitioner. Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Addl. Attorney General. Mr. Ahmad Pervaiz, Advocate for CIR. Mr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocate for FBR Mr. Muhammad Adil Chattha, Advocate for respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Manzurul Haq.\nVersus \nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24786", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6821 = 2023 SLD 6821", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46(1)(b),21(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 317/MB/2023 & MA (Stay) NO. 868/MB/2023.heard on: 30.11.2023. Date of order: 01.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN LATIF MINHAS (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran Ghazi, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Mashooq Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Awan Brothers Enterprises, Multan.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24787", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6822 = 2023 SLD 6822 = (2025) 131 TAX 355", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSSs", - "Key Words:": "Constitutionality of Proviso to Division VII of Part I of First Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the first proviso to Division VII of Part I of the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, inserted via section 5(53) of the Finance Act, 2022. The grievance pertained to the imposition of capital gains tax under section 37A on the sale of securities acquired in 2011, but disposed of during Tax Year 2023. The petitioner contended that since the securities were held for more than one year, they should be exempt from tax under the proviso to section 37A(1) as it existed prior to its omission by the Finance Act, 2014. Reliance was placed on the case of Anwar Yahya v. Federation of Pakistan (2017 PTD 1069) and several other judgments supporting protection of vested rights and opposing discriminatory tax classifications.\nThe government, represented by the Additional Attorney General and FBR, argued that no vested right existed at the time of disposal in 2023, and the omission of the proviso in 2014 removed any protection. The disposal date, not the acquisition date, was key for determining applicable law. The legislature was fully competent to impose tax through rational classifications, and no discrimination was evident.\nHeld:\nThe omission of the proviso to section 37A(1) via the Finance Act, 2014 was pivotal. As of Tax Year 2023, no protection was available to exempt long-held securities from capital gains tax.\nThe court distinguished the Anwar Yahya case, noting it was decided under the law as it stood prior to the 2014 and 2015 amendments.\nThe petitioner failed to establish any vested right, promissory estoppel, or representation by the state that would support an exemption from taxation in 2023.\nThe classification under the amended Division VII of the First Schedule, which linked tax rates to both holding period and date of acquisition (pre-/post-1 July 2022), was constitutionally valid. It was held to be based on intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the objective of encouraging fresh and continued investment.\nThe plea of discrimination was rejected. No inconsistency between the main charging provision (section 37A) and the Schedule was found.\nThe petition was dismissed as meritless.\nCitations:\nAnwar Yahya and others v. Federation of Pakistan (2017 PTD 1069) – Distinguished\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Federation of Pakistan (Civil Appeal No. 930 & 931/2017)\nDr. Muhammad Anwar Kurd v. State (2011 SCMR 1560)\nD.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983 SC 305)\nPakistan v. Hazrat Hussain (2018 SCMR 939)\nD.G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2020 PTD 1186)\nFawad Ahmad Mukhtar v. CIR (2022 PTD 454)\nArmy Welfare Sugar Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 1652)\nMolasses Trading & Export v. Federation (1993 SCMR 1905)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2022=5(53)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=37A,37A(1)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 20679/2023. Date of order: 27.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Mian Ashiq Hussain, Muhammad Arshad and Najia Noreen Maitla, Advocates for petitioner.\nMirza Nasar Ahmad, Addl. Attorney General. Mr. Ahmad Pervaiz, Advocate for CIR. Mr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocate for FBR Mr. Muhammad Adil Chattha, Advocate for respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MANZURUL HAQ \nVS \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24788", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6823 = 2023 SLD 6823", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act 2021=3,30", - "Case #": "W.P No.4l3-P12021, heard on: 01.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner (s): Qazi Ghulam Dastagir, Advocate. Respondent (s): M/s Kamran Murtaza, AAG, Rehman Ullah, Atta Ullah Khan, Advocates. Abdul Wahab DD Litigation KPK. Sharif Utlah (Assistant Director Legal).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Souvenir Tobacco Company Ltd, Re-drying & cigarette Factory, Marium Garhi, District Mardan.\nVS\nKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority through its Director General Railway Track, Phase-III, Hayatabad, Peshawar & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24789", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6824 = 2023 SLD 6824", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=99D", - "Case #": "W.P NO. 78520/2023. Date of order: 29.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Ikram-ul-Haq, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Muhammad Anwar Khan, Assistant Attorney General. M/s Ahmed Pervaiz and Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocates for respondent No. 3 alongwith Shabih-ul- Aijaz, commissioner, LTO, FBR (on Watching Breif)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Soneri Bank Limited.\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24790", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6825 = 2023 SLD 6825", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=99D", - "Case #": "W.P. NO. 78993/2023. Date of order. 30.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Salman Akram Raja, Ali Talib, Tariq Bashir and Arsaln Riaz, Advocate for the petitioners, Mr. Muhammad Anwar Khan, Assitant Attorney General. Barrister Ahmed Pervaiz, Mr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Avocates for Respondent- FBR alongwith shabih-ul- Aijaz, Commissioner, LTO, FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB Islamic Bank Limited etc.\nvs\nFederation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24791", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6826 = 2023 SLD 6826", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.6927 of 2021/BWP, heard on: 05.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Amir Ajam Malik, Advocate. Respondents by: Ms. Riffat Yasmeen, Assistant Attorney General along with Ulfat Ali, Town Inspector.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. Samina Zia.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24792", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6827 = 2023 SLD 6827", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2206/KB/2022, heard on: 09.10.2023. Date of order: 05.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR M. AJAZ KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naseer Ahmed Abbasi, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Asfandyar Janjua, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Fazal Rabani, Karachi\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, RTO-I, Karachi," - }, - { - "Case No.": "24793", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6828 = 2023 SLD 6828", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4197/LB/2023, heard on: 25.07.2023. Date of order: 31.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Zulqarnain Tirmzi ITP, Respondent by: Mr. M. Suleman DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Hafiz Mansoor ul Hassan Bahawalpur. \nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24794", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6829 = 2023 SLD 6829", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.40356 of 2019. Dates of hearing: 21.09.2023, 19.10.2023 & 24.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, learned Senior-ASC and Mr. Haq Nawaz Chattha, learned ASC.\nRespondent(s) by: Ms. Samia Khalid, learned Additional\nAdvocate General and Mr. Salman Asif Warraich, learned Assistant Advocate General with Ch. Rab Nawaz, Assistant Commissioner and Ijaz Ahmad, Tehsildar / Sub-Registrar\nKot Momin.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Popular Sugar Mills Limited.\n VS\n District Collector, Sargodha & 2 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24795", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6830 = 2023 SLD 6830", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=23", - "Case #": "E.F.A No.8251/2023. Date of hearing 14.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For appellant Mr. Asad Ahmad Ghani, Advocate. For the Respondents M/S Imran Malik, C.M Sarwar and Sikandar Javed, Advocate for respondents No.2 and 3. Mr. Fiaz Ahmad Ranjha, Advocate for respondent No.8.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Gujranwala Steel Industries.\nVersus\nIndustrial Development Bank of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24796", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6831 = 2023 SLD 6831", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA 890 LB of 2017 - ATIR, heard on: 07-07-2022. Date of order: 22-07-2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr.Muhammad Naeem , Accountant Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Qaswar Hussain, DR. Mr. M. Younas Ghazi, FCA. Mr. M. Imran Ghazi, adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Bahawalpur. \nVS\nM/s. FFC Educational Society C/o FFC Plant Site. Goth Machi, Sadiqabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24797", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6832 = 2023 SLD 6832", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 692/IB/2023, heard on: 15.11.2023. Date of order: 15.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate.Mr. Umar Qureshi, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Naheed Durani, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Nadeem Manzoor, Basement, Al Jalal Plaza, G.T. Road, Punjan Kasana, Gujrat.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Sialkot." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24798", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6833 = 2023 SLD 6833", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.74 of 2017, heard on: 05.12.2023.\nDate of short order: 05.12.2023. Date of Reasons: 12.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, Mr. Justice Jawad Akbar Sarwana.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Noman Zahid Ali, Advocate for the Appellant. M/s. Khalid Javed and Munawar-uz-Zaman Juna, Advocates for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Standard Chartered Bank Pakistan Limited\nVersus\nMst. Fatima Ehsan Al Ghori (since deceased) through LRs." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24799", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6834 = 2023 SLD 6834", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2018=10", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No.890-K to 909-K/2023. Date of Hearing: 22. 11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi. Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner(s):Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC. Ms. UIne Kalsoom, D.C. Law East Karachi. Mr.Nabeel Siraj, D.C Custom. \nFor respondents: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs & another (in all cases).\nVERSUS\nM/s. Young Tech Private Limited & another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24800", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6835 = 2023 SLD 6835", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.76 of 2021, heard on: 20.11.2023. Date of decision: 15.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui & Jawad Akbar Sarwana JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants: Abdul Karim Momnani s/o Abdul Aziz Momnani and Mst. Sultana Abdul Karim w/o Abdul Karim Momnani through Abdul Shakoor, Advocate Respondent: Habib Bank Ltd., Aijaz Hussain Shirazi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Abdul Karim Momnani and Another.\n v.\n Habib Bank Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24801", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6836 = 2023 SLD 6836", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDRXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=58", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.127 of 2011. Dated 14.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Mr. Justice Omar Sial.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khaleeq Ahmed, Advocate for Appellants.\nMr. Syed Daanish Ghazi, Advocate for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. Khursheed Begum and others.\nVersus\nNIB Bank Limited and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24802", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6837 = 2023 SLD 6837", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "ICA NO. 52600/2022, heard on: 04.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Usman Sheikh, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Initiating Officer/DCIR\nvs\nEhsan Ullah etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24803", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2023 6838 = 2023 SLD 6838", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113", - "Case #": "ITR NO. 72345 of 2023. Date of Hearing: 18.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Shoaib Rashid, Advocate. Respondent by: M/s. Asma Hamid, Hasan Ali Noor Ahsan and Sana Azhar, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "National Transmission & Despatch company Ltd. \nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue & another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24804", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3318 = 2024 SLD 3318", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=48(1)(b)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 290/2023. DATE OF DECISION: 21.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, J.-BABAR SATTAR, J.-", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONER BY: Ch. Naeem Ul Haq and Mr. Muhammad Imran Ul Haq, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Mr. Ghulam Qasim Bhatti, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Spars Private Limited, Islamabad, through its Company Secretary.\nVs.\nOfficer Inland Revenue, Islamabad & others," - }, - { - "Case No.": "24805", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3319 = 2024 SLD 3319", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No.288 of 2018.heard on: 21.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Mr. Justice Jawad Akbar Sarwana.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ghulam Rasool Korai, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Bahzad Haider, Advocate for Respondents No.1 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PSRM Steels Private Limited.\nVersus\nAskari Bank Limited and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24806", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3320 = 2024 SLD 3320", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8B(1)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 473/LB/2023, heard on: 22.09.2023. Date of order: 16.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naveed Farid, ITP. Respondent by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. AK Enterprises, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24807", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3321 = 2024 SLD 3321", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A), 114", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 26/IB/2022, heard on: 19.07.2023, Date of order: 24.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mudassar Shuja-ud-din, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Yousaf Ismail, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faqir Muhammad Sabir 18-19, A Block, Johar Town, Lahore.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24808", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3322 = 2024 SLD 3322", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2706/LB/2023, heard on: 22.06.2023. Date of order: 21.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Faisal Ali Butt, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Farrukh Aslam, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Xara Soft (Private) Limited, Ferozwala, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24809", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3323 = 2024 SLD 3323", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8B(1)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 548/LB/2023, heard on: 13.06.2023. Date of order: 05.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER. RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Ahmed Malik, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Amin Raza, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. HNR Company, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24810", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3324 = 2024 SLD 3324", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Execution Application No.08 / 2019. Date of Hearing: 27-10-2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRRSENT: Sana Akram Minhas, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Decree-Holder: Habib Bank Limited, Through Mr. Rahman Aziz Malik, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Habib Bank Limited.\nv. \nAmin Soap & Oil Industries (Pvt) Ltd & Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24811", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3325 = 2024 SLD 3325", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDQXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5381/LB/2023, heard on: 14.09.2023. Date of order: 18.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Qadeer Ahmed, ITP. Respondent by: Mrs. Anam Tahir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Nadeem Khan, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24812", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3326 = 2024 SLD 3326", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.82 of 2023, heard on: 20.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Mr. Justice Jawad Akbar Sarwana", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Mukesh Kumar G. Karara and Nabi Bux Laghari, Advocates for the Appellants. Mr. Suleman Huda, Advocate for Respondent No.1. Mr. M. Mubin Khan, Advocates for auction purchaser.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Ifrahim and another.\nVersus\nM/s. J.S. Bank Limited and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24813", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3327 = 2024 SLD 3327", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 2550 of 2015, heard on:02.06.2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant(s) by Mian Sohail Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondent(s) by Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Textile Asia Limited etc. \nVersus \nMCB Bank Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24814", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3328 = 2024 SLD 3328", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 534/LB/2016, heard on: 21.08.2023. Date of order: 02.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Ali, D.R. Respondent by: Mian Haseeb Tahir, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. H.S. Plastic, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24815", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3329 = 2024 SLD 3329", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(5)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 855/LB/2016, heard on: 25.07.2023. Date of order: 03.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICAIL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naveed Zafar, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Suleman, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Al-Chem Corporation, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24816", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3330 = 2024 SLD 3330", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDOC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8B(1)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1231/LB/2023, heard on: 02.06.2023. Date of order: 23.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ibrahim Shahbaz Butt, Adv. Respondent by: Mst. Zil e HUma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Pulcara Chemical Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd.\nVS\nCIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24817", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3331 = 2024 SLD 3331", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDOCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),177", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 481/LB/2016, heard on: 05.09.2023. Date of order: 12.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mazhar Ali, D.R. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO-II, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Wahid Industries, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24818", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3332 = 2024 SLD 3332", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,7,8(1)(a)(f)(g)(h)(i)(j)(k)(l)(m)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1409/LB/2022, heard on: 25.09.2023. Dte of order: 03.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Sh. Aqeel Ahmed, aAdv. Respondent by: Mr. Naveed Akhtar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Stylers International Ltd, 20-KM, Ferozpur Road, Glaxo Town, Lahore.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24819", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3333 = 2024 SLD 3333", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3449/LB/2023, heard on: 05.09.2023. Date of order: 03.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mansoor Fateh Ali, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Rao Shahzad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Aslam Malik, Sheikhupura.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24820", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3334 = 2024 SLD 3334", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDOHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 495/LB/2023, heard on: 24.03.2023. Date of order: 19.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Imran, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Shagufta Zareen. DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Fish Bowl, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24821", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3335 = 2024 SLD 3335", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDOHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891=2(8)Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=10", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.105 of 2016. Dated 17.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Mr. Justice Omar Sial.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khaleeq Ahmed, Advocate for the Appellants. Mr. Talha Jawed Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Naveed & others.\nVersus \nHabib Bank Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24822", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3336 = 2024 SLD 3336", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) Nos. 1213 & 1214 of 2023, heard on: 16.01.2024. Date of Judgment : 16.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant : The Collector of Customs, Enforcement, Karachi Through Mr. Pervez A. Memon, Advocate\nRespondent : M/S Taj Gasoline Pvt. Ltd. & another\nThrough Mr. Shoukat Hayat, Advocate" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24823", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3337 = 2024 SLD 3337", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=140", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.71690 of 2023. Date of hearing 07.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Jamil Khan, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Rana Muhamad Afzal, Advocate. Federation by: Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant\nAttorney General. Respondent-Departments by:-\nMr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocate. M/s Malik Abdullah Raza and Hassan Safdar Khan, Advocates.\nDr. Shazia Gull, Commissioner Inland Revenue, Syeda Lubna Shah Deputy Commissioner, Inland Revenue and Mr. Akhtar Suraj, ADCIR, Lahore.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sardar Waseem Ilyas.\nVs.\n Federation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24824", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3338 = 2024 SLD 3338", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,4,6,7,8(1)(d),13,22,23,26,33,34,2(37)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1471/LB/2016, heard on: 17.08.2023. Date of order: 10.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None. Respondent by: Mr. Qasim Rehman, ACA", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. ARCO Plastic, PVT, Ltd. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24825", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3339 = 2024 SLD 3339", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),11(4)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2333/LB/2022, heard on: 20.09.2023. Date of order: 24.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. Muhammad Tarique, Accountant member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abid Hafeez Abid, ADvocate. Respondent by: Ms. Rabia Haider Bukhari, DR>", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Maqsood Steel & Re-Rolling Mills, Gujranwala.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24826", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3340 = 2024 SLD 3340", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1925=10", - "Case #": "W.P. No.3609/2022. Date of Hearing : 13.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Arbab Muhammad Tahir, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by : Mr Abdul Wahid Qureshi, Advocate.\nMr Asad Mehmood, Advocate. Mr Naseem Ahmed Shah, Advocate. Mr Khurram Mehmood Qureshi, Advocate. Mr Abdul Rauf Qureshi, Advocate. Mr Jelal Haider, Advocate. Syed Farhat Abbas Sherazi, Advocate. Mr Ahsan Rashid, Advocate. Respondents by : Khalid Mehmood Dhoon, Asstt. Attorney General.\nMian Zain ul Abdeen Qureshi, State Counsel. Mr Ishtiaq Haider, Circle Registrar, Cooperative Societies, ICT. Mr Aimal Khan, Deputy Registrar, Cooperative\nSocieties, ICT.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Islamabad Cooperative Housing Society, Islamabad \nthrough its Secretary.\nVersus\nAdditional Commissioner (G)/Director Admin, ICT & 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24827", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3341 = 2024 SLD 3341", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "E.F.A. NO. 35845 Of 2020, heard on: 27.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicant: Mr. Imran Malik, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Iftikhar Ullah Malik, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zahida bibi, etc.\nVS\nSUMMIT Bank Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24828", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3342 = 2024 SLD 3342", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33,34", - "Case #": "STA NO. 859/LB/2017, heard on: 17.10.2023. Date of order: 16.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asim Manj, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Omer Wajid, FCA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, Zone-III,LTU, Lahore. \nVS\nM/s. Nishat Paper Products Co. Limited, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24829", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3343 = 2024 SLD 3343", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9", - "Case #": "FAO No.75308 of 2019, heard on: 11.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ashar Elahi, Advocate. Respondents by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faysal Bank Ltd.\nVersus\nM/s Usman Enterprises & another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24830", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3344 = 2024 SLD 3344", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1629/LB/2016, heard on: 05.09.2023. Date of order: 12.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Hashim Aslam Butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore. \nVS\nM/s. Dimond Products Pvt. Ltd. Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24831", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3345 = 2024 SLD 3345", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFDNHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=217", - "Case #": "W.P. No.79632/2022, heard on: 27.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s Shehbaz Butt, Mehak Zafar, Ibrahm\nShahbaz, Khurram Shahbaz, Asfand Yar Waheed and Sara Majeed, Advocates for petitioner. Respondents by: Ch. Imtiaz Elahi, Deputy Attorney General. Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal and Osama Zafar, Advocates for respondents No.1 & 2. Mr. Bilal Munir, Advocate for respondent No.3 – FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Kashf Foundation through its Chief Executive\nVersus\nChief Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTU, Federal Board of Revenue and two others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24832", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3346 = 2024 SLD 3346", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2001=130", - "Case #": "WRIT PETITION NO.27339 OF 2023. Date of hearing 18.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Jamil Khan, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s Shahbaz But and Chaudhary Anwaar-ul-Haq Arif, Advocates. Federation by: Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General. Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General.\nRespondent No.5 by: Barrister Lamia Niazi, Advocate.\nRespondent No.6 by: Mr. M. Nazeer Chauhan, Ad", - "Petitioner Name:": "Lahore Tax Bar Association.\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24833", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3347 = 2024 SLD 3347", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=217", - "Case #": "W.P. No.79632/2022, heard on: 27.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s Shehbaz Butt, Mehak Zafar, Ibrahm\nShahbaz, Khurram Shahbaz, Asfand Yar Waheed and Sara Majeed, Advocates for petitioner. Respondents by: Ch. Imtiaz Elahi, Deputy Attorney General. Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal and Osama Zafar, Advocates for respondents No.1 & 2. Mr. Bilal Munir, Advocate for respondent No.3 – FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Kashf Foundation through its Chief Executive\nVersus\nChief Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTU, Federal Board of Revenue and two others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24834", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3348 = 2024 SLD 3348", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "ICA No.55195 of 2020. Date of Hearing. 17-01-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANTS BY: Mr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Advocate.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Mr. Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Fauji Fresh and Freeze Ltd.\nVersus\nCommissioner Inland Revenue & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24835", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3349 = 2024 SLD 3349", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3528/LB/2023, heard on: 14.09.2023. Date of order: 27.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Waqas Ali, ITP, Respondent by: Syeda Iqra Munaver, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Khurram Rasheed, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24836", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3350 = 2024 SLD 3350", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 493/LB/2023.& MA (AG) NO. 47/LB/2023. Date of hearing: 24.05.2023. Date of order: 18.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naeem Munawar, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Ghulam Hussain Yasir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. Zephyr Textile Ltd.\nVS\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24837", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3351 = 2024 SLD 3351", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2706/LB/2023, heard on: 22.06.2023. Date of order: 21.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Faisal Ali Butt, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Farrukh Aslam, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Xara Soft (private) Limited, Ferozwala, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24838", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3352 = 2024 SLD 3352", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1309/LB/2019, heard on: 24.05.2023. Date of order: 01.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Usman Ijaz Rathore, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Adil Jilani, ACA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, Zone-II, (LTU), Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Coca Cola Exports Corporation, LAhore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24839", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3353 = 2024 SLD 3353", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTYzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1002/LB/2017, heard on: 13.11.2023. Date of order: 13.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Tabinda Shabeen, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. H.S. Rukkan ud Din & Co. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24840", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3354 = 2024 SLD 3354", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=72B", - "Case #": "STA NO. 476/LB/2016, heard on: 23.11.2023. Date of order; 05.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Tipu Sultan, ITP. Respondent by: Ms. Qayyum Rani, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Unipet (pvt) Ltd. Lahore. \nVS\nThe CIR, CTRO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24841", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3355 = 2024 SLD 3355", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 172/LB/2017, heard on: 24.08.2023. Date of order: 14.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Omer Wajid, FCA. Respondent by: Ms. Rabia Haider, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s, Nishat Power Limited, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24842", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3356 = 2024 SLD 3356", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2022=7E", - "Case #": "WP No.5327-P12022, heard on: 23.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED ARSHAD ALI. JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner (s): M/s Asim Khan, Asad Yousaf,\nNajmuddin, Najamul Saleheen, Muhammad Tariq, Nadia Gu! & Shahid Jan, Advocates. For the Respondents: M/s Sanaullah Deputy Attorney General, Ghulam Shoaib Jally, lshtiaq Ahmad (Junior), Barrister\nSarwar Muzafar Shah,Advocates along with Asad Bilal\nJehangir Additional Commissioner lnland Revenue\n& Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner lnland Revenue. M/s Shumail Ahmad Butt & Barrister Syed Mudassir Ameer, Advocates/Amicus Curie.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Latif Hakeem.\nV/s\nFederation of Pakistan Through its Secretary Finance,\nlslamabad and 02 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24843", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3357 = 2024 SLD 3357", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=156", - "Case #": "MA(R) NO. 479/LB/2022, heard on: 12.09.2023. Date of order: 01.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Essam Anwar Khokar, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nMr. Mujahid Zafar, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24844", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3358 = 2024 SLD 3358", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(7)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 926/LB/2015, heard on: 08.06.2023. Date of order: 08.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MOMIN SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Rao Shahzad, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Rizwan Babri, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTO, Lahore. \nVS\nM/s. First Capital Equities Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24845", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3359 = 2024 SLD 3359", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=128(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 870/LB/2015, heard on: 07.06.2023. Date of order: 22.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Mahrukh Imtiaz, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Escort Pakistan Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24846", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3360 = 2024 SLD 3360", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2115/LB/2017, heard on: 17.10.2023. Date of order: 30.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellantt by: Mr. Mazhar Ali, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The COmmissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, RTO-II, Lahore.\nVS\nMr. Muhammad Lutfullah Bhalli, Prop. Bhalli Constructors, 14-KM Multan Road, Thokar Niaz Baig, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24847", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3361 = 2024 SLD 3361", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 7098 of 2014, heard on: 22.02.2018.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mehar Irshad Ahmed Arain, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Ashfaque Thaleem, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Tehsil Muncipal Administration.\nVS\nPunjab Labour Appellate Tribunal-II, Multan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24848", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3362 = 2024 SLD 3362", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1520/LB/2023, heard on: 21.09.2023. Date of order: 06.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hashim Aslam Butt, Adv. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Con-Cast Steel Industries.\nVS\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24849", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3363 = 2024 SLD 3363", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No. 426 of 2022. Date of Hearing: 27.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa, CJ. Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Ms. Neelam Azra Khan, ASC. a/w Mr. Sohail Ahmed, Additional Commissioner (Legal), FBR.\n(Through video-link from Peshawar) For the Respondent: Not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, RTO, Peshawar and another\nVersus\nAjmal Ali Shiraz M/s Shiraz Restaurant, Peshawar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24850", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3364 = 2024 SLD 3364", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=115(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 6119/LB/2022, heard on: 12.02.2024. Date of order: 21.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Usman, ITP. Respondent by: Ms. Hira Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. United Staller, Pvt, Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24851", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3365 = 2024 SLD 3365", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTWXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14), 2(37), 7(1), 7(2)(i), 8(1)(d), 10, 21(2), 25, 26(1), 73", - "Case #": "STA No.232/LB/2009. Date of Hearing: 12.09.2023. Date of Order: 14.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN MUNIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Imran Ghazi, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Haroon Rasheed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Multan.\nVS\nM/s. Rainbow Industries, Khanewal Road, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24852", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3366 = 2024 SLD 3366", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Central Excise Act, (I of 1944)=7, 9, 52, 174, 176, 226, 236, 238", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 458 of 2017. Date of Hearing: 19.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mian Ashiq Hussain, ASC (through video-link, Lahore) For the Respondents: Mrs. Kausar Parveen, ASC Mr. Naeem Hassan, Secy. Litigation, FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Pakistan WAPDA Foundation.\nVersus\nThe Collector of Customs, Sales Tax, Lahore, etc.." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24853", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3367 = 2024 SLD 3367", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "ICA No.35908 of 2023. Date of Hearing. 25-01-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANTS BY: M/s. Syed Moazzam Ali Shah, Abdul Muqtadar Khan, Ms. Asma Hamid, Shahzad Ahmad\nCheema, RESPONDENTS BY: M/s Barrister Shaharyar Kasuri, Shahbaz Butt, Syed Muhammad Ijaz, Ali Raza, Sufiyan Zaman, Tanveer Ahmad", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nVersus\nMuhammad Osman Gul." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24854", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3368 = 2024 SLD 3368", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "MA(AG) NO. 3097/KB/2023, heard on: 19.12.2023. Date of order: 23.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Muhammad Aleem, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Subhat Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Farhan Pardesi, Karachi.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue," - }, - { - "Case No.": "24855", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3369 = 2024 SLD 3369", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.87 to 106 of 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench-III: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan. Mr. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the appellant(s): Mr. Ahmad Pervaiz, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Yahya, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Shahzad Cheema, ASC. Muhammad Qasim, Addl. Commissioner. Mr. M. Saeed Tahir, ASC (through V.L. from Lahore) For the Mr. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, ASC. (Through V.L. Lahore Registry) Mr. Shahryar Kasuri, ASC. Assisted by: Muhammad Hassan Ali and Umer A. Ranjha, Law Clerks, Supreme Court of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore (In all cases)\nVersus\nM/s Millat Tractors Limited, Lahore (In CP 2447-L/2022) and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24856", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3370 = 2024 SLD 3370", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1835/LB/2023, heard on: 25.09.2023. Date of order: 03.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Farooq Sheikh, Advocate & Mr. Mukarram Farooq Sheikh, Advocates. Respondent by: Mr. Javed Iqbal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Adnan Noor, Islamabad.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore," - }, - { - "Case No.": "24857", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3371 = 2024 SLD 3371", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=7E", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.213/2023. Date of Hearing : 15.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ, C.J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) By : Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Mr. Usman Kiyani, Mian Haseeb Ali Bhatti. Respondents By : Mr. Ghulam Qasim Bhatti, Syed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi, Barrister Atif Rahim Burki and Barrister Sohail Nawaz, Advocates. Assisted By : Ms. Maheen Zeeshan Law Clerk", - "Petitioner Name:": "Waheed Ashraf.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24858", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3372 = 2024 SLD 3372", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 358/LB/2023, heard on: 23.01.2024. Date of order: 23.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Atif Waheed Advocate. Responmdent by: Mr. Muhammad Hayat D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Shaheen Chemist, Shop NO.01, Cantt Plaza, CHaklala Scheme_III, Rawalpindi.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24859", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3373 = 2024 SLD 3373 = (2024) 130 TAX 113", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVTg", - "Key Words:": "Taxation of Insurance Business under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Section 99\n•\nFourth Schedule: Rule 5 (computation of profits and gains for insurance businesses)\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe respondents (taxpayers) filed appeals to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue concerning different tax years. The appeals involved similar questions of law related to the computation of profits and gains for insurance businesses under the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The members of the Tribunal initially had a difference of opinion, which led to the matter being referred to a Full Bench of the Appellate Tribunal.\nThe Full Bench of the Appellate Tribunal followed a judgment passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan (in the case of EFU General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. The Federation of Pakistan) and decided in favor of the respondents. The Department argued that the ratio of the Supreme Courts judgment was not applicable under the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and was based on the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. Despite this, the Full Bench of the Appellate Tribunal rendered the impugned judgment, and the case was referred to the High Court for further review.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nTaxpayer’s Argument:\no\nComputation of Profits and Gains: The taxpayers counsel argued that Rule 5 of the Fourth Schedule governs the computation of profits and gains, but it does not deal with the computation of tax liability, which is a separate concept. The Fourth Schedule should be applied in determining profits and gains, but tax liability is a distinct matter.\n2.\nDepartment’s Argument:\no\nThe counsel for the Department contended that the Supreme Courts judgment in EFU General Insurance Co. Ltd. was based on the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and its provisions, particularly Section 26(a), which are different from the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\no\nTherefore, the Department argued that the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment would not apply to the current Ordinance (2001).\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nTaxation of Insurance Business:\no\nThe Full Bench of the Appellate Tribunal held that the rate of taxation applicable to insurance businesses should not differ from other businesses. It emphasized that there should be no discrimination or distinction in the application of tax rates to insurance businesses, especially when the First Schedule provides different tax rates for dividend income.\no\nThe Tribunal reasoned that if the First Schedule grants benefits for certain types of income (like dividend income) to other companies, then insurance businesses should similarly benefit from the tax rate specified in the First Schedule.\n2.\nSupreme Court Precedent:\no\nThe Full Bench followed the precedent set by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of EFU General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. The Federation of Pakistan. The Court held that the rate of taxation for insurance businesses should not be different from other businesses and that such distinctions would be unjustified. Therefore, the Full Bench decided the matter in favor of the respondents (taxpayers).\n3.\nNo Justification for Discrimination:\no\nThe Departments argument that the ratio of the Supreme Courts judgment is inapplicable due to the different provisions under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal concluded that there was no basis for making a distinction between insurance businesses and other businesses regarding the applicable tax rates.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nEqual Treatment in Taxation:\no\nThe tax rate applicable to insurance businesses should be equal to that of other similar businesses. There should be no discrimination in the application of tax rates, and insurance businesses should not be deprived of benefits available to other businesses under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n2.\nSupreme Court Judgment as Precedent:\no\nThe judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of EFU General Insurance continues to hold relevance, even under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The legal principles established in that case regarding taxation of insurance businesses were upheld by the Full Bench of the Appellate Tribunal.\n3.\nComputation of Profits and Gains vs. Tax Liability:\no\nWhile the Fourth Schedule deals with the computation of profits and gains for insurance businesses, this is separate from the issue of tax liability, which is governed by different rules. The case emphasized that computation of profits and gains should not be conflated with the determination of tax liability.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe Full Bench of the Appellate Tribunal decided in favor of the respondents, upholding the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in EFU General Insurance and ruling that the rate of taxation for insurance businesses must be consistent with that for other businesses.\n•\nThe Departments argument was rejected, and the respondents were entitled to the same tax rate benefits as other businesses under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Appellate Tribunal affirmed that insurance businesses should be treated equally with other businesses in terms of the tax rate and that the Supreme Courts precedent in EFU General Insurance remained applicable. The matter was resolved in favor of the respondents, ensuring that insurance businesses are not subjected to unfair or discriminatory tax treatment under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=99,Fourth ScheduleIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979=26(a)", - "Case #": "I.T.R No. 186 of 2016 decided on 14.03.2024, date of hearing: 14.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM AND RASAAL HASAN SYED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Malik Abdullah Raza, M. Sohaib Aziz, Ahmed I'ervaiz, Samar Masood Soofi and Shamsher Ali Advocates in ITR Nos. 186/2016, 187/2016, 188/2016, 189/2016, 190/2016 and 237545/2018 for the Applicants.\nM/s. Naved A. Andrabi, Khurram Saleem, M. Adeel Ch., Abdul Latif, Waheed Ahmed, Tanveer Ahmed, Rana M. Afzal Razzaq Khan, Malik M. Zarif, Hannan Masood and Qari Zuhaib ur Rehman Zubairi, Advocates in ITR Nos.237/2015, 242/2015, 240/2015, 238/2015,241/2015 and 239/2015 for the Applicants.\nM/s. Umair Ahmad and Haris Irfan, Advocates in ITR Nos. 186/2016, 187/2016, 188/2016. 189/2016, 190/2016 and 237545/2018 for the Respondents.\nM/s. Shehzad Ahmad Cheema and Malik Abdullah Raza, Advocates in ITR Nos.237/2015, 242/2015, 240/2015, 238/2015,241/2015 and 239/2015 for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVs\nSECURITY GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24860", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3374 = 2024 SLD 3374", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 06/LB/2017, heard on: 25.09.2023. Date of order: 09.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Talat Mehmood Bosaal, D.R. Respondent by: Mr. Saood Nasrullah Cheema Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Sayid Paper Mills (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24861", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3375 = 2024 SLD 3375 = (2024) 130 TAX 102 = 2024 PTCL 770 = 2025 PTD 480", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTVXk", - "Key Words:": "The case in question deals with a challenge to Section 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which was inserted through the Finance Act, 2022. The petitioners have argued that the provision is unconstitutional, claiming that it exceeds the legislative competence of the federal government, violates citizens constitutional rights, and imposes discriminatory and confiscatory taxes.\nKey Legal Issues and the Court’s Decision:\n1.\nCompetence of the Federal Legislature:\no\nThe petitioners argued that Section 7E is ultra vires (beyond the legal power) of the Federation because it involves taxing immovable property, a subject that falls under the provincial jurisdiction as per the Constitution.\no\nThe court concurred, asserting that taxing immovable property, including capital gains from immovable property, falls within the domain of the provinces and not the federal government. Therefore, the court held that the imposition of income tax on immovable property by the Federation violates the Constitution by encroaching on provincial legislative powers.\no\nConclusion: The provision was deemed an overreach of federal powers and incompatible with the Federal Legislative List.\n2.\nViolation of Constitutional Rights:\no\nThe petitioners also claimed that the provision was confiscatory and discriminatory, violating Articles 23, 24, and 25 of the Constitution. These articles protect:\n\nArticle 23: Protection of property rights.\n\nArticle 24: Protection against the deprivation of property.\n\nArticle 25: Equality before the law.\no\nSection 7E imposes a tax on immovable properties even if they do not generate income or are not used in economic activities. This means that citizens could be forced to sell their property to pay the tax, which could be considered an unlawful deprivation of property.\no\nMoreover, the provision exempts certain categories of property holders (such as those with agricultural land or farmhouses), creating discriminatory treatment between property owners.\no\nConclusion: The court ruled that Section 7E was confiscatory and discriminatory, violating the fundamental rights to property and equality under the Constitution.\n3.\nRationality of the Tax Imposition:\no\nThe petitioners further argued that the legal fiction under Section 7E, which treats immovable property as generating income for the purpose of taxation, was irrational. This is because no actual economic transaction occurs with immovable property that would justify its taxation.\no\nThe court referred to the Elahi Cotton Mills case, where it was established that taxing based on legal fictions in the absence of economic activity could be considered irrational.\no\nConclusion: The court agreed with the petitioners argument, ruling that taxing immovable properties under a legal fiction without any underlying economic transaction was irrational.\nFinal Outcome:\nThe court declared Section 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to be ultra vires the Constitution, meaning it was beyond the federal governments authority and violated constitutional rights. As a result, the provision was struck down and declared void ab initio, meaning it was as if the provision had never existed.\nThis decision emphasizes the limits of federal legislative powers over matters that are constitutionally reserved for provinces and underscores the protection of fundamental rights, particularly in relation to property.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=7E,22,24", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition Nos. 2058 of 2022 and 958 of 2023, decided on 31.05.2024, date of hearing: 24.05.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, C.J. AND SHAUKAT ALI RAKHSHANI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Pervaiz Khan, Syed Mohibullah and Nasrullah Kakar, Advocates for the Petitioners in C.P. No. 2058 of 2022.\nMr. Usama Zaheer, Advocate, petitioner in person in C.P. No. 958 of 2023.\nMr. Khushal Khan Kasi, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No. 1 in C.P. No.2058 of 2022 and for Respondent No. 1 to 4 in C.P. No. 958 of 2023.\nBarrister Iftikhar Raza, Advocate, assisted by Mr. Rehmatullah Durrani, Commissioner Inland Revenue, Quetta for Respondent No. 2.\nMr. Zahoor Ahmed Baloch, Additional Advocate General (AAG) assisted by Barrister Iftikhar Raza, Advocate and Rehmatullah Durrani, Commissioner Inland Revenue, Quetta for Respondent No.5.\nM/s Amanullah Kanrani and Kamal Siddiqui, Advocates for Amicus Curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "QUETTA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY and another\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue Division and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24862", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3376 = 2024 SLD 3376", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.8594 of 2016/BWP, heard on: 28.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. Aejaz Ahmad Ansari, Advocate. \nRespondents by: M. Yaseen Kamran, Advocate. Ch. Muhammad Jameel, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. Haleema, etc.\nVersus\nExecutive Director, C & C Department Securities & Exchange Commission, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24863", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3377 = 2024 SLD 3377", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No. 52, 53, 132 to 143, 189 to 200, 223 to 225, 266 to 273, 282 to 293, 351 to 356, 396 to 417, 441, 451 to 456, 474, 510, 573 to 575 all of 2024 & CMA No. 997/2024, heard on: 24.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner: Mrs. Asma Hamid, ASC Mrs. Tasneem Amin, AOR For the respondents: Mr. Farough Nasim, ASC Mr. Salaman Akram Raja, ASC Mr. Haider Waheed, ASC Mr. Hyder Ali Khan, ASC Mr. Khalid Javed Khan, ASC Mr. Rashid Anwar, ASC (through video link from Karachi) Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR Mr. Ghulam Nabi, AOR Mr. Haider Waheed, ASC Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR (in CMA-997/2024 in CP-266/2024).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, L.T.O. Karachi.\nVS\nA.F. Ferguson & Company, Karachi and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24864", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3378 = 2024 SLD 3378", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 223/KB/2024, heard on: 19.02.2024. Date of order: 26.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MRS. RASHIDA SIDDIQUA, J.M. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Azizullah Enayat, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Shoukat Changezi, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Huzaifa Hunaid, Karachi.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, RTO-II, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24865", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3379 = 2024 SLD 3379", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1355/KB/2016, heard on: 31.01.2024. Date of order: 22.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Usama Ameer, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Faizullah Khan, ACCA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, LTU, Karachi.\nVS\nM/s. Pak Brunei Investment Company Limited, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24866", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3380 = 2024 SLD 3380", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=44(4), 182", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 112/KB/2017, heard on: 05.10.2023. Date of order: 23.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Talat Mehmood Bosaal, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Saqib Raza Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore\nVS\nM/s. Nationa; Communication Services (SMC-PVT)." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24867", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3381 = 2024 SLD 3381", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 65/KB-2024, heard on: 30.01.2024. Dare of order: 26.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AAMIR MAQSOOD, J.M. MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Salman Pasha, Advocate. respondent by: Mr. Imran Ali Sheikh, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Rahil Mazhar, 51-Al-Hamra Society, Off, Tipu Sultan Road, Karachi.\nVS\nThe COmmissioner-IR, Zone, AEIO, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24868", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3382 = 2024 SLD 3382", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA(Stay-Ext) No. 594/KB/2024, heard on: 23.02.2024. Date of order: 23.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MRS. RASHIDA SIDDIQUA, J.M. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Barrister Salman Dossani. Respondent by: Mr. Ali Hassan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority, Karachi.\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-I, LTO, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24869", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3383 = 2024 SLD 3383", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA (Stay) NO. 607/KB/2024, heard on: 26.02.2024. Date of order: 26.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. AMINULLAH SIDDIQUI, J.M. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Hasham Khan, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhayo, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Naveed Jan Baloch, Karachi.\nVS\nThe CIR Zone-III, CTO, Karchi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24870", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3384 = 2024 SLD 3384", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(d)", - "Case #": "ITA NO> 3147/KB/2023, heard on: 16.01.2024. Date of order: 22.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. AMINULLAH SIDDIQUI, J.M. MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, A. M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nadeem Naseem, Karachi. Respondent by: Mr. Abdul Rauf, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Sinan Sardar, Karachi.\nVS\nThe CIR Zone-I, RTO-III, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24871", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3385 = 2024 SLD 3385", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTUXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=100D", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 659/2024. Date of order: 28.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR STAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Saqib Siddeeq, Advocate for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Le Nest LLP through its MD.\nVS\nFederal Board of Revenue through Chairman & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24872", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3386 = 2024 SLD 3386", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=214C,177(2)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1495/LB/2017, heard on: 14.11.2023. Date of order: 25.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Iftikhar Ahmed, Advocate. Respondent by: Rao Shahzad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Javed Prop. Madina General Store, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24873", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3387 = 2024 SLD 3387", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2014C", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2581/LB/2014, heard on: 17.05.2023. Date of order: 29.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naveed A Andrabi, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Abdul Rasheed Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Etihad Sugar Mills Limited, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, LTO,Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24874", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3388 = 2024 SLD 3388", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3416/LB/2019, heard on: 22.05.2023. Date of order: 28.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Dada Jee Corporation (pvt) Ltd. Bhobattian Chowk, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24875", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3389 = 2024 SLD 3389", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=205(3)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2706/LB/2016, heard on: 16.11.2023. Date of order: 27.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waqar Karim, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Iqbal Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Khawaja Spinning Mills Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24876", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3390 = 2024 SLD 3390", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5063/LB/2023, heard on: 30.08.2023. Date of order: 09.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asim Zulfiqar, FCA. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Asif, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. FuelDirect (pvt) Limited, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, Audit-I, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24877", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3391 = 2024 SLD 3391", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1048/KB/2016, heard on: 06.02.2024. Date of order: 12.02,2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MRS. RASHIDA SIDDIQUA, J.M. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": ".Appellant by: Mr. Udha Ram, Advocate. Respondent by: Syed Bilal Jafri, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sher Muhammad Mugheri, Karachi, \nVS\nCIR, Zone-II, RTO, Sukhur" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24878", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3392 = 2024 SLD 3392", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "M.A (Cond) No. 45/KB/2024, heard on: 29.01.2024. Date of order: 29.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR M. AIJAZ KHAN, J.M. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: M/s. Imran Ahmed, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Aslam sheikh, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Jan Muhammad Contractor, Karachi.\nVS\nThe Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Appeal-VI, RTO, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24879", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3393 = 2024 SLD 3393", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1737/KB/2023, heard on: 17.01.2023. Date of order: 23.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. M. AMINULLAH SIDDIQUI, J.M. MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Taimoor Ahmed Qureshi, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Asfandyar Janjua, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Imad Iqbal, Karachi.\nVS\nThe CIR RTO-II, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24880", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3394 = 2024 SLD 3394", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1205/LB/2023, heard on: 09.06.2023. Date of order: 14.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran Munir, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Javed Iqbal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sh. Muhammad Umar Chishti, Kamonke.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Gujranwala." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24881", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3395 = 2024 SLD 3395", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTTXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2022=4C", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24882", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3396 = 2024 SLD 3396", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5353/LB/2023, heard on: 20.09.2023. Date of order: 02.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran Munir, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Rudra Amjad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Ali Abdullah Hamid, Faisalabad.\nVS\nThe CIR (Corporate Zone), Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24883", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3397 = 2024 SLD 3397", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,205,161(1A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 165/LB/2013, heard on: 20.09.2023. Date of order: 07.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asim Zufiqar, FCA. Respondent by: Khan Shahzaib, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Soneri Bank, Limited.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24884", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3398 = 2024 SLD 3398", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5)/121/111,122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1887/LB/2022, heard on: 24.05.2022. Date of order: 24.05.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Fahad Azhar Butt, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Punjab Land Development Company Limited.\nVS\nCIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24885", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3399 = 2024 SLD 3399", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25", - "Case #": "STA NO. 742/LB/2022, heard on: 24.05.2022. Date of order: 07.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SADDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Navid Farid (ITP). Mr. Qadeer Ahmed. Respondent by: Muhammad Zubair Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Minerals Beverages (Private) Limited.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24886", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3400 = 2024 SLD 3400", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,3(1A),6,7,22,23,26,73,2(37),11(3)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2214/LB/2023, heard on: 08.11.2023. Date of order: 20.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Usman, Advocate. Respondent BY; Ms. Tabinda Shaheen, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Life Style Shoes, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24887", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3401 = 2024 SLD 3401", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8", - "Case #": "STA NO. 692/LB/2020, heard on: 18.02.2022. Date of order: 22.03.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. S.A. Khan, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. M. Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ghani Glass, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, LTU, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24888", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3402 = 2024 SLD 3402", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1885/LB/2023, heard on: 20.09.2023. Date of order: 20.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Haseeb Anwar, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Tehmina Akram, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Electrocraft Engineering, Lahore. \nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24889", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3403 = 2024 SLD 3403", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1715/LB/2023. Date of Hearing: 04.10.2023. Date of order: 12.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran Munir, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Talat Mehmood, Bosaal, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. Nimat ALi Gill, P-140, Ismaeel City, Daewoo Road, Faisalabad.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24890", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3404 = 2024 SLD 3404", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 147/LB/2024, heard on: 25.01.2024. Date of order: 25.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. M. Faisal Iqbal, ITP. Respondent by: Ms. Ghazala Nasir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Saqib, H. No. 53, Block C-1, WAPDA Town, Gujranwala.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Gujranwala." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24891", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3405 = 2024 SLD 3405", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "Spl. Cus. Ref. A. 1355/2023, heard on: 22.02.2024. Date of Order: 22.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar\n Mr. Justice Adnan-ul-Karim Memon", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicant(s): Mr. Faheem Raza, Advocate.\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Khalid Jawed Khan along with M/s. Irfan Ali & Uzair Shoro, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Collector of Customs.\nVS\nM/s JW SEZ (PVT.) LTD. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24892", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3406 = 2024 SLD 3406", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=99", - "Case #": "I.T.R No.186/2016. Date of Hearing. 14-03-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPLICANTS BY: M/s Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Malik Abdullah\nRaza, M. Sohaib Aziz, Ahmed Pervaiz, RESPONDENTS BY: M/s. Umair Ahmad and Haris Irfan, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nVersus\nSecurity General Insurance Company Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24893", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3407 = 2024 SLD 3407", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=115(4), 214D, 177", - "Case #": "IT A No. 301 /LB/2024. Date of Hearing: 22.01.2024. Date of Order 13.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad lmran Ghazi, Adv along with \nSyed Muhammad Junaid Mamtaz, Adv. Respondent by: Ms. Kiran Maqsood, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian Muhammad Kashif, Kowali Road, Faisalabad.\nVersus\nThe CIR,RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24894", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3408 = 2024 SLD 3408", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=53,19,23", - "Case #": "Execution Application No. 25 of 2012. Dates of hearing : 23.01.2023, 16.02.2023 and 26.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Decree Holder : Askari BankLimited, M/s.Lubna Aman and Irfanullah Khan, Applicant : Mrs. Samar Rais, M/s. Jahanzeb Awan, ShahanKarimi, Rashid Mahar,\nSarosh Arif and Sauban Tasleem, Respondent No.11 : Muslim Commercial Bank, M/s. Rasshid Anwer and S. Mustafa Ali, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Askari Bank Limited VS A. H. International (Pvt.) Ltd. and others] along with Suit No.B-10 of 2007, J.M. No.33 of 2016\nand Suit No.531 of 2016." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24895", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3409 = 2024 SLD 3409", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),11(c),13,33", - "Case #": "Spl. Cr. Bail Application No. 21 of 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant/Accused : Muhammad Sibtain Abbas son of Ghulam Abbas through Mr. Arif Manthar Solangi, Advocate.\nThe State : Through Mr. Ghulam Asghar Pathan, Special Prosecutor along with I.O. Tahir Zafar, Audit Officer, I&I-IR,\nKarachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24896", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3410 = 2024 SLD 3410", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(36)Drugs Act, 1976=7", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Application (“Spl. STRA”) No. 399 of 2007, heard on: 15.02.2023. Date of Judgment: 10.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: Messrs Reckitt & Colman Pakistan Limited Through Mr. Khawaja Aizaz Ahsan, Advocate along with Mr. Sami-urRehman, Advocate. The Collector, Collectorate of Sales Tax (West) & others Through Mr. Irfan Mir Holepota, Advocate." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24897", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3411 = 2024 SLD 3411", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=236K, 34(5)", - "Case #": "IT A No. 302/LB/2024. Date of Hearing: 22.01.2024. Date of order: 13.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, Judicial Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad lmran Ghazi, Adv along with\nSyed Muhammad Junaid Mamtaz, Adv. Respondent by: Ms. Kiran Maqsood. DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian Muhammad Kashif, Kowali Road, Faisalabad. \nVS\nThe CIR,RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24898", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3412 = 2024 SLD 3412", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=182(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 865/IB/2015, heard on: 25.03.2024. Date of order: 25.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR M. AJAZ KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Afzal Malik, M/s. Malik Iron & Steel Corporation, A-733, M.A.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24899", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3413 = 2024 SLD 3413", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A), 122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA No.404/IB/2016. Date of Hearing: 07.03.2024. Date of Order: 07.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, Judicial Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Abdul Hafeez, Advocate.\nRespondent BY: Ms. Romana Alam, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Appellant: M/s Al-Wahab Flour Mills, 7 Wetridge Industrial Area, Rawalpindi.\nvs\nRespondent: Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24900", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3414 = 2024 SLD 3414", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.8594 of 2016/BWP.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. Aejaz Ahmad Ansari, Advocate. Respondents by: M. Yaseen Kamran, Advocate. Ch. Muhammad Jameel, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. Haleema, etc.\nVersus\nExecutive Director, C & C Department Securities & Exchange Commission, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24901", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3415 = 2024 SLD 3415", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTRXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 26/LB/2022, heard on: 19.07.2023. Date of order: 24.07.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mudassar Shuja-Ud_din, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Yousaf Is Ismail, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faqir Muhammad Sabir, 18-19, A Block, Johar Town, Lahore.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24902", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3416 = 2024 SLD 3416", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),214D", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2033/IB/2023, heard on: 22.12.2023. Date of order: 01.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "appellant by: Mr. Zahid Masood Chatha, Advocate. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Green Base Solution (pvt.), Ltd, Islamabad.\nvs\nThe CIR, CTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24903", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3417 = 2024 SLD 3417", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 195/LB/2024, heard on: 18.03.2024. Date of order: 18.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJID NAZIR MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asif Farid, Adv. Respondent by: Ms. Shaharyar Awan, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UP COUNTRY ENCLOSURES (PVT) LTD. 22 East, 3rd floor, Saeed Plaza Blue Area, Islamabad.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24904", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3418 = 2024 SLD 3418", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 712/LB/2022, heard on: 18.05.2022. Date of order: 23.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Kamal, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Sarim Bhatti, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Haier Pakistan (pvt). Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, Enforcement-I, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24905", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3419 = 2024 SLD 3419", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2715/LB/2015, heard on: 10.01.2024. Date of order: 25.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Javed Iqbal Khan. FCA. Respondent by: Ms. Qayyum Rani, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. United Iron & Steel (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24906", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3420 = 2024 SLD 3420", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=24(2)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4290 of 2023. Date of hearing 18.03.2014, 01.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by M/s Hafiz Muhammad Idris, ASC with Syed\nFarid Ahmed Bukhari, Faizan Ahmed Mirza, Respondent(s) by M/s Hassan Kamran Basheer, ASC with Abdul Wakeel, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Rahat Café, Rawalpindi.\nV/S\n Government of Punjab and Punjab Revenue Authority etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24907", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3421 = 2024 SLD 3421", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161/205,2(68),74(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 864/LB/2015, heard on: 25.03.2024. Date of order; 25.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR M. AJAZ KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Afzal Malik, M/s. Malik Iron & Steel Corporation, A-733, M.A. Jinnah Road, Rawalpindi.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24908", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3422 = 2024 SLD 3422", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(3)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 211/LB/15, heard on: 25.01.2024. Date of order: 13.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naveed Zafar Khan, Adv. Respondent by: Ms. Ghazala Nasir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Leo Scientific Store, Lahore.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24909", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3423 = 2024 SLD 3423", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(3)", - "Case #": "MA (AG) NO. 164/LB/2023, heard on: 28.11.2023. Date of order: 04.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abu Bakar, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Infotech (pvt) Ltd. 12-N, Gulberg-III, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24910", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3424 = 2024 SLD 3424", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45-B(3)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 669/LB/2016, heard on: 29.01.2024. Date of order: 14.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hamid Bashir, FCA. Respondent by: Ms. Ghazala Nasir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Farm Dynamics Pakistan (pvt), Ltd. H. #7, Block J-1, Canal Road Johar Town, Lahore.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24911", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3425 = 2024 SLD 3425", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTQXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1032/LB/2016, heard on: 30.08.2023. Date of order: 27.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Tehmina Akram, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Abuzar Hussain, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, Zone-III, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Tahir Rafique Textile Mills (pvt) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24912", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3426 = 2024 SLD 3426", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "MA (AG) NO. 166/LB/2022. ITA NO. 702/LB/2021, heard on: 24.08.2023. Date of order: 04.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJID NAZIR MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Adv. Respondent by: Ms. Maria Sharif, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Talha Ahmed, Prop; M/s. Sehna Traders. House No.B-1, 476-A, Mohalla Qureshi.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Sialkot." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24913", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3427 = 2024 SLD 3427", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(16)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1048/LB/2018, heard on: 15.01.2024. Date of order: 06.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR> SHSHAID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Ahmed Malik, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Usama Ejaz Rathore, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Five Star Foods, Plot No. 2, Quaid-e-Azam Industrial Estate, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24914", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3428 = 2024 SLD 3428", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=21", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 304/22 and CMA Nos. 891 and 1251/22.Date of Hearing: 21.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, CHEIF JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC. Mr. M. Makhdom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC. Mr. Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, ASC. For the Applicants: Mr. Hassan Irfan Khan, ASC. Mr. Hamad Naqi, DG NWFP Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan.\nMr. Anis M. Shahzad, AOR. Mr. Asif Hayat, Dy. MEO For CDA: Hafiz Arfat Ahmed Ch., ASC. Mr. Irfan Azeem, Dy. DG (Environment) For MCI: Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, ASC\nRaja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR For Federation: Mr. Mansoor Usman Awan, AGP. Malik Javed Iqbal Wains, AAGP. Mr. Zafar Mehmood, Military Estate Officer, Iftikhar Ahmed Dy. MEO. For M/o Defence: Col. Faran Tariq, Dy. Director Military Forms Lt. Col. Irfan, Asstt. Director (legal) For M/o Comate Change: Ms. Parveen Ejaz, Dy. Director.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Monal Group of Companies, Islamabad.\nVS\nCapital Development Authority through its Chairman and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24915", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3429 = 2024 SLD 3429", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1324/LB/2017, heard on: 04.01.2024. Date of order: 21.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Adnan, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Usama, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nvs\nM/s. Ali Bhai Engineers, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24916", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3430 = 2024 SLD 3430", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTOC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1482/LB/2023, heard on: 11.10.2023. Date of order: 16.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran Munir, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Asad-ur-Rehman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sh. M. Naveed, Faisalabad.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24917", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3431 = 2024 SLD 3431", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTOCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199 (1)(a)(ii)", - "Case #": "C.P.No.D-400 of 2024, heard on: 13.02.2024. Date of order: 13.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):: Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Mr. Justice Adnan ul Karim Memon.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr.Asim Iqbal advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Omer Khalid.\nVs. \nFederation of Pakistan & Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24918", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3432 = 2024 SLD 3432", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1),153(7)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 144/LB/2024, heard on: 18.01.2024. Date of order: 29.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Munir, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Abdullah Irshad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Faisalabad International Hospital, Faisalabad.\nVS\nCIR, Zone-I, RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24919", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3433 = 2024 SLD 3433", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA (Stay) No. 341/MB/2024.STA NO. 189/MB/2024, heard on: 30.04.2024. Date of order: 02.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shabbir Fakhruddin, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Mashooq Hussain, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Bismillah Trading Co. Khanewal.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24920", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3434 = 2024 SLD 3434", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTOHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=23(2),23(1)", - "Case #": "Suit No. 1091 of 2018, heard on: 29-04-2024. Date of decision: 29-04-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff : New Hampshire Insurance Company Mr. Shahbakhat Prizada Advocate.\nDefendant No.1 : Province of Sindh through Mr. Hisham Mahar, Assistant Advocate General, Sindh. Defendants 2-3 : Sindh Revenue Board & another, Mr. Javed Ali Sangi\nAdvocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "New Hampshire Insurance Company.\nvs\nProvince of Sindh & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24921", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3435 = 2024 SLD 3435", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTOHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 3690 OF 2024, heard on: 28.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate for the Petitioner. Malik Aamir Javed Bhutta, Assistant Attorney General on Court's Call. Mr. Tariq Manzoor Sial, Advocate for the respondents No.2 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Al- Madina Dry Fruits Traders. \nVS\nFederation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24922", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3436 = 2024 SLD 3436", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=11", - "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 14-A/2016, heard on:03.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD FAHEEM WALI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Petitioner: Syed Waqas Naqvi, Advocate. For Respondent: Mr. Hassan Idrees Mufti, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector Customs & another.\nVs\nM/s Chiniot Enterprises (Pvt) Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24923", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3437 = 2024 SLD 3437", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.26907 of 2024. Date of order: 02.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Afzal Awan, Advocate for the petitioners.\nCh. Imtiaz Elahi, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan.\n(ON COURT’S CALL).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s A & A Pipe Industries.\netc.\nVersus Federation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24924", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3438 = 2024 SLD 3438", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1697/LB/2017, heard on: 25.01.2024. Date of order: 07.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hashim Aslam Butt, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Arfa Tabassum, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Hi-Tech Networks (pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24925", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3439 = 2024 SLD 3439", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2118/LB/2022, heard on: 25.08.2023. Date of order: 25.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER, RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Fawad Mir, ITP, Respondent by: Mr. M. Hussain Shamim, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Riaz Bottries (Pvt). Ltd, (Now Lotte Akhtar Beverages (pvt), Ltd.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24926", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3440 = 2024 SLD 3440", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2090/LB/2022, heard on: 03.01.2024. Date of order: 08.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shoaib Shahzad, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Seemab Zafar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Premium Mart, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24927", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3441 = 2024 SLD 3441", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 514/MB/2023, heard on: 01.12.2023. Date of order: 02.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: M. Imran Ghazi Adv. Respondent by: Mashooq Hussain DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NOOR BANI JHAKKAR, JHAKKAR HOUSE, NEAR WERA STADIUM, LAYYAH.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, MULTAN." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24928", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3442 = 2024 SLD 3442", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2145/LB/2023, heard on: 19.09.2023. Date of order: 03.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER. RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Munir Anjum, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Naveed Akhtar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Yousaf Weaving Mills Limited, Lahore. \nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24929", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3443 = 2024 SLD 3443", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(1)(h)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2271/LB/2023, heard on: 23.01.2024. Date of order: 23.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TOUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Summair Saeed, Adv. Respondent by; Mr. Ali Ahsan Warraich, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Olympia Chemicals Limited, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24930", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3444 = 2024 SLD 3444", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2494/LB/2023, heard on: 21.12.2023. Date of order: 13.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Hussain Adv. Respondent by: Ms. Haida Sajjad DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Hadi Tex, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24931", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3445 = 2024 SLD 3445", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFTNHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=290,291,292", - "Case #": "C.O. No.06 of 2014 & C.M. No.314-C of 2015.APPLICATION UNDER ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC. heard on: 23.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: M/s. Shafqat Mehmood Chohan and\nMuhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocates. Respondents by: M/s. Malik Muhammad Rafiq Rajwana and Muhammad Sohail Iqbal Bhatti, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sheikh Kamran Shafi & others\nVersus\nSadaqat Shafi & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24932", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3446 = 2024 SLD 3446", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19(7)", - "Case #": "EFA No.41 of 2023, heard on: 18.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ch. Saleem Akhtar Warraich, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Syed Tariq-ur-Rehman Hashmi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "United Bank Ltd.\nVersus\nMuhammad Amjad Hayat Khan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24933", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3447 = 2024 SLD 3447", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2220/LB/2015, heard on: 09.02.2023. Date of order: 17.04.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER. RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.=", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Vikar A. Khan, FCA. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Ali, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ciba Enterprises (pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24934", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3448 = 2024 SLD 3448", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 282/MB/2024, heard on: 02.04.2024. Date of order: 04.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shabbir Fakhar-ud-din, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Mashooq Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Ghafoor Cotton Mills, PVT. Ltd, Multan. \nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24935", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3449 = 2024 SLD 3449", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3(2)", - "Case #": "Intra Court Appeal No. 71740 of 2023. Date of hearing 25.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants by Mr. Muhammad Azhar Siddique, Ms. Salma Riaz and Ms. Amna Liaqat, learned Advocates.\nRespondents by Mr. Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, learned Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nMr. Muhammad Nawaz Shah, learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faraz Iqbal Jamil and another.\nVS\nThe Federation of Pakistan and 04 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24936", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3450 = 2024 SLD 3450", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 895/LB/2017, heard on: 05.03.2024. Date of order: 29.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nadeem Ahmed DR. Respondent by: Mr. Shabbir Fakhar-ud-Din, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Premium Petroleum, Private, Ltd. LMQ Road, Multan.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24937", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3451 = 2024 SLD 3451", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=43AFederal Excise Act, 2005=33A", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 741/IB/2024, heard on: 16.05.2024. Date of order: 16.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mirza Saqib Siddique, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. M. Hayat, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Sajjad Ahmed, House No. 65, Kazam Kamal Road, Jhelum.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, CTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24938", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3452 = 2024 SLD 3452", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=181", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 220 of 2004. Date of Hearing: 27.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Mr. Justice Omar Sial.", - "Lawyer Name:": "ppellant No.1: None present Appellants No.2 and 3: Through Mr. Muhammad Najeeb Jamali Advocate\nRespondent No.1(ii)&(iii): Through Mr. Amir Saleem Advocate. Respondents No.3 & 4: Through Mr. Noor Muhammad Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s S.M. Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. & others.\nVersus\nDeceased Muhammad Mohsin Butt & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24939", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3453 = 2024 SLD 3453", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpYzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=14, 13(2), 3(1A)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2676/LB/2023, heard on: 18.01.2024. Date of order: 01.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Nasir Ali Gillani, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Irfa Tabassum, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Pakheim International Pharma (pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24940", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3454 = 2024 SLD 3454", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2022=8(7)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3031/LB/2023, heard on: 19.05.2023. Date of order: 22.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR SHAHID SIDDIOQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Qadeer Ahmed, ITP, Respondent by: Mr. Khan Shahzeb, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Khalid Javid Chowdhry, 66/3 Abid Majeed, Road Cantt, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24941", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3455 = 2024 SLD 3455", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2811/LB/2015, heard on: 20.01.2023. Date of order: 20.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ali Ahsan Warraich, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO-II, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Pak West Industries Pvt. Ltd. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24942", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3456 = 2024 SLD 3456", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2)", - "Case #": "MA (Stay) No. 11343/LB/2023, heard on: 22.12.2023. Date of order: 18.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mirza Bilal Zafar, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ubaid-ur-Rehman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Abdullah Steel Industry, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24943", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3457 = 2024 SLD 3457", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "General Clauses Act, 1897=24A", - "Case #": "STA NO. 24/LB/2024, heard on: 05.01.2024. Date of order: 08.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Rana Usman Ghani, Advocate, Respondent by: Ms. Mahrukh Imtiaz, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Rie Metals, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24944", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3458 = 2024 SLD 3458", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3174/LB/2022, heard on: 24.08.2023. Date of order: 04.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mushtaq AHmed, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Warda Designer Collection, Lahore. \nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24945", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3459 = 2024 SLD 3459", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=152,290", - "Case #": "Intra Court Appeal No. 32 of 2024. Date of order: 01.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD TARIQ NADEEM, JUDGE. SADIQ MAHMUD KHURRAM, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Aejaz Ahmad Ansari, Advocate for the\nappellants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. Haleema and three others \nVs.\n Executive Director (C & CD), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24946", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3460 = 2024 SLD 3460", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46(1)(b)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 62/LB/2024, heard on: 11.01.2024. Date of order: 15.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Talal Zahick, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. M. Suleman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Magna International, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24947", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3461 = 2024 SLD 3461", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2022=8(7)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3387/LB/2023, heard on: 03.10.2023. Date of order: 19.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHUD, JUDICAIL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Asif, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. M. Adnan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Anjum Zafar.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, CIR, AEOI, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24948", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3462 = 2024 SLD 3462", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "First Appeals No. 41 and 42 of 2019. Date of Hearing: 25th and 26 April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant in First Appeals No.41 and 42 of 2019 and\nrespondent No.1 in First Appeal No.220 of 2017: Ms. Faiz M. Durrani and Bashir Ahmed Khan along with Mr. Zeeshan Bashir Khan Advocates. Appellant in First Appeal No.220 of 2017 and respondent No.2 in First\nAppeals No.41 and 42 of 2019: Mr. Mukhtar Ahmed Kobhar Advocate. Respondent No.4 in First Appeals No.41 and 42 of 2019: Mr. Haris Rasheed Advocate.\nRespondent No.5 in First Appeals No.41 and 42 of\n2019: Mr. Abdul Shakoor Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Allied Bank Ltd.\nVersus\nM/s SAS Construction (Pvt.) Ltd. & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24949", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3463 = 2024 SLD 3463", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1696/IB/2022, heard on: 15.06.2023. Date of order: 15.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mujib Ur Rehman, W 570, Novelty Cinema, Ratta, Rawalpindi.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Range-II, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24950", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3464 = 2024 SLD 3464", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(19)(e)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3666/LB/2023, heard on: 17.10.2023. Date of order: 19.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER. RIZWAN AHMEDURFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by; Rana Muhammad Afzal, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Usman Ijaz. DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Faisal Ahmed, Multan.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24951", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3465 = 2024 SLD 3465 = (2024) 130 TAX 149", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpWXk", - "Key Words:": "Exemption under SRO 565(I)/2006 and SRO 475(I)/2011\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nCustoms Act, 1969: SRO 565(I)/2006, SRO 475(I)/2011, SRO 575(I)/2006\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe petitioners in these cases sought exemption from import duties under SRO 565(I)/2006 dated 05.06.2006. However, their goods were either issued show cause notices or withheld by the Respondents because the HS Codes mentioned in the Goods Declarations did not correspond to those listed in Serial No. 88 of Table II to SRO 565. As a result, the Respondents denied the claim for exemption.\nIn response, the petitioners argued that the exemption under SRO 565 applies to the description of goods in Table II and not necessarily to the HS Codes, which the department had erroneously interpreted. The petitioners also pointed out the subsequent issuance of SRO 475(I)/2011 on 03.06.2011, which amended the previous exemption and was applicable to all HS Codes, and they argued it should be considered retrospectively as it was clarificatory in nature.\nThe petitioners sought the release of their consignments, which were detained pending the dispute, after securing the disputed amounts before the Nazir.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nPetitioners’ Arguments:\no\nExemption Application: The petitioners argued that the exemption under SRO 565 applies to goods listed in Table II and not based on specific HS Codes, as contended by the Department.\no\nAmending Notification (SRO 475): The petitioners pointed out that SRO 475(I)/2011, which was issued after the initial import, now covers all HS Codes and should be applied retrospectively as a clarification.\no\nDistinction from Other SROs: The petitioners also drew a comparison to SRO 575(I)/2006, which specifically references both the description of goods and HS Codes, highlighting the absence of such specificity in SRO 565, suggesting that the intention behind SRO 565 was broader and did not require matching HS Codes.\n2.\nRespondents’ Arguments:\no\nThe Respondents argued that SRO 475(I)/2011 could not be applied to the petitioners case, as their goods were imported prior to the amendment. Furthermore, they maintained that the HS Codes were not listed against Serial No. 88 of Table II in SRO 565, and therefore, the petitioners were not entitled to the exemption.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nInterpretation of Exemption Clauses:\no\nThe court discussed the proper interpretation and application of exemption clauses in fiscal legislation. It highlighted the following principles:\n\nThe onus of proof lies on the taxpayer (petitioner) to demonstrate that their case falls within the scope of the exemption.\n\nIf two reasonable interpretations are possible, the interpretation against the taxpayer should be adopted.\n\nHowever, if the taxpayers case reasonably falls within the exemption, they should not be denied the benefit due to any alleged contrary intent of the legislature or authority.\n2.\nExemption Based on Description of Goods :\no\nThe court found that the Respondents had erred in their interpretation of SRO 565. The exemption related to the description of goods and was available to the petitioners. This was supported by the fact that the petitioners had properly declared the goods and met the criteria for exemption, as the HS Codes were not a mandatory condition in SRO 565.\no\nThe court quashed the show cause notices and ordered the release of the goods. The security provided before the Nazir was also ordered to be discharged upon proper verification and identification.\n3.\nAmendment by SRO 475(I)/2011:\no\nThe court acknowledged the issuance of SRO 475(I)/2011, which clarified the exemption to cover all HS Codes. However, the petitioners case did not require the retrospective application of this amendment, as the exemption was already applicable to them based on the description of goods under SRO 565.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nExemption Clauses in Fiscal Legislation:\no\nThe interpretation of exemption clauses in fiscal laws is strict, but reasonable interpretations in favor of the taxpayer are preferred if the case fits within the legislative intent.\n2.\nDescription of Goods vs. HS Codes:\no\nThe exemption under SRO 565(I)/2006 applies based on the description of goods listed in Table II, and not necessarily on the HS Codes. This is a significant point in cases where the HS Codes do not match the exact listing in the notification, but the goods are still eligible for exemption based on their description.\n3.\nRetrospective Application of Amendments:\no\nSRO 475(I)/2011 was not applied retroactively in this case because the exemption was available based on the description of goods, and the amendment primarily dealt with clarifying the coverage of HS Codes.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe court allowed the petitions, quashed the show cause notices, and ordered the release of the detained consignments. The securities furnished before the Nazir were to be discharged upon proper identification and verification. The Nazir’s fee was set at Rs. 5000 for each security.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe petitioners were entitled to the exemption under SRO 565(I)/2006 based on the description of goods, regardless of the absence of specific HS Codes in the declaration. The court quashed the show cause notices and ordered the release of their goods. The case highlights the importance of interpreting exemption clauses in a manner that favors the taxpayer when the goods reasonably meet the exemption criteria.\n________________________________________", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=", - "Case #": "CP No.D-3009, D-3269, D-3292, D-3313, D-3314, D-3545, D-3660 of 2010 and D-258, D-297, D-612, D-660 of 2011 and D-702 of 2012 decided on 29.03.2021, date of hearing: 29.03.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Umar Akhund, Sardar Faisal Zafar & Uzair Shoro Advocates for the Petitioners.\nMr. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, & Mrs. Masooda Siraj, Advocates for the Respondents. Mr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Dy. Att. General", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAIKH PIPE MILLS & OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24952", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3466 = 2024 SLD 3466", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 341/IB/2024, heard on: 13.05.2024. Date of order: 16.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJID NAZIR MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Ismail Ur Rehman, ITP/AR, Respondent by: Ms. Quratul Ain ADCIR/DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Victory Pipe Industries (Pvt), Ltd.\nVS\nThe CIR Large Tax Office, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24953", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3467 = 2024 SLD 3467", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=43A,33A", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 755/IB/2024, heard on: 20.05.2024. Date of order: 20.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Sheikh Istamalat Ali, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. M. Hayat, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sheikh Tariq Mehmood, V-571, Ghandam Mandi, Rawalpindi.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24954", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3468 = 2024 SLD 3468", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=73", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1303/LB/2015, heard on: 20.12.2023. Date of order: 04.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sufyan Ahmed Main, DR. Respondent by: Mr. M. Naeem Munawar, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Tribal Textile Mills Ltd. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24955", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3469 = 2024 SLD 3469", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=205/147", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4402/LB/2023, heard on: 07.08.2023. Date of order: 18.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Irfan Kamal, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Hina Mustafa, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Tameer Construction (Private) Limited. 234 Westwood Colony, Thokar Niaz Baig.\nVS\nCIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24956", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3470 = 2024 SLD 3470", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3538/KB/2023, heard on: 22.03.2024. Date of order: 07.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR M. AJAZ KHAN, J.M. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, A.M.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Mehtab Khan & Mr. Muhammad Hasham Advocates. Respondent by: Malik Ghulam Abbas, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. International Textiles Ltd, Karachi. \nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, MTO, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24957", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3471 = 2024 SLD 3471", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1), 121(1),161.", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5211/LB/2022, heard on: Date of order: 31.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nouman Aziz, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Imran Saeed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Simz Pharmaceuticals (pvt.) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24958", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3472 = 2024 SLD 3472", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 7798/LB/2023, heard on: 24.01.2024. Date of order: 28.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: M. bazal Pannu, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Al-Ghani Traders, Sheikhupura. \nVS\nThe CIR, RTO" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24959", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3473 = 2024 SLD 3473", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1),161(1A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5559/LB/2023, heard on: 25.09.2023. Date of order: 28.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICAIL MEMBER. RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Qadeer Ahmed, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Naveed Akhtar DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sialkot Airport International Limited, Sialkot.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO,Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24960", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3474 = 2024 SLD 3474", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=179(3)", - "Case #": "Spl. Cus. Ref. A. 166/2013.heard on: 23.05.2024.\nDate of Judgment: 23.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar.\n Mr. Justice Jawad Akbar Sarwana.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicants: Through M/s. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Ghulam Murtaza, Azad Hussain holding brief for Mr. Muhammad Bilal Bhatti, Pervaiz A. Memon, Advocates Respondents: Through Mr. Aqeel Ahmed Khan & Mr. Muzzamil Hussain, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Director I & I FBR, Regional Officer, Karachi.\nVS\nM/s. J.Z. Enterprises, Karachi another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24961", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3475 = 2024 SLD 3475 = (2024) 130 TAX 166", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpVXk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act, 1969 – Misdeclaration of Goods and Valuation Ruling\nRelevant Legislation:\nCustoms Act, 1969: Sections 25, 81(2), 196(5)\nCustoms Rules, 2001: Rule 107\nFacts of the Case:\nThe Applicant filed a Reference Application against a common order dated 07.12.2015 passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi. The Tribunal had decided on Customs Appeal Nos. K-189 to 193 of 2009 and other related matters. The Applicant raised the following grounds in their appeal:\nError in Tribunal’s Decision: The Appellate Tribunal was in error by deciding the appeals mutatis mutandis (on the same basis) for all cases without due consideration to specific facts and legal grounds.\nMisdeclaration: The main issue raised was that the respondent misdeclared the goods by importing Menthol under the guise of Hexahydrothymol, which led to lower valuation and, consequently, lower duties and taxes.\nExceeding Jurisdiction: The Applicant argued that the Tribunal had acted beyond its jurisdiction by setting aside the Customs Authorities’ orders issued under sections 80(3), 179, and 193 of the Customs Act on technical grounds.\nArguments:\nApplicant’s Arguments:\nMisdeclaration: The Applicant argued that Menthol was declared incorrectly as Hexahydrothymol in order to secure a lower valuation. This misdeclaration violated Section 32 of the Customs Act, which mandates correct declaration for proper assessment and duty calculation.\nCompetence of Valuation Ruling: The Applicant claimed that the Assistant Director Valuation, who issued the valuation ruling in question, was competent to do so under Section 5(2) of the Customs Act, and the Tribunal erred by ruling otherwise.\nRequest for Review: The Applicant sought to set aside the Tribunal’s decision or, alternatively, remand the matter back to the Customs Department for reconsideration.\nRespondent’s Arguments:\nCorrect Declaration: The Respondents defended the import declaration, arguing that Hexahydrothymol is another name for Menthol and hence, the declaration was correct. They contended that no misdeclaration occurred, and the goods were properly cleared by the Department at the declared value.\nTribunal’s Common Order: The Respondents justified the Tribunal’s common order, arguing that the Tribunal had addressed common issues of fact and law across the various appeals in a unified manner, making the decision consistent and valid.\nNo Misdeclaration: They maintained that the Goods Declarations were properly examined and assessed, and no basis existed for issuing the Show Cause Notices.\nDecision:\nIncompetence of Valuation Ruling:\nThe court held that Section 25A does not grant the Deputy Director the authority to issue a Valuation Ruling. The Tribunal correctly determined that the Assistant Director who issued the ruling lacked the required authority, making the valuation ruling invalid.\nIssuance of Show Cause Notice Based on Valuation Advice:\nThe court found that issuing the Show Cause Notices based solely on a valuation advice from 2006 was not justified. After the goods were released without objections to the declared values, there was no reason to revisit the issue of valuation based on outdated advice. The assessment had already been done and accepted without issue, so the Show Cause Notices were considered unwarranted.\nRephrasing of Legal Questions:\nThe court rephrased the legal questions presented for reference, clarifying:\nFirst Question: Whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that the Valuation Ruling was incompetently issued?\nSecond Question: Whether a valuation advice is binding for issuing a Show Cause Notice for recovery of short levied duty and taxes?\nConclusion on Questions:\nFirst Question: The court answered in favor of the Respondents, affirming that the Tribunal’s decision regarding the incompetent issuance of the Valuation Ruling was correct.\nSecond Question: The court answered against the Applicant, stating that the valuation advice was not binding for issuing a Show Cause Notice for recovery.\nFinal Ruling: Based on the analysis of the case, the court dismissed all the Reference Applications brought by the Applicant.\nKey Legal Principles:\nAuthority for Issuing Valuation Rulings: The Assistant Director Valuation does not have the authority under Section 25A of the Customs Act to issue binding Valuation Rulings.\nNo Binding Nature of Outdated Valuation Advice: A valuation advice from 2006 cannot be used as the sole basis for issuing a Show Cause Notice after the goods have already been cleared and released based on the declared value.\nMisdeclaration and Tax Liability: The court did not find a case of misdeclaration of goods, noting that Hexahydrothymol is a recognized chemical name for Menthol, thus dismissing claims of incorrect classification under Section 32.\nConclusion:\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal’s decision to set aside the Valuation Ruling and dismiss the Show Cause Notices was upheld by the court, leading to the dismissal of the Reference Applications filed by the Applicant. The decision clarified the limits of authority in issuing Valuation Rulings, reinforced the binding nature of valuation advice, and emphasized that misdeclaration should be supported by clear evidence before invoking tax recovery provisions.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,81(2),196(5)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application Nos. 156 to 167 of 2016 P, decided on 03.02.2021, date of hearing: 03.02.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Advocate for the Appellant\nSardar Faisal Zafar, Advocate for the Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE (APPRAISEMENT) WEST, CUSTOMS HOUSE, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S S. NAJMUDDIN AHMED & CO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24962", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3476 = 2024 SLD 3476 = (2024) 130 TAX 43", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTc", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Assessment, Penalty, and Default Surcharge\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Sections 2(16), 2(44), 3, 6, 7, 8B(1), 11, 22, 23, 25, 26, 33(1), 34, and 88(1).\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe appellant, a commercial importer-cum-manufacturer, was audited under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The assessing officer noted that the appellant failed to pay the sales tax and further tax on advances received, and also failed to deposit the sales tax for the relevant period. In response to the show cause notice, the appellant did not pay the required tax, and as a result, the officer imposed a default surcharge and penalties. Furthermore, the officer ordered the recovery of 10% of the output tax that the appellant, as an importer-cum-manufacturer, was required to pay with the return, which amounted to Rs. 949,517. The appellant did not challenge the penalty for the late filing of the monthly returns, making the penalty of Rs. 15,200 final. An appeal to the CIR(A) was dismissed, leading to the current appeal by the appellant.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nAppellant’s Arguments:\no\nUnadjusted Input Tax: The appellant argued that there was no tax payable on advances because they had a significant carried-forward unadjusted input tax during the period when advances were received.\no\nCommercial Importer Exemption: The appellant contended that, as a commercial importer, they were not required to pay 10% of output tax along with their returns, citing relevant SRO 647(I)/2007.\n2.\nTax Department’s Arguments:\no\nThe department argued that the advances received were taxable under Section 2(44) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and since the appellant was involved in manufacturing, they were required to pay 10% of output tax with the returns under Section 8B(1), which they failed to do.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nDefault Surcharge:\no\nThe court ruled that no default surcharge can be applied if no additional payment is due with the return. Section 34 does not cater to situations where the output tax is adjusted against the input tax credit in the return, meaning no payment is required. Therefore, the imposition of the default surcharge was unjustified.\n2.\nNon-reduction of Unadjusted Input Tax:\no\nThe court stated that failing to reduce the unadjusted carried-forward input tax does not attract penalties or default surcharge, as the amount was eventually adjusted in later months. No provision in the Sales Tax Act mandates penalties for such delays if the adjustment is made subsequently.\n3.\nRetrospective Application of Beneficial Amendments:\no\nThe court acknowledged an amendment to Section 2(44), which defines the time of supply as the actual delivery of goods. This amendment was beneficial to the taxpayer and, following legal precedents, the court held that such beneficial amendments may operate retrospectively.\n4.\nCommercial Importer and 10% Output Tax Requirement:\no\nThe court cited SRO 647(I)/2007 to emphasize that the appellant, as a commercial importer, was excluded from the requirement to pay 10% of the output tax along with the return. The appellant was not required to make this payment under Section 8B(1), making the department’s demand of 10% output tax legally incorrect.\n5.\nNon-payment of 10% Output Tax – Procedural Lapse:\no\nThe court found that the non-payment of 10% of the output tax was a procedural lapse and did not result in any revenue loss to the government. According to Section 8B(2), the unadjusted input tax would either be adjusted or refunded after a year, meaning no harm was caused to the governments revenue.\n6.\nSustainability of Tax Authority Orders:\no\nThe court concluded that the orders by the tax authorities to charge default surcharge on advances and demand 10% of output tax were unsustainable and violated the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Consequently, both the original order (dated 26.07.2021) and the appellate order (dated 24.12.2021) were annulled, and the appellants appeal was allowed.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nNo Default Surcharge Without Payment Due:\no\nDefault surcharge cannot be applied if no payment is due because the output tax is fully adjusted against input tax credits.\n2.\nNon-reduction of Unadjusted Input Tax:\no\nPenalties or default surcharges are not applicable if the unadjusted input tax is eventually adjusted in later months.\n3.\nBeneficial Amendments Retrospectively Applied:\no\nBeneficial amendments to tax laws, particularly those that clarify the time of supply, may apply retrospectively to benefit the taxpayer.\n4.\nCommercial Importers Exempt from 10% Output Tax Requirement:\no\nA commercial importer is exempt from the requirement to pay 10% of the output tax under Section 8B(1), as per the provisions of SRO 647(I)/2007.\n5.\nProcedural Lapse in Tax Payment:\no\nA procedural lapse such as the non-payment of 10% output tax does not result in revenue loss and is not subject to penalty or surcharge if the unadjusted input tax is eventually accounted for.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe court ruled in favor of the appellant, declaring that the default surcharge and the demand for 10% output tax were unjustified and violative of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the tax authorities were annulled. This decision highlights that procedural issues such as the non-payment of 10% of output tax do not justify penalties if no revenue loss occurs, and it also reinforces the retrospective applicability of beneficial tax amendments.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(16), 2(44), 3, 6, 7, 8B(1), 11, 22, 23, 25, 26, 33(1), 34, & 88(1)", - "Case #": "STA No 262/IB/2022, decided on 03.10.2023, date of hearing: 03.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASTT, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abaid Ullah, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Shehryar Akram, DR for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S XPLOR ENTERPRISES (PVT) LTD, ISLAMABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR, CTO, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24963", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3477 = 2024 SLD 3477 = (2024) 130 TAX 53", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTY", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Liability and Violation of Sales Tax Act, 1990\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Sections 3, 5, 33, and 34\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) reported discrepancies in the sales tax return filed by the registered person for June 2013, specifically regarding sales made between 13th June 2013 and 30th June 2013. It was observed that the sales tax had not been charged at the revised rate of 17%, even though the applicable rate had increased during that period. As a result, the registered person was issued a show cause notice for the non-payment of the correct amount of sales tax.\nIn the absence of a response from the taxpayer, the assessing officer ordered the registered person to pay the amount of sales tax along with a default surcharge under Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. A penalty of Rs. 10,000 was also imposed under Section 33(5) for failing to charge the correct sales tax rate.\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) reviewed the case and remanded it back to the assessing officer for further proceedings. The taxpayer appealed the decision, challenging the actions taken by the tax authorities.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nDepartments Argument (DR):\no\nThe Department argued that the taxpayer had violated the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by not charging the correct sales tax rate of 17% for the sales made during the period from 13th June 2013 to 30th June 2013.\no\nThe department emphasized the imposition of the default surcharge and penalty as per the provisions of Sections 33(5) and 34, respectively.\n2.\nTaxpayers Argument (AR):\no\nThe taxpayer opposed the appeal, arguing that the retrospective increase in the sales tax rate was unreasonable and that the penalty and surcharge were not justified.\no\nThe taxpayer argued that the sales tax rate change was unfairly applied to past transactions, which they contended was both expropriatory and confiscatory in nature, infringing on fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nInterpretation of Statutes:\no\nThe court emphasized the golden rule of statutory interpretation, which holds that an enactment must be construed as a whole, with its provisions being harmoniously interpreted to ensure that no part of the statute becomes redundant or ineffective. This approach is essential for ensuring that the intent of the legislature is fulfilled in its entirety.\n2.\nRetrospective Taxation:\no\nThe court found that the retrospective application of the sales tax rate increase was expropriatory and confiscatory in nature, making it unreasonable and in violation of fundamental rights. The imposition of higher taxes on past sales without allowing businesses to adjust or pass on the tax burden was deemed unjust and unfair. The taxpayer was unfairly burdened, as the increase in the tax rate was applied to past sales, which could not be revised to reflect the new rate.\n3.\nInfringement of Fundamental Rights:\no\nThe court cited cases such as Frontier Ceramics v. Government of Pakistan (1999 PTD 4126), Mayfair Spinning Mills Ltd v. Customs, Excise, and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (PTCL 2002 CL 115), and others to support the argument that retrospective tax increases are opposed to the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, particularly those relating to fairness and protection of property rights.\n4.\nRemand of Case:\no\nThe case was remanded to the assessing officer for further examination and proper adjudication, with the need for fair treatment of the taxpayers rights in the application of the revised sales tax rate.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nInterpretation of Enactments:\no\nStatutes must be interpreted as a whole, ensuring all parts of the law are consistent and effective. This harmonized interpretation helps avoid surplusage, making sure that every provision serves a clear purpose.\n2.\nRetrospective Application of Tax Laws:\no\nTax laws should not be applied retrospectively in a manner that is expropriatory or confiscatory. Retrospective increases in tax rates without reasonable adjustments or provisions for businesses to absorb the burden are considered unfair and unconstitutional.\n3.\nFundamental Rights and Taxation:\no\nRetrospective taxation that unduly burdens businesses or individuals without providing avenues for adjustment or compliance infringes upon fundamental rights, particularly the right to property and fairness guaranteed by the Constitution.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe court held that the increase in the sales tax rate with retrospective effect was unfair and violated fundamental rights. The taxpayer was unfairly burdened by the default surcharge and penalty, and the case was remanded to the assessing officer for a more thorough and fair examination. The application of retrospective tax laws must be carefully scrutinized to ensure it does not result in unreasonable or confiscatory outcomes for taxpayers.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,5,33,34", - "Case #": "STA NO. 79/IB/2014, decided on 18.01.2023, date of hearing: 18.01.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Sobia Mazhar for the Appellant.\nMr. Zaheer Ahmed, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (ZONE-I), RTO, Islamabad\nVs\nM/S AR FOODS (PVT) LTD Islamabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24964", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3478 = 2024 SLD 3478 = (2024) 130 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTU", - "Key Words:": "Excess Payment of Sales Tax and Maladministration under Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000: Section 10\n•\nFederal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013: Section 9\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Section 9, Section 66\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe complainant filed a complaint under Section 10(1) of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, against the tax department for failing to provide a mechanism in the sales tax return system to address the excess amount of sales tax inadvertently paid. The excess tax was paid by the complainant during the settlement of tax liability through the CPR (Challan Payment Receipt), where the systems calculated liability was higher than the actual amount due due to adjustments like credit availability from suppliers or buyers (e.g., ATL inclusion).\nAs a result, the excess payment was not reflected in the return form, and the CPR payment could not be altered or subdivided to adjust the overpaid amount. Consequently, the complainant was unable to claim a refund for the excess payment under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the tax department declined the claim for refund.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nComplainants Argument:\no\nThe complainant argued that, under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, any excess sales tax paid should be eligible for a refund.\no\nHowever, due to systemic issues, the excess tax was not reflected in the return form, and the CPR payment could not be adjusted or corrected. This left the taxpayer unable to claim a refund, which constitutes a failure of the system.\no\nThe complainant requested that the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) intervene to ensure that a proper mechanism is put in place to allow taxpayers to claim refunds for excess tax payments made inadvertently.\n2.\nTax Departments Argument:\no\nThe department did not address the issue, and the refund claim was declined, citing the inability to process refunds without the necessary adjustments in the system.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nFBR’s Failure to Develop an Adequate System:\no\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) held that the failure of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to develop a system that facilitates common taxpayers in making tax compliance was tantamount to maladministration.\no\nThe systematic flaw in which taxpayers cannot adjust or correct inadvertent excess payments, and where the CPR payment cannot be modified, was deemed to contribute to harassment and confusion for taxpayers, violating the principle of fairness in tax administration.\no\nThe FTO referred to Section 2(3)(i)(b) of the FTO Ordinance, which defines maladministration, to conclude that the FBRs failure to implement a user-friendly system for managing excess payments was a clear instance of maladministration.\n2.\nNecessary Amendments in the Sales Tax Return Form:\no\nThe FTO recommended that the FBR make necessary amendments to the sales tax return form to include a calculation field for the difference between the paid amount and the payable amount (labeled as “Excess Payment”) in the last column of the return form.\no\nThis amendment would enable taxpayers to adjust excess payments in subsequent tax periods, thereby ensuring that excess payments can be properly claimed and refunded in future periods.\n3.\nReport Compliance Within 45 Days:\no\nThe FTO directed that the FBR should implement these changes and report compliance within 45 days.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nExcess Payment and Refund:\no\nUnder Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, any excess tax paid over the amount due can be claimed as a refund. However, this can only be done if the tax system properly reflects the excess payment, which in this case was not possible due to system deficiencies.\n2.\nMaladministration in Public Administration:\no\nThe failure of tax authorities to create an adequate system to facilitate taxpayer claims, especially when such issues cause undue hardship or prevent taxpayers from exercising their legal rights (e.g., claiming refunds), constitutes maladministration.\n3.\nSystemic Failures in Tax Administration:\no\nTax authorities must ensure that the tax system is designed to account for inadvertent errors or excess payments. The FTO pointed out that the system should be flexible enough to allow adjustments for excess payments without causing undue delays or complications for taxpayers.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) ruled that the FBRs failure to provide a system that allows taxpayers to adjust excess payments and claim refunds was a case of maladministration. The FTO directed the FBR to amend the sales tax return form to include a calculation field for excess payments, enabling taxpayers to adjust such payments in future tax periods. The FBR was instructed to report compliance within 45 days, thereby addressing the complainants issue and preventing further maladministration in this regard.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10Sales Tax Act, 1990=9", - "Case #": "Complaint No.3172/ISB/ST/2023 decided on 08.08.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Nazim Saleem, Advisor for Dealing Officer.\nDr. Arslan Subuctageen, Advisor for Appraising Officer.\nNemo for Authorized Representative.\nMr. Zahid Baig, SS (ST&FE-Policy), FBR, Isd., Mr. Khalid Mehmood, (ST L&P), IR-Ops, FBR, Isd., Ms. Ayesha Saleem, Law Officer, PRAL, Isd., and Mr. Ehsan Ullah Khan, Secretary, BDT IT, FBR, Islamabad for Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUDASSER, ISLAMABAD\nVs\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24965", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3479 = 2024 SLD 3479 = (2024) 130 TAX 7", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Maladministration and Sales Tax Compliance Dispute under Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000: Sections 2(3)(ii), 10(4)\n•\nFederal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013: Section 9(1)\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Sections 2(43A), 3(9A), 11(3), 33(25A)\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe complainant, a registered taxpayer under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, received a notice dated 29.09.2021 from the tax department stating that their business was considered a Non-Integrated Tier-1 Retailer with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)s POS system. The notice required compliance by 08.10.2021.\nIn response, the complainant argued that their business did not qualify for integration with the FBRs POS system and requested exemption from the list of Tier-1 retailers. The complainant submitted two requests to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR), Zone-1, RTO Lahore, on 08.10.2022 and 13.10.2022, asking for a spot inquiry and exclusion from the Tier-1 Retailers list. Despite this, the tax department failed to address the requests and simply continued issuing repetitive notices, causing significant harassment to the complainant.\nThe complainant filed a complaint with the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO), seeking the FTO’s intervention to direct the tax department to conduct a physical verification to determine whether their business qualified for inclusion as a Tier-1 retailer and to exclude them from the list if it was found ineligible.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nComplainants Argument:\no\nThe complainant argued that despite submitting valid requests, the tax department ignored their replies and failed to take action.\no\nThey contended that the Department should have visited the premises and conducted a spot inquiry in the presence of the complainant or their authorized representative (AR), as instructed during the hearing.\no\nThe complainant requested the exclusion from the list of Tier-1 retailers and closure of the harassing proceedings since they did not qualify under the POS system criteria.\n2.\nTax Departments Argument:\no\nThe tax department continued issuing notices without taking appropriate action or addressing the complainant’s concerns.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nPhysical Verification and Opportunity for Defense:\no\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) determined that the tax department should have conducted a physical verification of the complainants business premises in the presence of the complainant or their representative.\no\nThe FTO emphasized that before issuing any orders, the tax authorities should have disposed of the complainants application for exclusion from the Tier-1 Retailers list only after giving the complainant an opportunity to present their case and defense.\no\nThis approach would align with the principles of fairness and transparency, ensuring that the complainant was treated in accordance with the law.\n2.\nNon-Disposal of Application as Maladministration:\no\nThe FTO concluded that the failure of the tax department to dispose of the complainant’s application within a reasonable time amounted to maladministration under Section 2(3)(ii) of the FTO Ordinance, 2000.\no\nThe repetition of notices and the non-action on the complainant’s legitimate requests were deemed improper, and the department’s failure to act appropriately was considered maladministration.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nDuty of Tax Authorities:\no\nTax authorities must address taxpayer complaints and requests for exclusion from the Tier-1 Retailer list with due diligence. They should conduct physical verifications and inquiries where necessary, providing the taxpayer an opportunity to present their case.\n2.\nMaladministration:\no\nThe failure of public authorities to properly address or dispose of applications and complaints from citizens, especially when no action is taken after reasonable requests and within a reasonable time, constitutes maladministration under Section 2(3)(ii) of the FTO Ordinance, 2000.\n3.\nFairness in Administrative Action:\no\nIt is a fundamental principle that taxpayers must be treated fairly, and authorities must not create unnecessary harassment through the repetition of notices without a proper investigation or response to complaints.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman ruled that the tax department’s failure to address the complainants application for exclusion from the Tier-1 Retailers list and to conduct the required physical verification was a clear case of maladministration. The tax department was directed to conduct the necessary inquiries in the presence of the complainant or their representative, and the proceedings should continue in accordance with the law. The complainant’s request for the closure of harassment proceedings was deemed justified, and the department was ordered to act accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3)(ii),10(4)Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(43A),3(9A),11(3),33(25A)", - "Case #": "Complaint No. 4727/LHR/ST/2022, decided on 23.12.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Adila Rehman, Advisor for Dealing Officer.\nDr. Arslan Subuctageen, Advisor for Appraising Officer.\nMr. Abdul Waheed Shakir, Advocate for Authorized Representative.\nMs. Huma Sarwar, Addl-CIR, RTO Lahore for Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. JAMIL AHMAD, M/S TAYIBA TILES & SANITARY, PATTOKI\nVs\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24966", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3480 = 2024 SLD 3480", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(11)", - "Case #": "Spl. Cr. Bail Application No. 40 of 2024, heard on: 23-05-2024. Date of order: 23-05-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant/Accused: Yasir Latif son of Muhammad Latif\nthrough Mr. Aqil Ahmed, Advocate. Complainant/State: Through Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Arain, Special Prosecutor." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24967", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3481 = 2024 SLD 3481", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-23 of 2020. Date of hearing and order: 16-05-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Adnan-ul-Karim Memon Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Alam Sher Bozdar, advocate for the petitioner.\nMr. Ghulam Mustafa G.Abro, Additional A.G, Sindh along\nwith Dilawar Soomro AEO/Focal Person District Education\nOfficer (ES&HS), Ghotki", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ms. Firdos Noor Malik.\nVs\nProvince of Sindh & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24968", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3482 = 2024 SLD 3482", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(2),34(1)(a),33(5)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1137/LB/2022, heard on: 05.12.2023. Date of order: 26.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. All, CA. Respondent by: Ms. Faiza Sadaf, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Shahtaj Sugar Mills, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24969", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3483 = 2024 SLD 3483", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1646/2024. Date of order: 24.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR IJAZ ISHAQ KHAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Saqib Saddique and Mr. Zahid ul Islam, Advocates for the petitioners.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian Group of Chakwal\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24970", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3484 = 2024 SLD 3484", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4B", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 506/LB/2023, heard on: 19.12.2023. Date of order: 19.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Kamran Hayder, FCA. Respondent by: Mr. Abdullah Zulfiqar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. LESCO, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24971", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3485 = 2024 SLD 3485", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpUXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120, 122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2820/LB/2016, heard on: 14.02.2024. Date of order: 14.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Ali, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Farhan Ahmed Khan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Gujranwala.\nVS\nMr. Maqsood Ahmed Prop. M/s. Bismillah Battery Service, Gujranwala." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24972", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3486 = 2024 SLD 3486", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 7150/LB/2023, heard on: 08.12.2023. Date of order: 13.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Abdul Rauf Ch. Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ubaid-Ur-Rehman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Malik Arif Ali, Ferozwala.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24973", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3487 = 2024 SLD 3487", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=90", - "Case #": "C.P.2646-L/2018, C.A.17-L/2019 and C.A.364-L/2020, heard on: 7 March 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Larger Bench - III: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail. Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the appellants/petitioners: Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, ASC. Mr. Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, ASC. For the respondents: Mr. Umar Farooq, ASC. Mr. Ashar Elahi, ASC. Mr. Hafeez Saeed Akhtar, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Akram Gondal, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, ASC. Mrs. Kausar Iqbal Bhatti, AOR. Mr. Muhammad Dawood Khan, OG-II, SME Bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. Samrana Nawaz, etc. (In C.P.2646-L/2018 & C.A.17-L/2019) Khalid Mujeeb Pervaiz Khan, etc. (In C.A. 364-L/2020)\nVersus\nMCB Bank Ltd., etc. (In C.P. 2646-L/2018 & C.A. 17-L/2019) The Bank of Punjab, etc. (In C.A. 364-L/2020)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24974", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3488 = 2024 SLD 3488", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A(3)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1864/LB/2024, heard on: 22.05.2024. Date of order: 22.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Sarfraz Ch. FCA. Respondent by: Mr. Umar Zaib, DR. Mian Yousaf Umar, Legal Advisor.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. CSH Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24975", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3489 = 2024 SLD 3489", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3973 of 2023. Date of hearing 23.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by M/s. Ahmar Bilal Soofi, Sr. ASC, Fatima\nMidrar, Usman Jilani and Waseem Doga, Advocates.\nRespondent(s) by Mr. Hassan Kamran Bashir, ASC and\nZeeshaan Zafar Hashmi, Ali Farooq Shujra, Advocates for PRA with Nadia Murad, Legal Officer, with Zubair Abbas, PLO, SPD. M/s Hassan Askari Kazmi, Muhammad Bilal, Malik Shaukat Mahmood and Faizan Naseer Chohan, Advocates. Mr. Abid Aziz Rajori, Assistant AdvocateGeneral with Barrister Talha Ilyas Sheikh and Syed Saim Hassan, Advocates. Mr. Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General and Sibah Farooq, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Strategic Plans Division and another.\nV/S \nPunjab Revenue Authority and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24976", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3490 = 2024 SLD 3490", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA (AG) NO. 373/KB/2023. STA NO. 321/KB/2019, heard on: 18.09.2023. Date of order: 30.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Irshad Alam, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Imran Ali Sheikh, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dewan Cement Ltd. Karachi.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, LTO, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24977", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3491 = 2024 SLD 3491", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1084/KB/2021, heard on: 02.12.2021. Date of order: 24.12.2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): HABIB ULLAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. A. S. Jafri, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Riaz Ali Shah, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Umaiz Raja, Hyderabad.\nVS\nCIR, A-VI, Zone-III,RTO-I,Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24978", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3492 = 2024 SLD 3492", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 33187 of 2024. Date of order: 29.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Naveed Zafar Khan and Zaheer Ud Din Babar advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Abdul Muqtadir Khan Advocate for the respondent/FBR on Court's call. Mr. Sheraz Zaka Assistant Attorney General on court's call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Daniyal Khurram\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan and other." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24979", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3493 = 2024 SLD 3493 = (2024) 130 TAX 713", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTTg", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Recovery of Arrears of Tax on Transfer of Taxable Activity\nDetails:\nThe petitioner entered into a scheme of arrangement with Messrs Lottee Akhtar Beverages (Pvt.) Limited (Lottee), which was approved by the High Court on 26.06.2018. Following the arrangement, the bifurcated assets of the petitioner were transferred to Lottee. The department issued a show-cause notice, alleging that the petitioner transferred its taxable activity to Lottee, an unregistered entity, and was thus liable to pay sales tax under Section 49(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of Respondent No. 4 to issue the notice through a constitutional petition.\nHeld:\n(a) The writ petition was deemed not maintainable as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that Respondent No. 4 lacked jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice.\n(b) The allegations made in the show-cause notice do not per se establish a lack of authority; they may or may not be tenable depending on the transaction’s applicability under Section 49.\n(c) Since the petitioner has already replied to the notice and the matter is pending before Respondent No. 4, any order passed would be appealable under the Sales Tax Act.\n(d) The principles laid down in Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Jahangir Khan Tareen (2022 SCMR 92) reaffirmed that writ petitions are not the appropriate forum to challenge show-cause notices when statutory remedies are available.\nThe writ petition was dismissed.\nCase References:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Jahangir Khan Tareen (2022 SCMR 92).\nIndus Trading and Contracting Company v. Collector of Customs (2016 SCMR 842).", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=48,49Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 76380 of 2023 decided on 20.11.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Sabtain Fazli, Abad-ur-Rehman, M. Umar Tariq Gill, Isa Ahmad Jalil and Kairan Hussain Mir for Petitioner.\nSheraz Zaka Assistant Attorney General on Court’s Call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RIAZ BOTTLERS (PVT.) LTD.\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24980", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3494 = 2024 SLD 3494", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ petition no.3017/2023. Date of order: 29.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR IJAZ KHAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Saqib Siddeeq, advocate for the petitioner\nMr. Sohail Nawaz, advocate for respondents no.1 to 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zeeshan Yaqoob\nVS\nChief Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Islamabad and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24981", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3495 = 2024 SLD 3495", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpTXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C", - "Case #": "ICA No.48745 of 2023. Date of Hearing. 16-05-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANT BY; M/s Salman Akram Raja, Malik Ahsan\nMehmood, Imtiaz Rasheed Siddiqui. RESPONDENTS in Appeals (mentioned in Appendix ‘B’) Shahzad Ata Elahi, M. Ajmal Khan, Shahbaz Butt, Waseem Ahmad Malik, Shahryar Kasuri, M. Shoaib Rashid, Mustafa Kamal.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Service Global Footwear Limited & another.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24982", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3496 = 2024 SLD 3496", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4320/LB/2022, heard on: 18.10.2023. Date of order: 12.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Bilal Ahmed, ITP. Respondent by: Mrs. Hina Mustafa, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Phono Engineers (pvt) Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24983", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3497 = 2024 SLD 3497", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1121/LB/2019, heard on: 29.01.2024. Date of order: 12.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Dr. Qurat-ul-Ain, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Khuhrram Shahbaz Butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Ravi Flour Mills, (AOP)." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24984", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3498 = 2024 SLD 3498", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1695/2024. Date of order: 06.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Naeem ul Haq and Mr. Muhammad Imran ul Haq, Advocates for the petitioner. Mr. Mansoor Ahmad, Advocate for the respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sharjeel Abbas Ehmar\nVersus\nAssistant/Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, Unit-II, RTO, Islamabad & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24985", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3499 = 2024 SLD 3499", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 488/LB/2018, heard on: 16.11.2023. Date of order: 20.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zeeshan Mushtaq, ACA. Respondent by: Mr. Bilal ZIa, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mitchell's Fruit Farm, Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24986", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3500 = 2024 SLD 3500", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=23", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1475/LB/2017, heard on: 10.01.2024. Date of order: 16.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shahid Umar Khan, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Rudar Amjad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Macca Sugar Mills (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, LAhore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24987", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3501 = 2024 SLD 3501", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=205(3)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 02/2016, heard on: 30.11.2023. Date of order: 07.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MEHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mouz Tahir, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. M.S. Reshmatex Ltd, 4th Floor, Nawab Market, Shadman Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24988", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3502 = 2024 SLD 3502", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(7),161(A)Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 84/LB/2019, heard on: 29.11.2023. Date of order: 04.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ubaid-Ur-Rehman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/S. Tulip Poly Bag Industries, Pvt, Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24989", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3503 = 2024 SLD 3503", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Revenue Act, 1967 (XVII of 1967)=80Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199(1)(a)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 7027/2022, heard on: 26.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Tariq Saleem Sheikh, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. A.R. Aurangzeb, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 to 3: Hafiza Mehnaz Nadeem Abbasi, Assistant Advocate General. For Respondents No.4 & 5: Ch. Muhammad Azhar, Advocate. For Respondent No.6: Mr. Mehmood Ahmad Bhatti, Advocate. Research assistance: Mr. Sher Hassan Pervez, Research Officer,\nLHCRC", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ghazanfar Amin.\nVs.\nProvince of Punjab and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24990", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3504 = 2024 SLD 3504", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,8(1)(a)(b)(f)(g)(h)(i)(j)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2268/LB/2023, heard on: 13.12.2023. Date of order: 25.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asim Zulfiqar, FCA. Respondent by: Miss. Sheraza Hameed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. D.G Khan Cement Company Ltd. 53-A, Lawrence Road, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24991", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3505 = 2024 SLD 3505", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "S.T.R NO. 34742 of 2024. Date of order: 04.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RASAAL HASSAN SYED, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rai Amer Ijaz Kharal, Advocate for the applicant. Mirza Nasar Ahmed, Additional Attorney General, and Mr. Asad Alii Bajwa Deputy Attorney General. Mr. Imran Rasool, Advocate for respondent, FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Royal Board and Paper Mills (pvt), Ltd.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24992", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3506 = 2024 SLD 3506", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 800/LB/2023, heard on: 27.02.2024. Date of order: 14.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ashiq Ali Rania, Advocate. Res[pondent by: Mr. M. Suleman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Abdullah Javed, R-325 11 Mehmood" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24993", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3507 = 2024 SLD 3507", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19(7)", - "Case #": "EFA No.41 of 2023, heard on: 18.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ch. Saleem Akhtar Warraich, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Syed Tariq-ur-Rehman Hashmi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "United Bank Ltd.\nVersus\nMuhammad Amjad Hayat Khan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24994", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3508 = 2024 SLD 3508", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "Special Custom Reference No. 151 & 152 of 2013, heard on: 21.03.2024. Date of Order: 08.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, Judge. Mr. Justice Adnan-ul-Karim Memon.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant: Mr. Ali Mehdi, Advocate. Respondents: Mr. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Bawany Metals Ltd., \nvs\nAdditional Collector of Customs, in both cases: Model Customs Collectorate of PaCCS, Custom House, Karachi & Another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24995", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3509 = 2024 SLD 3509", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120, 214C,177,122(9),122(1),122(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 347/LB/2016, heard on: 04.12.2023. Date of order: 04.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Javed Iqbal Khan, FCA & Mr. DAeed Khan, ACA. Respondent by: Mr. Asad ur Rehman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Nasim Sajid, Cavalry Ground, Lahore Cantt.\nVS\nCIR. RTO. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24996", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3510 = 2024 SLD 3510", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131,122(5A),122(9),111(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1045/IB/2024 (Tax Year 2018). Date of Hearing & Order: 21.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER), IMRAN LATIF MINHAS (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Samama Faraz Advocate.\nRespondent By: Mr. Naveed Hassan,DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. MUHAMMAD SAEED ZIA, House No.251 (Old # 125-B), Street # 11-B, Phase-1, Ghauri Town, Khanna East, Islamabad. - Appellant\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, ISLAMABAD- Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24997", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3511 = 2024 SLD 3511", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,25", - "Case #": "STA NO. 134/IB/2015 (Tax Period 2010-11), date of Hearing & Order: 15.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, MEMBER AND NASIR IQBAL, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Samama Faraz, Advocate.\nRespondent By: Mr. M. Razzaq, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. ZK Enterprises, 766/12, Bagh Wala, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi - Respondent\nVs\nThe CIR, RTO, Rawalpindi - Appellant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "24998", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3512 = 2024 SLD 3512", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=72", - "Case #": "STA NO. 430/LB/2016, heard on: 02.10.2023. Date of order: 18.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Umair Khan, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Basharat Ali Awan, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Honda Atlas Cars Pakistan, Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "24999", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3513 = 2024 SLD 3513", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P No.2863/2024. Date of order: 16.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ehsan Ullah Manj, Advocate for petitioners. Rai Mazhar Hussain Kharal, Assistant Advocate General. Mr. Zafar Iqbal Sheikh, Advocate for respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. Omer Chughtai, etc. \nVs\n Province of the Punjab, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25000", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3514 = 2024 SLD 3514", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),122(9),111(1)(a)/122(1)(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2297/LB/2019, heard on: 27.02.2024. Date of order: 19.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Iqtidar AHmed, DR. Respondent by: Mr. M. Sabir Asif, ACMA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-AEOI, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nMrs. Amatul Razzaq CHambers, Mozang Road, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25001", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3515 = 2024 SLD 3515", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpRXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.13 of 2023. Date of order: 20.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE. RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Manzoor-ul-Haq, Advocate for the appellants. Syed Wasim Haider, Advocate for the respondent-Bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Team Packages and others.\nVersus\n MCB Bank Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25002", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3516 = 2024 SLD 3516", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45B(3)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 256/LB/2018, heard on: 19.02.2024. Date of order: 28.03.2024,", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Nawaz Khurram, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Omer Zeb Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Prime Mechanical Works, Lahore. \nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25003", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3517 = 2024 SLD 3517", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1), 122(9), 122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 440/LB/2020, heard on: 22.01.2024. Date of order: 24.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Rashid, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Bilal Zia, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Chaudhry Liaqat Ali, C/O Islam Soap Industries (Pvt) Limited, Nankana Sahib, Sialkot.\nVS\nCIR, Zone-IV, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25004", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3518 = 2024 SLD 3518", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=305.301", - "Case #": "C. O. No. 14225 / 2023. Date of Hearing: 03.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners By: Mr. Muhammad Nawazish Ali Pirzada, Advocate. Respondent No. 1 By: Mr. Shezal Khan Burki, Advocate. Respondent No. 2 By: Mr. Ruman Bilal, Advocate. Respondent No. 5 By: Mr. Muhammad Ali Malik, Advocate. Respondent No. 647 By: Mr. Dilnawaz A. Cheema, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Equity Master Securities (Pvt.) Limited & 03 others.\nVersus\nPakistan Stock Exchange Limited & 937 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25005", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3519 = 2024 SLD 3519", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=54", - "Case #": "C. P No. 1513 of 2024, heard on: 21.05.2024.\nDate of Judgment: 30.05.20", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, Judge. Mr. Justice Jawad Akbar Sarwana.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: M/s Ammar Athar Saeed & Usman Alam, Advocates. Respondent by: Dr. Shahnawaz Memon,\nAdvocate. Mr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan,\nvs\nFederation of Pakistan & Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25006", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3520 = 2024 SLD 3520", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),214C", - "Case #": "ITA NO.817/LB/2022, heard on: 31.01.2024. Date of order: 24.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Waseem A. Malik, Advocate along with Syed Nawazish Ali Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Muaaz Tahir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ambreen Fawad, Multan.\nVS\nThe CIR, AEOI Zone, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25007", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3521 = 2024 SLD 3521", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2).33(1)(5),34,6,7,8(1)(a)(f)(g)(h)(i)(j),22,23,26", - "Case #": "STA NO. 189/LB/2024, heard on: 07.02.2024. Date of order: 16.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Arslan, ITP. Respondent by: Ms. Faiza Sadaf, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Hunza Sugar Mills (pvt). Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-V, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25008", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3522 = 2024 SLD 3522", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161/205,153", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3224/LB/2017, heard on: 20.12.2023. Date of order: 22.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Ms. Mahrukh Imtiaz, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Farhan Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Gujranwala.\nVS\nM/s. Gujranwala Food Exports (pvt) Ltd, Gujranwala." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25009", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3523 = 2024 SLD 3523", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2744/LB/2019, heard on: 23.02.2024. Date of order: 15.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shuja, Advocate. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Bilal Bashir, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25010", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3524 = 2024 SLD 3524", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=43A,Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126AFederal Excise Act, 2005=33A", - "Case #": "ITA No.686/IB/2024. Date of hearing 20.05.2024.Date of order 20.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by Sheikh Istamalat Ali, Advocate.\nRespondent by Mr. M. Hayat, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sheikh Tariq Mahmood; V-571, Gandum Mandi, Rawalpindi.\n Vs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25011", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3525 = 2024 SLD 3525", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpQXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2778/LB/2018, heard on: 24.01.2024. Date of order: 25.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Iqbal Anwar Mehndi, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Ahmed Mohy ud Din, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. GMS Hi Technik (pvt). Ltd. Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR CRTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25012", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3526 = 2024 SLD 3526", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=140, 138(1)", - "Case #": "I.C.A. no. 357 of 2022. Date of Hearing : 28.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Ishfaq Hussain Shah and Muhammad Ali\nHaider, Advocates Respondents by: M/s Jahanzeb Awan and Muhammad Uzair Bin, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Islamabad.\nVS\nM/s Pakistan LNG Limited, and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25013", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3527 = 2024 SLD 3527", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "MA (Cond) No. 56/LB/2024. ITA NO. 509/LB/2024, heard on: 07.02.2024. Date of order: 12.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: CH. M. Ashraf, Advocate. Respondent by: Dr. Qurat-ul-Ain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Nadeem Traders. P. NO. 25 Mamdot Block Mustafa\nTown Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25014", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3528 = 2024 SLD 3528", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)(5),221", - "Case #": "MA NO. 404/LB/2017. In (ITA NO. 527/LB/2012) & (MA NO. 216/LB/2017), heard on: 08.11.2023. Date of order: 29.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Tabinda Shaheen, DR.Respondent by: Mr. Qadeer Ahmed, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Sefam (Pvt) Limited, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25015", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3529 = 2024 SLD 3529", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=236G,236H", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 483/LB/2017, heard on: 21.11.2023. Date of order: 20.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Bilal Zia, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Tipu Sultan, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Newage Cables (Pvt), Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25016", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3530 = 2024 SLD 3530", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpOC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46", - "Case #": "STA NO. 541/LB/2024, heard on: 22.04.2024. Date of order: 22.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abdul Waheed, ADv. Respondent by: Mst. Lubna Shah, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Bin Bakkar, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25017", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3531 = 2024 SLD 3531", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpOCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 792/LB/2018, heard on: 22.02.2024. Date of order: 02.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Basharat Ali Awan, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Umer Zeb Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mid West Packages, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-II, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25018", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3532 = 2024 SLD 3532", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161B,161(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No.563/LB/2017. Date of Hearing: 25.01.2024. Date of Order: 02.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Jamil Bhatti, Accountant Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR.\nRespondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVersus\nM/s Varioline International (Pvt.), Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25019", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3533 = 2024 SLD 3533", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=290,291,292", - "Case #": "C.O. No.06 of 2014 & C.M. No.314-C of 2015.\n(APPLICATION UNDER ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC) heard on: 23.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: M/s. Shafqat Mehmood Chohan and Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocates. Respondents by: M/s. Malik Muhammad Rafiq Rajwana and Muhammad Sohail Iqbal Bhatti, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sheikh Kamran Shafi & others\nVersus\nSadaqat Shafi & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25020", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3534 = 2024 SLD 3534", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpOHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 805/LB/19, heard on: 13.03.2024. Date of order: 21.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Anwar Ali Parricha, Adv. Respondent by: Ms. Anum Tahir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Akbar Riaz, Lahore.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25021", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3535 = 2024 SLD 3535", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpOHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 98/LB/2018, heard on: 18.01.2024. Date of order: 18.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER, SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Umair Khan, DR. Respondent by: Ms. Silwat Malik, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Honda Atlas Cars Ltd. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25022", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3536 = 2024 SLD 3536 = 2025 PTD 58", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDc", - "Key Words:": "1.\nCase Background:\no\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue (BTB), Rawalpindi initiated proceedings under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance for Tax Years 2010, 2011, and 2012.\no\nUndeclared balances were added under Section 111(1)(b), and the respondents tax assessments were deemed finalized on 31.12.2014 and 20.01.2015.\no\nThe respondent, Masood-ul-Hassan (Proprietor of Prism Estate and Builders), challenged the assessment before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), Rawalpindi, which upheld the tax demand.\no\nAppeals were then filed before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), Islamabad, which set aside the tax assessments citing a lack of jurisdiction by the Commissioner BTB.\n2.\nDecision by the High Court:\no\nThe High Court overturned the ATIR decision, ruling that:\n\nThe Chief Commissioner had transferred jurisdiction to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (BTB), Rawalpindi, through an order dated 20.08.2014 under Section 209(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance.\n\nThe ATIR ignored this order and failed to properly assess jurisdiction.\n\nThe respondent did not challenge jurisdiction during initial proceedings, which, as per legal precedent (2003 SCMR 686), bars it from raising the issue at the appellate stage.\no\nThe judgment states that the Appellate Tribunal misread and omitted relevant facts, making its decision legally unsustainable.\n3.\nOutcome:\no\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner Inland Revenue.\no\nThe case was remanded back, confirming that the tax assessments were lawfully conducted under the Commissioner BTB’s jurisdiction.\nImplications:\n•\nThe ruling reinforces the authority of the Chief Commissioner to assign jurisdiction under Section 209(1).\n•\nFailure to challenge jurisdiction at the first instance results in waiver of that objection in appeals.\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal must ensure complete assessment of facts to avoid decisions based on misreading of records.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),122,122(1),209(1)", - "Case #": "Income Tax References Nos.01, 02 and 04 of 2019, decided on 20th May, 2024. Date of hearing: 20th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE AND JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Manzoor Hussain for Applicant.\nSh. Istadamet Ali and Junaid Hassan Sheikh for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE \nVS\nMASOOD-UL-HASSAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25023", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3537 = 2024 SLD 3537", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 850/LB/2019, heard on: 12.03.2024. Date of order: 28.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Anum Tahir, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, CTRO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. CNS Engineering, Phase-III, DHA, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25024", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3538 = 2024 SLD 3538", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b),122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 307/LB/2024, heard on: 21.05.2024. Date of order: 21.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Malik Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Sobia Mazhar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited, Plot 209, Utility Stores Corporation Building, F-7, Islamabad.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, LTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25025", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3539 = 2024 SLD 3539", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=38", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1219/LB/2018, heard on: 04.01.2024. Date of order: 04.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None. Respondent by: Mr. Ali Khalid, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Tariq Steel Furanace, Bund Road, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, CRTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25026", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3540 = 2024 SLD 3540", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161/205", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 902/LB/2010, heard on: 19.02.2024. Date of order: 20.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Tanveer Aslam, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mandiali Paper Mills, Sheikhupura.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25027", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3541 = 2024 SLD 3541", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1336/LB/2016, heard on: 27.09.2023. Date of order: 01.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zeeshan Mushtaq, ITP. Respondent by: 01.12.2023.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Atlas Copco Pakistan (pvt), Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR,RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25028", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3542 = 2024 SLD 3542", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)(5),120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1401/LB/2024, heard on: 05.04.2024. Date of order: 18.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shahid Jamil, ITP along with Mr. Majid Naeem, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. M. Nadeem Asad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. The Cooperative Engineers Town Society Limited. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25029", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3543 = 2024 SLD 3543", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=73", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1475/LB/2017, heard on: 10.01.2024. Date of order: 16.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shahid Umar Khan, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Rudar Amjad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Macca Sugar Mills (pvt). Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25030", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3544 = 2024 SLD 3544", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P No.1986 of 2024. Date of order: 26.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate for the Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Jan Muhammad.\nVersus\nThe Federation of Pakistan, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25031", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3545 = 2024 SLD 3445", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFFpNHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 563/LB/2017, heard on: 25.01.2024. Date of order: 02.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Zile-e-Huma, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Varioline International (pvt), Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25032", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3546 = 2024 SLD 3546", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=39(3),111(1)(a),21(n),21(c),21(l),122(5),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1413/LB/2014, heard on: 26.01.2024. Date of order: 12.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ikram-ul-Haq, ITP. Respondent by: Ms. Irfa Tabassum, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Waqar Plastic (pvt.) Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25033", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5YzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3547 = 2024 SLD 3547", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5YzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3(2)", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A.1800-L/2018 and C.P.L.A.1364/2023.heard on: 13.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench-III: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Umer Abdullah, ASC. (In CP 1800-L/18) Mr. Junaid Jabbar Khan, ASC. For the Mr. Umer Abdullah, ASC. Mr. Junaid Jabbar Khan, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "National Bank of Pakistan through its President, Head Office, Karachi, etc. (In CP 1800-L/2018) Muhammad Adeel (In CP 1364/2023)\nVersus\nMuhammad Adeel (In CP 1800-L/2018) National Bank of Pakistan through its President, National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi, etc. (In CP 1364/2023)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25034", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5YzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3548 = 2024 SLD 3548", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5YzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12(a)(i)(E)(G)Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 481/LB/2024, heard on: 25.03.2024. Date of order: 25.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ch. M. Ashraf, Advocate. Respondent by: Dr. Qurat-ul-Ain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Graphic Media Corporation, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25035", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5YzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3549 = 2024 SLD 3549", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5YzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 7317/LB/2023, heard on: 30.01.2024. Date of order: 13.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hamza Ashraf, FCA, Mr. Shahbaz Hassan, ACA & Silwat Malik ACA. Respondent by: Syed Faizan Ali Zaidi, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. SNGPL Ltd. \nVS\nCIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25036", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3550 = 2024 SLD 3550", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=14,2(28)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 498/LB/2023, heard on: 14.12.2023. Date of order: 03.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Rana Usman Ghani, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mew Muslim Traders, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25037", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3551 = 2024 SLD 3551", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Rules, 2006=18Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=23", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2077 of 2024. Date of order: 04.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AMMER FAROOQ, CHEIF JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Naeem Ul Haq, Advocate for the\npetitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Ali Satti.\n VS\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25038", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3552 = 2024 SLD 3552", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-2322 of 2024. Date of Hearing: 12.06.2024, 13.06.2024 and 21.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Justice Mrs. Rashida Asad.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: Through Mr. Zain A. Jatoi along with Mr.\nMustafa Mamdani Advocates. Respondents No.1 to 3: Through Mr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General and Ms. Wajeeha Mehdi, Deputy Attorney General.\nRespondent No.4: Through Mr. Muhammad Ishaque Pirzada and Mr. Abdul Mannan Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Umair.\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25039", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3553 = 2024 SLD 3553", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Yzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),122(9),122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 7819/LB/2013, heard on: 17.01.2024. Date of order: 04.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asim Zubair, Advocate. Respondent by: CIR, RTO, Lahore.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Faraz Noor, 329-L Block, DHA, Phase-6, Lahore\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25040", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Y3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3554 = 2024 SLD 3554", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Y3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Rules, 2006=36", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2375/LB/2023, heard on: 26.01.2024. Date of order: 20.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Ahmed Malik, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Sufyan A. Mian, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ayesha Spinning Mills Limited, 45-50 Industrial Area, Gulberg-III, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25041", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Y3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3555 = 2024 SLD 3555", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5Y3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 930/LB/2019, heard on: 01.03.2024. Date of order: 05.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MEHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Tehmina Akram, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Waseem Ahmed Malik, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore. \nVS\nM/s. Din Industries Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25042", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3556 = 2024 SLD 3556", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1A),161,149/165", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4488/LB/2022, heard on: 21.03.2024. Date of order: 06.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANTAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shoaib Ahmed, Adv. Respondent by: Mrs. Mahrukh Imtiaz, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Crescent Cotton Mills Limited, Faisalabad.\nVS\nCIR, Audit-II, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25043", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3557 = 2024 SLD 3557", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161", - "Case #": "I.T.R No.80 of 2024. Date of order> 09.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUDGE. BABAR SATTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Mohsin Nazir, Advocate for\nthe applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Talagang Energy (Pvt.) Limited.\nVs.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25044", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3558 = 2024 SLD 3558", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "I.T.R NO. 81 of 2024. Date of order: 09.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUDGE. BABAR SATTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate for the Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Smart Packages LLP.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25045", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3559 = 2024 SLD 3559", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1137/LB/2022, heard on: 05.12.2023. Date of order: 26.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Ali, CA. Respondent by: Ms. Faiza Sadaf, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Shahtaj Sugar Mills, Lahore\nvs\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25046", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3560 = 2024 SLD 3560", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21(c)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2220/LB/2019, heard on: 25.03.2024. Date of order: 06.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sufyan Ahmed, DR. Respondent by: Ch. Maqsood Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Pak Elektron Limited, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25047", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3561 = 2024 SLD 3561", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A, 131(1),133", - "Case #": "W.P. NP. 8923 of 2024. Date of order: 08.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Tanveer Ahmed, Advocate for the Petitioner. Mr. Ata Ul Manan Malik, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan, Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Javed Gulzar. \nVS\nThe Federation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25048", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3562 = 2024 SLD 3562", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Cantonments Act, 1924=60Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=XXVII-A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No.1363 to 1365 of 2018. Date of Hearing: 13.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Justice Qazi Faez Isa, CJ. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan. \nJustice Athar Minallah", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants: Mr. Muhammad Umer Riaz, ASC.\n(In all cases) Assisted by Ch. Abubakar. Mr. Zaki Haider, CEO, Clifton. Mr. Aamir Rashid, CEO, Faisal. Mr. Tanveer Ashraf, Director, ML & C. Mr. Javed Abbasi, Law Officer, ML & C. (Though video-link from Karachi) For the Applicant: Mr. M. Naeem Sadiq, ASC. (In CMA. 4728/23)\nOn Court’s Notice: Mr. Mansoor Usman Awan, Civil Appeal No. 1363 of 2018 etc. 2 Attorney-General for Pakistan.\nCh. Aamir Rehman,\nAdditional Attorney-General.\nRespondents No. 1-2: Ex-parte.\n(In CA. 1363/18)\nFor Respondent No. 1: Mr. Tahir Ishaq Mughal, ASC.\n(In CA. 1364/18) Mrs. Shaista Altaf, ASC.\nFor Govt. of Sindh: Mr. Zeeshan Adhi,\n(In CA. 1364 & 1365/18) Additional Advocate-General, Sindh.\nMr. Saifullah, Asst. Advocate-General, Sindh.\nMr. Ghulam Nabi Shah, Addl. Director Excise & Taxation.\nMr. Ayaz Ali Mangi, Dy. Director (P-II).\n(Through video-link from Karachi)\nRespondents No. 2, 3 and 5: Ex-parte.\n(In CA. 1364/18)\nRespondents No. 1 and 3: Ex-parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "In CA. 1363/18:\nCantonment Board Faisal and another.\nVersus\nHabib Bank Limited, Karachi and another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25049", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3563 = 2024 SLD 3563", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=387", - "Case #": "C.Ps.L.A. No. 1422-L and 1423-L of 2021, heard on: 7 May 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench - II: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, ASC.\nMr. Muhammad Imran Malik, ASC. Mr. Tariq Aziz, AOR.\nMian Liaqat Ali, AOR. For the Mr. Salman Aslam Butt, Sr. ASC. Mr. Shehzada Mazhar, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, ASC. Mr. Anis M. Shahzad, AOR. Mr. Mobin Ahmad Siddiqui, AOR. For Applicants: Barrister Haris Azmat, ASC. (in CMA 2216-7/2024) assisted by Ms. Faiza Asad, Adv. Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR.\nAmicus Curiae: Mr. Uzair Karamat Bhandari, ASC.\nKhwaja Ahmad Hosain, ASC. Mr. Faisal Siddiqi, ASC.\nFor the SECP: Mr. Akif Saeed, Chairman, SECP. Mr. Muzaffar Ahmed Mirza, CP, SECP. Mr. Shamshad A. Rana, SPP, SECP. Barrister Omer Malik, SPP, SECP. Mr. Hussain Raza, SPP, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Tanveer Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (in C.P.L.A 1422-L/2021) M/s Tanveer Spinning & Weaving Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.(in CPLA 1423- L/21)\nVersus\nSummit Bank Limited, etc. (in both cases)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25050", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3564 = 2024 SLD 3654 = 2025 PTD 255", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WXo", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA) Over Islamabad-Based Businesses\nThe petitioner, a company rendering taxable services in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), challenged its registration with the Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA), arguing that its business operations were limited to Islamabad and, therefore, it could not be compelled to register with the PRA under the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012.\nThe Preamble of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 and Section 25(1)(a) clarify that the tax applies to services that are:\nProvided, rendered, initiated, originated, executed, received, or consumed in Punjab.\nUnder Article 1 of the Constitution of Pakistan, Punjab and Islamabad Capital Territory are distinct administrative units. The Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA) operates under the Punjab Government, while Islamabad falls under federal jurisdiction.\nThe petitioner’s contention that it does not provide services in Punjab holds merit.\nUnder Section 29(2) of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012, any person disputing the registration requirement may apply to the Commissioner PRA for a decision.\nHeld:\nThe High Court did not rule on the merits but instead directed the Commissioner PRA to treat the petition as a representation and decide the matter within four weeks through a speaking order after hearing all concerned parties.\nStopgap Arrangement: The Court restrained PRA from taking coercive action against the petitioner until a final decision on the representation.\nThe constitutional petition was disposed of, directing the petitioner to seek resolution through the statutory remedy under Section 29(2).\nCase Law:\nShell Pakistan Limited v. Government of Punjab & Others (2020 PTD 1607)\nShaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan/National Tariff Commission & Others (2021 PTD 2126)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=25,25(1)(a), 27,29(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=1", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 169 of 2024, decided on 13th June, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Muhammad Idrees, ASC on behalf of the Petitioner alongwith M/s Hassan Askari Kazmi and Muhammad Bilal, Advocates. Mr. Abid Aziz Rajori, Assistant Advocate\nGeneral Punjab. Mr. Hassan Kamran Bashir, ASC on behalf of the Respondent/PRA alongwith M/s Abdul\nWakeel, Muhammad Hussam, Advocates. Mst. Nadia Murad, Legal Officer, PRA and Finance Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAK GULF CONSTRUCTION (PVT.) LIMITED \nvs\nGOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25051", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3565 = 2024 SLD 3565", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5WXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1).122(9),122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1542/KB/2023, heard on: 13.02.2024. Date of order: 01.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Irshad Alam, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Akhtar Khan, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Manzoor Hussain, Karachi. \nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-IV, RTO-II, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25052", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3566 = 2024 SLD 3566", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Partnership Act, 1932=32(2)", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO. 499 OF 2017, heard on: 24.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUNIB AKBAR. JUSTICE SHAHID WAHEED. JUSTICE MUSARRAT HILALI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Appellant: Syed Masten Ali Zaidi, ASC, Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh, AOR. Respondent NO.1: Mr. Ismail Khan Khalil, ASC. For Respondent NO. 2-3: Ex-Parte. For Respondent NO. 4-6: Mr. Fida Gul, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Nadir Khan.\nVS\nQadir Hussain & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25053", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3567 = 2024 SLD 3567", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C. P. No. D-6004 of 2020, heard on: 21.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh, CJ. and Yousuf Ali Sayeed, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANT BY: Ms. Saira Shaikh, Advocate. Respondent by: Qazi Ayazuddin, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Tariq.\nVs\nFederation of Pakistan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25054", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3568 = 2024 SLD 3568", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(4)/122(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2219/LB/2019, heard on: 25.03.2024. Date of order: 06.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE: ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sufyan Ahmed, DR. Respondent by: Ch. Maqssod Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE CIR, LTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Pak Elektron Limited, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25055", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3569 = 2024 SLD 3569", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),113(2)(c),65E", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2189/LB/2017, heard on: 25.04.2024. Date of order: 05.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waqar Karim, DR. Respondent by: Ch. Maqsood Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Pak Elektron Limited, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25056", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3570 = 2024 SLD 3570", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=8,10A,13,23,25", - "Case #": "W.P. NO. 9020 of 2024. Date of order: 10.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Ata Ul Manan Malik, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Mr. Tariq Manzoor Advocate for FBR (on Court's call).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ghani Packages.\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25057", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3571 = 2024 SLD 3571", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121(1)(d)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2398/LB/2018, heard on: 05.12.2023. Date of order: 02.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Anam Tahir, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nvs\nM/s. Aqua Safe Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25058", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3572 = 2024 SLD 3572", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),214D", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4394/LB/2023, heard on: 28.02.2024. Date of order: 08.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Saqib Raza, ADvocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ghulam Hussain Yasir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. National Education Networks (pvt) Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25059", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3573 = 2024 SLD 3573", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891=2(8)", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.105 of 2016. Dated 17.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Mr. Justice Omar Sial.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khaleeq Ahmed, Advocate for the Appellants. Mr. Talha Jawed Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Naveed & others.\nVersus\nHabib Bank Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25060", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3574 = 2024 SLD 3574", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,214C", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1891/LB/2018, heard on: 08.11.2023. Date of order: 01.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Qadeer Ahmed, ITP. Respondent by: Ms. Tabinda Shaheen, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Makson Packaging Co. (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25061", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3575 = 2024 SLD 3575", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5VXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=18(1)(a)", - "Case #": "C.P. No.D-454 of 2022. Dates of Hearing : 05.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Mr. Justice Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. Abdul Sattar Pirzada, Advocate Mr. Mamoon N. Chaudhry, Advocate Mr. Inzimam Sharif, Advocate Mr. Zulfiqar Ali, Advocate. Respondents : M/s. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Mirza Nadeem Taqi, Faheem Raza Khuro, Javed Hussain for Masooda Siraj, Ghulam Mujtaba Sahito, Azad Hussain for Khalid Mehmood Rajpar, Alqmah Bin Mehmood, Muhammad Usman Ahmed, Advocates.\nMr. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. Amir Latif, Deputy Director (Legal), DRAP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAMI Pharmaceuticals Private Limited.\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25062", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3576 = 2024 SLD 3576", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 993/LB/2019, heard on: 15.02.2024. Date of order: 16.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sufyan Ahmed, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Arshad Javed, FCA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Pepsi Cola Int. (Pvt) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25063", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3577 = 2024 SLD 3577", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "First Civil Appeal No.D- 03 of 2023.Date of Order: 14.02.2024.\nDate of Judgment: 21.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Saleem Jessar. & Jawad Akbar Sarwana JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Ghulam Muhammad through his legal heirs, three sons: (i.) Seengar Ali, (ii.) Muhammad Punhal; (iii.) Shah Nawaz through Mr. Jai Kumar, Advocate. Respondents: Zarai Tarqiati Bank Ltd. Islamabad through its Branch at Shahdadkot; Respondent No.1: Suresh Kumar s/o Bakhshan Ram, Manager, ZTBL Shahdadkot Branch, \nRespondent No.2: Nazir Hussain Jamali s/o Haji Ghazi Khan,\nAVP/Incharge Legal and Litigation Unit, ZTBL, Larkana Zone. Nemo.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ghulam Muhammad through his legal heirs.\nv.\nZarai Tarqiati Bank Ltd. and Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25064", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3578 = 2024 SLD 3578", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 607/LB/2014, heard on: 08.01.2024. Date of order: 16.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Qayyum Rani, D.R. Respondent by: Mr. Waheed-ud-Din, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Mutahir Metal Works (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25065", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3579 = 2024 SLD 3579", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(a)", - "Case #": "Suit No.563 of 2007. Dates of Hearing : 28.08.2023, 08.09.2023, 22.09.2023, 06.10.2023, 13.10.2023, 13.10.2023. 28.10.2023, 04.11.2023. Date of Order: 01.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jawad Akbar Sarwana, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff: Syed Danish Ghazi and Rameez Adnan\nAnsari, Advocates. Defendant: Emadul Hassan, Advocate for Self", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB Bank Limited.\nv\n Emadul Hassan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25066", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5US8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3580 = 2024 SLD 3580", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5US8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2001=129(1)(a)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1930/2019, heard on: 09.04.2024. Date of order: 09.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muaaz Tahir, D.R. Respondent by: Mr. Shabbir Ahmed, FCA.income tax o", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore\nVS\nM/s. Gharibwal Cement Limited, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25067", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5USs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3581 = 2024 SLD 3581", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5USs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2925/LB/2019, heard on: 07.03.2024. Date of order: 16.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Umair Khan, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Arshad Javed, FCA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Pepsi Cola Int. (pvt) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25068", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3582 = 2024 SLD 3582", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)(a), 111(1)", - "Case #": "MA (AG) NO. 17/LB/2024, heard on: 29.01.2024. Date of order: 18.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Usman Khalil, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Muaaz Tahir, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Yaqoob Hussain, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25069", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3583 = 2024 SLD 3583", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),214C,177(6)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2014/LB/2019, heard on: 16.02.2024. Date of order: 18.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Tahmina Akram, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Industrial Lubrication (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25070", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3584 = 2024 SLD 3584", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1310/ LB/2016, heard on: 04.10.2023. Date of order: 27.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Ali, D.R. Respondent by: Mr. Ahmed Nawaz Khurram, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Bannu Woollen Mills, Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25071", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3585 = 2024 SLD 3585", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5UXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122(1)(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2754/LB/2018, heard on: 11.01.2024. Date of order: 05.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mst. Seemab Zafar, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Khurram Shahzad, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nAbdul Aziz Abbas Sharif." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25072", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3586 = 2024 SLD 3586", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(1)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2107/LB/2022, heard on: 20.12.2023. Date of order: 03.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Naeem Munawar, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Sufyan Ahmed Main, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Qureshi Textile Mills Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25073", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3587 = 2024 SLD 3587", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=301,305.", - "Case #": "C. O. No. 14225 / 2023. Date of Hearing: 03.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners By: Mr. Muhammad Nawazish Ali Pirzada, Advocate. Respondent No. 1 By: Mr. Shezal Khan Burki, Advocate. Respondent No. 2 By: Mr. Ruman Bilal, Advocate\nRespondent No. 5 By: Mr. Muhammad Ali Malik, Advocate\nRespondent No. 647. By: Mr. Dilnawaz A. Cheema, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Equity Master Securities (Pvt.) Limited & 03 others.\nVersus\nPakistan Stock Exchange Limited & 937 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25074", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3588 = 2024 SLD 3588", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=214C,177(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 572/LB/2017, heard on: 17.01.2024. Date of order: 17.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waqar Karim, D.R. Respondent by: Mr. Khurram Shahzad, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. K&N's Foods (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25075", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3589 = 2024 SLD 3589", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1061/LB/2015, heard on: 12.09.2023. Date of order: 26.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Taxpayer by: Sheikh Aqeel Ahmed, Adv. Department by: Mr. Ghulam Hussain Yasir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Coca COla Beverages." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25076", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3590 = 2024 SLD 3590", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b)", - "Case #": "MA (R) NO. 34/LB/2024. ITA NO. 1159/LB/2023, heard on: 06.02.2024. Date of order: 12.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, Advocate. Respondent by: Mrs. Hira Khan, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Shabbir, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25077", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3591 = 2024 SLD 3591", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=257", - "Case #": "Case No: W.P. No.77742/2023, heard on: 03.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by Mr. Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Advocate.\nRespondent No.1 by: Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant\nAttorney General for Pakistan. Respondents No.2 to 6\nby: Mr. Ruman Bilal, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Future Vision Advertising (Private) Limited.\n Vs.\n Federation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25078", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3592 = 2024 SLD 3592", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33,33(5).11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1335/LB/2022, heard on: 12.03.2024. Date of order: 26.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Rana M. Afzal, Advocate. Respondent by: Dr. Quart-ul-Ain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Al-Nasr Textile Ltd.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25079", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3593 = 2024 SLD 3593", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)/11(3)", - "Case #": "M.A(Stay) No. 10667/LB/2023. STA NO. 2457/LB/2023, heard on: 16.01.2024. Date of order: 26.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Gulbaz Qaiser, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Adnan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ali Trading Corporation, Lahore.\nvs\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25080", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3594 = 2024 SLD 3594", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177(6)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1171/LB/2022, heard on: 10.01.2023. Date of order: 17.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shuja, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. M. Suleman, DR>", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Salman Basit, 105-F, Model Town, Lahore.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25081", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3595 = 2024 SLD 3595", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5TXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(9),6,26(1),33(1),33(5),34", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2613/LB/2023, heard on: 19.12.2023. Date of order: 15.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Iftikhar Ahmed, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Sufyan Ahmed Mian, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. GMB Steel Furnace & Re-Rolling Mills, Daska\nVS\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25082", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3596 = 2024 SLD 3596", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=71", - "Case #": "MA(R) NO. 418/LB/2023, heard on: 23.01.2024. Date of order: 22.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Kamran Iftikhar, Advocate, Respondent by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Abdul Razzaq Baloch, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25083", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3597 = 2024 SLD 3597", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129,124,122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1348/LB/2013, heard on: 26.02.2024. Date of order: 05.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN MUNIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Burhan Ahmed, ACA, Respondent by: Mr. Muaaz Tahir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. MCB Bank Ltd, Islamabad.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25084", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3598 = 2024 SLD 3598", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 809/LB/2018, heard on: 25.04.2024, Date of order: 26.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Rudar Amjad. Respondent by: Mr. Adil Jalani, ACA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nThe Coca Cola Export Corporation." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25085", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3599 = 2024 SLD 3599", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=40", - "Case #": "STA NO. 489/LB/2024, heard on: 28.03.2024. Date of order: 29.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khurram Shahzad, Advocate. Mr. Muhammad Suleman, DR. alongwith Mr. Nouman Malik, CIR and Mr. Abdul Muqtadir Khan, L.A.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Abdullah Plastic. Prop. Mr. Muhammad Ghar Suleman, Sheikhupura.\nVS\nCIR, Zone-III, RTO, Lahore etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25086", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5SS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3600 = 2024 SLD 3600", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5SS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9", - "Case #": "Case No:COS No.21/2017. Date of hearing 13.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff by Ms. Ambreen Moeen, Advocate and Ms. Javeria Latif, Advocate Defendants No.1 to 7 by: Defendant No.11\nby: Defendants No.8 to 10 and 12 to 14 by: M/s Aakif Majeed Butt Advocate, Hassan Ismail Advocate, Asim Tufail\nFarooqi Advocate and Muhammad Abdullah Jehangir, Advocate Mian Imran Mushtaq, Advocate Nemo", - "Petitioner Name:": "National Bank of Pakistan.\nVs\nM/s Salman Noman Enterprises Ltd. etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25087", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5SSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3601 = 2024 SLD 3601", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5SSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Copyrights Ordinance, 1962=41(2)", - "Case #": "F. A. O. No. 46541 / 2022. Date of Hearing: 04.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Saqib Asghar, Advocate Mr. Mudassar Hassan, Advocate Respondents No. 2-a to 2-c By: Mr. Haris Bin Hassan Jang, Advocate Applicant in C.M. No. 3-C/2022 By: Syed Danish Ghazi, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Akram Rahi.\nVersus\nThe Copyright Board and three others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25088", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3602 = 2024 SLD 3602", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129,120,177/214C", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1360/LB/2016, heard on: 11.10.2023. Date of order: 13.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Masood Ahmed Wahla, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Lubna Shah, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. M. Akram S/o. Muhammad Afzal, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO-II, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25089", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3603 = 2024 SLD 3603", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5STg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46(1)(b),21(2)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12(a)(i)(E)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1985/LB/2023, heard on: 12.09.2023. Date of order: 25.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muqadam, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Rao Shahzad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Bundu Khan Foods (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTRO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25090", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5SXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3604 = 2024 SLD 3604", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5SXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 355/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 08.03.2024. Date of order: 03.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN MUNIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shahbaz Qadir, AR. Respondent by: Mr. Farrukh Asiam, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Achha Foods (pvt) Limited, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25091", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5SXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3605 = 2024 SLD 3605", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5SXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),121(1)(d)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2442/LB/2017, heard on: 15.11.2023. Date of order: 02.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Sarim Bhatti, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Naeem Prop: Nadeem Brothers, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25092", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3606 = 2024 SLD 3606", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W. P. No. 48527 of 2021. Date of Hearing 10.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner By: Mr. Adil Bandial, Advocate. Respondents By: Mr. Ali Javed Darugar, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Meezan Beverages (Pvt.) Limited.\nVERSUS\nCompetition Commission of Pakistan and two others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25093", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3607 = 2024 SLD 3607", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "R.F.A No. 1583/2015.heard on: 06.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Moeez Tariq, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M.L. Traders, etc.\nVersus\nHabib Bank Ltd, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25094", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3608 = 2024 SLD 3608", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=147,147(6)", - "Case #": "Const. P. 5577/2023, heard on: 16.05.2024. Date of Judgment: 23.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Mr. Justice Jawad Akbar Sarwana.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: M/s. Dr. Farogh Naseem, Hussain Ali Almani, Haider Waheed, Ovais Ali Shah, Ahmed Hussain, For the Respondents: M/s. Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Ghazi Khan Khalil,\nAmeer Nausherwan Adil, Dr. Huma Sodher, S. Ahsan Ali Shah.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SICPA Inks Pakistan Pvt Ltd.\nVS\nFed. of Pakistan and Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25095", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3609 = 2024 SLD 3609 = (2024) 130 TAX 274", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTQ", - "Key Words:": "LAW REFORMS ORDINANCE, 1972-Section: 3 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section: 151 and Order XLI, Rules: 22 & 33 - Finance Act, 2022, Section: 8(2)(b) - Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Articles 141 & 142 - Entry No. 50 of Fourth Schedule to Constitution - Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 - Levy of tax u/s 8(2)(b) of Finance, Act, 2022 on resident individuals on their foreign assets - Dismissal of appeal by Single Judge in chamber - Arriving at different conclusions on certain issues by the Judges of Division Bench in Intra Court Appeal - Reference to a third Judge - Power of court of appeal - Exercise of power without notice to the parties and without affording opportunity of hearing - Validity – \nFACTS\nThe captioned intra court appeal, under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance-1972 as well as the appeals as detailed in schedule ‘A’ to this judgment, have been filed against judgment dated 22.12.2022 passed by the learned Judge-in-Chamber. Upon hearing the appeals the learned Judges of the Division Bench reached different conclusions on certain issues. As a result thereof, the cases have been referred.\nARGUMENTS\nCan power under Order XLI, Rule 33 CPC be exercised without notice to the parties and without opportunity of hearing and whether the judgment of the learned Single Judge could be upset by exercise of these powers?\nCan the power under O.XLI, R. 33 CPC be exercised unilaterally by one member of a Division Bench hearing the appeal.\nIf the answer to the above is in the affirmative, can the constitutionality of S.8(2)(b) of the 2022 Act be upheld by invoking Art. 141 of the Constitution in ignorance of entry 50 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution.\nHas the levy under S.8(2)(b) been imposed on a resident individual or a foreign asset.\nDECISION\n(a) Court of appeal can act ex delicto justiciae - The Court has also inherent powers under section 151, CPC, to make such orders, as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. These are all enabling provisions; the powers thereunder can be exercised by the Court to cover ostensibly impossible situations, for complete dispensation of justice, for which C.P.C. has been designed, but despite the best efforts of the draftsman, to cater for all possible situations, if it is found lacking in meeting some eventualities, the Court can act ex delicto justiciae, supply the omission in the procedure, adopt methodology, for effectually carrying out the purpose.\n(b) Federal Legislature has extra-territorial authority to legislate but no such extra-territorial authority is assigned to the Provincial Legislature - In “Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and Others Versus Federation of Pakistan and Others” it was observed that from the provisions of the Constitution it is clear that the Federal Legislature has extra-territorial authority to legislate but no such extra-territorial authority is assigned to the Provincial Legislature. In this case the Honourable Supreme Court relied on Article 141 of the Constitution and reached to the conclusion that Provincial Legislature has no legislative competence to legislate law regulating the trade unions functioning at trans-provincial level.\n(c) Parliament has power to make laws on such areas not included in any province - Meaning thereby, the Parliament has power to make laws given in Federal Legislative List as well as the matters pertaining to such areas which are not included in any Province. Article 141 of the Constitution embodies that Parliament has power to make laws having extra-territorial operation for whole or any part of Pakistan and the Provinces can make laws within their territorial limits.\nI have carefully gone through the judgments of the two Honourable Judges and I am in consonance with the view adopted by my learned brother Anwaar Hussain J. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the captioned Intra Court Appeal along-with connected matters are liable to be dismissed. The matter shall now be placed before the Honourable Division Bench for announcement of final decision.\n[Case-law referred.]", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=33", - "Case #": "ICA No. 13108 of 2023, decided on 21.06.2024, heard on: 13.05.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Hamza Anwar, Mr. Ali Talib, Mr. Hammad Amin, Mr. Muhammad Shabbir Hussain, Malik Ahsan Mahmood, Mr. Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Mr. Ahsan Bashir, Mr. Shehraz Alam Mannoo, Mehwish Alam Elahi, Khalid Bashir, Mr. Danish K. Mannoo, Mr. Jahangir Khan Mannoo, Mr. Omer Iqbal Khawaja, Mr. Ibrahim Haroon, Mr. Muhammad Muqaddam Sukhera, Mr. Muhammad Mansha Sukhera, Mr. Zeeshan Asif, Mr. Ali Sibtain Fazli, Mr. Hasham Ahmad Khan, Mr. Abad-ur-Rehman, Mr. Muhammad Umer Tariq Gill, Mr. Isa Ahmad Jalil, Mr. Kairan Hussain Mir, Barrister Saif ul Hassan, Barrister Muhammad Abubakar, Ch. Wasim Akram, Malik Nadir Ali Sherazi, Muhammad Usman, Mr. Wasim Ahmad Malik, Mr. Iftikhar Nawaz Gujjar, Hafiz Tanveer Nasir, Syed Nawazish Hussain, Barrister Shehryar Kasuri, Mr. Jamshid Alam, Muhammad Usama, Mr. Ghias Ahmad, Mr. Tariq Rashid, Malik Tanvir Ahmad Awan, Mr. Shahbaz Butt, Mr. Asif Imran Awan, Malik Bashir Ahmad Khalid, Mr. M. A. Rizwan Kamboh, Syed Naveed A. Andrabi and Mr. Sharjeel Tareef, learned Advocates for the Appellants.\nMr. Asad Ali Bajwa, learned Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Haroon-ul- Rasheed Mir, Mr. Muhammad Nasim Saqlain, Mr. Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, learned Assistant Attorney Generals for Respondents No.1.\nBarrister Ahmad Pervaiz, Syed Muhammad Ijaz, Mr. Muhmmad Imran Khan, Mr. Fahim Khadim, Mr. Qaisar Mahmood Sra, Mr. Shahraiz Khan Gill, Mr. Naeem Khan, Mr.Muhammad Danish Zuberi, Barrister Ali Umrao, Barrister Scheherozade Sheeryar. Mr. Jawad H. Tarar, Mr. Asif Ahad, Mr. Mohsin Majeed, Ch. Muhammad Yasin Zahid, Ch. Muhammad Ashfaq Bhullar, Rana Muhammad Afzal, Syed Muhammad Baqir Ali, Mr. Ikhlaq Ahmad, Mr. Anas Irtiza Awan, Ms. Humaira Bashir, Malik Abdullah Raza, Mr. Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Mr. Ibrar Ahmed, Mr. Muhammad Bilal Munir and Mr. Omer Habib Khan, Mr. Falak Sher Khan and Mr. Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, learned Advocates for Respondents No.2 & 3.\nMr. Salman Asif Warraich, learned Assistant Advocate General for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MRS. SHEHLA TARIQ SAIGOL\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND 03 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25096", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3610 = 2024 SLD 3610", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 597/LB/2019, heard on: 05.03.2024. Date of order: 27.04,2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Farrukh Aslam, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Farid-ud-din, ACA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Loft Commercial Pvt. Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25097", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3611 = 2024 SLD 3611", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Partnership Act, 1932=69(2)", - "Case #": "Suit No. 717 of 2024, heard on: 09-07-2024. Date of decision : 15-07-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff : M/s. Mian Raza Rabbani, Saalim Salam Ansari & M. Zeeshan Abdullah, Advocates alongwith Mr. Okash Mustafa & Sidra Hussain, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Century Roller & Stone Flour Mill (Pvt.) Ltd. \nv. \nMuhammad Asif & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25098", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3612 = 2024 SLD 3612", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=182(1)(a),165,182(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3124/LB/2019, heard on: 20.02.2024. Date of order: 01.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Tehmina Akram, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, CTRO, Lahore.\nVS\nMr. Hamid Ali Jawa, 42-L Mini Market, Gulberg-II, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25099", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3613 = 2024 SLD 3613", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(3)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 524/LB/2024, heard on: 04.04.2024. Date of order: 05.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Saqib Raza, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Ahmed Mujtaba, DR>", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ghazi Fabrics International Limited, 8-C, Gulberg-III, Lahore.\nVS\nThe Deputy CIR Unit, 16, Audit-II, LTO." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25100", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3614 = 2024 SLD 3614", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,214C,122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3293/LB/2019, heard on: 19.03.2024. Date of order: 20.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Bilal Zia, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Rafaqat Hussain, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Escorts Investment Bank Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25101", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3615 = 2024 SLD 3615", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5RXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1673/LB/2019, heard on: 18.01.2024. Date of order: 01.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Umer Farooq, ADV. Respondent by: Mr. Mauuz Tahir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Waheed Shahzad Plastic, Lahore.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25102", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3616 = 2024 SLD 3616", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Money Laundering Act, 2010=25(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.75231/2023, heard on: 22.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Tariq Saleem Sheikh, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Muhammad Osama Asif, Advocate,\nassisted by Mr. Waqar Ranjha, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 to 4: Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General\nfor Pakistan, and Mr. Zain Qazi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan, with Sh. Amer Sohail Anjum, Assistant Director (Legal) FIA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Bilal Nawaz.\nVs.\nDirector General, Federal Investigation Agency, and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25103", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3617 = 2024 SLD 3617", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8B(1)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 331/LB/2017, heard on: 22.02.2024. Date of order: 28.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Sh. Farooq Ahmed, Advocate. Respondent by: Mrs. Hina Mustafa, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Master Pipe Industries, Opposite Super Knda Karol Ghati Bund Road Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25104", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3618 = 2024 SLD 3618", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=24", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 47/LB/2019, heard on: 26.04.2024. Date of order: 16.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Rudar Amjad Sheikh, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Aqeel AHmed Sheikh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Tetra Pak Pakistan Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25105", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3619 = 2024 SLD 3619", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2024=21(2),46(1)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 385/LB/2024, heard on: 11.07.2024. Date of order: 11.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hashim Khalil, Advocate. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Zamzam Plastic Industries, Plot NO. 14, Phase-4, Hattar, Haripur.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-1, RTO, Main Mansehra Road, Abbottabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25106", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3620 = 2024 SLD 3620", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)(5),120(1),214C,177,122(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2040/LB/2017, heard on: 16.11.2023. Date of order: 02.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Imran, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Salman Ali Bhatti, Advocate. Mr. Shoaib Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, Zone-VII, CTRO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Tayyab Texila Mills Limited, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25107", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3621 = 2024 SLD 3621", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(2),129,129(1)(a)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3713/LB/2019, heard on: 16.04.2024. Date of order: 03.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shuja Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Sehar Aftab, DR>", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Gulf Sugar Mills Limited, Lahore.\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25108", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3622 = 2024 SLD 3622", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1603/LB/2018, heard on: 06.02.2024. Date of order: 25.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Faiza Sadaf, DR. Respondent by: Rana Muhammad Afzal, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Chang Hong Ruba Trading Co, (Pvt), :td, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25109", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3623 = 2024 SLD 3623", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=3,15", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1393-L of 2020, heard on: 22 February 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench - III: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Ms. Saba Saeed Sheikh, ASC. Mr. Syed Fayyaz Ahmad Sherazi, AOR. For the Respondent: Mr. Jam Khurshid Ahmed, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Malik Arshad Hussain Awan.\nVersus\nM/s United Bank Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25110", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3624 = 2024 SLD 3624", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(1), 161(1B),", - "Case #": "TR NO. 43-P/2022, heard on: 11.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED ARSHAD ALI JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner: Mr. Mukhtar Ahmed Maneri, Advocate, Along with Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue. For Respondent: Mr. Hussain Ahmed Sherazi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue Corporate Zone, Peshawar.\nVS\nM/s. Peshawar Electric Supply Company Limited, WAPDA House, Peshawar and other." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25111", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3625 = 2024 SLD 3635", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5QXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=43AFederal Excise Act, 2005=126A", - "Case #": "STA No.278/IB/2024. MA(Stay) STA No.254/IB/2024. Date of hearing 23.05.2024. Date of order 23.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by None.\nRespondent by Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Royal Trading Company, Phalia Road, Mandi Bahauddin.\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Sargodha." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25112", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3626 = 2024 SLD 3626 = 2025 PTCL 87", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODc", - "Key Words:": "Background of the Case:\n•\nThe petitioners, manufacturing units based in erstwhile FATA/PATA, were exempted from sales and income tax before the 25th Constitutional Amendment (2018).\n•\nThe Sales Tax Act, 1990 and the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 were amended through SRO 1212(1)/2018 and SRO 1213(1)/2018, extending these exemptions until 30th June 2023.\n•\nFinance Act 2024 further extended the exemption to 30th June 2024 with a key modification—requiring a pay order instead of a post-dated cheque as a security instrument.\n2. Legal Issue:\n•\nWhether businesses that imported goods before 1st July 2024 (when the Finance Act 2024 took effect) should comply with the new requirement of pay orders, or if they could still provide post-dated cheques as per the previous rule.\n3. Arguments:\n•\nPetitioners Argument:\no\nSince tax laws do not have retrospective effect, the amendment in Finance Act 2024 should not apply to goods already imported before 1st July 2024.\no\nReferring to Al-Samrez Enterprises (1986 SCMR 1917), the exemption rules in force at the time of import create a vested right that cannot be altered retrospectively.\no\nThe delay in clearance was due to WeBOC system issues and bureaucratic hurdles, not the petitioners fault.\n•\nRespondents Argument (Federal Board of Revenue - FBR & Govt. of Pakistan):\no\nFinance Act 2024 applies prospectively, and since no goods declaration (GD) had been filed, the petitioners must follow the new rule.\no\nSection 30 of the Customs Act, 1969 states that the rate of duty applicable is determined on the date of GD filing, which means Finance Act 2024 is applicable.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings:\n1.\nFinance Act 2024 is NOT retrospective:\no\nThe new requirement for pay orders is a substantive change that affects the financial burden of importers.\no\nCourts generally presume tax laws are prospective unless expressly stated otherwise.\no\nThe Supreme Court ruling in Al-Samrez Enterprises protects vested rights in cases where a contractual obligation (e.g., Letter of Credit) was created before a tax law change.\n2.\nCustoms Act, 1969 (Section 30) does NOT apply:\no\nSection 30 determines the rate of duty, not procedural changes like security instruments (pay orders vs. post-dated cheques).\no\nThe Finance Act 2024 does not alter the charging section of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 but merely changes the security mechanism.\n3.\nRelief Granted to Petitioners:\no\nImports made before 1st July 2024 shall be governed by the pre-2024 rule (i.e., post-dated cheques can still be used).\no\nOnly goods imported after 1st July 2024 must comply with the new rule (i.e., pay orders are required).\n________________________________________\nFinal Judgment:\n•\nPetitioners writ petitions were allowed.\n•\nThe amendment in Finance Act 2024 does NOT apply retrospectively.\n•\nPetitioners can clear their imported goods using post-dated cheques, provided they were imported before 1st July 2024.\n•\nThe Collectorate must verify import dates before granting relief.\n________________________________________\nSignificance of the Judgment:\n•\nProtects businesses from retrospective tax liabilities.\n•\nClarifies the applicability of new tax rules in transitional periods.\n•\nSets a precedent for interpreting future changes in taxation laws affecting FATA/PATA businesses.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "WP No. 3433-P/12024 with IR, heard on: 11.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUDGE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. Shumail Ahmad Butt,\nAdvocate. For Respondents M/s Rahat Ali Khan Nahaqi,\nAssistant Attorney General, Rehmanullah Advocate along with Sharifullah Assistant Director (Legal).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s lmtiaz Textile Bara, District Khyber and others Petitioners.\nV/s\nThe Federation of Pakistan Through Federal Secretary, Finance and Revenue Division, Islamabad and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25113", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3627 = 2024 SLD 3627", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=310", - "Case #": "FAB NO. 75-P/2011 with CM NO. 379-P/2011, heard on: 21.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): S. M. ATITIQUE SHAH, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abdur Rahim Jadoon, Advocate. Respondent by: Barrister Amir Khan Chamkani, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faqeer Muhammad\nVS\nM/S Natover Lease & Reflance Ltd," - }, - { - "Case No.": "25114", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3628 = 2024 SLD 3628", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(3), 4B", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2110/LB/2018, heard on: 30.01.2024. Date of order: 06.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khan Shahz,aib, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Umar Iqbal Kh, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nDanish K Monnoo, Monno House, 3-Montgomery Road, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25115", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3629 = 2024 SLD 3629", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=124/129", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5365/LB/2023, heard on: 25.03.2024. Date of order: 08.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Bilal Pervaiz, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Khan Bahadur, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Shahid Mehmood Malik, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25116", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5OC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3630 = 2024 SLD 3630", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5OC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177,174(2),111(1)(c)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2213/LB/2016, heard on: 11.01.2024. Date of order: 15.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Seemab Zafar, DR. Respondent by: Mian Nasir, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR< RTO-II, Lahore.\nVS\nMr. Mansoor Zaigham Prop- ZeGrill, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25117", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5OCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3631 = 2024 SLD 3631 = (2025) 131 TAX 205 = 2025 PTD 1570", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5OCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Rules, 2001=75", - "Case #": "Constitution Petitions No.D-594 and 729 of 2024. Date of Hearing : 07.08.2024. Date of Judgment : 07.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Rana Sakhavat Ali, Advocate alongwith sole proprietor Khawaja Sohail Ahmed. M/s. Imran Iqbal Khan and Aneela Zia,\nAdvocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Tec Style Emporium.\nvs\nM/s. Akhundzada Associates (Pvt.) Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25118", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3632 = 2024 SLD 3632 = (2025) 131 TAX 303 = 2025 PTD 1586", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODk", - "Key Words:": "Applicability of Enhanced Sales Tax Rate on Imported Plant and Machinery\nDetails:\nThe Petitioner challenged the applicability of the enhanced sales tax rate (from 10% to 17%) on the import of plant and machinery as amended through the Finance (Supplementary) Act, 2022. The Petitioner argued that the applicable sales tax rate should be the one prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Letter of Credit (L/C), i.e., 10%. The Petitioner sought multiple reliefs including a declaration that the enhanced rate was not applicable, provisional release of goods at the earlier rate, or in the alternative, securing of differential tax, and protection from any coercive recovery.\nThe Respondents contended, relying on statutory provisions, that sales tax on imported goods is payable at the rate in force at the time of the filing of the Goods Declaration, not at the time of L/C opening.\nHeld:\nThe Court dismissed the Petition, holding that under Section 6(1) and (1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, sales tax on imported goods is chargeable at the time and in the manner prescribed under the Customs Act, 1969. Specifically, the applicable rate is that prevailing at the time of filing the Goods Declaration under Section 30 of the Customs Act. The Court further observed that previous judgments—such as Al-Samrez Enterprises—that supported vested rights based on earlier contracts were overridden through statutory amendments, including insertion of Section 31A in the Customs Act and Section 6(1A) in the Sales Tax Act. The petitioner’s reliance on Molasses Trading and Fecto Belarus Tractors was found unpersuasive due to subsequent legal developments.\nThe Court directed that any amount secured through the interim order should be credited to the Collectorate’s account.\nCitations:\nMolasses Trading & Export (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan, [1993 SCMR 1905]\nFecto Belarus Tractors Ltd. v. Pakistan through Ministry of Finance, [2001 PTD 1829]\nAl-Samrez Enterprises v. Federation of Pakistan, [1986 SCMR 1917]", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=6,6(1),6(1A)Customs Act, 1969=30,31-A", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No.D-4323 of 2022, heard on: 07.08.2024. Date of Judgment : 07.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Abdul Rahim Lakhani, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Kashif Nazeer, Asst. Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Petitioner: M.A Flour Mills (Pvt) Limited Through Mr. Abdul Rahim Lakhani, Advocate.\nvs\nRespondent No. 1: Federation of Pakistan Through Mr. Kashif Nazeer, Asst. Attorney General\nRespondents No. 3&4: Chief Collector of Customs and Collector of Customs, MCC Appraisement (East) Karachi Through Mr. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Advocate." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25119", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3633 = 2024 SLD 3633", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5ODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=14", - "Case #": "FEA NO. 16/LB/2016, heard on: 23.01.2024. Date of order: 29.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shuja, ADvocate. Respondent by: 29.05.2024.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. EB Lands (Private) Limited, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-I, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25120", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5OHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3634 = 2024 SLD 3634", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5OHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7.8", - "Case #": "STA NO. 660/LB/2020, heard on: 16.04.2024. Date of order: 23.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ibrahim Hassan Butt, Adv. Respondent by: Ms. Sehar Aftab, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Alliance Sugar Mills, Lahore.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25121", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5OHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3635 = 2024 SLD 3635", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5OHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,116", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 246/LB/2019, heard on: 17.05.2024. Date of order: 27.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hashim Asiam Butt, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Khan Bahadur, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muzammil Ejaz, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25122", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3636 = 2024 SLD 3636", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122", - "Case #": "Suit 47 of 2015. Date/s of hearing : 08.08.2024. Date of announcement : 08.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Agha Faisal, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Plaintiff : Mr. Mushtaque Hussain Qazi, Advocate\nFor the Defendants/s : Syed Ahsan Ali Shah, Advocate\nMr. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Advocate Ms. Rabia Khalid\n(Assistant Attorney General)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian Pervez Akhtar \nvs.\nThe Federation of Pakistan & Others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25123", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3637 = 2024 SLD 3637", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=176", - "Case #": "Suit 536 of 2022. Date/s of hearing : 08.08.2024. Date of announcement : 08.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Agha Faisal, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Plaintiff : Mr. Mushtaque Hussain Qazi, Advocate\nFor the Defendants/s : Barrister Ghazi Khan Khalil, Advocate Ms. Rabia Khalid (Assistant Attorney General)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Imran Rahim \nvs\nFederation of Pakistan &\nOthers" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25124", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3638 = 2024 SLD 3638", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),2(46),3,3(1A),6,7,8,22,23,26,73,33(19)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 599/LB/2024, heard on: 28.06.2024. Date of order: 01.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waseem Khurshid, Advocate. Respondent by: 01.08.2024.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Al-Rehman Processing, Faisalabad.\nvs\nThe CIR, Lyallpur Zone, RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25125", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3639 = 2024 SLD 3639", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19(3)", - "Case #": "Suit No. B-21 of 2024. 09-08-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Asim Mansoor Khan and Zeeshan Bashir Khan, Advocate for the Plaintiffs. M/s. Waqar Ahmed and Behzad Haider, Advocates for the Defendant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zahida Ashraf & others.\nVS\n the Bank of Punjab Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25126", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3640 = 2024 SLD 3640", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1), 122(1)(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2911/LB/2018, heard on: 06.03.2024. Date of order: 06.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Farrukh Aslam, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Tariq Javed Raja, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Moazzam Sultan, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25127", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3641 = 2024 SLD 3641", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),122(1),122(5)/124", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2851/LB/2016, heard on: 21.12.2023. Date of order: 08.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Haida Sajjad, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Shahid Jamil, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. IRS Holding (pvt) Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25128", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3642 = 2024 SLD 3642", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5215/LB/2023, heard on: 08.01.2024. Date of order: 08.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shuja, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Usman Rathore, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Kamal Limited, DHA Phase-III, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25129", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3643 = 2024 SLD 3643", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),120,176(1),114(1),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1127/LB/2024, heard on: 19.03.2024. Date of order: 30.03,2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Imran Gondal, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Abdul Malik, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M. Kabir Ahmed Qureshi, Multan.\nVS\nThe CIR. LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25130", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3644 = 2024 SLD 3644", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11", - "Case #": "STA NO. 651/LB/2017, heard on: 01.04.2024. Date of order: 01.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER. SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Mohy ud Din, D.R. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO-II, Lahore\nVS\nM/s. Unique Control Cable, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25131", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3645 = 2024 SLD 3645", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFF5NHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 718/LB/2024, heard on: 14.05.2024. date of order: 16.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Javaid, AR. Respondent by: Mr. Umair Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Enterprises, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25132", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3646 = 2024 SLD 3646", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2249/LB/2018, heard on: 04.12.2023. Date of order: 22.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHUD SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Talib Hussaain, DR. Respondent by: Hafiz Ahmed Yar Khan, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Ittefaq Sons (pvt) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25133", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3647 = 2024 SLD 3647", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1),177", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No.36 of 2022. DATE OF HEARING 22.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPLICANT BY Agha Muhammad Akmal Khan, Advocate. \nRESPONDENT BY Mr. Niaz Ahmed Khan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nVersus \nZia-ur-Rehman." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25134", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3648 = 2024 SLD 3648", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12(a)(i)(A)(G)Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 748/LB/2024, heard on: 06.05.2024. Date of order: 06.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hussain Aslam Butt. Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Irfa, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sajjad Steel Re-Rolling Mills, Pvt, Ltd.\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25135", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3649 = 2024 SLD 3649", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "The amended assessment order dated 26.06.2024 was passed beyond the 270-day limit (180 days + 90-day extension) from the show-cause notice (SCN) issued on 27.12.2021, violating Section 122(9).\nThe Tribunal held this renders the order illegal, void ab initio, and time-barred, irrespective of the 5-year limit under Section 122(2).\nLegal Basis: Harmonious construction of Sections 122(2) and 122(9) confirms both time limits are mandatory and substantive. The 5-year limit (S.122(2)) governs initiation/conclusion of amendments, while S.122(9) mandates completion within 270 days post-SCN.\nMerits Ground (Ownership of Bank Account):\nThe addition of Rs. 71.4M under Section 111 (undisclosed income) was deleted.\nThe appellant proved via bank certificate (UBL, 02.07.2024) that the account belonged to the employer (M/s Strengthening Participatory Organization, NTN 2168117-1), not the appellant fund.\nThe Departmental Representative (DR) conceded this evidence, making the addition legally unsustainable.\nOrders passed beyond S.122(9)’s 270-day window are automatically void, even if the 5-year limit (S.122(2)) is unexpired.\nExample: An SCN issued 5 days before 5-year expiry requires the order to be passed within those 5 days – the 270-day window does not override S.122(2).\nHarmonious Construction:\nS.122(2) and S.122(9) operate sequentially but independently:\nStep 1: Amendment must be initiated within 5 years (S.122(2)).\nStep 2: Once SCN issued, order must be passed within 270 days (S.122(9)).\nViolation of either invalidates the order.\nConstitutional Safeguard:\nThe Tribunal flagged (but did not rule on) whether amendments rushed within 5 days of expiry violate Article 10A (due process) – leaving this for future cases.\nOutcome:\nImpugned order ANNULLED due to:\n(i) Time-bar under S.122(9), and\n(ii) Lack of merit (no ownership of bank account).\nLegal Precedents Cited:\nSuper Asia v. Collector of Sales Tax (2017 SCMR 1427): Supports strict adherence to statutory time limits.\nWaqar Zafar Bakhtawari v. Mazhar Hussain Shah (PLD 2018 SC 81): Endorses harmonious interpretation of statutes.\nThis decision reinforces that tax authorities must strictly comply with both substantive and procedural timelines, while evidence (e.g., bank certificates) remains pivotal for disproving alleged income.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=65,111,111(1),111(1)(b),114,120,121,122,122(1),122(2),122(4),122(5),122(9),131Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=4A,65(2),65(4)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1197/IB/2024 (Tax year, 2018), date of Hearing & Order: 09.09.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER and IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Waqas Shabbir, ITP\nRespondent BY: Mr. Sheryar Akram, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Strengthening Participatory Organization Employees Contributory Provident Found, Islamabad - Applicant\nVs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, CTO, Islamabad - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25136", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3650 = 2024 SLD 3650 = 2024 PTD 1062", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYy8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 120, 122, 170 & 221-Deemed assessment order-Rectification-Scope-Refund claim, self-adjustment of-Procedure / mechanism under law, non adopting of-Scope and effect-Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeal) rejected taxpayers appeal and confirmed rectification order passed by the Officer Inland Revenue (OIR)-Contention of the appellant / taxpayer was that the action of the OIR rectifying the deemed assessment order by way of rejecting the refund claim/adjusted was beyond his lawful authority-Plea of the Respondent /Department was that the taxpayer had adjusted refund against tax liability for relevant tax year without proper verification and determination by the Commissioner, thus considering the same as mistake /error, the Officer Inland Revenue had rightly passed the rectification order-Validity-Rectification is a jurisdiction ancillary to the appellate jurisdiction intended to rectify a mistake of fact or law apparent on the face of record which does not require investigation appraisal of evidence, interpretation of law or an enquiry into facts-Scope of S. 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance, 2001’) is restricted to rectify the mistake apparent from the record-Where an officer exercising such power enters into the controversy, investigates into the matter re-assesses the evidence or takes into consideration additional evidence and on that basis interprets the provision of law and forms an opinion different from the order, then it will not amount to rectification of the order-Any mistake which is not patent and obvious on the record cannot be termed to be an order which can be corrected by exercising power under S. 221 of the Ordinance, 2001-Powers under Ss.120, 122 & 221 of the Ordinance, 2001 are not overlapping rather independent clearly intended to operate within their respective spheres-Powers under S.221 of the Ordinance, 2001 are quite limited to the extent of mistakes apparent form record since there are other provisions which deal with the authority of department officials with regard tore-opening of assessment, revision etc., in cases where the department is of the view that certain income had escaped from the chargeability of tax, but for exercising powers under S.221 of the Ordinance, 2001, there must be a mistake apparently floating on the surface which is so obvious to strike ones mind without entering into long drawn process of reasoning, detailed deliberation etc.-Hence, tax liability created by invoking the provisions of S. 221 of the Ordinance, 2001 in deemed assessment order is illegal and unlawful-However, in the present case , the Officer Inland Revenue declared the self-adjustment of refund as illegal without determination of overpaid tax by the Commissioner, and the appellant /taxpayer had also adjusted refund against his tag liability without filing any refund application under S. 170 of the Ordinance, 2001 for determination of his claim by the Commissioner, rather adjusted the refund against tax liability at the time of filing of return- Retention of money known to have been paid under mistake of law or not due under the law has been discouraged and such practice has been regarded as a shabby thing or dirty trick but the taxpayers cannot be allowed to self-adjust refunds against their tax liabilities without proper determination of overpaid amount by the relevant officer as it would amount to giving them jurisdiction and powers of Commissioners provided under S. 170 of the Ordinance, 2001-Without proper application on given pro-forma and without determination/approval, no refund can be adjusted by the taxpayers against their tax liabilities on their own-Declared version of refund can only be varied through an amendment under S. 122 of the Ordinance, 2001 while disposing of refund application-As the appellant /taxpayer had illegally adjusted the refund against its tax liability without properly filing application for refund and without any determination by the Commissioner, Commissioner (Appeal) was right to the extent that the taxpayer failed to get the refund determined by the Commissioner before the self adjustment, however, he failed to deliberate upon the very vital quest on of scope of rectification in deemed assessment orders-Thus, appellant/taxpayer committed wrong by adjusting the refund claim against tax ability without getting it determined by the Commissioner and the OIR rather than dealing the matter under relevant provisions of Ordinance, 2001 proceeded to rectify the self-assessment order which could not be approved as the case of the appellant/taxpayer did not fall in the ambit of rectification-Appellant Tribunal Inland Revenue set- aside impugned orders having bet passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect, and directed that the Department would be at liberty to initiate proceedings against the taxpayer for disallowance of refund adjustment after adopting due procedure under the relevant provisions-Appeal filed by the taxpayer was allowed accordingly.\n2012 SCMR 371; 2018 SCMR 1131; 2006 PTD 2854; 2021 PTD 913; CIR v. Ch. Steel Mills, Daska in PTR No.335 of 2013; CIR v. Fatima 2016 PTD 377 and 2019 PTD 1116 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,120,120(3),121,122,122(1),122(3),122(4),122(5A),170,177,221Income Tax Rules, 2002=71", - "Case #": "I.T.A. NO. 644/LB/2023, decided on 26th February, 2024, date of hearing: 26th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Azhar Haseeb for Appellant.\nDr. Qurat ul Ain, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AHMAD HASHAAM ZAFAR \nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25137", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3651 = 2024 SLD 3651 = 2024 PTD 1068", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYys", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 114 (6)(ba), third proviso [as inserted / amended by the Finance Act, 2015]-Revision of tax return-Commissioner, powers of- Scope-There was no reasonable cause to sustain the impugned order of Single Judge of High Court which proceeded on an erroneous view of the amendment brought about through insertion of third proviso to S. 114(6) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Said amendment was brought about by the Finance Act, 2015-Issue involved was relating to tax years 2010, 2012 and 2013-Application for revision of the assessment in respect of tax year 2010 was filed on 13.8.2015 whereas in respect of tax years 2012 and 2013 the applications were filed on 12.06.2015-Controversy turned on the retrospectivity of the amendment and as to whether the Commissioner was obliged to pass an order for revision of return before the expiration of 60 days for the date when the revision of date was sought-By the proviso it was laid down that where the Commissioner had not made the order of approval in writing for revision of a return within 60 days, the approval required under clause (ba) shall be deemed to have been granted by the Commissioner and the conditions specified in clause (ba) shall not apply-Single Judge of the High Court while holding that the amendment was substantive in nature refused to apply it retrospectively, however, while doing so, the Single Judge fell in error by holding that tax years prior to 2015 shall be excluded from its operation -Clearly, the amendment did not have any reference to the tax years and was merely related to the powers of the Commissioner to decide the revision of return expeditiously and not later than 60 days- Said amendment clearly applied to pending proceedings before the Commissioner and whether they related to the year 2015 or to prior tax years-Respondents had not been able to rebut said proposition- Division Bench of High Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court and held that since the Commissioner did not decide the revision of return of the appellant before the expiration of 60 days, it shall be deemed to have been granted by the Commissioner-Intra-Court appeal, filed by the taxpayer / company, was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114(6),114(6)(ba)Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 55195 of 2020, heard on 17th January, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RASAAL HASAN SYED AND SHAHID KARIM, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khurram Shahbaz Butt for Appellant.\nShahzad Ahmad Cheema for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAUJI FRESH AND FREEZE LTD. THROUGH EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25138", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3652 = 2024 SLD 3652 = 2024 PTD 1077", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 168, 2(s), 16, 156(1), Cls. 8 & 89-Smuggling, allegation of- Seizure and confiscation-Powers of the Authorities-Limitation- Show-Cause Notice was served upon the importer after more than nine months of seizure of foreign/lranian origin cooking oil /ghee- Contention of the appellant was that proceedings against him were liable to be quashed for being time-barred-Validity-Section 168 of the Customs Act, 1969, in clear terms , provides two months period for the Authorities to serve a Show-Cause Notice on the person from whom the goods liable to confiscation have been seized-Said period of two months can be further extended by two months in case the Competent Authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extends the same-In the present case, assuming that even if the Competent Authority could have extended the time period for further two months, still it would have been time-barred-Therefore, Show-Cause Notice and the entire proceedings, which followed thereafter, was void ab initio and illegal, and the same was quashed-Customs Appellate Tribunal set-aside impugned Order-in-Appeal passed by the Collector of Customs- Customs Appeal filed by the importer was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(s),16,156(1),156(8),156(89),157,164,168,171,179,193,Clause8,Clause89Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=103", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-1723 of 2023, decided on 8th January, 2024, date of hearing: 4th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Customs Appeal No. K-1723 of 2023, decided on 8th January, 2024, date of hearing: 4th January, 2024.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Usman Malik for Appellant.\nZia Ullah, Subaidar for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR ALI \nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (APPEALS) AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25139", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3653 = 2024 SLD 3653 = 2024 PTD 1090", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDYzg", - "Key Words:": "2024 P T D (Trib.) 1090 \n[Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal]\nPRESENT: ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER\nADG LDI (PVT.) LTD.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, LAHORE\nI.T.A. No. 2783/LB of 2023, decided on 11th September, 2023. Date of hearing: 25th August, 2023\nAbdul Sattar, ITP for Appellant.\nMazhar Ali, DR for Respondent.\nIncome Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 170,120 & 122—Income Tax Rules, 2002, R. 71 — Self- assessment scheme—Self-adjustment of refund—Scope—Application to claim refunds, non-submitting of—Effect—Taxpayer/ company itself claimed refund adjustment against tax liability instead of paying amount of admitted liability for the relevant year under self-assessment scheme—Officer Inland Revenue (‘OIR’) passed amended assessment order holding said amount recoverable from the taxpayer declaring the self-adjustment of refund illegal having been done by the taxpayer without determination of overpaid tax by the Commissioner— Taxpayer/company filed appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (‘the Tribunal’) as the amended assessment order was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals)—Validity—Appellant (taxpayer/company) admittedly did not file any refund application under S. 170 for determination of his claim by the Commissioner under S. 170 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance, 2001’) while said provisions stipulated that a taxpayer who had paid tax in excess of the amount might apply to the Commissioner for refund of excess amount paid—According to the R. 71 of Income Tax Rules, 2002 (‘the Rules, 2002’) such application would be made in the pro forma specified in Part VI of First Schedule of the Rules, 2002—Thus, the whole mechanism given in the S.170 of the Ordinance, 2001 had not provided /allowed self-adjustment of refund by the taxpayers on their own against their tax liabilities—Without determination / approval, no refund could be adjusted by the taxpayers on their own—Declared version of the refund could only be varied through an amendment under S. 122 of the Ordinance, 2001 while disposing of refund application—Appellant (taxpayer/company) had illegally adjusted the claimed refund against its tax liability without properly filing application for refund and without any determination by the Commissioner, hence OIR had rightly noted the tax return as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue as admitted tax liability against declared income remained unpaid—Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue maintained the impugned order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) who had committed no illegality in confirming the amended assessment order—Appeal filed by the taxpayer/company was dismissed, in circumstances.\nCIR v. Fatima Enterprises 2016 PTD 377 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122,122(5A),170,170(3),Part VI of First ScheduleIncome Tax Rules, 2002=71", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 2783/LB of 2023, decided on 11th September, 2023, heard on: 25th August, 2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Sattar, ITP for Appellant.\nMazhar Ali, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADG LDI (PVT.) LTD.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25140", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3654 = 2024 SLD 3654", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25141", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3655 = 2024 SLD 3655 = 2024 PTD 1095", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDY3k", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)——Ss.148 & 170(4)—Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000), Ss. 9 & 10—Refund, claim for—Tax to be deducted on imported raw material—“Manufacturer”— Scope—Contention of the Department was that the taxpayer fell under the definition of “manufacture ” while the taxpayer / firm submitted that it was simply involved in packing of imported tea/spices in retail packing through human resources, which could not be termed as manufacturing process—Refund applications of the taxpayer before the Department could not be entertained because the Department filed references before the High Court, whereas the taxpayer filed complaint before the Federal Tax Ombudsman (‘the Ombudsman’)—Ombudsman passed recommendations to dispose of refund applications after completing verification process—Department invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court after its representation against Ombudsman’s recommendations was dismissed by the Appellate Authority (President)—Validity—Record revealed that the High Court had now answered all the References previously filed by the petitioner / department in negative by holding that the issue of declaring the respondent / taxpayer as “manufacturer” had been adjudicated upon in favour of respondent /taxpayer-Even otherwise , no illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error was noticed in the impugned recommendation of the Ombudsman followed by the order of the Appellate Authority-No case for interference by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction was made oat-Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148,170(4),171Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=9,10,14", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.5077-P of 2020, decided on 13th June, 2023, heard on: 13th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qaisar Abbas Bangash for Petitioner.\nAttiq-ur-Rehman and Chaudhary Naeem ul Haq for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, PESHAWAR \nVS\nMESSRS AL KHYBER TEA AND FOOD AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25142", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3656 = 2024 SLD 3656 = 2024 PTD 1097", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-S.122 (9)-Show-cause notice-Object, purpose and scope-Roving inquiry-Prejudice to taxpayer-Error and prejudice should be clearly manifest from show-cause notice-There is no room for roving inquiry and fishing expedition-Purpose of serving notice on taxpayer is to notify him of the case against him-When such document contains incomplete information it can seriously prejudice taxpayer’s defence- When taxpayer if saddled with tax liability that is not disclosed in notice, such liability that is not sustainable.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 PTD 1367; Honda Atlas Cars (Pakistan) Limited v. Appellate Tribunal Customs, Excise and Sales Tax 2021 PTD 1806; Caretex v. Collector of Sales Tax and Federal Excise 2013 PTD 1536; 1987 SCMR 1840; Collector Central Excise and Land Customs v. Rahim Din 1987 SCMR 1844 and Messrs Excide Pakistan v. The Deputy Collector 2004 PTD 1449 rel.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 111, 120 & 122-Convention between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, Art. 4-Tax recovery- Double taxation-Non-resident-Bilateral treaty-Appellant was aggrieved of show-cause notice issued by authorities for recovery of tax-Plea raised by appellant was that he was a tax non-resident and was assessed in France-Validity-Provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, could not be invoked as Bilateral Tax Treaty between Pakistan and France had overriding effect-Appellant was filing his tax returns in France and in the light of treaty between Pakistan and France no action could be perpetuated in Pakistan by authorities- Appellant was absolved from taxation in Pakistan and no provision of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was attracted as he did not have any plausible source of income that could be deemed to have been accrued to him-Provision of S. 111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was applicable to residents of Pakistan only and could not be extended to appellant who was resident abroad and did not have taxable in Pakistan-Provision of S. 111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, could be invoked on non-residents whose habitual abode was in France and had more personal and economic interest in France than Pakistan and had not earned Pakistan source income-Authorities failed to discharge onus for reinforcement of S. 111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001- Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue set aside the orders passed by two fora below, as appellant was not taxable in Pakistan and S. 111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was not attracted to non-resident in presence of treaty between Pakistan and France upon applicable tie-breaker text-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nMessrs Siemens Pakistan Engineering Co. Ltd. v. FOP and others 1999 PTD 1358; 2019 PTD 1828 and 2020 PTD 1662 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,120,122,122(9)", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1125/IB of 2022, decided on 31st July, 2023, heard on: 23rd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR M. AJAZ KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAJID NAZIR MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Imran-ul-Haq for Appellant.\nMiss Misbah Noureen, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS SHAHBAZ AHMAD\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, SARGODHA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25143", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3657 = 2024 SLD 3657 = 2024 PTD 1112", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 111, 2(29), 122 & 133-Income chargeable to tax-Inclusion of unexplained income/assets-Proceedings under S.122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, conducting of-Issuance of separate notice under S.111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Mandatory requirement- Question was whether or not, before invoking the provisions of S. 122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance, 2001’), a separate notice to the taxpayer in terms of S. 111 of the Ordinance, 2001 was a pre-requisite to include unexplained income/assets in income chargeable to tax or / and whether or not, a notice under S, 122(9) of the Ordinance, 2001 is enough to initiate proceedings for amendment of the assessment? - Show-Cause Notice under S. 122(9) of the Ordinance, 2001 was issued against the taxpayer on the basis of definite information that he purchased property during the relevant year but did not disclose its source, and subsequently an Assessment Order was passed following proceedings-Applicant (taxpayer) filed Reference Application as an Assessment Order passed against him was maintained up to Appellant Tribunal Inland Revenue-Case of the applicant was that the Respondents/Department was required to issue a separate notice under S. 111 of the Ordinance, 2001-Stance of the Respondents/Department was that there was no need to issue a separate notice under the aforesaid section for proceeding under S. 122 of the Ordinance, 2001-Held, that the issuance of a separate notice under S.111 of the Ordinance, 2001 is mandatory for the purpose of addition on account of unexplained income or assets-Prior separate notice under S. 111 of the Ordinance, 2001 to confront the taxpayer for explaining his unexplained income and assets has to be issued prior to making of addition of income for tax purposes-High Court answered the proposed question in affirmative i.e. against the Respondents/Department and in favour of the applicant/taxpayer- Consequently the impugned judgments were set-aside-Reference Application, filed by the taxpayer, was allowed, in circumstances.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, T.R.O., Faisalabad v. Faqir Hussain and another 2019 PTD 1828; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Multan Zone v. Falah ud Din Qureshi 2021 PTD 192 and Civil Petition No.2447-L of 2022 ref.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 111, 2(29), 122 & 133-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 189- Income chargeable to tax-Inclusion of unexplained income/assets- Proceedings under S. 122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, conducting of-Issuance of notice under S. 111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001- Expression “definite information ”-Connotation-Expression definite information will include factual information as well as information about the existence of a binding judgement of a competent Court of law/forum for the purposes of S.65 of the Ordinance, 2001, but any interpretation of a provision of law by a functionary which has not been entrusted with the functions to interpret such provision judicially, cannot be treated as a definite information”-Expression definite information certainly meant much more than mere material so as to cause a reasonable belief or even such evidence which may lead to a definite belief-Unless there is definite direct information and there is no further need to put the said definite information to trial by putting in further supporting material the process of self assessment could not be reopened-“Definite information ” does not mean a re-analysis of existing information or an analyses of further information that was previously accessible but had not been taken into account-High Court answered to the proposed question. in affirmative i.e. against the Respondents/Department and in favour of the applicant/taxpayer- Consequently the impugned judgments were set-aside-Reference Application, filed by the taxpayer, was allowed, in circumstances.\n(Civil Petition No.2447-L of 2022); Messrs Central Insurance Co. and others v. The Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others 1993 SCMR 1232; “Income Tax Officer and another v. M/s Chappal Builders 1993 PTD 1108 and Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Peshawar v. Messrs Sabrina Tent Services 2019 SCMR 1639 ref.\n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss. 111, 2(29), 122 & 133-Income chargeable to tax-Inclusion of unexplained income/assets-Proceedings under S. 122 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, conducting of-Issuance of notice under S. 111 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Expression “definite information”-\nRevenue Officers, powers of-Federal Board of Revenue Inland Revenue, Revenue Division, Government of Pakistan had already issued instructions through Notification No. 2(22)Rev. Bud/2020 dated 25th May 2021 to the Chief Commissioners Inland Revenue , LTOs, MTOs, CTOs, RTOs, against recklessly issuing notices under S. 122(5) read with S. 122(9) of the Ordinance 2001, whereby purportedly the threshold of “definite information “ as defined under S. 122(8) of the Ordinance, 2001 was not met-In the present case, instructions contained in the Notification No. 2(22)Rev. Bud/2020 dated 25th May 2021 had also been brushed aside while passing the impugned orders from Assessing Officer till the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue- High Court answered the propped question in affirmative i.e. against the Respondents/Department and in favour of the applicant/taxpayer, consequently the impugned judgments were set-aside-Reference Application , filed by the taxpayer, was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29),111,111(1)(b),122,122(1),122(5),122(8),122(9),133Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=189", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 03 of 2023, heard on 2nd April, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIRZA VIQAS RAUF AND JAWAD HASSAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Hamzah Sarwar for Applicant.\nMalik Itaat Hussain Awan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZUBAIR KHAN \nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE JHELUM ZONE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25144", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3658 = 2024 SLD 3658 = 2024 PTD 1174", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss.3, 7, 47 & 74-Notification SRO 480(I)/2007 dated 99-06-2007- Reference-Input adjustment-Extension in time-Respondent / Peshawar Electric Supply Company was issued with show cause notice relating to inadmissible input adjustment by the Company-Matter was decided by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue in favour of respondent / Company-Validity-Notification SRO 480(I)/2007 dated 09-06-2007 was issued under S.74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and was not without jurisdiction-Extension of time as per verbiage of S.74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 was time bound and the Legislature itself had not restricted jurisdiction of Federal Board of Revenue relating to extension of time even after the period which had lapsed-Input adjustment was linked with taxable supply which meant economic / taxable activities carried out by any person whether or not for profit and included an activity carried on by it that involved supply of goods and anything done or undertaken during commencement or termination of economic activity-Respondent / Electric Company paid sales tax at the time of purchasing taxable goods, therefore the tax remained with revenue as a trust which was adjustable by the company at the time of its output tax payable by respondent / Electric Company in course of taxable activities-Even if the electricity was lost either on account of pilferage or at the time of distribution which was a natural process as electricity passing through wires was certainly lost due to technical issues, however, such activity of respondent / Electric Company did not fall within the mischief of taxable activities-Respondent / Electric Company was entitled to input adjustment of sales tax paid at the time of purchasing taxable goods against electricity produced by it however the same was lost either on account of pilferage, distribution losses or technical reasons-High Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue-Reference was disposed of accordingly.\nAsad Ali and others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Province of Punjab v. Muhammad Arif & Co. PLD 2022 Lah. 596; Subedar Sardar Khan through Legal heirs and others v. Muhammad Idrees through General Attorney and another PLD 2008 SC 591; Sheikh Akhtar Aziz v. Mst. Shabnam Begum and others 2019 SCMR 524; Pakistan through Chairman FBR and others v. Hazrat Hussain 2018 PTD 1204; WAK Ltd. Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax Lahore (Now Commissioner Inland Revenue 2018 SCMR 1474; M/s. Abbasi Enterprises Through Proprietor and another v. Collector of Sales Tax Peshawar 2008 PTD 2025; Assistant Collector of Customs AFU Airport Lahore v. M/s. Triple-M (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director and others PJ.D 2006 SC 209; M/S Amin & Son Tailor Mianwali v. Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad 2010 PTD 21; 2009 PLC 258; PLD 2008 Lah. 200; Dilbadshah v. S. Rehmat Shah and others PLD 2007 Pesh. 103; 2007 CLC 315; 2007 PTD 127; M/S Zamindara Paper and Board Mills v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax 2007 PTD 840; Investment Corporation of Pakistan and others v. Sun Shine Jute Mills Ltd. 2005 CLD 713; Collector of Sales Tax Gujranwala v. M/s, Super Asia Muhammad Din 2017 SCMR 1427 = 2017 PTD 1756; Mujahid Soap’s case 2019 SCMR 1735 = 2019 PTD 1961; Messrs Sabir Daud Exports, Faisalabad v. Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad 2007 PTD 430; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s Golden Pearl Cosmetics 2017 PTD 1485; M/s. Abbasi Enterprises Uniliver v. Collector of Sale Tax and Federal Excise, Peshawar PTCL 2020 CL 159; The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi v. Messrs Attock Cement Pakistan Limited, Karachi 2023 SCMR 279; M/s. Taj Packages v. Government of Pakistan Company (Pvt.) Limited 2016 PTD 203; Pakistan through Chairman FBR and others v. Hazrat Hussain and others 2018 SCMR 939; Sheikhoo Sugar Mills v. Government of Pakistan 2001 SCMR 1376 and Collector of Customs Sales Tax and Central Excise v. Messrs Sanghar Sugar Mills Ltd. PLD 2007 SC 517 ref,\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Ss. 2(35), 7 & 8-Determination of tax liability and tax credits- Scope-Where at any stage sales tax has been legitimately paid then refund of input tax cannot be claimed where such goods were used in manufacture of ‘exempt supplies’-Where a registered person is exempt from liability of sales tax on its supplies, it does not mean that the tax that was paid on purchase of raw material used in making of such supplies would be liable to be refunded-There is no promise of the Legislature that sales tax paid on goods used to manufacture of exempt supplies’ would be liable to be refunded-Section 7 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 being is only a beneficial and machinery provision, a registered person can claim input adjustment against output when the said output (including value added) also falls within the mischief of taxable supplies, and as per mandate of S. 2(35) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, the exempt supply does not constitute a taxable supply.\nM/s Gul Cooking Oils 2008 PTD 169; Pakistan through Chairman FAR and others v. Hazrat Hussain and others 2018 SCMR 939 and Messrs Mayfair Spinning Mills Ltd. Lahore v. Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others PTCL 2002 CL. 115 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(35),3,7,8,8(i)(a),36,36(3),47,74Law Reforms ACT, 1977=25", - "Case #": "S.T.R. NO. 03-P of 2015 with C.Ms. Nos.3, 5 of 2015, 40, 35 of 2019 and 12 of 2021, decided on 18th October, 2023, heard on: 18th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Shoaib Jally along with Sharif Ullah (Assistant Director Legal) for Petitioners.\nHussain Ahmad Sherazi and Mouzzam Ali Butt for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR\nvs\nMessrs PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY (PESCO), SHAMI ROAD, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25145", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3659 = 2024 SLD 3659 = 2024 PTD 1205", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 194 & 196-Findings of the Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) on questions of fact(s)-Reference jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Department filed Customs Reference against the judgment passed by the Tribunal-Tribunal sought report from the Commissioner on the basis of which it was concluded that out of total lot of the consignment so seized, 40% of the goods were of local origin, whereas the remaining 60% were of foreign origin-Validity-High Court in reference jurisdiction in terms of S.196 of the Customs Act, 1969, cannot interfere and reach to some other conclusion against the Tribunal’s finding-Tribunal is the last fact finding forum and only questions of law are to be examined by the High Court in its reference jurisdiction.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Sargodha Spinning Mills Limited 2022 SCMR 1082 ref.\n(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 194 & 196-Findings of the Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) on questions of fact(s)-Belated objection regarding inspection order-Department filed Customs Reference against the judgment passed by the Tribunal-Tribunal sought report from the Commissioner on the basis of which it was concluded that out of total lot of the consignment so seized, 40% of the goods were of local origin, whereas the remaining 60% were of foreign origin-Validity- Objection regarding the inspection order was also belated inasmuch as, if aggrieved, the Applicant /Department ought to have impugned the same when the said order was passed.\n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 194C(7)(a), (d) & 196-Inspection carried out through commission by the Customs Appellate Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’)- Reference jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Department filed Customs Reference against the judgment passed by the Tribunal- Validity-In terms of S. 194C (7)(a) & (d) of the Customs Act, 1969, the Customs Appellate Tribunal for the purposes of discharging its functions is even vested with powers of inspection and issuance of commission; hence to the extent of findings of fact, as above, the same cannot be interfered with or altered in the reference jurisdiction.\n(d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 2(s), 181, 194 & 196-SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13.06.2009-SRO 566(I)/2005 dated 6.6.2005-Smuggling-Confiscation-Release of the goods on payment of duty and taxes without any redemption-Scope and effect-40,500 kgs of assorted brands and foreign origin cloth were seized from a godown and an order for outright confiscation of the seized goods was passed by the Adjudicating Authority-Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue {the Tribunal’) permitted release of the goods on payment of duty and taxes, against which judgment the Department filed Reference Application-Plea of applicant / Department was that goods-in-question were smuggled goods as the respondent had failed to provide any lawful defence as to the charge of smuggling in respect of the seized goods-Validity-Tribunal after coming to the conclusion that 60% of the quantity of the seized goods consisted foreign origin cloth, and once there is an admission that no substantial documents were produced as to the ownership and payment of duty and taxes on the seized goods, then there is no occasion for the Tribunal to permit or allow release of the said goods on payment of duty and taxes-Goods were either smuggled or lawfully imported; and once a conclusion has been drawn that the goods were not lawfully imported, otherwise duty and taxes were not to be paid, then 60% of the seized goods were nothing but smuggled goods-The release of smuggled goods (which stood confiscated) on payment of duty and taxes, and that too without any redemption of the said goods did not appear to be correct and supported by any provisions of law- Confiscation and redemption of seized goods is covered by S. 181 of the Act, read with SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13.06.2009-Moreover FBR had also notified the goods in question as goods falling within the contemplation of S. 2(s)(i) of the Act, vide SRO 566(I)/2005 dated 6.6.2005-Requirement to give option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation in respect of confiscated goods is not absolute and is subject to the Notification issued by FBR under S. 181, and the order of the Tribunal for imposition of redemption fine in lieu of outright confiscation of smuggled goods was unlawful and in violation of S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969-Tribunal, in the present case, had failed to appreciate the law and passed the impugned judgment in a very slipshod manner-Such conduct on the part of the Tribunal cannot be appreciated which is in fact a special Tribunal created under the Act-Extra care ought to have been taken by the Tribunal in passing such orders which on the face of it appeared to be in violation of the Customs Act, 1969-Impugned judgment could not sustain to the extent of 60% of the goods in question i.e. foreign origin goods which were admittedly smuggled goods warranting an outright confiscation- High Court set-aside /modified the impugned Judgment passed by the Tribunal to the extent of 60% foreign origin goods and the order of the Adjudicating authority is restored to that extent-Reference Application, filed by the Department, was allowed, in circumstances.\nCollector of Customs, Peshawar’s case 2017 SCMR 585 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),181,194,194C(7)(a),194C(7)(b),196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.512 of 2002, decided on 12th January, 2023, heard on: 12th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abu Bakar Siddique's case 2006 SCMR 705 distinguished. Sardar Muhammad Azad Khan for the Applicant.\nMs. Dil Khurram Shaheen for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, ENFORCEMENT, CUSTOMS HOUSE, KARACHI\nVS\nABDUL RAZZAQ AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25146", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3660 = 2024 SLD 3660", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2248/LB/2018, heard on: 04.12.2023. Date of order: 22.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Talib Hussain, DR. Respondent by: Hafiz Ahmed Yar Khan, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Ittefaq Sons (Pvt) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25147", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3661 = 2024 SLD 3661", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=151Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9", - "Case #": "Banking Suit No.B–28 of 2023. Date(s) of Hearing: 18-12-2023, 20-12-2023, 7-3-2024 & 10-8-2024. Date of Decision: 15-8-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sana Akram Minhas, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff (Bank): Mr. Gohar Mahmood, Advocate along with Ms. Sobia Mehak, Law Officer,Ms. Defendant (Customer): Maria Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "First Women Bank Limited \nvs\nHascol Petroleum Ltd" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25148", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3662 = 2024 SLD 3662", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=197(3),55,133,158,159", - "Case #": "C. O. No. 62104 of 2023, heard on: 04.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. Bilal Kashmiri, learned Advocate.\nRespondents No. 1 to 5 by: Mr. Faisal Islam, learned\nAdvocate. Respondent No. 6 by: Mr. Ruman Bilal, learned Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shahid Mahmood & Company (Pvt.) Limited and 2 others\n Versus\n Zahid Mahmood and 5 other." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25149", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3663 = 2024 SLD 3663", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 791/LB/2015, heard on: 05.01.2024. Date of order: 24,05,2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Fawad Mir, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. M. Suleman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mikkel and Naina, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR,RTO-II, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25150", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3664 = 2024 SLD 3664", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3237/LB/2023, heard on: 08.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abdul Majid, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ubaid-ur-Rehman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Nazir Akhtar, \nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25151", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3665 = 2024 SLD 3665", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDWXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1101/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 21.03.2024. Date order; 21.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, Chairman.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Iqbal Anwar Mehndi, ITP. Respondent by: Mrs. Mahrukh Imtiaz, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian Abdul Rashid, Shadman-II, Lahore.\nVS\nCIR, AEOI Zone, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25152", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3666 = 2024 SLD 3666", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1),153(7)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3175/LB/2023, heard on: 04.09.2023. Date of order: 30.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, judicial member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Usman Rauf, ACA. Respondent by: Mr. Essam Anwar Khokhar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Metaflex Sign System, Lahore.\nvs\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25153", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3667 = 2024 SLD 3667", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10(1),114(1),122(5A),140,124", - "Case #": "COMPLAINT NO.45991MLN11T/2024.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer: Dr Khalil Ahmad, Advisor Appraisement Officer: Mr Muhammad TanvirAkhtar, Advisor Authorized Representative: Mr M. Imran Ghazi, Advocate\nDepartmental Representative: Mr M Qaswar Hussain, Addi. CIR RTO, Multan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Saqlain, Naurangabad, D.G. Khan.\nVersus\nThe Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25154", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3668 = 2024 SLD 3668", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1097/LB/2024, heard on: 21.03.2024. Date of order: 21.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Iqbal Anwar Mehndi, ITP. Respondent by; Mrs. Mahrukh Imtiaz, DR.income tax o", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian Amer Rashid, DHA, Lahore.\nvs\nCIR, AEOI Zone ; LTO,Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25155", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3669 = 2024 SLD 3669", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37), 8(1)(caa), 8(1)(d),23,8A", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1542/LB/2024, heard on: 01.08.2024. Date of order: 07.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Farhan Ahmed Jan, Adv. Respondent by: Ms. Ghazala Nasir Siddiq, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sky Trader, Lohianwala, Gujranwala.\nVS\nCIR, Zone-II, RTO, Gujranwala." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25156", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3670 = 2024 SLD 3670", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=2(51A)", - "Case #": "C. P. No. D-860 / 2024, heard on: 13.08.2024. Date of Order: 13.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Mr. Justice Muhammad Abdul Rehman.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khalid Javed Khan, Advocate. M/s. Ovais Ali Shah, Marium\nRiaz, Fahad Hussain Narejo, Ms. Deeba Jafri, Assistant Advocate General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Arfeen International Pvt. Limited.\nvs\nSindh Revenue Board." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25157", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3671 = 2024 SLD 3671", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3488/LB/2018, heard on: 09.01.2024. Date of order: 24.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sohail Ibne Siraj, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Rudar AMjad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Rizwan Mehboob Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-IV, CTRO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25158", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3672 = 2024 SLD 3672", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),21(2)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12(a)(i)(C)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 957/LB/2024, heard on: 24.05.2024. Date of order: 24.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mian M. Arshad, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. M. Bilal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Qamar Khan Tea Company, Malakwal.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25159", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3673 = 2024 SLD 3673", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2022=8(3)(c)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5457/LB/2023, heard on: 25.03.2024. Date of order: 03.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN MUNIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hamza Ashraf, ACA. Respondent by: Mr. Rufar Amjad, DR>", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed Savail Meekal, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25160", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3674 = 2024 SLD 3674", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)/(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3489/LB/2018, heard on: 09.01.2024. Date of order: 24.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sohail Ibne Siraj, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Rudar Amjad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Ehsan, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-IV, CTRO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25161", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3675 = 2024 SLD 3675", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDVXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1067/LB/2023, heard on: 06.02.2024. Date of order: 25.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Umer Cheema, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "m/s. Ittefaq Silk Centre, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25162", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3676 = 2024 SLD 3676", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25,73", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1143/LB/2017, heard on: 08.05.2024. Date of order: 08.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN MUNIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Zeeshan Ali, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Qamar Minhas, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Star Wood Industries (pvt) Ltd.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO-II, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25163", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3677 = 2024 SLD 3677", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221", - "Case #": "MA (R) NO. 166/IB/2024. ITA NO, 734/IB/2024, heard on: 05.08.2024. Date of order: 12.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mirza Saqib Siddique, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Samiullah, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mian Group of Chakwal.\nVS\nThe Commissioner-IR, Zone-I, LTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25164", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3678 = 2024 SLD 3678", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3490/LB/2018, heard on: 09.01.2024. Date of order: 24.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Sohail Ibne Siraj, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Rudar Amjad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Imran Mehboob, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-IV, CTRO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25165", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3679 = 2024 SLD 3679", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1)(a)Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3468/LB/2019, heard on: 02.04.2024. Date of order: 25.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD. JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ali Ahsan Warraich, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Noman Razzaq Khan, FCA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Shakar Gunj Foods Products Ltd., Gulberg-III, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25166", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3680 = 2024 SLD 3680", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(1)(ca)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1191/LB/2019, heard on: 21.11.2023. Date of order: 14.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Usman Khalil, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ahmed Taimoor, DR.sales", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Vital International, Lahore\nvs\nCIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25167", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3681 = 2024 SLD 3681", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),214C", - "Case #": "IT A No.2254/LB/2015, heard on: 14-09-2021 Date of order: 14-09-2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT ,Judicial Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Sheikh M. lrfan Ayub, Adv. Respondent by: Ms.Farzana Gohar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Khalil Ahmad, Prop: New Shangrillah Bakers and\nGeneral Store, Khanewal. \nvs\nCIR, RTO, Multan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25168", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3682 = 2024 SLD 3682", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1592/LB/2019, heard on: 07.08.2024. Date of order: 16.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Aurangzeb, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. GASCO LPG (pvt), Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-I, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25169", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3683 = 2024 SLD 3683", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),15(4),68", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3603/LB/2017, heard on: 22.01.2024. Date of order: 06.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Irfa Tabassum, D.R. Respondent by: Mr. Tahir Mehmood Butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, CTRO, Lahore.\nVS\nMst. Zeenat-un-Nisa C/o Chawla Footwear, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25170", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3684 = 2024 SLD 3684", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2944/LB/2019, heard on: 26.04.2024. Date of order: 17.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Rudar Ahmed, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Hashim Aslam butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Creative Electronics (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25171", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3685 = 2024 SLD 3685", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDUXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-A, 194-B", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3391 of 2024, heard on: 09.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench-II: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah. Mr. Justice Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Abdul Rehman Khan, ASC Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR For the Raja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, DAG Saleem Ahmed Malik, Superintendant Customs Enforcement, Lahore Huriya Fatima, Legal Advisor, FBR Waheed Iqbal Bhatti, Inspector\nMr. Nadeem Mehmood Mian, ASC (for private respondent)\n(From Lahore via video-link)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Khalid alias Muhammad Khalid and others\nVersus\nCollector of Customs (Adjudication), Custom House, Lahore, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25172", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3686 = 2024 SLD 3686", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3608/LB/2017, heard on: 22.01.2024. Date of order: 06.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Irfa Tabassum, D.R. Respondent by: Mr. Tahir Mehmood Butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, CRTO, Lahore.\nVS\nMr. Muhammad Azeem C/o Chawla Footwear, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25173", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3687 = 2024 SLD 3687", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 245/IB/2024, heard on: 20.08.2024. Date of order: 20.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Sajid, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Kamal Laboratories, 11, Civil Lines, Rawalpindi.\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Cantt Zone, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25174", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3688 = 2024 SLD 3688", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(B)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 931/LB/2016, ITA NO. 932/LB/2016, heard on: 23.01.2024. Date of order: 22.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abdullah Zulfiqar, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Waseem A. Malik, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Bata Pakistan Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25175", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3689 = 2024 SLD 3689", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A), 122(9),111(1)(d),21(1),111", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3685/LB/2017, heard on: 05.01.2024. Date of order: 06.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAHID SIDDIQ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Adnan, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Qadeer Ahmed, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Siara Textile Mills (pvt) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25176", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3690 = 2024 SLD 3690", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4299/LB/2022, heard on: 02.09.2022. Date of order; 8.09.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shujaddain, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Talat Mehmood, DR. & Mr. Waqas Rashid, ADCIR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Arshad Gulzar, P-1271 A, West Canal Road, Abdulla Pur, Faisalabad.\nvs\nThe CIR, AEOI, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25177", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3691 = 2024 SLD 3691", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 2504/LB/2023, heard on: 18.12.2023. Date of order: 28.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD ASGHAR KHOKHAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nadeem Ashraf, FCA. Respondent by: Mr. Bilal Zia, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Crescent Bahuman, Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25178", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3692 = 2024 SLD 3692", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3686/LB/2018, heard on: 07.12.2023. Date of order: 12.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mst. Haida Sajjad, DR. Respondent by: Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Rana & Company." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25179", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3693 = 2024 SLD 3693", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5620/LB/2023. Date of hearing; 25.04.2024. Date of order: 14.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mirza Bilal Zafar, Adv. Respondent by: Mr. Ahmed Mujtaba, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Baba Farid Sugar Mills Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25180", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3694 = 2024 SLD 3694", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2291/LB/2018, heard on: 14.05.2024. Date of order: 23.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Tipu Sultan, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Muaaz Tahir, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mian Diesel & Turbo Operations Pakistan.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTU, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25181", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3695 = 2024 SLD 3695", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDTXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA. NO. 30/LB/2024, heard on: 20.02.2024. Date of order: 22.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Albar Ali Malik, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Tehmina Akram, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. M.s Enterprises, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25182", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3696 = 2024 SLD 3696", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(9),122(5),214C", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3902/LB/2018, heard on: 04.12.2023. Date of order: 10.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Haida Sajjad, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Sunil Sarfraz, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25183", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3697 = 2024 SLD 3697", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129(1)Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4668/LB/2022, heard on: 06.02.2022. Date of order: 06.02.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None, Respondent by: Ms. Saman Gulzar, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Vision Builders (pvt), Ltd. Lahore.\nVS\nTHe CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25184", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3698 = 2024 SLD 3698", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 5307/LB/2023, heard on: 11.09.2023, Date of order: 28.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Qadeer Asif, Advocate. Respondent by: Mrs. Anum Tahir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sardarpur Textile Mills Limited, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25185", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3699 = 2024 SLD 3699", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(7)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2126/LB/2019, heard on: 01.02.2024. Date of order: 21.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nadeem Asad, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Sajjad Ali, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Fazal Sons, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25186", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3700 = 2024 SLD 3700", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 758/KB/2023, heard on: 04.07.2024. Date of order: 11.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN, MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shoaib Hassan Butt, Adv. Respondent by; Mr. Abdul Hameed, DR:", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Geo Entertainment Television (pvt), Limited, Karachi, \nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25187", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3701 = 2024 SLD 3701", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=197(3)", - "Case #": "C. O. No. 62104 of 2023, heard on: 04.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. Bilal Kashmiri, learned Advocate.\nRespondents No. 1 to 5 by: Mr. Faisal Islam, learned\nAdvocate. Respondent No. 6 by: Mr. Ruman Bilal, learned\nAdvocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shahid Mahmood & Company (Pvt.) Limited and 2 others.\n Versus\n Zahid Mahmood and 5 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25188", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3702 = 2024 SLD 3702", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.M. No. 13116 of 2017, decided on 10th April, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRRSENT: SHMAS MEHMOOD MIRZA, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Wasif Majeed for Applicant.\nM. Imran Malik for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "REINHART INDIA (PRIVATE) LIMITED through Special\nAttorney\nVersus\nBASHIR COTTON MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive\nOfficer" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25189", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3703 = 2024 SLD 3703", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4932/LB/2023, heard on: 16.11.2023. Date of order: 25.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Atiq Ur Rehman, ACA. Respondent by: Mr. Ubaid Ur Rehman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Halmore Power Generation Company Ltd, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-II, Corporate Tax Office, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25190", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3704 = 2024 SLD 3704", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=66-A", - "Case #": "Income Tax Case No. 10 of 199. Dates of hearing: 09.08.2023. & 10.08.2023. Date of Judgment: 28.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Iqbal Salman Pasha Advocate. Mr. Faheem Ali Memon &\nMr. Muhammad Taseer Khan, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.,\nKarachi. \nVs. \nthe Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies-III, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25191", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3705 = 2024 SLD 3705", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA (R) NO. 42/LB/2024, heard on: 01.03.2024. Date of order: 22.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waqas Mufti, ITP. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Farm Solution Pvt. Ltd, Lahore.\nvs\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25192", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3706 = 2024 SLD 3706", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177", - "Case #": "Suit 897 of 2022.Date/s of hearing : 30.08.2024. Date of announcement : 30.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Agha Faisal, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Plaintiff/s : Mr. Abid S. Zuberi, Advocate.\nFor the Defendants/s : Mr. Ameer Bux Metlo, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ARY Communication Limited.\nvs. \nFederal Board of Revenue & Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25193", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3707 = 2024 SLD 3707 = (2025) 132 TAX 512", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTY", - "Key Words:": "Court: Likely a High Court (as it is hearing an appeal against the Special Judges order)\nCase Type: Petition for Pre-Arrest Bail\nFIR Details: FIR No. IR Unit-03/BWP/2023-24/01 dated 12.02.2024\nAllegations: Massive tax fraud involving the issuance of flying/fake invoices (fake sales and purchase invoices) without any actual supply of goods, to fraudulently claim and adjust input tax, causing a provisional loss of approximately Rs. 255 million to the national exchequer.\nCourts Decision: Bail Denied\nThe court refused to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioner and recalled any interim bail that had been granted.\nKey Reasons for Denial:\nPrima Facie Evidence of Guilt: The court found that the evidence gathered so far—including the petitioners business registration, submitted tax returns, and the adjudication order—reasonably connects the petitioner to the alleged offenses. The act of issuing fake invoices squarely falls within the definition of tax fraud under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nShifting Blame is Not a Defense: The petitioners defense that an employee, Muhammad Sibtain Abbas, was the real culprit who misused his credentials was rejected. The court held that as the registered proprietor, the legal responsibility for the transactions and filings rests squarely on the petitioner. The involvement of another individual in separate FIRs does not automatically absolve the petitioner.\nNecessity of Custody for Investigation: The court agreed with the departments argument that the petitioners physical custody is essential for a thorough investigation. This is needed to recover crucial evidence such as computers, cell phones, and electronic data, which are fundamental to uncovering the details of this complex white-collar financial crime.\nRisk of Tampering with Evidence: Granting bail at this stage carried a strong possibility of the petitioner tampering with evidence and frustrating the ongoing investigation.\nNature of the Offense: The court implicitly found the allegations to be serious and of a nature that falls within the exceptions for granting bail, given the massive financial loss to the public exchequer and the deliberate abuse of the tax system.\nThe petitioners arguments that the evidence was documentary and that no money was traced to his accounts were deemed insufficient to overcome the prima facie case established by the tax department.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(9), 2(14)(a),2(33A),2(37),3,6,7,8,(1)(a),8(1)(ca),8(1)(caa),8(1)(d),8A,22,23,25,26,34(1)(c),37A,37B,73", - "Case #": "Crl. Misc. No. 2325-B/2024. Date of order: 26.07.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: Asim Hafeez, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Naveed Farhan, Advocate for petitioner.\nCh. Muhammad Jameel, Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Muhammad Tariq Mehmood, Advocate for respondent/FBR. Mr. Arshad Ali, Deputy Commissioner, IRO/RTO, Bahawalpur. Mr. Muhammad Altaf, IRO Unit-3, Bahawalpur.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sikandar Hayat. \nVs \nThe State, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25194", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3708 = 2024 SLD 3708", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=34,11(2),72B", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1729/LB/2015, heard on: 17.01.2024. Date of order: 18.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Faiza Sadaf, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Basharat Ali Awan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Associated Technologies (pvt) Ltd. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25195", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3709 = 2024 SLD 3709", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),122(9),122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2150/LB/2019, heard on: 20.02.2024. Date of order: 01.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Attique-Ur-Rehman ACA, Respondent by: Mr, Iqtidar Ahmed, DR,", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ms. Albayrark Turizm Seyhat Insaat Ticaret Anonim Sirketi,Pakistan Branch, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25196", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3710 = 2024 SLD 3710", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12", - "Case #": "STA NO. 460/LB/2024, heard on: 15.05.2024. Date of order: 16.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Khalida Irshad Advocate. Respondent by: Mian Sufyan Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Usman Steel Casting. Kala Shah Kaku, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25197", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3711 = 2024 SLD 3711", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1750/LB/2017, heard on: 26.04.2024. Date of order: 02.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Usman Ahmed Rathore, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Hashim Aslam Butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore\nVS\nM/s. Kashmir Sugar Mills Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25198", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3712 = 2024 SLD 3712", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(7)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2486/LB/2019. Date of Hearing: 20.02.2024. Date of order: 25.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ghulam Hussain Yasir, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Abdul Majid azad, Adv.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR,LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Allied Marketing, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25199", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3713 = 2024 SLD 3713", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)Income Tax Rules, 2002=67,13", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 131/LB/2017, heard on: 22.04.2024.Date of order: 08.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Mujtaba, DR. Respondent by; Mr. Ali Raza Ansari, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore.\nVS\nM/s. Dar-e-Salam Textile Mills Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25200", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3714 = 2024 SLD 3714", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "ITA No.1197/IB/2024. Date of Hearing: 09.09.2024. Date of Order: 09.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (Judicial Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr.Waqas Shabbir, ITP. Respondent BY: Mr.Sheryar Akram,DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Strengthening Participatory Organization Employees Contributory Provident Found, Islamabad.\nVs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, CTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25201", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3715 = 2024 SLD 3715 = 2024 PLJ 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDRXk", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 8, 42 & 54-Transfer of Land Validation Act, 2003, S. 3-Suit for possession filed by appellant-Dismissed-Suit for declaration cum perpetual injunction filed by predecessor of respondent was disposed of-Matter was remanded-Suit of appellants was dismissed and suit of predecessor of respondents was decree to extent of perpetual injunction-Appeals-Modification in judgment-Consolidated judgment-Exchange deed-Law of estoppel-Prior to present suit a suit for declaration cum perpetual injunction was dismissed filed by appellant-No appeal was filed-Respondents were lawful owners of suit land-Prior to suit in hand appellant and others filed a suit of declaration cum-perpetual injunction against predecessor of respondents and others-He has also admitted factum of exchange and said exchange in light of revenue record also stands corroborated-Exchange and mutation etc in matter in handa has admittedly been executed prior to enforcement of law, claim of respondents herein is fully covered in light of said law, thus, it can safely be observed that respondents herein alongwith other co-sharers stand law owners of disputed piece of land by operation of law-1st appellate Court, while dealing with appeals in hand has rightly recorded its findings quite in consonance with evidence and law-Appeals dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=8,42,54", - "Case #": "C.A. Nos. 43 & 44 of 2017, decided on 8.5.2023.heard on: 8.5.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mian Arif Hussain, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Shamshad Hussain, Advocate for Appellants.\nSardar Tahir Anwar Khan, Advocate for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAEED and others-Appellants\nVS\nBEGUM JAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25202", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3716 = 2024 SLD 3716 = 2024 PLJ 8", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTc", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 8 & 42-Suit for declaration filed by predecessor of appellant was dismissed-Appeal-Disposed of-While suit for recovery and possession on was filed by predecessor of respondent was decreed-Consolidated judgment-Law of adverse possession-Predecessor of appellants was failed to prove stance of adverse possession-Exchange of land-Entitlement of possession-Challenge to-Concurrent findings-Principle of might is right-Predecessor of appellants filed a suit for declaring him owner of suit land on basis of law of adverse possession, whereas, respondents herein filed a suit for recovery of possession on basis of ownership-Both Courts below are unanimous that predecessor of appellants herein have failed to prove stance of adverse possession, whereas, matter of exchange stands proved and respondents are entitled to be awarded relief of possession-No single ingredient for constituting possession of plaintiffs, adverse to true owner is available as no witness claims possession of plaintiffs, hostile, rather statements of witnesses signify that possession is on account of exchange of different pieces of land of parties-The suit land is within possession of appellants herein since their father and period of more than 12 years has been elapsed but stance of respondents herein is not that they have been dispossessed or their possession has been discontinued-Suit land was within possession of father of appellants under license and permission and appellants herein have claimed ownership, so, respondents have also withdrawn their permission and have filed suit for possession, in view of claim of respondents and evidence on record, suit of respondents stands filed within limitation-Both Courts below, after evaluating evidence of parties have rightly recorded their findings quite an consonance with evidence and law-No misreading and non reading of evidence or other legal infirmity in judgments impugned herein has been pointed out, concurrent findings of facts do not warrant any interference by this Court-Appeal dismissed.\nAdverse possession-\n-Ingredients-In a matter of plea of adverse possession, basic ingredients required to be proved are that possession must be hostile, continues and notorious to interests of true owners for at least 12 years.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=8,42", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 75 of 2013, decided on 10.5.2023.heard on: 10.5.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mian Arif Hussain, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Suleman Khan, Advocate for Appellants.\nSardar Tahir Anwar Khan, Advocate for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD JAVED AKHTAR and another-Appellants.\nVS\nMUHAMMAD ANWAR KHAN and others-Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25203", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3717 = 2024 SLD 3717 = 2024 PLJ 13", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTY", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 39 & 42-Suit for declaration cum cancellation of mutation-Decreed-Appeal-Allowed-Inheritance of-Gift deed-Predecessor of plaintiff was participated in matter regarding sanctioning of Mutation No. 43-Objections of plaintiff were declined-Defendant No. 1 was adopted son of deceased-It is an admitted position that at time of sanctioning of Mutation No. 108, on behalf of appellants plaintiffs objections were filed but their claim was declined and said mutation remained intact-Predecessors in interest of plaintiffs, challenged subsequent mutation regarding granting of proprietary rights but did not challenge Mutation No. 43 which was base of subsequent Mutation No. 108 and remained mum-Plaintiffs failed to file a suit within prescribed period of limitation, First Appellate Court, while dealing with question of limitation has recorded its findings quite in a legal fashion, which being consonance with law and evidence are concurred with-Appeal dismissed.\nLimitation-\n-There will be no bar of limitation for filing suit of declaration rather nature of dispute in terms of declaratory and cancellation of different instruments is to be looked into. \n2023 SC 362 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=39,42", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 44 of 2015, decided on 1.8.2023, heard on: 1.8.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mian Arif Hussain, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Khalid Mahmood, Advocate for Appellants.\nKhawaja Muhammad Amin, Advocate for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NOOR HUSSAIN and 3 others-Appellants\nVS\nMUHAMMAD LATIF and 5 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25204", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3718 = 2024 SLD 3718 = 2024 PLJ 20", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTU", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-Sanction of timber-Acquisition of jungle-Private forest was situated on line of control-Determination of requirement of forest trees for defence purpose-Aggrieved party-Pre-mature writ petition-Writ jurisdiction-Alleged private forest is admittedly situated on line of control where enemy army is on juxtaposition and only defence forces can ascertain suitability of trees for defence purpose and High Court or any other authority cannot determine requirement of forest trees for defence purpose-Neither alternate place or Jungle can be allotted to any person on their own wish and whims nor any statutory provision is provided in statute, claim of petitioners is baseless, which is repelled-Factual controversy cannot be resolved through writ jurisdiction-Petitioners, in this guise, are neither aggrieved party within meaning of Article 44 of AJK Interim Constitution, 1974, nor have locus-standi to invoke extra-ordinary jurisdiction of High Court by-way writ petition-Letter cannot be challenged through writ jurisdiction-Pre-mature writ petition has been filed before High Court because no adverse or final order has been passed by competent authority against petitioners only impugned letters have been issued against petitioners-Petitions dismissed. \n2014 SCR 921 & 2000 SCR 308 ref.\nAzad Jammu and Kashmir Sale and Development of Private Forest Rules, 2001-\n-R. 2(d)-Private forest-”Private Forest” means a contiguous area bearing trees that is assessed to Land Revenue and over which owner has undisputed right of ownership and does not include Shamilat Deh, community land or crown land. \nAzad Jammu and Kashmir Sale and Development of Private Forest Rules, 2001-\n-R. 2(c)-Owner-”Owner” means a person/persons in whose title ownership and possession of private forest is entered singly or jointly in revenue record.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. Nos. 2727 of 2015, 1796 of 2017 & 1271 of 2018,\ndecided on 23.5.2023, heard on: 23.5.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sadaqat Hussain Raja, C.J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Amjad Ali, Advocate for Petitioners.\nCh. Aqif-ud-Din, Legal Advisor for Department.\nD.C.P for Ehtesab Bureau.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASHIQ HUSSAIN SHAH and others-Petitioners\nVS\nAZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR through as Chief Secretary Muzaffarabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25205", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3719 = 2024 SLD 3719 = 2024 PLJ 31", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "zad Jammu and Kashmir Food Authority Act, 2017 (XXXVII of 2017)-\n-S. 13-Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, Art. 44-Manufacturing of substandard food items and other products-Technical expert or quality inspector was not available-Powers of food safety officer-Sealing of factories premises and stock-Aggrieved party-No locus standi-Petitioners, are neither aggrieved party within meaning of Article 44 of AJ & K interim Constitution, 1974 nor have locus-standi to invoke extra-ordinary jurisdiction of High Court by-way writ petition-Writ lies where any violation of rules and departure of law has been made but no such violation appears to have been found or pointed out by counsel for petitioners during course of arguments-Factories were sealed on account of manufacturing substandard food and other products for public-at-large-Petitions dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. Nos. 356, 357 & 358 of 2022, decided on 23.2.2023, heard on: 23.2.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Muhammad Ejaz Khan, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Nadeem Khan, Advocate for Petitioners in the supra writ petitions.\nMr. Ahmed Saad Khan, AAG for official Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. A.A FOODS (PRIVATE) LIMITED, DISTRICT JHELUM, PAKISTAN and others-Petitioners\nVS\nAZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR FOOD AUTHORITY through Chairperson/Minister for Food, New Secretariat, Muzaffarabad Azad Jammu and Kashmir and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25206", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3720 = 2024 SLD 3720 = 2024 PLJ 34", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQS8", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-AJ & K Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1994, R. 13(1)-Post of lecturer-Waiting list-Validity of waiting list-Petitioner was at Sr. No. 5 on merit list-Four candidates were appointed-Aggrieved person-Maintainability-Petitioner was not challenged advertisement-The petitioner could not be benefited for post which was not advertised or requisitioned by Department-Petitioner was not aggrieved person in eye of law-The petitioner himself admitted that fours posts were advertised and four candidates were appointed and in these circumstances, writ petition was not maintainable-If a person participates in proceedings and failed to achieve desired result he could not turn around and challenge selection process-Petition dismissed.\n2016 SCR 15 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 532 of 2020, decided on11.12.2023, heard on: 11.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sadaqat Hussain Raja, C.J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Jahangir Akram, Advocate for Petitioner.\nMr. Noshaba Iqbal, Legal Advisor for Higher Education.\nCh. Mohammad Manzoor, AAG for Azad Government.\nAlia Abdul Rehman, Legal Advisor for PSC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAHIR MEHBOOB GILANI-Petitioner\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Chief Secretary Muzaffarabad and 5 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25207", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3721 = 2024 SLD 3721 = 2024 PLJ 38", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQSs", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-Petitioner was awarded one grace mark-Grace mark was not included in final result card-Deprivation from second division-One grace mark had been given to petitioner for declaring successful in subject of physics and in light of guideline provided by Apex Court of AJK grace marks would be counted in whole counting-After including one grace mark in whole counting marks of petitioner comes to 405 out of 900, which makes 45% and he became entitled to had degree of 2nd Division, petitioner was entitled to equitable relief of writ jurisdiction-Petition accepted.\n 2019 YLR 373 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 973 of 2020, decided on 6.12.2023, heard on: 6.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Liaqat Hussain, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Muhammad Kabir Kiani, Advocate for Petitioner.\nRaja Gul Majeed Khan, Advocate for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD FAHEEM AHMED KIANI-Petitioner\nVS\nUNIVERSITY OF AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Vice Chancellor having his office at Chellah Bandi, Muzaffarabad\nand another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25208", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3722 = 2024 SLD 3722 = 2024 PLJ 42", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTk", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 9, 42 & 54-Wrongly entring of inheritance mutation-Producing of another woman instead of appellant-Deprivation from inheritance-Limitation-Suit for declaration, possession and perpetual injunction-Dismissed-Concurrent findings-Gift deed-Appellant produced oral as well as documentary evidence-The oral evidence produced by plaintiff fully supported her version- The trial Court had neither considered evidence nor cognovit filed by Defendant No. 1 and disposed of issues No. 1 to 5 simultaneously which were “whether plaintiff had cause of action?, whether plaintiff’s correct name was Gulshana Begum?-Defendants in fact want to deprive their sister from legacy of their parents on basis of alleged gift deed executed in their favour-Limitation would run from date of knowledge, suit was well within time, even efflux of time did not extinguish right of inheritance and limitation did not run against a void transaction-This Court had authority to undo concurrent findings-Appeal accepted.\n 2016 SCMR 1417, 2010 SCMR 1630 & 2004 SCMR 1001 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=9,42,54", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 64 of 2018, decided on 15.12.2023, heard on: 15.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Liaqat Hussain, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Amjid Hameed Siddique, Advocate, for Appellant.\nMr. Aftab Ahmed Awan, Advocate for Respondents No. 1\nand 2.\nNemo for official Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GULSHANA BEGUM-Appellant\nVS\nABDUL RASHEED and 5 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25209", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3723 = 2024 SLD 3723", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQTg", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-Retirement-Non-releasing of pension-Inquiry-Allegation of-Issuance of NOC for payment of pension-Upgradation of post of petitioner-Recommendations of selection committee-Malafide intension-Entitlement for pension-Direction to-The post of petitioner was upgraded as per recommendations of selection committee and his promotion was made due to act of authority, he could be penalized for fault if any committed by authority-The petitioner was not employee of University when inquiry was initiated against him-Impugned order of inquiry was without jurisdiction and nullity in eye of law-Official of University with malice and mala-fide intention was not completing retirement file of petitioner-The petitioner was entitled to release pension and other shares-Petition accepted. \n2020 SCR 834 and 2016 SCR 360 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 1921 of 2023, decided on 21.12.2023, heard on: 21.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sadaqat Hussain Raja, CJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Gul Majeed Khan, Advocate for Petitioner.\nMr. Naeem Ahmed Mughal, Advocate on behalf of MUST.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IJAZ SALEEM RETIRED PRIVATE SECRETARY BS-18, MIRPUR-Petitioner\nVS\nVICE-CHANCELLOR MIRPUR UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MUST) MIRPUR and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25210", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3724 = 2024 SLD 3724 = 2024 PLJ 55", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQXo", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Arts. 22(iii) & 44-Tentative merit list for admission-Istiqaq certificate-Mangla Dam Efffectee certificate-Petitioners were not residing in Pakistan-Quota of Mangla Dam Effectees in Pakistan-Maintainability-Only those persons fall in definition of Mangla Dam Effectees who were residing now in any province of Pakistan-The petitioners were residing in District Bhimber they should be considered against quota of District Bhimber rather against quota of Mangla Dam Effectees residing in Pakistan-Petitioners had not attached any reliable documents with writ petition, which strengthen their claim-Petition dismissed. \n2013 SCR 795 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=22(iii),44", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 3139 of 2023, decided on 23.12.2023, heard on: 23.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sadaqat Hussain Raja, CJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Sajjad Ahmed Khan, Advocate for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMAN PAZIR QURESHI and another-Petitioners\nVS\nCHAIRMAN JOINT ADMISSION COMMITTEE MUZAFFARABAD AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25211", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3725 = 2024 SLD 3715 = 2024 PLJ 59", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDQXk", - "Key Words:": "Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (VIII of 1890)-\n-Ss. 9, 17 & 25-Application for appointment of guardian-Accepted-Minor was in custody of respondent-Suit for maintenance of minor was pending-Step mother-Welfare of minor-The minor was in custody of Respondent No. 1 but appellant who was father of minor did not paid him maintenance and a separate suit was filed by Respondent No. 1 against appellant, for maintenance of minor-If custody of minor was given to appellant it would tantamount to leave him at mercy of his step mother, while on counter part Respondent No. 1 did not contract second marriage and had given her whole life for her minor-Welfare of minor was to live with her mother and appellant who even paid no heed to give any maintenance to minor-The Court below had appreciated every iota of evidence in a legal fashion and reached at just conclusion, which did not suffered from any legal infirmity. \n2012 CLC 784 ref.\nGuardian and Wards Act, 1890 (VIII of 1890)-\n-S. 17-Appointment of guardian-It is a settled proposition of law that while appointing or declaring Guardian of a minor or handing over custody of minor under Sections 17 of Guardians and Wards Act, paramount consideration would be welfare of minor. \nRef. 2003 SC 318.\nGuardian and Wards Act, 1890 (VIII of 1890)-\n-S. 17(3)-Maturity of minor-If the minor is matured enough to express his opinion then he cannot be compelled to live with the person against his/her wish. \n2015 SCR 1455 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Guardians and Wards Act, 1890=9,17,25,17(3)", - "Case #": "Family Appeal No. 41 of 2019, decided on 2.2.2024, heard on: 29.1.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Chaudhary Khalid Rasheed, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Fazal-ur-Rehman Dar, Advocate for Appellant.\nCh. Muhammad Ashraf Ayaz, Advocate for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASHFAQ-Appellant\nVS\nNAJMA BIBI and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25212", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3726 = 2024 SLD 3726 = 2024 PLJ 64", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODc", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 9 & 54-AJ & K Pre-emption Act, (XIV of 2016), S. 13-Suit for possession and perpetual injunction through pre-emption-Right of prior purchase-Sharik-e-khewat-Sharik-e-khata-Easement rights-Decreed-Appeal-Dismissed-Commercial nature land-Market price-Concurrent findings-Challenge to-Trial Court decreed suit in terms that if plaintiff deposited consideration amount as well as expenses of registry suit would be deemed to had been decreed-The land sold through sale deed was not of commercial nature while witnesses produced by plaintiff admitted in their Court statements that land sold through impugned sale deed was of commercial nature, market price of a commercial land and non-commercial land could not be held similar-No misreading or non-reading of evidence or violation of any settled maxim of law had been illuminated by appellant in view of settled precept of law second appeal was not sustainable except on any of grounds mentioned in Section 100 CPC-Appeal dismissed. \nCivil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)-\n-S. 100-Second appeal-Concurrent findings-It is a trite law that concurrent findings of facts cannot be reversed in second appeal unless flagrant misreading or non-reading of evidence is pointed out by appellant or flagrant violation of any statutory law has been committed by Courts below.\n2022 SCR 416 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=9,54AJ & K Pre-emption Act, 2016=13", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 223 of 2019, decided on 2.2.2024, heard on: 29.1.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Chaudhary Khalid Rasheed, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdul Razzaq Chaudhary, Advocate for Appellant.\nMr. Muhammad Haleem Khan, Advocate for Respondent\nNo. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "QAMMAR DIN-Appellant\nVS\nMUHAMMAD LATIF and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25213", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3727 = 2024 SLD 3727 = 2024 PLJ 67", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODY", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 417 & 431-Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Act, (XLIII of 1985), Ss. 3/4 & 14-Acquittal of-Death of respondent-Report of process server-Statement of brother of respondent-Appeal was abated due to death of respondent-Respondent was died-In that regard, statement of brother of respondent was part of file whereas statement of Constable Zulfiqar Ali IHC, had also been recorded before Court-Appeal against respondent should be abated-Leaving aside factual aspects qua propriety of decision impugned as respondent had passed away, consequently after his death criminal appeal had already stood abated by operative of law- Corporal consequences of a conviction wither away with death of convict-Appeal dismissed.\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-S. 431-Abatement of appeal-Every appeal under S. 411-A, sub-section (2) or Section 417, Cr.P.C. shall finally abate on death of accused, and every appeal under this chapter (except an appeal from a sentence of fine) shall finally abate on death of appellant-Appeal fails as abated.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=417,431", - "Case #": "Crl. A. No. 31 of 2019, decided on 7.2.2024, heard on: 7.2.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Shahid Bahar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdul Qayyum Sabri, A.A.G for State.\nRaja Abdul Rauf Khan, Advocate for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE through Advocate General of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad-Appellant\nVS\nMUHAMMAD TASADDAQ-Accused-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25214", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3728 = 2024 SLD 3728 = 2024 PLJ 70", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODU", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu & Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977-\n-R. 17-Redesignation of post-Appointment of private respondent-No advertisement-Confirmation of-Valuation of procedure-Private respondent was assigned additional charge-Stop gap arrangement due to leave of concerned official-Seniority list-Direction to-Post of Assistant Engineer was downgraded and re-designated as Sub Engineer by President of AJK and official respondents appointed private Respondent No. 5 on permanent basis as Sub Engineer-After re-designation of post, private respondent had been confirmed without adopting procedure provided in law-Petition partly accepted. [P. 74 & 75] A & B\nAzad Jammu & Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977-\n-R. 17-Appointment-Any post which is to be filled in on permanent basis must be advertised and any appointment which has been made without advertisement aven then same has been made on recommendations of respective selection committee, shall be void.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 534 of 2019, decided on 21.2.2024, heard on: 21.2.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Liaqat Hussain, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Maqsood Ahmed Sulehria, Advocate for Petitioner.\nNemo for official Respondents.\nMr. Ikhlaq Hussain Mughal, Advocate for Respondent No. 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ARIF SULEHRIA, SUB-ENGINEER BS-11, D.A.M. MUZAFFARABAD-Petitioner\nVS\nAZAD GOVERNMENT through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25215", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3729 = 2024 SLD 3729 = 2024 PLJ 78", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODQ", - "Key Words:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4 & 18-Acquisition of land-Fixation of compensation-Filing of reference for enhancement of compensation-Partly accepted-Question of whether Compensation fixed by reference Court was justified and reasonable or not-Commercial nature of acquired land-Announcement of award after two years of execution of sale deed-Entitlement of petitioner-Witnesses produced by petitioner had categorically deposed that acquired land was of commercial nature and that fact had also been admitted by witnesses produced by respondents-Land has been acquired and sufficient to hold that land was of commercial nature and can be used for business purposes in future-Exh.PA had been executed whereas impugned award had been announced after about two years of said sale deed-Prices of land hiked day by day, petitioner was entitled to get\nRs. 60,000/- per marla besides 15% CAC because compensation was a wider term as compare to price, appellant was entitled to be compensated according to price for which a land owner was willing to sell and other to purchase-Appeal accepted.\n 2017 SCR 915 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=4,18", - "Case #": "C.As. Nos. 81-A & 132 of 2020, decided on 23.2.2024, heard on: 23.2.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Chaudhary Khalid Rasheed, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Amjad Ali Khan, Advocate for Appellant/Respondent.\nMr. Asad Abbasi, Advocate for Respondents/Appellants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR through Chief Secretary Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad\nand others-Appellants\nVS\nSyed ABID ALI GILLANI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25216", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3730 = 2024 SLD 3730 = 2024 PLJ 82", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDOC8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLI of 2001)-\n-S. 233-Education Cess Act, 1975, Ss. 3(b), 3(d) & 3(c)-Charging of education cess-Issuance of orders-Tax laibility-Alternate remedy-Maintainability-Cause of action-Delegation of powers-Legislative body was not arrayed as party-Petitioner had challenged vires of law i.e. Education Cess Act 1975 but had failed to array necessary parties in line of respondents-AJK Legislative Assembly and Azad Govt. were necessary parties in lis-The petitioner had switched over and bypassed statutory Appellate Fora provided by Act 1975-It was trite that vires of law cannot be questioned in collateral proceedings-Petitioner in order to got relief against impugned assessment order opted to attack law at random-An adverse finding cannot be recorded against a person at his back-Legislative body had not arrayed as party; writ was not competent on that sole score-In pursuance of powers conferred under Section 3B and 3D of AJK Education Cess Act 1975, Commissioner Income Tax delegated powers to different tax authorities-Petition dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=233", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 90 of 2019, decided on 1.2.2024, heard on: 1.2.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Shahid Bahar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Mohammad Munir Raja/Muhammad Najeeb Raja, Advocates for Petitioner.\nHaji Mohammad Afzal Khan, Advocate for Respondents No. 3 & 4.\nMr. Abdul Qayyum Sabri, AAG for State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOHAMMAD WAQAS MALIK-Petitioner\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR through Principal Secretary Azad Jammu and Kashmir Secretariat Muzaffarabad\nand others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25217", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3731 = 2024 SLD 3731 = 2024 PLJ 86", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDOCs", - "Key Words:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4 & 8-Acquisition of land-Mangla Dam raising project-Assessment of compensation-Filing of reference-Objections-Dismissal of reference-Evacuee property-Register allottment-Entitlement of allottees-Cause of action-Challenge to-Register allotment which was very obvious as names of all three allottees were clearly mentioned in allotment-The Reference Judge did not accept that document on ground that village and district of land had not been illuminated-Observation of Reference Judge was against record-Plaintiffs also proved through cogent and reliable documentary evidence that earlier compensation of allotted land was paid to allottees in equal shares while on other hand, respondents failed to place on record any proof to prove that Farzand Begum has already received compensation of her whole share-Allottees were entitled to receive whole compensation amount assessed by Collector-The judgment was delivered by Custodian Evacuee Property and reference was presented before Collector Land Acquisition was within limitation-No notice under Act was issued to petitioners, hence limitation would start from date of knowledge of petitioners, so reference was within limitation-Petitioners were allottees of land in equal shares, hence had got a cause of action to file reference as compensation was assessed solely in favour of Nazir Ahmed-Appeal allowed.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=4,8", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 69 of 2020, decided on 8.2.2024, heard on: 8.2.2024.heard on: 8.2.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Chaudhary Khalid Rasheed, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Ejaz Nazir, Advocate for Appellants.\nRaja Muhammad Shafique, Advocate for Respondents.\nMr. Javaid Najam-us-Saqib, Advocate for WAPDA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAVAID IQBAL MIRZA and others-Appellants\nVS\nABDUL RAUF KHAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25218", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3732 = 2024 SLD 3722 = 2024 PLJ 91", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODk", - "Key Words:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894)-\n-Ss. 4 & 18-Acquisition of land-Filing of reference-Accepted-Determination of compensation-Issuance of award-Meager compensation-Enhancement of compensation-Entitlement of enhanced compensation-The average price of land comes to Rs. 4,20,000/-That sale-deed had much relevancy for determination of compensation- The petitioner was bound by statement of her witness-Court below had appreciated evidence in a legal fashion and rightly declared landowner as entitled to get Rs. 4,20,000/- per marla-The argument advanced by counsel for respondents that respondents in appeal No. were also entitled to get Rs. 10,00,000/- per marla as had been ordered had also got no substance because respondents accepted judgment of Court below and had not filed appeal before High Court and even did not file cross objections, thus argument was repelled-The parties who were declared entitled to get enhanced compensation though not approached Court directly but case on their behalf was filed in representative capacity-Appeals dismissed. \nCompensation-\n-It is a celebrated precept of law that compensation cannot be fixed merely on oral statements rather through oral statements in references, location, nature and potential value of acquired land as well as land sold through sale deeds produced by landowners has to be established and for determining compensation, sale deeds of concerned village have to give weight.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=4,18", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 265, 266, 270 of 2019, decided on 23.2.2024, heard on: 21.2.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Chaudhary Khalid Rasheed, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Muhammad Arif Rathore, Advocate for Appellants (in Appeals No. 265/2019 and 266/2019).\nMr. Shahzad Siddique Janjua, Advocate for Respondents No. 2 to 6 (in Appeal No. 266/2019).\nMr. Shahzad Siddique Janjua, Advocates for Appellants (in Appeal No. 270/2019).\nChaudhary A. Naeem, Advocate for Respondents No. 1 to 10 (in Appeal No. 265/2019).", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Military Estate Officer Muzaffarabad, Shoukat Lines Muzaffarabad etc.\nVS\nMUHAMMAD IMTIAZ and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25219", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3733 = 2024 SLD 3733 = 2024 SLD 95", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDODg", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-Misconduct-Inquiry report-Penalty for halting promotion for three years-Allegation of mala fide-Lack of legal efficacy-Role of petitioner-Allegation gains-There is nothing on record to prove that petitioner had filed applications on behalf of complainants for ill gotten gains-It was not evident from inquiry report that how and from where petitioner had obtained stamp of lecturer or whether he stamped it or not-Signatures and stamp were put on documents by person who handed over said documents to petitioner because benefit of every doubt had to be resolved in favour of accused and in such case conviction was not warranted-Petitioner took correspondence from Line Superintendant for submitting same in office of Ombudsman did not fall within definition of misconduct-It was also relevant to mark that in order of President of State of Jammu & Kashmir while deciding appeal filed by petitioner herein had observed that allegation of mala fide and putting forged signatures and stamp had not been endorsed-Petition accepted. [Pp. 97 & 98] A, B, C, D, E & F\nMisconduct-\n-Omission to do an act or not to do an act is negligence which would not constitute misconduct and every act of negligence cannot be termed as misconduct.\n2005 PLC (CS) 67 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 506 of 2020, decided on 23.2.2024, heard on: 23.2.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Chaudhary Khalid Rasheed, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Abdul Sami Khan, Advocate for Petitioner.\nMr. Haider Rasheed Mughal, AAG for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD IDREES KHAN, ASSTT. B-16, Office of Mohtasib (Ombudsman) AJ&K MUZAFFARABAD-Petitioner\nVS\nMOHTASIB (OMBUDSMAN) AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR through Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25220", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3734 = 2024 SLD 3734 = 2024 PLJ 99", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDOHo", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Pension) Rules, 1971-\n-Rr. 5.1 & 5.2-AJK Interim Constitution, (VIII of 1974), Art. 44-Retirement after superannuation-Non-payment of pensionary benefits-Obligation of-Direction to-petitioner was retired from service in year 2017 as Junior Clerk but his pension payment order had not been finalized after passing many years till today-All concerned authorities were under legal obligation to sanction pension a month before date of retirement-This statutory provision had been ignored which resulted into creating hardships and anomalous situations and agony for retiring petitioner-Petition accepted. \n2015 SCR 1396 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 759-A of 2020, decided on 19.1.2024, heard on: 19.1.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Shahid Bahar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Humayun Nawaz Khan, Advocate for Petitioner.\nRepresentative of Education Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD BASHIR KHAN-Petitioner\nVS\nAZAD GOVT. OF THE STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR through its Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25221", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3735 = 2024 SLD 3755 = 2024 PLJ 103", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDOHk", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-Acquisition of land for construction of Mangla Dam-Azad Government was owner of acquired land-Funds was provided by WAPDA-WAPDA was only possessor of acquired land-Transfer of acquired land in favour of MDA-MDA was allotted residential and commercial plots-WAPDA was received consideration amount to CDA for acquired land-Bona fide purchaser-Obtaining of NOC-WAPDA had received consideration amount from MDA and after receiving consideration amount possession lies with MDA, hence, WAPDA had no concern with land in question after withdrawal from his possession-No cause of action to file instant writ petition-MDA had sold land to many State Subjects and State Subjects are bona fide purchaser of disputed land-If there is any dispute between WAPDA and MDA, bona fide purchaser could not be penalized because a right has accrued to petitioners to keep possession of land and use same for any purpose for which he\nwas authorized under law-According to rights pertaining to year 1991-92 suit land was owned by Government of AJK and WAPDA was not owner of land-DM issued NOC after obtaining reports from concerned quarters, so WAPDA had no authority to interfere in disputed plots of petitioners-The only dispute between MDA and WAPDA was regarding price of land which could be claimed by WAPDA by filing a civil suit before Court of competent jurisdiction or through negotiation between both institutions-No citizen can be grilled by authorities in such like situation-Order accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. Nos. 53 & 3452 of 2023, decided on 6.1.2024, heard on: 6.1.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sadaqat Hussain Raja, C.J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Qamar Idrees, Advocate on behalf of WAPDA.\nMr. Aurangzaib Chaudhary, Advocate for Petitioner.\nMr. Frooq Akbar Kiani, Advocate for Respondents No. 1 to 12/Mirpur Development Authority in Writ Petition No. 53/2023.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHAIRMAN WAPDA through Director (Legal) WAPDA, WAPDA House Lahore and others-Petitioners\nVS\nSyed IKRAM SHAH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25222", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3736 = 2024 SLD 3766 = 2024 PLJ 110", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDc", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 9, 42 & 54-Land Revenue Act, (XVII of 1967), Ss. 53 & 172-Rectification proceedings-Petitioner was participated in rectification proceedings-Proceedings were challenged-Jurisdiction of Civil Court-Suit for declaration recovery of possession, perpetual injunction-Application for rectification in revenue record-Accepted-Suit was decreed-Appeal-Allowed-Challenge to-The plaintiff, admittedly, participated in proceedings and on failure, he had approached civil Court for redressal of his grievance-Private respondents moved an application for rectification, which was allowed by concerned revenue officer-Appellant, in order to assail said mater of correction went up-to Board of Revenue but could not succeed, meaning thereby, that proper fora vested with Jurisdiction had been exhausted by appellant-The matter in hand might be dealt with under section 53 of Land Revenue Act, 1967, by Civil Court and that’s why, Senior Civil Judge was of view that civil Court is vested with powers to look into sanctity of orders passed by officers of Courts of revenue hierarchy-Appellant, herein, failed to bring on record any illegality in rectification proceedings but learned trial Judge, beyond any proof and assigning any cogent reason has questioned sanctity and veracity of rectification proceedings, so, judgment of trial Judge, was not sustainable in eye of law, which had rightly been turned down by Additional District Judge-Appeal dismissed. \nPresumption-\n-Presumption of lack of Jurisdiction may not be gathered until, specific law debars civil Court from exercising its Jurisdiction with specific remedy within hierarchy, which may attain finality of order or controversy involved. \nLand Revenue Act, 1967 (XVII of 1967)-\n-S. 172-Jurisdiction-Section 172 of Land Revenue Act, 1967 bars Jurisdiction of Civil Court regarding matters of correction of entries of revenue record.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=9,42,54Land Revenue Act, 1967 (XVII of 1967)=53,172", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 47 of 2017, decided on 20.12.2023, heard on: 20.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mian Arif Hussain, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Chaudhary Muhammad Afzal, Advocate for Appellant.\nChaudhary Tehseen Ahmed, Advocate for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAMEER AHMED-Appellant\nVS\nASIF MEHMOOD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25223", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3737 = 2024 SLD 3737 = 2024 PLJ 117", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDY", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-General Clauses Act, (X of 1897), S. 24-A-Temporary appointment-Regularization of Service-Creation of post of sanitary supervisors-Criteria of promotion-Constitution of Selection Committee-Power of to appoint-Fundamental right-Entitlement to equal protection-Discrimination-The petitioner was only person who fulfilled requisite qualification as his qualification was Matric and was serving as Sanitary Worker since 2007-The petitioner was eligible to be promoted against post of Sanitary Supervisor but he was ignored despite fact that he was Matric and had a vast experience in relevant field-The petitioner had been divested of his lawful right of promotion by impugned order thus, same was not sustainable in eye of law-No plausible ground or reasoning had been given by relevant quarters as to why petitioner was meted out with discriminatory treatment- All State Subjects are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law and there shall be no discrimination against any State Subject on basis of sex-Petition accepted.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44General Clauses Act, 1897=24-A", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 1309 of 2020, decided on 11.6.2024, heard on: 11.6.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Shahid Bahar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Gohar Altaf Khan, Advocate for Petitioner.\nRaja Gull Majeed Khan, Legal Advisor for University of AJ&K, Muzaffarabad.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAMEED MASIH\nVS\nUNIVERSITY OF AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Vice Chancellor University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir\nand others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25224", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3738 = 2024 SLD 3738 = 2024 PLJ 123", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDU", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-Purchasing of plot from proforma respondent-Petitioner was exclusive owner of Plot No. 8-A/1-Allotment of Plot No. 8-B adjacent to petitioner’s plot-Claim of respondent regarding plot of petitioner on basis of adjacent land-Civil suit-Rejected-Appeal-Dismissed-Inquiry Commission-Matter was pending before allotment committee-Allotment committee was not arrayed as party-Direction to- M.D.A after revising and scrutinizing records of plots passed a detailed order whereby it was held that Plot\nNo. 8-A/1 was an independent plot and petitioner was a conclusive owner of Plot No. 8-A/1- Respondents No. 15 filed a review petition against order dated 14.02.2012 in M.D.A which was dismissed-Stance taken by official quarters was seemingly tricky and vague, according to version of Respondent No. 11,12,13 matter was pending adjudication before Allotment Committee-High Court normally avoid to take up any matter qua adjudication, where matter involved a factual inquiry and scrutiny of respective claims of parties-Factual inquiry is a track of evidence where rival claims are probed by collecting evidence-Allotment Committee has not been arrayed as party in list, High Court inclined to array Allotment Committee of MDA as party in writ petition and directed relevant competent authority including Allotment Committee to do needful qua deciding matter in transparent fashion and judicious manner completely in accordance with law by providing full opportunity of hearing to both parties-Petitions disposed of.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 264 of 2018, decided on 6.12.2023, heard on: 6.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Shahid Bahar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Muhammad Farooq Minhas, Zulfiqar Ahmed Raja and Qazi Adnan Qayyum, Advocate for Petitioner.\nLegal Advisor on behalf of Respondents No. 9 and 10.\nRaja Khalid Mahmood Khan, Advocate for Respondents\nNo. 11 to 15.\nMr. Farooq Akbar Kiani, Advocate for MDA/Respondents No. 7 and 8.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL MAJEED-Petitioner\nVS\nAZAD GOVT. OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR MUZAFFARABAD, through Secretary Physical Planning Housing having its office at new Secretariat Muzaffarabad\nand others-" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25225", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3739 = 2024 SLD 3799 = 2024 PLJ 131", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Arts. 44 & 52-A-General Clauses Act, 1897, S. 24-A-Jari power project-Feasibility report-Letter of interest was issued-Issuance of NOC-Execution of irrevocable water use agreement-Initiation of another project by Respondent No. 2-Cancellation of NOC-Doctrine of audi alteram partem-Sovereign powers-Right of sponsor-Impugned notification and proceedings in furtherance of same are not in accordance with law-NOC already issued in favour of petitioner in accordance with law, which could not be cancelled by respondents-Issuance of impugned notification was clear cut violation of doctrine of Audi alteram partem which is universally accepted and time honoured golden principle of law; besides that notification is also without lawful authority-As per law things which requires to be performed any particular manner can only be performed as indicated in law otherwise performance or execution of same was nullity in eye of law-Jari Project Site was identified, planned, studied designed and developed by petitioner, who were working there since year 1992-The respondents could not initiate a project in Public Sector at a site where already an agreement has been concluded and executed between President of AJ & K for and on behalf of Azad Government of State of and petitioner under sovereign powers conferred through Article 52(A) of AJ & K Interim Constitution, 1974-The petitioner had a prima-facie case for development of project under its sponsorship, right of sponsor to proceed with development plan in private sector on additional releases of water was genuinely established from relevant record-Petition accepted.\n Ref. 2009 PTD 37.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44,52-AGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=24-A", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 788 of 2013, decided on 29.11.2023, heard on: 29.11.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Shahid Bahar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdul Rasheed Abbasi, Advocate for Petitioner.\nMs. Rahat Farooq, Advocate for Respondents No. 10 & 11.\nCh. Mohammad Manzoor, A.A.G for State.\nMr. Salma Tariq Khan Sadozai, Legal Advisor for Board of Revenue Legal Advisor for PP&H Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. KOHSAR HYDROPOWER (PVT). LTD. through Chief Executive, Mirpur-Petitioner\nVS\nAZAD GOVT. OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25226", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3740 = 2024 SLD 3740 = 2024 SLD 142", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNC8", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-Lease agreement-Cancellation of lease-Report of commission-Writ petition against cancellation of lease-Dismissed-Appeal-Dismissed by apex Court-Construction of shops and poltry farm on lease land-Concealment of facts regarding previous litigation-Non fulfillment of prerequisites of lease agreement- The petitioner did not fulfil prerequisites of lease agreement and illegally and against lease agreement and conditions got possession over land-He with connivance of politicians, time and again issued notification pertaining to lease of land in his favour, which clearly shows his conduct and behavior that how much he abides by law-No illegality or perversity had been committed by authority while issuing same, hence, petition in hand was devoid of any force was liable to be dismissed- The petitioner concealed material facts from High Court particularly regarding previous judgment passed by High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court of AJK-It is trite law that ill-gotten gain cannot be protected through equitable relief of writ-Allotment was cancelled on report of inquiry Commission and impugned notification was self-explanatory, well-reasoned and self-speaking, hence, requires no indulgence at all.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 96 of 2009, decided on 5.12.2023, heard on: 5.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Shahid Bahar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Mohammad Afzal, Advocate for Petitioner.\nMr. Zaffar Hussain Mirza, Hafiz Arshid Mehmood, Laieeq\nMr. Mehmood Amir and Waqas Toqeer Nasir, Advocates for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ch. MOHAMMAD RASHID-Petitioner\nVS\nAZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR through its Chief Secretary Muzaffarabad and 89 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25227", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3741 = 2024 SLD 3741 = 2024 PLJ 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNCs", - "Key Words:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (XXV of 1997)-\n-Ss. 9, 14 & 15-Ephedrine quota to some pharmaceutical Firms/Companies-Complainant on inquiry-Acquittal of-Ministry of Health, Islamabad, issued Ephedrine quota to some pharmaceutical Firms/Companies by bypassing the routine procedure-Ministry of Health collected records of 99 companies, including 28 Pharmaceutical companies, which previously did not obtain Ephedrine; neither they were allocated nor used the same-Ephedrine was sold out to narcotics smugglers and gained illegal money-As per the prosecution, the accused persons were involved in the smuggling and misusing of Ephedrine-Complaint was prepared based on an inquiry about the illegal use of Ephedrine-The registration of the FIR initiates every criminal trial in the instant case before the registration of FIR, the inquiry was conducted-Quota of Ephedrine 500 Kgs was lawfully allotted to the appellant-Prosecution failed to bring on the record any material evidence showing that the appellant got Ephedrine over the prescribed limit-Discrepancies/overwriting/ interpolations, as observed by us, cast serious doubt on the genuineness of the statements-The invoices were not signed or stamped by anyone-Defence put objections on all these documents in the testimony of Joint Director/PW-33-PW-35/the investigating officer-Questions put to the accused in the examination under Section 342 of Cr.P.C. did not focus on the evidence on record-Non-indications of inculpatory material in its relevant facets by the trial court to the accused adds to the vulnerability of the prosecution case-As per the prosecution case, tablets De-ASM had not been manufactured-Prosecution failed to establish that the appellant had sold the ephedrine to any smugglers and obtained illegal gain-There is no material on record to show that the raw Ephedrine was found in possession of appellant-Prosecution failed to establish that misused the ephedrine quota or illegally used the same in producing any psychotropic substance-Before registration of the instant criminal case, the fact of sending of samples was not in his knowledge. Before receipt of the result, they registered the FIR-If during inquiry proceedings PW-33, received the information that PW-16 collected samples of De-Asm tablets (secured from Arfat traders) on instructions of ANF Karachi and sent to the testing laboratory and after that received its report, the FIR should not have been registered-Appellant’s company had not used 3.7 Kg of Ephedrine-Appellant’s company utilized all the Ephedrine quota, whereas the minor quantity could have been wasted during manufacturing-Prosecution has miserably failed to bring on record any iota of material from which it could be proved that the quota of Ephedrine allotted to the appellant’s company was misused, sold, distributed, delivered, transported, or smuggled in violation of the above rules-The conviction cannot be upheld, and findings in this regard are required to be set aside, and the same are set aside and as a consequence of which, the appellant, is ordered to be acquitted of the charge\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-S. 154-Inquiry before registration of criminal case-There is no concept of conducting an inquiry on receiving information disclosing cognizable offence before registration of the criminal case under Section 154 Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. \nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-S. 154-Cognizable offence-If any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer-in-charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154 of Cr.P.C., the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case based on such information.\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-S. 154-Cognizable offence-The officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation. \nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-S. 154-Pre-investigative inquiry-There is no specific provision where pre-investigative inquiry is either expressly permitted-Except under Section 174, Cr.P.C., as regards unnatural death. \nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 154 & 155(2)-Non-cognizable offence-If the offence is non-cognizable, the investigating officer has no jurisdiction to take any further steps regarding the investigation without the leave of the Court by the provision of Section 155 (2) of the Code. \nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-S. 164-Special Magistrate PW-30, recorded statements under Section 164, Cr.P.C. of the appellants-During the physical remand was produced before Special Magistrate PW-30, and his statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. was recorded. \nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 337 to 339-Criminal Procedure Code, (V of 1898), S. 494-Section 494 of Cr.P.C., Public Prosecutor may, with the court’s consent before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried-Special Prosecutor for ANF has not approached the court to withdraw prosecution against the appellants-The purpose of tendering pardon to an accomplice is mainly to un-reveal the truth in a grave offence so that the guilt of other accused persons concerned in committing a crime could be brought home-The object of Section 337 of Cr.P.C. is to allow pardon in cases where a heinous offence is alleged to have been committed by several persons so that with the aid of the evidence of the person granted pardon, the evidence may be brought home to the rest-The Magistrate 1st Class is also empowered to tender pardon to an accomplice during the trial but not at the stage of investigation on condition of his making full and true disclosure of entire circumstances within his knowledge relative to the crime-Section 338 of Cr.P.C. vests the court to which the commitment is made with the power to tender pardon to an accomplice-Prosecution has not adopted the procedure under Section 337 of Cr.P.C. for recording the accomplice’s statement-Prosecution, by way of concealment of facts, has cheated Special Magistrate (PW-30), and got recorded statements u/S. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code of appellants and the same were rightly not relied upon by the Trial Judge and revoked the pardon granted to these appellants-Appellants admitted the facts which favour them, but at the same time, they tried to twist them to save their skins and shift the responsibilities on the principal accused. \nControl of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (XXV of 1997)-\n-Ss. 9, 14 & 15-Ephedrine quota-Accused persons have been assigned the role of abetting, associating and aiding the principal accused but none of the prosecution witnesses while appearing in the dock in the Courtroom uttered even a single word in what manner the said accused persons abetted, associated or aided the principal accused-Possibility cannot be ruled out that they were booked in this case to tighten the noose of the principal accused-After acquitted, an accused earns a double presumption of innocence, which can only be repelled/overturned if the acquittal order/judgment appears perverse, arbitrary, capricious, or patently illegal-Impugned judgment qua acquittal of co-accused does not fall under any of the above parameters; as such, were not inclined to intervene with the same. [P. 49] GG, HH & II\n2009 SCMR 1232; 2010 SCMR 222 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9,14,15Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=154,155(2),337,339", - "Case #": "Crl. A. Nos. 663, 684, 685, 834, 747 of 2018, decided on 18.10.2023, heard on: 17.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Miss Aalia Neelum and Asjad Javaid Ghural, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Tanveer Iqbal, Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon, Azam Nazir Tarrar, Hafeez-ur-Rehman Ch. and Ch. Shaharyar Tariq, Advocates for Appellants.\nMr. Muhammad Hanif Abbasi in Person.\nMr. Zafar Iqbal Chohan, Special Prosecutor for ANF for State", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD HANIF ABBASI and others-Appellants\nVS\nSTATE etc.-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25228", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3742 = 2024 SLD 3742 = 2024 PLJ 50", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDk", - "Key Words:": "Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302 & 34-Qatl-e-amd-Delay in FIR-Delay in post mortem examination-Bodily intervention to apprehend appellants-Mouth and eyes opened-Improved statement-Motive-Benefit of doubt-Acquittal of-Delay in lodging FIR is shouting louder than everything-Delayed reporting matter to police but also of delayed post mortem examination-PW-8 though claimed during his cross-examination that his house was at a distance of 3 squares from place of occurrence-Considerable delay in lodging FIR-Alleged eye witnesses have been three male participants while two appellants have been now not armed with any bold weapon to terrify them from saving deceased individuals-Mouth and eyes of deceased had been found opened-Mouth and eyes of deceased had been found opened-No person had afflicted to close eyes and mouth-Statement of any witness improved at trial is not worth relying -Neither he (PW12) investigated motive part of occurrence nor he gave any finding with regard to motive-Finding of guilt against an accused person cannot be based merely on high probabilities-Conviction and sentences are set aside and they are acquitted-Appeal accepted. [Pp, 58, 62, 64, 65 & 66] A, B, C, D, E, F, I, J, K, L\n2022 SCMR 1567; 2023 SCMR 596; 2023 SCMR 670 ref.\nDelay in post mortem-\n-Delay in post mortem of 22 and 24 hours casts doubt in veracity of prosecution version. [P. 58] B\n2020 SCMR 192; 2021 SCMR 16; 2021 SCMR 810; 2022 SCMR 393 ref.\nBodily intervention\n-Bodily intervention to apprehend appellants-Alleged eye witnesses have been three male participants while two appellants have been now not armed with any bold weapon to terrify them from saving deceased individuals-Eye witnesses had been neither present on spot at applicable time, nor they had witnessed occurrence. \n \n2008 SCMR 95; 2015 SCMR 315; 2017 SCMR 596; 2018 SCMR 326; 2021 SCMR 471; 2022 SCMR 1358 ref.\nMouth and eyes-\n-Mouth and eyes of deceased had been found opened-This fact shows that no person had afflicted to close eyes and mouth. \n \n2017 SCMR 486; 2017 SCMR 2002; 2019 SCMR 1068 ref.\nMedical evidence-\n-Medical evidence may confirm ocular evidence with regard to seat of injury, nature of injury, kind of weapon used in occurrence but it would not connect accused with commission of offence. \n2019 SCMR 872; PLD 2021 SC 600; 1993 SCMR 550 ref.\nImproved statement-\n-Statement of any witness improved at trial is not worth relying rather such improvement creates serious doubt. \n2010 SCMR 385 ref.\nRecovery-\n-It does not appeal to a prudent mind that after committing incident, said appellants would keep weapons of offence, i.e. club, kassi and safa, stained with human blood, in safe custody for about 27 days as they had ample opportunity during above mentioned period to destroy such a corroborative evidence. \n1995 SCMR 1735; 2009 SCMR 120; 2016 SCMR 2138 ref.\nBenefit of doubt-\n-Benefit of that doubt is to be given to accused person as of right, not as of concession. \n2022 SCMR 1540; 2022 SCMR 1567; 2023 SCMR 781;\n2023 SCMR 670 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=302,34", - "Case #": "Crl. A. No. 245 of 2021, heard on 10.5.2023, heard on: 10.5.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Tariq Nadeem, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Syed Zeeshan Haider and Tahir Mehmood Jatoi, Advocates for Appellants.\nMr. Zafar Iqbal Somro, Deputy District Public Prosecutor for State\nNemo for Complainant", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL GHAFFAR, etc.-Appellants\nVS\nSTATE, etc.-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25229", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3743 = 2024 SLD 3743", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJDNDg", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 167/435/439-A/561-A-Pakistan Penal Code, (XLV of 1860), Ss. 420, 468, 471, 161, 162/34-Prevention of Corruption Act, (II of 1947), S. 5(2)-Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, (XL of 1958), Ss. 3 & 6(1)-Remand order-Revision petition-Order of magistrate, whereby, he refused to allow physical remand, being executive order, is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction, being executive order is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction-An order passed by the Magistrate refusing remand is a judicial function and u/S. 435 of the Code, the Court superior to the one refusing remand can exercise jurisdiction of revision-Order for refusal of remand is outcome of judicial function-Any illegality or irregularity is committed, revision jurisdiction u/s 435 read with Section 439-A of the Code can be exercised-Court of Sessions can decide a revision petition arising out of the order of refusal of physical remand-No ground convincing to exercise inherent powers of Section 561-A of the Code, to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of any Court, is made out-Petition, fails.\n2017 MLD 1319; 2009 PCr.LJ 705; 2005 PCr.LJ 1709; 2005 YLR 805; 2005 YLR 805; 2001 MLD 1459]\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-S. 4(m)-“Judicial proceeding”-Judicial proceeding includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. \nAIR 1953 CAL 661 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=167/435/439-A/561-APakistan Penal Code, 1860=420,468,471,161,162/34Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=5(2)", - "Case #": "Crl. Misc. No. 40242-M of 2023, decided on 18.9.2023. Dates of hearing: 15.09.2023 and 18.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Asif Mehmood Cheema, Chaudhary Muhammad Farman Manais, Mukhtar Ahmad Ranjha, Safdar Hayat Bosal and Mohsan Rabbani, Advocates for Petitioner.\nMr. Abdul Samad Khan, Addl. Prosecutor General. Mr.Ghulam Sarwar Nehang, Addl. Advocate General, Mr. Farrukh Khan Lodhi, Malik Muhammad Tahir, Mr. Idrees Bhatti and Mr. Salman Asif Warraich, Assistant Advocates General with Jam Salah-ud-Din, Director (Legal), Anti-Corruption, Muhammad Riaz Chaudhary, Deputy Director Legal (Anti-Corruption Headquarter), Abdul Majeed Deputy Director Legal, Muhammad Asghar, Circle Officer, Sabtain Shah, I.O., Rizwan Deputy Director Investigation, Gujranwala and Khalid Mehmood Circle Officer, Lahore. Rana Sir Buland Khan, and Mir Haroon-ur-Rashid, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents Nos. 2 & 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PARVEZ ELAHI-Petitioner\nVS\nADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25230", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3853 = 2024 SLD 3853 = 2024 SCMR 1520", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpYzg", - "Key Words:": "Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016)-\n-Ss. 20, 21, 24 & 54-Electronic Transactions Ordinance (LI of 2002), Ss. 36 & 37-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 500, 506 & 509-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 12-Harassing, threatening and blackmailing a female by sending her personal pictures on her cell phone through social media-Non-applicability of Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, and the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002-After trial proceedings commenced before the Judge, Prevention of Electronic Crimes Court (PECC), the Judge concluded that sections 36 and 37 of Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 ( ETO 2002 ) were not attracted to the facts of the instant case; the proceedings could not be continued under section 54 of Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA 2016) as the provisions of PECA 2016 were also not attracted for the reason that at the time of commission of alleged offences i.e. one year prior to the petitioners (complainants) application dated 03.08.2016 submitted by the petitioner to FIA for registration of FIR, PECA 2016 was not in field as it came into force on 18.08.2016-In view of the above conclusions, after deletion of sections 36 and 37 of ETO 2002, Judge PECC ordered to place the case file before Sessions Judge for its further entrustment to the court of competent jurisdiction-High Court maintained the order of the Judge PECC-Validity-Assent of the President of Pakistan was received on 18.08.2016 for promulgation of PECA 2016 and notification dated 19.08.2016 was published in the Gazette of Pakistan on 22.08.2016-Offences mentioned by the petitioner in her application dated 03.08.2016 were allegedly committed by respondent (accused) much prior to promulgation of PECA 2016-While providing protection against retrospective punishment, Article 12 of the Constitution lays down that no law shall authorize the punishment of a person for an act or omission that was not punishable by law at the time of the act or omission-Therefore, both the Courts below had not committed any illegality in rejecting the application of the petitioner for altering the charge/reading over the charge to respondent under sections 20, 21 and 24 of PECA 2016-Furthermore, allegations levelled by the petitioner against respondent in her application and the incriminating material collected during investigation did not attract sections 36 and 37 of ETO 2002 as respondent had neither attempted nor gained access to any information system with or without intent to acquire the information contained therein; he had neither attempted nor done any act with intent to alter, modify, delete, remove, generate, transmit, or store any information through or in any information system being not authorised to do so; he had neither attempted nor done any act to impair the operation of any information system; he had neither attempted nor done any act to prevent or hinder access to any information contained in any information system-Thus, both the Courts below had not committed any illegality in concluding that sections 36 and 37 of ETO 2002 were not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the instant case-Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=20,21,24,54Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002=36,37Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=500,506,509Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=12", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.128 of 2024, decided on 11th June, 2024.\n(On appeal against the order dated 04.12.2023 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in Criminal Revision No.163 of 2023).\nheard on: 24th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Muhammad Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, Addl. PG Pb. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. UZMA MUKHTAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through Deputy Attorney General and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25231", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3854 = 2024 SLD 3854 = 2024 SCMR 1413", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpY3o", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-After lodging the FIR promptly, the police party started its investigation-On the day after the incident, the Investigating Officer arrested the petitioner who himself surrendered in the police station and during the course of investigation the petitioner disclosed about the weapon of offence, .30 bore pistol, concealed in an under construction garage in the haveli near to his house and on his pointation said pistol along with magazine was taken into possession-Investigating Officer received a sworn affidavit by the brother of the petitioner qua the alleged incident-Investigating Officer also dispatched two firearm empties of .30 bore pistol, three lead bullets from the dead body and .30 bore pistol to the Forensic Science Laboratory-As per report of Forensic Science Laboratory, two crime cartridges collected by the Investigating Officer from the place of occurrence were found wedded with the pistol recovered on the pointation of the petitioner-Petitioner was last seen by brother of the deceased fleeing away from the place of occurrence after commission of offence as said witness was residing in a house adjacent to the petitioners house and the said incident was also notified by the petitioners brother through an affidavit-There was nothing on record in favour of the petitioner as his own brother through an affidavit had submitted that he had seen the petitioner fleeing away from the place of occurrence after commission of an offence and thereafter informed the complainant of the case about the incident-Prosecution had established its case against the petitioner beyond any shadow of doubt-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Sentence, quantum of- Mitigating circumstances-Motive not proved-In the absence of premeditation to commit murder where motive is not proved by the prosecution, the same may be considered as a mitigating factor in order to reduce the quantum of sentence in cases involving capital punishment.\nIftikhar Mehmood and another v. Qaiser Iftikhar and others 2011 SCMR 1165; Zeeshan Afzal alias Shani and another v. The State and others 2013 SCMR 1602 and Muhammad Yasin and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 128 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos.548 and 602 of 2020, decided on 21st May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 15.04.2020 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Criminal Appeal No.125 of 2018, Jail Appeal No.130 of 2018 and Murder Reference No.8 of 2018)heard on: 21st May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zulfiqar Abbas Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court (in Cr.P. No.548 of 2020) and Ch. Naseer Ahmed Tahir, Advocate Supreme Court (in Cr. P. No.602 of 2020) for Petitioners.\nFauzi Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court/State counsel.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHANZEB AKHTAR and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25232", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3855 = 2024 SLD 3855 = 2024 SCMR 1419", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpY3k", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 392-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Robbery-Bail, refusal of-In the FIR, allegation against the petitioner was that he inflicted chhuri/ dagger blows at the abdomen of the deceased/complainant, which proved fatal and the complainant succumbed to injuries on the following day-Through a supplementary statement of the deceased/ complainant, which was recorded by the police on the day of occurrence while the complainant was admitted in the hospital, he nominated the present petitioner to be the unknown culprit who committed the offence-Father of the deceased/ complainant and a prosecution witness after having seen the CCTV video of the occurrence showing petitioner stabbing the deceased/complainant, charged the petitioner for murder of the deceased in their statements recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C.-In the forensic video analysis made by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency of the CCTV video of the occurrence, no editing features were observed, hence the question of false implication did not arise in the instant matter-Cause of death, as recorded in the post-mortem report, was injuries to liver and major vessel of the abdomen-Recovered chhuri/ dagger, as per FSL report, was found to be stained with the human blood-In this way, the medical evidence and the recovery of crime weapon fully supported the prosecution case by connecting the petitioner with the commission of crime, which entailed capital punishment and fell within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Mere fact that the petitioner was a juvenile did not entitle him to the concession of bail as he was charged for a heinous offence, the punishment for which was death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for more than seven years-Petitioner was not entitled to the concession of bail-Bail application was, therefore, dismissed and leave was declined.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=392Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 199 of 2024, decided on 19th April, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 19.02.2024 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 286-P of 2024), heard on: 19th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, Musarrat Hillani and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zia-ur-Rahman Tajik, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nNemo for the Complainant.\nNemo for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KAMRAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25233", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3856 = 2024 SLD 3856 = 2024 SCMR 1421", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Un-natural death of deceased lady during the nigh in her house due to stab wound on her abdomen had not been disputed/denied by the defence-Statement of two prosecution witnesses confirmed that they both had immediately responded to the hue and cry of the deceased, then injured, who told them about churri (knife) blows inflicted by the petitioner/convict-Postmortem report of the deceased also confirmed that the deceased had sustained stab wound on her abdomen which had resulted into her death-According to the postmortem report, time between injury and death of the deceased was one hour and 35 minutes approximately, which confirmed that the deceased remained alive for a considerable period before reaching the hospital-Petition was dismissed, leave to appeal was refused, and conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the accused by the High Court was maintained.\n(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art.46-Dying declaration-Scope-Dying declaration is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case-To find out truth or falsity of a dying declaration, a case is generally to be considered in all its physical environment and circumstances-Dying declaration can be made before a private person but it should be free from any influence and the person before whom it is made has to be examined-It is necessary to ascertain that the dying declaration was made honestly, its maker was in a fit state of mind to make the statement, its maker was free from outside influence, its maker was fearing death and had made a truthful statement.\nFarmanullah v. Qadeem Khan 2001 SCMR 1474 and Majeed v. The State 2010 SCMR 55 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.46-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Case based on dying declaration of deceased-In the instant case, the dying declaration made by deceased before three prosecution witnesses implicating the petitioner/convict was supported/ corroborated by the inquest report, the Medico Legal Certificate (MLC), the postmortem report, the report of the chemical expert with regard to the blood stained clothes of the deceased and the surrounding circumstances-Petition was dismissed, leave to appeal was refused, and conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the accused by the High Court was maintained.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Mitigating circumstances-Recovery of weapon of offence disbelieved-Absence of motive-Single stab wound-Appellate Court/High Court had (rightly) disbelieved the recovery of Churri (knife) on the pointation of the petitioner/convict from an open place-Furthermore, absence of motive in the FIR, non-proving of the motive introduced by the prosecution witnesses at the trial about the desire of the petitioner/convict to marry the deceased prior to her marriage with a prosecution witness, and single stab wound on the abdomen of deceased had rightly been considered as mitigating circumstances by the High Court to award lessor sentence of imprisonment for life to the petitioner-Petition was dismissed, leave to appeal was refused, and conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the accused by the High Court was maintained.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.968 of 2017 and Criminal Petition No.891 of 2017, decided on 20th May, 2024. (0n appeal against the judgment dated 19.06.2017 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in Criminal Appeal No.154/2015, Jail Appeal No.153/2015, Crl. Revision No.23/2016 and M.R. No. 14 of 2015) heard on: 20th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Khalid Mehmood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in Crl. P. No. 968 of 2017).\nTalat Mahmood Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in Crl. P. No.891 of 2017).\nFauzi Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for the State (As State Counsel)", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAEED and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25234", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3857 = 2024 SLD 3857 = 2024 SCMR 1427", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Delay in lodging of FIR-Consequential-Formal FIR was registered at 8:10 a.m., approximately more than sixteen hours after the incident, despite the police station being only 16 km away from the scene of the occurrence-Nowhere in the entire evidence, the prosecution had explained the reason for the delay in reporting the matter to the Police with such a delay-Delayed FIR showed dishonesty on the part of the complainant and that it was lodged with deliberation and consultation-Prosecution case against the petitioner was doubtful-Jail petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and accused was acquitted of the charge.\nAmir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 566 ref.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S.302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Chance witnesses-Reason for presence of eye-witnesses at the spot and time of incident not established-Combined effect of the statements of the alleged eye-witnesses was that their presence at the scene at the relevant time was not natural-Therefore, it was mandatory for the said witnesses to justify their presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time with some cogent reasons-In order to justify their presence, two of the witnesses asserted that they were employees of person AH , a resident of the village where the alleged occurrence took place, but they did not produce any independent oral or documentary evidence to support this claim-Similarly, the complainant also did not justify his presence at the place of occurrence which was more than 100 kms away from his residence, especially when he admitted that he had no relation with the deceased-In light of the aforementioned facts, the alleged eye-witnesses could not justify their reasons for being at the place of occurrence at the relevant time-Therefore, they were chance witnesses, and their evidence was not free from doubt-Prosecution case against the petitioner was doubtful-Jail petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and accused was acquitted of the charge.\nMst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others 2015 SCMR 1142; Muhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta and others 2017 SCMR 142 and Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Sequence of events not appealing to reason-All the eye-witnesses uniformly stated that all ten accused persons, who were armed with deadly weapons, kept making indiscriminate firing, but they escaped by seeking cover behind the nearby trees-This sequence of events did not appeal to reason-Furthermore, the allegation of indiscriminate firing was also negated by the recovery memo, whereby only eleven empty cartridges were secured by the Investigating Officer from the place of the alleged occurrence-Prosecution case against the petitioner was doubtful-Jail petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and accused was acquitted of the charge.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Corroboratory evidence-Scope-Corroboratory evidence does not convert an unreliable witness, or evidence, into a reliable one.\nSalamat Mansha Masih v. The State and another PLD 2022 SC 751 ref.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Medical evidence-Scope-Where direct evidence is found to be unreliable or untrustworthy, a conviction cannot be sustained solely on the basis of medical evidence.\nHayatullah v. The State 2018 SCMR 2092; Aman Ullah and another v. The State and others 2023 SCMR 723 and Muhammad Hanif v. The State 2023 SCMR 2016 ref.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Motive not proved-Regarding motive prosecution submitted before High Court that the present petitioner was not an accused in a previous murder case involving the maternal uncle of the complainant-This fact was also confirmed by the complainant during his cross-examination before the Trial Court-Motive was a double-edged weapon, which could be used either way and by either side i.e. for real or false involvement-So, the motive asserted by the prosecution indicated that there was an enmity of murder between the parties and the said motive, being double edge, could be the reason for the false implication of the petitioner-Admittedly, the complainant had no relation with the deceased of the present case, yet he was vigilantly pursuing the case by filing a private complaint even after the petitioner was found innocent by the local police-Ordinarily, an individual with no direct relation to the victim might report a crime if witnessed, but would not usually remain actively involved beyond that initial action. Fact that the complainant was so invested in this case, despite having no apparent reason to be, raised questions about the motives behind his actions and, by extension, casted doubt over the prosecutions case-Evidence of motive was rightly not believed by the High Court for valid reasons which were not open to any exception-Prosecution case against the petitioner was doubtful-Jail petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and accused was acquitted of the charge.\nNoor Elah v. Zafarul Haque PLD 1976 SC 557; Allah Bakhsh v. The State PLD 1978 SC 171; Khadim Hussain v. The State 2010 SCMR 1090; Tahir Khan v. The State 2011 SCMR 646; Tariq v. The State 2017 SCMR 1672 and Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652 ref.\n(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Recovery of weapon on pointation of accused-Absence of forensic report of firearm-So far as the recovery of a single barrel gun on the pointation of the petitioner was concerned, the High Court had rightly disbelieved the same in the absence of any positive report of the firearm expert-Even otherwise, it was highly unsafe to rely on the evidence of recovery, which even otherwise was a corroborative piece of evidence and relevant only when the primary evidence i.e. ocular account inspired confidence, whereas in the present case the ocular account was doubtful-Prosecution case against the petitioner was doubtful-Jail petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and accused was acquitted of the charge.\nNasir Javaid and another v. The State 2016 SCMR 1144; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. The State and others 2016 SCMR 267 and Hayatullah v. The State 2018 SCMR 2092 ref.\n(h) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Once a single loophole/lacuna is observed in a case presented by the prosecution, the benefit of such loophole/lacuna in the prosecution case automatically goes in favour of an accused.\nDaniel Boyd (Muslim Name Saifullah) and another v. The State 1992 SCMR 196; Gul Dast Khan v. The State 2009 SCMR 431; Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652; Abdul Jabbar and another v. The State 2019 SCMR 129; Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64 and Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 120 of 2017 and Cr. Petition No.305-L of 2017, decided on 16th May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 17.01.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Cr.A. No.652-J of 2016 and M.R. No. 147 of 2013).\nheard on: 16th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in J.P. No. 120 of 2017).\nNemo for Petitioner (in Cr.P. No.305-L of 2017).\nNemo for the Complainant (in J.P. No. 120 of 2017).\nMirza Abdul Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD HASSAN and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25235", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3858 = 2024 SLD 3858 = 2024 SCMR 1437", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 6-Terrorism-Scope-To constitute an offence of a terrorism, it is necessary that; firstly, the action must fall within the ambit of sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ( ATA of 1997 ); and secondly, the intent, motivation, object, design and purpose behind the said act has any nexus with the ingredients of clauses (b) and (c) of section 6(1) of the ATA of 1997-To formulate an opinion whether or not such offence is an act of terrorism, the allegations made in the FIR, material collected during the investigation and the evidence available on the record have to be considered on the touchstone of section 6 of the ATA of 1997, as a whole-In the absence of any of the ingredients of section 6 of the ATA of 1997, any action, irrespective of its heinousness, causing terror or creating sense of fear and insecurity in the society, does not fall within the ambit of terrorism.\n(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 13 & Third Sched.-Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC), jurisdiction of-Scope-Heinous offences-Section 13 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ( ATA of 1997 )provides dual power to the ATC i.e., to try the offences falling under the ATA of 1997 and try heinous offences, which otherwise do not fall within the definition of a terrorism, but are included in the Third Schedule to the ATA of 1997 by the government.\n(c) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-Ss. 6(1), 6(2)(e) & 7(e)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-A-Kidnapping for ransom-Whether an act of terrorism-Action involving kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking or hijacking is an offence under clause (e) of subsection (2) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ( ATA of 1997 ), if it is established that such action falls within the meaning of subsection (1) of section (6) of the ATA of 1997-If kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking or hijacking is done with intent, design, purpose, or object of terrorism, the same shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1) of section 6 and is an offence under subsection (2)(e) of section 6 of the ATA of 1997, triable exclusively by the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) and punishable under section 7(e) of the ATA of 1997-If there is no intent, object, purpose or design of terrorism in committing an act of abduction or kidnapping for ransom, it shall not be an act of a terrorism within the meaning of subsection (1) of section 6 of the ATA of 1997-Thus, in absence of an element of a terrorism, an act of abduction or kidnapping for ransom for personal vendetta shall constitute an offence under section 365-A, P.P.C.-However, in view of heinousness of such act, it is exclusively triable by the ATC, only for the purpose of its speedy trial, but the accused shall be charged under the relevant provision of law, instead of charging him under any of the provisions of the ATA of 1997.\nGhulam Hussains case PLD 2020 SC 61 ref.\n(d) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-Ss. 6(1), 6(2)(e) & 7(e)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-A-Kidnapping for ransom-Reappraisal of evidence-Offence committed for personal vendetta-Not an act of terrorism-In the case in hand, the complainant in the FIR and in his statement recorded on oath before the Trial Court, had simply alleged that his son was abducted for ransom-Record reflected that there was merely a demand of a ransom-Neither the complainant nor the prosecution witnesses had taken a stance that the action of the petitioners was with the intent, object, purpose or design of a terrorism-There was nothing on the record, connecting the petitioners in any manner with terrorist activities or having any link or nexus with any terrorist organization in order to bring such act of the petitioners within the ambit of terrorism, as defined in section 6(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ( ATA of 1997 )-Record made it clear that the act of the petitioners was for their personal vendetta, hence, it was an ordinary case of abduction or kidnapping for ransom, which fell within the ambit of section 365-A, P.P.C.-However, because of its heinousness and after its inclusion in the Third Schedule to the ATA of 1997, it was triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC), to the exclusion of any other court-Fora below were wrong in convicting and sentencing the petitioners under section 7(e) of the ATA of 1997, instead of convicting and sentencing them under section 365-A, P.P.C.-Since, punishment for both the offences was same, therefore, no prejudice would be caused to either of the parties, if the charge was altered-Jail petitions were dismissed with the modification that the charge framed against the petitioners under the provisions of the ATA of 1997 was altered to that of section 365-A, P.P.C.-As the prosecution had succeeded in proving its case against the petitioners for committing an ordinary offence of kidnapping for ransom, therefore, their convictions under section 7(e) of the ATA of 1997 were converted into section 365-A, P.P.C., and they were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life each with the benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C.\n(e) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-Ss. 6(1), 7(a), 7(b) & 7(h)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34-Kidnapping for ransom-Reappraisal of evidence-Murder of police officials who were part of a raiding party-Not an act of terrorism-Admittedly, the incident occurred on account of a raid upon a house which at the relevant time was in possession of the petitioners-Purpose of the raiding party was to recover an abductee from the clutches of the petitioners-Facts and circumstances of the case did not establish the intent, object, design or purpose of the petitioners to do an act of terrorism-Reaction shown by the petitioners was to avoid their arrest, hence, in retaliation, they started firing-Though, such act of firing was illegal, but there was no intention or preparation to commit murder, in order to overawe or intimidate the police officials, who were the members of the raiding party-Besides, the occurrence took place in a house and there was no evidence to prove the presence of general public, therefore, the element of sense of fear or insecurity in the society was also lacking-Thus, the action of the petitioners by committing murder of the police officials, in the given circumstances, did not fall within the ambit of provision of section 6(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ( ATA of 1997 )-In absence of any ingredient of terrorism, the petitioners could not have been convicted and sentenced under the provisions of the ATA of 1997-Since the prosecution had succeeded in proving the commission of qatl-i-amd against the petitioners, therefore, their action fell within the provisions of section 302, P.P.C.-Jail petitions were dismissed with the modification that the convictions and sentences awarded to the three petitioners by the High Court and the Trial Court under sections 7(a), 7(b) & 7(h) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were set aside and they were acquitted of the charge to that extent-However convictions and sentences of two of the petitioners under sections 302(b), 34 and 324, P.P.C., awarded by the fora below were maintained.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=6,13", - "Case #": "J.Ps. Nos.233 and 234 of 2015, J.Ps. Nos.620 and 621 of 2019 and J.Ps. Nos.408 and 409 of 2021, decided on 26th March, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 13.09.2012 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl.As. Nos. 106, 221-J and 222-J of 2007 and C.S.R. No. 45-T of 2007 and judgment dated 13.09.2012 in Crl.As. Nos.847, 848, 948 of 2005 and M.R. No. 15-T of 2005).\nheard on: 26th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sikandar Zulqarnain Saleem, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for Petitioner (in J.Ps. Nos. 233 and 234 of 2015).\nNemo for Petitioner (in J.Ps. Nos. 620 and 621 of 2019).\nSalman Safdar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in J.Ps. Nos. 408 and 409 of 2021).\nAsad Mehmood son of complainant for the Complainant (in J.Ps. Nos. 233 of 2015 and in J.P. No. 409 of 2021).\nFather and brother of Abdul Rehman-deceased (in J.Ps. Nos.408 and 409 of 2021)\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G. Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAVED IQBAL and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25236", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3859 = 2024 SLD 3859 = 2024 SCMR 1449", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Motive not proved-It was the case of the prosecution that the petitioner (accused) committed murder of deceased on the grudge that he defeated the petitioner in an Akhara (wrestling place)-As far as motive was concerned, same stood disproved-Since, no evidence was produced by the prosecution to substantiate the motive of the accused to commit the murder of the deceased, specifically in light of the fact that, petitioner/accused had no previous enmity with the complainant party, therefore motive set up by the prosecution in the FIR was disbelieved by the High Court-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed; impugned judgment was set aside, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Recovery of crime weapon-Inconsequential-As far as recovery of crime weapon i.e. churri, was concerned, the same was held to be inconsequential by the Courts below because it was recovered after 4 years of the alleged occurrence and was not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed; impugned judgment was set aside, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Presence of alleged eye-witnesses at the scene of occurrence doubtful-Delay in sending body for the post mortem was reflective of the absence of witnesses at the place of occurrence-Had they been present at the place of occurrence, they would have strived to save the life of deceased and immediately shifted him to the hospital-However, in the present case, contrary to normal reaction, father and brother of deceased, neither shifted the deceased to hospital nor accompanied him when he was sent to hospital by the police-Such behaviour alone created sufficient doubt about their presence at the place of occurrence-This fact also found corroboration from the fact that perusal of post-mortem report and inquest report revealed that dead body was brought to hospital by the police and was identified by two persons, who were not the alleged eye-witnesses of the occurrence-Thus, alleged eye-witnesses were also not the ones who had identified the dead body of the deceased at the time of the post-mortem report-In absence of physical proof qua presence of the witnesses at the crime scene, the same could not be relied upon-In view of the material contradictions in the statements of eye-witnesses and the fact that they did not accompany the deceased in the hospital and that their names were neither mentioned in inquest report nor in post-mortem report as the identifiers of the dead body spoke volumes about their absence at the place of occurrence-Hence, their testimonies were unreliable-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed; impugned judgment was set aside, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\nMuhammad Rafiq alias Feeqa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1068 and Muhammad Rafiq v. State 2014 SCMR 1698 ref.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Medical evidence-Scope-Medical evidence by its nature and character, cannot recognize a culprit in case of an un-witnessed incident-When eye-witness account relied upon by the prosecution is unreliable and untrustworthy, conviction cannot sustain on the basis of medical evidence alone.\nHashim Qasim and another v. The State 2017 SCMR 986 ref.\n(e) Criminal trial-\n-Absconsion of the accused-Effect-Fact of abscondence of an accused can be used as a corroborative piece of evidence, which cannot be read in isolation but it has to be read along with substantive pieces of evidence-Abscondence itself has no value in the absence of any other evidence-Abscondence of the accused can never remedy the defects in the prosecution case-Conviction due to abscondence alone cannot be sustained.\nAsadullah v. Muhammad Ali PLD 1971 SC 541; Rasool Muhammad v. Asal Muhammad 1995 SCMR 1373; Muhammad Sadiq v. Najeeb Ali 1995 SCMR 1632; Muhammad Khan v. The State 1999 SCMR 1220; Gul Khan v. The State 1999 SCMR 304; Muhammad Arshad v. Qasim Ali 1992 SCMR 814; Pir Badshah v. The State 1985 SCMR 2070; Amir Gul v. The State 1981 SCMR 182; Muhammad Farooq and another v. The State 2006 SCMR 1707 and Rohtas Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 566 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No.195 of 2017, decided on 8th May, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 02.02.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Cr.A. No.440 of 2013 and M.R. No.59 of 2013). \nheard on: 8th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haider Mehmood Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioner in person (Through video link Lahore).\nMirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.\nMuhammad Shafi for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN alias KHAROO -Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25237", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3860 = 2024 SLD 3860 = 2024 SCMR 1458", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional petition filed by employees of Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank-Maintainability-Master and servant relationship-Punjab Cooperative Bank Limited Staff Service Rules (2010) [ Rules ] were meant for internal consumption, but it was lucidly specified in the said Rules that the relationship between the Bank and its employees shall be that of a master and servant-Survey of the Banks corporate structure or substratum of the Bank unambiguously connoted that the terms and conditions of the employees were not governed by any statutory rules of service but they were governed and regulated under the relationship of a master and servant -In absence of statutory rules of service, the aggrieved employee cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court-Under the relationship of master and servant, the only available or applicable remedy is the filing of a civil suit in the civil court against actions detrimental to the interest of any such employee-In the present case writ petitions filed by the employees before the High Court were not maintainable owing to the relationship of master and servant and the absence of statutory rules of service.\nPIAC v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman PLD 2010 SC 676; PIAC v. Syed Suleman Alam Rizvi 2015 SCMR 1545; Abdul Wahab v. HBL 2013 SCMR 1383; Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Lt.Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed 2013 SCMR 1707 and Syed Nazir Gilani v. Pakistan Red Crescent Society 2014 SCMR 982 ref.\n(b) Master and servant-\n-Fundamental rights of the employee-Scope-Relationship of master and servant cannot be construed as so sagacious that the master i.e. the management of a statutory corporation or the corporation and/or company under the control of government having no statutory rules of service or the private sector may exercise the powers at their own aspiration and discretion in contravention or infringement of fundamental rights envisioned under the Constitution-Therefore, in all fairness, even under the relationship of master and servant, fundamental rights should be respected and followed, as the same are an integral part of due process.\nPresident, Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited, Head Office, Islamabad v. Kishwar Khan and others 2022 SCMR 1598 ref.\n(c) Master and servant-\n-Remedies for employees under a master servant relationship-Proposal to establish special tribunals/courts to expeditiously decide cases of employees under the relationship of master and servant-According to the masters mindset, the employee can be dismissed or terminated outrightly with good, bad, or no reason at all, without providing any opportunity of fair hearing on the justification of having no statutory rules to regulate such employment-On account of no expeditious remedy or forum to challenge the adverse actions, such employees have to file civil suits and wait for a number of years for their decision, but if they are allowed a fast-track remedy under some legislation ensuring that some lawful justification for termination of contracts of employment is provided, and if such legislation also creates some rights and obligations for employers and employees with the formation of special courts or tribunals, then their cases will also be decided at a speedy pace, just as the cases of civil servants and workman/workers are decided by the Service Tribunal, NIRC, and labour courts within lesser time than the time normally consumed in civil courts-If any such tribunal or special court is constituted under some special law, it will not only ensure checks and balances but ardently and fervently ease and alleviate the sufferings of the aforesaid category of employees who presently have to go through the miseries and turmoil of the rigors and rigidities of procedure, and the backlog of cases, for a long time-It is expedient and pragmatic to plan some legislation and establish a special tribunal/court under a special law to approach the cases of employees under the relationship of master and servant, which would not only uphold the basic human values which are vital to our social and economic lives but would virtually be a milestone by the government in safeguarding the fundamental rights of an extremely large category of employees who are deprived of expeditious access to justice as a consequence of no backing of statutory rules of service in various statutory organizations, corporations, autonomous bodies and, in particular, the persons employed in private, industrial and commercial establishments who are excluded from the definition of worker or workman under the labour laws due to the nature of their job.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.795-L of 2012 and\n(Against the judgment dated 16.12.2011 passed by Lahore High Court Lahore in W.P. No.3812 of 2005)\nCivil Appeal No. 123-L of 2013 and\n(Against the judgment dated 13.06.2012 passed by Lahore High Court Lahore in W.P. No.29117 of 2011).\nCivil Petition No.2508-L of 2017\n(Against the judgment dated 26.09.2017 passed by Lahore High Court Lahore in W.P. No.16193 of 2011).\nCivil Appeals Nos. 795 of 2012, 123-L of 2013 and Civil Petition No. 2508-L of 2017, decided on 15th April, 2024.\nheard on: 15th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Ayesha A. Malik and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Mansoor, Advocate Supreme Court, Hafiz M. Tariq Nasim, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Raheel, Deputy Head (HR) PPCBL for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 795-L of 2012, 123-L of 2013 and C.P. 2508-L of 2017).\nMian Ahmad Mahmood, Advocate Supreme Court, Talat Farooq Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court and Junaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 795-L of 2012, 123-L of 2013 and C.P. No. 2508-L of 2017).", - "Petitioner Name:": "The GENERAL MANAGER, PUNJAB PROVINCIAL COOPERATIVE BANK, LTD. and others-Appellants\nVersus\nGHULAM MUSTAFA and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25238", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3861 = 2024 SLD 3861 = 2024 SCMR 1471", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWSs", - "Key Words:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-Ss. 9(1)3(a) & 9(1)6(a)-Possession of 2300 grams of charas and 700 grams of heroin-Reappraisal of evidence-All the prosecution witnesses in their statements had unanimously given details qua raid, arrest of the petitioner, search, recovery of the contraband, preparation of samples, their safe transmission to the police station, safe custody and the delivery thereof to the Punjab Forensic Science Agency (PFSA)-During cross-examination, the prosecution witnesses remained consistent-Report of the PFSA confirmed the nature of the contraband recovered from the possession of the petitioner-Nothing had been brought on the record by the prosecution to falsely implicate the petitioner in the commission of an offence-Petition was dismissed and leave was declined.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9(1),3(a),9(1)6(a)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.474-L of 2024, decided on 24th May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.03.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No.80476 of 2023), heard on: 24th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Khurram Latif Khosa, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link Lahore) for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAIDER MEHAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25239", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3862 = 2024 SLD 3862 = 2024 SCMR 1474", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Unshaken testimony of two witnesses, being eye-witnesses of the occurrence and close relatives of the deceased was fully supported/corroborated by the medico legal evidence, recovery of four crime empties of .30 bore and blood stains from the place of occurrence, blood stained clothes of the deceased, report of the chemical expert, recovery of crime weapon (.30 bore pistol) from the house of the petitioner (convict) on his pointation and positive report of the firearm expert-Record did not reveal of any animus of the two eye-witnesses for false implication of the petitioner-There was no inordinate or unexplained delay in lodging the FIR-Prosecution had proved the charge against the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed, and conviction awarded to the petitioner/appellant under section 302(b), P.P.C. was maintained.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Related witnesses, evidence of-Reliance-In absence of any ulterior motive/animus for false implication of an accused, the confidence inspiring testimony of an eye-witness, whose presence with the deceased at the time and place of occurrence is established, cannot be discarded merely due to his relationship with the deceased.\nAman Ullah v. The State 2023 SCMR 723 and Imran Mehmood v. The State 2023 SCMR 795 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Mitigating circumstances-Motive nor proved-In the instant case, though the motive of the occurrence was alleged to be the previous enmity due to land dispute as well as matrimonial relations but the prosecution had failed to prove the same-Failure to prove the motive alleged by the prosecution can be considered as a mitigating circumstance for reducing the quantum of sentence awarded to an accused-Petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed, and conviction awarded to the petitioner/appellant under section 302(b), P.P.C. was maintained, however his sentence of death was converted into imprisonment for life on the basis of the mitigating circumstances.\nZeeshan Afzal alias Shani v. The State 2013 SCMR 1602; Amjad Shah v. The State PLD 2017 SC 152 and Muhammad Yasin v. The State 2024 SCMR 128 ref.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in- Expectancy of life , principle of-Period of incarceration equal to or more than a full term of imprisonment for life-In a case where a convict sentenced to death undergoes period of custody equal to or more than a full term of imprisonment for life during the pendency of his judicial remedy against his conviction and sentence of death, the principle of expectancy of life may be considered as a relevant factor along with other circumstances for reducing his sentence of death to imprisonment for life-In the present case the petitioner (convict) had been in the death cell for 16 years awaiting the fate of his juridical remedies-Inordinate delay in disposal of case was not attributable to the petitioner as the trial proceedings were twice remanded by the Appellate Court to the Trial Court; firstly, due to defective charge and non-examining the second investigating officer, and secondly, due to defective 342, Cr.P.C. statement of the petitioner-Petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed, and conviction awarded to the petitioner/appellant under section 302(b), P.P.C. was maintained, however his sentence of death was converted into imprisonment for life on the basis of the mitigating circumstances.\nHassan v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793 and Sikandar Hayat v. The State PLD 2020 SC 559 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.668 of 2019, decided on 5th June, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 30.04.2019 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Larkana Bench, in Crl. Jail Appeal No.D-35 of 2018), heard on: 21st May 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahab Sarki, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSaleem Akhtar Buriro, Addl. PG Sindh for the State.\nInayatullah Morio, Advocate Supreme Court, Ms. Perveen Chachar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHALID-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through PG Sindh-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25240", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3863 = 2024 SLD 3863 = 2024 SCMR 1479", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1), third proviso-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 161, 162, 109 & 409-Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Public servant taking gratification by corrupt or illegal means, abetment, criminal breach of trust by public servant, criminal misconduct-Bail, grant of-Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial-Present case did not involve any crime punishable by death-Petitioner (accused) was arrested on 05.08.2022 and was behind the bars since then-Charge in the case was framed on 12.06.2023 and yet the trial had not been concluded-Grant of bail on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of trial was a right of accused unless such delay had been occasioned as a result of his own conduct-Only ground on the basis of which the petitioners application for bail was dismissed was that petitioner moved an application under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C-However, the same did not reflect any design, pattern, or concerted effort by the petitioner to delay the conclusion of trial-An application for the protection of the accuseds rights and for fair trial guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution did not amount to any design, pattern, or concerted effort by the accused to delay the trial-Thus, merely moving an application under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C does not amount to deliberate delay on the part of the accused in conclusion of trial-In the present case only one application was moved and after that no adjournment was sought by the counsel for the accused on the relevant date of hearing-In such view a case of statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of trial was prima facie made out within the remit of Section 497, Cr.P.C.-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and the petitioner was granted post-arrest bail.\n \nShakeel Shah v. State and others 2022 SCMR 1 ref.\nMajor (R) Muhammad Iftikhar Khan v. The State and another 2022 SCMR 885 distinguished.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1), third proviso-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial-Scope-If any accused deliberately causes delay in the conclusion of trial by moving irrelevant repetitive applications, then he is not entitled for bail on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(1)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=161,162,109,409Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=5(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.239 of 2024, decided on 5th June, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 04.03.2024, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Miscellaneous No.69212-B of 2023).\nheard on: 5th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Zill-e-Huma, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nRashdeen Nawaz Kasuri, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, Irfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab, Naeem Sajid, Inspector, FIA, Lahore and Ms. Huma Noreen Hassan, Legal Consultant Pak Railways for the State.\nMian Sohail Anwar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADNAN SHAFAI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25241", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3864 = 2024 SLD 3864 = 2024 SCMR 1484", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973-\n-R. 4(1)(b)(i)-Employees of Post Office-Allegation of defalcation and embezzlement-Dismissal from service-Service Tribunal converted major penalty of dismissal from service imposed by the competent authority converted into reduction in time scale by two stages for a period of two years in terms of Rule 4(1)(b)(i) of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973-Legality-Inquiry report showed that proper opportunity was afforded to the respondents (employees) to defend the charges-Allegations were mostly based on documentary evidence and the performance of duties by the respondents in accordance with the relevant rules and circulars encompassing their nature of duties-Findings and recommendations jotted down in the enquiry reports were properly considered by the competent authority with the proper application of mind and since the charges were found to be proved, the punishment was imposed in accordance with law, keeping in mind all attending circumstances, including the gravity and severity of the proven charges-Tribunal while converting the major punishment into minor punishment failed to evaluate both the inquiry reports wherein the allegations were proved, and without appreciating the reports, the Tribunal treated the cases of both the respondents in the appeal as a mere case of inefficiency and negligence which was without any rationale-Tribunal also failed to highlight any serious defect in the inquiry reports or procedure which became the cause of modifying or setting aside the original punishment of dismissal from service awarded by the competent authority-Where public money and its embezzlement is involved or at stake, the responsible persons cannot be let free or exonerated with only a minor penalty, so while converting the major penalty of removal from service into any minor penalty, it is an onerous obligation of the Service Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction of conversion of punishment with proper application of mind which obviously connotes and necessitates that the quantum of punishment be proportionate and complementary to the charge of misconduct even for a minor act of negligence and inefficiency committed by the delinquent in his duties; so the punishment, even in the minor category as well, should also be of such kind that it may create at least some deterrence for the delinquent and other employees to be more vigilant and attentive to their duties in the future, rather than performing the tasks with callous attitude, which is highly prejudicial and detrimental to the effective functioning and performance of the department-Appeals were allowed, the impugned judgments passed by the Service Tribunal were set aside and the penalty (of dismissal from service) awarded by the department to the respondents was restored.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Punishment, award of-Interference by Tribunals/Courts in punishment awarded by the competent authority-Scope-Award of appropriate punishment under the law is primarily the function of the concerned administrative authority and the role of the Tribunal/Court is secondary-Court ordinarily would not substitute its own finding with that of the said authority unless the latters opinion is unreasonable or is based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations or is against the law declared.\nPostmaster General Sindh Province, Karachi v. Syed Farhan 2022 SCMR 1154; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal 2022 SCMR 2114 and Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, D.G. Khan v. Nadeem Raza 2023 SCMR 803 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973=4(1)(b)(i)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 2384 of 2016 and C.M.A. No. 3858 in C.A. No. 2384 of 2016 and Civil Appeal No. 2385 of 2016 and C.M.A. No. 3859 of 2016 in C.A. No. 2385 of 2016, decided on 17th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 21.03.2016 and 24.3.2016 passed by Federal Service Tribunal Islamabad (Karachi Bench) in Appeals Nos.27(K) CS and 44(K) CS of 2011).\nheard on: 17th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Ayesha A. Malik and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Aamir Rehman Addl. AGP (In both cases) along with Hamid-ul-Haseeb, AD (Legal) for Appellant.\nZulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta, Advocate Supreme Court (In both cases) along with Amanat Ali and Muhammad Azam for Respondent No.1", - "Petitioner Name:": "POSTMASTER GENERAL BALOCHISTAN-Appellant\nVersus\nAMANAT ALI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25242", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3865 = 2024 SLD 3865 = 2024 SCMR 1490", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpWXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Delay of more than fifteen hours in lodging FIR not explained-Consequential-Matter was reported to the police by the complainant approximately more than fifteen hours after the incident, despite the police station being only one furlong away from the place of occurrence-In the entire evidence, the prosecution had not explained the reason for such a delay in reporting the matter to the police-Such delayed FIR on the part of the complainant showed dishonesty and that it was lodged with deliberation and consultation-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed; the judgments passed by the Trial Court as well as the High Court, respectively, were set aside and the appellant was acquitted of the charge levelled against him.\nAmir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 566 ref.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Name of star eye-witnesses not mentioned in the FIR and belated recording of their statements-Consequential-Both the alleged eye-witnesses claimed that they were present at the time of incident but their names were not mentioned in the FIR-Moreover, despite their presence at the place of incident their statements under section 161 Cr.P.C were recorded by the police with a delay of 16 hours-Recording the statement of witnesses under section 161 Cr.P.C at a belated stage casted serious doubts on the version of prosecution-No plausible explanation was rendered by the prosecution as to why statements of star witnesses were recorded after such a delay and why their names were not mentioned in the FIR-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed; the judgments passed by the Trial Court as well as the High Court, respectively, were set aside and the appellant was acquitted of the charge levelled against him.\nMuhammad Khan v. Maula Baksh and another 1998 SCMR 570 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Sixteen hours delay in sending recovered weapon and ammunition for forensic analysis-Consequential-Accused as per the record was arrested red handed and from his possession one TT Pistol of 0.30 bore along with 28 live cartridges were recovered meanwhile six crime empty shells of .30 bore pistol were also recovered by the police from the place of occurrence-Sealed parcels of such weapon/ammunition were sent for the forensic report after an unexplained delay of more than 19 days-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed; the judgments passed by the Trial Court as well as the High Court, respectively, were set aside and the appellant was acquitted of the charge levelled against him.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Conviction-Heinousness of the offence-Mere heinousness of the offence if not proved to the hilt is not a ground to punish an accused.\n(e) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Principle-For the accused to be afforded the right of benefit of doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating uncertainty and if there is only one doubt, the benefit of the same must go to the accused-Any doubt arising in prosecution case is to be resolved in favour of the accused.\nMst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 ref.\n(f) Criminal trial-\n-Single loophole in the prosecution case-Benefit of doubt-Principle-Once a single loophole is observed in a case presented by the prosecution, such as conflict in the ocular account and medical evidence or presence of eye-witnesses being doubtful, the benefit of such loophole/lacuna in the prosecutions case automatically goes in favour of an accused.\nAbdul Jabbar v. State 2019 SCMR 129 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Cr. A. No.36 of 2023 and Cr.P. No.5-Q of 2021, decided on 23rd May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 28.12.2020 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Cr.A. No.299 of 2017 and Murder Reference No.8 of 2017 and Criminal Jail Appeal No.300 of 2017).\nheard on: 23rd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kamran Murtaza, Advocate Supreme Court for the Appellant/ Petitioner.\nSyed Pervez Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court (appeared as a State Counsel) for the State (in both cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHIAL MUHAMMAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25243", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3866 = 2024 SLD 3866 = 2024 SCMR 1496", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)-\n-S. 54-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12-Suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immoveable property-Balance sale consideration-Depositing in Court-Scope-There is no mandatory provision under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 wherein, come what may, the plaintiff (buyer) has to tender the outstanding sale consideration in Court at the time of instituting or presenting the plaint or even at the time of admission of the suit by the Court before issuing summons to the defendant or defendants-So for all practical purposes, the deposit of the sale consideration or balance sale consideration in the Court is not an automatic or precondition by fiction of law but there must be an order of the Court for deposit with certain timeline with repercussions for non-compliance.\nInitial burden lies on the plaintiff (vendee) to show his willingness and readiness unequivocally, and while asserting for any injunctive relief or otherwise, during the pending adjudication, the plaintiff may offer to deposit the balance amount in Court and at the same, the Court has to consider bona fide of the plaintiff i.e., whether he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, if the plaintiff does not offer to deposit the balance sale consideration in Court, even then, the Court in order to determine and find out the seriousness or unseriousness or bona fide or mala fide of the plaintiff who lodged the claim of specific performance of contract, may pass an order for depositing the amount in Court to protect the interest of the defendant as a check and balance with a certain timeline for compliance of such order with adverse consequence on account of non-compliance within the stipulated time.\nMessrs DW Pakistan (Private) Limited v. Begum Anisa Fazl-i-Mahmood 2023 SCMR 555 ref.\nThe primary wisdom of the courts in directing the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance to deposit the sale consideration in Court in fact conveys that the plaintiff/vendee has the capacity to pay the sale consideration or balance sale consideration and is ready and willing to perform his obligations arising from the contract which is a condition precedent for claiming relief of specific performance, but there is no mandatory provision under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 wherein, come what may, the plaintiff has to tender the outstanding sale consideration in Court at the time of instituting or presenting the plaint or even at the time of admission of the suit by the Court before issuing summons to the defendant or defendants. So for all intent and practical purposes, the deposit of the sale consideration or balance sale consideration in the Court is not an automatic or precondition by fiction of law but there must be an order of the Court for deposit with certain timeline with repercussions of non-compliance, and in case of genuine and satisfactory grounds pleaded for non-compliance within the stipulated time, the Court, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 148, C.P.C., may extend and accord some reasonable time for compliance, with or without cost, if a justifiable and satisfactory case for extension is made out.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 100 & O.XLI, R. 31-Second Appeal-Scope-High Court under the sphere of Section 100, C.P.C., can take cognizance of a substantial question of law rather than triggering interference on a pure question of fact-Court should also formulate the question of law to meet the requirements of Order XLI, Rule 31, C.P.C.-In a Second Appeal provided under Section 100, C.P.C the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first Appellate Court, rather the jurisdiction is relatively delineated to the questions of law which is sine qua non for exercising the jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882=54Specific Relief Act, 1877=12", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.51-K of 2021, decided on 4th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 22.02.2021 passed by High Court of Sindh, Circuit Bench, Hyderabad, in Second Appeal No.07 of 2020), heard on: 4th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naeem Suleman, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nMuhammad Suleman Unar, Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for LRs of Respondent No.1.\nEx-parte Respondents Nos.2 to 6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEER GUL-Appellant\nVersus\nRaja ZAFAR MEHMOOD through legal heirs and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25244", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3867 = 2024 SLD 3867 = 2024 SCMR 1507", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Contradictions in evidence of eye-witnesses-Motive not proved-Independent eye-witness withheld-Probability of false implication-There were material inconsistencies and contradictions in the statements of both the alleged eye-witnesses of the occurrence-Alleged motive for the murder of deceased was illicit relations between his wife (appellant N ) and appellant M -One of the alleged eye-witnesses did not support the allegation of an illicit relationship between the appellants, nor did he utter a single word regarding this during his examination as a witness-More importantly, during his lifetime, the deceased did not file any complaint with the police against the appellant M or take any action against his wife (appellant N ), for having an illicit relationship with appellant M -Nor did appellant N file any suit for dissolution of marriage against the deceased, which would be a natural outcome in such a situation-Thus, the allegation of an illicit relationship between the appellants, as levelled by the prosecution, was without merit-Prosecution had an independent eye-witness, however, it did not produce him-Prosecution withheld the best evidence, which undermined the credibility of its account-Furthermore, the alleged occurrence took place in daylight in a populated area; however, no one from the locality came forward to support the story of the prosecution-Star witness of the prosecution acknowledged that the complainant had not given the deceased his share of the inheritance from the property left by their father-Additionally, it was revealed that the deceaseds wife i.e. appellant N used to pressure her deceased husband to demand his rightful share of the inheritance from the complainant-In this view of the matter, the possibility of false implication of appellants could not be ruled out-Fact that the deceased was being urged by his wife to assert his inheritance rights suggests a potential motive for the complainant to falsely implicate the appellants-Appellant N and the deceased had four children, and the elder daughter was 10 to 12 years of age at the time of the occurrence-She was alleged by the appellant N to be present at the time of the occurrence-She would have been able to give rational answers to questions posed to her; however, she was not interrogated by the investigating officer in respect of the occurrence-Appeals were allowed, and both the appellants were acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Motive-False implication-Motive is a double-edged weapon, which can be used either way and by either side i.e. for real or false involvement in a case. [p. 1515] F\nNoor Elah v. Zafar ul Haque PLD 1976 SC 557; Allah Bakhsh v. The State PLD 1978 SC 171; Khadim Hussain v. The State 2010 SCMR 1090; Tahir Khan v. The State 2011 SCMR 646; Tariq v. The State 2017 SCMR 1672 and Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence- Recovery of electric wire and pistol-Inconsequential-So far as the recoveries were concerned, the prosecution had shown recoveries of electric wire and pistol, the alleged weapon of offence, but it did not support the case of the prosecution for the reason that these recoveries were corroborative pieces of evidence and were relevant only when the primary evidence, i.e., the ocular account, inspired confidence-However, the ocular account in this case was full of contradictions and did not inspire confidence-Appeals were allowed, and both the appellants were acquitted of the charge.\nNasir Javaid and another v. The State 2016 SCMR 1144; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. The State and others 2016 SCMR 267 and Hayatullah v. The State 2018 SCMR 2092 ref.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence- Delay in carrying out postmortem of deceased-Effect-Post-mortem of the body of the deceased was conducted seventeen hours after the alleged occurrence-Prosecution and counsel for the complainant were unable to point out any justifiable reason to explain the marked delay in carrying out the post-mortem of deceased-Such unexplained delay in the post-mortem put a prudent mind on guard to very cautiously assess and scrutinize the prosecutions evidence-In such circumstances, the most natural inference would be that the delay so caused was for preliminary investigation and prior consultation to nominate the accused and plant eye-witnesses of the crime-Appeals were allowed, and both the appellants were acquitted of the charge.\nMuhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1068; Irshad Ahmad v. The State 2011 SCMR 1190; Ulfat Husain v. The State 2018 SCMR 313; Muhammad Yaseen v. Muhammad Afzal and another 2018 SCMR 1549; Muhammad Rafique v. The State 2014 SCMR 1698; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2012 SCMR 419 and Khalid alias Khalidi and 2 others v. The State 2012 SCMR 327 ref.\n(e) Criminal trial-\n-Medical jurisprudence-Death by hanging-Death by strangulation-Distinction-Distinguishing characteristics and marks on the dead body of deceased caused due to death by hanging and death by strangulation listed.\nModi in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 26th Edition ref.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Medical evidence not pointing towards death by strangulation-Medical officer during cross-examination, stated that there were no scratches or any marks of injury on any part of the body of the deceased, which were commonly found in a case of death by strangulation-Considering the conclusion in the post-mortem report and the evidence of the medical officer, and analyzing them in light of the principles laid down in Modis Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, the prosecutions claim that the death of the deceased was caused by throttling was doubtful-Appeals were allowed, and both the appellants were acquitted of the charge.\n(g) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Principle-To extend the benefit of the doubt it is not necessary that there should be so many circumstances-If one circumstance is sufficient to discharge and bring suspicion in the mind of the Court that the prosecution has faded up the evidence to procure conviction then the Court can come forward for the rescue of the accused persons.\nDaniel Boyd (Muslim Name Saifullah) and another v. The State 1992 SCMR 196; Gul Dast Khan v. The State 2009 SCMR 431; Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652; Abdul Jabbar and another v. The State 2019 SCMR 129; Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64 and Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=129(g)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 2023 and Crl.M.A. No.228 of 2024 along with Crl. Appeal No. 170 of 2023, decided on 22nd May, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 19.09.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in Crl. Appeal No.272 of 2012, M.R. No. 31 of 2012, Crl. A. No. 266 of 2012 and Crl. Revision No.72 of 2012), heard on: 22nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sagheer Ahmed Qadri, Advocate Supreme Court for the Appellant (in Crl.A. No. 169 of 2023).\nRehan Iftikhar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for the Appellant (in Crl.A. No. 170 of 2023).\nIrfan Zia, A.P.G. Punjab for the State.\nMasood-ul-Hasan Chishti, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD IJAZ alias BILLA and another-Appellants\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25245", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3868 = 2024 SLD 3868 = 2024 SCMR 1605", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) & 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 448, 440, 511, 427, 148 & 149-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-House-trespass, forcibly entering a premises and making indiscriminate firing-Pre-arrest bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Case of cross-versions-Parties were related to each other and were involved in a conflict/dispute over a housing society launched by the petitioners (accuseds) late father-Hence, possibility of false implication and mala fide intention (of complainant) could not be ruled out-Apart from this, it was a case of cross-version-Petitioner in his cross-version had alleged that complainant party was the aggressor because petitioners side had right to enter into the housing society being the owners of same-Moreover, in the FIR it was alleged that one passerby was injured due to firing of the accused persons however police had conducted no investigation into his injury which also made the case of petitioner as one of further inquiry within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to pre-arrest bail.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497(2) & 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Case of cross-versions-In cases of counter versions arising from the same incident, one given by the complainant in the FIR and the other given by the opposite party, bail is granted as a rule on the ground of further inquiry for the reason that the question as to which version is correct is to be decided after recording of pro and contra evidence during the trial and also to ascertain which party was the aggressor or was aggressed upon-Refusal of bail in such cases is an exception.\nFazal Muhammads case 1976 SCMR 391; Shafiqans case 1972 SCMR 682 and Khalid Mahmoods case 2013 SCMR 1415 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2),498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=448,440,511,427,148,149Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl.P.L.A No. 1345-L of 2023, decided on 30th May, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 13.11.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl.Misc.No. 33619/B of 2023).\nheard on: 30th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Sabahat Rizvi, Advocate Supreme Court along with petitioner via video link from Lahore for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab and Asif Ihsan, S.I/IO, Lahore for the State.\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record along with complainant for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHIZAR HAYAT-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25246", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3869 = 2024 SLD 3869 = 2024 SCMR 1525", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 420, 468 & 471-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Cheating, fraud and forgery-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-In the present case, FIR had been lodged with a delay of approximately five months of alleged forgery and fabrication of documents and such delay had not been sufficiently explained by the counsel for the complainant-Secondly, there was a status quo (stay order) in the field granted by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-Therefore, the instant case fell within the parameter of further inquiry and allegations were to be decided by the trial court after recording evidence-Petitions were converted into appeals and were allowed, and petitioners (accused persons) were admitted to bail.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail, grant of-Principle-It is better to err in granting bail than to err in refusal because ultimate conviction and sentence can repair the wrong resulting from a mistaken relief of bail.\nChairman NABs case PLD 2022 SC 475 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=420,468,471Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl. P.L.As. Nos. 458 and 459 of 2024, decided on 31st May, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 08.05.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Misc No. 16559-B of 2024 and Crl. Misc. No.16616-B of 2024).\nheard on: 31st May 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Saleem Iqbal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with both petitioners present in court.\nIrfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab, Zafar Abbas, ASI and Sajjad, DSP Chiniot for the State.\nSheikh Irfan Akram, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AHMAD NAWAZ and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25247", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3870 = 2024 SLD 3870 = 2024 SCMR 1528", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1), first proviso-Bail-Female accused with children-Often many women implicated in cognizable offenses are found poverty-stricken and illiterate and in some cases, they have to take care of children, including suckling children-There are also many examples where the children are to live in prisons with the mothers-This ground reality is also ought to be considered which would not only involve the interest of such accused women, but also the children who are not supposed to be exposed to prisons, where there shall always be a severe risk and peril of inheriting not only poverty but also criminality, during the incarceration of their mother-The first proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. facilitates the Court to conditionally release on bail an accused if he is under the age of 16 years or is a woman or is sick or infirm under the doctrine of welfare legislation, reinforced by way of the said proviso which requires a purposive interpretation for extending the benefit of bail to the taxonomy of persons mentioned in it, and the same is to be taken into consideration constructively and auspiciously depending upon the set of circumstances in each case, among other factors, including the satisfaction of the Court that the bail petitioner does not have any criminal record or is not a habitual offender.\nTahira Batool v. State PLD 2022 SC 764; Asiya v. State 2023 SCMR 383; Ghazala v. State 2023 SCMR 887 and Munawar Bibi v. State 2023 SCMR 1729 ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss.497(1), first proviso & 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 34, 118, 120-B, 109 & 506-Murderous assault, conspiracy to commit murder-Bail, grant of-Female accused with suckling children-Further inquiry, case of-Rule of consistency, applicability of-FIR was lodged against some unknown persons, without even disclosing their identity or features-From time to time the complainant recorded her supplementary statements to implicate different accused persons-Present petitioner (female accused) was implicated vide a supplementary statement-Three further supplementary statements were also recorded by the complainant, and in the last supplementary statement, she implicated an accused who was attributed the role of making fire on the right leg below the abdomen of the deceased, but he was granted bail by the Supreme Court-Even in view of such supplementary statements, nothing was produced at present stage to show that the petitioner was mastermind of the murder-Record showed that except the petitioner, all other co-accused persons had been granted bail either by the Trial Court or the Supreme Court-All the accused persons who were part of the criminal conspiracy, including the main accused who fired upon the deceased, had been granted bail, therefore at present stage, there appeared no reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner was guilty for the offence jotted down in the FIR-Petitioner had not only made out a case of further inquiry but she was also entitled to be enlarged on bail in view of the rule of consistency coupled with the benefit of the first proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C.-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and the petitioner was enlarged on bail.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Bail-Rule of consistency-Doctrine of parity-Scope-Rule of consistency, or in other words, the doctrine of parity in criminal cases, including bail matters, recapitulates that where the role ascribed to the accused is one and the same as that of the co-accused, then the benefit extended to the co-accused should be extended to the accused also, on the principle that like cases should be treated alike, but after accurate evaluation and assessment of the co-offenders role in the commission of the alleged offence-While applying the doctrine of parity in bail matters, the Court is obligated to concentrate on the constituents of the role assigned to the accused and then decide whether a case for the grant of bail on the standard of parity or rule of consistency is made out or not.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(1)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.243 of 2024, decided on 22nd May, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 06.03.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Misc. No.84180-B of 2023).\nheard on: 22nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Bushra Qamar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\n. Khurram Khan, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.\nKhalid Masood Sandhu, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. ISHRAT BIBI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General, Punjab and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25248", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3871 = 2024 SLD 3871 = 2024 SCMR 1536", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 223 & 225-A-Police officials accused of facilitating escape of under trial prisoners from a court-Reappraisal of evidence-Evidence available on record revealed that with the active connivance of three accused police officials, the escapee Under Trial Prisoners (UTPs) managed their escape after cutting the iron bars/grill of lockup of Anti-Terrorism Court situated on the first floor of the Judicial Complex and after shaving their beard and cutting their hair in the washroom of the Court-Overwhelming incriminating evidence proved sharing of common intention and active connivance of three accused with the escapee UTPs in managing and facilitating their escape from confinement-Conviction of accused persons under sections 223 & 225-A, P.P.C. was maintained-Petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 223 & 225-A-Prison officials accused of facilitating escape of under trial prisoners from a court-Reappraisal of evidence-Record did not reveal any connivance or sharing of common intention by the five accused prison officials with the three convicted police officials and the two escapee Under Trial Prisoners (UTPs) in managing and facilitating their escape-No question arose of negligence or lack of supervision by the prison officials under Pakistan Prisons Rules, 1978-Prosecution had failed to produce definite and concrete evidence to prove the negligence of the prison officials-Petitions were converted into appeal and allowed, and the conviction and sentences recorded against the five accused prison officials were set-aside.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 223 & 225-A-Negligence of prison officials leading to escape of under trial prisoners-Negligence-Proof-According to settled principles, the factum of negligence can be taken into consideration on the basis of presumption or surrounding circumstances while taking disciplinary action against a public servant but to bring home charge in criminal proceedings against a public servant under sections 223 and 225-A, P.P.C., definite and concrete evidence is required to prove the factum of negligence.\nMuhammad Yaqoob v. The State PLD 2001 SC 378 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=223,225-A", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 351-352, 438, 50-K, 76-77-K, 92-K and 94-K of 2022, decided on 11th June, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 25.03.2022 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in ATAs Nos. 297, 296, 291, 282, 294, 288, 304 of 2019).\nheard on: 21st May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Farooq, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with petitioners in person (via video link from Karachi) (in Crl. Ps. Nos. 351-352 of 2022).\nZulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with petitioner in person (in Crl. P. No. 438 of 2022).\nAmir Mansoob Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with petitioner in person (in Crl. P. No.50-K of 2022).\nMuhammad Naeem Memon, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with petitioners in person (via video link from Karachi) (in Crl. Ps. Nos. 76-77-K of 2022).\nGhulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record/Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with Petitioner in person (via video link from Karachi) (in Crl. P. No.92-K of 2022).\nMazhar Ali B. Chohan, Advocate-on-Record, M. Ashraf Samoo, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with petitioner in person (in Crl. P. No. 94-K of 2022) (via video link from Karachi).\nSaleem Akhtar Buriro, Addl.P.G., Sindh for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAHEEM ANWAR MEMON and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General, Sindh and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25249", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3872 = 2024 SLD 3872 = 2024 SCMR 1543", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTk", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(1), third proviso-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409 & 109-Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)-Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010), Ss. 3 & 4-Criminal breach of trust by public servant, abetment, criminal misconduct, money laundering-Bail, grant of-Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial-In the present case, the petitioner (accused) was arrested on 05.08.2022 and the charge against him was framed on 27.06.2023; he made an application for his post-arrest bail on statutory ground on 07.08.2023-Order sheets of the period commencing from the date of arrest, date of framing of charge till the date of his filing the application for bail did not reflect any design, pattern, or concerted effort on the part of the petitioner to delay the conclusion of the trial-During this period, he made two formal applications namely an application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. and an application for excluding a person from the proceedings of this case-Perusal of these applications did not reflect any design, pattern, or concerted effort by the petitioner to delay the conclusion of the trial-An application for the protection of the accused s rights and just for fair trial guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution does not amount to any design, pattern, or concerted effort by the accused to delay the trial-Furthermore, tentative assessment of the material placed before the Court showed that petitioner was not a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal; he was a government employee working in Pakistan Railways who was not likely to cause any injury to others-Case of statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of trial was prima facie made out within the remit of Section 497, Cr.P.C.-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and the petitioner was granted post-arrest bail.\nShakeel Shah v. State and others 2022 SCMR 1 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(1)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=409,109Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=5(2)Anti Money Laundering Act, 2010=3,4", - "Case #": "Crl. P.L.A. No.238 of 2024, decided on 5th June, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 04.03.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Misc No. 68511-B of 2023).\nheard on: 5th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zill-e-Huma, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Amir Malik, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nRashdeen Nawaz Kasuri, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, Irfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab, Naeem Sajid, Inspector, FIA, Lahore and Ms. Huma Noreen Hassan, Legal Consultant Pak Railways for the State.\nMian Sohail Anwar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADNAN SHAFAI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25250", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3873 = 2024 SLD 3873 = 2024 SCMR 1548", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVTg", - "Key Words:": "Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-S. 2(xxxiii)-Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.O. 2(i)-Worker/workman-Scope-Workers employed through an independent contractor-Yardstick to decide the controversy between a direct employee of a company and an employee employed through an independent contractor rests on the extent of control and supervision on human resource, ongoing control of independent contractor, if any, financial risks and obligations, as well as the provision of plant, machinery, and premises, and finally supply of raw material and allied set-up-There is no bar to contract out the whole job or parts of it to an outsource contractor, including human resource within its own premises or through toll manufacturing agreements, but what is crucial is that the outsourcing should not be used as a weapon of circumvention of labour laws or to deprive the workers of legitimate rights envisaged under the labour laws by means of sham agreements-In the case in hand, it was established that the respondent-employees were under the direct supervision and control of petitioner-company and were working within its premises and involved directly or indirectly in the manufacturing process and were also performing their duties for the past many years-Respondent-employees, during evidence, produced various attendance and RPL requisition sheets issued by petitioner-company to prove the direct relationship of employment with petitioner and that the employees were performing duties in its establishment on regular basis against jobs of permanent nature where the entire raw material was provided by the petitioners management and they were also controlled and supervised by the said management-No such document produced by the employees before the NIRC was rebutted by the management of petitioner-Respondents were being paid from the account of the petitioner-company-It was also significant that the alleged contractors who provided labour/employees to the petitioner never came forward to rescue the petitioner-Fora below had rightly held the respondents to be employees/workmen of petitioner-company-Petitions were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nFaufi Fertilizer Company Ltd. v. National Industrial Relations Commission and others 2013 SCMR 1253 = 2014 PLC 10; Abdul Ghafoor and others v. The President National Bank of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 157; Messrs State Oil Company Limited v. Bakht Siddique and others 2018 SCMR 1181; Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Limited v. Registrar of Trade Unions and others 2020 PLC 153 and Nilgiri Coop. Mkt. Society Ltd. v. State of T.N. [(AIR 2004 SC 1639) = (2004) 3 SCC 514 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Act, 2012=2(xxxiii)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 525-K to 541-K of 2023, decided on 4th April, 2024.(Against the order dated 14.02.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh Karachi in Const. Petitions Nos. D-7068, 7069, 7070 to 7084 of 2021), heard on: 4th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Raana Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nGhulam Murtaza and M. Ishtiaque in person for Respondents Nos. 1 to 9.\nNemo for other Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IFFCO PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nGHULAM MURTAZA and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25251", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3874 = 2024 SLD 3874 = 2024 SCMR 1560", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVXo", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-\n-Ss. 15 & 18-Eviction petition-Death of original tenant-No intimation of such death to the landlord-Subletting without consent of landlord-Respondent (current occupant of subject premises) had admitted that he never informed the landlords/petitioners about the death of his grandfather, who was the original tenant inducted by the petitioners-Moreover, the respondent had himself admitted in his cross-examination that some doctors had been running a clinic in the subject premises/shop; he also admitted that he entered into a partnership in respect of the subject premises/shop with three doctors-Respondent had also admitted that the petitioners/landlords were not aware about the registration of said clinic and he never informed them about it-Section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (SRPO, 1979) envisages the various grounds on the basis of which the landlord may seek eviction of the tenant including the ground of default in payment of rent and subletting of any rented premises without the written consent of the landlord-It appeared from the record of the present case that the evidence of the parties adduced before the Rent Controller had not been properly appreciated and discussed in the impugned judgment of the High Court-Impugned judgment was, therefore, set aside and the case was remanded to the High Court to decide it afresh after providing an opportunity of hearing to both the parties and after evaluating the evidence available on the record.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=15,18", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.917-K of 2022, decided on 12th June, 2024.\n(Against the Judgment dated 07.03.2022, passed by the High Court of Sindh Karachi in Constitutional Petition No. S-931 of 2021).heard on: 12th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naeem Suleman, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nAamir Asher Azeem, Advocate High Court and K.A Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASHFAQ HUSSAIN and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nGHULAM NABI and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25252", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3875 = 2024 SLD 3875 = 2024 SCMR 1563", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpVXk", - "Key Words:": "Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance (LXX of 1979)-\n-S. 21 & Preamble-Margalla Hills National Park-Preservation, conservation and permissible use of the Margalla Hills National Park (the National Park)-Any lease, license, allotment or permission granted by Capital Development Authority (CDA), or by the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate (the Directorate) or any other department/authority to operate restaurants in the National Park was contrary to the provisions of the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979-Therefore, the same were declared to be of no legal effect and set aside-Observations and directions recorded by the Supreme Court in the matter stated.\nAny lease, license, allotment or permission granted by the Capital Development Authority (CDA), or by the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate (the Directorate) or any other department/ authority to operate restaurants in the Margalla Hills National Park (the National Park)was contrary to the provisions of the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979. Therefore, the same are declared to be of no legal effect and set aside.\nAccordingly, three months time is granted to all the restaurants on and around the Pir Sohawa Road in the National Park to vacate them. Small kiosks situated on or around the Pir Sohawa Road in the National Park may continue to operate provided they are licensed by the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board (the Wildlife Management Board) and strictly abide by their terms of license, which must include collecting of all garbage generated by each and their respective customers and disposing it outside the precincts of the National Park and, if they are permitted to have a stove then they must also have a fire extinguisher. [p. 1566] A\nFor the proper management of the National Park, CDA shall assist the Wildlife Management Board whenever required. If an officer of CDA well conversant with conservation and environment is not already a member of the Wildlife Management Board, it would be appropriate that one is appointed as a member of the Wildlife Management Board. Moreover, since the World Wildlife Foundation Pakistan (WWF) came forward to facilitate the preservation and protection of the National Park the Government may also consider nominating it on the Wildlife Management Board.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979=21", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 304 of 2022 and C.M.A. No. 891 of 2022, Civil Petition No. 305 of 2022 and C.M.A. No. 892 of 2022, Civil Misc. Application Nos. 887 and 888 of 2022 in C.P. NIL of 2022 and Constitution Petition No. 3 of 2024, decided on 11th June, 2024, heard on: 11th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.P. No. 304 of 2022).\nSaad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court along with Luqman Ali Afzal, owner of Petitioner Monal Group of Companies (in C.P. No. 305 of 2022).\nUmar Ijaz Gilani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in Const. P. No. 3 of 2024).\nHafiz Arfat Ahmed Ch., Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Ali Randhawa, Chairman CDA, Naeem Dar, DG Law, Irfan Azeem, Dy. DG (Environment), Kamran, Director, Law and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for CDA.\nMrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for MCI.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Addl. A.G., Brig. (R), Falak Naz, Legal Advisor, Col. Faran Tariq, Dy. Director Military Forms, Lt. Col. Irfan Asghar, Asstt. Director (legal) and Zafar Mehmood, MEO for Ministry of Defence.\nMuhammad Naqi Khan, DG/CEO (via video link from Lahore) for WWF Pakistan.\nMuhammad Aqib, Dy. Director for Survey of Pakistan.\nOn Courts Notice\nNabeel Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court for Capital View Restaurant.\nSikandar Bashir Mohmand, Advocate Supreme Court for Margalla Motel.\nTariq Mehmood Sajid Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Trendy Amusement.\nKhurram Mehmood Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Lok Virsa.\nRizwan Shabbir Kiyani, Advocate Supreme Court for Jumper Castle in Lake View Park.\nMaqbool Ahmed Chaudhry, Manager Admn for Islamabad Club.\nTaimoor Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Des Pardis.\nMs. Parveen Ejaz, Dy. Director for Ministry of Climate Change.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The MONAL GROUP OF COMPANIES, ISLAMABAD and others-Petitioner\nVersus\nCAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY through its Chairman and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25253", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3876 = 2024 SLD 3876 = 2024 SCMR 1567", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)-Dishonestly issuing a cheque-Pre-arrest bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Cheque given as a guarantee-Every transaction where a cheque is dishonoured may not constitute an offense-Foundational elements to constitute an offense under section 489-F, P.P.C. are the issuance of the cheque with dishonest intent; the cheque should be towards repayment of loan or fulfillment of an obligation; and lastly that the cheque is dishonoured-In the present case the agreement in question was executed between petitioner (accused) and person MA regarding a plot-Perusal of said agreement indicated that the cheque in question was issued as Guarantee from the petitioner to MA -Complainant had failed to produce any receipt issued by the petitioner while receiving cash amount of 2,00,000/-.-Tentative assessment of the record showed that the cheque was not towards the fulfillment of any obligation but rather it was given as security-Prima facie, it did not attract the elements of section 489-F, P.P.C.-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to pre-arrest bail.\n \nMian Allah Ditta v. The State and others 2013 SCMR 51 ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 498-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)-Bail, grant of-Principles-It is better to err in granting bail than to err in refusal because ultimate conviction and sentence can repair the wrong resulting from a mistaken relief of bail.\nChairman NABs case PLD 2022 SC 475 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=489-FConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl. P.L.A. No.340 of 2024, decided on 3rd June, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 29.01.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Misc No. 82102/B of 2024).\nheard on: 3rd June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Amir Malik, Advocate-on-Record along with petitioner for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab, Abdul Sami, SDPO Sargodha and M. Sami Jan, I.O for the State.\nShahid Tabassum, Advocate Supreme Court amd Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ANWAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25254", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3877 = 2024 SLD 3877 = 2024 SCMR 1571", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)-Possession and transportation of 146.20 kilograms of charas-Reappraisal of evidence-Separate samples sealed in one parcel-Effect-Instead of separately sealing the 150 pieces of the separated samples (total weighing 1.350 Kgs) in 150 separate parcels, the same were sealed in one parcel i.e. parcel No. 1 in flagrant violation of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Hashim v. The State (PLD 2004 SC 856)-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner (accused) beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\nMuhammad Hashim v. The State PLD 2004 SC 856 ref.\n(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)-Possession and transportation of 146.20 kilograms of charas-Reappraisal of evidence-Safe custody of the parcels of the contraband not proved-In order to prove the safe custody of the parcels of the contraband, Moharrar of the relevant police station had not been produced at the trial by the prosecution-Due to non-appearance of the Moharrar at the trial, the safe custody of the parcel of the contraband as well as the sample parcel had not been established by the prosecution-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner (accused) beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\nSaid Wazir v. The State 2023 SCMR 1144; Muhammad Shoaib v. The State 2022 SCMR 1006; Ishaq v. The State 2022 SCMR 1422 and Zahir Shah v. The State 2019 SCMR 2004 ref.\n(c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)-Possession and transportation of 146.20 kilograms of charas-Reappraisal of evidence-Seized vehicle not produced during trial-Ownership of vehicle not established-To prove the existence of secret cavities in the floor of the vehicle and for corroborating the statements of the prosecution witnesses about recovery of 150 pieces of contraband therefrom, the seized vehicle was not produced at the trial by the prosecution and in this regard no explanation had been offered by the prosecution-No driving license was recovered from the petitioner (accused)-Ownership of the petitioner with regard to the seized vehicle had also not been proved by the prosecution-No probe was made during investigation about the ownership of the vehicle with reference to its registration number-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioner (accused) beyond reasonable doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9(c)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 130-Q of 2021, decided on 22nd May, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 30.11.2021 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Crl. A. No.04/2021), heard on: 22nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Manzoor Ahmed Rahmani, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Quetta) for Petitioner.\nMs. Rubina Butt, Advocate Supreme Court as State counsel\n(on behalf of Govt. of Balochistan), Habibullah, SI/S.H.O. for the\nState.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SARFRAZ AHMED-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25255", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3878 = 2024 SLD 3878 = 2024 SCMR 1576", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTU", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 34-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention-Bail, refusal of-In the present case one person had lost his life and one person had sustained injuries at the hands of accused persons-Furthermore, the petitioner (accused) along with another accused was nominated in the FIR and specific role of firing at the deceased and injured person was attributed to petitioner specifically-Prosecution witnesses in their statements had supported the version of the complainant given by him in the FIR-Medical evidence also corroborated the ocular account-Record further reflected that the version of complainant was corroborated by the recovery of empties from the place of incident and recovery of pistol at the pointation of the petitioner, therefore, there appeared reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner/accused had committed the offence which was punishable with death or imprisonment for life, hence the case of petitioner fell within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Tentative assessment of material available on record prima facie connected the petitioner with the commission of the offence which fell within the ambit of the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Petition was dismissed, leave was declined, and petitioner was refused bail.\nSher Muhammad v. The State 2008 SCMR 1451 and Shoukat Ilahi v. Javed Iqbal and others 2010 SCMR 966 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,34Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal No.220 of 2024, decided on 7th June, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 02.02.2024 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench in B.A. No.30-M of 2024).\nheard on: 7th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zia ur Rehman Tajik, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nSyed Kosar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General KPK, Sher Hayat, SI/IO and Bakht Rehman, DSP Timergara for the State.\nZulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court, along with Complainant for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ITBAR MUHAMMAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25256", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3879 = 2024 SLD 3879 = 2024 SCMR 1579", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Failure to collect blood stained earth-Consequential-Admittedly no blood stained earth was collected from the alleged place of occurrence during investigation and in this regard no explanation had been offered by any prosecution witness including the Investigating Officer-This created serious doubt about the place of the occurrence as narrated by the prosecution witnesses-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the convict beyond reasonable doubt-Jail petition was converted into appeal and was allowed, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-No crime empties recovered from place of occurrence-Consequential-No crime empty or pellets were recovered from the place of occurrence-In this regard one of the witnesses had furnished contradictory explanation in his cross-examination by stating that one crime empty was collected from the spot and that the empty cartridge was taken away by the convict in his gun-Report of the firearm expert confirming that 12 bore rifle (allegedly recovered on the disclosure and pointation of the convict from his house) was in working condition, had already been held inconsequential by the Appellate Court and as such, same could not be considered as incriminating/corroborative piece of evidence against the convict/petitioner-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the convict beyond reasonable doubt-Jail petition was converted into appeal and was allowed, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)- Qatl-i-amd- Reappraisal of evidence- Dishonest improvements by witnesses-Possibility of false implication-Both witnesses claimed that they were accompanying the deceased at the time of occurrence but surprisingly they did not receive any firearm injury-It was not believable that by killing a person in presence of his close relatives accused/petitioner would not attempt to cause any injury to the prosecution witnesses leaving evidence to be hanged-Both said witnesses had also made dishonest improvements in their statements at the trial-Ocular testimony of both witnesses was lacking corroboration in material aspects-In view of all this, false implication of the convict/petitioner by the witnesses due to previous enmity could not be ruled out of consideration-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the convict beyond reasonable doubt-Jail petition was converted into appeal and was allowed, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\n(d) Criminal trial-\n-Absconsion-Principles-Conviction-Mere absconsion is not conclusive proof of guilt of an accused-It is only a suspicious circumstance which cannot take place of proof-Value of absconsion, therefore, depends on the fact of each case-Mere absconsion of an accused cannot be made basis of conviction-Absconsion of an accused, being a relevant fact, can be used as a corroborative piece of evidence but cannot be read in isolation and has to be read along with the substantive pieces of evidence-Abscondence can never remedy the defects in the prosecution case as it is not necessarily indicative of guilt-Moreover, abscondence is never sufficient by itself to prove the guilt.\nRohtas Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 566; Haji Paio Khan v. Sher Biaz 2009 SCMR 803; Muhammad Khan v. The State 1999 SCMR 1220 and Shafgat Abbas v. The State 2007 SCMR 162 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No.234 of 2017 and Criminal Petition No.596-L of 2017, decided on 27th May, 2024.\n(0n appeal against the judgment dated 08.03.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Appeal No.84-J of 2016 and M.R. No.389 of 2012).\nheard on: 23rd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Akbar Ali Dogar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in J.P. No. 234 of 2017).\nMian Pervaz Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in Crl. P. No. 596-L of 2017)\nIrfan Zia, Addl. PG. Pb. for the State", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAFAQAT ALI alias FOJI and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25257", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3880 = 2024 SLD 3880 = 2024 SCMR 1584", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases-\n- Sui juris -Meaning.\nBlacks Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 34, 201 & 109-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Honour killing-Pre-arrest bail, recalling of-According to the complainant he had contracted marriage with the deceased lady, which annoyed her family and relatives, due to which the accused persons murdered her on account of honour-Whereas the accused side claimed that the deceased lady had committed suicide-Parents or other family members of the deceased never lodged any FIR but the FIR was lodged by the complainant after the murder of his wife-In all conscience, had it been a case of suicide, even then, the matter should have been reported to the police by the family to investigate whether it was really a case of suicide or murder without branding the incident as suicide at first glance, which was not done and raised many questions and apprehensions on the conduct of the petitioners (accused persons) and other family members arrayed in the case by the prosecution-No specific details of mala fide intention on part of the complainant or the prosecution were shown by the accused side-In fact, no plausible reasons were shown as to why the FIR was not lodged by the parents and other family members-Moreover, the medical evidence indicated a dearth of blackening at the locale of the injury, which suggested that it was not a case of suicide-Certain material was available which demonstrated that the accused persons strived to wipe out the messages exchanged between the complainant and the deceased which were recovered by the forensics lab-Said messages provided significant insight into the relationship dynamics between the deceased and her husband which clearly indicated that the couple shared a harmonious and affectionate relationship-Their light-hearted and humorous conversations further substantiated that there was no animosity or distress in their marriage hence it contradicted any assertion of suicide and instead pointed towards it being a murder motivated by honour, as alleged-Petition was dismissed, leave was refused, and as a consequence the ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioners was recalled.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 9-Honour killing of females- Fasad-fil-arz -Karo-kari, custom of-Notorious act of honour killing is branded as karo-kari which menace is cancerous and tumorous to our society, humanity, and the populace-In fact, this is an act of murder in which a person is killed for his or her actual or perceived immoral deeds and comportments-Without doubt, the father and other family members of a female might be annoyed or exasperated on knowing about her marriage of choice, but it no way allows them to take the law in their hands-This genre of gender-based violence is not only destructive for humanity and social order but it is regarded as fasad-fil-arz which is not only against the norms of civilized culture in the society, but is also a violation of fundamental rights enshrined under the Constitution, and most importantly, it is also a serious defilement and disrespect to the teachings and injunctions of Islam-Neither the law of the land nor religion permits so-called honour killing which amounts to murder simpliciter-Such iniquitous and vile act is violative of Article 9 of the Constitution.\nMuhammad Akram Khan v. State PLD 2001 SC 96 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,34,201,109Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.201-K of 2023, decided on 11th June, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 20.11.2023 passed by High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad, in Crl.B.A. No.S-1019 of 2023).\nheard on: 11th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Jawad Ali Saahar, Advocate Supreme Court, Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record along with Petitioners for Petitioners.\nMeer Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.\nZafar Ahmad Khan, Addl.P.G., Sindh, Mehboob, SHO and Ayaz, I. O. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI MAHAR and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25258", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3881 = 2024 SLD 3881 = 2024 SCMR 1596", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Dishonestly issuing a cheque-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Complainant failed to provide specific details about the alleged business transaction with the petitioner (accused)-Additionally, the complainant was unable to provide any receipt for the cash amount allegedly received by the petitioner-Question whether the cheque was issued towards fulfilment of an obligation within the meaning of section 489-F P.P.C. was a question, which would be resolved by the Trial Court after recording of evidence-Petitioner was behind bars since his arrest-Maximum punishment provided under the statute for the offence under section 489- F, P.P.C. was three years and the same did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-Case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. entitling for further inquiry into his guilt-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to post-arrest bail.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 489-F-Dishonestly issuing a cheque, offence of-Scope-Foundational elements to constitute an offence under Section 489-F, P.P.C are the issuance of the cheque with dishonest intent; the cheque should be towards repayment of loan or fulfillment of an obligation, and lastly that the cheque is dishonoured.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Bail-Offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.-For such offences grant of bail is a rule and refusal is an exception.\nTariq Bashir v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34 ref.\n(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Bail-Registration of other criminal cases-Mere registration of other criminal cases against an accused does not disentitle him for the grant of bail if on merits he has a prima facie case.\nMoundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934; Muhammad Rafiq v. State 1997 SCMR 412; Syeda Sumera Andaleeb v. The State 2021 SCMR 1227 and Nazir Ahmed alias Bhaga v. The State 2022 SCMR 1467 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=489-FConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl.P.L.A No.240 of 2024, decided on 4th June, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 29.02.2024 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 277-B of 2024).\nheard on: 4th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khurram Masood Kiani, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nFauzi Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court as State Counsel for the State.\nRaja Rizwan Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALI ANWAR PARACHA-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25259", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3882 = 2024 SLD 3882 = 2024 SCMR 1600", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJpUTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D & 337-F(iii)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah-Reappraisal of evidence-FIR of the occurrence was promptly lodged-Record did not reveal of any motive on the part of eye-witnesses of the occurrence to falsely implicate the convict-Unshaken and confidence inspiring testimony of eye witnesses and unshaken testimony of injured witness duly corroborated by the medico legal evidence; recovery of crime empties from the place of occurrence; blood stained clothes of the deceased and injured; blood stains collected from the place of occurrence; reports of the chemical expert/serologist; and recovery of crime weapon on the pointation of the convict supported by positive report of the firearm expert of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency proved the charge against the convict beyond reasonable doubt-Conviction of accused under sections 302(b), 324, 337-D & 337-F(iii), P.P.C was maintained-Petition was converted into an appeal and was partially allowed.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Sentence, quantum of-Single mitigating circumstance-Single mitigating circumstance, available in a particular case, would be sufficient to put a Judge on guard for not awarding the penalty of death but imprisonment for life.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D & 337-F(iii)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, jaifah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah-Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Compromise between parties-In the instant case though the complainant and legal heirs of the deceased had not filed compromise documents (in court) but the complainant had made a statement before the Supreme Court that the legal heirs of both the deceased had pardoned the convict and they were not interested to further pursue the matter-Such circumstance coupled with motive of the occurrence and altercation of the convict with the deceased prior to the occurrence were considered as mitigating circumstances to reduce the sentence of death of the convict under section 302(b), P.P.C. as Tazir to imprisonment for life-Petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed, the conviction awarded to the petitioner under section 302(b). P.P.C was maintained, however his sentence of death on two counts was converted to that of imprisonment for life.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,337-D,337-F(ii)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 269 of 2017, decided on 24th May, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 20.03.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Crl.A. No. 28-J of 2014 and M.R. No. 37 of 2014).\nheard on: 22nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, APG., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "LIAQAT HUSSAIN-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25260", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJ5TSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 3990 = 2024 SLD 3990 = (2024) 130 TAX 77", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJ5TSs", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Assessment, Further Tax, and Refund Dispute under the Sales Tax Act, 1990\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990): Sections 3(1A), 11, 25(3), 33(5), 34(1)(a), 72B\n•\nCBR Circular No. 7(2), dated 01.02.1994\n•\nSRO No. 727(I)/2017, dated 01.08.2017\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe appellant, a registered retailer, filed e-returns for the tax periods from December 2021 to June 2022. The tax authorities observed certain discrepancies in the declarations made by the appellant. Specifically, the appellant had reported cotton yarn (HS Code 5207) as the only item sold in the period, which led the authorities to believe that the appellant was operating a spinning mill and manufacturing the yarn, rather than merely retailing it.\nAs a result of these observations, the tax authorities issued a show-cause notice under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, seeking an explanation from the appellant as to why a further tax of Rs. 15,208,462, along with default surcharge and penalties, should not be levied.\nThe adjudication proceedings resulted in the Order-in-Original, which established that the appellant was indeed liable to pay further tax, along with default surcharge and penalties. The appellant, aggrieved by this decision, appealed the matter to the Appellate Tribunal.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n1.\nTaxpayers Contentions:\no\nThe appellants representative (AR) argued that the tax authorities illegally imposed further tax on the appellant.\no\nThe AR stated that the assessment of further tax under Section 3(1A) was made without conducting an audit of the appellant’s records.\no\nThe AR also argued that the show-cause notice issued under Section 11(2) was wrong because the jurisdiction for assessing further tax lies under Section 25, not Section 11(2).\no\nThe appellant contended that as a retailer, selling goods to end consumers, they were exempt from further tax under SRO No. 648(I)/2013, which explicitly states that further tax is not chargeable under Section 3(1A) for goods sold to end consumers.\n2.\nTax Authoritys Argument:\no\nThe tax authorities asserted that the discrepancies in the appellant’s returns indicated that they were manufacturing and selling cotton yarn, which led them to believe the appellant was liable for further tax and penalties for not properly declaring their status as a manufacturer.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nNo Demand Without Audit:\no\nThe Supreme Court highlighted the principle of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard). The Commissioners action to create a demand for further tax was found to be against the principles of natural justice because no audit of the appellants records had been conducted as required under Section 25(3) of the Sales Tax Act, read with Section 72B.\no\nThe tax authorities had failed to complete the necessary audit of the appellant’s records, which is a requirement before any tax demand can be created.\n2.\nNo Concrete Evidence to Support Further Tax:\no\nThe appellant’s contention that they were only selling goods to end consumers was supported because no concrete evidence was presented by the tax authorities to contradict the appellant’s claim. The tax authorities failed to provide specific details (e.g., names of parties or distributors, and quantities of supplies) to substantiate their claim that further tax should be levied.\no\nWithout sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant was involved in manufacturing, the action for charging further tax was deemed unjustified and was annulled.\n3.\nUnjustified Reverse Calculation of Carry Forward:\no\nThe appellant had not adjusted or claimed a refund for carry forward input tax in the Sales Tax Return, which the tax authorities sought to reverse. The reverse calculation of carry forward was ruled as unjustified and unfounded, leading to its annulment.\n4.\nUpheld Findings of CIR (Appeals):\no\nThe findings of the CIR (Appeals) were upheld. The Departmental Appeals were dismissed because the CIR’s decisions were based on sound reasoning, with no legal or factual errors in the appeal process.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nAudit Requirement:\no\nDemand for further tax cannot be created without an audit of the registered person’s records as mandated under Section 25(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Failure to conduct an audit renders the demand invalid.\n2.\nBurden of Proof:\no\nThe tax authorities must provide concrete evidence to justify the imposition of further tax. Without evidence, the taxpayer’s claim stands, and further tax cannot be imposed.\n3.\nApplication of Further Tax:\no\nFurther tax is not chargeable under Section 3(1A) if the goods are sold to end consumers, as per SRO No. 648(I)/2013. This exemption applies to retailers who do not engage in manufacturing.\n4.\nCarry Forward Input Tax:\no\nThe tax authorities cannot impose tax based on a reverse calculation of carry forward input tax unless the correct procedures are followed, including the adjustment of carry forward input in the appropriate columns of the Sales Tax Return.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Appellate Tribunal’s decision was upheld, and the demand for further tax, along with the default surcharge and penalties, was annulled. The tax authorities failed to conduct an audit, and no evidence was provided to substantiate the imposition of further tax. As such, the CIR (Appeals)s findings were correct and upheld. The case was decided in favor of the appellant, and the departmental appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A),11(2),(11(4),25,25(3),33(5),34(1)(a),72B", - "Case #": "STA No. 1155/LB/2024, date of order: 23.08.2024, date of hearing: 20.08.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMAD, MEMBER & MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. M. Aurangzeb, Advocate. \nMr. Salman Chatha, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. GREAT YUEMEI (PVT) LTD, LAHORE ...APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE ADCIR, UNIT-18, ZONE-III, LTO, LAHORE … RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25261", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJ5STg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2021 6415 = 2021 SLD 6415 = 2021 PTD 1249", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFJ5STg", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-S.45A-Power of the Federal Board of Revenue and Commissioner (Inland Revenue) to call for record-Expression satisfying himself -Scope-Appellant assailed the order passed by Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) whereby he, while exercising power under S.45A(4) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, re-opened the order-in-original passed by Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR), which was earlier decided in favour of appellant and directed the DCIR to pass a speaking order afresh-Validity-Commissioner Inland Revenue had ample powers to call for and examine the record but for that purpose he was legally required to pass a fresh order by himself and he could not delegate his powers to any subordinate officer for the purpose of recording a fresh order after re-opening of an earlier order-Expression satisfying himself was crucial and reinforced the spirit of exclusivity of the jurisdiction conferred-Appeal was accepted and the impugned order was set aside.\n2017 PTD 1010 and 1997 SCMR 641 ref.\n2019 PTD (Trib.) 594 foll.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45A", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No.125/LB of 2015, decided on 28th August, 2019, heard on: 26th August, 2019.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Waseem Ch., Judicial Member and Masood Akhtar Shaheedi, Accountant Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khubaib Ahmad for Appellant.\nTanveer Hussain Bhatti, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs HILAL DYES (PVT.) LTD., FAISALABAD\nVersus\nThe COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25262", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4213 = 2024 SLD 4213 = 2024 CLD 531", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTRXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Preamble-Arbitration, concept of-Minimal interference by courts in international commercial arbitration-Minimal interference and support for the arbitration by the courts as an alternate mode of dispute resolution, explained.\nThe idea of arbitration is that of binding resolution of disputes accepted with serenity by those who bear its consequences because of their special trust in chosen decision makers. It is difficult for courts to achieve this kind of acceptance; public justice tends to be distant and impersonal. Arbitration is a private initiative. The idea of Arbitration is freedom reconciled with law. The philosophical premise is that people are free to arrange their private affairs as they see fit, provided that they do not offend public policy or mandatory law. Arbitration thus embodies the principles of autonomy and voluntariness, respecting the parties freedom to design a process that best suits their needs. It reflects a philosophical shift towards self-governance in dispute resolution, allowing parties to choose their arbitrators and the applicable law, thereby creating a more tailored and potentially equitable outcome. The role of courts in the context of arbitration has therefore evolved with a trend towards minimal interference.\nJan Paulsson, Idea of Arbitration, Oxford University Press (2013) ref.\nMore significant is the minimal interference in international commercial arbitration that stands as a cornerstone in the resolution of cross-border commercial disputes, offering a preferred alternative to litigation in national courts for businesses worldwide. One of the foundational aspects of international commercial arbitration is its emphasis on neutrality, expeditiousness, efficiency and the ability to provide solutions tailored to the needs of international business transactions. International commercial arbitration plays a crucial role in resolving disputes arising from cross-border trade and commerce, expeditiously and efficiently. The global view on international commercial arbitration is therefore overwhelmingly positive, with businesses and legal professionals alike recognizing its benefits over traditional litigation.\n(b) Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention )-\n-Art. I-International commercial arbitration-Pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention for enforcing foreign awards, explained.\nThe New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 plays a pivotal role, underpinning the global enforcement regime for foreign awards that has made arbitration a linchpin in international commerce. The Convention facilitates the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards across its member States, significantly reducing the uncertainty and complexity associated with cross-border dispute resolution. The role of courts in the context of international commercial arbitration has thus evolved to support and complement the arbitration process. Courts are no longer seen as competitors to arbitration but as essential partners in ensuring the effectiveness and integrity of the process. Their duty is to support, not to supplant, the arbitral process.\nThis approach of minimal interference and support for the arbitral process is enshrined in the concept of pro-enforcement bias , which refers to the inclination of legal frameworks, such as the New York Convention and national laws, to facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards. This bias underscores the commitment to uphold the integrity of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes by limiting the grounds on which enforcement can be refused and placing the burden of proof on the party resisting enforcement. The courts role is to interpret these provisions narrowly to promote certainty and predictability in international transactions. This bias is not about unjustly favoring one party over another but is aimed at promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. The pro-enforcement bias underscores the commitment of the legal system, embodied in international conventions, like the New York Convention, to respect and uphold the parties agreement to arbitrate and to ensure that the outcome of such arbitrations (the arbitral awards) are recognized and enforced with minimal interference. This bias is critical in providing parties with the confidence that their decisions to arbitrate disputes will be supported by courts around the world, thus enhancing the attractiveness of arbitration as a method of resolving international commercial disputes. This enforceability is crucial for the fluidity of international trade, providing businesses with the certainty and security needed to engage in cross-border transactions.\n(c) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 2(b), 2(c) & 2(e) -International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Scope-Whether an award made in a Contracting State, in pursuance to an arbitration agreement governed by the law of Pakistan, is a foreign arbitral award for applicability of the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and Foreign Award Act 2011?-Held, that as per the definitions provided in sections 2(b), 2(c) & 2(e) of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (the 2011 Act), an arbitral award made in a State which is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 or in such other State as may be notified by the Federal Government in the official Gazette, is a foreign arbitral award for applicability of the 2011 Act-Nothing more is required to make an award the foreign arbitral award for applicability of the provisions of the 2011 Act-Law governing the main contract between the parties, the law governing the arbitration agreement, and the law governing the arbitration proceedings are all irrelevant and extraneous in determining the status of an arbitral award under the 2011 Act-In defining a foreign arbitral award for applicability of the 2011 Act, the legislature has adopted a pure territorial approach and has made in this regard the seat of arbitration the sole criterion-Not only the governing laws but also the nationality of the parties to the award are irrelevant in determining the status of an arbitral award under the 2011 Act-In the present case the Award had been made in a Contracting State, i.e., Singapore-Nothing more was required to make it a foreign arbitral award, for applicability of the 2011 Act-In this regard, the facts that the main contract between the parties and the arbitration agreement were governed by the law of Pakistan, did not have any effect.\n(d) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Repealed law-Scope-Court cannot administer a repealed law, except to the extent specified by the legislature itself in the repealing law or some other general law providing the effect of the repeal of laws.\n(e) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Expression means used in a statute to define any word, term or expression-When the legislature employs the verb means in defining any word, term or expression, the definition provided is restrictive and exhaustive, and nothing else can be added to the same-Such definition being itself the most authentic expression of the legislatures intent as to the meaning of a particular word used in the law enacted by the legislature is binding on the courts and leaves no room for them to discover by way of interpretation some other intent of the legislature.\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Khurshid Ahmad PLD 2016 SC 545 ref.\n(f) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Prospective and retrospective effect of a law-Principles stated.\nA new law that only deals with the procedure and does not in any way affect the substantive rights of the parties applies both prospectively to future proceedings as well as retrospectively to pending proceedings. However, a law that takes away or abridges the substantive rights of the parties only applies prospectively unless either by express enactment or by necessary intendment the legislature gives to it the retrospective effect. The notable point is that even a procedural law that affects, though indirectly, the substantive rights of the parties is to be applied only prospectively, in the absence of any contrary provision therein, such as the right to institute an action for the enforcement of a substantive right or the right to appeal arising from that action as an appeal is considered a continuation of the original action. Denial of the remedy, it is said, is destruction of the right. Without remedy, there is no right; it is the remedy that makes the right real. The proper approach, therefore, to the construction of a statute as to its prospective or retrospective applicability, in the absence of legislatures express enactment or necessary intendment, is not to decide what label to apply to it, procedural or otherwise, but to see whether the statute if applied retrospectively to a particular type of case would impair existing rights and obligations. Such an examination, however, is needed only where the legislature has not, by express enactment or necessary intendment, provided for retrospective effect; as the legislature can by express enactment or necessary intendment also affect the existing rights and obligations. The legislature which is competent to make a law also has the power to legislate it retrospectively and can by legislative fiat take away even the vested rights.\nState v. Jamil PLD 1965 SC 681; Alam v. State PLD 1967 SC 259; Adnan Afzal v. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187; Abdullah v. Imdad Ali 1972 SCMR 173; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Asbestos Cement Industries 1993 SCMR 1276; Gul Hasan & Co. v. Allied Bank 1996 SCMR 237; Tariq Badr v. National Bank 2013 SCMR 314; Controller General of Accounts v. Abdul Waheed 2023 SCMR 111; PTCL v. Collector of Customs 2023 SCMR 261; Yew Bon v. Kenderaan 1983 PSC 1200 (Privy Council); In re: Joseph Suche & Co. Limited (1875) 1 Ch. D. 48; Sutlej Cotton Mills v. Industrial Court PLD 1966 SC 472 (5-MB); Shohrat Bano v. Ismail Soomar 1968 SCMR 574; Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Siddiq PLD 1981 SC 249; The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving 1905 AC 369; Iftikhar Ahmed v. State 2018 SCMR 1385; Hassan Nawaz v. Muhammad Ayub PLD 2017 SC 70; Mubeen-Us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602; F.A. Khan v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 520; Shahmir Transport Company v. Board of Revenue PLD 1964 Lah 710; Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhury PLD 1957 SC (Ind.) 448; National Bank v. SAF Textile PLD 2014 SC 283; Shahida Zaheer v. President of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 632; Yew Bon Tev v. Kenderaan Bas Mara 1983 PSC 1200 (Privy Council); Haider Automobile v. Federation of Pakistan 1969 SC 623; Molasses Trading v. Federation of Pakistan 1993 SCMR 1905 and Annoor Textile v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 568 ref.\n(g) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 1(3) & 4-Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S. 34-International commercial arbitration-Scope of section 1(3) as to the retrospective effect of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (the 2011 Act) on arbitration agreements-As for subsection (3) of Section 1 of the 2011 Act, which states that the Act shall apply to arbitration agreements made before the date of commencement of the Act, it only applies for the purpose of Section 4 of the 2011 Act to stay the legal proceedings in respect of a matter which is covered by the arbitration agreement and to refer the parties to arbitration-Notable point, however, is that because of the retrospective effect given by Section 1(3) of the 2011 Act, all courts in Pakistan are to recognize and enforce arbitration agreements, wherein the parties have agreed to have the arbitration held in a Contracting State, within the scope of the provisions of Section 4 of the 2011 Act, not of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (the 1940 Act), despite that such agreements have been made before the commencement of the 2011 Act.\n(h) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 1(4) & 10(2)-Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act (VI of 1937) [since repealed], S. 2-International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Scope of Section 1(4) as to the retrospective effect of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 on foreign arbitral awards expounded.\nSubsection (4) of Section 1 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (the 2011 Act) states that the Act shall not apply to foreign arbitral awards made before 14 July 2005 and thus by necessary intendment gives the Act retrospective effect on foreign arbitral awards that have been made on or after the said date.\nAs per subsection (2) of Section 10 of the 2011 Act, notwithstanding its repeal the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (the 1937 Act) is to continue to have effect in relation to foreign arbitral awards made before the date of commencement of this Act and within the meaning of section 2 of the 1937 Act, which are not foreign arbitral awards within the meaning of section 2 of the 2011 Act.To come within the compass of the saving provisions of Section 10(2) of the 2011 Act, a foreign arbitral award must therefore fulfill both the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b), i.e., (a) it must have been made before the date of commencement of the 2011 Act, and (b) it must fall within the meaning of foreign award as defined in Section 2 of the 1937 Act.\nIn section 10(2)(b) of the 2011 Act the phrase which are not foreign arbitral awards within the meaning of section 2 of this Act is like a proviso to the saving provisions and has qualified them in their scope and applicability. This phrase has exempted from the purview of the saving provisions those foreign awards which though fulfill both the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 10(2) but they are also foreign arbitral awards within the meaning of Section 2 of the 2011 Act. It means that an award which is a foreign arbitral award within the meaning of Section 2 of the 2011 Act shall not come within the scope of the saving provisions and shall therefore be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the 2011 Act, not of the 1937 Act.\nThe object of the saving provisions of Section 10(2) of the 2011 Act, is to save certain foreign arbitral awards, after the repeal of the 1937 Act, from falling within the scope of the Arbitration Act, 1940.\n(i) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Preamble-Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011), Preamble-International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Non-applicability of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (the 1940 Act)-Since, the 1940 Act relates, in pith and substance, to domestic arbitration, its status after the 18th amendment to the Constitution is that of a provincial law-The 1940 Act, a provincial law after the 18th amendment that came into force on 19 April 2010, cannot deal with international arbitration and any award made therein-So, in no way the remedies available to a party, before the 18th amendment, under the 1940 Act in relation to the Award made in an international arbitration would continue to be so after the 18th amendment, and more so, after the enactment of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 by the Federal Legislature.\nShahbaz Garments v. Government of Sindh 2021 SCMR 1088 ref.\n(j) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 2(c)-Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention ), Arts. III & V-International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Non-interference by domestic courts in Pakistan-Exceptions -The New York Convention implemented in Pakistan by the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (the 2011 Act), contains no ground as to the invalidity of a foreign award or its being against the law of the Contracting States, to refuse its recognition and enforcement and thus leaves no room for the courts of a Contracting State to enter into the exercise of examining the merits of a foreign award on the points of facts or law-In accordance with its objective, the New York Convention grants the Courts of the Contracting States the discretion to refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award only on the grounds listed in Article V of the Convention and places the burden to prove those grounds on the party opposing the recognition and enforcement of the award-Article V(1) provides five grounds whereby the recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused at the request of the party against whom it in invoked, and Article V(2) lists two further grounds on which the Court may refuse enforcement on its own motion-Ultimate burden of proof, however, remains on the party opposing recognition and enforcement-It is, therefore, only when the party against whom the award is invoked discharges this burden that a challenge may be sustained against the recognition and enforcement of an award-Language of Article V for refusing recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is permissive and not mandatory, and the exceptions stated therein are exhaustive and construed narrowly in view of the public policy favouring the enforcement of such foreign arbitral awards-Courts may nonetheless recognize and enforce the award even if some of the exceptions exist.\nGary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 3418-24 (2nd ed. 2014); Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 3413, 3418 and 3428 (2nd ed. 2014); Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 3413 (2nd ed. 2014); Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th ed. 2015); Albert Jan van den Bergs The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (1981); Russel on Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell (24th ed. 2015) and Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 3410 (2nd ed. 2014) ref.\n(k) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-S. 2(c)-Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention ), Art. V-International commercial arbitration-Foreign arbitral award-Non-interference by domestic courts in Pakistan-Exceptions-Public policy-Objectives sought to be achieved by the New York Convention underscore the pro-enforcement bias informing the Convention, guiding the Courts towards a narrow reading of the grounds of defence listed in the Convention, particularly, the public policy ground-Ground of defence that the arbitrators decision is erroneous in law or fact is, therefore, not provided in the Convention; it cannot be read into in any ground of defence provided in the Convention, particularly, the public policy ground, by a liberal reading instead of a narrow reading thereof-An expansive construction of the public policy ground would vitiate the Conventions basic effort to remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement-Recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may be refused by the courts of Pakistan on the public policy ground only where it would violate the most basic notions of morality and justice prevailing in Pakistan-Public policy ground cannot be used to examine the merits of a foreign arbitral award or to create more grounds of defence that are not provided for in the Convention, such as misapplication of the law of Pakistan by the arbitrator in making the award or the arbitrators decision being contrary to the law of Pakistan.\nParsons and Whittemore v. Societe Generale, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.1974) and Orient v. SNGPL 2021 SCMR 1728 ref.\n(l) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Prospective and retrospective effect of a law-Principles-While interpreting a provision of law or construing its effect, a constitutional court only declares what the law is and does not make or amend it-Law so declared by the court, therefore, as a general principle applies both prospectively to future cases and as well as retrospectively to pending cases, including the one in which it is declared-It is only as an exception to this general principle that while considering the possibility of some grave injustice or inconvenience due to the retrospective effect, the courts sometimes provide for the prospective effect of their judgments from such date as they think just and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case-But this exception cannot be invoked in a case where its effect would be tantamount to negation of the legislatures intent.\nMalik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 161 and Muhammad Khan v. Haider PLD 2020 SC 233 ref.\nTable of Contents\nPreface 540\nFacts 542\nProceedings of the courts below in Civil Appeal No. 722 of 2012 .. 543\nProceedings of the courts below in Civil Appeal No. 2649 of 2016 543\nCompeting contentions of the parties 544\n(i) Whether the Award is a foreign arbitral award 544\nRelevancy of Hitachi .. 544\nDefinition of foreign arbitral award in the 2011 Act 545\nEffect of word foreign in definition clause and option of reciprocity in the Convention 546\nThe definition in Section 2(e) of the 2011 Act is restrictive and exhaustive . 547\nThe Award is a foreign arbitral award . 548\n(ii) Whether the 2011 Act applies retrospectively to the Award made in arbitration proceedings commenced before its enforcement . 548\nPrinciples for construing a law as to its prospective and retrospective effect . 549\nScope of Section 1(3) as to the retrospective effect of the 2011 Act on arbitration agreements . 550\nScope of Section 1(4) as to the retrospective effect of the 2011 Act on foreign arbitral awards .. 551\nEffect of the 2011 Act on remedy under Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act .. 553\nEffect of the change of legislative power on the subject of arbitration by the 18th Amendment to the Constitution .. . 554\nNo remedy in the 2011 Act against the misapplication of the law of Pakistan in making an award . 556\nPro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention 556\nThe 2011 Act applies retrospectively to the Award made in arbitration proceedings commenced before its enforcement .. 561\nProspective or retrospective applicability of the construction of the 2011 Act 561\nDecision in Civil Appeal No. 722 of 2012 . 562\nDecision in Civil Appeal No. 2649 of 2016 .. 563", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 722 of 2012\n(Against the judgment of Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 14.5.2012, passed in Civil Revision No.691/2012)\nAnd Civil Appeal No. 2649 of 2016.\n(Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi, dated 07.10.2016, passed in HCA No.99/2015)\nCivil Appeal No. 722 of 2012 and Civil Appeal No. 2649 of 2016, decided on 28th February, 2024.\nheard on: 22nd February 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Athar Minallah and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid F. Ebrahim, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in C.A. No. 722 of 2012) and the Respondent (in C.A. No. 2649 of 2016).\nUzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court, Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record, Sheikh Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Ali Uzair Bhandari, Advocate for Respondent (in C.A. No. 722 of 2012) the Appellant (in C.A. No. 2649 of 2016)\nCh. Aamir ur Rehman, Addl. A.G.P. for the Federation (On Court's call).\nAssisted by Muhammad Hassan Ali and Umer A. Ranjha, Law Clerks.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAISEI CORPORATION and another-Appellants\nVersus\nA.M. CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25263", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4214 = 2024 SLD 4214 = 2024 CLD 563", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTc", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S.19-Execution proceedings- Office objection- Compromise decree-Office of High Court declined to convert compromise decree into execution proceedings in view of dictum laid down by Supreme Court in case titled Peer Dad v. Dad Muhammad, reported as 2009 SCMR 1268-Validity-Imposing a blanket prohibition against institution of execution proceedings for enforcement of compromise decrees without factoring individual situations or contexts would foster misconception of its efficaciousness, diminish its value, which would in turn persuade parties to shun compromises and discourage them from seeking settlements, and instead they might be inclined to lock horns in prolonged, obstinate legal battles, leading to increased strain on resources and an overburdened judiciary-Overboard generalization and an inflexible approach (by not considering individual circumstances or exceptions) which required parties to initiate new legal proceedings for every violation of a compromise decree, would deprive the decree holder of the fruits of its labour and would reduce earlier rounds of agonizing, draining and long-winded litigation (which resulted into compromise decree) into mere dress rehearsals for future litigation-This was not the intent of law nor could it be in line with the purpose of compromise decrees, it which was to settle disputes and avoid prolonged legal battles and it would also undermine the purpose of tailoring a special statute viz Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-High Court directed its office to issue notices to judgment debtors as the terms of compromise decree were executable-Office objection was overruled.\nPeer Dil v. Dad Muhammad 2009 SCMR 1268 distinguished.\nMuslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hirra Farooq Ltd. 2009 CLD 922; Samba Bank Ltd v. Syed Bhais 2013 CLC 2080; National Bank of Pakistan v. Sultan Ali Lakhani 2015 CLC 1278; Montgomery Flour and General Mills v. MCB Bank Ltd. 2015 CLD 1590; Ejaz Ahmed v. Meezan Bank Limited 2021 CLD 113; Peer Dil v. Dad Muhammad 2009 SCMR 1268; Muhammad Iqbal v. Khair Din 2014 SCMR 33; Abdul Hafeez v. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority PLD 2015 Sindh 336; Port Qasim Authority v. Industrial Management and Investment Co. 2020 CLC 721; Muhammad Jamil v. Waheeda Aslam 2020 CLC 1173; Blacks Law Dictionary [10th Edition]. Concise Oxford English Dictionary [12th Edition]; Muhammad Siddique v. Noor Hussain 1990 MLD 379; Jaffar Abbas v. Ahmad PLD 1991 SC 1131; Fazal Mehdi v. Allah Ditta PLD 2007 SC 343; Messrs Country Products Export Ltd. v. Messrs Bawany Sugar Mills Ltd. PLD 1968 Kar. 115; Nooruddin Hussain v. Diamond Vacuum Bottle PLD 1981 Kar. 720 (725, A); Ghulam Muhammad v. Zubaida Begum 1984 CLC 874; Muhammad Idris Mia v. Abdul Matleb Mia PLD 1966 Dacca 234; Sindh Road Transport Corporation v. S.M. Ali Zaheer Khan 1991 SCMR 425; Port Qasim Authority v. Industrial Management and Investment Co 2020 CLC 721; Muhammad Nawaz v. Rehmat Ali 1994 SCMR 349; Dr. Pehlaj Mal v. Seetal Das (JM No.33/2018); Mena Energy DMCC v. Hascol Petroleum Ltd. PLD 2022 Sindh 388; Khaliluddin v. Rafiq Ahmed Qandhari 2021 CLC 877; World Automobiles v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 2009 CLD 1276; Packages Limited v. Muhammad Maqbool PLD 1991 SC 258; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Faiqa Trading Company 2011 CLD 92; NIB Bank Limited v. Apollo Textile Mills PLD 2013 Kar. 430; Saeed Ullah Paracha v. Habib Bank Limited 2014 CLD 582; Ghulam Fareed v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2019 CLD 437; Nazli Hilal Rizvi v. Bank Al-Falah 2019 SCMR 1679; Summit Bank Limited v. M.M. Brothers 2023 SCMR 374; Pearl Fabrics Corporation v. KASB Bank Limited 2014 CLD 243; Standard Chartered Bank v. Johar Associates 2018 MLD 1293; Montgomery Flour and General Mills v. MCB Bank Ltd. 2015 CLD 1590; Pak Land Corporation v. Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari (KASB) Bank Ltd. 2020 CLD 310; Ejaz Ahmed v. Meezan Bank Limited 2021 CLD 113 and Fakir Abdullah v. Government of Sindh PLD 2001 SC 131 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19", - "Case #": "Execution Application No.08 of 2019, decided on 14th December, 2023, heard on: 27th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sana Akram Minhas, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rahman Aziz Malik for Decree-Holder.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HABIB BANK LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nAMIN SOAP AND OIL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD.-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25264", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4215 = 2024 SLD 4215 = 2024 CLD 575", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTY", - "Key Words:": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (VII of 1947)-\n-S. 23C(4)-Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1998, R. 8-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 10-A & 199-Order of penalty imposed by the Adjudicating Officer of State Bank of Pakistan, assailing of-Appeal before the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, admitting of-Deposit of surety of the equivalent amount of the penalty by the appellant-Pre-condition, vires of-Right to fair trial-Due process-Scope-Appellant invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court as the Presiding Officer of the Appellate Board, while relying upon S. 23C (4) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 ( the Act, 1947 ), had required the petitioner/ appellant to deposit before the Appellate Board a surety equivalent to the amount of penalty imposed upon him holding the same as a sine qua non for the appeal to be entertained and decided-Petitioner prayed for holding the provisions of S. 23C(4) to be unconstitutional on the ground that the same offended the rights of the petitioner/accused to be treated in accordance with law fairly and justly and his right to access of justice was also infringed-Validity-Provisions set out in S.23C(4) of the Act, 1947 provides that no appeal shall be admitted for hearing unless the appellant before the Appellate Board deposits in cash amount of penalty or at the discretion of the Appellate Board furnishes security equal in value to such amount of penalty, therefore, there is a complete prohibition enacted by subsection (4) of S. 23C of the Act 1947 to the hearing of the appeal unless the pre-condition is satisfied by an appellant, which is an infringement of the right which inheres in the petitioner to access to justice-One of the most important planks of the right of access to justice is the right to file at least one appeal against the order which affects the rights of a person-Right to file an appeal must be unimpeded and should not be circumscribed by a condition which surely takes away that right-Subsection (4) of S. 23C of the Act 1947 is one such provision which in fact is tantamount to taking away the right of the petitioner in not only filing of the appeal but also the hearing to be granted on that appeal irrespective of whether it fulfills the condition or not-It is one thing to say that petitioner may be burdened with a condition in case he seeks the suspension of the determination of a liability against him pending the appeal but another aspect entirely to provide in the law that the hearing of the appeal will be contingent upon the fulfillment of a condition precedent which if unfulfilled takes away the right of appeal-Distinction will have to be drawn between the two circumstances-Surely, under civil law a money decree can only be suspended if adequate security is provided by the judgment debtor and as determined by Appellate Court, but that mere fact does not mean that in case of failure to do so the appeal shall not be heard on its merits and that the appellant will be deprived of grant of hearing in the appeal itself unless he deposits the security equivalent to the amount of penalty-Subsection (4) of S. 23C of the Act 1947is a clog on the right of the petitioner to be dealt with in accordance with law-Petitioner has the right of filing at least one appeal and for that appeal to be heard without any pre-conditions attached to it, which is a fundamental right under the Constitution and springs from Art. 10A of the Constitution which provides, inter alia, that for the determination of civil rights and obligations, a person shall be entitled to due process, which also emanates from Art. 4 of the Constitution-Said right is absolute and cannot be taken away by laying down a condition which undermines that right-Rule 8 of the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1998, makes the receipt of an appeal by the Appellate Board subject to compliance with subsection (4) of S. 23C of the Act, 1947, thus, said Rule too prohibits the Appellate Board from hearing the appeal unless the condition is satisfied-High Court set-aside the impugned orders, and struck down subsection (4) of S. 23C of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, as well as R. 8 of the Rules 1998 (to the extent said Rule makes the receipt of an appeal subject to the compliance with subsection (4) of S. 23C of the Act 1947) holding the same as unconstitutional and violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner/appellant-Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\nAsfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607; Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 and Messrs Eastern Rice Syncicate v. Central Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 364 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947=23C(4)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10-A,199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 36748 of 2022, decided on 1st February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waqas Ahmad Mir, Mian Tariq Hassan, Hassan Ali and Jahangir Dogar for Petitioner.\nRehan Nawaz and Dr. Shahid Raza for Respondent-SBP.\nAsad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAN MUHAMMAD TAYAB through Authorized Attorney-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad\nand 7 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25265", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4216 = 2024 SLD 4216 = 2024 CLD 580", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Stock Exchanges (Corporatisation, Demutualization and Integration) Act (XV of 2012)-\n-Preamble-Object, purpose and scope-Provision of Stock Exchanges (Corporatisation, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012, is not a law for establishment or creation of authority as it merely provides enabling provision for conversion of a company limited by guarantee to a company limited by shares-Provision of Stock Exchanges (Corporatisation, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012, provides an easy way for amalgamation and integration without undergoing hassle of recourse available under Company law available at the relevant time.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Fourth Schedule-Federal Legislative List-Scope-Federal Legislative List as appearing in Fourth Schedule to the Constitution clearly demarcates and distributes the legislative powers between Provincial and Federal Legislatures-Entries in Federal Legislative List indicate subjects as long as it does not transgress or encroach upon power of other legislature-Entries in Federal Legislative List catalogue legislative powers and domain which has been given in these Articles-All entries are to be read by articulating them with the words subject to the Constitution -To understand width and amplitude of subject matter mentioned against each entry and to see whether it covers subject matter of taxation or not, the entry in question cannot be read as standalone-One has to see extent or limitation imposed by some other provisions of the Constitution or other entries in Federal Legislative List as they are also part of the Constitution.\nPakistan Medical and Dental Council v. Muhammad Fahad Malik 2018 SCMR 1956; Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582 and LDA v. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739 rel.\n(c) Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011)-\n-S. 23-Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Schedule-Federal entity-Show-cause notice-Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited-Income from listing fee and exchange operations-Petitioner / Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited assailed show-cause notice issued under S. 23 of Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, by respondent / Sindh Revenue Board for recovery of defaulted tax amount on petitioners income arising from listing fee and exchange operation earned by it-Plea raised by petitioner was that respondent / Sindh Revenue Board could not influence or exert their provincial executive authority over petitioner since it was a body created in pursuance of subjects enumerated in Fourth Schedule to the Constitution having Federal Legislative domain-Validity-Scheme of legislative entries in Fourth Schedule to the Constitution regarding taxation is such that taxes on income, sales tax on purchase and sales of goods, duties of customs and excise etc. fall in the domain of Federation-Federal Legislature has no power to legislate in respect of sales tax on services even regarding those subject matters which are enumerated in Federal Legislative List to the Constitution, subject to strict trans-provincial application(Entry 3 and 13 of Federal Legislative List not pressed by petitioner)-Entry 49 enjoys a unique position as it shifts taxing power (for services) from the Federation to the Provinces and it recognizes scope and extent of the powers and creates a reconciled balance, which allows Federation and Provinces to operate in their own fields in harmony-High Court declined to interfere in show-cause notices in question as the same were issued having authority and legislative competence in such regard-Petitioner had already registered itself voluntarily with respondent / Sindh Revenue Board earlier and if any issues of adjudication and not competence, were raised or agitated by the petitioner, the same could be addressed by the authority concerned by issuing show-cause notices-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nSindh Revenue Board v. Civil Aviation Authority 2017 SCMR 1344 and Karachi Golf Club (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh 2021 PTD 558 distinguished.\nProvince of Punjab v. Muhammad Tufail & Co. PLD 2017 SC 53; Kh. Ahmed Tariq Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 646; Pakistan Mobil Communication Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (C.P. No.D-4778/2021) and Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 SCMR 802 ref.\nLAW/STATUTES DISCUSSED\ni) Securities Act, 2015 ( Act of 2015 )\nii) Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012 ( Act 2012 )\niii) Rule Book Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. (PSX)\niv) Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 (SSTA 2011)\nv) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ( Constitution )", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos.3601, 3602 of 2018 and 3302, 3422 of 2019, decided on 27th January, 2022. Dates of hearing: 18th November, 26th October, 7th and 14th December, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Mahmood A. Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hyder Ali Khan along with Shaheer Roshan Shaikh, Sami-ur-Rehman and Hamza Waheed for Petitioner (in all petitions).\nSaifullah, Assistant Advocate General for Respondent No.1.\nMuhammad Tariq Masood, Shamshad Ahmed Narejo and Muhammad Idrees Jakhrani along with Khalid Zamir, Commissioner SRB and Syed Zain-ul-Abdin Shah, Deputy Commissioner SRB for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN STOCK EXCHANGE LIMITED through Duly Authorized Officer-Petitioner\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25266", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4217 = 2024 SLD 4217 = 2024 PLC 597", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963-\n-R. 1.8(a)-Pensionary emoluments, withholding of-Bogus documents-Pensionary benefits of petitioner / retired civil servant were withheld, on the basis that her Matriculation Certificate filed at the time of her initial appointment was bogus-Validity-All credentials and degrees and record of petitioner was with respondent authorities, who never questioned her qualification or degree-Upon attaining superannuation all required certificates were issued and till year 2017 no question was raised about her degrees-No departmental disciplinary proceedings were pending in such regard against petitioner at the time of attaining age of superannuation-Authorities conceded that till year 2019 the Government remained silent and upon a direction issued by High Court for the first time it was informed to petitioner that her Matriculate Certificate was bogus, that too, in a manner in which petitioner was never associated with proceedings initiated against her and she was informed that pensionary benefits were withheld and could not be released-High Court set aside order of withholding pensionary benefits of petitioner and imposed cost upon authorities for passing such order illegally and without lawful authority-High Court directed the authorities to release pensionary benefits to petitioner-Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\n \nHaji Muhammad Ismail, Advocates case PLD 2007 SC 35 and Province of Punjab through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad and others v. Javed Iqbal 2021 SCMR 328 rel.\nThe Government of N.W.F.P. through the Secretary to the Government of N.W.F.P. Communications and Works Department, Peshawar v. Mohammad Said Khan and another PLD 1973 SC 514; D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 130; Regional Operation Chief, National Bank of Pakistan, Human Resource Department, Regional Office, Sargodha and others v. Mst. Nusrat Perveen and others 2021 SCMR 702 and Syed Raza Mehdi Baqari v. Province of Punjab through Secretary, LG & CD Department and 2 others 2016 PLC (C.S.) 1046 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963=1.8(a)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.18509 of 2019, heard on 8th November, 2021, heard on: 8th November, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Raza Qureshi, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Azhar Abbas Haider Bukhari for Petitioner.\nMian Muhammad Shahid Riaz, Assistant Advocate General with Ms. Rukhsana Yasmeen, Deputy District Education Officer, Kabirwala for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KOUSAR PARVEEN\nVersus\nGOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB through Secretary Education and 6 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25267", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4218 = 2024 SLD 4218 = 2024 CLD 600", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQS8", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 118-Life insurance claim-Death of insured in road accident-Legal heirs opting not to conduct post-mortem examination of deceased (insured)-Proof to establish cause of death-Scope-Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claim-Appellant (insurer) never challenged the validity of death certificate of deceased (insured)-Entry in the death register of concerned union council and the report of the incident lodged at police station were official documents and presumption of truth was attached with them and the same should be taken into consideration-In circumstances where a person is met with an accident/unnatural death, his legal heirs ordinarily avoid conducting post-mortem examination, however in the present case, if the appellant/insurer deemed it to be necessary, it should have done the same by itself in order to protect its rights-Record further reflected that the insurance claim was lodged by the respondent with the appellant by complying with all procedural requirements, however, the appellant had badly failed to make due payment (within the time) as prescribed under the law-High Court had rightly decreed the suit for recovery of claim along with liquidated damages as prescribed under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Appeal filed by insurer was dismissed.\nKhurshid Ali and 6 others v. Shah Nazar PLD 1992 SC 822 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=118", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 343-L of 2020, decided on 13th December, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 15.10.2020 of the Lahore High Court Lahore passed in Insurance Appeal No. 171 of 2016)\n heard on: 13th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Ijaz ul Ahsan, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ibrar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nImran Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.\nAsad Ullah Khan, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan for the Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN and another- Appellants\nVersus\nMst. ZUBEDA BIBI-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25268", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4219 = 2024 SLD 4219 = 2024 CLD 604", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQSs", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 & 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr. 66, 89 & 90-Suit for recovery of finance-Execution proceedings-Objections, delay in decision-Effect-Appellant / Judgment Debtors were aggrieved of orders passed by Executing Court regarding issuance of Sale Certificates to auction purchasers-Validity-Proceedings taken by Executing Court while accepting bid on 28-02-2022 based on evaluation report of properties of year 2015 / 2016 was unlawful and inequitable as value of properties for the auction held in year 2022-Claim of bank was multiplied regularly-Order of acceptance dated 28-02-2022 was in fact a short order and did not provide time for raising objections in terms of O. XXI, Rr.89 & 90, C.P.C. and Rr.347 to 351 of Sindh Chief Court Rules-Before such reasons could have been provided, the Executing Court ordered issuance of sale certificate and permission was granted to conclude sale by issuing sale certificate-Division Bench of High Court directed to put mortgaged / attached property / properties to fresh auction and set aside order passed by Executing Court-Division Bench of High Court gave directions to comply with the provisions of O.XXI, R.66, C.P.C.-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nMFMY Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 1550; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Ltd. PLD 2023 SC 241 and 2022 CLD 413 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=66,89,90", - "Case #": "Special High Court Appeals Nos.153 of 2022 and 158 of 2023, decided on 31st January, 2024, heard on: 31st January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Omar Sial, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "S. Ahsan Imran Rizvi along with Bahadur Khosa and Assadullah Shar, Shahabuddin Kalwar holding brief for M. Saleem Mangrio for Appellants.\nRaashid Anwar with Syed Mustafa Ali along with Syed Ahsan Rahman, Law Officer Allied Bank Limited for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FATEH TEXTILE MILLS LTD and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25269", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4220 = 2024 SLD 4220 = 2024 PLC 607", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973-Bank employees-Annual Performance Appraisal Policy/System of Bank-Criteria-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, invoking of-Scope-Rating , expunging / altering of-Vested rights of bank officer(s)-Scope-Petitioners (bank employees serving as AVP, OG-I) invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court seeking directions against the respondents (Bank/Employer) to expunge their Rating-C from the Annual Performance Appraisals (APRs), and to upgrade / restore Rating-A-Validity-Record revealed that the grading of petitioners had been lowered by the countersigning authority but while lowering their grading, they had not been given any adverse entries in their APRs-It was just a matter of grading good or excellent for which they had provided Grades from 1 to 5 in their APR System-None of the entries in the APRs of both the petitioners could be termed as adverse entry-How much better performance had been delivered by which of the employees was supposed to be judged by the Institute itself-Immediate Appraisal Officer had, no doubt, given better grading to both the petitioners but the countersigning authority also had its due role in the APR devised and adopted by the Bank-While adopting APR they had provided a sort of competitive mechanism, where employees in the bank were supposed to be tested on the touchstone provided therein-Bank/respondents had given structured policy for APR of their officers wherein different Bank Officers (General Managers, Regional Head, Group Chiefs) had been assigned different roles/responsibilities, and in such process/roles, none of the fundamental rights of the petitioners were found violated-Petitioners did not have vested right to be retained in same category in which report of the immediate supervisor had placed them-Criteria devised was of such a nature that the same had been competitive and performance was to be comparatively evaluated at functional levels-In such a process, finality would naturally be attached to the valuation conducted at the office of functional Group Chiefs at Head Office-No mala fide or ill-will could be pointed out by the petitioners-None of their fundamental or legally justiciable right was found violated-Categorization of petitioners had also been according to APR System-Appraisal of the bank officers was internal matter of the bank in which the High Court could not interfere in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction-Constitutional petition filed by the bank Officers , was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \n(b) Employment-\n-Bank employees-Annual Performance Appraisal Policy /System of National Bank of Pakistan, vires of-Contention of the petitioners (bank officers of the National Bank) was that Annual Performance Appraisal Policy (APR Policy) was in contravention with National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973 (the Rules, 1973)-Held, that contention of the petitioners was misconceived as no conflict could be found between the Rules, 1973 and the APR Policy , and competitive appraisal of human resource could not be called to be irrational , unreasonable or illogical-Constitutional petition filed by the bank Officers, was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.558-A of 2019, decided on 22nd March, 2023, heard on: 7th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Wiqar Ahmad and Fazal Subhan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Waqas Qayyum for Petitioners.\nMukhtiar Ahmad Muneri for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SALEEM AWAN and another\nVersus\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President and 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25270", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4221 = 2024 SLD 4221 = 2024 CLD 611", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79 & 80-Transfer of shares-Procedure-Provisions of Ss. 74 to 80 of Companies Act, 2017, deal with relationship between transferor/transferee vis-a-vis the company and not between the transferor and the transferee inter se-Such provisions deal with the steps to be taken by transferor or transferee vis-a-vis the company in order to give effect to their agreement for transfer of shares.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 5, 80 & 126-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell-Return of plaint-Suit filed by appellant / plaintiff was with regard to agreement for sale of shares-Trial Court returned the suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under S. 5 of Companies Act, 2017-Validity-Provision of S. 126 of Companies Act, 2017, only pertains to rectification for any fraudulent entry or omission of name of any person in the register of members or if default or unnecessary delay is made in entering the fact of a person having become or ceasing to be a member thereof-No allegation was made in the suit to be covered under S.126 of Companies Act, 2017-Civil Courts jurisdiction is ousted only in respect of suits or proceedings which involved a matter which the Court under S.5 of Companies Act, 2017, is empowered to determine-Controversy between the parties involved dispute regarding agreement for sale of shares by respondents / defendants appellant / plaintiff due to which appellant / plaintiff was seeking specific performance of subject agreement-There is no provision in Companies Act, 2017, which can empower Company Court to exercise jurisdiction in respect of disputes between parties to a share purchase agreement-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts under S. 5 of Companies Act, 2017, is not barred in respect of such disputes-Enforcement of a contract for sale/purchase of shares is covered under Specific Relief Act, 1877-High Court set aside order passed by Trial Court and application filed by respondents / defendant were dismissed-High Court directed Trial Court to proceed with the suit in accordance with law-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nProvince of Punjab v. Messrs Muhammad Tufail and Company PLD 2017 SC 53; National Highway Authority v. Messrs Put Sarajevo General Engineering Company 2012 CLC 463; Ravi Glass Mills Limited v. I.C.I. Pakistan Powergen Limited 2004 YLR 2503; Messrs Businet International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Aramex International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 CLC 104; WAPDA v. Mian Ghulam Bari PLD 1991 SC 780; Messrs Brady & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Messrs Sayed Saigol Industries Ltd. 1981 SCMR 494; Sh. Imam Ali v. Ch. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1956 Lah. 341; Dr. Omar Masood and another v. Syed Amir Hussain Naqvi and another 2019 CLD 931; MCB Bank Limited v. Adeel Shahbaz Steel Mills and others 2023 CLD 655; Zaib Cold Storage and Ice Factory through Sole Proprietor and another v. Messrs Pakistan Industrial Leasing Corporation Limited 2006 CLD 67; Bankers Equity Ltd. v. Iqas Weaving Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 CLC 169; Tahir Tariq Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. N.D.F.C. through Chairman 2001 YLR 846 and Faqir Muhammad v. Federation of Pakistan 2000 SCMR 1312 ref.\nNational Investment Trust Ltd. v. Lawrencepur Woolen and Textile Mills Ltd. 2002 CLD 527 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=74,75,76,77,78,79,80,5,126Specific Relief Act, 1877=12Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.32 of 2023, decided on 14th February, 2024, heard on: 25th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Saman Rafat Imtiaz, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ramzan Chaudhry for Appellant.\nSajjad Muhammad Durrani for Respondents Nos.1 to 3.\nSyed Muneeza Fatima for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL SAEED-Appellant\nVersus\nMrs. NASEEM KHATTAK HUMAYUN and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25271", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4222 = 2024 SLD 4222 = 2024 CLD 619", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Partnership Act (IX of 1932)-\n-Ss. 7, 32(1)(c) & 32(2) & 32(3)-Suit for recovery along with profits against a partner-Partnership at will-Retirement of partner-Procedure provided for retirement not followed-Trial Court held the respondent (defendant in the suit) liable to pay the suit amount and passed a preliminary decree in favour of the appellant (plaintiff) against the respondents to the extent of Rs. 2,38,00,000/- -Admittedly, the appellant, who was a third party, was the sufferer as he made a huge investment in the (partnership) firm-Since in the instant case no deed of contract had been brought on record determining the period of partnership and determination of partnership, therefore, the High Court rightly observed that the provision of Section 7 of the Partnership Act, 1932 (Act) would apply, and hence the nature of the partnership was a partnership at will-High Court however erred in deciding the manner of retirement of the respondent-Section 32 (1) (c) of the Act explicitly mentions the precondition of issuing a notice by a retiring partner in writing to all other partners of his intention to retire, which was not issued by the respondent/ retiring partner in the present case-High Court in its reasons applied the procedure of retirement of a partner as given in Section 32 (2) of the Act, which states that the a retiring partner has the obligation of entering into an agreement with the third party and partners of reconstituted firm to discharge him from the liabilities of the partnership before retirement, however there was no agreement available in this case-Further, even if the respondent had fulfilled the requirements of Section 32 (1) (c) and Section 32 (2) of the Act, he would still not be discharged from the liabilities against a third party until a public notice was given by him or by any partner of the reconstituted firm as required under Section 32 (3) of the Act, but in the present case no such public notice was issued-Appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment passed by the High Court was set aside and consequently the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was restored.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-When the law requires that a particular thing should be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner and not otherwise.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Partnership Act, 1932=7,32(1)(c),32(2),32(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.499 of 2017, decided on 26th January, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 19.01.2017 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in R.F.A. No.65-P of 2012), heard on: 24th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Mastan Ali Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nIsmail Khan Khalil, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1.\nEx parte for Proforma Respondents Nos.2-3.\nFida Gul, Advocate Supreme Court for Proforma Respondents Nos.4-6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NADIR KHAN-Appellant\nVersus\nQADIR HUSSAIN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25272", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4223 = 2024 SLD 4223 = 2024 PLC 620", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTQXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act (XII of 1991)-\n-S. 6 (1)-Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999, R. 3-Judicial Officer-Misconduct-Dismissal from service-Term resignation -Resignation, voluntariness of-Withdrawal of resignation-Scope-Appellant (Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate) tendered his resignation after two months of the report of the Inquiry Officer who recommended the imposition of major penalty in the shape of dismissal from service against him-Contention of the appellant that there were serious threats to his life due to which he tendered his resignation, which was not voluntary, rather on account of compelling circumstances-Validity-No such contention/reason was mentioned in the resignation itself having been tendered by the appellant-It was also evident from the relevant notification that the resignation of the appellant was accepted on account of droppage of disciplinary proceedings initiated against him on the charge of misconduct-It was also manifestly clear that despite the fact that matter of acceptance of resignation remained under consideration for a considerable period but no effort was made by the appellant to move for its withdrawal-Even after acceptance of the resignation the appellant remained mum for a considerable period and finally he moved the representation after more than one year and nine months (from date of Notification), which was rejected by the respondents (Registrar High Court) after six months or so-Definitions of the term resignation as given in various law dictionaries leads to an irresistible conclusion that resignation means formal renouncement or relinquishment of an office , which must be intentional and voluntary, and for drawing a conclusion as to whether the resignation is voluntary or otherwise facts and circumstances in toto have to be taken into consideration-Once a resignation is accepted by the competent authority, the employee tendering the same is precluded to recall it-High Court viewed that the resignation of the appellant was voluntary without any hint of doubt and as such he was precluded to ask for its withdrawal and reinstatement in service-Appeal filed by the ex-Judicial Officer, being devoid of any merits, was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nMuhammad Salim Khan v. Director-General, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Emloyment and another 1991 SCMR 440 and Muhammad Zahoor v. Registrar Lahore High Court, Lahore and another 2005 SCMR 1194 ref.\nMuhammad Zahoor v. Registrar Lahore High Court, Lahore and another 2005 SCMR 1194; Dr. Muhammad Munir-ul-Haq and others v. Dr. Muhammad Latif Chaudhry and others 1992 SCMR 2135; Nabeela Kiran v. Government of Punjab and others 2020 PLC (C.S.) 560 and Syed Faisal Raza Gillani v. Lahore High Court, Lahore through Registrar and others 2015 PLC (C.S.) 137 distinguished.\n(b) Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act (XII of 1991)-\n-Ss. 5(a) & 6 (1)-Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974), S. 21-Judicial Officer-Imposition of major penalty, assailing of-Limitation-Appeal, right of-In terms of S.21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, right of appeal or representation is available to a Judicial Officer in respect of any order relating to terms and conditions of service, which is to be moved within sixty days of communication of such order to him-Appellant preferred departmental appeal after more than two years and two months of acceptance of his resignation , which was clearly beyond the prescribed period of limitation-When departmental appeal or representation is barred by time even if the appeal before the Service Tribunal is filed within time it would be hit by limitation-In terms of S.5(a) of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act, 1991, where an appeal, review or representation to a departmental authority is provided under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 , or any rules against any such orders, no appeal shall lie to the Tribunal unless the aggrieved person has preferred an appeal or application for review or representation to such departmental authority and a period of ninety days has elapsed from the date on which such appeal, application, or representation is so preferred-On account of time barred representation/departmental appeal, the present appeal against the order of rejection of appellants representation though apparently seemed to be in time but actually it was barred by time-Appeal filed by the ex-Judicial Officer was dismissed, in circumstances.\nSajjad Hussain v. Secretary, Ministry of Railways, Islamabad and others 2012 SCMR 195 and Muhammad Aslam v. WAPDA and others 2007 SCMR 513 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act, 1991=6(1)", - "Case #": "Service Appeal No.10 of 2018, heard on 20th June, 2023, heard on: 20th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mirza Viqas Rauf, Chairman and Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abid Saqi and Sabahat Rizvi for Appellant.\nJawwad Tariq Nasim for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALI ASHTAR NAQVI\nVersus\nLAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE through Registrar and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25273", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4224 = 2024 SLD 4224 = 2024 CLD 623", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODc", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 22-Suit for recovery of finance-Finance agreement-Terms and conditions, challenge to-Appellant / defendant was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court in favour of respondent / bank-Validity-After consuming amount, appellant / defendant came forward challenging KIBOR on the terms of which the finance facility was consciously availed, utilized and then defaults were made and recovery suit was filed-Appellant / defendant failed to point out that KIBOR was not applicable in terms of some circular of State Bank of Pakistan-Neither, when leave application was filed and granted nor at any stage of suit proceeding, nor when present appeal was filed, such circular of State Bank of Pakistan was presented to the Court-KIBOR was part of the agreed terms when loan was structured and financed and hence appellant / defendant could not blow hot and cold after utilization of amount-Cheques which bounced could not be adjusted in the execution proceedings and only the amount that was paid after decree was duly adjusted-High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.44 of 2019, decided on 6th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Omar Sial, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sohail Hameed for Appellants.\nSuleman Hudda for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD BILAL through Legal Heirs-Petitioner\nVersus\nDUBAI ISLAMIC BANK LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25274", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4225 = 2024 SLD 4225 = 2024 CLD 626", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODY", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 15(8), proviso and 15(13), 15(14) & 15(5) [as amended by Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Amendment Act (XXXVIII of 2016)]-Sale of mortgaged property without intervention of the Court-Objection petition seeking injunction for restraining the sale before filing of proper accounts for the sale proceeds-Maintainability-Appellants (who intented to participate in the bidding process) objected, through two Civil Miscellaneous Applications, to the sale of mortgaged property through auction without intervention of the Court, seeking a restraining order against the decree-holder/Bank from transferring the mortgaged property in favour of the auction purchaser through the sale deed-Executing Court (Single Judge of the High Court ) dismissed both Civil Miscellaneous Applications moved by the appellants holding the same as not-maintainable as the decree-holder/Bank had not yet filed the requisite accounts of the sale-Validity-There is nothing in the provisions of subsections (13) and (15) of S. 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance 2001) to suggest that application qua objection to the sale of mortgaged property without intervention of the Court and seeking injunction for restraining of sale of mortgaged property are not maintainable before proper accounts for the sale are filed in the Court-After the sale takes place (real or fictitious), a sale deed in respect of the property is to be executed by the financial institution which is authorized in said behalf by virtue of subsection (8) of S. 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Said subsection (8) contains a proviso that no such sale deed shall be executed or registered until expiry of seven days after the completion-Prior to enactment of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Amendment Act, 2016, there was no provision in the Ordinance, 2001 which permitted objecting to the conduct of sale after the fall of hammer, which was declared repugnant to due process and fair trial, as guaranteed under Art. 10-A of the Constitution by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of National Bank of Pakistan and 117 others v. SAF Textile Mills Limited reported as PLD 2014 SC 243, whereafter provisions of S.15 of the Ordinance, 2001 were amended to provide for the remedies under subsections (13) and (14) of S. 15 of the Ordinance, 2001-Subsequently, a Full Bench of High Court in the case of Muhammad Shoaib Arshad and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice Human Rights and Parliamentary Affairs and 4 others reported as 2020 CLD 638, declared the provisions of aforementioned amended S. 15 intra vires the Constitution-No doubt the financial institution which has sold the mortgaged property is required to submit proper accounts of the sale proceeds in the Banking Court within thirty days of the sale, as manifest from subsection (11) of S. 15 of the Financial Institutions ( Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, however, in the scheme of said section such occasion arises after the sale has become absolute either because no remedy was availed under subsections (13) and (14) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 or the remedy availed does not yield fruitful results for the objector-Thus, the impugned orders had been passed apparently without having regard to the provisions of subsections (13) to (15) and proviso to subsection (8) of S. 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, therefore, the impugned orders were not sustainable in law and the same were set aside-Civil Miscellaneous Applications of the appellants would be deemed to be pending before the Executing Court (Single Judge of the High Court) to be decided in accordance with law-Execution first appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nNational Bank of Pakistan and 117 others v. SAF Textile Mills Limited PLD 2014 SC 243 and Muhammad Shoaib Arshad and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice Human Rights and Parliamentary Affairs and 4 others 2020 CLD 638 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=15(8)", - "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.45601 of 2022, heard on 28th September, 2022, heard on: 28th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim and Raheel Kamran, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Sohail Khurshid for Appellant.\nJahanzaib Inam for Respondent No.1.\nMajid Ali Wajid for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAVEED KHALID BUTT and another-Appellants\nVersus\nThe BANK OF PUNJAB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25275", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4226 = 2024 SLD 4226 = 2024 CLD 631", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODU", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss.19 & 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 47 & O.XXI, R. 60-Execution proceedings-Agreement to sell-Right of purchaser-Scope-Appellant was aggrieved of execution proceedings on the plea that he was owner of mortgaged property on basis of agreement to sell in his favour-Validity-Executing Court had power under S. 47, C.P.C., to determine questions arising out between the parties to the suit-Appellant had come in picture after passing of judgment and decree hence was a stranger in the findings-In terms of O. XXI, R.60, C.P.C., release of property from attachment could be allowed only in case the objector/claimant had a title or right over it-Appellant had no valid title in his favour and there was a registered document whereby judgment debtor was the sole owner of the subject property-High Court declined to interfere in execution proceedings-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=47,60", - "Case #": "First Appeals Nos.60 of 2020 and 42 of 2021, decided on 4th December, 2023, heard on: 7th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ali Waris Lari for Appellant.\nFaiz Durrani for Respondent No.1.\nSohail Abbas for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL BASIT KHAN and others-Appellant\nVersus\nBANK ISLAMI PAKISTAN LIMITED through attorneys and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25276", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4227 = 2024 SLD 4227 = 2024 PLC 677", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODQ", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)-\n-S. 4(1)(b)(vi)-Contractual employee of Punjab Employees Social Security Institution, Lahore (the PESSI)-Reinstatement in service from date of dismissal with all back benefits-With regard to the allegation levelled against the respondent (employee) regarding his poor performance from 06.11.2011 to 21.08.2020, the fate of the said allegation could only be decided after conducting a thorough probe/regular enquiry-Said allegation stood belied from the remarks recorded by the Reporting Officer in the Personal Evaluation Reports of the respondent from the years 2009 to 2020, wherein his performance had been shown as satisfactory-Conduct of the petitioners (departmental authorities) established mala fide on their part to dispense with the services of the respondent as all penal actions against the respondent were initiated by them after filing of writ petitions and contempt petitions/applications by the respondent-As regards the allegation against the respondent of not following duty timings properly, it was apparent from the record that without specifying days when the respondent did not attend the office on time supported the plea of the respondent that he performed his duties to the entire satisfaction of his superiors-Moreover, the Reporting Officer while recording the remarks in the column of Punctuality did not give any adverse remarks against the respondent-Last allegation in the show cause notice that despite previous enquiries initiated against the respondent his behaviour remained very irresponsible during his service, no incident or untoward situation during the service of the respondent had been pointed out or referred to by the petitioners-High Court rightly reinstated the respondent in service from the date of his dismissal with all back benefits, and gave directions to the departmental authorities to take up the matter regarding regularization of services of the respondent with the relevant authority and upon fulfilment of codal formalities to ensure decision within a period of six months positively-Petitions were dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006=4(1)(b)(vi)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2007-L of 2023, C.M.A. No. 2782-L of 2023 in\nC.P. No.2007-L of 2023, C.P. No.2008-L of 2023 and C.M.A. No.4417-L of 2023 in C.P. No.2008-L of 2023, decided on 18th January, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 30.03.2023, passed by the Lahore\nHigh Court, Lahore in Writ Petitions Nos.33961 of 2022 and 178510 of 2018) heard on: 18th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Amin-ud-Din Khan and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aftab Raheem, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Shoaib Tabish, Law Officer (via video link from Lahore) for Petitioner/ Applicants (in both cases).\nM. Irian Khan Ghaznavi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (in both cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "The PUNJAB EMPLOYEES SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION, LAHORE through Commissioner and others\nVersus\nJAVED IQBAL and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25277", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4228 = 2024 SLD 4228 = 2024 CLD 635", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTOC8", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 237-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Circular No. 24 of 2017 issued by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Transmitting of Quarterly Financial Statements to Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan by the company-Failure to transmit-Effect-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan imposed penalty upon the appellants /company for failure for successive default periods-Contention of the appellants was that by filing of quarterly financial statements with the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) and Company Registration Office (CRO) fulfiled the requirements of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2017-Validity-Relevant provisions transpire that subsection (1) of the S. 237 of the Companies Act, 2017 expressly provides the time for filing of quarterly accounts whereas subsection (2) of the S. 237 specifies mode for filing of the same (quarterly accounts) i.e. electronically-Furthermore, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, in order to facilitate the companies and to streamline the filing process, issued Circular No. 24 of 2017 which makes it incumbent upon a listed company to electronically transmit its quarterly financial statement, in terms of S. 237(2) of the Companies Act, 2017, on the designated (given) e-mail address-Interim financial statements prepared accurately and in timely manner, provides a reliable source of information regarding a companys financial position and performance to its users, besides illustrating the results of the managements stewardship of resources entrusted to it-Appellants had fiduciary duties towards the Company and its shareholders while providing information to various stakeholders concerning their performances as to how diligently and ethically they were are discharging their fiduciary duties and responsibilities-Hence, contention of the appellants (that filing of quarterly financial statements with the concerned CRO and PSX fulfiled the requirements of the provisions the Companies Act, 2017) did not stricto sensu correspond with the relevant provision and might be construed as a mitigating factor attracting leniency, only if done within stipulated time, which was not the case in the present matter-Moreover, the argument of the appellants did not sustain on the touchstone of alternate filing modes as in most of the default periods, the same was done either with delay or not done at all-No case for interference by the Appellate Bench in the penalty imposing impugned order was made out-Appeal filed by the company was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=237Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.78 of 2021, decided on 25th August, 2023, heard on: 9th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Javed Panni and Batrrister Shahzad Javed Panni for Appellants.\nAmir Saleem, Additional Director, Adjudication-I and Sardar Sohaib Amin, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SOHAIL AHMED and others-Appellants\nVersus\nADDITIONAL DIRECTOR, LISTED COMPANIES, ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT-I-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25278", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4229 = 2024 SLD 4229 = 2024 CLD 640", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTOCs", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss.9 & 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12 (2)-Suit for recovery of bank finance-Plea of fraud and misrepresentation-Private dispute-Entries in statement of accounts-Appellants / defendants assailed judgment and decree passed against them on the plea of fraud committed by branch manager who was their relative-Validity-Fraud must be shown under S. 12(2), C.P.C. by appellants / defendants to have been played upon the Court during the proceedings of the lis-Appellants / defendants relied on bank entries in account statements in their application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., which called for examination on merits, not fraud and misrepresentation-Private dispute between appellants / defendants and their relative, who happened to be the Branch Manager did not constitute fraud under S.12(2), C.P.C.-Judgment passed by Banking Court had already discussed the points raised by appellants / defendants against the Bank Manager and decided the suit against appellants / defendants; the same issues could not be agitated in application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. as grounds of fraud and misrepresentation-Grounds of appeal remained unsubstantiated, general, vague, and were not supported with any cogent prima facie evidence or material-Order passed by Banking Court on application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., was based on reasonable grounds available to Banking Court for such dismissal-High Court declined to interfere in order in question, as Banking Court did not err while passing judgment/decree/order against appellants / defendants and it was well-grounded, and no interference was required-Judgment, decree and orders passed by Banking Court did not suffer from any illegality or material irregularity-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstance.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.76 of 2021, decided on 15th December, 2023, heard on: 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Shakoor for Appellants.\nAijaz Hussain Shirazi for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL KARIM MOMNANI and another-Appellants\nVersus\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25279", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4230 = 2024 SLD 4230 = 2024 CLD 645", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODk", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S.132-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33-Annual General Meeting, holding of-Stipulated period-Scope-Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) issued show-cause notice and subsequently imposed penalty upon appellant/ company for not holding Annual General Meeting of relevant financial year within a period of one hundred and twenty days-Contention of the appellant that Annual General Meeting for the financial year ended June 30, 2020 could not be held within the stipulated period due to litigation pending before the High Court and injunctive order passed by the High Court-Validity-Record revealed that multiple suits and applications pertaining to election of directors and holding of Annual General Meeting for the financial year ending June 30, 2020 were pending before the Single Bench as well as Division Bench of the High Court , wherein injunctive order was also passed-It was the case of the appellant that Annual General Meeting for the financial year ending June 30, 2020 was convened on July 16, 2021 upon express permission of the High Court-Contention of the appellant was supported by the certified true copies of the order sheet of the High Court which could not be refuted by the respondent-Appellate Bench set-aside the show-cause notice and impugned order passed by the Commission-Appeal filed by the company was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=132Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.55 of 2022, decided on 23rd August, 2023, heard on: 25th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ijaz Ahmed, Sarfraz Ahmed and Mohsin Naeem, Company Secretary for Appellants.\nAmir Saleem, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, Muhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I and Sardar Sohaib Amin, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs HUM NETWORK LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nDIRECTOR/HOD, ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT-I-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25280", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4231 = 2024 SLD 4231 = 2024 CLD 648", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTODg", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss.9, 10 & 22-Bankers Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S.2(8)-Recovery of finance-Leave to defend suit, grant of-Statement of accounts-Admissibility-Appellant / defendant was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Banking Court on the plea that statement of accounts produced by respondent / bank was not in compliance of S. 2(8) of Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891-Validity-Statement of accounts on the basis of which suit was decreed was disputed and could not be relied upon as it had become a case of evidence-Where defects in statement of accounts were pointed out, even on such score alone leave should have been granted by virtue of requirement of S.9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Banking Court as the same was passed without looking at applicability of statement of accounts in that form-High Court granted leave to defend the suit and remanded the matter to Banking Court for trial in accordance with law-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nAppolo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Limited PLD 2012 SC 268; Kareem Nawas Khan v. The State through PGP and another 2016 SCMR 291 and The Commissioner Inland Revenue v. The Secretary Revenue Division and others 2020 SCMR 2055 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10,22Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891=2(8)", - "Case #": "First Appeals Nos.105 and 106 of 2016, decided on 17th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Omar Sial, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khaleeq Ahmed for Appellants.\nTalha Jawed for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAVEED and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nHABIB BANK LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25281", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4232 = 2024 SLD 4232 = 2024 CLD 652", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTOHo", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 237-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Quarterly financial statements, non-transmitting of-Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) imposed penalty upon appellant/company for not timely transmitting quarterly financial statements-Validity-It was case of the appellant that quarterly financial statements for the default periods could not be timely transmitted as board meetings of the company for approval of said financial statements could not be held due to uncertainty with respect to legal status of the Board of Directors coupled with litigation pending before the High Court and injunctive order passed by the High Court-Said contention of the appellant appeared to be reasonable in the context that quarterly accounts for the default periods were transmitted within reasonable time after vacation of the restraining order by High Court allowing the company to hold Annual General Meeting-Record revealed that respondent/Commission issued warning to the other companies in the show-cause notice proceedings, but imposed penalty upon the appellant alone-Said admitted fact could be regarded as a mitigating factor-Appellate Bench, while taking a lenient view in the present case, converted the impugned order into warning-Appeal filed by the company was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=237Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.54 of 2022, decided on 25th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ijaz Ahmed, Sarfraz Ahmed and Mohsin Naeem, Company Secretary for Appellants.\nAmir Saleem, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, Muhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I and Sardar Sohaib Amin, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DURAID QURESHI and another-Appellants\nVersus\nADDITIONAL DIRECTOR/HOW, ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT-I-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25282", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4233 = 2024 SLD 4233 = 2024 PLC 563", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTOHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Deputation-Relieving / repatriating of deputationist before completion of deputation period-Deputationist, rights of-Scope-Petitioner assailed the order whereby he was relieved from borrowing department before completion of deputation period-Held, that it is within the domain of the borrowing department to relieve the civil servant at any time if they are not satisfied with his performance and for relieving such deputationist, no departmental proceedings are required-Even otherwise, the petitioner can only be proceeded departmentally by his parent department, if there is any allegation even in the office of borrowing department against him-Depuationist has no vested right to remain on the post, as deputationist, forever or for the stipulated period, and he can be ordered to be repatriated to the parent department at any time without assigning any reasons-In absence of any specific provision of law, deputationist could not ask to serve total period of deputation and he could be repatriated being a deputationist by competent authority in the interest of exigencies of service as and when so desired and such order of competent authority could not be questioned-Constitutional petition, filed by the deputationist, was dismissed, in circumstances.\nS. Masood Abbas Rizvi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment and others 2014 SCMR 799 ref.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Deputation-Period of deputation-Deputationist, rights of-Scope-Period of deputation could , at the best, be equated to that of an expression of a maximum period; which(period) could be curtailed or extended by competent authority and no legal or vested rights are available to a deputationist to serve his entire period of deputation in borrowing department.\nDr. Shafi ur Rehman Afridi v. C.D.A Islamabad through Chairman and others 2010 SCMR 378 ref.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Deputation, recalling of-Deputationist, rights of-Scope-It is a matter of practice and common experience that officers of the Provincial Cadres deputed for service at the Centre are frequently recalled by their Province, by the Provincial Government, in the exigencies of public service-Against such a recall they have no right of any kind to object , being substantively officers of the Provincial Government and only on deputation to the Centre-Constitutional petition, filed by the deputationist against recalling his deputation before completion of deputation, was dismissed, in circumstances.\nFederation of Pakistan v. Fazal Rahman Khundkar and another PLD 1959 SC (Pak) 82 ref.\n(d) Civil service-\n-Deputation-Relieving / repatriating of deputationist before completion of deputation period -Deputationist, rights of-Scope-Resort to deputation can only be made in extreme cases of exigencies of service on account of non-availability of relevant expertise in the department-Deputationist does not have any vested right to remain posted for an indefinite period-Employer has the right and authority to terminate the deputation period or repatriate the employee back to his parent department, and he can be ordered to be repatriated at any time without assigning any reason.\nChief Secretary and others case 2013 SCMR 1752; Ali Azhar Khan Baloch and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2015 SCMR 456; Senate Secretariat through Chairman and another v. Miss Faiqa Abdul Hayee 2014 SCMR 522 and S. Masood Abbas Rizvi v Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment and others 2014 SCMR 799 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.5090-P of 2021, decided on 13th January, 2022, heard on: 13th January, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Rooh-ul-Amin Khan and Ijaz Anwar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Noor Muhammad Khattak for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IJAZ HUSSAIN\nVersus\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Interior, Islamabad and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25283", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4234 = 2024 SLD 4234 = 2024 CLD 655", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDc", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss.9, 10 & 22-Suit for recovery of finance facility-Legal heirs of deceased borrower-All legal heirs not impleaded-Effect-Respondent / bank did not implead all appellants / legal representatives of deceased borrower and Banking Court decreed the suit only to the extent of appellants / legal representatives-Validity-Suit was filed by respondent / bank against some and not all legal heirs of deceased borrower as per names of legal representatives disclosed by appellant / legal representative in power of attorney attached to appeal-Judgment and decree could not be enforced against those legal representative of deceased borrower who were not impleaded in suit before Banking Court and were not given opportunity of hearing notwithstanding that any claim of legal representatives on land of deceased borrower would be subject to the first lien (mortgage) of respondent / bank-High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Banking Court in favour of respondent / bank, as the same was proper and based on facts and law which did not suffer from any illegality-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Larkana Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10,22", - "Case #": "First Civil Appeal No.D-03 of 2023, decided on 21st February, 2024, heard on: 14th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Saleem Jessar and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jai Kumar for Appellants.\nNemo for Respondent No.1.\nNemo for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM MUHAMMAD through his Legal Heirs-Appellants\nVersus\nZARAI TARAQIATI BANK LTD. through Manager and authorized person and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25284", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4235 = 2024 SLD 4235 = 2024 PLC 657", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDY", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O.II, R. 2-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Civil service-Regularization in service-Second constitutional petition filed on the basis of the same cause of action which was decided in the first constitutional petition-Maintainability-Respondents (employees) had sought their regularization from the date of their appointment in the first constitutional petition (the first petition) filed before the High Court, which was disposed of by the High Court directing that the respondents be regularized in terms of the said judgment-If the respondents were not satisfied with the said judgment they should have appealed the same or if the same was not implemented they should have sought its implementation, which could have been by invoking the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court-In any event on the same cause of action, and one which had been decided pursuant to the judgment in the first petition, another constitutional petition (the second petition) was not maintainable, and as no fresh cause of action had accrued to the respondents-This critical aspect of the case was overlooked by the Single Judge of the High Court who passed the order in the second petition-Though this is not the respondents case, if for the sake of argument it is assumed that in the first petition the respondents had only sought their regularization, and after they were regularized they wanted the regularization to take effect from the date of their initial appointment on contract basis, they could not seek this relief subsequently in the second petition because of the restriction in Order II, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and the second petition filed by the respondents was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1974-L of 2020, decided on 1st February, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 22.09.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.C.A. No.128925 of 2018).\nheard on: 1st February 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister M. Mumtaz Ali, Addl. AG Punjab for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 1 to 21.\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos.22 to 29 and 31 to 35.\nJunaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.30.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Secretary, Population Welfare Department, Lahore and others\nVersus\nSHEHZAD ANJUM and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25285", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4236 = 2024 SLD 4236 = 2024 CLD 660", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited Regulations-\n-Chapt.18-Securities Act (III of 2015), S.7-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 20 & 33-Dispute between a securities broker and its client, resolution of-Arbitration proceedings-Scope-Client alleged that illegal/unlawful trades/transactions were made in his Trading Account maintained with the security broker-Commissioner Supervision Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, directed the parties to approach Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) to resolve their dispute through arbitration-Appellant/client impugned said order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Validity-Record revealed the matter between the parties remained pending before the High Court and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan was directed by the High Court to decide the matter in accordance with law-Relevant law was very clear and unambiguous , therefore, any dispute between a securities broker and its client was subject to determination through the arbitration mechanism provided under Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited Regulations (PSX Regulations), which is compendium of PSX Regulations made in exercise of powers conferred under S. 7 of the Securities Act, 2015, with the prior approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and in terms of the Account Opening Form, being the underlying agreement between the parties-Impugned order was passed in compliance with the Courts order as well as relevant law-No reason had been noticed for interference with the merits of the impugned order passed by the Commissioner Supervision Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Appeal filed by the client was dismissed, in circumstances.\nCriminal Original No.303-W/2021 ref.\n(b) Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited Regulations-\n-Chapt. 18-Securities Act (III of 2015), S. 7-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 20 & 33-Dispute between a securities broker and its client, resolution of-Arbitration proceedings-Scope-Client alleged that Illegal/unlawful trades/transactions were made in his Trading Account maintained with the security broker-Commissioner Supervision Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, directed the parties to approach Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) to resolve their dispute through arbitration-Appellant/client impugned said order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Validity-Contention of the appellant was that the impugned order be modified making the same time-bound-Held, that the contention of the appellant was not tenable for the reason that in the applicable arbitration framework , an in-built timeline was provided, hence there was no need to issue a separate time-bound directions-No reason had been noticed for interference with the merits of the impugned order passed by the Commissioner Supervision Division Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Appeal filed by the client was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(c) Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited Regulations-\n-Chapt. 18-Securities Act (III of 2015), S. 7-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 20 & 33-Dispute between a securities broker and its client, resolution of-Arbitration proceedings-Scope-Client alleged that illegal/unlawful trades/transactions were made in his Trading Account maintained with the security broker-Commissioner Supervision Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, directed the parties to approach Pakistan Stock Exchange ( PSX) to resolve their dispute through arbitration-Appellant/client impugned said order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Validity-Contention of the appellant was that during the arbitration proceedings, respondent had submitted fictitious documents-Validity-Presentation of any fake or fabricated document during the arbitration proceedings, generally, does not vitiate the proceedings, rather the arbitrator has the authority to determine through appropriate procedures whether the documents submitted by either party are real or fictitious-No reason had been noticed for interference with the merits of the impugned order passed by the Commissioner Supervision Division Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Appeal filed by the client was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities Act, 2015=7Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=20,33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.24 of 2022, decided on 1st September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant present in person, Ghulam Murtaza Malik, Ms. Suzain Khattac and Saeed for Appellant.\nMuhammad Ali, Additional Director, Ms. Neelum Aamir, Joint Director, Muhammad Najam Ali, Chief Executive Officer, Next Capital Limited, Rizwan Yousuf, Company Secretary, Next Capital Limited, Ajeet Kumar, Chief Regulatory Officer, PSX, Tariq Qureshi, DGM and Unit Head Litigation, PSX, Atif Islam Siddiqui, Senior Manager Regulatory Affairs Division, PSX, Rashid Mahar Authorized Representative, CDC, and Badiuddin Akber, Chief Executive Officer, CDC, for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sardar SHAHBAZ ALI KHAN KHOSA-Appellant\nVersus\nCOMMISSIONER SUPERVISION DIVISION, SECP and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25286", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4237 = 2024 SLD 4237 = 2024 PLC 661", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Maintainability-Civil service-Service matter-Principle-When no final order has been passed against a petitioner and he cannot approach Service Tribunal, such petitioner becomes remediless and his only option is to approach High Court.\nUmer Daraz v. Additional Sessions Judge and others 2021 MLD 2077 and Finance Department, Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, through Secretary Finance, Civil Secretariat, Chatter Domail, Muzaffarabad v. Mahboob Ahmed Awan 2020 PLC (C.S) 741 rel.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Maintainability-Show cause notice-Principle-In routine, Constitutional petition against issuance of show cause notice is not maintainable, however, where show cause notice has been issued in violation of law on the subject, the same can be challenged in constitutional petition.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Jahangir Khan Tareen and others 2022 SCMR 92; Jahangir Muggo and others v. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others 2022 CLD 1325; Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Information and others 2021 CLC 159; Reliance Commodities (Private) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2020 Lah. 632 and Dr. Fatima Arshad v. Government of the Punjab and others 2020 PLC (C.S.) 688 rel.\n(c) Fundamental Rules-\n-F.R. 54-A-Departmental proceedings-Retirement from government service-Effect-Departmental proceedings, pending against government service, stand abated under R. 54-A of Fundamental Rules, in the event of his retirement from government service.\nMuhammad Zaheer Khan v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment and others 2010 SCMR 1554; Deputy Director, Food, Bahawalpur and others v. Akhtar Ali and others 1998 SCMR 597; Nasir Kamal v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Islamabad 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1226 and Syed Anwar Ali Shah v. Zarai Tarqiati Bank Ltd. 2021 PLC (C.S.) 662 rel.\n(d) Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963-\n-R. 1.8 (a)-Pensionary emoluments, withholding of-Inquiry after retirement-Effect-Petitioner / retired government servant was aggrieved of withholding of his pensionary emoluments on the basis of de novo inquiry initiated after his retirement-Validity-Competent Authority can proceed against a retiree if he is found involved in any activity prejudicial to good conduct of a government servant/retiree but not after his retirement-Disciplinary proceedings pending against a government servant abate after retirement and the same cannot be switched over to those under R.1.8(a) of Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963-Departmental proceedings against serving government servant and those against retiree are governed under distinct laws/rules and they have no overlapping effect on each other-Departmental proceedings pending against petitioner could not be converted into those under R. 1.8(a) of Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963, during service of petitioner-High Court set aside the notification withholding certain amount of petitioner as it was illegal and conditions envisaged under R. 1.8(a) of Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963, were not attracted-High Court directed the authorities to release the amount withheld from pensionary emoluments of petitioner-High Court quashed all proceedings initiated by authorities against petitioner-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nProvince of Punjab through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad and others v. Javed Iqbal 2021 SCMR 328; Chief Manager, Staff Bank of Pakistan and 2 others v. Ghulam Rasool and others 2011 SCMR 313; Province of the Punjab through Secretary, Livestock and Dairy Development Department, Punjab, Lahore and others v. Syed Munir Hussain Shah 1998 SCMR 1326; Hafiz Muhammad Kaleem ud Din v. Province of Punjab and others 2022 PLC (C.S.) 999; Khalid Imran Khan Barki v. Government of Punjab and others 2021 PLC (C.S.) 426; Masood Khan and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and another 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1540; Irshad Hussain v. Municipal Corporation Multan through Mayor and 3 others 2019 PLC (C.S.) 1203; Mrs. Riffat Sattar v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary and 6 others 2016 PLC (C.S.) 472; Secretary, Government of Punjab, Finance Department and 269 others v. M. Ismail Tayer and 269 others 2015 PLC (C.S.) 296; Ehsan-ul-Haque v. Executive Engineer, Ahmadpur Canal Division Ahmadpur East and 2 others 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1523; Noor Ahmad Shah v. Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary Education and 5 others 2003 PLC (C.S.) 1400 and Muhammad Masood Joya v. Government of Punjab and others 2000 PLC (C.S.) 864 ref.\nChief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Lahore and others v. Ms. Shamim Usman 2021 SCMR 1390; Ali Azhar Khan Baloch and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2015 SCMR 456; Taj Muhammad Afridi v. Principal Secretary to the President Secretariat and others 2011 SCMR 1111; The Government of N.W.F.P. through the Secretary to the Government of N.W.F.P. Communications and Works Departments, Peshawar v. Mohammad Said Khan and another PLD 1973 SC 514 and Muhammad Nawaz v. Ghulam Mustafa Ansari and 7 others PLD 2009 Lah. 467 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos.65818 of 2020 and 17823 of 2023, heard on 5th June, 2023, heard on: 5th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shujaat Ali Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Masood Ahmad Zafar for Petitioner.\nRana Shamshad Khan, Additional Advocate-General for Respondents.\nUmair Shahid for TEVTA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAFDAR IQBAL CHAUDHRY\nVersus\nCHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND VOCATION TRAINING AUTHORITY (TEVTA) and 3 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25287", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4238 = 2024 SLD 4238 = 2024 CLD 665", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNC8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 7(4) & 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R.10-Recovery of finance-Employee loan-Return of plaint-Dispute was with regard to Staff Loan extended to defendant / employee of bank-Validity-Loan advanced by bank to its employee was finance falling within statutory definition of finance under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-It was prerogative of Banking Court to determine whether or not heads of claims which defendant / employee alleged to fall outside the scope of finance, actually did-Such judicial determination of what heads of claim constituted finance had been mandated by the Legislature to be determined by Banking Court alone and not High Court exercising its original civil jurisdiction (under general civil law)-Division Bench of High Court retuned plaint to plaintiff / bank to enable it to avail jurisdiction of Banking Court under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\n2012 CLD 483; 2008 CLC 759; 2016 CLD 461; PLD 2010 SC 878; 1995 CLC 1982; 2014 CLD 729; 2019 CLD 1350; PLD 2022 SC 716; 2001 YLR 2259; 2015 CLD 600; 2019 CLD 1350; 2002 CLD 1466; PLD 2007 Kar. 362; PLD 2009 Lah. 494 and Nooruddin and others v. Messrs Sindh Industrial Trading Estate and others (High Court Appeal No. 129 of 2017) rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=7(4),9Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "Suit No.563 of 2007, decided on 1st February, 2024. Dates of hearing: 28th, August, 8th, 22nd September, 6th 13th, 28th October and 4th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jawad Akbar Sarwana, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Danish Ghazi and Rameez Adnan Ansari for Plaintiff.\nDefendant present in Person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB BANK LIMITED-Plaintiff\nVersus\nEMAD-UL-HASSAN-Defendant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25288", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4239 = 2024 SLD 4239 = 2024 CLD 672", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNCs", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 237-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33-Circular No. 24 of 2017 issued by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Transmitting electronically the Quarterly Financial Statements to Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan by a company-Failure-Effect-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan imposed penalty upon the appellants (Chief Executive, Directors and Chief Financial Officer of Company) for failure of successive default periods-Contention of the appellants was that quarterly financial statements were filed with the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) and Company Registration Office (CRO), however, the same could not be transmitted to SECP HQs due to oversight of the staff, therefore, as such the compliance of the law had been made-Validity-Subsection (1) of the S.237 of the Companies Act, 2017, expressly provides the timeline for filing of quarterly accounts whereas subsection (2) of the S. 237 specifies mode for filing of the same (quarterly accounts) i.e. electronically-Furthermore, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, in order to facilitate the companies and to streamline the filing process, issued Circular No. 24 of 2017 which makes it incumbent upon a listed company to electronically transmit its quarterly financial statement, in terms of S. 237(2) of the Companies Act, 2017, on the designated (given) e-mail address-Interim financial statements prepared accurately and in timely manner, provide a reliable source of information regarding a companys financial position and performance to its users, besides illustrating regarding the results of the managements stewardship of resources entrusted to it-Appellants had fiduciary duties towards the Company and its shareholders while providing information to various stakeholders concerning their performances as to how diligently and ethically they were discharging their fiduciary duties and responsibilities-Hence, contention of the appellants ( that filing of quarterly financial statements with the concerned CRO and PSX fulfiled the requirements of the provisions the Companies Act, 2017) did not stricto sensu correspond with the relevant provision and might be construed as a mitigating factor attracting leniency , only if done within stipulated time, which was not the case in the present matter-Moreover, the argument of the appellants did not sustain on the touchstone of alternate filing modes as in most of the default periods, the same was done either with delay or not done at all-No case for interference by the Appellate Bench in the penalty imposing impugned order was made out-Appeal filed by the company was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=237Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.77 of 2021, decided on 25th August, 2023. \nheard on: 9th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Javed Panni and Barrister Shahzad Javed Panni for Appellants.\nAmir Saleem, Additional Director, Adjudication-I and Sardar Sohaib Amin, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SOHAIL AHMED and 3 others-Appellants\nVersus\nADDITIONAL DIRECTOR, LISTED COMPANIES, ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT-I-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25289", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4240 = 2024 SLD 4240 = 2024 PLC 675", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDk", - "Key Words:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)-\n-Art. 44-Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Rules of Business (Revised), 1985-Writ petition-Maintainability-Petitioner (Assistant Education Officer) filed writ petition seeking directions to set-aside a proposal assertly moved by the Speaker Legislative Assembly in grab of which he would be disturbed from his present place of posting-Held, that apprehension on the basis of facsimile of an alleged proposal of irrelevant office (Speaker Legislative Assembly) provides no room for interference as the Departmental Authorities are under legal obligation to abide by the Constitutionally mandate Rules i.e. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Rules of Business (Revised), 1985-Even otherwise, a proposal of the Speaker Legislative Assembly, for transfer and posting in the Education Department is not relevant, however, the competent authority is clothed with powers to transfer the petitioner as per exigencies of the Department-Thus no vested right can be claimed by the petitioner in said regard-Writ petition, filed by Officer in Education Department, being meritless, was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974=44", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3131 of 2023, decided on 13th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Shahid Bahar, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qazi Zaheer Ahmed Awan for Petitioner.\nAbdul Basit Khan, Legal Advisor for the Education Department.\nEjaz Yousuf Awan for Respondent No.6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAHID AZIZ AWAN, ASSISTANT EDUCATION OFFICER\nVersus\nAZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Secretary Elementary and Secondary Education and 6 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25290", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4241 = 2024 SLD 4241 = 2024 CLD 676", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNDg", - "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 28, 114 & 123-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Order passed by the Registrar of Trademarks, assailing of-Constitutional petition-Maintainability-Appeal, right of-Petitioner filed constitutional petition impugning an order passed by the respondent (the Registrar of Trade Marks), who dismissed twenty (20) Notices of Opposition (TM-05) and like number of Extension Applications (TM-56) presented by him (petitioner) on the ground that the same were time barred-Contention of the petitioner was that as the right of appeal was specifically barred in the present case by virtue of S. 123 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, hence the petitioner had no alternate remedy there-under, thus the constitutional petition was maintainable-Validity-Combined reading of the provisions of Ss. 28, 114 & 123 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 manifest that S.28(2) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 expressly sets out a timeframe within which the notice of opposition is to be given, whereas S.123(1) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, applies only in respect of those matters where time has not been expressly provided for under the Ordinance-Furthermore, S.123(2) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, operates so as to bar an appeal only where the Registrar has allowed an application under S.123(1) and extended time in such un-provided cases-High Court viewed that the contention of the petitioner as to the unavailability of an appeal on the touchstone of S.123(2) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, was misconceived-Moreover, the aspect of opposition was rendered as a moot by the registrations made in favour of the Respondent under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, following the impugned Order, thus he was at liberty to pursue such remedies as might be available to him under the given circumstances in terms of the Ordinance, 2001-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001=28,114,123Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C.P. No.D-6004 of 2020, decided on 21st August, 2023, heard on: 21st August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh, CJ and Yousuf Ali Sayeed, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Saira Shaikh for Petitioner.\nQazi Ayazuddin, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No.1.\nSaleem Ghulam Hussain for Respondent No.2.\nMirza Mehmood Baig for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD TARIQ-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25291", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4242 = 2024 SLD 4242 = 2024 CLD 751", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNHo", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 22-Suit for recovery of finance-Process, non-service of-Effect-Appellant / borrower assailed judgment and decree passed by Banking Court on the plea that no process was ever served upon him-Validity-Report of bailiff and courier service regarding service upon appellant / borrower was silent-It was the prime duty of Banking Court to ascertain as to whether service of summons was duly served upon appellant / borrower or not-Report of bailiff and courier service acknowledgement were not available on record-Provision of S. 9(5) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was not complied with in letter and spirit and appellant / borrower was condemned unheard-High Court set aside judgment and decree passed against appellant / borrower and matter was remanded to Banking Court for trial afresh-High Court directed Banking Court to provide opportunity to appellant/borrower to file leave to defend application-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nMubarak Ali v. First Prudential Modaraba 2011 SCMR 1496 and Province of the Punjab through Member Board of Revenue (Residual Properties) Lahore and others v. Muhammad Hussain through Legal Heirs and others PLD 1993 SC 147 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court, Sibi Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.(S)18 of 2021, decided on 7th March, 2024, heard on: 29th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Nazeer Ahmed Langove and Sardar Ahmed Haleemi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Hassan Bugti for Appellants.\nJahanzaib Majeed for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUSA and 2 others-Appellants\nVersus\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Branch Manager-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25292", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4243 = 2024 SLD 4243 = 2024 CLD 681", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERFNTNHk", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018-\n-Reglns. 3, 4(a), 4(d), 6(2), 9(3), 11(2), 13 and 18(c)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 40-A and 33-Anti-Money Laundering policies-Regulatory requirements, non-compliance of-Effect-Appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Commission-Appellant, being a Trading Rights Entitlement Certificate (TREC) holder of Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) having been licensed as a securities broker, was imposed penalty by the Commission for contravention of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018 (the Regulations)-Contention of the appellant was that some of the violations had been rectified prior to the hearing date-Validity-Appellant had an obligation to adhere to the relevant requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018, which should have been followed by the appellant in their true letter and spirit-Argument that some violations had been rectified prior to hearing date at first place, was an admission on the part of the appellant, and might serve as a mitigating factor only where the violations had been corrected and necessary actions taken to comply with Regulations, 2018 prior to the issuance of the impugned order-Level of compliance was taken into account by the Commission and thus penalty was imposed accordingly-Outcome of a case always depends on specific circumstances and the severity of the violations committed-In the present case, the appellant failed to comply with mandatory requirements and neglected to implement mandatory policies that had been in effect since 2016-Money laundering is a serious crime and its severity cannot be under-estimated-Regulated individuals are expected to be highly vigilant in adhering to Anti-Money Laundering laws and should not offer excuses to avoid compliance-No reason to interfere with the merits of the impugned order was made out-Appellate Bench maintained the impugned order passed by the Commissioner (SMD) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=3,4(a),4(d),6(2),9(3),11(2),13,18(c)Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=40-A,33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.61 of 2019, decided on 23rd August, 2023, heard on: 18th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hammad Kehar, Director and Salman for Appellant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I and Muhammad Faisal, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs AXIS GLOBAL LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nThe COMMISSIONER (SMD)-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25293", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4244 = 2024 SLD 4244 = 2024 CLD 685", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 89-A, O. IX-A and IX-B-Alternative Dispute Resolution Act\n(XX of 2017), S. 2(i)-Mediation-Object, purpose and scope-Mediation is used to settle contract, interpersonal and human resource conflicts-Mediation involves intervention of a third person, or mediator, into a dispute to assist parties in negotiating jointly acceptable resolution of issues in conflict-Mediator meets with the parties at a neutral location where parties can discuss the dispute and explore a variety of solutions-Each party is encouraged to be open and candid about its own point of view-Mediator, as a neutral third party, can view a dispute objectively and assist the parties in considering alternatives and options that they might not have considered-Mediator is neutral and does not stand for personal benefit from the terms of settlement, and is impartial in that he or she does not have a preconceived bias about how the conflict should be resolved-Mediation is a process where parties meet with mutually selected impartial and neutral person who assists them in negotiation of their differences-Such process brings in hope of getting parties to discuss settlement through a trustworthy and skilled mediator who encourages settlement freeing up valuable court time and resources.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 6, 276 and 277-Companies (Mediation and Conciliation) Regulations, 2018, Reglns. 3, 4, 9, 10 and 11-Company dispute-Mediation-Company Judge, duty of-Dispute between the parties was non-payment of loan amount extended by petitioner company to respondent company-High Court persuaded the parties to settle their dispute through mediation-Validity-Due to ever growing economic activism, stimulation and expansion of international investment, trade entities are eagerly and consistently falling in interactions, deals and transactions, not only with local citizens but with foreign business communities as well-In course thereof, parties aspire certain securities safeguarding and protecting their investments, interests and rights as well as guaranteeing resolution of trade/commercial/corporate disputes at the earliest and at the lowest costs of time and money, that too, under the umbrella of law-Using mediation as a technique to resolve trade/commercial/corporate disputes has now been transformed in a global movement-It is duty of Company Judge to protect interest of company and minimize adverse effect to it-Based on the strong principles to safeguard the interest of company and to resolve corporate dispute developed by Supreme Court in various judgments, provisions of Ss. 276 and 277 of Companies Act, 2017, can be invoked in order to protect interest of company and the Court can initiate process of Early Neutral-Party Evaluation ( ENE ) and then mediation-Parties are encouraged throughout the litigation process to attempt to settle disputes, for good reason, and such decision may encourage more litigants to explore settlement possibilities before being ordered to do so by the court-Mediation outcomes not only save time and money of parties, but it also reduces load of work in Courts as well as it is the most updated way on resolutions based on the divine culture of peace -Issue between the parties pertained only claim of debt amount, which issue stood settled in the way that receipt of amount was admitted by petitioner-Disputed debt claim stood thoroughly satisfied and there was no justification for winding up the company in such a scenario-Petition was disposed of accordingly.\nDaniels v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] EWCA Civ 1312; Faisal Zafar and another v. Siraj-ud-Din and 4 others, GENOME Pharmaceuticals and SECP 2024 CLD 1; M.C.R. (Pvt.) Ltd., Franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority and others 2021 CLD 639; Federation of Pakistan and others v. Attock Petroleum Ltd. Islamabad 2007 SCMR 1095; The Additional Registrar Company v. Al-Qaim Sugar Mills Ltd. 2021 CLD 931; Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company Ltd. v. Chenab Limited 2020 CLD 339; Messrs U.I.G. (Pvt.) Limited through Director and 3 others v. Muhammad Imran Qureshi 2011 CLC 758; Messrs Alstom Power Generation through Ashfaq Ahmad v. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman and another PLD 2007 Lah. 581; Atlantic Pipe Corp. (304 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2002); African-American Slave Descendants Litigation MLD No.1491, Lead Case No.02 C 7764 (307 F. Supp. 2d 977 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Messrs Afcons Infra Ltd. and another v. Messrs Cherian Varkey Constn (2010 (8) SCC 24); Pitamber B Ruchandani v. Arti Bharatbhai Ruchandani and 5 (O.J.Appeal No. 7 of 2014); James Churchill v. Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1416; Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] 1 WLR 3002; Kelly v. Miller and others [2014] EWCA Civ 1151; Wright v. Michael Wright Supplies Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 234; Ghaith v Indesit Company UK Ltd. [2012] EWCA Civ 642; DK (Iraq) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 1169; Ezsias v. Welsh Ministers [2008] EWCA Civ 874; R (on the application of) v. Birmingham East and North Primary Care Trust [2008] EWCA Civ 465; Burchell v. Bullard and others [2005] EWCA Civ 358; Day v. Day [2002] EWCA Civ 1842; Circuits Ltd. v. Coates Brothers Plc [2002] EWCA Civ 333; Lt. General (Retd.) Mahmud Ahmad Akhtar and another v. Messrs Allied Developers (Private) Limited and others 2022 CLD 718; Shaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2021 PTD 2126; Ms. Shehla Zia and others v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693; D. G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and others 2021 SCMR 834; Messrs Bahria Town (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager (Operations) v. District Consumer Court, Rawalpindi and 2 others PLD 2022 Lah. 488; Ch. Fayyaz Hussain v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 1; The Additional Registrar Company v. Al-Qaim Textile Mills Limited 2021 CLD 931; Messrs Jet Green (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 770; Saif Ur Rehman Khan v. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) through Chairman and 2 others 2022 CLD 1460 and Tariq Iqbal Malik v. Messrs Multiplierz Group Pvt. Ltd. and 4 others 2022 CLD 468 rel.\nEach will have to accept that those who live by the sword must risk dying by the sword as well. That is the inevitable risk of litigation . What can the court do to prevent what, to those outside the litigation, may seem like an unseemly, or at least uncommercial, squabble? We can and we do encourage mediation, the earlier the better. It does have an extraordinary knack of producing compromise, even where the parties appear, at the start, to be intractably opposed.1\n(Sir Alan H. Ward, Judge, Court of Appeals, England and Wales)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=89-A", - "Case #": "Civil Original No. 08 of 1989, decided on 20th December, 2022, heard on: 20th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Anwar Kamal, Senior Advocate Supreme Court with Muhammad Umar Khan Vardaq, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMalik Qamar Afzal, Advocate Supreme Court with Malik Shahriyar Qamar Afzal, Raja Asad Iqbal Sati and Usman Jillani and Barrister Zainab Nasir along with Nasir Jabbar Khan for Respondent.\nMuzaffar Ahmad Mirza, Executive Director, Legal Affairs with Adeel Peter and Hassnain Raza, SPP for SECP.\nMalik Amjad Ali, Additional Advocate General.\nM. Kamal Hassan, ENE Mediator with M. Bilal Riaz and Barrister Mian Sheraz Javaid.\nCh. Ali Abbas, Advocate for IDBL Bank with Officials of Bank namely Faizan Khan, Officer Grade-II, IDBL and Zargham Shah.\nSadique Akbar Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for NBP.\nAttiq-ur-Rehman Kiani, Advocate Supreme Court, Official Liquidator (Applicant in C.Ms. Nos. 7 and 8 of 2022) Syed Bulent Sohail and Zarmeeneh Rahim.\nMalik Aneeq Ali Khatana, Barrister S.M. Hafeez Shah.\nRashid Mehmood, Civil Judge 1st Class/Research Officer Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench).", - "Petitioner Name:": "NETHERLANDS FINANCIERINGS MAATSCHAPPIJ VOOR ONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN\nN.V. (F.M.O.)-Petitioner\nVersus\nMORGAH VALLEY LIMITED and SECP-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25294", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4245 = 2024 SLD 4245 = 2024 PLC 687", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzY", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)-\n-S. 8(6)(a)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 212(1)-Retired civil servant-Pro-forma promotion on a selection post sought-Ouster of jurisdiction of the High Courts and Civil Courts-Post to which the respondent wanted (pro-forma) promotion was a selection post and such post according to Section 8 (6) (a) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 could only be filled on the basis of merit and not on seniority-Furthermore Article 212 of the Constitution ousts the jurisdiction of the High Courts and Civil Courts in the matters relating to the terms and conditions of a civil servant as the bar in the Constitution is absolute-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 =8(6)(a)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1893-L of 2021, decided on 17th January, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 13.09.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, in W.P. No.3963 of 2021).\n heard on: 17th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Muhammad Mumtaz Ali, Addl. AG, Punjab along with Ms. Saima Jehan, Sr, Law Officer and Nasir Ali, Law Officer for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Naveed Farhan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Secretary (Primary and Secondary Healthcare Department), Lahore and others\nVersus\nHafiz MUHAMMAD KALEEM-UD-DIN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25295", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4246 = 2024 SLD 4246 = 2024 PLC 690", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzU", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Civil Servants Act (XIV of 1973)-\n-S. 12-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 199 & 212-Constitutional petition-Maintainability-Terms and conditions of service-Reversion to lower post-Petitioners were aggrieved of orders passed by authorities reverting them to lower posts-Validity-Civil servant appointed on a higher post or status on adhoc, temporary or officiating basis was liable to be reversed under S.12 of Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, to his substantive post or grade without serving any notice-There were two permutations in S.12 of Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973: fist that reversion to lower or substantive post could be made by competent authority without notice; and second that such exercise was within the terms and conditions of service-High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter as reversion of petitioners / civil servants fell within the terms and conditions of service-In the present case there was neither any question of non-hearing of petitioners, nor of not providing them opportunity of hearing before passing orders in question, and nor the question of discrimination-High Court did not have jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution, as the matter squarely fell within the jurisdiction of Sindh Service Tribunal-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nNazeer Ahmed Chkrani v. Government of Pakistan 2004 SCMR 623; Gul Hassan Jatoi and others v. Faqeer Muhammad Jatoi and others 2016 SCMR 1244; 2015 SCMR 456; 2016 SCMR 1254; 2021 SCMR 1390; 2007 SCMR 54; PLD 2001 SC 1032; 1999 PLC (C.S.) 230; 2009 PLC (C.S.) 539 and 2009 PLC (C.S.) 568 ref.\nKhalilullah Karar and others v. PPO, Balochistan and others 2021 SCMR 1168 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Civil Servants Act, (XIV of 1973)=12Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No.D-900 of 2023, decided on 28th November, 2023, heard on: 15th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro and Arbab Ali Hakro, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Fidaullah Qureshi for Petitioners except petitioners Nos.2, 13 and 74.\nNoor Hassan Malik for Petitioners Nos.2, 13 and 74.\nAli Raza Baloch, Assistant A.G. along with Inspector/P.I Muhammad Akhtar Pathan on behalf of DIGP, Sukkur and SIP Jameel on behalf of SSP, Khairpur.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAMSHER ALI SIAL and 82 others\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary Home Department and 5 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25296", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4247 = 2024 SLD 4247 = 2024 PLC 695", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act (VII of 2023)-\n-S.36-Employee of a state-owned Electric Supply Company-Seniority-Retrospective effect of state-owned Enterprises (Governance of Operations) Act, 2013-Petitioner was employee of a State-owned company and aggrieved of fixing of his seniority by Board of Directors in their meeting held in the year 2014-Petitioner pleaded violation of some provisions of State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023-Validity-Provision of State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023, received assent of the President on 30-01-2023 and came into force at once-When an Act of Parliament provided that it would come into force at once, then every provision of it became enforceable from the day the Act had received assent of the President unless any provision of Act provided otherwise-Claim of applicability of State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023 to the decision taken by Board of Directors on 16-06-2014 or retrospective effect of the Act, even otherwise, was negated by S.36 of the Act-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Shoaib Roomi v. Secretary / Additional Secretary, Education Department, Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 605; National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Jawad Khan and 2 others 2023 SCMR 1381; Muhammad Shahzad Raza v. FESCO and others (Writ Petition No. 22990 of 2012) Shafiq-Ul-Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2020 PLC (C.S.) 1593; Pakistan Electric Power Company v. Syed Salahuddin and others 2022 SCMR 991; National Engineering Services Pakistan (NESPAK) and 2 others v. Muhammad Nawaz Cheema and 13 others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 785 and Sui Southern Gas Company Limited and others v. Saeed Ahmed Khoso and another 2022 SCMR 1256 ref.\nMessrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Sheikh Muhammad Illyas and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2020 SC 641 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.52009 of 2023, decided on 21st December, 2023, heard on: 3rd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Junaid Jabbar Khan, Syed Ali Zohair Karmani, Shehzad A. Chaudhry and Sehar Ilyas for Petitioner.\nBarrister Muhammad Ahmad Pansota for Respondent No.1.\nJawad H. Tarrar for Respondent No.2.\nMian Muhammad Javaid for Respondents Nos.3 and 4.\nBarrister Chaudhary Saeed Nagra for Respondent No.5.\nMalik Muhamad Awais Khalid for Respondent.\nGhulam Mujataba Khan, Director (Labour and Legal) FESCO and Mehboob Talib, Assistant Director (L&L) FESCO.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RIZWAN ALI\nVersus\nCHAIRMAN BOARD OF DIRECTOR, FESCO and 4 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25297", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4248 = 2024 SLD 4248 = 2024 CLD 708", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYy8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 7(2)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXII, R. 15-Mental Health Ordinance (VIII of 2001), Ss. 29 and 32-Suit for recovery of finance-Defendant of unsound mind-Guardian in the suit, appointment of-Banking Court, powers of-Banking Court has the power to determine the unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity of a person on an inquiry under Order XXXII of the C.P.C. based on the evidence and appoint a guardian for the suit for the limited purpose of representation before the court of law, without first seeking an appointment of a guardian under the Mental Health Ordinance, 2001.\nRule 15 of Order XXXII of C.P.C. provides that Rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII shall apply to (i) persons adjudged to be of unsound mind and (ii) persons who though not so adjudged are found by the Court on inquiry, by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity, to be incapable of protecting their interests when suing or being sued. The said Rule, therefore, acknowledges two categories of persons of unsound mind: one who is already adjudged by a court of competent authority as a person of unsound mind; and the other, who is not so adjudged but the court itself on inquiry finds that the person is of unsound mind. In both cases, the court is to appoint a guardian for the suit for such a person. In the first category, in view of the provisions of Rule 4(2) of Order XXXII of C.P.C. the court is to ordinarily appoint the same person as guardian for the suit who has been appointed the guardian under the Mental Health Ordinance, 2001 ( MHO ); while in the second, the court may appoint any suitable person who has no interest against the person of unsound mind. In the second category, the court cannot decline to appoint the guardian for the suit merely for the reason that the defendant has not been so adjudged under the MHO by the competent authority.\nWhere no guardian has been appointed under the MHO, it does not preclude the Civil Court, or the Banking Court, to proceed and appoint a guardian for the suit under Order XXXII of C.P.C. so that the interest of a mentally disordered person is protected before the court of law and also ensures the continuation and efficient conclusion of the trial. The Banking Court, therefore, has the power to determine the unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity of a person on an inquiry under Order XXXII of the C.P.C. based on the evidence and appoint a guardian for the suit for the limited purpose of representation before the court of law, without first seeking an appointment of a guardian under the MHO.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O.XXXII, Rr. 1, 3, 4(2) and 15-Mental Health Ordinance (VIII of 2001), S. 32-Minor-Defendant of unsound mind-Guardian for the suit and Guardian of the person or property-Distinction-Concept of next friend or guardian for the suit is to provide proper representation to a minor or a person with unsound mind during litigation, in order to protect his interests; therefore, their role is limited to the particular litigation or legal action for which they are appointed-Guardian for the suit is also called as Guardian ad Litem ; the Latin term ad litem means for the lawsuit -Thus, guardian for the suit is appointed by a court specifically for the duration of legal proceedings and his role is temporary and limited to the particular lawsuit or legal matter-This might involve making decisions about litigation, settlement or other legal strategies-A guardian of the person or property of a minor or a person of unsound mind, on the other hand, is a person legally appointed to manage all the affairs of another person-Such a guardian has the authority to make decisions on behalf of the said person in various aspects of life, including financial, medical, and personal matters.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=7(2)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=15Mental Health Ordinance, 2001=29,32", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1393-L of 2020, decided on 22nd February, 2024.\n(Against the judgment of Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 18.06.2020 passed in F.A.O No. 512 of 2013).\nheard on: 22nd February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Saba Saeed Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Fayyaz Ahmad Sherazi, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nJam Khurshid Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25298", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4249 = 2024 SLD 4249 = 2024 CLD 713", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYys", - "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-\n-Ss.39 and 40-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 and 2-Passing off-Infringement of trade mark and copy right-Interim injunction, refusal of-Concealing of facts-Plaintiff company assailed use of trade mark HAJMOLA by defendant company-Validity-Intellectual Property Tribunal passed an order restraining defendant company from passing off goods by using the offending trade mark-Subsequently the Tribunal passed another order observing that the injunctive order passed earlier would have no effect because of an order passed by High Court-Intellectual Property Tribunal adjourned that suit sine die till adjudication of matter by High Court-Plaintiff company failed to disclose filing and pending of adjudication of cases in its pleadings especially order passed by High Court, whereby the defendant company was permitted to use trade mark HAJMOLA on its products-Concealment of fact as to the earlier litigation between same parties, in subsequent suit, is a conduct which disentitles a party to grant of discretionary relief of an injunction-Complete disclosure about previous connected, related or relevant proceedings and orders is essential when a litigant approaches a Court and unless such non-disclosure can be satisfactorily explained, the claimant should not, as a matter of general principle, be granted interim relief-He who comes to equity must come with clean hands-Plaintiff failed to make out prima facie good arguable case for the grant of interim injunctive relief-Application was dismissed, in circumstances.\nFarooq Ghee and Oils Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Trade Mark Registry and others 2015 SCMR 1230; Messrs Bengal Waterproof Limited v. Messrs Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company and another AIR 1997 SC 1398; Muhammad Ashraf and 3 others v. Muhammad Latif 2005 YLR 756; Muhammad Qasim v. Razia Begum and 5 others 2012 CLC 1118; Bayer AG. through Authorized Signatory v. Bayhealth Care (Private) Limited through Chief Executive Director, Company Secretary and another 2013 CLD 2087; Messrs Snowhite Dry Cleaners v. Sufiyan Ahmed 2013 CLD 57; Roznama Hamdard through Chief Editor v. Hamdard National Foundation Pakistan 2010 SCMR 95; Wrangler Apparel Corporation v. Axfor Garments through Proprietor/Manager/Partners 2008 CLD 70; Vifor (International) Inc. through Authorized Signatory v. MeMon Pharmaceutical through Sole Proprietor 2013 CLD 1531; Pioneer Cement Limited through Company Secretary v. Fecto Cement Limited through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others PLD 2013 Lah. 110; Seven Up Company v. Kohinoor Thread Ball Factory and 3 others PLD 1990 SC 313; ARC International through Authorized Signatory v. Ahmer Mansoor and 2 others 2012 CLD 226; Messrs Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant 1987 SCMR 1090; J.N. Nichols (Vimto) PlC A Company incorporated in the United Kingdom v. Mehran Bottlers (Private) Limited, Karachi PLD 2000 SC 192; M. Sikandar Sultan v. Masih Ahmed Shaikh 2003 CLD 26; Maaza International Company L.L.C. v. Popular Food Industries Ltd. and another 2004 CLD 171; Tapal Tea (Private) Limited v. Shahi Tea Company 2002 CLD 1113; Pakistan Drug House (Pvt.) Limited v. Rio Chemical Company and another 2003 CLD 1531; Ch. Zafarullah Khan and 6 others v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 5 others PLD 1975 SC 15 and Sahib Khan v. Muhammad Ramzan and another 2000 MLD 729 distinguished.\nThe Stillmans Company (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive Officer v. S.M. Anees and another 2019 YLR 815; University of Health Sciences and others v. Mumtaz Ahmad 2010 SCMR 767; Clifton Block-7 Residents Association through V.P. Amir and 6 others v. Zubair Ahmed and 5 others 2015 CLC 1090; Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta and 15 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others PLD 2018 SC 370; Mumtaz Baig and others v. Jamal Din through legal heirs 2009 SCMR 1364; Muhammad Ibrahim through Attorney v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Sindh Secretariat, Karachi and 6 others 2018 MLD 1099; Messrs H and B General Trading Company through Director v. Messrs International Marketing Company through Proprietor and 2 others 2009 CLD 318; Italfarmaco S.P.A. v. Himont Pharmaceuticals (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2017 CLD 1382; Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. and another v. Soneri Bank Ltd. and another 2018 CLC 203; Messrs Beecham Group Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and another 1968 SCMR 626; Khushi Muhammad and 2 others v. The Province of Punjab through Secretary Government of Punjab and 2 others 1999 SCMR 1633; State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another v. Imtiaz Ali Khan 2012 SCMR 280; Abdul Hakim and 2 others v. Saadullah Khan and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 63; Aziz Ahmed and others v. Mst. Hajran Bibi and another 1987 SCMR 527 and Messrs Coca Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd through Company Secretary v. Messrs Echo West International (Pvt.) Ltd: through Chief Executive Officer and another 2016 MLD 1077 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001=39,40Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "Suit No. 1763 of 2019, decided on 4th December, 2023, heard on: 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Zafar Ahmed Rajput, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Saira Sheikh for Plaintiff.\nMohsin Tayebaly and Co. for Defendants Nos. 1 and 2.\nNemo for Defendants Nos.3 to 9.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HILAL FOODS (PVT.) LIMITED (FORMERLY HILAL CONFECTIONERY (PVT.) LIMITED) through Company Secretary, Karachi-Plaintiff\nVersus\nDABUR INDIA LIMITED and 8 others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25299", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4250 = 2024 SLD 4250 = 2024 CLD 721", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzk", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations , 2018-\n-Rglns. 3, 4(a), 13 and 6(2)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 40-A and 33-Anti-money laundering policies-Regulatory requirements, non-compliance of-Effect-Appeal to the Appellate Bench of the Commission-Appellant, having being licensed with Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) as a securities broker , was imposed penalty of Rs. 250,000/= by the Commission for contravention of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018 (the Regulations)-Validity-Appellant had an obligation to adhere to the relevant requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018, which should have been followed by the appellant in true letter and spirit-In present case, the appellant failed to comply with the mandatory requirements and had neglected to implement mandatory policies that had been in effect since 2012-Money-laundering is a serious crime and its severity cannot be under-estimated-Regulated individuals are expected to be highly vigilant in adhering to Anti-Money Laundering laws and should not offer excuses to avoid compliance-However, record revealed that the appellant had made efforts to rectify the non-compliances and was striving to adhere to the Regulations, thus the Appellate Bench considered justified to reduce the penalty from Rs.250,000/= to Rs.150, 000/=-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018=3,4(a),13.6(2)Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=40-A,33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.43 of 2019, decided on 29th August, 2023, heard on: 18th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Dilawayz Ahmed for Appellant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I and Muhammad Faisal, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs DARSON SECURITIES (PVT.) LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nCOMMISSIONER SMD, SECP-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25300", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4251 = 2024 SLD 4251 = 2024 CLD 724", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDYzg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 2 (g)(ii)-Willful default-Scope-Utilization of finance facility for a purpose other than for which the facility is obtained is a Willful default .\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 2 (g)(iii)-Willful default-Scope-Removal or transfer, misappropriation or sale of collaterals can constitute willful default when it takes place without permission of financial institution.\n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 20(1)(d)-Offence, punishment for-Pre-condition-Punishment for S. 20(1)(d) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is dependent upon determination of civil liability / decree.\n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 20-Simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings-Permissibility-Petitioners / borrowers were aggrieved of initiation of civil as well as criminal proceedings by financial institutions-Validity-Object of civil proceeding is to enforce civil rights, whereas criminal proceeding is to punish the offender for committing criminal offence-Both proceedings, even if relating to same matter can proceed simultaneously-Criminal Courts are empowered to postpose proceedings when criminal liability is intimately connected with the result of civil proceedings-Criminal and civil proceedings against petitioners/borrowers can be maintained simultaneously-Powers of Banking Courts could not be abridged as normal procedure of law was followed-High Court declined to interfere in proceedings of criminal complaints pending before Banking Courts-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMessrs Long Grain Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Habib Bank Limited through Senior Manager (CAD) and Senior Manager (Remedial) and another 2016 CLD 551; Akhlaq Hussain Kayani v. Zafar Iqbal Kiyani and others 2010 SCMR 1835; Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed and 3 others 2000 SCMR 122; Abdul Haleem v. The State and others 1982 SCMR 988; Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813; Muhammad Aslam v. The State and others 2017 SCMR 390; Central Board of Revenue and another v. Khan Muhammad PLD 1986 SC 192; Malik Khuda Bakhsh v. The State 1995 SCMR 1621; Mauj Din through Legal Heirs and others v. Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division and others 2002 SCMR 2001; Seema Fareed and others v. The State and another 2008 SCMR 839; Mian Ayaz Anwar and others v State Bank of Pakistan and others 2019 CLD 375; Misbah Ud Din Zaigham and 03 others v. Federal Investigation Agency through Assistant Director (FIA/CBC/LHR) and another 2021 CLD 906; Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investment Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218; Syed Wajahat Hussain Zaidi v. Banking Court No. 1 and others 2018 CLD 1273; Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf and others 2006 SCMR 1192; Muhammad Aslam v. The State and others 2017 SCMR 390; The Deputy Inspector-General of Police Lahore and others v. Anis-ur-Rehman Khan PLD 1985 SC 134; Karachi Transport Corporation and another v. Muhammad Hanif and others 2009 SCMR 1005; Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam and another v. State (Delhi Admn.) and another AIR 2009 SC 3232; Salman Ashraf v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 1292; The State v. Illahi Bux and others PLD 1965 (W.P.) Kar. 231 and Muhammad Amin v. Momin Khan and 2 others PLD 2014 Pesh. 49 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(g)(ii),20(1)(d)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.38033 of 2023, decided on 2nd February, 2024, heard on: 19th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, Muhammad Imran Malik, Akif Majeed Butt, Hassan Ismail, Asim Tufail Farooqi, Muhammad Bilal Mehmood, Barrister Sajid Ikram Siddiqui, Fazal Mahmood Chaudhary, Rao Zahid Tasawar, Shahzad Ahmad Qureshi, Mian Asghar Ali, Mian Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din, Tehseen Sarwar, M. Faizan Saleem, M. Imran Saleem, M. Usman Saleem, Taimur Saleem, Ms. Maha Batool, Ms. Hira Asif Awan, Nadeem Irshad, Muhammad Riaz, Ch. Abdul Razzaq and Ch. Mahmood-ur-Rehman for Petitioners.\nTariq Kamal Qazi, Shoaib Rasheed, Syed Moazam Ali Shah, Barrister Syed Ali Rizvi, Hfeez Saeed Akhtar, Barrister Sheheryar Riaz, Syed Aatir Raza, Ali Yousaf, Afnan Malik, Haroon Yazdani, Muhammad Irfan, Rana Haseeb Ahmad Khan, Ahmad Jamal, Abdul Muqtadir Khan, Barrister Ahmed Pervaiz, Jawad H. Tarar, Ch. Muhammad Ijaz Jamal, Kh. M. Ajmal, Majid Ali Wajid, Muhammad Nashit, Ansar Shahzad, Bilal Riaz Sheikh, Nadeem Ahmad, Qaiser Abbas, Sheikh Zeeshan Ishfaq, Falak Sher, M. Nadeem, Asher Ellahi, Moeed Ahmad, Hussain Javed, Salman Ahmad, Muzammil Ashraf Qureshi, Tariq Nawaz Bhatti, Saeed Mushtaq, Mian Zaheer Ahmad, M. Jawad Khan Lodhi, Muhammad Ahmad Khan Niazi, Nauman Ahmad Chaudhary, Syed Samir Sohail, Rana Muhammad Ishaq, Shoaib Rashid, Ms. Manahil Khan, Abdul Hameed, Ch. Sohail, Rana Muhammad Akram, Syed Moazzam Ali Shah, Suhaib Ahsan, Zain-ul-Abideen, Ms. Ambreen Moieen, Ms. Javira Latif, Amir Wakil Butt, Syed Hassan Gillani, Atif Sattar Arieen, Ms. Lubna Saleem for Respondents.\nMir Haroon-ul-Rasheed, Assistant Attorney General.\nMuhammad Nasim Saqlain, Assistant Attorney General.\nSalman Asif Warraich, Assistant Advocate General.\nMakhdoom Owais, Assistant Director Investigation, FIA, and Zahoor Ahmad, Sub-Inspector FIA/CBC/LHR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sheikh MUHAMMAD ANWAR and 4 others-Petitioners\nVersus\nJUDGE BANKING COURT and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25301", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4252 = 2024 SLD 4252 = 2024 CLD 740", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDY3o", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 166 & 512-Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019, Reglns. 6 & 37-Independent directors in a listed company, selection of-Mandatory requirement-Director Adjudication Securities and Exchange Commission penalized the appellant (a listed company) for its inability to have independent director(s)-Contention of the appellant (a listed company) was that the Companies Act, 2017, itself did not require having independent directors in a listed company-Validity-Subsection (1) of S.166 of the Companies Act, 2017 (the Act 2017), inter alia, recognizes the requirement of appointment of an independent director in a company under any law, rules, regulations or code, whereas subsection (3) of the S.166 of the Act, 2017 provides the manner of election of an independent director of a listed company-Subsection (5) of S.166 of the Act 2017 is an enabling provision whereby the Commission is empowered to specify the manner and procedure of selection of independent directors through regulations and Regln. 6 of Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019 (the Regulations) stipulates the same as mandatory; thus, in this context, said provisions makes it incumbent upon a listed company to elect independent directors-Use of words shall (in S. 166(3) of the Act 2017) and mandatory (in Regln. 6 of the Regulations) leaves no room for any ambiguity that the Legislative intent behind the said provision is to have independent directors of the Board of a listed company and the same is not directory in nature-Thus, the contention of the appellant /company was not tenable-Appellant was rightly penalized in terms of S. 512 of the Companies Act, 2017, read with Regln. 37 of the Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019, on account of contravention of provisions of the Regulations, 2019-Appellate Bench maintained the impugned order passed by Director-Adjudication of the Commission-Appeal, filed by the listed company, was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019-\n-Rglns. 6, 37 & 38-Companies Act (XIX of 2017), Ss. 166 & 512-Provisions under Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019-Independent directors, requirement of-Application for relaxation from such provisions, filing of-Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) penalized the appellant (a listed company) for its inability to have independent director(s)-Contention of the appellant (a listed company) was that its application for relaxation should have been accepted by the Commission-Validity-Appellant (applicant for relaxation), being a listed company, was required to have independent directors under Regulation 6 of the Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019 (the Regulations, 2019) and S. 166 of the Companies Act, 2017-Regulation 38 of the Regulations deals with an application for relaxation from the provision of the Regulations which is to be filed before the Commission-Appellant, admittedly, filed such application while submitting the reply to a show-cause notice, having been served to it by the Commission and not earlier-Thus, such application did not vitiate the show-cause notice proceedings, which culminated into impugned order-Appellant was rightly penalized in terms of S. 512 of the Companies Act, 2017, read with Regln. 37 of the Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019, on account of contravention of provisions of the Regulations, 2019-Appellate Bench maintained the impugned order passed by Director-Adjudication of the Commission-Appeal, filed by the listed company, was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=166,512Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019=6,37", - "Case #": "Appeal No.85 of 2022, decided on 13th February, 2024, heard on: 6th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Iftikharuddin Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMahboob Ahmad, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, Muhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I and Raja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TANDLIANWALA SUGAR MILLS LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25302", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4253 = 2024 SLD 4253 = 2024 CLD 744", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDY3k", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-\n-Ss. 19 & 24-Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act (XV of 1997), Preamble & S. 18-Suit for recovery filed by the bank-Decree-Execution-Limitation-Execution petition, filing of-Scope-Banking Court by applying the provisions of S. 24 of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, dismissed the execution petition filed by the bank /appellant on the ground that the same was filed after lapse of more than 09 years while appeal was pending-Validity-Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is a special law which covers all proceedings upon execution-Previous law i.e. Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans , Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, enabled the Banking Court to convert the proceedings into execution application on preferring an application-Whereas the frame of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, is different as its S.19 provides that upon announcement of judgment and decree, the suit shall automatically convert into execution application-Thus, no sooner the judgment and decree is passed in proceedings under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, the proceedings stand converted into execution application-Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, does not provide a way to file a fresh execution application, as was inadvertently done in the present case by the appellant/Bank-At the most, since an appeal was pending before the High Court and the machinery of the execution was not triggered, the application that was inadvertently moved as an execution application by the bank/appellant could be considered for triggering machinery of the Banking Court, where the suit was decreed and converted into execution application-Surprisingly, the Banking Court did not discuss S.19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Thus, S. 24 of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 can not be conceived to have its application on the execution proceedings as the suit proceedings automatically stand converted into execution, leaving no room for limitation-Since the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 does not recognize the scheme of filing fresh execution application, High Court referred the matter to the Banking Court in order to club the execution application with suit which will be deemed to be converted into execution-Appeal filed by the Bank/decree-holder was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,24Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997=18", - "Case #": "Ist Appeal No.120 of 2016, decided on 30th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Omar Sial, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahan Karimi for Appellant.\nMs. Maryam Riaz for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAYSAL BANK LIMITED through Authorized Attorneys-Appellant\nVersus\nMASOOD ASGHAR and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25303", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4254 = 2024 SLD 4254 = 2024 CLD 747", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTc", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S.159-Insurance Companies (Sound and Prudent Management) Regulations 2012, Regln. 2(5)-Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000), Ss. 54, 11 & 12-Election of directors, procedure for-Number of the candidates equalling number of directors-Minutes of the Extra Ordinary General Meeting (EOGM), submission of-Fitness and proprietary of the Company Secretary- Scope-Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) declared the company secretary not fit and proper for submitting minutes of EOGM which (meeting) was never held-Contention of the appellant (former Company Secretary) was that he submitted minutes merely as the same was demanded by the Commission whereas S. 159 of the Companies Act, 2017, was ambiguous as the same did not specify as to whether a meeting of the company was required to be held in case where the candidates contesting for the position of directors equaled the position of directors-Validity-There is no ambiguity in S. 159 of the Companies Act, 2017, as the same does not dispense the requirement of holding a general meeting of a company in case where the number of persons who offer themselves to be elected is not more than the number of directors-Appellant had not disputed the fact that he submitted to the Commission the extracts of the meeting of the EOGM (purportedly held on relevant date) despite the fact that no EOGM was held on such date with respect to election of directors of the Company-Said admission of the appellant, along with documents available on record, clearly manifested that at no stage the appellant tried to rectify his action prior to the issuance of show-cause notice rather presented false and fabricated minutes of the EOGM on the subsequent general meeting of the Company for approval-No reason for interference in the impugned order was made out-Appeal filed by the former company secretary was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=159Insurance Ordinance, 2000=54,11,12", - "Case #": "Appeal No.15 of 2023, decided on 2nd October, 2023, heard on: 8th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant in person.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, Shafiq-ur-Rehman, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I and Raja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAMS-UD-DIN-Appellant\nVersus\nDIRECTOR/HOD, ADJUDICATION-I, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25304", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4255 = 2024 SLD 4255 = 2024 CLD 852", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9(5) & 10(1)-Suit for recovery filed by the bank against the borrower /company as well as its directors/guarantors-Petition to leave to defend-Failure of the defendant(s)-Petition for leave to defend (PLA) purportedly filed by all/eight defendants (company and its directors/guarantors) showed that only three (out of eight) defendants had signed the same who had also filed their affidavits in (their respective) personal capacity and no PLA had been filed on behalf of rest of the (five) defendants-As per provisions of the Ss.10(1) & 9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance, 2001), where the defendant fails to file PLA and obtain leave from the Court to defend the suit, the allegation of facts in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the Court may pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of plaint or other material-PLA having not been filed by the all the defendants, the allegations of fact including availing of loan facility by the defendant/company was deemed to be admitted-No substantial question of law and fact had been raised in PLA filed by the defendants, which required recording of evidence for its resolution, therefore, PLA filed by the said defendants was dismissed, in circumstances-Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff / bank and against defendants jointly and severally.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 10-Suit for recovery filed by the bank against the borrower / company and its directors/guarantors-Petition for leave to defend-Failure of defendant(s)-Argument of the defendants was that signature of the one of directors/defendants on petition for leave to appear and defend (PLA) might also be treated as basis on behalf of the company / defendant-Held, that said argument was misconceived as no Board of Directors Resolution, Authority Letter or Memorandum and Articles of Association of the defendant / company had been placed on record authorizing the said defendant/director to represent the Company in the present suit and file PLA on its behalf, therefore, said PLA could not be treated on behalf of the Company as a defendant-PLA filed by the defendants was dismissed, in circumstances-Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff /bank and against defendants jointly and severally.\n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 2(d), 3, 9 & 10-Suit for recovery filed by the bank against the borrower /company and its directors/guarantors-Late payment charges /charity , recovery of-Penalty-Scope-Argument of the defendants was that amount of Rs.65,716,498 as late payment charges was not recoverable by the bank-Validity-Perusal of relevant clause of the Master Murabaha Finance Agreement (having been relied upon by the plaintiff/bank itself to justify late payment charges) showed that where amount payable by the customer under the principal documents was not paid by a specific date or within a week of the demand, the said amount be paid by the customer as charity @ 18% to the bank for donation by the bank on behalf of the customer for charity purposes-Such amount of charity claimed by the bank/plaintiff was not covered under the finance facility under S.2(d) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance 2001 ) as said amount was merely a penalty, which was not permissible under the law-Charity or gift is something the doner gives or grants with his free will and can not be recovered as compulsion-Thus, the amount claimed as late payment charges / charity by the bank/plaintiff was declined-After excluding the amount claimed as late payment charges by the bank / plaintiff , suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff / bank and against defendants jointly and severally together with costs and cost of funds as contemplated by S.3 of the Ordinance, 2001.\nDr. Faiz Rasool and others v. The Askari Bank Limited through Branch Manager/Authorized Attorney 2015 CLD 1710 ref.\n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Suit for recovery filed by the bank against the borrower / company and its directors/guarantors-Liability of defendant(s) being legal heir(s)-Scope-Liability of defendants (being legal heirs of the deceased borrower (director/defendant) shall be only to the extent of the property inherited by them from the deceased borrower/defendant.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9(5),10(1)", - "Case #": "C.O.S. No.233635 of 2018, heard on 2nd November, 2023. heard on: 2nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Abid Aziz Sheikh, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Rizwan-ul-Hassan, Muhammad Sajid Qureshi and Hamza Irshad for Plaintiff.\nImran Anjum Alvi, Muhammad Faizan Sarwar and Abbas Ali Cheema for Defendants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AL BARAKA BANK PAKISTAN LIMITED through Authorized Officers-Plaintiff\nVersus\nEDEN HOUSING LIMITED through Chief Executive Officers and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25305", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4256 = 2024 SLD 4256 = 2024 CLD 755", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTU", - "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)-\n-Ss.204-A(1) & 498-Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000), S.156-Anti-money laundering regulatory framework, non-compliance of-Appellant (Insurance Company) was penalized by the Securities and Exchange Commission for contraventions of Anti-Money Laundering Laws including Clauses 3, 4 & 5 of SRO Notification 20(I)/2012, [the Directive] and Circular No. 14 of the 2013 relating to Know-Your-Customer and Anti-Money Laundering (KYC/AML)-Validity-Appellant had an obligation to adhere to the relevant requirements of the Directive which should have been followed by the appellant in true letter and spirit-In the present case, the appellant failed to comply with the mandatory policies / Directive that have been in effect since the year 2012 - Regulated individuals are expected to be highly vigilant in adhering to Anti-Money Laundering Laws and should not offer excuses to avoid compliance - Record revealed that the Respondent/ Commission had earlier taken a lenient view with regard to contravention of S. 204-A of the Companies Ordinance, 1984-No reason was found to interfere with the merits of the impugned order - Appellate Bench maintained the impugned order -Appeal filed by the Insurance Company was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=204-A(1),498Insurance Ordinance, 2000=156", - "Case #": "Appeal No.107 of 2017, decided on 17th April, 2024, heard on: 6th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Imran Ali Dodani, Director Legal and Johrey Laal, Director Audit and Compliance for Appellant.\nShafiq ur Rehman, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I and Raja Farukh Ahmed, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs EAST WEST INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nCOMMISSIONER (INSURANCE), SECP-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25306", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4257 = 2024 SLD 4257 = 2024 CLD 758", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 310-Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 9-Suit for recovery filed before the Banking Court by a Company undergoing winding up-Maintainability-Leave of the Court, not sought for-Scope and effect-Plaintiff (company under winding up) filed suit for recovery against lessee/purchaser of car-Defendant / lessee preferred appeal as the Baking Court decreed the suit after denying leave to contest filed by him-Validity-Section 310 of the Companies Act, 2017, stipulates that no suit shall be proceeded with or commenced against a company regarding which either a winding up order is passed or the provisional manager is appointed without the leave or permission of the court before which the winding up proceedings are pending-Undoubtedly, the said court also has the jurisdiction to entertain, dispose of any suit or proceeding by or against the company ; and, in case any such proceeding is pending in any other court, it can be transferred to and disposed of by the court which is dealing with the matter of winding up the company-In the present case, one year and two months before filing of recovery suit before the Banking Court (through Deputy Manager Operations under an authority letter), the Provisional Manager had already been appointed after the commencement of the winding up proceedings of the company; thus, recovery suit was not maintainable /competent being against the very mandate of the provisions under S. 310 of the Companies Act, 2017-Record was completely silent in respect of any permission / leave obtained from the concerned Court to file the suit against the appellant / company before the Banking Court in terms of S.310 of the Companies Act, 2017-Respondent (plaintiff/company) ought to have filed the suit after obtaining leave of the Court-Such legal aspect of the case had not been considered by the Banking Court while decreeing the suit filed by the company, thus suit-in-question was not competent in circumstances of the present case-Findings of the Baking Court suffered from illegality and material irregularity, warranting interference by the Appellate/High Court-High Court set-aside impugned decree and remitted the matter back to the Banking Court for its decision afresh after due compliance of the provisions of S.310 of the Companies Act, 2017-Appeal filed by the lessee (defendant) was allowed accordingly.\nMessrs GAC Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. E.F.U. General Insurance Ltd and 2 others 2013 CLD 1568 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=310Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9", - "Case #": "FAB No.75-P of 2011 with C.M. No.379-P of 2011, decided on 10th July, 2023, heard on: 21st June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Ijaz Anwar and S M Attique Shah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdur Rahim Jadoon for Appellant.\nBarrister Amir Khan Chamkani for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAQEER MUHAMMAD-Appellant\nVersus\nMessrs NATOVER LEASE AND REFINANCE LTD. through DMO, Peshawar and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25307", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4258 = 2024 SLD 4258 = 2024 CLD 672", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWS8", - "Key Words:": "Anti Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010)-\n-S. 6(A)(2)(h)-Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Sanctions Rules, 2020, Rr.4(1) & 6(1)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018, Reglns. 6(2), 6(3), 6(4), 6(5), 9(3), 9(4) and 13(3)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S.33-Anti-money laundering regulatory framework, non-compliance of-Rectification of contraventions after visit of inception team of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission)-Appellant (Investment Management Company) was penalized by the Commission for contraventions of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018 (the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations)-Validity-Appellant had the responsibility to strictly adhere to the relevant requirements outlined in the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations and subsequent rectification actions did not absolve the appellant from the committed violations -However, record revealed that most of the shortcomings pertaining to closed-ended funds which were converted into open-ended funds and the data received from CDC was not as per the recent requirements-Subsequently, the appellant took various rectification actions and measures to enhance their due diligence practices including screening of all clients against the complete list of proscribed persons updation of database, proper categorization of accounts and improving KYC/CDD processes and committed to ensure compliance with the applicable regulatory framework-Appellate Bench, under the circumstances, considering the magnitude of imposed penalty as unjustified, reduced the penalty into nearly half-Appeal filed by (Investment Management) Company was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Money Laundering Act, 2010=6(A)(2)(h)", - "Case #": "Appeal No.11 of 2023, decided on 17th April, 2024, heard on: 21st March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Yaqoob for Appellant.\nMs. Asima Wajid, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication Division and Raja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication Division for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AKD INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nDIRECTOR (ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT-I)-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25308", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4259 = 2024 SLD 4259 = 2024 CLD 765", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWSs", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S.19-Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 58 (f)-Equitable mortgage, creation of-Deposit of title-Scope-Case of the appellants was that their liability was limited only to the extent of a cap provided by the registered mortgage deed and nothing more could be recovered under the registered instrument; that there was no document attached with the plaint to show that the deposit of title in fact was for creating equitable mortgage under S.58 of the Contract Act-Validity-Language of S.58(f) of the Contract Act, 1872, was not understood properly by the appellants as there was no requirement of any attached document apart from the fact that title was deposited for securing the loan extended to borrower-Deposit of title itself was sufficient to reveal the intent of an applicant depositing title document with the mortgagee-There was just one intention, that it is to secure the outstanding loan of the borrower-Mortgage by deposit of title deed gave his/ her intent that where a title document in relation to an immoveable property was deposited, the intent was to provide a security in relation to a transaction between main borrower and Bank/mortgagee- Contentions of the appellants were misconceived that the amount to the extent of cap provided under registered deed could only be recovered and nothing more, as this deposit of title document was enough to create equitable mortgage to cover entire outstanding amount-Registered mortgage is only a token mortgage to overcome any impediment that may come in the way-Requirement, for equitable mortgage is the existence of debt, delivery of title document and the intention that the document of title shall be the security for the debt and the same are sufficient to establish the intent-Additional mortgage deed cannot eclipse the fact of equitable mortgage under S.58(f) of Contract Act-High Court maintained judgment passed by the Banking Court-Appeal, being merit-less was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMst. Zubeda Khanum v. Presiding Officer, Special Court (Banking), Karachi and others 1994 CLC 2150 and National Bank of Pakistan through attorney and another v. Paradise Trading Company and others 2015 SCMR 319 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19Contract, Act, 1872=58(f)", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.127 of 2011, decided on 14th February, 2024, heard on: 14th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Omar Sial, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khaleeq Ahmed for Appellants.\nSyed Daanish Ghazi for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. KHURSHEED BEGUM and others-Appellants\nVersus\nNIB BANK LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25309", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4260 = 2024 SLD 4260 = 2024 CLD 768", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTk", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018-\n-Reglns. 6(2), 6(3), 6(4), 6(5), 9(3), 9(4) & 13(3)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), Ss. 40-A & 33-Anti-money laundering regulatory framework, non-compliance of-Rectification of contraventions after visit of the inception team of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission)-Investment Management Company was penalized by the Commission for contraventions of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018-Contention of the appellant /company was that rectification of the alleged contravention had been done-Held, that subsequent rectification actions by the appellant to comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018 (the regulations) did not absolve it (appellant) from committed violations-Said regulations were effective immediately after their issuance and warranted the appellant to ensure compliance in its true letter and spirit-No interference by the Appellate Bench was made out in the impugned order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Appeal filed by the Investment Management Company was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018=6(2),6(3),6(4),6(5),9(3),9(4),13(3)Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=40-A,33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.71 of 2019, decided on 17th April, 2024, heard on: 21st March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Yaqoob for Appellant.\nMs. Asima Wajid, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication Division and Raja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication Division for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AKD INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nCOMMISSIONER (SCD)-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25310", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4261 = 2024 SLD 4261 = 2024 CLD 770", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWTg", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 & 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 51, proviso & O.XXI, R. 40-Issuance of arrest-warrant-Scope-Decree-holder/bank filed application before the Banking Court seeking issuance of arrest warrant of the customer/judgment-debtor on the ground that as the decree was not materialized yet, hence the warrants were inevitable-Customer/judgment-debtor preferred appeal against acceptance of said application contenting that ground taken by the decree-holder was not enough for issuance of such warrants-Validity-Issuance of warrant in respect of decrees, which were unaccomplished, is not a routine matter-Section 51 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, provides for execution of a decree though arrest and detention of the judgment-debtor and the proviso thereof furnishes certain safeguards against the deprivation of liberty and contemplates that such power can only be exercised under certain given situations-In the present case, such situations were not considered prior to the issuance of warrants-High Court set aside impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the Banking Court, observing that unless the requirement of S. 51 & O. XXI, R. 40 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, are fulfilled, the ultimate recourse of arrest of the judgment-debtor may not be made-Appeal filed by the judgment-debtor was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=51,40", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.25 of 2016, decided on 15th March, 2024, heard on: 12th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Omar Sial, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khaleeq Ahmed for Appellants.\nZamir Ahmed Kalhoro for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR HASAN KHAN and 2 others-Appellants\nVersus\nMessrs HABIB BANK LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25311", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4262 = 2024 SLD 4262 = 2024 CLD 773", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWXo", - "Key Words:": "Companies (Investment in Associated Companies or Associated Undertakings) Regulations, 2017-\n-Regln. 5(6)-Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S. 199-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Investment in associated companies and undertakings-Recovery of accrued mark-up / interest receivable from associated companies-Regulatory requirements, non-compliance of-Company was penalized for not instituting any mechanism for the recovery of mark-up in accordance with regulatory requirement-Contention of the Appellant/Company was that failure to comply with the Companies Act, 2017 and the 2017 Regulations was unintentional as it relied on a legal opinion obtained from a reputable law firm-Validity-Contention of the appellant did not absolve it from committed violations as the recovery of interest/mark-up periodically and on regular basis was a mandatory requirement under S. 199 of the Companies Act, 2017, read with Regulation 5(6) of the Companies (Investment in Associated Companies or Associated Undertakings) Regulations, 2017, and any agreement between the appellant and its associated companies could not override the explicit dictates of legal provisions-Appellate Bench also considered that the interest and trust of shareholders had been violated-Appellant had submitted before the Appellate Bench that it had already started recovering the interest amount from its associated companies and it would provide the relevant details along with repayment schedule to the concerned department regarding recovery of the remaining interest amount-In view of the commitment to recover the interest, the Bench had not enhanced the penalty-Appellate Bench found no reason to interfere in the impugned order-Appeal, filed by company, was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=199Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.79 of 2023, decided on 26th March, 2024, heard on: 21st September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioners", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Bulent Sohail and Salman K. Haider for Appellants.\nMehboob Ahmad, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, Muhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I and Raja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TPL LIFE TRAKKER LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nDIRECTOR/HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT-I-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25312", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4263 = 2024 SLD 4263 = 2024 CLD 776", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDWXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXVII, R. 2(2)-Suit for recovery on the basis of cheque-Condition attached with leave granting order, non-compliance of-Leave granting order, recalling of-Application to leave to defend filed by the appellant/defendant was granted to him subject to furnishing security / surety bond, however, he remained unable to comply with the condition and as a result thereof leave granting order was recalled by the Trial Court and decree was passed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff-Argument of the appellant / defendant was that by recalling the leave granting order he was wrongly ousted from producing his defence and the Trial Court acted in haste while recalling the leave granting order-Validity-Order sheet of the Trial Court reflected that after about two and a half months of the grant of leave subject to condition (filing of surety bond),the counsel of appellant requested for some time to file surety bond when he was given last opportunity-Thereafter, on next date of hearing once again same request was made when absolute and final opportunity was granted-On next hearing the appellant was himself present in the Court and he gave undertaking with respect to submission of surety-But, the previous conduct continued and the Court clearly observed that the surety should be filed before closing hours of the Court but the appellant failed, apparently leaving the Trial Court with no other option but to recall the leave granting order, and as a consequence of the same leave to appear and defend the suit was deemed to be dismissed-Such conduct of the appellant was sufficient indication of the fact that the appellant accepted the condition and then caused undue delay of about four months just to avoid expeditious decision in suit-Thus, said recalling order of the Trial Court essentially meant that the appellant had no leave to appear and defend the case in terms of O.XXXVII, R.2(2) of the Code-Trial Court had rightly decreed the suit-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMuhammad Ramzan and others v. Ghulam Qadir 2011 SCMR 659; Murtaza Haseeb Textile Mills v. Sitara Chemical Industries 2004 SCMR 882 and Abdullah v. Shaukat 2001 SCMR 60 ref.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F-Suit for recovery on the basis of cheque-Criminal as well as civil litigation regarding the cheque-Scope-Decree was passed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff by the Trial Court-Contention of the appellant /defendant was that he had been discharged from the criminal cases registered under S. 489-F of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860-Validity-Both the criminal as well as civil cases have different standards of proof and acquittal or discharge from criminal case does not absolve a litigant from civil liability, if burden is discharged by the other side as per settled principles of civil standard of proof-Trial Court had rightly decreed the suit-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2(2)", - "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No.69211 of 2023, decided on 17th April, 2024, heard on: 27th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sultan Ali Dogar and Ali Raza Hanjra for Appellant.\nMian Imran Mushtaq for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAFEES AHMAD-Petitioner\nVersus\nZIA-UD-DIN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25313", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4264 = 2024 SLD 4264 = 2024 CLD 781", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S.17-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [Since repealed], S.31-Companies Act (VII of 1913) [Since repealed], S. 21-Memorandum and Articles-Object, purpose and scope-Articles of Association always regulate relationship between a Company and its member as its shareholder-Such relationship between shareholder and Company is governed by the Articles of Association.\n(b) Trusts Act (II of 1882)-\n-Ss. 3, 5, 6 & 8-Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.17-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [Since repealed], S. 31-Companies Act (VII of 1913) [Since repealed], S. 21-Suit for recovery of money-Unpaid dividends-Memorandum and Articles-Trust-Creation and subject-Unjust enrichment, principle of-Applicability-Plaintiff sought recovery of markup and profit on unpaid dividends retained by defendant company-Validity-Where author of trust makes a clear written declaration of trust, no actual transfer of movable trust property or trust money is necessary, and where author of trust is himself the trustee such declaration need not be registered-There was no declaration of trust by defendant Company in favor of plaintiff-Three certainties to form a trust based on judgments and provisions of law were also missing-Three missing requirements, include, (1) Defendant company intended to constitute a trust for unpaid dividends; (2) Defendant company intended to bind definite property (profit on unclaimed shares) by the trust; and (3) defendant company intended to benefit a definite person (plaintiff) in a definite way-Defendant Company was not acting as a trustee-Plaintiff voluntarily and willingly remitted funds to purchase shares that defendant company never registered, and used dividends from disputed shares for almost 37.5 years-Defendant company was bound to compensate plaintiff for unjust enrichment it had enjoyed for 37.5 years based on the orders of High Court passed in appellate jurisdiction read in the light of relevant articles of the Articles of Association of 1953, 1986 and 2007-Plaintiff was entitled to profit/interest on unpaid dividends on the basis of equity and/or unjust enrichment-Plaintiff established his claim against defendant company who was liable to compensate plaintiff in the sum of Rs.154,110,753 (net of taxes) as the equalizer profit on the dividend income retained and utilized by defendant company based on principles of equity and in the alternative, unjust enrichment-Defendant company retained plaintiffs funds arising out of the shares eventually registered in the name of plaintiff by way of Courts Order under relevant articles of the Articles of Association of 1953, 1986 and 2007 which provided an exception under the Articles of Association of defendant company that members could claim no interest-Such equalizer profit of Rs.154,110,753 was calculated based on simple interest of 5% p.a. of aggregate of unpaid dividend income of Rs.82,192,402 (net of taxes) spread over 37.5 years from 01-01-1970 to 30-06-2007 and such equalizer assumed that defendant company made annual profit of Rs.4,109,620 per year on unpaid dividends-Suit was decreed accordingly.\nMuhammad Rashid Ahmed v. Muhammad Siddique 2002 SCMR 300; Muhammad Tahir v. Abdul Latif and 5 others 1990 SCMR 751; Malik Din and another v. Muhammad Aslam PLD 1969 SC 136; Haseeb Express (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Azerbaijan Hava Yollari State concern Azerbaijan Airlines 1998 CLC 1390; Lucky Cement v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2015 PTD 2210; Wood v. Odessa Water Company (1889) 42 Ch. D.636; Tulsidas Kilachand v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1961 SC 1023; Bai Mahakore v. Bai Mangla (1911) ILR 35 Bombay 403 and Manchershaw S. Narielwalla v. Ardeshir S. Narielwalla (1908) 10 Bom LR 1209 rel.\n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 34-Interest on investment-Principle-Plaintiff sought imposing of interest at the rate of 14% per annum on the amount to be recovered from defendant company-Validity-Plaintiff had produced no evidence in support of and/or to justify a rate of interest/markup of 14% p.a. and failed to prove his claim for award of mark-up at the rate of 14% per annum-High Court declined plaintiffs claim for mark-up at 14% p.a. but in exercising its discretion under S. 34, C.P.C., read with the judgment of Supreme Court reported as Raja Muhammad Sadiq and 9 others v. WAPDA through Chairman, WAPDA House, Lahore and 3 others (PLD 2003 SC 290), awarded the plaintiff simple markup of 5% on Rs. 82,192,402/ from the date of filing of the suit, i.e. 03-07-2007, till the date of the decree-Mark up was allowed accordingly.\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Bashir Ahmad 2019 SCMR 362 fol.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=17", - "Case #": "Suit No.997 of 2007, decided on 13th October, 2023. Dates of hearing: 23rd, 25th August, 8th, 20th and 27th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jawad Akbar Sarwana, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Usman Tufail Shaikh for Plaintiff.\nKhawaja Aizar Ahsan, Shaheer Roshan Shaikh and Sami ur Rehman for Defendant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. BANO HASHAM ALLIBHAI-Plaintiff\nVersus\nNEW JUBILEE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED-Defendant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25314", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4265 = 2024 SLD 4265 = 2024 CLD 829", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTY", - "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 62-Suit for recovery of damages-Novation of contract-Effect-Respondent / plaintiff company filed suit for recovery of damages against appellant / defendant company-Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of respondent / plaintiff company-Validity-Discharge of original contract under S. 62 of Contract Act, 1872, was only to the extent it was novated, rescinded or altered-Such novated contract did not override intention of parties to novate original contract only partially-Original contract to the extent it was not novated or altered remained binding and operative-For novation excusing performance of previous agreements, it first needed to be established that parties agreed to substitute new contract wholly for the earlier one but it could not be so if accrued obligations under previous contract were kept alive in express terms despite new contract, all the more so where new contract was occasioned due to breach of first contract and injured party included a term in new contract that its claims under the old contract would remain alive-High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court as novation did not excuse performance of accrued obligations under previous settlement agreements-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others PLD 2021 SC 715; Muhammad Farooq and others v. Javed Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 73; BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd. v. Shire of Hastings (1977) 16 ALR 363 at 376; The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64; West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi PLD 1973 SC 222; House Building Finance Corporation v. Shahinshah Humayun Cooperative House Building Society 1992 SCMR 19; Philips Electronique v. British Sky Broadcasting [1995] EMLR 472 at 482 and Karachi Municipal Corporation v. Nawabuddin PLD 1961 (W.P.) Kar. 599 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=62", - "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.66 of 2013 and 55 and 56 of 2015, decided on 20th February, 2024, heard on: 24th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mohsin Akhtar Kayani and Sardar Ijaz Ishaq Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Qamar Afzal for Appellants.\nTariq Aziz for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIRCLENET COMMUNICATION PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED and others-Appellants\nVersus\nPAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANY LIMITED through General Manager-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25315", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4266 = 2024 SLD 4266 = 2024 CLD 837", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTU", - "Key Words:": "Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019-\n-Reglns. 7 & 37-Companies Act (XIX of 2017), Ss. 192, 193 & 512-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Failure of company to appoint a female director-Mandatory provisions, violation of-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) imposed a penalty of Rs.50,000/- on the company-Contention of the appellant / company was that no female was willing to work as a director in the appellant-company as the company was not operational and a winding up petition was also pending before the Court-Validity-A public listed company has higher responsibility towards its stakeholders and is obligated to act in the best financial interest of the share holders of the company to safeguard it-Law has made some provisions mandatory in nature which have to be followed-Violation of mandatory provision merely on the basis that no one is willing to join has no justification-Appellant was still an existing legal entity and it had to comply with the legal requirements-However, in present case despite concerted efforts, the appellant found itself unable to appoint a female director on its board, due to reasons that qualified female candidates were reluctant to engage with a company grappling with multifaceted challenges including the appellants dysfunctionality, restriction of share transfers and above all, winding up petition against the appellant-Appellate Bench while considering the mitigating factors converted the penalty into warning and directs the Appellant to be careful in future-Appeal filed by the company was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2019=7,37Companies Act, 2017=192,193,512Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.38 of 2021, decided on 27th February, 2024, heard on: 18th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Sarfaraz, Company Secretary (Authorized Representative) for Appellant.\nMahboob Ahmad, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, Muhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I and Raja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Haji MOHAMMAD ISMAIL MILLS LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR/HOD, ADJUDICATION-I SECP, ISLAMABAD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25316", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4267 = 2024 SLD 4267 = 2024 CLD 839", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss.3, 10(4), explanation, 19 & 22-Suit for recovery of finances-Execution proceedings-Cost of funds-Appellant / judgment debtor was aggrieved of dismissal of his objections regarding recovery of cost of funds prior to recovery of decretal amount-Validity-Execution of decree passed by Banking Court was governed by S.19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which contained no provision for applicability of explanation contained in S. 10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-No reference was made to application of such explanation in S.3 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which prescribed duty of a customer to pay cost of funds of financial institution-Decree-holder bank erred in law in appropriating repayments made by judgment-debtors towards other amounts such as cost of funds instead of decretal debt on the pretext of applicability of explanation in S.10(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-High Court set aside order passed by Banking Court as it was unlawfully approved-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nHabib Bank AG Zurich through Manager v. Mustafa Shamsuddin Ghatilla and 2 others 2003 CLD 658; SME Bank Limited through Branch Manager v. Messrs Punjab Store through Proprietor and another 2022 CLD 251; Messrs Divine Developers (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Bank of Punjab 2019 CLD 489 and Habib Bank Limited through Authorized Attorneys v. Pak Poly Products (Pvt.) Ltd. and 3 others 2013 CLD 1661 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=3,10(4)", - "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.13 of 2023, decided on 20th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Raheel Kamran, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Manzoor-ul-Haq for Appellants.\nSyed Wasim Haider for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs TEAM PACKAGES and others-Appellants\nVersus\nMCB BANK LIMITED-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25317", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4268 = 2024 SLD 4268 = 2024 CLD 845", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 10(4)-Suit for recovery filed by the bank-Application for leave to appear and defend the suit-Substantial question(s) of law or fact, non-raising of-Effect-Banking Court dismissed application for leave to defend filed by the customer/ defendant, and decreed the suit filed by the bank-Validity-After the plaintiff / bank filed its banking suit, the appellant (customer /defendant) was required to raise substantial questions of law or fact in its application for leave to defend, failing which the Banking Court would pass judgment and decree against him /defendant-Contents of the application for leave to defend submitted by appellant /defendant showed that he failed to raise his defence in terms of S.10(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which (application) required him to expressly set out the amount of finance availed by him, the amounts paid by him to the Bank (plaintiff/respondent) , identify the amount actually payable, identify the disputed amount, etc.-However, application filed by the appellant /defendant was silent on all said points-Impugned judgment and decree had been passed on proper appreciation of facts and law and the Single Judge of the High Court did not make any error while passing the same-First appeal, filed by the defendant/customer, was dismissed accordingly.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 10(4)-Bankers Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Preamble-Suit for recovery filed by the bank-Application for leave to appear and defend the suit, dismissal of-Scope-Banking Court dismissed application for leave to defend filed by the customer/ defendant, and decreed the suit filed by the bank-Plea of the appellant/defendant was that the banking suit pertained to the finance of previous years-Validity-Plaint and the supporting documents filed by the bank, included, inter alia, the Statement of Account duly verified under the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891, clearly mentioning relevant record/evidence like the finance having been disbursed and the opening entry reflected in the statement as the first credit entry-There was no carry forward entry in the account, negating appellants submission that Bank was claiming finance advanced in prior years, therefore, appellants plea that the banking suit pertained to the finance of previous years carried no weight-Impugned judgment and decree had been passed on proper appreciation of facts and law and the Single Judge of the High Court did not make any error while passing the same-First appeal, filed by the defendant/customer, was dismissed accordingly.\n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 10(12)-Suit for recovery filed by the bank-Application for leave to appear and defend the suit, dismissal of-Decreeing the suit forthwith-Scope-Banking Court dismissed application for leave to defend filed by the customer/ defendant, and on the same date decreed the suit filed by the bank-Plea of the appellant (customer / defendant) was that the dismissal of the leave to defend application and the passing of the judgment and decree on the same date constituted an irregularity-Held, that argument of the appellant had no legs to stand as S.10(12) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, clearly stated, in no uncertain terms, that where the application for Leave to Defend was rejected or where a defendant failed to fulfil the conditions attached to the grant of leave to defend, the Banking Court shall forthwith proceed to pass judgment and decree in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant-Accordingly, in the present (banking) suit, when the Banking Court rejected appellants leave to defend application, it was well within its powers to pass judgment and decree in banking suit-Impugned judgment and decree had been passed on proper appreciation of facts and law and the Single Judge of the High Court did not make any error while passing the same-First appeal, filed by the defendant/customer, was dismissed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Larkana Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10(4)", - "Case #": "1st Civil Appeal No.D-02 of 2022, decided on 26th March, 2024, heard on: 21st February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Saleem Jessar and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rehman A. Bhutto for Appellant.\nNiaz Ali Ansari for Respondent.\nOshaque Ali Sangi, Asstt. Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAFDAR ALI JALBANI-Appellant\nVersus\nZTBL through Authorized Person-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25318", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4269 = 2024 SLD 4269 = 2024 CLD 849", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVSs", - "Key Words:": "Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2017-\n-Reglns. 6 & 32-Companies Act (XIX of 2017), Ss. 192, 193 & 512-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Regulatory requirements, non-compliance of-Company being dormant-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) imposed penalty of Rs.150,000/= on appellant-company for its non-compliance of regulatory requirements under the Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2017-Contention of the appellant /company was that it had been dormant, however, non-compliances, which formed the basis for impugned order , had been complied with-Validity-Respondent/SECP vide impugned order also warned the appellant to ensure compliance in future which, though with a delay, had been done by the company-Moreover, admittedly, the appellant / company was not operational since long and was a dormant entity-The company not being operative did not absolve it from statutory compliances under the law and on that account, it was the responsibility of the management of the company to realize and decide accordingly that being a listed company it had to comply with the law as long as it appeared on the register of companies-However, keeping in view the said circumstances and considering subsequent compliance as a mitigating factor, Appellate Bench by converted the penalty imposed vide impugned order into a warning and also directed the appellant to ensure compliance of the regulatory requirements in future strictly in accordance with the law-Appeal filed by the company, was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2017=6,32Companies Act, 2017=192,193,512Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.81 of 2020, decided on 29th February, 2024, heard on: 18th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2017-\n-Reglns. 6 & 32-Companies Act (XIX of 2017), Ss. 192, 193 & 512-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Regulatory requirements, non-compliance of-Company being dormant-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) imposed penalty of Rs.150,000/= on appellant-company for its non-compliance of regulatory requirements under the Listed Companies (Code of Corporate Governance) Regulations, 2017-Contention of the appellant /company was that it had been dormant, however, non-compliances, which formed the basis for impugned order , had been complied with-Validity-Respondent/SECP vide impugned order also warned the appellant to ensure compliance in future which, though with a delay, had been done by the company-Moreover, admittedly, the appellant / company was not operational since long and was a dormant entity-The company not being operative did not absolve it from statutory compliances under the law and on that account, it was the responsibility of the management of the company to realize and decide accordingly that being a listed company it had to comply with the law as long as it appeared on the register of companies-However, keeping in view the said circumstances and considering subsequent compliance as a mitigating factor, Appellate Bench by converted the penalty imposed vide impugned order into a warning and also directed the appellant to ensure compliance of the regulatory requirements in future strictly in accordance with the law-Appeal filed by the company, was disposed of accordingly.\nMaqbool Husain Bhutta, Authorized Representative for the Appellant.\nMahboob Ahmad, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, Muhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I and Raja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian SHAHZAD ASLAM, (CEO) NAZIR COTTON MILLS LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nHOD-ADJUDICATION-I, ADJUDICATION DIVISION SECP-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25319", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4270 = 2024 SLD 4270 = 2024 CLD 948", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Writ of quo warranto-Appointment of Chief Executive Officer of a public sector company, challenging of-Aggrieved person-Scope-Petitioner filed constitutional petition challenging the appointment of the private respondent as Chief Executive Officer of Peoples Primary Health Initiative Balochistan (PPHI-B), a public sector company-Objection of the official respondents was that the writ petition was not maintainable as the petitioner had no locus standi to file the same-Held, that objection of the respondents was not tenable as in case of issuance of writ of quo warranto the person laying information before the court need not be an aggrieved person.\nHafiz Hamdullah v. Saifullah Khan and others PLD 2007 SC 52 ref.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 2(54), 4, 186 & 187-Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013, R.5(2)-Public Sector Company (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guide Lines, 2015, issued by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Clause 7 & Schedule 1-Chief Executive Officer of a public sector company, appointment of-Mechanism/eligibility criteria -Power /role of the Government-Scope-Petitioner challenged the notification for appointment of the private respondent as Chief Executive Officer of Peoples Primary Health Initiative Balochistan (PPHI-B), a public sector company-Contention of the petitioner was that the relevant procedure /criteria had not been followed in the said appointment-Validity-Section 4 of the Companies Act, 2017, expressly provides that provision of the Companies Act pre-empts anything contained in any other law (or the Memorandum of Association or Article of Association of a company or contract or agreement or resolution etc.) and any provision or resolution to the extent of its inconsistency with any provision of the Companies Act, 2017, would be void-Sections 186 & 187 of the Companies Act, 2017, empower the Board to appoint the CEO of a Company, subject to S.186 (4) or 187 (4) of the Companies Act, 2017, which prescribes the (relevant) Government the power to nominate CEO of a Public sector Company-Apart from said provision, the company/ PPHI-B had been registered / renewed as a public sector association not for profit in terms of S.2(54) of the Companies Act, 2017, therefore, the appointment of its CEO and allied matters (criteria, process, evaluation of candidates, terms and conditions etc.) were further regulated under R.5(2) of Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 (the Rules 2013) and Clause 7 and Schedule 1 of the Public Sector Company (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guide Line, 2015 (PSC) issued by SECP-Rule 5(2) of the Rules, 2013 is meant for evaluation of candidate for the post of Chief Executive by the Board-After such evaluation the Board must recommend at least three persons to the Government for appointment as CEO of the concerned public sector company; the nominee concurred by the Government is to be appointed by the Board as Chief Executive-Following the specific criteria for such appointment was important-Said provisions (of the Companies Act, 2017, Rules, 2013 PSC) and Articles of Association (AoA) of the Company (PPHI-B) provide certain mechanism/eligibility criteria for the appointment of the CEO-It is obvious from the AoA that Board of Directors owes the Company and makes the Board responsible for placing the succession and appointment of the CEO-Procedure adopted by the official respondents for the appointment of the private respondent did not conform to the said provisions and AoA of the Company on the matters, therefore, impugned notification could not be sustained-High Court set-aside the impugned notification and directed the official respondents to take necessary steps for the appointment of new CEO of the company on merits and in accordance with law-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\n \n2019 SCMR 1952 and Ghulam Rasool v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division Islamabad and others PLD 2015 SC 6 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Companies Act, 2017=2(54),4,186,187", - "Case #": "C.P. No.769 of 2023, decided on 19th October, 2023, heard on: 9th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ejaz Swati and Nazeer Ahmed Langove, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Munir Ahmed Kakar, Adnan Basharat and Ali Ahmed Kakar for Petitioner.\nShai Haq Baloch, Additional Advocate General along with Arif Shah, Chief Audit Officer PPHI-B for Respondents Nos.1 to 2.\nSyed Ayaz Zahoor and Muhammad Ali Kanrani for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. RASHID TARIN-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat, Quetta and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25320", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4271 = 2024 SLD 4271 = 2024 CLD 858", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVTg", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss.42 & 54-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2-Suit for declaration and injunction-Interim injunction, refusal of-Performance guarantee-Encashment-Principle-Respondent / plaintiff was aggrieved of encashing of Performance Guarantee issued on its behalf in favour of appellant / defendant-Trial Court allowed interim injunction restraining encashment of Performance Guarantee furnished on behalf of respondent / plaintiff by insurance company-Validity-Rights and liabilities of parties in a contract of guarantee have to be determined strictly in accordance with terms and conditions of guarantee without recourse to underlined contract-Guarantee, whether captioned as a bank guarantee or performance bond or performance security issued by a bank or an insurance company, is an autonomous contract and imposes an absolute obligation on guarantor to fulfill its terms-It is the language of contract of guarantee that reveals intention of parties-Where a bank / insurance company gives a guarantee in absolute and unconditional terms and where payment is to be made on demand irrespective of the dispute and differences between parties to underlying contract, bank / insurance company is duty bound to honour its obligation and it cannot be prevented by an injunction from honouring such obligation-Irrevocable commitment in the form of irrevocable bank guarantee cannot be interfered with by Courts, except where a case of fraud or irretrievable injustice has been made out-Terms of Performance Security do not defer a claim for its encashment until the resolution of disputes between the parties to underlined contract-Courts do their utmost to enforce a guarantee according to its terms and do not interfere by way of an injunction to prevent its enforcement-High Court set aside interim injunction issued by Trial Courts in favour of respondent / plaintiff restraining encashment of Performance Security in question-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nSambo Construction Co. Ltd. v. Laraib Energy Limited 2021 CLC 1914; Montage Design Build v. Republic of Tajikistan 2015 CLD 8; Standard Construction Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Communications 2010 SCMR 524; Shipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. PLD 2003 SC 191; Pak Consulting and Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan Steel Mills 2002 SCMR 1781; National Construction Ltd. v. Aiwan-e-Iqbal Authority PLD 1994 SC 311; Pakistan Real Estate Investment and Management Company Private Limited v. M/s Sky Blue Builders 2021 CLD 518; Husein Industries Ltd. v. Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. PLD 2020 Sindh 551; Shipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited 2003 CLD 1 and Sirafi Trading Establishment v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. 1984 CLC 381 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.141 of 2023, decided on 2nd May, 2024, heard on: 29th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Muhammad Tariq Rajwana for Appellant.\nSahibzada Uzair Hashim, Ali Ahmad Shah and Raja Hamza Tahir for Respondent No.1.\nMalik Zaheer Abbas Tipu, representative for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY-Appellant\nVersus\nMessrs KAC-UCC JV and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25321", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4272 = 2024 SLD 4272 = 2024 CLD 864", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVXo", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss.20 (4) & 22-Default in repayment of finance-Dishonoring of cheque-Pre-condition-Private complaint, dismissal of-Appellant / bank was aggrieved of dismissal of private complaint by Banking Court filed against respondent / accused for dishonoring of cheque presented for repayment of finance-Validity-Requirement of S.20(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, was different than gist of complaint filed by appellant / bank-Section 20(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, only enabled the Banking Court to frame punishment if customer / whosever, breached the terms by dishonestly issuing cheques towards repayment of finances or fulfilment of such obligation which was / were dishonored-Prime consideration for Court was to see whether element of dishonesty was involved or not and the later part was only consequential-Burden to prove such element of dishonesty was upon complainant which was lacking in the present complaint-There was no evidence to demonstrate such dishonest intention of alleged accused, even if charge was to be altered-It was not a civil case of recovery under banking jurisdiction that preponderance or cumulative effect was to be given for recovery proceedings; the process in the present case was criminal intent which led to punishment where intent of dishonesty was inevitable-High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Banking Court-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nZain Shahid v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 843 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=20(4),22", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.61 of 2016, decided on 3rd April, 2024, heard on: 3rd April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Omar Sial, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Rasool Korai for Appellant.\nNone present for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UNITED BANK LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nGHULAM NABI SHEIKH-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25322", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4273 = 2024 SLD 4273 = 2024 CLD 869", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDVXk", - "Key Words:": "Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010)-\n-S. 6(A)(2)(h)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018, Reglns. 5(a) & 27(2)(c)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Mandatory provisions, contravention of-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) imposed a penalty of Rs.60,000/- on the appellant (a Trading Rights Entitlement Certificate (TREC) holder of the Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited (PSX) and licensed as a securities broker) for the contravention of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Anti Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism) Regulations, 2018-Contention of the appellant was that it had never engaged in any business or transaction nor had any clients-Validity-Despite the fact that the appellant did not have any transactions or clients, it was still obligated to adhere to the law as per the requirements at the time of registration as TREC-However, the appellant had addressed the non-compliance issues and submitted a compliance report to the respondent/SECP prior to the hearing-Said step by the appellant should be seen as a mitigating factor-Respondent / SECP did not appropriately weigh these circumstances before imposing the penalty-Appellate Bench, considering the said mitigating circumstances, set-aside the penalty imposing impugned order passed by the SECP-Appeal, filed by the company, was allowed in, circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Appeal No.09 of 2023, decided on 13th February, 2024, heard on: 18th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shaheer Bin Tahir, Chief Executive Officer for Appellant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I and Muhammad Akram, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs XPERT SECURITIES LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nDIRECTOR/HOD (ADJUDICATION-I), ADJUDICATION DIVISION-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25323", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4274 = 2024 SLD 4274 = 2024 CLD 872", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTc", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 126, 136 & 160-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5 & Art. 181-Petition for rectification of register of members and to declare invalid the proceedings of a general meeting as well as election of directors, filing of-Limitation-Application for condonation of delay-Sufficient / reasonable cause-Scope-Petitioner (director / shareholder of the company) moved petition in the year 2021 challenging proceedings held in the year 2003-Petitioner also filed an application for condonation of delay on the ground that he came to know about impugned proceedings during perusal of certified true copies issued by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan in the year 2020-Validity-Ground, taken by the petitioner, did not furnish a reasonable cause to compel the Court to condone the delay-Such petitions, like the present one for rectification etc., where no period of limitation is provided would be governed by Art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, for which a period of three years is provided-Present petition was clearly beyond that period and challenged the transfer of shares which took place in the year 2003-Each days delay had to be explained by the petitioner which had not been done sufficiently-Present petition being beyond the period of three years provided by law is clearly barred by statutes, which was dismissed-Consequently, main petition for rectification etc. filed in the year 2021 by the director / shareholder was also dismissed.\nMessrs Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. v. Bankers Equity Ltd. 2023 SCMR 1353 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=126,136,160Limitation Act, 1908=5,181", - "Case #": "Civil Original No.81451 of 2021, decided on 24th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Masood Ahmad Zafar and Awais Bin Tariq for Petitioner.\nUsman Nasir Awan, Wajahat Ali and Mirza Waqas Baig for Respondents Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5.\nShan Saeed Ghumman for Respondent No.3.\nRuman Bilal for SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YOUNIS-Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs SHAHID SURGICAL (PVT.) LTD. and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25324", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4275 = 2024 SLD 4275 = 2024 CLD 874", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTY", - "Key Words:": "Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss.10 & 41-Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001), S.86-Competition Appellate Tribunal Rules 2015, R. 25-Competition (General Enforcement) Regulations, 2007, Reglns. 16 & 17-Dominant position, abuse of-Deceptive Marketing Practice-Mis-using brand name-Enhancement of penalty-Appellant company was aggrieved of penalty imposed on it for using logo/trademark of Starbucks -Plea raised by appellant was that trademark in question had no commercial existence in Pakistan-Validity-All undertakings are prohibited under S.10(1) of Competition Act, 2010, from entering into deceptive marketing practices without making any distinction between a foreign company not registered or operating in Pakistan-Any undertaking whether based in Pakistan or not for the purpose of S.10 of Competition Act, 2010 and Reglns. 16 & 17 of the Competition (General Enforcement) Regulations, 2007, can file a complaint to protect its legal rights beside an action under Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, or any other law-Appellant failed to establish its case and directions issued by the Commission for compliance were also not fulfilled- Commission by taking a lenient view had imposed penalty of Rs.5,000,000/- (Rupees Five Million) but the same was not paid-Competition Appellate Tribunal enhanced the penalty to Rs.6,000,000/- under R.25 of Competition Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2015, as the Competition Commission had noted that appellant was still using some of the images on social media-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=10,41Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001=86", - "Case #": "Appeal No.45 of 2023, decided on 29th May, 2024, heard on: 5th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, Chairperson, Muhammad Asghar Ch., Member Technical-I and Raja Saad Sultan, Member Technical-II", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Ghafoor Sheikh for Appellant.\nHassan Ahsan Mian, Law Officer for CCP for Respondent No.1.\nSana Sheikh Fikree for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs OPTIONS INTERNATIONAL (SMC PVT.) LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nCOMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25325", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4276 = 2024 SLD 4276 = 2024 CLD 882", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTU", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-\n-S. 33-Appeal before the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Withdrawal of-Counsel for the appellant/company submitted that the present appeal had become infructuous for the reason that one of the proposed directors passed away, whereas approval for appointment of the other proposed director as director of the appellant /company had already been granted by the competent authority and thus he wished to withdraw the present appeal-In view of the said statement of the counsel for the appellant / company, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.105 of 2017, decided on 20th March, 2024, heard on: 11th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hamza Siddiqui for Appellant.\nShafique ur Rehman, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I and Raja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DAWOOD FAMILY TAKAFUL LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nCOMMISSIONER INSURANCE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25326", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4277 = 2024 SLD 4277 = 2024 CLD 883", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 22-Suit for declaration and recovery of damages-Non-appearance as witness-Presumption-Appellants / plaintiffs being customers of respondent / defendant bank alleged that their fix deposit receipts were unauthorizedly encashed-Trial Court dismissed the suit-Validity-One appellant / plaintiff denied relationship of customer altogether and the other opted not to support his case on oath by appearing as witness, therefore, adverse presumption was raised against him-There was no plausible or cogent explanation in the evidence of appellants / plaintiffs as to what occasioned such deposit receipts to be placed with bank and what in specific was Amanat or entrustment which could be referred to that necessitated and which had prevented the respondent / defendant bank from adjusting amounts to settle outstanding liability so as to establish any foundational breach of trust, any contract or specifically unjustified encashment as was claimed-Issue-wise findings concluded that appellants / plaintiffs failed to prove their case and the suit was rightly dismissed by Trial Court-High Court declined to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by Banking Court as there was no misreading and non-reading of evidence nor there was any legal infirmity or jurisdictional defect-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No.1550 of 2015, heard on 6th May, 2024, heard on: 6th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim and Rasaal Hasan Syed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Asghar Ali for Appellants.\nWaseem Ahmad and Ch. Saeed Hussain for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian SADIQ HUSSAIN and another-Appellants\nVersus\nALLIED BANK PAKISTAN LIMITED and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25327", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4278 = 2024 SLD 4278 = 2024 CLD 888", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUS8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 19-Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 58(f)-Equitable mortgage, creation of-Deposit of title-Scope-Case of the appellants was that their liability was limited only to the extent of a cap provided by the registered mortgage deed and nothing more could be recovered under the registered instrument; that there was no document attached with the plaint to show that the deposit of title in fact was for creating equitable mortgage under S. 58 of the Contract Act-Validity-Language of S.58(f) of the Contract Act, 1872, was not understood properly by the appellants as there was no requirement of any attached document apart from the fact that title was deposited for securing the loan extended to borrower-Deposit of title itself was sufficient to reveal the intent of an applicant depositing title document with the mortgagee-There was just one intention, that it, to secure the outstanding loan of the borrower-Mortgage by deposit of title deed gave his/ her intent that where a title document in relation to an immoveable property was deposited, the intent was to provide a security in relation to a transaction between main borrower and Bank/mortgagee-Contentions of the appellants were misconceived that the amount to the extent of cap provided under registered deed could only be recovered and nothing more, as this deposit of title document was enough to create equitable mortgage to cover entire outstanding amount-Registered mortgage is only a token mortgage to overcome any impediment that may come in the way-Requirement for equitable mortgage is the existence of debt, delivery of title document and the intention that the document of title shall be the security for the debt, and the same are sufficient to establish the intent-Additional mortgage deed cannot eclipse the fact of equitable mortgage under S. 58(f) of Contract Act-High Court maintained judgment passed by the Banking Court-Appeal, being meritless was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMst. Zubeda Khanum v. Presiding Officer, Special Court (Banking), Karachi and others 1994 CLC 2150 and National Bank of Pakistan through attorney and another v. Paradise Trading Company and others 2015 SCMR 319 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19Contract, Act, 1872=58(f)", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 127 of 2011, decided on 14th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Omar Sial, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khaleeq Ahmed for Appellants.\nSyed Daanish Ghazi for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. KHURSHEED BEGUM and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nNIB BANK LIMITED and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25328", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4279 = 2024 SLD 4279 = 2024 CLD 890", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S. 257(1)-Expression without prejudice to its power under S. 256, the Commission -Scope-Provision of S.257(1) of Companies Act, 2017, commences with the expression without prejudice to its power under S. 256, the Commission -When such expression is used, it means that anything contained in the provision following such expression is not intended to cut down generality of the meaning of preceding provision.\nP Ramanatha Aiyars Advance Law Lexicon, Volume 4 rel.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 256 (1) & 257 (1)-Affairs of company-Appointment of Inspectors-Jurisdiction-Petitioner / company assailed show cause notice issued by Commission regarding investigation of affairs of company on complaint filed by persons other than shareholders-Validity-Both in S. 256(1) and S. 257(1)(b) of Companies Act, 2017, Commission was to form an opinion before appointment of Inspectors-Such opinion under S. 257(1)(b) of Companies Act, 2017, was to be based upon circumstances suggesting various situations mentioned in clauses (i) to (vii) of S. 257(1)(b) of Companies Act, 2017-Formation of opinion under S. 256(1) of Companies Act, 2017, was not confined only to circumstances suggested in clauses (i) to (vii) of S. 257(1)(b) of Companies Act, 2017, but Commission had much wide powers to appoint Inspectors if it was necessary to investigate into affairs of the Company-Provision of S. 257(1)(b) of Companies Act, 2017, was a separate clause under which Commission had independent power to appoint Inspectors to investigate affairs of the Company if in its opinion there were circumstances suggesting the situation mentioned in subsections (i) to (vii) of S. 257(1)(b) of Companies Act, 2017-High Court declined to interfere in appointment of Inspectors to investigate affairs of petitioner / company-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nTariq Iqbal Malik v. Messrs Multiplierz Group (Pvt.) Ltd. and 4 others 2022 CLD 468; Brothers Steel Ltd. and others v. Mian Mirajuddin and 15 others PLD 1995 SC 320 and Mian Miraj Din and others v. Brothers Steel Mills and others 1996 CLC 516 ref.\n(c) Words and phrases-\n-Punctuation mark semicolon (;) -Purpose and applicability- Semicolon is used to separate consecutive phrases or clauses independent of each other grammatically but dependent alike on some word preceding or following.\nWords and Phrases Volume 38B rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=257(1),256(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.77742 of 2023, decided on 3rd June, 2024, heard on: 3rd June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Abid Aziz Sheikh, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Rasheed Ghouri for Petitioners.\nSyed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondent No.1.\nRuman Bilal for Respondents Nos.2 to 6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs FUTURE VISION ADVERTISING (PRIVATE) LIMITED-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25329", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4280 = 2024 SLD 4280 = 2024 CLD 900", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTk", - "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-\n-S. 118-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, R. 2(2)-Suit for recovery on the basis of three cheques-Negotiable instrument-Presumption of truth-Scope-Application for leave to defend, acceptance of-Effect-Onus of proof-Plaintiff impugned the judgment passed by the Trial Court as his suit was partially decreed-Held, that provisions of S. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and O. XXXVII, R. 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, indicate that statutory presumption is attached with a negotiable instrument-Such presumption operates in favour of plaintiff unless and until leave to defend is granted-Where the Court, seized with such a suit, refuses leave to defend or where a defendant fails to fulfill a condition attached to a leave granting order or fails to apply within the prescribed time for leave to defend, then the Court shall decree the suit without any further proof of the suit on the basis of statutory presumption under S. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881-However, where the very execution of instrument is denied and leave is granted by the Court, then the said initial presumption in favour of plaintiff would not arise-In such a case, the mode of disposal of the suit from summary would convert to ordinary regular form of suit-In such circumstances the consideration for discharging the burden of proof would be the same as in an ordinary civil suit pending before a Civil Court-In the present case, after grant of leave to defend, appellants predecessor submitted written- statement and denied execution as well as consideration of three cheques, sued upon-Therefore, the burden of proof of the execution of cheques by appellant predecessor as well as consideration was upon the appellant-Appellant produced the official witnesses who merely produced the record of impugned cheques and dishonor slips and he had not led any evidence to prove that indeed the impugned cheques were executed towards fulfillment of an obligation or towards consideration-Appellants own statement, without proof of consideration independently through concrete evidence, was not sufficient to prove his claim-Since, the appellant failed to discharge burden of proof, therefore, the burden did not shift upon the shoulders of defendants/respondents to disproof in rebuttal as the same would not make any difference-Defendants in evidence denied execution of the impugned cheques as well as the consideration mentioned therein-Thus, the Trial Court had misinterpreted S. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and was wrong in placing the onus of proof of relevant issue on the defendants-High Court set-aside the impugned judgment being not sustainable in law; resultantly, suit instituted by the appellant was dismissed-Appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed with costs of Rs. 50,000/- and costs of proceedings.\nSyed Haider Aabdi v. Syed Javed Aabdi 1986 MLD 2298; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Ali Mohtaram Naqvi PLD 1987 Kar. 102 and Muhammad Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Liaquat Ali 2007 CLD 1542 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=118Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2(2)", - "Case #": "R.F.As. Nos. 22 and 33 of 2021, decided on 27th March, 2023, heard on: 13th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Zaheer-ud-Din Kakar and Gul Hassan Tareen, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shabbir Sherani and Khalil Ahmed for Appellant (in Regular First Appeal No. 22 of 2021).\nAdnan Ejaz Sheikh for Respondents (in Regular First Appeal No. 22 of 2021).\nAdnan Ejaz Sheikh for Appellants (in Regular First Appeal No. 33 of 2021).\nShabbir Sherani and Khalil Ahmed for Respondent (in Regular First Appeal No. 33 of 2021).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed MUHAMMAD ZAHIR and others-Appellants\nVersus\nMrs. SHAHNAZ AKHTAR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25330", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4281 = 2024 SLD 4281 = 2024 CLD 917", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Commercial Courts Ordinance (XIX of 2021) [since repealed]-\n-S. 3-High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Volume-I, Chap-1, Part-K, R. 10-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 202 & 203-Commercial Courts, function of-Scope-Punjab Commercial Courts Ordinance, 2021, [since repealed]-Effect-Petitioners/defendants sought revision of order (dated 31.05.2023) passed by the Civil Judge 1st Class (Special Court for Commercial Cases), Lahore, whereby suit for recovery of Rs.851,170,923/- along with specific performance of contract filed by respondents/plaintiffs was considered as commercial case-Plea of the petitioners/defendants was that the Civil Judge had acted contrary to the mandate of Rule 10, Part-K, Chapter-1, Volume-I of the Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court, Lahore (the Rule 10) as said R. 10 could not operate in vacuum unsupported by any law as the Punjab Commercial Courts Ordinance, 2021 (the Ordinance 2021), which was promulgated on 13.04.2021, stood repealed on 12.06.2021 while suit-in-question was instituted (on 14.09.2022) after more than one year of the Ordinance, 2021 being repealed-Validity-In order to secure expeditious disposal of cases of commercial nature, the Lahore High Court vide its Notification No.6032 DDJ/DR(PD & IT) dated 28.04.2020 (the Notification) designated a few courts of Additional District and Sessions Judge and Civil Judges at couple of stations entrusting the work of commercial cases pertaining to their districts to the Judicial Officers already dealing with the cases of Overseas Pakistanis-Rule 10, Part-K, Chapter-1, Volume-I of Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, provides that commercial cases should be disposed of as speedily as practicable, which are to include cases arising out of ordinary transactions of merchants, bankers and traders-Said notification also did not show that the courts were being designated as Commercial Courts in accordance with the Ordinance, 2001-Therefore, it was quite clear that the subject notification was issued on 28.04.2020 prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance, 2001 and its repeal had no legal effect upon functioning of the Commercial Courts-Even as per said R. 10, a plaintiff or appellant may apply at the time of preliminary hearing or by subsequent application before the final hearing thereof to have its case classed as commercial case-Petitioners had not been able to point out any prejudice being caused to them because of hearing and adjudication of the case-in-question by the Civil Judge designated as Commercial Court-Thus courts designated to hear cases of commercial nature were functioning in accordance with the C.P.C. and the Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court under its superintendence and control within the scope of Arts. 202 & 203 of the Constitution-High Court did not find any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order warranting interference in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction-Civil revision, being devoid of any merit, was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 202 & 203-High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, framing of-High Court, powers of-Scope-High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders have been framed by the Lahore High Court in accordance with Art. 202 of the Constitution that empowers it to do so subject to the Constitution-Article 203 of the Constitution envisages that each High Court shall supervise and control all courts subordinate to it with the object to establish orderly, honorable, upright, impartial and legally correct administration of justice-Supervision and control over the subordinate judiciary vested in the High Courts under Art. 203 of the Constitution is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation.\nMessrs Shaheen Air International Ltd. (SAI) and others v. Messrs Voyage De Air and others 2006 SCMR 1684 and Sh. Liaqat Hussain and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1999 SC 504 ref.\n(c) Punjab Commercial Courts Ordinance (XIX of 2021) [since repealed]-\n-S. 3-Notification No.6032 DDJ/DR(PD & IT) dated 28.04.2020 issued by the Lahore High Court-Commercial Courts, functioning of-Scope-Punjab Commercial Courts Ordinance, 2021 [since repealed]-Effect-Petitioner/defendant sought revision of order (dated 31.05.2023) passed by the Civil Judge 1st Class (Special Court for Commercial Cases), Lahore, whereby suit for recovery (of Rs.851,170,923/-) along with specific performance of contract filed by respondents/plaintiffs was considered as a commercial case-Held, that contention of the petitioners that Commercial Courts were established pursuant to the promulgation of the Punjab Commercial Courts Ordinance, 2021 and the year of issuance of the Notification No.6032 DDJ/DR(PD & IT) [dated 28.04.2020 issued by the Lahore High Court] was 2021 instead of 2020, was apparently based on a misconception inasmuch as the official website of the Lahore High Court still showed the same notification dated as 28.04.2020; and a judgment of High Court in the case reported as M.C.R. (Pvt.) Ltd. Franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority and others (2021 CLD 639) rendered on 08.03.2021 relied on the same notification having the date as 28.04.2020-Civil revision, being devoid of any merit was dismissed, in circumstances.\nM.C.R. (Pvt.) Ltd. Franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority and others 2021 CLD 639 ref.\n(d) Punjab Commercial Courts Ordinance (XIX of 2021) [since repealed]-\n-S. 3-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A-Jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, exercise of-Scope-Courts of ordinary civil jurisdiction have been designated to hear and dispose of the commercial cases which are dealing with the same in accordance with the procedure provided under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with the sole object to ensure expeditious disposal of the same on priority basis-Thus, for all practicable purposes all courts designated as Commercial Courts under the Notification No.6032 DDJ/DR(PD & IT) dated 28.04.2020 issued by the Lahore High Court are essentially Civil Courts exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for expeditious disposal of civil disputes-By considering a case as commercial one, the right of fair trial available to the opposite party is not being compromised since no special procedure has been laid down to dispose of the same.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Commercial Courts Ordinance, 2021=3Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=202,203", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 54865 of 2023, decided on 3rd May, 2024, heard on: 6th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Raheel Kamran, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "S. Naeem Bokhari and Ijaz Janjua for Petitioners.\nBarrister Hassan Khalid Ranjha, Additional Advocate General for Punjab.\nAsad Ahmed Ghani and Muhammad Rizwan Rasheed for Respondents Nos.1 and 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHINA HARBOUR ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD. and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nZ. Z. ENTERPRISES and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25331", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4282 = 2024 SLD 4282 = 2024 CLD 925", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUXo", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss.2 (c) & 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 47 & O.XXI, R.23A-Execution proceedings-Money decree-Objection to jurisdiction of Trial Court-Customer and banker-Scope-Decretal amount, non-deposit of-Effect-Respondent / decree holder due to some dispute with appellant / judgment debtor bank filed suit before Civil Court-During execution proceedings, appellant / judgment debtor bank without deposit of decretal amount filed objection petition to maintainability of suit before Civil Court instead of Banking Court-Objection filed by appellant / judgment debtor bank was dismissed by Executing Court-Validity-Respondent / decree holder being the investor in appellant / judgment debtor bank by way of purchase of Term Deposit Certificates, could not be termed as a person to whom finance had been extended by financial institution-Respondent / decree holder was also not a person on whose behalf appellant / judgment debtor bank issued any guarantee or letter of credit-Respondent / decree holder did not fall in the definition of customer and therefore he could not have knocked at the door of Banking Court-High Court declined to interfere in dismissal of objection petition as it was ill-conceived, and requisite decretal amount was also not deposited-Although a surety bond had subsequently been submitted in pursuance to an order passed by High Court but at the time of passing order in question neither the amount had been deposited nor surety bond was executed and on such score objection petition was also not maintainable-High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Executing Court as there was no illegality or material irregularity-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nF.A.O No.49 of 2008 and Irshad Mashi v. Emmanuel Masih 2014 SCMR 1481 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(c),9Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=47,23A", - "Case #": "F.A.O No.133-P of 2022 with C.M. No.152-P of 2024, decided on 13th April, 2024, heard on: 8th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Wiqar Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kashif Zaman along with Mehmooda Gul, Litigation Officer for Appellants.\nIssac Ali Qazi, Maqsood Ali and Khushnuma for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others-Appellants\nVersus\nMessrs PREMIER SUGAR MILLS AND DISTILLERY COMPANY, MARDAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25332", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4283 = 2024 SLD 4823 = 2024 CLD 931", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDUXk", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss.122, 125 & 127-Insurance claim-Determination-Ombudsman, jurisdiction of-Petitioner / Insurance company was aggrieved of order passed by Insurance Ombudsman on complaint filed by respondent / insurer-Validity-Controversy between petitioner / company and respondent / insurer involved disputed questions of fact, which required recording of evidence-Delay in providing report of Surveyor was made good and the same was provided but it was about payment of insurance amount that was in dispute-Petitioner / company refused claim of respondent / insurer and such matter could only be resolved by way of recording evidence-High Court set aside order passed by Insurance Ombudsman who had no jurisdiction in the matter and appropriate forum was Insurance Tribunal constituted under S. 125 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.\nMessrs Capital Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and 4 others 2013 CLD 1075; Atlas Insurance Limited v. Federal Insurance and others (W.P. No.23312 of 2014); Shafaatullah Qureshi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 142; Regional Manager, Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Lahore and 3 others 2012 CLD 846; Judicial Review of Public Actions by Justice Fazal Karim P.128 PLD 1975 SC 49; Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 1445; Dr. Zahid Javed v. Dr. Tahir Riaz Chaudhry and others PLD 2016 SC 637; Habib Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2022 CLD 769; Mst. Parveen Akhtar v. Subash Chandar and others 2016 MLD 1596 and United Bank Limited through Manager v. Banking Mohtasib Pakistan and another 2006 CLD 1226 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122,125,127", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2553 of 2020, decided on 31st May, 2024, heard on: 17th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Aamer Farooq, CJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Ibrahim for Petitioner.\nM. Irfan Zafar Hashmi for Respondent No.3.\nAzmat Bashir Tarar, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The MD /CEO UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LIMITED, LAHORE-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN through Director (Legal), President's Secretariat (Public), Islamabad and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25333", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4284 = 2024 SLD 4284 = 2024 CLD 938", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S.20 (4)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R. 11(a)-Term sufficient cause -Scope-Term sufficient cause used in S. 20(4) of Arbitration Act, 1940, is alike and akin to phrase where it does not disclose a cause of action used in R.11(a) of O.VII, C.P.C.-This is one of the grounds for rejection of plaint recognized by said provision of law-Proceedings in terms of S. 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940, are though in the nature of proceedings in a suit but in strict sense it is not a suit-When such application is moved a show-cause notice is to be issued to all the parties to the agreement requiring them to explain why agreement should not be filed-If sufficient cause is not shown to the contrary, the agreement is ordered to be filed.\nLahore Stock Exchange Limited v. Fredrick J. Whyte Group (Pakistan) Ltd. and others PLD 1990 SC 48 rel.\n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S.20-Arbitration-Reference to arbitrator-Scope-Application under S. 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940 cannot be resisted on the ground that agreement has become void-Such is a premature step to stifle arbitration clause.\nAbdul Waheed v. Additional District Judge and others PLD 2021 Lah. 453 distinguished.\n(c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S. 20-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2-Arbitration clause, invoking of-Termination of agreement-Interim injunction, grant of-Petitioner/Foundation was aggrieved of referring the matter between parties to arbitrator in view of arbitration clause and issuance of interim injunction in favour of respondent/land developer-Plea raised by petitioner / Foundation was that agreement between the parties was terminated while invoking arbitration clause in the agreement-Validity-Termination of contract by itself did not render arbitration clause redundant-Even in case of termination of contract by one of the parties, matter could still be referred to the arbitrators by the Court in terms of S. 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940-Temporary injunction was rightly granted in favour of respondent / land developer subject to deposit of remaining sale consideration in toto in the Court, which was so deposited-For grant of temporary injunction one has to show existence of prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss-Respondent/land developer remained successful in such test-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the order passed by Trial Court-Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.\n \nIndustrial Fabrication Company through M.D. v. Managing Director, Pak American Fertilizer Limited PLD 2015 SC 154 and Samsons Group of Companies v. Panther Developers and others 2022 CLD 932 distinguished.\nMessrs Sadat Business Group Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and another 2013 CLD 1451; BNP (Pvt.) Limited v. Collier International Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited 2016 CLC 1772 and Messrs Petrosin Products (Pvt.) Limited through Representative and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Privatization Commission of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others 2000 MLD 785 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=20(4)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=11(a)", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.90 of 2023, decided on 13th May, 2024. Dates of hearing: 29th January and 13th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mirza Viqas Rauf, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Usman Jillani and Waseem Sultan Doga for Appellant.\nMuhammad Ilyas Sheikh and Sh. Danyal Iftikhar for Respondent No.1.\nImran Shaukat Rao, Assistant Advocate General Punjab for Respondents Nos.2(a) to 2(k).", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY FOUNDATION (NCAF) through Authorized Officer Col. (R) Muhammad Sabir-Appellant\nVersus\nSheikh SAROSH IFTIKHAR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25334", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4285 = 2024 SLD 4285 = 2024 CLD 990", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTTY", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S. 34-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54-Suit for declaration, injunction, rendition of accounts, recovery of damages and mesne profit-Arbitration-Stay of legal proceedings-Phrase taking any other steps in the proceedings -Applicability-Appellant / defendant was aggrieved of dismissal of his application to stay legal proceedings so as to refer the matter to arbitration-Validity-If in a contract, there is provision of resolution of dispute between the parties by way of arbitration and parties have agreed to such forum, then such forum is to be resorted to and given preference over filing of suit-If one of the parties to the contract by-passing forum of arbitration files a suit, then the other party can file application for stay as contemplated under S.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 and if Trial Court is satisfied then order for stay of proceedings in the suit can be passed to enable resolution of dispute between the parties by way of arbitration only-Conditions precedent for application under S.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 are that the party applying for stay has not filed written statement or taken any other steps in the proceedings indicating that right to invoke arbitration clause is intentionally abandoned in favour of Court proceedings-Nothing was available over surface of record to construe that conduct of appellant / defendant, in order to be termed as a step in the proceedings , was such as would manifestly had displayed an unequivocal intention to proceed with the suit and giving up right to have the matter disposed of by arbitration-High Court set aside order in question as the same was passed by Trial Court in disregard of parameters and criteria for test laid down by the Supreme Court for ascertainment and determination of act of appellant / defendant in order to be termed as a step in the proceedings -High Court remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh on application under S.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nPakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Messrs Pak Saaf Dry Cleaners PLD 1981 SC 553; Pakistan Stone Development Company Limited through Chief Executive Officer v. Muhammad Yousaf and another 2018 CLC 877; Province of Punjab through Secretary to Government of Punjab, Communication and Works Department and 4 others 1986 CLC 2800; MD. ESACK v. Raja Miah and another PLD 1969 Dacca 719; Muhammad Farooq v. Nazir Ahmad and others PLD 2006 SC 196; Muhammad Ilyas Khokhar v. Ihsan Ilahi Mughal 2000 CLC 206; Muneer Flour Mills (Private) Limited and 4 others v. National Bank of Pakistan through Chief Manager and 2 others 2005 CLD 1019; Government of the Punjab and others v. Messrs Muhammad Asad & Co. 2021 CLC 2135; Aftab Ahmad Khan and another v. Wazir Ahmad and 4 others 2014 CLC 1401; Union of India, Applicant v. Girish Ghandra and others, Opposite Party AIR 1953 ALL. 149 (Vol.40, C.N. 66); Abdul Quddoos Dost Mohammad Momin and another, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Abdul Ghani Abdul Rahman and another, Defendants-Respondents AIR 1954 NAGPUR 332; (Vol. 41, C. N. 115); Messrs SGEC-AMC JV through Authorized Officer v. National Highway Authority through Chairman 2024 CLD 301; BNP (Pvt.) Limited v. Collier International Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited 2016 CLC 1772; Karachi Dock Labour Board v. Messrs Quality Builders Ltd. PLD 2016 SC 121; National Highway Authority through Chairman, Islamabad v. Messrs SAMBU Construction Co. Ltd. Islamabad and others 2023 SCMR 1103 and TAISEI Corporation and another v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=34Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.88 of 2023, heard on 7th May, 2024, heard on: 7th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jawad Hassan", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qazi M. Waqas Arif and Syeda Nida Zahra for Appellant.\nSameed Khalid for Respondents.\nArshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General with Barrister Sibah Farooq. Abid Aziz Rajori, Assistant Advocate General, Zarmeenah Rahim, Syed Bulent Sohail, Arbitrator.\nBarrister Talha Ilyas Sheikh, MCIArb.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAQAS YAQUB-Petitioner\nVersus\nADEEL YAQUB and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25335", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4286 = 2024 SLD 4286 = 2024 CLD 956", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTTU", - "Key Words:": "Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)-\n-S.11-Employee of a private bank-Service appeal-State Bank of Pakistan, jurisdiction of-Appellant was dismissed from service and her appeal was not entertained by State Bank of Pakistan-Validity-State Bank of Pakistan did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide service matters of employees of banks-Where jurisdiction was not vested by law, Courts could not confer such jurisdiction on any authority-Jurisdiction could not be conferred by parties even by consent-Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court as there was no illegality, jurisdictional defect or mis-reading of record and was well reasoned-Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nNoor Badshah v. United Bank Limited and others 2015 PLC (C.S.) 468; MCB Bank Limited v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2010 CLD 338; Eden Builders (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2022 SCMR 2044; Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman, WAPDA and 4 others v. Abdul Shakoor through Legal Heirs PLD 2008 Lah. 175; Mall Development (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Waleed Khanzada and others 2022 SCMR 2080; Attaullah Khan v. Ali Azam Afridi and others 2021 SCMR 1979; Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi PLD 2018 SC 189; The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons 2017 SCMR 1427; Shahida Bibi and others v. Habib Bank Limited and others 2016 CLD 2025 (SC) = PLD 2016 SC 995; Muhammad Anwar and others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum and others PLD 2013 SC 255; Zia Ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed Hussain and others 2014 SCMR 1015; Khalil-ur-Rehman and another v. Dr. Manzoor Ahmed and others PLD 2011 SC 512 and Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Zainab Bibi 2007 SCMR 1086 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962=11", - "Case #": "I.C.A. No.18654 in W.P. No.12119 of 2023, decided on 20th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Ch. Muhammad Iqbal and Muzamil Akhtar Shabir, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nadeem Ahmad Sheikh for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. ASMA ABDUL WARIS-Appellant\nVersus\nSTATE BANK OF PAKISTAN through its Governor and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25336", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4287 = 2024 SLD 4287 = 2024 CLD 965", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 (a) & 22-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 21 & 42-Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss. 32 & 33-Suit for recovery of finance and declaration-Contractual liability-Arbitration clause, non-invoking of-Effect-Appellant / customer filed suit to recover finance amount from insurance company on account of damages caused to pledged goods due to flood whereas respondent / bank filed suit for recovery of finance facility-Trial Court decreed suit filed by respondent / bank while dismissed that of appellant / customer-Validity-As per insurance policy if any difference had arisen as to amount of loss or damage, such difference was to be referred to decision of an arbitrator to be appointed in writing by parties in difference-Appellant / customer instead of invoking arbitration clause filed suit which was otherwise barred under S.12 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 and Ss. 32 & 33 of Arbitration Act, 1940-Suit filed by respondent / bank was verified on oath and supported by all necessary documents including statements of account, loan application, agreement of loan, undertaking by appellant / customer, power of attorney, mutation for mortgage property and other relevant documents which were duly signed / attested as required under the law-Suit was covered within the definition of S. 9(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Respondent / bank complied with the requirements of Ss. 9(2) & (3) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-High Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by Banking Court as there was no misreading or non-reading of evidence nor there were glaring illegalities or irregularities-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court, Sibi Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9(a),22Specific Relief Act, 1877=21,42Arbitration Act, 1940=32,33", - "Case #": "High Courts Appeals No.(S) 01 of 2011 and 02 of 2013, decided on 21st September, 2017, heard on: 6th September, 2017.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ejaz Swati and Abdullah Baloch, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Talat Waheed for Appellant.\nSyed Akram Shah for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHOUSIA RICE MILLS through Proprietor-Appellant\nVersus\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25337", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4288 = 2024 SLD 4288 = 2024 CLD 975", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Marine Insurance Act (V of 2018)-\n-S. 2(D)-Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013), S.18-Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000), Ss. 130, 122 & 118-Marine Insurance contract-Insurance matters-Principle of indemnity and doctrine of subrogation -Insurance claim after availing loss-Maintainability-Question was whether or not , the petitioner /insured after receiving the compensation of the loss occurred from the shipping company, was entitled to insurance claim-Held, that Marine Insurance has been defined in S. 2(D) of the Marine Insurance Act, 2018, as Marine Insurance means a contract whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured in manner and to the extent thereby agreed against marine loses that is to say, the loses incidental to marine adventure -In insurance matters, the principle of indemnity is the cardinal principle and the doctrine of the subrogation is relevant-For subrogation it is said that the insurer is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the insured and not to a contribution from other insurers where he has paid the whole of the loss or more than his proportionate share of it-Insured is entitled to a sum that would practically restore it to the same financial condition as before the damage-Insurance company can recover the amount paid to the insured as it has already compensated the insured-Insurance contract, particularly Marine Insurance Contract, is always a contract of indemnity and indemnity alone and the only purpose is to return the insured to the same position as he was prior to the loss-Principle of indemnity in insurance contract does not permit double compensation and particularly a marine insurance is a contract of personal indemnity and not a contract from which profit can be realized-Even otherwise the insurance loss is the financial damage one suffers due to insurable event and if the same is compensated, the insured is not entitled to ask for the double benefit-In the present case, admittedly, the insured (petitioner) had already been compensated by the shipping company (respondent), and had received $35,000 way back i.e. after about two and half months of filing of complaint before the Insurance Ombudsman-Said compensation of the loss to the petitioner was paid on the written request of the petitioner, which was made about four months before filing said complaint-Therefore, the petitioner who had already been compensated is not entitled to ask for insurance claim, keeping in view the principle of indemnity and doctrine of subrogation -Even, the complaint/grievance petition before the Federal Insurance Ombudsman filed by the petitioner was dismissed on account of payment/compensation already having been made to the complainant-Insurance petition was dismissed on ground of principle of indemnity.\nCastellain v. Preston and others (1881-85) All Er Rep 493; AIR 1997 SC 2871; Mission National Insurance Company, Plaintiff v. Lowell M. Schulman, Schulman Investment Company, and United Organics Corporation, Defendants 659 F. Supp 270 (1986) and Burnand v. Rodocanachi (2) (7App Cas at p 330) ref.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 130 & 122-Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013), S. 18-Complaint before the Insurance Ombudsman, dismissal / rejection of-Insurance petition before the Insurance Tribunal-Maintainability-Doctrine of election of remedy-Scope-Although in order to curb the multiplicity of the litigation/proceedings, the doctrine of election of remedy is applied but S. 130(4) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, provides that a complainant is not prevented from filing of suit against an insurance company even if his complaint has been rejected by the Federal Insurance Ombudsman-Thus, in the present case, insurance petition was maintainable.\n(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-Art. 86(b)-Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000), S.122-Insurance petition, filing of-Limitation-Petitioner (insured) had itself admitted in relevant para of the insurance petition that the cause of action occurred on 30.04.2017, whereas, the present petition was filed on 19.12.2020 i.e. after more than three and half years of accrual of cause of action-Article 86(b) of the Limitation Act, 1908, was applicable in the present case which provides limitation of three years from the date of occurrence of cause of action-Petitioner, in the insurance petition, had not given any explanation for the said delay nor any record was presented to meet with the objection raised by the respondent/insurance company-Insurance petition was dismissed being time-barred.\nRobina Bibi v. State Life Insurance 2013 CLD 477; 2006 MLD 619; 2006 MLD 622 and PLD 2018 SC 828 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Appellate Tribunal Punjab", - "Law and Sections:": "Marine Insurance Act, 2018=2(D)Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reform Act, 2013=18Insurance Ordinance, 2000=130,122,118", - "Case #": "Insurance Petition No.273 of 2022, decided on 22nd March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Justice (Retd.) Ali Akbar Qureshi, Chairman and Zafar Iqbal Tarar, Member Legal", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Rana for Petitioner.\nMuhammd Ali Farooq for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WIRE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY LTD.through Authorized Officer-Petitioner\nVersus\nHABIB INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25338", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4289 = 2024 SLD 4289 = 2024 CLD 985", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFDTSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969) [Since repealed]-\n-Ss. 2(1)(cc), 2(1)(da), 3(1) & 22-Commodity Futures Contracts, trading in-Proof-Evidence, deficiency of-Appellant (former partner of the firm dealing in Oil Seed Cake) was penalized by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) on allegation of operating as an Exchange for trading of future contracts-Held, that the evidence relied upon by the respondent/Commission was inadequate for arriving at the conclusion that the appellant was involved in the alleged acts of operating as an Exchange for trading of futures contracts-Respondent / Commission interpreted the contents of a constitutional petition having been filed by the appellant before the High Court in a certain manner and the respondent / Commission treated it as an admission by the appellant that he was running such an Exchange -Moreover, respondent /Commission was unable to interrogate the appellant or find sufficient evidence in terms of any witnesses, bank statements or any other document to support his conclusion as per the impugned order-The standardized document provided by the respondent / Commission , purported to be the form/receipt used by the appellant as record for futures contract, was not reliable evidence; the appellant denied any association with the said form/receipt; and the said document did not mention any particulars of a trade or parties involved or any entity acting as an Exchange -Appellate Bench set-aside the impugned order passed by the Commission-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\n(b) Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969) [Since repealed]-\n-Ss.2(1)(cc), 2(1)(da), 3(1), 20 & 22-Commodity Futures Contracts, trading in-Proof-Evidence, deficiency of-Appellant (former partner of firm dealing in Oil Seed Cake) was penalized by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) on allegation of operating as an Exchange for trading of future contracts-Held, that the Show Cause Notice (SCN), in so far as it related to the appellant and the consequent order, suffered from serious defects-The level of scrutiny, application of mind and due diligence expected from a public sector functionary were clearly lacking-Operating as an Exchange without registration in terms of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, is different from undertaking day to day activity in connection with the specific business which in the present case was trading of Oil Cakes by the firm-Moreover, the respondent/Commission , apart from a template receipt, failed to produce any document or evidence on the basis of which it could be established that the appellant, as a partner in the firm, was involved in the trading of futures contracts-Instead sole reliance for issuance of the SCN was a complaint and the complainant never appeared in any of the hearings or shared his personal testimony to pursue the present matter-Department must reflect on its order and ensure that cognizance of a matter must be backed by sound interpretation of law and should be corroborated with reasonable and reliable evidence and not on the basis of surmises and conjectures-Appellate Bench set-aside the impugned order passed by the Commission-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=2(1)(cc),2(1)(da),3(1),22", - "Case #": "Appeal No.27 of 2011, decided on 18th March, 2024, heard on: 12th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Aamir Khan, Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haq Nawaz Chattha, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nHmmad Javed, Additional Director, Additional-I, SECP.\nRaja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I SECP.\nMuhammad Faisal, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.\nNemo for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD LATIF-Appellant\nVersus\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25339", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4375 = 2024 SLD 4375 = 2024 PTCL 658 = 2025 PTCL 20", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUTY", - "Key Words:": "Execution of Tribunal Orders – Jurisdiction of the Tribunal vs. Writ Jurisdiction\nDetails:\nThe petitioner filed a writ petition seeking execution of an order passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal. The key issue was whether the Tribunal had the power to execute its own orders or if the petitioner needed to invoke the High Court’s writ jurisdiction.\nThe Court noted that the Customs Act, 1969, does not explicitly provide for the Tribunals power to execute its own orders. However, applying established principles of statutory interpretation, it held that when a statute grants jurisdiction or a substantive power to a Tribunal, it also implies the authority to take all necessary steps to make that power effective. Citing precedents, the Court reaffirmed that courts and tribunals inherently possess incidental and ancillary powers necessary for enforcing their decisions.\nUnder Sections 194-A and 194-B of the Customs Act, the Tribunal exercises appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, it must also have the implied power to execute its own orders; otherwise, its substantive power would be rendered ineffective. Consequently, the petitioner was directed to approach the Tribunal for execution rather than invoking the High Court’s writ jurisdiction.\nHeld:\nThe Court upheld the High Courts dismissal of the writ petition, stating that since the Tribunal has the power to execute its own orders, the petitioner must seek remedy before the Tribunal. Leave to appeal was declined.\nCitations:\n•\nAli Sher Sarki (Principle of implied powers)\n•\nMaxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes (Doctrine of necessary implication)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Customs Act, 1969=194-A,194-B", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3391 of 2024, decided on 9th August, 2024.\n(Against order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 28.06.2024 passed in W.PNo. 20130/2024).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MR. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH AND MR. JUSTICE MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Abdul Rehman Khan, ASC, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR.\nRespondents by: Raja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, DAG, Saleem Ahmed Malik, Superintendant Customs Enforcement, Lahore Huriya Fatima, Legal Advisor, FBR Waheed Iqbal Bhatti, Inspector. Mr. Nadeem Mehmood Mian, ASC (for private respondent) (From Lahore via video-link).", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHALID ALIAS MUHAMMAD KHALID AND OTHERS.\nVS \nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION), CUSTOM HOUSE, LAHORE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25340", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4376 = 2024 SLD 4376 = 2024 PTCL 665", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUTU", - "Key Words:": "INCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 (XLIX OF 2001)-Sections 153 & 161-The assessing officer has erred in law to pass the order under Section 161 by considering the appellant as a “Prescribed Person” under Section 153(7) ignoring the amended provisions of clause (j) of Section 153(7).~From bare perusal of clause (j) of sub-section (7) of section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, it becomes clear and obvious that a person registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 having turnover of one hundred million rupees or more in any of the preceding tax years is a prescribed person (withholding agent for the purposes of withholding tax under section 153) and shall, at the time of making the payment, deduct tax from the gross amount payable (including sales tax, if any) at the rate specified in Division-Ill of Part-Ill of the First Schedule however, in the instant case, the assessing officer has erred in law to pass the order under section 161 by considering the appellant as a “Prescribed Person” under section 153(7) of the Ordinance, 2001 ignoring the amended provisions of clause (j) of section 153(7) of the Ordinance. Perusal of the record produced before us clearly reveal that sales of the appellant were below the threshold of Rs. 100 Million in any of the preceding tax years therefore, the appellant does not fall in the definition of “prescribed person”. Since, turnover of the appellant remained below the threshold of one hundred million rupees to become a ‘prescribed person therefore, neither the appellant was a withholding agent nor legally required to deduct tax under section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nSince, turnover of the appellant remained below the threshold of one hundred million rupees to become a ‘prescribed person’ therefore, neither the appellant was a withholding agent nor legally required to deduct tax under Section 153.\nSections 161 & 205\nThe assessing officer has acted illegally in making exparte assessment on a date which was not fixed for hearing without furnishing the taxpayer with requisite hearing notice.- After perusal of the assessment order, there is no denial on the part of the learned DR that notice for hearing was given on 19-09-2022 for 28-09-2022 while the exparte assessment was framed on 29-09-2022 which in our opinion is not legally sustainable. The exparte assessment was made on 29-09-2022 which is the date when neither case was fixed for hearing nor any notice regarding appearance was issued to the taxpayer. The exparte action of the assessing officer was not justified as no notice was given to the taxpayer for a subsequent date on which the assessment order was passed. The assessing officer has acted illegally in making exparte assessment on a date which was not fixed for hearing without furnishing the taxpayer with requisite hearing notice. The finalization of the assessment on the date other than the one fixed for compliance is illegal and not tenable under the law. Since, factum of passing the exparte assessment has been made on a subsequent date qua the defaulted date, therefore, exercise of powers by the assessing officer on 29-09-2022 was not sustainable in law corollary of which would be annulment of the assessment order.\nThe finalization of the assessment on the date other than the one fixed for compliance is illegal and not tenable under the law.\nFactum of passing the exparte assessment has been made on a subsequent date qua the defaulted date, therefore, exercise of powers by the assessing officer on 29-09-2022 was not sustainable in law corollary of which would be annulment of the assessment order.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153,161", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 5258/LB/2023, decided on 12th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MR. RIZWAN AHMAD URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Rao Shahzad, (DR).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AMIN, LYALLPUR TOWN, FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR (WITHHOLDING ZONE), RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25341", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4377 = 2024 SLD 4377 = 2024 PTCL 672", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, 1973-Article 25 - Vacating the show cause notice in one case and taking action against another person in similar situation, amounts to discrimination which is hit by the Article 25.—We have noted that in similar situation, the DCIR, RTO, Faisalabad has also vacated the show cause notice and deleted penalty of one million rupees in case of M/s. Mujtaba Saud Textile, Faisalabad vide order-in-original No. 78/2021 therefore, imposition of penalty against the appellant is discrimination. It is now well-settled that vacating the show cause notice in one case and taking action against another person in similar situation, amounts to discrimination which is hit by the Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.\nSALES TAX ACT, 1990 (VII OF 1990)-Section 11- Vacating the show cause notice in one case and taking action against another person in similar situation, amounts to discrimination which is hit by the Article 25.—.See Article 25 o the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. \nSection 33\nThe provisions contain in Section 33 are not charging provisions and arc not provided for the purpose of generating revenue rather the purpose is to ensure compliance of different provisions given in the Statute.—We have found that initially the registered person failed to comply with the provisions regarding integration of the system with FBR however, now the appellant has integrated its point of sale with the Online Computer System of FBR and too appellant has installed point of sales (POS) software duly integrated for monitoring, recording or reporting of sales with the FBR therefore, imposition of penalty is illegal and unlawful. There is no body denying the fact that the provisions contain in section 33 of the Act are not charging provisions and are not provided for the purpose of generating revenue rather the purpose is to ensure compliance of different provisions given in the Statute. The purpose of levying penalty is to deter the assessee from repeating the default in future but it cannot be made as resource of mobilization/revenue generation measure. The penalty provisions are not meant to strangulate a business or to generate revenue. These provisions are to operate only as a deterrence force and their purpose has never been to throw a person out of business.\nThe purpose of levying penalty is to deter the assessee from repeating the default in future but it cannot be made as resource of mobilization/revenue generation measure.\nThe penalty provisions are not meant to strangulate a business or to generate revenue.\nThese provisions are to operate only as a deterrence force and their purpose has never been to throw a person out of business.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25Sales Tax Act, 1990=11", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 2066/LB/2022, decided on 9th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER & MR. RIZWAN AHMAD URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Adrian (DR).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. NEW NATIONAL ELECTRONICS, GOJRA ROAD, SAMMUNDRI, FAISALABAD.\nVS\nTHE CIR (CHENAB ZONE), RTO, FAISALABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25342", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4378 = 2024 SLD 4378 = 2024 PTCL 677", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUS8", - "Key Words:": "INCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 (XLIX OF 2001)-Sections 153, 161 & 205-Second Schedule, Part-IV, Clause 46AA-After the amendment made to Clause 46AA(v) by Finance Act, 2021, the payment against use of System Charges (UoSC) were also exempt from the operation of Section 153 therefore the PESCO being a withholding agent was not required to pay default surcharge for the delayed payment of income tax by the NTDC in terms of Section 161(1B), as amendment was remedial and curative in nature.—The parties are not at dispute that the payment received by the NTDC from PESCO against supply of electricity are exempt from the operation of section 153 of the Ordinance, however, it is the case of the Revenue that since the payment against UoSC were not exempt from the operation of section 153 of the Ordinance, therefore, the PESCO being a withholding agent was required to pay default surcharge for the delayed payment of income tax by the NTDC in terms of section 161(IB) of the Ordinance.\nThe record is clear that the payment by PESCO to NTDC against supply of electricity and UoSC are through different invoices and the amount against both heads are identifiable.\nAdmittedly, for the tax year under consideration, the amendment brought through Finance Act, 2021 whereby the word transmission of electricity has been added to clause 46AA ibid \nwas not available in the taxing statute at the relevant period for which the default surcharge has been claimed by the Revenue.\nIn the present case, for the tax year concerned in terms of clause 46AA(v) ibid, the PESCO was not required to deduct advance tax from payment to NTDC, however, the essential question whether the said exemption is also available against the payment which the PESCO was making for UoSC. It is an admitted position that transmission system of NTDC placed a vital role in supply of electricity and indeed is a tool/instrument through which the energy/electrons passes through and probably for this ambiguity the PESCO has failed to deduct advance tax in terms of section 153 of the Ordinance as the supply of electricity was exempt from the operation of section 153 in terms of clause 46AA ibid. No doubt, as appears from the record the payment against UoSC was separately invoiced, however, the word ‘supply of energy’ is obviously susceptible to two interpretation: one, that under clause 46AA(v) the companies receiving the payment for supply of electricity only were exempt from the operation of section 153 and the other interpretation is that the supply of electricity include both payment against the electricity as well as the UoSC.\nThe amendment brought about through Finance Act, 2021 in our opinion has neither created a different class of exemption but indeed has expanded the exemption from operation of section 153 through clause-46AA which was already available to PESCO for the supply of electricity and the said supply of electricity was given a broader sense by including transmission of electricity, which, thus, had remedied the narrow interpretation of supply of electricity to the transmission of electricity so as to expressly include the UoSC. This amendment is, thus, applicable to the present case as the matter was not past and close transaction but was a pending matter.\nWhen the withholding agent under the bona fide intention belief holds an opinion that it was not liable to deduct tax under Clause 46AA(v) then the matter relating to the imposition of default surcharge can be considered in view of the law laid down in the case of M/s D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. (PICL 2024 CL. 224).-The matter can be viewed\nthrough another angle also as the issue at hand relating to the liability ol withholding agent to deduct advance tax is indeed very complex and it cannot be said that the said non-deduction of tax was the intentional act of the PESCO, therefore, when the withholding agent under the bonafide intention belief holds an opinion that it was not liable to deduct the said tax in view of clause 46AA(v) ibid then the matter relating to the imposition of default surcharge can be considered in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of M/s D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd etc. vs. The Federation of Pakistan etc (PTCL 2004 CL 224).\nThe case of the respondent squarely falls within the law laid down by the Apex Court in D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltds case (supra), therefore, the imposition of default surcharge in terms of section 161(1B) is not legally correct.\nINTERPRETATION OF STATUTE\nFundamental principle of income tax law is that each tax year is a separate unit of account and taxation and the law has to applied as it stood in respect of that tax year alone.\nThe provisions creating a tax liability, must be interpreted strictly and any doubt arising therefrom must be resolved in favour of the taxpayer.\nWhere a provision in a taxing statute can be reasonably interpreted in two ways, that interpretation which is favorable\nto the assessee has to be accepted.\nIf two views are possible, the one favorable to the assessee has to be accepted.\nThe concept of remedial and curative statute.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153,161,161(1B),205", - "Case #": "TR No. 43-P/2022, decided on 11th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE IJAZ ANWAR AND MR. JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocate, along with Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nRespondents by: Mr. Hussain Ahmad Sherazi, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE CORPORATE ZONE, PESHAWAR\nVS\nM/S. PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED, WAPDA HOUSE, PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25343", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4379 = 2024 SLD 4379", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVFTUSs", - "Key Words:": "INCOME TAX ORDINANCE, 2001 (XLIX OF 2001) Section 121-It is trite law that an issue which was not confronted in the show cause notice cannot be made basis for a decision. In our considered view, the assessing officer has not confronted the appellant with disallowance of Rs. 2,961,644/- in the show cause notice which has also been reproduced in the body of impugned order. It is trite law that an issue which was not confronted in the show cause notice cannot be made basis for a decision. The assessing officer cannot go beyond the charge sheet given in the show cause notice. Be that as it may, impugned action of disallowance under the head of cost of goods sold is not sustainable under the law and is hereby deleted being unlawful and unjustified. We respectfully agree with the reported judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of “Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs vs. Rahim Din reported as (1987 SCMR 1840)” which undoubtedly makes it clear that the issue which was not framed in the impugned show cause notice cannot be adjudged through an adjudication and appellate order. \nThe assessing officer cannot go beyond the charge sheet given in the show cause notice.\nThe issue which was not framed in the impugned show cause notice cannot be adjudged through an adjudication and appellate order.\nSection 131\nNo evidence has been brought on record that the impugned appellate order was manually issued and physically served upon the taxpayer. Therefore, when taxpayer has a substantive right of appeal under Section 131 of the Ordinance, 2001, such a right cannot be taken away so lightly merely on some technicalities or procedural lapses whatsoever. In our considered opinion, the learned CIR(A) was bound to serve the appellate order on the taxpayer not only electronically but also manually through registered post, which has not been done so far. Under the law, issuance of notice or order and its service on correct address is a condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction, which means a valid and proper service as required under section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 read with Rule 74 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 and not otherwise. In the instant case, no evidence has been brought on record that the impugned appellate order was manually issued and physically served upon the taxpayer. Therefore, when the taxpayer has a substantive right of appeal under section 131 of the Ordinance, 2001, such a right cannot be taken away so lightly merely on some technicalities or procedural lapses whatsoever. We are of the considered view that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. Further, we added our view that the notion of accrual of valuable right to an adversary after the lapse of limitation in ordinary cases of civil nature is not generally applicable to the matters of revenue. Under these circumstances, we do not feel any hesitation in granting condonation of delay of 174-days in filing of appeal. Resultantly, we hold that as per provisions contained in section 131(2)(d) of the Ordinance, the appeal filed before this ATIR is not haired by time limitation as prescribed in the Ordinance, 2001. Accordingly, application for condonation of delay for filing of appeal is allowed.\nRefusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.\nThe notion of accrual of valuable right to an adversary after the lapse of limitation in ordinary cases of civil nature is not generally applicable to the matters of revenue.\nLearned CIR(A) was bound to serve the appellate order on the taxpayer not only electronically but also manually through registered post, which has not been done so far.\nWe do not feel any hesitation in granting condonation of delay of 174 days in filing of appeal. Resultantly, we hold that as per provisions contained in Section 131(2)(d) of the Ordinance, the appeal filed before this ATIR is not barred by time limitation as prescribed in the Ordinance, 2001.\nSection 153\nThere was no lawful justification for the assessing officer to treat the contractual receipts under normal tax regime instead of final tax regime as declared by the appellant Thus, charging of tax under normal law as meted out by the assessing officer is hereby deleted.-We have given consideration to die assessment order and the records produced by the All we find that appellant provided the copies of tax deposit challans on account of tax deductions under this head and from perusal of the same, it reveals that tax deduction was made u/s 153(1)(c) and duly deposited into government treasury. Therefore, there was no lawful justification for (he assessing officer lo treat the contractual receipts under normal tax regime instead of final tax regime as declared by the appellant. Thus, the charging of tax under normal law as meted out by the assessing officer is hereby deleted.\nSection 218\nSection 218 provides two mandatory modes of service of notice or order etc., that is (1) primary service which always requires personal service on individual; and (2) secondary service which must be either by post, electronic means or other method as prescribed for service of summons under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908).~After perusing the facts of the condonation application, particularly in the light of law and judgments quoted supra, we are of the firm view that the submissions made by the learned AR carries substantial weight and the appellant has sufficient cause as defined in Section 131(4) of the Ordinance, 2001 and within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act for filing of second appeal after lapse of sixty days, mentioned above, for the reason that section 218 provides two mandatory modes of service of notice or order etc., that is (1) primary service which always requires personal service on individual; and (2) secondary service which must be either by post, electronic means or other method as prescribed for service of summons under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908). The law which encompass service of notice/orders has clear mandate which requires its adherence.\nProper service as envisaged in the provision can clearly be assumed only if the primary and substituted modes detailed in clause (a), (b), (c) & (d) of sub-section (1) & (2) of Section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 and are resorted to instantaneously and/or concurrently.- Bare perusal of the above provision of law clearly postulates mode for service of notices and orders, etc. but proper service as envisaged in the provision can clearly be assumed only if the primary and substituted modes detailed in clause (a), (b), (c) & (d) of sub-section (1) & (2) of section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 and are resorted to instantaneously and/or concurrently. The case in hand clearly indicates that no mode of service of order is mentioned in the order of the learned CIR(A). There is nothing on record which suggests the service of the impugned order on the appellant through any mode so prescribed in clause (a), (b) & (c) of sub-section (1) & (2) of section 218 of the Ordinance.\nMere reliance on electronically service/IRIS cannot be deemed to be a service to be treated and equated as proper service in accordance with the law.- Bare perusal of above quoted Rule indicates that service of the documents electronically has been structured in the above referred Rule and the primary modes of services as prescribed and provided in section 218 of the Ordinance. 2001 have not been catered in the Rule referred supra. However, without adverting to language of section 218 of the Ordinance, no adverse presumption as regards proper service can be mounted against the subject merely on the fact that the order has been issued and served. We may observe here that in most of these cases where service through IRIS is opted, there always comes a defense from the subject pleading non-service and/'or alleging absence of ability of vigilance in monitoring the issuance/service of notices/orders served through IRIS. More so, Rule 74 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 also places conditions for reckoning the service as sufficient service if the order is electronically served and these conditions so enumerated in the clause a, b & c of sub-rule 3 of Rule 74 are to be resorted to and complied. In the instant case, no such compliance of section 218 and Rule 74 has been reflected in the record hence, it cannot be presumed that sufficient service has been made as per supra law and Rule. It is not out of context to point out that presumption of service of notice or order cannot be established on record or proved unless simultaneously resort is made to any of the primary modes of service as prescribed in clause (a), (b) & (c) of sub-section (1) & (2) of section 218 of the Ordinance. In the vogue of above referred provisions of law and in the absence of resorting to any of primary mode for service of notice/order, mere reliance on electronically service/IRIS cannot be deemed to be a service to be treated and equated as proper service in accordance with the law. Significantly, if the notices/orders are not sent by resort to primary and substituted modes so prescribed in section 218 of the Ordinance, the plea of non-service is commonly offered as defense which may or may not be accurate yet since exparte proceedings abridges/eclipses aggrieved parties right, the provisions of section 218 are to be construed and applied strictly. Section 21X of the Ordinance, 2001 if read in conjunction with Article 129 of the Qanoon-e-Shahdat Order, 19X4 and section 27 of the General Clause Act makes it abundantly clear that for accredit qua presumption of service of notice/order, service mechanism fundamentally be brought to be in conformity to clause (a), (b) & (c) of sub-section (1) & (2) of section 218 of the Ordinance. Otherwise, notices/orders served only electronically on IRIS cannot alone constitute a proper service in terms of section 218 of the Ordinance and Rule 74 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002. We are of the firm opinion that mere placement of notice or order on the IRIS does not constitute valid service within the meaning of section 218 read with Rule 74 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002.\nMere placement of notice or order on the IRIS does not constitute valid service within the meaning of Section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 read with Rule 74 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002.\nSignificantly, if the notices/orders are not sent by resort to primary and substituted modes so prescribed in section 218 of the Ordinance, the plea of non-service is commonly offered as defense which may or may not be accurate yet since exparte proceedings abridges/eclipses aggrieved parties right, the provisions of Section 218 are to be construed and applied strictly.\nIn the vogue of referred provisions of law and in the absence of resorting to any of primary mode for service of notice/order, mere reliance on electronically service/IRIS cannot be deemed to be a service to be treated and equated as proper service in accordance with the law.\nSection 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 if read in conjunction with Article 129 of the Qanoon-e-Shahdat Order, 1984 and Section 27 of the General Clause Act makes it abundantly clear that for accredit qua presumption of service of notice/order, service mechanism fundamentally be brought to be in conformity to clause (a), (b) & (c) of sub-section (1) & (2) of Section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001.\nWithout adverting to language of Section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001, no adverse presumption as regards proper service can he mounted against the subject merely on the fact that the order has been issued and served.\nPresumption of service of notice or order cannot be established on record or proved unless simultaneously resort is made to any of the primary modes of service as prescribed in clause (a), (b) & (c) of sub-section (1) & (2) of Section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001\nUnder the law, issuance of notice or order and its service on correct address is a condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction, which means a valid and proper service as required under Section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 read with Rule 74 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 and not otherwise.\nThe record shows that notices and order were issued only through IRIS and no manual service of impugned order was issued or served properly which even hinges against the above circular.\nThe learned CIR(A) was bound to serve the appellate order on the taxpayer not only electronically but also manually through registered post, which has not been done so far.\nINCOME TAX RULES, 2002\nRule 74\nRule 74 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 also places conditions for reckoning the service as sufficient service if the order is electronically served and these conditions so enumerated in the clause a, b & c of sub-rule 3 of Rule 74 are to be resorted to and complied.\nIn the instant case, no such compliance of Section 218 and Rule 74 has been reflected in the record hence, it cannot be Presumed that sufficient service has been made as per supra Law and Rule.\nNotices/orders served only electronically on IRIS cannot alone constitute a proper service in terms of section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 and Rule 74 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002.\nIn most of these cases where service through IRIS is opted, there always comes a defense from the subject pleading non-service and/or alleging absence of ability of vigilance in monitoring the issuance/service of notices/orders served through IRIS.\nMere placement of notice or order on the IRIS does not constitute valid service within the meaning of Section 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 read with Rule 74 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121,131(2),153", - "Case #": "M.A.(Condonation) No. 143/LB/2024 & I.T.A. No. 1198/LB/2024, decided on 21st March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASALM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Zubair Khan, Dr.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALEEM GOHAR, FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR (CORPORATE ZONE), RTO, FAISALABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25344", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVF5UTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4577 = 2024 SLD 4577 = 2024 PLJ 661 = 2025 PTD 682", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVF5UTQ", - "Key Words:": "The case pertained to the final determination in anti-dumping duty proceedings and the subsequent issuance of a sunset review notification by the National Tariff Commission ( Commission ). The Court emphasized that a Tribunal or Court must first establish its territorial jurisdiction before proceeding on the merits. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or parties preferences unless the law expressly allows it. In this case, the proceedings were linked to matters already under appeal before the Tribunal and the Islamabad High Court. Therefore, the Lahore High Court held that it lacked jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.\nHeld:\nPetition was allowed; the impugned notice lacked jurisdiction as the matter fell under the domain of the Islamabad High Court.\nCitations:\n2008 SCMR 240\n2011 SCMR 743\n2005 SCMR 1388\nPLD 1995 SC 66\nPLD 2024 SC 610", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 3965 of 2023, decided on 28.6.2024, heard on: 28.6.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mirza Viqas Rauf, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Shafqat Mehmood Chohan and Adnan Ahmed Paracha, Advocates for Petitioners.\nMr. Tahir Raheel Awan, Assistant Attorney General Pakistan.\nMr. Waqas Amir, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.\nM/s. Saif Ullah Khan and Rais Mehmood Ali, Advocates for Respondent No. 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. MADNI PAPER MART and another-Petitioners\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Commerce and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25345", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVF5STY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4595 = 2024 SLD 4595 = (2024) 130 TAX 521 = 2025 PTD 260 = 2025 PTCL 209", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVF5STY", - "Key Words:": "Refund Application and Classification Dispute under the Customs Act, 1969\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nCustoms Act, 1969: Sections 18, 33, 80, 196\n•\nCustoms Rules: General Rules for Interpretation, Rule 3\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nM/s K.S. Sulemanji Esmailji & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd., a company based in Karachi, imported 26 consignments of BOPP (Biaxially Oriented Polypropylene) Printed Laminated Packaging Film. At the time of import, the Customs Department assessed the consignments and completed the customs clearance under Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969, based on the declarations made by the respondent-company.\nLater, the respondent claimed that they had overpaid the customs duty at the rate of 25% instead of the correct rate of 20%. The company filed a refund application under Section 33 of the Customs Act, seeking a refund of the excess duties paid.\nWhile the refund request was pending, the matter was referred to the Classification Committee formed by the Board. The Classification Committee examined the imported goods and determined that the correct PCT Heading (Pakistan Customs Tariff) for the goods was 3920.2040, which was later upheld by the authorities.\nThe Deputy Collector of Customs rejected the refund application, and the Customs Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondent, determining that the correct customs duty rate was 20%. However, the Department disagreed with the Tribunal’s ruling and filed a reference before the High Court. The High Court rejected the Department’s reference, and the matter was then brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan for further review.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nClassification of Goods: The primary issue revolved around the proper classification of the imported goods under the Pakistan Customs Tariff. The Classification Committee had determined that the goods fell under PCT Heading 3920.2040, but both the Tribunal and the High Court arrived at different classifications.\n2.\nRefund Application: The respondent-company sought a refund of the excess customs duties, arguing that the duties were paid at a rate of 25% instead of the correct 20%. The issue was whether the refund application was valid and whether the correct classification justified the refund.\n3.\nInterpretation of Classification Rules: The legal challenge focused on whether the Tribunal and the High Court could override the findings of the Classification Committee, especially when the Committee’s determination was based on technical deliberations (including laboratory test reports).\n________________________________________\nDecision:\nThe Supreme Court made the following findings:\n1.\nRole of the Classification Committee:\no\nThe Supreme Court emphasized that the findings of the Classification Committee could only be substituted by the Tribunal or the High Court if it was demonstrated that the Committee’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful, or violated the applicable rules and principles of classification.\no\nIn this case, both the Tribunal and the High Court erred by disregarding the Classification Committee’s determination and attempting to classify the goods themselves. The Tribunal, in particular, bypassed the competent forum (the Classification Committee) and made its own classification ruling.\n2.\nTribunals Error:\no\nThe Tribunal wrongly disregarded the Classification Committee’s ruling, which had been supported by extensive deliberations and laboratory test reports. The Tribunal’s classification of the goods was not based on the correct interpretation of the rules of classification under the Harmonized System, which is used for tariff purposes.\n3.\nHigh Court’s Misinterpretation:\no\nThe Supreme Court also found that the High Court misinterpreted the Rules of Interpretation under the Customs Act. The High Court did not properly consider the reasons recorded by the Classification Committee for determining the appropriate PCT Heading.\n4.\nRestoration of Original Decision:\no\nThe Supreme Court concluded that the Tribunal and the High Court had erred in their rulings and, therefore, the Original Order by the Deputy Collector, which had rejected the refund application, was valid and should be restored. This meant that the refund application filed by the respondent-company was rejected and the assessment at the higher duty rate (25%) stood.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nClassification Committee’s Authority:\no\nThe Classification Committees findings regarding the classification of goods are binding, and neither the Tribunal nor the High Court can substitute the Committee’s decision unless it is proven to be arbitrary or in violation of the applicable rules.\n2.\nRules of Interpretation:\no\nThe classification of goods under the Pakistan Customs Tariff should follow the Harmonized System rules, and decisions on classification must be based on careful deliberation, including technical factors like laboratory test reports.\n3.\nRefund Claims:\no\nRefund applications should be made within the legal timeframe, and they must be based on correct and substantiated grounds, such as overpayment of customs duties due to a wrong classification or tariff rate.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled in favor of the Department and set aside the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court. The original decision to reject the refund application by the Deputy Collector was restored, as the Classification Committee’s ruling was valid and binding. The respondent-company’s appeal was dismissed, and the customs duties paid at the rate of 25% were upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=18,33,80,196", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal Nos.799 to 824 of 2015 decided on 18.01.2024, heard on: 18.01.2024\n(Against the judgment dated 22.12.2014 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Special Customs Reference Applications No.8 to 33 of 2011)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE AND ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Muhammad Iqbal, ASC a/w Ch. M. Javed, Chief (L), FBR and Nayyar Shafiq, Chief (Tariff) for the Appellants.\nMr. Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, ASC for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF APPRAISEMENT (WEST), CUSTOMS HOUSE, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S K.S. SULEMANJI ESMAILJI AND SONS PVT. LTD., KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25346", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJDTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4692 = 2024 SLD 4692 = (2024) 130 TAX 208", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJDTXo", - "Key Words:": "Gas Tariff Notification and Legal Challenge\n________________________________________\nRelevant Legislation:\n•\nOil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002: Sections 7, 8, & 21\n•\nNatural Gas Tariff Rules, 2002: Rules 4, 5, 10, 18 & 21\n•\nNEPRA Licensing (Application & Modification Procedure) Regulations, 1999: Regulation 21\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973: Articles 18 & 25\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe Appellants are industrial consumers of natural gas supplied by Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC). Some Appellants utilize gas for their production processes, while others use it for electricity generation. The impugned case revolves around the Gas Tariff Notification issued by OGRA on 23.10.2020, which increased natural gas tariffs for retail consumers. The Notification was made effective retrospectively from 1.9.2020, a move which the Appellants contested.\nThe Appellants filed suits in the High Court challenging the OGRA Notification, asserting that the increase in tariffs was improper, especially regarding the classification of their gas consumption. They argued that they were industrial consumers, not captive power producers, and thus should not be subject to the higher rates applied to captive power users.\nSubsequently, the SSGC issued another Notification on 23.11.2020 detailing the prescribed prices for different categories of consumers, which the Appellants also contested, arguing that this additional Notification violated legal requirements under the OGRA Ordinance and Tariff Rules.\n________________________________________\nLegal Arguments:\n1.\nIssue of Retrospective Tariff: The Appellants challenged the retrospective application of the tariff increase, arguing that it violated procedural requirements and was unjustified. They contended that the tariff increase should only apply prospectively from the date of the Notification, not from an earlier date.\n2.\nCategory of Consumers: The Appellants argued that their facilities should be categorized as industrial consumers, not as captive power producers, and thus they should not be subjected to the higher tariffs applicable to the latter group. They further contended that they were entitled to gas for electricity generation under the Gas Supply Agreements (GSAs) and the Gas Policy.\n3.\nPromissory Estoppel: The Appellants invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel, claiming that the government had promised uninterrupted gas supply for their electricity generation needs. They argued that this promise created vested rights, preventing any changes to the tariff structure or gas supply arrangements.\n4.\nGas Development Surcharge: The Appellants also contested the imposition of a gas development surcharge, arguing that it lacked clear guidelines and amounted to arbitrary decision-making without proper legal framework, violating their rights under the OGRA Ordinance.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n1.\nNature of Directives: The Court referenced prior rulings and emphasized that provisions related to the execution of public duties are typically viewed as directory rather than mandatory when their non-fulfillment causes inconvenience or injustice to individuals without advancing the lawmakers objectives. The failure of OGRA to determine category-wise prices at the required time was seen as an irregularity, but it did not invalidate the Notification.\n2.\nOGRA’s Delayed Action: The Court upheld that OGRA’s failure to determine the prescribed prices in a timely manner was an irregularity but did not affect the validity of the Notification itself. The subsequent Notification issued by SSGC on 23.11.2020 was considered valid and consistent with OGRAs powers under Rule 21 of the Tariff Rules.\n3.\nCaptive Power Definition: The Court referred to the revised definition of captive generating plants in the latest NEPRA Regulations (2021), which altered the status and meaning of captive power producers. This definition change meant that the Appellants, who used gas for electricity generation, could no longer be classified as industrial consumers but instead fell under the captive power producer category, subjecting them to higher tariffs.\n4.\nDoctrine of Promissory Estoppel: The Court rejected the Appellants’ reliance on promissory estoppel, stating that neither the Gas Policy nor the Gas Supply Agreement (GSA) guaranteed indefinite or uninterrupted gas supply for electricity generation. The Court ruled that the Appellants’ claim to uninterrupted gas supply lacked legal grounding, and their reliance on vested rights was unfounded.\n5.\nImpugned Judgment: The Court upheld the decision of the Single Judge of the High Court, ruling that the OGRA Notification was valid and the tariff increase was justified. The Appeals filed by the Appellants were dismissed as lacking merit.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nPublic Duty and Directory Nature of Directives: Provisions related to public duties and their execution may be directory if their non-fulfillment does not invalidate actions but may lead to penalties.\n2.\nIrregularities in Execution: Irregularities, such as failing to issue notifications within the prescribed timeline, do not necessarily invalidate the actions taken by regulatory bodies like OGRA, provided the underlying actions are consistent with the law.\n3.\nCaptive Power Classification: Regulatory definitions, such as those in the NEPRA Regulations, can significantly alter the categorization of consumers, especially when newer regulations redefine terms like captive power producers.\n4.\nPromissory Estoppel in Gas Supply: The doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply when there is no clear, binding promise of uninterrupted gas supply, and gas supply for electricity generation is contingent upon regulatory and contractual terms.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe High Court Appeals were dismissed, with the Court finding that the impugned OGRA Notifications were legally valid. The Appellants’ claims regarding retrospective tariff application, category classification, and promissory estoppel were rejected. The decision reinforced the validity of the regulatory framework governing gas tariffs and affirmed that the Appellants consumption practices rendered them subject to the captain power producer tariff structure.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002=7,8,21Natural Gas Tariff Rules, 2002=4,5,10,18,21", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.92 of 2023 [and connected matters enumerated in the SCHEDULE attached at the end of this judgment] decided on 28.03.2024, heard on: 16.8.2023, 21.8.2023, 22.8.2023, 23.8.2023, 28.8.2023, 30.8.2023, 4.9.2023, 6.9.2023, 7.9.2023, 11.9.2023, 30.8.2024, 12.9.2023 & 25.3.2024, 12.9.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND SANA AKRAM MINHAS, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Ayan Mustafa Memon, Muhammad Rashid Anwar, Ovais Ali Shah, Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Sofia Saeed, Navin Merchant Salim, Amin M. Bandukda, Faiz Muhammad Durrani, Naeem Suleman, Ali Abid Zuberi, Syed Mohsin Ali, Nazeer Siddiqui, Habib Kazi, Suleman Yousuf, Aijaz Ahmed, Syed Muhammad Ali Mehdi, Ali Qambar Askari, Imran Iqbal, Ghulam Muhammad, Ali Nawaz Khuhawar, Marium Riaz, Fizzah Bucha, Ayesha Sahto, Arshad Hussain Shahzad, Afaq Ahmed, Samia Faiz Durrani, Shakeel Akbar, Kashan Ahmed, Hussain Akhtar Ansari, Tauqeer Randhawa, Zohaib Hassan, Haroon Shah, Aijaz Ali Sial, Umar Sikandar, Garib Shah, Nasir Illahi Siddiqui, Saleh Muhammad Siddiqui, Jawed Qureshi, Tehmina Ashraf, Ghulam Rasool Korai, Siraj Sheikh, Zaheer-u-Din Babar Bohyo, Jawad Qureshi & Adil Saeed, Advocates for the Appellants.\nM/s Asim Iqbal, Kashif Hanif, Ameer Nausherwan Adil Memon, Furqan Ali, Barrister Ghazi Khan Khalil, Farmanullah Khan, Abdul Razak Panhwar, Syeda Mariam Mastoor, Syeda Khizra Fatima Chishti, Abdul Hakim Junejo, Syed Kumail Abbas, Sheryar Khan, Muhammad Shahid, Zafar Iqbal Arain, Shazia Aziz Khan, Sarmad Ali, Hayat Muhammad Junejo, Jahanzaib Awan & Shaista Parveen, Advocates for the Respondents.\nMr. Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Attorney General, Mr. G. M. Bhutto, Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Amar Saleem Butt, Manager Legal, SSGCL, Mr. Raja Love Kush, Deputy Manager Legal, SSGCL, Mr. Muhammad Ali, Acting Deputy Chief Manager Billing, SSGCL, Mr. Saeed Rizwan, Deputy Chief Manager Billing, SSGCL, Mr. S. Ali Hassan Alamdar, Deputy Manager Legal, SSGCL, Mr. Muhammad Faisal Khan, Acting General Manager, Legal SSGCL, Ms. Nadira Tabassum, Manager Legal, SSGCL for Federation of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "A & G AGRO INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED & OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25347", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4765 = 2024 SLD 4765 = 2024 PLJ 235 = (2024) 130 TAX 363", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJTVTY", - "Key Words:": "Grant of Bail in Smuggling Case under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and Customs Act, 1969\n________________________________________\nRelevant Provisions:\n•\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898): Section 497 (Bail)\n•\nCustoms Act, 1969: Sections 2(s), 16, 157(1), 171, 178\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe petitioner was assigned the role of a pilot for a vehicle transporting non-paid Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL), which were allegedly smuggled and stolen. The stolen POL was being transported from one location to Pak Arab Refinery Limited. The goods, vehicles, and other culprits involved in the illegal activity were seized and arrested.\nIn this case, the petitioner was one of several people arrested on the spot while allegedly committing the crime of smuggling stolen POL. The petitioner was attributed a role as a pilot of the vehicle in which the stolen POL was stored and being transported. The High Court had previously granted bail to four co-accused individuals, and the petitioner now sought bail as well.\n________________________________________\nArguments Presented:\n•\nPetitioner’s Role:\nThe petitioner was assigned the role of pilot in the smuggling operation, which involved transporting stolen POL. It was argued that the role of the petitioner appeared to be no different from the co-accused persons, who were also arrested at the scene, and all were allegedly involved in the same criminal activity.\n•\nCo-Accused Granted Bail:\nThe learned High Court had already granted bail to four co-accused persons involved in the same case. The petitioner’s role as a pilot was attributed similarly to the co-accused, and as per the doctrine of parity, which ensures consistency in bail decisions, the petitioner should also be granted bail.\n•\nDoctrine of Further Inquiry:\nThe petitioner argued that there was room for further inquiry, suggesting that the involvement of the accused in the crime might not be conclusively established at this stage. This created doubt regarding the petitioner’s role in the alleged smuggling operation. The doctrine of further inquiry emphasizes that if there are doubts about an accused’s involvement, it might justify bail as the case is still under investigation or has not been conclusively proven.\n________________________________________\nLegal Considerations:\n1.\nBail as a Rule:\nUnder Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, bail is generally considered the rule, while jail is the exception. The primary objective of the trial is to ensure the accused faces the criminal prosecution and not to punish the accused prematurely by keeping them in custody before the trial.\n2.\nDoctrine of Parity:\nThe doctrine of parity suggests that if co-accused persons are granted bail under similar circumstances, then the same treatment should be extended to the petitioner. Since the role of the petitioner as a pilot is not significantly different from the roles of the co-accused, the bail granted to the co-accused should be applied to the petitioner as well.\n3.\nFurther Inquiry:\nThe doctrine of further inquiry applies when there is doubt regarding the accused’s involvement in the alleged crime, which can justify the grant of bail. In this case, it was argued that the accused’s involvement in the smuggling operation was not conclusively established, and thus further inquiry was necessary.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\nThe Court granted bail to the petitioner, applying the doctrine of parity and considering that the role of the petitioner in the alleged crime appeared similar to the role of the co-accused, who had already been granted bail. The Court acknowledged the principle that bail is the rule, and the doctrine of further inquiry raised doubts regarding the petitioner’s involvement in the crime, further justifying the bail decision.\nThe Court emphasized that the purpose of the trial is to make the accused face the prosecution and not to punish them beforehand. Therefore, the petitioner was granted bail, and the case would proceed to trial to establish the full extent of involvement and criminality.\n________________________________________\nKey Principles:\n1.\nBail is the Rule, Jail is the Exception:\nBail should be granted unless there are compelling reasons to deny it, and the primary purpose of a trial is to ensure the accused is given an opportunity to respond to the charges.\n2.\nDoctrine of Parity:\nIf co-accused are granted bail under similar circumstances, the same benefit should be extended to the petitioner.\n3.\nDoctrine of Further Inquiry:\nThe doctrine of further inquiry justifies bail if there is reasonable doubt about the accuseds involvement in the crime, indicating that the matter requires further investigation.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe petitioner was granted bail, and the Court applied the doctrine of parity and the doctrine of further inquiry to reach this decision. The case will proceed, but the bail decision ensures that the petitioner is not prematurely punished before trial.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,157(1),178", - "Case #": "Crl. P. No. 35-K of 2024, decided on 4.4.2024, heard on: 4.4.2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 14.3.2024 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Spl. Cr. Bail Appeal No. 17/2024).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Justice and Irfan Saadat Khan, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Nisar Ahmed Bhanbhro, ASC for Petitioner.\nMr. Khaleeque Ahmed, DAG for State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ATTAULLAH-Petitioner\nvs\nSTATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25348", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJpTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4794 = 2024 SLD 4794 = (2024) 130 TAX 299", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJpTXo", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Customs Adjudication in Misdeclaration Cases\n________________________________________\nRelevant Provisions:\n•\nCustoms Act, 1969 (IV of 1969): Sections 6, 32, 196\n•\nSRO 886(I)/2012, dated 18.07.2012: Entrustment of functions of Customs officers to certain other officers\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation Customs, Faisalabad intercepted a truck loaded with imported cloth, which was suspected of being misdeclared. The truck contained bales of Georgette Chiffon fabric, and the customs seal on the container was found to be broken. The goods were seized, and a Show Cause Notice was issued to the respondents for misdeclaration, leading to a short levy of duties at the import stage. The truck and its container were seized, but the owner was allowed to redeem the vehicle by paying a redemption fine of Rs. 50,000.\nThe Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal, ruling that the Show Cause Notice and the order-in-original had no legal effect. As a result, the applicant-department filed a Reference before the High Court challenging this decision.\n________________________________________\nArguments Presented:\n•\nApplicant-Department’s Arguments:\nThe Legal Advisor for the Customs Department argued that the Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the misdeclaration case, as the violation occurred at the import stage at Karachi Port, which resulted in the short levy of duties. The misdeclaration and offence were linked to the importation process, and thus, the adjudicating authority should have been located at the port of importation, i.e., Karachi, not at the place of seizure (Faisalabad).\n•\nRespondents’ Arguments:\nThe respondents contested the jurisdiction issue and maintained that the case had been properly adjudicated at the location of the seizure, as provided under the Customs Act and related SROs. They asserted that there was no procedural or jurisdictional defect in the show cause notice and the subsequent order-in-original.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the applicant-department, making the following key findings:\n1.\nJurisdiction of Adjudicating Authorities:\nThe Court held that the Customs officers at the port of importation (Karachi) have primary jurisdiction over misdeclaration cases because violations related to short levy of duties occur at the importation stage. However, the Customs officers at the point of destination (Faisalabad) do not have the authority to adjudicate these violations. Thus, the jurisdiction for adjudication remains with the officers at the port of importation.\n2.\nPower of Customs Officials at Port of Destination:\nThe Court clarified that Customs officials at the entry point (such as the place of seizure) can take cognizance of the contravention but do not have adjudication powers. The adjudication must be carried out by officials at the port of importation, where the violation initially occurred.\n3.\nLawful Adjudication by Collector at Port of Destination:\nDespite the jurisdictional issue, the Court emphasized that the show cause notice and the adjudication carried out by the Collector (Adjudication) at the port of destination (Faisalabad) were lawful. The Court disagreed with the view that the adjudication was beyond jurisdiction and rejected the Appellate Tribunals decision to set aside the proceedings.\n4.\nMisapplication of Jurisdictional Plea:\nThe Court ruled that the argument regarding territorial jurisdiction was misconceived. Even though the misdeclaration occurred at the importation stage in Karachi, the Customs officials at Faisalabad were within their rights to initiate proceedings for seizure and redemption of the truck, and the case could lawfully proceed there, with adjudication being validly handled at the port of importation.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Reference Application was decided in favor of the Customs Department, and the Appellate Tribunals decision to set aside the show cause notice and the order-in-original was overturned. The adjudication by the Collector (Adjudication) at the port of destination (Faisalabad) was upheld as lawful, and the seizure of goods and redemption of the vehicle were validated.\n________________________________________\nKey Principles:\n1.\nJurisdiction of Customs Officers:\nCustoms officers at the port of importation hold jurisdiction over misdeclaration cases and should conduct adjudication related to short levy of duties arising at the import stage.\n2.\nAdjudication by Officials at Port of Destination:\nWhile Customs officers at the place of seizure (such as the destination port) may take cognizance of contraventions, adjudication powers remain vested in the officials at the port of importation.\n3.\nLegal Effect of Show Cause Notice:\nThe show cause notice and order-in-original issued in this case were found to be lawful despite concerns over territorial jurisdiction, as the Collector (Adjudication) at the port of importation had the proper authority to adjudicate the matter.\n________________________________________\nCase Referred to:\n•\nCollector of Customs v. M/s. Ayaz Ahmed (2007 PTCL 601): This case was cited to support the jurisdictional principles regarding Customs adjudication in cases of misdeclaration.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=6,32,196", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No. 66929 of 2022, decided on 05.04.2023, heard on: 05.04.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND JAWADHASSAN, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Khalid Chaudhry, Advocate for the Applicant- department.\nMr. Raza Ahmad Cheema, Advocate for the Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE & INVESTIGATION-FBR, THROUGH ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR, FAISALABAD\nVS\nMUHAMMAD IMRAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25349", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJpTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4795 = 2024 SLD 4795 = (2024) 130 TAX 237 = 2025 PTD 313", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJpTXk", - "Key Words:": "Challenge to Section 8(2)(b) of the Finance Act, 2022\n________________________________________\nRelevant Provisions:\n•\nLaw Reforms Ordinance, 1972: Section 3\n•\nFinance Act, 2022: Section 8\n•\nFinance Act, 1989: Section 7\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Section 8\n•\nFinance Act, 2010: Section 4\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973: Articles 141, 142, 142(a)(e), 143, and Entries 44 & 50 of the Fourth Schedule\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe appellants challenged Section 8(2)(b) of the Finance Act, 2022 on the grounds that it exceeded the legislative authority of the Parliament, making the imposition of Capital Value Tax (CVT) on foreign assets of resident individuals unconstitutional. The constitutional petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed by the Single Judge of Lahore High Court, which upheld the imposition of the tax. The appellants appealed, seeking a declaration that the provision was ultra vires and unconstitutional.\nThe case centered on the interpretation of Entry 50 of the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution, which deals with the power to levy taxes on the capital value of assets. The appellants argued that Entry 50 prohibited the Federal Government from imposing taxes on immovable property, whether located inside or outside Pakistan, and that this exclusion applied to taxes on the capital value of immovable property.\n________________________________________\nArguments Presented:\n•\nAppellants’ Arguments:\n1.\nThe appellants argued that Entry 50 of the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution prohibits the Federal Government from imposing taxes on the capital value of immovable property, both within and outside Pakistan.\n2.\nThey contended that the exclusion clause ( not including taxes on immovable property ) in Entry 50 should be read as a proviso, excluding the taxation of immovable property, thus limiting the scope of the Federal Government’s authority to levy taxes on assets other than immovable property.\n3.\nThe appellants also pointed out that Capital Value Tax on immovable property was already being imposed by the Punjab Finance Act, 2017, and this should not overlap with federal jurisdiction.\n•\nRespondents’ (Federation and FBR) Arguments:\n1.\nThe respondents defended the constitutionality of Section 8(2)(b) of the Finance Act, 2022, arguing that it was within the Federal Government’s power to levy taxes on the capital value of assets, including immovable property, as long as the property was linked to a resident taxpayer.\n2.\nThey cited Article 141 of the Constitution, which allows the Federal Government to legislate on matters with extra-territorial effects, such as taxing the foreign assets of resident individuals.\n3.\nThe Federal Government further argued that Entry 50 of the Fourth Schedule must be read in conjunction with Entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List, which grants the Federal Government the power to legislate on matters beyond Pakistans territorial limits, including taxes on foreign assets owned by residents.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\nThe Court upheld the decision of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeals, making the following key findings:\n1.\nEntry 50 of the Federal Legislative List:\nThe Court confirmed that Entry 50 falls within the Federal Legislative List and provides the Federal Government with the power to levy taxes on the capital value of assets. The term capital value of assets encompasses both movable and immovable property, and the exclusion for taxes on immovable property is specific to that category, not to the broader category of assets. Therefore, the imposition of tax on the capital value of foreign assets of residents is within the Federal Governments authority.\n2.\nInterpretation of Legislative Entries:\nThe Court emphasized that entries in the legislative lists should be broadly interpreted. The words “not including taxes on immovable property” in Entry 50 create an exception for immovable property, but do not restrict the Federal Governments ability to tax the capital value of other assets, including foreign assets of residents. This interpretation aligns with the understanding that Entry 50 covers taxes on the capital value of movable and immovable property, with an exception for immovable property.\n3.\nExtra-territorial Jurisdiction of Federal Legislature:\nThe Court reinforced the principle that the Federal Legislature possesses the authority to legislate on matters that have an extra-territorial impact under Article 141 of the Constitution. As residents of Pakistan, individuals holding foreign assets are subject to taxation on those assets by the Federal Government, which is empowered to do so under the Constitution.\n4.\nImposition of Capital Value Tax on Foreign Assets:\nThe Court also rejected the appellants argument that the tax on foreign assets violated the territorial jurisdiction of the Federal Government, ruling that taxation on the capital value of assets held by residents is valid, even if those assets are located abroad. The principle of residence is applicable in this context, and the tax is imposed on the individual, not on the foreign property itself.\n5.\nEjusdem Generis Principle:\nThe Court noted that the principle of Ejusdem Generis (which suggests that a general term should be interpreted in the context of specific terms) was not applicable in this case, as the legislative entries should be read in their entirety and not in isolation.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2)(b) of the Finance Act, 2022, and dismissed the constitutional petitions. The appellants challenge against the imposition of Capital Value Tax on foreign assets was rejected, and the Court concluded that the Federal Government had the authority to impose taxes on the capital value of assets held by residents, regardless of their location.\n________________________________________\nKey Principles:\n1.\nBroad Interpretation of Legislative Entries: Legislative entries should be interpreted broadly and liberally to ensure that the Parliaments power to legislate is not unnecessarily constrained.\n2.\nFederal vs Provincial Jurisdiction: While provinces can legislate on matters within their borders, the Federal Government has jurisdiction over extra-territorial matters, including taxes on foreign assets of residents.\n3.\nCapital Value Tax: The taxation of the capital value of assets is within the Federal Government’s power under Entry 50 of the Fourth Schedule, excluding immovable property.\n________________________________________\nCase Law Referenced:\n•\nRelevant case law was cited to reinforce the principles of broad legislative interpretation and the authority of the Federal Government in matters with extra-territorial implications.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=141,142, 42(a)(e),143Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=8", - "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 13108 of 2023, decided on 12.06.2023, heard on: 12.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE AND ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/S Salman Akram Raja, Ali Sibtain Fazli, Syed Muhammad Ijaz, Syed Naveed A. Andrabi, Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Shehbaz Butt, Faisal Rasheed Ghauri, Barrister Muhammad Abu Bakar, Azeem Hafeez, Raheel Safdar, Rai Amer Ijaz Kharal, Hammad ul Hassan Hanjra, Basharat Ali Awan, Ibrahim Haroon, Ghias Ahmad, Ahsan Ahmad, Ch. Babar Waheed, Muqaddam Sukhera, Nadeem Shahzad Hashmi, Usman Ali Bhoon. Malik Ahsan Mahmood, Anas Irtiza Awan, Waseem Ahmad Malik, Ch. Wasim Ismail, Muhammad Shabbir Hussain, Mahmood Arif, Ibrahim Shahbaz Butt, Muhammad Ahsan Mahmood, Asad Abbas, Usman Zia, Mudasir Cheema, Abad ur Rehman, Hasham Ahmad Khan, Umar Tariq Gill, Kaivan Hossain Mir, Isa Ahmad Jalil, Muhammad Hamza Rauf, Muhammad Imran Khan, Fahim Khadam, Syed Faryad H. Shah Tirmizi, Khurram Saleem, Muhammad Iqbal Sabri, Raja I-lamza Anwar, Mansha Sukhera, Zeeshan Asif, Muhammad Ali Awan, Omer Iqbal Khawaja, Saqib Qadeer, Muhammad Abrar, Yasir Hameed, Azeem Suleman, Muhammad Arslan Saleem Chaudhry, Mohsin Majeed, Faisal Anwar Minhas, Muhammad Zeeshan Sulehria, Kashif Habib Sheikh, Malik Nadir Ali Sherazi. Muhammad Usman, Muhammad Waseem Akram, Asad Javed Jutt, Ahmad Khalid, Waqar Fayyaz Dogar, Mian Nafees Bashir, Syed Kamal Ali Ilaider. Ashiq Ali Rana, Ch. Sabir Ali, Ali Raza Advocates for the Appellants.\nMr. Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G.\nMr. Muhammad Mansoor Sial, Asst. Att. General.\nMs. Sheeba Qaiser, A.A.G.\nM/S Barrister Ahmad Pervaiz, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Malik Abdullah Raza, Qaiser Zaman, Ibrar Ahmad, Ms. Riaz Begum, Falak Sher Khan, Saffi ul Hassan, Muhammad Nouman Khan, Jawad H. Tarar and Ms. Scheharezade Shahryar, Advocates for the Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "MRS. SHEHLA TARIQ SAIGOL AND OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25350", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJpSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4796 = 2024 SLD 4796 = (2024) 130 TAX 208", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJpSTc", - "Key Words:": "Challenge to OGRA Notification on Natural Gas Tariff\n________________________________________\nRelevant Provisions:\n•\nOil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002: Sections 7, 8, and 21\n•\nNatural Gas Tariff Rules, 2002: Rules 4, 5, 10, 18, and 21\n•\nNEPRA Licensing (Application & Modification Procedure) Regulations, 1999: Regulation 21\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973: Articles 18 & 25\n•\nGas Tariff Notification: Dated 23.10.2010\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe appellants are retail consumers of natural gas supplied by Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC), operating industrial facilities that depend on natural gas for production processes and electricity generation. They entered legal proceedings against the OGRA Gas Tariff Notification dated 23.10.2020, which was issued to enforce a price increase in natural gas for retail consumers, with retrospective effect from 1.9.2020.\n•\nNotification and Dispute:\nThe Gas Tariff Notification set the sale price and minimum charges for the fiscal year 2020-2021, which led to an increase in the tariff for the appellants. The appellants argued that the tariff increase was imposed unlawfully and sought to challenge the retrospective effect of the increase, which they contended was a violation of their rights.\n•\nNotification Issues:\no\nA second notification issued on 23.11.2020 provided the prescribed prices for each category of retail consumer. This was done four months after the original tariff determination by OGRA in July 2020, which the appellants argued violated the OGRA Ordinance, specifically Section 8.\no\nThe appellants also challenged the gas development surcharge as illegal, arguing that it lacked clear guidelines and authority under the OGRA Ordinance and other relevant laws.\n•\nCourts Initial Judgment:\nThe Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the suits filed by the appellants, upholding the validity of the original Gas Tariff Notification, but with the modification that it would apply only prospectively from the date of its notification (23.10.2020), not retrospectively from 1.9.2020.\n________________________________________\nArguments Presented:\n•\nAppellants Arguments:\n1.\nThe appellants argued that the judgment in the case of Pakistan Beverages, which was upheld by a Division Bench in Sui Southern Gas, became a part of the Division Bench judgment through the doctrine of merger.\n2.\nThey contended that the gas development surcharge, under Section 8 of the OGRA Ordinance, was a levy and not a component of the tariff itself, and that its imposition lacked legal foundation.\n3.\nThe appellants argued that the increase in gas prices was not justified, as the price increase was minimal, and the surcharge was levied without clear guidelines for its calculation and imposition.\n4.\nThey asserted that they were industrial consumers, not captive power producers, and the application of the captive power rate to their bills was illegal and violated previous court rulings.\n•\nRespondents Arguments:\nThe respondents (OGRA and SSGC) argued that the gas development surcharge is an integral part of the tariff, as stipulated under Section 8(6)(b) of the OGRA Ordinance. They further defended the price increase as necessary to meet the revenue requirements of SSGC and stated that the appellants reliance on previous rulings was misplaced, particularly regarding the classification of consumers.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nPublic Duty and Statutory Provisions:\nThe Court followed the principle that provisions concerning public duties that may cause inconvenience to individuals are typically viewed as directory rather than mandatory, meaning non-compliance does not necessarily invalidate actions taken under them. In this case, OGRA’s failure to determine category-wise prices at the required stage was considered an irregularity, but it did not prejudice the appellants, and thus, the notification remained valid.\n•\nImpugned Judgment Validity:\nThe Court upheld the judgment of the Single Judge in concluding that the OGRA’s failure to determine the prescribed price categories at the required time was an irregularity, but it did not invalidate the notification. The Court also emphasized that both the original and subsequent notifications were saved under Rule 21 of the Tariff Rules, which allowed for such modifications.\n•\nCaptive Power Producer Definition:\nThe Court also noted that the revised definition of captive generating plants in the NEPRA Regulations 2021 altered the status of those who were previously considered captive power producers. As a result, the appellants could no longer be classified as industrial consumers entitled to different pricing.\n•\nPromissory Estoppel:\nThe appellants reliance on the doctrine of promissory estoppel and vested rights was rejected. The Court ruled that no promises had been made regarding the uninterrupted supply of gas for electricity generation, and such supply was contingent upon various factors. Therefore, the appellants could not assert a right to receive gas at preferential rates for captive power use.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the decision of the Single Judge of the High Court. The Gas Tariff Notification was upheld, and the appellants challenge was found to lack merit. The Court also emphasized that the appellants were no longer eligible for industrial consumer rates under the revised definitions and regulations. No costs were awarded in this case.\n________________________________________\nCase-law Referenced:\n1.\nPakistan Beverages (Reference No. 1 of 1988)\n2.\nState v. Imam Baksh\n3.\nSui Southern Gas\n4.\nSindh Petroleum\n5.\nBulleh Shah\n6.\nQuetta Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (2020 CLC 1414)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.92 of 2023 [and connected matters enumerated in the SCHEDULE attached at the end of this judgment] decided on 28.03.2024, heard on: 16.8.2023, 21.8.2023, 22.8.2023, 23.8.2023, 28.8.2023, 30.8.2023, 4.9.2023, 6.9.2023, 7.9.2023, 11.9.2023, 30.8.2024, 12.9.2023 & 25.3.2024, 12.9.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND SANA AKRAM MINHAS JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Ayan Mustafa Memon, Muhammad Rashid Anwar, Ovais Ali Shah, Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Sofia Saeed, Navin Merchant Salim, Amin M. Bandukda, Faiz Muhammad Durrani, Naeem Suleman, Ali Abid Zuberi, Syed Mohsin Ali, Nazeer Siddiqui, Habib Kazi, Suleman Yousuf, Aijaz Ahmed, Syed Muhammad Ali Mehdi, Ali Qambar Askari, Imran Iqbal, Ghulam Muhammad, Ali Nawaz Khuhawar, Marium Riaz, Fizzah Bucha, Ayesha Sahto, Arshad Hussain Shahzad, Afaq Ahmed, Samia Faiz Durrani, Shakeel Akbar, Kashan Ahmed, Hussain Akhtar Ansari, Tauqeer Randhawa, Zohaib Hassan, Haroon Shah, Aijaz Ali Sial, Umar Sikandar, Garib Shah, Nasir Illahi Siddiqui, Saleh Muhammad Siddiqui, Jawed Qureshi, Tehmina Ashraf, Ghulam Rasool Korai, Siraj Sheikh, Zaheer-u-Din Babar Bohyo, Jawad Qureshi & Adil Saeed, Advocates for the Appellants.\nM/s Asim Iqbal, Kashif Hanif, Ameer Nausherwan Adil Memon, Furqan Ali, Barrister Ghazi Khan Khalil, Farmanullah Khan, Abdul Razak Panhwar, Syeda Mariam Mastoor, Syeda Khizra Fatima Chishti, Abdul Hakim Junejo, Syed Kumail Abbas, Sheryar Khan, Muhammad Shahid, Zafar Iqbal Arain, Shazia Aziz Khan, Sarmad Ali, Hayat Muhammad Junejo, Jahanzaib Awan & Shaista Parveen, Advocates for the Respondents.\nMr. Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Attorney General, Mr. G. M. Bhutto, Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Amar Saleem Butt, Manager Legal, SSGCL, Mr. Raja Love Kush, Deputy Manager Legal, SSGCL, Mr. Muhammad Ali, Acting Deputy Chief Manager Billing, SSGCL, Mr. Saeed Rizwan, Deputy Chief Manager Billing, SSGCL, Mr. S. Ali Hassan Alamdar, Deputy Manager Legal, SSGCL, Mr. Muhammad Faisal Khan, Acting General Manager, Legal SSGCL, Ms. Nadira Tabassum, Manager Legal, SSGCL for Federation of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "A & G AGRO INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED & OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25351", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJ5RS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4797 = 2024 SLD 4797 = (2024) 130 TAX 352", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJ5RS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(36),121,122,122(1),122(4),122(5),122(9),137,137(2),174,176(6),177,214C,221", - "Case #": "ITR No. 21716 of 2022, decided on 12.05.2022, heard on: 12.05.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Mansha Sukhera, Advocate for the Applicant- Taxpayer.\nMr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocate for the Respondents- Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S PUNJAB LOK SUJAG\nVS\nAPPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE BENCH, LAHORE ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25352", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJ5RSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4798 = 2024 SLD 4798 = (2024) 130 TAX 61", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVJ5RSs", - "Key Words:": "Taxpayer’s Appeal Regarding Exemption Certificates under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\n________________________________________\nRelevant Provisions:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Sections 30, 54(1), 122A, 122B, 127, 12(1), 148, 152, 153, 153(1)(b), 159\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979: Sections 129, 138, 53\n•\nExemptions and Tax Provisions in Other Laws: Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals), Payments to Non-Residents, Exemption Certificates.\n________________________________________\nFacts of the Case:\nThe taxpayer (the appellant) had been assigned a contract by M/s Salam Air (Oman) to act as the General Sales Agent for selling tickets throughout Pakistan. The taxpayer applied for and received exemption certificates under sections 152 and 159 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for payments made by M/s Salam Air, citing their non-resident status. However, the CIR (Commissioner of Income Tax) raised objections, asserting that Salam Air had a permanent establishment (PE) in Pakistan, and thus, should be treated as a resident entity. Consequently, the CIR issued notices and revoked the exemption certificates that had been previously issued to the taxpayer.\nThe CIR (Appeals) upheld the rejection of the exemption certificates, and the taxpayer appealed the decision to the Tribunal. The DR (Departmental Representative) argued that the appeal was not maintainable before the Tribunal, as the taxpayer should have filed a revision application with the Chief Commissioner under section 122B of the Ordinance.\n________________________________________\nArguments Presented:\n•\nTaxpayers Argument (AR):\no\nThe taxpayer contended that the Commissioner (Appeals) erred by denying the appeal and instead directed the taxpayer to file a revision application under section 122B. The appellant argued that the law allows the taxpayer to choose between filing an appeal or seeking revision. There is no legal restriction on choosing one remedy over the other.\no\nThe taxpayer further argued that the CIR had no authority to cancel the exemption certificate retrospectively, especially after payments had already been made abroad under the assumption of the exemption being valid.\n•\nDepartment’s Argument (DR):\no\nThe DR maintained that since Salam Air had a National Tax Number (NTN) and a permanent establishment in Pakistan, it was incorrect to treat the company as a non-resident. Based on this, the exemption certificates were revoked correctly by the CIR.\n________________________________________\nDecision of the Tribunal:\n•\nMaintainability of Appeal:\nThe Tribunal ruled that the taxpayer was within their rights to file an appeal before the Tribunal against the CIR (Appeals) decision. It emphasized that the appeal was legally maintainable, citing precedents from superior courts and past tribunal rulings. The objections raised by the DR regarding the appeal procedure were dismissed as irrelevant.\no\nExemption Certificate Cancellation:\nThe Tribunal held that the CIR did not have the authority to revoke the exemption certificate after payments had already been made. It noted that the exemption certificates had been issued in good faith, with the taxpayer fulfilling all required conditions at the time of issuance. The Tribunal determined that revoking the certificates retrospectively was an improper exercise of power and amounted to a mere difference of opinion between the CIR and the taxpayer.\no\nRestoration of Exemption Certificates:\nThe Tribunal ruled that the exemption certificates granted to the appellant should be restored, as the Commissioner had no legal grounds for cancelling them after the payments had been processed. The decisions of the lower forums were vacated, and the exemption certificates were reinstated.\n________________________________________\nKey Citations Referenced:\n1.\n(2000) 81 TAX 119 (SHC)\n2.\n(2007) 96 TAX 133 = 2007 PTR 262\n3.\n(2008) 98 TAX 241\n4.\n(PLD 2006 SC 602)\n5.\n(2007 PTD 2088 (Trib.)\n6.\n(2013 PTD 2005)\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe Tribunal’s decision emphasized the taxpayer’s right to appeal and clarified the limits of the Commissioner’s authority in retroactively withdrawing exemption certificates. The Tribunal restored the exemption certificates, upholding the taxpayer’s position.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=30,54(1),122A,122B,127,12(1),148,152,152(2),153,153(1)(b),159Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=53,129,138", - "Case #": "ITA No. 34/LB/2024, 35/LB/2024, 39/LB/2024, 44/LB/2024 and 44-A/LB/2024, decided on 22.01.2024, heard on: 05.01.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Saqib Raza, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Ali Khalid, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. NOVEL TRAVEL (PVT.) LIMITED, LAHORE\nVS\nTHE CIR, CRTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25353", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4799 = 2024 SLD 4799 = 2024 PTD 1218 = (2024) 130 TAX 678", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Show-Cause Notices and Default Surcharge (Sections 137, 153, 161, and 205(3))\nFacts:\nChina Power Hub Generation Company (Pvt.) Limited challenged show-cause notices for default surcharge on tax not withheld as a withholding agent for tax years 2017, 2018, and 2019.\nThe company argued that after compliance with earlier notices and payment of adjudged amounts, subsequent notices for default surcharge were without lawful authority.\nLegal Findings:\nDefault surcharge under Section 205(3) is not automatic but requires adjudication as part of the main order under Section 161.\nSeparate or independent proceedings under Sections 161 and 205 are impermissible; they must be conducted simultaneously.\nThe High Court ruled that issuing fresh notices for default surcharge, after compliance with earlier adjudicated demands, lacked jurisdiction and lawful authority.\nRuling:\nThe High Court set aside the impugned notices and declared the orders issued thereon as void, allowing the constitutional petition.\n(b) Officers Powers and Default Surcharge\nKey Principle:\nIf an officer fails to adjudicate the quantum of default surcharge in the initial proceedings under Section 161, it implies a conscious decision not to impose it. Re-issuing notices mechanically is unwarranted.\nEffect:\nProper adjudication during the original assessment is essential, and failure to do so precludes subsequent separate proceedings for default surcharge.\n(c) Waiver of Default Surcharge (Proviso to Section 205(3))\nBeneficial Proviso:\nThe proviso to Section 205(3) provides relief from default surcharge if:\nA taxpayer complies with the demand under Section 137(2) following an order under Section 129 (Commissioner’s appeal).\nNo further appeal is filed under Section 131.\nThis encourages compliance and reduces litigation.\nCase Findings:\nThe petitioner complied with the adjudged amount without pursuing appeals. The issuance of fresh notices for default surcharge discouraged compliance and was deemed unwarranted.\nRuling:\nThe High Court quashed the impugned notices as they contradicted the spirit of the proviso.\n(d) Mens Rea and Imposition of Default Surcharge\nMens Rea Requirement:\nDefault surcharge requires evidence of willful default or malafide intent.\nIn the petitioner’s case, issues related to offshore contracts involved genuine interpretative disputes under Section 152, negating any intent of evasion.\nHigh Court Ruling:\nEach case must be decided on its merits, considering mens rea. The notices were invalidated due to the absence of adjudication regarding intent or willful default.\n(e) Jurisdictional Defect in Notices\nSubsequent Orders:\nSince the initial show-cause notices were declared without jurisdiction, any subsequent orders based on them were also void.\nThe principle of addressing subsequent events was applied to grant comprehensive relief.\nPrecedents:\nReferences to Samar Gul v. Central Government PLD 1986 SC 35 and Syed Ali Asghar v. Creators (Builders) 2001 SCMR 279 reinforced the requirement for lawful authority in issuing notices.\nRuling:\nThe High Court quashed the notices and associated orders for the relevant tax years, allowing the constitutional petition.\nConclusion\nThe High Courts rulings emphasized:\nProper adjudication during the initial proceedings under Sections 161 and 205 is mandatory.\nDefault surcharge cannot be imposed mechanically or through separate proceedings.\nJurisdictional defects in notices render subsequent actions null and void.\nCompliance should be encouraged through clarity and lawful practices, avoiding unnecessary litigation.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=137,153,161,205(3)", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-3532 of 2020, decided on 11th February, 2021, heard on: 11th February, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hyder Ali Khan, Samiur Rehman Khan and Hamza Waheed for Applicant.\nDr. Shah Nawaz Memon for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHINA POWER HUB GENERATION COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED THROUGH AUTHORIZED OFFICER\nVS\nPAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25354", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4800 = 2024 SLD 4800 = 2024 PTD 1227", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Anti-Dumping Duties Act (XIV of 2015)-S. 70 (13)-Orders passed by the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal (Islamabad), assailing of-Lahore High Court, territorial jurisdiction of-Scope-Appellants were Importers of various commodities subjected to duties under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 (‘the Act 2015’)-Appellants preferred appeal, before the Lahore High Court, against orders passed by the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal, situated at Islamabad (“Appellate Tribunal”)-Contention of the appellants was that since the “Appellate Tribunal” was performing functions in connection with affairs of the Federation, so appeal could be adjudicated by any of the High Courts against its decision while it was negligence on the part of the Federation that it failed to establish Benches at Lahore, Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar and the appellants could not be penalized on that score-Plea of the official respondents was that decision of the “Appellate Tribunal” could only be assailed before the Islamabad High Court and that not only order in original, but order in appeal were passed at Islamabad-Validity-Decision of the “Appellate Tribunal” is appealable under subsection (13) of S. 70 of the Act 2015, and it is evident from (the wordings of) said S. 70(13) that an appeal against the decision of the Appellate Tribunal lies before the High Court-However the term “High Court” is nowhere defined in the Act 2015-“Appellate Tribunal” is performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation-Admittedly, in the present case, initially investigation was started at Islamabad, which resulted into passing of order in original; the said order was assailed through an appeal before the “Appellate Tribunal” under Ss. 70(1)(2) & 70 of the Act 2015”, which decided the same through impugned order-Thus, the word “High Court” used in subsection (13) of S. 70 of the Act 2015 corresponded to Islamabad High Court and, as such, the Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to ponder upon the decision of the “Appellate Tribunal”-Resultantly, all the appeals were returned to the appellants to present the same to the Court of competent jurisdiction-Appeals were disposed of accordingly.\n(b) Anti-Dumping Duties Act (XIV of 2015)-S. 70(13)-Orders passed by the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal (Islamabad), assailing of-Lahore High Court, territorial jurisdiction of-Scope-Forum non conveniens, doctrine of-Appellants were importers of various commodities subjected to duties under the Anti- Dumping Duties Act, 2015 (‘the Act 2015’)-Appellants preferred appeal, before the Lahore High Court, against orders passed by the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal situated at Islamabad (“Appellate Tribunal”)-Contention of the appellants was that they were residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court and it would be convenient for them to invoke its jurisdiction-Plea of the official respondents was that the appellants had changed their addresses with mala fide intent, so said jurisdiction could not be assumed on their convenience-Validity-Cause of action, in the present case, arose either at Islamabad or Karachi and even the present appellants while preferring their appeals before the “Appellate Tribunal” mentioned their addresses of places other than Rawalpindi city-Apparently, the appellants had now changed addresses for their convenience or for any other reason best known to them-Court cannot assume jurisdiction on the whims of the parties or to facilitate any of them-Doctrine of forum non conveniens is founded on the principle that if some other forum is more appropriate and the interest of justice would be served better, the Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a case could be suitably tried by another Court-However, said principle, being a discretionary power, allows courts to dismiss a case where another court, or forum, is much better suited to hear the case, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum-Word “High Court” used in subsection (13) of S. 70 of the Act 2015 corresponds to Islamabad High Court and, as such, the Lahore High Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to ponder upon the decision of the “Appellate Tribunal”-Resultantly, all the appeals were returned to the appellants to present the same to the Court of competent jurisdiction-Appeals were disposed of accordingly.\nHassan Shahjehan v. FPSC through Chairman and others PLD 2017 Lah. 665; Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1997 SC 334; Let.-Gen.(R) Salahuddin Tirmizi v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2008 SC 735 and Messrs Karachi Iron and Steel Mercants Association through Authorised, Representative and 30 others v. Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal and 22 others 2021 PTD 1150 ref.\nTrading Corporation of Pakistan (Private) Limited v. Pakistan Agro Forestry Corporation (Private) Limited and another 2000 SCMR 1703 and Muhammad Fayyaz v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2022 PTD 399 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 74 of 2022, heard on 8th February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SADAQAT ALI KHAN, MIRZA VIQAS RAUF AND CH. ABDUL AZIZ, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waqas Amir and Ahmed Sheraz for Respondent No.2.\nCh. Muhammad Nawaz for Respondents Nos.3 and 4.\nSaif Ullah Khan for counsel for Respondent No.5.\nNaveed Zafar Khan, Muhammad Siddique Akbar and Ms. Nazma Parveen Malik for Appellants.\nMalik Muhammad Saddique Awan, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan, Arshad Mehmood Malik, Ch. Sajid Mehmood, Ch. Muhammad Rizwan and Ch. Tayyab Bilal, Assistant Attorney-Generals for Pakistan for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS ASHFAQ BROTHERS AND ANOTHER \nVERSUS\nANTI-DUMPING APPELLATE TRIBUNAL OF PAKISTAN THROUGH REGISTRAR AND 4 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25355", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4801 = 2024 SLD 4801 = (2024) 130 TAX 473 = 2025 PTD 180 = 2025 SCMR 1 = 2025 PTCL 628", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQSs", - "Key Words:": "Key Issues in the Case\nAdjustment and Refund of Input Tax:\nWhether the input tax deduction under Section 7 can be claimed for goods that are destroyed (e.g., by fire) and do not remain available for making taxable supplies.\nScope of Use Under Section 8:\nWhether the loss of goods (e.g., through fire) qualifies as being used for any purpose other than taxable supplies under Section 8(1)(a).\nImpact of Subordinate Legislation:\nThe validity of demanding repayment of accrued benefits under changes introduced through SROs without express authorization by primary legislation.\nCourts Findings\nInput Tax Adjustment:\nInput tax adjustment is permissible even if the raw materials were not fully consumed or were damaged during the tax period, as long as other conditions under Section 7 are fulfilled.\nLoss Through Fire:\nLoss of raw materials through fire does not fall within the scope of use for purposes other than taxable supplies. \nSection 8(1)(a) does not apply in such cases, and there is no valid notification under Section 8(1)(b) excluding such materials.\nPast and Closed Transactions:\nSubordinate legislation (e.g., changes via SROs) cannot retroactively demand repayment of benefits that are vested and related to past and closed transactions unless authorized by primary legislation.\nLegal Principles Affirmed\nThe High Court’s majority opinion was deemed correct in its interpretation of the Sales Tax Act, particularly regarding the loss of goods and the applicability of input tax adjustments.\nSubordinate legislation cannot infringe on vested rights without explicit backing by primary legislation.\nOutcome\nAppeals by the tax authorities were dismissed.\nJudgments in favor of the taxpayer by the Lahore High Court and Sindh High Court were upheld.\nThe Supreme Court ruled that the input tax adjustments claimed by the taxpayer were lawful, and there was no need for intervention.\nThis judgment clarifies the application of Sections 7, 8, and related provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, particularly in cases of loss of goods and the retrospective application of tax rules.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(2)(d),3A,3AA,7,8(1)(b),10,11,36", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals. Nos.947 of 2002, 980, 981 & 982 of 2007 and 224 of 2010 and Civil Petition No.246 of 2009 decided on 12.11.2024, heard on: 02.10.2024\n[Against the judgment dated 04.12.2001, passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in CA No.66 of 1999; the judgment dated 29.11.2006, passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in S.S.T.R.As. No.142 and 172 of 2005; the judgment dated 25.03.2008, passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in S.S.T.R.A. No.58 of 2007; and the judgment dated 28.11.2008, passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in S.S.T.R.A. No.350 of 2007]", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YAHYA AFRIDI, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, ASC assisted by Muhammad Abdul Hassan, Advocate (in CA No.947), Mr. Muhammad Siddique Mirza, ASC (in CAs No.980-982), Raja Muhammad Iqbal, ASC (in CA No.224 & CP 246) for the Appellants. \nMr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC Along with Malik Ahsan Mahmood, ASC and Malik Ghulam Sabir, Advocate, HC (in CA No.947) for the Respondent.\nDr. Muhammad Farough Naseem, ASC (via video link from Karachi) for the Respondent.\nSyed Naveed Amjad Andrabi, ASC (in CA No.224) for the Respondent.\nNemo (in CA No.246) for the Respondent.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan for the Federation.\nMr. Zubair Khan, Additional Commissioner, CTO, Lahore (via video link from Lahore) for the Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, LARGE TAXPAYERS OFFICE, LAHORE AND ANOTHER\nVS\nM/S MAYFAIR SPINNING MILLS LTD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25356", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4802 = 2024 SLD 4802 = 2024 PTD 1258", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-S.6-Cheque-Connotation-Cheque is a request of drawer to the bank where the drawer maintains an account to pay a specific sum of amount to the payee on presentation of the cheque or on the date fixed on the cheque-Under banking practice in our country, bank is supposed to make payment to payee if there is sufficient amount payable to the payee equal to the amount mentioned on the cheque.\nMitras Legal and Commercial Dictionary; The Chambers 21st Century Dictionary; The Law Laxicon and The Blacks Law Dictionary rel.\n(b) Interpretation of statutes-Fiscal laws-Intendment-Scope-In a tax statute one has to look at what is clearly said-There is no room for any intendment; nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied.\nCommissioner of Income Tax Kanpur v. Upper Doab Sugar Mills (1978) All U 128 rel.\n(c) Administration of justice-Where law requires something to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner-What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.\nMuhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi and others PLD 2018 SC 189 rel.\n(d) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-Sixth Schedule, Entry No. 152-Post-dated cheques-Vires-\nPetitioner/importer assailed demand of respondents/authorities to provide post-dated cheque with endorsement “good for payment” from the banker-Validity-It was not the will of Legislature in Entry No. 152 in Sixth Schedule to Sales Tax Act, 1990, which mandated that importer at the time of clearance of imported goods, destined for consumption at Erstwhile Tribal Area, to provide a post-dated Cheque for the amount of sales tax under Sales Tax Act, 1990, to be accompanied with a certificate “good for payment” from bank for its clearance-Such demand of respondents/authorities that post-dated cheque as required through Entry No. 152 in Sixth Schedule to Sales Tax Act, 1990 shall be accompanied with the certificate “good for payment” was ultra-vires to Entry No. 152 in Sixth Schedule to Sales Tax Act, 1990-High Court declared such demand as illegal and without lawful authority-Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.\nMessrs Taj Packages Company (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager v. The Government of Pakistan through Federal Secretary Finance and Revenue Division and 6 others 2016 PTD 203; Pakistan through Chairman, FBR and others v. Hazrat Hussain 2018 SCMR 939; Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others 2016 PTD 1555; Sethi and Sethi Sons through Humayun Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad 2012 PTD 1869; The Federal Government through Secretary Interior, Government of Pakistan v. Ms. Ayyan Ali and others 2017 SCMR 1179; Messrs Al-Iblagh Limited, Lahore v. The Copyright Board, Karachi and others 1985 SCMR 758; LPG Association of Pakistan through Chairman v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Islamabad and 8 others 2009 CLD 1498; Khalid Saeed v. Shamim Rizwan and others 2003 SCMR 1505; Muhammad Ibrahim v. The State 2021 PCr.LJ 412; Hafiz Abdul Salam v. Hassan Din 2020 YLR 2297; Messrs Jet Green (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 770; National Bank of India Ltd., Lahore v. Dost Muhammad and Bros, the Mall, Lahore PLD 1957 Lah. 420; Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. Bank of Baroda Ltd and others AIR 1941 Cal. 372 and Bank of Baroda, Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, Ltd, and others AIR 1944 Privy Council 58 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=6", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 4030-P of 2022, decided on 24th November, 2022, heard on: 24th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): S.M. ATTIQUE SHAH AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rahim Khan Jadoon for Petitioner.\nAamir Javed, Addl. Attorney General, Sanaullah, D.A.G. and Azhar Naeem Qarni for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS YAR STEEL MILLS THROUGH REPRESENTATIVE \nVS\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH FEDERAL SECRETARY, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25357", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4803 = 2024 SLD 4803 = 2024 PTD 1330", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQTg", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-Ss. 2(s), 156(1), 157(2), 171 & 215-SRO No. 499(I)/2009 dated 13-06-2009-Smuggling, allegation of-Vehicle used in smuggling of fuel, confiscation of-Release of the vehicle-in-question (Oil Tanker) against the payment of 20% fine-Allegation was that Oil Tanker was used for smuggling of High Spirit Diesel (HSD) without proper documentation-Department filed Reference application as the Customs Appellate Tribunal while setting aside Order-in-Original, ordered release of the vehicle-in-question (Oil Tanker) to the respondent, being lawful owner, against the payment of 20% fine-Plea of the applicant / Department was that Oil Tanker was very much part and parcel of the illegality and violation made by the respondent-Validity-Record revealed that when the Oil Tanker was taken into custody there was nobody in it, thereafter it was taken to the concerned Customs House- When a Show-Cause Notice was issued, in response the owner of the Oil Tanker appeared and submitted before the Customs Authorities (‘the Authorities’) that he had nothing to do with the HSD and stated that his Oil Tanker was plying on hire basis-High Court viewed that though the Customs Authorities rightly impounded the HSD as no person claiming its ownership came forward clearly depicting that it was smuggled ,hence seizing of the Oil Tanker was not justified when complete ownership documents of it were duly furnished-At the time of raid, interestingly, the subject-vehicle (Oil Tanker) was found abandoned but it was also said to have been registered with the Motor Vehicle Authority-However, the Authorities failed to acquire details and to issue Show-Cause Notice to the owner-Though ownership documents of the Oil Tanker were furnished, however, no effort was made by the Authorities to verify the same from the Excise Department-Prior to the incident, which took place on 26-5-2015 with regard confiscation of the HSD in the Oil Tanker, the Department was not in possession of any material or evidence against the owner of the Oil Tanker to be involved in any objectionable activity-It was only when the Authorities failed to release the Oil Tanker, the respondent approached the High Court and got directions for the release of the Oil Tanker subject to furnishing ownership documents to the Nazir and obtaining an undertaking from the owner that till such time the present Special Customs Reference Application was pending he would not sale out the said Oil Tanker-Customs Appellate Tribunal while allowing the appeals had categorically observed that after seizing the Oil Tanker necessary legal requirements with regard to issuing proper Show-Cause Notice to the owner and confronting him on other aspects was not carried out by the Department, which was in violation of mandatory provision of S. 171 of the Customs Act, 1969-Authorities made no effort to create a link between the HSD and the Oil Tanker, which established that the confiscation of HSD and the Oil Tanker were two different aspects requiring different treatments-However, it was observed that a somewhat similar treatment was accorded by the Department to the HSD as well as to the Oil Tanker-Nobody came forward to claim ownership of the HSD whereas owner of the Oil Tanker was claimed through some documents but the HSD and the Oil Tanker were incorrectly treated alike by the Authorities-Hence, the Department had simply failed to make out case of smuggling/confiscation of the Oil Tanker as mentioned under S.2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969, and no misinterpretation on the part of the Customs Appellate Tribunal had either been found or established by the Department-Therefore, confiscation of the Oil Tanker was unwarranted and could not be approved-High Court, in circumstances, confirmed the release of the vehicle (Oil Tanker) and answered the question raised in the present matter in negative i.e. against the Department and in favour of the Respondent-Special Customs Reference Application, filed by the Department, was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),156(1),157(2),171,215", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 493 of 2016, decided on 10th May, 2022, heard on: 27th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IRFAN SAADAL KHAN AND MAHMOOD A. KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahid Ali Qureshi for Applicant.\nDr. Muhammad Khalid Hayat for Respondent No. 1\nNemo for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, HYDERABAD\nVS\nABDUL SATTAR AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25358", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4804 = 2024 SLD 4804 = 2024 PLD 688", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNDQXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 62(2)-Elections for seat of National Assembly/Provincial Assembly-Nomination papers-Scrutiny-Attendance of candidate at the time of scrutiny-Not mandatory-There is no requirement for the candidate to be in attendance before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny of his nomination papers-Subsection (2) of section 62 of the Elections Act, 2017 is an enabling provision, which makes it permissible (but not mandatory) for, inter alia, a candidate to attend the scrutiny of his nomination paper.\n(b) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 62(9)-Elections for seat of National Assembly/Provincial Assembly-Nomination papers-Absconder-Fugitive from law-Proclaimed offender-Eligibility to contest elections-Disadvantage, if any, for being a proclaimed offender ordinarily relates only to the case in which a person has been so proclaimed, and not to the other cases or matters which have no nexus to that case-In the absence of any contrary provision in the Constitution or the Elections Act 2017 ( Act ), status of a person as a proclaimed offender in a criminal case does not affect his civil right to contest an election-Clearly, if a proclaimed offender can contest elections someone who is only alleged to be an absconder can equally do so.\nTahir Sadiq v. Faisal Ali and others 2024 SCMR 775 ref.\n(c) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 62(9)-Election Rules, 2017, R. 51-Elections for seat of National Assembly/Provincial Assembly-Nomination papers-Form and content-Requirement of filing an affidavit along with nomination papers disclosing such criminal cases (if any) as were pending against the candidate six months prior to the filing of the nomination in terms of the order reported as Speaker, National Assembly of Pakistan and others v. Habib Akram and others PLD 2018 SC 678 ( Habib Akram order )-Not applicable to General Elections 2024-Such arrangement of filing affidavits brought about by the Habib Akram order was only an interim measure-Looking at the Habib Akram order as a whole and the context in which it came to be made, it applied only to the General Elections of 2018 and, at most, to the 2018 election cycle that those elections engendered-That would include any bye-elections held in that cycle and also elections to the Senate held during that period-But that is all-To conclude otherwise, i.e., that the order extended beyond that cycle, would be incorrect-Firstly, that would give the order a degree of permanence and continuity quite contrary to its stated interim nature-It would be as though the matters in which the order was made had been finally decided and disposed of-That, of course, is not the case-Secondly, such characterization and application of the order would run against the grain of the present electoral framework, where the form and contents of the nomination paper were within the domain of the primary legislative process-Habib Akram order, being an interim measure, had ceased to be operative, since the 2018 election cycle had come to an end - It had no application for the General Elections of 2024 or for any elections held or to be held in the present election cycle-Inasmuch as candidates have been required to file affidavits in terms thereof or with reference thereto for the said General Elections or any elections thereafter, that cannot entail any legal consequences or penalties at any stage of the relevant electoral process, including any election dispute taken, or to be taken, to an Election Tribunal-This will continue to be so until either the electoral framework relating to nomination papers is altered by primary legislation, or the matters in which the Habib Akram order came to be made are decided finally and conclusively in the same or similar terms, or the said order is expressly extended by the Court-Certainly, absent any such contingencies, the Election Commission cannot require candidates for any election in the present election cycle to file such affidavits.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=62(9)", - "Case #": "C.P.L.As. Nos. 210, 211, 212, 213 and 214 of 2024, decided on 30th January, 2024.\n(On appeal against judgments dated 16.01.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.Ps. Nos. 2610 and 2620, 2168 and 2664 of 2024).\nheard on: 30th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in all cases).\nAhsan Bhoon, Advocate Supreme Court (in all cases) for Respondent No. 1 (via Video-Link, Lahore).\nKhurram Shehzad, Addl. DG. Law and Falak Sher, Legal Consultant for ECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UMAR FAROOQ-Petitioner\nVersus\nSAJJAD AHMAD QAMAR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25359", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4825 = 2024 SLD 4825 = 2024 SCMR 1719", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNC8", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)-Dishonoring of cheque-Pre-arrest bail, refusal of-Prima facie case-Fulfilment of obligation-Determination-Stolen cheque-Proof-Petitioner/accused sought pre-arrest bail on the plea that cheque in question was stolen and FIR was registered by his brother-Validity-Question whether cheque was issued towards fulfilment of obligation within the meaning of section 489-F, P.P.C. was a question, which was to be determined by Trial Court after recording of evidence-Bail before arrest was an extraordinary relief which could not be granted unless person seeking it satisfied conditions specified under section 497(2), Cr.P.C. and had established existence of reasonable grounds leading to believe that there were in fact sufficient grounds warranting further inquiry-First Information Report was not found to be false after investigation-There was sufficient incriminating material available on record which prima facie connected petitioner/accused with alleged offence, disentitling him from extra-ordinary relief of pre-arrest bail-Supreme Court declined to interfere in order passed by High Court as the same had considered all aspects of the case, both legal and factual and was well-reasoned-Petitioner/accused approached Supreme Court with a delay of 35 days and application seeking condonation of delay did not disclose any cogent reason for such delay-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused and consequently petitioner was refused pre-arrest bail.\nMuhammad Sadiq and others v. The State 2015 SCMR\n1394 and Gulshan Ali Solangi and others v. The State 2020 SCMR 249 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=489-FConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl. P.L.A No.619-L of 2024, decided on 1st July, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 04.03.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. No. 4681-B of 2024), heard on: 1st July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Amjad Farouk Bismil Rajput, Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioner for Petitioner.\nKhurram Khan, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AZHAR PERVAIZ BUKHARI-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25360", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4826 = 2024 SLD 4826 = 2024 SCMR 1719", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNCs", - "Key Words:": "Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J.; Musarrat Hilali, J. agreeing; Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. dissenting. [Majority view]\n(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-First Information Report not registered promptly-Probability of deliberations and consultations before registering the FIR-Complainant in his statement before the Court stated that after the occurrence, he went to the petition writer and got recorded his complaint-Subsequently, he went to the police station for the registration of an FIR, but the Moharrar referred the complainant to the Incharge, therefore, he returned back-Complainant stated that he did not inform the Moharrar about the incident-Complainant further stated that he came back to the place of the occurrence, where the police officials were already present-According to the investigating officer (I.O.), he along with other police officials reached at the place of the occurrence upon receiving an information regarding the incident-That was the first information, which he did not enter into a register maintained in the police station, nor had disclosed the source of his information-Complainant contended that he made an oral statement before the I.O. at the place of the occurrence, who reduced it into writing and obtained his signatures thereon, but no FIR was registered upon his statement, nor was it produced in the court-Thus, the initial stance of the complainant had not come on the record-Besides, nephew of the complainant, claimed to have witnessed the occurrence, and he in reply to a question, stated that the I.O. recorded his statement and fifteen minutes thereafter, the complainant reached at the scene of the occurrence, but surprisingly, his statement was also not taken as a first information-Admittedly, the FIR was subsequently registered upon a written complaint of the complainant, drafted by a petition writer-Facts and circumstances led to the conclusion that the FIR was not registered promptly, rather, the matter was reported belatedly to the police, after deliberation and consultation, therefore, false involvement of the appellant (convict) could not be ruled out-Appeal was allowed and appellant was acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence- Recovery of weapon on pointation of accused-Inconsequential-Pistol allegedly recovered on pointation of accused was sent to the ballistic expert for examination, wherefrom, a negative report was received, therefore, the High Court declared the recovery of pistol from the appellant (convict) to be inconsequential-Keeping in view the observation of the doctor regarding shape and size of the injuries on the person of the deceased, it was evident that the injuries were caused by a pistol, other than the one recovered from the appellant-Appeal was allowed and appellant was acquitted of the charge.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-Accused having no nexus with the motive for the crime-In the FIR and in his court statement, the complainant alleged that a day before the occurrence, there was altercation between appellant M and his deceased son, as a result whereof, the occurrence had taken place-If the contention of the complainant was believed to be true, then there was no occasion for present appellant A to take such an extreme step for no whim and reason-Motive was assigned to appellant M , with which appellant A had no nexus, therefore, his involvement in the case was an afterthought-Since, one of the convicts was acquitted by the Appellate Court on the basis of a compromise and the other i.e. appellant M had died during the pendency of the appeal, therefore, their roles towards the incident remained undecided-Under such circumstances, it was unsafe to hold the present appellant A alone responsible for the commission of the offence-Appeal was allowed and appellant A was acquitted of the charge.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-Unnatural conduct of complainant and alleged eye-witness-Presence of complainant and alleged eye-witness at the place of occurrence doubtful-It was not acceptable to a prudent mind that when the son of the complainant received bullet injuries, he and the eye-witness being his nephew did not take the injured to a hospital, in order to save his life-Instead, the complainant opted to go to the police station for registration of an FIR, leaving behind two witnesses-Record reflected that the dead body remained lying at the place of the occurrence for about two and half hours-According to the doctor the dead body was brought to the hospital by the police officials and there was no evidence to prove that the complainant and a witness went along the dead body to the hospital, which was why, the dead body was identified by others, who were not produced as witnesses-Manner in which the complainant and alleged eye-witness narrated the story did not appear to be trustworthy-In the facts and circumstances of the case, their presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time was not established, therefore, the prosecution case against the appellant was doubtful-Appeal was allowed and appellant was acquitted of the charge.\nPer Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J.; dissenting with Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. [Minority view]\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-FIR lodged promptly-Occurrence took place on 08.04.2009 at 01:00 pm, which was reported through a written application by the complainant at 02:40 pm and the FIR was registered at 03:20 pm-Father of the deceased (i.e. the complainant) strived hard to approach the Police Station to report the incident, and he went on a bus therefore there was a delay of two and half hours in the lodging of FIR-Such delay was not fatal to the prosecution case-Considering that the police station was located 13 miles away from the scene of the incident, along with the explanation provided by the complainant, it could be concluded that the report was made promptly-If delay in lodging FIR is well explained then same is not fatal for the prosecutions case-Even otherwise in the absence of previous enmity the delay in lodging the FIR would not matter much-Ocular account was fully supported by the medical evidence and corroborated by the circumstances of the case-Prosecution had produced sufficient incriminating material against the appellant-High Court had rightly converted the death sentence of the appellant to life imprisonment-Impugned judgment of the High Court was well reasoned and needed no interference-Appeal was dismissed.\nNasrullah and others v. The State 1996 SCMR 1926 ref.\n(f) Criminal trial-\n-Motive not proved-Effect-Mere failure to prove alleged motive has no adverse effect on the prosecutions case, if prosecution has proved its case by reliable evidence.\nHameed Khan alias Hameedai v. Ashraf Shah and another 2002 SCMR 1155; Saeed Akhtar v. The State 2002 SCMR 383 and Syed Hamid Mukhtar Shah v. Muhammad Azam and 2 others 2005 SCMR 427 ref.\n(g) Criminal trial-\n-Witnesses related to the deceased, testimony of-Reliability-Mere close relationship of the deceased with witnesses is not a criteria to believe or disbelieve their evidence.\nMuhammad Ahmed and another v. The State 2010 SCMR 660; IJaz Ahmed v. The State 2009 SCMR 99; Saeed Akhtar v. The State 2002 SCMR 383 and Abid Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 208 ref.\n(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-Witnesses related to the deceased-Inconsequential-Mere relationship of the deceased with witnesses is not a criteria to disbelieve their evidence-Typically, most people in the community are hesitant to get involved as witnesses in serious murder cases unless they have some kind of personal connection to either the victim or the accused-This reluctance stems from various factors such as fear of retaliation, concerns about their safety/security and a lack of trust in the legal system-It is common for individuals to feel more compelled to come forward if they have a relationship, whether its familial, social, or otherwise, with one of the parties involved-In the present case, eye-witnesses had given very reliable reason for their presence on the spot at the time of occurrence which could not be discredited-They had no axe of their own to grind and it could not be shown that they substituted the appellants (convicts) for any ulterior motive-Complainant undoubtedly was a witness of the occurrence which took place in broad daylight with no possibility of mistaken identity-Being the father of the deceased, he would not allow the real culprit to escape by implicating an innocent person-Prosecution had produced sufficient incriminating material against the appellant-High Court had rightly converted the death sentence of the appellant to life imprisonment-Impugned judgment of the High Court was well reasoned and needed no interference-Appeal was dismissed.\nMuhammad Ahmed and another v. The State 2010 SCMR 660; Ijaz Ahmed v. The State 2009 SCMR 99; Saeed Akhtar v. The State 2002 SCMR 383; Abid Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 208; Muhammad Ahmed and another v. The State 1997 SCMR 89 and Sajid Mehmood v. The State 2022 SCMR 1882 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),34", - "Case #": "Crl. Appeal No. 46-L of 2020 and Crl. Petition No. 906-L of 2014, decided on 26th March, 2024.\n(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 14.07.2014 passed in Crl. Appeal No. 2293 of 2010 and M.R. No. 589 of 2010).\n heard on: 26th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Najma Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (Via video Link Lahore).\nMian Shah Abbas, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (Via video Link Lahore).\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABID HUSSAIN and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25361", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4827 = 2024 SLD 4827 = 2024 SCMR 1622", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNDk", - "Key Words:": "Per Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J; Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting. [Majority view]\n(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 279, 427 & 320-Rash driving or riding on a public way, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, qatl-i-khata by rash or negligent driving-Reappraisal of evidence-First Report Information lodged with a delay of five days-Name of witnesses not mentioned in the FIR-No identification parade held-Occurrence in this case took place on 30.11.2014 at 6.30 pm, but the FIR was lodged on 04.12.2014 at 6.30 pm and as such there was delay of five (05) days in reporting the matter to the Police-No plausible explanation had been given by the complainant for the gross delay in lodging the FIR, therefore, sanctity of truth could not be attached to the said delayed FIR-Although the FIR was lodged with the delay of five (05) days from the occurrence but even then the name of any eye-witness was not mentioned therein-Admittedly the complainant was not an eye-witness of the occurrence-Prosecution subsequently two persons as eye-witnesses in this case but the names of said eye-witnesses were not mentioned in the contents of the delayed FIR-Even the name of any accused or his description or features were not mentioned in the delayed FIR-Admittedly, no identification parade of the petitioner (accused) had been held in this case-Prosecution failed to prove that it was the petitioner who was driving the vehicle in question-Prosecution had also not proved through any cogent evidence that it was driver of the said vehicle, who was responsible for rash and negligent driving-As such the prosecution failed to discharge its initial burden to prove the case against the petitioner beyond the shadow of doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the charges while extending him the benefit of doubt.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 279, 427 & 320-Rash driving or riding on a public way, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, qatl-i-khata by rash or negligent driving-Reappraisal of evidence-Eye-witnesses not naming the accused as the driver of the vehicle-Consequential-First alleged eye-witness of the occurrence in his statement before the Trial Court, had not mentioned the registration number of the vehicle which hit the vehicle of the deceased-He even did not name the petitioner (accused) in his above referred statement-He did not state that it was the petitioner who was driving the vehicle which hit the car of the deceased-He further stated that he could not tell the colours of the vehicles of the deceased or the accused-He also stated that he could not tell that from which direction the vehicle of the accused came at the spot-He further stated that he did not know the accused or the deceased of this case-Likewise the other alleged eye-witness was also not mentioned in the contents of the delayed FIR-He had also not stated before the Trial Court that the vehicle was driven by the petitioner-He had not named the petitioner in his examination-in-chief or during his cross-examination-He had categorically conceded during his cross-examination that he had not seen the occurrence though he reached at the spot within few seconds from the occurrence-He further conceded that he had not given any statement at the spot that the occurrence took place due to rash and negligent driving-He had further conceded that the driver of vehicle had already fled away from the spot when he reached there and no driver was present inside the vehicle-It was, therefore, evident that both the alleged eye-witnesses of the occurrence produced by the prosecution had not named the petitioner in this case or alleged that the petitioner was driving the vehicle in question which hit the deceased-Prosecution failed to prove that it was the petitioner who was driving the vehicle in question-Prosecution had also not proved through any cogent evidence that it was driver of the said vehicle, who was responsible for rash and negligent driving-As such the prosecution failed to discharge its initial burden to prove the case against the petitioner beyond the shadow of doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the charges while extending him the benefit of doubt.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss.279, 427 & 320-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342-Rash driving or riding on a public way, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, qatl-i-khata by rash or negligent driving-Reappraisal of evidence-Proper site plan not prepared-Evidence relating to a traffic signal on the highway not specifically put to the accused in his statement recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C-No site plan of the place of occurrence had been prepared in this case on the pointation of any eye-witness of the case-Traffic inspector/prosecution witness stated before the Trial Court that he prepared a site plan of the place of occurrence (Exh:PW-4-A) but perusal of the said document showed that the same was not a site plan rather it was written on the said document that the same was a report regarding a traffic accident-Said witness had conceded that he was not an eye-witness of the occurrence, and the name of any eye-witness on whose pointation the site plan was prepared had not been mentioned in Exh:PW-4-A-It was the case of the prosecution that in fact the car of the deceased persons was parked at a signal of a highway when a vehicle hit the said car, therefore, it should be presumed that the occurrence took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said vehicle-In this respect, no traffic signal had been shown in Exhibit PW-4-A-As no traffic signal had been shown in Exhibit PW-4-A, therefore, it could not be held that car of the deceased was parked on the highway due to said traffic signal, waiting for opening of the same, when the vehicle of the accused hit the said car-It was not put to the petitioner (accused) in his statement recorded under Section 342, Cr.P.C. in clear terms that the car of the deceased was standing on the highway as traffic signal on the said road was closed and at that time the vehicle of the accused hit their vehicle-Under the circumstances, when a piece of prosecution evidence had not been specifically put to the accused/petitioner in his statement recorded under Section 342 Cr.P.C. then the said piece of evidence could not be used against him-Counsel for the complainant further argued that it was so mentioned in Exh:PW-4-A that there were marks of friction/rubbing of tyres at the spot which were sixty feet long and it showed that the vehicle was driven by the accused rashly and negligently, but the traffic inspector/prosecution witness has not stated before the Trial Court that he was carrying any tool of measurement at the time of preparation of Exhibit PW-4-A to measure the length of marks of friction/rubbing of tyres on the road-Moreover, admittedly he was performing his duties as a traffic inspector at the time and day of occurrence and he was not an investigating officer in this case, therefore, it was not his duty to carry a tool of measurement with him and prepare a site plan of the place of occurrence, rather the same was the duty of investigating officer, but surprisingly he had not prepared any site plan of the place of occurrence-Prosecution failed to prove that it was the petitioner who was driving the vehicle in question-Prosecution had also not proved through any cogent evidence that it was driver of the said vehicle, who was responsible for rash and negligent driving-As such the prosecution failed to discharge its initial burden to prove the case against the petitioner beyond the shadow of doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the charges while extending him the benefit of doubt.\n \n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 279, 427 & 320-Rash driving or riding on a public way, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, qatl-i-khata by rash or negligent driving-Reappraisal of evidence-Rash and negligent driving-Not proved-No prosecution witness had stated that what was the prescribed speed limit of the vehicles on the highway in question and what was the approximate speed of the vehicle at the time of occurrence which statedly hit the car of the deceased persons-Under the circumstances it was not determinable in this case as to whether the accident took place due to any fault of the driver of the vehicle or the same took place on account of any mistake of the deceased persons-Merely driving a vehicle at a high speed on the highway is not an offence, unless it is proved that the driving of the accused was above the prescribed speed limit and the same was also rash and negligent-Furthermore, if the injured or the deceased were themselves responsible of any rash or negligent act then the ingredients of above mentioned offences were not attracted against the driver of the other vehicle-Prosecution failed to prove that it was the petitioner who was driving the vehicle in question-Prosecution had also not proved through any cogent evidence that it was driver of the said vehicle, who was responsible for rash and negligent driving-As such the prosecution failed to discharge its initial burden to prove the case against the petitioner beyond the shadow of doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the charges while extending him the benefit of doubt.\nIsrar Khan v. The State and another 2018 YLR Note 236; Muzaffar Ali alias Nannah v. The State 1999 MLD 567; Muhammad Ashiq v. The State 2018 YLR 2589; Mushtaq v. The State 1998 PCr.LJ 158; Muhammad Rafique v. The State 2020 PCr.LJ 688 and Yasir Arafat v. The State 2012 MLD 611 ref.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 279, 427 & 320-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.342-Rash driving or riding on a public way, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, qatl-i-khata by rash or negligent driving-Reappraisal of evidence-Examination/statement of accused under section 342, Cr.P.C-Scope-When the prosecution evidence is disbelieved then the statement of an accused is to be accepted or rejected in toto-In such situation, it is legally not permissible to accept the inculpatory part of the statement of an accused and reject the ex-culpatory part of the same statement-In the present case the petitioner (accused) in his Section 342 Cr.P.C. statement categorically stated that he was innocent and he never committed the alleged occurrence-Petitioner had also stated categorically that he had never driven the vehicle rashly or negligently and he took utmost care and caution on his part while driving the vehicle-Although in the last sentence of his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C, the petitioner had stated that the accident happened beyond his control despite utmost care and caution on his part, but even from this part of the statement of the petitioner, the ingredients of offences of rash and negligent driving were not made or proved-If the above mentioned statement of the petitioner was accepted in toto then no offence of rash and negligent driving on the part of the petitioner was made out in this case-It could not be held that the petitioner admitted that the occurrence took place due to his rash and negligent driving-Prosecution failed to prove that it was the petitioner who was driving the vehicle in question-Prosecution had also not proved through any cogent evidence that it was driver of the said vehicle, who was responsible for rash and negligent driving-As such the prosecution failed to discharge its initial burden to prove the case against the petitioner beyond the shadow of doubt-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and the accused was acquitted of the charges while extending him the benefit of doubt.\nMuhammad Rafique v. The State 2020 PCr.LJ 688; Muhammad Asghar v. The State PLD 2008 SC 513; Ghulam Qadir v. Esab Khan 1991 SCMR 61 and Sultan Khan v. Sher Khan PLD 1991 SC 520 ref.\nPer Ayesha A. Malik, J.; dissenting with Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J. [Minority view]\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 279, 427 & 320-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.342-Rash driving or riding on a public way, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, qatl-i-khata by rash or negligent driving-Reappraisal of evidence-Inculpatory statement of accused-Conviction, basis of-Prosecution s evidence was put to the petitioner (accused) during his examination under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C.)-He did not deny driving the vehicle nor the accident-He stated that he was driving the vehicle and that there was an accident but, according to him, that accident was beyond his control despite his utmost care and caution-From this statement, three crucial facts were established; firstly, the presence of the petitioner at the scene of the accident was established; secondly, that he was driving the said vehicle; and most importantly, that the accident happened as the vehicle was beyond the petitioner s control resulting in the death of two people-This was clearly an inculpatory statement, which could form the basis of his conviction-In the absence of any other evidence, the statement of the accused must either be accepted or rejected as a whole meaning thereby that if the prosecution s case rested solely on the Section 342, Cr.P.C. statement then it must be taken in its entirety-Where other evidence (including witnesses testimonies, police documents, etc.) corroborated with the statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C. that the petitioner was responsible for the death of the deceased, it became a strong case for relying upon his inculpatory statement of Section 342, Cr.P.C.-All three lower fora had concurrently considered this statement of petitioner under Section 342, Cr.P.C. as an essential factor for his conviction along with the other corroborative evidence-Furthermore, the record showed that the petitioner had clearly admitted that he was driving at a fast speed because he harshly applied the emergency brake and left long tire marks on the road-Hence, he himself admitted to the accident and the fast speed of his vehicle-Moreover, the petitioner neither opted to appear as his own witness under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C. nor produced any evidence in his defence to show what the unavoidable circumstances were-Judgments rendered by all three lower fora, convicting and sentencing the petitioner, were well reasoned and did not call for interference-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nAli Ahmad v. The State PLD 2020 SC 201 and Sultan Khan v. Sher Khan PLD 1991 SC 520 ref.\n(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 279, 427 & 320-Rash driving or riding on a public way, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, qatl-i-khata by rash or negligent driving-Reappraisal of evidence-Rash and negligent driving-Proof-Essentially, the prosecution had to establish that the vehicle should have been at a slower speed on account of the traffic requirements to bring it in the ambit of rash and negligent driving-To establish rash or negligent driving, the prosecution relied on the statements of an independent eye-witness to the accident and a Traffic Sergeant-Independent eye-witness was present at the red signal in his own vehicle on the right side of vehicle of the deceased persons; he heard the noise of the petitioner s (accused s) vehicle hitting the vehicle of deceased persons-So he testified to the fact of the signal (red light) and the fact that the vehicle of the deceased was waiting at the signal-Similarly, the Traffic Sergeant was on duty at an intersection (chowk), which was close to the signal where the accident took place; he arrived at the scene of the accident on hearing the noise of the accident-According to him, the accident took place as the vehicles were standing at the traffic signal which was red-From this ocular account, it was established that the vehicle of the deceased was standing at the traffic signal along with other cars; the petitioner s vehicle was speeding, hence, he crashed into the vehicle of the deceased-Given that there was a traffic signal and cars were standing at the signal, the petitioner should have slowed down the speed of his vehicle but he failed to do so-Police report prepared by Traffic Sergeant also contained a site plan, which depicted that tyre marks of the petitioner s vehicle left approximately 60 feet long traces which established that he was speeding despite the fact that the traffic signal was red and cars were standing at the signal-Hence, the petitioner clearly violated the traffic rules as he should have slowed down the speed of his vehicle as he headed towards the traffic signal-Furthermore, he was driving at a speed which was not justified given the traffic signal and the fact that several cars were standing at the signal-This meant that the petitioner ignored the conditions of the traffic and the road and persisted with his speed with no regard for the prevailing traffic conditions-This was rash and negligent driving which was established from the record-Judgments rendered by all three lower fora, convicting and sentencing the petitioner, were well reasoned and did not call for interference-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=279,427,320", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 134 of 2024, decided on 4th July, 2024.\n(Against Order dated 17.01.2024 passed by Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Crl. Rev. No.35 of 2023), heard on: 4th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Jawad Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nJunaid Iftikhar Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.\nFauuzi Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court as State Counsel, Islamabad and Inamullah, ASI/IO, PS, Ramna, Islamabad for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed FIDA HUSSAIN SHAH-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25362", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4828 = 2024 SLD 4828 = 2024 SCMR 1642", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNDg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 185(3)-Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court-Scope-Supreme Court is not a fact-finding Court-In its jurisdiction under Article 185 (3) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court cannot go behind concurrent findings of fact unless it can be shown that the findings on the face of it were against the evidence, or were so patently improbable or perverse that to accept it would amount to perpetuating a grave miscarriage of justice, or if there has been any misapplication of the principle relating to appreciation of evidence, or the finding could be demonstrated to be physically impossible.\nSardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1454 ref.\n(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Family dispute-Judgment/order passed by Family Court- Interference by High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction-Since the legislature has conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the Family Courts, by virtue of section 5 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 to expedite family cases and tried to cordon off family litigation to the extent of a single family appeal, it would not reflect well on a Constitutional Court to interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the writ jurisdiction as provided under Article 199 of the Constitution, unless the jurisdiction exercised by the Family Court is contrary to law and/or findings reached in exercise of said jurisdiction are perverse and without proper appreciation of evidence in that non-interference would lead to a grave miscarriage of justice or for that matter injustice.\nArif Fareed v. Bibi Sara 2023 SCMR 413 ref.\n(c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5 & Sched.-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 185(3) & 199-Suit for recovery/return of dowry articles-Claim of dowry receipts being fake and fabricated-Factual controversy-Non-interference by High Court and Supreme Court-Petitioner s (husband s) assertions about supposedly fake and fabricated receipts of dowry articles was a factual inquiry, which was undertaken by the Family Court and the Appellate Court and could not have been done by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, or the Supreme Court under its jurisdiction under Article 185 (3) of the Constitution-Therefore, the High Court, in the impugned judgment rightly declined to interfere in the findings of the two fora below-Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\n(d) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Ambit of a writ petition is not that of a forum of appeal nor does it automatically become such a forum in instances where no further appeal is provided, and it is restricted inter alia to appreciate whether any manifest illegality is apparent from the order impugned.\nGul Taiz Khan Marwat v. Registrar Peshawar High Court PLD 2021 SC 391 and M. Hammad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari 2023 SCMR 1434 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3),199Family Courts Act, 1964=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.263-K of 2024, decided on 15th July, 2024.\n(Against the Order dated 28.2.2024 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Const. Petition No.S-395 of 2023), heard on: 15th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Raana Khan, Advocate-on-Record/Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioner for Petitioner.\nNemo for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SHAMIM ALI-Petitioner\nVersus\nMst. ASMA BEGUM and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25363", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4829 = 2024 SLD 4829 = 2024 SCMR 1656 = (2024) 130 TAX 528 = 2024 PTD 1238", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNHo", - "Key Words:": "1. Delegation of Legislative Powers (Constitution, Article 77)\nLegislature’s Power and Delegation:\nThe legislature retains the primary authority to impose taxes and may delegate ancillary and incidental functions to the executive (Federal Government). However:\nEssential legislative functions cannot be abdicated.\nDelegated authority must operate within the intelligible standards and guiding principles set by the legislature.\nCase Law:\nThe Supreme Court clarified that Section 3A of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, which empowered the Federal Government to impose a special excise duty on certain goods, did not violate Article 77 because the legislature provided sufficient guidance and standards for delegation.\n2. Doctrine of Excessive Legislative Delegation\nJudicial Limits on Delegation:\nExcessive or unfettered delegation that allows the executive to act without legislative guidance is unconstitutional.\nThe High Court erred by presuming that delegated power under Section 3A could be abused. Such presumptions cannot invalidate legislation unless proven.\nOutcome:\nThe Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s decision, holding that Section 3A of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, was a lawful delegation of authority.\n3. Judicial Review and Constitutionality of Laws\nPresumption of Constitutionality:\nCourts presume laws enacted by the legislature are constitutional. The burden of proof lies on the party challenging the law’s validity.\nThe judiciary must interpret statutes to harmonize them with the Constitution and avoid striking them down unless absolutely necessary.\nScope of Judicial Review:\nCourts are not empowered to rewrite laws or interfere based on ethical or philosophical considerations.\nStriking down a law requires stringent adherence to constitutional principles and clear evidence of inconsistency.\nRelevant Cases:\nThe principles established in Elahi Cotton Ltd. (PLD 1997 SC 582) and subsequent judgments were applied, emphasizing the legislature’s exclusive prerogative to make laws.\n4. Federal System and High Court Decisions (Constitution, Articles 189 & 201)\nBinding Nature of Judicial Precedent:\nSupreme Court Decisions: Binding on all courts, including High Courts.\nHigh Court Decisions: Binding only on subordinate courts within their jurisdiction. Other High Courts may consider them persuasive but are not obligated to follow them.\nIndependence of Federating Units:\nHigh Courts operate independently within their territorial jurisdictions, reflecting the federal nature of Pakistan.\n5. Timely Pronouncement of Judgments (CPC, Order XX, Rule 1(2))\nJustice Delayed is Justice Denied:\nCourts must pronounce judgments promptly after hearings conclude to uphold the right to timely justice. Delays undermine public confidence and violate constitutional principles.\nHistorical and Religious Significance:\nThis principle is deeply rooted in Islamic injunctions, historical legal doctrines, and global judicial practices.\n6. Role of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) (Constitution, Article 50)\nLegislative Authority:\nParliament, as a creation of the Constitution, operates within expressly defined boundaries. It:\nDetermines legislative policies and principles.\nDelegates ancillary functions only when necessary and within constitutional constraints.\nKey Principle:\nDelegation must not amount to abdication of essential legislative responsibilities.\nConclusion\nThe rulings affirm the supremacy of the Constitution and emphasize the careful balance of powers between the legislature, executive, and judiciary.\nDelegation of legislative authority is permissible within defined limits, but essential legislative functions must remain with Parliament.\nCourts must exercise restraint in judicial review and respect the independence of other state organs while ensuring the Constitutions supremacy.\nTimely delivery of judgments is both a constitutional obligation and a cornerstone of justice.\nThese principles collectively reinforce Pakistan’s federal structure, constitutional governance, and adherence to the rule of law.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=77Federal Excise Act, 2005=3-A", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.749 to 758 of 2013, 900 of 2014, 918, 943 to 946 of 2018 and 1022 of 2019, decided on 25th July, 2024.\n(Against the judgments dated 27.06.2011 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.C.A. No.288/2011, dated 22.02.2013 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.Ps. Nos.D-2123, D-2124, D-2126, D-2156, D-2127, D-2128, D-2129, D-2130 and D-2131 of 2011, dated 23.12.2013 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.Ps. Nos.D-4011 of 2013, dated 11.08.2015 of the High Court of Sindh Karachi passed in D-1116 of 2014, dated 2.10.2017 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Exc. Ref. Appl. No. 17 of 2013, Fed. Exc. Duty Spl. Ref. No.29 of 2013, Spl.F.E.R.A. No. 156 of 2013 and dated 25.10.2018 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-1094 of 2015) \nheard on: 6th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Appellant(s):\nRana Munir Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 749 of 2013).\nIrfan Mir Helepota, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 750 to 758 of 2013, 900 of 2014, 943 and 946 of 2018 and 1022 of 2019).\nDr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court along with Usman Azam Bhatti, Dy. Commissioner, Abid Rasool, Addl. Commissioner. Abdul Wahid Shar, Addl. Commissioner (in C.As. Nos. 918 and 945 of 2018).\nCh.Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 944 of 2018)\nFor the Federation:\nRana Asadullah Khan, Addl. Attorney General (in C.A. No.749 of 2013).\nFor respondent No.1:\nTariq Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 900 of 2014).\nKhalid Javed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 918 of 2018) (via video link, Karachi).\nIqbal Salman Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos.943 and 946 of 2018).\nArshad Shahzad, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 945 of 2018) (via video link, Karachi).\nKhalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1022 of 2019)", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAHTAJ SUGAR MILLS LTD. and others-Appellants\nVersus\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25364", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4830 = 2024 SLD 4830 = 2024 SCMR 1689", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQVNTNHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 10A-Due process and fair trial-Object, purpose and scope-Due process is a prerequisite that needs to be respected in all stratums-Right to fair trial is a fundamental right in case of stringency and rigidity in affording such right-It is the function, rather a responsibility of Court to protect such right, so that no injustice and unfairness is done to anybody-Concept of natural justice is intended to restrain arbitrary actions within the bounds of upholding and protecting supremacy of law-Such fundamental principle is consistently and squarely applicable to proceedings, whether judicial quasi-judicial or administrative, except where law specifically and unambiguously excludes its application in peculiar facts and circumstances of a case-Solitary pragmatic importance of rule of natural justice is to prevent injustice and miscarriage of justice and ensure that justice is not only done, but it is also manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done.\n(b) West Pakistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963-\n-Rr. 1.8(a) & 2.11(c)-Pension-Object, purpose and scope-Withholding of benefits-Absent without leave-Petitioner/civil servant was aggrieved of order passed by authorities withholding pensionary benefits on the ground of his absence from duty without leave-Order of the authorities was maintained by High Court-Validity-Pension articulates payment of fixed amount, according to scheme of pension in accordance with law, rules and regulations, or pension scheme in vogue, which is recompensed on regular basis to a person on his superannuation-Foremost and predominant strength of mind is to afford and safeguard economic refuge and shelter and recuperate old age security-In general phenomena, superannuation or stepping down is considered a second innings in which a retired person aspires to live up to his highly anticipated imaginings or dreams and devote time to his kith and kin and friends-After retirement, timely payment of pension is considered as main source of income or livelihood-Despite serving for a long time with sheer commitment, if pensionary benefits are delayed or denied without any lawful justification or without assigning any reason or providing any opportunity of hearing, it would be a very sorry state of affairs, rather an appalling and deplorable situation for a person who performed his duties with utmost dedication and enthusiasm throughout his career but at the eve of his retirement, he was treated inhumanly, coldheartedly and gets nothing on the pretext of totally misconceived interpretation of some rule-Pension could not have been denied to petitioner/civil servant without issuing show cause notice and providing opportunity of hearing-Petitioner/civil servant was deprived of his pensionary benefits despite serving the department for at least 24 years, 05 months and 15 days without adjustment of his earned leaves-Payment of pensionary benefits are protected under the law, rules and regulations, even in private sector, where scheme of pension in vogue is according to the organizational/management policy-Where pension is payable, it is a vested right and not charity, alms or donation by the employer, but a compensation of services rendered assiduously by giving blood, sweat, toil and tears-Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court and the authorities ensured payment of pension to petitioner/civil servant-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed.\nShahla Zia v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693 and Haji Muhammad Ismail Memons case PLD 2007 SC 35 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 982-K of 2021, decided on 12th June, 2024.\n(Appeal against the order dated 19.04.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh Bench at Sukkur in C.P. No. D-1289 of 2022). \nheard on: 12th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in person.\nSagheer Abbasi, A.A.G., Hakim Ali Shaikh, A.A.G. along with Ghulam Muhammad, Accountant Local Government, Sukkur, Khursheed Ahmed, Section Officer, Finance Department and Sikandar Hassan, Chief Law Officer for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YOUSAF-Petitioner\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF SINDH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25365", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4831 = 2024 SLD 4831 = 2024 SCMR 1649", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Oral Gift, Fraud, and Burden of Proof\nGeneral Allegations Insufficient:\nAllegations of fraud must be specific, not general.\nThe burden of proof initially lies with the party alleging fraud or fabrication.\nFailure to Prove Fraud:\nIn this case, the respondents (plaintiffs) failed to discharge the initial burden of proving fraud or fabrication related to the oral gift.\nAbsence of specific references to the oral gift in the pleadings resulted in no issue being framed on that aspect during the trial.\nPossession and Dispossession:\nThe respondents were unable to prove possession of the property or any dispossession during the predecessors lifetime.\nTransfer of Shares:\nThe transfer of shares by the Housing Society in the name of the appellants (defendants) went unchallenged.\nThe appellants were minors when the oral gift was made, which strengthened their claim.\nAppeal Outcome:\nThe appeal was allowed, the High Courts judgment was set aside, and the respondents suit was dismissed.\nCase Law Distinguished: Fareed and others v. Muhammad Tufail and another 2018 SCMR 139.\n(b) Fraud and Pleadings under CPC\nRule 4 of Order VI, C.P.C.:\nPleadings alleging fraud must provide specific particulars, including dates and items where necessary.\nFraud cannot be established based on general or vague allegations, regardless of their strength.\nCase Law References:\nSpecificity and clarity are emphasized in several precedents:\nMst. Sahib Noor v. Haji Ahmed (1988 SCMR 1703)\nMuhammad Umar v. Muqarab Khan (1968 SCMR 983)\nGhulam Shabbir v. Mst. Nur Begum (PLD 1977 SC 75)\n(c) Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court (Section 115, C.P.C.)\nPrinciples of Revisional Jurisdiction:\nThe High Court must ensure that the subordinate courts order:\nFalls within its jurisdiction.\nWas passed without breach of law or material procedural irregularities.\nSection 115, C.P.C., applies only where no appeal lies and exceptional circumstances exist.\nScope and Limitations:\nRevisional jurisdiction is limited and does not extend to erroneous factual findings unless:\nFindings are based on misreading of evidence.\nMaterial evidence is ignored.\nPatent errors of law or abuse of jurisdiction occur.\nFindings are perverse or conjectural.\nConcurrent Findings:\nOrdinarily, concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are not revisable.\nExceptions are gross errors in evidence appraisal or procedural violations.\nCase Law References:\nKanwal Nain v. Fateh Khan (PLD 1983 SC 53)\nMai Rashid Beg v. Rehmat Ullah Khan (PLD 2001 SC 443)\nImam Din v. Bashir Ahmed (PLD 2005 SC 418)\nAdministrator Thal Development v. Ali Muhammad (2012 SCMR 730)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.648 of 2022 and C.M.A. No. 5213 of 2022, decided on 17th January, 2024.\n(Appeal against judgment and decree dated 06.05.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Civil Revision No.224476 of 2018), heard on: 17th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Uzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nZulfiqar Abbas Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Ejaz Jamal, Advocate Supreme Court and Arshad Ali Ch., Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AAMIR AFZAL and another-Appellants\nVersus\nS. AKMAL (deceased) through L.Rs. and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25366", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4832 = 2024 SLD 4832 = 2024 SCMR 1683", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzY", - "Key Words:": "Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)-\n-S. 54-Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S. 49-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 79-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54-Un-registered power of attorney-Presumption of correctness-Document, proof of-Principle-Concurrent findings of facts by the Courts below-Predecessor-in-interest of respondents/plaintiffs claimed to be owner of suit plot in question and had denied execution of any power-of-attorney in favour of predecessor-in-interest of petitioners/ defendants-Judgment and decree passed by Trial Court in favour of respondents/plaintiffs were maintained by Lower Appellate Court as well as by High Court-Plea raised by petitioners/defendants was that power-of-attorney in question was duly notarized-Validity-There was no registered power-of-attorney, therefore, presumption of correctness could not be attached in terms of section 49 of Registration Act, 1908-In absence of any registered document, whose registration was compulsory, no immovable property could be transferred on the basis of purported unregistered general power-of-attorney-Predecessor-in-interest of petitioners/ defendants did not produce or exhibit power-of-attorney in question, in terms of Article 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, as neither alleged attorney/sub-attorney nor Notary Public and attesting witnesses were produced by predecessor-in-interest of petitioners/defendants-Basic document which was alleged to be a general power-of-attorney dated 19-02-1977 was not registered and was held to be a forged document by three Courts below through concurrent findings recorded to such effect-Burden shifted upon the beneficiary of such alleged power-of-attorney, which could not be discharged by predecessor-in-interest of petitioners/defendants-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nDr. Muhammad Javed Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212; Allah Bakhsh and others v. Bakhsha and others 2003 SCMR 1011 and Syed Khursheed Ali Jaffery v. Jamiluddin Siddiqui 1993 CLC 2511 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882=54Registration Act, 1908=49Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=79", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No 520-K of 2024, decided on 15th July, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 02.05.2024 of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in IInd Appeal No. 179 of 2021), heard on: 15th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Badar Alam, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed PERVAIZ HUSSAIN and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nZIKR-UR-REHMAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25367", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4833 = 2024 SLD 4833 = 2024 SCMR 1675", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-\n-S. 4-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 3-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 212(3)-Civil service-Dismissal from service-Departmental and criminal proceedings-Acquittal in criminal case-Effect-Delay in approaching Service Tribunal-Petitioner/civil servant was dismissed from service on the allegations of misconduct, inefficiency and corruption-Petitioner/civil servant sought his reinstatement in service on the plea of his acquittal in criminal case-Validity-Criminal proceedings address allegations of criminal conduct and determine legal culpability, while departmental proceedings are connected with matters of service discipline and conduct-Results of a criminal case do not necessarily impact issues related to departmental responsibilities and discipline-Delay in invoking lawful remedy by person or entity that was sleeping over their rights may be denied-Appeal of petitioner/civil servant, after his acquittal in criminal case was barred by time and he failed to justify such delay-Service Tribunal was correct in dismissing appeal of petitioner/civil servant on both grounds of limitation as well as merits, as his conduct throughout the proceedings had been questionable-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Service Tribunal, as it was well-reasoned and had considered all legal and factual aspects of the matter-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nDawood Ali v. Superintendent of Police and others 2005 SCMR 948; Khaliq Dad v. Inspector General of Police and others 2004 SCMR 192; Muhammad Ashraf Khan v. Director Food, Punjab Lahore and another 2004 SCMR 1472; Dr. Sohail Hassan Khan v. Director General (Research), Livestock and Dairy Development Department, Punjab, Lahore and others 2020 SCMR 1708; The District Police Officer, Mianwali and others v. Amir Abdul Majid 2021 SCMR 420; Muhammad Iqbal v. District Police Officer, Sahiwal and another 2011 SCMR 534; Province of Punjab v. Khadim Hussain Abbasi 2021 SCMR 1419 and Usman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi and others 2022 SCMR 745 rel.\n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 3-Limitation-Determination-Principle-It is inherent duty of Court, under section 3 of Limitation Act, 1908 to delve into question of limitation, regardless of whether it is raised or not.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Service Tribunals Act, 1973=4Limitation Act, 1908=3Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.516-K of 2022, decided on 19th July, 2024.\n(Against the Judgment dated 09.02.2022 passed by Federal Service Tribunal Islamabad (Karachi Bench) in Appeal No.75(K)(CS) of 2020).\nheard on: 19th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in person\nAsif Sahito, Assistant Superintendent, GPO, Hyderabad for Respondents Nos. 1-2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUMTAZ UDDIN SHAIKH-Petitioner\nVersus\nCHIEF POST MASTER, GPO, HYDERABAD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25368", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4834 = 2024 SLD 4834 = 2024 SCMR 1697", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elimination of Custom of Ghag Act (II of 2013), Ss. 4 & 5-Telegraph Act (XIII of 1885), S. 25-Prohibition of Ghag and damaging or tampering with telegraphs-Bail, refusal of-Petitioner was alleged to have compelled the complainant to marry his daughter with one of petitioners sons who was also co-accused-Petitioner along with his son and others restrained prosecution witness from engagement of his son with daughter of complainant, threatened the prosecution witness of dire consequences and demanded cancelling the engagement function, which function was consequently cancelled-As per Jirga proceedings son of petitioner did not agree with decision of Jirga members which was in favour of complainant, while complainant agreed with the same-Jirga members were unable to make any settlement/resolve dispute between the parties-On the basis of tentative assessment of material available on record, petitioner was prima-facie involved in commission of non-bailable offences under the provisions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elimination of Custom of Ghag Act, 2013-Petitioner accused was not entitled for discretionary relief of post-arrest bail-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.368 of 2024, decided on 23rd July, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 14.03.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench passed in Crl. Misc. (B.A.) No. 76-B of 2024).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khush Amir Khattak, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nShah Faisal Ilyas, Addl. A.G., KPK, Madad Khan, D.S.P. (Investigation) and Farid Khan, SI for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAZA KHAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25369", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4835 = 2024 SLD 4835 = 2024 SCMR 1701", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYy8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Advertised post-Qualifying for the interview-Merely qualifying for the interview (after passing the written test) does not create any vested right for appointment to a specific post in favour of the candidates.\nSecretary Finance and others v. Ghulam Safdar 2005 SCMR 534 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Civil service-Advertised post-Interview process following the written test-Challenging the interview process in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Permissibility-Written test measures a candidates knowledge and expression skills but does not evaluate important personality traits like communication skills, leadership qualities, and decision-making abilities-These traits are assessed during the interview-Interview process allows evaluators to see how candidates interact and respond in real-time, offering a complete picture of their suitability for the job-An interview is inherently a subjective evaluation, and a Court of law does not have jurisdiction to substitute its opinion with that of the Interview Board to provide relief to anyone-Role of the Interview Board is to evaluate candidates based on a variety of subjective criteria, which may include interpersonal skills, presentation, and other intangible qualities that are difficult to measure objectively-These assessments are inherently qualitative and depend on the opinion of interviewers, who are appointed for their expertise and ability to make such evaluations-However, this does not mean that the decisions of the Interview Board are beyond scrutiny-If there are any indications of mala fides, bias, or significant errors in the opinion (of the Interview Board) that are apparent from the record, the Court would certainly be compelled to intervene-But where the candidates fail to pass the interview examination for not meeting the necessary standards in the interview, the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked for challenging the interview process.\nMuhammad Ashraf Sangri v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 SCMR 157 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.154-K of 2022 and 166-K of 2022, decided on 26th July, 2024.\n(Against the Order dated 15.12.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh in C.P.No.D-756 of 2013 and C.P. No. D-3575 of 2013), heard on: 26th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qaim Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in both cases).\nSibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh, Ms. Lubna Parvez, Advocate-on-Record along with Maqsood Ahmed Kalhoro, Additional Secretary Food Department and Nisar Ahmed Memon, SEO for Respondents Nos.1-3. (in both cases)", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAHEED GUL KHAN and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nPROVINCE OF SINDH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25370", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4836 = 2024 SLD 4836 = 2024 SCMR 1705", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYys", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 427-Qatl-i-amd-Ad interim pre-arrest bail, confirmation of-Cancellation of bail-Principles-Dying declaration-Scope-Accused was admitted to pre-arrest bail by Trial Court but High Court cancelled the same-Validity-Statement under section 161, Cr.P.C. recorded in injured condition of deceased, one day prior to his death, was rightly not considered as a dying declaration by Trial Court as death occurred on the next day-Investigation was completed to the extent of petitioner accused-After submission of challan, trial had also commenced-Trial Court, after tentative assessment of material available on record granted pre-arrest bail to petitioner accused but the same was wrongly cancelled by High Court without appreciating that no grounds for cancellation of pre-arrest bail of petitioner accused were available to complainant-While cancelling pre-arrest bail of petitioner accused, High Court also failed to appreciate that there was nothing on record to show that petitioner accused ever abused or misused concession of pre-arrest bail-On the basis of tentative assessment of material available on record, apprehension of petitioner accused for his arrest by police at the behest of complainant with mala fide and ulterior motives, could not held as vague or baseless-Grant of pre-arrest bail to petitioner accused by Trial Court was not granted in wrong exercise of discretion -Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court and restored that of Trial Court-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and bail was allowed.\nMuhammad Faisal v. The State 2020 SCMR 971 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,427", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.660 of 2024, decided on 26th July, 2024.\n(On appeal against the order dated 24.05.2024 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in Crl. B. C.A. No.37 of 2024), heard on: 26th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kamran Murtaza, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (through video link from Quetta).\nMs. Robina Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for the State (as state counsel) and Mohsin Asad, I.O. (through video link from Quetta).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL QUDOOS-Petitioner\nVersus\nHafiz ISRAR AHMED and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25371", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4837 = 2024 SLD 4837 = 2024 SCMR 1714", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzk", - "Key Words:": "Partition Act (IV of 1893)-\n-S.4-Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O. XXVIII, R.3-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 8 & 54-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)-Joint dwelling housing, partition of-Frivolous and vexatious cases-Imposing of costs-Petitioner/plaintiff filed suit for partition of suit house and Trial Court after passing preliminary decree appointed Court auctioneer to auction the property-Petitioner/plaintiff objected to auction report submitted by Court auctioneer, which objections were turned down by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court allowed the same-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside the order passed by Lower Appellate Court-Validity-Petition filed by petitioner/plaintiff before Supreme Court was frivolous and vexatious and process of Court was abused by petitioner/plaintiff just to pressurize the other side and delay the matter on one pretext or the other, depriving her siblings and mother from lawful auction of such property-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court and to curb practice of instituting frivolous and vexatious cases imposed costs under Order XXVII, Rule 3 of Supreme Court Rules, 1980, which had laid down foundation for expeditious justice and to promote smart legal system, enhancing access to justice by entertaining genuine claims-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nQazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge, Gujrat PLD 2023 SC 298 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Partition Act, 1893=4Specific Relief Act, 1877=8Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 3300 of 2024, decided on 30th July, 2024.\n(Against the judgment of Islamabad High Court, Islamabad dated 02.07.2024 passed in C.R. No. 111 of 2023).\nheard on: 30th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Wahid Qureshi and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nRespondents not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASMA HALEEM-Petitioner\nVersus\nABDUL HASEEB CHAUDHRY and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25372", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4838 = 2024 SLD 4838 = 2024 SCMR 1716", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDYzg", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 427-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to qatl-i-amd and causing damage to property-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Rule of consistency-Trial, commencement of-Absconsion-Weapon not recovered-Petitioner accused was arrested for committing qatl-i-amd after remaining absconder for seven months-Neither injury statement of alleged injured was prepared nor there was any medical report about his alleged firearm injury-No recovery of firearm was effected from petitioner/accused during investigation-Investigation was complete, challan had been submitted and trial had commenced-Charge was read over to accused persons by Trial Court but so far statements of prosecution witnesses had not been recorded at trial-Co-accused had already been granted post-arrest bail by the Supreme Court-On tentative assessment of material available on record case against petitioner/accused fell within the ambit of further inquiry-On the basis of rule of consistency petitioner accused was also entitled for grant of post-arrest bail-Mere absconsion of petitioner accused for almost seven months could not be made a basis to refuse him post-arrest bail-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and bail was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,427", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.556 of 2024, decided on 26th July, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 06.05.2024 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Crl. M.B.A. No. 1612-P of 2024), heard on: 26th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Astaghfirullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNoroz Khan, Addl.A.G., KPK for the State.\nHussain Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZEESHAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25373", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4839 = 2024 SLD 4839 = 2024 SCMR 1796", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDY3o", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-\n-S. 15-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42-Tenant claiming ownership over rented property by filing a suit for declaration-Tenant cannot maintain occupancy of rented premises merely because he/she has initiated a suit for declaration-In instances where the tenant asserts ownership of the property, the legally mandated procedure requires the tenant to vacate the premises, pursue the civil suit, and, upon a favorable judgment by the competent court, regain possession of the property.\nRehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad and another 1983 SCMR 1064; Muhammad Nisar v. Izhar Ahmed Shaikh and others PLD 2014 SC 347 and Nasir Khan v. Nadia Ali Butt and others 2024 SCMR 452 ref.\n(b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-\n-S. 15-Eviction of tenant-Default in payment of rent-Personal bona fide need of landlady-When a landlord/landlady pursues eviction on the grounds of personal bona fide need and non-payment of rent, such a claim cannot be dismissed simply by challenging the ownership of the property-It is pertinent to consider the substance of the landlords claim regarding the legitimate need for the property and the alleged default in rent payment-In the case at hand the landlady (respondent) had established the default in payment of rent as well as her personal bona fide need and had also adduced affidavit in this regard-Thus, both the grounds for eviction i.e. default in payment of rent and personal bona fide need had not been disputed by the tenant (petitioner)-Petitioner had not produced any evidence to rebut the claims of the landlady-Petition filed by the tenant was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=15", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 562-K of 2024, decided on 8th August, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 17.05.2024/01.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C. P. No.S-45 of 2023), heard on: 8th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Chaudhary Abdul Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nKhalid Javed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Yasir Ali, AHC for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. MUSSARRAT SHAHEEN-Petitioner\nVersus\nMst. VERBEENA KHAN AFROZ and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25374", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4840 = 2024 SLD 4840 = 2024 SCMR 1722", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDY3k", - "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)-\n-S.O. 15-Punishments-Quantum-Scope-As soon as act of misconduct is established and employee is found guilty after due process of law, it is the prerogative of employer to decide quantum of punishment, out of various penalties provided in law.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Arbitrary relief-Court, jurisdiction of-Scope-No Court has any jurisdiction to grant arbitrary relief without support of any power granted by the Constitution or law.\n(c) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-Ss. 48 & 58-Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.O. 15-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Termination from service-Ten days absence without leave-Misconduct-Awarding of punishment-Object, purpose and scope-Petitioner/workman was terminated from service for absent being from duty without leave for a period of more than ten days-Trial forum did not consider absence for such period as misconduct therefore, reinstated the petitioner/workman in service-Lower Appellate Forum set aside order of reinstatement and High Court maintained that order-Validity-National Industrial Relation Commission (Trial forum) in its original order overturned the law and ordered reinstatement but it did not keep in mind doctrine of proportionality and reasonableness and modified act of misconduct from 10 days absence to 15 days absence-Full Bench of National Industrial Relation Commission (Lower Appellate Forum) rightly set aside such order in appeal which was affirmed by High Court-Addressing of misconduct aids, keeps an eye on and protects wellbeing of the organization and its employees in order to make sure that the workplace is in a trouble free environment-It is prerogative and inherent right of employer to trigger disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law to address misconduct, if committed by any employee but course of action for encountering any act of misconduct should stick to the principle of natural justice and the set of guidelines provided to ensure due process of law-Wrong handling of misconduct cases results in bad impact on industrial relations and also adversely affects trust level between management and workers-It is also essential for employer to maintain transparency, uniformity and egalitarianism, which insinuates compliance of all legal requirements with equal treatment to employees without any discrimination or favoritism-Supreme Court declined to interfere in order passed by High Court and Lower Appellate Forum-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968=15Industrial Relations Act, 2012=48,58Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 307-K of 2023, decided on 10th June, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 22.11.22 passed by High Court of Sindh at Karachi, in C.P. No. D-255 of 2022), heard on: 10th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhary, Advocate-on-Record/Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAKHIB ZAR-Petitioner\nVersus\nMessrs K-ELECTRIC LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25375", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4841 = 2024 SLD 4841 = 2024 SLD 1731", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Delay in lodging FIR not plausibly explained-Probability of false implication-Co-accused persons acquitted on the same set of evidence-Rule of consistency, applicability of-Complainant did not explain the delay in taking the dead body from the scene of the occurrence to the hospital-Besides, the time of death mentioned by the complainant in the FIR is 7.30 a.m., but the FIR was registered after a delay of more than two hours, without any explanation in this behalf, therefore, there was a probability of consultation and deliberations before reporting the matter to the police by the complainant-Under such circumstances, false involvement of the petitioner in the case could not be ruled out-Besides, in the postmortem report, the doctor opined that the cause of death was excessive loss of blood and haemorrhagic shock as a result of four injuries-These injuries were assigned by the complainant jointly to all the accused persons-It was a fact that except the petitioner, rest of the accused were acquitted of the charge by the High Court and one of them by the Trial Court on the same set of evidence-Complainant has ascribed injuries jointly to all the accused and did not single out the petitioner-Under such circumstances, it would not be safe to hold him alone responsible for causing death of the deceased-Role of the petitioner was similar to that of the other co-accused, therefore, he was also entitled for equal treatment, hence, deserved the benefit of doubt-There were also a number of flaws and contradictions in the statements of witnesses, which created doubts in the prosecution story-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into and appeal and allowed, and the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner was set-aside.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Scope-While extending a benefit of doubt to an accused, it is not necessary that there must be multiple infirmities and doubts in the prosecution case-Single or slightest doubt in the prosecution case would be sufficient to extend its benefit in favour of an accused.\nAhmad Ali s case 2023 SCMR 781 ref.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 200 & 417(2)-Appeal against acquittal, filing of-Pre-requisites-Conviction in a private complaint-Under section 417(2) of the Cr.P.C., appeal against acquittal in a case instituted upon a (private) complaint, can only be filed upon grant of special leave to appeal by a High Court-Thus, seeking special leave to appeal is a condition precedent for challenging an order of acquittal passed by any court, other than a High Court.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 309 & 310-Qatl-i-amd-Waiver and compounding of qisas in qatl-i-amd-Locus standi of deceased s brother to challenge judgment of acquittal in circumstances where legal heirs of deceased entered into a compromise with the accused-Estoppel-Scope-Accused was convicted and sentenced to death by the Trial Court-During the pendency of his appeal before the High Court, legal heirs of the deceased (widow and a minor) entered into a compromise with the accused, on the basis whereof, he was acquitted of the charge through the impugned judgment-Validity-Under the injunctions of Quran and Sunnah, and under section 309 PPC, only an adult sane Wali (legal heirs) may at any time waive their right of Qisas without any compensation or may compound his/their right of Qisas on accepting badal-i-Sulh (compensation) as provided by section 310 PPC.-No doubt, the petitioner (complainant) who was brother of the deceased, informant of the FIR as well as a complainant in the private complaint, could challenge the impugned judgment of acquittal being an aggrieved person, but the legal heirs of the deceased did not want to pursue the matter further against the respondent-If the legal heirs of the deceased did not wish to pursue the matter, the petitioner had no authority to undermine their right guaranteed by law-Permitting the petitioner to pursue the matter would amount to promoting frivolous litigation-Petitioner had not been able to show that the right of compounding the offence exercised by the legal heirs was a result of coercion, duress or undue pressure-Thus, under such circumstances, the petitioner was estopped under the law to challenge the impugned judgment (of acquittal) before the Supreme Court-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Crl. Petitions Nos. 522-L of 2018, 1008-L of 2014, 599-L and 557-L of 2018, decided on 25th September, 2023.\n(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 26.02.2018 passed in M.R. No. 264 of 2013, Crl. A. No.1717 of 2013, Crl. A. No. 1171 of 2013, Crl. A. No. 1377 of 2013 and Crl. Revision No. 677 of 2013), heard on: 25th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Ayesha A. Malik and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zaheer Zulfiqar, Advocate Supreme Court (in Crl. P. No.1008-L of 2014), Zahid Aslam Malik, Advocate Supreme Court (in Crl. P. No. 522-L of 2018) and M. Irfan Malik, Advocate Supreme Court (in Crl. Ps. Nos. 557-L and 599-L of 2018) for Petitioners (All through video link from Lahore).\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25376", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4842 = 2024 SLD 4842 = 2024 SCMR 1738", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTY", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 337-F (v) & 337-A(i)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, ghayr-jaifah hashimah and shajjah-i-khafifah-Bail, refusal of-Double murder-Cross version-Positive report of Forensic Science Laboratory-Petitioner (accused) was alleged to have committed murder of two persons and made murderous assault upon complainant-Petitioner accused sought his bail on the plea that it was a case of cross version-Validity-Seven crime empties of 7.62 bore and three crime empties of .30 bore were recovered from place of occurrence by investigating officer in cross-version case-Petitioner accused was arrested and during investigation, on his pointing a Kalashnikov (crime weapon) was recovered from house of his relative-There was positive report of firearm expert and incriminating material available on record-Petitioner accused was prima-facie involved in commission of heinous non-bailable offences for committing murder of two persons and making murderous assault upon complainant and his family members, therefore, he was not entitled for concession of post-arrest bail-Mere registration of counter version of occurrence by petitioner accused in Roznamcha (Daily Book) could not be made a basis to grant him post-arrest bail-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, leave was refused and bail was denied.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,337-F(v),337-A(i)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.271 of 2024, decided on 25th July, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 15.03.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Crl. Misc. (B.A.) No.372-P/ 2024), heard on: 25th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hussain Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Peshawar).\nNoroz Khan, Addl.A.G., KPK, Fazil Khan, D.S.P. and Ma'azullah, S.I. for the State.\nIrfanullah (Brother of complainant) for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "YAR MUHAMMAD KHAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25377", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4843 = 2024 SLD 4843 = 2024 SCMR 1741", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Belateldy lodged FIR-Presence of eye-witnesses at scene of occurrence doubtful-Motive not proved-First Information Report was lodged after an unexplainable delay of 3 hours despite the fact that the distance of the police station from the place of occurrence was 5 km-Complainant had a bike that he used to go to the police station, but despite this the delay in lodging the FIR was not plausibly explained by the prosecution-Prosecution witnesses were unable to provide a justification for their overnight stay at their deceased sisters house-They were posed specific questions regarding their purpose of stay and whether there was any family function-However, no plausible justification was given by them in this regard, which made their presence at the spot highly doubtful-Material facts relating to the place of occurrence were also missing in the FIR and were added through a supplementary statement-It showed that prosecution witnesses improved their version later on-It was hard to believe that sole accused could succeed in fleeing away in front of three persons and that too in cotton crops having 3/4 feet height-As far as motive was concerned, the Trial Court through its judgment had conceded that the prosecution had failed to prove the motive in the case at hand-As far as recovery of the deceaseds ear-rings was concerned, it was not proved by the prosecution during the trial, and the Trial Court disbelieved it-Injuries on the deceaseds ear were not mentioned by the witnesses-There were major contradictions in the prosecutions case that were overlooked by the courts below-Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt-Consequently jail petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed,the impugned judgment was set aside, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.\n(b) Criminal trial\n-Witness, evidence of-Improvements made in witness statement-Effect-Where a witness makes dishonest improvements in his statement then it loses its significance in the eyes of law.\nSardar Bibi and another v. Munir Ahmad and others 2017 SCMR 344; Amir Zeman v. Mahboob and others 1985 SCMR 685; Akhtar Ali and others v. The State 2008 SCMR 6; Khalid Javed and another v. The State 2003 SCMR 1419; Mohammad Shafiqe Ahmad v. The State PLD 1981 SC 472; Syed Saeed Mohammad Shah and another v. The State 1993 SCMR 550; Mohammad Saleem v. Mohammad Azam 2011 SCMR 474 and Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 ref.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Unwitnessed incident-Medical evidence-Scope-Medical evidence by its nature and character cannot recognize a culprit in case of an un-witnessed incident-Where the eyewitness account relied upon by the prosecution is unreliable and untrustworthy, the accused s conviction cannot sustain on the basis of medical evidence alone.\nHashim Qasim and another v. The State 2017 SCMR 986 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 514 of 2016 and Crl. P. 1011-L of 2016, decided on 6th May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 22.06.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench passed in Crl. Appeal No. 313-J of 2012), heard on: 6th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Abdul Ghaffar, Advocate Supreme Court (in J.P. No. 514 of 2016) (through video link Lahore) for Petitioner.\nNemo for Petitioner (in Crl. P. No. 1011-L of 2016).\nIrfan Zia, Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD JAHANGIR and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25378", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4844 = 2024 SLD 4844 = 2024 SCMR 1749", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Contempt of Court Ordinance (V of 2003)-\n-S. 3-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 204-Contempt of Court-Show cause notice, issuance of-Illegally running a restaurant in protected area of Margalla Hills National Park (the National Park)-Alleged contemnor had voluntarily agreed to vacate the premises where he was running an illegal restaurant, however, instead of abiding by his statement, which was recorded in an earlier order of the Supreme Court, he initiated a media propaganda campaign against the Supreme Court projecting that it was the Supreme Court which was responsible for causing the suffering of all those employed by him in the restaurant by leaving them un-employed and that the absence of his restaurant would be a great loss to all his customers-Alleged contemnor propagated this by suppressing the fact that he was running the restaurant in violation of the law and by destroying the protected National Park-Alleged contemnor prima facie had disobeyed/ disregarded the earlier order of the Supreme Court and appeared to have committed a wilful breach of the valid undertaking given to the Supreme Court by him and had acted to bring the authority of the Supreme Court and the administration of law into disrespect and disrepute, and to lower the authority of the Supreme Court and scandalizing the judges of the Court in relation to their official work-Supreme Court issued show cause notice to the alleged contemnor to show cause why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against him with the directions that he should state whether he had reached out to his brother, who was the Cabinet Secretary, and had sought the issuance of the Notification regarding removal of the Chairperson of the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board and for the placement of the Wildlife Board under the Ministry of Interior/Interior Division, by removing it from the Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination.\n(b) Rules of Business, 1973-\n-Rr. 3(3), 10(1)(b) & Sched. II-Islamabad Wildlife Management Board(Wildlife Board) transferred from the Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination to the Ministry of Interior/ Interior Division-Legality-Rule 3 of the Rules of Business, 1973 (the Rules) vests power in the Prime Minister to allocate business of the Federal Government amongst the different Divisions mentioned in Schedule II of the Rules-However, the business which is allocated amongst the Divisions must have some nexus with the work of the Division and serve the public interest-Schedule II of the Rules, is enacted pursuant to R. 3(3) of the Rules and it lists the different Divisions, including the Establishment Division-Amongst the functions of the Establishment Division is the Review of organizations, functions and procedures of the Divisions and that this be done with the objective of improving their efficiency-Rule 10(1)(b) of the Rules states that a change in the allocation of business between various divisions of a Ministry must not be done without previous consultation with the Cabinet Division-In the present case two Divisions were rearranged without the involvement/approval of the Establishment Division and without consulting the Cabinet Division-Interior Division has many responsibilities, as set out in Schedule II of the Rules-To handover the Wildlife Board and the Margalla Hills National Park (National Park) to the Ministry of Interior/Interior Division was not done with the objective of improving their efficiency-Wildlife Board and the National Park did not have the remotest concern with the workings of the Ministry of Interior/Interior Division, nor did it have any expertise or competence in attending to their affairs-Attorney General stated before the Supreme Court that the Memorandum dated 6 August 2024, through which the Wildlife Board was transferred from the Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination to the Ministry of Interior/Interior Division, has been withdrawn by issuing Memorandum dated 9 August 2024 and that the Wildlife Board shall continue to function under the Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination (and not under the Ministry of Interior/Interior Division)-Supreme Court after appreciating the fact that the Prime Minister had decided to withdraw the Memorandum gave directions that part of the Margalla Hills was in the province of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, therefore, the Provincial Government shall file concise statement under the signatures of the Chief Secretary, Secretary Forest and Director-General, Galiyat Development Authority, stating/disclosing the construction and projects which were being raised therein.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003=3Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=204", - "Case #": "Criminal Original Petitions Nos. 19 and 20 of 2024, decided on 17th August, 2024, heard on: 15th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, C.J. and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Umar Ijaz Gillani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in both cases).\nHafiz Arfat Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court, M. Ali Randhawa, Chairman CDA, Talat Mehmood Gondal, Member Environment, CDA and Naeem Dar, Director-General (Law), CDA for CDA.\nQasim Ali Chowhan, Advocate Supreme Court for MCI.\nShah Faisal Ilyas, Additional Advocate-General, KP. and Shahrukh Ali, D.G., Galiyat for Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.\nShah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court along with Saddique Anwar, CEO for Pine City.\nOn Court's notice:\nMansoor Usman Awan, Attorney-General for Pakistan.\nMalik Javed Iqbal, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan.\nAnis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record.\nKamran Ali Afzal, Secretary Cabinet Division, Islamabad (respondent No. 1 in Crl. Org. P. No. 19/2024)\nEazaz A. Dar, Secretary, Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination, Islamabad (respondent No. 1 in Crl. Org. P. No.20/2024)", - "Petitioner Name:": "BILAL HAQUE-Petitioner\nVersus\nKAMRAN ALI AFZAL, SECRETARY, CABINET DIVISION, ISLAMABAD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25379", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4845 = 2024 SLD 4845 = 2024 SCMR 1757", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Inquiry proceedings-No opportunity provided to accused official to cross-examine witnesses-Effect-Violation of principles of natural justice and due process of law-Senior Superintendent Prison and Deputy Superintendent Jail (the petitioners)-Penalty of reduction to lower post for 5 years and dismissal from service respectively-Legality-In the case in hand, admittedly 20 witnesses were examined who deposed against the petitioners but the inquiry officer failed to provide any opportunity to the petitioners to conduct cross-examination of such witnesses to discredit their statement or testimony-Neither the inquiry report depicted that the statements of the alleged 20 witnesses were recorded in presence of petitioners nor any right of cross-examination was provided to them-No evidence which is accusatorial to the opposite party would be admissible unless such party is afforded an evenhanded opportunity of skimming its exactitudes by cross-examination-Right of proper defence and cross-examination of witnesses by the accused is a vested right-In the present case role of inquiry officer was to sift the grain from the chaff and actually establish that the petitioners violated their assigned duties which could only be proved through evidence and if the opportunity of cross-examination was afforded to the petitioners as their defence to disprove the allegations raised against them-Inquiry officer in the present case did not adhere to the principle of natural justice and due process of law, which destroyed the whole substratum of inquiry and the case of misconduct made out by the department against the petitioners-Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, consequently the penalty of reduction to lower post awarded to Senior Superintendent Prison by the Original and Appellate Authority, and enhanced by the Tribunal from 3 years to 5 years was set aside, and he was restored to his original position with back benefits; whereas the punishment awarded to Deputy Superintendent Jail by the Original and Appellate Authority and conversion of his compulsory retirement into dismissal from service by the Tribunal was also set aside and he was reinstated in service with back benefits.\n \nFederation of Pakistan through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue FBR, House, Islamabad and others v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603; Raja Muhammad Shahid v. The Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135 and Usman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO, Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 ref.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings stemming from the same offence-Standard of proof-Standard of proof required in a departmental inquiry is not analogous to the standard of proof which is considered necessary in the criminal trial-Departmental inquiry stems from the charges of misconduct where the standard of proof depends on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence but not a proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is a strict proof required in criminal trials.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Concurrent departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings stemming from the same offence-Acquittal in criminal proceedings-Effect-Where the accused official is acquitted by the Court in criminal proceedings and his conviction is set aside, it does not mean that he could not be called upon to face disciplinary proceedings on account of misconduct or dereliction of his duties.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 646-K to 647-K of 2021, decided on 9th August, 2024.\n(Appeal against the judgment dated 30.03.2021 passed by the Sindh Service Tribunal at Karachi in Appeals Nos. 867 and 823 of 2018).\nheard on: 21st June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M.M. Aqil Awan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Muhammad Arshad Khan Tanoli, Advocate Supreme Court and Danish Rashid Khan for Petitioners (in both cases).\nHakim Ali Shakh, Additional A.G., Sindh, Sagheer Ahmed Abbasi, Additional A.G., Sindh, Ms. Shazia Qazi, Special Secretary Prisons, Sindh, Muhammad Nasir Khan, D.I.G., Prisons, Sindh and Muhammad Channa, S.O., Prison-I for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM MURTAZA SHEIKH and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nThe CHIEF MINISTER, SINDH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25380", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4846 = 2024 SLD 4846 = 2024 SCMR 1770", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWSs", - "Key Words:": "Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5-Recovery of decretal amount-Misconduct-Concealment of facts-Costs imposition of-During execution proceedings, High Court imposed fine upon petitioner/judgment debtor for filing second Constitutional petition suppressing the fact of dismissal of earlier petition on the same subject-Validity-While dismissing Constitutional petition High Court made serious observations about misconduct of petitioner/judgment debtor who by concealment of relevant facts from lawyers and Courts, managed to file miscellaneous application as well as second Constitutional petition after dismissal of his appeal on merits by Lower Appellate Court and after withdrawal of his earlier Constitutional petition from the High Court by making false accusations against lawyers without any substance-Petitioner/ judgment debtor did not deserve any leniency nor there were convincing reasons to waive off the cost imposed by High Court-Supreme Court declined to entertain request for satisfaction of judgment and decree in instalments, as no such application was filed by petitioner/judgment debtor before Executing Court-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3601-L of 2022, decided on 23rd July, 2024.\n(On appeal against the order dated 28.10.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No. 65452 of 2022), heard on: 23rd July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Tanveer Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nRespondent not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SALEEM-Petitioner\nVersus\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25381", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4847 = 2024 SLD 4847 = 2024 SCMR 1773", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Unnatural conduct of complainant and eye-witness-Admittedly, the appellant (accused) was alone, whereas, the complainant, witness and the deceased were three in numbers-Taking the words of the complainant that he and the eye-witness were 20 paces away from the appellant, they could have easily reached the appellant and overpowered him within few seconds, but no attempt was made by them to avert the attack-It was hard to believe that life of the brother and uncle of complainant and eye-witness respectively, was in danger, but they did not react immediately-Had the complainant and the eye-witness been present at the time and place of the occurrence, the appellant could have been apprehended before causing any dagger injuries to the deceased-Despite the fact that the complainant and his companion were 20 paces away from the appellant, they did not make any attempt to catch hold of him, even after he caused dagger injuries to the deceased-Prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed, and appellant was acquitted of the charges.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Presence of complainant and eye-witness at the time and place of occurrence doubtful-Witnesses alleged that after the occurrence, they boarded the injured in their jeep to take him to a hospital for treatment and on the way, the injured was shifted into the van of the rescue service for taking him to THQ Hospital-Natural reaction of the complainant (brother of deceased) ought to have been to reach the hospital immediately in order to save the life of the injured, but the needful was not done-There was no justification in shifting the injured from the jeep to the rescue van-To substantiate the contention of the complainant, the statements of the driver of the rescue van was of utmost importance, but the Investigating Officer did not record statement of any of the members of the van-Besides, for the sake of arguments, if it was believed that the complainant and eye-witness boarded the injured in the jeep, then the jeep and clothes of the complainant and the witness must have been stained with blood-Admittedly, no blood was collected from the jeep nor the blood stained clothes of the witnesses were taken into possession by the Investigation Officer (IO) and no explanation in this behalf had been advanced by the prosecution-Stance of the complainant and the eye-witness was not only improbable, but also got no support from the record-Prosecution had failed to prove the presence of the complainant and the eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence-Prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed, and appellant was acquitted of the charges.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S.302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Medical evidence-Rigor mortis, development of-Postmortem report and opinion of doctor negating version of the complainant-In the present case the doctor who conducted the postmortem of the deceased, while appearing as a witness before the Trial Court, submitted that rigor mortis was developed and eyes of the deceased were semi opened-Considering the contention of the complainant that the injured was immediately taken to the hospital for treatment in his jeep, question arose as to how rigor mortis was developed and why eyes of the deceased were not closed-Postmortem report, the statement of the doctor and his opinion did not support the contention of the complainant regarding immediate shifting of the injured to the hospital-Had the complainant and eye-witness been present at the place and time of the occurrence, the injured could have been taken to the hospital, without loss of time and thereby, rigor mortis could not have developed-Doctor explained that the injuries were lunar shaped, which meant that probably, the injuries were caused through lunar shaped weapon-On the contrary, the complainant and the eye-witnesses alleged that the appellant (accused) inflicted dagger blows on the deceased-Their statements regarding nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased and the weapon used contradicted the postmortem report and the statement of the doctor-Presence of the witnesses at the time of the crime was doubtful, as such the occurrence seemed to be unseen-Prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed, and appellant was acquitted of the charges.\n(d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 40-Information received by police from the accused-Proof-In order to bring the case within the ambit of Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, the prosecution must prove that a person accused of any offence, in custody of police officer, has conveyed an information or made a statement to the police, leading to discover of new fact concerning the offence, which is not in the prior knowledge of the police-Such information or statement should be in writing and in presence of witnesses-In absence of information or statement from a person, accused of an offence and in custody of police officer, discovery of fact alone, would not bring the case of the prosecution under the said Article.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Recovery of crime weapon on disclosure of accused-Inconsequential-According to the prosecution, a dagger used in the commission of the offence was recovered on the disclosure and pointation of the appellant-Surprisingly, the Investigating Officer (IO) did not record the information received from the appellant in writing, in presence of a witness, while he was in police custody-Prosecution had failed to establish any disclosure from the appellant, therefore, recovery of the dagger, in the circumstances was immaterial-Even otherwise, the IO stated that the recovery of the dagger was effected on the pointation of the appellant, in presence of an eye-witness, who was also a nephew of the deceased-According to the said witness, the dagger was wrapped in a black colour shopper, but when it was presented before the Trial Court, it was unsealed and was wrapped in a white colour plastic-None of the recovery witness put any identification mark upon it in order to exclude any possibility of foisting false recovery or substituting the recovered one-Manner in which the dagger was taken into possession and produced in the Court, created doubt regarding its recovery, therefore, the High Court had rightly disbelieved it-Prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed, and appellant was acquitted of the charges.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Delay in lodging FIR-Probability of false involvement of accused-Injured was shifted to the hospital at about 10:30 a.m. and by that time he was alive; he was under a treatment till 01:35 p.m. and thereafter, succumbed to injuries-This fact was admitted by the Investigating Officer in his cross-examination-According to the prosecution, the FIR was registered at 11:25 a.m., but surprisingly, section 302, P.P.C. was inserted in it when by that time, the injured was alive-This showed that the FIR was actually registered after the death of the deceased, but with mala fide intention, and time of its registration was mentioned as 11:25 a.m. in order to cover the delay in lodging the FIR-Delay in lodging the FIR was a result of deliberation and consultation, therefore, false involvement of the appellant could not be ruled out-Prosecution had failed to establish its case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed, and appellant was acquitted of the charges.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 577 of 2019 and Crl. P. No. 596 of 2016, decided on 13th May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 17.03.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Crl. Appeal No.198 of 2012), heard on: 13th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Basharat Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant (in Crl. A. No. 577 of 2019).\nRaja Muhammad Farooq, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in Crl. P. No. 596 of 2016).\nMirza Abid Majeed, DPG Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR ALI ABBASI and another-Appellants/Petitioners\nVersus\nZAFAR ALI ABBASI and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25382", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4848 = 2024 SLD 4848 = 2024 SCMR 1782", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal trial-\n-Case based on circumstantial evidence-Principle-In a case where there is no direct evidence and the prosecution case hinges upon the circumstantial evidence, utmost care and caution is required for reaching at a just decision of the case-In such like cases every circumstance should be linked with each other and it should form such a continuous chain that its one end touches the dead body and other the neck of the accused-If any link in the chain is missing then its benefit must go to the accused.\nCh. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia and another 1992 SCMR 1047; Sarfraz Khan v. The State 1996 SCMR 188; Asadullah and another v. The State 1999 SCMR 1034 and Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another 2008 SCMR 1103 ref.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-Extra judicial confession of accused before the police-Inadmissible in evidence-There was neither any last seen evidence nor evidence of waj takkar available on the record against the appellants (accused persons)-Prosecution case was based on alleged confession of appellant MY before the police while in custody-There was also conflict in the statements of witnesses of extra judicial confession of MY regarding the date of making of said confession-Even otherwise confession of an accused before the police while in custody is inadmissible in evidence-Police did not make any effort to produce MY before the concerned Magistrate for recording of his judicial confession in accordance with the law-Furthermore complainant was real brother of deceased but he did not enter appearance in the witness box-According to the prosecution, he shifted to some unknown place, therefore, non-bailable warrants of his arrest to compel him to appear before the Trial Court, could not be executed-Prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond the shadow of doubt-Appeals were allowed, and the appellants were acquitted of the charges.\nSaeed Ahmad v. The State 2011 SCMR 1686 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-Medical evidence neither supporting the prosecution case nor the motive for the offence-According to the medical evidence produced by the prosecution through a doctor, the right eye of deceased was missing and the same was removed with a sharp edged weapon but there was no mention of removing the right eye of the deceased with sharp edged weapon in the alleged extra judicial confession of appellant MY -No sharp edged weapon had been recovered from any of the appellants during the investigating of this case-According to the prosecution case, the appellants attempted to commit sodomy with the deceased before committing his murder and when the deceased refused and raised hue and cry, the appellants committed the occurrence-There was no mention of presence of any injury on the buttocks or on the anal area of the deceased in the medical evidence and as such the alleged motive of the prosecution had also not been supported by the medical evidence-Prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond the shadow of doubt-Appeals were allowed, and the appellants were acquitted of the charges.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-Recovery of mobile phone and motorcycle belonging to deceased from the accused-Inconsequential-Insofar as the alleged recovery of mobile phone of the deceased from the possession of MY , appellant was concerned, no proof of the ownership of said mobile phone in the name of deceased had been brought on record-SIM numbers of mobile phone of the deceased were mentioned in the FIR-Said SIMs of the deceased were not recovered from the possession of the appellants-Police official who was recovery witness of mobile phone of the deceased from the possession of MY appellant had candidly conceded during cross-examination that no SIM was present in the recovered mobile phone-No documentary proof was produced in the prosecution evidence to show that the motorcycle allegedly recovered from the possession of MY appellant, was owned by the deceased or the same was in the name of his any family member-Even the complainant who was brother of the deceased did not appear in the witness box to identify that the motorcycle allegedly recovered from the possession of MY appellant was the same motorcycle, which belonged todeceased-Alleged recoveries of motorcycle and mobile phone of the deceased from the possession of MY appellant were not helpful for the prosecution case-Prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond the shadow of doubt-Appeals were allowed, and the appellants were acquitted of the charges.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-Call Data Record (CDR), production of-Inconsequential-Call Data Record (CDR) of the SIMs of the deceased and appellants (accused persons) were produced in the prosecution evidence but no documentary evidence was produced before the Trial Court to establish that the SIMs mentioned in the call data record were in the name of the deceased or appellants-Moreover, no phone recording or its transcript was produced in evidence to show the nature of the conversation between the appellants and the deceased-Evidence of CDR produced in this case was inconsequential for the prosecution-Prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond the shadow of doubt-Appeals were allowed, and the appellants were acquitted of the charges.\nAzeem Khan v. Mujahid Khan 2016 SCMR 274 ref.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention-Reappraisal of evidence-Pointing out of the place of occurrence and the place of recovery of dead body by the accused persons-Inconsequential-Insofar as the prosecution evidence about the pointing out of the place of occurrence and the place of recovery of dead body by the appellants (accused persons) was concerned, it was noteworthy that no incriminating material like blood stained earth etc was recovered from the place of occurrence allegedly pointed out by the appellants whereas the place of recovery of dead body was already in the knowledge of the prosecution because according to the prosecution case, the dead body was recovered from the place by the police on 07.01.2015 whereas the said place was pointed out by the appellants on 22.01.2015-Under the circumstances, the above-mentioned prosecution evidence cannot be used against the appellants-Prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond the shadow of doubt-Appeals were allowed, and the appellants were acquitted of the charges.\n(g) Criminal trial-\n-Doubt in the prosecution case- Principle- Even a single circumstance, which creates reasonable doubt in the prosecution evidence, is sufficient to discard the prosecution case.\nMst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Abdul Jabbar v. State 2019 SCMR 129; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 and Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),34", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeals Nos. 23-Q and 24-Q of 2020, decided on 29th July, 2024.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 31.7.2018 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Criminal Appeal No.401 of 2017, Criminal Appeal No.415/2017 and Criminal Appeal No.442 of 2017), heard on: 29th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, Jamal Khan Mondokhail and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Gohar Yaqoob Yousafzai, Advocate-on-Record and Inamuallah, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in both cases).\nAmeer Hamza Mengal, Additional P.G. Balochistan for the State (in both cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "REHMATULLAH and 2 others-Appellants\nVersus\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25383", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4849 = 2024 SLD 4849 = 2024 SCMR 1791", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Co-sharer-\n-Joint (undivided) khata-Vendee (buyer), right of-Vendee, who buys from a co-sharer, who owns an undivided khata in common with others, is clothed with the same rights as the vendor (co-sharer) has in the property, no more and no less-If the vendor (co-sharer) was in exclusive possession of a certain portion of the joint land and transfers its possession to his vendee, so long as there is no partition between the co-sharers, the vendee must be regarded as stepping into the shoes of his transferor (co-sharer) qua his ownership rights in the joint property, to the extent of the area purchased by him, provided that the area in question does not exceed the share which the transferor (co-sharer) owns in the whole property.\nMuhammad Muzaffar Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf Khan PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 9 and Atta Muhammad v. Manzoor Ahmad 1992 SCMR 138 ref.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 42, 54 & 55-Suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction-Shamlat land-Claim of ownership-Proof-Plaintiffs were claiming exclusive ownership of the suit land primarily on the basis of their alleged possession without specifying/explaining the nature/status of their alleged possession-Plaintiffs further based their claim upon the statements made by four shareholders on 14 April 1938 in favour of predecessors of the plaintiffs with regard to the suit land-Admittedly statements in writing of those four shareholders were not available on record-Neither the said four shareholders nor their successors had ever affirmed those statements before any forum-In the Roznamcha dated 14 April 1938 neither any reason nor any specification or measurement of the area of Shamlat Deh for its exclusion from the partition had been mentioned-Said vague Roznamcha did not mention as to on what basis the unspecified portion of Shamlat Deh had to be declared as ownership of predecessors of the plaintiffs-Counsel for the plaintiffs failed to explain as to how merely on the basis of their alleged possession, the plaintiffs could be declared as owners of the suit land-Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court had rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs by passing speaking and well-reasoned judgments-By decreeing the suit vide impugned judgment, the High Court had erred in facts as well as in law-Appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of High Court was set aside with the direction that the plaintiffs were at liberty to approach the revenue forum for redressal of their grievance, if any, in accordance with law.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54,55", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.477-L of 2011, decided on 6th August, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 13.10.2011 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No.773 of 2005), heard on: 2nd July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Usman Karim-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nImran Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1-4 (through video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR IQBAL and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nMUHAMMAD RAFIQ and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25384", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4850 = 2024 SLD 4850 = 2024 SCMR 608", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlFDWXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)-\n-Ss. 2(a), 2(f) & 19-Eviction of tenant-Relationship of tenant and landlord, denial of-Dispute qua ownership of rented premises-Ejectment-petitioner (Masjid) sought eviction of the tenant from its (Masjids) shops-Plea of the tenant was that he was not under tenancy of the ejectment-petitioner, instead (he was tenant) of Evacuee Trust Property Board (Evacuee Board) to whom rented-premises belonged-Tenant filed present constitutional petition against eviction orders concurrently passed against him-Held, that record revealed that the petitioner/tenant, while making reference to a document having been exhibited as evidence, claimed that he was a tenant of respondent (Evacuee Board)-Said document was prepared after the filing of ejectment-petition-Petitioner, in his evidence, had even denied having any knowledge as to the amount paid to respondent (Evacuee Board) at the time of alleged execution of the said document-Petitioner also admitted that a real uncle of the petitioner was president of the mosque committee but then again denied, for want of knowledge, that the said uncle/president gave the premises to the predecessor of the petitioner, on rent-Reading of evidence had left no doubt that the predecessor of the petitioner entered into (exhibited) rent agreement with the ejectment-petitioner-Petitioner asserted that instead of ejectment-petitioner, respondent (Evacuee Board) was the actual owner, however, in said respect previous judgment passed in previous constitution petition had already been decided, which was contested by respondent (Evacuee Board) as well ; and, after hearing the parties, High Court reached to the conclusion that factual controversy was involved vis- -vis the ownership dispute which could not be resolved without recording of evidence-Said order (passed in constitutional petition), admittedly, was never assailed and instead a reference had been filed by respondent (Evacuee Board), with respect to several shops including the premises before the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board which was pending adjudication-Record even revealed that the petitioner filed a suit before institution of present eviction proceedings claiming himself to be the owner of the premises-Thus, the petitioner could not be allowed to adopt two different versions in two different cases, which was hit by principle of approbate and reprobate; in one case he had pleaded himself to be the owner of the premises and in the ejectment-petition he had taken the defence quite contrary to the earlier-Dispute of ownership, between ejectment-petitioner (Masjid) and respondent (Evacuee Board) was to be determined by the forum having authority to record evidence-Undoubtedly, the ejectment-petitioner (Masjid) for the time being was receiving rent with respect to the premises (shops)-No benefit could be given to petitioner/tenant for the dispute of ejectment-petitioner and respondent (Evacuee Board)-No illegality, infirmity or mistake had been made by both the Courts below while passing eviction order-Constitutional petition, filed by tenants, was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)-\n-Ss. 2(a), 2(f) & 19-Eviction of tenant-Rented premises claimed to be any place of religious worship -Scope-Rent Tribunal, jurisdiction of-Scope-Ejectment-petitioner (Masjid) sought eviction of the tenant from its (Masjids) shops-Tenant filed present constitutional petition against eviction orders concurrently passed against him-Held, that petitioner, while relying upon Ss. 2(a) & 2(f) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, contended that the Rent Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matters pertaining to any place of religious worship -Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, provides that application in respect of rented premises shall be filed in the Rent Tribunal for the settlement of the disputes in an expeditious manner; the premises as mentioned in S. 2(f) of the Act 2009 includes building , while defining the word building S. 2(a) of the Act, 2009, excludes room in a hotel, hostel, boarding house, guest house or any place of religious worship-However the words any place of religious worship by no means can be stretched to a premises or building that is being used for a commercial purpose-Admittedly, the premises-in-question are shops, being used for commercial purpose-Said provisions of the Act, 2009 cumulatively reveal that any property, space or premises let out for the purpose of business or trade are not intended to be excluded from the definition of building or for that matter premises-Thus, the objection of the petitioner as to maintainability of the ejectment-petition, was rejected-No illegality, infirmity or mistake had been made by both the Courts below while passing eviction order-Constitutional petition, filed by tenants, was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 =2(a),2(f),19", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 47196 of 2022, decided on 11th June, 2024. heard on: 7th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah for Petitioner.\nSyed Muhammad Shah for Respondent No. 3.\nRana Zahid Nasim Shahid for Respondent No. 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAHEED YOUNAS-Petitioner\nVersus\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, GUJRANWALA and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25385", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlJ5WSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4909 = 2024 SLD 4909 = 2024 PLJ 119 = (2024) 130 TAX 574", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVEQlJ5WSs", - "Key Words:": "Key Statutes and Provisions:\nKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2013:\nSection 19 & 22: These provisions address the collection and withholding of sales tax on services rendered within the jurisdiction of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).\nSindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011:\nGoverns the collection of sales tax on services provided within Sindhs territorial jurisdiction.\nFinance Act, 2013:\nRelevant provisions such as Sections 19, 27, and 30 outline tax obligations but lack a mechanism for refund of taxes collected erroneously.\nContract Act, 1872:\nSection 72: Mandates the refund of amounts paid under a mistake of law or fact.\nFacts and Issues:\nThe petitioner, a Karachi-based company, provided services under an agreement with a respondent entity in KP.\nLocation of Services: The storage facility for methanol was in Karachi, making the services subject to the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, under which the tax was already paid.\nDispute: KP Tax Authority collected sales tax for the same services, which the petitioner challenged, arguing that the collection was beyond KPs jurisdiction.\nKey Legal Findings:\nJurisdictional Overreach:\nThe services were rendered and consumed in Karachi, falling within Sindhs jurisdiction for taxation under the Sindh Sales Tax Act, 2011.\nKP Tax Authoritys collection of sales tax was beyond its territorial and legal jurisdiction.\nRefund Obligation:\nSince the Finance Act, 2013, does not provide a specific refund mechanism for taxes collected erroneously, Section 72 of the Contract Act, 1872, applies.\nSection 72 imposes a legal duty on the recipient of money paid under a mistake of law to refund it to the payer.\nPrecedent:\nThe Supreme Court, in Messrs Pfizer Laboratories Limited, upheld that taxes collected without lawful authority must be refunded after due verification.\nThis principle reinforces the taxpayer’s right to recover amounts collected erroneously.\nHigh Courts Directions:\nDirected Respondent No. 1 (KP Tax Authority) to refund the sales tax withheld from the petitioner after verification.\nA three-month timeframe was set for completing the refund process.\nLegal Principles Established:\nTerritorial Taxation:\nTaxing authorities cannot collect taxes for services rendered outside their jurisdiction. Territoriality is a fundamental principle of fiscal legislation.\nRefund Under Section 72, Contract Act, 1872:\nWhen a statutory framework lacks a refund mechanism, general contractual principles apply. Payments made under a misconception of law must be refunded.\nJudicial Enforcement of Refunds:\nCourts can direct refund of taxes collected unlawfully, ensuring taxpayers are not penalized for administrative overreach or jurisdictional errors.\nPractical Implications:\nFor Taxpayers:\nEnsure clarity regarding the jurisdiction and applicable laws before remitting taxes.\nIn cases of erroneous tax collection, invoke judicial remedies under Section 72 of the Contract Act or relevant case law.\nFor Tax Authorities:\nExercise caution to avoid jurisdictional overreach and maintain consistency with territorial limits.\nImplement transparent refund mechanisms to address mistakes promptly.\nFor the Judiciary:\nUphold taxpayers rights by providing clear guidance on refund obligations.\nEnsure timely enforcement of refund orders to avoid prolonged disputes.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court rightly ordered the KP Tax Authority to refund the sales tax collected beyond its jurisdiction. The decision emphasizes the territorial principle in taxation, the application of Section 72 of the Contract Act for refunding erroneous payments, and the judiciarys role in safeguarding taxpayer rights.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2013=19,27,30", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 2364-P of 2023, heard on 17.1.2024, heard on: 17.1.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): S.M. Attique Shah and Syed Arshad Ali, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Hamza Hussain Bangash, Advocate for Petitioner.\nMr. Muhammad Ayub Shinwari, Advocate for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. AL-HAMD BULK STORAGE (PVT) LTD., KARACHI SINDH-Petitioner\nVS\nKHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA REVENUE AUTHORITY through Director General, Peshawar and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25386", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4926 = 2024 SLD 4926", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Shariat Appeal No. 05 of 2018. Date of Hearing: 08.08.2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 07.03.2017 of the Federal Shariat Court passed in \nCrl. A. No. 15-I & M.R. No. 02-I of 2016 a/w. Crl. A. No. 60-I of 2009)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Justice Qazi Faez Isa, Chairman. Justice Naeem Akhtar Afghan. Justice Shahid Bilal Hassan. Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masud. Dr. Qibla Ayaz.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Rizwan Ejaz, ASC\nFor the State: Mr. Noroz Khan, Addl.A.G., KP", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shameem Khan Appellant\nVersus\nThe State Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25387", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4927 = 2024 SLD 4927", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Shariat Appeal No. 2 of 2018. Date of Hearing: 08.08.2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.01.2012 of the Federal \nShariat Court, Islamabad passed in Criminal Appeal No.164-L \nof 2004 and Crl. Murder Reference No.8-L/2005.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shariat Appellate Bench: Justice Qazi Faez Isa, Chairman. Justice Naeem Akhtar Afghan. Justice Shahid Bilal Hassan\nDr. Muhammad Khalid Masud. Dr. Qibla Ayaz.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Humayoun Rashid Ch., ASC. \nFor the State: Mr. Ahmed Raza Gillani,\nAdditional Prosecutor-General, Punjab.\nFor the Complainant: Mr. Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "Imran alias Mani. … Appellant \nVersus\nThe State. … Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25388", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4928 = 2024 SLD 4928", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.296/2015.Date of Hearing: 10.7.2024. Against the judgment dated 10.12.2014. passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in RFA No.67 of 1998.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi. Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant(s): Malik Javed Iqbal Wains, Addl. Attorney \nGeneral for Pakistan For the Mr. Khawaja Hassan Riaz, ASC a/w Respondent Muhammad Rashid\nAssisted by: Ahsan Jehangir Khan, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and another Appellant(s) \n Versus\nM/s Rashid Builders (Pvt) Limited …Respondent(s" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25389", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4929 = 2024 SLD 4929", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition Nos. 3105-L to 3114-L & 3119-L to 3122-L of 2023, heard on: 07.08.2024. (On appeal against the judgment dated 16.05.2023 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 3482 to 3488, 4259, 4571 of 2022 and 435 to 439 of 2023).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Athar Minallah\nMr. Justice Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioners(s): Mr. Baleegh-uz-Zaman, Addl. A.G. \nMr. Riasat Ali, DSP For the Mr. Muhammad Arshad Bhatti, ASC (via video link from Lahore)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Superintendent of Police Headquarters, Lahore etc. \n….Petitioner(s) \nVersus\nIjaz Aslam (In C.P. 3105/2023) Sana Ullah (In C.P. 3106/2023) Nadeem Hussain (In C.P. 3107/2023) Bukhtiar Ahmad (In C.P. 3108/2023) Sarfraz Ali (In C.P. 3109/2023) Muhammad Bilal (In C.P. 3110/2023)\nMuhammad Asif (In C.P. 3111/2023) Zahid Imran (In C.P. 3112/2023) Muhammad Asif (In C.P. 3113/2023)\nMuhammad Asif (In C.P. 3114/2023) Khuram Shahzad (In C.P. 3119/2023) Fayyaz Ali (In C.P. 3120/2023)\nAbdul Samad (In C.P. 3121/2023) Muhammad Tahir Hussain (In C.P. 3122/2023)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25390", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4930 = 2024 SLD 4930", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.144-L OF 2020 AND CIVIL PETITION NO.282-L OF 2024. Date of hearing 22.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi. Justice Naeem Akhntar Afghan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner (C.P.282-L/24) Ch. Zulfiqar Ali Dhudi, ASC (via video link from Lahore) For the appellants (Crl.A.144-L/20) Mr. Hammad Akbar Wallana, ASC (via video link from Lahore) For the State (in both cases) \nMr. Irfan Zia, Addl. Prosecutor General\nPunjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Riaz (Crl.P.282-L/24) ...Petitioner\nAppellant Muhammad Yahya etc. (Crl.A. 144-L/20) Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25391", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4931 = 2024 SLD 4931", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No.2697 and 2698-L of 2016 Date of Hearing: 28.06.2024. Appeal against the order dated 23.06.2016 \npassed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in WPs.No.21263/2016 & 21265/201", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. Mr. Justice Shahid Bilal Hassan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. Muhammad Amjad Pervaiz, ASC\nFor the Respondent No.1 (In both petitions) Syed Kamil Pervaiz, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Town Administration and another (In both cases) \n…Petitioners Versus Mohammad Khalid and others\nMuhammad Iqbal Javed and others (In C.P.2697-L/2016) \n(In C.P.2698-L/2016) …Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25392", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4932 = 2024 SLD 4932", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2293-L of 2016. Date of Hearing: 02.09.2024. (On appeal from the judgment dated 24.06.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in WP No. \n22019/2016)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Justice Qazi Faez Isa, CJ Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail. Justice Naeem Akhtar Afghan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Syed Mansoor Ali Bukhari, ASC. (through video link from Lahore) For the Respondents: Not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Abdil Ali. … Petitioner Versus Additional District Judge, Gojra and others. … Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25393", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4933 = 2024 SLD 4933", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No.525-K to 527-K/2024 and Civil Petitions No.477-K to 511-K OF 2024. Date of Hearing: 01.08.2024\nAgainst the Orders dated 19.03.2024 and 30.01.2024 passed by Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi in Appeals No.58, 59, 61, 760, 862, 902, 774, 805, 820, 776, 821, 864, 755, 803, 829, 742, 841, 804, 901, 759, 766, 831, 806, 822, 794, 761, 840, 747, 764, 746, 749, 817, 748, 744, 830, 743, 740, 763/2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. Sadar-ud-Din Buriro, ASC\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Addl. AG, Sindh. Mr. Javed Ali Khawaja, Focal Person (Litigation) and Syed Abid Ali, Director (HR), Education & Literacy Department, Government of Sind", - "Petitioner Name:": "Rao Muhammad Rashid (in CP 525-K/24) Khalid Mehmood (in CP 526-K/24) Kaleem Khan (in CP 527-K/24) Noor Khan Dahar (in CP 477-K/24) Hafezullah (in CP 478-K/24) Khair Muhammad (in CP 479-K/24)\nTahir Mehmood (in CP 480-K/24) Syed Shahid Hussain Shah (in CP 481-K/24) Abdul Qayoom (in CP 482-K/24)\nQurban Ali (in CP 483-K/24) Parvaz Khan (in CP 484-K/24) Abdullah (in CP 485-K/24) Aalia Aamir (in CP 486-K/24)\nKhalid Hussain (in CP 487-K/24) Zahid Hussain (in CP 488-K/24) Pir Sher Muhammad (in CP 489-K/24)\nAsma (in CP 490-K/24) Muhammad Hanif Sholani (in CP 491-K/24) Abdul Fatah (in CP 492-K/24) Muhammad Irfan (in CP 493-K/24) Ghulam Nabi (in CP 494-K/24) Muhammad Nadeem (in CP 495-K/24) Farooque Ali Palari (in CP 496-K/24) Mujib ur Rehman (in CP 497-K/24)\nAijaz (in CP 498-K/24) Muhammad Irshad (in CP 499-K/24) Wazeer Shah (in CP 500-K/24) Mumtaz Ali Qureshi (in CP 501-K/24) Aivaz Ali (in CP 502-K/24)\nFatima (in CP 503-K/24) Noor Hussain (in CP 504-K/24)\nMeraj Uddin (in CP 505-K/24) Abdul Hafeez Shah (in CP506-K/24) Ali Raza (in CP 507-K/24) Mansoor Ahmed (in CP 508-K/24) Imdad Ali (in CP 509-K/24) CPs 525-K/24 etc 2 Muhammad Bux (in CP 510-K/24) Muhammad Ilyas (in CP 511-K/24) …Petitioner(s) Versus Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary etc. (in all cases) Respondent(s" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25394", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4934 = 2024 SLD 4934", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No.278-K and 279-K OF 2022. Date of Hearing: 02.08.2024. Against the judgment dated 03.12.2021 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in CPs No.D-3081 and D-4120/2019.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: For the Federation: MaliK Naeem Iqbal, ASC Mr. M. Iqbal Chaudhry, AOR Mr. Khaliq Ahmed, DAG For Respondent No. 3 (KPT): For Respondent No. 4 (Aquatech): Mr. Ahmed Pervaiz, ASC \nSyed Imtiaz Shah, Legal Head (KPT) Mr. M. Saleem Thapadewala, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "Waqar Ahmed & others Aaqib Ali and others (in CP 278-K/22) (in CP 279-K/22) …Petitioners Versus The Federationof Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Islamabad & others …Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25395", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4935 = 2024 SLD 4935", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTWXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.431 of 2021. (On appeal against the judgment. dated 10.03.2021 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in R.F.A.No.163 of 2018).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN. MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR. MR. JUSTICE SHAHID WAHEED.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant : Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi, ASC Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Tariq Mehmood, Sr.ASC For Respondent No.2 Mrs. Bushra Qamar, ASC Mr. Tariq Aziz, AOR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Liaquat Ali Khan … Appellant VERSUS Muhammad Akram & \nanother … Respondent(s" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25396", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4936 = 2024 SLD 4936", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. 7 of 2024.Date of Hearing: 11.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Justice Qazi Faez Isa, CJ Justice Naeem Akhtar Afghan. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbas", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Umer Ijaz Gilani, ASC. assisted by Mr. Muhammad Alee, Advocate. For Respondents No.1-2: Malik Javed Iqbal Wains , Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan. Mr. Abdul Sattar Khokhar, Sr.JointSecretary, M/o F.E & P.T. Dr. Agha Haider, Deputy Director, (Legal),\nM/o F.E & P.T. For Respondent No. 3: Mr. M. Nazir Jawwad, ASC. Mr. Nazeer Hussain, Director-General, Coordination H.E.C. Mr. Ahad Mehmood Raza,\nAssistant Director (Law), H.E.C. For Respondent No. 4: Mr. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab. Mr. Muhammad Rehman, Sr. Law Officer, HED, Lahore. For Respondent No. 5: Mr. Shah Faisal Utmankhail, Advocate-General, KP.\nMr. Shah Faisal Ilyas, Additional Advocate-General, KP.\nMr. Ghulam Saeed, Special Secretary, HED, KP.\nAsif Khan, Litigation Officer, HED, KP. For Respondent No. 6: Mr. Hassan Akbar, Advocate-General, Sindh. Mr. Jawad Dero, Additional Advocate-General, Sindh.\nMr. Feroze A. Mahar, Director Constitution Petition No. 7/2024 2 For Respondent No. 7: Mr. Muhammad Ayaz Swati, Additional Advocate-General, Balochistan.\nMr. Jehanzeb Mandokhail, Addl. Secretary, Colleges, HED, Balochistan. For Ministry of Health: Mr. Asif Sohail, Director Legal. For Ministry of Science and\nTechnology: Mr. Najeeb Mandokhail, Section Officer.\nFor Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan: Mr. Parasmahesar, Section Officer", - "Petitioner Name:": "All Public Universities BPS Teachers Association (APUBTA) through its President. … Petitioner Versus\nThe Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Federal Education and Professional Training, Islamabad and others. … Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25397", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4937 = 2024 SLD 4937 = (2024) 130 TAX 368 = 2025 PTD 231 = 2025 SCMR 240", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,111(1)(b),122(9),128(5)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=Order XLVII, Rule 1", - "Case #": "C.R.P.870/2023 in C.P.L.A.2166-L/2023, decided on: 15.03.2024, heard on: 15.03.2024\n(For review of this Court’s order dated 08.08.2023 passed in CP No. 2166-L/2023)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Muhammad Akram, ASC (via video link from Lahore) for the Petitioners.\nCh. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, ASC for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AHMAD SIKANDER\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, AEOI ZONE, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25398", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4938 = 2024 SLD 4938 = (2024) 130 TAX 394", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(13),2(38A),4C,147,177,207,208,209,214Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=175(2),199,199(1)(c)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=20(c),117", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2436 of 2023, decided on 15.03.2024, heard on: 15.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Salman Akram Raja, Mr. Khalid Javed, Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, Mr. Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, Mr. Ijaz Ahmad, Mr. Hyder Ali Khan, Mr. Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Mr. Asad Ladha, Mr. Adnan Haider Randhawa, Mr. Ovais Ali Shah, Mr. Muhammad Asad Ashfaq Tola, Mr. Usman Shoukat, Mr. Rashid Hafeez, Mr. Muhammad Younis, Mr. Shahbaz Shah, Mr. Jahangir Awan, Mr. Jawad A. Qureshi, Mr. Asad Zaman Tarar, Mr. Uzair bin Shafie, Hafiz Munawar Iqbal, Mr. Ahsan Jamal Pirzada, Mr. Imran Khan, Mr. Abdullah Noor, Mr. Hamza Azmat Khan, Ms. Samia Faiz Durrani, Mr. Asmar Tariq Mayo, Mirza Rafaqat Ali Baig, Mr. Mahmood Arif, Mr. Muhammad Usman Rafique, Mr. Iftikhar Nawaz Gujjar, Hafiz Tanveer Nasir, Syed Muhammad Ghazenfur, Syed Nawazish Hussain, Ms. Ramsha Banuri, Mr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Mr. Muhammad Shahrukh Sheikh, Mr. Aziz ul Haq Nishtar, Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Mr. Akhlaq Ahmed Bhatti, Mr. Muhammad Aqib, Mr. Sikandar Ilyas, Mr. Hamza Waheed, Mr. Muhammad Shaheer Roshan, Mr. Hassan Khan Durrani, Mr. Anique Salman Malik, Mr. Usman Salic, Mr. Khalique Zaman, Mr. Saadat Ali Syed, Mr. Aitzaz ul Haque, Mr. Haroon Dugal, Sardar Alam Shafqat, Mr. Ali Raza Kamboh, Mr. Amayed Ashfaq Tola, Mr. Rashid Mehar, Mr. Sohail Mahmood, Mr. Haider Waheed, Mr. Jahanzeb Awan, Mr. Ammar Athar Saeed, Mr. Umer Ijaz Gillani, Mr. Muhammad Alee, Malik Bashir Ahmad Khalid, Mr. Emad ul Hassan, Mr. Muhammad Imran ul Haq, Mr. Wasi Ullah Khan, Ms. Faryal Shah, Mr. Hashim Khalil, Mr. Sufiyan Zaman, Mr. Hamza Siddiqui, Mr. Khalil ur Rehman, Mr. Noman Amin Farooqi, Mr. Khurram M. Hashmi, Mr. Muhammad Mohsin Nazir, Mr. Kamran Ilyas Raja, Mr. Habib Qazi, Mr. Muhammad Adil Saeed, Mr. Muhammad Ali Mehdi, Syed Nasir Ali Gilani, Mr. Nasir Mehmood, Qazi Umair Ali, Malik Ahsan Mehmood and Malik Nasir Abbas Awan Advocates for the petitioners in their respective petitions.\nBarrister Munawar Iqbal Duggal, Additional Attorney General along with Hafiz Ahmad Rasheed, Assitant Attorney General\nMs. Asma Hamid, Dr. Farhat Zafar, Mr. Babar Bilal, Ms. Sana Azhar, Mr. Noor Ahsan, Mr. Hassan Ali, Mr. Muhammad bin Majid, Mr. Ghulam Rasool Bhatti and Mr. Osama Shahid, Advocates for the Respondents.\nSabir Hussain, Legal Advisor, CM Pak, Hafiz Bilal bin Akbar, Deputy Director and Shoaib Ali Khan, Assistant Director Legal DRAP, Raja Shayan, Law Officer Mari Petroleum Company Ameer ul Azeem, Representatives of the departments.\nAssisted by Sakeena Bangash, Law Clerk, Islamabad High Court.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN OILFIELDS LIMITED AND OTHERS\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25399", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4939 = 2024 SLD 4939 = (2024) 130 TAX 442", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=38,40A", - "Case #": "STR No. 97 of 2013, decided on 12.04.2023, heard on: 12.04.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND JAWAD HASSAN, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Advocate/Legal Advisor for Applicant- department.\nMr. Abdus Salam Sajid, Advocate for Respondent-taxpayer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III, LARGE TAXPAYERS, KARACHI\nVs\nM/S ADAM SUGAR MILLS LTD., KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25400", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4940 = 2024 SLD 4940 = (2024) 130 TAX 455", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=34A,133Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=151", - "Case #": "PTR No. 511 of 2012, decided on 26.01.2023, heard on: 26.01.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJIDMEHMOOD SETHI AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE\nVs\nSILVER FIBER SPINNING MILLS LIMITED, LAHORE", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shahbaz Ahmad Cheema, Advocate/Legal Advisor for applicant- department.\nMr. Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Advocate for respondent-taxpayer." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25401", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4941 = 2024 SLD 4941 = (2024) 130 TAX 463", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-8297 of 2019 and Misc. No. 36534/2019, decided on 02.11.2021, heard on: 02.11.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MAHMOOD A. KHAN, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zeeshan Khan, advocate for the petitioner.\nMr. Zulfiqar Ali Khan, advocate for respondent No.2. Mr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, DAG along with Mr. Hussain Bohra, Assistant Attorney General", - "Petitioner Name:": "LOUIS DREYFUS CO. (PVT) LTD.\nVs\nF.B.R & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25402", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4942 = 2024 SLD 4942 = (2024) 130 TAX 465", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,3(1),3(1)(a),47(5),71Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007=58F,58G,58H", - "Case #": "Spl. S.T.R.A No. 104 of 2019 and CMA No.793/2019 (Exemption), decided on 18.10.2021, heard on: 18.10.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI ANDMAHMOOD A. KHAN, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Syed Mohsin Imam, Advocate for the applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I\nVs\nM/S FAIZAN STEEL" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25403", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4943 = 2024 SLD 4943 = (2024) 130 TAX 469", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,45,46", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Application No. 10 of 2016 and CMA No.268 of 2016, decided on 12.01.2021, heard on: 12.01.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jawaid Farooqui Advocate for Applicant.\nShakeel Ahmed Advocate for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MIRPURKHAS SUGAR MILLS LTD\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25404", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4944 = 2024 SLD 4944 = (2024) 130 TAX 84", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,205,236G", - "Case #": "ITA No. 218/PB/2021, decided on 27.10.2021, heard on: 27.10.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ishtiaq Ahmed, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMrs. Fouzia Iqbal, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S BABRI COTTON MILLS, HABIB ABAD, KOHAT\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (CORPORATE ZONE), RTO, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25405", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4945 = 2024 SLD 4935", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTVXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. 7 of 2024. Date of Hearing: 11.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Justice Qazi Faez Isa, CJ Justice Naeem Akhtar Afghan. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Umer Ijaz Gilani, ASC. assisted by Mr. Muhammad Alee, Advocate. For Respondents No.1-2: Malik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan. Mr. Abdul Sattar Khokhar, Sr. Joint Secretary, M/o F.E & P.T. Dr. Agha Haider, Deputy Director, (Legal), M/o F.E & P.T. For Respondent No. 3: Mr. M. Nazir Jawwad, ASC. Mr. Nazeer Hussain, Director-General, Coordination H.E.C. Mr. Ahad Mehmood Raza,\nAssistant Director (Law), H.E.C. For Respondent No. 4: Mr. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab. Mr. Muhammad Rehman, Sr. Law Officer, HED, Lahore. For Respondent No. 5: Mr. Shah Faisal Utmankhail, Advocate-General, KP. Mr. Shah Faisal Ilyas, Additional Advocate-General, KP. Mr. Ghulam Saeed, Special Secretary, HED, KP. Asif Khan, Litigation Officer, HED, KP. For Respondent No. 6: Mr. Hassan Akbar, Advocate-General, Sindh. Mr. Jawad Dero, Additional Advocate-General, Sindh. Mr. Feroze A. Mahar, Director Constitution Petition No. 7/2024 2\nFor Respondent No. 7: Mr. Muhammad Ayaz Swati,\nAdditional Advocate-General, Balochistan. Mr. Jehanzeb Mandokhail, Addl. Secretary, Colleges, HED, Balochistan.\nFor Ministry of Health: Mr. Asif Sohail, Director Legal. For Ministry of Science and Technology: Mr. Najeeb Mandokhail, Section Officer. For Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan: Mr. Parasmahesar, Section Officer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "All Public Universities BPS Teachers Association (APUBTA) through its President. … Petitioner Versus\nThe Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Federal Education and Professional Training, Islamabad and others. … Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25406", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4946 = 2024 SLD 4946", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No. 1573, 1673, 1729, 1767 and 2433 of 2024. Dates of Hearing: 03.07.2024, 08.07.2024, \n11.07.2024 and 12.07.2024. [Against the judgments dated 05.03.2024, 16.04.2024, 24.04.2024 and 15.05.2024 of the Lahore \nHigh Court, Lahore and Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench passed in Writ Petitions No. 1333, 16416, 19091 and 23249/24 and ICA No. 29/24 respectively)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Justice Qazi Faez Isa, CJ. \nJustice Naeem Akhtar Afghan \nJustice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. M. Shahzad Shaukat, ASC, In CPs No.1573 and 1673/24 assisted by Raza-ur-Rehman, AHC. \nIn CP No.1729/24 Mr. M. Ahsan Bhoon, ASC and Mr. Waqas Ahmed Mir, ASC. In CP No.1767/24 Mr. M. Umer Riaz, ASC. In CP No.2433/24 Mr. Taimoor Aslam Khan, ASC and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR. For the Respondents: Mr. Hamid Khan, Sr. ASC and For respondent No. 3 in CP No.1573/24 Mr. Ajmal Ghaffar Toor, ASC, assisted by Mr. Haider Bin Masud, Adv. \nFor respondent No. 3 in CP No.1673/24 Mr. Hamid Khan, Sr. ASC, Mian Abdul Rauf, ASC and Mr. Waqar Rana, ASC. Civil Petition No. 1573 of 2024 etc. 2 For respondent No. 1 in CP No.1729/24 Sh. Usman Karim-ud-Din, ASC and Mr. Arshad Nazir Mirza, ASC. For respondent No. 4 in CP No.1767/24 Mr. M. Ahmed Pansota, ASC. For respondent No. 1 in CP No.2433/24 Mr. M. Taufiq Asif, ASC. For ECP: Mr. M. Arshad, DG (Law), ECP and In all cases Mr. Falak Sher, Legal Consultant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Abdul Rehman Khan Kanju. In CPs No.1573 and 1673/24 \nAzhar Qayyum Nahra. In CP No.1729/24 Zulfiqar Ahmed. \nIn CP No.1767/24 Rana Muhammad Arshad. In CP No.2433/24 Petitioners Versus Election Commission of Pakistan through its Secretary, Islamabad and others. \nIn CP Nos. 1573, 1673 and 1767/24 Ch. Bilal Ejaz and others. In CP No.1729/24 Muhammad Atif and others. \nIn CP No.2433/24 Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25407", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4947 = 2024 SLD 4947", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2477 of 2024, heard on: 21.08.2024\n(On appeal against the order dated 22.05.2024 of the Lahore \nHigh Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No. 24978 of 2024)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan. Mr. Justice Naeem Akhtar Afghan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner: Mr. Hassan Raza Pasha, ASC. For the ECP: Mr. Muhammad Arshad, D.G. Law. Mr. Falak Sher, Legal Consultant Respondent No.4: Mr. Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa, Sr. ASC Syed Ibqal Hussain Shah, AOR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ali Gohar Khan Petitioner VS Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad & others Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25408", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4948 = 2024 SLD 4948", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CMAs No. 597 & 598 of 2024 in ICAs 16 gs 24/2023. Date of Hearing: 11.07.2024.(For rejection of the appeals on behalf of the respondents 1 to 5)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Larger Bench: Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan. Mr. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail. Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi. Mr. Justice Shahid Waheed. Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan. Mr. Justice Shahid Bilal Hassan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicants: Mr. Faisal Siddiqui, ASC\n(in both CMAs) For the Federation: Mr. Mansoor Usman Awan, Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Federation of Pakistan Appellants The Province of Balochistan through the Chief Secretary Services and General Administration Department Quetta. \nvs \nKaramat Ali and others respondents," - }, - { - "Case No.": "25409", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4949 = 2024 SLD 4949", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 809-L of 2017 Date of Hearing: 10.07.2024. (Against the judgment dated 20.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Appeal No. 248 of2016).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi. Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25410", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4950 = 2024 SLD 4950", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1335/LB/2022. (Tax Periods July,2018 to June, 2019) heard on: 12.03.2024. Date of order: 26.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAR UL HAQUE, (Accountant member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Rana M Afzal, Advocate. Respondent by: Dr. Qurat-Ul-Ain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S Al-Nasar Textile Ltd, 29-Shadman-II, Lahore appellant \nVS \nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25411", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4951 = 2024 SLD 4951", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "S.T.R No. 25/2021. Date of Hearing 12.09.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Anwaar Hussain J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ch. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue \nVersus\nM/s Multan Electric Supply Company Limited" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25412", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4952 = 2024 SLD 4952", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO. 135/LB/2022, heard on: 25.04.2022. Date of order: 27.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER, MEMBER (TECHNICAL )", - "Lawyer Name:": "1. Present for the Appellant; Rana Rehan Advocate. \n2. Present for the respondent: Ch. Imtiaz Elahi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sadam Khan Appellant \nVS\nAdditional Collector of Customs, Lahore respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25413", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4953 = 2024 SLD 4953 = 2024 MLD 1774", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000=18Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951=Preamble", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 12376 of 2023, decided on 8th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Shams Mehmood Mirza, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Moeen Ahmad for the Petitioner.\nJamil Khan for Respondent/NADRA.\nSheraz Zaka Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Abdul Qadir and others-Petitioners\nVs\nFederation of Pakistan and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25414", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4954 = 2024 SLD 4954", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEALS NO. 335/LB/2019.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER MEMBER (TECHNICAL)", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Adnan Moton, Advocate. For the respondent: Mr. Muhammad Asif Butt, Advocate. Mr. Ameer Haider Deputy Collector and Mr. Sajjad Bukhari, Inspector.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Style Textile (pvt), Lahore. VERSUS Collector of customs, Lahore and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25415", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4955 = 2024 SLD 4955", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTUXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "SCRA No.493 of 2016, heard on: 27.04.2022. Date of decision : 10.05.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Irfan Saadat Khan, Mehmood Ahmed Khan,JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Respondent No.1 : through Dr. Muhammad Khalid Hayat,\n Advocate. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Collector of Customs, Applicant : through Mr.Shahid Ali Qurreshi, Advocate. Versus Abdul Sattar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25416", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4956 = 2024 SLD 4956", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Cust. Ref No. 18-P/2023 with CMs 23/2023, 26/2023 & 27/2023. Date of hearing; 22.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; SYED ARSHAD ALI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdur Rauf Rohaila, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. Amir Bilal, Advocate, for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs, (Appraisement) Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar. VS M/S. Jan Builders, FF-697, First Floor, Deans Trade centre, Peshawar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25417", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4957 = 2024 SLD 4957", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-2322 of 2024. Date of Hearing: 12.06.2024 13.06.2024 and 21.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Justice Mrs. Rashida Asad.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: Through Mr. Zain A. Jatoi along with Mr. Mustafa Mamdani Advocates. Respondents No.1 to 3: Through Mr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General and Ms. Wajeeha Mehdi, Deputy Attorney General.\nRespondent No.4: Through Mr. Muhammad Ishaque Pirzada and Mr. Abdul Mannan Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Umair. Versus Federation of Pakistan & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25418", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4958 = 2024 SLD 4958", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.136 of 2017. Date of Hearing: 27.03.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Mr. Justice Agha Faisal.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant: Through Mr. Pervez Iqbal Kasi Advocate. \nRespondents: Through Mr. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui \nAdvocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s OBS Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited Versus The Customs Appellate Tribunal & another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25419", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4959 = 2024 SLD 4959", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Complaint No.5779Il5B!CU5T12024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; Dr. Asif Mahmood Jah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer Dr. Arsian Subuctageen, Advisor Appraising Officer Mr. Muhammad Nazim Saleem, Advisor Authorized Representative : Mr. M. lshtiaq, ITP, Shahzad Qazi & Co. Departmental Representative Ms. Mahrukh Chohan, AC Customs", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Sikandar Khan, Clo Mr. Shahzad Qazi, Shahzad Qazi & Co., Office 12-14, jst Floor, Ahmed Center, 1-8 Markaz, Islamabad. ... Complainant Versus The Secretary, Revenue Division, ... Respondent Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25420", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4960 = 2024 SLD 4960", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ petition no.3124/2023. Date of order; 05.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Adnan Haider, Advocate for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ajmal & Brothers VS Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25421", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4961 = 2024 SLD 4961", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C. P. No. D-7176 / 2022, heard on: 12.10.2023. \nDate of Order: 12.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Justice Ms. Sana Akram Minhas.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: Imran Qadeer, Through Mr. Malik Altaf Hussain, Advocate. Respondent No. 1: Through Mr. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General. \nRespondent ,No. 2: Through Mr. Agha Zafar Ahmed, \nAdvocate. Respondents No. 3 to 5: Nemo for the Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "Federation of Pakistan, vs M/s Helium (Pvt.) Ltd. & Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25422", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4962 = 2024 SLD 4962", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Custom Reference No. 115 of 2024, heard on: 21-10-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Sardar Ahmad Haleemi, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Jalal-ud-Din Kakar, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Fateh Muhammad Vs. Collector, Customs, Quetta & another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25423", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4963 = 2024 SLD 4963", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.35-K/2024. Date of Hearing: 04.04.2024.Against the judgment dated 14.3.2024 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Spl. Cr. Bail Appeal \nNo.17/2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Nisar Ahmed Bhanbhro, ASC \nFor the State: Mr. Khaleeque Ahmed, DAG", - "Petitioner Name:": "Attaullah …Petitioner(s) Versus The State …Respondent(s)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25424", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4964 = 2024 SLD 4964", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "WP No.2350-P/2022, heard on: 17.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; SYED ARSHAD ALI. J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. lsaac Ali Qazi, Mufariq Shah and Abdur Rahim Jadoon, Advocates, for the petitioner. M/s. Sanaullah DAG, Abbas Bakhtiar, lshtiaq Ahmad (Junior) Neelam A. Khan and Sabahat Ali Bukhari, Advocates, for the respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S M.K Steel Mills VS. Collector of Customs, MCC Custom\nHouse, Peshawar & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25425", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4965 = 2024 SLD 4965", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTTXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.150 of 2023. Date of hearing 8 May 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): GUL HASSAN TAREEN J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Barrister Iftikhar Raza. Respondent No.1 by: Mr. Mazhar Ali Khan, Advocate. Official respondent(s) by: Mr. Zakir Kakar, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Directorate Intelligence & Investigation Customs FBR Quetta v. M/S R.K. Enterprises (Importers) Quetta and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25426", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4966 = 2024 SLD 4966", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Review No. 131-P of 2023 in C.O.C No. 370-P of 2023. Writ Petition No. 4226-P of 2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Petotioner: Mr. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Advocate for Appicants. Mr. Abdul Samad Khan, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Ashfaq Collector Customs (Appraisement) and another VS M/S United Traders, Importers & Exporters 22-C Al Mursaleen Plaza and another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25427", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4967 = 2024 SLD 4967", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Custom Ref. No. 59-P/2019, heard on: 05.06'2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):SYED ARSHAD ALI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner; Mr. Mukhtar Ahmed Maneri, Advocate. For Respondent; Barrister Syed Mudassir Ameer, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector Customs, Peshawar petotioner vs Syed Aftab-ul-Hassan respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25428", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4968 = 2024 SLD 4968 = 2024 PTD 1584", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-Ss.111(1)(b) & 122(5)-Concealed income-Credit entries in the bank account/statement of taxpayer-Definite information-Scope-Term definite information means information which is complete and does not require further processing-Bank credit entries or bank deposits in itself do not constitute definite information as it requires further processing to relate it to net income of a taxpayer chargeable to tax-Only that part of the credit entries or bank deposits is chargeable to tax which can be termed as net profit or income-Whole of the credit entries or bank deposits in a bank account run by a businessman can never be his net profit or income chargeable to tax-Instead such credit entries or bank deposits may, at best, represent gross business receipts which after deduction of expenses will constitute net income or profit liable to tax-Thus, in the present case, the action of the Officer Inland Revenue (OIR) treating entire credit entries or bank deposits as amount liable to tax was neither lawful nor logical-High Court set-aside impugned order passed in favour of the Department by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue whereby the findings of two Authorities were agreed upon-Reference Application, filed by taxpayer, was allowed.\nMessrs E.F.U. General Insurance Co. Limited v. The Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 700; 2019 PTD 2001 and 2013 PTD 884 ref.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 122(5) & 111(1)(b)-Concealed income-Credit entries in the bank account/statement of taxpayer-Definite information-Scope-Officer Inland Revenue (OIR) treated taxpayers bank credit entries as definite information in terms of S. 122(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance 2001) and added it to declared income of the taxpayer as concealed income, which findings were upheld upto the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Tribunal)-Whether there was definite information in the possession of the OIR or not-Held, that record revealed that the OIR invoked S. 122(5) of the Ordinance 2001 to make addition of said bank credit entries of PKR 10,544,681/- to the declared income as concealed income-Provision of law under S.122(5) of the Ordinance, 2001 lays down that only such definite information is relevant which is obtained through audit or through a process similar to audit-In the present case , the OIR had not conducted any audit in the case of applicant/taxpayer, hence, the so-called definite information regarding bank credit entries could not be made a basis for invoking S. 122(5) of the Ordinance 2001-High Court set-aside impugned order passed in favour of the Department by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue whereby the findings of two Authorities were agreed upon-Reference Application filed by taxpayer, was allowed.\n(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 111(1)(b) & 122(5) [as inserted /amended through Finance Act, 2020]-Concealed income-Proceedings for the relevant tax year, non-conducting of-Credit entries in the bank account/statement of taxpayer-Definite information -Scope-Officer Inland Revenue (OIR) treated taxpayers bank credit entries as definite information in terms of S.122(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance, 2001) and added it to declared income of the taxpayer as concealed income, which findings were upheld upto the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Tribunal)-Validity-In the present case, for the (relevant) Tax Year 2015, the OIR had incorrectly applied amended provisions of S. 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which were brought on the statute through Finance Act, 2020-High Court set-aside impugned order passed in favour of the Department by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue whereby the findings of two Authorities were agreed upon-Reference Application, filed by taxpayer, was allowed.\n2023 SCMR 534 ref.\n(d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 122(5), 122(9), 111(1)(b) & 111(5), Explanation-Concealed income-Separate notice(s)-Scope-Officer Inland Revenue (OIR) treated taxpayers bank credit entries as definite information in terms of S. 122(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ( the Ordinance, 2001) and added it to declared income of the taxpayer as concealed income, which findings were upheld upto the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Tribunal)-Validity-In the present case, the OIR had issued a combined notice under Ss. 122(5), 122(9) & 111(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance , 2001 ( the Ordinance, 2001)-Prior to insertion of Explanation to S. 111(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, separate notice under S. 111 of the Ordinance was mandatory-OIR was duty bound to issue separate notice under S. 111 of the Ordinance 2001 for the Tax Year 2015-Hence, the proceedings conducted were unlawful-High Court set-aside impugned order passed in favour of the Department by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue whereby the findings of two Authorities were agreed upon-Reference Application filed by taxpayer, was allowed.\n2024 SCMR 700 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No.30 of 2024, decided on 16th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 27th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, CJ and Muhammad Aamir Nawaz Rana, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Usama Zaheer for Applicant.\nIftikhar Raza and Munawar Kasi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SARDAR MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ TAREEN\nVs\nThe COMMISSIONER-IR, ZONE I, RTO, QUETTA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25429", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4969 = 2024 SLD 4969", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1436/KB/2024, heard on: 25.07.2024. Date of order; 27.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN. MR. SAJID NAZIR MALIK, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Malik Arslan Ahmed, ACA. Respondent by: Mr. Kashif Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Safoora Builders and Developers, Karachi, Sindh, Appellant. VS The Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Range B, MTO, Karachi, Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25430", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4970 = 2024 SLD 4970", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1219/KB/2023, heard on: 31.05.2024. Date of order: 01.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN. MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by ; Mr. Ravi Bhimen, Advocate. Respondent by; Mr. Muhammad Noman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Altaf Nini, Karachi. Appellant. VS CIR, Audit-II, CTO, Karachi, respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25431", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4971 = 2024 SLD 4971", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 7126/LB/2023, heard on: 19.02.2024. Date of order: 02.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abuzar Hussain, Advocate. Respondent by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Awais Imtiaz, Sialkot appellant vs The CIR, RTO, Lahore. respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25432", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4972 = 2024 SLD", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 917/KB/2024. Date of hearing; 31.05.2024. Date of order: Mr. Muhammad Noman, DR.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Jeham Alam Khan, ITP. Respondent by: Mr. Muhammad Noman, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Bacha Hussain, Karachi, Appellant VS The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, CTO, Karachi Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25433", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4973 = 2024 SLD 4973", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 7326/2023, heard on: 31.01.2024. Date of order; 26.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI,(ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Rana M. Afzal. Respondent by; None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Tara Imperial Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore Appellant VS The CIR, LTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25434", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4974 = 2024 SLD 4974 = (2025) 132 TAX 353", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition Nos.D-3073 & 3074 of 2021. Date of Hearing : 06.09.2024. Date of Judgment : 03.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar. Mr Justice Mohammad Abdur Rahman.", - "Lawyer Name:": "RESPONDENT : Through Mr. Faheem Raza Khuhro, \nAdvocate.: FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Through Mr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PETITIONERS (in both Petitions)\n: United Refrigeration Industries Limited & \nDawlance (Private) Limited RESPONDENT NO.2\n(in both Petitions) : Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Large Taxpayer Office, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25435", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4975 = 2024 SLD 4975", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A.824-K/2023 heard on: 03.07.2024 (Against the judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 07.2.2023, passed in CP No.D8385/2019).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench-II: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar. Mr. Justice Shahid Bilal Hassan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "In attendance: Dr. Shah Nawaz, ASC. Mr. M. Tariq Arbab, Member (L) FBR. Mir Badshah Khan, Member (Operation) FBR. Fahad Faizan, CIR, FBR. Dr. Sohail Ahmed Fazlani, Addl. Comm. FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt) \nLimited & others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25436", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4976 = 2024 SLD 4976", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 129/PB/2021, heard on: 28.02.,2024. Date of order: 28.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Azam, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Faheem Sialkot, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ms. Majida VS The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Range-I, RTO, Peshawar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25437", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4977 = 2024 SLD 4977", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3328/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 10.07.2024. Date of order; 10.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shuja, Advocate. Respondent by; Mr. M. Asif, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sabirs Vegetable Oils (Pvt) Limited, Lahore Appellant VS The CIR Zone Lto, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25438", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4978 = 2024 SLD 4978", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1015/KB/2024, heard on: 11.07.2024. Date of order: 05.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER. MR. FAKHR-UL-ZAMAN MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Hasham Khan, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Mamoon Moazam, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shoaib Younus, Appellant VS The Commissioner-IR, Unit-4, RangeB-II, CTO, Karachi, Respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25439", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4979 = 2024 SLD 4979 = 2024 PTCL 705", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar\nThis case concerns the legality of charges related to the non-payment of sales tax on free electricity provided to employees. The appellant produced documentary evidence, including electricity bills and employee authorization forms, which showed that sales tax had been paid on the free supply of electricity. The evidence indicated the deduction of GST and the adjustment of GST against the employees free units. However, this evidence appears to have been overlooked by the Department. As a result, the charges for non-payment of sales tax were deemed illegal, as the documentary evidence substantiated the appellants claim that sales tax had been paid.\nSection 11 - Limitation Period for Assessment Order:\nThe show cause notice was issued on 15-09-2022, and the Assessment Order was received by PESCO on 21-03-2023. The receipt stamp confirmed the date of receipt. The department claimed that the Assessment Order was passed on 09-03-2023, but this was contested by the appellant. According to the rules, the Assessment Order must be passed within 120 days of the show cause notice, with possible adjournments of up to 60 days.\nGiven these adjournments, the latest permissible date for passing the order was 13-03-2023, and it was sent to the postal authorities on 16-03-2023. The appellant argued that the order was passed after 13-03-2023, which would be beyond the limitation period stipulated by Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act. However, since no evidence was provided to prove that the order was passed after this date, the departments argument was not accepted. Therefore, the Assessment Order was considered valid.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe charges for non-payment of sales tax were deemed illegal due to the submitted evidence of GST payments on the free electricity supply.\n•\nThe Assessment Order was not barred by limitation, as it was passed within the allowed time frame, considering the adjournments.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(46),3,3(1),3(1)(a)3,11,11(2),11(5),33(5)", - "Case #": "STA No. 155(PB) of 2023, Order dated: 01-02-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. ABDULLAH KHAN KAKAR JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. SHAH KHAN ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hussain Ahmad Sherazi, Mr. Mouzzam Ali Butt, Advocate a/w Mr. Farooq Azam, ACCA. \nRespondent by: Ms. Fouzia Iqbal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD., (PESCO)\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25440", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4980 = 2024 SLD 4980", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3241/LB/2022, heard on: 22.088.2022. Date of order: 22.08.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hamza Sajid, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ali Raza Gillani, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Zeeshan Steel Ind, Landa Bazar, Lahore. VS CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25441", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4981 = 2024 SLD 4981", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1793/KB/2024, heard on: 03.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Afzal, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Majid Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. SAF & Company, Karachi. appellant VS The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, MTO, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25442", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4982 = 2024 SLD 4982", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3360/LB/2018. Date of hearing; 22.04.2024. Date of order; 22.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mst. Lubna Shah, DR. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Lahore appellant VS Mian Muhammad Jamil respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25443", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4983 = 2024 SLD 4983", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2737/LB/2018, heard on: 29.01.2024. Date of order; 01.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Syed Faizan Ali Zaidi, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Abdul Rasheed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR LTU, Lahore, Appellant VS M/s. Greenvelley Premium Super Market Respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25444", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4984 = 2024 SLD 4984 = 2025 PTCL 242 = 2025 PTD 1149 = (2025) 132 TAX 343", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRXo", - "Key Words:": "Legal Questions Considered:\n1.\nWhether profit on debt from surplus funds deposited before business commencement is business income under section 18(2), or income from other sources under section 39(1)(c)?\n2.\nWhether pre-commencement expenses include only feasibility, prototypes, and trial production under section 25(5), or also general administrative expenses incurred wholly to derive chargeable income?\n3.\nWhether pre-commencement expenses could lawfully be deducted from profit on debt, or must be amortized under section 25 and the Third Schedule?\n________________________________________\nCourts Analysis & Findings:\nOn Question 1: Profit on Debt – Business Income vs. Other Sources\n•\nSection 18(2): Profit on debt is taxed as business income only if deriving such income is the core business of the taxpayer.\n•\nSection 39(1)(c): Residual head of “income from other sources” applies when income doesn’t fall under other heads.\n•\nThe Respondent is not a bank, NBFC, lending or investment company, nor registered with SECP/SBP.\n•\nThe MOA of the Respondent allows investment of surplus funds, but explicitly prohibits carrying out investment-related business.\n•\nActual business commencement was on 20.12.2020. Profit on deposits during 2017–2020 was prior to commencement.\n•\nRelying on majority view in Lucky Cement Ltd. v. CIR (2015 PTD 2210), the Court held that such income is from “other sources,” not “business”.\n•\nThe Islamabad High Court’s Fauji Foundation ruling (2021 PTD 1951) distinguished due to differing facts and absence of investment prohibition.\nAnswer to Q1: Profit on debt earned before business commencement is not business income, but income from other sources under Section 39(1)(c).\n________________________________________\nOn Question 2: Scope of Pre-Commencement Expenditure under Section 25(5)\n•\nSection 25(5) defines pre-commencement expenditure to include:\n“any expenditure incurred before commencement of a business wholly and exclusively to derive income chargeable to tax,” including feasibility studies, prototypes, trial production.\n•\nTribunal wrongly took a restrictive view, limiting scope only to the items expressly mentioned.\n•\nThe word “including” implies expansion, not limitation, in light of SC’s ruling in Qudrat Ullah v. ADJ Renala Khurd (PLD 2024 SC 581).\n•\nManagement and administrative expenses incurred before commencement fall within the expanded scope.\nAnswer to Q2: Tribunal erred in restricting scope. Administrative expenses incurred pre-commencement are pre-commencement expenses under Section 25(5).\n________________________________________\nOn Question 3: Deductibility vs. Amortization of Pre-Commencement Expenses\n•\nSince profit on debt was not business income, and expenses were pre-commencement, they could not be deducted directly.\n•\nSection 25(5) mandates such expenses to be amortized on a straight-line basis under the Third Schedule.\n•\nADCIR and CIR-A correctly disallowed immediate deduction, applying amortization provisions.\nAnswer to Q3: Expenses were correctly amortized under the law and could not be deducted against income from other sources.\n________________________________________\nFinal Judgment:\n•\nImpugned Tribunal order set aside to the extent of Question Nos. 1 and 2.\n•\nOrders of ADCIR and CIR-A restored.\n•\nReference Applications partially allowed.\n•\nCopy to be transmitted to Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue under Section 133(5) of the Ordinance, 2001.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles Affirmed:\n•\nSurplus fund profit earned before business begins is not “business income.”\n•\nPre-commencement expenses include all necessary costs incurred exclusively to generate taxable income.\n•\nAmortization is the correct mechanism for such expenses—not direct deduction.\n•\nMOA restrictions on engaging in investment/banking business are material for classification of income.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(46)(a),18(1),18(2),22,24,25,25(5),120(1),122(5A),133Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=22,30,30(2)(b)", - "Case #": "Case No. ITR No. 56081/2022. Date of hearing 07.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUSTICE AND SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Raja Sikandar Khan, Advocate.\nRespondent by: M/s Barrister Muhammad Abubakar, Ch. M. Waseem Akram and Malik Nadir Ali Sherazi, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE SIALKOT\nVS\nAIR SIAL LIMITED, SIALKOT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25445", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4985 = 2024 SLD 4985", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTRXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 34/LB/2024, 35/LB/2024, 39/LB/2024, 44/LB/2024 and 44-A/LB/2024, decided on 22.01.2024, heard on: 05.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, Judicial Member and SHABAN BHATTI, Accountant Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Saqib Raza, Advocate for Appellant. Mr. Ali Khalid, DR for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. NOVEL TRAVEL (PVT.) LIMITED, LAHORE VS THE CIR, CRTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25446", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4986 = 2024 SLD", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 699/MB/2024. Date of hearing; 19.09.2024. Date of order; 23.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE (MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. M. Imran Ghazi, Advocate, along with Mr. M. Saleem. ITP. Respondent by; Mr. Mashooq Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mahmood Textile Mills Ltd, Multan appellant VS The CIR, RTO, Multan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25447", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4987 = 2024 SLD 4987", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2062/KB/2023. Date of hearing; 04.07.2024. Date of order; 10.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present ; MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER. MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Jehan Alam, ITP. Respondent by; Mr. Hafiz Tariq, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ismail, Hyderabad. VS The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, RTO, Hyderabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25448", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4988 = 2024 SLD 4988", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STR No.69/2022. Date of hearing; 14.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE. ASIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate for the applicant / department. M/s Inayat-ur-Rehman and Sahid Hussain Mitroo, Advocates for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commisioner Inland Revenue Legal Zone, Large \nTaxpayers Office Multan Versus M/s Usman Trade Linkers \nMultan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25449", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4989 = 2024 SLD 4989 = (2025) 131 TAX 14", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No.50303 of 2024. Date of Hearing 26.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Raheel Kamran J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner in this petition M/s Arslan Saleem Chaudhry Advocate and Barrister Asfandyar Khan Tareen For the petitioners in W.P.No.50600 of 2024 & W.P.No. 50310 of 2024 M/s Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Muhammad Nadeem Sheikh, Rana Usman Habib Khan and Azeem Ullah Virk, Advocates For the petitioner in W.P.No.49857 of 2024 Malik Asif Rafique Rajwana, Advocate For the Federation of Pakistan\nMr. Muhammad Hamza Sheikh, Assistant Attorney General For the respondents /Inland Revenue Barrister Shahjahan Khan, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Zubair Versus Federation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25450", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4990 = 2024 SLD 4990", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1254/KB/2024. Date of hearing; 28.08.2024. Date of order: Mr. Abdul Aleem Qureshi, D.R.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN. MR. SAJAD NAZIR MALIK, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asif Hussain, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Abdul Aleem Qureshi, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mehran Construction Company, Karachi, Appellant VS The Commissioner-IR, Zone v, MTO, Karachi, Respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25451", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4991 = 2024 SLD 4991", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1929/KB/2024. Date of hearing; 23.09.2024. Date of order; 11.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Waqas Yamin, (FCA). Respondent by: Mr. Imran Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shamina Khatoon, appellant VS The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone, AEOI, Karachi, respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25452", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4992 = 2024 SLD 4992", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1396/KB/2024. Date of hearing; 03,09,2024. Date of order; 22.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Saleem Laliwala, Advocate. Respondent by; Mr. Imran Mehmood, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Zulfiqar Ahmed, Karachi, Appellant VS The Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone AEOI, Karachi, Respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25453", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4993 = 2024 SLD 4993", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1065/KB/2024, heard on: 03.07.2024. Date of order; 02.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN. MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abdul Rahim Lakhari, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Shahzad Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ms. Amina Abdullah Hashwari, Karachi, Appellant VS CIR, Zone AEOI, LTO, Karachi, Respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25454", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4994 = 2024 SLD 4994", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1396/KB/2024. Date of hearing; 03.09.2024. Date of order; 22.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER. MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Saleem Laliwala, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Imran Mehmood, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Zulfiqar Ahmed, Karachi, Appellant VS The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone AEOI, Karachi, respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25455", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4995 = 2024 SLD 4995", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTQXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 572/LB/2017. Date of hearing; 17.01.2024. Date of order; 17.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZAL QAZI, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waqar Karim, D.R. Respondent by: Mr. Khurram Shahzad, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore appellant VS M/s. K&Ns Foods (Pvt), Lahore, Respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25456", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4996 = 2024 SLD 4996 = 2025 PTCL 199", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODc", - "Key Words:": "Illegal Penalty for POS Disconnection Set Aside\nAppellate Forum: Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore\nAppellant: Registered Tier-I Retailer (Electronic Goods)\nAppeal No.: Against Order-in-Appeal No. 02/2024 dated 10.05.2024\nRelevant Tax Period: December 2023\nThe appellant, a registered Tier-I retailer, is integrated with FBRs Point of Sale (POS) System since 25.02.2022.\nDuring December 2023, the POS connection at one branch (Kashmir Road, Faisalabad) showed as “disconnected”.\nShow Cause Notice dated 08.01.2024 was issued alleging violation and proposing penalty of Rs. 500,000/- under Section 33(25A).\nAdjudication was conducted ex parte and penalty imposed.\nCommissioner (Appeals) upheld the penalty on 10.05.2024.\nThis second appeal was filed before the Tribunal.\nArguments & Findings:\nAppellants Key Arguments:\nNo opportunity of hearing—case decided on a single date ex parte.\nPOS was not used due to renovation, and no sales were made during the disconnection period.\nPenalty under Section 33(25A) applies only to cases of non-integration, not mere disconnection of an already integrated POS.\nProduced Sales Tax Returns and Annex-C, showing all sales were made through POS.\nDepartment’s Position:\nSupported the impugned orders, claiming breach due to disconnection.\nTribunal’s Observations:\nAppellant’s POS integration was already in place since Feb 2022.\nNo evidence that sales were made outside the POS system.\nAnnex-C of sales tax return showed all sales properly recorded through POS.\nDepartment failed to conduct any physical verification or provide proof of actual violation.\nPenalty under Section 33(25A) applies only for failure to integrate, not for temporary disconnection due to genuine circumstances.\nPenalty provisions are deterrent, not meant for revenue generation or strangulating business.\nKey Finding: Imposing penalty under Section 33(25A) despite proven POS integration is illegal and unwarranted.\nLegal Principle Reiterated:\nPenalty under tax laws is not a charging provision, but meant to ensure compliance.\nMust be justified by factual default, not applied in a mechanical manner.\nDisconnection during renovation is not equivalent to failure to integrate.\nFinal Judgment & Order:\nAppeal Allowed.\nShow Cause Notice and both impugned orders (Adjudication & Appeal) set aside.\nPenalty of Rs. 500,000/- annulled.\nRatio: Penalty under Section 33(25A) is not attracted when POS is already integrated, and no sales are made during disconnection.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(43A),3(9A),11,33,33(25A),40CSales Tax Rules, 2006=150ZEG", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1427/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 10,07.2024. Date of order; 12.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN) AND MR. MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Muhammad Asif (DR).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Yousaf Fazal Electronics & Home Appliances, Faisalabad …… Appellant\nVs \nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore …… Respondents:" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25457", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4997 = 2024 SLD 4997", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1176/KB/2023. Date of hearing; 05.06.2023. Date of order; 14.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Rana Usman Khan, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ali Khalid, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. M. Hadeed Traders, Sheikhupura VS The CIR, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25458", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4998 = 2024 SLD 4998", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 04/PB/2021. Date of hearing; 13.08.2024. Date of order; 13.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. SHAH KHAN (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Azam, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Ishfaq Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Khalid Nawaz (Khalid Construction Engineering) VS The Commissioner-IR Unit 23 Range-I, RTO, Peshawar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25459", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 4999 = 2024 SLD 4999", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 122/PB/2020. Date of hearing; 02.10.2024. Date of order: 02.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Azam, Advocate/AR. Respondent: Mr. Aziz Ur Rehman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Four Season Fast Food Arbab Road, Peshawar Cantt. VS Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Peshawar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25460", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5000 = 2024 SLD 5000", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTOC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1179/KB/2018. Date of hearing; 24.01.2024. Date of order; 24.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Faiza Sadaf, D.R. Respondent by> Mr. Naeem Munawar, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore VS M/s. Tribal Mills Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25461", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5001 = 2024 SLD 5001", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTOCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 436/IB/2015. Date of hearing; 22.07.2024. Date of order; 22.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Hafiz M. Idrees, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Naseer Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Nariman Construction Company, Islamabad. VS Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25462", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5002 = 2024 SLD 5002", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 814/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 27.05.2024. Date of order; 29.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Fatima Mehmood, Advocate. Respondent by: 29.05.2024.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Arshad Mahmood, T. T. Singh VS The CIR RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25463", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5003 = 2024 SLD 5003", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1346/LB/2019. Date of hearing; 23.04.2024. Date of order; 29.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Mr. Farrukh Ahmed, ITP. Respondent by; M/s. Zainab Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Saahi Wood (pvt) Ltd. Lahore. VS CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25464", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5004 = 2024 SLD 5004", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTOHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 893/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 12.07.2024. Date of order; 12.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE (MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Mehfuz Elahi, ITP. Respondent by: Syeda Iqra Munawar Kazmi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Grow More (SMC Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore. VS The CIR, Corporate Tax Office, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25465", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5005 = 2024 SLD 5005", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTOHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 400/LB/2019. Date of hearing; 21.06.2024. Date of order; 02.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN (MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Atif Mehmood, Advocate. Respondent by; Mr. Ahmed Mohy-ud-din, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Petrosin Ravi Industries Ltd. Lahore. VS The CIR, Zone-VI, RTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25466", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5006 = 2024 SLD 5006", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 101/PB/2021. Date of hearing; 11.10.2024. Date of order; 11.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANT BY: Mr. Ishtiaq Ahmed, Advocate. Respondent by; Mr. Ishfaq Ahmed, Advocate, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Badar Enterprises, Gadoonamzal, District Sawabi. VS CIR, (Mardan Zone), RTO, Peshawar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25467", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5007 = 2024 SLD 5007 = 2024 PTD 1501", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDY", - "Key Words:": "Interpretation and application of tax exemption rules under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and related regulations, specifically addressing Customs General Orders (CGOs) issued by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). Heres a breakdown of the key elements:\nRelevant Legal Framework\n1.\nSales Tax Act (VII of 1990): Sixth Schedule\nProvides details of goods or services exempted from sales tax under specific conditions.\n2.\nFederal Board of Revenue Act (IV of 2007), Section 4\nEstablishes the authority of the FBR to issue legal instruments such as CGOs, SROs, and notifications for implementing tax laws.\n3.\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 199\nGrants High Courts the power to issue orders, including writs, to ensure justice, particularly in cases of governmental or administrative overreach.\n4.\nRelevant Notifications\no\nCGO No. 08/2021 (31-08-2021)\nEstablished policies to benefit industrial units in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), providing exemptions under specified conditions.\no\nCGO No. 08/2022 (31-08-2022)\nPotentially provided continuity or modifications to prior exemptions or benefits.\nCase Details\n•\nPetitioner: An importer/small industrialist operating with annual imports below PKR 200 million, seeking to avail benefits under CGO No. 08/2022.\n•\nClaim: The petitioner argued for exemption of taxes on their raw material consignment as per the CGO, citing their classification as a small industry.\nKey Judicial Findings\n1.\nFBRs Jurisdiction\nThe FBR is authorized to issue CGOs and similar instruments to implement policy and tax exemptions. CGO No. 08/2021 was deemed valid and enforceable as a policy framework.\n2.\nEligibility for Tax Exemption\nThe petitioner satisfied the conditions set forth in CGO No. 08/2021, qualifying as a small industrialist with annual imports below PKR 200 million.\n3.\nConditional Compliance\nThe petitioner expressed willingness to comply with all stipulated conditions in the relevant CGOs and circulars.\n4.\nResolution\no\nThe authorities agreed to release the petitioner’s stuck consignment, provided compliance with all necessary conditions was confirmed.\no\nThe High Court, recognizing the validity of the petitioner’s claim, disposed of the petition accordingly.\nPrecedent\nThe case references Nafees Plastic Industries v. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, Registered Tax Office, Peshawar (W.P No. 4155-P/2021) as a precedent, emphasizing the FBR’s authority to issue tax exemption policies and the courts’ role in upholding legitimate claims under such policies.\nConclusion\nThe High Court upheld the petitioner’s claim for tax exemption based on compliance with relevant CGOs, reinforcing the principle of fair implementation of tax policies to support small industries. The case highlights the importance of procedural compliance and clear policy guidelines in resolving tax-related disputes.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 5216-P of 2022, heard on: 10th August, 2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): KAMRAN HAYAT MIAN KHEL, JUSTICE AND FAZAL SUBHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rauf Rohala for Petitioner.\nIshtiaq Ahmad for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS AITIMAD POLYMER PIPE \nVS\nCHIEF COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25468", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5008 = 2024 SLD 5008", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 661/LB/2016.Date of hearing; 13.06.2023. Date of order; 02.08,2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Akmal, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Akram-ul-Haq, Advocate along with Syed Haider Iqbal, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO-II, Lahore VS M/s. waqar Plastic (pvt.) Ltd. Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25469", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5010 = 2024 SLD 5010", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. .1052/LB/2016. Date of hearing; 20.06.2023. Date of order; 15.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Zile-e-Huma, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Fazal Kareem, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Magna Textile Industries Pvt. Ltd. VS The CIR, RTO, Faisalabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25470", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5011 = 2024 SLD 5011", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 12/PB/2017, heard on: 10.10.2024. Date of order: 10.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Azizur Rehman, DR. Respondent by: Mr. M. Taj Hamid, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Peshawar. VS M/s. Premier Sugar Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd. Nowshera Road, Mardan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25471", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5012 = 2024 SLD 5012", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1215/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 12.07.2024. Date of order; 15.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Saqib Raza, Advocate. Respondent by; Mr. Javed Iqbal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ghazi Fabrics International Limited, Lahore. VS The CIR, Zone-III, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25472", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5013 = 2024 SLD 5013", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1542/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 01.08.2024. Date of order: 07.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN )", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Farhan Ahmed Jan, adv. Respondent by: Ms. Ghazala Nasir Siddiq, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sky Trader, Opp, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lohinwala, Gujranwala. VS CIR, Zone-II, RTO, Gujranwala." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25473", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5014 = 2024 SLD 5014", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STR No.69/2022. Date of order; 14.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR HUSSAIN, Judge. ASIM HAFEEZ. Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate for the applicant / department. M/s Inayat-ur-Rehman and Sahid Hussain Mitroo, Advocates for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commisioner Inland Revenue Legal Zone, Large Taxpayers Office Multan Versus M/s Usman Trade Linkers \nMultan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25474", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5015 = 2024 SLD 5015 = (2024) 130 TAX 694", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FTNHk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) – Retrospective Application of Further Tax under Section 3(1A)\nDetails:\nThe case pertained to the interpretation of Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as amended by the Finance Act, 2022. The amendment added the phrase or he is not an active taxpayer and imposed further tax on taxable supplies made to registered persons. The issue arose regarding taxable supplies made during the periods from October to December 2013 and February, May, June, October, November, and December 2014. The controversy centered on whether further tax could apply retrospectively when the registration status of recipients was suspended or blacklisted.\nHeld:\n(a) Registration of recipients of taxable supplies must be effective, operative, and free from legal disability at the time of the transactions to claim exemption from the further tax regime under Section 3(1A).\n(b) Merely obtaining a registration number does not suffice. If the recipients registration was suspended or blacklisted at the time of supplies, the supplier was obligated to levy further tax.\n(c) The Appellate Tribunal correctly upheld that supplies made to suspended or blacklisted recipients attracted further tax, aligning with the intent of Section 3(1A).\nThe High Court decided that the benefit of exemption from further tax under Section 3(1A) could only be claimed if the recipients registration was valid and functional at the time of the taxable supplies.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,3(1A)", - "Case #": "STR No. 43 of 2023, date of order: 15.10.2024, heard on: 15.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE AND ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Aqeel Ahmad, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Iftikhar Majid, Advocate for respondent No.3.\nMr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate for respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RAFHAN MAIZE PRODUCTS CO. LTD\nVS\nTHE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25475", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5016 = 2024 SLD 5016 = (2024) 130 TAX 689", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzc", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) – Tax Credit and Registration Provisions\nDetails:\nThe department demanded tax from the respondent, who filed a reference in the Lahore High Court, relying on the definition of liable to be registered under Section 2(25) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The respondent sought benefits available to registered persons, arguing they should be entitled to input tax adjustments for supplies made to persons not registered but potentially eligible for registration under Section 2(25). The department opposed, contending that benefits under Section 73(4) could not be claimed by non-registered recipients of taxable supplies.\nHeld:\n(a) Benefits under Section 73(4) allowing input tax adjustments for taxable supplies are exclusive to registered persons and cannot be extended to non-registered recipients through Section 2(25).\n(b) In case of conflict, Section 73(4), being a specific provision, overrides the general definition under Section 2(25).\n(c) The special provisions of Section 73(4) cannot be invalidated by interpreting Section 2(25) in a broader context. The Appellate Tribunal erred in giving unwarranted preference to Section 2(25), misinterpreting its scope, and misconstruing the law.\nThe High Court decided in favor of the applicant department, rejecting the respondents claims.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(25), 8(1),73(4)", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 34 of 2023, decided on 17.10.2024, Date of hearing: 17.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE AND ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Sulaman Bhatti, Advocate for the applicant- department.\nMr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate for the respondent- taxpayer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, LTO MULTAN\nVS\nM/S AN TEXTILE MILLS LTD. SHEIKHUPURA ROAD, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25476", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5017 = 2024 SLD 5017", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1210/LB/2019. Date of hearing; 10.06.2024. Date of order; 11.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Ahmed Mujtaba, DR. Respondent by: Mr. Abad ur Rehman, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore. VS M/s. Lotte Akhtar Beverage, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25477", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5018 = 2024 SLD 5018", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1362/LB/2019. Date of hearing; 03.07.2024. Date of order; 08.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zeeshan Chishti, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Abdullah Zulfiqar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Tariq Glass Industries, Ltd. Lahore. VS The CIR, LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25478", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5019 = 2024 SLD 5019", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.805 of 2015. Date of Decision : 27-9-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by : M/s Naseem Sikandar and Nudrat Stultana Alvi, Advocates. (W.P. No.805, 806, and 826 of 2015) Barrister Omer Azad Malik and Mian Haseeb Bhatti, Advocates. (W.P. No.768, 1008, and 1132 of 2015) Mr. Haseeb Shakoor Paracha, Advocate.\n(W.P. No.905, 1028, and 1029 of 2015) Mr. Asad Ladha, Advocate. (W.P. No.1041 of 2015) Respondents by : M/s Osama Shahid and Babar Bilal, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Oil and Gas Development Company Limited. Versus \nThe Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25479", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5020 = 2024 SLD 5020", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.493/IB/2024. Date of hearing 28.10.2024. Date of order 28.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by Mr. Waseem Abbass, ITP. Respondent by Mr. Imran Shah, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s LMK Resources Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd; 9 th Floor,No.55-C. PTET/ U Fone Tower, Jinnah Avenue, Islamabad.\nAppellant Vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, LTO, Islamabad. Respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25480", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5021 = 2024 SLD 5021", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 53/IB/2024, heard on: 14.06.2024. Date of order; 14.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. SAJID MALIK (MEMBER). MR. IMRAN LATIF MINHAS (MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ameer-ul-Azeem, ACA. Respondent by: Mr. Naseer Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Huraira Foods & Beverages, Industrial Area Islamabad. VS The CIR, Zone South, RTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25481", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5022 = 2024 SLD 5022", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 273/IB/2024. Date of hearing; 21.05.2024. Date of order; 21.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Zulqarnain. Awan, Advocate. Respondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Malik Fakhr I Alam House No. 1425, Sikandar Street Kutchary Road, Haripur VS Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Abbottabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25482", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5023 = 2024 SLD 5023 = 2025 PTD 121", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpYzg", - "Key Words:": "This Sales Tax Reference Application was filed under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, challenging the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) Lahore Bench’s decision dated 21.06.2022, which favored the taxpayer by setting aside the orders of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) and CIR (Appeals).\nThe High Court had to address the following questions of law:\n1.\nWhether ATIR was justified in relying on its decision in STA 262/KB/2018, which held that if the principal tax amount is paid before the initiation of proceedings under Section 11(1) of the Sales Tax Act, penalty and default surcharge cannot be imposed.\no\nThis argument ignores express provisions of Sections 33 & 34, which provide no amnesty from penalties and surcharges.\n2.\nWhether the ATIRs decision contradicts the 2016 PTD 643 Lahore ruling, which states that filing of a return is mandatory, and failure to do so on time constitutes an offense, making the taxpayer liable for penalty under Section 33 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n________________________________________\nArguments Presented:\nApplicant (FBR/Tax Department):\n•\nThe ATIRs reliance on its earlier decision in STA 262/KB/2018 was misplaced.\n•\nThe delay in tax return filing and late payment of tax was admitted by the taxpayer, triggering penalty and default surcharge.\n•\nPrecedents supporting their position:\no\nCommissioner Inland Revenue vs. Madina Cotton Ginners and Oil Mills (2016 PTD 643) → Filing of return is mandatory, and failure to file attracts penalties.\no\nMessrs Attock Refinery Limited (2021 PTD 1680), Messrs Punjab Small Industries, Rawalpindi (2021 PTD 871), and Dhan Fibers Ltd. (2006 PTD 2683) → All support the principle that tax penalties apply regardless of tax payment timing.\nRespondent (Taxpayer - Rasool Nawaz Sugar Mills Ltd.):\n•\nRelied on the Balochistan High Court’s decision in STR No. 05/2021 (Quetta Electric Supply Co.), which held that:\no\nIf tax is paid voluntarily before notice issuance, the show cause notice abates.\no\nPenalties and default surcharge are not automatically applicable when the principal tax has already been paid.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Findings and Decision:\n1.\nATIR Misinterpreted Section 11(1) and Its Proviso:\no\nSection 11(1) allows for tax assessment, penalty, and default surcharge.\no\nThe Proviso states that if tax is voluntarily paid with penalties before an order is issued, the show cause notice abates.\no\nHowever, it does not exempt the taxpayer from penalties or default surcharge just because the principal amount was paid.\n2.\nFiling of Return After Due Date Does Not Eliminate Default Consequences:\no\nFailure to file a return on time triggers an automatic penalty, even if tax has been paid later.\no\nFiling a late return without paying penalty/default surcharge does not absolve liability.\n3.\nProviso to Section 11(1) Does Not Exempt from Penalties and Surcharge:\no\nThe taxpayer must fulfill the conditions of the Proviso to get relief.\no\nMerely filing a late return does not eliminate default consequences.\n4.\nThe ATIR’s Decision Was Legally Defective:\no\nThe Appellate Tribunal failed to consider relevant legal precedents.\no\nQuetta Electric Supply Co. ruling did not properly consider the legal implications of Sections 33 & 34.\no\nThe ATIR misread Section 11(1) and its proviso.\n________________________________________\nFinal Judgment:\n1.\nQuestion (a) was answered in the negative – ATIRs decision was incorrect.\n2.\nQuestion (b) was answered in the affirmative – Filing returns on time is mandatory, and penalties apply for delays.\n3.\nThe ATIR’s order was set aside.\n4.\nCase remanded to the ATIR for fresh adjudication – The Tribunal must re-decide the case after hearing both parties.\n________________________________________\nImplications of the Judgment:\n•\nTaxpayers cannot avoid penalties or default surcharge simply by paying the principal tax before a show cause notice is issued.\n•\nFiling a tax return on time is mandatory, and late filing always triggers penalties under Section 33.\n•\nThe proviso to Section 11(1) does not offer a blanket exemption from penalties – it only allows abatement of a show cause notice if all conditions are fulfilled.\n•\nThe ATIR must properly consider legal precedents before making decisions.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STR No.77498/2022. Date of order; 26.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, Judge. Asim Hafeez. Judge", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zain-ul-Abidien Bokhari, Advocate for the Applicant-department. Mr. Waseem Ahmad Malik, Advocate assisted by Ms. Najia Noreen Maitla, Advocate for respondent-taxpayer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal-Zone-LTO, Lahore.\nVs \nM/s Rasool Nawaz Sugar Mills Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25483", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5024 = 2024 SLD 5024", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No.2582/IB/2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (Judicial Member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Anwar-ul-Haq, ACA. Respondent By: Ms. Sobia Mazhar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Capital Foods (Private) Limited, 15-E, Naseerabad, Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi. Appellant Vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, CTO, Islamabad. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25484", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5025 = 2024 SLD 5025", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 518/IB/2015. Date of hearing; 13.06.2024. Date of order; 21.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN LATIF MINHAS (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Departmental Representative: Mr. Niaz Ahmed/DR. Taxpayers Authorized Representative; Mr. Zulfiqar Awan, Advocate/AR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue. Zone-II, Rawalpindi. VS M/s. Mehmood Battery Centre, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25485", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5052 = 2024 SLD 5052 = 2024 SCP 377 = (2025) 131 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=36,36(3),45B,45B(2)Customs Act, 1969=179,194-BConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10-A", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No.275 of 2022 in Civil Petition No.4599 of 2021, heard on: 25.10.2022. Date of Order: 06-11-2024.\n(For review of judgment of this Court dated 12.5.2022, passed in C.P No.4599/2021)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): : MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK AND MR. JUSTICE SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, ASC., Ms. Asma Idrees, Addl. Commissioner, Yousaf Khan, Law Officer.\nFor the Respondent No.1, in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III. RTO, Rawalpindi, etc. ...…. Petitioner(s)\nvs\nM/s Sarwaq Traders, Rawalpindi, etc. ….Respondent(s)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25486", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5090 = 2024 SLD 5090 = 2024 CLD 1186", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXI, R. 90, second proviso-Execution of decree-Auction sale-Application to set aside sale on ground of irregularity or fraud-Deposit of amount or furnishing of security in court-Meaning and scope of the second proviso to Rule 90 of Order XXI, C.P.C.-Deposit of the amount, which is required under the second proviso, is not to be made by the applicant along with the application but rather it is to be made on the direction of the court.\nAlhamdi Begum v. NBP PLD 1976 Kar. 723; Shafique Shah v. Irshad Begum 1981 CLC 369; Rukhsana v. Muhammad Ilyas 1993 CLC 1949; Ali Match Industries v. IDB 1999 MLD 2127; Niamat Ali v. Muhammad Imran PLD 2003 Lah. 42; Sultan Mahmood v. HBFC 2006 YLR 2776 and Khursheed v. Inam-Ur-Rehman PLD 2009 Lah. 552 approved.\nHabib and Company v. MCB PLD 2020 SC 227 overruled.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O.XXI, R. 90, second proviso-Execution of decree-Auction sale-Application to set aside sale on ground of irregularity or fraud-Deposit of amount or furnishing of security in court-Purpose of the second proviso to Rule 90 of Order XXI, C.P.C.-Evidently, the purpose of the second proviso is to discourage frivolous objections-Condition stipulated in the second proviso for entertaining the application ensures that the rule is not misused to delay the completion of the sale and expeditious conclusion of the execution proceedings, and that the objections are made only by bona fide persons on valid grounds-If upon adjudication the application is found frivolous, the amount deposited or the security furnished, as the case may be, by the applicant is to be appropriated for awarding costs to the person(s) who suffer from the delay in completing the sale due to the filing of the application-Therefore, in determining the amount required to be deposited, the executing court should consider various factors such as the decretal amount, the time elapsed since filing the execution petition, the sale amount and the applicants previous conduct, etc., and fix an amount reflective of the costs likely to be awarded to the affected party in case of dismissal of the application.\n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 19(7)(a) & (b)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.90, second proviso-Execution of decree-Auction sale-Application to set aside sale on ground of irregularity or fraud-Deposit of amount or furnishing of security in court-Effect of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 ( Ordinance ) on the provisions of Rule 90 of Order XXI, C.P.C., particularly the second proviso thereof-Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19(7) of the Ordinance are not comprehensive provisions regarding objections to the sale of property in the execution of a decree; they do not specify who can make objections or the grounds on which objections can be made-Therefore, these clauses cannot function independently of Rule 90 of Order XXI, C.P.C., regarding objections to the sale of property in the execution of a decree-It is worth noting that since Section 141, C.P.C., does not apply to applications under Rule 90 of Order XXI, C.P.C., 11 the procedure for investigating objections made under this rule is also summary, as provided in clause (a) of Section 19(7) of the Ordinance-Latter provision merely further prescribes a period of 30 days to complete the investigation of objections through a summary procedure-Clause (b) of Section 19(7) of the Ordinance provides for imposing a penalty of up to twenty percent of the sale price of the property if objections are found by the Banking Court to be malafide or aimed at delaying the sale of the property-This penalty amount, is to be deposited by the applicant, or its security furnished, as per the second proviso to Rule 90 of Order XXI, C.P.C., before the court entertains the application to set aside the sale-Thus, there is no conflict between the two provisions; clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19(7) of the Ordinance are only complementary to the provisions of Rule 90 of Order XXI, C.P.C., for the execution of decrees under the Ordinance-Banking Court is therefore bound to follow both the provisions in the matter of objections made to the sale of property in the execution of a decree.\nMessrs Majid & Sons v. N.B.P 2002 CLD 1742 disapproved.\nPakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation v. Government of Pakistan 2002 CLD 1 overruled.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=90", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 2646-L of 2018, C.A. No. 17-L of 2019 and C.A. No. 364-L of 2020, decided on 10th May, 2024.\n(Against (i) judgment dated 20.11.2018 passed in E.F.A. No.620/2011, (ii) judgment dated 20.11.2018 passed in E.F.A. No.17/2012, and (iii) judgment dated 03.02.2020 passed in E.F.A No.231782/2018 respectively by the Lahore High Court, Lahore), heard on: 7th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for the Appellants/Petitioners (Through video link from Lahore).\nUmar Farooq, Advocate Supreme Court, Ashar Elahi, Advocate Supreme Court, Hafeez Saeed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Akram Gondal, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Kausar Iqbal Bhatti, Advocate-on-Record and Muhammad Dawood Khan, OG-II, SME Bank for Respondents (Through video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. SAMRANA NAWAZ and others-Appellants/Petitioners\nVersus\nMCB BANK LTD. and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25487", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5091 = 2024 SLD 5091 = 2024 CLD 1344", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQSs", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 19-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2), O.XXI, Rr. 58 & 60-Execution of decree-Setting aside of judgment-Forged document-Proof-Non-recording of evidence-Effect-Appellants claimed to be owners of mortgaged property on the basis of registered sub-leases of plot in question-Banking Court dismissed application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. and maintained judgment in question-Validity-There were only words against words; it was only in response to S.12(2), C.P.C. application that Banking Court found that the instruments were not genuine and fake-Thus required trial, more particularly when registered instruments were obtained and/or executed much before equitable and registered mortgage of year 2003-Sub-leases of appellants were registered in the year 1998 and application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., could not have been dismissed summarily via order under appeal-Division Bench of High Court set aside order in question and remanded the case to Banking Court to allow parties who might record their respective evidence, if they so desired-Appeal was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2),58,60", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.23 of 2019, decided on 16th April, 2024, heard on: 16th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Omar Sial, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Atif Rafique for Appellants.\nFaiz H. Durrani for Respondent No.1.\nNo one appeared for Respondents Nos.2 to 8.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAHOOR AHMED and others-Petitioners\nVersus\nMessrs AL-ZAMIN LEASING MODARABA and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25488", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5092 = 2024 SLD 5092 = 2024 CLD 1335", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQTk", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Ss. 8, 9 & 30-Arbitration-Objections, rejection of-Award made rule of Court-Principle-Appellant authorities were aggrieved of rejection of objections filed against award which had been made rule of the Court by Trial Court-Validity-While making award rule of Court, in a case where parties does not file objections, the Court is not supposed to act in a mechanical manner like the proverbial post office and place its seal on it-Court is obligated to look into the award and if it finds patent illegality on the face of award, the Court is empowered to set aside, modify or remit the award for reconsideration-Trial Court neither considered the reasons for setting aside the award nor considered as to whether award was liable to be remitted-By simply observing that award had been delivered by two Arbitrators who were Officers of the Department of appellant, irrespective of the fact whether the award was invalid, it was violative of the contract or otherwise violative of the rule of due process and it had no basis-High Court set aside rule of the Court and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh on the objection to the award by framing proper issues and allowing the parties to produce evidence-Appeal was allowed in circumstances.\nA. Qutubuddin Khan v. Chec Millwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Limited 2014 SCMR 1268; M/s. Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division and another 1992 SCMR 65; Karachi Dock Labour Board v. Messrs Quality Builders Ltd. PLD 2016 SC 121; Karachi Metropolitan Corporation v. Associated Constructors Ltd. 1984 CLC 1077; Umer Din through L.Rs. v. Mst. Shakeela Bibi and others 2009 SCMR 29; Allah Din & Company v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan and others 2006 SCMR 614 and The Director Industries And Mineral Development v. Dada Bhoyhormusjee & Sons 1990 MLD 301 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=8,9,30", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.524 of 2013, decided on 12th July, 2024, heard on: 30th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Rasaal Hasan Syed, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waheed Alam Asst. Advocate General for Appellant.\nRiaz Karim Qureshi for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PUNJAB HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT through Chief Engineer and others-Appellants\nVersus\nSh. ABDUR RAZAQ & COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. through Chief Executive-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25489", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5093 = 2024 SLD 5093 = 2024 CLD 1311", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQTg", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 12(1)(d), 12(1) (e), 12(4), 12 (5)(a), 45(6) & 156-Appeal before the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Provisions under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, non-compliance of-Scope and effect-Force majeure events-Scope-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) penalized Insurance Company for non-compliance of statutory requirements under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Stance of Appellant (Insurance Company) was that their non-compliance was due to force majeure events and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic-Validity-Stance of the Appellant for their non-compliance with the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, did not adequately justify their violations-Penalty was rightfully imposed, given the apparent violations of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, specifically the improper maintenance of records, failure to provide complete data and claims and the unauthorized shifting of records without Board approval-It is essential for all entities to adhere to regulatory requirements to maintain the integrity and trustworthiness of their operations-Extenuating circumstances and future precautionary measures taken by the Appellant did not absolve the Appellant from the violations-Penalty would serve as a reminder to the Appellant and others to adhere to the provisions of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, and to maintain proper records, irrespective of unforeseen events and challenges such as force majeure events and pandemics-Appellate Bench acknowledged the difficulties faced by the Appellant but emphasized that regulatory compliance remained a fundamental obligation-Appellant should take impugned decision as an opportunity to review and strengthen their processes to ensure future adherence to the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-No reason to interfere in the impugned order by the Appellate Tribunal was found-Appeal filed by Insurance Company, was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=12(1)(d),12(1)(e),12(4),12(5)(6),45(6),156", - "Case #": "Appeal No.13 of 2023, decided on 24th October, 2023, heard on: 21st September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Abdul Rehman Warraich and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioners", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kamran Rafique - Compliance Officer and Shah Zaman - Manager Account and Finance for the Appellant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Shafiq-ur-Rehman, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP and Raja Farukh Ahmad Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs TPL LIFE INSURANCE LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nDIRECTOR/HOD, ADJUDICATION-I-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25490", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5094 = 2024 SLD 5094 = 2024 CLD 1314", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V of 1970)-\n-Ss. 3, 4, 11 & 20-Undue concentration of economic power-Past and future conduct-Pubic interest-Appellant was aggrieved of order passed by Monopoly Control Authority-Held, that power of the Authority, under S. 11 of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 was in no manner restricted to future transactions only-Power to pass an order could be exercised if there has been a contravention i.e. if past conduct of parties constituted contravention of law and also if there is likely to be a contravention i.e. future conduct of parties-Monopoly Control Authority could not only pass an order directing future course of action but could also correct past unlawful conducts and could direct the person, found to be in breach of the law, to return the benefit that had been siphoned wrongfully-If this was not done, then the person violating law would be unjustly enriched and his act would defeat the very purpose of law-High Court declined to interfere in conclusion drawn by Monopoly Control Authority in its order as there was a limited scope of appeal under S. 20 of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 and there was no transgression of authority-Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\nPakistan Mobile Communication (Pvt.) Limited v. The Commissioner of Income Tax (C.As Nos. 1081-1092 of 2009) and 2008 CLD 17 rel.\n(b) Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance (V of 1970)-\n-S.11-Proceedings against contravention-Limitation-There is no time limitation given in S. 11 of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Action taken in public interest-Scope-Where action is to be taken in public interest, it does not mean that such action must be in advancement of public interest, what is required is that it should not harm or prejudice the public interest.\nAshiq Ali Bhutto v. President Summary Military Court and others PLD 1979 Kar. 814 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No.7 of 2007, decided on 7th June, 2024. Dates of hearing: 7th and 16th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ms. Sana Akram Minhas, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jawad A. Qureshi for Appellants.\nIjaz Ahmed along with Hashmatullah Aleem for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SEARLE PAKISTAN LTD. and another-Appellants\nVersus\nThe COMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25491", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5095 = 2024 SLD 5095 = 2024 CLD 1292", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpQXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S.10-Deceptive marketing practice-Misleading information-Scope-Misleading information encompasses omission of material information which is pivotal to a consumers transactional decision.\n(b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S.10-Deceptive marketing practice-Misleading information-Omission of material information-Redeemable tokens, non-disclosure of-Show cause notice was issued to respondent company for not disclosing in TV Commercial (TVC), presence of redeemable tokens in paint buckets-Validity-Most consumers do not buy paint themselves, instead painters / contractors actually make the purchase on behalf of consumers-Beneficiaries of tokens are mostly painters / contractors and not the consumers-Omission of required disclosures in TVC makes consumers unaware of presence of redeemable coupons in buckets which are an inducement for painters / contractors on whom consumers are relying for selecting paint-Practice of respondent company inserting tokens without required disclosure in alleged TVC amounted to misleading information lacking reasonable basis with respect to price of its product-This was a deceptive practice under S.10(2)(b) of Competition Act, 2010-Competition Commission held respondent company as non-compliant and penalty of fine was imposed-Show-cause notice succeeded in circumstances.\nIn the matter of; Show-Cause Notice Issued to Paint Manufacturers 2012 CLD 808; In the Matter of; Show-Cause Notices issued to the Paint Manufacturers for non-compliance of CCPs Order dated 13.01.2012; In the Matter of; China Mobile Pakistan Ltd. (Zone) and Pakistan Telecom Mobile Ltd. (Ufone) 2010 CLD 1478; In The Matter of; Show-Cause Notice Issued to M/s Proctor and Gamble Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited for Deceptive Marketing Practices 2017 CLD 1609; Reckitt Benckiser 2015; Dry and Acid-Lead Battery Manufacturers 2018; In the Matter of; Show-Cause Notice Issued to Tara Crop Sciences (Pvt.) Limited 2016 CLD 105 and In the Matter of; M/s Al-Hilaal Industries (Pvt.) Limited, 2012 CLD 1861 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=10", - "Case #": "File No.415/OFT/Diamond Paints/CCP/2021/1355, decided on 16th August, 2024, heard on: 16th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. Salman Ahmed Sidhu, Chairman and Salman Amin, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hammad Saeed for Messrs Nippon Paint Pakistan (Private) Limited (Complainant).\nWaqas Ahmed Mir, Advocate Supreme Court and Anas Irtiza Awan for Messrs Diamond Paint Industries (Private) Limited (Respondent).", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN THE MATTER OF: SHOW CAUSE NOTICE ISSUED TO M/S DIAMOND PAINT INDUSTRIES (PRIVATE) LIMITED\nOn Complaint Filed By\nM/S NIPPON PAINT PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED FOR DECEPTIVE MARKETING PRACTICES" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25492", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5096 = 2024 SLD 5096 = 2024 CLD 1277", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Jurisdiction-\n-Determination-Principle-Question of jurisdiction of adjudicating forum goes to the very root of the case and if such forum is not vested with jurisdiction to decide the dispute or assumes jurisdiction not vested in it, the order passed by it is void ab initio and of no legal effect-When Court does not have jurisdiction, no amount of consent or acquiescence can invest such Court with such jurisdiction-Point of jurisdiction is purely a question of law which can be raised even if it has not been taken in writing, although propriety demands that it should be raised in the first instance-It is obligatory on Court in appellate jurisdiction, which is a continuation of original proceedings, to address the same.\nMuslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel and others 2024 SCMR 298; Dr. Tahir Masud v. Amjad Ali Khan and 4 others 2019 PLC (C.S.) 1167 and WAPDA through Chairman and 3 others v. Khalid Pervaiz 2015 YLR 1598 rel.\n(b) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-\n-S. 41-Rectification-Scope-Term rectification is not specifically defined in Copyright Ordinance, 1962 therefore, it entails ordinary dictionary meaning-In the context of Copyright Ordinance, 1962, term rectification means that Copyright Board can adjudicate all claims against grant or refusal of registration of copyright or an interest therein on application of the Registrar or an aggrieved person with or without allegations of infringement of intellectual property rights-Copyright Board apart from other functions is also conferred with jurisdiction to decide claims regarding infringement of copyrights under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 which includes rectification applications based on infringement of intellectual property rights.\n(c) Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012)-\n-Ss. 17, 18 & 39-Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962), S. 41-Intellectual property offences-Intellectual Property Tribunal-Jurisdiction, reconciliation of-Scope-Jurisdiction of all forums with respect to all suits and civil proceedings regarding infringement of intellectual property laws and that of Magistrate regarding offences under Copyright Ordinance, 1962 has been taken away by Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012-Jurisdiction regarding such offences is vested with Intellectual Property Tribunal-For the purposes of reconciliation of S. 41(2) of Copyright Ordinance, 1962 with Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 all cases of rectification can be conveniently divided into two categories-First category of cases is of rectification simpliciter not based on any allegation of infringement or breach of any other intellectual property right under intellectual property laws included in Schedule of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012-Second category of cases is of rectification based on any allegation of infringement or breach of any other intellectual property right under intellectual property laws included in Schedule of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012-Determination of rectification cases by Copyright Board falling in first category does not create any inconsistency with jurisdiction of Tribunal under Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 and can be conveniently decided by Copyright Board-There is irreconcilable inconsistency with respect to second class of cases of rectification based on allegations of infringement of any existing intellectual property right under intellectual property laws included in Schedule of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012-Where rectification application contains allegations of infringement or breach of intellectual property rights under intellectual property laws included in Schedule of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 jurisdiction to decide such application vests with Tribunal in terms of Ss. 17, 18 & 39 of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012.\n(d) Copyright Ordinance (XXXIV of 1962)-\n-Ss. 41 & 77-Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012), Ss. 17, 18 & 39-Copyright entry, cancellation of-Infringement and breach of intellectual property rights-Jurisdiction of Copyright Board-Scope-Appellant was aggrieved of cancellation by Copyright Board of copyright registration made in his name-Validity-Claim of rectification of copyright filed by respondents seeking cancellation of entry of copyright made in favour of appellant, in essence, was not rectification simpliciter but was based on allegations of infringement and breach of intellectual property rights of other authors and singers allegedly protected under intellectual property laws included in Schedule of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012-Such claim could not be determined without deciding allegations of infringement of intellectual property rights-Jurisdiction to decide rectification application coupled with allegations of breach of intellectual property rights under intellectual property laws included in Schedule of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 exclusively rested with Tribunal created and existing under Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012-High Court set aside order passed by Copyright Board which was passed without jurisdiction-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nMessrs Shaheen Chemist through Proprietors and 3 others v. Zahid Mehmood Chaudhry and another 2023 CLD 1; Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel and others 2024 SCMR 298; Dr. Tahir Masud v. Amjad Ali Khan and 4 others 2019 PLC (C.S.) 1167; WAPDA through Chairman and 3 others v. Khalid Pervaiz 2015 YLR 1598; Messrs Federal Bank for Cooperatives v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone 2021 PTD 1203; Muhammad Multazam Raza v. Muhammad Ayub Khan and others 2022 SCMR 979 and Mahile Engine Components Japan Corporation v. Azam Autos and others (Suit No. 2058 of 2019) rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.46541 of 2022, decided on 8th July, 2024, heard on: 4th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Abid Hussain Chattha, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saqib Asghar and Mudassar Hassan for Appellant.\nHaris Bin Hassan Jang for Respondents Nos.2-a to 2-c.\nSyed Danish Ghazi for Applicant (in C.M. No.3-C of 2022).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM RAHI-Appellant\nVersus\nThe COPYRIGHT BOARD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25493", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5097 = 2024 SLD 5097 = 2024 CLD 1272", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 45, 46 & 158-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed], S. 4-Issuance of ordinary shares-Approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) with certain conditions)-Penalty for false statement in documents (books, records, accounting, reporting etc.)-Commission granted approval of issuance of ordinary shares to the Appellant (Insurance Company) subject to the condition that the issuance of shares shall be in cash and the Appellant was required to submit bank statements to the Commission upon receipt of the subscription money from the shareholders and underwriters to the issue-Commission penalized the Appellant (Insurance Company) as inspection of the Appellant revealed that apart from subscription (of about one-fourth shares) from general public, remaining (about three-fourth) right shares were issued to the underwriters (three different companies); Inspection report revealed that the Appellants bank account showed that on one date an amount (of Rs. 230 million) was credited and debited simultaneously eleven times and Rs. 0.573 million and 10.246 million were also credited on the same day ; while debit and credit transactions showed receipt of Rs.230 million against the subscription of right shares ,however, each transaction was credit and debited sequentially and the bank balance remained unchanged-Contention of the Appellant was that the impugned order was hit by the principle of double jeopardy as by an earlier order, passed about two years ago, it had already been penalized-Validity-Record revealed that by virtue of earlier order, the Appellant, was penalized on account of non-compliance of another statutory requirement (to maintain the minimum paid-up capital), whereas, the impugned order was a culmination of the Show Cause Notice having been issued under Ss. 45 & 46 read with S.158 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Impugned Order had been passed under the provisions of the Insurance Ordinance which were not the subject of the earlier order dated-Contention of the Appellant was misplaced as mere mentioning of facts in an earlier order did not in any manner operate as an estoppel to invoke the relevant provisions of law on account of a contravention-Appellate Bench upheld the impugned order passed by the Commission-Appeal, filed by (Insurance) Company, was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance(XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 45, 46 & 158-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed], S. 4-Issuance of ordinary shares-Approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) with certain conditions)-Penalty for false statement in documents (books, records, accounting, reporting etc.)-Contention of the Appellant (Insurance Company) that the impugned order failed to establish mis-statement in terms of Ss. 45 & 46 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Held, that said contention was mis-conceived as the Appellant had not denied any aspect of the transactions nor the manner in which they were reported in the financial record-Appellate Bench upheld the impugned order passed by the Commission-Appeal, filed by (Insurance) Company, was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 10-A-Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000), Ss. 45, 46 & 158-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed], S.4-Issuance of ordinary shares-Approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) with certain conditions)-Penalty for false statement in documents (books, records, accounting, reporting etc.)-Opportunity of fair trial given-Contention of the Appellant (Insurance Company) that the impugned order violated Art. 10-A of the Constitution was without any basis as it was evident from the record that Show-Cause Notice (SCN) was, inter alia, also issued to the directors of the Appellant and the ingredients of a fair trial had been fulfilled in the SCN proceedings-Appellate Bench rightly upheld the impugned order passed by the Commission-Appeal, filed by (Insurance) Company , was dismissed.\n(d) Insurance Ordinance(XXXIX of 2000)-\n-Ss. 45, 46 & 158-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed], S. 4-Issuance of ordinary shares-Approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) with certain conditions)-Penalty for false statement in documents (books, records, accounting, reporting etc.)-Appellant (Insurance Company) was warned through the impugned order by the Commission-Contention of the Appellant that the approval granted by the Commission did not prohibit receiving of funds in tranches-Validity-Said contention had no relevance to the matter at hand as one of the underlying conditions for grant of approval by the Commission was that the issuance of shares shall be in cash-Appellant failed to comply with the said condition and had not offered any cogent reasoning that the mentioned condition was duly met in letter and spirit by the Appellant and was thus, inter alia, warned vide the impugned order-Appellate Bench rightly upheld the impugned order passed by the Commission-Appeal, filed by (Insurance) Company, was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=45,46,158", - "Case #": "Appeal No.42 of 2016, decided on 21st November, 2023, heard on: 20th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saadat Ali Saeed for Appellant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.\nShafique Ur Rehman, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.\nRaja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs CRESCENT STAR INSURANCE LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25494", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5098 = 2024 SLD 5908 = 2024 CLD 1266", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-S.135(1)-Trade Organizations Act (II of 2013), Ss.14(1) & 14(3)(g)-Trade Organizations Rules, 2013, R.6(1)(h)-Pakistan Poultry Association-Annual General Meeting-Holding of adjourned Annual General Meeting (AGM) of Pakistan Poultry Association (PPA) on the same day without following the law and required quorum-Jurisdiction of Directorate General Trade Organization (DGTO) to issue direction to call AGM of PPA and to take cognizance of complaint filed by respondent-Scope-High Court ruled that DGTO had jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondents complaint regarding non-compliance of the requirements of proviso to S.135(1) of the Companies Act by PPA-Provisions of Trade Organization Act, 2013 (2013 Act), give far-reaching powers to DGTO to oversee the activities and functions of a trade organization to ensure that they remain compliant with provisions of 2013 Act and 2013 Rules as well as the terms and conditions of their licences-Section 14(1) of 2013 Act provides inter alia that the affairs of a registered trade organization shall be managed and conducted in such manner as the Regulator may direct from time to time-Section 14(3)(g) of the 2013 Act empowers the Regulator to give directions to trade organizations in matters concerning 2013-Act or any rules or directives, made thereunder-Registered Trade Organization is required to conduct its affairs in accordance with and remain compliant with the requirements of the Companies Act, 2017-Directorate General Trade Organizations (DGTO) did not commit any illegality by requiring PPA to call an AGM in accordance with the law-Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.\n(b) Trade Organizations Act (II of 2013)-\n-Ss.7(1)(c), 7(1)(g) & 8-Trade Organizations Rules, 2013, R.6(1)(h)-Failure of a company to get itself registered under the Companies Act, 2017-Effect-Trade organization renders its licence liable to cancellation where it fails to get registration as a company under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2017, or where it does not discharge statutory obligations as a limited company under the said Act-Licence granted to any trade organization is subject to the condition that trade organization complies with the provisions of inter alia the Companies Act, 2017-Section 8 of Trade Organizations Act, 2013 which contains a non-obstante clause giving an overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act over the Companies Act, 2017, provides for the cancellation of a trade organizations registration where the licence granted to it is cancelled by the Federal Government or where it fails to apply for the grant of a fresh licence.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=135(1)Trade Organization Act, 2013=14(1),14(3)(g)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.445 of 2024, decided on 19th April, 2024, heard on: 2nd April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Tariq Bilal along with Muzamil Aftab, Secretary General PPA for Petitioner.\nMs. Asia Batool, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent.\nMisbah-ul-Mustafa Safir for Respondent No.2.\nMalik Ghulam Sabir and Ali Nawaz Kharral, Amici curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN POULTRY ASSOCIATION through Secretary General-Petitioner\nVersus\nREGULATOR OF TRADE ORGANIZATIONS and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25495", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5099 = 2024 SLD 5099 = 2024 CLD 1254", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. VII, R. 11-Rejection of plaint-Principles relating to rejection of plaint under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C stated.\nA plaint cannot be rejected in piecemeal under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Even if one prayer contained in the plaint is found to be maintainable in the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, the plaint cannot be rejected in part. What is essentially required is that the plaintiff must demonstrate that not only a right has been infringed in a manner that entitles him to a relief but also that when he approached the Court, the right to seek that relief was in subsistence. Nothing more than the averments of the plaint have to be seen for the purposes of adjudicating whether the plaint unveiled any cause of action. However, the dearth of proof or weakness of proof in the circumstances of the case does not furnish any justification for coming to the conclusion that there was no cause of action disclosed in the plaint, because for the rejection of plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., the Court cannot take into consideration pleas raised by the defendants in the suit, as at that stage, the pleas raised by the defendants are only contentions in the proceedings, unsupported by any evidence on record. However, if there is some material apart from the plaint which is admitted by the plaintiff, the same can also be looked into and taken into consideration by the Court while deciding an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Moreover, the Court may, in exceptional cases, consider the legal objections in the light of averments of the written statement but the pleading as a whole cannot be taken into consideration for the rejection of plaint. The Court has to presume the facts stated in the plaint as correct for the determination of such application. In case of any mixed questions of law and facts, the right methodology and approach is to allow the suit to proceed to the written statement and discovery phases and to determine the matter either by framing preliminary issues or through a regular trial. This rule does not justify the rejection of any particular portion of the plaint or a piecemeal rejection, as the concept of partial rejection is seemingly incongruous to the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. However, it should be kept in mind that astute drafting for creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law, and a clear right to sue ought to be shown in the plaint. Where there is a joinder of multiple causes of action, and at least some of these causes could potentially lead to a decree, a plea of demurrer cannot be admitted to reject the plaint. Similarly, if there are several parties and the plaint discloses a cause of action against one or more of them then, too, the plaint cannot be rejected, as what is required in law is not the reading of the plaint in fragments but reading it as a whole. The Court is under an obligation to give a meaningful reading to the plaint and if it is manifestly vexatious or meritless, in the sense that it does not disclose a clear right to sue, the court may reject the plaint, but before rejecting it must determine whether litigation of such a case will be absolutely vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court.\nUndoubtedly, the plaint can be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., at any stage of the proceedings to culminate the civil action, on the philosophy that incompetent lawsuits should be buried at their inception in order to save the precious time of the Court which may be consumed and dedicated in serious and genuine litigation, but at the same time, this underlying principle does not give license to invoke the same in every lawsuit just to prolong or drag the proceedings with mala fide intention or ulterior motives. On the contrary, such application must articulate, distinctly, how and in which condition, as enumerated under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., is the plaint liable to be rejected, rather than filing it with sweeping or trivial allegations to waste the valuable time of the Court.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 2(9), 2(17) & 5-Partnership Act (IX of 1932), Ss. 4, 32, 39 & 40-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 12 & 54-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11-Suit for specific performance of agreement, recovery and permanent injunction-Rejection of plaint-Scope-Partnership agreement-Agreement for transfer of shares between partners-Jurisdiction of Civil Court-In the present case the business entity was being operated through a registered partnership firm between the two partners i.e. the petitioner (defendant) and respondent No. 1 (plaintiff)-Said business was neither a corporate entity nor was it incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, or the Companies Act, 2017 therefore, the assertion of the petitioner that the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 5 of the Companies Act, 2017 was misconceived and fallacious-As a matter of fact, Section 5 had no applicability or nexus in the matter-Therefore, it had nothing to do with the pending suit between the parties-Substratum of the plaint did not highlight any dispute with regards to the business of the partnership firm, nor did anybody approached the Court for dissolution of the partnership firm or rendition of accounts; but for all practical purposes, the respondent No.1 only entered into an agreement for buying out 50% share of the petitioner in the partnership firm against a valuable consideration, and due to the alleged breach and non-fulfillment of terms and conditions of the agreement, respondent No.1 filed the suit for specific performance of contract with some other ancillary reliefs-All the prayers mentioned by the respondent No.1 were not considered (by the Trial and Appellate Court) which had independent status and were not dependent upon the alleged right of execution of sale deed or transfer of 50% share of the partnership firm in favour of respondent No.1 against a valuable consideration-According to respondent No.1, the partnership business was a going concern and he wanted to buy out 50% share of another partner-Effect of the agreement in question was also to be decided by the Trial Court on whether the arrangement in question could be construed as an agreement for relinquishment of share or retirement from the firm-On the alleged consensus ad idem, the contract was signed, and on the alleged breach, respondent No.1 filed the suit-Court cannot force someone to file a suit for dissolution of partnership or rendition of accounts, but it has to see whether specific performance of contract is possible or not, and in this case, unless the parties were provided equal opportunity to lead the evidence, it was not possible to decide the matter summarily on the basis of an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.-At present stage, the Trial Court could not presume or anticipate the outcome that if the case was made out on merits and the Court granted a decree of specific performance, what the plaintiff would do with the partnership business, and whether he would induct any other partner, continue as proprietor, or convert it into a corporate entity of business-That was not the issue before the Court right now-At present, the lis only related to the alleged sale agreement of 50% share of another partner against some valuable consideration-This was the core issue and dispute between the parties which needed to be adjudicated by the Trial Court-High Court had rightly set-aside the orders of Trial Court and First Appellate Court, whereby the plaint was rejected, and remanded the matter to Trial Court with directions to decide the suit on merits-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(c) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Internal aids for interpretation-Illustrations in a statute, purpose of-Internal aid of interpreting any statute or its provision can be derived primarily from the statute itself including its preamble, illustrations, headings, marginal notes, punctuation, transitory provisions, etc.-Illustrations should not be considered redundant or inconsequential, as they are evenly significant and constructive for securing the proper meaning of the provision-While they cannot influence the ordinary connotation of the section, they are beneficial to demonstrate the means and methods by which such sections are set in motion while interpreting the law.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=11", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 49-K of 2022, decided on 9th August, 2024.\n(Appeal against the judgment dated 22.11.2021, passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Hyderabad in IInd Appeal No .70 of 2021), heard on: 9th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Arshad S. Pathan, Advocate Supreme Court for the Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. REHMAT BEGUM-Petitioner\nVersus\nMEHFOOZ AHMED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25496", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5100 = 2024 SLD 5100 = 2024 CLD 1247", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpOC8", - "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-\n-S.118-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2-Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 128-Suit for recovery of money-Liability of surety-Dishonored cheque-Presumption-Appellant / defendant was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court for recovery of amount mentioned in cheque which was dishonored on presentation-Plea raised by appellant / defendant was that he issued the cheque merely as surety-Validity-Appellant / defendant undertook to pay Rs.1,500,000/- without requirement of any reference to principal debtor-There was nothing on record suggesting that anything contrary had been settled between the parties-Witnesses were cross-examined in length but nothing adverse or sufficient to rebut the presumption arising under S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was noticed-Appellant / defendant admitted signing second agreement and did not deny issuance, presentation and dishonoring of the cheque-High Court declined to interfere in the judgment and decree and imposed cost upon appellant / defendant as Trial Court had reached the correct conclusion-Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\nSukur Pradhan and others v. Orissa State Financial Corporation and others AIR 1992 Orissa 281; The Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Dr. Damodar Prasad and another AIR 1969 SC 297; Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd., Karachi v. Fazal Vanaspati Limited, Karachi PLD 1993 Karachi 90; National Bank of Pakistan v. F.S. Aitzazuddin and 2 others PLD 1982 Karachi 577 and Suresh Narain Sinha v. Akhauri Balbhadra Prasad and others AIR 1957 Patna 256 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Regular First Appeal No. 676 of 2021, decided on 19th July, 2024. Dates of hearing: 14th May, 24th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Shahid Iqbal Babbar and Malik Ali Muhammad for Appellant.\nHaroon Mehboob Butt, Barrister Muhammad Azaz and Tahir Habib for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALTAF-Appellant\nVersus\nRana SHAKEEL AHMAD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25497", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5101 = 2024 SLD 5101 = 2024 CLD 1230", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpOCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S.59-Expression notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force -Effect-Expression notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force is meant to give precedence to the provisions of Competition Act, 2010 over any other Act or Rules which were in force at the time of the enactment-Provisions of Competition Act, 2010 have overriding effect over conflicting or comparative provisions of laws of any other administrative or regulatory bodies specifically with respect to matters covered under the Competition Act, 2010.\n(b) Maxim-\n-Lex specialis derogat legi generali-Connotation-In legal history and practice lex specialis derogat legi generali means where two laws govern same factual situation, a law governing specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides the law which governs general matters on the same subject (lex generalis).\nSyed Mushahid Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 SCMR 1218 rel.\n(c) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss.10, 30 & Schedule-Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012), Ss. 2(g) & 13(xx)-Deceptive market practice-Deceptive passing off-Anti-competitive practice-Competition Commission, jurisdiction of-Overlapping of two laws-Scope-Maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali -Applicability-Show cause notice was issued to respondent company for employing deceptive marketing practices-Plea raised by respondent company was that the Competition Commission did not have jurisdiction in the matter-Validity-There was no overlapping jurisdiction in the matters related to deceptive marketing especially concerning the issue of trade dress (passing off) between Intellectual Property Organization and Competition Commission and there was no question of para materia or parallel jurisdiction-Commercial and economic activities of businesses and commercial entities involved in production or distribution of goods or services with a view to increase economic efficiency, ensure fair competition and protect consumers from anti-competitive practice were dealt under the provisions of Competition Act, 2010, which was a special law-Scheme of anticompetitive prohibitions with a mechanism for enforcement was provided in Competition Act, 2010-In the matters of deceptive passing off, Competition Act, 2010 was a specific law (lex specialis) while Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 was general law (legi generali)-Special law was to prevail over general law (Lex specialis derogat legi generali)-Competition Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to prevent and prohibit anticompetitive practices and restore market competition whenever any distortion was introduced in violation of prohibitions prescribed in S.10 of Competition Act, 2010-Proceedings were lawfully initiated against respondent company-Objection was dismissed in circumstances.\nSyed Mushahid Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 SCMR 1218; A. Rahim Foods (Pvt.) Limited v. K & NS Foods (Pvt.) Limited 2023 CLD 1001 W.P. No.26929 of 2015; Blacks Law Dictionary 6th Edition; C.P.L.A. No.102-L of 2013 and Society of Accounting Education (SOAE) v. CFA Institute, Lahore and another, Civil Appeal No. 2117 of 2017 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=59", - "Case #": "(File No: 338/ISMAIL INDUSTRIES/OFT/CCP/2019) (File No: 354 / ENGLISH BISCUITS/OFTCCP/2019) (File No: 325/HILAL-FOODS/OFT/CCP/2018), decided on 26th August, 2024. Dates of hearing: 20th and 21st December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Saeed Ahmad Nawaz and Salman Amin, Members", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hassan Zafar, Advocate High Court for the M/s. English Biscuits Manufacturer.\nMs. Hania Haroon, Advocate High Court for the M/s. Ismail Industries Limited.\nKhurram Shehzad Chughtai, Advocate High Court for the M/s. Hilal Foods (Pvt.) Limited.\nWasim Khokhar, Advocate High Court for the M/s. Volka Foods International Limited.\nShafqat Chohan, Advocate Supreme Court for the M/s. SM Foods Private Limited.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN COMPLIANCE THE ORDER OF THE HONORABLE LAHORE HIGH COURT (MULTAN BENCH) LAHORE DATED 02-10-2023, IN INTRA COURT APPEALS NOS.185, 186, 187 of 2023, ALL TITLED S.M. FOOD MAKERS LIMITED V. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25498", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5102 = 2024 SLD 5102 = 2024 CLD 1225", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 134 & 136-Companies (Postal Ballot) Regulations 2018, Regln.8-Extraordinary General Meeting (EOGM), holding of-Contravention, allegation of-Jurisdiction of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)-Scope-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) penalized the Chairman of Board of Directors of Network Limited /Company, being Chairman of the EOGM (Appellant) on complaints of three members of the Company (the Complainants)-Allegation levelled by the complainants was that the Appellant had not complied with the requirements of Companies (Postal Ballot) Regulations, 2018 (the Postal Regulations)-Appellant raised objection with respect to jurisdiction of the Commission to entertain the complaints challenging the proceedings of the EOGM submitting that the proceedings of the EOGM had never been challenged before the Court of competent jurisdiction-Validity-Under S. 136 of Companies Act, 2017 (the Act, 2017), the power to declare the proceedings of a general meeting invalid lie with the Court but, in the present case, the complainants approached the Commission-Though jurisdictional error is always fatal to any legal proceedings and a coram non judice order has no sanctity in eyes of the law, however, the present appeal was preferred against the impugned order passed under S. 134 of the Act, 2017, whereunder penalty was imposed on the Appellant for contravening the provisions of S. 134 of the Act and Regulations made thereunder-Hence, the contention of the appellant that the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction was not tenable and the impugned order did not suffer from any jurisdictional error-Appeal was disposed of.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss.2(66), 134, 143, 144, 145 & 479-Companies (Postal Ballot) Regulations, 2018, Regln. 8-Extraordinary General Meeting (EOGM), non-adjournment of-Contraventions, allegation of-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) penalized the Chairman of Board of Directors of Network Limited /Company, being Chairman of the EOGM (Appellant) on complaints of three members of the Company (the complainants)-Allegation levelled against the appellant was that it had not adjourned the meeting in terms of Regln.8 of the Companies (Postal Ballot) Regulations, 2018 (the Postal Regulations)-Contention of the appellant was that S. 145 of the Companies Act, 2017, did not mandate adjournment of the meeting when a poll was demanded and that Regln. 8 of the Regulations, 2018 was contradictory to S. 145 of the Act, 2017 as such the same could not override the primary law-Validity-Admittedly, the notice was duly issued by the Company to hold the EOGM for voting to be held, inter alia, on agenda (as item # 3) pertaining to reversal of the decision of the Board whereby FD Shares Registrar was appointed-It was also an admitted fact that on a demand of poll through postal ballot, the appellant authorized voting to be conducted through postal ballot, however, the same was done on the day of the meeting (i.e. August 22, 2020)-Record (outcome of the voting) showed that 37.79% votes were cast against the resolution and thus special resolution to reverse the mentioned decision of the Board was not passed, as under Cl. (66) of S.2 of the Act, 2017, a special resolution had to be passed by a majority of three-fourth of such members of the company entitled to vote as were present in person or by proxy or vote through postal ballot at a general meeting-Thus, the imposition of penalty was not justified-Appellate Bench cancelled the penalty imposed on the appellant vide the Impugned Order-Appeal was allowed circumstances.\n(c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss.134, 143, 144, 145 & 479-Companies (Postal Ballot) Regulations 2018, Regln. 8-Holding of Extraordinary General Meeting (EOGM), non-adjournment of-Contraventions, allegation of-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) penalized the Chairman of Board of Directors of Network Limited/Company, being Chairman of the EOGM (Appellant) on complaints of three members of the Company (the complainants)-Allegation levelled against the appellant was that it had not adjourned the meeting in terms of Regln. 8 of the Companies (Postal Ballot) Regulations, 2018 (the Postal Regulations)-Contention of the appellant was that it was a matter of record that the Company showed its willingness to hold another meeting but the Commission, despite asking, did not issue any guidance to hold a fresh poll-Validity-As the Company had sought guidance and offered the Commission to hold another meeting in matter-in-question but the Commission did not issue any such instructions, thus, the imposition of penalty was not justified-Appellate Bench cancelled penalty imposed on the appellant vide the Impugned Order-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=134,136", - "Case #": "Appeal No.116 of 2021, decided on 16th January, 2024, heard on: 25th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants:\nIjaz Ahmed, Sarfraz Ahmed and Mohsin Naseem, Company Secretary.\nFor the Respondent:\nAmir Saleem, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.\nMuhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.\nSardar Sohaib Amin, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAZHAR-UL-HAQ SIDDIQUI-Appellant\nVersus\nHOD, ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT-I, SECP-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25499", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5103 = 2024 SLD 5103 = 2024 CLD 1221", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpODg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 1(3)-Distorting competition within Pakistan-Scope-Use of the Starbucks name and logo-Both the Starbucks name and logo were registered abroad and in Pakistan-Matter before the Competition Commission ( Commission ), and then before the Competition Appellate Tribunal ( Tribunal ), was with regard to the use of the Starbucks name and logo by the appellant and selling its products under such name and style-Complaint from the proprietor of the said tradename and trademark, Starbucks Corporation USA (respondent No. 2), was received by the Commission which took action on it, and passed the penalty imposing order, which penalty was enhanced by the Tribunal-Counsel for appellant contended that the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act) only applied to undertakings and all actions or matters that take place in Pakistan and distort competition within Pakistan, as stipulated in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Act, however since Starbucks Corporation USA (respondent No. 2) did not have any outlet in Pakistan, nor had authorized anyone to use its name, logo and products in Pakistan, therefore, the appellant was not in competition with the respondent No. 2, its authorized user(s) and/or its products-Validity-Said contention had no substance-Appellant had put itself forward by selling its own products under the international brand name Starbucks and by using its logo, which must have had the effect of distorting competition within Pakistan because a local vendor selling similar products, as those being sold by the appellant, would be at a serious disadvantage and not able to compete therewith since the unsuspecting public would believe, understand or perceive the same to be the genuine products of the respondent No. 2-Appeal was dismissed.\n(b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 1(3) & 38-Distorting competition-Use of the Starbucks name and logo-Matter before the Competition Commission ( Commission ), and then before the Competition Appellate Tribunal ( Tribunal ), was with regard to the use of the Starbucks name and logo by the appellant and selling its products under such name and style-Complaint from the proprietor of the said tradename and trademark, Starbucks Corporation USA (respondent No. 2), was received by the Commission which took action on it, and imposed a penalty of five million rupees on the appellant and ordered further additional penalty of one hundred thousand rupees per day from the date of passing of the order in case of non-compliance-Tribunal decided the appeal by enhancing the penalty amount from five million to six million rupees but reduced the per day penalty amount to five thousand rupees from one hundred thousand rupees-Validity-Counsel for the appellant conceded that the law authorizes the penalties which had been imposed under section 38 of the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act)-Therefore, it was not understandable how the same could be objected to-No other point had been urged which may persuade the Court to take a view different from the one taken by the Tribunal-Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=1(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1011 of 2024, decided on 7th August, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 29.05.2024 of the Competition Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad passed in Appeal No. 45 of 2023), heard on: 7th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Taimoor Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nHafiz Naeem, Legal Advisor for Respondent No. 1.\nRespondent No. 2 not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs OPTIONS INTERNATIONAL (SMC-PVT.) LTD. through CEO-Appellant\nVersus\nThe COMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Registrar and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25500", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5104 = 2024 SLD 5104 = 2024 CLD 1199", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpOHo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Precedent-\n-Judgment per incuriam-Principle-Doctrine of per incuriam refers to a judgment of Court which has been decided without reference to, or in ignorance of a statute or an earlier judgment/precedent and/or overall dress up of the scheme of law, which could have been relevant and therefore such ignorance has affected the result of the case-Some of the factors to be considered while contending that a decision is not a binding precedent and should not be followed or be ignored on such principles are summarized hereunder but are not limited:\ni. Decision where point in issue is not argued or considered by Court or decision rendered without answer to argument, without reference to crucial words of the rules and without any citation of authority;\nii. Decision where mere direction is issued without laying down any principle of law; and\niii. If a judgment is delivered in ignorance of the scheme of law to demonstrate real intent of legislature will also be recited per incuriam.\nLegislatures real intent should never be left behind or overshadowed by judgment rendered per incuriam-Jurisprudence evolves and unveils through a constant process.\nChaudhary Pervez Elahi v. Deputy Speaker, Provincial Assembly of Punjab, Lahore and others PLD 2023 SC 539 rel.\n(b) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Provision or word used in any statute cannot be rendered redundant.\nPakistan Television Corporation Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal), LTU Islamabad and others 2017 PTD 1372; Micro Innovations and Technologies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others 2023 PTD 742 and Messrs Master Foam (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others v. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and others PLD 2005 SC 373 rel.\n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 2-Appeal-Term Judgement -Scope-Term judgment only refers to judgment of Banking Court in exercise of criminal jurisdiction-In case of civil jurisdiction appeal is actually against a decree-Court cannot render any word of S. 22(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as redundant nor can it read any word or procedure into it-Such reading also aligns with the definition of judgment or decree as given in Civil Procedure Code, 1908.\n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S.22-Appeal-Limitation-Delay caused in drawing decree sheet-Effect-Appellants / borrowers filed appeal after receiving copy of decree which was prepared with delay-Plea raised by respondent / bank was that appeal was not maintainable as the same was beyond period of limitation-Validity-In civil jurisdiction appeal could be filed after passing of judgment but the process was completed only after filing of decree within limitation-Only on the basis of judgment, civil appeal was not maintainable under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-If appeal was preferred against judgment only for any urgent cause, it was to be followed by a decree to be placed and time consumed to obtain decree was to be excluded as limitation would run from the date of drawing decree-Appeal was maintainable in circumstances.\nFirst Pakistan Security Limited and others v. Bank Alfalah Limited 2020 CLD 269 dissent.\n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 22-Suit for recovery of finance-Availing of finance facility-Statement of account, no objection to-Suit filed by respondent / bank for recovery of outstanding finance facility was decreed against appellants / borrowers by Judge in Chambers of High Court in exercise of Banking jurisdiction-Validity-Appellants / borrowers failed to prove that they did not utilize Term Finance Facility-Partial denial of availing Term Finance Facility in terms of leave application/affidavit-in-evidence was immaterial when in cross-examination witness admitted to have availed two finance facilities i.e. Running Finance Facilities and Term Finance Facilities which were sanctioned in their favour-Out of Term Finance Facility sanctioned for Rs. 18 million, a sum of Rs.4 million was paid to another bank for release of property documents-Property documents, after its release, were then mortgaged with respondent / bank for outstanding amounts, which amounts were disclosed in statement of account and were not subjected to any challenge-Surrender of respondent / bank to settle outstanding amount of Rs.30 million by way of 24 monthly installments also superseded unreliable statement made in leave to defend application as well as in affidavit-in-evidence-Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Banking Court-Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.\nMultiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and others 1995 SCMR 362; Yousaf Garments and 3 others v. Grindlays Bank and another 1988 CLC 1214; Bank of America v. Alam & Bros and 6 others 1984 CLC 3393; Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal and others v. The Dakore Temple Committee and others AIR 1925 Privy Council 155; H.H.S Feldman v. the Province of East Bengal PLD 1970 Kar. 295; The Asiatic Industries Ltd., Karachi v. Zahid Ali PLD 1972 Kar. 84; Appollo Textile Mills Limited v. Soneri Bank Limited PLD 2012 SC 268; Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad and another PLD 2008 SC 462 and Cooperative Insurance Society of Pakistan Limited, Karachi and others v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, Karachi and 12 others 1999 SCMR 2799 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.89 of 2023, decided on 26th June, 2024.Dates of hearing: 26th April, 15th and 24th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ms. Sana Akram Minhas, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahab Sarki for Appellant along with Wahaj Ali Khan.\nAdil Khan Abbasi for Respondent No.1.\nIjaz Ahmed Zahid, Amicus Curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs FAROOQUI FISHERIES through Partner and others-Appellants\nVersus\nFAYSAL BANK LIMITED and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25501", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5105 = 2024 SLD 5105 = 2024 CLD 1032", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpOHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 6(1) & 387, proviso-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A-Company ordered to be wound up by the Court-Appointment of liquidator to manage the affairs of the company-Winding-up order challenge to-Maintainability-Directors, powers of-Company that has been ordered to be wound up can challenge the winding-up order in its name, provided the institution of appeal and the person acting on behalf of the company are authorized by a resolution of its board of directors-Section 6(1) of the Companies Act, 2017 provides that [a]ny person aggrieved by any judgment or final order of the Court passed in its original jurisdiction under this Act may, within sixty days, file a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. -It uses the general expression any person aggrieved and does not mention the specific persons competent to file a petition for leave to appeal-Company against which a winding-up order has been passed falls within the scope of the expression any person aggrieved and thus can file a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court under Section 6(1) of the 2017 Act-Company can exercise such right of appeal through its directors-Upon the commencement of the winding-up proceedings, despite the appointment of the liquidator, certain powers still remain with the directors of the company who, before the winding-up order, had the ultimate responsibility for managing the company and acting in its best interests in their fiduciary capacity-Such powers are usually referred to as residuary powers, and are not affected by the provisions of company law like the proviso to Section 387 of the Companies Act, 2017-Therefore, a company against which the winding up order has been passed is to exercise its right of appeal through the board of directors-Board of directors can, by its resolution, authorise any person, including the former chief executive of the company, to act on behalf of the company in filing an appeal or a petition for leave to appeal against the winding-up order-When the directors can defend the original winding-up proceeding, they surely can also file and pursue an appeal arising from that original proceeding, as it is an integral part of defending the company from being wound up until it stands wound up or dissolved-This continuity ensures that the company retains its right of defense throughout the legal process-It is a necessary corollary of the companys right to appeal that its directors control the conduct of the appeal, just as they had control over the defence to the winding-up petition in the first instance-Denying the directors the capacity to exercise the companys right to appeal would effectively deprive the company of its locus standi to challenge the winding-up order, which would be contrary to the fundamental right of every person, including a juristic person like a company, to a fair trial and due process in the determination of civil rights and obligations, guaranteed by Article 10A of the Constitution-Regarding the expenses/costs for filing the appeal or petition for leave to appeal, the liquidator upon his appointment takes over the charge of all the assets and funds of the company, and the directors no longer have any control or authority to make or authorize any expenditure therefrom-Given this position, the directors inevitably have to arrange the funds for payment of fees to the counsel, etc., from their personal sources other than the funds and assets of the company and also bear the costs of appeal or petition for leave to appeal, if any, in case of dismissal-However, if the companys appeal succeeds and the winding-up order is set aside, they may get reimbursement of those expenses from the companys funds under a resolution of the board of directors made after the success of the appeal.\nRe Diamond Fuel Company (1879) 13 Ch. D. 400; Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Company v. Gopal Chetti (1931) 58 Ind App 416; U.K. Jurisdiction: Re Union Accident Insurance Co. Ltd. (1972) 1 All ER 1105; Closegate Hotel Development (Durham) Ltd. v. McLean (2013) EWHC 3237 (Ch). Indian Jurisdiction; Anil Kumar Sachdeva v. Four A Asbestos [1980] 50 Comp Cas 122 (Del); Sinha Watches v. Gujarat S.F.C. (1985) 58 Com Cas 489 (Guj); Tata Finance Ltd. v. Chemox Chemical Industries, [2000] 100 Com Cas 338 (Bom); Rishabh Agro Industries v. P.N.B. Capital Services AIR 2000 SC 1583; Modi Rubber Ltd. v. Madura Coats Ltd. MANU/UP/1521/2004=2004 SCC Online All 1400 Australian Jurisdiction: Re Laverton Nickel (1979) 3 ACLR 945; Re Rick Wilson (1982) 7 ACLR 354. South African Jurisdiction: OConnell Manthe and Partners v. Vryheid Minerale 1979 (1) SA 553 (T); Storti v. Nugent (2001) 3 SA 783 (W); Praetor v. Aqua Earth Consulting CC (162/2016) [2017] ZAWCHC 8 Malaysian Jurisdiction; Sri Hartamas Development v. MBF Finance (1991) LRC (Comm) 595; KTL v. Azrahi Hotels (2003) 3 CLJ 49. Singapore Jurisdiction; Sun Electric Power v. RCMA Asia (2021) 2 SLR 478; Hin Leong Trading v. Rajah and Tann, (2022) SGCA 28; Closegate Hotel Development (Durham) Ltd. v. McLean (2013) EWHC 3237 (Ch) and Re Rick Wilson (1982) 7 ACLR 354 ref.\n(b) Appeal-\n-Person adversely affected-Appeal, right of-Where a right of appeal is provided from a judgment, decree or order without specifying the persons who can avail it, every person who is adversely affected and thus aggrieved by such judgment, decree or order can avail that right of appeal.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=6(1),387Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "C.Ps.L.As. Nos. 1422-L and 1423-L of 2021 and C.M.As Nos. 1636-L, 1758-L and 1759-L of 2021 and C.M.As Nos.2160, 2161, 2216 and 2217 of 2024, decided on 28th June, 2024.\n(Against the consolidated judgment of the Lahore High\nCourt, Lahore, dated 17.06.2021, passed in C.Os. Nos. 28 and 29 of 2013). Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court, Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record and Mian Liaqat Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nSalman Aslam Butt, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court, Shehzada Mazhar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court, Anis M. Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record and Mobin Ahmad Siddiqui, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.\nBarrister Haris Azmat, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Ms. Faiza Asad, Advocate and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Applicants (in C.M.As. Nos. 2216, 2217 of 2024)\nUzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court, Khwaja Ahmad Hosain, Advocate Supreme Court and Faisal Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court, Amicus Curiae.\nAkif Saeed, Chairman, SECP, Muzaffar Ahmed Mirza, CP, SECP, Shamshad A. Rana, SPP, SECP. Barrister Omer Malik, SPP, SECP and Hussain Raza, SPP, SECP for the SECP.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court, Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record and Mian Liaqat Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nSalman Aslam Butt, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court, Shehzada Mazhar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court, Anis M. Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record and Mobin Ahmad Siddiqui, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.\nBarrister Haris Azmat, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Ms. Faiza Asad, Advocate and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Applicants (in C.M.As. Nos. 2216, 2217 of 2024)\nUzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court, Khwaja Ahmad Hosain, Advocate Supreme Court and Faisal Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court, Amicus Curiae.\nAkif Saeed, Chairman, SECP, Muzaffar Ahmed Mirza, CP, SECP, Shamshad A. Rana, SPP, SECP. Barrister Omer Malik, SPP, SECP and Hussain Raza, SPP, SECP for the SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs TANVEER COTTON MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and another-Petitioners\nVersus\nSUMMIT BANK LIMITED and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25502", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5106 = 2024 SLD 5106 = 2024 CLD 1184", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDc", - "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-\n-S.56-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII Rr.1, 2 & O.VII, R.10-Recovery suit on the basis of negotiable instrument-Part performance-Payments received by the appellant in pursuance of different cheques issued from the same cheque books-Non-adoption of procedure of endorsement on the cheque before presenting it-Effect-Section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act, 1881), specifically provides for an endorsement on a negotiable instrument with regards to part-payment and thereafter the instrument could be negotiated for the balance amount-If the drawer and the payee of the cheque adopt the procedure given in S.56 of the Act 1881, then it would be open to the payee of the cheque to present the cheque for payment of only the endorsed balance amount, due to him-Without adopting the procedure as provided in S.56 ibid, the cheque could not be presented for encashment and suit under O.XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2 of C.P.C. could not be filed, rather a suit for recovery of balance amount of cheque before a court of plenary jurisdiction has to be instituted-After receipt of part payment, appellant did not adopt the procedure as provided under S.56 of the Act, 1881, therefore, he was barred from presenting the cheque in question in the bank for its encashment and instituting suit under O.XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2 of C.P.C.-Proper forum in this regard was Court of plenary jurisdiction i.e. Civil Court for getting his grievance redressed-Trial Court should have returned the plaint under O.VII, R.10, C.P.C. for its presentation before the court of competent jurisdiction, obviously, keeping in view barricade of limitation-Appeal was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=56Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2,10", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No.11759 of 2021, heard on 16th May, 2024, heard on: 16th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Bilal Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Chaudhry Mohsin Iftikhar Gujjar for Appellant.\nMehboob Rasool Awan and Imran A. Mian for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AFZAL-Appellant\nVersus\nBINYAMEEN SAJID-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25503", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5107 = 2024 SLD 5107 = 2024 CLD 1170", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDY", - "Key Words:": "Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 126-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54-Suit for declaration and injunction-Interim injunction, refusal of-Bank guarantees, types of-Object, purpose and scope-Principle of strict liability-Applicability-Plaintiff/company sought stay against encashing of bank guarantees issued to defendant for Performance of Contract and to secure Mobilization Advance-Validity-Bank guarantee is an autonomous contract, and as such it has to be construed on its own terms, independent of underlying contract between principal and beneficiary, irrespective of claims pending between them-Accordingly nature and text of bank guarantee assumes great importance-Of the two well-known types of bank guarantees, Mobilization Guarantee is given to secure advance payment received by principal from beneficiary for contracted works-Usually beneficiary deducts that advance payment from bills raised by principal from time to time and Mobilization Guarantee is then renewed for unadjusted amount-Performance Guarantee, generally speaking, is to guarantee fulfilling of obligations by principal under underlying contract-Mobilization Guarantee is essentially beneficiarys money with principal-Courts ordinarily invoke the rule of non-interference with a bankers obligation to construe such guarantee as not being subject to a restraining order even if there is a dispute between the parties to the underlying contract-In cases involving guarantees such as Performance Guarantees, Courts grant or refuse injunction depending upon the text of the guarantee construing it on the rule of strict compliance-Plaintiff did not bring forth any exception to unsettle general rule of non-interference with bank guarantees, and the demand raised on bank guarantees too met the test of strict compliance-Plaintiff did not have a prima facie case for the grant of temporary injunction to stay payment under the bank guarantees, nor was it a case of irreparable harm-High Court declined to grant interim injunction restraining encashing of bank guarantees as balance of convenience was also in favour of defendant-Application was dismissed, in circumstances.\nShipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. PLD 2003 SC 191; EFU General Insurance Ltd. v. Zhongxing Telecom Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2022 SC 809; Guangdong Overseas Construction Group Company v. Creek Marina PLD 2011 Kar. 304; Shan Associates v. Getz Pharma 2020 CLD 808; Husein Industries v. Sui Southern Gas Company PLD 2020 Sindh 551; Pakistan Real Estate Investment and Management Company v. Sky Blue Builders 2021 CLD 518; Sazco (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Askari Commercial Bank Ltd. 2021 SCMR 558; National Construction Ltd. v. Aiwan-e-Iqbal Authority PLD 1994 SC 311; National Grid Company v. Government of Pakistan 1999 SCMR 2367 and Equitable Trust of New York v. Dawson Partners Ltd. [1926] 27 Lloyds Rep 49, 52 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=126Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54", - "Case #": "Suit No. 1192 of 2022, decided on 31st August, 2023. Dates of hearing: 6th, 11th, 21st, 28th October, 2022 and Re-hearing on 4th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja Shams-ul-Islam, Obaid-ur-Rehman, Sabih Ahmed Zuberi and Khalid Iqbal for Plaintiff.\nArshad M. Tayebaly and Talha Javed for Defendants Nos. 1 and 2.\nNemo for Defendant No. 3.\nFaheem Raza for Defendant No. 4.\nMubashir Mirza, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZIAUDDIN AHMED & CO. (PVT.) LIMITED-Plaintiff\nVersus\nKARACHI SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25504", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5108 = 2024 SLD 5108 = 2024 CLD 1167", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDU", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)-\n-Ss. 6(1) & 22-Stock Exchange Members (Inspection of Books and Record) Rules, 2001, Rr. 3 & 4-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Appeal before the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Provisions of relevant laws, non-compliance of-Post acquisition and merger of the company-Scope and effect-Aggrieved of the penalty imposing order along with certain directions in wake of inspection report/proceedings, the company (KASB Securities Limited) filed an appeal; post filing of appeal appellant underwent acquisition and merge into its successor entity (AKD Securities Limited)-Submission of the appellant was that the impugned order was damaging for the reputation of its (appellants) successor entity, inter alia, for the reason that the present appeal had been fixed after about eleven years of filing-Validity-Appellant had conceded before the Bench that under the law its successor entity was responsible for the liabilities of the appellant-Submission of the appellant (that the impugned order was damaging for the reputation of its successor entity) was not convincing as the record clearly suggested that the present appeal was filed by the appellant (KASB Securities Limited) more than a decade ago (in 2014) against the impugned order, which post, acquisition and merger, was now represented by successor entity (AKD Securities Limited)-Fact that the impugned order and the present appeal were on record at the time acquisition and merger took place made it amply clear that the successor entity was in knowledge of the penalty/ directions imposed/issued vide the impugned order and pending appeal there against-Moreover, the contention of the appellant that the present appeal was fixed after eleven years of filing was also not correct as record showed that previously, the present appeal was fixed for hearing on four dates-Bench did not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969=6(1),22", - "Case #": "Appeal No.17 of 2014, decided on 31st January, 2024, heard on: 18th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Farid Alam, Chief Executive for Appellant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.\nRaja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.\nMuhammad Faisal, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I, SECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KASB SECURITIES LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nDIRECTOR/HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, MSRD-SECP-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25505", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5109 = 2024 SLD 5109 = 2024 CLD 1145", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)-\n-Ss. 3, 4 & Sched., Art. II-Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss. 20 & 41-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2-Arbitration proceedings-Interim injunction, refusal of-Foreign jurisdiction-Scope-Plaintiff was acting as General Sales Agent (GSA) in Pakistan on behalf of defendant airline of foreign country-Plaintiff was aggrieved of intention of defendant airline to terminate the agreement-Plaintiff invoked arbitration clause in the agreement and sought referring the matter to arbitration after issuance of interim injunction in its favour-Validity-GSA Agreements fulfilled the term agreement in writing containing an arbitral clause as mentioned in Art. II of Schedule of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011-Proceedings were governed by the provisions of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 and not Arbitration Act, 1940-High Court declined to confirm restraining order granted earlier, as no case was made out by plaintiff for such kind of interim injunctive relief-Subject GSA Agreements not only contained foreign arbitration clause but also the governing law was that of foreign country-Plaintiff could avail remedy of interim relief/ protection, under the relevant provisions of laws of foreign country-High Court stayed proceedings of suit filed by plaintiff, under Ss. 3 & 4 of Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, and ad-interim order passed earlier was vacated/recalled-Application was dismissed in circumstances.\nTallahasee Resources Incorporated through Mrs. Maleeha Waheed Malik v. Director General Petroleum Concessions, Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division) and another 2021 CLC 423; The Hub Power Company Limited (HUBCO) through Chief Executive and another v. Pakistan WAPDA through Chairman and others PLD 2000 SC 841; Messrs Uzin Export and Import Enterprises for Foreign Trade v. Messrs M. Iftikhar & Company Limited 1993 SCMR 866; Pak Turk Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Turk Hava Yollari (Turkish Airlines Inc.) 2015 CLC 1; Messrs Serulean (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi v. Messrs Bhoja Airlines (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chairman and another 2001 YLR 3150; Gul son Air Cargo Services (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Compagnie Internationale Air France 1997 CLC 1250; In re: Messrs Allied Commercial Finance Limited 1986 CLC 2408; Muhammad Farooq M. Memon v. Government of Sindh through its Chief Secretary, Karachi 1986 CLC 1408; Muhammad Jamil v. Iqbal Ahmed PLD 1977 Kar. 351; Global Quality Foods Pvt. Limited v. Hardees Food Systems, Inc. PLD 2016 Sindh 169; 1979 CLC 307; 1997 CLC 1230; PLD 1972 AJK 80; 1994 CLC 2000; PLD 1974 Lah. 231; 1979 CLC 565; 1983 CLC 1695; 2013 MLD 1083; 1995 CLC 1877; 1987 CLC 2063; 2010 YLR 3331; PLD 2014 Kar. 427; 2011 CLC 323; 1984 CLC 546; PLD 1976 Kar. 644; 2000 MLD 785; 2001 CLC 664; 2003 CLD 209; 2004 CLC 544; 2008 CLD 1312; 2003 YLR 461; PLD 1983 Kar. 613; PLD 1978 Kar. 273; 1996 SCMR 690 ; PLD 1993 SC 42; 2010 YLR 1560; PLD 1989 Kar. 645; 2005 MLD 641; PLD 1986 Kar. 38; PLD 2008 Isl. 48 ; PLD 1970 SC 373; 1989 CLC 1143; PLD 1995 Kar. 286; 1998 CLC 485; 2014 CLD 337; PLD 1966 AJK 19; 1994 SCMR 1555; 2006 CLD 1491; PLD 1978 SC 220; PLD 1989 Kar. 404; Digital World Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Samsung Gulf Electronics FZE through Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer and another PLD 2010 Kar. 274; Hitachi Limited and another v. Rupali Polyester and others 1998 SCMR 1618; Aroma Travel Services (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director and 4 others v. Faisal Al Abdullah Al Faisal Al-Saud and 20 others PLD 2018 Sindh 414; Ovex Technologies (Private) Limited v. PCM PK (Private) Limited and others PLD 2020 Isl. 52; Standard Construction Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Communications and others 2010 SCMR 524; Societe Generale De Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Revenue Division, Islamabad 2002 SCMR 1694; Lahore Cantt. Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. Messrs Builders and Developers (Pvt.) Ltd and others PLD 2002 SC 660; Abdul Salam Ansari and 6 others v. Province of Sindh through Secretary and 2 others 2012 CLC 350; Messrs James Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd., through Executive Director v. Province of Punjab through Secretary to the Government of Punjab (Communication and Works) Department, Lahore and 3 others PLD 2002 SC 310; Mst. Baigan v. Abdul Hakeem and another 1982 SCMR 673;Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Corporation Company (Pvt.) Ltd. 2018 MLD 2058; Cummins Sales and Service (Pakistan) Limited through Authorized Signatory v. Cummins Middle East FZE through Chief Executive and 4 others 2015 CLD 1655; Abid Associated Agencies International (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Areva and others 2015 MLD 1646; Cummins Sales and Service (Pakistan) Limited through Authorized Signatory v. Cummins Middle East FZE through Chief Executive and 3 others 2013 CLC 291; Sahabzadi Maharunisa and another v. Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another v. Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another PLD 2016 SC 358; FAR Eastern Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Guest International Nederland by and 6 others 2009 CLD 153; Messrs Travel Automation (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director v. Abacus International (Pvt.) Ltd. through President and Chief Executive and 2 others 2006 CLD 497 and Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Limited v. Pepsico. Inc. and 4 others 2004 CLD 1530 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=20,41Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "Suit No. 1657 of 2020, decided on 17th May, 2021. Dates of hearing: 1st, 26th March, 12th, 15th, 16th, 26th and 27th April, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Faisal Kamal Alam, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "S. Haider Imam Rizvi, Jamal Bukhari, S. Ahsan Imam Rizvi and Asadullah Shar for Plaintiff.\nJahanzeb Awan and Rashid Mahar for Defendant.\nIrfan Ahmed Memon, D.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TCB AVIATION (PVT.) LIMITED-Plaintiff\nVersus\nSRI LANKAN AIRLINES LIMITED through Country Manager-Defendant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25506", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5110 = 2024 SLD 5110 = 2024 CLD 1137", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNC8", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 22-Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 500 (1993 Revision), Art. 23-Finance facility, recovery of-Letter of Credit-Goods damaged-Liability of insurance company-Determination-Novation, principle of-Applicability-Suit filed by respondent / bank was decreed against appellants / customers to recover finance facility advanced in terms of Letter of Credit-Appellants / customers claimed that goods were damaged as a consequence of alleged transshipment-Validity-Goods in question were insured and there was a role and responsibility of Insurance company, in the facts and circumstances encountered-Such aspect was not considered by Banking Court-Respondent / bank alleged that credit facility upon payment was transformed into PAD (Payment Against Documents) facility and eventually converted into FIM (Finance Against Imported Merchandize) facility-Whether cause of action was rested on the Credit arrangement or FIM facility, which triggered another moot question that whether doctrine of novation was attracted and what was the cause and effect of novation, if it actually happened-High Court declined to examine judgment of Banking Court in the context of incomplete, bald and inconclusive adjudication-Judgment and decree passed by Banking Court did not constitute a valid, fair and proper adjudication of all-inclusive issues / questions, and the judgment dealt with the partial issues superficially-High Court declared judgment passed by Banking Court ineffective and illegal as the questions raised and left unattended had jettisoned its lawful existence-High Court remanded the matter to Banking Court for decision afresh-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nMaster Muhammad Bashir v. Moinuddin 1990 CLC 703; Muhammad Arshad Khan v. Chairman, M.D.A and 6 others 1997 MLD 3066; Bashir Ahmad v. Abdul Wahid PLD 1995 Lah. 98; Habib Bank Limited v. Judge Banking Court and others 2015 CLD 1875; Crescent Leasing Corporation Limited through Constituted Attorney v. Messrs Sarhad Goods Transport Company and 3 others 2013 CLD 854; Rehmatullah Khan and another v. Ghulam Farid and others 2009 SCMR 371; Administration Municipal Corporation, Multan through T.M.O and 2 others v. Haider Zaman Qureshi 2012 MLD 948; Shah Nawaz and another v. Nawab Khan PLD 1976 SC 767; MCB Bank Limited v. Sunshine Cloth Limited C.O.S No. 152/2010; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Ilyas Enterprises through Proprietor Mr. Ilyas Malik and 2 others 2004 CLD 1338; Messrs Sazco (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Askari Commercial Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 558; S.A. Hameed and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited and others 2004 CLD 1620 and Habib Bank Limited v. Tauqeer Ahmed Siddiqui and another 2009 CLD 312 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22", - "Case #": "Regular First Appeals Nos.1583, 1584 and 1443 of 2015, decided on 6th June, 2024, heard on: 6th June, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Asim Hafeez, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Imran Malik for Appellants.\nMoeez Tariq for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M.L. TRADERS through Sole Proprietor and another-Appellants\nVersus\nHABIB BANK LIMITED through Branch Manager and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25507", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5111 = 2024 SLD 5111 = 2024 CLD 1118", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNCs", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-\n-S. 33-Associations with Charitable and Not for Profit Objects Regulations, 2018, Regln. 7, clause (xvi)-Appeal before the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission)-Maintainability-Prior approval of the Commission for appointment of the Chief Executive of the Company-Refusal letter issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, assailing of-Appellant/Company was aggrieved of the refusal letter (the impugned letter) sent by the Director, Company Law Division, in response to an application whereby the Appellant sought prior approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) for appointment of the Chief Executive of the Appellant / Company-Record revealed that Appellant / Company had filed two constitutional petitions before the High Court but to no avail; it was argument of Appellant/Company that question of maintainability had already been determined and that no hearing opportunity had been provided to the Appellant by the Director, Company Law Division before issuing the impugned letter while the said officer of the Commission went beyond the scope of the Appellants application, which (otherwise) was merely an application to seek prior approval for appointment of the Chief Executive of the Appellant / Company in terms of cl. (xvi) of Regln. 7 of the Associations with Charitable and Not-for-Profit Objects Regulations, 2018, and the Director issued determination under the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 which tantamount to treating the Appellant a public sector company-Held, that Appellant in both constitutional petitions had also arrayed the concerned ministries of the Government of Pakistan; which showed that the matter at hand involved stakes of the relevant ministry/division as well, which had also been confirmed by the Appellant-Thus, matter at hand could not be treated as an order of the Commission-Appellate Bench referred the same to the Divisional Head/Executive Director, Licensing and Registration Division (formerly Company Law Division) of the Commission, for decision through a speaking order, in accordance with law, after granting opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned-Appeal filed by the company was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.3(14)Misc./ABR of 2023, decided on 22nd January, 2024, heard on: 6th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Feisal Hussain Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION FUND-Appellant\nVersus\nCOMMISSIONER-COMPANY LAW, SECP-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25508", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5112 = 2024 SLD 5112 = 2024 CLD 1107", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012)-\n-S. 16 & Preamble-Intellectual Property Organization-Object, purpose and scope-Purpose of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 is to consolidate regulation of all existing intellectual property laws included in its Schedule by Intellectual Property Organization and vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Tribunal to try all offences and adjudicate all suits and other civil proceedings regarding infringement or breach of intellectual property laws.\n(b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 10 & 12-Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012), S.3-Term deceptive marketing practice -Competition Commission and Intellectual Property Organization-Jurisdiction-Distinction-Provision of Competition Act, 2010, relates to competition laws, whereas, Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012, pertains to intellectual property laws-Each enactment has created a specialized regulatory body and has put in place a self-contained regulatory framework to administer duties and obligations imposed by law-Provision of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012, consciously excludes Competition Act, 2010, from its Schedule-Legislature has intentionally kept Competition Act, 2010, beyond the purview of Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012-Term deceptive marketing practices under S. 10 of Competition Act, 2010, constitutes a necessary and essential element of competition law, jurisdiction of which is vested with Competition Commission of Pakistan under the Competition Act, 2010.\n(c) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss.10 & 37(2)-Competition Commission (General Enforcement) Regulations, 2007, Regln. 16 (2)-Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012), Ss. 3 & 16-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Deceptive market practice-Show cause notice-Inquiry officer, appointment of-Petitioner company was aggrieved of issuance of show cause notice by Competition Commission under Regln. 16(2) of Competition Commission (General Enforcement) Regulations, 2007, as a complaint had been filed by respondent company alleging deceptive marketing practices and an inquiry officer had been appointed-Validity-In terms of deceptive marketing practices, jurisdiction of Competition Commission under Competition Act, 2010 and Intellectual Property Organization or the Tribunal under Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012, were distinct and separate in terms of ambit and scope of such laws and did not amount to any inconsistency or conflict of jurisdiction-Show cause notice issued by Competition Commission was not without jurisdiction-Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court as a normal rule could not be invoked on mere suspicion or apprehension when no substantive right was infringed and aggrieved party had right to advance its defence in response to a notice-Challenge to a show cause notice in constitutional jurisdiction at premature stage and tendency to bypass remedy provided under concerned statute amounted to fetter rights conferred on statutory functionaries specially constituted for the purpose to initially decide the matter-Objections of petitioner company would have been decided by Competition Commission during proceedings under show cause notice but such an occasion did not arise due to filing of petition before High Court-Petitioner company did not approach High Court with clean hands and resorted to uncalled for litigation, obstructing the Commission as a regulator empowered under the law to undertake and perform its routine functions and duties-High Court declined to interfere in the matter-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nCompetition Commission of Pakistan and others v. Dalda Foods Limited, Karachi 2023 SCMR 1991 ref.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Jahangir Khan Tareen and others 2022 SCMR 92 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012=16Competition Act, 2010=10,12", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 48527 of 2021, decided on 26th June, 2024, heard on: 10th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Abid Hussain Chattha, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Adil Bandial for Petitioner.\nAli Javed Darugar for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEEZAN BEVERAGES (PVT.) LIMITED through duly authorized Officer-Petitioner\nVersus\nCOMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Chairman and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25509", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5113 = 2024 SLD 5113 = 2024 CLD 1099", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNDg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXVII, Rr.1 & 2-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 76 & 77-Suit for recovery on the basis of cheque-Secondary evidence, adducing of-Conditions-Trial Court decreed the suit against the defendant / appellant-Record revealed that the plaintiff / respondent, as documentary evidence, exhibited photocopies of the documents (the agreement, bank deposit slip, Bank Statements, the cheque and dishonor slip)-Documents must be proved by primary evidence-In certain cases, the documents can be proved through the secondary evidence in terms of Art. 76 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 (the Order 1984)-Secondary evidence is an exception to general rule and only meant for the purpose to cater to a genuine need and hardship-It is not to be allowed in routine or without complying with the requirements mentioned under Arts. 76 & 77 of the Order, 1984-Contents of the documents can only be proved through secondary evidence if the conditions mentioned under Art. 76 of the Order 1984 are available which should be satisfied first-Said Article provides an alternate mode and method of proving the documents which for various reasons could not be produced-When primary evidence is not available or produced, Law permits secondary evidence which remedy is designed for the protection of person, who despite best efforts is unable, from the circumstances beyond his control, to produce the primary evidence-Where a person is unable to bring the original documents despite reasonable efforts, the Court is competent to admit secondary evidence but at the same time, it should be kept in mind that the said benefit is not intended fora person who intentionally or with some ulterior motive or sinister objects, refuses to produce the documents in court which is in his possession, power or control- Court is competent to determine whether sufficient ground has been made out or not for the admission of secondary evidence which discretion is to be exercised keeping in the parameters contained in Art. 76 of the Order 1984 and facts and circumstances of each case as secondary evidence is given to prove the existence, contents of documents and nothing more-Impugned judgment on the face of it was short of pre-requisites on the subject-High Court set-aside the impugned ex-parte judgment and decree, and remanded the case to the Trial Court for decision on merits with the direction that the application for leave to appear and defend the suit filed by the appellant/defendant would be deemed to have been allowed on the basis of surety bond having been tendered before the High Court/Appellate Court-Appeal, filed by the defendant, was allowed accordingly.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXVII , Rr. 1 & 2-Suit for recovery on the basis of cheque-Ex-parte proceedings-Judgment, passing of-Court, powers of- Court having no option but to decree the suit -Scope-Trial Court, after conducting ex-parte proceedings against the defendant / appellant , decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff /respondent-Validity-Trial Court while decreeing the suit , in concluding paragraph, observed that Court was left with no option but to decree the suit-Said observation, on the face of it, was contrary to law as not only in an ex-parte case/instance , but even in case of a conceding statement, it is obligatory for the court to appreciate the veracity of the claim of the respondent/ plaintiff-Court is under obligation to see the legality and genuineness of the issue brought before it-Observation that Court was left with no option reflected dealing with the cause in a mechanical manner without application of judicial mind-High Court set-aside the impugned ex-parte judgment and decree and remanded the case to the Trial Court for decision on merits and directed that the application for leave to appear and defend the suit filed by the appellant/defendant would be deemed to have been allowed on the basis of surety bond having been tendered before the High/Appellate Court-Appeal , filed by the defendant, was allowed accordingly.\nMisbah Khanum v. Kamran Yaseen and another 2022 SCMR 1629 and Hamid Nasrullah Ranjha v. Civil Judge West Islamabad 2024 MLD 10 ref.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Act of Court shall prejudice no one-Scope-Where any Court did not comply with a mandatory provision of law or omitted to pass an order in the manner prescribed by law, the litigant could not be taxed much less penalized for the act or omission of the Court-Fault in such cases does lie with the court and not with the litigant and no litigant should suffer on such account-In such like situation, where injustice is caused due to an act or omission on the part of court, the courts are required to remedy the defect that occurred as a consequence thereof.\nMuhammad Ijaz and another v. Muhammad Shafi through LRs 2016 SCMR 834; Shirin and 4 others v. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others 1995 SCMR 585 and Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath AIR 1922 PC 269 ref.\n(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A-Suit for recovery on the basis of cheque-Ex-parte judgment-Fair trial-Scope-After inability of the defendant to submit surety-bond, Trial Court passed ex-parte decree against the defendant / appellant-Validity-In the FIR registered by the respondent/plaintiff against the appellant/defendant on account of dishononing of the subject-cheque, the appellant/defendant was acquitted after a full length trial-There was nothing on record to show that the respondent/ plaintiff assailed the said judgment of acquittal-Such facts warranted due appreciation and judicial scrutiny for just decision of the case under the principle of fair trial envisaged in Art. 10-A of the Constitution-Said aspects had to be seen in conjunction with the mischief attributed to the appellant/defendant whereby he was held guilty of non-submission of surety bond, and was permanently precluded to contest the suit-Appellant /defendant should be afforded an opportunity to contest the suit-High Court set-aside the impugned ex-parte judgment and decree, and remanded the case to the Trial Court for decision on merits and directed that the application for leave to appear and defend the suit filed by the appellant/defendant would be deemed to have been allowed on the basis of surety bond tendered before the High/Appellate Court-Appeal, filed by the defendant, was allowed accordingly .", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=76,77", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 286 of 2022, decided on 5th July, 2024, heard on: 31st May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Arbab Muhammad Tahir, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Faisal Malik for Appellant.\nHabib-ur-Rehman for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAAD MUHAMMAD ABBASI-Appellant\nVersus\nSyed EJAZ ALI-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25510", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5114 = 2024 SLD 5114 = 2024 CLD 1095", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNHo", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss.4, 132 & 505(1)(d)-Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002), Ss. 6(2) & 8(2)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Appeal before the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission)-Failure of listed company to convene Annual General Meeting (AGM)-Effect-Special law, applicability of-Scope-M/s Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (the Gas Company ) was penalized as it failed to convene the annual general meeting (AGM) for the respective financial year despite availing extension of time by the Commission required under subsection (1) of S.132 of the Companies Act, 2017 (the Act 2017)-Argument of the Appellant (Gas Company) was that it, time and again, approached the Commission for grant of extension due to the fact that the Appellant under the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 (the OGRA Ordinance, 2002 ), being a special law, was required to file a petition before the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) for determination of final revenue requirement (FRR) on annual basis and only thereafter it could finalize their financial statements based on OGRAs determination-Validity-Argument of the Appellant(Gas Company) that a special law prevails over the general is not untenable in the present case, given the absence of a corresponding provision in the OGRA Ordinance, 2002 vis-a-vis S.132 of the Act, 2017-Section 505(1)(d) of the Act, 2017 states that the provisions of this Act shall apply to any other company governed by any special enactment for the time being in force except in so far as the said provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of such special enactment-This implied that S. 132 of the Act, 2017 is applicable regardless, as there is no conflict between said section and any section of the OGRA Ordinance, 2002-Moreover, S. 4 of the Act, 2017 explicitly states that the Act, 2017 holds an overriding effect-Additionally, it adheres to well-established legal principle that in the event of inconsistency between two special laws, the one enacted later takes precedence, as is the case with the Act, 2017 in the present matter-Claim of the Appellant (Gas Company) that the reason for delay in holding the AGM was due to the fact that OGRA had not approved the FRR on time was baseless, as the record indicated that the Appellant submitted the petition for FRR to OGRA with delay and the said fact had also not been disputed by the Appellant-Said delay reflected negligence on the part of the Appellant while a listed company is under an obligation, inter alia, to hold the AGM as per the law within 120 days of the close of its financial year which the Appellant had failed to do so-Appellate Bench did not find any reason to interfere with the Impugned order-Appeal filed by the Gas Company was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=4,132,505(1)(d)Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.39 of 2021, decided on 20th January, 2024, heard on: 2nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nadeem Ahmad and Ms. Nida Zafar for Appellant.\nMehboob Ahmed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP and Muhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ADJUDICATION-I, SECP, ISLAMABAD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25511", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5115 = 2024 SLD 5115 = 2024 CLD 1089", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1FpNHk", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997)-\n-S.12-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)-Petitioner assailed Scheme sought to be launched by Provincial Government to provide motorcycles to students, on the plea that the Scheme would cause environmental pollution and adverse impact on environment by induction of a large number of motorcycles in the traffic pattern of Punjab-Validity-Provisions of S.12 of Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, were couched in mandatory terms and prohibited commencement of any project unless an Environmental Impact Assessment had been filed with Provincial Agency whose approval had been obtained in such regard-Such, a fortiori, applies to a scheme or undertaking by Government and is the essence of a responsible Government-Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) as a sine qua non was to be submitted by Transport Department with regard to the Scheme to Provincial Agency and a prior approval had to be obtained before the Scheme was formally launched-High Court directed Transport Department, to do the needful as it was under obligation to do so-High Court further directed that before the Scheme was formally put into effect and the distribution of petrol motorcycles would take place, an EIA was to be submitted to Provincial Agency for its approval in accordance with law-Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Environmental Protection Act, (XXXIV of 1997)=12Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.30823 and 30822 of 2024, decided on 17th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Ejaz Latif, M. Azhar Siddique and Ch. Arshad Gulzar for Petitioner.\nMrs. Hina Hafeez Ullah Ishaq and Syed Kamal Ali Haider Members of the Judicial Water and Environmental Commission.\nAsad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General.\nHassan Ejaz Cheema, Assistant Advocate General with Dr. Ahmad Javed Qazi, Secretary Transport and M. Nawaz Manik, Legal Advisor for EPA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ch. RIZWAN ALI RAA-Petitioner\nVersus\nGOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25512", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5Yzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5116 = 2024 SLD 5116 = 2024 CLD 1069", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5Yzc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases-\n-Germ-Meaning.\nMatter of Protector and Gamble 2017 CLD 1609 rel.\n(b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S.10(2)-Deceptive marketing practice-Advertisement content-Impact-Guidelines-Ordinary consumers are unlikely to investigate types of laboratory tests conducted to substantiate claims made about a product-Such consumers are primarily attracted to bold advertising claims displayed on packaging and in TV Commercials and readily rely upon highly appealing descriptions-It is essential that claims made are clearly and conspicuously qualified to justify their reliability and validity in wide spectrum of real life social conditions.\n(c) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S.10(2)-Deceptive marketing practice-Advertisement content-Scientific evidence-Advertisement must provide minimum level of substantiation required in terms of competent and reliable scientific evidence-In absence of such evidence claims are called misleading and deceptive regarding products characteristics constituting violation of S. 10(2)(b) of Competition Act, 2010.\n(d) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 10 & 30-Deceptive marketing practice-False and misleading claims-Infringement-Advertisement content-Disclaimer on packaging-Respondent company was issued show cause notice for using false and misleading claims about product in question-Validity-There was no report to sufficiently establish measurable superiority of the product over the products of competitors-Disclaimer on packaging of product in question was equally incomprehensible for consumers-Respondent failed to present empirical evidence or reliable data, such as comprehensive market research, sales figures, scientific studies or validation by a relevant third-party to substantiate their claim-Advertising such claim by respondent company tentamount to distribution of false and misleading information to consumers in violation of S. 10(2)(b) of Competition Act, 2010-Respondent company committed violations of S.10 of Competition Act, 2010, which continued even after issuance of show cause notice and persisted-Respondent company demonstrated clear intent of deliberate claims for same product in different countries, with worst deception occurring in Pakistan-Competition Commission imposed fine upon respondent company-Show cause notice succeeded, in circumstances.\nIn the matter of Proctor and Gamble 2017 CLD 1609; In the matter of M/s. China Mobile Pak Limited and M/s Pakistan Telecome Mobile Limited 2010 CLD 1478; Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) and Oxford English Dictionary ref.\n(e) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S.10(2)-Deceptive marketing practice-Infringement-Advertisement content-Disseminating false or misleading information to consumers in violation of Ss. 10(2)(b) & 10(2)(c) or 10(2)(d) of Competition Act, 2010 constitutes an inherent infringement of S.10(2)(a) of Competition Act, 2010 by detrimentally impacting competitors business interests-Deceptive marketing distorts fair competition, giving undue advantage to an undertaking in breach of law, to detriment of returns (quantitative interests), brand image and product reputation (qualitative standing) of competitors-Correlation between deceptive marketing of one undertaking and potential harm to the business interests of the competitors, is logical and verifiable-Such principle is applicable unless exceptional circumstances warrant a divergent interpretation in a specific case, potentially absolving the undertaking from liability under S. 10(2)(a) of Competition Act, 2010.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=10(2),10,30", - "Case #": "File No.376/OFT/Unilever/CCP of 2020, decided on 31st July, 2024. Dates of hearing: 7th May, 4th June, 16th July of 2021, 3rd January and 23rd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Abdul Rashid Sheikh and Saeed Ahmad Nawaz, Members", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Haroon Dugal, Advocate Supreme Court, Waqar Waraich and Ms. Subhe Naseeb for Reckitt Benckiser Pakistan Limited.\nKhawaja Aizaz Ahsan, Hamza Malik, Shaheer Roshan and Ms. Abiyya Kasmani for Unilever Pakistan Limited.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN THE MATTER OF: SHOW CAUSE NOTICE ISSUED TO: UNILEVER PAKISTAN LIMITED\nOn Complaint Filed By\nRECKITT BENCKISER PAKISTAN LTD. FOR DECEPTIVE MARKETING PRACTICES" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25513", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5YzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5117 = 2024 SLD 5117 = 2024 CLD 1055", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5YzY", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S.8-Arbitration-Arbitrators with divided opinion-Umpire, appointment of-Procedure-Statutory notice, non-issuance of-Effect-During arbitration proceedings between the parties, the umpire appointed recused from acting as umpire-Petitioner /Civil Aviation Authority was aggrieved of order passed by Trial Court for appointment of an umpire for arbitration proceedings between the parties-Held, that requirement for appointment of umpire is intended to meet contingency of arbitrators with divided opinion-Where arbitrators are not at variance there is no occasion to refer matter to umpire, who can only be appointed if there are even number of arbitrators-Contract between parties required the arbitrators and not the parties to appoint the umpire-Respondents / contractors did not address notice in question for appointment of substitute umpire to the arbitrators but to petitioner / Authority-Such notice did not conform to requirements of S. 8(1)(b) of Arbitration Act, 1940-Respondents / contractors could not solicit concurrence in appointment of umpire from petitioner / Authority but from arbitrators as that was what the relevant clause of the Contract had provided for-Without a notice by respondents / contractors to the arbitrators to appoint the umpire in place of umpire nominated in contract, the application under S. 8 of Arbitration Act, 1940 could not be entertained by Trial Court, which ought to have pointed out respondents / contractors to the arbitrators who were to concur in the appointment of substitute umpire-As arbitrators had not been required by respondents / contractors to supply vacancy created by recusal of umpire nominated in contract to sit as the umpire, the requirements of S. 8(1)(b) of Arbitration Act, 1940, were not fulfilled, therefore Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to appoint an umpire under S.8(2) of Arbitration Act, 1940-High Court set aside the order passed by Trial Court and respondents / contractors were at liberty to request arbitrators to supply vacancy created due to recusal of umpire nominated in contract-Respondents / contractors could send a notice in writing under S. 8(1) Arbitration Act, 1940, to arbitrators requiring them to supply the vacancy within fifteen days of such notice, in case they did not appoint an umpire-In case arbitrators did not appoint umpire even after notice, then respondents / contractors could apply under S.8(2) of Arbitration Act, 1940, to Trial Court to supply the vacancy-Revision was allowed accordingly.\nExcel Techno Solutions FZE, UAE v. Messrs Oil and Gas Development Company Limited 2019 CLC 416; Better Engineered Solutions (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Balochistan Development Authority, Quetta PLD 2023 Isl. 105; Messrs Alpha Insurance Co. Limited v. Messrs Ch. Nizam Din & Sons 2001 CLC 289; Project Director University of Loralai v. Zarif Khan Hussainzai and Brothers 2023 YLR 527; Karachi Dock Labour Board v. Messrs Quality Builders Ltd. PLD 2016 SC 121; Mengal Brothers Transporters (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 MLD 195; Syed Munir Syed v. Sardar Muhammad Kamal Khan 2019 YLR 209; Gul Rehman v. Gul Nawaz Khan 2009 SCMR 589; Muhammad Kamal-ud-Din v. Munir Syed 2022 SCMR 806; Province of Punjab v. Rana & Sons 1996 CLC 69; Keshavsinh Dwarkadas Kapadia v. Indian Engineering Company AIR 1972 SC 1538; Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar AIR 1979 SC 1457; D. Gobindram v. Messrs Shamji K. & Co. AIR 1961 SC 1285; Vedprakash v. Union of India AIR 1984 Delhi 325; Food Corpn. of India v. A. Muhammad Yunus AIR 1987 Kerala 231; Union of India v. Raghunath Singh & Co. AIR 1980 SC 103; Parbhat General Agencies v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 2298; Misti Enterprises v. Britannia Engineering Products and Services Ltd. AIR 1993 Cal. 272; Union of India v. D.P. Singh AIR 1961 Patna 228; Union of India v. Dev & Co. AIR 1978 Gauhati 91 and Bharat Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1954 Calcutta 606 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=8", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No.168 of 2024, decided on 22nd July, 2024, heard on: 5th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Yousaf Khosa, Barrister M. Zubair Khan Nasar, Barrister Khushbakht and Malik Omair Saleem along with Sagheer Ahmad Bhatti, Legal Officer, CAA for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Masood Khan and Syed Faisal Hussain Shah for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF PAKISTAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nLTH JV and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25514", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5YzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5118 = 2024 SLD 5118 = 2024 CLD 1050", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5YzU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 4, 132 & 505(1)(d)-Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002), Ss. 6(2) & 8(2)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Appeal before the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission)-Failure of the company to convene Annual General Meeting (AGM)-Effect-Provisions of the Companies Act, 2017-Special law, applicability of-Commission penalized M/s Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (the Gas Company) as it failed to convene the Annual General Meeting (AGM) for the respective financial year as required under subsection (1) of S.132 of the Companies Act, 2017, (the Act 2017)-Argument of the Appellant (Gas Company) was that special law (OGRA Ordinance) would prevail over the general law-Validity-Argument of the appellant was not untenable given the absence of a corresponding provision in the OGRA Ordinance vis-a-vis S. 132 of the Companies Act, 2017-Furthermore, the Respondent/Commission had highlighted S. 505(1)(d) of the Companies Act, 2017, which stated that the provisions of this Act (Companies Act 2017) shall apply to any other company governed by any special enactment for the time being in force, except in so far as the said provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of such special enactments , which implied that S. 132 of the Companies Act, 2017, was applicable, as there was no conflict between said section and any section of the OGRA Ordinance-Moreover, S.4 of the Companies Act, 2017, explicitly states that the Companies Act, 2017, has an overriding effect-Additionally, it adheres to the well-established legal principle that in the event of inconsistency between two special laws, the one enacted later takes precedence, as was the case with the Companies Act, 2017, in the present matter-Appellate Bench did not find any reason to interfere with the impugned penalty imposing order passed by the Commission-Appeal filed by Gas Company was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 4, 132 & 505(1)(d)-Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002), Ss. 6(2) & 8(2)-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 33-Appeal before the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission)-Failure of listed company to convene Annual General Meeting (AGM)-Effect-Provisions of the Companies Act, 2017-Special law, applicability of-Scope-Commission penalized M/s Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (the Gas Company) as it failed to convene the Annual General Meeting (AGM) for the respective financial year as required under subsection (1) of S.132 of the Companies Act, 2017, (the Act, 2017)-Argument of the Appellant (Gas Company) was that under the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 (the OGRA Ordinance 2002), being a special law, it was required to file a petition before the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) for determination of Final Revenue Requirement (FRR) on annual basis and only thereafter finalize their financial statements based on OGRAs determination-Validity-Argument of the appellant (that the reason for delay in holding the AGM was due to the fact that OGRA had not approved the FRR on time) was baseless, as it was evident from the record (relevant OGRAs letter etc.) that the Appellant submitted the very petition for FRR to OGRA with delay and the same had also not been disputed by the Appellant-Said delay reflected negligence on the part of the Appellant-A listed company is under an obligation, inter alia to hold the AGM as per the law within 120 days of the close of its financial year which the Appellant had failed to do so-Appellate Bench did not find any reason to interfere with the impugned penalty imposing order passed by the Commission-Appeal filed by Gas Company was dismissed, in circumstance.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=4,132,505(1)(d)Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002=6(2),8(2)Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.40 of 2021, decided on 22nd January, 2024, heard on: 2nd November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nadeem Ahmad and Ms. Nida Zafar for Appellant.\nMehboob Ahmed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP and Muhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LIMITED-Appellant\nVersus\nEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ADJUDICATION-I, SECP, ISLAMABAD-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25515", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5YzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5119 = 2024 SLD 5119 = 2024 CLD 1040", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5YzQ", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S.34-Suit for recovery of money-Partnership deed-Arbitration clause, invoking of-Stay of proceedings-Communication prior to filing of suit-Appellants/ defendants were aggrieved of dismissal of their application filed under S.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 for staying proceedings and directing the parties to pursue their remedies in terms of arbitration clause-Plea raised by respondent / plaintiff was that certain notices issued to appellants/ defendants were not responded and in Trial Court they had asked to file written statement-Validity-Request for adjournment for submission of written statement was recorded by Trial Court on the day when the Court was also confirming that the entire attachments to the suit were not available with appellants/defendants and the same were handed over to them on the given day-Trial Court had wrongly construed the intention of appellants / defendants to discard their right to invoke arbitration clause available in partnership deed-Any initial presumption arising against appellants/defendants stood dislodged-Referred communication, prior to institution of suit had no bearing, as S. 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 provided that an application for stay could be instituted at any time after commencement of legal proceedings-Suit was relied upon for ascertaining the intention to waive off right of arbitration related to period prior to partnership deed which then required the disputes to be resolved through arbitration-Earlier suit of respondent / plaintiff pertained to year, 2014 which was disposed of on 16-02-2015 on the basis of partnership deed formally executed on 07-01-2015-Subsequent suit could not be termed as a continuation of the earlier suit, for the purposes of ascertaining situation in hand-This fact was mistakenly observed by the Trial Court-Preamble of partnership deed gave it a superseding effect besides the fact that specific clause of partnership deed provided that the same constituted the entire understanding between the parties with respect to the subject matter of the partnership deed-High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, set aside the order passed by Trial Court and proceedings in the suit were stayed-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nPakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Messrs Pak Saaf Dry Cleaners PLD 1981 SC 553; POSCO International Corporation through Authorised Officer v. Rikans International through Managing Partner / Director and 4 others PLD 2023 Lah. 116 and S.M. Hashim Hussain v. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority 2005 SCMR 1782 ref.\nRachappa Guruadappa, Bijapur v. Gurusiddappa Nuraniappa and others 1990 MLD 1383; Dunichand Sons and Co. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd. AIR 1962 Cal. 541 (V 49 C 116); Badsha Meah Sowdagar v. Nurul Haq and others PLD 1967 Dacca 250 and Messrs Pakistan Associates Construction Ltd. v. WAPDA and another 1989 MLD 203 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=34", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.79041 of 2023, decided on 16th April, 2024, heard on: 12th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Naeem Sehgal and Huzaifa Naeem Sehgal for Appellant.\nIjaz Ali Akbar Sabzwari for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PUNJAB MASHHAD MEAT COMPLEX and another-Appellants\nVersus\nMASHHAD MEAT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25516", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5Yy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5120 = 2024 SLD 5120 = 2024 CLD 1004", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5Yy8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Organizations Act (II of 2013)-\n-Ss. 3, 6(2), 7(2), 9(1) & 21(4)-Trade Organizations Rules, 2013, Sched. B-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199-Constitutional petition-Trade organization license-Renewal-Principle-Appellant/ petitioner was old Hyderabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Old-HCCI) and aggrieved of order passed by Committee of the Federal Cabinet dismissing its appeal against order passed by Directorate General of Trade Organizations (DGTO), cancelling the license issued to it-Appellant/petitioner also assailed grant of license to New-HCCI-Validity-Application of appellant/petitioner for renewal of its license was not filed within the period prescribed by S. 6(2) of Trade Organizations Act, 2013-Appellant/petitioner was entitled to extension of thirty days for filing of such application, which period was to be reckoned from the date ninety days prior to the expiry of the license -Law entitled appellant/petitioner to an extension in time for filing an application for renewal of its license up to 06-03-2013 only- Respondent/DGTO was not vested with the power to entertain application for renewal of license or an application for extension in time for filing such application beyond time limits prescribed in S. 6(2) of Trade Organizations Act, 2013 and its proviso-Respondent/DGTO acted in transgression of S. 6(2) of Trade Organizations Act, 2013 by not just entertaining appellants/petitioners application filed on 02.07.2013 for renewal of its license but also by keeping it pending for years and requiring the appellant/petitioner through letters to clear deficiencies in its application-This had the consequence of appellant/ petitioner functioning without valid license since 06-05-2011 when its license had expired-New-HCCI submitted application for grant of license as trade organization to respondent/DGTO on 26-04-2019-By that time, license granted to appellant/petitioner had not been cancelled by Federal Government-During subsistence of appellant/petitioners license, New-HCCI could not have applied to respondent/DGTO for issuance of license in its favour-More than one trade organization with same name and object could not be granted licenses under the provisions of Trade Organizations Act, 2013 and Trade Organizations Rules, 2013-Respondent/DGTO granted license to New-HCCI after cancelling appellants/petitioners license and dismissal of appeal by Federal Government-High Court set aside orders against appellant/ petitioner passed by respondent/DGTO and Federal Government-High Court also set-aside license granted by authorities to New-HCCI as the same had been granted in violation of requirements of S. 9(1) of Trade Organizations Act, 2013-High Court remanded the matter to respondent/DGTO to amend show cause notice and thereafter decide whether or not to cancel appellants/petitioners license after affording opportunity of hearing as required by S. 7(2) of Trade Organizations Act, 2013-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nMirza Abdul Rehman and others v. Director General Trade Organization and others Writ Petition No.4239 of 2023; Karachi Women Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. The Director General/Regulator of Trade Organizations Writ Petition No.2274 of 2023; Mian Naseer Hayat Maggo v. Federation of Pakistan through the Ministry of Commerce 2019 CLD 267; MFMY Industries Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 1550; Pawan Goel v. KMG Milk Food Ltd. (2008 (142) Comp. Cas 441; Abid Hussain v. Additional District Judge, Alipur 2006 SCMR 100 and Messrs Tariq Brothers v. Controller of Customs 2005 PTD 186 ref.\n(b) Trade Organizations Act (II of 2013)-\n-S. 7(1)(a)- License, cancellation of- Jurisdiction- Federal Government under S. 7(1)(a) of Trade Organizations Act, 2013 is empowered to cancel license of a trade organization which fails to apply for its renewal within prescribed period or extended period allowed by Director General Trade Organization.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Show cause notice-Penal action-Principle-Order which is penal in nature cannot be passed on a ground which is not mentioned in the show cause notice.\nSmt. Hetal Alpesh Muchhala v. Adityesh Educational Institute and others 2009 Supreme Court OnLine 1454; Collector Central Excise and Land Customs v. Rahm Din 1987 SCMR 1840; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. RYK Mills 2023 SCMR 1856; Poja Jaiswal v. Food Corporation of India AIR 1923 Allahabad 86; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Rose Food Industries 2023 SCMR 2070; Ramlala v. State of U.P. 2023 SCC OnLine (All) 2479 and Associated Switch Gears and Projects v. State of U.P. (MANU/UP/0953/2024) rel.\n(d) Trade Organizations Act (II of 2013)-\n-S.6(1)-Trade Organizations Rules, 2013, R. 10(2) & Schedule-B-Renewal of license-Principle-Litigation of members-Scope-Licensed trade organization is obligated under S. 6(1) of Trade Organizations Act, 2013 to renew its license every five years-Trade organizations application for renewal of its license is to be made to Director General Trade Organization (DGTO) on the format set out in Schedule-B to Trade Organizations Rules, 2013-Conditions which a trade organization has to fulfill for renewal of its license have been set out in R. 10 of Trade Organizations Rules, 2013-Trade organization whose license is not renewed due to non-fulfillment of conditions set out in R. 10(2) of Trade Organizations Rules, 2013, cannot be said to be discharging statutory obligations in accordance with the requirements of Trade Organizations Act, 2013 and Trade Organizations Rules, 2013-Internal bickering or litigation between members of trade organization does not absolve a trade organization from fulfilling its obligations imposed under Trade Organizations Act, 2013 and Trade Organizations Rules, 2013.\n(e) Administration of justice-\n-Principles of natural justice-Audi alteram partem-Applicability-Principle of natural justice, unless prohibited by wording of a statute, must be read into each and every statute-Right of personal hearing to a person against whom an adverse order is to be made is to be equated with a fundamental right and an adverse order made without affording opportunity of personal hearing is to be treated as a void order-If principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision, it is immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in absence of departure from these essential principles of natural justice-Decision taken in violation of principles of natural justice must be declared to be no decision-Violation of principle of audi alteram partem (no one should be condemned unheard) would be enough to vitiate even the most solemn proceedings-This principle has originated from the Islamic principles of justice.\nAbdul Majeed Zafar v. Governor of the Punjab 2007 SCMR 330; Nazir Ahmad Panhwar v. Government of Sindh 2005 SCMR 1814; Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate v. Muhammad Ismail 2023 SCMR 1319; Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari v. Chairman Federal Land Commission PLD 1977 SC 461 and Hazara (Hill Tract) Improvement Trust v. Mst. Qaisra Ellahi 2005 SCMR 678 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Organization Act, 2013=3,6(2),7(2),9(1),21(4)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.158 of 2023, decided on 22nd May, 2024, heard on: 10th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Nawaz Kharal, Hassan Muneeb Zia, Ayesha Tauqeer Aslam, Narmeen Jamal and Malik Qamar Abbas for Petitioner/Appellant.\nArshid Mehmood Kiani, Deputy Attorney-General.\nMs. Asia Batool, Assistant Attorney General.\nMalik Ghulam Sabir for Respondent No.5 (in Writ Petition No.158 of 2023 and for Applicant in C.M. No. 969 of 2022 in C.M.A. No.56 of 2022).\nMuzaffar A. Mirza, Chief Prosecutor and Hasnain Raza, SPP, SECP.\nPir Shah Gul Ahmad, Deputy Director, D.G.T.O.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HYDERABAD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (HCCI) through duly authorized person-Petitioner\nVersus\nMINISTRY OF COMMERCE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Directorate General of Trade Organization and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25517", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5ODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5121 = 2024 SLD 5121 = 2024 PTD 1415", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5ODQ", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)—Ss. 2(s), 16, 17, 156(1)(8), 156(1)(89), 157(1), 157(2) & 181—SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13-06-2009—Smuggling of petroleum products— Confiscation of vehicle carrying such product—Redemption—Scope— Respondent’s vehicle was confiscated for carrying Diesel Oil under the cover of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)—Appellant / Collectorate filed appeal before the Tribunal to modify the order of Collector Adjudication whereby an option had been given to the owners under S. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 to redeem the vehicle confiscated under S.157(1) & (2) of the Customs Act, 1969, carrying smuggled goods on payment of redemption fine along with personal penalty—Validity— Seizing Officer had failed to bring the case of the respondent .within clause (b) of the SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13-06-2009—Even the Appellant / Collectorate failed to produce any fresh evidence before the Tribunal necessitating interference with the impugned order—In view of the above, Tribunal maintained the impugned order passed by the Adjudication Officer—Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nFaiz Muhammad v. F.O.P and others (Civil Petition No.4580 of 2021) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,17,156(1)(8),156(1)(89),156(2),157(1),157(2),171,178,181Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No.K-1460 of 2023, decided on 1st January, 2024, heard on: 28th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shakil Ahmed Abbasi, Member Judicial-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for Appellant/Department\nMuhammad Usman Malik for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (ENFORCEMENT), KARACHI\nvs\nCHAKER ALI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25518", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5OC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5122 = 2024 SLD 5122 = 2024 PTD 1422", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5OC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases—Fiscal statute—Scientific or technical words—Where a word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that in a taxing statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature.\n(1989)72 STC 280 (SC); (1989)1 SCC 150 and (1876) 1 Ex D 242 at 248 rel.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)——Ss. 11(2), 47 & Sixth Schedule, Table-II, Entry No. 10—Reference— Agriculture produce—Authorities sought recovery of tax under S. 11(2) of Sales Tax Act, 1990, for using cut wood for manufacturing its goods falling within the ambit of Entry No. 10 of Table-ll of Sixth Schedule to Sales Tax Act, 1990—Validity—Wood plank!tree for the purpose of sale, if cut in pieces did not attract manufacturing process as such process was neither combined with another article nor the cut wood was so changed or transformed to an article being distinctly used— Taxpayer was purchasing raw wood where standing trees of poplar and eucalyptus were cut into pieces (admittedly an agriculture produce), the same did not in any manner transform into another product and remained as agriculture produce as long as it was not subjected to further process of manufacture for manufacturing chipboard or laminated wood—At the point of purchasing raw cut wood , it remained an agriculture produce and was exempt from incidence of sales tax in view of Entry No. 10 of Table-II of Sixth Schedule to Sales Tax Act, 1990— Sales Tax Reference was answered in positive. \nMalik Shamas Din and Brothers v. The Income Tax and Sales Tax Officer and another 1959 PTD 718; (1824) 9 Wheaton (US) 430 at 438; Madanlal Manoharlal and others v. State of Haryana and another [Writ Petitions (Civil) Nos. 1695 of 1987; and 284 and 513 of 1988 decided on 28.11.1989]; Messrs Pakistan WAPDA Foundation v. The Collector of Customs, Sales Tax, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 79 and Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad v. Messrs Al- Technique Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 2017 SC 99 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(11),2(33),2(35),2(39),2(41),3(3),11(2),11(4A),13,47,Sixth Schedule, Table-II, Entry No. 10", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 06 -P of 2021, decided on 13th June, 2023, heard on: 13th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Isaac Ali Qazi, Saqib Khan and Saad Ali Qazi for Applicant.\nRehmanullah along with Sharifullah, Assistant Director (Legal) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs FRONTIER GREEN WOOD INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD.\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, WITHHOLDING ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25519", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5OCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5123 = 2024 SLD 5123 = 2024 PTD 1432", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5OCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)——S.8—Input tax adjustment—Disallowance—Input tax claimed by Gas Company in respect of UFG (Un-Accounted For Gas)—Scope— Registered person (Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines Ltd /SNGPL) filed appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue against order passed by Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) whereby he upheld the disallowance of input tax claimed in respect of UFG (Un- accounted for Gas) over and above the permissible limit as determined by the OGRA and input tax claimed under S. 8 of Sales Tax Act, 1990—Held, that during the process of transmission and distribution, significant volume of natural gas remains unaccounted for due to leakage, pilferage, measurement errors or malfunctioning of gas meters which are termed as Unaccounted For Gas (UFG)—While determining the appellants revenue, final tariff on the basis of guaranteed return OGRA allowed adjustment of UFG to the extent of certain percentage of gas available for sales as against the actual loss incurred on this account—In that background, the appellant was aggrieved by the disallowance of input tax of Rs. 1,789,711,550/- as allegedly the same was in excess of percentage approval by OGRA—Previously, there were some conflicting judgments of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (‘the Tribunal’) on the issue-in-hand, hence during the course of hearing of companys appeal STA No.833/LB/2016, a miscellaneous application was given for the constitution of Larger Bench to resolve the controversy—Larger Bench of the Tribunal was constituted on the request of the taxpayer and matter was decided in favour of company— Input tax is admissible in respect of gas blown due to ruptures even if gas is not actually supplied as the intention of the appellant at the time of receiving gas was to make taxable supplies, which principle is squarely applicable in the present case—Appellate Tribunal, following the ratio decendi settled by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in STA No.833/LB/2016, held that the Appellant (SNGPL) was entitled to input tax adjustment/claim incurred in respect of Un-accounted For Gas (UFG)—Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) erred in law while upholding the disallowance of input tax on that account after completely ignoring the decision of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal which was against the lawful rights of the appellant—Tribunal set- aside the impugned order passed by Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals)—Appeal filed by registered person (SNGPL) was allowed, in circumstances.\nAppeal STA NO.833/LB/2016 and 2002 PTCL CL 115 ref.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)——S.46—Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue—Constitution and powers—Decisions of Bench(s) of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue—Binding effect—Scope—Registered person (Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines Ltd. /SNGPL) filed appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue against order passed by Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) whereby he upheld the disallowance of input tax claimed in respect of UFG (Un-accounted For Gas) over and above the permissible limit as determined by the OGRA and input tax claimed under S. 8 of Sales Tax Act, 1990—Argument of the respondent / Department was that a decision of larger Bench of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (‘the Tribunal’) was not binding on the present (smaller / Division) Bench of the Tribunal—Validity— Previously, there were some conflicting judgments of the Tribunal on the issue-in-hand, hence during the course of hearing of companys appeal STA No.833/LB/2016, a miscellaneous application was given for the constitution of Larger Bench to resolve the controversy—Larger Bench of the Tribunal was constituted on the request of the taxpayer and matter was decided in favour of company—There can be hardly any dispute that the Tribunal is a competent authority to pronounce on a question of law arising under the law including issue-in-hand, and it functions in a quasi-judicial manner; its decisions are to be followed by the lower authorities unless these are upset by a higher Court— According to a precedent followed by it, the Chairman of the Tribunal can constitute a larger Bench to resolve the conflicting views of various Benches of the Tribunal on the same issue—The decisions of such Larger Benches are binding on smaller Benches unless overruled by the High Courts or the Supreme Court or are distinguishable on facts clearly—Therefore, a decision of a larger Bench of the Tribunal has greater value as a precedent and it has to be preferred over the views expressed by the smaller Benches—Further, on the smaller Benches the view of larger Bench is binding—Viewed in this background, the appellant had rightly contended that the CIR(A) committed an error prejudicial to the interests of the appellants rights when he failed to notice the decision of the larger Bench of the Tribunal—Argument of the Department was misconceived that the decisions of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal are not binding on smaller bench—Appellate Tribunal, following the ratio decendi settled by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in STA No.833/LB/2016, held that the Appellant (SNGPL) was entitled to input tax adjustment/claim incurred in respect of Un-accounted For Gas (UFG)—Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) erred in law while upholding the disallowance of input tax on this account after completely ignoring the decision of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal which was against the lawful rights of the appellant— Tribunal set-aside the impugned order passed by Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals)—Appeal filed by registered person (SNGPL) was allowed, in circumstances.\nAppeal STA No.833/LB/2016 ref.\n(c) Precedent—— Law of precedent is an important aspect of legal certainty in rule of law.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8,8(1),11(2),", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1964/LB of 2023, decided on 18th February, 2024, heard on: 18th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hassan Akhtar for Appellant.\nShah Jahan Khan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPE LINES LIMITED\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25520", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5ODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5124 = 2024 SLD 5124 = 2024 PTD 1441", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5ODk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax was applicable on turnover and not on area.\nSRO 608(I)/2014 dated 02.07.2014, amongst various categories of Tier-1 retailers mentioned below, a retailer whose shop area measures 1000 sq.ft in area or more fell in the definition of Tier-1 retailer and had to integrate with the FBR POS System:\n(a) a retailer operating as a unit of a national or international chain of stores;\n(b) a retailer operating in an air-conditioned shopping mall, plaza or centre, excluding kiosks;\n(c) a retailer whose cumulative electricity bill during the immediately preceding twelve consecutive months exceeds twelve hundred thousand Rupees;\n(d) a wholesaler-cum-retailer, engaged in bulk import an supply of consumer goods on wholesale basis to the retailers as well as retail basis to the general body of the consumers;\n(e) a retailer, whose shop measures one thousand square feet in area or more; and\n(f) any other person or class of persons as prescribed by the Board.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10(1),10(4),Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reform Act, 2013=9(1),Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(43A),3(1),3(9)", - "Case #": "Complaint No. 2739/ISB/ST of 2021, decided on 12th April, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Sarfraz Ahmad Warraich, Dealing Officer.\nMrs. Sarwat Tahira Habib, Sr. Advisor, Appraising Officer. Complainant in person.\nDepartmental Representative: Nemo.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KASHIF ANWAR \nVS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25521", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5ODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5125 = 2024 SLD 5125 = 2024 PTD 1446 = 2024 PTD 1448", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVER1F5ODg", - "Key Words:": "(NOTE: Actual citation of this case is 2024 PTD 1446, by mistake printed as 2024 PTD 1448)\nTopic: Income Tax – Assessment Order, Revision, and Treatment of Subsidy\n(a) Jurisdiction of Inspecting Additional Commissioner (IAC) under S. 66-A\n•\nDetails: The taxpayer (M/s Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.) argued that once an original assessment order was passed under S. 62 with the involvement of the IAC, it could not be revised under S. 66-A.\n•\nHeld: The High Court held that the IAC had the jurisdiction to invoke S. 66-A even if some prior involvement existed. The key factor was the degree of involvement—mere consultation did not preclude revision. Thus, the question of law was answered against the taxpayer.\n•\nCitations: Nishat Mills Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2021 PTD 1986\n________________________________________\n(b) Erroneous but Non-Prejudicial Assessment Orders – Applicability of S. 66-A\n•\nDetails: The taxpayer contended that an erroneous assessment order under S. 62 was not prejudicial to the Revenue since it showed losses.\n•\nHeld: The Court ruled that an erroneous order could still be prejudicial if the losses could affect future tax calculations. Since both conditions (erroneous & prejudicial) under S. 66-A were satisfied, the revision was valid.\n•\nCitations: Glaxo Laboratories Ltd v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner PLD 1992 SC 549 = 1992 PTD 932\n________________________________________\n(c) & (d) Subsidy as a Revenue vs. Capital Receipt\n•\nDetails: The taxpayer received subsidies from the Federal Government to cover cotton trading losses and argued they were capital receipts and not subject to income tax.\n•\nHeld: The High Court ruled that since the subsidy was meant to offset trading losses, it was a revenue receipt and taxable. The Tribunals reliance on unrelated case law was also noted.\n•\nCitations:\no\nWest Pakistan Road Transport Board Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax PLD 1974 Note 9\no\nSindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. Karachi v. Central Board of Revenue PLD 1975 Kar. 128 (Distinguished)\no\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Forbes Campbell & Co Ltd. PLD 1978 Kar. 1047\n________________________________________\n(e) Doctrine of Mutuality & Subsidy Treatment\n•\nDetails: The taxpayer claimed that since 100% shares were owned by the Federal Government, the doctrine of mutuality applied, making subsidies non-taxable.\n•\nHeld: The Court rejected this argument, stating that corporate identity was separate from the government, and subsidies were not refundable like capital injections. Thus, they were taxable revenue receipts.\n•\nCitations:\no\nUnreported judgment dated 10.3.2023 in ITR No.211 of 1991\no\n2019 PTD 1734\no\n2019 PTD 587\no\nThe Commissioner of Income Tax v. Smith Kline and French of Pakistan Limited 1991 SC MR 2374\no\nHarmone Laboratories Pakistan Ltd. v. Commissioner Income Tax 2011 PTD 627 (Distinguished)\n________________________________________\n(f) Subsidy as Taxable Income\n•\nDetails: The taxpayer argued that voluntary payments by the government should not be considered taxable income.\n•\nHeld: The Court ruled that subsidies compensating for loss of profit in a trading business are taxable as income. The subsidy was a trading receipt and directly connected to the taxpayer’s business operations.\n•\nCitations:\no\nThe Ratna Sugar Mills Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1958 Allahabad 633\no\nRaghuvanshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City AIR 1953 SC 4\no\nLincolnshire Sugar Co. v. Smart (1937) 20 Tax Case 643\n________________________________________\nOutcome: In all cases, the High Court ruled against the taxpayer and in favor of the department. The subsidies were classified as taxable revenue receipts, and the revision under S. 66-A was deemed valid.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=2(24)(b),62-A,66-A,136(1),136(2)", - "Case #": "Income Tax Cases Nos. 10, 11 of 1994 and Income Tax Reference No. 137 of 1994, Income Tax References Nos. 95, 193 and 194 of 2001, decided on 28th September, 2023. Dates of hearing: 9th and 10th August, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MS. SANA AKRAM MINHAS, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iqbal Salman Pasha.for Applicant (in I.T.R. No. 137 of 1994).\nFaheem Ali Memon and Muhammad Taseer Khan for Respondent (in I.T.R. No. 137 of 1994).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS COTTON EXPORT CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. KARACHI AND OTHERS\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES-III, KARACHI AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25522", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFTTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5127 = 2024 SLD 5127 = (2024) 130 TAX 574", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFTTSs", - "Key Words:": "K.P. Sales Tax on Services Act, 2013\nBackground\nA Karachi-based company entered into an agreement with a Peshawar-based company to provide storage facilities for methanol in excise bonded tanks in Karachi. The Karachi company was selected for audit under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, and was held responsible for paying sales tax on services provided in Karachi.\nLegal Proceedings\nThe Karachi company challenged this decision through a constitutional petition in the Peshawar High Court. The respondents argued that the Peshawar-based company had validly withheld and deposited the tax with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa authorities, citing sections of the Finance Act, 2013.\nKey Questions\nRefund Eligibility: Is the sales tax withheld by the Peshawar-based company from the Karachi companys invoices refundable?\nJurisdiction: Can the refund be entertained by the court under constitutional jurisdiction?\nDecision\nThe court ruled in favor of the Karachi company, stating that no taxing event occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and thus the petitioner was not liable for tax under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa law. Since the Karachi company had already paid sales tax under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, the tax withheld by the Peshawar-based company was deemed beyond the jurisdiction of Khyber Pakhtunkhwas taxing authority. The court ordered the refund of the withheld amount to the Karachi company, citing the Contract Act, 1872, Section 72, which mandates restitution in cases of unjust enrichment.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022=19,19(2),20,22Finance Act, 2013=27,30Contract, Act, 1872=72[1]", - "Case #": "WP No. 2364-P/2023 decided on 17.01.2024, heard on: 17.01.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): S.M. ATTIQUE SHAH AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Hamza Hussain Bangash, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nMr. Muhammad Ayub Shinwari, Advocate for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S AL-HAMD BULK STORAGE (PVT) LTD, KARACHI SINDH\nVS\nKHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA REVENUE AUTHORITY, THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR GENERAL, PESHAWAR AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25523", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFTTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5128 = 2024 SLD 5128 = (2024) 130 TAX 571", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFTTTk", - "Key Words:": "Statute: Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990)\nSections: 7 & 8(1)(a)\nIssue: Entitlement to input tax adjustment for wastage of cement bags during production.\nFacts:\nThe taxpayer, engaged in the production of cement bags, sought input tax adjustment for cement bags that were burst during the production process.\nThe tax department denied this adjustment, citing section 8(1)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (STA), which limits input tax adjustments in specific circumstances.\nThe orders of the CIR (Appeals) and the Appellate Tribunal upheld the denial.\nThe taxpayer filed a reference in the High Court against the Tribunal’s decision, questioning whether input tax adjustment can be denied for wastage during production.\nArguments:\nTaxpayer’s Counsel:\nSection 7 of STA: Establishes the right to adjust input tax paid on goods used for taxable supplies.\nMisapplication of Section 8(1)(a):\nInput tax adjustment cannot be denied for wastage of materials used in production.\nThe orders of the CIR(Appeals) and the Tribunal lacked reasoning or explanation for the application of section 8(1)(a) to the production wastage.\nWastage of cement bags was incidental to the production process for taxable supplies and not for any unrelated purpose.\nTax Department:\nThe taxpayer failed to provide evidence of the cement bags that burst during production.\nInput tax adjustment is not permissible without proof, as the wastage does not necessarily relate to taxable supplies.\nDecision:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, concluding that:\nWastage in production is an inherent part of the production process for taxable supplies.\nSection 8(1)(a) does not apply to wastage that occurs during the production of taxable supplies, as it is not for any purpose other than the provision of taxable supplies.\nInput tax adjustment can include wastage incurred during production, provided it relates to taxable supplies.\nKey Findings:\nSection 8(1)(a) of STA: The bar on input tax adjustment applies only to goods or services used for purposes other than taxable supplies. Wastage during production is considered part of taxable supplies.\nThe denial of input tax adjustment for burst cement bags was unwarranted as the taxpayer’s claim fell within the purview of section 7 of STA.\nConclusion:\nThe court clarified that taxpayers engaged in production are entitled to input tax adjustments, even for wastage incurred during the production process, as long as it pertains to taxable supplies. The reference was allowed in favor of the taxpayer, setting a precedent for similar cases involving production wastage.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7,8,8(1)(a)", - "Case #": "S.T.R No. 21 of 2017 decided on 04.06.2024, heard on: 04.06.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE AND SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Muhammad Idris and Syed Farid Bukhari, Advocates for the applicant.\nMr. Muhammad Abdul Hassan, Advocate for the respondents/tax department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S FAUJI CEMENT COMPANY LIMITED\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25524", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5129 = 2024 SLD 5129 = 2024 PTD 1469 = (2025) 132 TAX 60", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Maintainability of Reference Under Section 67A of Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012\nIssue: The maintainability of a tax reference under Section 67A of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012, when the Appellate Tribunal does not communicate its order.\nRuling: A reference to the High Court under Section 67A is not maintainable if the order of the Appellate Tribunal is not required by law to be communicated. The case Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-V v. Messrs T.N.W. Engineering Works (2019 PTD 46) supports the notion that the failure to communicate the order affects the maintainability of a reference.\n(b) Constitutional Petition Against Interlocutory Orders\nIssue: Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution can be entertained against an interlocutory order.\nRuling: There is no absolute bar to filing a constitutional petition under Article 199 against interlocutory orders, especially if the order is coram non judice (made by a tribunal or authority lacking jurisdiction) or made without jurisdiction. The court referred to precedents such as Khawaja Adnan Zafar v. Hina Bashir and others (2024 SCMR 1295) and Rashid Baig and others v. Muhammad Mansha and others (2024 SCMR 1385) in asserting that interlocutory orders can be challenged if they are made without authority or jurisdiction.\n(c) Conditional Stay Order and Imposition of Deposit Under Sections 67(3) and 68 of Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012\nIssue: The legality of a conditional order imposed by the Appellate Tribunal requiring the petitioner/company to deposit a portion of the disputed tax amount before the recovery could be stayed.\nRuling: The High Court found the condition imposed by the Appellate Tribunal to deposit part of the disputed tax amount to be arbitrary and lacking justification. The order did not explain why such a condition was imposed and whether it was based on any admission or determination regarding the tax liability of the petitioner/company. In the absence of any reasoned decision, the court ruled that the condition was imposed in a slipshod manner and did not fulfill the requirements of Section 68 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012. The High Court set aside the condition, emphasizing that it was imposed without lawful authority and had no legal effect.\nPrecedents Cited:\nThe High Court referred to multiple cases to emphasize principles of constitutional law, tax law, and the requirement for reasoned decisions in legal orders:\nPresident, All Pakistan Women Association v. Muhammad Akbar Awan (2020 SCMR 260)\nMessrs Pak Saudi Fertilizers v. Federation of Pakistan (2002 PTD 679)\nZ. N. Exporters (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax (2003 PTD 1746)\nBrothers Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Appellate Tribunal Sales Tax (2003 PTD 1836)\nMessrs Fauji Oil Terminal and Distribution Company Ltd v. Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division (2012 PTD 1762)\nMessrs Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (2024 PTD 30)\nMirza Shaukat Baig v. Shahid Jamil (PLD 2005 SC 530)\nLucky Cement v. Commissioner Income Tax (2015 SCMR 1494)\nConclusion:\nMaintainability of Tax Reference: A reference to the High Court under Section 67A of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012, is not maintainable if the order of the Appellate Tribunal has not been communicated, as required by law.\nInterlocutory Orders: Constitutional petitions can be entertained against interlocutory orders if they are coram non judice or lack jurisdiction.\nConditional Stay Order: The Appellate Tribunals imposition of a condition requiring the deposit of a portion of the disputed amount before granting a stay on recovery was arbitrary and lacked legal justification. The condition was set aside by the High Court.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=67(3),67A,68", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 48782 of 2024, decided on 9th October, 2024, heard on: 23rd September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mumtaz-ul-Hasssan for Petitioner.\nAbdul Muqtadir Khan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAISALABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD.\nvs\nTHE CHAIRMAN PUNJAB REVENUE AUTHORITY AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25525", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5130 = 2024 SLD 5130 = 2024 PTD 1507", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzY", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues:\nIncome Tax Exemption and Commercial Operations of the Civil Aviation Authority:\nThe Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) argued that it was exempt from income tax, given its status as a state-owned enterprise (SOE) generating revenue from services provided on a commercial basis.\nThe State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023 and the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically Sections 54 and 134A (as amended by the Finance (Amendment) Act, 2024), are central to the dispute. The petitioner contended that it was not obligated to follow the ADR mechanism outlined under Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nState-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023:\nThe State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act provides that SOEs are entities run on a commercial basis and controlled or managed by the Federal Government. The petitioner, CAA, falls under the ambit of this Act, meaning it is subject to certain governance rules applicable to state-owned enterprises.\nThe Acts Section 2(e)(ii) defines state-owned enterprises, and its Section 3 outlines the operational and governance rules for such entities. Since CAA generates revenue on a commercial basis and is managed by the Federal Government, these provisions apply to it.\nAlternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) under Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance:\nSection 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 provides an internal mechanism for resolving tax disputes between SOEs and the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) through an Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) process. This mechanism is meant to facilitate quick resolution and avoid prolonged litigation, which often results in higher costs and delays.\nThe petitioner was challenged on whether it was required to follow the ADR process. The Court held that as a state-owned enterprise, the CAA was subject to this mechanism, as it was in the interest of the Federal Government to resolve such disputes efficiently.\nRole of the High Court:\nThe High Court declined to exercise its discretion under Article 199 of the Constitution to adjudicate the dispute on its merits. Instead, the Court directed the Civil Aviation Authority to avail the ADR mechanisms provided under Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 or under Rule 8(2) of the Rules of Business, 1973.\nIf the dispute was not resolved through these mechanisms, the petitioner was permitted to seek relief through the legal remedies available under the law.\nCommittee Formation and Stay on Recovery:\nThe High Court also directed the Federal Board of Revenue to form a Committee under Section 134A(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 if the petitioner opted for ADR. This Committee was tasked with resolving the dispute.\nFurthermore, the High Court ordered that the Inland Revenue authorities halt any recovery proceedings under Section 134A(7) of the Income Tax Ordinance as soon as the Committee was notified.\nPrecedents and References Cited:\nThe Court referred to several important cases, including:\n1995 SCMR 1647\nPLD 2013 Lahore 343\nProvince of Punjab v. Haroon Construction Company (2024 SCMR 947)\nFaisal Zafar v. Siraj-ud-Din (2024 CLD 1)\nNetherlands Financierings Maatschappij Voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (F.M.O.) v. Morgah Valley Limited and SECP (PLD 2024 Lah. 315)\nShehzad Arshad v. Pervez Arshad (2024 CLD 1121)\nThese cases likely discuss the principles of governance for state-owned enterprises, the importance of ADR in tax matters, and the role of the judiciary in overseeing administrative decisions.\nCourts Conclusion:\nThe Civil Aviation Authority is considered a state-owned enterprise under the State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023, and is therefore subject to the ADR provisions of Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe High Court did not adjudicate the matter on merits, instead directing the CAA to pursue the ADR mechanism either under Section 134A or Rule 8(2) of the Rules of Business, 1973.\nThe Federal Board of Revenue was instructed to form a Committee to resolve the dispute through ADR.\nRecovery proceedings were to be halted once the Committee was notified.\nThe constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly, with directions to follow the ADR process before seeking judicial relief.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 1513 of 2024, decided on 30th May, 2024, heard on: 21st May, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ammar Athar Saeed and Usman Alam for Petitioner.\nDr. Shahnawaz Memon for Respondents.\nKashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF PAKISTAN\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25526", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5131 = 2024 SLD 5131 = 2024 PTD 1520 = (2024) 130 TAX 565", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzU", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Principles and Decision:\nLegislative Competence: The court confirmed that the legislature (i.e., Parliament) has the authority to legislate on any subject within its domain, including the power to make laws with retrospective effect. This power also extends to modifying or even taking away vested rights through legislation.\nRetrospective Effect of Laws: The general principle is that when a law is enacted with retrospective effect, it applies to events that have already occurred, unless there is a specific legal protection or exception. The court emphasized that once a law is given retrospective effect by the legislature, the affected individuals cannot claim that their rights were violated because the law imposed a previously non-existent obligation.\nThe Finance Act, 2024: The court noted that although the Finance Act, 2024, made an amendment to Section 153(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, there was no explicit or implied provision that made this amendment apply retroactively. In the absence of such a provision, the amendment could not be construed as affecting exemption certificates issued under the law as it stood before the amendment.\nImpact on Exemption Certificates: The amendment to Section 153(4) was found to only apply to exemption certificates issued after its effective date (01-07-2024). Since the exemption certificates in question were issued prior to this date, the amendment could not affect their validity.\nRuling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners, determining that the revocation of their tax exemption certificates was not valid under the law as it existed at the time the certificates were issued. The petitioners were entitled to continue benefiting from the exemption certificates issued to them before the Finance Act, 2024, came into force.\nPrecedents Cited:\nMolasses Trading v. Federation of Pakistan (1993 SCMR 1905): This case is likely cited for the principle that legislative bodies can make laws with retrospective effect, and individuals are not protected from obligations imposed by such laws.\nMuhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad and others (2000 SCMR 367): This case might have been cited for establishing that retrospective laws, in the absence of an express protection for vested rights, are valid and enforceable.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court set aside the order that had revoked the exemption certificates of the petitioners and allowed them to continue availing the tax exemptions that were granted to them prior to the amendment. The petitioners were entitled to the benefits of the exemption certificates issued under the law as it existed before the Finance Act, 2024, came into effect.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 43578 of 2024, date of hearing and order: 30-09-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AUTHOR(S): RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ajmal Khan for Petitioner (in this petition).\nBarrister Hamza Shehram Sarwar, Asad Zaman Tarar and Kamal Ali Khan for Petitioner (in W.P. No.49585 of 2024).\nMuhammad Hamza Sheikh and Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, Assistant Attorneys General for the Federation.\nMuhammad Bilal Munir for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S K&N’S FOODS (PVT.) LTD. \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25527", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5132 = 2024 SLD 5132 = 2024 PTD 1526", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzQ", - "Key Words:": "This case involves several issues under the Customs Act, 1969, the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, and relevant SROs (Statutory Regulatory Orders), dealing with the confiscation of a vehicle on allegations of smuggling and the release of the vehicle upon payment of a redemption fine and penalty. Heres a breakdown of the legal principles and the courts findings:\n(a) Appeal on Release of Confiscated Vehicle\nIssue: The Collectorate filed an appeal before the Customs Appellate Tribunal to modify the Collector Adjudications order, which allowed the owners to release the confiscated vehicle by paying a redemption fine along with a penalty.\nRuling:\nThe Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Collectorate because there was no evidence to prove the vehicle’s involvement in smuggling activities or the existence of secret compartments to conceal smuggled goods.\nThe Collectorate failed to present new evidence to challenge the Collector Adjudications decision.\nAs a result, the Tribunal upheld the decision, allowing the owners to retrieve the confiscated vehicle by paying the redemption fine and penalty.\n(b) Request for Remission of Penalty\nIssue: The owner of the confiscated vehicle requested the waiver of the penalty imposed, stating that the vehicle was a passenger carrier he had rented out for earning purposes and that he was unaware of the renters involvement in smuggling.\nRuling:\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal remitted the penalty entirely, citing justice and fairness.\nThe Tribunal considered the fact that the owner had rented the vehicle out and had no knowledge of the illegal activity, finding it appropriate to waive the penalty imposed on the owner.\n(c) Jurisdiction to Impose Penalty\nIssue: Whether the Adjudication Authority had the jurisdiction to impose a penalty for offences under the Customs Act, 1969 or if this authority should rest with the Special Judge, Customs and Taxation.\nRuling:\nThe Tribunal ruled that the Adjudication Authority did not have the jurisdiction to impose a penalty for offences under the Customs Act, 1969.\nPenalty imposition for offences related to smuggling and other violations under the Customs Act can only be carried out by the Special Judge, Customs and Taxation, and not by any other authority or tribunal. The Customs Act, 1969 does not confer such power upon the Adjudication Authority.\nLegal Provisions Involved:\nCustoms Act, 1969:\nSections 2(s) (definition of smuggling), 16 (functions of Customs), 156(1)(8) and 156(1)(89) (penalties for smuggling offences), 157(1) and 157(2) (search, seizure, and confiscation), and 181 (power to remit penalty).\nSection 181 allows for the release of confiscated goods (like vehicles) on payment of a redemption fine and penalty, but this does not extend to imposing penalties for smuggling offences, which is within the jurisdiction of the Special Judge, Customs and Taxation.\nImports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950:\nSection 3(1) grants authority for controlling imports and exports, including penalizing illegal activities like smuggling.\nSRO 499(I)/2009 and SRO 566(I)/2005:\nThese SROs provide the regulatory framework and penalties related to the customs duties and control over smuggling activities.\nConclusion:\nAppeal Dismissed: The appeal by the Collectorate was dismissed because there was no evidence proving that the vehicle was involved in smuggling or had secret compartments for illicit goods.\nWaiver of Penalty: The Customs Appellate Tribunal waived the penalty imposed on the vehicle owner, considering that he rented the vehicle out without knowing the renter’s criminal activity.\nJurisdictional Issue: The Tribunal clarified that penalty imposition for smuggling offences falls under the jurisdiction of the Special Judge, Customs and Taxation, not the Adjudication Authority.\nIn conclusion, the Tribunals decisions focus on fairness, lack of evidence for smuggling, and jurisdictional limits regarding penalty imposition.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,156(1)(8),156(1)(89),157(1),157(2),181Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. H-1694 of 2023, decided on 13th December, 2023, heard on: 20th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hamayun Naseer, Inspector, present for Appellant/Department.\nSaifullah Brohi for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS HYDERABAD THROUGH DEPUTY COLLECTOR, CUSTOMS (PREVENTIVE) LARKANA/SUKKUR\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION) QUETTA CAMP OFFICE AT HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25528", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5133 = 2024 SLD 5133 = 2024 PTD 1532", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYy8", - "Key Words:": "The case revolves around the evasion of duties and taxes under the Customs Act, 1969 and Sales Tax Act, 1990. Specifically, the importer (company) allegedly misdeclared water-based varnishes as acrylic polymer, resulting in evasion of customs duties and taxes. Below is a breakdown of the issues and legal findings in the case:\n(a) Misdeclaration and Evaded Duties\nIssue: The importer was alleged to have imported water-based varnishes by misclassifying them as acrylic polymer, which had different PCT headings attracting different duty rates (20% vs. 10%). The Department adjudicated that the duties and taxes had been evaded, and the importer was ordered to deposit the evaded duties and taxes.\nContention of the Importer: The importer argued that in the past, they had cleared identical consignments by paying lower duties, and the earlier practice of the Department should continue, as it was based on previous treatment.\nRuling:\nThe High Court emphasized that the Show-Cause Notice issued by the Department was based on updated information and data that had come to light, rather than any prior ruling.\nThe Tribunal had specifically addressed the issue of past departmental practice, clarifying that previous clearances were based on incorrect and incomplete data provided by the importer. The Tribunal found that upon subsequent scrutiny, the correct classification of the imported item was identified, and the duties were recalculated accordingly.\nThe Tribunal held that a wrong benefit, extended beyond the law or policy, should not be perpetuated, and the past practice was not applicable in this case.\nSince the importer did not object to the findings about the composition of the imported items or the classification, the High Court dismissed the reference application, agreeing with the Tribunals findings.\n(b) Factual Controversies and Powers of the Appellate Tribunal\nIssue: The importer filed a Reference Application against the Order-in-Original upheld by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The importer contested the order, asserting that the misdeclaration was not intentional, and sought relief from the penalties.\nRuling:\nThe High Court noted that the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue is the final arbitrator of factual matters. Under reference jurisdiction, factual disputes are not typically revisited by the High Court, which focuses more on legal questions rather than reevaluating the facts of the case.\nThe Tribunal had already examined the facts, and its decision on the matter was final, thus barring the High Court from intervening.\nThe High Court dismissed the reference application, citing that factual controversies fall within the Tribunals domain and are not ordinarily subject to judicial review in the High Court under reference jurisdiction.\nLegal Provisions Involved:\nCustoms Act, 1969:\nSections 32(1), 32(2), 32(3-A), 79, 80, and 156(1), 156(14): Deal with the powers of the Customs authorities to impose penalties, inspect imports, issue show-cause notices, and adjudicate on the classification of goods.\nSales Tax Act, 1990:\nSections 3 & 6: Relate to the imposition of sales tax on goods and services.\nCase References:\nA.P. Moller Maersk and others v. Commissioner Inland Revenue and others (2020 PTD 1614): Relates to the issue of misdeclaration and the powers of the Customs authorities to impose duties.\nCommissioner (Legal) Inland Revenue v. E.N.I. Pakistan (M) Limited, Karachi (2011 PTD 476): Discusses the role of the Tribunal in adjudicating tax matters.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Karachi v. Kassim Textile Mills (Private) Limited, Karachi (2013 PTD 1420): Pertains to issues of tax evasion and the correctness of departmental actions.\nRadaka Corporation and others v. Collector of Customs and another (1989 SCMR 353): Deals with the interpretation of Customs provisions and penalties.\nSyed Azam Shah v. Federation (Civil Appeal 764 of 2021): A relevant case concerning the misdeclaration of imported goods.\nConclusion:\nPast Departmental Practice: The Tribunal rejected the argument of the importer that past clearance practices should be continued, as those practices were based on incorrect data. The correct classification of the imported items led to a re-assessment of the duties owed.\nJurisdictional Issue: The High Court affirmed the Tribunal’s authority to resolve factual disputes. Factual controversies are not subject to review by the High Court under reference jurisdiction.\nDismissal of Reference: The High Court dismissed the reference application filed by the importer, agreeing with the Tribunals finding that the duties and taxes were correctly adjudged and should be paid.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.756 of 2015, decided on 29th March, 2022, heard on: 24th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Pervaiz Iqbal Kasi for Applicant\nKhalid Rajpar for Respondents.\nIrfan Ahmed Memon, Deputy Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS PACKAGES LIMITED THROUGH SENIORS ACCOUNTANTS\nVS\nCUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL THROUGH CHAIRMAN AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25529", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5134 = 2024 SLD 5134 = 2024 PTD 1542", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYys", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act, 1969 & Foreign Currency Seizure\nThe case involves the seizure of foreign currency from a respondent who was apprehended approximately 100 kilometers within the territory of Pakistan, after crossing the Pak-Afghan border. The Department (Customs) filed a Reference Application against a judgment by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which had ordered the release of both the foreign currency and the vehicle to the respondent. Below is the breakdown of the legal issues and the Courts findings:\n(a) Legality of Possessing Foreign Currency\nFacts: The respondent was apprehended carrying US dollars 200,000 and Saudi Riyal 930,000 in his vehicle. He claimed the currency was the proceeds from the sale of ancestral property in Afghanistan, and since there was no Counter of Declaration at the Pak-Afghan border, he was on his way to Quetta to exchange the currency at the State Bank.\nLegal Issue: Whether possessing and transporting foreign currency in this manner violated any laws or regulations, specifically under the Customs Act, 1969 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.\nRuling:\nThe Court found that there was no Counter of Declaration at the Pak-Afghan border, which was a significant point in the respondents favor. The respondent’s claim that he was heading to Quetta to exchange the currency seemed plausible, given that there was no facility for currency exchange or declaration at the border.\nState Bank Notification (F.E.2/2017-SB dated 30-08-2017): The State Bank of Pakistan had issued a notification allowing any person to bring in foreign currency, subject to limits (except Indian currency). This made the transport of foreign currency legal.\nThe Court also noted that the foreign currency was seized far from the border, in Yaro District, which was not a place associated with the immediate border crossing.\nAs per Section 2(s) of the Customs Act, the seizure provisions did not apply since the recovery occurred outside the jurisdiction of the customs border area.\nConclusion: The Appellate Tribunals decision to release the foreign currency and vehicle was upheld, and the Departments Reference Application was dismissed, as the respondent had not violated the law.\n(b) Legality of Seizing Officers Authority\nFacts: The seizure of the foreign currency was made by an officer designated as an OPF inspector (a clerk by designation), who was not authorized to carry out such a seizure.\nLegal Issue: Whether the seizing officer had the legal authority to make the seizure under Section 168 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nRuling:\nSection 168 of the Customs Act, 1969 requires that seizures be made by a Gazetted officer. Since the OPF inspector was not a Gazetted officer, he lacked the authority to carry out the seizure, making the entire recovery of the foreign currency illegal.\nConclusion: The Appellate Tribunal rightly overturned the Collector Customs adjudication, as the seizure was not carried out by an authorized officer, and the Departments Reference Application was dismissed.\n(c) Application of Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950\nFacts: The respondent was accused of violating the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, based on the possession of foreign currency.\nLegal Issue: Whether Section 3(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, applied to the respondent’s case.\nRuling:\nThe Court noted that the import policy did not impose an embargo on the importation of foreign currency. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 allowed the importation of foreign currency, subject to certain restrictions (such as no Indian currency).\nThe Departments actions in attempting to persecute the respondent under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 were deemed unjustified, and the Court ruled that such actions were malicious.\nConclusion: The Customs Appellate Tribunal correctly overturned the Collector Customs decision, and the Departments Reference Application was dismissed, as the foreign currency did not violate the relevant import/export control laws.\nKey Legal Provisions Involved:\nCustoms Act, 1969:\nSections 2(s), 15, 16, 156(1), (8), (89), 157(2), 168: Pertains to the seizure and adjudication of goods and currency under customs law.\nImports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950:\nSection 3(1): Governs the control over imports and exports, but did not apply to foreign currency in this case.\nForeign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947:\nSection 8(2): Allows the importation of foreign currency, subject to conditions.\nState Bank Notification (F.E.2/2017-SB): Allows individuals to bring foreign currency into Pakistan, except for Indian currency.\nConclusion:\nThe Court found that the seizure of the foreign currency was illegal due to the lack of authority by the officer making the seizure and because the respondent was not violating any legal provisions regarding the importation of foreign currency. The Customs Appellate Tribunals decision to release the seized currency and vehicle was upheld, and the Departments Reference Application was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),15,16,156(1)(8),156(1)(89),157(2),168,171Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)", - "Case #": "Customs Reference Application No.09 of 2023, decided on 12th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, JUSTICE AND SHAUKAT ALI RAKHSHANI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ENFORCEMENT), CUSTOM HOUSE AIRPORT ROAD, QUETTA\nVS\nMESSRS ABDUL MANAN AND ANOTHER", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ENFORCEMENT), CUSTOM HOUSE AIRPORT ROAD, QUETTA\nVS\nMESSRS ABDUL MANAN AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25530", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5135 = 2024 SLD 5135 = 2024 PTD 1547", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzk", - "Key Words:": "Customs Duty and Tax Exemption on Cocoa Powder Import\nLegal Issue\nThe petitioners (importers) challenged the levy of additional customs duty on the import of Cocoa Powder (HS Code 1805.0000) under SRO 967(I)/2022, dated 30-06-2022, which imposed an additional customs duty on goods except as provided within the notification.\nThe petitioners argued that they were entitled to a customs duty exemption under SRO 1261(I)/2007, dated 31-12-2007, and thus should be granted exemption from the additional duty under this earlier notification.\nLegal Provisions Involved:\nCustoms Act (IV of 1969), Section 18(1) & Fifth Schedule, Table-B, Part-II, Chapter-VII, Serial No. 2: Deals with exemptions from customs duties.\nSRO 1261(I)/2007, dated 31-12-2007: Provides certain customs duty exemptions to goods under specific circumstances.\nSRO 967(I)/2022, dated 30-06-2022: Introduced an additional customs duty on goods imported, but with exceptions.\nClause 3(vi) of SRO 967(I)/2022: Allowed exemptions for certain goods that were already subjected to customs duties under the Fifth Schedule of the Customs Act.\nArguments and Pleas:\nPetitioners’ Claim:\nPetitioners sought the exemption from the additional customs duty under SRO 967(I)/2022, arguing they were eligible for the benefit of SRO 1261(I)/2007, which provided exemptions for goods like Cocoa Powder.\nAuthorities Argument:\nThe authorities argued that two separate exemptions under two different SROs could not be claimed simultaneously. The additional customs duty under SRO 967(I)/2022 was imposed on all goods except as specifically provided, and the petitioners goods did not qualify for exemption under this new rule because the exemption under SRO 1261(I)/2007 was not applicable to goods under Clause 3(vi) of the new notification.\nCourts Findings:\nExemption under SRO 967(I)/2022: The Court noted that SRO 967(I)/2022, specifically Clause 3(vi), applied to goods already subjected to customs duties under the Fifth Schedule of the Customs Act, 1969. Since Cocoa Powder was not part of the listed items under the Fifth Schedule, the petitioners could not claim the exemption provided under this clause.\nExemption under Two Different Notifications: The Court observed that the petitioners were not entitled to claim an exemption under two different SROs at the same time. The two SROs provided different exemption criteria, and the petitioners could not claim simultaneous benefits under both.\nDismissal of Petition: The Court declined to intervene in the matter, ruling that the petitioners were not entitled to the exemption under SRO 1261(I)/2007 while SRO 967(I)/2022 applied. Thus, the petitioners constitutional petition was dismissed.\nConclusion:\nThe Court upheld the levy of additional customs duty on the import of Cocoa Powder as per SRO 967(I)/2022, ruling that the petitioners could not claim exemption under two separate notifications simultaneously. The petition was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=18(1),18(1A)", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-4036, D-3091, D-5467 and D-5819 of 2023, decided and heard on 27th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Imran Iqbal Khan along with Aneel Zia for Petitioner (in all Petitions).\nKhalid Mahmood Siddiqui for Respondents (in C.P. No.D-4036 of 2023).\nFaheem Raza for Respondents (in C.P. No.D-3091 of 2023).\nKhalid Mahmood Rajpar for Respondents (in C.Ps. Nos.D-5467 and D-5819 of 2023).\nAgha Shahid Majeed for Respondent (in C.P. No.D-5467 of 2024).\nSardar Zafar Hussain along with Tariq Aziz, Assistant Collector, SAPT for Respondents (in C.Ps. Nos.D-1740 and D-2574 of 2023).\nKashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General for the Federation of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S YOUNG’S (PRIVATE) LIMITED THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION / CHAIRMAN, FBR, ISLAMABAD AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25531", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5136 = 2024 SLD 5136 = 2024 PTD 1553", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpYzg", - "Key Words:": "Withholding Tax and Default Surcharge\nLegal Issue\nThe taxpayer, a withholding agent, was alleged to have failed in discharging his duty to pay the tax collected under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. As a result, the Assessing Officer imposed a recovery of tax along with a default surcharge on the taxpayer, which was upheld by the Appellate Authority. The taxpayer challenged the imposition of this tax recovery and surcharge, arguing that the Assessing Officer did not follow the proper legal requirements in initiating action under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nLegal Provisions Involved:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001:\nSection 161: Deals with the recovery of tax from the withholding agent.\nSection 165: Relates to the filing of statements for tax deducted or collected.\nSection 182: Concerns penalties for failure to file statements or for misrepresentation.\nSection 205: Deals with the imposition of default surcharge.\nArguments and Pleas:\nTaxpayer’s Claim:\nThe taxpayer argued that the Assessing Officer had failed to meet the legal requirements under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, before initiating recovery actions.\nSpecifically, the taxpayer claimed that:\nIt was not determined whether the taxpayer was indeed a withholding agent under the definition of a prescribed person. \nThe transactions subject to deduction/withholding tax were not properly identified.\nThe tax withheld was not credited correctly to the relevant individual taxpayer.\nAssessing Officer’s Action:\nThe Assessing Officer imposed a tax recovery on the taxpayer based on the assumption that they had failed to comply with withholding tax obligations.\nThe Assessing Officer did not point out any deficiency in the statements filed under Section 165 of the Ordinance, and did not raise specific findings regarding the accuracy of the disclosed tax information.\nCourts Findings:\nFailure to Fulfill Legal Requirements:\nThe Assessing Officer did not properly satisfy the conditions required before taking action under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance.\nThe officer should have first determined:\nWhether the taxpayer was a withholding agent and whether the transactions were subject to withholding tax.\nWhether the taxpayer had correctly withheld the appropriate amount of tax and whether it was credited to the relevant taxpayer.\nProper Procedure Under Section 165:\nThe Assessing Officer did not follow the correct course of action under Section 165 of the Ordinance when the required statements were not filed or contained discrepancies.\nInstead of taking recovery action under Section 161, the officer should have confronted the taxpayer about the deficiencies in the statements and imposed penalties under Section 182 of the Ordinance, if applicable.\nFlawed Proceedings:\nThe proceedings under Section 161 of the Ordinance were found to be defective because the officer did not establish that the taxpayer had violated the provisions of the law.\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue set aside the orders passed by both the Assessing Officer and the Appellate Authority, noting the lack of proper legal procedure.\nConclusion:\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue allowed the appeal and set aside the orders passed by both the Assessing Officer and the Appellate Authority. The taxpayer was not liable for the recovery of the tax and default surcharge as the proceedings under Section 161 were found to be flawed. The case was decided in favor of the taxpayer.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=20,153(3),160,161,161(1),165,182,205Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=50", - "Case #": "I T. A. No. 317/IB/2023, decided on 31st July, 2023, heard on: 22nd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR M. AJAZ KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAJID NAZIR MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Imran-ul-Haq for Appellant.\nMiss Misbah Noureen, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR \nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, WITHHOLDING TAX ZONE, RTO-II, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25532", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5137 = 2024 SLD 5137 = 2024 PTD 1566 = (2024) 130 TAX 698", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpY3o", - "Key Words:": "Legal Issue:\nThe case revolves around the failure of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Tribunal) to provide a speaking order while deciding an appeal. The taxpayer, aggrieved by the decision, filed a reference application, arguing that the Tribunals order lacked reasoning. The key legal question was whether the reference application was maintainable and whether the Tribunals failure to give reasons in its order violated legal principles that require decisions to be reasoned and transparent.\nLegal Provisions Involved:\nGeneral Clauses Act, 1897:\nSection 24A: Requires that statutory power be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly, and for the advancement of the purposes of the enactment. Additionally, it mandates that authorities give reasons for their decisions.\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001:\nSections 131 & 133: Deal with the powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal in deciding appeals and handling reference applications.\nJudicial Principles:\nDecisions or orders passed by judicial or quasi-judicial bodies must be speaking orders. This allows the aggrieved party to understand the basis of the decision and enables higher courts to effectively review the decision.\nArguments and Pleas:\nTaxpayer’s Argument:\nThe taxpayer argued that the Appellate Tribunal had failed to provide a speaking order when deciding the appeal. In the operative part of the order, the Tribunal simply reproduced arguments from both sides and the decisions of lower authorities without giving reasons for rejecting or accepting them.\nThe taxpayer emphasized that such an order violated the principles of natural justice and fairness, as required by Section 24A of the General Clauses Act and other judicial precedents.\nRespondents (Departments) Argument:\nThe department argued that a reference application could only be maintained if it raised questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact arising from the order of the Tribunal. They contended that since no questions of law or facts had been addressed by the Tribunal, the reference application should be dismissed.\nCourts Findings:\nViolation of Principles of Natural Justice:\nThe High Court found that the Tribunal had failed to provide any reasoning for its decision, which was essential for ensuring transparency and fairness in the judicial process. A speaking order is required not only to explain the rationale behind a decision but also to allow higher courts to understand the reasoning when reviewing the decision.\nMandate of Section 24A:\nThe High Court emphasized that Section 24A of the General Clauses Act requires that any executive or judicial authority provide reasons for its decisions. Failure to do so makes the decision susceptible to being set aside.\nImpact on the Reference Application:\nThe Court ruled that no questions of law or facts were addressed in the Tribunals order because it was devoid of reasoning. Since the order failed to deal with the legal issues raised by the taxpayer, the reference application filed by the taxpayer was maintainable.\nDirections for Tribunal:\nThe High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and directed that the case should be deemed pending before the Tribunal, with instructions that the Tribunal should pass a speaking order addressing the factual and legal issues raised by the parties.\nThe Tribunal was ordered to decide the case afresh, ensuring that a reasoned decision was provided.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court ruled that the Tribunal’s order was flawed because it lacked a proper explanation for the decision. The Tribunal had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, which mandates that reasons must be provided for decisions. Consequently, the reference application filed by the taxpayer was maintainable, and the Tribunal was directed to pass a speaking order and reconsider the case. The petition was disposed of in these terms.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,133A,133(1),133(8)General Clauses Act, 1897=24A", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 53185 of 2024, decided on 24th September, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUSTICE AND SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahbaz Butt for Applicant.\nTabassam Ali, Legal Advisor for Respondent-department", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S MEDEQUIPS THROUGH MANAGING PARTNER\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25533", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5138 = 2024 SLD 5138 = 2024 PTD 1571 = (2025) 131 TAX 483", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFFpY3k", - "Key Words:": "Recovery Notices and the Requirement of Constituting an ADRC for State-Owned Enterprises\nLegal Issue:\nThe petitioner, Trading Corporation of Pakistan, challenged the recovery notices issued by the Income Tax Authorities. The core issue was that the notices were issued without constituting an Alternate Dispute Resolution Committee (ADRC), as required by recent amendments to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and other related fiscal laws. The petitioner argued that, due to these amendments, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were entitled to apply for the constitution of ADRCs for resolving any disputes, and recovery notices should not be issued until this process was followed.\nLegal Provisions Involved:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001:\nSections 54 & 134A (as amended by Finance (Amendment) Act, 2024): These sections mandate the creation of ADRCs for resolving tax disputes, particularly involving State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).\nSales Tax Act, 1990:\nSection 47A: Deals with the establishment of ADRCs in the context of sales tax disputes.\nAlternative Dispute Resolution (ADR):\nThe amendments to the Income Tax Ordinance required that State-Owned Enterprises, when faced with disputes related to taxation, must apply to the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) for the constitution of an ADRC. The ADRC would serve as an alternative mechanism for resolving tax-related disputes without immediate recourse to formal litigation.\nArguments and Pleas:\nPetitioner’s Claim:\nThe Trading Corporation of Pakistan argued that the Income Tax Authorities issued recovery notices without establishing an ADRC, as mandated by the recent amendments. According to the petitioner, State-Owned Enterprises had the right to request the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to constitute an ADRC for resolving their disputes.\nThe petitioner contended that, under the new legal framework, the Income Tax authorities were obligated to withdraw all pending litigations and recovery notices against State-Owned Enterprises, pending the constitution of an ADRC.\nResponse from the Income Tax Authorities:\nThe Inland Revenue officials acknowledged the amendments and the requirement for the constitution of ADRCs for State-Owned Enterprises. They understood that the issuance of recovery notices without following this process was not in line with the amended laws and obligations.\nCourt’s Findings:\nLegal Obligation to Constitute ADRCs:\nThe Court found that, under the recent amendments to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, State-Owned Enterprises were required to apply to the FBR for the constitution of an Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee (ADRC). This committee was the prescribed mechanism for resolving disputes involving tax matters related to these entities.\nInland Revenue’s Obligations:\nThe Court noted that, following the amendments, Inland Revenue officials were under a clear legal obligation to withdraw any and all recovery notices issued to State-Owned Enterprises related to tax matters, pending the constitution of the ADRC. The Court emphasized that there was no other legal remedy available to the State-Owned Enterprises except to apply for the formation of an ADRC.\nOrder for Withdrawal of Recovery Notices:\nIn light of these findings, the Court directed that all recovery notices previously issued by the Income Tax Authorities to State-Owned Enterprises should be withdrawn, as the proper procedure for dispute resolution through ADRCs had not been followed.\nConclusion:\nThe Court disposed of the constitutional petition by directing the Inland Revenue authorities to withdraw all recovery notices issued to State-Owned Enterprises under tax laws. The Court further confirmed that the FBR was to constitute an Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee as per the amendments to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and other federal fiscal laws. The petitioner’s claim was upheld in this regard.\nThe case references the Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan (Constitution Petition No. D-1513 of 2024) and Province of Punjab v. Haroon Construction Company, 2024 SCMR 947, which reinforce the procedural requirement for ADRC constitution for tax disputes involving State-Owned Enterprises.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=54,134ASales Tax Act, 1990=47A", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-3642 and 4059 of 2024, decided & heard on 05-09-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rafiq A. Kalwar along with Muhammad Yasir for Petitioner (in both petitions).\nMukesh Kumar Khatri for Respondent.\nKashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General for the Federation of Pakistan", - "Petitioner Name:": "TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. THROUGH AUTHORIZED OFFICER\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY FINANCE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25534", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1996 1682 = 1996 SLD 1682 = 1996 PLJ 1495", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDVTg", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Act V of 1898)-\n—-S. 103 read with S. 13 of-West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965),- Non-Compliance of S. 103-Effect of-Contention that S.H.O. had received a prior information about presence of proclaimed offender in the house of appellant, he was bound to have associate two respectable persons of locality with search/raid of house, in accordance with mandatory provisions of S. 103 Cr.P.C.-Search of premises was carried out in the absence of appellant in violation of S. 103 Cr.P.C.-Co-accused who was at least present at the time of raid was also acquitted by trial court—Appeal accepted.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=103", - "Case #": "Cr. Appeal No. 37 of 1995, accepted on 13.3.1996. \nheard on: 13.3.1996.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAVAID NAWAZ KHAN GANDAPUR AND ZEENAT KHAN, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Dost Muhammad Khan, Advocate for Appellant.\nMr. Muhammad Khan Khakwani, Advocate for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "YOUSAF JAN-Appellant\nVS\nSTATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25535", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5139 = 2024 SLD 5139 = 2024 SCMR 1902", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDVXo", - "Key Words:": "The cases pertain to the legality and procedure of recounting ballot papers in the context of the General Elections 2024. The petitioners challenged orders for recounting passed by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) after the consolidation of results. The key issues revolved around the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, the powers of the Returning Officer (RO) and the Election Commission (EC), and the provisions of the Elections Act, 2017, especially Section 95(5) regarding recounting.\nMajority Opinion (Qazi Faez Isa, CJ; Naeem Akhtar Afghan, J.)\n1.\nConstitutional Jurisdiction of the High Court (Art. 199): The High Court does not generally exercise jurisdiction over disputed facts in writ petitions under Article 199. In the present case, the respondents were not aggrieved by the recounting of ballots, and they had other remedies available, making the writ petitions not maintainable. The Supreme Court emphasized that recounting is an administrative act, not a judicial one, and that the Election Commission had the right to order a recount.\n2.\nElection Act, 2017 – Section 95(5): The recounting of ballots by the Returning Officer is an administrative task. Section 95(5) prescribes the conditions for recounting based on the margin of victory. The petitioners argued that the consolidation of results had already occurred, but the evidence to this effect was not presented. The Supreme Court ruled that the Returning Officers could not refuse recounts on unfounded grounds like mob interference, which would set a dangerous precedent.\n3.\nElection Commission’s Jurisdiction: The Court noted that the Election Commission did not lack jurisdiction to order a recount and that petitioners could challenge the recount under alternative remedies, such as filing an election petition before an Election Tribunal. The jurisdiction under Article 199 was not applicable as there were no grounds to show that the Election Commission was acting outside its powers.\nDissenting Opinion (Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J.)\nJustice Abbasi disagreed with the majority, suggesting that the Election Commissions actions were invalid after the consolidation of results. According to the dissent, once the election process is completed and the results published, any disputes regarding the election should be addressed through election petitions before the Election Tribunal, not through the Election Commission.\nLegal Principles and Provisions Involved\n1.\nConstitution of Pakistan:\no\nArticle 199: Grants High Courts the power to issue writs, but only where the petitioner is aggrieved and there is no adequate remedy available.\no\nArticle 218(3): Deals with the Election Commission’s duties to ensure free and fair elections.\n2.\nElections Act, 2017:\no\nSection 95(5): Regulates the recounting of ballot papers by the Returning Officer upon a valid request, with specific conditions, including the margin of victory.\no\nSection 8: Provides the powers and duties of the Election Commission regarding election processes.\no\nSection 9: Allows the Election Commission to intervene in electoral matters.\no\nSection 98: Deals with the finalization and notification of election results.\no\nSection 139: Relates to the filing of election petitions before an Election Tribunal.\n3.\nElections (Second Amendment) Act, 2023:\no\nAmended Section 95(5), eliminating the discretion of the Returning Officer to refuse recount requests arbitrarily, though the officer still has the authority to accept or reject recount applications based on the merits of each case.\nConclusion\nThe majority opinion of the Supreme Court set aside the High Courts decisions, dismissing the writ petitions and allowing the recounts ordered by the Election Commission. The minority opinion disagreed, asserting that the Election Commission lost jurisdiction after the consolidation of results, and such matters should be handled by the Election Tribunal. The case reaffirmed the administrative nature of recounting and the proper legal procedures to challenge election-related disputes.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1573, 1673, 1729, 1767 and 2433 of 2024, decided on 12th August, 2024.\n(Against the judgments dated 05.03.2024, 16.04.2024, 24.04.2024 and 15.05.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore and Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench passed in Writ Petitions Nos. 1333, 16416, 19091 and 23249/24 and I.C.A. No. 29/24 respectively).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, CHIEF JUSTICE, NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Shahzad Shaukat, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Raza-ur-Rehman, Advocate High Court for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos. 1573 and 1673 of 2024).\nM. Ahsan Bhoon, Advocate Supreme Court and Waqas Ahmed Mir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 1729 of 2024).\nM. Umer Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 1767 of 2024).\nTaimoor Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No.2433 of 2024).\nHamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Ajmal Ghaffar Toor, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Haider Bin Masud, Advocate for Respondent No. 3 (in C.P. No. 1573 of 2024).\nHamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Mian Abdul Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court and Waqar Rana, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 3 (in C.P. No. 1673 of 2024).\nSh. Usman Karim-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court and Arshad Nazir Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (in C.P. No.1729 of 2024).\nM. Ahmed Pansota, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 4 (in C.P. No. 1767 of 2024).\nM. Taufiq Asif, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (in C.P. No.2433 of 2024).\nM. Arshad, DG (Law), ECP and Falak Sher, Legal Consultant for ECP (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL REHMAN KHAN KANJU and others-Petitioners\nVS\nELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Islamabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25536", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5140 = 2024 SLD 5140 = 2024 SCMR 1802", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDVXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) - Sections 302(b) & 392, Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965) - Section 13\nThis case involved the appellant’s conviction under sections 302(b) (Qatl-i-amd - murder) and 392 (robbery) of the Pakistan Penal Code, as well as section 13 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance (possession of an illegal weapon). The appellant, along with a co-convict, was involved in a robbery and subsequent murder.\nFacts:\n•\nThe appellant and the co-convict hired or booked a vehicle, and the appellant was picked up on the way. They then robbed the driver, snatching money and a cell phone, and demanding more money.\n•\nWhen the driver attempted to escape by stopping the vehicle near a populated area, the appellant, fearing arrest, fired once at the driver, killing him. Both the appellant and co-convict fled but were apprehended after being chased by people and police.\n•\nThe appellant later confessed in his statement under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) that he fired only once, and the single spent shell found at the scene supported this account.\n•\nThe co-convict was described as having abetted the appellant and played an active role, including persuading him to commit the crime. However, he was sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302(b) PPC, while the appellant received the death penalty.\nCourts Decision:\n•\nThe court acknowledged the shared common intention between the appellant and the co-convict, making the co-convict vicariously liable for the murder. However, the co-convict was given a lesser sentence of life imprisonment.\n•\nThe appellants death sentence was reconsidered due to mitigating circumstances, particularly the fact that he fired only once, which was considered a significant factor in reducing the severity of the sentence.\n•\nAs a result, the appellants sentence was reduced from death to life imprisonment. However, the conviction and sentence under sections 392 (robbery) and 13 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance were maintained, along with the compensation amount to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) - Section 302(b) (Qatl-i-amd)\nThe appellants sentence for murder (Qatl-i-amd) under Section 302(b) was reduced due to mitigating circumstances. One of the key factors for this reduction was that the appellant only fired once, as opposed to multiple times, which was seen as a mitigating factor. This non-repetition of the fire shot made the court consider the alternate punishment of life imprisonment instead of the death penalty.\nKey Legal Points:\n1.\nMitigating Circumstances:\no\nThe fact that the appellant fired only once, rather than multiple times, was considered a mitigating circumstance. This factor played a critical role in reducing the death sentence to life imprisonment.\no\nThe appellant’s confessional statement, which indicated that he acted under the influence of the co-convict’s persuasion and shared common intention, was also considered to reduce the severity of the punishment.\n2.\nShared Common Intention:\no\nBoth the appellant and co-convict had a shared intention to commit robbery and were involved in the murder. This joint participation made the co-convict vicariously liable, and the court noted that while the co-convict received a lesser sentence, the appellant’s role in the crime warranted a reduction in his sentence, given the circumstances.\n3.\nConviction and Sentence Under Other Provisions:\no\nThe appellant’s conviction and sentence under Section 392 (robbery) and Section 13 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance (illegal possession of a firearm) were maintained.\no\nCompensation to the deceased’s legal heirs was upheld, and the appellant would face imprisonment in default of payment.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe death sentence of the appellant was reduced to life imprisonment due to mitigating factors, particularly the single shot fired. However, the convictions and sentences for robbery and illegal possession of a firearm were upheld. The legal heirs of the deceased were entitled to compensation, and the appellant was required to serve additional time if the compensation was not paid.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),392Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965=13", - "Case #": "Criminal Shariat Appeal No. 05 of 2018, date of order: 8th August, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 07.03.2017 of the Federal Shariat Court passed in Crl. A. No. 15-I and M.R. No. 02-I of 2016 along with Crl. A. No. 60-I of 2009).\nHeard on: 8th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA, CHAIRMAN, JUSTICE NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, DR. MUHAMMAD KHALID MASUD AND DR. QIBLA AYAZ, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rizwan Ejaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nNoroz Khan, Addl.A.G., KPK for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAMEEM KHAN-Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25537", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5141 = 2024 SLD 5141 = 2024 SCMR 1806 = (2025) 131 TAX 144", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTc", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969) – Sections 194-A & 194-B, and Constitutional Jurisdiction (Art. 199)\nThis case addresses the power of the Customs Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) to execute its own orders passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Sections 194-A and 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969, and the extent to which the writ jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked in relation to the execution of these orders.\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nExecution of Orders by the Tribunal:\no\nWhile the Customs Act, 1969 does not explicitly provide for the power of the Customs Appellate Tribunal to execute its orders, the principle of statutory construction suggests that where a statute confers jurisdiction, it implicitly grants all the powers necessary to make that jurisdiction effective.\no\nThis means that when the Tribunal is granted substantive jurisdiction (the power to hear appeals and make decisions), it also implicitly possesses the ancillary and incidental powers necessary for the execution of its orders.\n2.\nIncidental and Ancillary Powers:\no\nThe Tribunal’s powers are not limited to those expressly outlined in the statute. It is assumed that statutory tribunals possess the powers necessary to implement their decisions.\no\nCourts and tribunals have the power to execute their own orders because it would be impractical and ineffective to issue rulings without the ability to enforce them.\no\nThe Tribunals ability to execute orders passed under Sections 194-A and 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969 is therefore implied by law, even if not specifically stated in the statute.\n3.\nWrit Jurisdiction:\no\nSince the law provides an adequate remedy (execution of orders by the Tribunal itself), the writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to execute orders passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal.\no\nThe High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is not available where a statutory remedy exists, and in this case, the Tribunal has the implied power to execute its own orders.\nCase Law References:\n•\nMaxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Ed.): Emphasizes that where a statute confers jurisdiction, it implies all necessary powers for its exercise.\n•\nSutherland Statutory Construction (3rd Ed.): Supports the principle that ancillary powers are implied for the effective exercise of statutory powers.\n•\nUnion of India v. Paras Laminates (1990) 4 SCC 453 and Income Tax Officer v. Mohammed Kunhi AIR 1969 SC 430: Reinforce the idea that courts and tribunals are assumed to have the power to execute their orders.\n•\nState of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society (2003) 2 SCC 412: Illustrates the principle of implied powers of statutory bodies to enforce their decisions.\n•\nM/S Hal v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (2014 SCC Online Orissa 71): Highlights that the execution of orders is inherent in the tribunal’s jurisdiction.\nConclusion:\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal has the implied power to execute its own orders passed under Sections 194-A and 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969. Since there is an adequate remedy provided by the Tribunal itself, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to execute such orders. The power to execute is considered an incidental and necessary function that accompanies the Tribunals primary power to adjudicate disputes under the Customs Act.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-A,194-BConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3391 of 2024, date of order: 9th August, 2024.\n(Against order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 28.06.2024 passed in W.P No.20130 of 2024).Heard on: 9th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE, ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE AND MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nRaja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, D.A.G. Saleem Ahmed Malik, Superintendant Customs Enforcement, Lahore, Huriya Fatima, Legal Advisor, FBR Waheed Iqbal Bhatti, Inspector for Respondents.\nNadeem Mehmood Mian, Advocate Supreme Court (for private respondent) (From Lahore via video-link).", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHALID ALIAS MUHAMMAD KHALID AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION), CUSTOM HOUSE, LAHORE AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25538", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5142 = 2024 SLD 5142 = 2024 SCMR 1811", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTY", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860) – Sections 302(b) & 34, and Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979) – Section 10(2)\nThis case involves an appeal against convictions under Sections 302(b) and 34 of the Penal Code for Qatl-i-amd (murder), and Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, concerning the charge of committing zina (adultery). The appellant was convicted for the murder of two individuals who were alleged to have witnessed the appellant and a co-accused committing zina.\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nFailure to Prove the Motive:\no\nThe prosecution’s case rested on the allegation that the deceased witnessed the appellant and the co-accused committing zina, which supposedly led to their murder.\no\nHowever, the site plan indicated that the rooms where the zina was allegedly occurring and where the murders took place were at opposite ends of the house. These rooms were separated by a courtyard and another room, making it impossible for the deceased to have witnessed the zina.\no\nThe motive for the murder, based on the claim that the deceased witnessed the crime, was found to be unbelievable and unsubstantiated. There was no reason to believe that the deceased would need to be silenced for witnessing the zina, as they could not have seen it due to the physical layout of the house.\n2.\nCredibility of Eye-Witnesses:\no\nThree eye-witnesses were mentioned in the case, all of whom were related to both the accused and the deceased. One of these witnesses did not testify because he was “given up,” and another important witness also failed to testify without any clear reason.\no\nFurthermore, the eye-witnesses exhibited unnatural conduct in failing to intervene during the attack on the deceased. Despite the fact that one of the deceased was alive for 15 to 20 minutes and the other for 10 to 15 minutes after being attacked, the eye-witness did nothing to attempt to save them or seek medical help.\n3.\nEvidence Supporting the Allegation of Zina:\no\nNo physical evidence of zina was found. There was no recovered clothing, bedsheet, mattress, or any other item that could have contained semen or other evidence linking the appellant to the act.\no\nIt was deemed highly unlikely that the appellant, in the middle of committing zina, would suddenly choose to murder two elderly individuals who were the co-accused’s in-laws. Additionally, there was no evidence that the deceased had witnessed the act, nor that they were involved in investigating the crime or confronted the appellant.\n4.\nDiscrepancies in the Prosecution’s Case:\no\nThe prosecution’s entire case relied on the testimony of two witnesses. However, there was a significant lack of corroborative evidence or credible motives for the killings.\no\nThe appellant’s actions, according to the prosecution’s narrative, did not align with what would be expected if the killings had actually been committed to silence the witnesses.\n5.\nReasonable Doubt:\no\nThe prosecution failed to meet the beyond reasonable doubt standard required to sustain the charges. The evidence presented was insufficient to prove the appellant’s guilt for either Qatl-i-amd (murder) or zina.\nLegal Outcome:\nGiven the insufficient evidence, lack of corroboration, and the unbelievable nature of the alleged motive, the appellate court found that the convictions and resulting sentences could not be upheld.\n•\nThe appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the trial court was set aside.\n•\nThe appellant was acquitted of all charges, including the charge of Qatl-i-amd (murder) under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code and the charge of zina under Section 10(2) of the Hudood Ordinance.\nConclusion:\nThe appeal was successful due to the prosecution’s failure to establish a credible motive or provide sufficient evidence to prove the charges of murder and zina. The convictions were overturned, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),34Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979=10(2)", - "Case #": "Criminal Shariat Appeal No. 2 of 2018, date of order: 8th August, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.01.2012 of the Federal Shariat Court, Islamabad passed in Criminal Appeal No. 164-L of 2004 and Crl. Murder Reference No. 8-L of 2005).Heard on: 8th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA, CHAIRMAN, JUSTICE NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, DR. MUHAMMAD KHALID MASUD AND DR. QIBLA AYAZ, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Humayoun Rashid Ch., Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nAhmed Raza Gillani, Additional Prosecutor-General, Punjab for the State.\nZulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMRAN ALIAS MANI-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25539", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5143 = 2024 SLD 5143 = 2024 SCMR 1816", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTU", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) – Section 10\nThis case revolves around a suit for the recovery of money filed by the respondent/plaintiff due to delays caused in the completion of a project, which the respondent claims were due to the fault of the appellant/authorities. The matter concerns contractual liabilities and the But-for Test, which determines whether the delays were independent or directly caused by the actions of the appellant/authorities.\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nNature of Delays:\no\nThe respondent/plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of money and additional costs for delays in the completion of the contract. However, the delays occurred due to multiple factors, including inclement weather that was beyond the control of the appellant/authorities.\no\nThe appellants/authorities granted extensions of time to the respondent/plaintiff due to these delays, which were considered reasonable under the circumstances.\no\nThe But-for Test was applied to determine whether the delays by the respondent/plaintiff were independent of the delays caused by the appellants/authorities or if they were a consequence of the appellants’ actions. If the respondents delays were solely due to the initial delays caused by the appellants, then the appellant’s delays would be considered the root cause.\n2.\nApplication of the But-for Test:\no\nThe But-for Test asks whether the delays by the respondent/plaintiff would have occurred had the appellants not initially delayed the project. If the respondent/plaintiff’s delays were caused only because of the appellants delays, then the appellant’s delays were considered the cause.\no\nThe test concluded that the delays by the respondent/plaintiff were independent of the appellant’s actions. Thus, the respondent/plaintiff was not entitled to recover money for the delays in question.\n3.\nConcurrent Findings of Two Courts:\no\nBoth the Trial Court and the High Court had earlier maintained the judgment in favor of the respondent/plaintiff. However, the Supreme Court found the findings of both lower courts to be patently improbable and perverse.\no\nThe Judgment and Decree passed by the High Court were overturned by the Supreme Court, as the factual conclusions drawn by both the Trial Court and the High Court were not aligned with the But-for Test.\n4.\nMisreading and Non-reading of Evidence:\no\nThe High Court and Trial Court failed to properly assess the facts and evidence, especially considering the extensions of time that were granted to the respondent/plaintiff, which were an acknowledgment of the delays.\no\nThe Supreme Court held that the respondent/plaintiff’s suit was an attempt to avoid paying the refund that was rightfully owed by the respondent to the appellants/authorities, which was the actual basis for initiating the recovery proceedings.\n5.\nValidity of Recovery Proceedings:\no\nThe respondent/plaintiff was allowed multiple extensions of time, and when the project was eventually completed, the question arose as to why the respondent initiated recovery proceedings.\no\nThe Supreme Court ruled that these recovery proceedings were unjustified, and the suit for recovery of money should not have been filed in the circumstances.\nLegal Outcome:\n•\nThe Supreme Court applied the But-for Test, concluding that the delays by the respondent/plaintiff were independent of the delays caused by the appellants/authorities.\n•\nSince the delays were not attributable to the appellants, the respondent/plaintiff was not entitled to recover any money through the suit.\n•\nThe appeal was allowed, and the judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court and the High Court were set aside.\n•\nThe suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff was dismissed.\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court found that the lower courts had misread the facts and failed to apply the But-for Test properly. Since the respondent/plaintiff’s delays were found to be independent of the appellants actions, the recovery suit was dismissed. The Court clarified that extensions of time granted during the project had addressed the issue of delays, and there was no valid basis for the respondent to seek recovery of money.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=10", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.296 of 2015, date of order: 10th July, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 10. 12.2014 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in R.F.A. No.67 of 1998).\nHeard on: 10th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, JUSTICE, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JUSTICE and Irfan Saadat Khan, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Javed Iqbal Wains, Addl. Attorney General for Pakistan for Appellants.\nKhawaja Hassan Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent along with Respondent Muhammad Rashid.\nAssisted by Ahsan Jehangir Khan, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND ANOTHER-PETITIONERS\nVS\nM/S RASHID BUILDERS (PVT.) LIMITED-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25540", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5144 = 2024 SLD 5144 = 2024 SCMR 1831", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Service - Institutional Autonomy in Punishment and Courts Role\nIn matters related to service and punishment in public sector institutions, courts must strike a balance between respecting institutional autonomy and ensuring compliance with the law and public interest. The institutional autonomy principle asserts that public institutions, such as government departments, should have a degree of self-governance, particularly in decisions about punishment for misconduct. The competent authority in these institutions is best positioned to determine the nature of the penalty based on factors like the gravity of misconduct, past conduct, responsibilities, and disciplinary needs.\nThe courts’ role is secondary, only intervening in cases of illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety. Courts are not to second-guess decisions based on subjective standards of leniency or compassion. This respects the institutional autonomy of organizations that are responsible for maintaining public trust and discipline. If the institutions decisions abide by law and follow internal norms, the courts typically uphold these decisions.\nKey references:\n•\nDivisional Superintendent v. Nadeem Raza (2023 SCMR 803)\n•\nSecretary Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain (2013 SCMR 817)\n•\nVice Chancellor Agriculture University v. Muhammad Shafiq (2024 SCMR 527)\n(b) Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 - Doctrine of Unclean Hands\nThis case involves driver constables in the police department who were dismissed for using fake driving licenses to secure their appointments. The Doctrine of Unclean Hands was invoked, which asserts that those who act dishonestly or fraudulently cannot be allowed to benefit from their actions. Despite working for 14 years and later obtaining legitimate driving licenses, the fact that they secured their jobs through fraudulent means could not be condoned.\nThe dismissal from service was lawful, as it was based on an inquiry that confirmed the misconduct. The decision to reinstate them due to their years of service and later acquisition of valid licenses was incorrect because it failed to recognize the fraudulent nature of their initial appointment.\nThe Doctrine of Unclean Hands means that anyone who gained a public service role through fraudulent means cannot be trusted with the duties of that role. Even if the fraud was discovered long after the fact, it still warrants disciplinary action. The Tribunals decision to reinstate the employees was overturned by the appellate court.\nKey references:\n•\nSecretary Education v. Noor-Ul-Amin (2022 PLC (C.S.) 132)\n•\nAnwar Ali v. Chief Executive Officer HESCO (2009 PLC (C.S.) 963)\n(c) Void Order - Consequence of Lack of Authority\nWhen an order is made without lawful authority, the entire structure built upon that order collapses. In cases where an authority issues an order beyond its legal mandate, any actions or decisions taken based on that order are also invalid. This principle ensures that decisions are made within the legal framework and any excesses or abuses of power are automatically nullified.\nKey references:\n•\nVice Chancellor Agriculture University v. Muhammad Shafiq (2024 SCMR 527)\n•\nPakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2022 SC 574)\n•\nAtta-ur-Rehman v. Umar Farooq (PLD 2008 SC 663)\n(d) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974) - Judicial Oversight in Service Tribunals\nService Tribunals are tasked with granting relief based on legal principles, not based on arbitrary or subjective standards such as leniency or compassion. Any relief granted outside the boundaries of the law is deemed invalid. Courts or Tribunals cannot override established principles and rules for personal preferences or sympathies. Relief must be supported by constitutional or legal authority.\nThe principle of institutional autonomy mandates that decisions regarding service matters should be left to the discretion of the relevant institutions, provided they comply with established laws, regulations, and procedures.\nKey references:\n•\nDivisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Zafarullah (2021 SCMR 400)\n•\nGovernment of Pakistan v. Nawaz Ali Sheikh (2020 SCMR 656)\n•\nChief Postmaster v. Muhammad Afzal (2020 SCMR 1029)\n•\nDr. A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories v. Hamid Ullah (2010 SCMR 302)\n(e) Constitution of Pakistan - Article 25: Discrimination in Civil Service\nArticle 25 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law. However, this constitutional provision does not apply to situations where a person gains a benefit through unlawful means. If a benefit is granted illegally, it cannot be claimed by others who were similarly placed but did not engage in fraudulent or unlawful actions. Discrimination claims based on illegal actions cannot succeed in court, as illegal actions cannot be legitimized merely because others might also seek similar benefits.\nIn employment matters, the illegality of obtaining a benefit (e.g., through falsified documents) bars the claim of discrimination.\nKey references:\n•\nArticle 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan\nConclusion:\nIn summary, the courts generally respect the institutional autonomy of public institutions, especially in disciplinary matters, as long as these decisions align with legal standards. Misconduct involving fraudulent actions (such as using fake documents) undermines the integrity of public service and can justify dismissal despite the length of service. Courts will only intervene in matters of punishment or service decisions if there is a clear violation of law, illegality, or irrationality, but will not interfere based on personal sympathies or leniency.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 3105-L to 3114-L and 3119-L to 3122-L of 2023, date of order: 7th August, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 16.05.2023 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeals Nos. 3482 to 3488, 4259, 4571 of 2022 and 435 to 439 of 2023).Heard on: 7th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE, ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE AND MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Yasin v. D.G. Pakistan Post Office 2023 SCMR 394 ref.\nBaleegh-uz-Zaman, Addl. A.G. and Riasat Ali, D.S.P. for the Petitioners.\nMuhammad Arshad Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, HEADQUARTERS, LAHORE AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nIJAZ ASLAM AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25541", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5145 = 2024 SLD 5145 = 2024 SCMR 1839", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) - Sections 302(b), 324, and 149: Qatl-i-amd, Attempt to Commit Qatl-i-amd, Unlawful Assembly\nThis case highlights the importance of consistent and reliable evidence in criminal trials. The key issues revolved around material contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the complainant and the alleged eye-witness, raising doubts about their presence at the scene.\nThe complainant presented a detailed account of the firearms used by each accused, despite being seated in a position that made it impossible for him to view the entire incident. Further, his statements about the timing of the FIR registration and the arrival of the police contradicted the evidence provided by the eye-witness. These contradictions created doubts about the credibility of both witnesses, especially since their accounts did not align on key facts.\nThe lack of specific identification of the accused and inconsistencies regarding the seating arrangement of the accused on their motorcycles further undermined the prosecutions case. Given the doubts raised by the evidence, the court acquitted the accused, setting aside the judgments of both the High Court and Trial Court.\nKey references:\n•\nMuhammad Mushtaq v. Mustansar Hussain and others (2016 SCMR 2123)\n•\nMuneer Malik and others v. The State through P.G. Sindh (2022 SCMR 1494)\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) - Sections 302(b), 324, and 149: Joint Recovery of Weapons\nIn this case, the prosecution relied on the joint recovery of weapons from the accused, claiming that the weapons recovered were used in the commission of the crime. However, the Investigating Officer acknowledged that the recovery was made from the same place and at the same time for both appellants. This created a joint recovery scenario, which lacked individual attribution and was considered inadmissible in evidence.\nAdditionally, forensic reports confirmed that the recovered weapons did not match the crime cartridges found at the scene, further weakening the prosecutions case. The joint recovery and discrepancy in the forensic evidence led to the acquittal of the appellants, as the prosecution failed to establish a direct link between the accused and the crime.\nKey references:\n•\nMuhammad Mushtaq v. Mustansar Hussain and others (2016 SCMR 2123)\n•\nMuneer Malik and others v. The State through P.G. Sindh (2022 SCMR 1494)\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) - Sections 302(b), 324, and 149: Motive in Criminal Cases\nThe prosecution claimed that the motive for the crime was a longstanding blood feud between the two parties. While the defense did not deny the existence of the feud, the court clarified that motive alone is not enough to establish guilt.\nMotive is a double-edged sword, meaning that while it may explain why one party commits a crime, it could also explain why the rival party may falsely implicate others. Since the motive could be used for either genuine or false involvement, the mere existence of motive did not suffice to convict the appellants.\nThe lack of concrete evidence linking the appellants directly to the crime, combined with the potential for false implication due to enmity, led to the acquittal of the appellants.\nKey references:\n•\nNoor Elahi v. Zafarul Haque (PLD 1976 SC 557)\n•\nAllah Bakhsh v. The State (PLD 1978 SC 171)\n•\nKhadim Hussain v. The State (2010 SCMR 1090)\n•\nTahir Khan v. The State (2011 SCMR 646)\n•\nTariq v. The State (2017 SCMR 1672)\n•\nMuhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State (2019 SCMR 652)\n(d) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) - Sections 6 and 7: Terrorism and Personal Enmity\nThe case involved allegations of terrorism in addition to murder and attempted murder. The prosecution argued that the crime fell under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as it involved multiple murders committed due to enmity. However, the court observed that there was no evidence of terrorism as defined in the Act.\nThe alleged crime occurred in a non-populated area and was a result of personal vendetta, not an act intended to spread fear or terror in the general public. The lack of evidence of terror or insecurity at the scene further confirmed that the crime did not qualify as terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act. Therefore, the court upheld the High Courts decision to set aside the conviction under the Act and acquitted the appellants.\nKey reference:\n•\nGhulam Hussain and others v. The State and others (PLD 2020 SC 61)\n(e) Criminal Trial - Benefit of the Doubt\nThe principle of benefit of the doubt asserts that if any doubt arises in the prosecution’s evidence, it is the duty of the court to resolve that doubt in favor of the accused. It is not necessary to have numerous contradictions; even a single reasonable doubt can lead to acquittal.\nIn this case, the material contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the prosecution created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the court, leading to the acquittal of the appellants. The benefit of the doubt was extended to the accused, as the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nKey references:\n•\nDaniel Boyd (Muslim Name Saifullah) and another v. The State (1992 SCMR 196)\n•\nGul Dast Khan v. The State (2009 SCMR 431)\n•\nMuhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State (2019 SCMR 652)\n•\nAbdul Jabbar and another v. The State (2019 SCMR 129)\n•\nMst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others (PLD 2019 SC 64)\n•\nMuhammad Imran v. The State (2020 SCMR 857)\nConclusion:\nIn this case, the appellants were acquitted due to contradictory testimonies, inconsistent evidence, and failure to establish a clear connection between the appellants and the crime. The doctrine of benefit of the doubt was applied, and motive alone was insufficient to secure a conviction. Furthermore, the allegations of terrorism were not substantiated, and the court rightly excluded the application of the Anti-Terrorism Act. The case reaffirms the importance of credible evidence and the necessity for the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,149", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No.144-L of 2020 and Civil Petition No.282-L of 2024, date of order: 22nd May, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 02.10.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Crl. Appeal No.102232-J/2017 and Capital Sentence Reference No.18-T of 2017).\nHeard on: 22nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JUSTICE AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Zulfiqar Ali Dhudi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.P. No. 282-L of 2024) (via video link from Lahore).\nHammad Akbar Wallana, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Crl.A. No. 144-L of 2020) (via video link from Lahore).\nIrfan Zia, Addl. Prosecutor General Punjab for the State (in both cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD RIAZ and others-Petitioners/Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25542", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5146 = 2024 SLD 5146 = 2024 SCMR 1852", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968) - Sections 1(b), 1(e), and 12: Dismissal from Service without Notice\nThe case addresses the legality of termination of employment without a written order, specifically in the context of employees who had worked for a continuous period exceeding nine months.\nKey points to note:\n1.\nStanding Order 12 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, requires that any termination of service (including dismissal, retrenchment, or discharge) be done through a written order that explicitly mentions the reason for such action. This is to ensure transparency, fairness, and adherence to the principles of natural justice.\n2.\nVerbal Orders for termination are illegal and in direct contravention of both labour laws and the principle of good governance. The requirement of a written order ensures that the employee is fully informed of the reasons for termination and is provided with an opportunity to challenge it if necessary.\n3.\nContinuous Service Beyond Nine Months: The court found that both employees had worked well beyond the nine-month limit stipulated for temporary workers. Their work was against positions that were essentially permanent in nature. The employer’s attempt to classify them as temporary workers was deemed a misuse of temporary engagement provisions. The Standing Order 1 of the Ordinance only permits temporary engagements for work that is essentially temporary and is expected to be completed within nine months. Since the employees were engaged for permanent roles, their service should have been treated as continuous.\n4.\nCircumvention of Labour Laws: The employers failure to classify the workers as permanent employees despite their continuous service, and the verbal termination, was viewed as a violation of labour rights. The Labour Court’s decision to reinstate the employees with back benefits was upheld, and the petitions filed against them were dismissed.\nKey References:\n•\nChairman Agriculture Policy Institute Ministry of National Food Security and Research, Government of Pakistan v. Zulqarnain Ali (2022 SCMR 636)\n•\nMuhammad Yaqoob v. The Punjab Labour Court Nos. 1 and 5 and others (1990 SCMR 1539)\n•\nExecutive Engineer, Central Civil Division Pak. P.W.D. Quetta v. Abdul Aziz and others (PLD 1996 SC 610)\n•\nGovernment of Punjab and others v. Punjab Appellate Tribunal Lahore and others (2002 SCMR 878)\n(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) - Sections 3 & 5: Condonation of Delay in Cases Involving Government Departments and Private Organizations\nThis case concerns the condonation of delay in filing an appeal, focusing on the approach to Government departments, autonomous bodies, and private sector organizations under the Limitation Act, 1908.\nKey points to note:\n1.\nSection 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 mandates that an action or appeal must be initiated within the time limit prescribed. If the filing is delayed, the party must provide a valid reason for the delay, and it must be condoned by the court.\n2.\nPrinciple of Condonation: The court emphasized that no extraordinary clemency or preferential treatment should be granted to Government departments, autonomous bodies, or private organizations in cases involving delay. Such entities must adhere to the same standards as ordinary litigants or citizens when seeking condonation for delay.\n3.\nEquality in Treatment: The delay in filing appeals should be treated on a uniform basis, and the courts should ensure that the standard of justice is applied equally to all litigants. Government entities and private organizations must justify delays like any other party, rather than receiving undue leniency.\n4.\nThe principle reinforces that the Law of Limitation is applicable to all parties, and exceptions should not be made based solely on the nature of the party involved.\nKey Reference:\n•\nRegional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari (2024 SCMR 1021)\nConclusion:\n•\n(a) The Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 mandates that employment termination, especially for workers who have been employed for over nine months, must be carried out with a written order specifying the reasons for termination. Verbal termination is not legally permissible. In this case, the workers were unlawfully dismissed and rightly reinstated by the Labour Court.\n•\n(b) Regarding the Limitation Act, the principle of condonation of delay applies equally to all parties, including Government departments and private sector organizations. No preferential treatment should be given to such bodies, and delays should be dealt with in the same manner as those involving ordinary litigants.\nThese principles uphold fairness, accountability, and justice in employment and legal matters, ensuring that all parties are held to the same standards.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=3,5", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 2697-L and 2698-L of 2016, date of order: 28th June, 2024.\n(Appeal against the order dated 23.06.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in W.Ps. Nos. 21263 and 21265 of 2016).Heard on: 28th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE AND SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Amjad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nSyed Kamil Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1 (in both Petitions).", - "Petitioner Name:": "TOWN ADMINISTRATION AND ANOTHER-PETITIONERS\nVS\nMOHAMMAD KHALID AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25543", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5147 = 2024 SLD 5147 = 2024 SCMR 1862", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTk", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) - Section 12 & Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) - Section 54: Suit for Specific Performance of Agreement to Sell Immoveable Property\nThis case addresses the issue of specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property and the time-bound payment obligations associated with such agreements.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nSection 12 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877): This provision deals with the specific performance of agreements to sell, providing the grounds on which a court can enforce a contract.\n2.\nSection 54 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882): This section deals with the sale of immovable property, specifically stating that the sale of property is completed when the seller transfers the ownership of the property to the buyer in exchange for the sale consideration.\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nCut-off Date for Payment of Balance Sale Consideration:\no\nWhen parties enter into an agreement to sell immovable property, the agreement will typically specify a timeline by which the buyer must pay the balance sale consideration.\no\nCourts are not empowered to extend this cut-off date or alter the terms of the agreement, as doing so would effectively rewrite the contract. The buyer’s primary obligation is to make the payment within the agreed timeframe.\n2.\nObligation to Deposit Balance Consideration:\no\nIf the buyer fails to make the payment within the stipulated time, they must demonstrate their readiness, ability, and willingness to pay the remaining amount. This can be done by:\n\nOffering the payment to the seller, or\n\nDepositing the payment in court if the seller refuses to accept it.\no\nThe court cannot alter the terms of the agreement or extend the deadline for payment without breaching the specific intent of the contract.\n3.\nException to the Rule:\no\nOne exception could be when the balance sale consideration is a small portion of the total sale price. In such a case, it may be possible for the court to consider allowing an extension, but this is not the default approach.\nCourts Approach:\n•\nCourts must ensure that the agreement between the buyer and seller is honored as stipulated. They cannot modify terms, such as the payment deadline, as it would undermine the sanctity of the contract.\n•\nThe buyer, to enforce specific performance, must prove that they were prepared to make the payment. If they were unable to pay within the stipulated time, they should have taken actions like offering payment or depositing the amount in court. Only then can they expect the court to intervene and compel the seller to transfer the property.\nThis ensures that a clear timeline for the payment is respected, and the seller is not unfairly burdened or delayed by a buyer’s inaction.\nConclusion:\n•\nCourts cannot extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration beyond what is agreed upon in the contract. If a buyer does not make timely payment, they must demonstrate their willingness to perform by offering or depositing the amount. The only exception might be in cases where the balance due is a relatively small portion of the total sale price.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12Transfer of Property Act, 1882=54", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2293-L of 2016, date of order: 2nd September, 2024.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 24.06.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No. 22019 of 2016).\nHeard on: 2nd September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, CHIEF JUSTICE, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Mansoor Ali Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDIL ALI-PETITIONER\nVS\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, GOJRA AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25544", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5148 = 2024 SLD 5148 = 2024 SCMR 1864", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUTg", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Service Tribunals Rules, 1974 and Procedural Law\nCase (a): Departmental Appeal and Limitation\nIn this case, the Sindh Service Tribunals dismissed several service appeals at the preliminary stage (in limine) based on the timeliness of departmental appeals. The departments officials, while present in court, claimed that certain departmental appeals were indeed filed within the prescribed time, but due to incomplete assessment of the record at the tribunal stage, the exact timelines and details could not be properly verified.\nKey Points:\n1.\nIssue of Limitation: The Tribunal initially dismissed the appeals because the departmental appeals were believed to be time-barred. However, the department presented a tentative assessment, stating that some appeals were filed within time but required further scrutiny to confirm the facts. The dismissal in limine was thus seen as premature.\n2.\nNeed for Further Investigation: The Tribunal was asked to verify certain facts regarding:\no\nThe dates of the departmental orders.\no\nThe receipt dates of such orders by the petitioners.\no\nThe filing dates of departmental appeals/representations.\no\nWhether the decisions of departmental appeals were communicated to the petitioners.\no\nThe date of filing service appeals by the petitioners.\n3.\nFactual and Legal Controversy: The limitation issue in this case was not a simple matter of pure law but rather involved a mix of factual and legal controversies. This required a more detailed investigation, as the factual basis of the appeals could not be determined summarily.\n4.\nRemand for Adjudication: The petitions were converted into appeals, and the court remanded the matter to the Sindh Service Tribunal to reconsider the departmental appeals based on a proper examination of the facts. The Tribunal was directed to provide the parties with a fair opportunity to be heard and to conduct a thorough factual inquiry before deciding the appeals.\nConclusion for Case (a):\n•\nAction: The case was remanded to the Tribunal for a more detailed examination of the facts surrounding the timeliness of the departmental appeals.\n•\nRuling: The impugned orders of the Tribunal were set aside, and the Tribunal was instructed to consider all relevant issues and adjudicate afresh in accordance with the law.\n________________________________________\nCase (b): Administration of Justice and Procedural Law\nThis case elaborates on the role of procedural law in the administration of justice.\nKey Principle:\n•\nProcedure as a Facilitator: The procedure is meant to facilitate justice, not to obstruct it. Any technical interpretation of the rules or laws that results in unreasonable rigidity or prevents justice from being served must be avoided.\n•\nElasticity in Interpretation: The courts should allow reasonable flexibility in interpreting procedural rules to advance the cause of justice. A construction that turns the law into a futile exercise should be guarded against.\nConclusion for Case (b):\n•\nThe procedural rules should not be mechanically applied if they hinder the fair administration of justice. Courts must be flexible and pragmatic in their approach, ensuring that the core objective of justice is upheld.\n________________________________________\nOverall Conclusion:\nIn both cases, the court emphasized the need for a fair and thorough investigation of facts, particularly where procedural rules may have led to unjust or premature decisions. The flexibility in interpreting the law allows for a more just outcome, ensuring that technicalities do not obstruct the rightful resolution of disputes.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 525-K to 527-K of 2024 and Civil Petitions Nos. 477-K to 511-K of 2024, date of order: 1st August, 2024.\n(Against the Orders dated 19.03.2024 and 30.01.2024 passed by Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi in Appeals Nos. 58, 59, 61, 760, 862, 902, 774, 805, 820, 776, 821, 864, 755, 803, 829, 742, 841, 804, 901, 759, 766, 831, 806, 822, 794, 761, 840, 747, 764, 746, 749, 817, 748, 744, 830, 743, 740 and 763 of 2023). Heard on: 1st August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sadar-ud-Din Buriro, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Addl. A.G., Sindh, Javed Ali Khawaja, Focal Person (Litigation) and Syed Abid Ali, Director (HR), Education and Literacy Department, Government of Sindh for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAO MUHAMMAD RASHID AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25545", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5149 = 2024 SLD 5149 = 2024 SCMR 1871", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUXo", - "Key Words:": "Civil Service Rules (Punjab)-R. 8.129 & Appendix 20, Clause 7-Revised Leave Rules, 1981, Rr. 9 & 15-Civil Judge-Study leave for judicial officers-Policy-Admission in LLM programme at a foreign university-Petitioner, who was a Civil Judge, secured admission to the LLM programme of studies offered by two foreign universities-However, vide Lahore High Courts letter it was conveyed to him that the Administration Judge had declined to grant him requisite permission, and had instead advised that the petitioner may obtain the same degree from a local university-Against the decision of the Administration Judge the petitioner filed Service Appeal before the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal (the Tribunal), which through the impugned judgment maintained the decision of the Administration Judge-Validity-No reason for declining permission to the petitioner was given-If, though it was not stated, his services were required then this was not stated; in any case this could not be a reason because he was advised to obtain the same degree from a local university-Impugned judgment upheld the decision of the Administration Judge, by stating that, in this case the authority is not persuaded to exercise discretion for a number of reasons. -However, not a single reason was cited in the impugned judgment of the Tribunal nor in the decision of the Administration Judge and none had been cited by the Registrar of the Lahore High Court-Therefore, the said decision and the impugned judgment were not sustainable-Petitioner had been rendering service as a judicial officer for over ten years; he wanted to improve his legal qualification in his field of work by wanting to do an LLM, and had obtained admission and scholarship-Lahore High Court, therefore, would not have incurred any expenditure on his travel, lodging and payment of fees-Petitioner was also not close to retirement and was prepared to sign the requisite undertaking/bond-Undoubtedly, better qualified judicial officers would be an asset to the judiciary, and by utilizing their additional training and the knowledge they acquired, they would be better placed to dispense justice-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and impugned judgment as well as the decision of the Administration Judge were set-aside with the direction that if the petitioner could no longer avail the admission and scholarship in the coming academic year he would be entitled to do so in the next, or any future year-Supreme Court observed that a clear, equitable and transparent policy with regard to study leave of judicial officers may be formulated by the High Court, which should then be applied uniformly, and if a judicial officer secured admission in a reputable foreign university on scholarship basis in the field of law or related discipline and fulfilled the stipulated criteria, including having served for the prescribed minimum number of years, was not close to retirement, there was no financial outlay by the High Court and was not facing disciplinary proceedings then permission should not be withheld, unless there was some good reason which was communicated to him/her.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2243 of 2024, date of order: 29th August, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 25.04.2024 of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, Lahore passed in Service Appeal No. 15 of 2023). Heard on: 29th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): QAZI FAEZ ISA, CHIEF JUSTICE AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahid Latif, Deputy Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore for Respondent.\nMuhammad Mumtaz Ali, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab on Court Notice for Government of Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED FAIZAN E RASOOL-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE THROUGH REGISTRAR-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25546", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5150 = 2024 SLD 5150 = 2024 SCMR 1877", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDUXk", - "Key Words:": "Analysis of Constitutional Jurisdiction and Employment Issues\n(a) Regularization of Service and Writ Jurisdiction (Art. 199)\nThis case addresses the regularization of contractual employees and the scope of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan.\nKey Points:\n•\nRequirement of Law or Policy for Regularization: The claim for regularization of service must be based on a law or policy that provides specific parameters and procedures for such regularization. This implies that the regularization of a contractual employees service cannot be arbitrarily demanded through a writ petition unless a clear legal framework or policy decision exists within the organizations rules.\n•\nWrit Jurisdiction: Under Article 199, a writ petition can be filed only if the regularization is permissible under law and within an established policy framework. The organization must also be subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.\nConclusion for (a):\n•\nA claim for regularization of service under Article 199 requires a recognized legal framework or policy, and the High Court will intervene only if the organization is amenable to its jurisdiction.\n________________________________________\n(b) Scope of Extraordinary Jurisdiction (Art. 199)\nThe scope of the High Courts extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 is limited, especially when the case involves disputed questions of fact.\nKey Points:\n•\nExtraordinary Jurisdiction: The jurisdiction under Article 199 is designed to provide a quick remedy in cases where the illegality or impropriety of the action can be established without the need for an exhaustive inquiry or the recording of evidence.\n•\nDisputed Facts: If the case involves disputed factual issues that require detailed examination and evidence gathering, the High Court should not intervene under Article 199. Such disputes should be resolved by courts with plenary jurisdiction, where evidence can be recorded and contested facts determined.\nConclusion for (b):\n•\nThe High Court cannot address cases with complex factual disputes under Article 199 and should refrain from intervening when a full trial is necessary to resolve the issue.\n________________________________________\n(c) Employment through a Contractor and Regularization (Art. 199)\nThis case deals with employees engaged through a contractor and the disputed claims for regularization of their services.\nKey Points:\n•\nDisputed Issues: Several key issues were raised, including whether the employees were employed by the contractor or by the Karachi Port Trust (KPT), and whether the outsourcing arrangement was a genuine contract or a sham arrangement to evade legal obligations and benefits under labour laws.\n•\nPermanent Employment Status: The employees also claimed that they had worked for several years against permanent posts, raising the issue of whether they had acquired permanent worker status under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.\n•\nDisputed Factual Questions: These are complex factual issues that could not be decided under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, which is limited to dealing with legal questions without a need for evidence.\nConclusion for (c):\n•\nThe High Court could not address the factual controversies about employment status, outsourcing arrangements, and regularization. These issues required fact-finding and should have been resolved by lower courts with the authority to examine evidence.\n________________________________________\n(d) Writ Jurisdiction and Lack of Statutory Service Rules\nThis case addresses the maintainability of writ petitions where the employer organization has no statutory rules of service.\nKey Points:\n•\nAbsence of Statutory Service Rules: If an organization does not have statutory rules governing the service of its employees, a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be maintained.\n•\nWrit Jurisdiction: Writ petitions under Article 199 are only maintainable when the organization is bound by statutory rules that govern employment-related matters. In the absence of such rules, the High Court cannot intervene.\nConclusion for (d):\n•\nA writ petition is not maintainable against an organization that does not have statutory service rules, as the High Courts jurisdiction is linked to the existence of such rules.\n________________________________________\nOverall Conclusion:\n•\nThe High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 199 is limited to cases where the legal framework supports the claim and where the issues can be resolved without the need for extensive factual inquiries.\n•\nThe regularization of services for employees depends on the presence of legitimate legal frameworks and the organization’s amenability to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.\n•\nFor disputes involving disputed factual issues (such as employment through contractors or questions about permanent status), the High Court should not intervene under its extraordinary jurisdiction, and these matters should be addressed by courts with plenary powers.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 278-K and 279-K of 2022, date of order: 2nd August, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 03.12.2021 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.Ps. Nos. D-3081 and D-4120 of 2019). Heard on: 2nd August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSITCE AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and M. Iqbal Chaudhary, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nKhaliq Ahmed, D.A.G. for the Federation.\nAhmed Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Imtiaz Shah, Legal Head (KPT) for Respondent No.3.\nM. Saleem Thapadewala, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.4 (Acquatech).", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAQAR AHMED AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH CABINET SECRETARIAT, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25547", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5151 = 2024 SLD 5151 = 2024 SCMR 1883", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-S. 12-Suit for specific performance of agreements to sell-Vendee/plaintiff failing to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the agreements-Effect-First reason which prevailed with the Trial Court in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff (vendee) was that defendant (vendor) had not obtained a No Demand Certificate for the house, which was held to be a condition for transfer of the house-However there was no clause in the agreements which obliged defendant to obtain such a certificate before the transfer-Regardless to this position, the evidence available on record showed that defendant had in fact obtained a No Demand Certificate from the relevant Authority, regarding property tax, water and allied charges-Defendant also produced the receipt for payment of property tax and a copy of letter from the Directorate of the Authority regarding request for issuance of NOC-Secondly, the plaintiffs claim that he had issued a legal notice to the defendant asking him to obtain an NOC from the Authority and transfer the house to him, appeared to be an abortive attempt to cover up his default because he had not produced any postal receipt showing its dispatch, which was essential particularly when defendant had denied receiving of such notice in his written statement-Thirdly, to prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay the second installment of Rs.5,000,000/- in terms of agreements, the plaintiff was under burden to adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make such payment in time, or if he did not have sufficient funds to meet his obligation, he had to prove how the funds would be available to him-No such evidence was brought on record by the plaintiff-Therefore, even assuming that defendant had committed breach, since the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the agreements which were required to be performed by him, there was a bar to specific performance in his favour-Appeal was dismissed accordingly.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 22-Specific performance, remedy of-Equitable remedy-Remedy by way of specific performance is equitable and it is not obligatory on the Court to grant such a relief merely because it is lawful to do so-Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 expressly stipulates so.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.431 of 2021, date of order: 19th May, 2023.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 10.03.2021 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in R.F.A.No.163 of 2018).Heard on: 19th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IJAZ UL AHSAN, JUSTICE, MUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE AND SHAHID WAHEED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zulfiqar Ali Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nTariq Mehmood, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1.\nMrs. Bushra Qamar, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "LIAQUAT ALI KHAN-Petitioner\nVS\nMUHAMMAD AKRAM and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25548", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5152 = 2024 SLD 5152 = 2024 SCMR 1887", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Legality of Tenured Positions and Governance in Public Sector Universities\nDetails:\nA constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan was filed before the Supreme Court concerning the state of governance in public sector universities. The court highlighted the improper practices of universities failing to fill critical tenured positions, including Vice-Chancellors, Pro Vice-Chancellors, Rectors, Presidents, and other key roles, or keeping these positions vacant or under acting charge. It was observed that many universities were being run in contravention of their governing laws, affecting academics, institutional reputation, and the value of degrees awarded. Meetings of governing bodies such as syndicates, senates, boards of governors, and boards of trustees were not being held periodically as required by law.\nAdditionally, the court noted the excessive recruitment of non-academic staff, which violates the Higher Education Commissions (HEC) prescribed ratio of 1:1.5 for academic to non-academic staff. This imbalance contributes to the financial difficulties faced by universities.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court directed the following actions:\nCopies of the order were to be sent to the Vice-Chancellors/Rectors of non-compliant universities.\nNon-compliant officials were required to submit written explanations within two weeks and appear in person at the next hearing to justify their non-compliance with governing laws.\nThe Federation, Provinces, and Islamabad Capital Territory were ordered to report whether they had issued directions to universities to limit or stop further recruitment of non-academic staff.\nCitations:\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 184(3)\nHigher Education Commission (HEC) guidelines on staff ratios", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3)", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. 7 of 2024, date of order: 29th August, 2024. Heard on: 11th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AUTHOR(S) QAZI FAEZ ISA, CHIEF JUSTICE, NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Umer Ijaz Gilani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner assisted by Muhammad Alee, Advocate.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan, Abdul Sattar Khokhar, Sr. Joint Secretary, Ministry of F.E & P.T. and Dr. Agha Haider, Deputy Director, (Legal), Ministry of F.E & P.T. for Respondents Nos. 1-2.\nM. Nazir Jawwad, Advocate Supreme Court, Nazeer Hussain, Director-General, Coordination H.E.C., Ahad Mehmood Raza, Assistant Director (Law), H.E.C. for Respondent No. 3.\nWaseem Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab and Muhammad Rehman, Sr. Law Officer, HED, Lahore for Respondent No. 4.\nShah Faisal Utmankhail, Advocate-General, KP, Shah Faisal Ilyas, Additional Advocate-General, KP., Ghulam Saeed, Special Secretary, HED, KP and Asif Khan, Litigation Officer, HED, KP for Respondent No. 5.\nHassan Akbar, Advocate-General, Sindh, Jawad Dero, Additional Advocate-General, Sindh and Feroze A. Mahar, Director for Respondent No. 6.\nMuhammad Ayaz Swati, Additional Advocate-General, Balochistan, Jehanzeb Mandokhail, Addl. Secretary, Colleges, HED, Balochistan for Respondent No. 7.\nAsif Sohail, Director Legal for Ministry of Health.\nNajeeb Mandokhail, Section Officer for Ministry of Science and Technology.\nParasmahesar, Section Officer for Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALL PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES BPS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (APUBTA) THROUGH PRESIDENT-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY FEDERAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25549", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5153 = 2024 SLD 5153 = 2024 SCMR 1896", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Dismissal of Police Officials on Grounds of Overage\nDetails:\nThe case involved police officials dismissed from service due to allegations of being overage at the time of appointment. The petitioners argued that:\n1.\nThey were dismissed without being given an opportunity for a personal hearing or a proper inquiry to establish deceit or illegality on their part.\n2.\nSimilarly placed colleagues were reinstated, while they were discriminated against.\n3.\nThey were not notified of any overage issue at the time of recruitment and served 4 to 6 years before the flaw was identified.\n4.\nThe recruitment process itself was flawed, and no explanation was provided for the delay in detecting the age issue.\n5.\nThe exact age of the petitioners at the time of recruitment was disputed and unresolved.\nThe department failed to consider the possibility of age relaxation or any ex-post facto approval under existing policies or notifications. There was no evidence on record showing that the petitioners secured their appointments through illegal means or fraud.\nHeld:\n1.\nThe petitions were converted into appeals and allowed.\n2.\nThe impugned dismissal orders were set aside.\n3.\nThe matter was remanded to the Tribunal for a decision on the merits after providing equal opportunity of hearing to both parties.\nCitations:\n•\nPrinciples of natural justice (right to a fair hearing)\n•\nRelevant Government Policies or Notifications regarding age relaxation", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 499-K and 519-K of 2023, date of order: 6th August, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 27.02.2023, passed by the Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi in Appeals Nos. 454 and 455 of 2020). Heard on: 6th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, JUSTICE AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners in persons (in both cases).\nSibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General, Sindh, Mushtaq Ahmed Abbasi, A.I.G. (Legal) and Muhammad Ghaffar, D.S.P. Legal Nawaz Ali, D.S.P. Legal, Benazirabad for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAVED ALI AND ANOTHER-PETITIONERS\nVS\nINSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, SINDH AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25550", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5154 = 2024 SLD 5154 = 2024 SCMR 1984", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Family Settlement - Significance, Principles, and Enforcement\nA family settlement is an agreement among family members, typically aimed at resolving disputes over the division of assets or property. This concept is legally significant as it promotes family harmony and aims to resolve conflicting claims, particularly regarding inheritance or property distribution.\nKey Points:\n1.\nPurpose: Family settlements seek to foster peace and avoid protracted litigation, resolving disputes through mutual understanding.\n2.\nKey Principles of Family Settlements:\no\nGenuineness and Bona Fides: The settlement must be genuine and made in good faith, aiming to resolve disputes equitably.\no\nVoluntariness: A family settlement must be voluntary and free from fraud, undue influence, or familial pressure.\no\nOral or Written Agreement: A family settlement can be oral, and no formal registration is required unless it involves transferring property or creating rights over immovable assets.\no\nPre-existing Title: Each family member involved must have a pre-existing claim or interest in the property being settled, even if only a potential claim.\no\nEnforceability: Courts will uphold family settlements when they are fair and equitable, and they discourage attempts to revoke agreements once material benefits have been received.\no\nBinding Nature: The arrangement is binding on all parties involved if made in good faith and executed with the intention to resolve family disputes.\n3.\nLegal Framework: Courts have consistently upheld family settlements, recognizing their role in preventing further discord within families. The principle of estoppel is often invoked to prevent one party from later contesting an agreement from which they have already benefited.\nConclusion: Family settlements are a valuable tool for resolving family disputes, particularly over property, and the law encourages them if they are made in good faith and with the intention of maintaining peace. Courts will usually uphold such settlements unless there are clear grounds to believe they were made under improper conditions.\n________________________________________\n(b) Power of Attorney – Agent’s Duties in Property Transactions\nUnder the Contract Act, 1872, a power of attorney creates an agency relationship where the agent is authorized to act on behalf of the principal. However, there are important duties and limitations when an agent deals with the principals property, especially when acting for personal benefit.\nKey Points:\n1.\nAgent’s Duty to Act on Behalf of the Principal: An agent must always act in the best interest of the principal, particularly when dealing with the principal’s property.\n2.\nSale of Property for Personal Benefit:\no\nWhen the agent seeks to sell or transfer the principal’s property for their own benefit, they must first seek the principals consent after fully disclosing all relevant facts.\no\nIf the agent fails to obtain such consent, the principal may repudiate the transaction.\n3.\nReasonable Diligence: If there is uncertainty about the power of attorneys interpretation, the agent is obligated to make diligent efforts to communicate with the principal and clarify instructions.\nConclusion: Agents must act in good faith and ensure that their actions are authorized and transparent, particularly in transactions involving the principal’s property. If the agent fails to do so, the principal has the right to repudiate any transactions carried out for the agent’s personal gain.\n________________________________________\n(c) Registration Act – Family Settlement and Registration Requirements\nThe Registration Act, 1908 requires certain documents related to the transfer of immovable property to be registered. However, the requirements are nuanced when it comes to family settlements.\nKey Points:\n1.\nFamily Settlement and Registration:\no\nA family settlement typically involves an informal arrangement among family members to divide property. If the terms of the settlement are not intended to transfer property rights from one family member to another, then registration is not required.\no\nIf the document merely memorializes an oral family agreement, rather than creating rights or obligations, it is not subject to registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.\n2.\nWhen Registration is Necessary:\no\nIf the family settlement document creates or declares rights over immovable property (worth more than Rs. 100), then it must be registered and attested by two witnesses.\no\nHowever, a memorandum recording the settlement does not fall under the mandatory registration requirement unless it is specifically intended to transfer property or create enforceable rights.\n3.\nProof of Family Settlement: Even if the family settlement document is not registered, the parties may still prove that the settlement was made and acted upon, especially if the family members followed through with the arrangement.\nConclusion: While family settlements are often informal, if they involve the creation or transfer of rights in immovable property, registration and attestation may be necessary. The document’s purpose and the nature of the property involved determine whether registration is required.\n________________________________________\nOverall Legal Principles:\n•\nFamily Settlements: Serve as a peaceful means to resolve familial disputes over property, and they are recognized and upheld by courts when made in good faith.\n•\nPower of Attorney: Agents must act diligently and with full disclosure when handling a principal’s property, especially if they are acting for personal gain.\n•\nRegistration of Family Settlements: The necessity of registration depends on whether the document creates or transfers rights in immovable property. Non-transfer documents, such as memoranda, do not require registration.\nThese principles aim to foster fairness and transparency in property dealings, especially in family contexts, ensuring that settlements and transactions are conducted in good faith and according to legal requirements.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 197-L of 2019 and C.M.As. Nos.3759 and 5618 of 2022, date of order: 19th August, 2024. 1. C.A. No. 197-L of 2019\n(Against the order dated 29.04.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in C.R. No.1657 of 2014).\n2. C.M.A. No. 3759 of 2022 in C.A. 197-L of 2019\n(For transposition of appellants Nos. 1-b, 2-a and respondents Nos. 3 and 4).\n4. C.M.A. No. 5618 of 2022 in C.A. 197-L of 2019\n(For impleadment as party) Heard on: 30th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE AND SHAHID WAHEED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mahmood Ahmad Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants/Applicants (in C.M.A. No.3759 of 2022).\nMudassar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (in C.M.A. No.5618 of 2022).\nMuhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court, Rana Abid Nazeer, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.\nBarrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.2.\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BASHIR AHMED (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS L.RS. AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nNAZIR AHMAD AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25551", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5155 = 2024 SLD 5155 = 2024 SCMR 1945", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Recounting of Ballot Papers under Section 95(5) of the Elections Act, 2017\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a candidate in the General Elections 2024, challenged the Election Commission of Pakistan’s (ECP) refusal to recount votes. The petitioner claimed to have submitted a recount application to the Returning Officer (RO) on February 9, 2024. However, the typed application provided by the petitioner lacked a date and signature/thumb impression. The ECPs counsel and the ROs report denied receipt of such an application prior to the commencement of result consolidation proceedings.\nThe court noted the following:\nSection 95(5) of the Elections Act, 2017 mandates that a recount application must be submitted before the consolidation of results begins.\nThe petitioner failed to prove timely submission of the application for a recount.\nThe RO’s report declared the application an afterthought and confirmed that it was not received before consolidating the results.\nHeld:\nSince the petitioner did not fulfill the statutory prerequisite under Section 95(5) of the Elections Act, 2017, there was no occasion for the ECP to direct a recount.\nThe petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.\nCitations:\nElections Act, 2017, Section 95(5)\nCase Distinguished: Abdul Rehman Khan Kanju and others v. Election Commission of Pakistan and others (2024 SCMR 1902)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=95(5)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2477 of 2024, date of order: 21st August, 2024.\n(On appeal against the order dated 22.05.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No. 24978 of 2024). Heard on: 21st August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, JUSTICE AND NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hassan Raza Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court for the Petitioner.\nMuhammad Arshad, D.G. Law and Falak Sher, Legal Consultant for the ECP.\nMuhammad Latif Khan Khosa, Senior Advocate Supreme Court Syed Iqbal Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALI GOHAR KHAN-PETITIONER\nVS\nELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25552", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5156 = 2024 SLD 5156 = 2024 SCMR 1952", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Engaging Private Counsel by Government Entities: Legal Framework and Permissibility\nThe case discusses the legal permissibility of government ministries and the federal and provincial governments engaging private counsel to conduct legal proceedings. The key issue raised was whether the Federation and Ministries are prohibited from hiring private counsel, especially in light of the Supreme Courts judgment in Rasheed Ahmad v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2017 SC 121).\nKey Points:\n1.\nJudgment in Rasheed Ahmad (PLD 2017 SC 121):\no\nThe judgment did not completely close the door on hiring private counsel. Instead, it laid down a procedure for engaging private counsel in specific circumstances. It emphasized that such engagement could be done for compelling reasons in the public interest, not for protecting an individual or for ulterior motives.\n2.\nRule 14(1A) of the Rules of Business, 1973:\no\nThis Rule empowers government divisions to engage private counsel, provided that the procedure prescribed under it is followed. The Attorney General for Pakistan (AGP) confirmed that the necessary procedure was followed in the case at hand.\n3.\nSupreme Court Rules, 1980:\no\nThe Supreme Court Rules, specifically Order IV, Rule 6, requires that an Advocate-on-Record (AOR) is responsible for filing petitions and appeals in the Supreme Court. The AOR can instruct a private counsel to assist with the case, provided the appropriate procedure is adhered to.\n4.\nConclusion:\no\nThe engagement of private counsel was legally valid, as the required procedure was followed, and there was no defect in the filing of the appeals. The court dismissed the application questioning the engagement of private counsel, ruling that the procedure had been correctly adhered to.\n(b) Public Interest and the Need for Private Counsel in Complex Legal Matters\nThe case further elaborates on the permissibility of engaging private counsel when the matter involves complex legal questions with significant public and constitutional implications.\nKey Points:\n1.\nComplex Legal Issues:\no\nThe appeals involved substantive questions related to criminal law, constitutional law, and international human rights, which were unprecedented and could potentially affect the rights and liberties of citizens. Given the specialized nature of these issues, the Attorney General for Pakistan (AGP) admitted that he lacked the requisite expertise in the complex areas of law involved.\n2.\nCompelling Reasons:\no\nThe AGPs statement about his limitations in addressing these complex legal questions was acknowledged and appreciated by the court. The engagement of private counsel was deemed necessary to provide comprehensive assistance in such a significant matter, which was in the public interest.\n3.\nPublic Interest and Rules of Business, 1973:\no\nThe Supreme Court found that engaging private counsel was justified in this instance under the public interest exception, as per Rule 14(1A) of the Rules of Business, 1973. This rule allows the engagement of private counsel for compelling reasons, such as the need for specialized expertise in complex legal matters.\n4.\nRasheed Ahmad Case (PLD 2017 SC 121):\no\nThe court reaffirmed the criteria established in Rasheed Ahmad, which allows for the engagement of private counsel when compelling reasons exist, and there is no ulterior motive behind the engagement. In this case, the engagement of private counsel was for public interest, not to protect a specific individual.\n5.\nConclusion:\no\nThe engagement of private counsel in this case was justified due to the complexity of the issues involved and the public interest in ensuring that the appeals were handled properly. The applications questioning the engagement of private counsel were dismissed.\nOverall Conclusion:\nThe decisions in both parts of the case underscore that engagement of private counsel by government entities is legally permissible when certain conditions are met:\n•\nCompelling reasons exist for the engagement of private counsel.\n•\nThe procedure outlined in the Rules of Business, 1973 and the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 is followed.\n•\nThe engagement is in the public interest, particularly in matters involving complex or specialized legal issues.\nIn cases where the Attorney General or other officials may lack the required expertise, hiring private counsel can be a valid means of ensuring effective legal representation, as long as it adheres to the proper procedural requirements.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Rules of Business (Federal), 1973=14(1A)", - "Case #": "C.M.As. Nos. 597 and 598 of 2024 in I.C.As. Nos. 16 and 24 of 2023, date of order: 11th July, 2024.\n(For rejection of the appeals on behalf of the Respondents Nos. 1 to 5).\nHeard on: 11th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, SHAHID WAHEED, IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, JUSTICE(S)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faisal Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (in both C.M.As.).\nMansoor Usman Awan, Attorney General for Pakistan for the Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER-APPLICANTS\nVS\nKARAMAT ALI AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25553", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5157 = 2024 SLD 5157 = 2024 SCMR 1959", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Re-appraisal of Evidence and Mitigating Circumstances\nThe case concerns a convicts possession of explosives under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997 and Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The evidence demonstrated that the petitioner was in possession of 2.1 kilograms of explosive material, confirmed by a ballistic expert to be dynamite, a high explosive. The possession was without lawful justification, and no credible evidence was presented by the petitioner to contest the accusations or explain his possession.\nKey Points:\n1.\nEvidence of Possession:\no\nThe prosecution successfully proved through eye-witness testimony (public servants) that the petitioner had explosives in his possession.\no\nThe Forensic Science Agencys analysis confirmed the material as dynamite, substantiating the case under both the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and ATA, 1997.\n2.\nPresumption of Terrorism:\no\nUnder Section 27A of the ATA, a presumption of terrorism arose due to the unlawful possession of explosives, unless the defendant proved lawful justification.\no\nThe petitioner’s failure to rebut this presumption led to a clear conviction under Section 6(2)(ee) of the ATA (act of terrorism), based on possession of explosives without lawful justification.\n3.\nMitigating Factors:\no\nWhile the terrorism charge stood, the absence of a live electric circuit and the petitioner’s lack of a prior criminal record were considered mitigating circumstances.\no\nConsequently, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence from life imprisonment to 14 years of simple imprisonment, acknowledging these factors.\n(b) Possession of Explosive Substance and Presumption of Terrorism\nThe Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 directly links the possession of explosives without lawful justification to the purpose of terrorism.\nKey Points:\n1.\nClear Legislative Intent:\no\nThe ATA contains a rebuttable presumption under Section 27A, effectively shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant. Once the prosecution proves possession, the accused must demonstrate lawful justification.\no\nThe legislative intent is to treat the possession of dangerous materials as a terrorist act unless proven otherwise, highlighting the inherent danger of explosives.\n2.\nBurden of Proof:\no\nThe court emphasized that possession of explosives without lawful justification is sufficient to establish an intent related to terrorism. The accused’s failure to rebut this presumption further solidified the terrorism conviction.\n(c) Legal Presumption in Criminal Law\nIn criminal statutes, such as the Anti-Terrorism Act, legal presumptions (such as the presumption of terrorism from possession of explosives) are critical but must be strictly interpreted.\nKey Points:\n1.\nStrict Interpretation:\no\nThe legal presumption regarding possession of explosives and its link to terrorism must be handled with caution. This ensures that a defendant is not convicted unjustly on the basis of assumptions alone, but only after appropriate evidence is presented.\n(d) Burden of Proof in Explosive Substance Cases\nThe burden of proof in cases involving possession of explosive substances shifts to the accused once the prosecution establishes that the accused was in possession of the material.\nKey Points:\n1.\nProsecution’s Burden:\no\nThe prosecution must first prove possession of explosives. Once this is established, the burden shifts to the accused to show that the possession was for lawful purposes (e.g., for work-related or authorized activities).\no\nFailure to provide any evidence to justify the possession of explosives leads to a presumption of intent aligned with terrorism, as per Section 6(1)(c) of the ATA.\n(e) Distinction Between Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908\nThe case also involved a detailed examination of Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, which address the possession of explosives under different circumstances.\nKey Points:\n1.\nSection 4 vs. Section 5:\no\nSection 4 deals with possessing explosives with malicious intent to endanger life or property.\no\nSection 5 criminalizes possession of explosives without any malicious intent, but still under suspicious circumstances.\n2.\nApplication in This Case:\no\nWhile an electric circuit was found with the explosives, the prosecution failed to prove that the circuit was functional to trigger an explosion.\no\nHence, Section 4 did not apply, and the convict was only found guilty under Section 5 of the Act for possessing the explosives without lawful justification.\no\nThe convict was sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment under Section 5 for possessing explosives under suspicious circumstances.\nConclusion\nIn cases involving the possession of explosive substances under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) and the Explosive Substances Act, the prosecution must first prove the fact of possession. Once proven, the burden shifts to the accused to show a lawful justification. If the accused fails to do so, the presumption of terrorism applies, and the court can convict the accused for acts of terrorism.\nHowever, mitigating circumstances, such as a lack of prior criminal history and the absence of a live trigger mechanism, can influence the severity of the sentence. In the present case, the court reduced the sentence from life imprisonment to 14 years due to such mitigating factors, while upholding the conviction under the ATA and Explosive Substances Act.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=27A", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 809-L of 2017, date of order: 12th August, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 20.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2016).Heard on: 10th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YAHYA AFRIDI, JUSTICE, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JUSTICE AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arif Mehmood Rana, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (Via video-link, Lahore).\nMuhammad Jaffar, Addl. P.G. Imran Baber, Inspector and Khalid Mehmood, S.I. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASJAD-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25554", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5158 = 2024 SLD 5158 = 2024 SCMR 1968", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Definition of Terrorism and Abduction for Ransom\nThe Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997 was discussed in relation to abduction or kidnapping for ransom under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC).\n•\nActs of Terrorism: According to the majority view, if abduction for ransom is carried out with the intent or purpose of terrorism, it falls within the scope of Section 6(1) and Section 6(2)(e) of the ATA, making it a terrorism-related offense triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) and punishable under Section 7(1)(a).\n•\nNon-Terrorist Ransom Cases: In the absence of a terrorist motive (i.e., for personal gain), abduction for ransom will be considered a non-terrorist offense under Section 365-A, PPC, but still triable by the ATC due to the inclusion of such offenses in the Third Schedule of the ATA for expedited trials.\n•\nKey Takeaway: While the crime itself may not always be terrorism, certain heinous cases of abduction for ransom may be tried under the ATA solely for the purpose of ensuring a speedy trial.\n(b) Re-appraisal of Evidence: Terrorism Not Established\nIn the case at hand, the complainant reported the abduction of his son and ransom demand by unknown persons. However, no evidence connected the accused to terrorist activities, nor was there any proof of a terrorist design or intent behind the abduction.\n•\nKey Points:\n1.\nThe complainant and witnesses did not describe the act as terrorism, nor did the prosecution claim a terrorist motive.\n2.\nThe accused were involved in abduction for ransom, a crime under Section 365-A, PPC, but without any connection to terrorism.\n•\nOutcome: The convictions under ATA provisions were set aside, and the accused were acquitted of terrorism charges. The court determined the proper charge was under Section 365-A, PPC, and not under the ATA, as no terrorist motive was present.\n(c) Evidence of Abduction and Murder: Conviction for Abduction and Murder\nThe prosecution provided strong evidence supporting the abduction and murder of the complainant’s son:\n1.\nLast-seen witnesses: Two prosecution witnesses identified the accused as the last people seen with the victim.\n2.\nRecovery of evidence: A taxi car used in the abduction and the dead body of the victim were recovered.\n3.\nMedical evidence: The post-mortem confirmed the victim had been brutally murdered.\nHowever, the prosecution did not establish any terrorist intent in the actions of the accused.\n•\nOutcome: The conviction for murder under Section 302(b), PPC and abduction for ransom under Section 365-A remained intact. The court rejected the terrorism charge due to lack of proof of a terrorist motive.\n(d) Minority Opinion: Terrorism in Cases of Brutal Abduction\nIn a minority view, Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi dissented, arguing that the case should be treated as an act of terrorism due to the brutality of the crime. The abduction and murder of a student in broad daylight, followed by the throwing of the body, was seen as creating widespread fear and insecurity among the public.\n•\nKey Arguments for Terrorism:\n1.\nImpact on Society: The crime was not ordinary but caused public terror, particularly among students and their families.\n2.\nPublic Message: Applying the ATA was seen as a way to send a strong message that such heinous acts would not be tolerated and to ensure the protection of public security.\n•\nOutcome: Despite the majority view, Justice Rizvi believed the ATA provisions applied due to the terrorizing effect of the crime. However, the majority judgment prevailed.\n(e) Deterrence in Sentencing\nThe importance of deterrence in sentencing was highlighted, especially in terrorism-related cases where such acts cause significant harm and fear in society. Deterrence serves as a key factor in sentencing, particularly when the crime involves brutality or terrorizing the public.\nConclusion\nThis case revolves around the distinction between ordinary criminal acts (like abduction for ransom) and acts that fall under terrorism. The majority view emphasized that unless there is a terrorist intent behind the crime, it should not be classified as an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997. However, the minority view saw the brutality of the abduction and murder as sufficient to consider it an act of terrorism, highlighting the importance of societal impact in defining terrorist acts.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=365-A", - "Case #": "J. P. No.193 of 2016, date of order: 21st March, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 04.02.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in C.S.R. No.5-T of 2011, Crl. As. Nos.182 and 186 of 2011).Heard on: 21st March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JUSTICE AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Basharatullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G. Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RIZWAN RASHEED AND ANOTHER-PETITIONERS\nVS\nTHE STATE-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25555", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5159 = 2024 SLD 5159 = 2024 CLD 1451", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940) – Section 18 – Scope of Question of Law \n•\nIssue: The expression question of law in the context of arbitration proceedings includes not just direct legal issues but also legal conclusions drawn from established facts.\n•\nInterpretation: When an arbitrator draws conclusions of fact from the evidence presented, the legal effect of those facts becomes a question of law.\n•\nCase Precedent: The case refers to Hodgkinson v. Fernie (1857) to highlight that the legal consequences of factual findings are treated as questions of law in arbitration matters.\n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940) – Sections 17, 18, and 39(vi) – Arbitration Award Dispute\n•\nBackground: The dispute centers on a consultancy contract for design services for a hotel project in Islamabad between an employer (petitioner) and a consultant (respondent).\n•\nIssue: The disagreement arose over the consultants right to invoice reimbursable expenses, particularly regarding the finality of drawings required for the project. The issue involves whether the employer was obligated to pay for detailed drawings regardless of whether the drawings were final or acceptable.\n•\nArbitration Outcome:\no\nThe arbitrator ruled in favor of the consultant, allowing invoicing for the relevant expenses. However, the award did not sufficiently explain how the construction of the Schedule 4 in the contract supported the consultants entitlement to invoice, especially in the absence of the employer’s approval of the final drawings.\no\nThe award failed to elaborate on how the stage of payment had been accomplished without the employers explicit approval of the final drawings, and it did not adequately address the mutual understanding between the parties that the employer had the right to approve the final work.\n•\nLegal Review:\no\nThe Trial Court had made the arbitration award the rule of the Court despite the employer’s objections.\no\nUnder Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, an appeal could not be made to contest the decree based on the award. However, the Appellate Court under Section 39(vi) had the authority to revisit the award itself. Upon review, the High Court set aside the rule of Court and remitted the award back to the arbitrator, directing that the arbitrator reconsider the matter of invoicing, particularly in relation to the employer’s approval of the final drawings before payment.\n•\nOutcome: The appeal was allowed, and the case was remitted back to the arbitrator with instructions to address the issues regarding the consultants right to invoice in relation to the final approval of the drawings by the employer.\nLegal Precedents Cited:\n1.\nGerrys International (Private) Limited v. Aeroflot Russian International Airlines (2018) SCMR 662\n2.\nBhagawati Oxygen Ltd. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (2005) SCC 462\n3.\nAbdul Ghani and Inayat Karim (1960) PLD Supreme Court (Pak) 98\n4.\nA. Qutubuddin Khan v. CHEC Mill Wala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2014) SCMR 1268\n5.\nNational Highway Authority v. Sambu Construction Co. Ltd. (2023) SCMR 1103\n6.\nInjum Aqeel v. Latif Muhammad Chaudhry (2023) SCMR 1361\n7.\nPakistan State Oil Company Limited v. Muhammad Tahir Khan (2001) PLD SC 980\n8.\nShahin Shah v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2022) SCMR 1810\n9.\nRashida Begum v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar (2003) PLD Lah. 522\nThese precedents emphasize the importance of properly addressing contractual agreements and the reasoning behind arbitration awards.\nConclusion:\nThe case highlights two key aspects of arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1940:\n1.\nScope of Question of Law : The legal consequences of factual conclusions in arbitration are treated as questions of law.\n2.\nInadequate Award Justification: The arbitration award lacked adequate explanation on how the contractual terms were applied, particularly in relation to payment for drawings and final approval by the employer. As a result, the High Court set aside the award and sent it back to the arbitrator for further clarification.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=17,18,39(vi)", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.121 of 2021, date of order: 10th October, 2024.\nHeard on: 25th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, justice and Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Talha Ilyas Sheikh for Appellant.\nMalik Omair Saleem for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAK GULF CONSTRUCTION (PRIVATE) LIMITED-Petitioner\nVS\nGODWIN AUSTEN JOHNSON-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25556", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5160 = 2024 SLD 5160 = 2024 CLD 1346", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDTXk", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act, 1940 - Jurisdiction of Civil Court in Appointment of Arbitrator\nLegal Issue:\nThis case involves a dispute regarding the interpretation of contract terms related to contract price variations due to legislative changes and currency fluctuations. Specifically, the issue pertains to whether these variations should be compensated and whether such matters fall within the scope of arbitration.\nArbitration Act, 1940 – Sections 8(2) & 20:\n•\nSection 8(2) and Section 20 of the Arbitration Act (X of 1940) deal with the appointment of arbitrators and the jurisdiction of civil courts in arbitration matters.\n•\nUnder these provisions, the civil court’s role is limited to ensuring that a dispute exists and whether it is covered by the arbitration agreement. The court does not delve into the merits of the dispute or interpret the terms of the contract itself.\nKey Points:\n1.\nJurisdiction of Civil Court:\no\nThe civil court is not meant to resolve the substantive issues of the dispute, but rather to determine whether a dispute exists and whether it falls under the arbitration agreement.\no\nThe examination by the civil court is minimal and is confined to confirming the existence of a dispute, not the interpretation of the contract or the validity of the claims.\n2.\nInterpretation of Contract and Variations:\no\nIssues such as contract price variations due to legislative changes or currency fluctuations are typically reserved for arbitration.\no\nThe distinction between variations caused by legislative changes (e.g., changes in law or taxes) and currency fluctuations (market-based changes) is an important consideration but should be decided by the arbitrator, not the civil court.\no\nWhile a civil court may consider whether a dispute exists, it is not the courts role to determine whether the contract terms justify the claim for escalation or how the contract should be interpreted.\n3.\nDispute and Arbitration Clause:\no\nThe assertion of a claim by one party and its repudiation by the other constitutes a dispute that makes the arbitration clause operative.\no\nThe interpretation of specific terms of the contract, such as whether the petitioner is entitled to escalation on the basis of legislative changes or currency fluctuations, must be handled by the arbitrator.\n4.\nCivil Courts Role:\no\nThe civil court is only involved in determining the existence of a dispute and its coverage under the arbitration agreement.\no\nThe court should not delve into the merits or intricacies of the contract interpretation, as that is the responsibility of the arbitrator.\nOutcome:\n•\nThe civil revision was allowed, meaning the matter was sent for arbitration. The civil court was not to interpret the contract terms or decide on the escalation claim, as those matters are to be handled by the arbitrator based on the contractual provisions.\nLegal Precedents:\n1.\nThe Union of India v. Mangaldas N. Varma (1958) 2 MLJ 16 – This case helps clarify that disputes over contract terms, especially those involving price variations due to external factors, are typically for the arbitrator to decide.\n2.\nGhulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering, Science and Technology v. M/S Hassan Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (1998 CLC 485) – Emphasizes that contract interpretation issues fall within the domain of arbitration and not civil court jurisdiction.\n3.\nAJ Corporation v. Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Limited (2013 CLD 636) – Reinforces that arbitration is the appropriate forum for resolving contractual disputes involving interpretation of terms such as price variations due to market changes.\nConclusion:\nThe case underscores the importance of distinguishing between the civil court’s limited role in confirming the existence of a dispute and the arbitrators responsibility to interpret contract terms and decide on issues such as compensation for escalation due to legislative changes or currency fluctuations.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=8(2),20", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No.200 of 2023, date of order: 19th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hamza Siddiqui for Petitioner.\nMalik Zafar Abbas for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CRTG-MATRACON JV THROUGH MANAGER LEGAL-PETITIONER\nVS\nFEDERAL EMPLOYEES BENEVOLENT FUND AND GROUP INSURANCE FUND (FEBFGIF)-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25557", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5161 = 2024 SLD 5161 = 2024 CLD 1350", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTc", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Reinstatement of National Bank of Pakistan Employees Dismissed After Departmental Proceedings\nDetails:\nThe petitioners, employees of the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP), were dismissed following departmental proceedings related to charges stemming from a robbery incident at the bank. Despite being exonerated in criminal proceedings, they were penalized in departmental inquiries based on additional evidence that was allegedly not properly confronted. The key issues included:\nDiscrepancies in the inquiry process, including reliance on additional evidence without proof that it was shared with the petitioners.\nUse of a statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. as evidence against the petitioners without allowing them the right to cross-examine the declarant.\nInconsistencies in the inquiry officers findings, where certain charges were partially upheld while others, directly linked to them, were dismissed.\nViolation of natural justice, as the right to a fair trial and procedural fairness was not observed during the proceedings.\nThe High Court emphasized that while departmental and criminal proceedings can occur concurrently, principles of natural justice and fair trial must be upheld. The inquiry process and findings were deemed flawed and non-transparent.\nHeld:\nThe petitions were allowed, and the dismissal orders were set aside.\nThe petitioners were reinstated in service with all permissible back benefits.\nCitations:\nBanks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, Section 11\nNational Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 2021, Rule 2\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 199 (Jurisdiction of High Court)\nCase References:\nFederal Government through Secretary Interior, Government of Pakistan v. Ms. Ayyan Ali and others (2017 SCMR 1179)\nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Anwar Shah and others (2015 SCMR 434)\nMuhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan (2023 SCMR 301)\nHabib Bank Limited v. Gulzar Khan and others (2019 SCMR 946)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974=11", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.2832 of 2021, date of order: 27th March, 2024. Dates of hearing: 25th, January, 7th and 16th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Imran Hassan Ali for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Arshad Tabrez for Petitioner (in corrected Writ Petition No.3243 of 2021).\nMalik Muhammad Siddique Awan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD TARIQ KHAN-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN THROUGH PRESIDENT/CEO AND 4 OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25558", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5162 = 2024 SLD 5162 = 2024 CLD 1373", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTY", - "Key Words:": "Execution of Decree and Setting Aside of Sale under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 & Civil Procedure Code, 1908\nLegal Provisions Involved:\n•\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Section 19\n•\nCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Order XXI, Rules 89 & 90\nThese legal provisions outline the procedure for setting aside the sale of property in execution of a decree under certain conditions and circumstances, particularly in the context of banking court decrees.\n________________________________________\nKey Points:\n(a) Setting Aside of Sale on Deposit of Certain Amount\n1.\nRule 89 of Order XXI:\no\nAllows any person (owner or person holding interest in the property) to apply to set aside the sale after it has been conducted. This requires the person to deposit:\n\n5% of the purchase money for payment to the purchaser.\n\nThe amount due to the decree-holder, as specified in the proclamation of sale (with deductions for amounts already received).\n2.\nRule 90 of Order XXI:\no\nProvides a separate recourse for setting aside the sale based on fraud or material irregularity in the auction process.\n3.\nMutual Exclusivity of Rules:\no\nIf the judgment-debtor applies under Rule 89, they cannot simultaneously apply under Rule 90 unless they withdraw the application under Rule 89. The remedies provided by these two rules are mutually exclusive.\n________________________________________\n(b) Application under Rule 89 – Failure to Establish Market Value:\n•\nThe petitioner, a judgment-debtor, filed an application under Order XXI, Rule 89 to set aside the auction sale. The petitioner contended that the auction proceedings were conducted without considering the actual market value of the mortgaged property.\n•\nHowever, since the judgment-debtor had opted for the remedy under Rule 89, it was inconsistent for them to argue the lack of market value consideration at this stage.\n•\nOutcome: The appeal was dismissed as the petitioner had chosen to proceed under Rule 89, and the grounds for contesting the auction based on market value were inapplicable.\n________________________________________\n(c) Failure to Deposit Decretal Amount:\n•\nThe judgment-debtors application under Rule 89 was rejected because they failed to deposit the required decretal amount (as specified in the proclamation of sale) to the decree-holder, despite having deposited the 5% of the purchase money.\n•\nThe absence of the second deposit (the decretal amount) as required under Rule 89 rendered the application invalid.\n•\nOutcome: The appeal was dismissed due to the failure to meet the conditions set by Rule 89.\n________________________________________\n(d) Timely Payment by the Purchaser:\n•\nThe judgment-debtor argued that the purchaser had not deposited the remaining 75% of the bid amount within the stipulated 15-day period.\n•\nHowever, the record showed that the purchaser had indeed deposited the remaining 75% of the amount within the required time frame (15 days).\n•\nOutcome: The appeal was dismissed, as the purchaser had complied with the conditions, and the sale was confirmed.\n________________________________________\n(e) Vested Right of the Purchaser:\n•\nThe purchasers vested right was established after several failed attempts to auction the mortgaged property. On the eighth attempt, the property was successfully sold, and the highest bid was accepted. The purchaser then deposited the remaining 75% of the bid amount.\n•\nSince the purchaser fulfilled their obligations, the right to the property was vested in the purchaser and could not be disturbed.\n•\nOutcome: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the purchasers legal right to the property.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe Civil Procedure Code, specifically Order XXI, Rules 89 & 90, provides a structured process for contesting the sale of property under execution. However, any application to set aside the sale must meet specific requirements, including timely deposits and valid grounds (fraud, irregularity, etc.).\n•\nKey Takeaway: The remedies under Rule 89 (setting aside the sale on deposit) and Rule 90 (setting aside the sale on grounds of fraud or irregularity) are mutually exclusive. The judgment-debtors failure to meet the required conditions, such as depositing the decretal amount or contesting the sale under an appropriate rule, led to the dismissal of the appeal in all cases. Additionally, once the purchaser’s rights are vested and they fulfill their obligations, the sale cannot be set aside.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 26 of 2024, date of order: 8th August, 2024.Heard on: 8th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, JUSTICE AND ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Saleem Thepdawala for Appellant.\nSuleman Huda for Respondent No. 1.\nTaimur Ahmed Qureshi for Respondent No. 2.\nAli Raza Litigation Officer NBP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed Ayaz haider-Petitioner\nVS\nNational Bank of Pakistan and 2 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25559", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5163 = 2024 SLD 5163 = 2024 CLD 1381", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Futures Market Act (XIV of 2016)\n•\nSs.57, Cls. (a) to (f), 123(8) & 123(10) – Commodity Exchange and Futures Contracts Rules, 2005, R. 20 & Sched.\n•\nNon-compliance with standards of conduct: The appellant, a futures broker at Pakistan Mercantile Exchange (PMEX), was penalized by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) for failing to adhere to required standards of conduct. The complainants alleged that their discretionary authority (DTA) was misused by the appellants employees, who traded excessively in their accounts, ultimately resulting in significant losses.\n•\nValidity of the penalty: The nature of the relationship between the complainants and the appellant was determined by the account opening forms, with some complainants giving DTAs and others sharing login credentials. The appellant failed to demonstrate how it managed these relationships responsibly. Notably, there was no evidence supporting that the appellant followed proper trading practices or that the complainants had revoked the DTAs or login credentials. The penalty was therefore reduced to Rs.3,500,000 by the appellate bench.\n________________________________________\n(b) Futures Market Act (XIV of 2016)\n•\nSs. 57, Cls. (a) to (f), 123(8) & 123(10)\n•\nNon-compliance with standards of conduct: The appellant faced penalties for mishandling the complainants accounts by trading excessively to generate commissions, causing substantial losses. The appellant argued that the complainants statements lacked evidentiary value due to not being cross-examined. However, cross-examination was not mandatory in the Show-Cause Notice proceedings.\n•\nValidity of the penalty: The appellate bench rejected the appellants argument and reduced the penalty to Rs.3,500,000, citing that the appellant failed to provide adequate defense for their actions or offer sufficient proof of the fairness and diligence in handling the complainants accounts.\n________________________________________\n(c) Futures Market Act (XIV of 2016)\n•\nSs. 57, Cls. (a) to (f), 123(8) & 123(10)\n•\nBroker duties and discretionary authority: The appellant was penalized for not properly handling discretionary authority (DTA) and for engaging in excessive trading, particularly for complainants who did not grant DTAs. The appellant failed to show mechanisms for obtaining verbal instructions or responding to customer concerns, thereby resulting in the complainants losses.\n•\nValidity of the penalty: The appellate bench upheld the penalty but reduced it to Rs.3,500,000. The brokers failure to meet its fiduciary duties and manage client accounts with appropriate care led to the substantial losses incurred by the complainants.\n________________________________________\n(d) Futures Market Act (XIV of 2016)\n•\nSs. 57, Cls. (a) to (f), 123(8) & 123(10)\n•\nNon-compliance with standards of conduct: The broker was penalized for failing to act in the best interest of the complainants by engaging in excessive trading to generate commissions, causing financial losses.\n•\nValidity of the penalty: The Commission had provided specific directions for brokers regarding Discretionary Trading Authority (DTA) under the Commodity Exchange and Futures Contracts Rules, 2005. However, these directions were not part of the Show-Cause Notice or the impugned order, and therefore, the appellate bench reduced the penalty to Rs.3,500,000, disposing of the appeal accordingly.\n________________________________________\n(e) Futures Market Act (XIV of 2016)\n•\nSs. 57, Cls. (a) to (f), 123(8) & 123(10)\n•\nBroker duties and discretionary authority: The appellant, as a futures broker, was penalized for excessive trading and not sufficiently adhering to proper trading practices. The complainants alleged the broker’s actions were driven by commission generation, resulting in significant losses.\n•\nValidity of the penalty: The appellant contended that S. 57(d) did not require written instructions from customers. However, the appellate bench found this contention to be incorrect, emphasizing that the broker’s duties under S. 57(d) required a clear, well-documented approach to managing discretionary authority. The penalty was reduced to Rs.3,500,000, with the appeal disposed of accordingly.\n________________________________________\n(f) Futures Market Act (XIV of 2016)\n•\nSs. 57, Cls. (a) to (f), 123(8) & 123(10)\n•\nNon-compliance with standards of conduct: The appellant failed to meet required standards of conduct when handling customer accounts. Excessive trading led to losses, and the broker did not take sufficient action to ensure clients interests were protected.\n•\nValidity of the penalty: The appellants actions were in violation of provisions of the Commodity Exchange and Futures Contracts Rules, 2005. The failure to document and demonstrate a clear understanding of customers investment goals and risk tolerance, despite acknowledging the high-risk nature of the market, contributed to the penalty. The penalty was reduced to Rs.3,500,000, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Futures Market Act, 2016=57,(a)to(f),123(8),123(10)", - "Case #": "Appeal No.142 of 2020, date of order: 5th September, 2023. Heard on: 18th May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AKIF SAEED, CHAIRMAN/COMMISSIONER AND ABDUL REHMAN WARRAICH, COMMISSIONER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Feisal Hussain Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court, Ahmad Abdul Rehman, Hussain Gulraze Mir, Chief Executive, Rashid Ali and Mobeen Gilani for Appellant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP, Muhammad Faisal, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I, SECP and Syed Asif Ali, Additional Joint Director, Prosecution and Civil Litigation Department, SECP for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S H.G. MARKETS (PRIVATE) LIMITED-PETITIONER\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER-SMD, SECP AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25560", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5164 = 2024 SLD 5164 = 2024 CLD 1391", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "Legal Context:\n•\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Section 10: Governs the recovery of finances by financial institutions, allowing a defendant to seek leave to defend a suit for recovery of finance.\n•\nLimitation Act (IX of 1908), Section 5: Provides a mechanism for the condonation of delays in filing applications or suits based on justifiable reasons.\nKey Issue:\n•\nThe petitioner (defendant) sought condonation of delay in filing an application for leave to defend a suit for recovery of finance, arguing that the service of process (summons) was issued to an incorrect address.\nFactual Background:\n•\nA suit was filed by the bank (respondent) for the recovery of finances.\n•\nThe petitioner contended that the process was sent to an old and incorrect address, not the current registered address, rendering the service invalid.\n•\nAs a result, the limitation period for filing the leave to defend application had not yet commenced.\nCourt’s Findings:\n1.\nInvalid Service: The court accepted that the service through registered post and courier, which was directed to the old, incorrect address, constituted invalid service.\n2.\nCommencement of Limitation: Since the service was invalid, the limitation period for filing the leave to defend application did not begin.\n3.\nCalculation of Limitation Period:\no\nWhen calculated from the date of receiving the notice through the Court Bailiff on 24-7-2023, the application for leave to defend was filed within the prescribed 30-day period.\no\nIf calculated from the newspaper publication of the notice on 12-7-2023, there was a delay of two days, with the application being filed on 15-8-2023.\n4.\nCondonation of Delay: The High Court invoked the proviso to Section 10(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, to condone the delay in filing the application. The court further treated the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as an application under Section 10(2) of the Financial Institutions Ordinance.\n5.\nJurisdiction and Legal Provision: The High Court clarified that citing an incorrect legal provision does not hinder the court’s jurisdiction or its ability to exercise authority. It allowed the bank to file its replication (response) if necessary.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe High Court condoned the delay in the defendant’s application for leave to defend, citing the procedural errors due to invalid service.\n•\nThe court also reaffirmed that a court’s jurisdiction is not affected by the incorrect legal provision cited as long as it has the authority to hear the case.\nThe petitioners application for leave to defend was allowed, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly. The case relied on prior judgments, including those in Ayub Raza v. Bank Al Falah (2019 CLD 602) and other relevant case law.\n________________________________________\nImportant Precedents Referenced:\n1.\nAyub Raza v. Bank Al Falah (2019 CLD 602)\n2.\nThe Bank of Punjab v. Hascol Petroleum Ltd. (Banking Suit No. B-45/2022)\n3.\nDeutsche Bank v. Fateh Textile Mills (2019 CLD 285)\n4.\nJ.S. Bank v. Landhi Steel Mill (2018 CLD 1016)\n5.\nNazir Hussain v. Bank of Punjab (2007 CLD 687)\nThese cases helped shape the decision on condoning delays and clarified issues around the interpretation of the limitation period and service validity.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh Chief Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=10", - "Case #": "Banking Suit No.B-28 of 2023, date of order: 15th August, 2024. Dates of hearing: 18th, 20th, December, 2023, 7th March and 10th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SANA AKRAM MINHAS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Gohar Mahmood along with Ms. Sobia Mehak, Law Officer, FWBL for Plaintiff.\nMs. Maria Ahmed for Defendant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FIRST WOMEN BANK LIMITED THROUGH DULY CONSTITUTED ATTORNEYS-PLAINTIFF\nVS\nM/S HASCOL PETROLEUM LIMITED THROUGH CEO/MD-DEFENDANT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25561", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5165 = 2024 SLD 5165 = 2024 CLD 1403", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Review of Order by Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)\n•\nContext:\no\nState Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan (the Applicant) sought a review of the order passed by the Appellate Bench of SECP.\no\nThe Applicant raised the issue of jurisdiction regarding the Commission’s power to pass the original order.\no\nThe Applicant relied on Circular No. 14 of 2000 (dated September 23, 2006), which was issued for the first time at the review stage. However, this reliance was misplaced as Circular No. 05 of 2016 (dated January 26, 2016) and its subsequent amendment through Circular No. 27 of 2020 (dated September 4, 2020) were in force at the time the show-cause notice was issued on June 06, 2016.\n•\nFindings of the Bench:\no\nThe Bench determined that the question of jurisdiction had already been addressed in the original order, and the Applicant did not highlight any new issues or illegalities in the review application.\no\nThe Bench also observed that higher cash surrender values were provided to policyholders due to a software malfunction, which led to the compensation order for the policyholders and the imposition of a penalty under Sections 76 and 156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\n•\nConclusion:\no\nThe review application was dismissed as the Applicant failed to demonstrate any anomaly or illegality in the original decision.\n(b) Powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000\n•\nContext:\no\nThe Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) is empowered under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 to regulate the insurance industry, ensuring the protection of policyholders’ interests.\n•\nFindings:\no\nThe Insurance Ordinance, 2000 as a whole empowers the SECP to take all necessary actions in the interest of policyholders. This includes enforcing regulations that ensure fairness and transparency in the insurance sector.\n(c) Jurisdiction of SECP vs. Insurance Ombudsman\n•\nContext:\no\nThe insurance company contested that Section 122(3) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 explicitly bars the SECP from addressing disputes between insurers and policyholders.\no\nSECPs Jurisdiction: The company argued that Section 122(3) limited the SECP’s jurisdiction, asserting that only the Insurance Ombudsman could handle such disputes.\n•\nFindings:\no\nThe jurisdictional issue was clarified as Section 122(3) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 only bars the jurisdiction of a Court (as defined under Section 2(xvi)), not that of the SECP.\no\nThe SECP is still empowered to entertain complaints of policyholders under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997.\no\nSections 125 & 127 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 deal with the appointment, jurisdiction, and powers of the Insurance Ombudsman. These sections do not interfere with the SECPs powers as provided in the law.\n•\nConclusion:\no\nThe SECP retains jurisdiction over policyholder complaints, and the Insurance Ombudsman’s role does not encroach upon the powers of the Commission.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Provisions Referenced:\n1.\nInsurance Ordinance, 2000:\no\nSection 2(xvi): Defines a Court in relation to disputes under the Ordinance.\no\nSection 76 & 156: Relate to penalties and actions against insurance companies.\no\nSection 122(3): Discusses the jurisdiction of Courts, which does not extend to the SECP.\no\nSections 125 & 127: Detail the role of the Insurance Ombudsman and do not affect the SECP’s jurisdiction.\n2.\nSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997:\no\nProvides the framework for the powers and jurisdiction of the SECP in regulating the insurance sector.\n3.\nCirculars:\no\nCircular No. 05 of 2016 and Circular No. 27 of 2020 were applicable at the time of the show-cause notice and dealt with regulatory matters in the insurance sector.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe review application by the State Life Insurance Corporation was dismissed, and the jurisdiction of the SECP to address issues relating to policyholder disputes was reaffirmed.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122(3)", - "Case #": "Review Application No.04 of 2017, in Appeal No.94 of 2016 decided on 15th September, 2023. Heard on: 22nd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AKIF SAEED, CHAIRMAN/COMMISSIONER AND ABDUL RAHMAN WARRAICH, COMMISSIONER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waqas Asad Sheikh for Applicant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP and Shafique ur Rehman, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondents.\nAthar Ali Shah (legal heirs of Syed Aijaz Ali Shah) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN-APPLICANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INSURANCE AND THERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25562", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5166 = 2024 SLD 5166 = 2024 CLD 1407", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSSs", - "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) - Limitation and Rendition of Accounts\nContext:\n•\nApplicant sought the rendition of accounts, division of assets/properties, and recovery of future dividends from a company.\n•\nThese were considered intricate questions that required detailed evidence.\n•\nThe Judge in Chambers of the High Court did not address the maintainability of the company petition under the framework of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which pertains to time limits for filing certain suits.\nKey Legal Points:\n1.\nCompany Petition and Limitation:\no\nThe petition sought remedies for account rendition, division of assets, and future dividends.\no\nThe question of whether the petition was barred by the Limitation Act (specifically Article 181) was raised. Article 181 deals with the time limits for filing actions relating to accounts and division of assets, which may limit the ability to pursue the petition.\n2.\nIntricate Questions Requiring Evidence:\no\nThe matters at hand were considered complex, requiring proper evidence to determine whether the claim could proceed.\n3.\nDecision by Judge in Chambers:\no\nThe Judge in Chambers did not consider the limitation issue under Article 181 of the Limitation Act.\no\nThe Division Bench of the High Court did not address the limitation directly at that stage, as it would have been unfair to decide such an important issue without giving parties the opportunity to argue the matter before the Judge in Chambers and present necessary evidence.\n4.\nProceeding with the Case:\no\nThe Division Bench of the High Court clarified that the maintainability of the petition based on limitation (i.e., under Article 181 of the Limitation Act) should be explored in detail, including the recording of evidence if necessary.\no\nThe Division Bench expected the Judge in Chambers to revisit the case and focus on the limitation point as well as the other intricate issues that arose from the petition. A detailed investigation would be carried out, and if required, evidence would be presented.\nOutcome:\n•\nThe appeal was disposed of with the expectation that the Judge in Chambers would:\no\nConsider the limitation issue.\no\nAllow the parties to address their concerns regarding the maintainability of the petition.\no\nIf necessary, record evidence and revisit the intricate questions related to the rendition of accounts, division of assets, and future dividends.\n________________________________________\nLegal Provisions Referenced:\n1.\nCompanies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984):\no\nSections 290, 291, 292: Relate to the powers of the court to manage company affairs, including issues of accounts, assets division, and disputes between shareholders or stakeholders.\n2.\nLimitation Act (IX of 1908):\no\nArticle 181: Pertains to the time period for filing certain suits, including those related to the rendition of accounts and division of assets in company matters.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe appeal was resolved by the Division Bench of the High Court, which directed that the limitation issue under Article 181 of the Limitation Act be thoroughly examined. The parties were given the opportunity to address this issue, and if needed, evidence would be recorded before proceeding with the complex matters of rendition of accounts and the division of assets.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=181", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.220 of 2004, date of order: 8th April, 2024. Heard on: 27th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE AND OMAR SIAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Najeeb Jamali for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.\nAmir Saleem for Respondents Nos.1(ii) and (iii).\nNoor Muhammad for Respondents Nos.3 and 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S S.M. CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD. MANAGING DIRECTOR AND 2 OTHERS-PETITIONER\nVS\nMUHAMMAD MOHSIN BUTT (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25563", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5167 = 2024 SLD 5167 = 2024 CLD 1409", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTk", - "Key Words:": "Context:\n•\nThe case involves a dispute between siblings (previous partners) over the use of a trademark for the business established by their father under the name Riaz & Sons. \n•\nOne partner (the petitioner) sought to prevent the other two respondents from using the trademark until the matter was resolved.\n•\nThe Intellectual Property Tribunal had granted a temporary injunction, restraining the petitioner from using the trademark until the suit was decided, ruling that the trademark belonged to the partnership firm, not the individual partners.\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nOwnership of the Trademark:\no\nThe trademark in question, Riaz & Sons , was a point of contention between the petitioner and the respondents, who both sought exclusive use of the trademark.\no\nBoth parties had applied for the registration of the trademark, and the applications were still pending.\no\nThe issue revolved around the rights to the trademark and how it should be used, particularly in the context of their partnership.\n2.\nPartnership Agreement:\no\nThe partnership between the petitioner and respondents had been established 17 years ago and was undisputed.\no\nThe Tribunal considered that the trademark belonged to the partnership firm and not to the individual partners, as the partnership firm had not been dissolved.\no\nThe Tribunal ruled that the assets of their father, including 78% of the shareholding in the partnership, were to be distributed in accordance with the Partnership Act, 1932.\n3.\nTemporary Injunction:\no\nThe Tribunal granted an injunction preventing the petitioner from using the trademark until the case was resolved, essentially giving the respondents exclusive use of it.\no\nThe petitioner contested this order, arguing that it was unfair and iniquitous to restrain their use of the trademark without resolving the underlying dispute.\nCourts Decision:\n•\nThe High Court held that the Tribunals decision was wrong.\n•\nThe issue was not just about the trademark but also involved the partnership agreement and the rights of the partners to use the trademark.\n•\nThe applications for registration of the trademark were still pending, and the dispute about the trademark and the partnership had not yet been decided.\n•\nNeither party should be given exclusive use of the trademark until the matter was settled.\n•\nThe High Court set aside the Tribunals order, which had restrained the petitioner from using the trademark.\nOutcome:\n•\nThe appeal was allowed by the High Court, which reversed the temporary injunction granted by the Intellectual Property Tribunal.\n•\nThe petitioner was not restrained from using the trademark until the dispute regarding its use and the rights of the partners was resolved.\nLegal Provisions Referenced:\n1.\nIntellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012):\no\nSection 19: Deals with matters related to the Intellectual Property Tribunal, including disputes regarding trademarks.\n2.\nPartnership Act (IX of 1932):\no\nSection 4: Relates to the formation and conduct of partnerships, including how assets and liabilities are managed and distributed in case of disputes among partners.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, setting aside the Intellectual Property Tribunals order that had restrained the petitioner from using the trademark Riaz & Sons. The case is still to be resolved in terms of the trademark ownership and rights of the partners in the context of the ongoing partnership.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Partnership Act, 1932=4", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.74662 of 2022, date of order: 3rd May, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shakeel Abid for Appellant.\nUsman Nasir Awan for Respondents Nos.1 and 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD WAHEED-PETITIONER\nVS\nADNAN RIAZ AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25564", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5168 = 2024 SLD 5168 = 2024 CLD 1412", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSTg", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017) – Appeal Regarding Finality of Orders\nContext:\nThe appeal involves the finality of an order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) under the Companies Act, 2017. The order was passed in 2023 under Section 464(4)(b) of the Companies Act, 2017, which set aside previous orders from the Registrar of Companies (2015) under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (repealed). The appellant sought to challenge this order before the Appellate Bench of the SECP.\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nFinality of Orders Under Section 464 of the Companies Act, 2017:\no\nSection 464(5) of the Companies Act, 2017 provides that orders passed under Section 464(4)(b) are final and cannot be questioned before any court or authority.\no\nSection 468 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (repealed) had similar provisions regarding finality.\n2.\nAppealability of Orders:\no\nThe appellant contended that Sections 464(4)(b) and 480(b) of the Companies Act, 2017 were pari materia (identical), implying that if one is appealable, so should the other.\no\nHowever, the Appellate Bench noted that Section 464(5) explicitly bars any challenge to the final orders passed under Section 464(4), making the appeal non-maintainable.\no\nThe analogy drawn between Section 464(4)(b) and Section 480(b) was rejected, as Section 480(b) relates to a remedial provision and provides for appeal, unlike Section 464(4), which deals with matters that are conclusive and not subject to appeal once decided.\n3.\nScope of Jurisdiction:\no\nThe Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, specifically Section 33, empowers the SECP to make decisions on appeals, but this is subject to provisions that expressly exclude the possibility of appeal under the Companies Act, 2017.\no\nThe Appellate Bench interpreted Section 33 to mean that the right to appeal is available only when it has not been explicitly excluded by the legislature. Since Section 464(5) explicitly bars appeals, this appeal was considered non-maintainable.\nCourts Decision:\n•\nFinality of the Order: The Appellate Bench confirmed that the order passed by the Commission under Section 464(4)(b) of the Companies Act, 2017, was final and could not be challenged in any court or before any authority, as per the explicit provision of Section 464(5).\n•\nNon-maintainability of Appeal: The appeal was filed against an order that, by the legislative language of Section 464(5), could not be questioned. Therefore, the appeal was non-maintainable and was dismissed.\nOutcome:\nThe appeal was dismissed, with the Appellate Bench concluding that the finality of the order passed under Section 464(4)(b) of the Companies Act, 2017 is legally binding, and cannot be contested further in the courts or any other authorities.\nLegal Provisions Referenced:\n1.\nCompanies Act, 2017:\no\nSection 464(4)(b): Provides that the Commissions order in certain matters is final.\no\nSection 464(5): Bars questioning the Commissions final order in specified matters.\no\nSection 480(b): Relates to remedial actions but does not grant the same finality as Section 464.\no\nSection 481: Provides the right of appeal in specific matters but is not applicable to orders passed under Section 464.\n2.\nCompanies Ordinance, 1984 (repealed):\no\nSection 468: Similar to Section 464 of the Companies Act, 2017, it also contained provisions about the finality of orders.\n3.\nSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997:\no\nSection 33: Outlines the appellate jurisdiction of the SECP Bench, limited by provisions of other laws that exclude appeal rights.\nConclusion:\nThe Appellate Bench of the SECP correctly dismissed the appeal, affirming that the legislative provisions in the Companies Act, 2017 render orders passed under Section 464(4)(b) final, with no further recourse for appeal or challenge before any court or authority.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=464,464(4)(b),464(5),468,480(b),481", - "Case #": "Appeal No.70 of 2023, date of order: 15th September, 2023.Heard on: 20th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL REHMAN WARRAICH AND AAMIR KHAN, COMMISSIONERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Imtiaz Haider, Nazir Ahmad Shaheen and Maqsood Ahmed for Appellant.\nKhalid Latif for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAQSOOD AHMED-PETITIONER\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER-CRD, SECP AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25565", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5169 = 2024 SLD 5169 = 2024 CLD 1419", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSXo", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – Return of Plaint Under Order VII Rule 10\nContext:\nThis case involves a suit for damages filed by a private limited company incorporated in Pakistan against a telecommunications company based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The plaintiffs Chief Executive Officer (CEO) claimed to have been arrested at Dubai Airport due to a criminal case related to fraudulent misuse of a SIM card allegedly issued by the defendant.\nThe defendant filed an application under Order VII, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), 1908, seeking to return the plaint, arguing that the suit was misconceived in terms of jurisdiction and that it was wrongly filed in the name of the company rather than the CEO in his individual capacity.\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nJurisdiction and Territorial Scope:\no\nThe cause of action arose from events that occurred outside of Pakistan, specifically in the UAE.\no\nThe suit was brought before a Pakistani Court, but the defendant argued that the jurisdiction of the Pakistani Court was not applicable as the events leading to the claim occurred in Dubai, a jurisdiction outside the courts purview.\n2.\nProper Plaintiff:\no\nThe plaintiff (private limited company) filed the suit, but the defendant contended that the cause of action related to an alleged arrest of the CEO at Dubai Airport. Hence, it was a personal claim of the CEO, not the company, and therefore the suit should have been filed by the CEO in his individual capacity.\n3.\nReturn of the Plaint under Order VII, Rule 10 of CPC:\no\nOrder VII, Rule 10 of the CPC, 1908 allows the court to return a plaint if the territorial jurisdiction of the court is not properly invoked, or if the plaint is filed in the wrong venue.\no\nThe defendant sought the return of the plaint under this provision, arguing that the Pakistani Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit and that the case should be filed in the appropriate jurisdiction (the UAE), and possibly by the CEO, individually.\nCourts Decision:\n•\nThe court held that the cause of action did not arise in Pakistan, but rather in the UAE, as the events that led to the CEOs arrest occurred at Dubai Airport and were related to actions that happened outside Pakistans territory.\n•\nThe court further agreed that the suit was filed in the wrong name—the company was not the proper plaintiff. The CEOs claim was personal and related to his individual arrest, and as such, it should have been filed by the CEO, not the company.\n•\nThe defendants application under Order VII, Rule 10 was thus allowed, and the court ordered the plaint to be returned due to the lack of jurisdiction and improper plaintiff.\nOutcome:\nThe plaint was returned to the plaintiff, and the case was not allowed to proceed in the Pakistani court. The court concluded that the plaintiff, being a private limited company, was not the proper party to bring the suit for the CEOs personal grievance, and the matter should have been addressed in the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose (UAE).\nLegal Provisions Referenced:\n1.\nOrder VII, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), 1908:\no\nThis provision allows the return of plaint when it is filed in an incorrect court based on territorial jurisdiction or if the suit is brought in the name of an improper party.\n2.\nSection 20 of CPC:\no\nThis section deals with the territorial jurisdiction of courts and dictates where a suit may be filed based on where the cause of action arose.\nConclusion:\nThe plaint was returned due to improper jurisdiction and because the CEO was the correct plaintiff, not the company. The matter should have been raised in the UAE, where the cause of action arose, under the CEOs individual capacity, not the company. The application under Order VII, Rule 10 of the CPC was therefore granted by the court.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=20", - "Case #": "Civil Suit No.110 of 2022, date of order: 23rd April, 2024. Heard on: 16th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aamir Raza for Plaintiff.\nMansoor Hassan Khan for Defendant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S POPULAR INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD., THROUGH CEO-PLAINTIFF\nVS\nM/S ETISALAT GROUP THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER-DEFENDANT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25566", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5170 = 2024 SLD 5170 = 2024 CLD 1421", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDSXk", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 – Execution Proceedings and Undivided Property\nContext:\nThe case pertains to a dispute in execution proceedings under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The petitioner/objector was a co-sharer in an undivided property where a petrol pump was situated. The petitioner/objector challenged the auction of the petrol pump, arguing that no auction could be held until there was a partition of the land, as the land was in a joint Khata (joint ownership). The auction was conducted by the Banking Court, which had issued a sale certificate in favor of the decree-holder bank (respondent).\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nUndivided Property and Joint Khata:\no\nThe petitioner raised the plea that the property, which was co-owned with other parties, should be partitioned before any auction could be conducted. The auction, conducted without partition, allegedly encroached on the petitioner’s share in the joint property.\n2.\nDemarcation of Property:\no\nThe central issue was whether there was a clear demarcation of the property being auctioned, particularly concerning the specific share of the land owned by the petitioner in the joint Khata. The petitioner claimed that the petrol pump was situated on land that was part of his share in the undivided property.\n3.\nBanking Court’s Decision:\no\nThe Banking Court had rejected the objection, ruling that the petitioner, as a co-sharer in the joint Khata, had no direct interest or prejudice in the auction proceedings. The court issued the sale certificate without addressing the potential conflict over the undivided nature of the property.\n4.\nBanking Court’s Jurisdiction and Execution Proceedings:\no\nThe petitioner argued that the auction could not be completed without partitioning the property, which is a prerequisite under Section 19 & 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and Order XXI, Rule 90 and Rule 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), 1908.\nCourt’s Decision:\n•\nThe High Court found that the Banking Court had failed to establish any demarcation or clear identification of the specific property being auctioned, particularly in terms of distinguishing the portion of land that belonged to the petitioner.\n•\nThe petitioner’s objection regarding the auction of the property was legitimate because there was no partition of the land and no clear indication that the petrol pump was part of the respondent’s pledged property. In the absence of proper demarcation, the petitioner’s claim could not be dismissed.\n•\nThe Banking Court had failed to ensure that the auction proceedings were fair and did not infringe upon the rights of the co-sharer (the petitioner). As the sale certificate was issued without determining whether the petrol pump was indeed located on the petitioner’s share of the property, the High Court decided that the sale certificate was issued prematurely and incorrectly.\n•\nThe High Court set aside the Banking Court’s order and remanded the matter back to the Banking Court to decide the objection afresh, ensuring that the petitioner’s claim was properly examined.\nOutcome:\nThe appeal was allowed, and the case was sent back to the Banking Court for reconsideration of the petitioner’s objection, particularly with respect to the partition and demarcation of the property before proceeding with the auction.\nLegal Provisions Referenced:\n1.\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), Sections 19 and 22:\no\nThese provisions deal with the recovery of finances and the execution of the bank’s claims.\n2.\nCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908), **Order XXI, Rules 90 & 100:\no\nThese rules relate to execution proceedings, objections raised to the execution, and the conduct of auction proceedings, particularly ensuring fairness and clarity in such processes.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court recognized the validity of the petitioner’s objection regarding the auction of undivided property without proper partition and demarcation. The matter was sent back to the Banking Court for reconsideration, ensuring a fair process before finalizing the sale. The appeal was allowed, and the earlier sale certificate was set aside.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22", - "Case #": "Execution First Appeal No.256203 of 2018, date of order: 20th September, 2022.Heard on: 20th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE AND RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iftikhar Ahmed Mian and Arslan Khan Swati for Appellants.\nC.M. Rehman for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAJI KHALID DAD NASIR AND ANOTHER-PETITIONERS\nVS\nSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25567", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5171 = 2024 SLD 5171 = 2024 CLD 1426", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTc", - "Key Words:": "Performance Guarantee, Bank Guarantees, and Judicial Review\nA. Performance Guarantee and Scope (Contract Act, 1872 - Section 124)\n•\nA performance guarantee (often issued in the form of a bank guarantee) operates independently of the underlying agreement between the parties.\n•\nThe guarantor or promisor is bound to honor the guarantee when the beneficiary decides to encash it.\n•\nThe guarantor does not have the authority to question or involve itself in the terms or conditions of the underlying agreement between the parties; the focus remains on the guarantee’s validity and the beneficiary’s right to call upon it.\nB. Constitutional Jurisdiction of High Court (Article 199)\n•\nThe High Court exercises constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, and it has the authority to review decisions made by lower courts or authorities.\n•\nJudicial review does not entail rewriting an agreement or taking over the role of one of the parties. Instead, courts assess whether the decision made is reasonable, rationale, and proper based on the facts and circumstances. Judicial review examines if the decision was made within the parameters set by the law.\nC. Performance Guarantee, Encashment, and Injunction (Contract Act, 1872; Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Specific Relief Act, 1877)\n•\nThe petitioner/plaintiff company sought a restraining order to prevent the encashment of a performance guarantee executed in favor of the respondent/defendant.\n•\nThe defendant (bank or entity holding the guarantee) was the sole judge of whether there was any delay in fulfilling the obligations under the agreement and whether the penalty clause could be invoked.\n•\nA force majeure clause could have prevented the penalty clause from being invoked if certain conditions (such as a delay due to uncontrollable events) were met, but in this case, there was no force majeure clause present.\n•\nThe defendant sought to encash the guarantee due to a delay in the project, invoking the penalty clause. However, whether there was an actual delay or not was a factual matter that needed to be decided based on evidence and documents.\n•\nThe High Court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a prima facie case for injunctive relief. Since the matter was related to money, there was no irreparable loss that could be caused by allowing the encashment.\n•\nFurthermore, the balance of convenience was in favor of the defendant, as they were entitled to encash the performance guarantee due to the terms of the agreement.\n•\nEven if the plaintiff’s suit were ultimately decided in its favor, the court could order the return of money following the final decision, meaning no irreversible harm would occur.\n•\nThe Trial Courts decision to refuse the interim injunction against encashment of the guarantee was upheld by the High Court, and the appeal was dismissed.\nLegal Precedents and Case References:\n•\nThe case cited several precedents regarding performance guarantees and injunctions, such as:\no\nM/S Mehboob Enterprises v. Karachi Development Authority (1997 MLD 3085)\no\nM/S Mercury Corporation v. M/S Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (2000 YLR 734)\no\nAtlas Cables (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Islamabad Electric Supply Company (2016 CLD 1833)\no\nShipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. (PLD 2003 SC 191)\no\nBraganza v. BP Shipping Limited (2015 SCMR 742)\no\nOasis Travels (Pvt.) Limited v. Donvand Limited (2020 CLC 1128)\n•\nThese cases reinforced the position that performance guarantees are independent contracts and that courts must be cautious in interfering with encashment unless clear evidence of wrongdoing exists.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe High Court confirmed that the performance guarantee operates independently from the agreement between the parties and cannot be blocked by a party unless there is clear evidence of a breach or unjust action.\n•\nThe defendant was within its rights to encash the guarantee, and the plaintiff did not present a sufficient case for an interim injunction.\n•\nThe appeal was dismissed, and the matter was left to be decided on the merits of the case, with the possibility of monetary compensation if the plaintiff prevails eventually.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Contract, Act, 1872=124Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "F.A.Os. Nos. 139, 140 and 141 of 2021, date of order: 16th May, 2024. Heard on: 7th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ, CHIEF JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdullah Alim Qureshi, Malik Omair Saleem and Barrister Khush Bakht with Irtazaa Ifzaal Group Director (Legal), PTCL and Obaid Lodhi, Manager (Legal), PTCL for Appellants.\nFaisal Fareed for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S PAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANY LIMITED AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nUNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND, ISLAMABAD THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25568", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5172 = 2024 SLD 5172 = 2024 CLD 1444", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTY", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 – Suit for Recovery and Petition for Leave to Defend\nA. Background and Context:\n•\nA suit for recovery was filed by a Bank against the defendant (a customer), seeking to recover dues related to a finance facility.\n•\nThe defendant filed a petition for leave to appear and defend, seeking to contest the suit. However, the Banking Court ruled that no substantial question of law was raised by the defendant, leading to a decree in favor of the Bank.\n•\nThe defendant (the original customer) passed away during the appeal process, and his legal heirs (appellants) continued the appeal before the Appellate/High Court.\n•\nThe legal heirs argued that they should be granted an opportunity to contest the case and seek leave to defend the suit.\nB. Legal Requirements for Leave to Defend:\n•\nSection 10(5) and 10(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 lay down the requirements for filing a petition for leave to defend in a recovery suit. The defendant must raise substantial questions of law or fact that warrant a trial by evidence.\n•\nThe defendant (or appellant in this case) was unable to show any substantial legal question that would justify a full trial or further investigation into the matter.\n•\nAmbiguous objections and lack of clear legal defense in the leave application rendered the petition inadequate to compel a trial.\nC. Evidence and Banking Documentation:\n•\nThe record showed that the deceased customer had made a request to renew/extend the finance facility. The Bank presented evidence showing that the funds were withdrawn for adjusting overdue liabilities from previous loans.\n•\nFinance and security documents were duly executed by the deceased (and subsequently acted upon by the legal heirs).\n•\nThe Bank had provided a statement of account for the relevant finance periods (2003-04 and 2005-06). The legal heirs did not dispute any of the entries or make valid objections regarding the account or the documents presented by the Bank.\n•\nMoreover, the Bank disclosed that a previous suit had been filed by the customer against the financial institution, which was dismissed. This fact was not disputed by the appellants, and the dismissal of that suit indicated an acquiescence by the deceased regarding the legitimacy of the Bank’s claim.\nD. Court’s Decision:\n•\nThe Banking Court found that the appellants (legal heirs) failed to raise any substantial question of law or fact that would require further investigation or a full trial.\n•\nThe Bank had sufficient documentation, including statements of account and finance documents, that met the legal requirements.\n•\nThe Court concluded that the deceased customer had benefitted from the finance facility, and the legal heirs could not dispute the legitimacy of the Bank’s claim.\n•\nThe Court emphasized that the requirements under Section 10(5)(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance were not met by the appellants.\n•\nThe appeal was dismissed, as the judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court were found to be correct and without any legal or procedural errors.\nE. Key Legal Points:\n•\nThe petition for leave to defend in recovery suits must raise substantial questions of law or fact to be granted a trial.\n•\nIf no such substantial issues are raised, the Banking Court may pass a decree in favor of the Bank.\n•\nIn this case, the legal heirs of the deceased customer could not establish any serious defense against the Bank’s claim, and the dismissal of a previous suit further weakened their case.\n•\nThe Bank provided clear evidence, including the statement of account and other documents, which were not rebutted by the appellants.\n•\nThe requirements of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were not met by the appellants, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.\nF. Conclusion:\nThe appeal by the legal heirs of the deceased customer was dismissed. The Banking Court’s decision was upheld because the appellants failed to present any substantial legal or factual defense. The Bank’s claim was backed by proper documentation, and no serious objections were raised by the appellants during the proceedings. The case reaffirms that a petition for leave to defend in a recovery suit must meet specific legal requirements, and in the absence of such substantial questions, the Bank’s recovery claim will be upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=10(5),10(6)", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No.125 of 2012, heard on 20th February, 2024.Heard on: 20th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE AND ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Shoaib Tahir Thaheem for Appellant.\nMuhammad Saleem Iqbal for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS-PETITIONER\nVS\nALLIED BANK LIMITED THROUGH BRANCH MANAGER-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25569", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5173 = 2024 SLD 5173 = 2024 CLD 1447", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTU", - "Key Words:": "Appeal under the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997\nA. Background and Context:\n•\nPetitioner: A company aggrieved by an order sent to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) as a representation.\n•\nIssue: The petitioner filed an appeal under Section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 (the Act 1997), seeking to set aside an investigation report.\n•\nThe Appellate Bench Registry declined to register the appeal, citing the bar in Section 33 of the Act 1997, which restricts the maintainability of appeals.\n•\nThe petitioner requested the matter be placed before the Appellate Bench to decide on the maintainability of the appeal.\nB. Legal Provision: Section 33 of the SECP Act, 1997\n•\nSection 33 of the SECP Act, 1997 provides a bar on the maintainability of certain appeals.\n•\nSpecifically, it prohibits the filing of appeals against investigations, findings, or orders made under the Act, unless there is a direct legal right to appeal under specific provisions.\nC. The Appellant’s Contentions:\n•\nThe appellant contended that the appeal was maintainable, as the impugned order (directing the matter to SECP) went beyond the scope of the Representation Order.\n•\nThe appellant sought to challenge the investigation report itself, which it argued was not properly handled by the SECP.\nD. Court’s Examination and Findings:\n•\nRecord Review: Upon reviewing the record, it was found that the dispute stemmed from corporate issues related to shareholding and directorship within the appellant company. These issues had led to multiple litigations in different forums.\n•\nHigh Court’s Decision: A constitutional petition had already been filed by the petitioner before the High Court, challenging the investigation report. The High Court dismissed this petition, and its order was self-explanatory, confirming the legality of the investigation report.\n•\nBar of Maintainability: The Bench noted that the legality of the investigation report had already been determined by the High Court and could not be revisited. The appeal was therefore an attempt to re-litigate the investigation report, which was not permissible, as the High Court’s decision on the report had already been made final.\n•\nThe prayer of the appellant in the appeal clearly showed that it sought to question the investigation report, which had already been dismissed by the High Court, rendering the appeal non-maintainable.\nE. Court’s Conclusion:\n•\nThe Bench concluded that the appeal was non-maintainable as it effectively sought to challenge the investigation report, a matter already adjudicated by the High Court.\n•\nThe bar in Section 33 of the SECP Act, 1997 was invoked, preventing the appeal from being entertained.\n•\nAs the appellant did not raise a new or substantial issue, the appeal was dismissed.\nF. Key Legal Points:\n•\nSection 33 of the SECP Act, 1997 places a bar on appeals related to investigation reports or decisions made by the SECP, unless explicitly allowed by the Act.\n•\nIf an issue has already been decided by a competent court (in this case, the High Court), it cannot be re-litigated before the Appellate Bench.\n•\nThe appellant’s attempt to directly or indirectly re-challenge the investigation report, which had already been dismissed by the High Court, was deemed invalid.\nG. Conclusion:\nThe appeal filed by the company was dismissed as non-maintainable. The High Court’s dismissal of the constitutional petition regarding the investigation report rendered the matter settled, and the appeal before the Appellate Bench could not be pursued further due to the bar in Section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33", - "Case #": "Appeal No.17(13)/Misc./ABR/2022 (Objection Case), date of order: 6th February, 2024.Heard on: 31st January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AKIF SAEED, CHAIRMAN/COMMISSIONER AND MUJTABA AHMAD LODHI, COMMISSIONER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zafar Mahmood, Executive Manager for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "YUSRA MEDICAL AND DENTAL COLLEGE (PRIVATE) LIMITED-PETITIONER\nVS\nOFFICER AUTHORIZED, SECP AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25570", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5174 = 2024 SLD 5174 = 2024 CLD 1536", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Suit for Recovery of Damages under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001\nA. Background:\n•\nPetitioner/Bank: United Bank Limited.\n•\nRespondent/Customer: A customer who had availed a car finance facility.\n•\nClaim: The customer filed a suit against the bank seeking declaration, possession, and damages related to the repossession of the motor vehicle obtained under the car finance facility.\n•\nIssue: The customer claimed that the repossession was wrongful, resulting in mental suffering and loss of reputation. The bank appealed against the Banking Court’s judgment, which accepted the customer’s claim for damages.\nB. Legal Provisions:\n•\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001:\no\nSection 2(d): Defines financial accommodation in relation to the finance facility.\no\nSection 9: Deals with the competence of the Banking Court to entertain suits related to financial accommodations.\no\nSection 16(3): Allows financial institutions to repossess property in case of default.\nC. Arguments of the Bank:\n•\nJurisdiction: The Bank argued that the claim for damages was based on an allegation of a tortuous act, not a breach of the finance agreement, and hence did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Banking Court.\n•\nThe Bank further asserted that the repossession was valid under Section 16(3) of the Ordinance, as the customer had defaulted in repayment obligations.\nD. Courts Findings and Reasoning:\n1.\nNature of the Claim:\no\nThe court observed that the customers claim for damages was based on tort — specifically, alleging that the repossession was wrongful, causing mental suffering and loss of reputation.\no\nA suit for damages arising from tortious acts does not fall within the scope of the Banking Courts jurisdiction as defined under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n2.\nClaims Grounded in Contract vs. Tort:\no\nThe court clarified that claims for damages arising from breach of contract in relation to a loan or finance agreement could be entertained by the Banking Court, as they fall within the scope of the Ordinance.\no\nHowever, a tort claim that does not stem from a contract or a finance facility is outside the jurisdiction of the Banking Court.\n3.\nEvidence and Burden of Proof:\no\nThe court found that the customers affidavit-in-evidence failed to substantiate the allegations of mental suffering and loss of reputation. The claim for damages was not backed by any factual assertions or evidence regarding the actual loss suffered by the customer.\no\nAs a result, the burden of proof regarding the alleged damages was not discharged.\n4.\nConclusion on the Jurisdiction:\no\nSince the claim was based on tort and was unproven, the Banking Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and the damages claim could not stand.\n5.\nOutcome:\no\nThe High Court set aside the Banking Court’s decision, ruling that the Banking Court could not entertain the claim for damages arising out of a tortious act.\no\nThe appeal filed by the Bank was allowed, and the customer’s claim for damages was dismissed.\nE. Key Legal Points:\n•\nA tort claim for damages cannot be adjudicated by the Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nThe Banking Court has jurisdiction only over suits arising from breach of contract related to finance facilities, not those based on tortious acts.\n•\nIn the absence of evidence supporting the damages claim, especially where the claim is based on tort and not contractual breach, the Banking Court’s judgment in favor of the customer was overturned.\nF. Precedents Cited:\n•\nNasimuddin Siddiqui v. United Bank Limited (1998 CLC 1718)\n•\nAbdul Rehman Allana v. Citibank (2003 CLD 1843)\n•\nM. Nujeebullah Qureshi v. Citibank N.A. (2009 CLD 49)\n•\nM/S M.M.K Rice Mills v. Grays Leasing (2006 CLD 1147)\n•\nCitibank N.A v. Syed Shahanshah Hussain (SBLR 2009 Sindh 1290)\n•\nM/S Klb-e-Hyder and Co. v. National Bank of Pakistan (2008 CLD 576)\nConclusion:\nThe Bank’s appeal was successful, and the claim for damages based on a tortious act was struck out as outside the jurisdiction of the Banking Court. The High Court ruled that such claims should be filed in an appropriate forum.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(d)", - "Case #": "I.A. No.33 of 2018, date of order: 18th September, 2024. Heard on: 18th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, JUSTICE AND ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nabeel Ahmed Kolachi for Appellant.\nNoor Muhammad Dayo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CITIBANK N.A.-PETITIONER\nVS\nMUHAMMAD TASLEEM AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25571", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5175 = 2024 SLD 5175 = 2024 CLD 1474", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRS8", - "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001) - Objection Against Deceptive Similarity\nA. Background:\n•\nPetitioner/Objector: A company aggrieved by the order passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks dismissing its objection against the registration of a disputed trade mark.\n•\nRespondent/Company: The company seeking registration of the disputed trade mark.\n•\nIssue: The petitioner objected to the deceptive similarity between its registered trade mark and the disputed trade mark of the respondent.\nB. Legal Provisions:\n•\nTrade Marks Ordinance, 2001:\no\nSection 17: Deals with the rights and privileges of a registered trade mark holder.\no\nSection 39: Provides grounds for opposing the registration of a trade mark.\no\nSection 114: Relates to the powers of the High Court in matters involving trade mark disputes.\nC. Arguments of the Petitioner:\n•\nThe petitioner argued that the disputed trade mark was deceptively similar to its registered trade mark, which could create confusion and deception among the consumers.\n•\nThe petitioner highlighted strong reasons for opposition based on the likelihood of confusion in the market due to the similarity of the two marks, including their visual, phonetic, and conceptual similarities.\nD. Registrars Findings:\n•\nThe Registrar of Trade Marks dismissed the petitioners objection, relying on the concept of the totality of impression and the test of the average consumer. The Registrars reasoning was based on a perceived lack of confusion when viewed in isolation, under the assumption that the average consumer would not be misled.\nE. High Courts Decision:\n1.\nMisconception in Registrar’s Order:\no\nThe High Court found the Registrar’s reasoning to be misconceived and erroneous, particularly the application of the test of the totality of impression and the average consumer.\no\nThe Court pointed out that the deceptive similarity between the two trade marks was evident, and the Registrar had not adequately addressed the strength of the petitioner’s opposition.\n2.\nStrong Opposition:\no\nThe petitioner had made a strong case in its opposition against the registration of the disputed trade mark. The High Court acknowledged the merits of the opposition and determined that there was a substantial likelihood of consumer confusion due to the similarity between the marks.\n3.\nOrder for Change:\no\nThe High Court directed the respondent company to change the disputed trade mark to one that was not deceptively similar to the petitioner’s trade mark or any third party’s trade mark.\no\nThe respondent was ordered to make appropriate applications before regulatory authorities such as the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and the Drug Regulatory Authority, if necessary.\n4.\nSet Aside Registrar’s Order:\no\nThe High Court set aside the order passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks, as the contested trade mark was found to be too similar to the petitioner’s mark, violating provisions of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001.\n5.\nAppeal Outcome:\no\nThe petitioner’s appeal was allowed, and the respondent was instructed to make necessary changes to its trade mark registration.\nF. Legal Precedents Cited:\n•\nM/S Burneys Industrial and Commercial Co. Ltd. v. M/S Rehman Match Works (PLD 1983 Kar. 357)\n•\nM/S Mehran Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Limited v. M/S Chiltan Ghee Mill (Pvt.) Ltd. (2001 SCMR 967)\n•\nJamia Industries Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Pak) Ltd. (PLD 1984 SC 8)\n•\nSeven-Up Company v. Kohinoor Thread Ball Factory (PLD 1990 SC 313)\n•\nShan Food Industries v. Eastern Products (Pvt.) Ltd. (2012 SCMR 1504)\n•\nM/S Farooq Ghee and Oils Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (2015 CLD 1245)\nG. Conclusion:\nThe High Court upheld the petitioner’s objection to the registration of the disputed trade mark due to its deceptive similarity with the petitioner’s registered mark. The Registrar’s order was set aside, and the respondent was directed to change its trade mark. The decision reinforced the importance of protecting trade mark rights and preventing consumer confusion caused by similar trade marks.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001=17,39,114", - "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No.63 of 2022, date of order: 10th July, 2024.Heard on: 14th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zain Shaikh for Appellant.\nSalim Ghulam Hussain for Respondent No.1.\nZulfiqar Ali for Respondent.\nSarmad Khan Azad for Respondent No.2 along with Qasim Iqbal for Respondent.\nAlqamah Bin Mehmood for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S GETZ PHARMA INTERNATIONAL FZ LLC THROUGH AUTHORIZED ATTORNEY-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25572", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5176 = 2024 SLD 5176 = 2024 CLD 1481", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) - Revision Application and Limitation\nLegal Issue:\n•\nWhether a revision application filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation can be entertained and whether the delay in filing such an application can be condoned under the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n•\nSection 115 of Civil Procedure Code (CPC): Grants a right of revision to higher courts over orders passed by the lower courts.\n•\nSection 5 of Limitation Act, 1908: Provides for the condonation of delay in filing a case if a party can show sufficient cause for the delay.\n•\nSection 29(2)(b) of Limitation Act, 1908: Excludes the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in certain cases, including revision applications filed under Section 115 of the CPC.\nCourts Conclusion:\n•\nThe court concluded that the provision of Section 115 of CPC is a special law, and due to the exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act under Section 29(2)(b), condonation of delay in filing revision applications is not permissible.\n•\nA revision application filed beyond the period of limitation is deemed time-barred and must be dismissed.\nCited Precedents:\n•\nGovernment of Balochistan v. Abdul Rashid Langove (2007 SCMR 518)\n•\nAllah Dino v. Muhammad Shah (2001 SCMR 286)\n•\nMuhammad Zafar v. Nazir Ahmed (2005 MLD 1034)\n•\nMuhammad Amir v. Muhammad Sarfraz (2019 CLD 523)\n•\nRaja Karamat Ullah v. Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sukhera (1999 SCMR 1892)\n•\nNoor Muhammad v. Assistant Commissioner, Vehari (1986 SCMR 292)\n•\nAbdul Aziz v. Additional Settlement Commissioner (1984 SCMR 1562)\n________________________________________\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) - Consent Decree, Appeal Against, and Res Judicata\nLegal Issue:\n•\nWhether a consent decree (decree resulting from an agreement between the parties) can be appealed, and the applicability of the principle of res judicata in cases where a revision application is filed against a dismissed appeal.\n•\nThe issue also involved the imposition of costs under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).\nKey Legal Provisions:\n•\nSection 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001: Relates to the recovery of finances and legal actions in financial matters.\n•\nSection 12(2) of CPC: Allows a party to challenge a decree on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or clerical error.\n•\nSection 35(1)(iii) of CPC: Pertains to the imposition of costs for litigation, particularly when proceedings are found to be frivolous or meritless.\nCourts Conclusion:\n•\nThe court upheld the finality of the consent decree. The decree, being a compromise decree, is binding upon the parties and operates as res judicata. This means that the decree cannot be challenged in subsequent proceedings unless fraud or other exceptional circumstances are proven.\n•\nThe revision application filed by the defendant was dismissed as time-barred, and the High Court imposed costs of Rs. 1 million on the appellant, to be deposited in the government treasury.\n•\nThe principle of res judicata was correctly applied, which means that the defendants failure to challenge the consent decree effectively precluded them from contesting it at a later stage.\nCited Precedents:\n•\nMeghraj v. Bayabai AIR 1970 SC 161\n•\nMeka Venkatadri v. Raja Parthasarathy AIR 1922 PC 233\n•\nNajam Koreshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank (2015 SCMR 1461)\n•\nMahmud Alam v. Mehdi Hussain (PLD 1970 Lah. 6)\n________________________________________\nSummary of Legal Principles:\n1.\nRevision Application and Limitation: Revision applications under Section 115 of the CPC are governed by strict time limitations, and the Limitation Acts provisions for condonation of delay do not apply in such cases, leading to dismissal of time-barred applications.\n2.\nConsent Decree and Res Judicata: A consent decree (arising from a compromise between parties) is treated as final and binding, and it cannot be challenged unless fraud or other exceptional grounds exist. The principle of res judicata applies, barring future disputes over the same issue.\n3.\nCosts Imposition: The CPC Section 35(1)(iii) empowers courts to impose litigation costs on parties who engage in unnecessary or meritless proceedings, as seen in the imposition of Rs. 1 million on the defendant.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No.02 of 2013, C.R. No.06 of 2005 and R.F.A. No.204 of 2004, date of order: 26th September, 2024. Heard on: 16th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE AND SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Muhammad Kashif Zaman for Appellants along with Appellant No.1. in person (in E.F.A. No.02 of 2013).\nQausain Faisal Mufti for Appellant (in R.A. No.204 of 2004).\nWasim Abid for Respondent No.1 (in E.F.A. No.02 of 2013).\nMuhammad Mehboob Alam for Respondents Nos.2 to 4 (in E.F.A. No.02 of 2013) and for Petitioner (in C.R. No.06 of 2005).\nRaja Abdul Qayyum for Respondent No.1. (in R.F.A. No.204 of 2004 and C.R. No.06 of 2005).\nAmir Latif Gill for CDA (in C.R. No.06 of 2005).\nUmar Farooq, Deputy Registrar and Barrister Khadija Naeem, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed WAQAR-UL-HASSAN SHAH BUKHARI and others-Petitioners\nVS\nSMALL BUSINESS FINANCE CORPORATION (NOW SME BANK LTD.) and 3 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25573", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5177 = 2024 SLD 5177 = 2024 CLD 1503", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTk", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)\nLegal Issues:\n•\nWhether the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has jurisdiction to entertain complaints from policyholders despite the provisions of Section 122(3) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\n•\nThe scope of review available to the Appellate Bench of the SECP, and whether the SECPs jurisdiction over insurance matters is barred in this context.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nSection 2(xvi) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000: Defines Court within the context of the Insurance Ordinance.\n2.\nSection 122 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000: Deals with the jurisdictional powers of the Insurance Ombudsman and also provides for the jurisdiction of courts.\n3.\nSection 125 & 127 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000: Outlines the functions, powers, and appointment of the Insurance Ombudsman, not interfering with the powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP).\n4.\nSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997: Empowers SECP to handle certain matters related to complaints from policyholders in the insurance sector.\nFactual Background:\n•\nM/S State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan filed a review application against the order passed by the Appellate Bench of the SECP. The insurance company contended that the Appellate Bench did not consider Section 122(3) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, which explicitly bars the jurisdiction of a court (as defined in Section 2(xvi)) to entertain complaints of policyholders.\n•\nThe Insurance Company argued that the SECP lacked jurisdiction due to this provision, claiming that the issue should be resolved by a court rather than the SECP.\nCourts Ruling:\n•\nThe Appellate Bench rejected the review application, clarifying that the jurisdiction bar in Section 122(3) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 applies specifically to courts, not the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. The SECP has jurisdiction under the provisions of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 to entertain complaints related to policyholder issues.\n•\nThe Bench further explained that Sections 125 and 127 of the Insurance Ordinance, which deal with the functions and jurisdiction of the Insurance Ombudsman, do not in any way interfere with the powers of the SECP to deal with complaints from policyholders.\n•\nThe applicant (State Life Insurance Corporation) admitted that the higher cash surrender value was shown to the policyholder due to a malfunction of a software program, which led to the loss being suffered by the policyholder. In response, the SECP issued a direction to compensate the policyholder and imposed penalties under Sections 75 and 156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\n•\nThe Bench found no anomalies or legal errors in the impugned order and concluded that the order was consistent with the law. Therefore, the review application was dismissed.\nLegal Conclusion:\n•\nThe SECP has the authority to deal with complaints from policyholders under the relevant provisions of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997.\n•\nThe review application filed by the insurance company was dismissed, as it failed to establish any illegality or error in the Appellate Benchs order.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122(3)", - "Case #": "Review Application No.03 of 2017 in Appeal No.58 of 2016, date of order: 15th September 2023. Heard on: 22nd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AKIF SAEED, CHAIRMAN/COMMISSIONER AND ABDUL REHMAN WARRAICH, COMMISSIONER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waqas Asad Sheikh for Applicant.\nHammad Javed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP, Shafique ur Rehman, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and Muhammad Ayub (on behalf of Mst. Nazir Fatima) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN-APPLICANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INSURANCE AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25574", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5178 = 2024 SLD 5178 = 2024 CLD 1507", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRTg", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940) – Section 34 and Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) – Section 54\nLegal Issues:\n•\nWhether the Trial Court properly refused to stay the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in a suit for recovery of contractual amounts and injunction.\n•\nThe interpretation of the phrase taking any other steps in the proceedings in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and its impact on the right to request a stay of proceedings.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nSection 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940: Provides that if there is an agreement to arbitrate, the court can stay the proceedings in a suit if the party applies before taking any other steps in the proceedings.\n2.\nSection 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877: Deals with injunctions and their availability in cases related to the enforcement of contracts.\nFactual Background:\n•\nThe petitioner/defendant in the case was aggrieved by the Trial Courts refusal to stay the proceedings of a suit in which the plaintiff sought recovery of a contractual amount and an injunction.\n•\nThe defendant invoked the discretion of the Trial Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, to stay the proceedings of the suit on the ground that there was an arbitration agreement in place between the parties. This application was filed before submitting the written statement or taking any other step in the proceedings.\nCourts Ruling:\n•\nThe High Court reviewed the Trial Court’s refusal and found that the petitioners application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was filed in accordance with the law. The Trial Court’s dismissal was based on the premise that the petitioner/defendant had taken steps in the proceedings, but the High Court disagreed with this interpretation.\n•\nThe key phrase in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is taking any other steps in the proceedings . The High Court clarified that this phrase does not cover every action taken in the case. Instead, it refers to steps that manifest a clear intention to waive the benefit of the arbitration agreement and proceed with the merits of the suit. This includes actions like filing a written statement or engaging in activities that suggest a submission to the courts jurisdiction.\n•\nThe High Court emphasized that the defendant had invoked the arbitration clause before taking any steps that could be interpreted as a waiver of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the Trial Court should have granted the stay of proceedings under Section 34 since the parties were ready and willing to proceed with the arbitration.\n•\nThe High Court referred to the case of General Electric Company v. Renusagar Power Company (1987), where the principle of arbitration and the importance of respecting arbitration agreements were upheld.\nLegal Conclusion:\n•\nSection 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 provides the option to stay proceedings in a suit if a party applies before taking any substantial step in the suit, such as filing a written statement or submitting to the jurisdiction of the court.\n•\nThe High Court found that the Trial Court had erred in dismissing the defendants application for stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and that the defendant was within its rights to invoke arbitration before engaging in further proceedings.\n•\nThe High Court set aside the Trial Courts order and allowed the defendant’s appeal, staying the proceedings in the suit as per the arbitration agreement.\nSignificance:\n•\nThis case underscores the importance of arbitration clauses in contracts and the strict interpretation of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which allows for the stay of suit proceedings when a party moves for arbitration at the appropriate time. The ruling clarifies that merely taking administrative or procedural steps in a suit does not automatically waive the right to arbitration unless there is a clear indication of such waiver.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=34Specific Relief Act, 1877=54", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.138 of 2021, date of order: 26th September, 2024.Heard on: 23rd September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE AND ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Muhammad Usama Rauf for Appellant.\nBarrister Yousaf Khosa, Abdullah Alim Qureshi and Malik Omair Salim for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAJVAIRY ASSOCIATES (PVT.) LTD. THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER-PETITIONER\nVS\nM/S POWER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF CHINA LIMITED-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25575", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5179 = 2024 SLD 5179 = 2024 CLD 1518", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRXo", - "Key Words:": "State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act (VII of 2023)\nLegal Issues:\n•\nWhether the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is exempt from the levy of income tax and whether it is obliged to follow the Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nThe application of the State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023, and whether it mandates state-owned entities to follow specific dispute resolution mechanisms for tax-related issues.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nState-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023 – Sections 2(e)(ii) & 3: These sections deal with the scope of state-owned enterprises, specifically those managed or controlled by the federal government and their commercial operations.\n2.\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Sections 54 & 134A (as amended by the Finance (Amendment) Act, 2024): The provision for dispute resolution mechanisms and tax exemptions for state-owned enterprises.\n3.\nRules of Business, 1973 – Rule 8(2): Addresses inter-departmental procedures and dispute resolution protocols.\nFactual Background:\n•\nThe Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which generates its revenue by providing services on a commercial basis, sought to claim exemption from income tax. The CAA argued that it was not required to follow the Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism as mandated under Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, regarding disputes with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).\n•\nThe dispute arose because the CAA believed it should be exempt from tax obligations due to its status as a government authority and sought a resolution without engaging in the ADR process.\nCourt’s Analysis:\n•\nState-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023, specifically Section 2(e)(ii), applied to the CAA as it was a state-owned enterprise generating revenue from commercial activities, and therefore, the provisions of this Act were applicable.\n•\nThe CAA was under the purview of this Act, which mandates that state-owned enterprises operating on a commercial basis, and controlled or managed by the Federal Government, must follow prescribed procedures, including dispute resolution mechanisms for tax matters.\n•\nThe High Court observed that Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 had evolved a mechanism for resolving tax disputes between state-owned enterprises and the FBR. The rationale behind this was to prevent excessive litigation costs and delays in resolving disputes, which often result in financial losses for the government.\n•\nThe High Court declined to adjudicate the matter on its merits under Article 199 of the Constitution and instead directed the CAA to follow the ADR process as outlined in Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, or alternatively, under Rule 8(2) of the Rules of Business, 1973.\n•\nThe High Court emphasized that if the CAA was dissatisfied with the outcome of the ADR process, it was free to pursue other remedies as available under the law.\n•\nIn case the CAA opted for ADR, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) was directed to form a Committee as per Section 134A(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and Inland Revenue authorities were instructed to halt any recovery proceedings under Section 134A(7) until the committee was notified.\nLegal Conclusion:\n•\nThe High Court confirmed that the CAA, being a state-owned enterprise, was governed by the provisions of the State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023, and was therefore subject to the ADR mechanism under Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for resolving its tax-related disputes with the FBR.\n•\nThe High Court directed the CAA to engage with the ADR mechanism, and the FBR was instructed to halt recovery proceedings pending the formation of the ADR Committee.\n•\nThe constitutional petition filed by the CAA was disposed of with the directions for adherence to the ADR processes, with the CAA being allowed to seek further remedies under the law if necessary.\nSignificance:\n•\nThe case reinforces the importance of ADR mechanisms for resolving disputes between state-owned enterprises and the Federal Board of Revenue to avoid unnecessary litigation.\n•\nIt emphasizes that state-owned enterprises, even when operating commercially, remain subject to specific governance and operational rules, including those related to taxation and dispute resolution under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nThe decision also highlights the role of administrative bodies (like the FBR) and their obligation to engage in ADR to expedite dispute resolution and reduce the financial burden on the state.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=54,134A", - "Case #": "C.P. No.1513 of 2024, date of order: 30th May, 2024. Heard on: 21st May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ammar Athar Saeed and Usman Alam for Petitioner.\nDr. Shahnawaz Memon for Respondents.\nKashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF PAKISTAN-Petitioner\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25576", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5180 = 2024 SLD 5180 = 2024 CLD 1532", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDRXk", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)\nLegal Issues:\n•\nWhether an appeal against an order passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), signed by one Commissioner for and on behalf of the Commission, lies before the Appellate Bench or the High Court.\n•\nJurisdiction of the Appellate Bench and the High Court in matters involving orders of the SECP.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n1.\nSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 – Sections 33 & 34: These sections deal with the jurisdiction and procedures for filing appeals against orders of the Commission.\n2.\nCompanies Act, 2017 – Section 258: Pertains to the SECPs authority to conduct investigations.\nFactual Background:\n•\nA company filed an appeal before the Appellate Bench of the SECP, challenging an investigation order passed by the Commission in the exercise of powers under Section 258 of the Companies Act, 2017.\n•\nThe company argued that the impugned order was signed by a Commissioner (Supervision Division) for and on behalf of the Commission, and, therefore, since this situation resembled the action of a single Commissioner or an authorized officer, the appeal should lie before the Appellate Bench of the SECP under Section 33 of the SECP Act, 1997.\nCourt’s Analysis:\n•\nThe Court examined the provisions of Sections 33 & 34 of the SECP Act, 1997 and concluded that:\no\nAn order of the Commission passed by two or more Commissioners is appealable before the High Court.\no\nAn order passed by one Commissioner or an authorized officer of the Commission, however, is appealable before the Appellate Bench of the Commission.\no\nThe impugned order was not issued by a single Commissioner or an authorized officer, but rather, it was the collective decision of the Commission (which was then composed of four Commissioners), and signed by one Commissioner on behalf of the Commission.\no\nAs the order in question was a collective decision of the full Commission, the jurisdiction to hear an appeal against such an order lies with the High Court, not the Appellate Bench.\n•\nJurisdictional Error: The Court emphasized that jurisdictional errors are fatal to any legal proceeding, and an appeal filed before an improper forum is void. In this case, the Appellate Bench lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the order in question was not an order issued by a single Commissioner or an authorized officer but a collective decision by the Commission.\nLegal Conclusion:\n•\nThe Appellate Bench lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal against the impugned order passed by the SECP, as the order was a collective decision of the Commission.\n•\nThe appeal was directed to be returned for filing before the appropriate court of competent jurisdiction, i.e., the High Court, as per the express provisions of Section 33 of the SECP Act, 1997.\n•\nThe appeal was disposed of accordingly, with the Appellate Bench lacking jurisdiction to entertain it.\nSignificance:\n•\nThis case highlights the importance of jurisdictional clarity in legal proceedings, particularly regarding appeals against decisions of regulatory bodies like the SECP.\n•\nIt establishes that when the Commission makes a collective decision, the appeal must be filed with the High Court and not with the Appellate Bench of the Commission, as per the clear provisions of Section 33 of the SECP Act, 1997.\n•\nThe decision reinforces the principle that a jurisdictional error in filing an appeal can render the proceedings void and that such matters must be directed to the correct forum to ensure proper legal adjudication.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33,34", - "Case #": "Appeal No.24(14)Misc./ABR/23, date of order: 6th September, 2023.Heard on: 6th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AKIF SAEED, CHAIRMAN/COMMISSIONER AND MUJTABA AHMAD LODHI, COMMISSIONER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Ahad Nadeem for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S CNERGYICO PK LIMITED-PETITIONER\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER-SUPERVISION DIVISION, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN -RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25577", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5181 = 2024 SLD 5181 = 2024 CLD 1543", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQTc", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nClaim of Policyholder: The petitioner (policyholder) filed a claim, arguing that the insurer failed to return the full premium amount with profits at the time of policy maturity.\n2.\nDuty of Insurer: Whether the insurer met the legal requirements in communicating relevant information about the policy to the policyholder throughout the policy cycle.\n3.\nQualification of Insurance Agents: Whether the insurer followed the regulatory requirements regarding the qualifications and conduct of its insurance agents.\n4.\nLanguage and Communication: The mandatory use of plain language in policy documentation for the understanding of policyholders.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n•\nInsurance Ordinance, 2000:\no\nSections 75, 77, 118, 122(3) – Pertaining to the duty of utmost good faith, language of policy documents, and the rights of the policyholder.\n•\nInsurance Rules, 2017:\no\nRules 41, 54, 56, 57 – Outlining the communication requirements between insurers and policyholders.\n•\nCorporate Insurance Agents Regulations, 2020:\no\nRegulation 18(f) – Requires proper conduct by insurance agents, ensuring that policies are clearly explained, and documentation is accurately completed.\nFactual Background:\n•\nThe petitioner was aggrieved that the respondent insurer failed to return the full premium amount along with the expected profits at the policys maturity.\n•\nThe insurer argued that it regularly communicated with the policyholder through Call Back Confirmation (CBC). However, the policyholder contested the validity of this communication, asserting that it did not meet the legal requirements.\nCourt’s Analysis:\n1.\nDuty of Insurer:\no\nThe insurer is legally bound to communicate the status of the policy, including unit-linked policies, statutory funds, creation of funds, units allocation, and the investment details to the policyholder.\no\nThe phrase throughout the policy cycle was significant, indicating that the insurer must continuously update the policyholder about the policy’s progress, investments, and other related matters to protect the policyholder’s financial interests.\n2.\nProof of Communication (CBC):\no\nThe CBC provided by the insurer was deemed insufficient as evidence. It failed to address the creation of funds, units, or the investment of premiums, which are required by law.\no\nThe insurer failed to prove that the CBC was in accordance with the legal requirements, and it was not admissible as valid communication.\n3.\nQualifications of Insurance Agents:\no\nThe Insurance Tribunal directed that insurance agents must be qualified and trained to explain all aspects of the policy clearly to policyholders, especially regarding specialized terminology.\no\nIllustrations regarding potential profits on maturity or surrender should also be provided in a comprehensible format, and there must be proper insurance need analysis conducted for the policyholder.\n4.\nLanguage of Policy Documents:\no\nIt was emphasized that policy documents should be drafted in plain, simple language to ensure that the policyholder, especially if illiterate or uneducated, could easily understand the terms and conditions.\no\nThe insurer was directed to provide bilingual documents (in Urdu and English) for better understanding.\n5.\nInsurance Tribunal’s Order:\no\nThe Insurance Tribunal ruled in favor of the policyholder, directing the insurer to return the premium, excluding the paid amount, along with liquidated damages as per Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\no\nThe Tribunal also issued detailed instructions for future practices, including ensuring that the insurer’s agents meet all regulatory qualifications, provide adequate illustrations to prospective policyholders, and ensure proper documentation and communication throughout the policy cycle.\nLegal Conclusion:\n•\nInsurers Failure to Comply: The insurer failed to comply with legal requirements for communication, and the tribunal found this to be a significant breach of duty. The Call Back Confirmation (CBC) failed to meet legal standards and was not valid as evidence.\n•\nMandatory Use of Plain Language: The tribunal emphasized the mandatory requirement for insurers to use plain and understandable language in policy documentation, ensuring that policyholders can fully comprehend their rights and the terms of the policy.\n•\nPolicyholder’s Rights: The policyholder was entitled to receive the full premium amount with profits, and the insurer was ordered to pay liquidated damages for failure to meet obligations.\nDirections to Insurers:\n1.\nQualified Insurance Agents: Insurers must ensure that their agents are fully qualified and explain the policy clearly, using simple terms.\n2.\nPolicy Documentation: Insurers must provide clear and bilingual policy documents, with all relevant details explained in an easily understandable manner.\n3.\nInvestment of Premium: Insurers were instructed to invest the premium in a company with at least an AA+ rating by the Pakistan Credit Rating Agency.\n4.\nInsurance Need Analysis: A thorough analysis of the policyholder’s insurance needs should be conducted before issuing the policy.\nOutcome:\n•\nThe petition was allowed, and the insurer was ordered to return the premium with profits, along with liquidated damages.\n•\nThe Insurance Tribunal issued several regulatory directives to ensure that such issues do not recur in the future.\nRelevant Case References:\n•\nPLD 2019 SC 675\n•\n2021 SCMR 522\n•\n2016 PLC (C.S.) 1219\n•\n2023 PCr.LJ 1394\nThis case highlights the importance of clear communication and full disclosure by insurers to protect the rights of policyholders, ensuring that they understand the terms, investments, and benefits of their insurance policies.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=75,77,118,112(3)", - "Case #": "Petition No.76 of 2024, date of order: 7th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE (R) ALI AKBAR QURESHI, CHAIRMAN AND ZAFAR IQBAL TARAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner in person.\nArshad Farooq Ch. and Sher Dill Shehbaz Khagga for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MANSHA-PETITIONER\nVS\nJUBILEE LIFE INSURANCE-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25578", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5182 = 2024 SLD 5182 = 2024 CLD 1563", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Jurisdiction in Insurance Disputes under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, an Insurance Company, challenged the directions issued by the Ombudsman to pay compensation to the respondent, a policyholder, under a fire insurance policy. The High Court evaluated whether the Ombudsman had jurisdiction over such disputes, particularly when a specialized forum, the Insurance Tribunal, existed under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\nKey points included:\nThe Ombudsman acted beyond the scope of authority defined under Section 122 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, which pertains to addressing cases of maladministration rather than adjudicating policy claims.\nThe respondent (policyholder) chose the wrong forum by approaching the Ombudsman instead of the Insurance Tribunal for a claim under the fire policy.\nAllowing the Ombudsman to adjudicate policy claims would undermine the statutory role of the Insurance Tribunal under Section 127 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\nThe High Court found no evidence of maladministration by the Insurance Company and held that the merit of the claim had not been properly adjudicated before the appropriate forum.\nHeld:\nThe High Court set aside the findings of the Ombudsman and the Insurance Mohtasib due to lack of jurisdiction.\nThe constitutional petition was allowed, and the matter was directed to be brought before the proper forum, the Insurance Tribunal.\nCitations:\nInsurance Ordinance, 2000, Sections 122 & 127\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 199 (Jurisdiction of High Court)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=122,127Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-1379 of 2023, date of order: 5th September, 2024. Heard on: 13th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BEFORE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, CHIEF JUSTICE AND JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ghazali Shaikh for Petitioner.\nShahab Imam for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ADAMJEE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE PRESIDENT, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND 3 OTHERS-RESPONDENTs" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25579", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5183 = 2024 SLD 5183 = 2024 CLD 1570", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQTU", - "Key Words:": "Merger and Stamp Duty in the Context of the Companies Act (XIX of 2017)\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nMerger and Stamp Duty: Whether the transfer of assets resulting from the merger of companies is subject to stamp duty and mutation fees, particularly when such assets are transferred as part of a sanctioned scheme of merger.\n2.\nConstitutionality of Stamp Duty on Mergers: Whether the constitutional provisions allow for exemption from stamp duty on transfers during a merger, and if the Stamp Act (1899) applies in such cases.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n•\nCompanies Act, 2017:\no\nSections 279, 280, 281 & 282 – Deal with the merger process, approval of merger schemes, and the regulatory framework governing corporate mergers.\n•\nStamp Act, 1899:\no\nSection 3 – Imposes stamp duty on instruments that are chargeable under the Act.\no\nFirst Schedule, Article 27-A – Introduced by the Punjab Finance Act, 2008, to include instruments such as court orders related to the transfer of immovable property under certain circumstances, including mergers.\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 199 – Pertains to the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain constitutional petitions and intervene in legal matters involving the interpretation of laws.\nFactual Background:\n•\nThe petitioner company, after the approval of its Scheme of Merger, was aggrieved by the imposition of stamp duty and mutation fees on the assets transferred from the merged companies at the time of registration or mutation of the merger.\n•\nThe respondent maintained that the transfer of assets during the merger was subject to stamp duty as per the provisions of the Stamp Act, specifically under Article 27-A of the First Schedule, which was introduced through the Punjab Finance Act, 2008.\nCourt’s Analysis:\n1.\nMerger as an Instrument Under Stamp Act:\no\nThe court held that an order sanctioning a merger qualifies as an instrument under the Stamp Act, 1899. Therefore, such an order is chargeable to stamp duty in the same way as other instruments involving the transfer of immovable property, including sale, exchange, gift, or mortgage.\no\nThe order sanctioning the merger falls within the ambit of Article 27-A of the First Schedule to the Stamp Act, which covers transfers of property and rights to immovable property resulting from mutual consent in mergers.\n2.\nApplicability of Stamp Duty:\no\nThe Stamp Act applies to all instruments (such as the court order in this case), and unless specifically exempted, such instruments are subject to the charge of stamp duty. The court noted that there were no exemptions in the Stamp Act for mergers involving the transfer of assets between companies.\no\nThe court acknowledged that stamp duty is a provincial subject and the law governing the duty applies to assets transferred as part of a merger, except in cases within the Islamabad Capital Territory, where Section 282(5) of the Companies Act, 2017 provides some exemptions.\n3.\nJurisdictional and Constitutional Considerations:\no\nThe High Court declined to interfere in the matter, reaffirming that the Stamp Act applies in the context of a merger. The petitioners plea for exemption from stamp duty on the merger order was not upheld.\no\nThe High Court noted that while there is a constitutional framework for the distribution of legislative powers between the Federation and Provinces (as laid out in Article 142(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan), the provisions regarding stamp duty are under the domain of the provinces. Consequently, the petitioners claim for exemption from stamp duty was not granted.\n4.\nPrecedents Cited:\no\nTotal Parco Pakistan Ltd. v. Total Oil Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. (2023 CLD 241) and Fatima Sugar Mills Limited v. Company Secretary (PLD 2015 Lah. 632) were referenced in relation to mergers and the legal treatment of stamp duty in such transactions.\nLegal Conclusion:\n•\nMerger as an Instrument: The court concluded that the merger order is an instrument for the purposes of the Stamp Act, making the transfer of assets subject to stamp duty as specified under Article 27-A of the First Schedule of the Stamp Act, 1899.\n•\nNo Exemption from Stamp Duty: The court found no legal basis for exempting the transfer of assets during the merger from stamp duty, except in specific circumstances defined by law for certain regions (e.g., Islamabad Capital Territory).\n•\nDismissal of Petition: The constitutional petition was dismissed, and the petitioner was directed to comply with the stamp duty requirements related to the merger process.\nOutcome:\n•\nThe petitioners constitutional challenge was rejected, and the imposition of stamp duty and mutation fees on the transfer of assets during the merger was upheld.\n•\nThe High Court declined to interfere in the matter, affirming the applicability of the Stamp Act in the context of company mergers.\nRelevant Case References:\n•\nTotal Parco Pakistan Ltd. v. Total Oil Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. (2023 CLD 241)\n•\nFatima Sugar Mills Limited v. Company Secretary (PLD 2015 Lah. 632)\n•\nDivisional Superintendent, Quetta Postal Division v. Muhammad Ibrahim (2022 SCMR 292)\nThis case reinforces the principle that the Stamp Act applies to instruments like court orders related to the merger of companies, subjecting them to stamp duty unless explicitly exempted. The decision clarifies that the merger order is an instrument within the definition of the Stamp Act, and no constitutional or legal exemption applies to the imposition of stamp duty on such transactions.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=279,280,281,282", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3455 of 2023, date of order: 7th November, 2024. Heard on: 24th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh and Muhammad Kashif for Petitioners.\nKhalid Ishaq, Advocate General Punjab and Malik Amjad Ali, Additional Advocate General Punjab for Respondents.\nMuhammad Ilyas Sheikh and Muhammad Kashif for Petitioners.\nKhalid Ishaq, Advocate General Punjab and Malik Amjad Ali, Additional Advocate General Punjab for Respondents.\nMuhammad Ilyas Sheikh and Muhammad Kashif for Petitioners.\nKhalid Ishaq, Advocate General Punjab and Malik Amjad Ali, Additional Advocate General Punjab for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JADEED FEEDS INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED-PETITIONER\nVS\nBOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB THROUGH CHIEF INSPECTOR OF STAMPS AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25580", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5184 = 2024 SLD 5184 = 2024 CLD 1518", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Tax Exemption and Dispute Resolution Mechanism for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)\nLegal Issues:\n1.\nTax Exemption for Civil Aviation Authority: Whether the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), as a state-owned enterprise (SOE), is exempt from income tax and whether it is obligated to follow the Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) process for tax disputes under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n2.\nApplicability of ADR Mechanism: Whether the CAA, being a commercial entity, can avoid the ADR process or if it is mandated by law to follow such mechanisms for resolving tax-related disputes.\nKey Legal Provisions:\n•\nState-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023:\no\nSection 2(e)(ii): Defines state-owned enterprises and their operational framework, which includes entities operating on a commercial basis and controlled or managed by the federal government.\no\nSection 3: Outlines the governance structure and operational guidelines for SOEs under this Act.\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001:\no\nSections 54 & 134A: Deal with the Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) process, which provides a mechanism for resolving disputes between state-owned enterprises and the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).\no\nSection 134A (as amended by the Finance Amendment Act, 2024): Focuses on the internal mechanism to expedite the resolution of tax disputes involving SOEs, including the formation of committees for ADR.\n•\nRules of Business, 1973:\no\nRule 8(2): Provides guidelines on handling inter-division procedures and resolving disputes between federal government departments, which could be relevant in disputes involving state-owned entities.\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 199: Empowers the High Court to entertain constitutional petitions and issue directions related to matters of public interest or individual rights.\nFactual Background:\n•\nThe Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), as a state-owned enterprise, claimed that it was exempt from the levy of income tax and was not obliged to follow the Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The CAA argued that its status as an authority generating revenue through services on a commercial basis did not make it subject to tax obligations in the same way as other entities.\n•\nThe Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), on the other hand, contended that tax disputes involving SOEs should be resolved through the ADR process as outlined in Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nCourt’s Analysis:\n1.\nTax Exemption and Commercial Basis of CAA:\no\nThe court noted that the CAA operates on a commercial basis and generates revenue through the sale of services, making it subject to the provisions of the State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023, which governs such entities.\no\nThe CAA was controlled or managed by the Federal Government, and as such, it fell within the ambit of the State-Owned Enterprises Act, 2023. The court emphasized that the CAA could not claim an exemption from tax obligations based solely on its status as a state authority unless specifically exempted under the law.\n2.\nObligation to Follow ADR Mechanism:\no\nThe court referred to Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which establishes a framework for resolving tax disputes between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). This provision is designed to expedite the resolution of disputes to avoid prolonged litigation that could be costly for the federal government.\no\nSince the CAA is an SOE, it is bound to follow the ADR mechanism for tax disputes, as stipulated under Section 134A. The court also noted that the Rules of Business, 1973, under Rule 8(2), provide another procedural mechanism for dispute resolution between federal agencies.\n3.\nHigh Court’s Discretion:\no\nThe High Court, in its discretion under Article 199 of the Constitution, chose not to adjudicate the matter on its merits at this stage. Instead, it directed the CAA to avail either the ADR process under Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance or the inter-division procedures under Rule 8(2) of the Rules of Business, 1973 to resolve the dispute with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).\no\nThe High Court further directed that if the dispute was not resolved through these mechanisms, the CAA could pursue its remedy through other legal avenues as per the law.\n4.\nFormation of Committee and Stay on Recovery:\no\nThe court directed the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to form a committee under Section 134A(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in case the CAA opted for the ADR process.\no\nThe court also ordered that the Inland Revenue authorities should halt recovery proceedings under Section 134A(7) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 once the committee was notified.\nLegal Conclusion:\n•\nThe court held that the CAA, as a state-owned enterprise, was bound to follow the ADR process under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for resolving its tax disputes with the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).\n•\nThe CAA could either utilize the ADR mechanism under Section 134A or the inter-division procedure under Rule 8(2) of the Rules of Business, 1973 for resolving the matter.\n•\nThe High Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter on merits at this stage and directed the FBR to form the necessary committee for the ADR process.\n•\nThe court also stayed any further recovery actions until the committee under the ADR process was constituted.\nOutcome:\n•\nThe constitutional petition was disposed of, with directions for the CAA to resolve the dispute through ADR or inter-division procedures as appropriate.\n•\nThe Federal Board of Revenue was directed to form a committee as per Section 134A(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and recovery proceedings were stayed pending the resolution of the dispute.\nRelevant Case References:\n•\n1995 SCMR 1647\n•\nPLD 2013 Lahore 343\n•\nProvince of Punjab v. Haroon Construction Company (2024 SCMR 947)\n•\nFaisal Zafar v. Siraj-ud-Din (2024 CLD 1)\n•\nNetherlands Financierings Maatschappij Voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (F.M.O.) v. Morgah Valley Limited and SECP (PLD 2024 Lah. 315)\n•\nShehzad Arshad v. Pervez Arshad (2024 CLD 1121)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=54,134A", - "Case #": "C.P. No.1513 of 2024, decided on 30th May, 2024. Date of hearing: 21st May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ammar Athar Saeed and Usman Alam for Petitioner.\nDr. Shahnawaz Memon for Respondents.\nKashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF PAKISTAN-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25581", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 5185 = 2024 SLD 5185 = (2024) 130 TAX 703", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQS8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Failure to Pay Withholding Tax and Audit Proceedings\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer was alleged by the department to have failed to deposit tax collected or deducted, leading to an assessment order dated 31.03.2016. The order identified payments under the heads of rent, royalty, etc., but no independent transactions were specified for which withholding obligations were not discharged. Additionally, no opportunity was afforded to the taxpayer to reconcile or explain whether the payments were not subject to withholding or whether obligations had been discharged.\nHeld:\n(a) Proceedings under Sections 161 and 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, are distinct and independent of each other. They should not be conflated.\n(b) The Assessing Officer must follow Rule 44 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, to reconcile the withholding tax obligations discharged by the taxpayer before initiating proceedings under Section 161.\n(c) A show-cause notice must be issued under Section 161, specifically confronting the taxpayer with transactions in which withholding obligations were not fulfilled.\n(d) The assessment order, as well as the decisions of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Appellate Tribunal, were found unsustainable. The case was remanded to the Commissioner Inland Revenue to initiate appropriate proceedings under Rule 44 and subsequently under Section 161, if necessary.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,177Income Tax Rules, 2002=44", - "Case #": "ITR No. 11 of 2019, date of order: 23.05.2024, date of hearing: 23.05.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE AND SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Osama Shahid, Advocate for the applicant.\nHafiz Muhammad Idris and Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Advocate for the respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nM/S HEWLETT PACKARD PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25582", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1 = 2025 SLD 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJDQSs", - "Key Words:": "Alleged Tax Fraud for the Tax Period July-2017 to June-2018\nDetails:\nThe case involves M/s Republic by Umar Farooq, accused of tax fraud under Section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, based on alleged concealed sales for the specified tax period. The accusation originated from data recovered during a raid on M/s Republic Women Wear, which the department used to estimate sales of the appellant. Despite the registered person’s denial of the connection with the retrieved data and submission of supporting documents, the DCIR issued an assessment order demanding Rs. 17,413,931 in sales tax, along with penalties and default surcharge. The CIR(A) upheld this order.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal vacated the orders of both the DCIR and CIR(A), citing the absence of concrete evidence connecting the registered person with the alleged tax fraud. The data used as the basis for the accusation was deemed unreliable as it was retrieved from a third partys premises. The Tribunal held that:\n• Tax fraud must be proven beyond conjectures and presumptions.\n• Burden of proof lies with the department, which it failed to discharge.\n• Non-compliance with statutory requirements renders the assessment void ab initio.\nCitations:\n• 2018 PTD 108 (LHC): Burden of fraud is on the department.\n• 2016 PTD 2744 (Trib.): Allegations of tax fraud cannot rely on conjectures.\n• 1995 SCMR 1249, 2015 PTD 448, 2019 PTD 592: Non-compliance with procedural requirements invalidates orders.\n• Pepsi Cola International, 2017 PTCL SO HC: An illegal foundational order invalidates subsequent proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(33),2(37),2(41),2(44),2(46)3,7,8,11(1),11(2),11(3),22(1),23,2633,34,38", - "Case #": "STA No.195/LB/2024 (Tax Period July-2017 to June-2018), STA No.196/LB/2024 (Tax Period July-2018 to June-2019). Date of hearing: 09.12.2024, Date of order: 13.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, MEMBER AND IMRAN MUNIR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Rehan Yousaf, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahmad Khalid, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. REPUBLIC BY UMAR FAROOQ, LAHORE .... APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, ZONE-III, CTO, LAHORE .... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25583", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2 = 2025 SLD 2", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpTTk", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Commissioner (Appeals) Under Section 45B(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nThe case arises from a sales tax demand of Rs. 99,410,913/- issued by the assessing officer against the appellant for the tax period July 2016 to June 2017. The demand was based on alleged discrepancies in the appellants taxable supplies and non-deposit of sales tax. The assessing officer relied on Annexure-F and certain assumptions regarding discrepancies between sales tax and income tax declarations.\nThe appellant challenged this demand before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-VI), Karachi, who annulled the assessment on the merits but improperly remanded the case to the assessing officer for de novo consideration. The appellant then filed the present appeal, contesting the remand as being beyond the jurisdiction of the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 45B(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe Tribunal examined the following legal and factual aspects:\nSection 45B(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 explicitly states:\n In deciding an appeal, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Appeals) may make such further inquiry as may be necessary provided that he shall not remand the case for de novo consideration. \nThe Tribunal concluded that remanding the case violates this provision and legislative intent, which aims to avoid protracted litigation by empowering the Commissioner (Appeals) to conclude matters directly.\nJudicial Precedent:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s Supreme Tech International (STR No. 12/2012): The Lahore High Court emphasized that the Commissioner (Appeals) lacks the power to remand cases for de novo consideration and must use the authority to conduct further inquiries at the appellate stage.\n2004 PTD 368 – Al-Hilal Motors Stores: Findings based on presumptions or assumptions lack legal sustainability.\n2023 PTD 467: Reliance on Annexure-F for determining liability requires substantive and clear evidence.\nFBR Circular No. 04 of 2019: Clarifies that entries in Annexure-F primarily relate to value-added tax for commercial importers and do not directly determine sales tax liability.\nMerit of the Assessment:\nThe assessing officer relied on presumptions and Annexure-F, which is primarily designed for commercial importers. The appellant argued that its applicability was irrelevant, as clarified in FBR Circular No. 04 of 2019.\nThe Commissioner (Appeals) correctly annulled the assessing officer’s findings on merits but overstepped by remanding the case, contravening the prohibition in Section 45B(3).\nJudgment Summary:\nThe Tribunal annulled the remand order of the Commissioner (Appeals) as it exceeded his jurisdiction.\nThe findings concerning the lack of evidence and assumptions made by the assessing officer were upheld.\nRelevant Case Law:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s Supreme Tech International (STR No. 12/2012).\n2004 PTD 368 – Al-Hilal Motors Stores.\n2023 PTD 467.\nMessrs Karass Paints and Allied Industries (2006 PTD 2482).\nThe appeal was disposed of as follows:\nThe Commissioner (Appeals) exceeded his jurisdiction in remanding the case for de novo consideration, contrary to Section 45B(3). This part of the order was annulled.\nThe findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) concerning the annulment of the assessment on merits were upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1),45-B,45B(3)", - "Case #": "STA No. 66/KB/2024, (Tax Period July, 2016 to June, 2017), date of hearing: 18-11-2024 and date of order: 08-12-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND SAJID NAZIR MALIK, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Irshad Alam, advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ghulam Sarwar, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S HAMMAD LUBRICANT, PROP: CHOUDHRY MUHAMMAD RIAZ, PLOT NO. A/03, S.I.T.E, SUPER HIGH WAY, KARACHI …. APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, ZONE-II, RTO-I, KARACHI …. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25584", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 3 = 2025 SLD 3", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpTTg", - "Key Words:": "The case involves M/s Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited ( Appellant ), a publicly listed company engaged in manufacturing and marketing fertilizers, challenging the appellate order issued by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR-Appeals). The primary issue relates to the disallowance of a significant expense for Gas Infrastructure Development Cess (GIDC) under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ( the Ordinance ). Additional disputes regarding other tax adjustments were referred back to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration.\n________________________________________\nKey Issues and Findings\n1.\nCore Issue: Disallowance of GIDC Expense (Rs. 18.89 billion)\no\nAppellants Argument:\n\nGIDC is a legitimate business expense accrued under the GIDC Act, 2015, and should be deductible under Section 20 of the Ordinance.\n\nThe Income Tax Ordinance overrides conflicting provisions in other laws.\n\nAs the liability was accrued and measurable with reasonable accuracy, it qualifies for deduction under Section 34 of the Ordinance.\n\nThe appellant referenced judicial precedents supporting the deductibility of accrued liabilities.\no\nDepartments Argument:\n\nUnder Section 5 of the GIDC Act, 2015, GIDC is deductible only when paid.\n\nThe liability was not definitive during the relevant tax year due to ongoing judicial proceedings and stay orders.\n\nThe appellant passed the burden of GIDC onto its customers through pricing, making the claim unjustified.\n2.\nTribunals Findings on GIDC:\no\nAllowability of Deduction:\n\nThe tribunal determined that while Section 5 of the GIDC Act does not explicitly apply to gas consumers like the appellant, GIDC can still be claimed under Section 20 of the Ordinance as it is incurred for business purposes.\n\nThe provision created by the appellant aligns with accrual accounting standards (IAS 37) as the liability was probable, measurable, and reflected accurately.\no\nBurden of GIDC on Customers:\n\nThe tribunal concluded that the appellant passed on the GIDC cost to end consumers, as evidenced by financial records and audited accounts.\n\nThe appellant failed to prove that the GIDC burden was not transferred, breaching fiduciary obligations.\n3.\nAdditional Adjustments:\no\nOther tax adjustments confirmed or remanded by CIR (Appeals) were mutually agreed to be reconsidered by the Assessing Officer within two months.\n________________________________________\nTribunal’s Decision\n1.\nThe appellants claim for GIDC as an expense is allowed under Section 20 of the Ordinance, provided the liability is incurred for business purposes.\n2.\nSince the GIDC burden was passed on to customers, the appellant must deposit the collected cess with the Federal Government along with applicable default surcharges, per the Supreme Court judgment.\n3.\nMatters unrelated to GIDC were remanded to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration.\n________________________________________\nDirectives\n•\nThe assessing officer was instructed to resolve pending matters within two months.\n•\nRelevant authorities, including the Ministry of Petroleum and OGRA, were notified for necessary action.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=3,32(2),34,34(1),34(3),54,120(1)(b),122(4),122(5A),124,129(1),131(1)Gas Infrastructure Development Cess Act, 2015=5Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=73Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=129", - "Case #": "ITA No. 207/IB/2023 (Tax Year, 2018), Order dated: 08-01-2025, heard on: 18.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Rashid Qureshi, FCA \nRespondent by: Mr. Osama Shahid, L.A.\nAssisted by Mr. Muhammad Fiaz Hussain, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S FAUJI FERTILIZER COMPANY LIMITED; SONA TOWER, 156 THE MALL, RAWALPINDI …. APPELLANT \nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (APPEALS-I), LTO, ISLAMABAD …. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25585", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 7 = 2025 SLD 7 = 2025 PLJ 1 = 2025 PTD 530", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpSTY", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 100, 100BA, 236C, 236K & Sched.-10, R. 1A-Petitioner was a statutory authority-Real state projects-Filing of tax return for year 2023-Return was filed within extended period with penalty-Insertion of Sched.-10 R. 1A-Enhanced rates of tax-Past and closed transaction-Retrospective operation of proviso to Rule 1A-Ambiguous language of proviso-Non-application of Rule 1A-Challenge to-Rule 1A of Tenth Schedule had been inserted for application of enhanced rates of tax for filers who were on active taxpayers list but who had not filed tax return by due date or extended due date-Section 100BA was made applicable to tax year 2024-There was nothing in its text to suggest that it would apply to previous tax years, or to returns filed in those years-Language of proviso was ambiguous which does not clearly express intention of legislature-Proviso to Rule 1A was a curious provision in that it simply prescribes that rates of taxes in Rule 1A should not apply to a person who had filed return by due dates in last three years-It is a settled principle of law that taxing statute must use clear and unambiguous language imposing tax obligations-An equally settled principle of construction of a fiscal statute is that one has to look merely at what is clearly said and there is no room for any intendment, there is no equity about a tax, there is no presumption as to a tax and nothing is to be read in and nothing is to be implied and one had to look fairly at language used-Proviso to Rule 1A could not be given retrospective effect so as to destroy or impair past and closed or concluded transactions-Petition allowed.\n \nPLD 1991 SC 870; (2015) 1 SCC 1; PLD 2016 SC 398; PLD 2017 SC 99; 1977 AIR SC 552; (2010 241 CLR 252 & (1990) 171 CLR 1 ref.\nLegislation-\n-Federal Board of Revenue would be well advised to constitute a body of experts for rendering opinion on future legislation/ Notifications in light of legal and constitutional principles settled by Courts in order to avoid such legislation being struck down. This puts unnecessary burden on Courts and impedes revenue collection.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=100,100BA,236C,236K,10,R,1A", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 54097 of 2024, decided on 24.9.2024. Date of hearing: 24.9.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shams Mehmood Mirza, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Imtiaz Rashid Siddique, Barrister Shehryar Kasuri and Raza Imtiaz Siddique Advocates for Petitioner.\nMr. Sheraz Zaka Assistant Attorney General. Barrister Ahtasham Mukhtar and Saffi-ul-Hassan Advocates for Respondent/FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DEFENCE HOUSING AUTHORITY-Petitioner\nvs\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25586", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 20 = 2025 SLD 20 = 2025 PLJ 14 = 2025 PTD 653", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpRS8", - "Key Words:": "Simultaneous Issuance of Notices under Sections 111 and 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails: The case involved the simultaneous issuance of notices under Sections 111 and 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The main issue was whether proceedings under these sections could be initiated concurrently. The Supreme Court judgment clarified that while notices under both sections can be issued at the same time, adjudication under Section 111 must be concluded first to establish definite information that would justify initiating proceedings under Section 122(5). The respondents counsel undertook to comply with the Supreme Courts ruling in the case of Millat Tractors. The High Court refrained from interfering with the impugned notices, given the undertaking by the respondents counsel.\nHeld: The petition was dismissed, as the High Court found no reason to interfere due to the assurance that proceedings under Section 111 would be completed before commencing proceedings under Section 122.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,122,122(5),122(9)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 32407 of 2024, decided on 23.9.2024. Date of hearing: 23.9.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shams Mehmood Mirza, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Imtiaz Rasheed Siddique and Raza Imtiaz Siddique Advocate for Petitioners.\nMr. Ahmad Pervaiz Advocate for Respondent/FBR.\nMr. Sheraz Zaka Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAISAL AHMAD and 2 others-Petitioners\nversus\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE through Chairman and 4 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25587", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 23 = 2025 SLD 23 = 2025 PLJ 16 = 2025 PTD 659", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJpRTg", - "Key Words:": "Unilateral Amendment of Tax Returns without Prior Notice under the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails: The case involved the amendment of tax returns under Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, where respondents modified the nature of the amount from creditable inputs to non-creditable without issuing prior notice to the petitioners. The primary legal issue was whether such unilateral amendments without prior show-cause notice were lawful. The court observed that the petitioners were deprived of due process as they were not given the opportunity to respond before their tax returns were modified. Additionally, the notices lacked references to the specific legal provisions authorizing the amendments.\nHeld: The court declared the respondents actions of modifying the tax returns without prior notice to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Consequently, the impugned notices were struck down, and the petition was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=10(1)(6)(7)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 50616 of 2024, decided on 4.9.2024. Date of hearing: 4.9.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shams Mehmood Mirza, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Imtiaz Rasheed, Raza Imtiaz Advocates for Petitioners.\nMr. Sheraz Zaka Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. Ahmed Pervaiz Advocate for Respondent/FBR.\nMr. Abdul Muqtadir Khan Advocate for Respondent/FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAKARGANG FOOD PRODUCTS LIMITED and another-Petitioners\nversus\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25588", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 88 = 2025 SLD 88", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=12", - "Case #": "F.A.O.No. 41 of 2024/BWP. Date of order: 10.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muzamil Akhtar Shabir, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Naveed Farhan, Advocate for appellants. \nCh. Riaz Ahmed, Advocate for respondent-Bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Wazir Cotton Ginners & Oil Mills, etc.\nVs. \nBank of Punjab." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25589", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 89 = 2025 SLD 89", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=12", - "Case #": "F.A.O.No. 41 of 2024/BWP. Date of order/ 10.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muzamil Akhtar Shabir, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Naveed Farhan, Advocate for appellants. \nCh. Riaz Ahmed, Advocate for respondent-Bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Wazir Cotton Ginners & Oil Mills, etc.\nVs. Bank of Punjab." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25590", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5US8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 90 = 2025 SLD 90", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5US8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=51", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.25 of 2016. Date of hearing: 12.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):; Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Mr. Justice Omar Sial.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khaleeq Ahmed, Advocates for the Appellants.\nMr. Zamir Ahmed Kalhoro, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zafar Hasan Khan and others\nVersus\nM/s. Habib Bank Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25591", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5USs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 91 = 2025 SLD 91", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5USs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891=2(8)Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=10", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.105 of 2016. Dated 17.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Mr. Justice Omar Sia.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khaleeq Ahmed, Advocate for the Appellants \nMr. Talha Jawed Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Naveed & others \nVersus \nHabib Bank Limited." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25592", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 92 = 2025 SLD 92", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "RFA No. 872 of 2016. Date of hearing; 29.03.2019.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Muzamil Akhtar Shabir, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants by: M/s. Akif Majeed and M. Imran Malik, Advocates.\nRespondent No. 1 by: Mr. A. W. Butt, Advocate. Respondent No. 2 by: Malik Asadullah and Mirza Zeeshan, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Gulistan Power Generation Limited & 3 others.\nVs\nThe Bank of Punjab & 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25593", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 93 = 2025 SLD 93", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19", - "Case #": "Execution Petition No.01 of 2024. Date of Order/ 18.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ishtiaq Haider, ASC, Saleem Raza and Syed Afraz Naqvi, Advocates for decree-holder with Ali Mohammad Khan, Group Head, Askari Bank Ltd. Liaqat Mehmood Balt and Omer Ali Mehmood, Regional Head. Ms. Shahina Akbar, Advocate for the decree holder in Ex.P. No.02 of 2010 with Parveen Zareen, Manager, First Women Bank, Al-Amin Plaza, Rawalpindi. Barrister Zulfiqar Ali Shah and Luqman Ali Sipra, Advocates for the judgment debtor(s) with Khawaja Ahmad Kamal, CEO, Khawaja Flat Glass Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Sh. Ahsan-ud-Din, ASC Court-Auctioneer. Mr. Ahmad Nawaz Khan, Advocate/Court Auctioneer. Mr. Muhammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate-General on Court’s call. \nMr. Mohammad Ahmad, Advocate on Court’s call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Askari Bank Limited \nVersus \nM/s. Khawaja Flat Glass Industries (Private) Limited, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25594", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 94 = 2025 SLD 94", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(b)(i)", - "Case #": "EFA No.248622/2018. Date of hearing 18.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants by Mr. Muhammad Riaz, Advocate\nMr. Ashar Elahi, Advocate [in E.F.A No.43805/2021]\nRespondents by Nemo.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Al-Makkah Press (Pvt.) Ltd. etc. \nVS. \nStandard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25595", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 95 = 2025 SLD 95", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5UXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9", - "Case #": "FAO No.75308 of 2019. Date of hearing: 11.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ashar Elahi, Advocate. \nRespondents by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faysal Bank Ltd. \nVersus\nM/s Usman Enterprises & another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25596", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 96 = 2025 SLD 96", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "E.F.A No.22133 of 2023. Date of Hearing 03.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Appellant Syed Zeeshan Haider Zaidi, Advocate.\nFor Respondent Mr. Moiz Tariq, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s G.A Traders (Sole Proprietorship)\nvs.\nAllied Bank of Pakistan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25597", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 97 = 2025 SLD 97", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19(7)", - "Case #": "C.P.2646-L/2018, C.A.17-L/2019 and C.A.364-L/2020. (Against (i) judgment dated 20.11.2018 passed in E.F.A. No.620/2011,\n(ii) judgment dated 20.11.2018 passed in E.F.A. No.17/2012, and (iii) judgment dated 03.02.2020 passed in E.F.A No.231782/2018 respectively by the Lahore High Court, Lahore). Date of hearing: \n7 March 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail. Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Mr. Justice Athar Minallah.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the appellants/petitioners: Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, ASC. (Through video link from Lahore) Mr. Shahid Ikram Siddiqui, ASC.\nFor the respondents: Mr. Umar Farooq, ASC.\n(Through video link from Lahore) Mr. Ashar Elahi, ASC. Mr. Hafeez Saeed Akhtar, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Akram Gondal, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sheikh, ASC. Mrs. Kausar Iqbal Bhatti, AOR. Mr. Muhammad Dawood Khan, OG-II, SME Bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. Samrana Nawaz, etc. (In C.P.2646-L/2018 & C.A.17-L/2019) Khalid Mujeeb Pervaiz Khan, etc. (In C.A. 364-L/2020). Appellants/Petitioners\nVersus\nMCB Bank Ltd., etc. (In C.P. 2646-L/2018 & C.A. 17-L/2019) The Bank of Punjab, etc. (In C.A. 364-L/2020" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25598", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 98 = 2025 SLD 98", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=284,285,287,284(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1721-K of 2021 (Against the order dated 25.10.2021 passed By the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in J.C.M. No.49 of 2016). Date of Hearing: 19.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan and Mr. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, ASC.\nFor Respondent No.1: Ch. Atif Rafiq, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, Karachi … Petitioner\nVersus\nNina Industries Limited, Karachi and others … Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25599", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 99 = 2025 SLD 99", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=34Companies Act, 2017=126", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. 4468/2024 (Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 24.06.2024, passed in C.M. No.3 of 2023 in C.O. No.48681/2023. Date of hearing: 2 December 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench-II: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan and Mr. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Barrister Iftikhar-ud-din Riaz, ASC.\nMr. Muhammad Haroon Mumtaz, ASC.\nFor the Mr. Arshad Mohsin Tayebaly, ASC.\nMr. Tariq Aziz, AOR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Kausar Rana Resources (Private) Limited, etc. Petitioner(s)\nVersus\nQatar Lubricants Company W.L.L. (QALCO), etc. Respondent(s" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25600", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 100 = 2025 SLD 100", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=290,291,292", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 220 of 2004. Date of Hearing: 27.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui. Mr. Justice Omar Sial.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant No.1: None present\nAppellants No.2 and 3: Through Mr. Muhammad Najeeb Jamali Advocate. \nRespondent No.1(ii)&(iii): Through Mr. Amir Saleem Advocate.\nRespondents No.3 & 4: Through Mr. Noor Muhammad Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s S.M. Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. & others\nVersus\nDeceased Muhammad Mohsin Butt & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25601", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 101 = 2025 SLD 101", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=234-A", - "Case #": "W.P. No.3321/2019. Date of Hearing: 23.06.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MOHSIN AKHTAR KAYANI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, Advocate for petitioners in W.P No.3321/2019.\nMr. Muhammad Afzal Siddiqui, Advocate for \npetitioners in W.P No.3322/2019.\nRespondents by: Barrister Minaal Tariq for SECP.\nMr. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui & Syed Hasnian Ibrahim \nKazmi, Advocates for respondent No.3 to 6 in both \nwrit petitions.\nMr. Muhammad Afzal Siddiqui, Advocate for \nrespondent No.7 in W.P. 3321/2019", - "Petitioner Name:": "Jahangir Muggo and others.\nvs.\nSecurities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25602", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 102 = 2025 SLD 102", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=34", - "Case #": "SECP APPEAL NO. 06 OF 2015. DATE OF HEARING: 31.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; BABAR SATTAR, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANT BY: Mr. Shezada Mazhar, Advocate. \nRESPONDENTS BY: Mr. Shahzad Ali Rana, Advocate for \nSECP.\nRespondent No.3 in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Siddiq Moti (deceased) through legal heirs.\nVs\n Appellate Bench Registry, SECP, Islamabad and 02 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25603", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 103 = 2025 SLD 103", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001=52", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.264 of 2021. Date of hearing: 10.12.2024. Date of Decision: 17.01.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, CJ and Mr. Justice Jawad Akbar Sarwana.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Ms. Hanya Haroon and Syed Hassan Zaman Shah, Advocates and\nRespondents: Mr. \nZark Ahmed Khan Ghory, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mahle Engine Components Japan Corporation.\nvs\nAzam Autos and another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25604", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 104 = 2025 SLD 104", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=8,9", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.524 of 2013. Date of hearing 30.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Rasaal Hasan Syed, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants by Mr. Waheed Alam, Asst. Advocate General.\nRespondent by Mr. Riaz Karim Qureshi, Advocate for respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Punjab Highway Department and others\nv.\nSh. Abdur Razzaq & Company (Pvt) Ltd" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25605", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 105 = 2025 SLD 105 = (2025) 132 TAX 202", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5TXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "S.C.R.A. No 213 of 2024. Date of hearing : 28-10-2024. Date of decision : 05-11-2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry and Mr. Justice Abdul Mobeen Lakho.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Arain, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Director, Directorate General I&I (Customs) \nv.\nMuhammad Sabir & another]" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25606", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 106 = 2025 SLD 106 = 2025 PTCL 188 = (2025) 131 TAX 442", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STc", - "Key Words:": "Confiscation of Lawfully Registered Vehicle – Interpretation of Liable to Confiscation Under Section 157 of the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\n•\nThe case arises from a Reference Application under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, challenging the confiscation of a lawfully registered oil tanker (Registration No. FDS-1057) carrying 48,000 liters of High-Speed Diesel (HSD).\n•\nThe vehicle was intercepted on 23.02.2023 by Customs officials, but the driver fled, leaving the vehicle unattended. No legal documents were found for the goods.\n•\nA show cause notice was issued on 05.04.2023, leading to an order-in-original dated 27.04.2023 for the outright confiscation of the goods and vehicle.\n•\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-I, Lahore, dismissed the applicants’ appeal on 30.01.2024.\n•\nThe applicants challenged this decision, arguing that under clause (f) of SRO 499(I)/2009, vehicles not covered under clause (b) may be redeemed, and the Tribunal failed to exercise discretion under Section 157 of the Act.\n•\nThe respondent-department defended the confiscation, citing previous Supreme Court decisions affirming the seizure of vehicles carrying smuggled goods.\nHeld:\n•\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the applicants, holding that the phrase “liable to confiscation” does not mean “shall be confiscated” under Section 157(2) of the Customs Act, 1969.\n•\nConfiscation is discretionary and must be exercised in accordance with principles of natural justice (e.g., issuing notices, hearing evidence).\n•\nThe Tribunal erred in automatically confiscating the vehicle without considering whether the owner was responsible for smuggling.\n•\nThe Court relied on precedents, including PLD 1974 Supreme Court 5 (Haji Abdul Razzak) and 2020 PTD 209, where similar principles were upheld.\n•\nContrary precedents cited by the respondent were held to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s binding decisions, lacking precedential value.\n•\nThe Reference Application was decided against the respondent-department, and the Tribunal was directed to reconsider the case per Section 196(5) of the Act.\nCitations:\n1.\nHaji Abdul Razzak v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance (PLD 1974 Supreme Court 5) – Interpretation of liable to confiscation as requiring a discretionary decision based on justice.\n2.\nCollector of Customs v. Customs Appellate Tribunal Bench-II, Lahore (2020 PTD 209) – Upheld by the Supreme Court, affirming the distinction between liable to confiscation and mandatory confiscation.\n3.\nKhan Wali v. The Collector MCC, Peshawar (2016 PTD 2388) – Establishing judicial discretion in vehicle confiscation cases.\n4.\nMultiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee (PLD 1995 Supreme Court 423) – Holding that later contradictory decisions by benches of equal strength lack binding authority.\n5.\nQaiser v. The State (2022 SCMR 1641); Hasnain Raza v. Lahore High Court (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 7) – Ruling that later benches must adhere to prior rulings of equal strength unless overturned by a larger bench.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,18,156(2),157(1)(2),157(2),196Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)Sales Tax Act, 1990=3", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No. 34648 of 2024. Date of hearing: 12.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND JUSTICE RASAAL HASAN SYED", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicants by: Mian Abdul Salam Sajid, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mian Muhammad Ashfaq Hussain, Advocate (for department).", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAHANZAIB & ANOTHER \nVS\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION), COLLECTORATE OF ADJUDICATION, DRY PORT, FAISALABAD & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25607", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 107 = 2025 SLD 107 = (2025) 131 TAX 185", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STY", - "Key Words:": "Key Questions of Law Decided\na) Whether the Tribunal was justified in deciding the case ex parte without notice or hearing the Department and in absence of para-wise comments?\nb) Whether such a judgment is sustainable in law or violates Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan (right to fair trial)?\nBoth questions were answered in the negative by the High Court.\n________________________________________\nLegal Findings & Reasoning\n1.\nViolation of Right to Fair Trial (Article 10-A of the Constitution):\no\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal proceeded to pass a consolidated judgment without issuing notice to or hearing the applicant (Director, D.I. & I.–Customs, Multan) in Appeal No. 418-LB/2022.\no\nThe Court found that Ms. Aneela Jamil, Advocate, who was marked as present, was not authorized to represent the applicant, and no power of attorney had been issued in her favor.\no\nThe Court held that condemning a party unheard amounts to violation of the fundamental right of fair trial as guaranteed under Article 10-A.\n2.\nDue Process and Natural Justice Violated:\no\nCiting PLD 2024 SC 337 (Jawad S. Khawaja case) and 2024 SCMR 1689 (Muhammad Yousaf case), the Court reiterated that:\n\nFair trial includes right to notice, counsel of choice, hearing, reasoned judgment, and independent adjudication.\n\nDue process and natural justice require a party be given an opportunity to respond before adverse action is taken.\n3.\nImproper Consolidation of Appeals with Distinct Facts:\no\nAppeal No. 418-LB/2022 concerned distinct goods, seizure proceedings, and parties from Appeal No. 417-LB/2022.\no\nDespite the difference in facts and parties, the Tribunal decided both appeals through a single consolidated judgment, resulting in prejudice to the applicant who was neither notified nor heard.\n4.\nLegal Precedents Cited:\no\nPLD 2024 SC 337 – Fair trial principles elaborated (Jawad S. Khawaja v. Federation).\no\n2024 SCMR 1689 – Due process is mandatory in all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.\no\n1997 PCrLJ 565, 2024 PCrLJ 183, 2019 MLD 1713 – Right to representation through counsel is integral to fair trial.\n________________________________________\nConclusion & Final Order\n•\nThe Court held that the impugned judgment (dated 18.01.2024) is unsustainable to the extent it pertains to Customs Appeal No.418-LB/2022.\n•\nThe reference is allowed under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, and the case is remanded to the Customs Appellate Tribunal with the direction to:\no\nProvide due notice to the applicant.\no\nAfford a fair opportunity of hearing.\no\nDecide the matter afresh on merits in accordance with law, preferably within two months from the receipt of certified copy of the order.\n________________________________________\nRelevant Case Law:\no\nPLD 2024 SC 337, 2024 SCMR 1689, 1997 PCrLJ 565, 2024 PCrLJ 183, 2019 MLD 1713", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No. 07 of 2024, date of order: 25.11.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUSTICE AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Naveed-ul-Hassan Bukhari, Advocate for applicant.\nRana Asif Saeed, Advocate for respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE & INVESTIGATION, CUSTOMS, MULTAN\nVS.\nCUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25608", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 108 = 2025 SLD 108", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=17,26,91,139,161,168,197,198,199", - "Case #": "SCRAs No.216 to 222 of 2018. Dated: 19.9.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Syed Mahmood Alam Rizvi, Advocate for Applicant in all SCRAs \nMr. Umair Azam in attendance for Respondents pursuant to order of disposal dated 16.12.2019 in CP No.D-4821 of 2017 & other \nconnected matters", - "Petitioner Name:": "Director, Intelligence & Investigation \nv. \nM/s. Power Industries Pakistan & anothe" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25609", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 109 = 2025 SLD 109", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25(I)(3)(4)", - "Case #": "S. C. R. A. No. 530 of 2022. Date of hearing: 27.11.2024. \nDate of Order: 27.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant: M/s. Khalid Javed Khan,\nIrfan Ali Shaikh & Uzair Shoro, Advocates. \nRespondents: Mr. Khalid Mehmood Rajpar, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd,\nvs\nThe Director, Directorate of Post Clearance Audit (South), Custom House, Karachi," - }, - { - "Case No.": "25610", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5SS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 110 = 2025 SLD 110", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5SS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Finance Act, 2018=10", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No.890-K to 909-K/2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRBSBNT: Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan. Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC (in all cases)9/w Ms. UIne Kalsoom, D.C. Law East Karachi\nMr.Nabeel Siraj, D.C Custom (both vIa video link, Karachi)\nFor N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs & another (in all cases)\nVERSUS\nM/s. Young Tech Private Limited & another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25611", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5SSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 111 = 2025 SLD 111 = 2025 PTCL 224 = 2025 PTD 508 = (2025) 131 TAX 604", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5SSs", - "Key Words:": "High Court’s Decision on Reference Against Tribunal’s Order Allowing Re-export under Section 138 – Customs Act, 1969\nFactual Background:\n•\nConsignment: Battery scrap imported by the Respondent (M/s Bilal Metals) from Bahrain, weighing 108,070 kg.\n•\nDispute: On customs examination, ~55% (60,335 kg) found to be of Indian origin, which is banned for import under Pakistan’s Import Policy.\n•\nInitial Proceedings: Adjudicating Authority outrightly confiscated the goods and imposed a penalty equivalent to their value, under Section 156(1), citing misdeclaration of origin under Section 32(1), 79(1), and violation of Para-5 of the Import Policy Order, 2022.\n•\nAppeal before Tribunal: Tribunal set aside the Order-in-Original, allowed re-export as “Frustrated Cargo” under Section 138, and remitted the penalty.\n•\nReference Application by Customs Department: Challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and interpretation of “frustrated cargo”.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues (Reframed by the High Court):\ni. Whether in the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal was justified in allowing re-export under section 138 of the Customs Act, 1969, when no application was filed before the competent customs officer by the consignor or the vessel in-charge?\nii. Whether the imposition of penalty under clause 9 of Section 156(1) of the Customs Act was justified?\n________________________________________\nFindings & Analysis:\n1. Misapplication of Section 138 & Rules 86–89 – Frustrated Cargo:\n•\nSection 138 and Rules 86–89 allow re-export only upon application by consignor or vessel in-charge, and for reasons such as inadvertence, misdirection, or untraceability/dishonor by consignee.\n•\nIn this case:\no\nNo formal application was filed by the consignor or vessel in-charge.\no\nThe Respondent (consignee) contested the case on merits before the Adjudicating Authority and did not raise the issue of frustrated cargo.\no\nLetters exchanged after confiscation between importer and shipper were not formal applications under the statute.\n•\nTribunal exceeded jurisdiction by allowing re-export suo motu without legal basis or application under Section 138.\n2. Distinction from Precedent – Driveline Motors Ltd.:\n•\nIn Driveline Motors (2022 PTD 363), the consignor had applied for re-export after consignee refused to accept delivery, which was not the case here.\n•\nThus, reliance misplaced; facts materially distinguishable.\n3. On Penalty:\n•\nThe Respondent imported battery scrap of mixed origins.\n•\nIt was not established that the Respondent had mens rea or acted deliberately to misdeclare.\n•\nThe Respondent was a certified industrial importer with environmental clearance to import battery scrap.\n•\nHence, while confiscation upheld, penalty remitted to avoid undue hardship.\n________________________________________\nFinal Decision & Orders:\nQuestions Answered in Negative:\n•\nTribunal was not justified in allowing re-export under Section 138 without statutory application.\n•\nPenalty under Section 156(1)(9) was not justified under the circumstances.\nConsequential Orders:\n•\nTribunal’s judgment set aside.\n•\nOrder-in-Original restored, but penalty remitted.\n•\nRe-export disallowed under Section 138.\n•\nReference Application allowed.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles Reaffirmed:\n•\nFrustrated cargo under Section 138 must meet strict statutory criteria; requires application by consignor/vessel in-charge, not consignee.\n•\nTribunal cannot suo motu allow re-export or substitute procedural safeguards under guise of equity.\n•\nPenalty under Section 156(1) should align with intent, nature of goods, and degree of culpability.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1),79(1),16,32(1),138,156(1)(9),179,181Customs Rules, 2001=86,89", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) No. 638 of 2024. Date of Hearing : 16.12.2024. Date of Judgment: 13.01.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khalil Ullah Jakhro, Advocate.\nMr. Ahmed Masood, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS APPRAISEMENT (EAST) \nVS\nM/S. BILAL METALS PRIVATE LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25612", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 112 = 2025 SLD 112 = (2025) 132 TAX 217", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) No. 1490 of 2023. Date of Hearing : 03.09.2024 Date of Judgment : 26.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Mr. Justice Mohammad Abdur Rahman.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPLICANT : Ms. Tania Alam, Advocate.\nRESPONDENT : Mr. Ghulam Nabi Shar, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Collector of Customs Applicant\nvs\nM/s. Dua International & Co. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25613", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 113 = 2025 SLD 113 = 2025 PTD 1053", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5STg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=157,168(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 285 of 2022, Date of Hearing: 31.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by : Mr. Asad Raza Khan, Advocate.\nRespondents by : Ch. Imtiaz Ahmed, Advocate. Mr. Aqeel Akhtar Raja, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Raz Textiles through its Authorized Attorney \nVersus\nThe Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25614", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5SXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 114 = 2025 SLD 114", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5SXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=221-A", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A.836-K to 887-K, 951-K, 1056-K, 1296_K of 2020 & 741-K to 743-K of 2021 and 165-K/2022. Date of hearing: 13.01.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Bench-II: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. Mrs. Justice Ayesha A. Malik and Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mirza Nasar Ahmad, ASC (thr video-link) Mr. M. Nadeem Qureshi, ASC Raja M. Iqbal, ASC.\nFor the Mr. Salah-ud-Din, ASC. Mr. Haider Waheed, ASC. Mr. Imran Iqbal, ASC. Mr. Ghulam Haider Sh, ASC Mr. Hussain Ali Amani, ASC.(thr. video-link) Mr. Afzal Awan, ASC. Mr. Pervaiz Akhtar Tahir, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "Federation of Pakistan through Revenue Division, etc.\nPetitioner(s)\nVersus\nDewan Motors (Pvt) Ltd., etc Respondent(s)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25615", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5SXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 115 = 2025 SLD 115", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5SXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,32A", - "Case #": "Spl. Cr. Bail Application No. 176 of 2024. Date of hearing : 15-01-2025 Date of order : 15-01-2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry ,J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant/Accused : Mr. Mamoon A.K. Shirwany, Advocate.\nThe State : Mr. Ashiq Ali Anwar Rana, Special Prosecutor Customs.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Raza ul Haq Mallick son of Mallick Muhammad Anwar ul Haq.\nvs\nI.O./Appraising Officer namely; Asim Abbas, who is present in Court." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25616", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 116 = 2025 SLD 116", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1773/KB/2024. M.A(Cond) No. 2788?KB/2024. Date of Hearing: 14.11.2024. Date of order: 21.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJID NAZIR MALIK (MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Abdul Rahim Lakhand, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Dr. Farzana Altaf, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mrs. Irshad Lone, 56B,Gulbarg III, Karachi, Appellant\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II,CTO, Karachi, Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25617", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 117 = 2025 SLD 117", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1945/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 21.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Jehan Alam, ITP and Mr. Sulman, Advocate. \nRespondent: Shaukat Ali, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Waqas Ahmed\nvs\nThe Commissioner-IR. Zone-II, RTO, HYderabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25618", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 118 = 2025 SLD 118", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1122/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 04.07.2024. Date of order: 07.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT; MR. SAJID NAZIR MALIK, MEMBER AND MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Waleed, Advocate and Mr. Nasir Jamal, Advocate.\nRespondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Altaf Adam, Karachi.\nvs\nThe Commissioner IR, MTO, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25619", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 119 = 2025 SLD 119", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2035/KB/2024. Date of hearing; 22.10.2024. Date of order; 03.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ajeet Sundar, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Shaukat Ali, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Asif\nvs\nThe Commissioner-IR, Zone, RTO-I, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25620", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 120 = 2025 SLD 120", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2370?KB/2024. Date of hearing; 11.12.2024. Date of order: 20.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. SAJID NAZIR MALIK, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr, Rakesh Kumar, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Syed Shah Faisal, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commander City, Karachi\nvs\nDCIR, Zone-V, MTO, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25621", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 121 = 2025 SLD 121", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(4),122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2248?KB/2022. Date of hearing: 11.10.2024. Date of order: 10,12,2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syeda Abida Bokhari, Advocate. Syeda Ayesha Mehmood, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Tanzeel Farooqui, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. R & Agro Industries(Pvt) Ltd, Karachi\nvs\nThe Commissioner-IR, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25622", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 122 = 2025 SLD 122", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(1)(a)(b),152(2A)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1345/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 05.09.2024. Date of order: 02,12,2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AIJAZ AHMED KHAN< MEMBER AND SAJID AKBAR KHAN< MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Feroze Aziz, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KEPCO Plant Service & Engineering Co, Ltd., Karachi\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Sukkur." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25623", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 123 = 2025 SLD 123", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),122(9)/22(1)(5)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1565/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 11.12.2024. Date of order: 15.01.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT:MR.AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. SAJID AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Malik Arslan Ahmed, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Naseer Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Shakil Aftab, Karachi\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25624", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 124 = 2025 SLD 124", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,162", - "Case #": "ITA No.1393/KB/2024. date of order: 11.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Siddiq, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Wazir Ahmed, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Triple Associates\nvs\nDCIR, Zone-V, MTO, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25625", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 125 = 2025 SLD 125", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5RXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002=2(xxx)", - "Case #": "Case No. W.P. No. 13846/2011.Date of order: 12.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shujaat Ali Khan, Judge.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Umer Sharif, Advocate for the petitioners.\nMr. Tanveer Ahmad Ghumman, Advocate for respondents No.1 and 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Pakistan Railway, etc. \nVersus \nAbdul Rasheed, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25626", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 126 = 2025 SLD 126", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "National Industrial Relations Commission", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 12A(02)/2023-P. CMA No. 24A(02)2023-P. Date of order: 20,02,2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BEFORE: MR. ABDUL RASOOL MEMON, LEARNED CHAIRMAN. MR. SHABBIR HUSSAIN AWAN, LEARNED MEMBER AND SYED NOOR-UL-HUSSAIN, LEARNED MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Tariq Mahmood Advocate for the appellant. \nMr. Inayatullah Khan, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HBL\nvs\nAlamgir Khan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25627", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 127 = 2025 SLD 127", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2330-L of 2019 Against the Order dated 18.06.2019 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.3212/2016. Date of Hearing: 23.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan, Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. Baleegh-uz-Zaman Ch., Addl.AG, \nPunjab\nFor the Respondent: Mr. Muhammad Anwar Bhanr, ASC\n(through video link Lahore)", - "Petitioner Name:": "Secretary to Government of the Punjab Law & \nParliamentary Affairs Department, Lahore, and another Petitioners\n Versus\nAli Ahmad Khan Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25628", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 128 = 2025 SLD 128", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2330-L of 2019 Against the Order dated 18.06.2019 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.3212/2016. Date of Hearing: 23.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan, Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. Baleegh-uz-Zaman Ch., Addl.AG, \nPunjab\nFor the Respondent: Mr. Muhammad Anwar Bhanr, ASC\n(through video link Lahore", - "Petitioner Name:": "Secretary to Government of the Punjab Law & \nParliamentary Affairs Department, Lahore and another Petitioners\n Versus\nAli Ahmad Khan Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25629", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 129 = 2025 SLD 129", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010=33", - "Case #": "W. P. No. 15270 / 2023. Date of Hearing 09.05.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: Mr. Asad Abbas Dhother, Assistant Advocate General \nRespondent(s) by: Malik Amir Mukhtar, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Province of Punjab and 05 others\nVERSUS \nJaffar Ahmed and 02 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25630", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 130 = 2025 SLD 130", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3649 of 2023 (Against the judgment dated 30.08.2023 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in C.P. No.570 of2021). Date of Hearing: 12.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi, Mr. Justice Shahid Waheed and Mr. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Malik Khushal Khan, ASC (via Meo linkfrom Quetta) \nFor Respondent No.l: Mr. Kamran Murtaza, Sr. ASC\nSyed Rifaqat H. Shah, ACR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "National Bank ofPakistan through its President,\nHead Office, Karachi petitioner\nvs\nRoz-ud-Din and another respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25631", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 131 = 2025 SLD 131", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Agricultural Research Council Ordinance, 1981=9,9(3)", - "Case #": "WRIT PETITION NO. 2240 OF 2024. DATE OF HEARING: 18.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONER BY: M/s Hafiz Arfat Ahmed Ch., Tariq Zaman and Ali Shaharyar, Advocates. \nRESPONDENTS BY: Barrister Munawar Iqbal Duggal, \nAdditional Attorney General, Mr. Aqeel Akhtar Raja, Assistant Attorney General and Raja Muhammad Arsalan Jawad, Assistant Attorney General. Sardar Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa, Sardar Shahbaz Ali Khan Khosa, Ms. Suzain Jehan and Dr. Malik Muhammad Hafeez, Advocates for respondent No.6.\nMr. Nauman Munir Paracha, Advocate for PARC.\nMr. Muhammad Ali Idrees, S.O (E-6), Establishment Division.Mr. Muhammad Imran Haider Sial, Legal \nOfficer M/o National Food Security and Research.\nMs. Samina M. H. Cheema, Director, (Legal) PARC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. Nasir Mehmood Cheema and another.\nVs\nFederation of Pakistan through Ministry of National Food Security and Research and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25632", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 132 = 2025 SLD 132", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,25", - "Case #": "C.P No.D-4452 of 2013. Date of Hearing & Order: 06.04.2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):: Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan and Mr. Justice Adnan-ul-Karim Memon.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Hakim Ali Khan, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nSyed Soulat Rizvi, Additional Advocate General Sindh a/w Raza Mian DSP (Legal).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mir Hassan \nVersus \nThe Province of Sindh & 03 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25633", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 133 = 2025 SLD 133", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199 (1)(a)(ii)", - "Case #": "C.P.No.D-400 of 2024. Date of hearing: 13.02.2024. Date of order: 13.02.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S):: Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Mr. Justice Adnan ul Karim Memon.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner through Mr.Asim Iqbal advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Omer Khalid \nVs. \nFederation of Pakistan & Others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25634", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 134 = 2025 SLD 134", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(3),33(5),33(15)", - "Case #": "STA No. 739/KB/2024 (Tax Period January 2024). Date of hearing: 12-12-2004. Date of order: 20-12-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. SAJID NAZIR MALIK, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hashim Khan, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Mansoor Wesal, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Century Engineering Industries (Pvt) Ltd., Karachi - Appellant\nVs\nCIR, Zone-II, LTO, Karachi - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25635", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 135 = 2025 SLD 135", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5QXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=38,11(1)/(3)", - "Case #": "STA No. 195/LB/2024, 196/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 09.12.2024. Date of order: 13.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN MUNIR (MEMBER) AND MONIM SULTAN (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Rehan Yousaf, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahmed Khalid, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Republic by Umar Farooq, Lahore Appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-III, CTO, Lahore Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25636", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 136 = 2025 SLD 136", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25(2)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1068/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 11.09.2024. Date of order: 16.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Mr. Hammad Ul Hassan Hanjra, Adv.\nRespondent by: Khan Shahzab Bashir, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Batala Steel, 35-Empress Road, Lahore\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-II, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25637", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 137 = 2025 SLD 137", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1)", - "Case #": "STA No. 66/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 15.11.2024. Date of order: 06.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJID NAZIR MALIK (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Irshad Alam, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Gulam Sarwar, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Hammad Lubricant, Prop: Choudhry Muhammad Riaz, Karachi Appellant\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-II, RTO-I Karachi, Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25638", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 138 = 2025 SLD 138", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(3)", - "Case #": "STA No. 642/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 13.11.2024. Date of order: 20.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hasham Khan, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Umair Malik, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Century Engineering Industries (Private) Limited, Karachi.\nVs\nCIR, Zone-II, LTO, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25639", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 139 = 2025 SLD 139", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37)", - "Case #": "Criminal Misc. No. 2217-B of 2024. Date of order; 23.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Ahmed Masood, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Razi Ul Haq Qureshi, Deputy Director I&I IR, Islamabad. Raja Inam Ameen Minhas and Ch. Ehtisham Ul Haq, Special Prosecutor, I&I, FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shahid Hussain Khawaja \nVs \nThe State and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25640", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5OC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 140 = 2025 SLD 140", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5OC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(7)", - "Case #": "STA No. 254/LB/18. Date of hearing: 26.10.2023. Date of order: 30.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Nasir Ali Gillani, Adv\nRespondent by: Mr. Abdullah Sipara, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. F.S. Candino Industries, Sialkot\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, CIR, RTO, Sialkot." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25641", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5OCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 141 = 2025 SLD 141", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5OCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 338/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 02.08.2024. Date of order: 13.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shoaib Hassan Butt, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Usman Azam Bhatti, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Crystalline Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore\nvs\nThe CIR. CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25642", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 142 = 2025 SLD 142", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1144/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 20.09.2024. Date of order: 08.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Aurangzeb, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ms. Marukh Imtiaz, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. AM Steel Furnace & Re-Rolling Mills, Daska, Sialkot\nvs\nThe DCIR, Unit-20,Zone-IV, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25643", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 143 = 2025 SLD 143", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5ODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45-B", - "Case #": "STA No. 1966/LB/2021. Date of hearing: 26.04.2024. Date of order: 29.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None\nRespondent by: Ms. Syed Iqra, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Rashid Steel Industry, Lahore\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25644", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5OHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 144 = 2025 SLD 144", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5OHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 131/LB/2017. Date of hearing: 22.04.2024. Date of order: 08.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Mujtaba, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Ali Raza Ansari, ITP", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore\nVS\nM/s. Dar-e-Salam Textile Mils Ltd, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25645", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5OHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 145 = 2025 SLD 145", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5OHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No.2592 of 2014. Date of Hearing: 16.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. Imran Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate\nRespondents No.1(A to F) by: Ch. Masood Ahmad Zafar, Advocate\nRespondents No.2 to 6 Nemo", - "Petitioner Name:": "Abdul Sattar (deceased) through L.Rs.\nvs.\n Muhammad Yaseen (deceased) through L.Rs. and 5 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25646", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 146 = 2025 SLD 146", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "ITA No.1197/IB/2024. Date of Hearing: 09.09.2024. Date of Order: 09.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (Judicial Member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr.Waqas Shabbir, ITP\nRespondent BY: Mr.Sheryar Akram,DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Strengthening Participatory Organization Employees Contributory Provident Found, Islamabad. Applicant\nVs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, CTO, Islamabad. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25647", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 147 = 2025 SLD 147", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=149/165", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1067/LB/2017. Date of hearing: 11.06.2024. Date of order: 11.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, MEMBER AND SHABAN BHATTI, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Ahmed Mohy ud Din, D.R.\nRespondent by: Mr. Farhan Ahmed, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore\nvs\nM/s. Lal Din Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25648", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 148 = 2025 SLD 148", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=149/165", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1962/LB/2024.Date of hearing: 23.05.2024. Date of order: 20.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mehfuz Elahi, ITP\nRespondent by: Ms. Shiraza Hameed, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Kamlia Steel Furnace, Kala Shah Kaku, SHeikhupura\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-II,LTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25649", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 149 = 2025 SLD 149", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(24).33", - "Case #": "STA No. 1954/LB/2023. Date of hearing: 02.04.2024. Date of order: 25.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mudassar Shuja, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahmed Mujtaba, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s, Sabir Poultry (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25650", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 150 = 2025 SLD 150", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=124/132", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3343/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 11.07.2024. Date of order: 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI (MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Awais, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ghulam Hussain Yasir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sparco Construction Company, Lahore Appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-I, LTO, Lahore Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25651", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 151 = 2025 SLD 151", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1_", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2008/LB/2022. Date of hearing: 15.06.2023. Date of order: 08.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahmed Akmal, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Rehan, Lahore appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25652", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 152 = 2025 SLD 152", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Cooperative Societies Act, 1925=47", - "Case #": "W.P. No.3609/2022. Date of Hearing : 13.06.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Arbab Muhammad Tahir, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by : Mr Abdul Wahid Qureshi, Advocate.\nMr Asad Mehmood, Advocate. Mr Naseem Ahmed Shah, Advocate. Mr Khurram Mehmood Qureshi, Advocate. Mr Abdul Rauf Qureshi, Advocate. Mr Jelal Haider, Advocate. Syed Farhat Abbas Sherazi, Advocate. Mr Ahsan Rashid, Advocate.\nRespondents by : Khalid Mehmood Dhoon, Asstt. Attorney General. Mian Zain ul Abdeen Qureshi, State Counsel. Mr Ishtiaq Haider, Circle Registrar, Cooperative Societies, ICT. Mr Aimal Khan, Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, ICT.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Islamabad Cooperative Housing Society, Islamabad\nthrough its Secretary\nVersus\nAdditional Commissioner (G)/Director Admin, ICT & 2 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25653", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 153 = 2025 SLD 153", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NDg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 98/LB/2018. Date of hearing: 18.01.2024. Date of order: 18.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHABAN BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Umair Khan, DR,\nRespondent by: Ms. Silwat Malik, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore\nvs\nM/s. Honda Altas Cars Ltd, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25654", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 154 = 2025 SLD 154 = 2025 PTD 1 = (2025) 131 TAX 292", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NHo", - "Key Words:": "Liability of Directors for Customs Duty Recovery\nDetails: The applicant, a director of an importer company, challenged the attachment of her house for the recovery of outstanding customs duties and taxes related to goods imported by the respondent company. At the relevant time, the Customs Recovery Rules, 1992, did not impose liability on directors for the payment of taxes and duties owed by an importer company. The rules also did not extend to transactions involving the transfer of disputed property or declare the applicant/director and her mother as defaulters.\nHeld: The applicant, upon facing the attachment proclamation, correctly sought to become a party to the company’s appeal to support its case against the order-in-original. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, after allowing her application, was required to adjudicate upon her claim, which it did by rejecting it on merits. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a reference before the High Court, which decided all questions in her favor. The reference was allowed.\nCitations: H.M. Extraction Ghee and Oil Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue (2019 SCMR 1081)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196,202,202(1)Customs Recovery Rules, 1992=7,8", - "Case #": "Custom Reference No. 29685 of 2022, heard on 11th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 11th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE AND ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Uzair Karamat Bhandari, Ali Uzair Bhandari and Imran Iqbal for Applicant.\nRana Mehtab for Respondent No.5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAIZA BASIR SYED \nvs\nCUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL and 4 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25655", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 155 = 2025 SLD 155", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFJ5NHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "S.T.R No.25/2021.Date of Hearing 12.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Anwaar Hussain, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ch. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue\nVersus\nM/s Multan Electric Supply Company Limited" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25656", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 156 = 2025 SLD 156", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(1)(2)(3)(4)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1338/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 04.07.2024. Date of order: 08.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Pervez Iqbal, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ms. Qayyum Rani, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mughal Iron and Steel Industries Limited, Lahore\nvs\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25657", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 157 = 2025 SLD 157", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1)", - "Case #": "ITR No.10 of 2018. Date of hearing: 04.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: M/s. Sh. Anwar-ul-Haq and Sh. Ikram Elahi,\nAdvocates.\nRespondent by: Ch. Imran-ul-Haq, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, District Zone, Regional Tax Office, Rawalpindi\nVersus\nSh. Ikram Ellahi & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25658", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 158 = 2025 SLD 158", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "MA (Rect.) No. 706/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 18.09.2024. Date of order: 21.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Hamid Bashir, (ITP)\nRespondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. CAP Industries(pvt) Ltd. Karachi\nvs\nCIR, ZONE-II, RTO-I, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25659", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 159 = 2025 SLD 159", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177(6),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2151/LB/2019. Date of hearing: 20.02.2024. Date of order: 01.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD (JUDICIAL MEMBER).", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Attique-Ur-Rehman Aca\nRespondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore\nvs\nMs. Albayrark Turizm Seyhahat Insaat Ticaret Anonim Sirketi Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25660", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 160 = 2025 SLD 160", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1155/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 20.08.2024. Date of order: 23.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQUE IFTIKHAR AHMED (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Aurangzeb, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Salman Chatha, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Great Yuemei (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore\nvs\nThe ADCIR, Unit-18, Zone-III, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25661", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 161 = 2025 SLD 161", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2376/LB/2019. Date of hearing: 16.05.2024. Date of order: 21.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Mohy-ud-Din, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Asim Zulfiqar Ali, FCA", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore.\nvs\nM/s. Sapphire Retail Ltd, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25662", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 162 = 2025 SLD 162", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(5),11(2),45B(3)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1216/LB/2016. Date of hearing: 19.03.2024. Date of order: 29.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Asif, DR\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO-II, Lahore\nvs\nM/s. Bismillah Electronics, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25663", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 163 = 2025 SLD 163", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDYzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)/(3)", - "Case #": "STA No. 961/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 12.06.2024. Date of order: 02.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shahid Jamil, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Qamar Minhas, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Neat Foods (Pvt.) Ltd, Lahore\nvs\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25664", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 164 = 2025 SLD 164", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2452/LB/2019. Date of hearing: 13.03.2024. Date of order: 21.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Bilal Zia, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Umar Wajid, ACA", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue CIR, LTU, Lahore\nVS\nM/s. Staff Provident (Fund trust), Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25665", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 165 = 2025 SLD 165", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(a)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2240/LB/2022. Date of hearing; 08.06.2023. Date of order; 14.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Muhammad Saqib, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmed D. R", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Mian Amer Mahmood, Lahore appellant\nVS\nThe CIR, AEOI Zone, LTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25666", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 166 = 2025 SLD 166", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=10(3),11(2)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=37", - "Case #": "W.P No.15793 of 2022. Date of Hearing: 11.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Karim, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONERS BY: Mr. M. Sohail Iqbal Bhatti, Advocate.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Mr. Mohammad Sulaman Bhatti, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Mehr Dastgir Leather and Footwear Industries (Pvt) Limited\nVersus\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25667", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 167 = 2025 SLD 167", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=36", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 34 of 2013. DATE OF HEARING: 04.10.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPLICANT BY: Hafiz Muhammad Idrees and Syed Farid Bukhari, Advocates\nRESPONDENTS BY: Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Emaar DHA Islamabad Limited\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Legal), Large Taxpayers Unit Islamabad and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25668", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 168 = 2025 SLD 168", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12Sales Tax Act, 1990=25", - "Case #": "STA No. 1276/LB/2017. Date of hearing: 19.10.2023. Date of order: 09.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. M. Ayouab Tariq, Advocate & Mr. M. Jamil, ITP.\nRespondent by: Ms. Ghazala Nasir, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Nadia Steel & General Mills (Pvt) Ltd. Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25669", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 169 = 2025 SLD 169", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "ITR No. 27 of 2024. Date of order; 24.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate for applicant-taxpayer.\nMalik Itaat Hussain Awan, advocate for respondent department, along with Yousaf Khan, S.O.I.R. Legal (Hqrs.), RTO, Rawalpindi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Irshad Ali\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25670", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 170 = 2025 SLD 170", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.43578 of 2024. Date of Hearing 30.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Raheel Kamran, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner in this petition Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Advocate\nFor the petitioner in W.P.No.49585 of 2024 Barrister Hamza Shehram Sarwar, Asad Zaman Tarar and Kamal Ali Khan, Advocates\nFor the Federation of Pakistan M/s Muhammad Hamza Sheikh and Muhammad Mansoor Ali Sial, Assistant Attorneys General\nFor respondentsFBR Mr. Muhammad Bilal Munir, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s K&N’s Foods (Pvt.) Ltd.\nVersus\n Federation of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25671", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 171 = 2025 SLD 171", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(7),161,161(1)(A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3605/LB/2023. Date of hearing: 20.06.2023. Date of order: 21.08.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khizar Mir, ITP.\nRespondent by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ikazi Fashion House Pvt. Ltd, Lahore\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25672", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 172 = 2025 SLD 172", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 100/MB/2024 (Tax Year:2017), date of Hearing & Order: 11.06.2024 .", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Haris, ITP.\nRespondent by: Mr. Mukhtar Hussain, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. GHULAM HUSSAIN, HOSSE NO 410, GALI MOHALLACH- NEST THUNA GALLAH MANDI, SAHIWAL APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR RTO SAHIWAL.. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25673", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 173 = 2025 SLD 173", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1)", - "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 75-P/2024 with CM No. 94/2024.Date of hearing: 08.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IJAZ ANWAR ,J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by; Ch. Naeem ul Haq, Advocate\nbarrister Sarwar Muzaffar Shah.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mohammad Ishaq Khan\nvs\nAdditional Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Range-II, Zone-Peshawar, RTO, Peshawar and Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25674", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 174 = 2025 SLD 174", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 53185-2024. Date of Order; 24.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUDGE AND SUTAN TANVIR AHMED, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shahbaz Butt, learned Advocate for the applicant.\nMr. Tabassam Ali, learned Legal Advisor for the respondent-department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Medequips \nVersus \nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue and 3 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25675", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 175 = 2025 SLD 175", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDWXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W.P. No.48782 of 2024. Date of Hearing 23.09.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Raheel Kamran, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner Mr. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan, Advocate For the\nRespondents/PRA Mr. Abdul Muqtadir Khan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Ltd.\nVersus\nThe Chairman Punjab Revenue Authority, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25676", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 176 = 2025 SLD 176", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=72B", - "Case #": "STA No. 1022/LB/2019. Date of hearing; 03.06.2024. Date of order; 11.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN MUNIR (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waqar Karim, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Arslan, ITP", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, Zone-IV, LTU, Lahore\nvs\nM/s. TCL Electronic Pakistan (Pvt.)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25677", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 177 = 2025 SLD 177", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(7)(a),182(2)", - "Case #": "ITA No.2277/LB/2019. Date of hearing: 04.07.2024. Date of order: 04.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN , MEMBER AND SHABAN BHATTI, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; None\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Zone-V, RTO, Lahore appellant\nVS\nM/s. Selmore Pharmaceuticals (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25678", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 178 = 2025 SLD 178", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=165", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 577/LB/2018. Date of hearing: 07.06.2024. Date of order: 11.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nawab Ur Rehman, Advocate\nRespondent by: Miss. Saman, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Malik Paint Industries (Pvt) Ltd. Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25679", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 179 = 2025 SLD 179", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A),22,23,26", - "Case #": "STA NO. 245/IB/2024. Date of hearing: 20.08.2024. Date of order: 2-.08.2024", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Sajid, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Kamal Laboratories, 11, Civil Lines, Rawalpindi\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Cantt Zone, RTO, Rawalpindi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25680", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 180 = 2025 SLD 180", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45-B", - "Case #": "STA No. 752/LB/2018. Date of hearing: 16.01.2024. Date of order: 16.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None\nRespondent by: Mr. Ali Khalid, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Power Solutions, Lahore\nVS\nCIR, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25681", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 181 = 2025 SLD 181", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3453/LB/2019. Date hearing: 19.04.2024. Date of order; 19.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Zainab Hussain, DR\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Lahore\nVS\nMr. Muhammad Tahir, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25682", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 182 = 2025 SLD 182", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3319/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 10.07.2024. Date of order 11.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Farhan Ahmed Jan, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Zia, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Sufi Steel Industries (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore\nvs\nCIR, Zone, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25683", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 183 = 2025 SLD 183", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(3).19(1),11(2)Federal Excise Act, 2005=14", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1210/LB/2019. Date of Hearing: 10.06.2024. Date of order: 11.06.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Mujtaba, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Abrar Ur Rehman, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore\nVS\nM/s. Lotte Akhtar Beverages, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25684", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 184 = 2025 SLD 184", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-II, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=167", - "Case #": "CUSTOMS APPEAL NO. 529/LB/2009. Date of hearing: 24.03.2022. Date of order: 11.04.2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD AAMER, MEMBER (TECHNICAL)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mirza Farhan Ahmed in person\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Khalid Ch. Advocate and Mr. Maqsood Ahmed, Superintendent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mirza Farhan Ahmed\nvs\nCollector of Customs (Appeals), Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25685", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 185 = 2025 SLD 185", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDVXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA No. 1698/LB/2017. Date of hearing: 24.04.2024. Date of order: 13.05.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AYESHA FAZIL QAZI (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Omer Daraz Sh, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Ayaz Nawaz Warraich, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Butt Auto Workshop, Lahore\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25686", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 186 = 2025 SLD 186", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 993/LB/2019. Date of hearing: 15.02.2024. Date of order: 16.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sufyan Ahme, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Arshad Javed, FCA", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, LTU, Lahore\nvs\nM/s. Pepsi Cola Int. (Pvt) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25687", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 187 = 2025 SLD 187", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221", - "Case #": "MA (R) No. 246/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 27.06.2024. Date of order: 03.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR UL HAQUE, (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Arshad Javed, FCA\nRespondent by: Mr. Rudar Amjad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Pepsi Cola International, (Pvt) Ltd.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25688", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 188 = 2025 SLD 188", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1),122(9)/122(5)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2450/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 10.07.2024. Date of order: 11.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Bilal Pervaiz, Advocate.\nRespondent by: 11.07.2024.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Khokhar Properties (SMC-Private) Ltd. Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25689", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 189 = 2025 SLD 189", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "ITR No.168-2024. Date of order: 30.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AAMER FAROOQ C.J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. M. Mohsin Nazir, Advocate for applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Security Investment Bank Limited\nVs.\nCommissioner Appeal Inland Revenue, CTO, Islamabad & Another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25690", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 190 = 2025 SLD 190", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(c),122(5A),154,154(4)", - "Case #": "ITR No.38 of 2014. Date of Hearing: 01.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Ch. Nazir Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Yasir Islam Chaudhry, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Crystalline Chemicals (Pvt.) Limited\nVersus\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Sargodha and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25691", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 191 = 2025 SLD 191 = (2025) 131 TAX 643", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 64793 OF 2024. Date of order: 28.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Advocate for the petitioner. \nBarrister Shahjahan Khan, Advocate For the FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Iqbal Avenue Co-operative Housing Society LImited\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25692", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 192 = 2025 SLD 192", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No.2582/IB/2022. Date of Hearing: 11.01.2023 Date of Order: 11.01.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (Judicial Member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Anwar-ul-Haq, ACA\nRespondent By: Ms. Sobia Mazhar, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Capital Foods (Private) Limited, 15-E, Naseerabad, Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi. appellant\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, CTO, Islamabad respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25693", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 193 = 2025 SLD 193", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131", - "Case #": "ITA No.1272/IB/2024. Date of Hearing: 10.09.2024\nDate of Order: 10.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (Judicial Member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr.Asif Fareed, ITP\nRespondent BY: Ms.Sidra Shafique,DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr.Mohammad Saghir, M/s Alsaleha Pharmacy, Shop\nNo.03, Block No.26, Mir Plaza, Civic Centre, Melody, Islamabad. applicant\nvs\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Islamabad. respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25694", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 194 = 2025 SLD 194 = 2025 PTCL 163", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUXo", - "Key Words:": "ATIR Decision on ITA against Order under Section 122(5A), Tax Year 2022\nBackground:\n•\nThe taxpayer, an individual, filed a return for Tax Year 2022 declaring Rs. 54.68 million as income.\n•\nForeign source income of Rs. 113.5 million was declared as exempt based on tax treaties with the UK and UAE.\n•\nThe Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Range-II, Zone-AEOI, Lahore, initiated amendment proceedings under section 122(5A), deeming the assessment erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue.\n•\nAfter show-cause and supplementary notices, the order under section 122(5A) was passed on 24.05.2024, resulting in a total income of Rs. 168.2 million and additional tax demand of Rs. 39.7 million.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues & Tribunal Findings:\n1.\nTime Limitation – Section 122(9)\no\nShow cause notice: 25.08.2023\no\nLast compliance: 02.04.2024\no\nLimitation: 180 days + 90 days for adjournments = Expiry by 15.04.2024\no\nOrder passed: 24.05.2024\no\nCommissioner’s extension order (dated 19.04.2024) was neither justified with reasons nor shared with the taxpayer.\no\nHeld: As per binding judgments (PTCL 2017 CL 736, 2020 PTD 147), extension without justifiable reasons or opportunity of hearing is invalid; order passed beyond limitation is null and void.\n2.\nMisinterpretation of Tax Treaties (Section 107 vs Section 11(5))\no\nTaxpayer claimed exemption based on Articles 6 (Property), 14 (Capital Gains) of treaties with UK/UAE.\no\nOIR incorrectly interpreted “may be taxed” as implying dual jurisdiction and invoked Section 11(5).\no\nTribunal applied principles from 2023 PTD 863 (SC), emphasizing international tax treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention.\no\nHeld: Taxing rights for property and capital gains rest exclusively with the source country (UK/UAE). Therefore, Pakistan has no taxing right, and no foreign tax credit under section 103 was necessary.\no\nSection 107(2) provides overriding effect to tax treaties; income rightly declared exempt.\n3.\nBinding Precedents Ignored\no\nTribunal cited its earlier decision in ITA No. 4299/LB/2022 (Arshad Gulzar), where identical treaty interpretation was accepted.\no\nOIR disregarded this on the pretext that department had filed a reference before High Court.\no\nHeld: Until reversed by the High Court, Tribunal orders are binding (see FBR instruction C.No.1(7)DT-14/92 and 2016 PTD 722).\n4.\nImproper Use of Section 122(5A)\no\nTribunal reiterated that section 122(5A) cannot be used to re-investigate or seek fresh evidence.\no\nOIR’s repeated notices for documents crossed the permissible limits under section 122(5A).\no\nHeld: The assessment was not erroneous merely because of difference in interpretation when binding precedent existed. Therefore, jurisdiction under 122(5A) was illegally assumed.\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\nThe amendment order dated 24.05.2024 passed under Section 122(5A) is annulled being time-barred, without lawful jurisdiction, and based on misinterpretation of tax treaties.\n________________________________________\nLegal Citations Relied Upon:\n•\nPTCL 2017 CL 736 – Supreme Court: Extension must be with written, justified reasons.\n•\n2020 PTD 147 – Invalid extension renders the order void.\n•\n2023 PTD 863 – Supreme Court on interpretation of international tax treaties.\n•\nITA No. 4299/LB/2022 – ATIR ruling in favor of exemption for foreign income.\n•\n2016 PTD 722 – Law of precedent: earlier bench decision is binding.\n•\nFBR Circular C.No.1(7)DT-14/92 – Tribunal orders are binding on tax officials.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=107,122(5A),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2460/LB/2024 (Tax Year 2022), Date of hearing: 07.10.2024 Date of order: 23.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE, MEMBER AND TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Mudassar Shuja, Advocate\nRespondent by; Mr. Ali Ahsan Warraich, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. M. JAHANGIR MUGGO, FAISALABAD ...APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, ZONE-AEOI, LAHORE. ...RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25695", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 195 = 2025 SLD 195", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDUXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4272/LB/2022. Date of hearing: 07.03.2023. Date of order: 04.04.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shoaib Saleem, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Imran, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Malik Super Store, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25696", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 196 = 2025 SLD 196", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1149/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 27.06.2024. Date of order: 08.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Adeel Anwar, FCA\nRespondent by: Ms. Faiza Sadaf, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Tanveer Spinning & Weaving Mills (Pvt), Ltd. Lahore\nvs\nDCIR, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25697", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 197 = 2025 SLD 197", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122(3)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2741/LB/2022. Date of hearing: 02.07.2024. Date of order: 10.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN, MEMBER AND SHABAN BHATTI, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zafar Iqbal, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahmed Muhy-ud-Din, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Raja Green Farms (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25698", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 198 = 2025 SLD 198", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1799/LB/2021. Date of hearing: 17.05.2024. Date of order: 20.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Khalida Irshad, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Talib Hussain, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Usman Steel Casting, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25699", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 199 = 2025 SLD 199", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3293/LB/2019. Date of hearing: 19.03.2024. Date of order: 20.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Bilal Zia, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Rafaqat Hussain, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, LTU, Lahore\nVS\nM/s. Escorts Investment Bank Ltd, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25700", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 200 = 2025 SLD 200", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=170", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1231/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 09.07.2024. Date of order: 15.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Hasham Khan, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Anadil, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sindbad's Wonderland (Pvt) Ltd, Karachi\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland revenue" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25701", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 201 = 2025 SLD 201", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2743/LB/2024. Date of Hearing: 08.10.2024. Date of order: 18.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Present; Monim Sultan (Member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ch. Qamar-Uz-Zaman, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Lahore Cantonment Board (LCB), Lahore\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-V, RTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25702", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 202 = 2025 SLD 202", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1097/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 21.03.2024. Date of hearing: 21.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Iqbal Anwar Mehdi, ITP\nRespondent by: Mrs. Mahrukh Imtiaz, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian Amer Rashid, DHA, Lahore\nVS\nCIR, AEOI Zone, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25703", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 203 = 2025 SLD 203", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45B(3)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1198/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 09.07.2024. Date of order: 16.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ghualm Murtaza, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Zia, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. AHN Synthetic (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore. \nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-I, LTU, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25704", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 204 = 2025 SLD 204", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDTXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 4394/LB/2023. Date of hearing: 28.02.2024. Date of order: 08.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Saqib Raza, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ghulam Hussain Yasir, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. National Educational Network (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25705", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 205 = 2025 SLD 205", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDSTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),34(1),33(5),43-A,45B", - "Case #": "STA NO. 120/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 03.10.2024. Date of order: 14.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MONIM SULTAN (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asghar Raza, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ghulam Hussain Yasir, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Gujranwala Electric Power Company Ltd, Gujranwala Appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-IV, LTO, Gujranwala" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25706", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 206 = 2025 SLD 206", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDSTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),11(3)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1215/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 12.07.2024. Date of order: 15.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Saqib Raza, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Javed Iqbal, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Ghazi Fabrics International Limited, Lahore Appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-III, LTO, Lahore Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25707", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 207 = 2025 SLD 207", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDSXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "Income tax Reference No. 32 of 2022. Date of order: 13.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE AND JAWAD HUSSAIN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Imam ul Haq, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Malik Ataat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the respondent with Yousaf Khan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mubashir Yameen\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25708", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 208 = 2025 SLD 208", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 103 of 2024. Date of order: 11.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE AND JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Faisal Rasheed, Advocate along with Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate for the applicant. \nMalik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "Hamid Saleem\nVS\nCommissioner Inand Revenue etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25709", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 209 = 2025 SLD 209", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 7002/LB/2023. Date of hearing: 01.10.2024. Date of order: 08.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQUE (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Rana Munir Hussain, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ms. Saman Gulzar, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. S.M. Builders, Lahore\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-V, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25710", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 210 = 2025 SLD 210", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=33(14),34(15)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 248/LB/2018. Date of hearing: 05.12.2023. Date of order: 12.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Yousaf Ismail, DR\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr Tafazul Abas, Regional Manager of M/s. Faisal Bank Ltd. Lahore.\nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-1, CRTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25711", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 211 = 2025 SLD 211", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "W.P.NO. 2476 of 2024. Date of order: 12.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. CDIGITAL AS JV\nVS\nAssistant Commissioner, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25712", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 212 = 2025 SLD 212", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1309/IB/2024. Date of hearing: 13.11.2024. Date of order: 13.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M.M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Adviocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Zahir Shah, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Khawar Sultan, Village Sehala Chaudhrian, Islamabad Applicant\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone South, Unit-II, RTO, Islamabad respondent." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25713", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 213 = 2025 SLD 213", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3565/LB/2019. Date of hearing: 04.04.2024. Date of order: 18.042024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khawar Siddique, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Azeem Shoukat, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR RTO, Lahore\nVS\nMr. Walid Iqbal, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25714", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 214 = 2025 SLD 214", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2333/LB/2018. Date of hearing: 02.09.2024. Date of order: 04.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ANWAAR UL HAQUE; MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Farrrukh Aslam, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Maqsood Ahmed, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTO, Lahore\nVS\nM/s. Pak Elektron Limted, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25715", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 215 = 2025 SLD 215", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1180/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 06.08.2024. Date of order: 06.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT; MONIM SULTAN, MEMBER AND SHABAN BHATTI, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ghulam Murtaza Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Gulffam Afzal, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Himmel Pharmaceuticals (Pvt) Ltd. Lahore\nVS\nCIR, Zone-II, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25716", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 216 = 2025 SLD 216", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=46", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3661/LB/2023. Date of hearing: 22.06.2023. Date of order: 27.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MONIM SULTAN (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Javed Iqbal Qazi, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ms. Zil-e- Huma, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. H.N. Textile Pvt, Ltd, Lahore.\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25717", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 217 = 2025 SLD 217", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDRXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)/(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2686/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 29.10.2024. Date of order: 30.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT; MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant b y: Mr. Hassan Ali Qadri, FCA\nRespondent by: Mr. Nadeem Asad, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Meezab-e-Kabba Travels & Tours (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore appellant\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25718", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 218 = 2025 SLD 218", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A(4)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1247/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 02.08.2024. Date of order: 21.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Mehtab Haider Kazmi, ACA\nRespondent by: Ms. Ghazala Nasir Siddiq, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Hunza Steel (pvt) Ltd. Lahore Appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25719", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 219 = 2025 SLD 219", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1129/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 29.10.2024. Date of order: 29.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: IMRAN MUNIR (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr, Ashiq Ali Rana, Advocate\nRespondent by: Syeda Iqra, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Shamshir Chemical Industries (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore Appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-III, CTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25720", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 220 = 2025 SLD 220", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),11(3)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1279/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 23.09.2024. Date of order.27.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: IMRAN MUNIR (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sikandar Ali, Advocate\nRespondent by: Syed Usman Sheikh, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Nazir Steel Mills. Lahore. Appellant\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-IV, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25721", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 221 = 2025 SLD 221", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),11(3)", - "Case #": "MA(Stay) No. 5777/LB/2024. STA No. 1569/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 29.10.2024. Date of order: 01.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMEDE (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zeeshan Asif, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Usman Azam Bhatti, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Pak West Industries (Pvt) Ltd. Lahore appellant\nvs\nCIR, LTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25722", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 222 = 2025 SLD 222", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1404/LB/2024. Date of hearing; 13.06.2024. Date of order: 10.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT:MONIM SULTAN (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Anwar-ul-Haq, CFO, A.R\nRespondent by: Mr. Sufian Adeel , DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Gourmet Foods, Lahore appellant\nVS\nThe CIR Zone-I, LTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25723", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 223 = 2025 SLD 223", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120.111(1)(d),113", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3480/LB/2019. Date of hearing: 16.08.2024. Date of order: 20.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Imran Munir, Adv\nRespondent by: 20.08.2024.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Zainab Imamat Faisalabad appellant\nvs\nThe CIR RTO, Faisalabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25724", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 224 = 2025 SLD 224 = (2025) 131 TAX 191 = 2025 PTD 1300", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTk", - "Key Words:": "Constitutional Petition Seeking Stay of Sales Tax Recovery During Pendency of Sales Tax Reference\nCase: Reliance Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue & Others\nCourt: Lahore High Court\nNature: Constitution Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution\nRelief Sought: Stay of recovery notices during pendency of Sales Tax Reference No.93/2024\nStatus: Petition dismissed as withdrawn\n________________________________________\nKey Facts\n•\nThe petitioner, a public limited company engaged in textile manufacturing and export, challenged recovery notices issued under Section 48 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for recovery of Rs. 56,875,908.\n•\nThe said recovery was initiated despite the fact that Sales Tax Reference (STR No.93/2024) had already been filed on 27.06.2024 under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which remains pending.\n•\nInstead of moving the Division Bench where the STR is pending, the petitioner approached this Court through a writ petition to stay coercive recovery actions.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Questions\n1.\nWhether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, can stay recovery proceedings when a Sales Tax Reference is already pending before a Division Bench?\n2.\nWhether the pendency of STR before the competent forum provides an equally efficacious alternate remedy, barring writ jurisdiction?\n________________________________________\nLegal Findings\nAvailability of Alternate Remedy\n•\nThe Court held that once the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has adjudicated the matter and an STR is pending before a Division Bench, the petitioner has an equally efficacious and adequate remedy under the law.\n•\nThe petitioner did not file an application for urgent hearing or stay in the STR, nor did it attach an urgent motion, which could have expedited relief.\nPrinciples of Alternate Remedy & Jurisdiction\n•\nThe constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 should not be invoked when an adequate alternate remedy is available (as per PLD 2024 SC 780, 2021 SCMR 1675).\n•\nFiling a writ to seek relief that is already obtainable in the pending STR violates legal maxims:\no\nWhat can’t be done directly can’t be done indirectly,\no\nWhat should be done through a specific legal procedure must be done accordingly\n(PLD 2018 SC 189, 2023 SCMR 1871).\n Non-maintainability of Writ Against High Court\n•\nThe Court held that it cannot issue writs against itself or direct a Division Bench to hear a matter (PLD 2021 SC 391, PLD 2010 SC 61), and therefore this petition is not maintainable.\nPrinciple of Fair Trial – Article 10-A\n•\nThe petitioner’s reference is pending before a judicial forum, satisfying the right to fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution (PLD 2024 SC 337).\n•\nNo violation of Article 10-A occurs when a lawful remedy is in progress and no denial of hearing has taken place.\n________________________________________\nCited Laws & Constitutional Provisions\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990\no\nSection 47 – Sales Tax Reference to High Court\no\nSection 48(1)(a) – Recovery of Government Dues\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973\no\nArticle 10-A – Right to fair trial\no\nArticle 199 – Constitutional Jurisdiction of High Court (Writ)\n•\nCompanies Ordinance, 1984 / Companies Act, 2017 – Incorporation law of petitioner\n________________________________________\nKey Case Law Cited\n•\nPLD 2024 SC 337 – Jawad S. Khawaja: Components of fair trial\n•\n1993 SCMR 39 – Chanda Motors: Assessment order not final until all forums are exhausted\n•\n2006 SCMR 1519 – Caltex Oil: Tribunal is first independent forum for adjudication\n•\n2024 PTD 30, 2014 PTD 841, 2009 PTD 1220 – Writ relief granted before filing of reference when stay expired\n•\n2024 PTD 1085 = 2024 SCMR 853 – Recovery not allowed if final appeal is pending\n•\nPLD 2018 SC 449, PLD 2021 SC 391 – High Court cannot issue writ against itself\n________________________________________\nFinal Holding\n•\nThe Court held that since an STR is already pending, the petitioner has an adequate alternate remedy.\n•\nNo exceptional circumstances were shown to justify invoking writ jurisdiction.\n•\nPetition was declared not maintainable, and on request of counsel, was disposed of as withdrawn to pursue relief in the STR.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 15377 of 2024, date of order: 15-11-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Tanveer Hussain Ansari and Abdul Sattar, Advocates for petitioner.\nMalik Muhammad Bakhsh Khakhi, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab.\nMr. Kashif Nadeem Malik, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RELIANCE WEAVING MILLS LIMITED \nVS\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE (FBR) THROUGH CHAIRMAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25725", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 225 = 2025 SLD 225", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 708/MB/2024. Date of hearing: 22.10.2024. Date of order: 22.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: DR. SHAH KHAN (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran Nawaz Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Mashooq Hussain, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Barat Hussain, Muzaffargarh appellant\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Multan respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25726", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 226 = 2025 SLD 226", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO.1297/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 21.05.2024. Date of order: 30.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT : MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Sheikh Aqeel Ahmed, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ms. Shiraza Hameed, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Haleeb Foods, Ltd, Lahore appellant\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-II, LTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25727", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 227 = 2025 SLD 227", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDQXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 46 of 2024. Date of order; 03.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MIRZA WAQAS RAUF, JUDGE AND ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Imran ul Haq, Advocate for the applicant-taxpayer.\nMr. Manzoor Hussain, Advocate for the respondent-department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Ghulam Shabbir Hussain appellant\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue etc. respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25728", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 228 = 2025 SLD 228", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=165", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 13/LB/2018. Date of hearing; 14.11.2024. Date of order: 14.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nadeem Ahmed, DR. \nRespondent by: Mr.Shabbir Fakhar-uddin, ITP", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, RTO, Multan appellant\nvs\nM/s. Abdul Waheed Khan and Company (pvt) Ltd, Kot Addu respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25729", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 229 = 2025 SLD 229", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 01/2024. Date of Order: 05.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE AND MUHAMMAD QURESHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Zahid Rafique and Faisal Rasheed, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMalik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Amir Sajjad \nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25730", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 230 = 2025 SLD 230", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=73(4)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1458/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 18.07.2024. Date of order: 24.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ANWAAR UL HAQUE: (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Sabir Asif, ACMA\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahmed Taimoor, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Perfect International, Lahore applicant\nVS\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25731", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 231 = 2025 SLD 231", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 7000/LB/2023. Date of hearing; 19.04.2024.Date of order: 22.04.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Iqtidar Ahmed, DR\nRespondent by; Mr. Tabarak Hussain, Adv", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, Zone-V, LTO, Lahore appellant\nVS\nMr. Farrukh Ijaz, Gujranwala respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25732", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 232 = 2025 SLD 232", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDOC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1443/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 11.07.2024. Date of order: 22.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Syd Mehtab Haider Kazmi, ACA\nRespondent by; Mr. Bilal Zia, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Brothers Metal Works (Pvt) Ltd, Gujranwala applicant\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25733", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 233 = 2025 SLD 233", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDOCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A(2)", - "Case #": "ITR NO.75751/2024. Date of order; 05.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ASIM HAFEEZ, JUDGE AND ABID AZA SHEIKH, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zeeshan Ali, Advocate for the applicant.\nMr. Tabassum Ali, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Rashid Ahmed \nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25734", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 234 = 2025 SLD 234 = (2025) 131 TAX 43", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODk", - "Key Words:": "Grant of Approval under Clause (36) of Section 2 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to a Non-Profit Organization\nDetails:\nThe Taxpayer, a non-profit organization incorporated in 2016 as a public limited company without share capital under Section 42 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (now the Companies Act, 2017), applied for approval under Clause (36) of Section 2 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for charitable status. The application was rejected by the Commissioner and the appeal was dismissed by the Chief Commissioner. The case was then brought before the Tribunal.\nThe department denied approval based on:\nThe Taxpayer charging 35% interest on microloans, higher than commercial bank rates.\nAlleged lack of charitable activity beyond financial training for borrowers.\nPayment of salary to CEO, allegedly a promoter/trustee.\nThe Taxpayer argued:\nIt was previously granted approval under similar conditions.\nComparable microfinance entities have been approved.\nThe CEO is not a trustee/promoter.\nIts income is used solely for the organizations welfare goals, not private benefit.\nHigher interest rates are a sectoral norm due to unsecured lending risks.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held that:\nReliance on the Khushali Bank case was misplaced due to factual differences.\nNo evidence was provided that promoters or trustees derived personal benefit.\nThe CEO’s salary was permissible as he was not a trustee/promoter.\nThe Taxpayer met all requirements of Clause (36) of Section 2.\nHigh interest rates in microfinance do not disqualify an organization from exemption, especially when compared to private lenders charging exorbitant rates.\nPrior approvals to similar organizations show that denial in this case was discriminatory.\nAccordingly, the Tribunal vacated the orders of the Commissioner and Chief Commissioner as illegal and directed approval be granted under Clause (36) of Section 2 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nCitations:\nOxford University Press v. CIR [(2019) 120 Tax 157 (S.C. Pak)]", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=2(36),Clause (59) of Part 1 of second scheduleIncome Tax Rules, 2002=218", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3960/LB/2022 decided on 31.10.2024. Date of hearing: 17.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, JUDICIAL MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Mohsin Nasrullah, FCA, for the Appellant.\nMs Tabinda Shaheen, DCIR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. RURAL COMMUNITY PROGRAM (RCDP), LAHORE\nVS\nTHE CIR CTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25735", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 235 = 2025 SLD 235", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDODg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "ITR NO. 13 of 2022. Date of order: 16.02.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: SULTAN TANVIR AHMED, JUDGE AND MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Jehlum Zone)\nVS\nMuhammad Tanveer etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25736", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 236 = 2025 SLD 236", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDOHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "ITR NO. 120 of 2024. Date of order: 11.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE AND JAWAD HUSSAIN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Manzoor Hussain, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Imran Ahmed\nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25737", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 237 = 2025 SLD 237", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDOHk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=218(1)(a)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1988/IB/2024. Date of hearing: 17.12.2024. Date of order: 17.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: NASIR IQBAL (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Hafiz Muhammad Idrees, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Rafaqat Hussain, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Ali Abbas Syed, Islamabad appellant\nVS\nThe Deputy Commissioner, Inland Revenue, South Zone, RTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25738", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 238 = 2025 SLD 238", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=176,122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1288/IB/2024. Date of hearing:08.10.2024. Date of order: 18.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: IMRAN LATIF MINHAS (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ali Siddiqui, Advocate/AR\nRespondent by: Mr. Rafaqat Hussain Warsi/DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Javed Zaheer, Islamabad\nVS\nThe Commissioner, Islamabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25739", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 239 = 2025 SLD 239", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "ITR NO. 04 of 2020. Date of order: 05.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE AND MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the applicant. Mian Arif Nazir, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan along with Yousaf Khan, S.O.I.R Legal RTO, Rawalpindi.\n Mr. Usama Jamshaid, Advocate for respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue\nVS\nFazal Mehmood Shah etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25740", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 240 = 2025 SLD 240", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 7317/LB/2023. Date of hearing; 30.01.2024. Date of order; 13.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ZAHID SIKANADAR (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by; Mr. Hamza Ashraf, FCA, Mr. Shahbaz Hass ACA & Silwat Malik ACA.\nRespondent by: Syed Faizan Ali Zaidi, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. SNGPL Ltd. appellant\nvs\nCIR, LTU, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25741", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 241 = 2025 SLD 241", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.3924 of 2024. Date of order: 18.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: AAMER FAROOQ, CHIEF JUSTICE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Asif Fareed and Hafiz Irfan Shabber, Advocates for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Safdar Ijaz\nVs\nOfficer of Inland Revenue, Islamabad, etc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25742", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 242 = 2025 SLD 242", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNC8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "ITR NO. 13 of 2023. Date of order: 17.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUDGE AND JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Muhammad Abbas, Advocate for the applicant\nMr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate for the respondent No. 1", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue\nVS\nM/s. Medpoint Distributors etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25743", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 243 = 2025 SLD 243", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNCs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=147,127(1)", - "Case #": "W.P. NO. 4062/2024. Date of order: 24.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. M. Imran ul Haq, advocate for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Redtone Telecommunications Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd.\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan snd others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25744", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 244 = 2025 SLD 244", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1403/IB/2024. Date of hearing: 13.11.2024. Date of order: 11.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT; M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Aazar A. Hameed, ACA. Mr. Moeen-uddin, ACA\nRespondent by: Ms. Naila Gul, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Attock Gen Limited, Rawalpindi, appellant\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, CTO, Islamabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25745", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 245 = 2025 SLD 245 = 2025 PTCL 99", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNDg", - "Key Words:": "1. Case Background & Legal Issues\n•\nPetitioners:\no\nM/s Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA)\no\nM/s Communicator’s Globe Private Limited\no\nM/s Excel Labs Private Limited\n•\nRespondents:\no\nFederal Board of Revenue (FBR)\no\nTax Department\n•\nLegal Issues:\no\nWhether advance tax under Section 147 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, can be coercively recovered without issuing notices under Sections 137 and 138.\no\nWhether an advance tax estimate filed by a taxpayer under Section 147(6) can be rejected by the Commissioner.\no\nWhether the taxpayer has a right to appeal against a recovery order for advance tax.\n________________________________________\n2. Summary of Each Petition\n(i) Writ Petition No. 181/2019 (PTA)\n•\nThe PTA challenged the coercive recovery of PKR 1,376,231,788.\n•\nThe Tax Department attached PTA’s bank account under Section 140 without issuing prior notices under Sections 137 or 138.\n•\nPTA argued:\no\nIt filed an estimate under Section 147(6), showing no advance tax was payable.\no\nA refund was due for Tax Year 2018.\no\nNo assessment was completed before the recovery.\n•\nTax Department’s defense:\no\nAdvance tax was payable, and FBR had no obligation to issue additional notices before recovery.\no\nSince PTA missed the payment deadline, FBR was within its rights to attach the bank account.\n(ii) Writ Petition No. 4497/2022 (Communicator’s Globe)\n•\nThe petitioner challenged FBR’s demand of Rs. 1.96 billion in advance tax for Tax Year 2021.\n•\nThe Commissioner Appeals annulled the tax assessment, but FBR still issued a demand under Section 147.\n•\nRs. 49 million was recovered coercively through bank account attachment.\n•\nArguments:\no\nThe assessment order was annulled, so no valid basis existed for the advance tax demand.\no\nNo notice under Section 137 or 138 was issued before recovery.\n(iii) Writ Petition No. 4558/2022 (Excel Labs)\n•\nFBR issued a notice under Section 147, demanding Rs. 35.27 million.\n•\nExcel Labs filed an estimate under Section 147(6), stating only Rs. 2.34 million was payable.\n•\nFBR ignored the estimate and recovered the full demand under Section 140.\n•\nArguments:\no\nSection 147(6) allows taxpayers to file estimates, which FBR cannot reject without statutory authority.\no\nThe Finance Act, 2021 removed the Commissioner’s power to reject estimates, so FBR’s actions were illegal.\n________________________________________\n3. Court’s Key Findings\n(i) Advance Tax is a Legal Obligation, but FBR Must Follow Due Process\n•\nAdvance tax under Section 147 is a statutory liability (i.e., a tax charge) and must be paid as per the law.\n•\nHowever, FBR cannot bypass due process—it must issue notices under Sections 137 and 138 before coercive recovery.\n(ii) FBR Cannot Ignore Taxpayer Estimates (For Tax Years Without Commissioner’s Power to Reject)\n•\nThe Finance Act, 2018 granted the Commissioner power to reject estimates, but the Finance Act, 2021 removed this power.\n•\nFor tax years where the Commissioner lacked authority, FBR could not unilaterally discard estimates filed under Section 147(6).\n•\nIf the estimate was incorrect, the only remedy was a surcharge under Section 205.\n(iii) Taxpayers Have the Right to Appeal Against Coercive Recovery\n•\nThe rejection of a tax estimate or advance tax recovery must be treated as an appealable order.\n•\nWithout a proper order, taxpayers cannot seek redress, making FBR’s actions procedurally unfair.\n(iv) FBR’s Recovery Actions Were Unlawful in These Cases\n•\nIn all three petitions, FBR failed to issue notices under Section 137 or 138 before using Section 140 for coercive recovery.\n•\nThe coercive recovery was declared illegal.\n________________________________________\n4. Court’s Final Judgment\nPetitioners writ petitions were allowed.\nFBR’s coercive recovery actions were declared illegal.\nFBR must refund amounts collected in excess of actual advance tax liability.\nTaxpayers’ estimates under Section 147(6) cannot be rejected without legal authority.\nFBR must follow due process before recovering advance tax.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(63),4,4(1),4(6),114,120,122,122(5A),137,137(2),138,138(1),140,147,147(1),147(1)(d),147(2),147(4),147(4A),147(4B),147(5),147(5A),147(5B),147(6),147(7),147(10),205(1A)Income Tax Act, 1922=18-A,18A(5)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 181/2019", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONERS BY: Ch. Naeem ul Haq, Ch. Imran ul Haq and Ch. Faheem ul Haq, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Mr. Osama Shahid, Advocate for the Tax Department in Writ Petition\nNo.181 of 2019. Mr. Ghulam Qasim Bhatti, Advocate for the Tax Department in Writ Petition No.4497 & 4558 of 2022. Mr. Aqeel Akhtar Raja and Raja Muhammad Jawad Arslan, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Pakistan Telecommunication Authority through its Director (Budget & Accounts)\nvs.\nFederation of Pakistan for the purpose of Service through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25746", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 246 = 2025 SLD 246", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNHo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),33", - "Case #": "Criminal Misc. No. 2217-B of 2024.Date of order; 23.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: BABAR SATTAR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Ahmed Masood, Advocate for\nthe petitioner. Mr. Razi Ul Haq Qureshi, Deputy \n Director I&IIR, Islamabad. Raja Inam Ameen Minhas and Ch. Ehtisham Ul Haq, Special Prosecutor, I&I, FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Shahid Hussain Khawaja\nVersus\nThe State and another." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25747", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 247 = 2025 SLD 247 = (2025) 131 TAX 236", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNDNHk", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax – Inclusion of Government Subsidy in Turnover for Minimum Tax Calculation\nDetails:\nThe respondents/taxpayers, public limited companies (Discos) engaged in the distribution of electricity, challenged the inclusion of Federal Government subsidy in turnover for the purpose of minimum tax under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR), acting under Section 122(5A), passed an order charging minimum tax under Section 113, by treating the government subsidy as part of turnover and making an apportionment under Section 67.\nThe Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the Discos, holding that the subsidy could not be added as turnover under Section 113 since it was exempt under Clause (102A) of Part I of the Second Schedule. The department then filed a reference before the High Court to determine whether subsidy should be included in turnover for tax purposes.\nArguments:\n•\nDiscos Position:\no\nMinimum tax under Section 113 applies only to amounts billed and received from consumers for the sale of electricity.\no\nThe subsidy received from the Federal Government is not a receipt from the sale of goods, but rather a reimbursement, and therefore, should not be included in turnover for minimum tax purposes.\no\nGross receipts must be derived from the sale of goods, and since the subsidy does not arise from such sales, it should be excluded.\n•\nTax Departments Position:\no\nSubsidy is a revenue receipt that forms part of total income derived from the sale of electricity.\no\nThe turnover definition under Section 113 includes all revenue receipts, including those in the form of government subsidies.\no\nAs a result, the subsidy must be included in turnover for minimum tax computation.\nHeld:\n•\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the tax department, holding that:\no\nSubsidy constitutes revenue receipts and is derived from the sale of electricity.\no\nThe total turnover under Section 113 includes both the amount recovered from consumers and the subsidy granted by the government.\no\nConsequently, minimum tax under Section 113 is chargeable on the cumulative revenue, including subsidy.\nCitations:\n•\nGeneration, Transmission and Distribution of Electricity Power Act, 1997 – Section 31(7)\n•\nNEPRA (Tariff, Standards and Procedure) Rules – Rule 17\n•\nCase Referred: CIR v. M/s QESCO (2022 PTD 1844)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=67,113,120,122(5A),133,Clause (102A) of part I of Second Schedule", - "Case #": "ITR No. 73049 of 2022, decided on 06.12.2023, date of hearing: 06.12.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Riaz Begum, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema Malik Abdullah Raza, Falak Slier Khan, Shahid Sarwar Chahil, Liaqat Ali Chaudhry, Syed Zain ul Abideen Bokhari and Waqar A. Sheikh Advocates for the Applicants.\nM/s Malik Kashif Rafiq Rajwana, Malik Asif Rajwana, Ehtisham ud Din Khan, Malik Rizwan Khalid, Muhammad Umer Rafiq, Muhammad Adeel Chaudhry, Rana Tahir Mahmood, Abdul Latif, Qari Zuhaib ur Rehman Zubairi, Muhammad Afzal Dharala, Advocates for respondents/ for applicants in ITR Nos.74710 and 74708 of 2017, ITR Nos.59530,76238 and 76250 of 2023.\nMalik Muhammad Arshad Hameed. Advocate for respondent in ITR No.82911 of 2017.\nM/s Main Ashiq Hussain. Muhammad Arshad, Waqas Ahmad Aziz, Shehzad Ahmad and Mian Muhammad Naeem Wattoo, Advocates for respondents/for applicants in 1TR Nos. 14774 and 14763 of 2023.\nM/s Samar Masood Soofi, Shamsher Ali, Arslan Saleem and Rana Muhammad Mehtab, Advocates for respondents in CIR reference applications.\nMr. Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G. for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS\nM/S GUJRANWALA ELECTRIC POWER CO. (GEPCO)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25748", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 248 = 2025 SLD 248", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),126A,131(I)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 667/MB/2024. Date of hearing: 24.10.2024. Date of hearing: 24.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: DR. SHAH KHAN, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shabbir Fakhr-ud-Din, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Mashooq Hussain, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Ibrahim, Multan appellant\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Multan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25749", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 249 = 2025 SLD 249", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25", - "Case #": "STA NO. 756/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 10.07.2024. Date of order: 29.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hashim Aslam Butt, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Asif. DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. ANN Global(Pvt) Ltd, Lahore appellant\nVS\nThe CIR, Unit-02, Zone-1, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25750", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 250 = 2025 SLD 250", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120.177", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 900/LB/2019. Date of hearing: 02.09.2024. Date of order: 03.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUHAMMAD JMAIL BHATTI, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Zil-e-Huma, DR\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CIR, Zone-I, RTO-II, Lahore appellant\nVS\nM/s. A&R Co. Industrial, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25751", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 251 = 2025 SLD 251", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3189/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 11.09.2024. Date of order: 11.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Navid Farid, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Yasir Butt, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed Shamshad Hussain Lahore Appellant\nVS\nThe CIR, AEOI, Zone, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25752", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 252 = 2025 SLD 252", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYy8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114(1),153(7)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1478/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 05.09.2024. Date of order: 20.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Arshad, FCA\nRespondent by: Mr. Umair Malik, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Archroma Pakistan Ltd, Karachi appellant \nvs\nThe Commissioner-IR, Zone-II, LTO, Karachi respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25753", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 253 = 2025 SLD 253", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYys", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),122(5A),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 1019/KB/2024. Date of hearing: 21.11.2024. Date of order: 21.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Khalid Mehmood, Advocate\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "Abdul Wahab, Karachi applicant \nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-IV, CRTO respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25754", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 254 = 2025 SLD 254", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=140", - "Case #": "ICA NO. 255154 of 2018. Date of order: 17.01.2019.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shahbaz Butt, Advocate for appellant. \nMr. Zahid Sikanadar Sheikh, Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. Ibrar Ahmed, Advocate for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Lahore Electric Supply Company Limited\nVS\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance & 4 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25755", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 255 = 2025 SLD 255", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTYzg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1),122(1),214-C", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 11885 of 2019. Date of order: 28.09.2019.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUDGE AND MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUDGE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mirza Waqas Baig, Advocate for petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue\nVS\nM/s. Greenvelly Premium Super Market (Pvt) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25756", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 256 = 2025 SLD 256", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTY3o", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "ICA NO. 107706 of 2017. Date of order: 12.02.2019.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUDGE AND MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUDGE.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Imran, Advocate for appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Bashir Pipe Industries (Pvt) Ltd.\nVS\nThe Federation of Pakistan & another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25757", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 257 = 2025 SLD 257", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTY3k", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A)", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Application (“ITRA”) No.274 of 2024. Dated; 3rd December 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: Mr. Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Mr. Justice Mohammad Abdur Rahma.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ghulam Murtaza Khuhro, Advocate for Applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUKESH KUMAR (Applicant)\n VS \nAPPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE & OTHERS (Respondent)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25758", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 258 = 2025 SLD 258", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A(4),120,111", - "Case #": "ITA No.1451/IB/2024 MA(AG) No.320/IB/2024.Date of Hearing: 17.12.2024 Date of Order: 17.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: M. M. AKRAM (Judicial Member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Sharif Uddin Khilji, FCA\nRespondent BY: Mrs. Hira Nazir, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Fahad Bin Saeed, P-86 Block-B Satellite Town, Rawalpindi. Applicant\nVs\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, Unit-II, Zone City, RTO, Rawalpindi. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25759", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 259 = 2025 SLD 259", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=53(7)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2681/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 18.09.2024. Date of order: 18.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ali Raza Naseem, Adv\nRespondent by: Ms. Tabinda Shaheen, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mt. Shakir Ullah, Sheikhupura, Lahore applicant\nvs\nThe CIR, Audit-III, CTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25760", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 260 = 2025 SLD 260", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(7),161(1A)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 2484/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 16.10.2024. Date of order: 06.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM(CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Ali Tariq, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Usman Azam Bhatti, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Chanar Sugar Mills Ltd. Lahore. appellant\nVS\nCIR, LTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25761", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 261 = 2025 SLD 261", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1609/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 28.10.2024. Date of order: 05.11.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Nawaz Khurram, Adv\nRespondent by: Mr. Tallat Mehmood Bosal, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Orient Material (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore applicant\nVS\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25762", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 262 = 2025 SLD 262", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=43A", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1099/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 24.09.202. Date of order: 27.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT; MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hashim Aslam Butt, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ghulam Hussain Yasir, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. MEP Solutions (Pvt) Limited, Lahore appellant\nvs\nThe DCIR, Zone-I, LTO, Lahore & Others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25763", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 263 = 2025 SLD 263", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWSs", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO.1168/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 06.08.2024. Date of order: 22.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ANWAAR UL HAQUE (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zeeshan Manzoor, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Adnan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Maple Leaf Power Limited, Lahore applicant\nVS\nThe DCIR, CTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25764", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 264 = 2025 SLD 264", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=34(1),33(5)/(16)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1726/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 01.11.2024. Date of order:", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Naveed, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Foot Patels (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore respondent\nVS\nThe CIR, Zone-I, CRTO, Lahore appellant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25765", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 265 = 2025 SLD 265", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWTg", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25(2)", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1068/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 11.09.2024. Date of order: 16.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hammad Ul Hassan Hanjra, Adv\nRespondent by: Khan Shahzab Bashir, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Batala Steel, Lahore appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone-II, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25766", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 266 = 2025 SLD 266", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWXo", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 3023/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 08.08.2024. Date of order: 09.08.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Irfan Ilyas, FCA \nRespondent by: Mr. Soban Ahmed, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Millat Tractors, Ltd, Lahore Appellant\nvs\nThe ACIR, LTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25767", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 267 = 2025 SLD 267", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTWXk", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA NO.126/LB/2016. Date of hearing: 22.10.2024. Date of order: 28.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUHAMMAD JAIL BHATTI (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: None\nRespondent by: Zil-e-Huma, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Irfan Pharmacy, (Pvt), Okara appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, Zone, RTO-II, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25768", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 268 = 2025 SLD 268", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVTc", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=72B", - "Case #": "STA NOP. 476/LB/2016. Date of hearing; 23.11.2024. Date of order: 05.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: AYESHA FAZIL QAZI (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Tipu Sultan, ITP\nRespondent by: Ms. Qayyum Rani, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Unipet (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, CRTO, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25769", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 269 = 2025 SLD 269", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVTY", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=156", - "Case #": "STA NO. 1420/LB/2022. Date of hearing: 12.09.2023. Date of order: 01.11.2023,", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: ZAHID SIKANADAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Essam Anwar Khokhar, DR\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, RTO, Lahore appellant\nvs\nMr. Mujahid Zafar, Lahore respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25770", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 270 = 2025 SLD 270", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,122(5)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 734/MB/2024,. Date of hearing: 22.10.2024. Date of order: 22.10.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: DR. SHAH KHAN (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed Khan, Adv\nRespondent by: Mr. Rehan Ahmed Khan, Adv", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Javaid Akhtar, Sahiwal Appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, RTO, Sahiwal respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25771", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 271 = 2025 SLD 271", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131(1),120(1)(b)", - "Case #": "ITA No.207/IB/2023. Date of hearing: 18.12.2024 Date of order: 08.01.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Rashid Qureshi, FCA\nRespondent by: Mr. Osama Shahid, L.A. Assisted by Mr. Muhammad Fiaz Hussain, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited; Sona Tower 156 The Mall, Rawalpindi. NTN:1435809-3 Appellant\nVS\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-I), LTO, Islamabad. Respond" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25772", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 272 = 2025 SLD 272", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVESFNTVS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO.1099/LB/2024. Date of hearing: 21.03.2024. Date of order: 21.03.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM (CHAIRMAN)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Iqbal Anwar Mehdi, ITP \nRespondent by: Mrs. Mahrukh Imtiaz, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mian Tahir Rashid, Shadman-II, Lahore appellant\nVS\nCIR, AEOI Zone, LTO, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25773", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 273 = 2025 SLD 273 = 2025 SCMR 174", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTYys", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n-Ss. 39 & 42-Mutation entries-Scope-Any entry available in the revenue record unless it is substituted through a valid entry by the decree of any court or valid attestation of mutation of correction of any rights in the land remains in the field-Simultaneously if once it is found that the entries have been unlawfully changed, it shall be deemed that the old entries would continue.\nKaramat Hussain and others v. Natho Khan and others 2007 CLC 1391 ref.\n(b) West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959)-\n-Para. No. 22-Shamlat Deh land-Ala Maaliks and Adna Maaliks, concepts of-Interpretation of the judgments rendered in the cases of Ladhoo v. B.O.R. (1991 MLD 99), and Ladhoo v. B.O.R in C.Ps. Nos.823 and 824-L of 1990-Appellants were Adna Maaliks who held possession over land in
the Shamlat Deh - Appellants challenged mutation entries and orders of the revenue officers whereby the land in their possession was not recorded as under their ownership consequent to West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959) [ MLR-64 ]-Case of appellants was based on the implementation of the High Court judgment reported as Ladhoo v. B.O.R. (1991 MLD 99), and the Supreme Court judgment Ladhoo v. B.O.R in C.Ps. Nos.823 and 824-L of 1990, wherein they claimed that their rights as Adna Maaliks having possession in the Shamilat Deh had been recognized and upheld in terms of MLR 64 and Notification dated 3rd March, 1960 issued by the West Pakistan Land Commission under the MLR-64 ( 1960 Notification )-Respondents were Ala Maaliks, who claimed a superior right in the Shamlat Deh on the basis of their proprietary rights in the village, meaning thatthey claimed proportionate ownership in the Shamlat Deh according to their proprietorship in the village-Respondents relied on the Hasab Rasad Khewat and the Wajib-ul-Arz to justify their entitlement to proprietary rights in the Shamlat Deh-[Per Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. [Majority view]: Appellants were unable to state what their status over suit land (Shamlat Deh land) was except that they were in possession and cultivating the Shamlat land-It did not create any right in favour of appellants if they were in possession of Shamlat land-It seemed that appellants who were previously Aala Maalik or under the Aala Maalik, wanted to grab Shamlat land on the plea that they were in possession- Without any right or valid entrance upon the Shamlat land they cannot claim any right-Concept of Aala Maalik was no more in existence after promulgation of West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959) [ MLR-64 ]-It was admitted by the appellants that they were not recorded Aala Khud Adna Maalik or Adna Maalik in the village proprietary land-Through the decision of case titled Ladhoo v. B.O.R reported as 1991 MLD 99 and order of dismissal of C.Ps. Nos. 823 and 824-L of 1990 by the Supreme Court no rights were created in favour of the present appellants-For determination of rights in the Shamlat Deh the benchmark as well as formula for grant of rights is on the basis of entitlement of a person in the malkiyat khata; whatever rights he was holding on the basis of said rights he is entitled to get land in the Shamlat Deh-Person who has absolutely no rights in the malkiyat khata, he cannot be granted any right in the Shamlat Deh khata-No right had been created in favour of the appellants by the MLR-64 nor they could show that any right had been created in their favour-Wrong picture of the judgment passed by the High Court reported as 1991 MLD 99 was shown to the Supreme Court-Distribution of Shamlat land upon the proprietary body of village was a rule under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 and wajib-ul-arz also supported the distribution of Shamlat land in accordance with the ownership of the whole proprietary body of the village-In accordance with para 6 of 1960 Notification distribution of Shamlat land was upon two categories only i.e. Adna Maaliks and Ala Khud Adna Maalik and none was entitled for grant of land on the basis of possession only-If anyone was in possession on the Shamlat land without having any right in the proprietorship khata, he had absolutely no right for grant of Shamlat land-The aforementioned two categories create the proprietary body of the village, therefore, they were entitled for distribution of Shamlat land in proportionate with their proprietorship-Appeals were dismissed]-[Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. [Minority view]: High Court judgment reported as Ladhoo v. B.O.R. (1991 MLD 99) ( 1990 HC Judgment ) and the Supreme Court judgment Ladhoo v. B.O.R. in C.Ps. Nos.823 and 824-L of 1990 ( 1991 SC Judgment ) both concluded that the revenue authorities did not commit any illegality in removing the names of Ala Maaliks from column No.3 of the Jamabandi for the year 1945-46 in which they were reflected as owners-This fact alone was enough to show that the rights of Adna Maaliks consequent to MLR 64 and the 1960 Notification had to be recognized, in that, the revenue record had to translate the possessory rights of Adna Maaliks into their proprietary rights-Revenue record showed that the possession of Adna Maaliks in the Shamlat Deh had not been challenged-Secondly, the available records did not reflect that Ala Maaliks had, at any time, challenged MLR 64 or the 1960 Notification; to the contrary, they repeatedly sought exclusive possession in the Shamlat Deh as against Ala-khud-Adna and Adna Maaliks, which were denied by the Supreme Court-Hence, both the 1990 HC Judgment and 1991 SC Judgment recognized the rights of Adna Maaliks and clarified that even where there were no Adna Maaliks under Ala Maaliks, Ala Maaliks could not claim ownership in the Shamlat Deh on account of MLR-64-Furthermore, as per the revenue record and the Jamabandis relied upon, Adna Maaliks did have possession in the Shamlat Deh; therefore, they were entitled to proprietary rights over the land in their possession consequent to MLR 64-There were no superior rights for Ala Maaliks and any claim on the basis of Ala Maalikat stood terminated after MLR-64-Where a person was entered in the revenue record as Ala Maalik as well as Ala-khud-Adna Maalik, they could retain that land as Adna Maalik but not as Ala Maalik-Only time they could retain their title as Ala Maaliks was when there was no Adna Maalik under them-Proprietary rights of Adna Maaliks as on 03.03.1960 was based on MLR 64 and any excess land in their possession for which they claimed proprietary right had to be based on some grant, lease, inheritance or lawful manner involving proper transfer of title in their favour-In the event that there was extra land with no legal backing and subject to Clause 6(d) of the 1960 Notification, an order must be passed to that effect and the land would resume in favour of the government-Appellants proprietorship claim on the basis of possession was backed by law and in accordance with the judgments of the Supreme Court-Appeals were allowed and impugned judgment was set aside.]\nLadhoo v. B.O.R. 1991 MLD 99 distinguished.\nKhanan v. Fateh Sher 1993 SCMR 1578 ref.\n(c) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 185 & 199-Litigation before the High Court and Supreme Court under Article 199 and Article 185 of the Constitution respectively-Creation of a right in favour of one of the parties-Scope-Without any existing right the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot create a new right in favour of any party before the Court.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967=39,42Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185,199", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos.936 to 938 of 2012, order date: 16th September, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 02.07.2010 passed by Lahore High Court at Lahore in W.Ps. Nos.10329 of 2005 and 8274 of 2005).\nPer Amin-ud-Din Khan, J.; Yahya Afridi, J. agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting. Dates of hearing: 13th, 14th, 15th, 20th, 26th February and 2nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants:\nTariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record/Advocate Supreme Court (in Civil Appeal No.936 of 2012).\nSyed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syeda B.H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record (in Civil Appeal No.937 of 2012).\nMuhammad Akram Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Syed Fazaz Raza, Advocate and Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record (in Civil Appeal No.938 of 2012).\nFor the Respondents:\nBarrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court along with Muhammad Ikram Ch., Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Malik Noor Muhammad Awan, Advocate Supreme Court, Maulvi Anwar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record.\nFor Respondent/Government:\nMuhammad Baleegh-uz-Zaman, Addl. A.G., Punjab along with Malik Abdul Waheed, Member Consolidation and Jamshed Gulzar, Tehsildar.\nResearch and assistance by:\nMiss Maira Hassan, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and others-Appellants\nVs\nMEMBER (JUDICIAL-II) BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25774", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 274 = 2025 SLD 274 = 2025 SCMR 168", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTYzk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Pension-Claim for pensionary benefits-Limitation-Pension constitutes a recurring cause of action-Claims constituting payment of lawful dues constitute a recurring cause of action and delay, if any, would not automatically vitiate a claim.\nAbdul Jabbar v. Pakistan Railways 2018 PLC (C.S.) 375; Umar Baz Khan v. Jehanzeb PLD 2013 SC 268; M.R. Gupta v. Union of India and others (1995) 5 SCC 628 and Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh (2008) 8 SCC 648 ref.\n(b) Civil Service Regulations (CSR)-\n-Art. 371-A(ii)-Pensionary benefits, calculation of-Inclusion of contractual period for calculation of pensionary benefits-Contractual period (of less than 5 years),being temporary service, is recognized by Article 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations (CSR) for inclusion in the calculation of pension provided that the contractual period is followed by regularization or confirmation without any gap or interruption, in accordance with clause (ii) of Article 371-A of the CSR-Clause (ii) of Article 371-A of the CSR provides for situations where a government servant has rendered less than five years of continuous temporary or officiating service-In such instances, the period of service shall also be counted towards pension or gratuity, provided that it is immediately followed by confirmation/regularization as a permanent employee-In the present case, since temporary service (contract period) of respondent (employee) was 4 years therefore clause (ii) of Article 371-A was applicable-Record reveals that the respondents service from his contractual appointment to regularization and retirement was continuous and uninterrupted and this had not been disputed by the petitioner (employer)-Therefore, Federal Service Tribunal had rightly allowed the appeal of the respondent-Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.\nChairman, Pakistan Railway, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Shah Jehan Shah PLD 2016 SC 534 and Ministry of Finance through Secretary and others v. Syed Afroz Akhtar Rizvi and others 2021 SCMR 1546 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.1353-L of 2023, order date: 12th September, 2024.\n(Against the Judgment dated 20.02.2023 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Lahore in the Appeal No.8(L) of 2020). Date of hearing: 12th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Munib Akhtar, Athar Minallah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Imran Aziz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nAurangzeb Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (via video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHAIRMAN/DEAN SHEIKH ZAYED HOSPITAL, LAHORE-Petitioner\nVs\nAMJAD MEHMOOD KHAN-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25775", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 275 = 2025 SLD 275 = 2025 SCMR 160", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTYzg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 25-Employee of National Bank of Pakistan-Allegations of omissions and irregularities regarding ATM cash feeding, maintenance and balancing-Penalty of dismissal from service reduced to down gradation by one step in pay scale-Other employees facing similar allegations awarded lesser punishment-Discrimination-In the impugned judgment, the High Court rightly held that under similar facts and circumstances as well as the same set of allegations and charges the other employees of the Bank were awarded lesser punishment by the Disciplinary Cases Committee of the Bank, and no reason whatsoever had been assigned to single out the respondent who had been awarded the major punishment of dismissal from service which amounted to clear discrimination-Nothing had been brought on record to show that respondent was directly responsible or had committed any gross misconduct or negligence in respect of the allegations as contained in the charge sheet/show cause notice, whereas, the guilt regarding allegations and charges in the instant case had been duly accepted through confessional statement by another employee of the bank i.e. the Branch Manager against whom a criminal case was also registered, however, such aspect had been totally ignored while awarding the major punishment of dismissal from service, which, on the face of it, was otherwise not commensurate with the magnitude of the guilt and the role assigned to respondent-Neither in the charge sheet nor in the proceedings before the Disciplinary Cases Committee there was any direct charge of misconduct, fraud, embezzlement of fraud or even the connivance of respondent with the offence committed by the Branch Manager who had accepted his guilt and entire responsibility, therefore, on the allegation of not complying with office circulars to handle the ATM cash feeding and allowing the Branch Manager, who was reportedly performing the said duty as joint custodian, major penalty of dismissal from service was not only harsh but also disproportionate to the allegations/charge besides being discriminatory-Impugned judgment of the High Court by which it modified the penalty of dismissal from service awarded to the respondent to down gradation by one step in his pay scale was upheld-Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nSecretary to Government of the Punjab Food Department, Lahore and another v. Javed Iqbal and others 2006 SCMR 1120 ref.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Punishment, quantum of-Discretion of competent authority-Authority vested with discretion to award punishment to an employee has to ensure that such punishment should commensurate with the magnitude of guilt.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.3649 of 2023, order date: 12th September, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 30.08.2023 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in C.P. No.570 of 2021). Date of hearing: 12th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Yahya Afridi, Shahid Waheed and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Khushal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Quetta).\nKamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President, Karachi-Petitioner\nVs\nROZ-UD-DIN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25776", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 276 = 2025 SLD 276 = 2025 SCMR 153", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTY3o", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973-\n-Rr. 7 & 7-A-Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), S. 9-Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S. 5-Ante-dated promotion-Proforma promotion-Federal Service Tribunal, jurisdiction of-Whether the Tribunal was competent and vested with jurisdiction to declare the respondent (retired civil servant) qualified for promotion when others were promoted and then simultaneously direct the competent authority to consider him for proforma promotion-Held, that it is implicit from the scheme provided under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 (Act of 1973) read with the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 (Rules of 1973) that promotion to a higher post is confined to a civil servant who has not retired or superannuated after attaining the age of superannuation-Said scheme does not contemplate for a civil servant to be considered for promotion after retirement or having attained the age of superannuation-Civil servant who has retired after attaining the age of superannuation cannot claim to be considered for promotion to a higher post-Question of evaluating the fitness or suitability for promotion has always been within the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent authority and it is not shared by the Service Tribunal or a Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction in respect of eligibility and qualification-Tribunal is, therefore, not competent nor vested to alter, vary or in any manner modify the scheme of promotion to a higher post explicitly prescribed under the Act of 1973 and the Rules of 1973-In the present case the Tribunal had transgressed its jurisdiction by declaring the respondent (retired civil servant) to be qualified for promotion from the date others were promoted-Tribunal also fell in error by pre-empting the process required to be adopted by the designated forum for determining the eligibility and entitlement of the respondent for the purposes of proforma promotion-Petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Promotion-Not a vested right-Promotion is neither a vested right nor could it be claimed with retrospective effect-What a civil servant may claim as of right under the law is that the latter should be considered when the cases for promotion are taken up-Civil servant cannot call upon a Tribunal or Court to direct the department to fill the promotion post forthwith or on a particular date or to keep it vacant or under consideration.\nAbid Hussain Shirazai v. Secretary Ministry of Industries and Production 2005 SCMR 1742 and Muhammad Yousaf v. Chairman Railway Board 1999 SCMR 1559 ref.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-If the law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner it has to be done accordingly, otherwise it would not be in compliance with the legislative intent.\nZia ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed Hussain and others 2014 SCMR 1015 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973=7,7-ACivil Servants Act, 1973=9Service Tribunals Act, 1973=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 848 of 2022, heard on 12th December, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 05.1.2022 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad passed in Appeal No. 814(R)CS of 2019). Date of hearing: 12th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Asadullah Khan, Additional Attorney General for Petitioners.\nRespondent in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, FINANCE DIVISION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others-Petitioners\nVs\nMUHAMMAD ANWAR-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25777", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 277 = 2025 SLD 277 = 2025 PTD 244", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTY3k", - "Key Words:": "Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)—\n—Ss.2(3), 9 & 10—Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 9—Sales Tax Rules, 2006, Rr. 19, 20, 21 & 22—Credit notes issued to un-registered persons, non-admissibility of—Maladministration—Scope—Complaint filed regarding the issue of admissibility of credit notes issued to un¬registered persons—Plea of the complainant was that the online portal for filing tax return (IRIS) allowed the declaration of credit notes\nissued to unregistered customers in the sales tax return, however, in subsequent month, the. IRIS portal had reversed the said credit notes, which reflected incidence of maladministration—Explanation made by the FBR was that such blocking, being a bona fide action, was temporary and aimed at abnormal flow of credit notes as unbridled acceptance of credit notes could trigger a wave of tax fraud as in some cases of Registered Persons an abnormality of huge credit notes against supplies made to unregistered persons, drastically reducing their tax liability, had been observed by FBR—In order to address the hardships caused to the Registered Persons, the FBR had, at first, allowed adjustment of Credit Notes against unregistered buyers in case of the automobile sector; and then at second stage, adjustment through Credit Notes for manufacturer-cum retailers, up to certain limits had been allowed—Federal Board Revenue’s detailed reply and actions initiated after the intervention of FTO Secretariat in order to alleviate the grievances of genuine registered persons was fair, cautious and reasonable—Thus, no maladministration was visible—Complaint warranted no further action, which was disposed of.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(3),9,10Sales Tax Act, 1990=9Sales Tax Rules, 2006=19,20,21,22", - "Case #": "Complaint No.0807/KHI/ST/2022, decided on 24th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Dr. Asif Mahmood Jah, Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor Dealing Officer.\nRafaqat Ali Khan, CA Firm Authorized Representative.\nZulfiqar Ali Gopang, Second Secretary IT Wing, FBR, Islamabad Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL HAFEEZ, DIRECTOR AND ANOTHER \nVS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25778", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 278 = 2025 SLD 278 = 2025 SCMR 134", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Balochistan Service Tribunals Act (V of 1974)-\n-S. 4-Balochistan Civil Servants Act (IX of 1974), S. 2(1)(b)-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 199 & 212-Employees of Balochistan Secretariat Service-Matter concerning terms and conditions of service-Ouster of jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-Questions and grievances relating to transfer and postings of a civil servant fell within the ambit of the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant and thus were within the exclusive domain of an administrative Tribunal established under the command of Article 212 of the Constitution-In the present case, the respondents (employees of Balochistan Secretariat Service) were asserting a right which fell within their terms and conditions of service-They were admittedly civil servants within the meaning of the said expression as defined under the Balochistan Civil Servants Act, 1974 (Act of 1974)-There was nothing on record to show that the respondents had availed the departmental remedies provided under the law-It was mandatory for them to have agitated the grievance in the manner prescribed under the scheme of law applicable to a civil servant under the Act of 1974 and the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974 (the Tribunals Act)-Moreover, they had explicitly stated in the memorandum of the petition that the same matter was challenged and it was pending before the Tribunal-Objection regarding maintainability of the petition and its adjudication under Article 199 of the Constitution was raised by the Government but it was not adverted to by the High Court-Respondents were attempting to achieve an object which was not justiciable before the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution-Bar under Article 212 had ousted the jurisdiction of the High Court-Declaration made by the High Court was, therefore, not sustainable-Matter was already pending before the Tribunal and thus the latter had the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it-Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, and the impugned judgment was consequently set aside.\nAyyaz Anjum v. Government of Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Department and others 1997 SCMR 169 and Peer Muhammad v. Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary and others 2007 SCMR 54 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 212-Civil service-Matter concerning terms and conditions of service-Bar contained under Article 212 of the Constitution-Scope-Exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal and the bar contained under Article 212 are of such a nature that that they are attracted even if the grievance arises from an order which may involve questions of mala fide, coram non judice or having been passed without jurisdiction-Civil servant cannot bypass the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal by adding a ground of violation of fundamental right(s)-Service Tribunal will have exclusive jurisdiction in a case founded on the terms and conditions of service even if it involves the question of violation of fundamental rights-Service Tribunal will be vested with jurisdiction even where the case involves the vires of a statutory rule or notification-If a statutory rule or notification adversely affects the terms and conditions of a civil servant the same will be treated as a final order for the purposes of the jurisdiction of a Service Tribunal.\nSyed Arshad Ali and others v. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. and others 2008 SCMR 314; Peer Muhammad v. Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary and others 2007 SCMR 54; Khalid Mahmood Wattoo v. Government of Punjab and others 1998 SCMR 2280; Asadullah Rashid v. Haji Muhammad Munir and others 1998 PLC (C.S.) 1371; Noor Badshahd Khattak v. Government of NWFP and others 2004 PLC (C.S.) 1084 and I.A. Sherwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others 1991 SCMR 1041 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974=4Balochistan Civil Servants Act, (IX of 1974)=2(1)9b)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,212", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 5795 of 2021 and Civil Petition No.2-Q of 2022, order date: 13th December, 2023.\n(Against the judgment dated 30.10.2021 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in C.P. No.631 of 2021). Date of hearing: 13th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 5795 of 2021).\nAyaz Khan Swati, Additional Advocate General, Balochistan for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 2-Q of 2022)\nNemo for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD HASSANULLAH (OMG/B-18), ACTING ADDITIONAL SECRETARY, HEALTH DEPARTMENT, BALOCHISTAN-Petitioner\nVs\nCHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN, QUETTA and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25779", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 279 = 2025 SLD 279 = 2025 SCMR 129", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 148 & 149-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Case of cross-versions-[Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. [Majority view]: Admittedly there was an issue between the parties in respect of land where the incident had occurred-Claim of the complainant was that the petitioners and others attacked upon the father of the complainant with sticks who was injured and subsequently he was thrown in front of the tractor and the tractor ran over their father, which resulted into his death-On the other hand, the petitioners denied the claim of the complainant and narrated that the complainant was the aggressor who attacked upon them-Role of each of the accused had to be established subsequently, in the light of medical report showing cause of death-Case of the prosecution had to be proved through cogent and reliable evidence, which was yet to be produced before the Trial Court-At present stage, on a tentative assessment, prima facie, the petitioners could not be singled out for commission of the offence-Their involvement in the case was one of a further inquiry, on the basis of which, the petitioners were entitled for the grant of bail-Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed; and the petitioners were granted post-arrest bail]-[Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. [Minority view]: Perusal of the record indicated that all the petitioners were expressly nominated in the FIR with specific roles attributed to them-They collectively caused injuries to the deceased and threw him in front of the tractor-Petitioners had not disputed the time, date, and place of occurrence or their presence at the time of occurrence-Medico legal certificate available on record fully supported the prosecution case-There was no contradiction between the medical report and the version put forth by the complainant-Cross-version was registered after a delay of one month and 03 days-Petitioners filed their first post-arrest bail before the Trial Court wherein they never mentioned about the alleged occurrence as mentioned in cross-version-Offence of qatl-i-amd alleged in the present case, being punishable with death or imprisonment for life under Section 302, P.P.C., fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1), Cr.P.C-Present case, on tentative assessment, did not seem to be one of the further inquiry-Petition was dismissed; leave was refused, and consequently petitioners were denied post-arrest bail.\nMuhammad Atif v. State 2024 SCMR 1071 and Bakhti Rehman v. State 2023 SCMR 1068 ref.\nPer Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. [Minority view]\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Rule of consistency-Scope-Rule of consistency is applicable only when one persons case is at par with the rest of the accused whose post-arrest bail has been granted.\nMuhammad Atif v. State 2024 SCMR 1071 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,148,149Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 46 of 2024, heard on 17th May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 19.12.2023 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Misc. No.74603-B of 2023). Date of hearing: 17th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mazhar Iqbal Sidhu, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nMirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. Punjab and Tariq, SI/IO for the State.\nAkhtar Hussain Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAEEM SAJID and others-Petitioners\nVs\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General Punjab and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25780", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 280 = 2025 SLD 280 = 2025 PTD 272", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTU", - "Key Words:": "Maladministration in Income Tax Refund Processing\nDetails:\nA government servants refund application for Tax Year 2018 was rejected on the ground that evidence of tax deduction was missing. However, the rejection order itself contained contradictory statements, indicating evidence was on record yet also stating that no supporting documents were provided. Additionally, the taxpayer was not given an opportunity to be heard, violating Section 170(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nHeld:\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) found this to be a clear case of maladministration and directed FBR to revisit the order and decide the refund claim after affording due opportunity of hearing.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Sections 170(4), 236-K\nFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 – Sections 9(1), 10(4)\nFederal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 – Section 9(1)\nConclusion:\nThe FTO recommended corrective action, emphasizing that FBR must ensure due process in refund claims and rectify departmental negligence.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=170(4),236-KFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=9(1), 10(4)Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reform Act, 2013=9(1)", - "Case #": "Complaint No. 2475/ISB/IT/2022, decided on 28th July, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Dr. Asif Mahmood Jah, Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Lawyer Name:": "NAVEED ANJUM \nvs\nThe SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Majid Qureshi, Advisor Dealing Officer.\nMuhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor Appraisal Officer\nComplainant in person Authorized Representative.\nHaider Abbas, DCIR, RTO, Islamabad Departmental Representative." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25781", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 281 = 2025 SLD 281 = 2025 SCMR 104", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Contract employees-Regularization in service-Scope-Regularization of a contractual employee constitutes a fresh appointment into the stream of regular appointments in civil services.\nProvince of Punjab through Secretary Livestock and Dairy Development Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others v. Dr. Javed Iqbal and others 2021 SCMR 767 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 90, 91 & 99-Executive authority of the Federation, exercise of-Scope-Article 90 of the Constitution provides that the executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised in the name of the President by the Federal Government, which includes the Prime Minister and Federal Ministers but the said authority has to be exercised subject to the Constitution-It means that whenever the authority is exercised, it has to be within the limits prescribed by the Constitution-Neither the Prime Minister nor the members of the Federal Cabinet are permitted to perform their functions beyond the legal provisions i.e. the Constitution, statutory law, and the rules.\n(c) Civil service-\n-Contract employees-Regularization of posts in BS-16 and above-Cabinet Sub-Committee, powers of-Scope-Rules of Business, 1973, were duly framed to conduct the business of the Federal Government-Under these rules, although there is a concept of Cabinet Sub-Committees on different subjects, there is no provision for the intervention of a Cabinet Sub-Committee in governing the terms and conditions of service of employees-However, the Cabinet Sub-Committee can recommend reforms in the service structure, which can be approved by the Cabinet in accordance with the law and the Constitution-As, the Cabinet Sub-Committee lacks the authority to recommend the regularization of posts in BS-16 and above, therefore, any recommendation by the Cabinet Sub-Committee to regularize appointments in BS-16 and above is void ab initio and without any lawful authority.\n(d) Void order-\n-Any action that is void ab initio and without lawful authority cannot be protected under the doctrine of a past and closed transaction.\n(e) Civil service-\n-Contract employees-Regularization in service-Factors to be considered by an employer/institution opting for regularization of its contract employees-Any institution opting for regularization of its employees must be either mandated by law or must carry out regularization through a well-thought-out policy of the institution concerned laying down the criteria and the process for regularization; performance evaluation of the contractual employee must be assessed to determine if the employee meets the standards required for a regular position; there must be availability of positions that match the skills and experience of the contractual employee; the budgetary considerations and financial implication of a regular employee must be weighed and considered-There must be a fair assessment of the employees qualifications, performance and merit, so as to ensure only competent and committed employees are granted permanent employment status.\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice Islamabad and another v. Fazal-e-Subhan and others PLD 2024 SC 515; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Forest, Peshawar and others v. Sher Aman and others 2022 SCMR 406 and M/S. State Oil Company Limited v. Bakht Siddique and others 2018 SCMR 1181 ref.\n(f) Employment-\n-Appointments and promotions in public sector organizations-Transparency, merit and open competition, significance of-Appointments in the public sector based on corruption, nepotism, favoritism, lack of due process, and misuse of authority have long been a significant issue in our society-These practices undermine the principles of fairness and equality, eroding public trust in governmental institutions-When positions are filled not on merit but through personal connections or corrupt practices, it not only deprives deserving candidates of opportunities but also weakens the overall efficiency and integrity of the public sector-Upholding the values of transparency, merit, and open competition in public sector employment is essential for fostering a system where the most qualified individuals serve, ensuring that public resources are utilized effectively and justly for the benefit of all-Without adherence to these principles, the public sector risks becoming a tool for the powerful rather than a service for the people, perpetuating cycles of inequality and inefficiency-Therefore, it is imperative that the recruitment and promotion processes in the public sector be conducted with the highest standards of fairness and accountability, free from any undue influence or bias.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=90,91,99", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos.949, 1025, 1028, 1132 to 1134 of 2023, order date: 13th September, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 31.01.2023, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in I.C.A. No.514 of 2015 and Writ Petition No.2042 of 2020).\nDate of hearing: 8th July, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Yahya Afridi, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz S.A.Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Mrs. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos.949 and 1028 of 2023).\nTariq Mahmood, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No.1025 of 2023).\nAbdul Rahim Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No.1032 of 2023)\nMuhammad Ramzan Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. No.1033 of 2023).\nDr. G. M. Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No.1034 of 2023).\nS.A. Mahmood Khan Sadozai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.2-3 (in C.P. No.949 of 2023).\nZubair Hussain Jarral, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.Ps. Nos.1025 and 1134 of 2023).\nNemo for Respondents (in other cases).\nHassan Nawaz Makhdoom, Additional Attorney General, Hammad Nazar, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Pakistani and HRD Muhammad Abdullah, A.D. Legal FPSC for the Federation.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOHSIN RAZA GONDAL and others-Petitioners\nVs\nSARDAR MAHMOOD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25782", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 282 = 2025 SLD 282 = 2025 SCMR 98", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWS8", - "Key Words:": "Islamic law-\n-Inheritance-Females deprived of their right to inheritance-Father of the parties died about eleven years ago and when the sisters of the petitioner sought their share in his inheritance on 11 October 2021 only then did the petitioner (brother) file a suit for partition, declaration, specific performance and permanent injunction two months thereafter-Pendency of the said suit had no effect on the estate of the deceased nor could exclude the legal heirs from their inheritance-Property of a deceased Muslim vested in his legal heirs immediately upon his death-Inheritance rights of the vulnerable members of society, which include females, must be protected-Unfortunately, a practice has developed whereby those defying shariah and the law, facilitated by some lawyers, adopt various nefarious means, including taking the plea of pending litigation in depriving legal heirs from what is rightfully theirs-Filing of present frivolous petition and the dishonest tactics employed by the petitioner justified the dismissal of present petition with costs in the sum of three hundred thousand rupees, which the petitioner was directed to pay equally to the respondents who had been deprived of their legal shares-Said respondents would also be justified to claim mesne profits for all the days that the petitioner did not abide by his Consent/Joint Statement whereby he agreed to have the property evaluated and pay the legal heirs their respective shares as per shariah.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3381 of 2024 and C.M.A. No. 7234 of 2024 in Civil Petition No. 3381 of 2024, order date: 2nd October, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 26.06.2024 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, passed in W.P. No. 138 of 2023). Date of hearing: 2nd October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Muhammad Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court along with petitioner and Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nIn person (Respondents Nos. 3, 4, 6 to 9).", - "Petitioner Name:": "TANVIR SARFRAZ KHAN-Petitioner\nVs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Director Legal, Islamabad and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25783", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 283 = 2025 SLD 283 = 2025 SCMR 92", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWSs", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975-\n-R.4(1)(b)(iv)-Police official-Misconduct, allegation of-Dismissal from service-Ex-parte inquiry-Judgment of Tribunal based on allegations/findings which were never part of the show cause notice-Legality-In the show cause notice the allegation of absence from duty was raised, but based on the same show cause notice, the Tribunal reproduced some other allegations regarding the petitioners conviction in a criminal case, which allegation was alien to the show cause notice, and no other show cause notice was presented by the parties that indicated any allegation of conviction in a criminal case or requested the petitioner to submit a reply-Departmental proceedings may be initiated on the basis of allegations contained in the show cause notice and not on the allegations which were never part of the show cause notice-Therefore, in all fairness, the departmental action on account of any misconduct should be confined to the allegations mentioned in the show cause notice/statement of allegations, and should not travel beyond its precinct because the accused of misconduct who is petitioner in this case was only liable to answer the allegations communicated to him in the show cause and had no supernatural knowledge to respond to the allegations not known to him-Even the holding of the enquiry was claimed to be a regular one, but it was actually conducted ex-parte without involving the petitioner or providing him any opportunity to defend himself-According to the latest position, the petitioner had been acquitted in the criminal case while being extended the benefit of doubt by the Trial Court-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Service Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975=4(1)(b)(iv)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3109-L of 2016, order date: 23rd September, 2024.\n(Appeal against the judgment dated 03.06.2016 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.2236 of 2015). Date of hearing: 23rd September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. M. Lehrasib Khan Gondal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nBaleegh-uz Zaman Ch., Addl. A.G. Punjab along with Akhtar Ali Mehmood, DSC (Legal) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAISAL ALI-Petitioner\nVs\nDISTRICT POLICE OFFICER, GUJRAT and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25784", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 284 = 2025 SLD 284 = 2025 SCMR 74", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S.302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Reappraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Mitigating circumstances-Death sentence reduced to imprisonment of life-Principle of life expectancy, applicability of-[Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. [Majority view]: FIR was lodged after a considerable delay without any explanation-It was not clear that out of the four shots fired by the appellant (convict), how many bullets hit the deceased-Similarly, it was also not explained that how many bullets were fired by each of the three accused and how many of them had hit the deceased-Admittedly, no empty was recovered from the place of the occurrence, therefore, in the given circumstances, it could not be said with certainty that out of all the four assailants, whose fire shots resulted into fatal injury(s), causing death of the deceased-Occurrence had taken place all of a sudden without there being any proof of premeditation-It was a free fight, without proof of the motive alleged in the FIR-One of the co-accused, had already been acquitted by the Trial Court on the same set of evidence-Appellant remained in prison since May 2006 and was incarcerated in death cell w.e.f. 2013 till date, almost for more than eleven years-Section 302(b), P.P.C. provides a punishment for death or imprisonment for life-Total period of detention of the appellant in prison was about 18 years, without earning a single day of remission, because of being awarded death sentence-If remissions were counted towards his sentence, the appellant had served a period of almost an imprisonment for life-Delay in conclusion of judicial proceedings was on account of the system in vogue and for no fault of the appellant-After serving a sentence for life, including eleven years detention in death cell, executing his death penalty at present stage would not only be harsh, but would also be contrary to the principle of life expectancy-Under such circumstances, the appellant could not be sentenced twice for one and the same offence, hence punishment for death awarded to the appellant could not sustain-Appeal was dismissed; conviction awarded to the appellant under section 302(b), P.P.C. was maintained, however, the sentence of death awarded to him was altered to that of imprisonment for life]-[Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. [Minority view]: Considering the distance between police station and place of occurrence it could safely be concluded that there was no delay in the registration of the FIR-Primary eye-witness was a resident of the same locality, and was a natural eye-witness to the occurrence, as he lived in close proximity to the place of incident-Ocular account furnished by the eye-witness stood fully corroborated by the medical evidence-Incident in the present case could not be characterized as a free fight or unpremeditated murder because firstly deceased was shot to death by the appellant, then his dead body was thrown in a nala-Moreover, when the FIR in the present case was registered by the complainant, the appellant not only murdered the complainant in a brutal and gruesome manner but also assassinated his son-Appellant was a habitual criminal/murderer, who had no regard for human life-Case of acquitted co-accused was fundamentally distinct from that of the appellant, therefore, his acquittal held no bearing on the appellants case-Because of the brutality and dangerousness of the appellants actions, it was necessary to impose a strict punishment on him i.e. capital punishment in order to deliver justice and protect society-Mitigating the punishment based on the long trial or the time the appellant spent in custody did not change the severity of the crime-Appeal was dismissed and death penalty imposed by the High Court was maintained]\nGhulam Shabbir v. The State (Crl. R. P. No. 103/2017) and PLD 2013 SC 793 ref.\nPer Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J; dissenting with Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. [Minority view]\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S.302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Sentence, quantum of-Motive not proved-Whether a mitigating circumstance to reduce death penalty to life imprisonment-Absence of motive, failure to prove motive, or a motive that remains unclear or not alleged does not constitute a mitigating circumstance (justifying reduction of sentence)-Death penalty cannot be withheld solely because the prosecution fails to allege or establish a motive-Underlying reason behind this is that true motive for an offence is typically known only to the accused, rather than to the complainant, informant, or any other witnesses, unless it is explicitly or implicitly conveyed-Witnesses may describe the actions of accused during the commission of the offence-Others may try to infer or label the motive based on their observations or the information available to them, but the actual motive remains solely with the accused.\nMoazam Shah v. Mohsin Shah PLD 2001 SC 458; Ghalib Hussain v. Muhammad Arif 2002 SCMR 29; Nazakat v. Hazrat Jamal and another PLD 2007 SC 453 and Muhammad Latif v. The State PLD 2008 SC 503 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S.302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Sentence, quantum of-Delay in conclusion of trial or deciding the appeal-Whether a mitigating circumstance to reduce death penalty to life imprisonment-Mere length of time taken in concluding the trial and in deciding the appeal filed by the appellant would not by itself constitute an extenuating circumstance justifying the imposition of the lesser penalty.\nMuhammad Hassan v. The State 1973 SCMR 344; Samano v. The State 1973 SCMR 162; Shah Muhammad v. The State PLD 1973 SC 332 and Bakshish Elahi v. The State 1977 SCMR 389 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 2019, heard on 19th April, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 21.03.2013 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Appeal No. 92 of 2018 and M.R. No. 53 of 2008).\nPer Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J.; Musarrat Hilali, J. agreeing; Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. dissenting. Date of hearing: 19th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Munir Ahmed Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nShah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.\nIrfan Zia, D.P.G., Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM RASOOL-Petitioner\nVs\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25785", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 285 = 2025 SLD 285 = 2025 SCMR 69", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Administration of justice-\n-Every judge must abide by the law and must not fall prey to the process of the Court being misused nor should in any manner become a party.\n(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Forest Ordinance (XIX of 2002)-\n-Ss. 2(23) & 44-Galiyat Development Authority Act (XII of 2016), S. 6-Part of Margalla Hills National Park (the National Park ) in the territory of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province-Preservation and conservation-Protected guzara forest-Galiyat Development Authority (GDA) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa granted approvals to raise construction in respect of designated guzara forests that fell within the area of GDA-Legality-Galiyat Development Authority cannot approve construction in lands which prohibit it, including in guzara forest nor in the National Park-Galiyat Development Authority is also required to undertake forest conservation and the preservation of wildlife-Galiyat Development Authority must also serve and protect the National Park-Galiyat Development Authority must withdraw any permission which had already been granted pursuant to which construction had not been completed and should stop issuance of permissions/approvals in respect of the said lands-It must be ensured that the National Park remains a protected area and Supreme Court directed all concerned to ensure its preservation-Petitions were disposed of.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Original Petitions Nos. 19 and 20 of 2024, order date: 25th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 7th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Javed Iqbal, A.A.G.P. for the Federation of Pakistan.\nHafiz Arfat Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and Irfan Azim, DD(G), Environment for the CDA.\nRashid-ul-Haq Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court and Ehtisham Khan, AD, GDA for GDA.\nShah Faisal Ilyas, Additional A.G., Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.\nM. Ahsan Bhoon, Advocate Supreme Court, Hafeez-ur-Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court along with Luqman Ali Afzal (on Court Notice).", - "Petitioner Name:": "BILAL HAQUE and another-Petitioners\nVs\nKAMRAN ALI AFZAL, SECRETARY, CABINET DIVISION, ISLAMABAD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25786", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 286 = 2025 SLD 286 = 2025 SCMR 64", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 22-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell-Discretion of Court-Scope-In a suit for specific performance grant of decree is a discretionary relief with the court-If the court comes to the conclusion that in grant of a decree equity leans in favour of the plaintiff then decree can be granted, otherwise, it is the discretion of the court-Even if the plaintiff has proved the agreement to sell even then it is the discretion of the court to grant a decree or refuse the same.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Appeal entertained by Court despite lacking jurisdiction-Contributory negligence of Court-Condonation of delay in seeking relief-Where a party, despite acting with reasonable diligence, is misled by the Court or fails to receive timely guidance about jurisdictional matters, the resulting delay or error is not entirely attributable to that party-If there is contributory negligence of the person knocking the door of the court and also by the court, then the person knocking the wrong door cannot be deprived of his/her legal rights available under the law.\nSherin and others v. Fazal Muhammad and others 1995 SCMR 584 and Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor and others PLD 1991 SC 957 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=22", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.785 of 2022, order date: 23rd September, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 04.07. 2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court in R.F.A. No. 117 of 2021).\nDate of hearing: 23rd September 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Asghar Hussain Sabzwari, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Sardar Muhammad Tariq Farid Gopang, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nTaimoor Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.\nRaja Khalid Mahmood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No 3.\nAssisted by Miss Maira Hassan, Judicial Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UFAID GUL-Appellant\nVs\nMst. FARKHANDA AYUB KHAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25787", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 287 = 2025 SLD 287 = 2025 SCMR 60", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTWXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O.XXXVII, Rr. 1, 2 & 4-Summary suit for recovery based on cheques-Ex parte decree-Application for setting aside ex parte decree dismissed-Validity-All available modes of service were adhered to by the Trial Court so that the petitioner (defendant) should join the proceedings and after failure in ordinary means of service, the Trial Court resorted to publication of Court notice in newspaper but even then the petitioner did not bother to join the proceedings, therefore, he was proceeded against ex parte on 18.02.2022-Even the order dated 09.06.2022 goes to divulge that after closure of ex parte evidence, the Trial Court kept the file of the case in wait but none on behalf of the petitioner joined the proceedings and ultimately the Trial Court proceeded to pass the ex parte judgment and decree dated 09.06.2022-After lapse of about 19 months, the petitioner filed application seeking setting aside of ex parte judgment and decree dated 09.06.2022 and not the order dated 18.02.2022 when he was proceeded against ex parte, that too, without filing an application for leave to appear and defend the suit, which otherwise ought to have been filed along-with the application for setting aside ex-parte proceedings, judgment and decree, because proceedings under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.) are of summary nature and special procedure has been provided for the same-Rule 4 of O. XXXVII, C.P.C. deals with the situation where the defendant fails to appear and files application for leave to defend; however, in the instant case, no application for leave to appear and defend was filed by the petitioner and only application seeking setting aside of ex parte judgment and decree, but not the order for initiating ex parte proceedings, was filed.\nHaji Ali Khan and Company v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1995 SC 362 ref.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XXXVII, R. 4-Summary suit for recovery-Ex parte decree-Power of Court to set aside decree-Special circumstances-Scope-Under Rule 4 of Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (C.P.C.) under special circumstances the court can set aside the decree-Rule 4 is subject to the condition there must be special circumstances to support any application for setting aside decree-Plain reading of Rule 4 makes it diaphanous that it excludes ordinary circumstance or circumstances which may happen every day-Meaning thereby that heavy burden lies on the defendant to show the circumstances due to which he was unable to appear during proceedings of the suit-special circumstances are different from ordinary circumstance and circumstance which may happen every day, rather the same are rare, exceptional and beyond the control of a human being-Same can be categorized as: 1) Serious illness or accident preventing defendants appearance; 2) Death or sudden incapacitation of defendants counsel; 3) Natural calamity or unforeseen events; 4) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. 5) Failure of justice due to non-service or inadequate service.\n(c) Pleadings-\n-Party cannot lead or take a different stance from what it has pleaded in its application or plaint and written statement/written reply.\nSh. Fateh Muhammad v. Muhammad Adil and others PLD 2007 SC 460 and Hyder Ali Bhimji v. Additional District Judge Karachi South and another 2012 SCMR 254 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2,4", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1970-L of 2024, order date: 19th November, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 27.05.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in C.R. No. 31785 of 2024). Date of hearing: 19th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Yahya Afridi, C.J. and Shahid Bilal Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Tariq Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video-link from Lahore).\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MANSAB-Petitioner\nVs\nMUHAMMAD HANIF-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25788", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 288 = 2025 SLD 288 = 2025 SCMR 50", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, 186 & 34-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7 & 21-L-Murderous assault on police, acts of terrorism-Reappraisal of evidence-Testimonies of witnesses not reliable-Three persons who were stopped for personal search by the police on the basis of suspicion were not known either to the deceased or the complainant-There is no explanation why the three unidentified accused did not flee from the crime scene immediately after they had fatally wounded the deceased-Their presence at the crime scene till two other police officials from the Police Station had arrived there was unexplained-Arrest of the petitioner was also shrouded in mystery-Evidence brought on record by the prosecution showed that he was arrested on the same day when the investigation was transferred to another Inspector-Recovery of the firearm weapon and the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory was disbelieved by the High Court and this factum had not been challenged by the prosecution-Testimonies regarding the circumstances which had led to the arrest of the petitioner and his identification by the two witnesses had not been found to be confidence inspiring nor reliable-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the appellant was extended the benefit of doubt-Consequently, his conviction and sentence were set aside.\n(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 22-Test identification parade-Principles and scope-Identification parade is one of the methods of proof contemplated under section 22 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-It must be carefully conducted in order to achieve its main object i.e. to enable a witness to properly identify a person involved in a crime and to exclude the possibility of a witness simply confirming a faint recollection and impression-The process has to be carried out having regard to the exigencies of each case in a manner that is fair and does not indicate any collusiveness-It is merely a corroborative piece of evidence and holding of test identification parade is not mandatory-If the testimony of the witness qua the identity of the accused inspires confidence and the witnesses are consistent in all material particulars and there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the latter had deposed falsely then in such an eventuality not conducting a test identification parade is not fatal to the prosecutions case-Omission of salient features in a crime report is not necessarily a ground to discard a test identification parade-Test identification parade is, therefore, not required when the victim had identified the accused and his statement has been found reliable.\nMuhammad Siddique and others v. The State 2020 SCMR 342; Javed Khan Bacha v. The State 2017 SCMR 524; M.Akram Rahi v. State 2011 SCMR 877; Muhammad Hayat v. The State 2021 SCMR 92 and Ghulam Abbas v. The State 2022 SCMR 1102 ref.\n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 22-Test identification parade-Necessary guidelines for conducting a test identification parade provided.\nKanwar Anwar Alis case PLD 2019 SC 488 ref.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, 186 & 34-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7 & 21-L-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22-Murderous assault on police, acts of terrorism-Reappraisal of evidence-Test identification parade-Infirmities-In the present case the test identification proceedings were fraught with serious infirmities and, therefore, could not be relied upon for handing down the conviction-Proceedings were conducted and supervised by a Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, who had admitted in his testimony that the features of the petitioner and the eight dummies were not recorded in the report-It was unlikely that the two police officials who had arrived at the crime scene after the incident had taken place could have identified the accused who had fired at the deceased-None of the witnesses had attributed a specific role to the petitioner-In the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be ruled out that the witnesses of the test identification proceedings may have seen the petitioner after his arrest-It also appeared from the deposition of the Judicial Magistrate, who had supervised and conducted the test identification proceedings that he was not familiar with the guidelines and principles enunciated by the Supreme Court regarding the test identification proceedings-Probity and evidentiary value of the test identification proceedings were definitely questionable and, thus, could not have been relied upon for the purposes of handing down the conviction-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the appellant was extended the benefit of doubt-Consequently, his conviction and sentence were set aside.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,353,186,34Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7,21-L", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No.786-L of 2016, order date: 22nd April, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 16.05.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Criminal Appeal No. 745 of 2012). Date of hearing: 22nd April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Athar Minallah, Musarrat Hilali and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Javed Iqbal Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, Addl.PG, Punjab along with Khalil ur Rehman (complainant) for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SUBHA SADIQ-Petitioner\nVs\nThe STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25789", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 289 = 2025 SLD 289 = 2025 SCMR 45", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTY", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 452 & 34-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, common intention- Reappraisal of evidence-Crime empties and recovered weapons not sent for forensics-Presence of complainant at scene of occurrence doubtful-Dishonest improvements made by complainant and witnesses-Injured witness and material witness not produced for evidence-Adverse presumption-Crime empties recovered during investigation and firearm allegedly recovered from the appellant (accused person) were not sent to the firearm expert for analysis and in this regard no explanation had been offered by the prosecution at the trial-Surprisingly, complainant did not receive a single firearm injury in the whole occurrence despite indiscriminate firing by the six nominated accused and despite allegedly witnessing the entire occurrence from a close range-Non-receiving of any firearm injury by the complainant during the occurrence and his accurate attribution of each injury of the deceased and injured to each accused specifically with specific firearms casted serious doubt about his presence at the place of occurrence and his plantation as an eye witness of the occurrence due to previous enmity with the nominated accused could not be ruled out of consideration particularly when his testimony was lacking independent corroboration in material aspects-There was no medico legal certificate of an alleged injured witness on record-Said alleged injured witness and brother of the complainant allegedly present at the place of occurrence had not been produced as prosecution witnesses at the trial-Presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was to be drawn to the effect that had these two witnesses been produced at the trial, they would have not supported the prosecution version-Ocular testimony of the injured witnesses was contradictory to the medico legal evidence-Statements of complainant, eye-witnesses and the injured witness were suffering from dishonest improvements and material contradictions rendering their testimony doubtful-Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the appellant and the acquitted co-accused beyond reasonable doubt-Acquittal of co-accused by the Appellate Court did not suffer from any illegality or irregularity-Appellant was acquitted of the charge, while the appeal challenging the acquittal of the co-accused and the appeal seeking enhancement of sentence of the convicts were dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,452,34", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeals Nos. 505 to 507 of 2019, order date: 24th May, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 11.02.2015 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Crl. A. No. 21-ATA/2009, Crl.A. No.29-ATA of 2010 and CSR No. 12 of 2009). Date of hearing: 24th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Crl. A. No. 505 of 2019).\nSardar Ashiq Hussain Baloch, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in Crl.As. Nos. 506 and 507 of 2019).\nIrfan Zia, Addl. P.G., Punjab for the State (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKHTAR and others-Appellants\nVs\nThe STATE and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25790", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 290 = 2025 SLD 290 = 2025 SCMR 40", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTU", - "Key Words:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunals Act (I of 1974)-\n-S. 4- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2011, Rr. 5 & 7-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.212(3)-Misconduct-Proof-Death of civil servant-Departmental proceedings-Object, purpose and scope-During pendency of service appeal civil servant passed away, therefore, disciplinary actions initiated by authorities were set aside by Service Tribunal-Validity-Predominant goal of initiating departmental proceedings including inquiry is to decide whether allegations of misconduct in show cause notice are proven and then to confront delinquent regarding why disciplinary action, including imposition of minor or major penalty should not be taken-Before taking such drastic action, a fair opportunity should be provided to employee to defend allegations-In departmental inquiries, standard of proof is based on balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence-Regular inquiry is commenced only when an even handed and fair opportunity to present a defense is offered-Service Tribunal in determination of facts and law, is the highest appellate forum with exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to terms and conditions of service of civil servants-Supreme Court may grant leave to appeal under Article 212 (3) of the Constitution, against judgment, decree, order or sentence of Administrative Court or Tribunal only if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law of public importance, which is otherwise sine qua non-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Service Tribunal as no such question was involved-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nSecretary Revenue Division v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabbasum PLD 2019 SC 563 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.531-P of 2024, order date: 4th October, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.02.2024 passed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Peshawar in Service Appeal No.1267 of 2023).Date of hearing: 4th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid Yousuf Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record along with Sajid Khan, Focal Person, Education Department for Petitioners.\nNemo for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Secretary Elementary and Secondary, Education Department, Peshawar and others -Petitioners\nVs\nAURANGZEB (EX-PRIMARY SCHOOL HEAD TEACHER) GPS WANNA KHEL TEHSIL TAKHTBHAI DISTRICT MARDAN (deceased) through L.Rs -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25791", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 291 = 2025 SLD 291 = 2025 SCMR 34", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S.8-Suit for recovery of possession and mesne profit-Declaration, non-seeking of-Defective title of opponent-Effect-Respondents/ plaintiffs sought recovery of possession of suit property and mesne profit on the plea of their ownership-Trial Court dismissed the suit but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same in favour of respondents/ plaintiffs-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction maintained judgment and decree in favour of respondents/plaintiffs but dismissed the suit to the extent of recovery of mesne profit-Validity-Respondents/plaintiffs had no title, and those under whom they claimed also had no title, and the very gift of disputed shops never existed-Respondents/plaintiffs failed to establish their ownership or title to suit property-Respondents/plaintiffs could not call upon appellants/ defendants to establish legitimacy of their property title, nor could they seek a decree for possession based on claims that appellants/defendants either lacked a title or possessed a flawed one-Respondents/plaintiffs were to succeed based solely on the strength and validity of their own title rather than capitalizing on any potential shortcomings of the situation of appellants/defendants-Trial Court was precluded from examining validity of the title of appellants/defendants, particularly since respondents/plaintiffs did not formally challenge the same-Simple suit for possession filed by respondents/appellants was not maintainable-Despite appellants/defendants assertions in their written statement, respondents/plaintiffs did not take any step to seek declaration of title-Supreme Court declined to affirm judgment and decree passed by High Court as such oversight went unaddressed-Respondents/plaintiffs did not demonstrate necessary diligence in pursuing their suit and failed to call any witnesses to substantiate alleged gift transaction, which significantly weakened their position-Solitary statement provided by attorney of respondents/plaintiffs was insufficient to support their claims, particularly since it did not effectively demonstrate that appellants/defendants, as licensees, had possession of shops in question-Rationale behind demand of respondents/plaintiffs for mesne profits of Rs.10,000 per month was not adequately established and there was lack of tangible evidence to justify such figure-Appellants/plaintiffs did not provide credible basis for seeking eviction of appellants/defendants from shops in question-Supreme Court dismissed suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs resultantly decrees issued by High Court and Lower Appellate Court were set aside and that of Trial Court was restored-Appeal was allowed.\nTaj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 and Sultan Mahmood Shah through LRs and others v. Muhammad Din and 2 others 2005 SCMR 1872 rel.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 8, 42 & 54-Relief of possession with or without declaration of title-Principle-If plaintiff is in possession but his title to property is disputed or clouded, or if defendant claims title and poses a threat of dispossession, plaintiff must sue for declaration of title and seek injunctive relief-If plaintiffs title is clouded or disputed and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession, he must file suit for a declaration, possession and injunction.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=8", - "Case #": "C.As. Nos.493 and 494 of 2023, order date: 17th October, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 04.07.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar ul Qaza), Swat, passed in Civil Revision No.304-M of 2012). Date of hearing: 17th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Amin ud Din Khan and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zia ur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (via video link from Peshawar) (in C.A. No. 493 of 2023) and Tariq Aziz, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record (in C.A. No. 494 of 2023).\nTariq Aziz, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.A. No. 493 of 2023) and Zia ur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Peshawar) (in C.A. No. 494 of 2023).", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHURSHID ALI and others-Appellants\nVs\nMIANGUL ADNAN AURANGZEB (deceased) through LRs and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25792", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 292 = 2025 SLD 292 = 2025 SCMR 20", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVS8", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Administrative Structure, Powers and Duties of Institute Officers Rules, 2021-\n-Rr. 4(7)(i) & 4(7)(iv)-Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021, R. 6-Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Act (XXVI of 2013), S. 11-Executive Director ( ED ) of the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences ( Institute )-Appointment and re-appointment-Process and eligibility-Maximum age of candidate, dispute over-Whether an applicant for the post of ED can be up to 65 years of age, or cannot be older than 60 years?-Held, that proper resort to clause (iv) of sub-rule (7) of rule 4 of the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Administrative Structure, Powers and Duties of Institute Officers Rules, 2021 (herein after clause (iv) ) must be regarded as a two-stage process-In the first stage, the Board must, if it is so minded, consider whether the outgoing ED is at all suitable for reappointment under clause (iv)-If it concludes that reappointment is not warranted or legally permissible the matter ends, and the Board must then move to appointing a new ED in terms of clause (i) of sub-rule (7) of rule 4 of the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Administrative Structure, Powers and Duties of Institute Officers Rules, 2021 (herein after clause (i) ) and other applicable provisions-If however, the Board is of the view that a reappointment is both legally permissible and desirable for the purposes, and in the best interests of the Institute the matter would move to the second stage-Board must then move to seeking applications for appointment of other persons as ED under clause (i) and other applicable provisions-Any advertisement or other circular etc issued in this regard must clearly state that the outgoing ED is also under consideration for reappointment under clause (iv)-Once the fresh applications have been received and shortlisted and interviews held etc (which must be done independently of, and separately from, any consideration of the outgoing ED) the Board must then consider why the (best of the) applicants under clause (i) should not be appointed as the new ED and the outgoing ED be reappointed under clause (iv)-Here, the Board must also keep in mind the possibility of a chilling effect on actual or potential applicants of the fact that the outgoing ED is also under consideration for reappointment-If a decision is reached in favor of reappointment, then detailed reasons for the same must be given in writing by the Board and made public (by, inter alia, posting the same on the website of the Institute)-It is only by applying this two-stage process that there will be a proper, legally valid and harmonized application of clause (iv), as would allow for a reappointment of the outgoing ED that is sustainable in law-In the present case the retirement age was set by the Board itself, in exercise of section 24 of the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Act, 2013 whereby the power of reappointment was reserved-In the impugned judgment the High Court failed to keep in mind that the only manner in which clause (iv) could be actuated, for purposes of reappointment, was by recognizing that the age limit would get enhanced beyond the sixty years set by the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021 ( TCS Rules ), which was for appointment-At the same time, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the procedure actually adopted by the Board was also legally defective-There was no application at all of the two-stage process by which alone a lawful resort could be had to clause (iv)-In setting a uniform age of 65 years in its decision and the consequent advertisement, the Board failed to keep in mind that it was dealing with two distinct exercises, one of appointment and the other of reappointment-Leave petition was converted into an appeal and was disposed of with the directions that the Board shall, if it is so minded, consider the case of petitioner for reappointment in terms of clause (iv); that if it is of the view that petitioner cannot or ought not to be considered for reappointment his case will come to an end, and the Board shall then proceed to consider the shortlisted candidates for appointment in terms of clause (i); that if however the Board is of the view that petitioner can be considered for reappointment, it shall then proceed to consider the shortlisted candidates for appointment in terms of clause (i) and thereafter and thereupon make a decision for appointment or reappointment, as the case may be; that the detailed reasons in writing required (twice) from the Board must be made public by inter alia posting the same on the website of the Institute and, in particular, provided to the respondent-candidate.\nProf. Dr. Asad Alam Khan and others v Government of Punjab and others 2021 PLC (C.S.) 304 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 1417-K of 2022, order date: 15th November, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 17.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Hyderabad in C.P. No.D-1879 of 2022.).\nDate of hearing: 23rd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nHakim Ali Sh., Addl. AG., Sindh, Saghir Ahmed Abbasi, Addl. A.G., Sindh for Respondents Nos. 1-3 (via Video-Link, Karachi).\nSarmad Hani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Dr. KHALID IQBAL TALPUR-Petitioner\nVs\nPROVINCE OF SINDH and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25793", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 293 = 2025 SLD 293 = 2025 SCMR 14", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVSs", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Regularization of Service Act (XV of 2018)-\n-S. 3-Regularization of service-Matter referred to Scrutiny Committee-Authorities were aggrieved of order passed by High Court referring matter of respondents/contract employees to Scrutiny Committee-Validity-To accommodate and regularize services of contractual employees who gave their blood, toil, tears and sweat for many years, Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 was promulgated with fair intention-It was responsibility of Government to apply and allow benefit to all employees placed in equal and similar circumstances without any discrimination and not to pick and choose employees for conferring benefit or advantage of law-Implementation of Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 has to be unbiased and non-discriminatory, rather it should be evenhanded, fair and square-When law giver enacts any beneficial law, it must be implemented across the board with assiduousness and meticulousness without any conservative or rigid approach-Implementation of beneficial statutes meant for civil servants and labourers are unnecessarily being delayed which forces deprived persons to knock the doors of Courts-If implementation is made in its letter and spirit within a reasonable period of time, then such course would decrease unnecessary burden on Courts docket-Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as High Court only held that respondents/contract employees were liable to be considered for regularization under Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 and appointing authority was directed to send their cases for consideration to competent authority and till determination of eligibility, services of respondent/contract employees would not be terminated-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018=3", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3520 of 2020, order date: 9th October, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 22.09.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in W.P. No.2572 of 2018). Date of hearing: 9th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Muhammad Mumtaz Ali, Addl. A.G., Punjab for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6-8.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Chief Secretary, Lahore and others-Petitioners\nVs\nQASIM MEHMOOD and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25794", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 294 = 2025 SLD 294 = 2025 SCMR 100", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTVTk", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 409-Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5(2)-Criminal breach of trust by public servant, criminal misconduct-Re-appraisal of evidence-Sentence, reduction in-Embezzled amount deposited back in State exchequer-Offer of no contest by the convict to seek a lighter sentence to be able to attend to his ailing wife-Petitioner (convict) being an employee of a Corporation was on a carrier job; he was supposed to maintain highest standard of integrity, but he had failed to discharge his duty honestly and had committed an act of breach of trust-Petitioner did not plead guilty, hence, after trial, he was convicted and sentenced-Offer of no contest by the petitioner, meant that the petitioner neither agreed nor disagreed with the charge and with his conviction-Upon depositing of the embezzled amount in the State exchequer, he showed his intention simply to close the case, for the reason that his wife was ill and needed his help and support-By not pursuing the matter, the petitioner would certainly lose his job and would not be entitled for his post-retirement benefits, besides, leaving a stigma on his career-His offer that he did not wish to contest the petition, was with a hope that he would succeed in getting reduction in the quantum of the sentences, awarded to him-Though, as a matter of right, the petitioner cannot claim reduction of sentence, however, he placed himself at the mercy of the Supreme Court-Depositing the embezzled amount and his plea of no-contest showed the intention of the petitioner to escape the agony of proceedings before the Supreme Court and to resolve the case in order to support his family, especially, his ailing wife-Supreme Court while exercising its discretion, can do complete justice, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case-Act committed by the petitioner did not affect the public at large-Loss caused to the Government exchequer had been repaired by the petitioner after depositing the embezzled amount-He had been awarded three years sentence, out of which, he had served out a considerable period-Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, the petitioner had succeeded in making out a case for a lighter sentence-Thus, in view of the above, the conviction awarded to the petitioner under sections 409, Pakistan Penal Code and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 were upheld, however, sentences awarded to him in both the offences were reduced to that of already undergone, by extending the benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C to him-Amount of fine imposed upon the petitioner under section 409, P.P.C. was reduced from Rs. 2,50,000/- to Rs. 40,000/- and the amount of fine imposed upon the petitioner under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was also reduced from Rs. 2,50,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- -Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=409Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=5(2)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 498 of 2024, order date: 30th September, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 03.05.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Crl. Appeal No. 888-P of 2018). Date of hearing: 30th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Musarrat Hilali and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Nasrum Minallah, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nRaja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, D.P.G. for the State.\nWaqar Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZULFIQAR ALI-Petitioner\nVs\nThe STATE through D.A.G., Islamabad-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25795", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 335 = 2025 SLD 335 = (2025) 131 TAX 1 = 2025 PTCL 33", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Supreme Court Review Judgment\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (Section 45B(2))\nWhether the first and second provisos to Section 45B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 are mandatory or directory regarding the timeframe for appellate decisions by the Commissioner (Appeals).\nBackground:\n•\nTaxpayer received a show cause notice (18.01.2011) for violation of Section 25.\n•\nOrder-in-original issued (22.02.2011) against the taxpayer.\n•\nTaxpayer’s appeal dismissed on merits by the Commissioner (Appeals).\n•\nAppellate Tribunal (05.09.2012) declared the order void ab initio as it was decided beyond 180 days, per Section 45B(2).\n•\nLahore High Court (01.06.2021) upheld this view.\n•\nSupreme Court (Judgment under Review – 12.05.2022) also ruled the timeframe as mandatory, invalidating orders passed beyond 180 days.\n•\nReview Petition filed, arguing that appellate adjudication differs from original adjudication and should not be bound by strict time limitations.\n________________________________________\nSupreme Court Review Decision:\n•\nMajority (2-1) held that the first and second provisos to Section 45B(2) are DIRECTORY, meaning the Commissioner (Appeals) can decide cases beyond 180 days without invalidating the order.\n•\nCourt relied on the A.J. Traders case, which held similar appellate provisions under the Customs Act, 1969, to be directory.\n•\nReasoning:\no\nAppellate adjudication differs from original adjudication, as it involves a taxpayer’s right to appeal, linked to Articles 4 & 10-A (Due Process) of the Constitution.\no\nDismissing appeals due to time lapse would unfairly penalize taxpayers for delays caused by the state.\no\nStrict mandatory interpretation would create injustice, denying taxpayers their right to appeal.\no\nCommissioner (Appeals) should still make efforts to decide within the statutory timeframe and provide reasons for delays.\n________________________________________\nDissenting Opinion (Ayesha A. Malik, J.):\n•\nThe third proviso of Section 45B(2) allows for excluding adjournment periods from the 180-day limit.\n•\nSince the taxpayer took adjournments, the appeal was actually decided within the prescribed timeframe when those delays were excluded.\n•\nFavored remanding the case to the Tribunal to recalculate the timeframe considering adjournments.\n________________________________________\nFinal Order (By Majority – 2:1 Decision):\n•\nFirst & second provisos of Section 45B(2) are directory, not mandatory.\n•\nCase remanded to the Tribunal for decision on merits, with instructions to handle appeals efficiently within the legislative intent.\n•\nJustice Ayesha A. Malik dissented, arguing the Tribunal should reconsider the effect of taxpayer’s adjournments.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\nTaxpayer’s right to appeal remains intact despite delays by Commissioner (Appeals).\nLapse of statutory timeframe does not void appellate decisions.\nTribunal must decide cases on merits, ensuring due process.\nState functionaries should not benefit from their own delays.\nCommissioner (Appeals) must provide justification for delays.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=36,36(3),45B(2)Customs Act, 1969=179", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No.275 of 2022 in Civil Petition No. 4599 of 2021. Date of hearing: 25.10.2022, Order dated: 06-11-2024.\n(For review of judgment of this Court dated 12.5.2022, passed in C.P No.4599/2021)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BENCH-V: MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, ASC.\nMs. Asma Idrees, Addl. Commissioner Yousaf Khan, Law Officer.\nFor the Respondent No.1, in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III. RTO, RAWALPINDI, ETC. … PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nM/S SARWAQ TRADERS, RAWALPINDI, ETC. …. ....RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25796", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 336 = 2025 SLD 336 = (2025) 131 TAX 14 = 2025 PTD 274", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQS8", - "Key Words:": "Stay of Tax Recovery by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue\nW.P. No. 49857/2024, W.P. No. 50600/2024 & W.P. No. 50310/2024\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) can impose conditions (such as partial tax payment) for granting stay of tax recovery under Section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\nPetitioner (Taxpayer):\n•\nATIR is the first independent appellate forum; imposing conditions restricts access to justice.\n•\nSection 131(5) does not require tax payment for a stay.\n•\nATIR’s discretion should not be arbitrary or impose unlawful conditions.\nRespondent (Tax Department):\n•\nATIR has discretionary powers to grant stay with conditions to ensure compliance.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Findings:\n•\nATIR’s authority to grant stay is discretionary but should ensure unrestricted access to justice.\n•\nNo legal requirement in Section 131(5) for taxpayers to deposit tax as a condition for stay (unlike Section 133(10), which requires a 30% deposit for a High Court stay).\n•\nImposing conditions without justification is arbitrary and shows lack of application of mind by ATIR.\n•\nATIR’s orders imposing tax deposit conditions are set aside.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision:\nPetitions allowed – Taxpayers not required to pay any amount for the stay.\nATIR directed to decide appeals within 30 days.\nNo costs imposed.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\nATIR cannot impose arbitrary conditions for stay orders.\nTaxpayers can seek stay without upfront tax deposit.\nATIR must decide appeals within 30 days after receiving this judgment.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=130(2),131(5),133,134A(11)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 50303 of 2024. Order dated: 26-09-2024, heard on: 26.09.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTCE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner in this petition M/s Arslan Saleem Chaudhry Advocate and Barrister Asfandyar Khan Tareen\nFor the petitioners in W.P. No.50600 of 2024 & W.P. No. 50310 of 2024 M/s Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Muhammad Nadeem Sheikh, Rana Usman Habib Khan and Azeem Ullah Virk, Advocates\nFor the petitioner in W.P. No.49857 of 2024 Malik Asif Rafique Rajwana, Advocate\nFor the Federation of Pakistan Mr. Muhammad Hamza Sheikh, Assistant Attorney General\nFor the respondents /Inland Revenue Barrister Shahjahan Khan, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ZUBAIR\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25797", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 337 = 2025 SLD 337 = (2025) 131 TAX 21 = 2025 PTD 174", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQSs", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax – Revised Return and Disqualification from Self-Assessment Scheme\n________________________________________\nDetails:\nThe case concerns whether a correction made to an income tax return through a letter amounts to a revised return under Section 57 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, thereby disqualifying the taxpayer from the Self-Assessment Scheme as per Circular No. 9 of 1987, dated 26.10.1987. The Income Tax Officer deemed the correction as a revised return and denied the benefit of the scheme. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIR(A)] set aside this order, but the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ruled otherwise, holding that the corrected version constituted a revised return, leading to a reference before the High Court.\n________________________________________\nHeld:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the Applicant, holding that:\n1.\nSince no revised return was actually filed, the question of disqualification from the Self-Assessment Scheme did not arise.\n2.\nFailure to submit required documents within the prescribed period due to valid reasons does not automatically disqualify an assessee from the Self-Assessment Scheme.\n3.\nThe Tribunal’s decision was incorrect, and the order of CIR(A) was restored.\n________________________________________\nCitations:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 1979 – Sections 55, 57, 59, 61, 63 & 136\n•\nCircular No. 9 of 1987, dated 26.10.1987\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax Vs. Kamruddin Fakhruddin (2001 PTD 623)\nThe reference application was answered in negative, in favor of the Applicant and against the Department.\n[Case-law referred.]", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=55,57,59,61,62,136(1)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 755 of 2000, decided on 20.11.2023, date of hearing: 04.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND SANA AKRAM MINHAS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Arshad Siraj, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. QAZI CARPETS\nVS\nTHE ITO, SERVICE UNIT NO. 2, CIRCLE 4, HYDERABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25798", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 338 = 2025 SLD 338 = (2025) 131 TAX 41", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQTk", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax – Scope of Tax and Authority for Audit\n________________________________________\nDetails:\nThe case revolves around whether the Director General Audit Inland Revenue Receipts (DGAIRR) had the authority to conduct an audit leading to a sales tax demand. During the sales tax audit, it was observed that the Respondent did not pay sales tax on the differential amount declared in income tax and sales tax returns. Additionally, the Respondent allegedly suppressed supplies and short-paid sales tax.\nA show cause notice was issued on 08.02.2017, and upon being dissatisfied with the explanation, the Assessing Officer ordered the recovery of sales tax along with default surcharge and penalty. The First Appellate Authority upheld this order. However, the Appellate Tribunal annulled both orders, leading to a Reference to the High Court by the Department.\n________________________________________\nHeld:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the Respondent, holding that:\n1.\nThe DGAIRR does not fall within the categories of officers authorized under Section 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to conduct audits and issue show-cause notices.\n2.\nA similar issue had been adjudicated in STR No. 01-P/2017, and for judicial consistency, the same principle was followed.\n3.\nThe reference was answered in the negative, confirming that the show-cause notices issued on the basis of an unauthorized audit were invalid.\n________________________________________\nCitations:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 – Sections 3, 25, 30 & 72B\n•\nCollector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Peshawar v. Makk Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. Peshawar (2010 PTD 1355)\nThe reference was decided against the Department and in favor of the Respondent.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,25,30,72B", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 33-P, 74-P, 75-P and 92-P of 2022, decided on 10.10.2023, date of hearing: 10.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Abdul Shakoor, Justice and Syed Arshad Ali, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Sehrish Munawar Bokhari along with Sharifullah Assistant Director (Legal) for Petitioner.\nHussain Ahmad Shirazi and Muazzam Ali Butt for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (CORPORATE ZONE), PESHAWAR\nVS\nM/S TRIBAL AREAS ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD., PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25799", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 339 = 2025 SLD 339 = (2025) 131 TAX 45", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQTg", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax - Input Tax Adjustment on Packing Material for Zero-Rated Supplies\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 - Sections 3, 7, 8 & 47\n•\nSRO 1125(I)/2011\n•\nSRO 777(I)/2018\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the applicability of the first proviso to SRO 1125(I)/2011, which barred input tax credit or refund on packing material purchased by registered persons whose taxable supplies were zero-rated. This proviso was later deleted by SRO 777(I)/2018, but at the relevant time, it was applicable to the petitioner. The key issue before the court was whether the petitioner was entitled to input tax adjustment on packing material used for taxable supplies.\nHeld:\nThe court held that Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, allows input tax adjustment for registered persons if the goods are used for taxable activities. Since the packing material was used for taxable supplies, the petitioner was entitled to adjust input tax against its output tax. The references were disposed of accordingly, and a copy of the judgment was sent to the Tribunal under Section 47(5) of the Act.\n•\n[Relevant case-law referred]", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),2(20),2(41),3,7,8,13,47", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 26-P of 2023, decided on 19.09.2023, date of hearing: 19.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ishtiaq Ahmad for Petitioner.\nSharif Ullah, Assistant Director (Legal) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S GADOON TEXTILE MILLS LTD.\nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER IR (AUDIT-05), INLAND REV ENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25800", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 340 = 2025 SLD 340 = (2025) 131 TAX 54", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQXo", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax – Sticky Loans and Accrual of Interest Income\n________________________________________\nDetails:\nThe case concerns whether interest on sticky loans, which is debited to a separate mark-up suspense account by banks, should be treated as accrued income for tax purposes under Sections 11 & 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The Revenue Department argued that such interest should be included in the total income for the relevant tax year.\nThe Order-in-Original was passed against the Respondent (Bank), which then appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the Respondent based on existing case law, though the specific precedent relied upon was not explicitly mentioned in the judgment.\n________________________________________\nHeld:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the Respondent, holding that:\n1.\nSticky loan interest does not automatically become taxable income merely because it is receivable. Banks and lending institutions following mercantile or hybrid accounting methods are only liable to pay tax on such interest when it is actually recoverable and offered for taxation.\n2.\nThe phrase “accrues or arises” in Section 11(1)(a)(ii) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 must be interpreted in light of the recognized accounting practices of banking institutions.\n3.\nInterest on non-performing assets is subject to tax only when it becomes recoverable and is voluntarily offered for taxation by the bank.\nAccordingly, the reference was answered in the negative, in favor of the Respondent and against the Revenue Department.\n________________________________________\nCitations:\n•\nKerala Financial Corporation v. CIT (AIR 1994 SC 2416)\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax (Legal), Islamabad v. Askari Commercial Bank Limited, Rawalpindi (2018 PTD 1089)\n•\nDeputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle C-4, Karachi v. National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi (2019 SCMR 1011)\nThe ruling upheld the principle that interest on sticky loans is only taxable upon actual recoverability, thereby rejecting the Revenue Departments stance.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=11,11(1)(a)(ii),133", - "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 04 of 2006 (and other connected References), decided on 02.05.2023, date of hearing: 02.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Shoaib Jally for Petitioner.\nBarrister Syed Mudassir Ameer for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX/WEALTH TAX COMPANIES ZONE, PESHAWAR\nVS\nISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK LTD, PESHAWAR CANTT." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25801", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 341 = 2025 SLD 341 = (2025) 131 TAX 63", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTQXk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Customs – Provisional Assessment and Final Determination of Duty\n________________________________________\nDetails:\nThe case concerns the assessment of duty and taxes on an imported Range Rover vehicle under the Customs Act, 1969, particularly regarding provisional assessment and the final determination of liability.\nThe petitioner imported the vehicle from the UK and filed a Goods Declaration at Customs Dry Port, Peshawar. The vehicle’s value was determined via an online portal, leading to an assessment of USD 87,750 after a 30% discount on certain taxes. Dissatisfied with the assessment, the petitioner filed a complaint with the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO), who directed the Collector MCC to address the issue of a delay/detention certificate.\nSubsequently, the Assistant Collector MCC issued a show cause notice and passed an order finalizing the provisional assessment, demanding recovery of duty and taxes by encashing the petitioner’s bank guarantee. The petitioner challenged this order through a constitutional petition.\n________________________________________\nHeld:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, holding that:\n1.\nSection 81 of the Customs Act, 1969 does not include additional amounts determined on the basis of a provisional assessment unless a final determination has been made within the stipulated period.\n2.\nThe differential amount assessed through provisional means is only speculative and does not become payable unless confirmed through proper inquiry and final determination.\n3.\nSince the final determination had not been completed properly, the impugned order dated 02.12.2020 was set aside, and the bank guarantee securing the differential amount was ordered to be returned to the petitioner.\n4.\nThe findings of the Assistant Collector MCC were based on an incorrect interpretation of Section 81(4) of the Customs Act, 1969.\nAccordingly, the Writ Petition was allowed in favor of the petitioner.\n________________________________________\nCitations:\n•\nSUS Motors (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan, Islamabad & 2 others (2011 PTD 235)\n•\nHussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi & others (PLD 1970 SC 1)\n•\nMessrs Alpha Chemicals v. Federation of Pakistan & 4 others (2013 PTD 2064)\nThe ruling affirmed that provisional assessments do not create an enforceable tax liability unless finalized within the legally prescribed period.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,79,80,81(1),81(2),81(4)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199(1)(a),199(1) (c)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 737-P of 2021, decided on 11.04.2023, date of hearing: 11.04.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aamir Bilal for the Petitioner.\nSanaullah DAG, Gul Nazir Azam and Ishtiaq Ahmad (Junior) for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S TEST INTERNATIONAL\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION/CHAIRMAN FBR, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25802", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 342 = 2025 SLD 342 = (2025) 131 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTODc", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax – Amendment of Assessment and Refund Claims\n________________________________________\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a permanent establishment of a UAE-based company, provides oil field services to various government and public sector clients in Pakistan. The appellant filed income tax returns as required by law. However, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) initiated:\n1.\nAudit proceedings for Tax Year 2017\n2.\nMultiple amendment of assessment proceedings under Section 122(5A) for Tax Years 2013-2017\nThese actions led to a significant income tax demand against the appellant, which was challenged before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) [CIR(A)] and later before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR).\nMeanwhile, the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue (ACIR), exercising jurisdiction under Section 170(4) in May 2024, inquired about the withholding tax deduction on imports and services. The ACIR rejected the appellant’s claim, treating the withheld amount as final tax liability and denied a refund claim for Tax Year 2014, citing time-barred limitations.\nFeeling aggrieved, the appellant filed direct appeals before the Tribunal, relying on its pecuniary jurisdiction.\n________________________________________\nHeld:\n1.\nAssessing Officer lacks jurisdiction to modify tax liability under Section 170 – The Assessing Officer cannot determine, change, modify, or alter the tax liability of the appellant under Section 170 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n2.\nOrders of the appellate authorities are binding on lower tax officers – The appellate forum, after scrutiny of records and legal analysis, ruled in favor of the appellant. The impugned order by the Assessing Officer (AO) is legally unsustainable and cannot override the superior authorities’ decisions.\n3.\nFBR officials disregarded judicial orders on refunds – The tax officials’ refusal to adhere to higher court judgments amounts to severe contempt.\n4.\nRefund must be issued immediately – The Tribunal annulled the orders of the Assessing Officer and directed FBR to immediately issue the due refund along with compensation as per the ruling in Commissioner Inland Revenue vs. Prime Commercial Bank Ltd (2023 PTD 997).\n5.\nFBR to issue guidelines on compliance with superior court decisions – The Chairman FBR was instructed to issue directives to all officers handling refunds under Section 170, emphasizing strict adherence to judicial precedents.\n________________________________________\nCitations:\n•\nCIR, Legal, LTO vs. Honda Atlas Cars Limited (Civil Petition No. 1129-L/2021, dated 15.11.2022)\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, LTO vs. Honda Atlas Cars (ITR No. 2455 of 2021)\n•\nZarai Taraqiati Bank Limited & Others vs. Mushtaq Ahmed Korai (2007 SCMR 1698)\n•\nHafiz Moor Muhammad & Others vs. Ghulam Rasul & Others (1999 SCMR 705)\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue vs. Muhammad Ali (2016 PTD 377)\n•\n(2020 PTD 1157) (SC)\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Islamabad vs. Fauji Foundation Limited (2023 SCMR 1694)\n•\nPfizer Laboratories Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan (PTCL 1998 CL 354)\n•\nSui Northern Gas Pipelines vs. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (PTCL 2015 CL 652)\n•\nMCB Bank Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (2015 PTD 911)\nThe decision reaffirmed that FBR authorities must strictly comply with appellate and superior court decisions, ensuring that taxpayers are not deprived of lawful refunds.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b),22(5A),131,170,170(3),170(4),177,214C", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 849/IB/2023 to ITA No.852/IB/2023, decided on 08-07-2024, date of hearing: 08-07-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Waheed Shahzad Butt, Advocate & Mr. Khurram Shahzad, ITP, for the Appellants.\nMr. Faisal Mushtaq Dar, CIR, Ms. Ishrat Mujahid, ACIR and Mr. Osama Idress, Add CIR for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S SPRINT OIL AND GAS SERVICES, ISLAMABAD\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CTO, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25803", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 343 = 2025 SLD 343 = (2025) 131 TAX 26", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTODY", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Refund – Fraudulent Claim and Penalty\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990, Sections 3, 10, and 33.\n•\nSales Tax Refund Rules, 2006, Rule 29(4).\n•\nSRO 180(I)/2011, dated 05.03.2011.\nDetails: The appellant filed a sales tax refund claim of Rs. 8,551,005 for the tax period July 2011 under Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, citing input tax credit carried forward per Section 3(2)(h) of the Act and SRO 180(I)/2011. A pre-refund audit under Rule 29(4) of the Sales Tax Refund Rules, 2006, identified discrepancies, leading to a show-cause notice on 11.12.2013. After considering the appellant’s response, the assessing officer rejected the refund claim through Assessment Order No. 32/2014 dated 25.03.2014 and imposed a 100% penalty under Section 33. The appellant’s appeal before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) [CIR(A)] was unsuccessful, leading to a further appeal before the Tribunal.\nHeld: The Tribunal upheld the rejection of the refund claim and the imposition of a 100% penalty, concluding that the appellant had committed fraud to obtain an inadmissible refund. Citing the principle that fraud unravels everything, the Tribunal emphasized that no legal judgment can stand if obtained through fraudulent means. The appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,10,33", - "Case #": "STA NO. 26/PB/2015, decided on 22.10.2021, date of hearing: 22.10.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ishtiaq Ahmed, Advocate for the Appellant.\nIshfaq Ahmed, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S F.B. TRADERS, PESHAWAR\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (ZONE-I), RTO, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25804", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 344 = 2025 SLD 344 = (2025) 131 TAX 35", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTODU", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Audit and Amendment of Assessment under Section 122(5A)\nDetails:\nThe appellant, an individual running a clinic/hospital, was selected for an audit. After scrutiny, the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (AdCIR) identified discrepancies and issued a show cause notice under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Consequently, an amended assessment order was passed, disallowing certain expenses and adding them to the appellant’s income. The taxpayer challenged this before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) [CIR(A)], who deleted the additions. The decision was subsequently challenged by the Department.\nHeld:\n•\nSection 122(5A) does not empower the AdCIR to conduct inquiries similar to an audit under Section 177 of the Ordinance.\n•\nThe assessing officer improperly based his order on inquiries made from the taxpayer, which falls outside the scope of Section 122(5A).\n•\nThe Tribunal found that the order issued under Section 122(5A) was legally unsustainable.\n•\nThe appeal was dismissed as meritless and devoid of legal force.\nCitations:\n•\n(2017 PTD (Trib) 1911)\n•\nM/s Multinet Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. Karachi Vs. The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, LTU, Karachi (2019 PTD (Trib) 2162)\n•\n(2014 PTD (Trib.) 2085)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,120,122(1),122(5A),127,129,177General Clauses Act, 1897=24A", - "Case #": "ITA NO.3289/LB/2015, decided on 23.09.2021, date of hearing: 17.09.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND RIZWAN AHMAD URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Amjad, D.R for the Appellant.\nMuhammad Maqbool Khan, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE CIR, RTO, MULTAN\nVS\nDR. HAFEEZ ANWAR WAPDA TOWN, MULTAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25805", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 345 = 2025 SLD 345 = 2025 ITR 32", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTODQ", - "Key Words:": "Section 28(iv), read with section 41(1), of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Business income - Value of any benefit or perquisite, arising from business or exercise of profession (Waiver of loan) - Assessment year 1976-77 - Assessee had acquired certain tooling and equipments from KJC for which KJC agreed to provide loan to assessee, however, subsequently, another entity took over KJC and agreed to waive outstanding loan amount - Revenue claimed that waived amount represented income under section 28(iv) or alternatively, under section 41(1) - Assessee however, pointed out that sum waived could not be brought to tax as it represented waiver of a loan liability which was on capital account and, thus, was not in nature of income - Whether, for invoking provisions of section 28(iv), benefit received has to be in some form other than in shape of money and since waiver amount represented cash/money, provisions of section 28 (iv) were inapplicable - Held, yes - Whether further, for application of section 41(1), it is sine qua non that there should be an allowance or deduction claimed by assessee in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred, however, assessee had not claimed deduction under section 36(1)(iii) for interest on loan and loan was obtained for acquiring capital assets, hence, waiver was on account of liability other than trading liability and, thus, provisions of section 41(1) were inapplicable - Held, yes [Paras 13, 15, 16 and 17][In favour of assessee]\nFACTS\n■ The assessee entered into an agreement on 18-6-1964 with Kaiser Jeep Corporation ( KJC) based in America wherein KJC agreed to sell the dies, welding equipments and die models to the assessee. For the procurement of the said toolings and other equipments, the KJC agreed to provide a loan to the assessee at the rate of 6 per cent interest repayable after 10 years in instalments. Subsequently, American Motor Corporation (AMC) took over the KJC and also agreed to waive the principal amount of loan advanced by the KJC to the assessee and to cancel the promissory notes as and when they got matured.\n■ The assessee filed its return for relevant assessment year 1976-77 and showed Rs. 57.74 lakhs as cessation of its liability towards the American Motor Corporation. The Assessing Officer, however, held that the credit represented income taxable under section 28.\n■ On appeal, the Commissioner(Appeals) dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Assessing Officer with certain modifications.\n■ On further appeal, the Tribunal decided the case in favour of the assessee and set aside the order passed by the Commissioner(Appeals).\n■ On Reference by revenue to the High Court, the High Court confirmed findings of Tribunal in favour of assessee.\n■ On appeal to the Supreme Court, the revenue claimed that the waived amount represented income under section 28(iv) or alternatively, under section 41. However, the assessee pointed out that sum waived could not be brought to tax as it represented the waiver of a loan liability which was on the capital account and thus, was not in the nature of income.\nHELD\n■ The term loan generally refers to borrowing something, especially a sum of cash that is to be paid back along with the interest decided mutually by the parties. In other terms, the debtor is under a liability to pay back the principal amount along with the agreed rate of interest within a stipulated time.[Para 10]\n■ It is a well-settled principle that creditor or his successor may exercise their Right of Waiver unilaterally to absolve the debtor from his liability to repay. After such exercise, the debtor is deemed to be absolved from the liability of repayment of loan subject to the conditions of waiver. The waiver may be a partly waiver i.e., waiver of part of the principal or interest repayable, or a complete waiver of both the loan as well as interest amounts. Hence, waiver of loan by the creditor results in the debtor having extra cash in his hand. It is receipt in the hands of the debtor/assessee. The short but cogent issue in the instant case arises whether waiver of loan by the creditor is taxable as a perquisite under section 28(iv) or taxable as a remission of liability under section 41(1).[Para 11]\n■ On a plain reading of section 28(iv), prima facie, it appears that for the applicability of the said provision, the income which can be taxed shall arise from the business or profession. Also, in order to invoke the provision of section 28(iv), the benefit which is received has to be in some other form rather than in the shape of money. In the instant case, it is a matter of record that the amount of Rs.57.74 lakhs is having received as cash receipt due to the waiver of loan. Therefore, the very first condition of section 28(iv) which says any benefit or perquisite arising from the business shall be in the form of benefit or perquisite other than in the shape of money, is not satisfied in the instant case. Hence, in no circumstances, it can be said that the amount of Rs 57.74 lakhs can be taxed under the provisions of section 28(iv).[Para 13]\n■ On a perusal of section 41(1), it is evident that it is a sine qua non that there should be an allowance or deduction claimed by the assessee in any assessment for any year in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee. Then, subsequently, during any previous year, if the creditor remits or waives any such liability, then the assessee is liable to pay tax under section 41. The objective behind this section is simple. It is made to ensure that the assessee does not get away with a double benefit once by way of deduction and another by not being taxed on the benefit received by him in the later year with reference to deduction allowed earlier in case of remission of such liability. It is undisputed fact that the assessee had been paying interest at 6 per cent per annum to the KJC as per the contract but the assessee never claimed deduction for payment of interest under section 36(1)(iii). In the case at hand, the Commissioner(Appeals) relied upon section 41(1) and held that the assessee had received amortization benefit. Amortization is an accounting term that refers to the process of allocating the cost of an asset over a period of time, hence, it is nothing else than depreciation. Depreciation is a reduction in the value of an asset over time, in particular, to wear and tear. Therefore, the deduction claimed by the assessee in previous assessment years was due to the deprecation of the machine and not on the interest paid by it.[Para 15]\n■ Moreover, the purchase effected from the KJC is in respect of plant, machinery and tooling equipments which are capital assets of the assessee. It is important to note that the said purchase amount had not been debited to the trading account or to the profit or loss account in any of the assessment years. It is to be noted that there is difference between trading liability and other liability. Section 41(1) particularly deals with the remission of trading liability. Whereas in the instant case, waiver of loan amounts to cessation of liability other than trading liability. Hence, there is no force in the argument of the revenue that the case of the assessee would fall under section 41(1).[Para 16]\n■ To sum up, the judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot be interfered with for the following reasons:\n(a) Section 28(iv) does not apply on the present case since the receipts of Rs 57.74 lakhs are in the nature of cash or money.\n(b) Section 41(1) does not apply since waiver of loan does not amount to cessation of trading liability. It is a matter of record that the assessee has not claimed any deduction under section 36(1)(iii) qua the payment of interest in any previous year.[Para 17]\n■ In view of above discussion, the appeals being devoid of merit are dismissed.[Para 18]\nCASE REVIEW\nMahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. CIT [2003] 128 Taxman 394/261 ITR 501 (Bom.), Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dholgiri Industrial (P.) Ltd. [2014] 48 taxmann.com 279 (Madhya Pradesh), CIT v. Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. [2013] 36 taxmann.com 557 (Gujarat) (para 18) affirmed and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ramaniyam Homes (P.) Ltd. [2016] 68 taxmann.com 289 (Madras) (para 18) reversed.\nCASES REFERRED TO\nMahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. CIT [2003] 128 Taxman 394/261 ITR 501 (Bom.) (para 2).", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "civil appeal nos. 6949-6950 of 2004 & others, APRIL 24, 2018.", - "Judge Name:": "R.K. AGRAWAL AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR, Arijit Prasad, Adv., Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR, B.V. Balram Das, AOR, Pratap Venugopal, Adv., Ms. Surekha Raman, Adv., Ms. Niharika, Adv., Ms. Kanika Kalaiyarasan, Adv., Ajay Vohra, Sr. Adv., Ms. Kavita Jha, AOR, Udit Naresh, Adv., Manish K. Bishnoi, AOR, Rabin Majumder, AOR, Shantanu Sagar, AOR, Gunnam Venkateswara Rao, AOR, Amar Dave, Adv., P.S. Sudheer, AOR, Ms. Shruti Jose, Adv., Rishi Maheswari, Adv., Bharat Sood, Adv., Ms. Bharti Tyagi, AOR, Rakesh K. Sharma, AOR, Nishant, Adv., Bhargava V. Desai, AOR, Akshat Malpani, Adv., Rajat Jariwal, Adv., Snehal Kakrania, Adv., Bharat Gupta, Adv., Akshay Mahajan, Adv., Sanjeev K. Kapoor, Adv., A. Venayagam Balan, AOR, T.G. Narayanan Nair, AOR, Sumit Goel, Adv., Ms. Sonal Gupta, Adv., Tanuj Agarwal, Adv., Ms. Tanya Chaudhry, Adv. and Rashmikumar Manilal Vithlani, AOR for the Appearing Parties.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner\nv.\nMahindra And Mahindra Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25806", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1992 2254 = 1992 SLD 2254 = 1992 PLJ 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTOC8", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction-\n—Offence under Section 13 of Arms Ordinance, 1965-Recovery of Klashnikovs/sten-guns—Conviction for—Challenge to—Ordinances by which arms such as a Klashnikov, a G-III Rifle or any type of assault rifle were added in paragraph C of Schedule to Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, were not laid before appropriate Legislature after four months of their publication in Gazette of Pakistan, and as such, stood repealed as provided in Article 189 of Constitution-On dates of occurrence, i.e. dates of recovery of sten-guns /klashniksovs from appellants, neither Ordinances were alive nor proceedings under same were pending-Held: Trial of appellants for keeping unlicensed arms such as sten-gun and klashnikov which were introduced through Ordinances of 1988, was corum-non-judice- Appeals accepted. \nPLJ 1991 Cr.C. (Lahore) 187 (DB) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arms Ordinance, 1965=13", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 420 of 1990 (also CrlA. Nos. 399, 654, 703, 380, 304,897, 789, 349 and 751 of 1990) accepted on 16.7.1991. Date of hearing: 16.7.1991.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Muhammad Munir khan and Rashid Aziz khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for Appellant.\nNemo for State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAEEM-Appellant\nversus\n THE STATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25807", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 346 = 2025 SLD 346 = (2025) 131 TAX 127", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVJTOCs", - "Key Words:": "1.\nOwnership & Exchange of Land:\no\nRespondent No.4 (Muhammad Rizwan Sohail) owned 46 kanals of land in Chak No. 13/G, Tehsil Chishtian, District Bahawalnagar.\no\nHe appointed Respondent No.5 (Nauraiz Asif) as his General Attorney through a General Power of Attorney (GPA) dated June 22, 2016, registered on June 28, 2016.\no\nAnother individual (Asif Rasheed) owned 2 kanals in the same area.\no\nOn February 20, 2020, Respondent No.4 and Asif Rasheed exchanged their 48 kanals of land with the Petitioner’s 48 kanals in Mauza Mehmoodpur, District Bahawalnagar, through a registered Exchange Deed.\n2.\nDevelopment of Housing Scheme & Municipal Approval:\no\nThe Petitioner and his associate (Hassan Shahzad) applied for a housing scheme (Mubarak Town) on the exchanged land.\no\nThe Municipal Committee approved it on May 28, 2021, with the condition that 16 kanals, 18 marlas would be reserved for roads and transferred free of cost.\no\nThe Petitioner fulfilled this condition through Waqf Deed No. 4461.\n3.\nTax Issue & Withholding of Fard Malkiat:\no\nWhen the Petitioner sought Fard Malkiat for selling plots, the Halqa Patwari refused due to an outstanding CVT demand of Rs. 25,024,000, allegedly due on the General Power of Attorney from 2016.\no\nThe Sub-Registrar, Chishtian, had already issued a Recovery Notice (dated January 13, 2021) against Respondent No.4 for this tax.\no\nThe Petitioner filed this writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution to challenge the refusal to issue Fard Malkiat.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues Raised:\n1.\nMaintainability of the Petition:\no\nThe Assistant Advocate General argued that the Petitioner was not an “aggrieved party” under Article 199 of the Constitution.\no\nThe Court analyzed various precedents, including Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust (PLD 1969 SC 223), concluding that the Petitioner was directly affected and had locus standi.\n2.\nLegality of the CVT Demand on Power of Attorney:\no\nSection 6(3) of the Punjab Finance Act, 2012 imposed CVT on immovable property acquisition through purchase, gift, exchange, power of attorney, or lease (20+ years).\no\nHowever, SC judgment in Sub-Registrar (Rural), Rawalpindi v. Muhammad Ilyas (2017) clarified that CVT is not payable on Power of Attorney given to relatives but remains applicable to transfers involving strangers.\no\nThe Court emphasized the principle of strict interpretation of taxation laws (Bisvil Spinners Ltd. v. Superintendent, Excise & Land Customs Circle, Sheikhupura, PLD 1988 SC 370).\n3.\nAssessment & Recovery Process Violations:\no\nThe Notice dated January 13, 2021 did not follow due process as required under Sections 6(3), 6(5), and 6(15) of the 2012 Act.\no\nNo proper assessment order was issued by the District Collector.\no\nThe Petitioner & Respondent No.5 were not given a hearing, violating due process principles (Abdul Hameed v. Province of Punjab, 2022 CLC 1083).\n4.\nSub-Registrar’s Authority to Withhold Fard Malkiat:\no\nSection 6(17) of the 2012 Act allows recovery as arrears of land revenue, but does not authorize the Sub-Registrar to block land records.\no\nThe Assistant Advocate General failed to show any law empowering the Sub-Registrar to withhold Fard Malkiat without a court order.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision:\n1.\nPetition is Maintainable – The Petitioner is an “aggrieved party” under Article 199 of the Constitution.\n2.\nCVT Liability is Disputed – The Petitioner’s land was acquired through an Exchange Deed, not Power of Attorney, meaning the CVT demand might not be valid.\n3.\nSub-Registrar’s Action Declared Illegal – The refusal to issue Fard Malkiat was without lawful authority.\n4.\nFuture Recovery Proceedings Allowed – The ruling does not preclude the authorities from pursuing recovery of unpaid CVT through proper legal channels.\n________________________________________\nFinal Order:\nWrit petition accepted.\nRestriction on Fard Malkiat issuance is declared unlawful.\nPunjab government can still recover CVT through a proper legal process.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\n1.\nLand transactions through Exchange Deeds do not automatically attract CVT.\n2.\nSub-Registrars lack legal authority to block Fard Malkiat without a valid court order.\n3.\nDue process must be followed in CVT assessments; taxpayers must be given hearings.\n4.\nThis judgment can be cited in similar cases involving CVT disputes on Power of Attorney transactions.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967=13,14,161,162,163,164", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 7027/2022, date of hearing: 26.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ SALEEM SHEIKH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. A.R. Aurangzeb, Advocate.\nFor Respondents No.1 to 3: Hafiza Mehnaz Nadeem Abbasi, Assistant Advocate General.\nFor Respondents No.4 & 5: Ch. Muhammad Azhar, Advocate.\nFor Respondent No.6: Mr. Mehmood Ahmad Bhatti, Advocate.\nResearch assistance: Mr. Sher Hassan Pervez, Research Officer, LHCRC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHAZANFAR AMIN\nVS.\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25808", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 347 = 2025 SLD 347 = 2025 PTD 65", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Confiscation and Release of Smuggled Goods and Vehicles under the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe Collectorate filed Reference Applications challenging the Customs Appellate Tribunal’s orders, which allowed the release of confiscated vehicles/containers against payment of a 20% redemption fine. \nThe key issues involved:\n1.\nInterpretation of “liable to confiscation” under Section 157(2) of the Customs Act, 1969.\n2.\nApplicability of SRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13-06-2009, which prohibits release if smuggled goods are found in a secret/false cavity.\n3.\nPowers of the Tribunal as the final fact-finding authority under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nThe Collectorate’s Arguments:\n•\nSection 157(2) states that a conveyance used to transport smuggled goods is liable to confiscation, meaning mandatory confiscation.\n•\nSRO 499(I)/2009 prohibits the release of vehicles containing smuggled goods found in secret/false cavities.\n•\nThe smuggled goods in this case were found in a specially designed cavity, making the vehicle ineligible for release.\nThe Tribunal’s Findings:\n•\nThe phrase “liable to confiscation” does not mean mandatory confiscation; the Customs Act allows the option of a fine in lieu of confiscation under Section 181.\n•\nThe Show-Cause Notice merely stated that the goods were found inside a cavity behind the shoppers, not in a false/secret cavity as required under Clause (b) of SRO 499(I)/2009.\n•\nSince the Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority, its conclusion that the vehicle did not contain a false cavity could not be challenged in a reference under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the Collectorate’s Reference Applications, holding that:\n1.\nThe Tribunal correctly interpreted Sections 157 & 181 of the Customs Act, 1969, confirming that vehicles used for smuggling are not automatically confiscated but may be released on payment of a fine.\n2.\nSRO 499(I)/2009 did not apply, as the goods were not found in a secret/false cavity.\n3.\nFactual determinations by the Tribunal are final and cannot be revisited under Section 196.\nCitations:\n•\nCustoms Act, 1969: Sections 2(s), 15, 16, 157, 181, 196\n•\nSRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13-06-2009\n•\nMessrs T & N Pakistan Private Limited v. The Collector Customs and others, 2022 SCMR 1119", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),15,16,156(1)(8),156(1)(89),157,157(1),157(2),181,196Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)", - "Case #": "Special Custom Reference Application No. 99 of 2024, decided on 30th August, 2024. Date of hearing: 28th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD EJAZ SWATI, ACJ AND SARDAR AHMED HALEEMI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Jawad Mehmood for Applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (ENFORCEMENT), KHUZDAR, CAMP OFFICE AT CUSTOMS HOUSE, GADDANI\nVs\nMUHAMMAD ALI AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25809", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 348 = 2025 SLD 348 = 2025 PTD 70", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)-Ss.2(3)(1)(a)(b) & (ii) & 9(1)-Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Ss. 170(3) & (4), 221, 122(9) & 122(5A)-Letter No. 6(43) Rev.Bud/2021/116078-R dated 10.05.2022 issued by the Federal Board of Revenue-Disposal of cases of all individuals/AOP who had adjusted refund claims against admitted tax liability of Tax Years 2016-2021. matter of-Federal Tax Ombudsman, jurisdiction of- Maladministration-Scope-Respondent /Department raised objection regarding bar on jurisdiction of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman-Validity-Issue in hand was not of assessment of determination of tax-The taxpayer had outstanding refund claim of previous years far in excess of admitted tax liability clearly visible in respective tax years in IRIS-Determination of refund under S.170 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for those previous tax years against prescribed period of six months, was pending with the department- Now the Department intended to penalize the taxpayer for not being able to produce refund order which was in fact to be processed by the Department itself-This was a fit case of maladministration to be treated by Federal Tax Ombudsman.\n(b) Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000)-Ss. 2(3)(1)(a)(b) & (ii) & 9(1)-Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Ss. 170(3) & (4), 221, 122(9) & 122(5A)-Letter No. 6(43) Rev.Bud/2021/116078-R dated 10.05.2022 issued by the Federal Board of Revenue-Refund claims, self-adjustment of-Scope-Disposing of cases of all individuals/AOP who had adjusted refund claims against admitted tax liability of Tax years 2016-2021 by the FBR in light of Letter No. 6(43) Rev.Bud/2021/116078-R dated 10.05.2022-Federal Tax Ombudsman initiated investigation of the matter-Argument of the Respondent / Department was that a taxpayer could not adjust any refund already claimed in previous years until and unless it was determined by the Department under S. 170(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance-In support of said argument, the decision of the Supreme Court judgment dated 05.03.2020 in Civil Petitions 283-L to 286-L of 2018 dated 05.03.2020 had been quoted /referred to-Validity-Said judgment was distinguishable which was with reference to claim of additional payments for delayed refunds (compensation); on the contrary, issue-in-hand was not of said matter-In the present matter, the claim of the taxpayer was his own excess payments of previous tax years for which he had applied to the Department as per law and it was the responsibility of the Department to dispose the applications of refund in terms of Ss. 170(3)A 170(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance. But the Department, instead of complying with the said provisions, kept on sleeping over the refund application of taxpayer for more than prescribed period of sixty days-Taxpayer ,on the other hand, after having failed to get his refunds issued, resorted to claiming of its adjustment in hL return in subsequent years for wnich a separate TAB was provided in return of income through IRIS (This TAB was subsequently removed in income tax return for Tax year 2022 in IRIS)-Thus, all .the actions of disposal of refund application of previous years, determination of refund and adjustment of the same against taxpayers admitted liability in terms of provisions of Ss. 170(3) & 170(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was pending with the Department and the Department was asking the taxpayer to produce the evidence for the same-Thus, non-disposal of refund applications of previous years and issuance of show cause notice under S.221 or 122(9)/122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without conducting proper desk audit tantamounted to maladministration in terms of S.2(3)(1)(a)(b) & (ii) of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000-Federal Tax Ombudsman recommended the respondent / FBR to issue clear cut and uniform instructions / clarifications with respect to letter-in-question-No refund adjustment claim can be rejected without taking substantial steps (i.e, conducting detailed desk audit of returns, verifying tax payments from ITMS/IRIS etc., confronting specifically unverified tax deductions/payment setc.)-Federal Tax Ombudsman recommended to dispose of refund applications for previous years on merits as per law after providing opportunity of hearing-Federal Tax Ombudsman disposed of Own Motion Investigation accordingly,\nCivil Petitions Nos.283-L to 23o-L of 2018 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=170(3),(4),221,122(9),122(5A)Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=9(1)", - "Case #": "In re: Own Motion Nos.0052 and 0064/OM/2022 Adjustment of Income refunds with Tax Liability \nDated 27-05-2022[1] R.O. Karachi\nOWN Motion Nos.0052 and 0064/OM/2022, decided on 20th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Dr. Asif Mahmood Jah, Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Lawyer Name:": "Badruddin Ahmad Quraishi, Advisor Dealing Officer.\nMuhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor Appraisal Officer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25810", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 349 = 2025 SLD 349 = 2025 PTD 112", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWTk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Reopening of Assessment by Audit Officer under the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nA Petroleum Company imported furnace oil in an oil tanker that was partially empty, incurring dead freight charges. The Goods Declaration (GD) was assessed and cleared by the Appropriate Officer of Customs. However, during an audit, the Audit Officer, Director General Audit Customs and Petroleum, raised an objection, claiming that the declared freight charges were lower than market practice, leading to an alleged short realization of Rs. 2,481,696 in duties and taxes.\nThe Customs Department issued a show-cause notice under Sections 32(1) & 32(3A) of the Customs Act, 1969, which was adjudicated by the Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Quetta, directing the importer to pay the shortfall. On appeal, the Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside the Order-in-Original, ruling in favor of the importer. The Collectorate challenged this decision before the High Court.\nThe Importer’s Arguments:\n•\nThe Audit Officer lacked jurisdiction to re-open the assessment order under Section 195 of the Customs Act, 1969.\n•\nOnly the Collector of Customs could reopen such an order within two years of its issuance.\n•\nThe company had declared and paid all duties and taxes on the imported furnace oil, including dead freight charges, and thus, the case did not fall under Sections 18 or 25 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nThe Customs Department’s Arguments:\n•\nThe freight cost declared in the GD was lower than market rates, leading to a loss of revenue.\n•\nThe Audit Officer had the authority to question the assessment and issue a show-cause notice.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the Reference Application, holding that:\n1.\nThe assessment made under Sections 79 & 80 of the Customs Act, 1969, was final and was not appealed under Section 193.\n2.\nThe Audit Officer lacked jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Only a Collector of Customs had such authority under Section 195, and that too within two years.\n3.\nThe Customs Authority had become functus officio, meaning it had lost the legal power to reopen the assessment.\n4.\nReopening an assessment involves a factual controversy requiring adjudication by the Additional Collector of Customs or the Appellate Tribunal, not the High Court in a Reference under Section 195.\nCitations:\n•\nCustoms Act, 1969: Sections 18, 25, 32(1), 32(3A), 79, 80, 195\n•\nCollector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Quetta v. Messrs Al-Habib Enterprises and Engineering, 2019 PTD 1712", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1),32(3A)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.02 of 2020, decided on 30th August, 2024. Date of hearing: 19th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD KAMRAN KHAN MULAKHAIL, JUSTICE AND SHAUKAT ALI RAKHSHANI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Jawad Mehmood for Applicant.\nDr. Pervaiz and Tahir Kaleem for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, CUSTOM HOUSE, GAWADAR AT GADDANI\nVS\nMESSRS BYCO PETROLEUM PAKISTAN LIMITED AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25811", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 350 = 2025 SLD 350 = 2025 PTD 116", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWTg", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Discriminatory Sales Tax Rates in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) and Maladministration under the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance\n________________________________________\n(a) Higher Rate of Sales Tax in ICT – Maladministration\nDetails:\nThe Pakistan Overseas Employment Promoters Association filed a complaint regarding the higher rate of sales tax applicable in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) under the Islamabad Capital Territory (Tax on Services) Ordinance, 2001, compared to lower rates in Sindh and Punjab and no tax in KPK and Balochistan. The complainant argued that this disparity should be considered maladministration by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).\nHeld:\n•\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) found that no maladministration could be attributed to FBR since it was implementing the ICT Tax on Services Ordinance, 2001, which had been promulgated by the President and later amended by the Finance Act, 2021.\n•\nThe discriminatory tax structure could only be addressed through legislation.\n•\nThe complaint had already been submitted as a budget proposal for the 2022-23 financial year and forwarded to FBR for consideration.\n•\nHowever, the FTO recognized the disparity as a significant barrier to the ease of doing business and recommended that FBR propose amendments in the ICT Tax on Services Ordinance, 2001, in the next budget (2023-24) to ensure fair treatment for businesses operating in ICT.\nCitations:\n•\nEstablishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000: Sections 2(3), 9 & 10\n•\nIslamabad Capital Territory (Tax on Services) Ordinance, 2001: Section 3\n________________________________________\n(b) Sales Tax on Service Charges for Overseas Employment in ICT – Maladministration\nDetails:\nThe Pakistan Overseas Employment Promoters Association also challenged the application of sales tax on service charges (Rs. 6,000 per person) for overseas employment in ICT. The complainant argued that sales tax should only be applied to service charges and not on the entire turnover, which included air tickets, medical expenses, work permits, visas, and other documentation costs.\nHeld:\n•\nThe Emigration Rules, 1979, define service charges for overseas employment, which are Rs. 6,000/- for a salary up to USD 1,200 and Rs. 10,000/- for a salary exceeding USD 1,200.\n•\nUnder the Punjab Finance Act, 2020, a 5% sales tax is applied only on the service charges (Rs. 6,000/- or Rs. 10,000/-).\n•\nHowever, in ICT, under Section 3(1) of the ICT (Tax on Services) Ordinance, 2001, a 15% tax was imposed on the entire value of services, including expenses—a major discrepancy between provincial and federal taxation laws.\n•\nThe FTO found no maladministration on the part of FBR, but recognized that this tax structure created a discriminatory environment for businesses operating in ICT.\n•\nThe FTO recommended that FBR take corrective action by proposing amendments in the ICT (Tax on Services) Ordinance, 2001, in the Finance Bill 2023-24 to harmonize tax rates across regions.\nCitations:\n•\nEstablishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000: Sections 2(3), 9 & 10\n•\nIslamabad Capital Territory (Tax on Services) Ordinance, 2001: Section 3\n•\nEmigration Rules, 1979: Sr. No. 15\n•\nPunjab Finance Act, 2020", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3),9,10,14(8)Islamabad Capital Territory (Tax on Services) Ordinance, 2001=3", - "Case #": "Review Petition in Complaint No. 1838/ISB/ST/2022, decided on 13th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. ASIF MEHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Arslan Subuctageeen, Advisor Dealing Officer.\nNisar Ahmad, Registrar Appraising Officer.\nFaheem Iqbal, Former Vice Chairman and Shahbaz Zeb Khan, Secretary General, Authorized Representatives.\nAmir Amin Bhatti, Chief FBR Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED REHMAT ALI SHAH \nVS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25812", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 351 = 2025 SLD 351 = 2025 PTD 121 = (2025) 132 TAX 82", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Imposition of Penalty and Default Surcharge for Delayed Tax Return and Payment\n________________________________________\nRecovery Proceedings & Imposition of Penalty and Default Surcharge\nDetails:\n•\nTax authorities initiated recovery proceedings against the respondent (taxpayer) due to the delayed filing of sales tax returns and late payment of tax due.\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) set aside the penalty and default surcharge, reasoning that the principal tax liability had already been voluntarily discharged before the initiation of proceedings under Section 11(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n•\nThe Revenue Department challenged the ATIR’s decision, arguing that penalty and default surcharge could still be imposed regardless of whether the principal tax had been paid voluntarily before proceedings.\nHeld:\n•\nUnder Section 2(34) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, even if no additional tax was payable at the time of return filing after the due date, penalty and default surcharge could still be imposed under Sections 33 & 34 of the Act.\n•\nA restrictive interpretation of order of assessment of tax would undermine the legal discipline of tax compliance, making Sections 33 & 34 redundant—which should be avoided through a harmonized reading of the law.\n•\nThe Division Bench of the High Court set aside the ATIR’s order, finding it legally defective, and remanded the matter back to the ATIR for reconsideration (de novo determination).\n•\nThe ATIR was directed to hear the appeal afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to both parties.\nCitations:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Sections 2(34), 11, 33, 34 & 47\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Madina Cotton Ginners and Oil Mills (2016 PTD 643)\n•\nMessrs Attock Refinery Limited v. The Collector of Sales Tax (2021 PTD 1680)\n•\nMessrs Punjab Small Industries, Rawalpindi v. Deputy Collector Adjudication (2021 PTD 871)\n•\nDhan Fibers Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (2006 PTD 2683)\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Quetta Electric Supply Company (2022 PTD 1265)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(1),2(34),33,34,47", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No.77498 of 2022, decided on 26th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zain-ul-Abidein Bokhari for the Applicant-department.\nWaseem Ahmad Malik assisted by Ms. Najia Noreen Maitla for Respondent-taxpayer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE-LTO, LAHORE\nVS\nMESSRS RASOOL NAWAZ SUGAR MILLS, LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25813", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 352 = 2025 SLD 352 = 2025 PTD 127", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDWXk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Imposition of Penalty for Undeclared Sales in Sales Tax Returns\n________________________________________\nPenalty for Undeclared Sales & Determination of Taxable Supplies\nDetails:\n•\nThe Assessing Officer issued a show-cause notice to the taxpayer for not declaring sales in sales tax returns and allegedly evading sales tax.\n•\nThe Assessing Officer’s order imposing tax and penalty was upheld by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals).\n•\nThe taxpayer challenged the decision before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), arguing that the imposition of sales tax was not supported by any deeming provision in the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nHeld:\n•\nThe Sales Tax Act, 1990, unlike income tax law, does not contain any deeming provision that allows cash credits in a taxpayer’s accounts to be automatically treated as taxable supplies or business income.\n•\nA taxpayer cannot be subjected to tax based on assumptions or presumptions, but only under clear and unambiguous provisions of law.\n•\nThe Revenue Department failed to establish that the disputed amounts were linked to taxable supplies or taxable business activities.\n•\nThe burden of proof was on the tax authorities, but they failed to provide any material evidence to substantiate their claim.\n•\nSince the basis of the tax demand was flawed, the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) set aside the orders of both the Assessing Officer and Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), allowing the taxpayer’s appeal.\nCitations:\n•\n2013 PTD 2130\n•\n2018 PTD 4\n•\nMessrs Al-Hilal Motors Stores v. The Collector, Sales Tax and Central Excise (2004 PTD 868)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(35),2(39),2(41),2(46),3,3(1),3(1A),6,11,22,23,25(3),26,26(1),33", - "Case #": "S.T.A. NO.458/IB/2023, decided on 31st July, 2023. Date of hearing: 23rd June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR M. AJAZ KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SAJID NAZIR MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Imran-ul-Haq for Appellant.\nMiss Misbah Noureen, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS IMPERIAL SANITATION, RAWALPINDI\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25814", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 353 = 2025 SLD 353 = 2025 PTD 133", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVTc", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Duty and Tax Remission (DTRE) for Unaccounted Goods Destroyed by Fire\n________________________________________\nDuty and Tax Remission (DTRE) – Destruction of Unaccounted Goods\nDetails:\n•\nThe Customs Department filed a Reference against an order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal concerning unaccounted-for un-exported goods under SRO 450(I)/2001 and Rule 307-A(2)(d) of the Customs Rules, 2001.\n•\nThe Departments stance was that the Textile Mill/Factory (respondent) failed to report a fire incident in time, and thus was not entitled to duty and tax remission.\n•\nThe respondent countered that the fire incident was undisputed, the insurance claim was settled in its favor, and hence, it was entitled to duty and tax remission.\nHeld:\n•\nThe incident of fire was an admitted fact, and the Tribunal rightly observed that once goods are destroyed by fire, the benefit of Rule 307A(2)(d) must be granted.\n•\nSRO 450(I)/2001 requires accounting for all goods benefiting from DTRE. However, Rule 307-A(2)(d) allows destruction of such goods with the approval of the Regulatory Collector if they are unfit for sale or consumption.\n•\nSince the goods were completely destroyed in the fire and were not fit for consumption, the Regulatory Authority should have exercised discretion to grant duty and tax remission.\n•\nThe Tribunal’s decision was upheld, as the authorities failed to provide valid reasons for denying the remission.\n•\nThe Reference Application by the Department was dismissed, and the decision was in favor of the Textile Mill/Factory.\nCitations:\n•\nCustoms Rules, 2001 – Rule 307-A(2)(d)\n•\nSRO 450(I)/2001 dated 18.06.2001", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Rules, 2001=307A(1),307-A(2)(d)Customs Act, 1969=196(8)Limitation Act, 1908=5", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) No.71 of 2016, decided on 22nd February, 2021. Date of hearing: 22nd May, 2021.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MAHMOOD A. KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Iqbal M. Khurram for Applicant.\nImran Iqbal Khan for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF EXPORT\nVS\nM/S ISLAND TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25815", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 354 = 2025 SLD 354 = 2025 PTD 137 = (2025) 132 TAX 502", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Reference Applications & Retrospective Taxation\n________________________________________\n(a) Failure to Propose Relevant Question in Reference Application\nDetails:\n•\nThe Department filed a Reference Application before the High Court against the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue’s (ATIR) decision that vacated orders of lower authorities and deleted the addition made under Section 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nHowever, the Department did not propose any question before the High Court challenging the Tribunal’s findings on the main issue in the case.\nHeld:\n•\nSince no specific question was proposed regarding the issue-in-hand, it was deemed that the Tribunal’s observations attained finality.\n•\nFailure to challenge the core issue signified a lack of diligence, and no retrospective adjudication could be made on a question that was not raised in time.\n•\nThe Reference Application was dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Pak Arab Pipe Line Company Ltd. 2014 PTD 982\n•\nMessrs Azad Kashmir Logging and SAW Mills Corporation v. Commissioner Income Tax 2017 PTD 1058\n•\nThe Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Fauji Foundation 2021 PTD 1951\n________________________________________\n(b) Retrospective Effect of Section 111(1)(d) of the Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\n•\nThe Department challenged the Tribunal’s decision, which had deleted an addition made by the Assessing Officer under Section 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nThe core issue was whether Section 111(1)(d), inserted through the Finance Act, 2011, applied retrospectively to tax year 2010.\nHeld:\n•\nSection 111(1)(d) was inserted via the Finance Act, 2011, and took effect prospectively from 01.07.2011.\n•\nSince the tax year under consideration was 2010, the provision could not be applied retrospectively.\n•\nAs a general principle, tax statutes operate prospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise by the legislature.\n•\nThe Reference Application was dismissed.\nCitations:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Messrs Millat Tractors Limited, Lahore and others 2024 SCMR 700\n•\nSardar Sher Bahadar Khan v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2018 SC 97\n________________________________________\n(c) Suppression of Sales & Chargeability to Tax under Section 111(1)(d)\nDetails:\n•\nThe Department challenged the Tribunal’s decision, which deleted an addition made by the Assessing Officer under Section 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nThe Department argued that the show-cause notice should have been issued under Section 111(1)(b) instead of 111(1)(d).\nHeld:\n•\nSection 111(1)(d) specifically deals with suppression of sales and production.\n•\nThe phrase “chargeable to tax” applies to all elements of sub-clause (i), including suppressed sales and production.\n•\nOnly production or sales that are chargeable to tax fall under Section 111(1)(d).\n•\nThe taxpayer’s liability remains on the net income or the amount that has escaped assessment.\n•\nThe Reference Application was dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, RTO Lahore v. Mian Liaqat Ali Proprietor, Liaqat Hospital 2023 SCMR 534", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,111(1),111(1)(b), 111(1)(d),111(1)(d)(i),113A,115(4),122(5),133(5)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 10 of 2018, heard on 4th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 4th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Anwar-ul-Haq and Sh. Ikram Elahi for Applicant.\nCh. Imran-ul-Haq for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, DISTRICT ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, RAWALPINDI\nVS\nSH. IKRAM ELLAHI AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25816", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 355 = 2025 SLD 355 = 2025 PTD 143", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVTU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Limitation & Role of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue\n________________________________________\n(a) Identical Verbatim Orders by Different Benches of the Tribunal\nDetails:\n•\nThe taxpayer filed a Reference before the High Court against the dismissal of their appeal by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) on the ground of limitation.\n•\nThe High Court noted that the impugned order contained identical paragraphs (verbatim) as another previous order issued by a different Bench of the Tribunal.\n•\nThis raised concerns about the casual and negligent approach of the Tribunal in attending to case-specific facts.\n•\nThe Court remarked that while Artificial Intelligence (AI) was not used, the approach resembled an automated cut and paste judgment.\n•\nThe identical wording and even factual mistakes in the same paragraph numbers in both orders suggested an undue reliance on a prior ruling.\nHeld:\n•\nSince the earlier order on which the impugned decision was based had already been set aside, the impugned order was also unsustainable.\n•\nThe matter was remanded to the Tribunal to reconsider the limitation issue afresh, after seeking proper comments and supporting documents from the Commissioner Inland Revenue.\n•\nIf the condonation application was granted, the case was to be decided on its merits.\n•\nThe Reference Application was disposed of accordingly.\nCitations:\n•\nSCRA No. 1234 & 1235 of 2023\n________________________________________\n(b) Limitation in Appeals Before the Tribunal & Duty to Verify Facts\nDetails:\n•\nThe taxpayer filed a Reference Application before the High Court, challenging the Tribunals decision that dismissed their appeal on limitation grounds.\n•\nThe taxpayer argued that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was not received in time, and their appeal before the Tribunal was filed with an application for condonation of delay.\n•\nThe Tribunal rejected the appeal, stating that the taxpayer had not disputed service of the order through electronic means.\n•\nHowever, no supporting material was on record to establish electronic service.\nHeld:\n•\nSince the Commissioner (Appeals) had not filed objections or comments before the Tribunal, the Tribunal’s assumption regarding electronic service of the order was factually incorrect.\n•\nAs the highest factual determination authority, the Tribunal had a duty to ascertain the actual service of the order before deciding the condonation application.\n•\nThe High Court remanded the matter back to the Tribunal with instructions to:\n1.\nCall for proper comments and supporting documents from the Commissioner to verify the service of order.\n2.\nRe-examine the limitation issue accordingly.\n3.\nIf the condonation application is granted, decide the appeal on merits.\n•\nThe Reference Application was disposed of accordingly.\nCitations:\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. RYK Mills Lahore 2023 SCMR 1856\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Sargodha Spinning Mills 2022 SCMR 1082\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 PTD 1367\n•\nWateen Telecom Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2015 PTD 936", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131,133(5)", - "Case #": "I.T.R.As. Nos.82 in C.M.A. No.891 and 83 in C.M.A. No.894 of 2024, decided on 14th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Omer Memon and Aitzad Manzoor Memon for Applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAKESH KESHWANI THROUGH AUTHORISED AND CONSTITUTIONAL ATTORNEY\nVS\nASSISTANT/DEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUEAND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25817", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 356 = 2025 SLD 356 = 2025 PTD 148 = (2025) 132 TAX 338", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Classification of Wholesalers and Retailers\n________________________________________\nMisclassification of Buyers as Retailers Due to Non-Registration as Wholesalers\nDetails:\n•\nA Sugar Mill (Manufacturer) received a Show-Cause Notice in 2015 regarding Tax Year 2014, alleging failure to collect tax at 0.5% on sales to wholesalers/retailers as required by Sections 236G & 236H of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (introduced via Finance Act, 2013).\n•\nThe Order-in-Original concluded that sales to unregistered persons must be treated as sales to retailers, making the Sugar Mill liable for tax collection.\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue upheld this finding, leading the Sugar Mill to challenge the decision before the High Court.\n•\nThe Sugar Mill argued that:\no\nA person can only be treated as a wholesaler if authorized as an agent for sales.\no\nUnregistered buyers cannot automatically be considered retailers.\nHeld:\n•\nThe recipients of supplies were classified as retailers solely due to their failure to register as wholesalers, without verifying their actual business activity.\n•\nChapter I, Rule 4 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, requires classification based on business activity, not just registration status.\n•\nUnder the Sales Tax Act, 1990:\no\nWholesalers buy and sell in bulk to other businesses.\no\nRetailers sell goods to the general public for consumption.\n•\nFailure to register as a wholesaler or retailer has specific legal consequences under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which the assessing officer overlooked.\n•\nThe correct consequence for an unregistered wholesaler was the collection of tax at 0.2%, as per Division XIV, Part IV, Schedule I of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n•\nAutomatically treating unregistered wholesalers as retailers without verifying their business activity is legally incorrect.\n•\nThe High Court set aside the Appellate Tribunals order and remanded the case to the assessing officer to determine the actual status of the recipients.\n•\nReference Application was disposed of in favor of the Sugar Mill.\nCitations:\n•\nOlympia Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore v. Assistant Collector, Central Excise and Sales Tax, Sheikhupura Division, Lahore and 2 others 2002 PTD 776", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(28),2(47)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1),133(8),236G,236HSales Tax Rules, 2001=4", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 112167 of 2017, decided on 8th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUSTICE AND SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Zaheer Khan for Applicant\nBarrister Muhammad Saram Israr for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS FATIMA SUGAR MILLS LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER\nVS\nAPPELLATE TRIBUNAL, INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25818", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 357 = 2025 SLD 357 = 2025 PTD 153", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDVS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax Exemption for FATA/PATA Under the Sales Tax Act, 1990\n________________________________________\nInterpretation of Sales Tax Exemption for FATA/PATA Under Serial No. 151 of the Sixth Schedule\n(a) Interpretation of Or and And in Serial No. 151\nDetails:\n•\nThe Department argued that sub-serials (a) and (b) of Serial No. 151 should be read conjunctively, meaning only supplies and imports by industries located in FATA/PATA were exempt.\n•\nThe taxpayer (SNGPL) contended that both sub-serials were independent, meaning the exemption on supplies was separate and not contingent upon imports.\nHeld:\n•\nThe words or and and can be interpreted conjunctively or disjunctively depending on legislative intent.\n•\nThe legislative history showed a clear intent to continue tax exemptions for FATA/PATA residents until June 30, 2024, ensuring a gradual transition into the tax regime.\n•\nSemi-colons in Serial No. 151 indicate two distinct and independent exemptions.\n•\nThus, the Department’s interpretation was incorrect, and the exemption on supplies was upheld.\n•\nAppeal of SNGPL was allowed.\n________________________________________\n(b) Transposition of Exemption Under Rescinded SROs\nDetails:\n•\nSerial No. 151 was added via Finance Act, 2019 to replace SRO 1212(I)/2018 after the rescindment of SROs 888, 889, and 890(I)/2018.\n•\nThe Department argued that reading sub-serials disjunctively would mean all supplies were tax-exempt, which was not the legislative intent.\n•\nCircular No. 01 of 2019 clarified that Serial No. 151 was merely a continuation of earlier exemptions.\nHeld:\n•\nThe word further in Circular No. 01 of 2019 confirmed that imports were exempt in addition to already exempted supplies.\n•\nThe intent was to continue tax exemptions on supplies and imports until June 30, 2024.\n•\nAppeal of SNGPL was allowed.\n________________________________________\n(c) Exemption on Gas Supplies Under Serial No. 151 & 152\nDetails:\n•\nThe Department argued that Serial No. 152 explicitly exempted electricity supplies, and if gas was to be exempted, the legislature would have mentioned it specifically.\n•\nSNGPL contended that Serial No. 151 itself covered supplies, which included gas supplies.\nHeld:\n•\nThe history of exemptions for FATA/PATA showed a consistent effort to maintain pre-25th Amendment benefits.\n•\nThe Department’s argument was incorrect—exemption on gas supplies was covered under Serial No. 151.\n•\nAppeal of SNGPL was allowed.\n________________________________________\n(d) Legality of Sales Tax Imposed on Gas Supplies to FATA/PATA\nDetails:\n•\nThe Department contended that since SNGPL supplied gas from outside FATA/PATA, its sales were taxable.\n•\nSNGPL argued that it had a network of offices, infrastructure, and pipelines in FATA/PATA, making its supplies local and therefore exempt.\nHeld:\n•\nSerial No. 151 restored the pre-25th Amendment legal position, meaning supplies to FATA/PATA remained exempt.\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue declared the sales tax, further tax, extra tax, default surcharge, and penalties imposed on SNGPL’s supplies to Swat (FATA/PATA) as illegal and void ab initio.\n•\nImpugned orders were set aside, and SNGPL’s appeal was allowed.\n________________________________________\nCitations:\n•\nCr. A. No. 74M of 2016 & Cr. A. No. 165 of 2012 (referred)\n•\n2018 SCMR 939 & 2022 SCMR 1251 (distinguished)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),13(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=246(d),247", - "Case #": "S.T. A. No. 2166/LB of 2023, decided on 22nd January, 2024. Date of hearing: 13th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hassan Akhtar for Appellant.\nShah Jahan Khan, LA along with Talib Hussain, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPE LINES LIMITED \nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25819", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1968 2240 = 1968 SLD 2240 = 1968 PTD 741 = (1968) 18 TAX 105", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNDSXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Income tax Act (XI of 1922), S. 64 Assessee having been assessed by Income tax Officer of District A for last ten years changing his residence Cannot be assessed afresh by Income tax Officer of District B (new residence of assessee) for the year already assessed Assessment and demand order by Income tax Officer of District B -Without jurisdiction and nullity in law Jurisdiction Agreement of parties Cannot confer jurisdiction on a Tribunal which it does not otherwise possess according to law.\n \n(b) Income tax Act (XI of 1922), S. 33 A(1), proviso (1)- Order of Commissioner prejudicial to interest of assessee, having been passed ex parte Such order offends against principle of natural justice Commissioner of Income tax could pass such order after due notice and opportunity of hearing and after recording reasons therefore.\n \nCommissioner of Income tax, West Punjab, North West Frontier and Delhi Provinces, Lahore v. Tribune Trust, Lahore P L D 1947 P C 247 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Act, 1922=22(2),22(4),33A(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 155 of 1960, date of order & heard on: 29-02-1968,", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Waheeduddin Ahmed, C. J. and Muhammad Fazle Ghani Khan, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Amin Butt for Petitioner.\nSh. Abdul Haq for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sheikh MUHAMMAD AMIN Petitioner\nVs\n(1) INCOME TAX OFFICER, JHANG AND (2) COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NORTH ZONE, LAHORE Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25820", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 358 = 2025 SLD 358 = 2025 PTCL 50", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTVTg", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax on Services – Jurisdiction of Provincial vs. Federal Taxation\nDetails:\nThe case addresses the taxation of food and beverages supplied by restaurants, determining whether such transactions fall under Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 (SSTSA 2011) or the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under federal tax laws. The FBR contended that restaurant operations amounted to the manufacture and sale of goods, thereby falling within federal taxation. However, the Sindh Revenue Board (SRB) maintained that such activities constitute services and are subject to Sindh Sales Tax (SST) under provincial jurisdiction.\nThe court analyzed Entry 49 of the Federal Legislative List, Part I, Fourth Schedule to the Constitution of Pakistan, which was amended by the 18th Constitutional Amendment to exclude sales tax on services from federal jurisdiction, thereby placing it within the provincial domain.\nAdditionally, Tariff Heading 9801.2000 of the First Schedule of SSTSA 2011 explicitly classifies restaurant services under taxable services, and Section 2(74) of the same Act defines “restaurant.” The SRB had also issued a clarification on 22.02.2012, affirming that restaurants providing food and beverages fall under Sindh Sales Tax and not the Federal Excise Duty applicable to goods.\nHeld:\nThe court ruled that the supply of food and beverages by restaurants constitutes a service under SSTSA 2011 and is chargeable under Sindh Sales Tax. The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) lacks jurisdiction over this matter, as sales tax on services is exclusively a provincial subject per the Constitution of Pakistan. The argument that restaurant operations involve the sale of goods was rejected.\nCitations:\n1.\nSindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011\no\nSection 2(74): Definition of restaurant \no\nSection 2(79): Definition of service \no\nTariff Heading 9801.2000: Classification of restaurant services as taxable under provincial jurisdiction\n2.\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973\no\nEntry 49, Federal Legislative List, Part I, Fourth Schedule (as amended by 18th Constitutional Amendment) – Exclusion of sales tax on services from federal jurisdiction\n3.\nSRB Clarification dated 22.02.2012 – Confirming Sindh’s exclusive jurisdiction over restaurant taxation", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=2(74),2(79)Sindh Sales Tax on Services Rule, 2011=12,13,14,42,42(1)(a)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=142(c)", - "Case #": "Suit No. 2250 of 2016, decided on 7th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YOUSUF ALI SAYEED.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff by: Mr. Umair Ahmed Qazi, Advocate.\nDefendants by: Mr. Waqar Memon, Advocate for Defendants No. 2;3 & 5:\nMr. Javed Ali Sangi advocate for Defendant No. 4", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. UIG (PVT.) LTD. \nVS \nMEMBER INLAND REVENUE (SALES TAX) AND OTHERS, SINDH REVENUE BOARD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25821", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 359 = 2025 SLD 359 = 2025 PTCL 28", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTVXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Interpretation of Strict Liability Under Sections 33 and 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe case concerns the interpretation of Sections 33 and 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) regarding strict liability. The High Court did not discuss Section 33, prompting its remand for fresh consideration on whether it should be interpreted as a strict liability provision.\nThe Supreme Court observed that Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, was amended by the Finance Act, 2005, making default surcharge a strict liability clause. The amended provision applies irrespective of whether the default was deliberate, unintentional, or inadvertent. The High Court’s decision did not consider this amendment and relied on outdated case law.\nHeld:\n1.\nSection 33: Since the High Court did not discuss Section 33, the matter is remanded for fresh adjudication, with directions to determine whether Section 33 should also be interpreted as a strict liability clause.\n2.\nSection 34: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s ruling on default surcharge, holding that Section 34, post-amendment, imposes strict liability regardless of intent. The respondent is therefore liable to pay default surcharge.\nCitations:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990)\no\nSection 33: Not discussed in the impugned judgment; remanded for fresh consideration.\no\nSection 34: Amended via Finance Act, 2005, making default surcharge a strict liability clause.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,33,33(1),33(5),34", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No. 1221-K to 1257-K and 1290-K to 1299-K of 2022, decided on 5th July, 2024.\nAgainst the judgment dated 06.05.2022 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Spl. Sales. Tax. Ref(s). No. 191, 196, 203, 274, 192, 208, 201, 206. 272, 209, 273, 207, 202, 210, 212, 195, 194, 204, 205, 719/2018, 665/2020, 21, 22, 78, 82, 84, 85/2016, 193/2018, 199/2019, 200/2016, 211/2018, 720, 725/2019, 130,741/2015, 108 to 111, 114-116/2016 and 274/2018.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND MR. JUSTICE SHAHID BILAL HASSAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Dr. Shah Nawaz, ASC (at Principal Seat) Mr. Kashif Hafeez, Addl. Commissioner LTO Karachi ( video link from Karachi).\nRespondent by: Mr. Hyder Ali Khan, ASC.\nFederation by: Mr. Malik Javed Wains, Addl. AGP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nVS \nM/S. BYCO PETROLEUM PAKISTAN LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25822", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 360 = 2025 SLD 360 = 2025 PTCL 72 = (2025) 131 TAX 135", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTVXk", - "Key Words:": "Review of Supreme Court’s Majority Judgment on Taxation of Software Lease Payments\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a Netherlands-based company, leased software (FLIC tapes) to a Pakistan-based company under two agreements. It declared the receipts as business profits and claimed exemption under Article 7 of the Pakistan-Netherlands Double Taxation Convention. However, the Pakistani tax authorities classified the payments as royalties under Article 12 and imposed a 15% tax. The Income Tax Tribunal upheld the tax, and the Supreme Court’s majority judgment (2023 SCMR 1803) overruled the Sindh High Court’s decision, restoring the Tribunal’s ruling.\nThe petitioner sought review on the grounds of errors apparent on the face of the record, including:\n1.\nThe Court erroneously considered tax adjustment in the Netherlands as a reason to reject the reference.\n2.\nThe availability of an alternate remedy under the Convention was irrelevant to the High Court’s jurisdiction.\n3.\nThe Court mistakenly assumed that the petitioner had failed to explain the nature of its receipts before tax authorities.\n4.\nThe majority judgment incorrectly distinguished between the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions, despite their definitions of royalties being materially similar.\n5.\nThe Court did not conclusively determine whether the petitioner’s receipts qualified as “royalties.”\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court found multiple errors in the majority judgment, including the misinterpretation of tax treaty provisions and an erroneous assumption of material facts. The minority judgment, which had ruled in favor of the petitioner, was endorsed. The Court held that:\n•\nThe receipts were “business profits,” not “royalties.”\n•\nThe High Court had correctly ruled in favor of the petitioner.\n•\nThe review was accepted, the majority judgment was recalled, and the respondent’s appeals were dismissed.\nThe judgment emphasized that Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) should be interpreted dynamically to promote international economic cooperation while balancing tax base protection.\nCitations: CIT v. Inter Quest Informatics Services (2023 SCMR 1803); M/s Squibb Pakistan v. CIT (2017 SCMR 1006)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petitions No.988 to 1001 of 2023 in Civil Appeals No.94 to 106 of 2008 & 550/2011. Order dated: 28-11-2024. Date of hearing: 28.11.2024 (For review of the judgment of this Court dated 08.9.2023).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, MR. JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH, MR. JUSTICE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: (through video-link)\nFor the \nMr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC & Mr. Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, ASC.\nMrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, ASC.\nMr. Fayyaz Hussain Abro, Addl. Comm. FBR. (through video-link from Karachi).\nDr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG Law, FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S INTER QUEST INFORMATICS SERVICES (IN ALL CASES) ..... RESPONDENT(S)\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, ETC (IN ALL CASES) …. PETITIONERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25823", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 361 = 2025 SLD 361 = 2025 PTD 16 = (2025) 132 TAX 360", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTc", - "Key Words:": "Condonation of Time Limit by FBR – Validity of Show-Cause Notice\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, Mehr Dastgir Leather and Footwear Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., challenged a Show-Cause Notice issued under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, alleging an inadmissible refund claim. The petitioner argued that the dispute had already been adjudicated up to the Supreme Court of Pakistan.\nThe Department contended that the Show-Cause Notice was issued after approval from the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under Section 74 of the Act, 1990, which condoned the time limit. The condonation process started with a letter from the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue on 26-04-2022 and culminated in an FBR approval letter dated 01-07-2022, extending the time limit up to 29-08-2022. However, the Show-Cause Notice proceedings were not finalized within this extended period.\nThe High Court observed that:\n•\nSection 74 allows FBR to extend the time limit for acts where a specific time frame is provided in the Act or rules.\n•\nHowever, Section 74 does not apply to actions under Section 11 (now repealed), which deals with tax assessment and recovery.\n•\nFBR’s condonation letter did not provide reasonable grounds for extending the time limit after 15 years.\n•\nThe Show-Cause Notice was issued beyond the condoned time frame, making it ultra vires.\n•\nThe delay in processing the refund claim and issuance of the Show-Cause Notice was deemed mala fide.\nHeld:\nThe High Court struck down the impugned Show-Cause Notices and directed the Respondents to process the refund claims within three months. The constitutional petition was allowed.\nCitations:\n•\nFederal Board of Revenue through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Abdul Ghani and another (2021 SCMR 1154)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=10(3),11,11(2),37,74Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 15793 of 2022, heard on 11th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 11th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Sohail Iqbal Bhatti for Petitioner.\nMohammad Sulaman Bhatti for Respondent-Department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S MEHR DASTGIR LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25824", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 362 = 2025 SLD 362 = 2025 PTCL 64 = (2025) 131 TAX 178 = 2025 PTD 746", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTY", - "Key Words:": "Speaking Order Requirement & Procedural Fairness in Tax Adjudication\nDetails:\nThe case concerns the failure of the Appellate Tribunal to issue a speaking order as required under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The taxpayer was served a show cause notice alleging suppression or concealment in sales tax records when compared to income tax records. The taxpayer argued that the lower forums had exceeded the scope of the allegations originally raised in the show cause notice.\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nFailure to Issue a Speaking Order:\no\nA speaking order must be reasoned and well-founded, addressing all relevant legal and factual issues.\no\nThe Appellate Tribunal did not independently examine the case or provide a justifiable rationale for its decision.\no\nAs a result, the impugned order does not meet the legal standard under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897.\n2.\nScope of Show Cause Notice & Right to be Heard:\no\nIf a taxpayer raises substantial factual grounds that require further verification, the department must issue a fresh or supplementary show cause notice before making a determination.\no\nNo decision can be made on new grounds that were not explicitly stated in the original notice unless the taxpayer is given an opportunity to respond.\no\nThe lower forums acted beyond their jurisdiction by exceeding the allegations initially raised.\nHeld:\n1.\nThe impugned order is legally unsustainable due to lack of reasoning and failure to meet the requirements of a speaking order under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897.\n2.\nThe Appellate Tribunal was obligated to examine the case with proper application of mind and provide clear justifications, which it failed to do.\n3.\nAny new grounds or factual discrepancies beyond the scope of the original show cause notice require the issuance of a fresh or supplementary notice, ensuring the taxpayers right to respond.\n4.\nThe matter is remanded for reconsideration in line with procedural fairness and statutory compliance.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133(1),132Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,6,7,11,11(2),22, 23 & 26,33,34,46,47,47(5)General Clauses Act, 1897=24-A", - "Case #": "STR No. 73619 of 2024, decided on 11th December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI AND MR. JUSTICE RASAAL HASAN SYED.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Shahbaz Butt, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Shahid Sarwar Chahil, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SABIR PRESS CALENDAR\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, FAISALABAD & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25825", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 363 = 2025 SLD 363 = 2025 PTCL 87 = 2025 PTD 301 = (2025) 131 TAX 647", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTU", - "Key Words:": "Retrospective Application of Tax Law Amendments – Sales Tax Exemption for FATA/PATA Industries\nDetails:\n•\nPetitioners, comprising individuals and private limited companies, operate manufacturing units in the erstwhile Federally and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (FATA/PATA).\n•\nBefore the 25th Constitutional Amendment (2018), businesses operating in these areas enjoyed tax exemptions. These exemptions were continued post-amendment via SROs 1212(I)/2018 and 1213(I)/2018.\n•\nThe Finance Act, 2024, extended the exemption till June 30, 2024, but altered the condition for securing tax-exempt imports, replacing post-dated cheques with pay orders.\n•\nPetitioners contested the retrospective application of this amendment to goods already imported and manifested before July 1, 2024.\nHeld:\n•\nThe amendment in the Finance Act, 2024, does not have retrospective effect unless explicitly stated.\n•\nA statute affecting substantive rights should not be presumed retrospective unless expressly or necessarily implied.\n•\nIf imports were manifested or reached Pakistans territorial waters before July 1, 2024, the old security instrument (post-dated cheque) remains applicable.\n•\nSection 30 of the Customs Act, 1969, which determines applicable duties based on the date of goods declaration, is inapplicable since the amendment did not alter the charging or machinery provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n•\nThe matter of factual verification (whether goods were manifested before July 1, 2024) is left to the relevant Collectorates.\n•\nWrit petitions were allowed in favor of the petitioners.\nCitations:\n•\nAl-Samrez Enterprise Case – Supreme Court held that vested rights created under a tax exemption cannot be withdrawn retrospectively.\n•\nGas & Oil Ltd. Pakistan v. Collector, Model Customs Collectorate of Preventive & Others (2020) – Sindh High Court judgment on tax exemption applicability.\n•\nM/s Gadoon Textile Mills & Others v. Federation of Pakistan & Others (2023) – Similar principle of non-retrospective application of fiscal statutes.\n•\nAziz-ud-Din Industries Ltd. Case – Apex Court reaffirmed that no statute should be construed retrospectively unless explicitly stated.\n•\nZila Council Jhelum Case – Establishing the principle that fiscal statutes are presumed prospective unless explicitly stated otherwise.\n•\nQaisar Abbas Case – Further reinforced that retrospective application requires clear legislative intent.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=13Customs Act, 1969=19,30", - "Case #": "WP No. 3433-P/2024 with IR, order dated: 11-07-2024 and date of hearing: 11.07.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI & JUSTICE DR. KHURSHID IQBAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shumail Ahmad Butt, Advocate.\nM/s Rahat Ali Khan Nahaqi, Assistant Attorney General, Rehmanullah Advocate along with Sharifullah Assistant Director (Legal).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S IMTIAZ TEXTILE BARA, DISTRICT KHYBER AND OTHERS …. PETITIONERS.\nV/S\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH FEDERAL SECRETARY, FINANCE AND REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS ….. RESPONDENTS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25826", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 364 = 2025 SLD 364 = 2025 PTD 10 = 2025 PTCL 721", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Tax Exemption under Customs Act and Sales Tax Act – Applicability of Two HS Codes\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, an importer, claimed exemption from customs duty under SRO 565(I)/2006, as amended by SRO 474(I)/2016, asserting that the imported goods fell within the exemption criteria specified in column No. 3 of the Table at serial No. 3 of SRO 474(I)/2016. The petitioner argued that since two HS Codes were available at serial No. 3, the exemption or zero-rating of duties applied.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that Clause 133 of the Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, was not pari materia with serial No. 3 of the Table to SRO 474(I)/2016. Unlike Clause 133, which required only product registration under the Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, 1971, serial No. 3 of SRO 474(I)/2016 imposed an additional requirement: approval or recognition by the Ministry of National Food Security and Research. The Court reaffirmed that in cases of tax exemption, the burden of proof lies on the taxpayer. Since the petitioner failed to fulfill the condition specified in column No. 2 of serial No. 3, including obtaining the required approval, the Court refused to interfere. Consequently, the constitutional petition was dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\nSurfactant Chemicals Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2020 PTD 1985)\n•\nFederal Board of Revenue v. Surfactant Chemicals Company (Pvt.) Ltd. (Civil Petitions Nos. 95-K and 145-K of 2020)\n•\nOxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2019 SCMR 235)\n•\nPakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Assistant Collector Sales Tax (2019 SCMR 906)\n•\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Kassim Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (2013 PTD 1420)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19Sales Tax Act, 1990=Sixth Schedule Clause 133", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-4002 of 2019 along with C.P. No.6074 of 2021 and 774 and 2385 of 2002, decided on 12th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 12th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Asad Manzoor Halepota for Petitioner (in all Petitions).\nDr. Shah Nawaz for Respondent No.3. (in C.P. No.D-4002 of 2019).\nKhalid Rajpar for Respondent No.3 (in C.P. No.D-774 of 2022).\nMs. Masooda Siraj for Respondent No.4 (in C.P. No.D-774 of 2022).\nKashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SURFACTANT CHEMICAL COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. THROUGH AUTHORIZED OFFICER\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ISLAMABAD AND 5 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25827", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 365 = 2025 SLD 365 = 2025 PTD 23", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUS8", - "Key Words:": "Interpretation of Fiscal Laws – Levy of Federal Excise Duty on Ghee and Cooking Oil\nDetails:\nThe case involved a dispute regarding the levy and collection of Federal Excise Duty (FED) on ghee and cooking oil. The authorities challenged the decision of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had set aside a Show-Cause Notice issued to taxpayers for the recovery of FED.\nThe High Court examined the issue by interpreting fiscal laws under the principle that:\n•\nA tax can only be levied within the scope of the charging section, strictly interpreted.\n•\nNo tax can be imposed by inference, analogy, or by attempting to determine legislative intent beyond the clear words of the statute.\n•\nThe levy and collection of FED on ghee and oil, as placed in the Second Schedule to the Federal Excise Act, 2005, must follow the procedure under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n•\nSection 7 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 incorporates the input adjustment mechanism from Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, ensuring that taxpayers receive the same benefits for input tax adjustments.\nThe High Court found that:\n•\nThe assessing officer ignored essential legal and factual aspects while passing the assessment order.\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal, in turn, incorrectly annulled the assessment without considering that the taxpayers were liable for FED during the relevant period.\nHeld:\nThe High Court set aside both the order of the Appellate Tribunal and the assessment and remanded the matter to the assessing officer for fresh assessment. The reference was accordingly disposed of.\nCitations:\n•\nMessrs Taj Vegetable Oil Processing Unit, Skhako Dargai, Malakand Agency v. The Government of Pakistan through Federal Secretary Finance and Revenue Division, Islamabad and others (Writ Petition No. 4495-P/2017, decided on 10.03.2020)\n•\nCommissioner of Wealth Tax v. Sharwan Kumar Swarup & Sons (1995 ECR 425 SC)\n•\nW.H. Cockerline & Company v. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (16 TC 1 at 19)\n•\nHalsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth Edn. Vol. 23, Para 29)\n•\nUnderstanding Statutes, Canons of Construction (First Edition by S.M. Zafar)\n•\nNagpur Improvement Trust v. Amrik Singh and others (AIR 2002 SC 3499)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "T.R. No. 29-P of 2022, decided on 12th September, 2023. Date of hearing: 12th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rahmanullah and Sharif Ullah, Assistant Director (Legal) for Petitioner.\nShumail Ahmad Butt, Qazi Shehzad Iqbal, Saad Ali Qazi and Ms. Khoshnuma for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CORPORATE ZONE, PESHAWAR\nVS\nM/S WASIM SHARIF INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25828", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 366 = 2025 SLD 366 = 2025 PTD 35", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUSs", - "Key Words:": "Retrospective Applicability of Clause (3A) – Income Tax Exemption on Waived Loans\nDetails:\nThe case involved the retrospective application of Clause (3A) of Part-IV of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, introduced through the Finance Act, 2004. The dispute arose when the Taxation Officer reviewed a deemed assessment order under Section 120 of the Ordinance and treated a waived loan as taxable income, denying the taxpayer the benefit of Clause (3A). The waiver was granted under the State Bank of Pakistans BPD Circular No. 29 (dated 15.10.2002), which facilitated loan write-offs for irrecoverable debts.\nThe taxpayer successfully appealed against the addition, and the Appellate Tribunal upheld the deletion of the assessed amount. The Department then filed a Reference Application, arguing that:\n•\nClause (3A) was enacted through the Finance Act, 2004 and should not apply retrospectively to Tax Year 2004.\n•\nLoan waivers under the BPD Circular No. 29 should be treated as taxable income.\nThe High Court ruled that:\n•\nClause (3A) was intended to provide relief to taxpayers benefiting from loan waivers under BPD Circular No. 29.\n•\nThe legislative intent supported a retrospective application of Clause (3A) from the effective date of BPD Circular No. 29 (15.10.2002).\n•\nClause (3A) functioned as a curative, declaratory, and beneficial provision.\n•\nThe Central Board of Revenue (CBR) Circular No. 14 of 2004 (dated 17.07.2004) clarified that Clause (3A) had retrospective effect.\n•\nMere enactment of Clause (3A) through the Finance Act, 2004 did not imply prospective application alone.\nFurthermore, the Court noted that:\n•\nClause (3A) was later deleted through the Finance Act, 2008.\n•\nThe Finance Act, 2011 added an Explanation to Section 18(1)(d) of the Ordinance, treating waived loans as taxable income.\n•\nDespite these later changes, the benefit under Clause (3A) remained available from 15.10.2002 until its deletion in 2008.\nHeld:\nThe High Court decided against the Department, affirming that Clause (3A) was declaratory and had retrospective effect. The Reference Application was dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\nThe Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. Ram Kishan Dass [2019] 413 ITR 337 (SC)\n•\nMessrs Khurdistan Trading Company (Partnership, Firm) through Authorized Attorney v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2014 PTD 339", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=14(5),18(1)(d)34(5),,70,Second Schedule Part-IV, Clause (3A)", - "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 634 of 2010, decided on 7th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Asad Gondal for Applicant Department.\nM. Ijaz Ali Bhatti for Respondent Taxpayer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE \nVS\nM/S STANDARD ICE AND COLD STORAGE, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25829", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 367 = 2025 SLD 367 = 2025 PTD 43 = (2025) 132 TAX 489", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTk", - "Key Words:": "Recovery of Sales Tax on Exempted Goods\nDetails:\nThe case revolved around the determination of whether the supplies made by the taxpayer fell under the Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which exempts certain food items from sales tax. The tax authorities challenged the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), which had ruled in favor of the taxpayer.\nKey contentions included:\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue merely reproduced the taxpayer’s arguments without corroborative evidence or categorical findings.\n•\nThe ruling did not align with the taxpayer’s sales tax returns for the relevant tax periods.\n•\nIf the taxpayer’s supplies were entirely covered under the Third and Sixth Schedules, input tax could not be claimed.\nThe High Court held that the Tribunals findings were not sustainable due to the lack of supporting documentation and proper examination of tax records. The Court:\n•\nSet aside all prior orders, including the Tribunals decision.\n•\nRemanded the matter to the concerned tax authority for fresh determination.\n•\nDirected that the taxpayer be given an adequate opportunity to present its case.\nHeld:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities, requiring a re-examination of the taxpayer’s supplies and the applicability of exemptions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nCitations:\n•\n1990 PTD 1088\n•\n2004 PTD 868", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,3(1A),11,11(1),11(2),45B,46,47", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference Application No.21 of 2024, decided on 31st October, 2024. Date of hearing: 18th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, CHIEF JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD AAMIR NAWAZ RANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Iftikhar Raza and Munawar Kasi for-Applicant.\nAbdul Musawir Kasi and Muhammad Umer Dogar for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, QUETTA\nVS\nM/S RAZA UR REHMAN AND BROTHERS AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25830", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 368 = 2025 SLD 368 = 2025 PTD 51", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERVNTUTg", - "Key Words:": "Tax Credit Eligibility for Investment in Plant & Machinery\nDetails:\nThe case revolved around the interpretation of Section 107AA of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (now repealed) and its interaction with Section 239(15) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The key issue was whether a taxpayer could claim a tax credit if they had made the investment before June 30, 2002, but had not installed the machinery by that date.\nThe tax department contended that:\n•\nTax credit was only available if both investment and installation of plant/machinery were completed before June 30, 2002.\n•\nSection 239(15) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 reaffirmed this requirement.\n•\nSince the taxpayer had not installed the machinery before the cut-off date, the tax credit for Tax Years 2004 and 2005 was not claimable.\nThe taxpayer argued that:\n•\nOnly investment had to be made before June 30, 2002 to qualify for tax credit.\n•\nInstallation was only relevant for determining the income year in which the tax credit could be adjusted against tax payable.\nThe High Courts Findings:\n•\nSection 107AA of the repealed Ordinance clearly stated that the requirement was investment in plant and machinery for installation within the prescribed period (July 1, 2000 – June 30, 2002).\n•\nThe phrase for installation was meant to ensure the machinery was used in an industrial setup rather than being sold or leased.\n•\nEligibility for tax credit depended on the investment being made before the deadline.\n•\nTiming of installation only determined when the tax credit could be adjusted, not whether it was claimable.\n•\nSection 239(15) of the 2001 Ordinance did not impose additional restrictions but rather affirmed the cut-off date of June 30, 2002 for investment.\nSince the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and CIT (Appeals) had correctly interpreted these provisions, the High Court upheld their decisions and dismissed the department’s reference applications.\nHeld:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, affirming that investment made before June 30, 2002, was sufficient for eligibility of tax credit, while installation only determined the timing of its adjustment.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=107AA,107AA(2),107AA(3),239(15)", - "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 156 of 2011, decided on 16th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Amjad Hussain Malik and Ijaz Mehmood Chaudhry for Applicant.\nShahbaz Butt for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE. FAISALABAD\nVS\nM/S BE BE JAN FIBRES (PVT.) LTD., FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25831", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlFDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 362 = 2024 SLD 362 = 2024 PTD 61", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlFDSXo", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax on Replacement of Auto Parts under Warranty\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer was aggrieved by the authorities imposition of sales tax on the replacement of auto parts provided under warranty at no additional charge. The taxpayer argued that these replacements were an integral part of the original sale contract, which already included the price of the vehicle and the warranty service. The sales tax had already been paid on the full price of the vehicle, including any future replacements covered by the warranty.\nHeld:\nThe High Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, holding that the replacement of auto parts under a manufacturers warranty was not subject to sales tax at the relevant time. Since no separate consideration was charged at the time of replacement, the transaction did not constitute a supply under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The court set aside the judgments of the Tribunal and lower forums, allowing the reference.\n•\nRelevant Case Law:\no\nCommissioner of Sales Tax v. Prem Nath Motors (1979) 43 STC 52 (Delhi)\no\nPrem Motors, Gwalior v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gwalior 1986 (61) STC 244\no\nGeo Motors v. State of Kerala (2001) 122 STC 285\no\nMohd. Ekram Khan & Sons v. Commissioner of Trade Tax UP (2004) 6 SCC 183\no\nMessrs Tata Motors v. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (SPL) and another (Civil Appeal No. 1822 of 2007)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "S.T.Rs. Nos.93 of 2010 and 85 of 2011, heard on: 20-06-2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shams Mehmood Mirza, JUSTICE and Muhammad Raza Qureshi, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Ishaq, Abid Hussain Sayyal and Wajahat Ali for Applicant.\nMalik Abdullah Raza for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S HONDA ATLAS CARS (PAKISTAN) LIMITED\nVS\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR, LEGAL LTU, LAHORE and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25832", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlFDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 363 = 2024 SLD 363 = 2024 PTD 584 = (2025) 132 TAX 250", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlFDSXk", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Exemption under Clause 126-F for Businesses in Affected Areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer operated a CNG filling station in Malakand and claimed an income tax exemption under Clause 126-F of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Based on this exemption, a tax refund was issued. However, the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue amended the deemed assessment, arguing that the taxpayer’s commission income fell under the Presumptive Tax Regime (PTR) and was therefore not eligible for exemption.\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) ruled in favor of the taxpayer, and this decision was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The tax department then filed a reference before the High Court.\nHeld:\nThe High Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, confirming that the taxpayers income for Tax Year 2010 was exempt under Clause 126-F. Consequently, the taxpayer was entitled to a refund of the minimum tax deducted under Section 153(3)(b). The court dismissed the department’s reference, affirming that the exemption was intended to provide fiscal relief to businesses affected in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region.\nCitations:\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Sections 153(3)(b), 234-A & Second Schedule, Part I, Clause 126-F (Inserted by Finance Act, 2010)\n•\nCircular No. 14 of 2011 dated 06-10-2011 (FBR)\n•\nCase Law:\no\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. The Secretary Revenue Division and others (2020 SCMR 2055) (Referred)\no\nMessrs Sarwar Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and others (PTR No.71 of 2014) (Distinguished)\no\nHusnain Cotex Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore (2017 SCMR 822) (Distinguished)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Tax Reference No.09-P of 2021, decided on 21-06-2023. Date of hearing: 21-06-2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Abdul Shakoor, JUSTICE and Syed Arshad Ali, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Asad-ul-Mulk for Petitioner.\nNemo. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE, MARDAN ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR\nVs\nIMRAN AHMAD GREEN HILL CNG STATION MALAKAND" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25833", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlFDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 364 = 2024 SLD 364 = 2024 PTD 1580", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlFDRTc", - "Key Words:": "Unlawful Transfer of Taxpayer’s Jurisdiction – Federal Tax Ombudsman’s Intervention\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, a resident of Quetta engaged in government construction contracts, filed a complaint against the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) for unlawfully transferring his jurisdiction from RTO Quetta to MTO/LTU Karachi. The transfer was made through Notification No. 07(407) Jurisdiction/2019/280620-R dated 03-12-2019, which shifted cases related to Builders and Developers to specialized tax zones.\nThe taxpayer contended that he was neither a Builder nor a Developer under Section 100D(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and thus, the transfer was unwarranted. Furthermore, Section 100D was inserted via the Finance Act, 2020 (effective 30-06-2020), whereas his jurisdiction had already been transferred six months earlier, rendering the move unlawful.\nHeld:\nThe Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) found that while the FBR had the legal authority under Section 209 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to transfer cases of a particular class (such as Builders and Developers), the transfer of the complainant’s case was unjustified. The move caused severe hardship, as the taxpayer was entitled to be taxed where his business was conducted. Additionally, the issue of whether public sector contractors should be treated similarly to private builders/developers required further deliberation by the FBR.\nThe FTO recommended that the FBR take a pragmatic approach by:\n1.\nEnsuring uniform treatment of similar cases in line with superior court decisions.\n2.\nReviewing the complainant’s specific circumstances to reach a legal and equitable resolution.\nThe complaint was disposed of accordingly.\nCitations:\n•\nEstablishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXXV of 2000), Sections 9 & 10\n•\nIncome Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Sections 209 & 100D (Inserted via Finance Act, 2020)\n•\nFBR Notification No. 07(407) Jurisdiction/2019/280620-R dated 03-12-2019", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Complaints Nos.3508 and 3510/QTA/IT/2022, decided on 11th October, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Dr. Asif Mahmood Jah, Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Lawyer Name:": "Tausif Ahmad Qureshi, Advisor, Dealing Officer.\nAppraisal by Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor Appraisal.\nAmjad Ali Siddiqui, Authorized Representative.\nMunir Ahmed Maher, ACIR, RTO Quetta, Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ARBAB ABDUL RAZAQ\nVs\nThe SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25834", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlJDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 370 = 2025 SLD 370 = 2025 PTD 226", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlJDUXo", - "Key Words:": "Delay in Passing Order-in-Original – Violation of Customs Act, 1969\nNon-compliance with Statutory Timelines in Customs Adjudication\nDetails:\nThe case involved an alleged violation of Sections 2(s) & 16 of the Customs Act, 1969, where the Order-in-Original (OIO) was passed beyond the statutory timeline. The Department contended that the Collector (Adjudication) had granted an extension under Section 179(3) of the Act. However, records showed that:\n•\nShow-Cause Notice was adjudicated under Section 179(3) and its First Proviso.\n•\nCases invoking Section 2(s) must be decided within 30 days of the Show-Cause Notice.\n•\nThe Collector can extend this period by a maximum of 60 days with recorded reasons.\n•\nIn this case, the OIO was passed after 112 days, exceeding the allowed 90-day period (30+60 days).\n•\nThe extension reasons were not recorded, nor was there clarity on when the original period expired, when the request for extension was made, or the duration of the extension.\n•\nThere was no mention of any adjournment sought by the respondent/importer, meaning no additional time could be excluded from the prescribed timeline.\nHeld:\n•\nSince the maximum allowable adjudication period was 90 days, and the OIO was passed after 112 days, the decision was time-barred and invalid.\n•\nThe proposed question was answered against the applicant (Department) and in favor of the respondent (importer).\nCitations:\n•\nDirector, Director General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs), Karachi v. Messrs Chase Up (SCRA No. 119 of 2024)\n________________________________________\nNature of Limitation Period in Customs Adjudication – Mandatory vs. Directory\nStatutory Limitation in Customs Adjudication – Mandatory vs. Directory Interpretation\nDetails:\nThe applicant (Collectorate) argued that the statutory limitation period under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, was directory rather than mandatory. The Order-in-Original (OIO) was passed after 112 days following an extension from the Collector (Adjudication).\nHeld:\n•\nThe Legislature prescribes a definite period for passing an order, making such a provision mandatory, not directory.\n•\nFailure to comply with a mandatory timeline renders the act invalid.\n•\nSince the adjudication in this case exceeded the prescribed statutory timeline, the decision was invalid.\n•\nThe Reference Application was dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\nMujahid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal (2019 SCMR 1735)\n•\nThe Collector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia Mohammad Din (2017 SCMR 1427)\n•\nA.J. Traders v. Collector of Customs (PLD 2022 SC 817)\n•\nDirector, Director General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs), Karachi v. Messrs Chase Up (SCRA No. 119 of 2024)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,179(3)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 811 of 2023, decided & heard on: 30th May, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Pervaiz Ahmed Memon for Applicant.\nSardAr Muhammad Ishaque and Amjad Hayat for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION-CUSTOMS\nvs\nAJAB KHAN and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25835", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNDNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 561 = 2025 SLD 561 = 2025 PLD 137", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNDNHo", - "Key Words:": "Transfer and Re-investigation of Criminal Cases under Police Order, 2002\nDetails:\n1.\nTransfer of Investigation During Pendency of Private Complaint:\no\nThe accused was facing trial in a private complaint for cheating and forgery.\no\nWhile the trial was ongoing, police authorities ordered a re-investigation of the FIR registered against the accused.\no\nThe court analyzed the validity of transferring investigations when a private complaint is pending.\n2.\nLegal Framework for Transfer of Investigation:\no\nUnder Article 18-A of Police Order, 2002, only three authorities can transfer investigations: \n\nHead of District Police\n\nRegional Police Officer\n\nProvincial Police Officer\no\nTransfer is not routine but justified only in cases where further material is required or where the previous investigation was: \n\nUnilateral, mala fide, excessive in jurisdiction, or flawed.\no\nThe court must ensure that repeated transfers do not obstruct justice or inconvenience parties.\n3.\nRe-Investigation and Stage of Criminal Proceedings:\no\nPolice have the power to conduct re-investigation or further investigation even after submission of the S. 173 Cr.P.C. report in court.\no\nA fresh challan can be submitted based on subsequent investigations.\no\nHowever, re-investigation or further investigation is not allowed after the conclusion of a trial.\nHeld:\n•\nThe High Court directed that any re-investigation or further investigation under Art. 18-A of Police Order, 2002, should only be conducted after the conclusion of the private complaint trial.\n•\nConstitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nCitations:\n•\nCase Laws Referenced: \no\nRegarding Transfer of Investigation:\n\nNur-Elahi v. The State (PLD 1966 SC 708)\n\nQari Muhammad Rafique v. Additional IGP (2014 SCMR 1499)\n\nMuhammad Naveed v. IGP Punjab (2019 PCr.LJ Note 130)\n\nRaja Khurshid Ahmed v. Muhammad Bilal (2014 SCMR 474)\n\nAbid Hussain v. The State (2022 PCr.LJ 83)\no\nRegarding Re-Investigation at Different Stages:\n\nMuhammad Nasir Cheema v. Mazhar Javaid (PLD 2007 SC 31)\n\nLiaqat Ali Virk v. IGP Punjab (PLD 2010 Lah. 224)\n\nZafar Ali v. RPO (2017 YLR 1703)\n\nMuhammad Yousaf v. The State (2000 SCMR 453)\n\nBahadur Khan v. Muhammad Azam (2006 SCMR 373)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Police Order (22 of 2002)=18-ACriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=173", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 18153 of 2022, heard on 7th September, 2022. Date of hearing: 7th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafeez-ur-Rehman for Petitioner.\nBarrister Ameer Abbas Ali Khan, Assistant Advocate General along with Nasir Mahmood Malik, DSP (PIB), Qadeer Hussain, DSP (Legal), Altaf Hussain, SI and Abdul Sattar, SI for Official Private Respondents.\nRai Tariq Saeed for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DILSHAD AKBAR-PETITIONER\nVS\nINSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 4 OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25836", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNDNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 562 = 2025 SLD 562 = 2025 PLD 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNDNHk", - "Key Words:": "Legality of Sealing Vehicle Showrooms and Judicial Review of Executive Actions\nDetails:\n1.\nSealing of Vehicle Showrooms Without Regulatory Basis:\no\nPetitioners motor showrooms were sealed by the District Administration despite the absence of any regulatory or licensing system for such businesses.\no\nSection 80 of the Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010, did not cover the business of selling and purchasing vehicles or establishing motor showrooms.\no\nThe restriction imposed by the authorities was declared illegal and a violation of fundamental rights under Article 18 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of trade, business, or profession.\n2.\nJudicial Review of Executive Actions:\no\nArticle 199 of the Constitution empowers the judiciary to review executive actions.\no\nThe Executive has no inherent power beyond what is conferred by law.\no\nEvery executive action must: \n\nBe justified by the law under which it is taken.\n\nBe free from mala fide intent (both factually and legally).\no\nIf any law violates fundamental rights, it must be declared void as the Executive cannot override constitutional guarantees through policy decisions.\nHeld:\n•\nThe Constitutional petition was allowed after obtaining affidavits from the petitioners, ensuring that their business operations would not disrupt road traffic.\n•\nThe sealing of motor showrooms was declared illegal as it lacked statutory backing and violated fundamental rights.\nCitations:\n•\nCase Laws Referenced: \no\nPakistan Muslim League (N) through Khawaja Muhammad Asif, M.N.A. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642)\no\nEast and West Steamship Co. v. Pakistan (PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 41, 68)", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=18", - "Case #": "Constitution Petitions Nos. 1365 and 1446 of 2024, decided on 12th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, C.J. AND MUHAMMAD AAMIR NAWAZ RANA, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ali Attari and Muhammad Akram Shah for Petitioners (in Constitution Petition No. 1365 of 2024).\nZahoor Ahmed Baloch, Additional Advocate General assisted by Waqar Khan Kakar, Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Quetta for Respondents (in Constitution Petition No. 1365 of 2024).\nSyed Ayaz Zahoor and Mehnaz Hameed for Petitioners (in Constitution Petition No.1446 of 2024).\nZahoor Ahmed Baloch, Additional Advocate General assisted by Waqar Khan Kakar, Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), Quetta for Respondents (in Constitution Petition No.1446 of 2024).", - "Petitioner Name:": "YAR MUHAMMAD AND 29 OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL SECRETARIAT, QUETTA AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25837", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 563 = 2025 SLD 563 = 2025 PLD 9", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzc", - "Key Words:": "Late Filing of Nomination Papers for Reserved Seats in Elections\nDetails:\n•\nBackground: The petitioner, a female candidate, challenged the Election Tribunal’s decision upholding the Returning Officer’s rejection of her nomination papers for the reserved seats for women in the National and Provincial Assemblies.\n•\nElection Schedule & Nomination Deadline: \no\nThe Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) issued a revised schedule for the General Elections of 08.02.2024.\no\nThe deadline for submitting nomination papers was 24.12.2023.\no\nThe petitioner submitted her application six days after the cut-off date, seeking permission to file her nomination papers, which was rejected.\n•\nLegal Provisions: \no\nSection 104 of the Elections Act, 2017 mandates that political parties must submit a list of candidates for reserved seats within the prescribed time.\no\nSubsection (7) of S. 104 further requires that candidates for reserved seats must submit nomination papers within the deadline to the designated Returning Officer.\no\nArts. 224 & 225 of the Constitution establish that any challenge affecting the election process must be brought at the appropriate stage before the Election Tribunal, and not during the election process.\n•\nCourt’s Reasoning: \no\nThe petitioner failed to meet the deadline, and late submission was not permissible under S. 104 of the Elections Act, 2017.\no\nElection processes, once initiated, cannot be interfered with at intermediate stages (Art. 225 & 226 of the Constitution).\no\nCompliance with prescribed election procedures is mandatory, and deviation is not allowed.\nHeld:\n•\nPetition dismissed as the rejection of late nomination papers was legally justified.\n•\nThe Election Tribunal acted within the law, and the electoral process could not be disrupted.\nCitations:\n•\nMuhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi (PLD 2018 SC 189)\n•\nShahida Bibi v. Habib Bank Ltd (PLD 2016 SC 995)\n•\nHuman Rights Case No. 4668 of 2006 (PLD 2010 SC 759)", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=104", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. 142 of 2024, decided on 7th February, 2024. Date of hearing: 7th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD EJAZ SWATI AND GUL HASSAN TAREEN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Bahlol Khan Kasi for Petitioner.\nShahzad Aslam, Asst: Director (Law), ECP for Respondents Nos.1 to 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAFEESA REHMAN-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE ELECTION TRIBUNAL BALOCHISTAN, QUETTA AND 2 OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25838", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 564 = 2025 SLD 564 = 2025 PLD 31", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzY", - "Key Words:": "Payment of Diyat, Fine, and Compensation in Installments\nDetails:\n•\nBackground: The petitioner, convicted under Sections 302(b), 324, 449, 337-A(iii), and 337-F(iii) of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), filed a constitutional petition seeking permission to pay the diyat, fine, and compensation in installments.\n•\nLegal Framework: \no\nFine as an Independent Punishment: \n\nSection 35 read with Section 397 of Cr.P.C. grants courts the discretion to order that sentences for multiple offences in the same trial run either consecutively or concurrently.\n\nHowever, when it comes to punishments of fines, the courts do not have the discretion to allow them to run concurrently—they must run consecutively.\no\nImprisonment in Default of Fine: \n\nIf a convict fails to pay the fine, they must serve the default imprisonment terms consecutively rather than concurrently.\n•\nCourt’s Reasoning: \no\nSince the petitioner expressed willingness to pay the diyat, fine, and compensation, the petition was disposed of accordingly without altering the legal requirement for consecutive payment of fines and default imprisonment terms.\nHeld:\n•\nPetition disposed of, with the understanding that the petitioner would pay the required amounts.\n•\nFine and imprisonment in default must run consecutively, as per Cr.P.C. provisions.\nCitations:\n•\nAbdul Majid v. The State and another (2005 YLR 1551)\n•\nMst. Shaista Bibi and another v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Mach and 2 others (PLD 2015 SC 15)\n•\nAli Abbas v. The State (PLD 1959 (W.P.) Karachi 56)\n•\nShaheen Tahir v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Faisalabad and another (PLD 2008 Lah. 497)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),324,449,337-A(iii),337-F(iii)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=397", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.168-D of 2024 with C.M.A. No.180-D of 2024, decided on 6th June, 2024. Date of hearing: 6th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE FAZAL SUBHAN AND DR. KHURSHID IQBAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Farooq Akhtar for Petitioner.\nGhulam Muhammad Sappal, Addl: A.G. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SADIQ-PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25839", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 565 = 2025 SLD 565 = 2025 PLD 36", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzU", - "Key Words:": "Quashing of FIR Under Constitutional Jurisdiction\n(a) Quashing of FIR – Factual Controversy Beyond Constitutional Jurisdiction\nDetails:\n•\nThe petitioner/accused sought quashment of FIR under Art. 199 of the Constitution before the High Court.\n•\nThe allegations prima facie disclosed a cognizable offence under Sections 302 & 34, PPC.\n•\nThe court held that factual disputes must be determined through trial based on evidence and cannot be adjudicated under constitutional jurisdiction.\n•\nThe Investigating Officer (IO) has the power to verify allegations and proceed against a complainant if found false.\n•\nThe complainant must be given a fair opportunity to prove the allegations in the ordinary course of trial.\nHeld:\n•\nQuashing of FIR was denied as the allegations required proper investigation.\n•\nConstitutional petition dismissed in limine.\n________________________________________\n(b) Quashing of FIR – Scope and Police Investigation\nDetails:\n•\nLegal Duty of Police: Under Section 154, Cr.P.C., the registration of FIR is mandatory upon disclosure of a cognizable offence.\n•\nNo Court Interference in Investigation: \no\nAfter FIR registration, police have the statutory right to investigate under Section 156, Cr.P.C.\no\nCourts cannot interfere in police investigation unless a clear legal bar exists.\n•\nFIR is Not an Encyclopedia: \no\nIt only sets the criminal law in motion, and the real facts emerge during investigation.\no\nIf an accused is found innocent, the case can be disposed of under Sections 169 & 173(3), Cr.P.C.\no\nComplainants lodging false cases may face punitive action under Section 182, PPC.\nHeld:\n•\nQuashing of FIR before investigation was deemed premature.\n•\nConstitutional petition dismissed in limine.\n________________________________________\n(c) High Court’s Powers – Exceptional Circumstances for Quashing FIR\nDetails:\n•\nThe High Court can quash an FIR only in exceptional cases, such as: \no\nWhen no cognizable offence is disclosed on the face of the FIR.\no\nWhen allegations are false or fabricated.\no\nWhen a civil dispute is wrongfully converted into a criminal case.\no\nWhen a legal bar prevents criminal proceedings.\n•\nThe High Court cannot assume the role of the Investigating Agency under Article 199 of the Constitution or Section 561-A, Cr.P.C.\nHeld:\n•\nFIR quashment denied in the absence of exceptional circumstances.\n•\nConstitutional petition dismissed in limine.\nCitations:\n•\nBrig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmad v. The Government of Pakistan (1994 SCMR 2142)\n•\nDr. Ghulam Mustafa v. State and others (2008 SCMR 76)\n________________________________________\n(d) Partial Quashing of FIR – Not Permissible\nDetails:\n•\nA co-accused sought quashing of the FIR only for himself, while the case proceeded against other accused persons.\n•\nThe court held that partial quashing of an FIR is not legally permissible.\nHeld:\n•\nQuashing of FIR for one accused was rejected.\n•\nConstitutional petition dismissed in limine.\nCitations:\n•\nDirector General, Anti-Corruption Establishment, Lahore and others v. Muhammad Akram Khan and others (PLD 2013 SC 401)\n•\nNaeem Abbas v. Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Islamabad and 7 others (2015 PCr.LJ 1592)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=302,34", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 273-B of 2024, decided on 30th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Kamran Hayat Miankhel and Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shoiab Khan for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BALQIAZ ALI SHAH alias ATTA ULLAH JAN-Petitioner\nVS\nWRASHEM GUL and 6 others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25840", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 566 = 2025 SLD 566 = 2025 PLD 41", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Remitting an Arbitration Award to Arbitrators or Umpire\nDetails:\n•\nThe Provincial Government appealed against a Civil Court order that had made the umpire’s award the rule of the court.\n•\nThe dispute arose because the original arbitrators had unanimously passed an award, but the Trial Court had remitted the matter to the umpire for reconsideration based on an application by the respondent company.\n•\nThe Provincial Government contended that remitting the award to the umpire was incorrect since the arbitrators had already reached a unanimous decision.\n•\nThe respondent company argued that under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, an award could be remitted to arbitrators or an umpire for reconsideration.\nHeld:\n•\nInterpretation of Section 16 & First Schedule of the Arbitration Act, 1940:\no\nAn umpires role is limited to cases where arbitrators fail to reach an agreement (Rule 4, First Schedule).\no\nIf the arbitrators have already issued a unanimous award, the matter cannot be referred to the umpire for reconsideration under Rule 5.\no\nSection 16 allows remitting an award for reconsideration if: \n\nSome matters remain undetermined, or\n\nThe award includes issues beyond the scope of arbitration that cannot be separated from the main decision.\no\nIf ambiguity arises in an arbitrators’ award, it must be sent back to the arbitrators, not the umpire.\no\nThe umpire only steps in when arbitrators disagree.\n•\nTrial Court’s Order Was Illegal:\no\nThe Trial Court’s decision to remit the award to the umpire was against the Arbitration Act’s scheme.\no\nThe umpire had no authority to reconsider a unanimous award passed by arbitrators.\no\nThe Civil Court’s decision making the umpire’s award the rule of the court was also illegal.\nFinal Decision:\n•\nThe High Court set aside: \no\nThe Trial Court’s order remitting the award to the umpire.\no\nThe umpire’s award.\no\nThe Trial Court’s judgment making the umpire’s award the rule of the court.\n•\nThe case was remanded back to the Trial Court to redecide the respondent’s application under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.\n•\nAppeal filed by the Provincial Government was allowed.\nCitation:\n•\nMuhammad Farooq Shah v. Shakirullah (2006 SCMR 1657)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=16", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No.186 of 2023 with C.M. No.299 of 2023 with C.M. No.541 of 2023, decided on 20th May, 2024. Date of hearing: 20th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE SYED ARSHAD ALI, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Yasir Khalid, A.A.G. for Appellants.\nBarrister Muhammad Yaseen Raza Khan and Barrister Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Afridi, Amicis Curiae for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY, PESHAWAR AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nMESSRS HMA PUMPS (PVT.) LTD. PESHAWAR CANTT. AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25841", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 567 = 2025 SLD 567 = 2025 PLD 45", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYy8", - "Key Words:": "Dismissal of Suit Under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. & Power of Court to Grant Alternate Relief\nDetails:\n•\nThe plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance, declaration, and permanent/mandatory injunction, with an alternate prayer for recovery of earnest money.\n•\nThe plaintiff failed to deposit the remaining sale consideration, leading to dismissal of the suit under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C.\n•\nThe petitioner argued that the entire suit should have been dismissed without granting a money decree for the return of the paid amount.\nHeld:\n•\nInterpretation of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C.:\no\nWhen a party fails to perform an act necessary for the further progress of the suit, the court has discretion to proceed with the case.\no\nThe word forthwith does not mean immediate dismissal but rather proceeding without undue adjournment.\no\nThe provision is discretionary, and a court is not bound to impose penal consequences in every case.\n•\nEquitable Relief for Refund of Earnest Money:\no\nThough the suit could be dismissed due to non-payment of the remaining sale consideration, the plaintiff was still entitled to recover the money already paid.\no\nThe court was within its discretion to grant equitable relief instead of dismissing the suit in its entirety.\nFinal Decision:\n•\nThe Civil Revision was dismissed as the Trial Court correctly exercised its discretion in granting a money decree for the return of earnest money.\nCitations:\n•\nMuhammad Aslam v. Nazeer Ahmad (2008 SCMR 942)\n•\nHasham Khan and others v. Haroon ur Rashid and others (2022 SCMR 1793)\n•\nMuhammad Asif Awan v. Dawood Khan and others (2021 SCMR 1270)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No.34-D of 2023 with Civil Misc. Nos.5I and 58-D of 2023, decided on 14th November, 2023. Date of hearing: 2nd November 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD FAHEEM WALI, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmad Ali, Haji Shakeel and Miss Shumaila Awan for Petitioner.\nRizwanullah Khan Arain for Rrespondent No.1.\nAamir Farid Saddozai, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents Nos. 4 to 8.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ATTAULLAH-PETITIONER\nVS\nGHAZANFARULLAH AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25842", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 568 = 2025 SLD 568 = 2025 PLD 53", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYys", - "Key Words:": "Limitation for Filing Leave to Defend in Summary Suits & Responsibility of the Trial Court\nDetails:\n•\nThe defendant was served with summons in a summary suit under Order XXXVII, C.P.C.\n•\nThe Trial Court struck off the defence and passed an ex-parte decree after the defendant failed to file a leave to defend application within 10 days as required under Article 159 of the Limitation Act, 1908.\n•\nThe defendant later filed an application under O. IX, R. 13, C.P.C., read with S. 12(2), C.P.C., seeking to set aside the ex-parte judgment and decree, but the Trial Court dismissed it.\n•\nGrounds for appeal: \no\nThe 10-day period should commence from the actual date of service, and in this case, the Trial Court curtailed it by one day, depriving the defendant of his statutory right.\no\nThe Trial Court failed to wait until the full statutory period expired, violating the principles of due process and fairness.\no\nThe Trial Court prematurely held the service as valid despite missing key documents, such as courier receipts and acknowledgment of delivery ( AD ), raising doubts on the validity of service.\nHeld:\n•\nArticle 159 of the Limitation Act, 1908, mandates a 10-day period to file a leave to defend application in summary suits.\n•\nThe Trial Court must ensure that the defendant is properly served and given a full opportunity to respond before striking off his defence.\n•\nThe defendant was unfairly deprived of his statutory right as his 10-day period was cut short, violating due process.\n•\nStriking off the defence prematurely is a serious procedural flaw that undermines fairness in legal proceedings.\n•\nThe High Court set aside the ex-parte judgment and decree, as well as the dismissal order of the defendant’s application.\n•\nThe defendant was allowed to file his leave to defend application within 10 days from the date of the judgment.\nFinal Decision:\n•\nThe appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded for reconsideration, ensuring the defendant had a fair chance to file his application.\nCitations:\n•\nMeer Javed Asghar v. Citibank (2007 CLD 304)\n•\nMuhammad Shafique v. National Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1992 Lah. 60)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=159", - "Case #": "First Appeal No.38 of 2020, decided on 15th May, 2024. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND SANA AKRAM MINHAS, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hyder Raza Arain for Appellant.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUMTAZ HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI-APPELLANT\nVS\nMUHAMMAD TAHIR-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25843", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 569 = 2025 SLD 569 = 2025 PLD 59", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzk", - "Key Words:": "SECPs Power to Initiate Inquiry and Issue Show Cause Notices\nDetails:\n•\nPetitioners challenged a show cause notice issued by the SECP concerning irregular financial transactions and lack of compliance with regulatory requirements by a Modarba company.\n•\nThe SECP acted under Section 20(4)(o) of the SECP Act, 1997, which empowers it to perform functions and exercise powers delegated by the Federal Government or any other law in force.\n•\nThe SECP’s inquiry revealed several financial irregularities, including: \no\nUnauthorized payments made without proper documentation.\no\nFire incidents causing losses due to the absence of insurance coverage (Takaful).\no\nLack of transparency in financial transactions requiring further scrutiny.\n•\nThe petitioners argued that the SECP’s actions infringed their fundamental rights and sought relief under Article 199 of the Constitution.\nHeld:\n•\nThe High Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under Article 199, as: \no\nNo fundamental right was infringed, and the court was not sitting in appeal over SECP’s decision.\no\nThe petitioners raised factual disputes, which could not be adjudicated under constitutional jurisdiction.\no\nThe SECP’s role as a regulatory body requires it to safeguard investors and certificate holders, and the impugned order was a valid regulatory action.\n•\nThe constitutional petition was dismissed.\nFinal Decision:\n•\nThe SECP’s action was upheld, and the inquiry was deemed lawful and necessary to maintain regulatory oversight over Modarba companies.\nCitations:\n•\nSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 (S. 20(4)(o))\n•\nModarba Companies and Modarba Rules, 1981 (R. 8(4))", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-3523 of 2020, decided on 23rd September, 2024. Date of hearing: 2nd September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, C.J. AND JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sameer Tayebally for Petitioner.\nKhaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No.1.\nFurqan Ali for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "B.R.R. GUARDIAN MODARABA AND 8 OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE AND 2 OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25844", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 570 = 2025 SLD 570 = 2025 PLD 63", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTYzg", - "Key Words:": "Acquittal in a Case of Dishonoured Stale Cheque\nDetails:\n•\nPetitioner sought acquittal under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C., contending that the charge was baseless and no conviction was likely.\n•\nCheque was issued on 15-03-2018 and was presented for encashment on 14-09-2021, after three years.\n•\nThe FIR did not specify the transaction for which the cheque was issued, except that it was given as a guarantee.\n•\nCheque was returned not due to insufficient funds, but because it was stale (outdated).\n•\nAs per Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a cheque is a negotiable instrument.\n•\nSection 84(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, mandates that a cheque must be presented within a reasonable time, and generally, a cheque older than six months is considered stale.\nHeld:\n•\nSection 489-F, P.P.C., does not apply to every dishonoured cheque, and in this case, the dishonour was due to staleness rather than insufficient funds.\n•\nTrial Court’s dismissal of the acquittal application was set aside, and the application for acquittal was allowed.\nFinal Decision:\n•\nPetitioner was acquitted, as the cheque was stale and did not meet the criteria for an offence under Section 489-F, P.P.C.\nCitations:\n•\nGriffiths v. Dalton 1940-2-KB 264\n•\nSajid Irtaza v. Additional Sessions Judge/Justice of Peace, Lahore 2021 PCr.LJ 1071\n•\nShafquat Hussain Hashmi v. The State 2012 MLD 1551\n•\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. Jamilur Rehman 1994 MLD 271", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=489-F", - "Case #": "Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. S-109 of 2022, decided on 3rd October, 2024. Date of hearing: 3rd October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE KHADIM HUSSAIN SOOMRO, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Wahab Baloch for Applicant.\nAitbar Ali Bullo, Deputy Prosecutor General, Sindh for Respondent No.1.\nNaushad Ali Tagar for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COL. (R) MUKARRAM ALI SHAH-APPLICANT\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25845", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 571 = 2025 SLD 571 = 2025 PLD 69", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTY3o", - "Key Words:": "License Renewal, Perpetuity, and Regulatory Authority\nDetails:\nThe petitioner company challenged the non-renewal of its Cable Television Network license under the MMDS System. The petitioner claimed that its license was granted in perpetuity and should not be subject to renewal under the new regulatory framework. However, the High Court ruled that the license issued under the previous regime was always subject to renewal and conditions under the new law. The court clarified that a license with an expiry date cannot be considered perpetual unless explicitly stated in the license agreement or under prevailing law.\nThe Frequency Allocation Board (FAB), established under Section 42 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, replaced the Pakistan Wireless Board under the Telegraph Act, 1885. The court held that a license is a privilege and does not confer a vested right to the licensee. Furthermore, under the principle of locus poenitentia, an authority that grants a license also retains the right to modify, amend, or revoke it.\nThe court directed the petitioner to approach Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) under Rule 6 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 to apply for a new license and seek frequency allocation from FAB. PEMRA was ordered to decide such applications within 100 days, as per Rule 9 of the 2009 Rules. Until the decision on such an application, PEMRA was restrained from taking any adverse action against the petitioner.\nHeld:\n•\nThe claim of a license in perpetuity was rejected.\n•\nLicenses issued by the government are not absolute rights but privileges subject to renewal and conditions.\n•\nRegulatory authorities have the power to revoke, amend, or modify licenses based on legal provisions.\n•\nThe petitioner was directed to apply afresh for a new MMDS license under PEMRA Rules, 2009.\n•\nThe High Court dismissed the petition but granted temporary protection to the petitioner from adverse action until the application was decided.\nCitations:\n•\nPak Telecom Mobile Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Islamabad (PLD 2014 SC 478)\n•\nPakistan and another v. FECTO Belarus Tractors Limited (PLD 2002 SC 208)\n•\nMessrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (1992 SCMR 1652)\n•\nPakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) and others v. Southern Networks Limited, Karachi (2023 SCMR 1348)\n•\nMag Entertainment (Pvt.) Ltd v. Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. (2018 SCMR 1807)\n•\nOther relevant cases cited in the judgment.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996=42", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-482 of 2007, decided on 14th December, 2023. Date of hearing: 14th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, C.J. AND ABDUL MOBEEN LAKHO, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abbas Leghari and Nadeem Ahmed for the Petitioner.\nBadar Alam for Respondent No.2.\nKashif Hanif, Sarmad Ali, Zafar Iqbal Arain and Ms. Shaista Perveen for Respondent No.3 (PEMRA).\nSalar Khan for Respondent No.4 (Frequency Allocation Board)\nAli Akbar Sehto, Deputy Director Law PTA.\nKhaleeq Ahmed, D.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SOUTHERN NETWORK LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE-PETITIONER\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION ISLAMABAD AND 3 OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25846", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 572 = 2025 SLD 572 = 2025 PLD 98", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTY3k", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 17-High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Vol. IV, Ch. 1, Part-1, General, Part-G-Position of Additional Sessions Judges-Subordination of Magistrates and Benches to Sessions Judge-Scope-Words Court of Sessions, Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge, and Assistant Sessions Judge have been used in Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 with the difference in their meanings-Court presided over by an Additional Sessions Judge is also a Court of Sessions-Powers of an Additional Sessions Judge are similar to those of Sessions Judge-Difference is that Sessions Judge presides over Sessions Court and is the person who can receive cases, appeals, revisions, and all other petitions under law whereas an Additional Sessions Judge cannot receive directly-Additional Sessions Judge can only hear cases entrusted to him by Sessions Judge-Additional Sessions Judge has no power under law to entrust cases to other Courts-Provision of S. 17(4), Cr.P.C. provides for an emergency in which whenever Sessions Judge is unavoidably absent or incapable of acting, he may make provision for disposal of any urgent application by an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, or if there be no Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, by such Judge or Magistrate who has jurisdiction to deal with any such application-Except for such provision of law in Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, no provision makes Additional Sessions Judge subordinate to Sessions Judge.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 528 (1-A)-Words case and trial -Distinction-Word case comprises various stages, i.e., the case at investigation stage, the case at inquiry stage, and the case at trial stage-Word case is not only trial but also other proceedings as well, e.g., physical as well as judicial remand of accused, order on application of Superdari (سپرداری) of case property, application for bail and other allied matters.\nIqbal Hussain v. The State PLD 1985 Lah. 65; Abdul Rafiq alias Oassu v. The State 1994 PCr.LJ 2507 and Mehboob Hassan v. Akhtar Islam and others 2024 SCMR 757 rel.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 17 (4), 193, 498, 526 & 528 (1-A)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F-Transfer of pre-arrest bail application-Sessions Judge, powers of-Question was with regard to exercise of power by Sessions Judge under S. 193 read with S. 17(4), Cr.P.C. with respect to transfer of bail petition from one Additional Sessions Judge to another in the same Sessions Division-Held, that, exercise of power by Sessions Judge under S. 193 read with S. 17(4), Cr.P.C. is administrative in nature-Such power is simple distribution of work-Provision of S. 528, Cr.P.C. appears under Chap. XLIV, Cr.P.C. dealing with transfer of criminal cases and itself is captioned as power of Sessions Judge to transfer cases and appeals from one criminal Court to another criminal Court at any time before trial of case or hearing of appeal has commenced before Additional Sessions Judge-Power under S. 528, Cr.P.C. is to be exercised only if it is expedient for ends of justice and not for any other reasons-Thus, there is a statutory but administrative subordination in making over, recalling, withdrawing, and transferring cases, as far as Additional Sessions Judge is concerned, to the Sessions Judge-Power of transfer does not always depend on superior jurisdiction-It can also confer power, as seen in S. 24 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Given the scheme provided under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 conferring power on Sessions Judge to transfer a case/appeal pending before Additional Sessions Judge, the decision in the case titled Naveed Hussain v. The State and others reported as PLD 2020 Lahore 382, was overruled by the High Court-Petitioner was free to move Sessions Judge under S.528, Cr.P.C. for withdrawing and transferring bail petition to another Additional Sessions Court so that it could be heard and decided-Transfer application was disposed of accordingly.\nNaveed Hussain v. The State and others PLD 2020 Lah. 382 overruled.\nAbdul Rafiq alias Oassu v. The State 1994 PCr.LJ 2507 and Mehboob Hassan v. Akhtar Islam and others 2024 SCMR 757 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=17", - "Case #": "Transfer Application No. 10572-T of 2024, heard on 13th November, 2024. Date of hearing: 13th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE AALIA NEELUM, C.J., SYED SHAHBAZ ALI RIZVI, ASJAD JAVAID GHURAL, FAROOQ HAIDER AND ALI ZIA BAJWA, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Zulfiqar Ali Hargan for Applicant.\nRana Ahsan Aziz, Additional Prosecutor General, Ms. Maida Sobia, Deputy Prosecutor General, Rafaqat Ali Dogar, Deputy Attorney General and Waqas Umar, Assistant Advocate General for the State.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MIAN ZAHEER ABBAS RABBANI-APPLICANT\nVS\nTHE STATE AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25847", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 573 = 2025 SLD 573 = 2025 PLD 112", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTc", - "Key Words:": "Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance (XCVIII of 2002)-\n-Ss. 19 & 20-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 99-A & 298-C-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A-Cancellation of declaration of magazine-Due process of law-Preaching of faith by Qadiani group-Appellant was aggrieved of cancellation of declaration of magazine in question for publishing objectionable material-Plea raised by appellant was that declaration of magazine was cancelled on recommendations of Muttehida Ulema Board which had no authority in such regard-Validity-On receipt of material record/information the authorities after application of judicious mind issued show cause notice to appellant to appear and explain his position on the allegation regarding preaching of Qadianiat through magazine in question-Appellant appeared before authorities, filed reply and was also heard by authorities before passing order in question as envisaged in Art.10-A of the Constitution as well as mandated by S. 19 of Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance, 2002-Recommendations made by Muttehida Ulema Board as well as notification issued by Home Department were not questioned before any competent forum-Recommendations were in active knowledge of appellant, which had attained finality-Appellant through publishing objectionable material in magazine in question committed violation of law and authorities had rightly cancelled declaration of the magazine in question-High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction declined to interfere in order passed by authorities as it was well-reasoned-Appellant failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional defect in the order-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=99-A,298-CConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "Press Appeal No. 225 of 2012, heard on 30th April, 2024. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE CH. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Fahad Malik for Appellant.\nRaja Muhammad Arif, Additional Advocate General for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAHIR MEHDI IMTIAZ AHMAD WARRAICH-APPELLANT\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25848", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 574 = 2025 SLD 574 = 2025 PLD 124", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 42 & 54-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)-Documentary evidence-Objection to admissibility-Petitioner/defendant filed application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., seeking to set aside ex-parte decree passed against him-Respondents/plaintiffs sought de-exhibition of certain documents which were produced by petitioner/defendant in his evidence during proceedings under S. 12(2), C.P.C.-Trial Court allowed application of respondents/plaintiffs and de-exhibited the documents, which order was maintained by Lower Appellate Court-Validity-Objections with respect to admissibility of documents can be of two kinds: (i) document is inadmissible in evidence being irrelevant or not capable for being considered in evidence ( inadmissibility in evidence ); and (ii) objections directed towards mode of proof due to irregularity or insufficiency ( mode of proof )-If no objection is raised as to inadmissibility in evidence but just mode of proof, after the document has been marked as an exhibit, the principle of waiver for failing to raise objection as to formal validity can be attracted-Proper time for raising such objection as to formal validity or mode of proof is prior to marking a document as an exhibit or at the time when it is sought to be marked as an exhibit-Such objections should be taken at the earliest and once document has been tendered and marked as an exhibit, belated objection as to mode of proof is discouraged by Courts-High Court set aside orders of Trial Court marking the documents as exhibits without oath statement of advocate and the order to de-exhibit them and also set aside judgment of Lower Appellate Court-High Court noted that the petitioner/defendant could file suitable application to produce further evidence/documents or re-examination of any witness-High Court directed Trial Court to give chance to respondents/plaintiffs to cross-examine as to additional evidence, if produced-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.\nMalik Riazullah v. Mst. Dilnasheen and others 2018 CLC 1569; Muhammad Arif and others v. Aziz-ur-Rehman and others 2023 CLC 713; Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others PLD 2021 SC 715; Gulzar Hussain v. Abdur Rehman and another 1985 SCMR 301; Gopal Das and another v. Sri Thakurji and others AIR (30) 1943 Privy Council 83; Muhammad Akram and another v. Mst. Farida Bibi and others 2007 SCMR 1719; Khurshid Ali and 6 others v. Shah Nazar PLD 1992 SC 822; Jodhpur Gums and Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank and others AIR 1999 Rajasthan 38 and N.M.S. Sadasivier Krishnier and others v. T.S. Meenakshi Iyer and others AIR 1933 Madras 781 ref.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Act of Court-Effect-Prejudice must not be caused to litigants because of any mistake of Courts, though the litigants and their counsel are also required to be vigilant.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 10608, 10609 and 10611 of 2024, decided on 13th August, 2024. Date of hearing: 12th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Akhtar Rana for Petitioner.\nMian Umar Farooq for Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and 11 to 13.\nFor Respondents Nos. 6 to 10 and 14: Ex-parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. AFIA AMBRINE-PETITIONER\nVS\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, SIALKOT AND 14 OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25849", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 575 = 2025 SLD 575 = 2025 PLD 171", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 12, 39, 42 & 54-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 148 & O. XVII, R.3-Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, cancellation of document, declaration and injunction-Balance sale consideration, payment of-Non-compliance of Court order-Penal provision, invoking of-Extension of time-Principle-Previous conduct of party-Petitioner/plaintiff was aggrieved of order passed by Trial Court declining to extend time for deposit of balance consideration amount, resultantly suit was dismissed for not depositing complete balance consideration amount-Validity-When Trial Court invoked penal provisions of O. XVII, R. 3, C.P.C. due to non-compliance of order, no reference could be made to any previous omission or commission, if any, on the part of petitioner/plaintiff-In the event of non-compliance of Court s order, Court could invoke penal provisions of O. XVII R. 3, C.P.C. but prior to resorting to such penal action Trial Court should have satisfied itself that the party concerned had failed to comply with its order despite availing reasonable time-As per S. 148, C.P.C., Court enjoys power to extend period fixed by it for performance of an act by a party to the lis upon showing sufficient cause for non-compliance of its order within the stipulated period-Trial Court failed to exercise such powers despite the fact that petitioner/plaintiff filed application for extension of time to comply with order in question prior to expiration of period fixed by Trial Court-Such act of Court amounted to failure on its part to exercise power vested in it, which called for interference by High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction vested under S. 115, C.P.C.-High Court set aside order in question and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh-Revision was allowed accordingly.\nIrfan Rasheed v. Muhammad Muazim and others PLD 2022 Lah. 372; Sultan Ahmad and others v. Khuda Bux and others 1986 SCMR 1005; Malik Hadayat Ullah and 2 others v. Murad Ali Khan PLD 1972 SC 69; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Muhammad Sadiq and another 1995 SCMR 105; Muhammad Asghar v. Mian Muhammad Hussain 2010 CLC 22; Ghulam Rabani v. Muhammad Fiaz and another 2016 CLC 1547; Zahoor Ahmed v. Mehra through Legal Heirs and others 1999 SCMR 105; Jind Wadda and others v. Abdul Hameed and another PLD 1990 SC 1192; Haji Shamsur Rehman and another v. Nadar Khan and 6 others 2005 CLC 215; United Bank Ltd. v. Haji Muhammad Rahim Khan 1994 MLD 2312; Sheikh Khurshid Mehboob Alam v. Mirza Hashim Baig and another 2012 SCMR 361; Maulvi Abdul Aziz Khan v. Mst. Shah Jahan Begum and 2 others PLD 1971 SC 434; Muhammad Aslam v. Nazir Ahmed 2008 SCMR 942; Government of N.-W.F.P. and others v. Fazal Maula and others PLD 1993 Pesh. 192; Service Industries Limited through Chief Financial Officer v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary and others 2020 CLD 562; Shaikh Aijazur Rehman v. The State (NAB) through Director General (NAB) and another PLD 2006 Kar. 629; M.Z. Khan v. Aziz-Ud-Din Ahmad Khan and others 2004 YLR 84 and Ahmad Yar and 6 others v. Ghulam Rasool and 5 others 2016 CLC Note 42 ref.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Consolidation of proceedings-Scope-When different proceedings are consolidated by Court of competent jurisdiction, such proceedings are to be decided jointly until and unless they are unconsolidated by the same forum with tangible reasons.\n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XVII, R. 3-Non-compliance of direction of Court-Deciding of case-Principle-It is not mandatory to decide the lis on same day when a party fails to comply with the order of a court-Court should adjourn proceedings to decide the same on merits or having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case should extend the period for compliance of its own order suo motu or on the application of the party concerned.\n(d) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 12-Specific performance of agreement to sell-Condition to deposit balance consideration amount-Object, purpose and scope-There exists no provision in Specific Relief Act, 1877 compelling plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell to deposit balance amount of consideration-But, Courts order so, to adjudge readiness of plaintiff to perform his part of the contract.\nMuhammad Asif Awan v. Dawood Khan and others 2021 SCMR 1270 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=12,39,42,54Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=148,3", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 49002 of 2021, heard on 18th May, 2022. Date of hearing: 18th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sh. Usman Karim-ud-Din for Petitioner.\nImran Raza Chadhar for Respondent No.1.\nImran Ahmad Malik for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NASIR MAHMOOD-PETITIONER\nVS\nZAFAR IQBAL AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25850", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 576 = 2025 SLD 576 = 2025 PLD 146", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)-\n-S. 95(5), (6), (7) & (8)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199-Consolidation of results-Recounting of ballot papers-Jurisdiction of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)-Scope-Interference by ECP after completion of process of consolidation of results by Returning Officer (R.O.)-Legality-Long investigation of ECP in resolving the controversy as to consolidation of results-Effect-Plea of haste on part of R.O. in completing the consolidation results-Validity-Recount of ballot papers and the power to be exercised by ECP has to be done before conclusion of the consolidation proceedings and if the exercise of power is not completed as contemplated by S.95(6), of Elections Act, 2017 ECP cannot thereafter proceed to exercise such power on the misplaced notion that it can do so by invoking the provisions of S.8 of the Elections Act, 2017, (Act) or any other provision in law or the Constitution-ECP delayed the matter and initiated inquiries into the entire process of election, which was not the mandate of S.95(6) of the Act as when an application was made to ECP it merely had to see whether the R.O. had proceeded in accordance with law while refusing recount of votes under the powers conferred by S.95(5) and no more-In any case, it could only have done so prior to completion of the consolidation proceedings by the Returning Officer-Returning Officer could have awaited the period prescribed for consolidation proceedings to be completed and given in proviso to S.95(7)of the Act but that was for ECP to instruct the R.Os. and indeed some time must be given to ECP to exercise its powers in terms of S.95(6) of the Act-Provision for further time in that regard could only be done by an amendment in the law regarding which High Court was not empowered to issue a direction and it was for the legislature to look into the same-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nCh. Bilal Ejaz v. Election Commission of Pakistan and others (W.P. No.16416 of 2024) rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Elections Act, 2017=95(5),(6),(7),(8)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 23249 of 2024, heard on 15th May, 2024. Date of hearing: 15th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE SHAHID KARIM, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abid Hussain Khichi for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Shan Gul for Respondent No.3.\nAsad Ali Bajwa and Ch. Imtiaz Elahi, D.A.Gs.\nHassan Ijaz Cheema, A.A.G.\nImran Arif Ranjha, Legal Advisor for E.C.P with Haroon Kasi, Director (Law) and Bushra Rasheed Chaudhry, Deputy Director Law ECP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ATIF-PETITIONER\nVS\nELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25851", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 577 = 2025 SLD 577 = 2025 PLD 152", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 2(d)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. I, R.10- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199- Determination of necessary and proper parties-Court may strike out or add parties-Dispute between a father and his adult sons regarding maintenance-Father filed an application to strike out the names of his sons from the suit on the ground that his sons being adults were no longer entitled to maintenance-Trial Court accepted the application, but the Appellate Court reversed the decision-Validity-Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out-Party who has no connection with the relief sought may be struck out from the record as a party-Court can also strike out a party over whom it has no jurisdiction and whether a party is to be struck out or not is to be determined on the basis of plaint as framed-High Court in view of S.2(d) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, held that adult sons were proper and necessary party and their presence was necessary for the proper decision of the controversy involved in the suit and the impugned order was held to be well-reasoned and was passed after due appreciation of the record as well as merits of the case, which was not open to any exception or interference by High Court while exercising its constitutional jurisdiction-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nMst. Aila Nawaz v. Judge Family Court, Khanewal and 2 others 2018 CLC 241 and Muhammad Riaz Ahmad v. Mst. Shaheen Akhtar and 3 others PLD 2023 Lah. 317 distinguished.\nMuhammad Arif and others v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot and others 2011 SCMR 1591 rel.\n(b) Islamic law-\n-Maintenance, definition of-Scope-Obligation of father to pay maintenance to his adult son-Scope-Right of maintenance is not limited only to food, clothing and lodging, but also entails all other necessary expenses for the mental and physical wellbeing of the recipient.\nHumayun Hassan v. Arslan Humayun and another PLD 2013 SC 557 rel.\n(c) Islamic law-\n-Maintenance of children-Obligation of father to pay maintenance to his adult son-General rule and exception-Scope-Obligation of the father to maintain his adult son who has not yet accomplished basic education, enabling him to earn his livelihood, may be considered by the court in an appropriate case, a factor falling within the exception to the general rule-Education is the necessary qualification which is required by a person to enable him to earn bread and butter, however, it does not include higher studies and studies abroad.\nHumayun Hassan v. Arslan Humayun and another PLD 2013 SC 557 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Family Courts Act, 1964=2(d)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 62571 of 2024, decided on 11th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Tariq Latif for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD IMRAN-PETITIONER\nVS\nSAMINA KOUSAR AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25852", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 578 = 2025 SLD 578 = 2025 PLD 161", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9 & 10-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ,O. VII, R. 10 & O. XIII R. 1-Suit for recovery, filing of-Territorial jurisdiction, determination of-Scope-Documents admitted/acknowledged by parties-Effect-Suit filed at Rawalpindi (R)-Held, that in the present case, the admitted documents/agreements (Diminishing Musharakah Financing Agreement etc.) clearly depicted that the parties had mutually agreed to resolve their issues at Courts of Karachi (K) having exclusive jurisdiction for the determination of their disputes-Based on the agreements between the parties, which had been acknowledged by the parties and the documents filed and relied by the plaintiffs under S. 9 of Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance 2001) along with list of documents under O. XIII, R. 1 of the C.P.C. and under S. 10 of the Ordinance 2001 by the defendant, High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter due to specific and exclusive jurisdiction clauses in all the agreements-High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; therefore, the plaint was returned under O. VII, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for presenting it before a Court of competent jurisdiction-Suit was disposed of accordingly.\nFaysal Bank Limited v. Messrs Usman Enterprises and another 2023 CLD 1563; Eden Builders (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2022 SCMR 2044; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393 and Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd). Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174 ref.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10-Suit for recovery, filing of-Territorial jurisdiction, determination of-Scope-Exclusive jurisdiction incorporated in agreement regarding a place other than where the suit was filed-Effect-Suit was filed at Rawalpindi (R)-Held, that in the present case, documents/ agreements (Diminishing Musharakah Financing Agreement etc.) clearly depicted that the parties had mutually agreed to include/incorporate jurisdiction clauses in a clear and unambiguously manner, which showed that the parties had given exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts at Karachi (K)-Thus, the parties were bound by their terms and conditions for resolution of their disputes-All the agreements were executed on different dates at the registered office of the defendant at Karachi and were not disputed by the parties-Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; the plaint was returned under O. VII, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for presenting it before a Court of competent jurisdiction-Suit was disposed of accordingly.\nEden Builders (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2022 SCMR 2044; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd). Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174; Saleem Mehtab v. Messrs Refhan Best Food Ltd, Compnay through Chief Executive and 9 others 2010 MLD 1015; Chaudhry Mehtab Ahmad and another v. Mir. Shakeel-ur-Rehman and 4 others 2004 MLD 662; Tahir Tariq Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 2 others v. N.D.F. C. through Chairman 2001 YLR 846; Tradesmen International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock and another 2008 CLD 1217; Bankers Equity Ltd. v. Iqas Weaving Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 CLD 169 and MCB Bank Limited v. Adeel Shahbaz Steel Mills and others 2023 CLD 655 ref.\n(c) Jurisdiction-\n-Principle-When parties were at controversy regarding point of jurisdiction of Court, it was incumbent upon the Court either to decide question of jurisdiction after giving an opportunity of hearing to parties and then to proceed with the other issues regarding merits of case.\nAmerican Express Travel Related Services Company Inc. and others v. Muhammad Nasrullah Beg, Advocate 2000 MLD 1155 ref.\n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10-Suit for recovery, filing of-Territorial jurisdiction, determination of-Scope-Boilerplate clauses-Scope-All commercial and banking contracts/ agreements contain a number of boilerplate clauses , which are often seen as standard add-ons to the main terms and conditions of the contract-One such boilerplate clause relates to jurisdiction and choice of law, and although these can be relatively straightforward when both parties are based in the same jurisdiction, they deserve proper consideration, particularly when the parties to the contract are based in different jurisdictions-In drafting dispute resolution clauses in commercial contracts and banking agreements, parties contemplate, inter alia, the most convenient and affordable forums to resolve their disputes through the boilerplate clauses -In the present case, all the agreements were executed on different dates at the registered office of the defendant at Karachi and this was not disputed by the parties-Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; the plaint was returned under O. VII, R.10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for presenting it before a Court of Competent Jurisdiction-Suit was disposed of accordingly.\nState Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393 and Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd). Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174 ref.\n(e) Contract-\n-Boilerplate clause-Scope-A boilerplate clause is a legal English term that is used in conjunction with contract law-When forming contracts, parties to the contract often use templates or forms with boilerplate clauses (boilerplate language, used as standard language)-Such clauses refers to the standardized clauses in contracts, and they are to be found towards the end of the agreement-Including boilerplate clauses is the process by which parties to the contract may better define their relationship and the will to provide certainty if terms in the contract are ever disputed-Boilerplate clauses are standard contractual terms that are routinely included in many contracts-In the present case, all the agreements were executed on different dates at the registered office of the defendant at Karachi and this was not disputed by the parties-Lahore High Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; the plaint was returned under O. VII, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for presenting it before a Court of competent jurisdiction-Suit was disposed of accordingly.\n(f) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10-Suit for recovery, filing of-Territorial jurisdiction, determination of-Scope-Exclusive jurisdiction clause-Boilerplate clause-Scope-Boilerplate clauses-Validity-Question that parties to a contract are faced with is the extent of autonomy they can exercise in choosing an appropriate forum in a boilerplate clauses -Henceforth, to avoid the hassle of litigating in a forum, which is inconvenient or time-consuming, parties often mutually agree to litigate their disputes before a specific Court-Such clauses are drafted taking into account the common economic and geographic convenience of the parties-Exclusive jurisdiction clauses enunciate a choice by parties to limit the place of institution of the suit to one forum-Jurisdiction clauses, therefore, relate as to which Courts would hear a dispute-Nevertheless, an exclusive jurisdiction specifies that only the Courts of a particular jurisdiction, such as those of K (Karachi), in the present case, should deal with any disputes arising out of a contract between the parties-In the present case, all the agreements were executed on different dates at the registered office of the defendant at Karachi and this was not disputed by the parties-Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to pass any judgment and decree against the defendant; the plaint was returned under O. VII, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for presenting it before a Court of Competent Jurisdiction-Suit was disposed of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 6 of 2023, decided on 30th September, 2024. Dates of hearing: 23rd April and 30th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE JAWAD HASSAN, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court, Aakif Majeed and Asim Tufail Farooqi for Plaintiffs.\nMs. Samia Faiz Durrani, Advocate Supreme Court, Faiz Durani, Advocate Supreme Court with Salman Khan Baryalay and Arshad Mehmood for Defendants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS SADIQ POULTRY FARMS (PVT.) LIMITED THROUGH AUTHORIZED DIRECTOR AND 2 OTHERS-PLAINTIFFS\nVS\nFIRST HABIB MODARABA, A SUBSIDIARY OF HABIB METRO BANK THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE-DEFENDANT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25853", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 579 = 2025 SLD 579 = 2025 SCMR 303", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Substantive law and procedural law-Distinction-Substantive law defines rights, while procedural law deals primarily with the process or remedies involved-Procedural law initiates and guides the process and course of action through which the lawsuit progresses and the way in which court proceedings are undertaken-It also regulates and oversees the procedures employed-Substantive law, on the other hand, comprises statutory obligations relevant to the subject matter, declaring the applicable rights and obligations, and regulating the demeanor of an individual or government-Substantive law determines the conduct and relations of the parties inter se in respect of the matter litigated, whereas the procedural law regulates the conduct and relations of Courts and litigants in respect of the litigation-Substantive law deals with the ends which the administration of justice contemplates while the procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which the ends of administration of justice are to be attained-The question as to what facts constitute a wrong is determined by substantive law, while what facts constitute proof of a wrong is a question of procedure-Substantive law defines the rights whereas the law of procedure defines the modes and conditions of the application of one to the other-Substantive law relates to the matter outside the Courts, whereas the procedural law regulates affairs inside the Courts.\nThe Works of Jeremy Bentham 1843; Introduction to Jurisprudence 3rd Ed. Reprint, 2011 by Dr. Avtar Singh and Dr. Harpreet Kaur and Meeru Khan v. Mst. Naheed Aziz Siddiqui and others PLD 2023 SC 912 ref.\n(b) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Procedural law-Prospective and retrospective application-Outcome of legislation or changes in law that pertain solely to the procedures or legal remedies indicates that if legislation is enacted with the primary intent to alter or modify procedural aspects without prejudicing the rights of the litigants, then no doubt, it will apply to all pending and future actions-Individuals do not possess a vested right in any particular course of procedure, so for all intents and purposes, the change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively-However, laws affecting, curtailing or prejudicing vested rights shall be applied prospectively.\nCorpus Juris Secundum, Francis J. Ludes and Harold J. Gilbert Volume 5B 1841; Canon of Construction and Interpretation of Statutes; M. Mahmood Pages 315, 513, 301, The Construction of Statutes, Earl T. Crawford 1998, pages 581-583; The Interpretation of Statutes, N.S. Bindra 1984, 7th Edition, pages 645-646 and Principle of Statutory Interpretation and Statutory Words and Phrases, S.C. Sarkar 2013, page 109 ref.\n(c) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)-\n-S. 57(5)-Trans-provincial establishment-Forum of appeal-National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), jurisdiction of-Exclusion of jurisdiction of Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal-Industrial Relations Act, 2012 ( IRA ) is applicable only to the employees and entrepreneurs of trans-provincial establishments, while after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, the provinces have also promulgated their local labour laws, including those relating to industrial relations, and in case of any grievance, the aggrieved person may approach the Labour Courts as per the prescribed procedure-If dissatisfied with an order of a Labour Court, they may file an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, but not to the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC)-In the present case, since the petitioner was a trans-provincial establishment, the matters were previously being handled by the Labour Court before the promulgation of the IRA-However, pending adjudication of the appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, a special industrial relations law was promulgated for trans-provincial establishments whereby a procedural change was made in the choice of forum of appeal, applicable not to new cases but to those pending in Labour Courts or the Labour Appellate Tribunal for the establishments/organizations included and covered in the definition of trans-provincial establishments in the IRA-Consequently, from the effective date, the jurisdiction of Provincial Labour Courts and the Labour Appellate Tribunal for the employees of trans-provincial establishment stood excluded for all intents and purposes-Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal decided the appeal of the petitioner on 13.03.2013, when the IRA was very much in the field, having come into force on 14.3.2012-Therefore, taking into consideration Subsection (5) of Section 57 of the IRA, no Labour Court or Labour Appellant Tribunal could have taken the cognizance in respect of any matter which was well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NIRC-Industrial Relations Act has an overriding effect on all provincial labour laws-Despite these unambiguous and non-complex legal barricades, the Labour Tribunal, instead of acknowledging its lack of jurisdiction as an appellate forum in the cases of trans-provincial establishments, dismissed the appeal rather than returning the memo of appeal for presentation before the competent forum-Any order or decision passed without jurisdiction would be coram non judice and thus a nullity-If a mandatory condition for exercise of jurisdiction by a court is not fulfilled, then the entire proceeding which follows becomes illegal and suffers from want of jurisdiction-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; consequently, the order passed by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the impugned judgment passed by the High Court, both were set aside with the directions to the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal to return the original memo/ file of Labour Appeal to the duly authorized representative of the petitioner for its immediate institution and decision by the Full Bench of the NIRC on merits, and in accordance with law, after providing ample opportunity of hearing to the parties.\n(d) Words and phrases-\n- Coram non judice -Definition.\nWords and Phrases (Permanent Edition, Volume 9A); Blacks Law Dictionary (7th Edition, Bryan A. Garner); K J Aiyers Judicial Dictionary: A Complete Law Lexicon (13th Edition, P.M. Bakshi) and Coram Non Judice. Legal Maxim. Law Times Journal (Amol Verma, May 29, 2019) ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Act, 2012=57(5)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1866-L of 2023,decided on 7th November, 2024. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2024.\n(Appeal against the judgment dated 21.02.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 9869 of 2013).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Farooq Zaman Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nTariq Masood, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4 to 6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED -PETITIONER\nVS\nPUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL THROUGH CHAIRMAN, LAHORE AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25854", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 580 = 2025 SLD 580 = 2025 SCMR 206", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)-\n-S. 8(5)-Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S. 4-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 212(3)-Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to check and resolve serious confusion which occurred due to some proof-reading lapses while publishing section 8 of Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 in law text books by different publishers.\n(b) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)-\n-S. 8(5)-Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S. 4-Proforma promotion-Wrongly published section-Maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit -Meaning-Appeal filed by appellant seeking proforma promotion under section 8(5) of Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 was dismissed by the Service Tribunal-Validity-Service Tribunal based its judgment on incorrect exposition of law which was result of adverting to a wrongly published gazette notification-Patent and obvious error or oversight on the part of Court in any order or decision, could be reviewed sanguine to legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit meaning that no man should suffer because of the fault of Court or delay in the procedure-There is de rigueur sense of duty in administration of justice that Court and Tribunal should become conscious and cognizant that as a consequence of their mistake, nobody should become victim of injustice and in the event of any injustice or harm suffered because of a mistake of Court, the same should be remedied by making necessary corrections forthwith-Supreme Court set aside judgment passed against appellant/civil servant and matter was remanded to Service Tribunal for decision afresh.\nHomoeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed v. Government of the Punjab through its Secretary Health, Department and others 2022 SCMR 1546 = 2022 PLC (C.S) 1390 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 =8(5)Punjab Service Tribunals Act, (IX of 1974)=4Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2022,decided on 4th November, 2024. Date of hearing: 4th November, 2024.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 24.06.2019 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 4548 of 2018).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant in person.\nSanaullah Zahid, Additional Advocate General, Punjab for Government of Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BASHIR AHMED ANJUM -APPELLANT\nVS\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH CHIEF MINISTER PUNJAB, LAHORE AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25855", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 581 = 2025 SLD 581 = 2025 SCMR 211", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWXo", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss.8, 42 & 54-Suit for possession, declaration and injunction-Adverse possession-Electricity bills-Proof of possession-Suit filed by predecessor-in-interest of appellants was decreed in his favour but Lower Appellate Court allowed appeal and suit was dismissed-Judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court were maintained by High Court-Validity-Possession of suit property was with predecessor-in-interest of respondents/defendants who had electricity consumption meter in their name but the same did not bear any fruit for them and had no effect on merits of the case-Such entries could never be termed as equivalent to ownership-Predecessor-in-interest of appellants was owner of suit house and after his death, the appellants stepped into his shoes-Status of predecessor-in-interest of respondents was that of a tenant and thereafter, respondents had stepped into his shoes-Sale mutations were of no help to predecessor-in-interest of respondents and their possession of suit house was not less than that of a trespasser-Supreme Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by Lower Appellate Court and High Court as Trial Court had rightly granted decree in favour of appellants-Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=8,42,54", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A No. 223-P of 2015, decided on 21st November, 2024. Date of hearing: 30th October, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 08.12.2014 passed by Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench in C.R. No. 38-B of 2008).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD AND MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sabit Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Shoaib Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMJAD ALI AND OTHERS -PETITIONERS\nVS\nANWAR SHAH AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25856", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 582 = 2025 SLD 582 = 2025 SCMR 215", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTWXk", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S.115-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)-Revision petition-Suo motu jurisdiction-Dismissal for non-prosecution-Principle-Petitioner was aggrieved of dismissal of his revision petition by High Court for non-prosecution-Validity-In cases where revisional Court assumed suo motu jurisdiction, only such cases ought not to be dismissed for non-prosecution-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nHussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1 and Farman Ali v. Muhammad Yousaf Ali and another PLD 1992 SC 330 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1999-L of 2019, decided on 27th November, 2024. Date of hearing: 27th November, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 12.06.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Review Application No. 12674 of 2019).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: YAHYA AFRIDI, C.J. AND MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Naveed Shabbir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore).\nQazi Misbahul Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (through video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHARIF AHMAD -PETITIONER\nVS\nRASHID AHMAD AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25857", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 583 = 2025 SLD 583 = 2025 SCMR 216", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Sindh Public Service Commission (Recruitment Management) Regulations, 2006-\n-Reglns. 0358, 0359 & 0413-Position of Assistant Conservator Forests (BPS-17)-Conditions incorporated in the original advertisement altered without any readvertisement-High Court declared the recruitment process null and void with the directions to readvertise the posts afresh and allow all interested candidates to participate in the competitive process-Validity-It is an admitted position that the Sindh Public Service Commission ( SPSC ) invited applications only for 2 posts of Assistant Conservator of Forest (BPS-17) on Urban quota, vide advertisement No.04/2020 dated 13.07.2020 and the last date of submitting applications was 20.08.2020-However, on 08.09.2020, an Addendum was issued which altered the complexion of the recruitment process for the 2 posts originally announced for urban candidates; it was modified and bifurcated, with 1 post allocated to Urban and 1 to Rural, without readvertising the 1 post dedicated to the Rural area-Not only was the original condition incorporated in the advertisement modified, but at the same time, no opportunity was afforded to the prospective candidates to apply for the 1 post dedicated to the Rural area which they could not apply for in terms of the original advertisement notifying only 2 posts for Urban areas-Another misstep was increasing the numbers of vacant posts from 2 to 7-Again, in the original advertisement, only 2 posts were announced, but departing from the original conditions, the number of posts were increased without readvertising-Furthermore, once the cutoff date for applications was fixed as 20.08.2020 for the general public, how was the deadline extended to 25.09.2020, through an Addendum dated 08.09.2020, without publishing any advertisement or re-advertisement in continuation of the original advertisement-Niceties of Regulations 0358, 0359 & 0413 of the Sindh Public Service Commission (Recruitment Management) Regulations, 2006 made it obligatory that upon the acceptance of additional vacancies or increase in the number of posts, the said posts should have been readvertised for inviting fresh applications, and the change of the closing date for the receipt of applications could not be altered unless notified, which again implies that the extension in the closing date should also be advertised for the general public who could not apply within the original timeline, but the SPSC failed to follow its own Regulations diligently-There were also allegations of a close nexus of certain candidates with high-ranking government officials, due to which preferential treatment and favoritism was allegedly proffered by the SPSC-Judgment of the High Court did not warrant any interference.\n(b) Civil service-\n-Appointment-Transparency in the appointment process-Significance-Wrong selection of blue-eyed candidates, based on nepotism, favoritism, or external pressures, leads to chaos and turmoil in the civil service structure, creating unrest and discontent among civil servants with serious repercussions-In all fairness, merit should be the sole criterion in the selection process, as it is an integral part of good governance-Lack of transparency or preferential treatment of undeserving candidates in the appointment process amounts to a brutal murder of merit and excellence-Transparent recruiting process should be marked by unambiguity, uprightness, trustworthiness, and evenhandedness-Honesty and integrity are the best means to magnetize talented individuals suited for the job, and an open-minded selection process should be based on objective criteria free from any extraneous considerations, while providing every candidate with a fair and equal opportunity to compete.\nChief Secretary Punjab v. Abdul Raoof Dasti 2006 SCMR 1876; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Bacha Alam Khan 2022 SCMR 718; Suo Motu action regarding eligibility of Chairman and Members of Sindh Public Service Commission etc. 2017 SCMR 637; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101 and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 1997(7) SCC 622 ref.\n(c) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 -\n-R. 12(2)-Sindh Public Service Commission (Recruitment Management) Regulations, 2006, Regln. 0612-Position of Assistant Conservator Forests (BPS-17)-Eligibility criteria-Upper age limit, relaxation in-Notification granting age relaxation of up to 15 years in the upper age limit-Legality-Joint reading of the Notification in question which approved the 15 years relaxation in the upper age limit and Regulation 0612 of the Sindh Public Service Commission (Recruitment Management) Regulations, 2006 (2006 Regulations), showed that the Government of Sindh could only relax the age of eligible candidates at its discretion through an Age Relaxation Order which could be issued collectively or specifically for any candidate -Powers to authorize age relaxation for up to 2 years was vested in the Secretary of the concerned department while the Chief Secretary was authorized to accord age relaxation for up to 5 years only which was now raised up to 15 years-Even in the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 (APT Rules), the maximum age relaxation limit was 10 years which was by itself highly unjustified and excessive, and rather than curtailing this period by setting a well thought-out benchmark and being mindful of the norms of reasonableness and proportionality, the Government of Sindh, without any justifiable rhyme or reason, extended the age relaxation up to 15 years-In the context of the recruitment in issue, the maximum age was 30 years; if one added 15 years more, then a person, if selected for the job, would join his duty under the age of 45 years and would retire upon attaining the age of 60 years-Meaning that after just 15 years tenure of service, he would be entitled to claim huge pensionary benefits, including other retiring benefits, which was also discriminatory to those employees who gave their blood and sweat, and toiled and served the government for more than 25 to 30 years and then became entitled to the pensionary and other retirement benefits-Supreme Court struck down the Notification and the Addendum by which relaxation of up to 15 years was granted in the upper age limit-Supreme Court directed that Sindh Public Service Commission should re-advertise the posts in question afresh and allow all interested candidates to participate in the competitive process-Petitions were dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 231 and 183-K of 2022 and Civil Petition No. 827 of 2023, heard on 7th March, 2024. Date of hearing: 7th March, 2024.\n(Against the Judgment dated 23.12.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Constitutional Petition No. D-849 of 2021).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Aaqil Awan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 231 of 2022).\nSyed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 827 of 2023).\nSabtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh for Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 183-K of 2022).\nSabtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh for the Government of Sindh and SPSC (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 231 of 2022 and 827 of 2023).\nDr. A. Jabbar Kazi, Additional Secretary, Forest.\nHassan Akbar, Advocate General, Sindh.\nFakhar Alam, Chief Secretary.\nAli Imran Baloch, Secretary Law.\nM. Yousaf, Senior Law Officer, SPSC.\nM. Ishaque, Deputy Controller, SPSC (via video link from Karachi).\nGhulam Sarwar Baloch, Advocate Supreme Court and Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 (via video link from Karachi) in C.P.L.A. No. 231 of 2022).\nSyed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 13.\nRespondent No. 7 (in person (via video link from Karachi in C.P.L.A. No. 183-K of 2022).", - "Petitioner Name:": "AYAZ AND OTHERS -PETITIONERS\nVS\nMUSTAFA SAEED AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25858", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 584 = 2025 SLD 584 = 2025 SCMR 231", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTY", - "Key Words:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)-\n-Ss.31 & 32-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 18 & 29-Suit for pre-emption-Plea of fraud-Limitation-Pleadings-Proof-Suit filed by appellant/pre-emptor was decreed in his favour by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court but High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation-Validity-Mere assertion in pleadings was not beneficial at all unless established through evidence in the light of pleadings-Fraud had to be pleaded from the beginning with full particulars of fraud and then should be established through evidence-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by High Court as the suit filed by appellant/pre-emptor was barred by limitation-Appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Limitation Act, 1908=18,29", - "Case #": "C.A No. 176-P of 2013,decided on 6th November, 2024. Date of hearing: 6th November, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 09.09.2013 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in C.R. No. 832-P of 2002 with C.M. No. 739-P of 2012).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD AND MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zia ur Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAJ WALI KHAN -PETITIONER\nVS\nHUKAM KHAN (DECD) THROUGH L.RS -RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25859", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 585 = 2025 SLD 585 = 2025 SCMR 235", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTU", - "Key Words:": "Civil service-\n-Departmental appeal, filing of-Limitation-Police official dismissed from service-Departmental appeal filed by police official was rejected by the competent authority for being barred by time, and the said rejection order of the departmental appeal was maintained by the Service Tribunal vide impugned judgment-Validity-When the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner (police official) on 25.11.2010 and the dismissal order was passed on 11.01.2011, the petitioner was behind the bars (in connection with a murder case) and obviously, he was not in a position to diligently pursue and avail the remedy of departmental appeal in accordance with law-Bona fides of the petitioner could not be doubted when he was incarcerated; it was not an easy or comfortable task, rather it was beyond his control, to respond to the show cause notice, which was never served upon him, or to file a departmental appeal against the dismissal order, which was also never served upon him, within the stipulated time-However, when he was released from jail, he immediately filed the departmental appeal which was rejected-Petitioner then approached the Service Tribunal for redressal of his grievance but the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation-In all conscience, neither the overall conduct of the petitioner in pursuing his legal remedies depicted any negligent or reckless conduct nor did it appear that he deliberately failed to file the departmental appeal within time, and nor was any proof presented on the record to demonstrate that the petitioner was served with the show cause notice and dismissal order while he was in jail for him to pursue and avail the remedy of departmental appeal-Departmental appeal could, no doubt, be transmitted by the petitioner through the Jail Superintendent/authority, provided that he received the dismissal order in jail, but in this case when no order was served, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty or solely responsible for the delay in filing of the departmental appeal-On the contrary, he was a victim of circumstances, therefore the (police) department cannot take the refuge of limitation-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; as a consequence, thereof, the impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal to decide the service appeal of the petitioner on merits after affording a fair opportunity of hearing to the parties.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1181-L of 2016, decided on 24th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2024.\n(Appeal against the judgment dated 15.02.2016 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 899 of 2016).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Tariq Javaid, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nBaleegh-uz-Zaman Ch., Additional Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TASSAWAR HUSSAIN -PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE REGIONAL POLICE OFFICER, MULTAN AND ANOTHER -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25860", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 586 = 2025 SLD 586 = 2025 SCMR 239", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Finance Act (XXXIV of 1964)-\n-S. 13 [as amended by the Punjab Finance Ordinance, 2001]-Punjab Finance Ordinance (VI of 2001), S. 4-Industries using private generators of more than 500 KW capacity to generate electricity for self use-Electricity duty, levy of-Legality-Section 13 of the Punjab Finance Act, 1964 [as amended by the Punjab Finance Ordinance, 2001] is not a general levy on electricity consumption-Rather it is on such consumption for a specific (i.e., limited) purpose or class-Taxing event in terms of S. 13(1) is on energy consumed, such consumption resulting from a supply of energy by either a licensee or someone who is not a licensee to a person who is the consumer of the energy, said consumers falling in the various categories or classes set out in the first column of the Fifth Schedule-This is the first stage, or the leviability of the duty-As for the second stage, the respondents did not fall within the taxing event-Respondents certainly produce energy by means of their generators of more than 500 KW capacity, but this energy is for self use, i.e., consumed by the respondents themselves-Thus, there is no supply of the energy-Second element of the taxing event did not apply to them and hence they are not within the levy-Respondents are not liable to pay the electricity duty on their own self use of the power/energy generated by their generators of more than 500 KW capacity-Appeals were dismissed accordingly.\n(b) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Taxing statute-Multiple interpretations-Preference-It is a cardinal principle of taxing statutes that if more than one reasonable interpretation is possible of the charging, or taxing, provision, then the one more favorable to the putative taxpayer is to be adopted, i.e., the one that either takes him out of the charge altogether or (if such be the case) results in a reduced or lessened burden.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Finance Act, 1964=13", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471 and 472 of 2011, decided on 8th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 29th February, 2024.\n(On appeal against judgment dated 13.01.2011 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.C.As. Nos. 299, 301, 304, 306, 291, 316, 350 of 2005, 96, 97, 98, 191 of 2006, 303, 305, 309, 311, 322, 341, 289, 290, 293, 300, 302, 343, 344, 345, 292, 298, 449, 310, 315, 320, 342 of 2005, W.Ps. Nos. 7940 of 2007, 15425, 17491, 17492, 17493, 18777, 18778, 19300, 19301, 19548, 19549, 19640, 20677 and 21378 of 2010).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUNIB AKHTAR, SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND SHAHID WAHEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haq Nawaz Chattha, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 261 of 2011).\nAhmed Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 453 of 2011).\nMir Afzal Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (in C.As. Nos. 455 and 458 of 2011).\nMuhammad Ramzan Ch., Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 438, 440, 441, 445, 446, 448, 452, 453 and 467 of 2011).\nImtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link, Lahore) in C.A. No. 460 of 2011).\nMian Abdul Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link, Lahore) in C.As. Nos. 259, 260, 263, 264, 265, 444, 445, 447, 452, 459 and 461 to 469 of 2011).\nIrfan ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court for NEPRA.\nEx-parte for other Respondents.\nBarrister M. Mumtaz Ali, Additional Advocate General, Punjab, Muhammad Iqbal Tahir, Energy Inspector, Energy Department and Zafar Abbas, Energy Inspector, Energy Department for Appellants (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY IRRIGATION AND POWER AND ANOTHER -APPELLANTS\nVS\nKUNJAH TEXTILE MILLS LTD AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25861", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 587 = 2025 SLD 587 = 2025 SCMR 249", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973-\n-Regln. 20-Employee of State Life Insurance Corporation-Change in date of birth sought close to retirement-Permissibility-It is obligatory for any employee to intimate his correct date of birth and to produce confirmatory documentary evidence at the time when the first entry is made in the service record which cannot be altered, except in the case of a clerical error, because the date of birth once recorded at the time of joining service is deemed to be final and thereafter no alteration in the date of birth is permissible-It is an admitted position that in the original National Identity Card (CNIC), the year of birth of the respondent (employee) was 1964, while in the CNIC prepared on 12.11.2002, again his date of birth was 22.09.1964-Even in his Passport his date of birth was 22.09.1964-However, the respondent was issued his new CNIC on 03.03.2023, wherein his date of birth was shown as 22.09.1966-Employer-Corporation had issued a circular, wherein it was categorically mentioned that certain employees are placing a representation for the correction in the date of birth after having completed a number of years of service, therefore, it was announced by means of the aforesaid circular that no change in the date of birth will be made if it is not requested within 2 years of the date of initial appointment-Respondent himself relied upon this circular-Record reflects that the respondent first applied for the correction of his date of birth in the official record vide application dated 17.03.2023 on the basis of his matriculation certificate issued in 1983, but no justification was shown in the application as to why he himself mentioned his date of birth as 22.09.1964 when he was appointed by the petitioners company-It is also incomprehensible that even when he applied for a CNIC in 2002, why at that time the correction was not applied, and even in his passport, issued in 2010, he maintained the same date of birth-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court was dismissed.\nManzar Zahoor v. Lyari Development Authority and another 2022 SCMR 1305 = 2022 PLC (C.S) 1128 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Change in date of birth sought by an employee of a Government Corporation-Constitutional petition filed by employee before the High Court-Maintainability-Extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is envisioned predominantly for affording an express remedy where the unlawfulness and impropriety of the action of an executive or other governmental authority could be substantiated without any inquiry-Expression adequate remedy signifies an effectual, accessible, advantageous and expeditious remedy-In the case in hand, the remedy of filing civil suit was an appropriate and alternate remedy as remedium juris which was more convenient, beneficial, and effective-Controverted questions of fact, adjudication on which is possible only after obtaining all types of evidence in power and possession of parties, can be determined only by the courts having plenary jurisdiction in the matter, and on such ground the constitutional petition filed by the employee was incompetent.\nGovernment of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary Civil Secretariat, Peshawar and others v. Shah Faisal Wahab and others 2023 SCMR 1642; Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. PLD 1983 SC 280 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2367 of 2024,decided on 16th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2024.\n(Appeal against the judgment dated 27.03.2024 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 3377-P of 2023).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Jawwad Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nNoor Muhammad, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (through video link at Peshawar).", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (P&GS) STATE LIFE, PRINCIPAL OFFICE KARACHI AND OTHERS -PETITIONERS\nVS\nMUHAMMAD NISAR, AREA MANAGER, STATE LIFE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN, PESHAWAR ZONE, PESHAWAR-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25862", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 588 = 2025 SLD 588 = 2025 SCMR 257", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 188-Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI, R. 1-Review petition before the Supreme Court-Principles upon which a judgment may be reviewed stated.\nA petition for review is neither an appeal nor a revision petition to a superior court but rather a request made to the same court to reconsider its decision on the limited grounds prescribed for review. It does not entail a rehearing or re-argument of the case adjudicated in the judgment under review.\nFor purposes of a review petition the settled principles governing the ground of error apparent on the face of the record are that the error, whether of fact or law, must be self-evident and readily discernible on the face of the record. It should not require meticulous examination or detailed analysis to uncover, nor should it need to be demonstrated through extensive or intricate arguments, or established through a lengthy process of reasoning on points where reasonable divergence of opinion may exist. Established instances falling within the scope of error apparent on the face of the record include judgments passed on an erroneous assumption of material facts or by overlooking a material question of fact or law or an important aspect of the matter, which, if noticed and considered earlier, would have direct bearing on the conclusions reached by the Court.\nAbdul Ghaffar v. Asghar Ali PLD 1998 SC 363; Pakistan v. Fecto Belarus Tractors Ltd PLD 2002 SC 208; Muhammad Boota v. Member, BOR 2010 SCMR 1049; Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421 and Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 ref.\n(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) -\n-Ss. 107 & 133(1)-Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) (since repealed), Ss. 163 & 136(1)-Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 1982, Arts. 7, 12, paras. 3(a), 3(b), 22, 23 & 24-Concept of Royalties -Scope-Business profits-Non-resident foreign company-Exemption from income tax-Income/royalties earned by the non-resident company in Pakistan for the lease of certain software-Whether such income was business profits and thus exempt from payment of income tax in Pakistan under Article 7 of the Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (the Convention), or the same constituted royalties as defined in paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Convention and was liable to tax.\nPetitioner (foreign incorporated company), in its tax returns, declared the receipts under the software lease agreements (Agreements) as business profits and sought exemption from income tax in Pakistan under Article 7 of the Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 1982 ( the Convention ). However, the tax department treated these receipts as royalties under Article 12 of the Convention and subjected them to income tax at the rate of fifteen percent. The Income Tax Officer, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal concluded that the payments received by the petitioner fell within the definition of royalties under paragraph 3(a) and (b) of Article 12 of the Convention and were therefore liable to income tax in Pakistan. The petitioner challenged the assessment orders, appellate orders and Tribunal judgments before the High Court through references. The High Court ruled in favour of the petitioner, holding that the amounts received by the petitioner for leasing FLIC tapes (software programs) under the Agreements did not qualify as royalties under the Convention and were not subject to income tax in Pakistan. The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court and the majority judgment under review allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Courts judgments and restoring the Tribunals judgments as well as the original and appellate orders of the Income Tax Officers.\nBy the majority judgment under review the Court decided the matter against the petitioner mainly for the following reasons: (i) it would not really matter to the petitioner if, under Article 12 of the Convention, it had to pay income tax in Pakistan, because the petitioner could, with the tax authority of the Netherlands, claim an adjustment of the tax amount paid in Pakistan; (ii) the High Court did not note that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under Article 24 of the Convention to present its case to the competent authority of its own country, the Netherlands, which, if agreed with the respondents stance, could take up the matter with the competent authority of Pakistan; (iii) the petitioner did not explain and prove the nature of the receipts for which it claims tax exemption before the Income Tax Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal- the fact-finding forums-and it was unwarranted for the High Court to have delved into the nature of the receipts; (iv) the High Court incorrectly assumed the applicability of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Convention (OECD MC), as Article 12 of the Convention adheres to Article 12 of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (UN MC) and not to Article 12 of the OECD MC; and (v) the full definition of royalties in paragraph 3(a) of Article 12 of the Convention included payments for information concerning industrial, commercial, or scientific experience .\nAs to grounds (i) and (ii), in the majority judgment under review there is an error which is apparent on the face of the record. The possibility of adjustment of tax paid by the petitioner in Pakistan by the competent authority in the Netherlands or the availability of an alternate remedy before the competent authority in the Netherlands, was no ground for the High Court to decline to answer the questions of law referred to it in the reference application filed by the petitioner. In this regard, the Supreme Court mistakenly regarded the two different jurisdictions of the High Court to be interchangeable: one under Article 199 of the Constitution and the other exercised in the present case, the reference jurisdiction under the Income Tax Ordinance. Under Article 199, the High Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it finds that the petitioner has an alternate adequate remedy. However, it escaped notice of the Supreme Court that a reference application is akin to an appeal and the reference jurisdiction is similar to appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, neither a reference application can be dismissed, nor can the exercise of reference jurisdiction be declined, on the ground of availability of some alternate remedy.\nMessrs Squibb Pakistan v. CIT 2017 SCMR 1006 and CIR v. Rafeh Limited PLD 2020 SC 518 ref.\nSo far as ground (iii) is concerned, the petitioner contended that this is the result of an erroneous assumption of a material fact. There was substance in this contention, as the error in this regard is also apparent on the face of the record. The nature of the receipts was explained by the petitioner in its tax returns, and there was no dispute regarding this fact before the Income Tax Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Tribunal. It was, and remains, an admitted fact that the receipts were rentals received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs. The nature of the receipts was an admitted fact, and the questions referred were questions of law. Therefore, the observations made by the Supreme Court in the majority judgment, that it was unwarranted for the High Court to have delved into the nature of the receipts, appear to have overlooked the said orders of the Tribunal. The High Court only dealt with and answered the questions of law and did not determine the nature of the receipts, which was an admitted fact.\nAs for ground (iv), it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that, in the majority judgment, it escaped the notice of the Supreme Court that there is no significant difference in the definition of royalties provided in Article 12 of the UN MC and Article 12 of the OECD MC; therefore, the reference to Article 12 of the OECD MC, instead of Article 12 of the UN MC, by the High Court was inconsequential. This contention is supported by a plain reading of the two definitions. The only material difference between the definitions of royalties in the UN MC and the OECD MC is that the former includes payments received as consideration for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment in its definition. However, since neither the Income Tax Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals), the Tribunal, nor the respondent before the Supreme Court relied upon this clause of the definition of royalties as FLIC tapes containing computer software programs are admittedly not equipment , this difference was immaterial to the decision of the case.\nAs to ground (v), it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that, in the majority judgment, the Supreme Court totally overlooked the question of law that was referred by the Tribunal to the High Court and decided in favour of the petitioner; that, instead, the majority judgment only cursorily observed that the full definition of royalties in paragraph 3(a) of Article 12 of the Convention included payments for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience , but did not clearly and decisively hold that the receipts received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs involved in the present case are covered by that clause of the definition of royalties . The majority judgment cursorily observed that the full definition of royalties in paragraph 3(a) of Article 12 of the Convention includes payments for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience . However, it did not clearly or decisively hold that the receipts received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs, as involved in the present case, are covered by that clause of the definition of royalties .\nIf a payment is in respect of rights to use the copyrights in a program, (e.g. by reproducing it and distributing it) then such a payment would be considered as a royalty. Other payments, however, only give a user the right to operate the program, where a consumer pays for a copy of computer program to use, this is not royalty payment. The Tribunal was not correct, and the High Court was correct, in determining that the receipts received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs were not income from royalties but were business profits , as claimed by the petitioner in its tax returns.\nLynne Oats and Emer Mulligaan-Principles of International Taxation, 7th edition. Bloomsbury Professional Tax. P.141 ref.\nThe majority judgment under review suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record. It proceeded on an erroneous assumption of a material fact and overlooked the material question of law and important aspects of the matter involved. The majority judgment under review was recalled and the appeals of the respondent were dismissed, upholding the judgments of the High Court. Review petitions were accepted accordingly with the observations that Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) provide a crucial framework for fostering international economic cooperation, facilitating cross-border investments, and avoiding the dual taxation of income that can impede global commerce; that these treaties serve as bridges between nations, designed to encourage economic collaboration while preventing conflicts over taxing rights; that they achieve this by allocating taxing authority between the source and resident states, promoting predictability for businesses and individuals engaged in international activities; that Courts in developing countries must interpret these treaties as dynamic instruments that balance the need for economic growth with the protection of their tax base, and that treaties should not be interpreted rigidly but should reflect their object and purpose, ensuring they serve the broader goal of equitable economic development globally.\nKlaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions -5th edition. Wolters Kluwer ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=188Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=107,133(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petitions Nos. 988 to 1001 of 2023 in Civil Appeals Nos. 94 to 106 of 2008 and 550 of 2011, decided on 28th November, 2024. Date of hearing: 28th November, 2024.\n(For review of the judgment of this Court dated 08.09.2023).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, ATHAR MINALLAH AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (through video link).\nMrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court, Fayyaz Hussain Abro, Addl.Comm.FBR (through video link from Karachi) and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG Law, FBR for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MESSRS INTER QUEST INFORMATICS SERVICES -PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25863", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 589 = 2025 SLD 589 = 2025 SCMR 269", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTk", - "Key Words:": "Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) [since repealed]-\n-Ss. 25-A & 65-B-Grievance petition, filing of-Limitation-Grievance petition filed after a lapse of 22 years-Under Section 25A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 ( IRO 1969 ), there is a specific timeframe for lodging the grievance in writing which cannot be stretched over an unlimited period of time-Law does not envisage that after expiry of the limitation period, if the employer gives a response to any time-barred grievance notice, it will amount to an extension in the period of limitation provided to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for redress of individual grievances-No cause of action subsists merely for the reason that one letter was replied after the lapse of the limitation period by the employers management, which could not extend the starting point of limitation provided under the law for a workman to lodge his grievance before instituting the grievance petition in the Labour Court-No proper justification had been shown in the Order of the Labour Court and/or the impugned judgment of the High Court as to how, against the dismissal order on 25.05.1976, a grievance notice dated 26.04.1997 was found to be within time-Even for condonation of delay, nothing was mentioned by the respondent/workman before the Labour Court or the High Court-Act of sending a grievance notice and filing a grievance petition in the Labour Court or Commission has not been left open-ended but it is linked with the time constraint for initiating legal action for the redress of an individual grievance-Under the mandate of law an employee is supposed to deliver the grievance notice to his employer within the specified time, then wait only for the statutory period provided to the employer for the response, and after the lapse of this period, whether the notice was responded to or not by the employer, approach the Court immediately rather than spoiling or obliterating the period of limitation-It is a fundamental duty of the Court to examine the question of limitation vis-a-vis the statutory provisions envisioned under special or general law, requiring compliance of an act within a specific timeline-In the present case both the Labour Court and the High Court failed to advert to the crucial question of limitation provided for transmitting the grievance notice as provided in the repealed IRO 1969, and without appreciating the law and evidence led in the case, rendered the impugned judgments, which were not sustainable and were liable to be set aside, while the judgment of the Punjab Appellate Tribunal was based on the correct exposition of law-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; as a consequence thereof, the judgment of the High Court and the Labour Court were set-aside and the judgment passed by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal was restored.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Ordinance, (XXIII of 1969)=25-A,65-B", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2305-L of 2016, decided on 24th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2024.\n(Appeal against the judgment dated 27.04.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in Writ Petition No. 8153 of 2002).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Farooq Zaman Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nM. Yafis Naveed Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for LRs of Respondent No. 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED AND OTHERS -PETITIONERS\nVS\nTHE PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LAHORE AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25864", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 590 = 2025 SLD 590 = 2025 SCMR 279", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVIIof 2023)-\n-S. 6-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188-Review petition-Adjournment sought by counsel-Grounds-Family engagement-In the application for adjournment the nature of the pressing family engagement was not disclosed-Review petitioners were represented by Advocates of the Supreme Court (ASCs)-Therefore, if the Senior Advocate had some pressing family engagement, then any of the other ASCs could have attended and proceeded with the present case-Moreover, section 6 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 now enables engagement of other counsel in a review petition, which was not permissible earlier-Supreme Court observed that in the circumstances, it was not persuaded to adjourn the case, however, in the interest of justice and only by way of indulgence it was doing so; that no further request for adjournment would be entertained, and it was expected that the case would proceed on the next date-Case was adjourned accordingly.\n(b) Practice and procedure-\n-Adjournment-Scope-Merely filing an adjournment application does not mean that the case will be adjourned.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=188", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No. 14 of 2024 in Civil Petition No. 42 of 2024, decided on 11th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 11th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J., MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for Petitioners.\nSyed Ahmed Hassan Shah, Advocate Supreme Court along with/ for Respondent No. 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN TEHREEK-I-INSAF, THROUGH AUTHORIZED PERSON AND OTHERS -PETITIONERS\nVS\nELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN, THROUGH SPECIAL SECRETARY, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25865", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 591 = 2025 SLD 591 = 2025 SCMR 281", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3-Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post-Reappraisal of evidence-Doubts as to the correct time of registration of FIR-As per the evidence a lot of time must have been consumed in arranging the weightlifter (crane) and removing the debris of the building and bringing out the dead bodies of 06 police persons from underneath the said debris and thereafter in preparation of the injury statements and inquest reports of the said dead bodies-It was not possible to complete all these proceedings within a period of 30 minutes as claimed by the prosecution-It was, thus evident that the FIR was not lodged at the given time mentioned in the relevant column of the FIR rather the same was registered with a considerable delay but the wrong time of registration of the FIR had been mentioned in its relevant columns to show the promptness of the FIR-Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Witnesses, evidence of-No enmity between witnesses and the accused -Absence of enmity of the witnesses with the accused does not mean that they should be relied upon blindly without determining as to whether their evidence was trustworthy or the same was inherently unreliable.\nHaroon v. State 1995 SCMR 1627 and Muhammad Iqbal v. State 1984 SCMR 930 ref.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3-Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post-Reappraisal of evidence-Chance witnesses-Doubtful testimony-Unnatural conduct of chance witnesses-Name of any witness who had seen the occurrence was not mentioned in the contents of the FIR-Likewise, it was not stated therein that how many accused participated in the occurrence and what were their descriptions-However, according to the prosecution case on the same day two witnesses appeared before the Police and claimed that they had witnessed the occurrence-Names of both the said eye-witnesses were not mentioned in the FIR-Conduct of the said eye-witnesses was highly unnatural because according to their statements they had witnessed the occurrence of a shocking, brutal and heinous offence of the murders of 08 innocent police employees through firing and bomb blast but they stated that instead of reporting the matter to the police they went to another city to purchase a buffalo-Both the alleged eyewitnesses were not residents of the area where the occurrence took place, as such, they were chance witnesses-Reason given by the chance witnesses for their presence at the spot at the time of occurrence had not been established plausibly, and the story of their presence at the spot was subsequently concocted to strengthen the weak prosecution case of an unseen occurrence-It was not safe to rely upon evidence of such alleged chance witnesses-Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.\nMst. Sughra Begum v. Qaiser Pervez 2015 SCMR 1142; Mst. Mir Zalai v. Ghazi Khan and others 2020 SCMR 319; G.M. Niaz v. The State 2018 SCMR 506; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 137; Muhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta and others 2017 SCMR 142 and Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192 ref.\n(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22-Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post-Re-appraisal of evidence-Joint test identification parade-Legality-Identification parade of two accused persons was jointly held-Further no specific roles during the occurrence were attributed to any of the accused persons by the prosecution eye-witnesses at the time of their identification parades-Therefore, the identification of the petitioners (accused persons) during their identification parades carried no value in the eyes of law-Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.\nKamal Din v. The State 2018 SCMR 577; In the matter of Kanwar Ali, Special Judicial Magistrate PLD 2019 SC 488 and Azhar Mehmood v. The State 2017 SCMR 135 ref.\n(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342-Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post-Reappraisal of evidence-Recovery of weapons of offence from accused persons and positive forensics report-Inconsequential-Said recoveries were not put to the petitioners (accused persons) in their statements recorded under Section 342 Cr.P.C., therefore, the said pieces of prosecution evidence could not be considered against the petitioners and the same has rightly been discarded by the High Court-Even otherwise the direct evidence of alleged eye-witnesses in this case had been discarded, therefore, the convictions and sentences of the petitioners under the capital charge could not sustain merely on the basis of alleged recoveries-Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.\nFida Hussain Shah v. The State 2024 SCMR 1622; Haji Nawaz v. The State 2020 SCMR 687; Mst. Anwar Begum v. Akhtar Hussain 2017 SCMR 1710 and Muhammad Fazal v. The State 2009 SCMR 436 ref.\n(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3-Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post-Reappraisal of evidence-Motive not proved-Plea of prosecution that petitioners (accused persons) were involved in other criminal cases of terrorism and they had committed the occurrence of this case in order to create terror in the society-Validity-No previous record of the petitioners regarding their involvement in any other criminal case prior to the registration of present case had been brought on the record-Moreover, the enmity of the petitioners with the local police was established during the cross-examination of a Police Inspector-A habeas petition was filed against the local police by the father of one of the petitioners (accused) before the High Court and in the said case the detenue was released-Furthermore, no record was produced by the prosecution to establish that the petitioners had any link with any terrorist/proscribed organization-It was, therefore, evident that the petitioners had no reason to commit the occurrence of this case rather the local police had a motive to falsely involve the petitioners in the instant case of an unseen occurrence-Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),148,149,412,440Anti Narcotics Force Act, 1997=7(a)Explosive Substances Act, 1908=3", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 260-L and 275-L of 2015, decided on 21st October, 2024. Date of hearing: 21st October, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 28.01.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1202 of 2010, 1245 of 2010 and Capital Sentence Reference No. 33-T of 2010).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, MUSARRAT HILALI AND MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Munir Ahmed Bhatti, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nMirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL HAYEE AND ABDULLAH ALIAS GHAZALI AND ANOTHER -PETITIONERS\nVS\nTHE STATE AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25866", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 592 = 2025 SLD 592 = 2025 SCMR 298", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTVXk", - "Key Words:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 & 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 166-Execution of decree-Objections-Limitation-Petitioners filed objections against sale of mortgaged property which objections were dismissed-Validity-Property was auctioned on 19-07-2016 while petitioners filed objections in Executing Court on 14-05-2019-Compliant with Article 166 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, only thirty days time was provided for making any application for setting aside a sale in execution of decree, including any such application filed by judgment debtor-Petitioners filed their objection petition to sale after more than three years, and thus, the same was time barred-Supreme Court declined to interfere in order passed by High Court as there was no illegality in it-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=89,90Limitation Act, 1908=166", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3811 of 2019, decided on 15th January, 2024. Date of hearing: 15th January, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 12.09.2019 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in E.F.A. No. 50073 of 2019).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J., MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND MUSARRAT HILALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rai Azhar Iqbal Kharal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nZulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.\nAbdul Hameed Chohan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHAUDHARY GHULAM HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER -PETITIONERS\nVS\nMESSRS SAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED, LAHORE AND ANOTHER -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25867", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 593 = 2025 SLD 593 = 2025 SCMR 301", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTc", - "Key Words:": "Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 184(3)-Constitution petition challenging the proposed Twenty-Sixth (26th) Constitutional Amendment-Constitution petition and appeal dismissed as withdrawn-Counsel for the appellants/petitioners stated that he had been engaged on their behalf and had been instructed to withdrawl Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 89 of 2024 and the unnumbered Constitution Petition, filed on 16 September 2024 in respect of which certain objections were noted by the Registrars office-Appellant No. 1 and the petitioner No. 1, who was earlier representing himself and was also the counsel of the other appellants/petitioners confirmed the statement made by the counsel-In such circumstances, Supreme Court declared that the said Appeal and the unnumbered Constitution Petition were dismissed as withdrawn.\nHamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Abid Shahid Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court and Appellant No. 1/ Petitioner No. 1 with appellants/petitioners, namely, Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Tahir Faraz Abbasi and Shafqat Mehmood Chauhan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=184(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 89 of 2024 and Constitution Petition No. Nil of 2024, decided on 17th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 17th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J., NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN AND SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABID SHAHID ZUBERI AND OTHERS -APPELLANTS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25868", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 594 = 2025 SLD 594 = 2025 SCMR 395", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-Preamble-Process of civil litigation-Scope-Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is a consolidatory law which is primarily procedural in nature and can be defined as a branch of law administering and directing process of civil litigation-Rules framed under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are for advancing dispensation of justice, rather than supplementing or complementing it to defeat the ends of justice.\nNarsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey (1883) ILR 5A11 163 rel.\n(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. IX, Rr. 8 & 9-Restoration of suit, application for-Past conduct of party-Petitioner/defendant was aggrieved of restoration of suit filed by respondent/plaintiff which was dismissed for non-prosecution-Plea raised by petitioner / defendant was that Trial Court was to see the past conduct of respondent/plaintiff-Validity-No obligation was imposed under Order IX, Rules 8 and 9 C.P.C. on the Court to first consider past record before restoring suit to its original position-Court was only required to determine whether sufficient cause for non-appearance was made out for the day when suit was dismissed for non-prosecution-Past conduct could be ruminated to assess seriousness or non-seriousness of a party in litigation-Due to any past reckless conduct, Court could impose costs for any default with a warning-Past conduct alone could not be considered a ground for dismissing restoration application, if sufficient cause for non-appearance on the date of hearing was otherwise made out-Supreme Court declined to interfere in orders passed by High Court affirming restoration of lawsuit which was dismissed for non-prosecution, as there was no illegality or perversity-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nRai Muhammad through legal heirs v. Ejaz Ahmed PLD 2021 SC 761; Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munawar Khan 2023 SCP 368; SKB-KNK Joint Venture Contractor v. Water and Power Development Authority 2022 SCMR 1615 and Zulifqar Ali v. Lal Din 1974 SCMR 162 ref.\n(c) Administration of justice-\n-Procedural technicalities-Scope-Function of Court is to administer substantial justice between parties after providing ample opportunity for hearing which is a significant component and virtue of a fair trial-Procedure serves as machinery with the object of facilitating and not obstructing administration of justice-Technical objections have to be construed liberally and should not be allowed to defeat substantial justice.\nImtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali PLD 1963 SC 382 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=8,9", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3597-L of 2023 and Civil Petition No. 8-L of 2024, decided on 31st October, 2024. Date of hearing: 31st October, 2024.\n(On appeal from the Orders dated 13.10.2023 and 30.11.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 67274 of 2023 and R.A. No. 78636 of 2023).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Asad Javed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Aurangzeb Khan Daha, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FARYAL ARIF LATIF -PETITIONER\nVS\nARIF LATIF -RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25869", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 595 = 2025 SLD 595 = 2025 SCMR 318", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497(2)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 109-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Murderous assault-Bail, grant of-Further inquiry-Perusal of the contents of the FIR showed that paternal uncle of the complainant and the other family members were also present at the spot at the time of occurrence, therefore, it was not understandable as to why the FIR was lodged belatedly with a delay of 13 hours and 50 minutes-No eye-witness was mentioned in the FIR and contents of the FIR showed that the occurrence was unwitnessed-On the day after the occurrence prosecution introduced two alleged eye-witnesses, whose names were not mentioned in the FIR-It did not appeal to a prudent mind that when the said alleged eye-witnesses were statedly present at the relevant time inside the house where the occurrence took place then as to why their brother, who was complainant of the FIR, had not mentioned their names in the contents of the FIR-Furthermore petitioner (accused) along with his two brothers was nominated in the FIR, therefore, evidentiary value of the prosecution evidence qua identification of the petitioner during identification parade after his nomination in this case required further probe and inquiry entitling the petitioner to the grant of post-arrest bail-Two co-accused of the petitioner who were also identified by the alleged eye-witnesses during their identification parade had already been acquitted by the Trial Court-Same prosecution evidence had already been disbelieved against co-accused persons by the Trial Court and their case was not distinguishable from the case of the petitioner except alleged abscondence of the petitioner-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed and the petitioner was granted post-arrest bail.\nNaveed Sattar v. The State 2024 SCMR 205 ref.\n(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497 -Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Abscondence of accused-Mere abscondence of an accused by itself is no ground to refuse bail to him if otherwise he is entitled to the said relief on merits.\nHidayat Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 172; Ehsanullah v. The State 2012 SCMR 1137 and State v. Mukhtar Ahmad Awan 1991 SCMR 322 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302,324,109Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 776 of 2024, decided on 24th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 24th October, 2024.\n(On appeal against order dated 14.06.2024 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Cr. Misc (BA) No. 1270-P of 2024).\nSyed Abdul Fayaz, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nAltaf Khan, Additional Advocate-General. K.P.K; Muhammad Usman, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Aar Gul, SI for the State.\nHussain Ali, Advocate Supreme Court along with Complainant in person for the Complainant (via video link from Peshawar).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, MUSARRAT HILALI AND MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAZHAR ALI -PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25870", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 596 = 2025 SLD 596 = 2025 SCMR 322", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 4, 9, 25, 25A & 184(3)-Constitution petition before the Supreme Court-Maintainability-Public Sector Universities-Posts of Vice-Chancellors, Pro Vice-Chancellors, Rectors, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Registrars, Heads of Faculties and Departments, Controller of Examination, Director Finance and other tenured positions either lying vacant and/or held on acting charge basis-Decision making bodies of the public sector universities, i.e., their board of trustees, board of governors, syndicates, senates and academic councils not meeting periodically and/or compliance not being made in holding the minimum prescribed number of meetings as stipulated in their respective laws-Matters raised in the present petition are within the ambit of clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution-Issues which have been raised are of public importance affecting the interest of all those attending these universities-Peoples taxes help run public sector universities, therefore, they expect that they be run in accordance with applicable laws and efficiently, and their taxes do not go to waste-Other pre-condition in clause (3) of Article 184 is that the petition must seek the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights-This requirement is also met-Article 25 of the Constitution mandates that citizens are entitled to equal treatment and to equal protection of the law, but if compliance is not made with the laws governing public sector universities, the citizens Fundamental Rights are violated-Article 25A of the Constitution requires that children upto the age of 16 years must be educated, which demonstrates the importance the Constitution attaches to education-Position of a Vice-Chancellor of a university must not be left vacant, and if appointment to this position is delayed it adversely affects the functioning of the university, which attracts Article 9 of the Constitution-right to life-as life has been construed to include all of lifes attendant benefits, including that of education provided by the law-Article 4 of the Constitution stipulates that citizens have an inalienable right to be treated in accordance with the law, but if public sector universities, funded by the taxpayers do not operate in accordance with laws governing them, then citizens are not being treated in accordance with the law-Constitution petition was held to be maintainable.\nAamir Raza Ashfaq v. Minhaj Ahmed Khan 2012 SCMR 6 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 184(3)-Constitution petition before the Supreme Court-Public Sector Universities-Posts of Vice-Chancellors, Pro Vice-Chancellors, Rectors, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Registrars, Heads of Faculties and Departments, Controller of Examination, Director Finance and other tenured positions either lying vacant and/or held on acting charge basis-Decision making bodies of the public sector universities, i.e., their board of trustees, board of governors, syndicates, senates and academic councils not meeting periodically and/or compliance not being made in holding the minimum prescribed number of meetings as stipulated in their respective laws-Legality-From the information provided by the Higher Education Commission (HEC) and the Federal Ministry of Education very serious transgressions committed by some Federal public sector universities were brought to the Supreme Courts attention-Supreme Court issued the following directions to all Federal and Provincial public sector universities (the universities), the Federal Ministries of Education, Science and Technology and Defence, the Provincial Ministries of Education, the HEC and the Provincial Higher Education Departments (HEDs):\n(i) Governing bodies of the universities, respectively referred to in their respective laws whether as board of governors, board of trustees, syndicates, senates and academic councils, must meet (at least) the minimum prescribed times;\n(ii) Appointments be made to all tenured positions in the universities as prescribed in their respective laws, including those of Vice-Chancellors, Registrars, Directors-General, Deans, Treasurers/Directors of Finance, Controllers of Examinations, Chairpersons and others specified therein, and this must be done transparently and on merit, by stipulating their respective criteria and inviting appointments through their respective websites and advertisements;\n(iii) Vacant tenured positions must not be held for more than six months on acting-charge-basis and such temporary charge be given to that person who is specified in the applicable law and, in the absence thereof to a person of equivalent seniority, failing which to the person next in seniority;\n(iv) The Federal Ministries of Education, Science and Technology and Defence, the Provincial Ministries of Education, the HEC and the HEDs of the Provinces must collate requisite information about the universities under their respective jurisdictions, and periodically check if they are compliant with their respective laws. Such information should be made publicly accessible on their websites;\n(v) The universities should not exceed the academic to non-academic staff ratio prescribed by HEC, and those universities which have exceeded the same must not hire further non-academic staff, unless absolutely necessary after specific permission is granted by their respective governing bodies;\n(vi) Student unions be revived in universities but it must be ensured that they are inclusive and not divisive, ethnic or sectarian;\n(vii) HEC and HEDs should annually rank the universities in their respective jurisdictions pursuant to internationally recognized criteria;\n(viii) The Shariah Academy, the Dawah Academy and the Iqbal International Institute for Research and Dialogue of the International Islamic University be made fully functional in compliance with their respective statutes;\n(ix) A safe and harassment free environment, free of psychotropic drugs and weapons must be ensured in the universities. Transgressors and those who destroy universities properties must be dealt with strictly;\n(x) Hostels meant for the students enrolled in the universities must not be allowed to be occupied by those who have completed their studies and by outsiders;\n(xi) Community service, sustainable living, good environmental practices, inter-university competitions, sports, games and debates should be encouraged;\n(xii) Research culture and research based publications should be promoted;\n(xiii) The lands of the universities must be demarcated, if not already demarcated, and if their land or any part thereof is encroached upon, encroachments therefrom be removed. Universities must also secure their lands. Iron grills and steel mesh boundaries can be installed quickly and cheaply and do not require much maintenance and also do not block vision, however, if a solid brick or block wall is required it would be best not to plaster and paint it to avoid periodical and perpetual drain of resources. The universities ownership of land must be recorded in the record of rights.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,9,25,25A,184(3)", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. 7 of 2024,decided on 24th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 20th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: QAZI FAEZ ISA, C.J., NAEEM AKHTAR AFGHAN AND SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Umer Ijaz Gilani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMalik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan Supreme Court, Mohyuddin Wani, Secretary M/o F.E&P.T., Abdul Sattar Khokhar, Senior Joint Secretary, M/o F.E&P.T. and Dr. Agha Haider, Deputy Director, (Legal), M/o F.E&P.T. for Respondents No. 1 to 2.\nM. Nazir Jawwad, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Zia-ul-Qayyum, Executive Director, H.E.C for Respondent No. 3.\nKhalid Ishaq, Advocate-General, Punjab, Barrister M. Mumtaz Ali, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab and Abdul Rehman Ch., Senior Law Officer, HED, Lahore for Respondent No. 4.\nShah Faisal Ilyas, Additional Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Ghulam Saeed, Special Secretary, HED, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Qazi Ayyaz, Senior Officer (Litigation) for Respondent No. 5.\nHassan Akbar, Advocate-General, Sindh, Saifullah, Additional Advocate-General Sindh, Moeen-ud-Din Siddiqui, Secretary, HEC and Ms. Naheed Haider, Deputy Director, Legal HEC, Sindh for Respondent No. 6.\nMuhammad Ayaz Swati, Additional Advocate-General, Balochistan and Hafiz Muhammad Tahir, Secretary Education, Balochistan for Respondent No. 7.\nOn Court's Notice:\nDr. Saeed-ud-Din, Rector for Sindh Institute for Technology MS.\nProfessor Dr. Akhtar Ali Malik, Vice-Chancellor and Nazeer Chishti, Director (Legal) for National Fertilizer Corporation Institute.\nAttaullah Hakim Kundi, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Zabita K. Shinwari, Vice Chancellor for Federal Urdu University.\nRizwan Shabbir Kayani, Advocate Supreme Court for National College of Arts.\nDr. Muhammad Mukhtar, Vice-Chancellor for National Skills University.\nMuhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Niaz Ahmed Akhtar, Vice-Chancellor for Quaid-e-Azam University.\nRehan-ud-Din Golra, Advocate Supreme Court, Anis M. Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record, Professor Dr. Samina Malik, Rector and Atiq-ur-Rehman Chughtai, Director, HR for International Islamic University.\nKhalid Mehmood Iraqi, Vice-Chancellor for University of Karachi.\nKamal-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court and Mir Qasim Jat, Advocate-on-Record for Shaheed Muhtarma Benazir Bhutto University.\nDr. Mujeeb Memon, Vice-Chancellor for Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto University of Law.\nAbdus Salam Memon, Advocate Supreme Court and Professor Ikram-ud-Din Ujjan, Vice-Chancellor for Liaqat University of Medical and Health Sciences.\nProfessor Dr. Gulshan Ali, Vice-Chancellor for People University of Medical and Health Sciences.\nProfessor Dr. Arabella Bhutto, Vice-Chancellor for University of Sufism.\nProfessor Dr. Yousaf Khushk, Vice-Chancellor for Shah Abdul Latif University.\nApplicant in person (in CMA. No. 10026 of 2024).", - "Petitioner Name:": "ALL PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES BPS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (APUBTA) THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT -PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY FEDERAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25871", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 597 = 2025 SLD 597 = 2025 SCMR 341", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Directory and mandatory provisions-Ascertainment of-Legislative intent can be drawn by consideration of the entire statute, its nature, its object and the consequences whether it will cause serious inconvenience or injustice to persons as a result of construing the provision in one way or the other-If by holding a provision mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created for innocent persons of the general public without furthering the object of the enactment, the same should be construed as directory.\nN.S Bindras Interpretation of Statutes. 12th Edition. P.437 and 438 ref.\n(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-S. 45B(2), first and second provisos-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188-Review petition-Appeal to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals)-Timeframe provided under first and second provisos to section 45B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ( Act )-Whether the first and second provisos were mandatory or directory provisions?-By way of judgment under review the Supreme Court held that the provisos were mandatory provisions and any order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 45B(2) beyond the maximum period of 180 days was an invalid decision. -[Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. (Majority view): First and second provisos to section 45(B)(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ( Act ) are directory provisions and lapse of the statutory timeframe will not affect the proceedings before the Commissioner (Appeals) who shall conclude the appeal in accordance with law by deciding the appeal on its merits-First and second provisos to section 45B(2) of the Act are directory provisions and do not deprive the taxpayer of his right to appeal or deny the tax department the right to adjudicate the matter on merits by virtue of lapse of the maximum statutory timeframe-Inspite of the first and second provisos to section 45(B)(2) being directory provisions, the Commissioner (Appeals) must make reasonable effort to decide the appeal of the taxpayer within the maximum statutory timeframe, subject to the third proviso to section 45B(2)-In case the taxpayer unduly delays the prosecution of the appeal without sufficient cause, the Commissioner (Appeals) is well within its power to proceed ex-parte against the taxpayer-Commissioner (Appeals) must also give reasons if the appeal is not decided within the statutory timeframe under the proviso to section 45(B)(2), so that the legislative aspiration to achieve effective and efficient tax governance is also realized even though such a timeframe is only directory in nature]-[Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. (Minority view): Primary ground for filing the present review was the argument that the adjournments taken by respondent/taxpayer during the proceedings before the Commissioner (Appeals) should have been considered in terms of Section 45-B(2), third proviso of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (Act)-Record showed that the dates of adjournment were not considered while calculating the time period under Section 45B of the Act by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad Bench (Tribunal) or the High Court-Given that present matter was a factual matter, it was necessary for the Tribunal to consider the dates of adjournments for the purposes of calculating the delay in terms of Section 45-B of the Act-Under the circumstances, review was allowed, the judgment under review was recalled; and accordingly, the orders of the High Court and the Tribunal were set aside; and the case was remanded to the Tribunal with the directions that the appeal of the taxpayer shall be deemed to be pending and the Tribunal shall decide afresh the issue of the timeframe as prescribed in Section 45-B of the Act with reference to the adjournments sought-[Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. (as Referee Judge) (Majority view): First and second provisos to section 45(B)(2) of the Act should be treated as directory provisions-This interpretation effectively safeguards the tax-payers constitutional rights while promoting efficient and fair tax governance-It serves the public interest by preventing procedural timelines from being used against tax-payers in a way that would compromise fairness and justice in the appellate system-Provisions must not be interpreted in a way that limits or undermines fundamental rights-Strict enforcement of statutory timelines for tax-payer appeals could jeopardize these rights and potentially deny tax-payers a fair opportunity to seek redressal-Therefore, declaring first and second provisos to section 45(B)(2) of the Act as directory is crucial to maintain due process and uphold the constitutional principles of justice.\n2019 SCMR 1735 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=45B(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=188", - "Case #": "Civil Review Petition No. 275 of 2022 in Civil Petition No. 4599 of 2021, decided on 6th November, 2024. Date of hearing: 25th October, 2022.\nPer Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J; Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. (as Referee Judge) agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court; Ms. Asma Idrees, Additional Commissioner and Yousaf Khan, Law Officer for Petitioners.\nRespondent No.1, in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III RTO, RAWALPINDI AND OTHERS -PETITIONERS\nVS\nMESSRS SARWAQ TRADERS, RAWALPINDI AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25872", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 598 = 2025 SLD 598 = 2025 SCMR 353", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil service-\n-Concurrent disciplinary and criminal proceedings-Permissibility-Prosecution in criminal cases and departmental inquiries on the same allegations can proceed concurrently at both venues without having any overriding or overlapping effect-It is the prerogative of the employer to conduct the disciplinary proceedings despite acquittal in the criminal proceedings.\nFaraz Naveed v. District Police Officer Gujrat 2022 SCMR 1770 ref.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 10-A-Civil service-Employee of Intelligence Bureau-Removal from service-Ex-parte departmental proceedings against employee when he was incarcerated in connection with a criminal case-Constitutionality-Employee re-instated in service by the Service Tribunal after his acquittal in the criminal case on basis of a compromise-Legality-It was not disputed that not only at the time of issuing show cause notice but even at the time of the alleged inquiry, the respondent was incarcerated-Obviously, then, it was not within his control or domain to face and defend the charges of misconduct or his involvement in a criminal case as a free man-It is a most valuable and instinctive human right of every Under Trial Prisoner (UTP) and a convicted person to defend or challenge his indictment and conviction in accordance with the law-Right of proper defence is a vested right and not providing ample opportunity of defence is also against Article 10-A of the Constitution-In order to answer and defend the allegations of misconduct, the personal appearance of the delinquent ought to be ensured and he should be afforded not only a right to adduce evidence and call witnesses to support his innocence, but he should also be given a fair opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who deposed against him-In the present case during the ex-parte departmental proceedings the inquiry officer predominantly believed the police reports and challan of criminal cases and conducted the inquiry when the respondent was behind bars and his request for deferring the inquiry proceedings till the outcome of the criminal case was not accommodated and a major penalty of removal from service was recommended and imposed-Conducting ex parte proceeding, knowing that the employee (respondent) was unable to defend the charges of misconduct was nothing but a sheer violation of due process and the principles of natural justice, thus, rendering the entire exercise ineffectual and inconsequential-Petition was converted into an appeal and partly allowed, with the directions that the order of reinstatement with back benefits passed by the Service Tribunal, shall be subject to the outcome of de novo inquiry and in this regard the competent authority of the petitioners department shall appoint an inquiry officer who should conduct an impartial regular inquiry, and during the inquiry proceedings, the respondent should be afforded ample opportunity of defence.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 281-K of 2022, decided on 15th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 15th October, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 17.12.2021 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad (Karachi Bench) in Appeal No. 151(K)CS of 2020).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Attorney General and Ghulam Hussain, Inspector, I.B. for Petitioners.\nSyed Shoa-un-Nabi, Advocate Supreme Court along with Respondent for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS -PETITIONERS\nVS\nBABAR ALI SOLANGI -RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25873", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 599 = 2025 SLD 599 = 2025 SCMR 358", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTk", - "Key Words:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-\n-S. 15-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)-Eviction of tenant-Default in payment of monthly rent-Unauthorized subletting of the property-Ex-parte order passed by Rent Controller not obtained by way of fraud or misrepresentation-Rent Controller attempted to serve notices upon the lesses and petitioners in the rent/eviction application through various modes, including by way of Bailiff, Registered Post A/D, T.C.S, pasting notice on the wall and gate of the property and finally through publication-Despite these efforts, the lessee and petitioners in the matter failed to appear-In view of the same, the Rent Controller decided that service was valid/good against the lessee and petitioners and after being afforded several chances to contest the case, the lessee and petitioners were ordered to be proceeded against ex parte, which was followed by an ex parte judgment, allowing the land ladys (respondents) rent/eviction application-Validity-Rent Controller had attempted to issue notices to the petitioners through numerous modes, including by way of the Court Bailiff, Registered Post A/D, T.C.S, pasting notice on the wall and gate of the property and finally through publication-It was only after exhausting all the modes of service that the Rent Controller held service to be good against the petitioners-Despite notice, through all its modes and at the correct address, the petitioners had failed to enter appearance and absented themselves from proceedings in the eviction application-Order for ex parte proceedings and ex parte judgment that followed could not, therefore, be considered as a result of fraud or misrepresentation but of the willful absence of the petitioners-Furthermore, the fact that there had earlier been litigation concerning the property was not a valid ground for interference with the findings of the three Courts below-Moreover, the controversy highlighted by the petitioners that in an earlier rent/eviction application, the respondents attorney had claimed to be owner whereas in the instant application he claimed to be the respondents attorney would not improve their case since it would not change their status as unauthorized sub-lessees of the original lessee-No valid ground was found for interference with the orders of the three Courts below-Petition, being devoid of any merits, was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=15Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 832-K of 2024, decided on 19th December, 2024. Date of hearing: 19th December, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 05.08.2021 of the Sindh High Court, Karachi passed in Constitutional Petition No. S-1363 of 2011).", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nN.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SADAQAT ALI and another -Petitioners\nVS\nMst. NASREEN AKHTAR -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25874", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 600 = 2025 SLD 600 = 2025 SCMR 361", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUTg", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O. XLVII, R. 1 & S. 114-Judicial proceedings-Presumption of correctness-Review, filing of-No grounds for review agitated-Dispute between the parties in respect of urban land-Revision application before the High Court was disposed of by consent of the counsel for the parties-Petitioner claimed that he and his counsel did not give any consent for disposal of the said revision application and to challenge such order filed a review application before the High Court, but the same was dismissed-Validity-No ground whatsoever for seeking review of an error apparent from record or in the impugned order passed by the Single Judge of Sindh High Court in the revision application had been agitated rather, there was a serious allegation that consent of the parties had been wrongly recorded by the Judge of High Court, thus disputing the judicial order and the proceedings however, without any evidence, material or formal affidavit of the petitioner or of the counsel who was present in Court along with counsel for respondent-It is settled legal position that presumption of correctness and sanctity is attached to all judicial proceedings, orders, decisions and the judgments passed by the Courts, whereas, the same can be assailed by an aggrieved party by filing appeal, revision as may be provided in accordance with law-However, in exceptional cases, any order or judgment passed by the competent Court of jurisdiction, or any proceedings can be subjected to review under Order XLVII, Rule 1 C.P.C. and Section 114 read with Section 151 C.P.C. by showing some error on the face of the record and the impugned order/decision sought to be reviewed, which otherwise could be rectified without reappraisal of the evidence or re-examination of the merits of the case-Whereas, in the instant case no error of such nature had been pointed out except an allegation to the effect that the counsel representing the petitioner did not give any consent for disposal of the revision application, however, such allegation was not duly supported by affidavit to this effect by the counsel, therefore, could not be a ground or basis for seeking review of the consent order-Single Judge of High Court had rightly dismissed the review application vide impugned order-Civil petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=114", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1218-K of 2023, decided on 16th December, 2024. Date of hearing: 16th December, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 12.10.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Civil Revision Application No. S-60 of 2008 (Hyderabad)).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUNIB AKHTAR, IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Javed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNeel Keshav, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED ALI AHMED SHAH-PETITIONER\nVS\nSYED SHOUKAT HUSSAIN SHAH AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25875", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 601 = 2025 SLD 601 = 2025 SCMR 367", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Balochistan Civil Servants Act (V of 1974)-\n-S.4-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 10-A & 212 (3)-Restoration in service-Due process of law-Authorities assailed order passed by Service Tribunal restoring civil servant in service-Validity-Civil servant appeared in test and interview and was declared successful-Appointment order was issued to civil servant who joined service accordingly-Civil servant could not be blamed or reproached for committing any illegality or securing job through unfair means, fraud, or misrepresentation-Civil servant was at Serial Number 02 on merit list and was appointed on 08-08-2023, but his appointment order was withdrawn/cancelled on 27-09-2023 without any show cause notice or any opportunity to be heard-Such action was in sheer contravention of Article 10-A of the Constitution and lacked due process of law-Supreme Court declined to interfere in order passed by Service Tribunal-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Principles of natural justice-Scope-Such principles require that delinquent should be afforded fair opportunity to converge, explain, and contest claims against him before he is found guilty and condemned-Principles of natural justice and fair-mindedness are grounded in philosophy of affording right of audience before any detrimental action is taken, in tandem with its ensuing constituent that the foundation of any adjudication or order of a quasi-judicial authority, statutory body, or any departmental authority regulated under some law, must be rational and impartial, and decision-maker has an adequate level of decision-making independence-Reasons of decision arrived at should be amply well-defined, just, and understandable-It is incumbent that all judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative authorities should carry out their powers with judicious and evenhanded approach to ensure justice according to the tenor of law and without any violation of the principles of natural justice.\nTariq Aziz-ud-Din, Human Rights Cases Nos. 8340, 9504-G, 13936-G, 13635-P and 14306-G to 14309-G of 2009 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1130; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101; Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 1997 (7) SCC 622; Junaid Wazir v. Superintendent of Police 2024 SCMR 181; Federation of Pakistan v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603; Usman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745; Capital Development Authority v. Shabir Hussain 2022 SCMR 627; Raja Muhammad Shahid v. The Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135; Muhammad Yaseen v. Province of Sindh 2024 PLC(C.S.) 111; Government of Balochistan v. Ghulam Rasool 2024 SCMR 1155 and Inspector General of Police, Quetta v. Fida Muhammad 2022 SCMR 1583 rel.\n(c) Review-\n-Principles-Mere irregularities having no significant effect or impact on the outcome would not be sufficient to warrant review of judgment or order-If anomaly or ambiguity is of such nature so as to transform the course of action from being one in the aid of justice to a process of injustice, then review petition may be instituted for redressal to demonstrate the error, if found floating conspicuously on the surface of the record-Desire of re-hearing of the matter cannot constitute a sufficient ground for grant of review which, by its very nature, cannot be equated with the right or remedy of appeal.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Z-III, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Tax House, Karachi v. M/s. MSC Switzerland Geneva and others 2023 SCMR 1011 = 2023 PTD 964 = 2023 SCP 150 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Civil Servants Act, (IX of 1974)=4Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A,212(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 187-Q and 188-Q of 2024,decided on 4th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 4th October, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 27.06.2024 passed in R.A. No. 12 of 2024 and judgment dated 16.05.2024 passed in S.A. No. 41 of 2024 by the Balochistan Service Tribunal, Quetta).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Ayaz Khan Swati, Additional Advocate General Balochistan for Petitioners (in both cases).\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN, THROUGH SECRETARY ENERGY DEPARTMENT, QUETTA AND ANOTHER -PETITIONERS\nVS\nMUHAMMAD YASIR -RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25876", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 602 = 2025 SLD 602 = 2025 SCMR 374", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTUXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973-\n-R. 4(b)(iii)-Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S. 4-Disciplinary proceedings-Quantum of sentence-Willful absence from service-Converting of major penalty-Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal-Authorities were aggrieved of converting of major penalty of removal from service into compulsory retirement-Validity-Civil servant was absent from duty and authorities laid out sufficient reasons to show why they did not want civil servant to continue with his service, considering that he willfully absented himself, did not obtain clearance before travelling, and started looking for jobs after travelling abroad, all of which the civil servant was unable to sufficiently rebut-Due process was observed and followed by authorities-Where absence from duty was admitted, there was no need to hold regular inquiry-Service Tribunal had no justifiable reason to reduce the punishment from major penalty of removal from service into compulsory retirement on the pretext that the punishment was harsh given that the civil servant had studied abroad and was an asset for Pakistan-Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal as it exceeded its jurisdiction by arbitrary exercise of discretion which was illegal and without lawful authority and restored penalty imposed by authorities-Appeal was allowed.\nGovernment of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal 2023 PLC (C.S.) 283; Deputy Postmaster General, Central Punjab, Lahore v. Habib Ahmad 2021 SCMR 584; Usman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745; Commissioner, Faisalabad Division, Faisalabad v. Allah Bakhsh 2020 SCMR 1418; Tahira Waheed v. Director, Federal Government Educational Institutions 2003 SCMR 1090; Imtiaz Ahmed Lali v. Returning Officer PLD 2008 SC 355; Secretary Education v. Mustamir Khan 2005 SCMR 17; Tasawar Hussain v. Deputy Commissioner District Jhelum 2021 SCMR 1367; Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Muhammad Arif Butt 2021 SCMR 1033 and Lord Woolf, Chief Justice of England and Wales from 2000 to 2005 rel.\n(b) Administration of justice-\n-Judicial discretion must be exercised judiciously and transparently, based on established principles and sound reasoning.\nAccess to Justice Report 1996 by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Service Tribunals Act, 1973=4", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1017 of 2022, decided on 27th November, 2024. Date of hearing: 27th November, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 28.01.2022 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 620(R)CS of 2018).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: AYESHA A. MALIK, IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haseeb Shakoor Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSyed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHAIRMAN PAKISTAN ORDNANCE FACTORIES, POF BOARD, WAH CANTT. -PETITIONER\nVS\nAKHTAR TANVEER AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25877", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 603 = 2025 SLD 603 = 2025 SCMR 380", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTTTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Words and phrases-\n-Immediate- Meaning.\nBlacks Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition page 764 and Webster Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopaedic Edition page 631 rel.\n(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)-\n-S. 13-Right of pre-emption-Talb-i-Muwathibat-Delay in making such demand-Effect-Petitioner / vendee was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court as well as High Court whereby suit was decreed in favour of respondent / pre-emptor-Validity-Use of word immediate is significant and cannot be undermined-Delay of two hours in making demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat is not an immediate demand and such delay is fatal to a successful claim of pre-emption-Right of pre-emption is a unique and a fragile right-Unlike many other rights bestowed by law, exercise of right of pre-emption depends entirely on timely making of various demands set out in section 13 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987-Making of Talb-i-Muwathibat, under section 13 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 is the foundation on which making of Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat is based-Timelines and conditions for making of Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat provided in sections 13(3) and 13(4) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 depend entirely upon making of Talb-i-Muwathibat-Date, time and place of making such demand is pivotal and foundational to the exercise of right of pre-emption, the importance of which cannot be over-looked-Person (postman) who allegedly served registered post A.D. upon deceased petitioner / vendee was not produced in witness box, when it was essential to bring him in the witness box, especially when receipt of the same was denied, so as to prove and determine the fact that he actually served registered post A.D. upon deceased petitioner / vendee-Service upon addressee was not proved by respondent / pre-emptor-Supreme Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by Lower Appellate Court and High Court and restored that of Trial Court whereby suit filed by respondent / pre-emptor was dismissed- Appeal was allowed.\nBashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Ramzan 2021 SCMR 134; Mir Muhammad Khan and 2 others v. Haider and others PLD 2020 SC 233 and Muhammad Riaz v. Muhammad Akram and others 2024 SCMR 692 rel.\n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Art. 129(g)-Withholding best available evidence-Presumption-When available evidence has been withheld by a party, an adverse presumption as enunciated under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 would arise against such party that had the witness appeared in the witness box, he would not have supported the stance of that party. [p. 386] C", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=129(g)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 406 of 2022, decided on 9th December, 2024. Date of hearing: 9th December, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.11.2021 of the Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench, Bannu passed in C.R. No. 30-B of 2019).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Anwar Ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis M. Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHER AYAZ KHAN ALIAS SHERAZ KHANA, THROUGH L.RS. AND OTHERS -PETITIONERS\nVS\nGUL NAJEEB KHAN -RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25878", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 604 = 2025 SLD 604 = 2025 SCMR 387", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVERlNTTTY", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss.42 & 54-Suit for declaration and injunction-Name in official record, correction of-Principle-Petitioners/plaintiffs sought correction of parentage of their predecessor-in-interest in revenue record but Lower Appellate Court as well as High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction dismissed the suit-Validity-Party who asserts a fact to be corrected or otherwise has to prove the same through documentary or oral evidence but petitioners failed to do so-Mere assertion with regard to parentage in official record in absence of any declaration from Court of competent jurisdiction or correction of record by authorities concerned could not otherwise be given any credibility-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court as there was no error or illegality in it-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 1294-K of 2020 and Civil Petitions Nos. 148-K and 149-K of 2023, decided on 15th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 15th October, 2024.\n(Against the order dated 10.09.2020 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Larkana in Civil Revision Appeal No. S-05 of 2009).\nAnd\n(Against the order dated 07.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Bench at Sukkur in Civil Revision Appeals Nos. S-229 and S-230 of 2018).", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in all cases).\nSarfaraz Ahmed Akhund, Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.1 (in all cases).\nHakim Ali Sheikh, Additional Advocate General Sindh along with Ms. Rida Zahra Talpur, Assistant Commissioner Pano Aqil for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TASLEEM HUSSAIN (DECD) THROUGH L.R.S AND OTHERS -PETITIONERS\nVS\nALLAHDAD SHAH AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25879", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2012 3510 = 2012 SLD 3510 = 2012 PLJ 25", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYzU", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Pakistan Penal Code, (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409, 420, 468, 471 & 109-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, S. 5(2)-Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 185(3)-Bail, refusal of-Identical questions of law and facts-Signatures were not genuine-Classical example of corruption, misuse of power and abuse of authority-Causing a huge loss to public exchequer-Question of guilt or innocence-Whether on basis of alleged incriminating material a prima facie case was made out-Determination-Board of Directors had acted on advice and report of management committee-No stretch of imagination-Validity-Member of Management Committee was held responsible for causing loss to NICL and it was hardly believable that they had acted in a good faith or with bona fide intention-Land was valued at very exorbitant rate and thus substantial loss had been caused to public exchequer-Accused betrayed confidence of Board of Directors and more so such determination could be without connivance of accused with each other-Factors could not be decided at that stage and determination would be made by trial Court on basis of evidence which was yet to be recorded-As applicability of Ss. 409, 420, 468, 471 & 109 of PPC r/w. S. 5(2) of P.C.A, 1947 that could only be decided by Court of competent jurisdiction on basis of evidence which was yet to be recorded and it would be too premature to offer any comments in facts regard-Bails were dismissed. \nCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)-\n-S. 497-Bail, dismissal of-No managerial or material role-Bold allegation-Question of-Whether it was a case of sheer discrimination as had not been shown as an accused person-Factum of discrimination could not be proved on basis of bald allegation-Validity-Merely a director and managerial role whatsoever was assigned qua the purchase of land and factum of discrimination could not be proved on basis of bald allegation-Role of general manager was assigned the sale-deed after recommendation of management committee, it would not be in interest of justice, fair play and equity to involve Director General was absolutely no iota of evidence available on record connecting with commission of alleged offence-Bail was declined. \nLeave to Appeal-\n-Jurisdiction-Sound principle-Leave to appeal was not granted by Supreme Court where grievance was that High Court had in proper exercise of its jurisdiction, appreciated and assessed evidence or exercised discretion in a manner with which it was easily possible to disagree. [P. 30] E\n1979 SCMR 254, NLR 1978 Crl. 328, PLD 1977 SC 642; 1969 PCr.LJ 358 & PLD 1969 SC 98, ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=409,420,468,471,109Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947=5(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl. Petitions No. 177-180 of 2011, decided on 18.5.2011.\n(On appeal from the order dated 28.3.2011 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Crl. Bail Application Nos. 256 to 259/2011). Date of hearing: 18.5.2011", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Javed Iqbal and Anwar Zaheer Jamali, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gilani, Sr. ASC and Syed Safdar Hussain, AOR for Petitioners.\nMr. KK Agha, Addl. A.G., Qaisar Masud, Deputy Director, Khalid Jamil, A.D. and Bashir Ahmad Sh, AD for Respondent (In all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ZAHOOR & 3 others-Petitioners\nversus\nSTATE-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25880", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 605 = 2025 SLD 605 = 2025 PTCL 156 = (2025) 132 TAX 13", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Maintainability of Appeal – Requirement of Physical Signature and Proper Authorization\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a taxpayer, filed an appeal under Section 131 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, challenging the order dated May 20, 2024, issued by the Office of Inland Revenue for the tax year 2018. The taxpayer’s case was selected for audit under Section 214C, and non-compliance with various notices led to an adverse order under Section 122(1). The taxpayer, residing abroad, authorized a representative to file the appeal on their behalf. However, the appeal and related documents, including the Power of Attorney (POA), bore scanned signatures instead of physical signatures. The tribunal examined whether such an appeal was maintainable.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it was not properly filed in compliance with Section 131 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and Rule 77 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002. The Tribunal held that:\n•\nAppeals must be physically signed and verified by the appellant or an authorized representative.\n•\nScanned signatures do not satisfy the legal requirement for authentication.\n•\nThe POA, though authorizing representation, did not explicitly grant the authority to file the appeal.\n•\nThe appeal was time-barred, and the condonation application also bore scanned signatures, making it non-compliant.\nConsequently, the appeal was dismissed due to procedural deficiencies.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1),120(1),122(1),122(9),131,177(1),214CIncome Tax Rules, 2002=77", - "Case #": "ITA No.1989/IB/2024, MA(Cond.) No.328/IB/2024, MA(Stay) No.1469/IB/2024 (Tax Year, 2018). Date of hearing: 17.12.2024 and Date of order: 17.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MR. IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zain Ul Hassan, ACA\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. ZAFAR ASLAM KHAN, PESHAWAR ……. APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-SOUTH, RTO, ISLAMABAD …….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25881", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 606 = 2025 SLD 606 = 2025 PTCL 204 = (2025) 131 TAX 433 = 2025 PLJ 93", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYy8", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Income Tax Audit Notice under Clause 105A – Interpretation of Preceding Four Tax Years \nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the audit selection notice dated 11.10.2024 issued under Section 177(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for Tax Year 2023, claiming exemption under Clause (105A) of Part IV of the Second Schedule, arguing that since the audit for Tax Year 2018 was completed on 28.06.2024, the next audit could only occur after 28.06.2028. The petitioner also relied on FBR Circular dated 21.07.2022.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that Clause 105A refers specifically to the “preceding four tax years,” not to the year in which the audit is completed. The audit for Tax Year 2018, though completed in 2024, still pertains to the 2018 tax year, and hence, audit for Tax Year 2023 is valid. The petitioners interpretation would effectively extend the audit protection period to up to 10 years, contrary to legislative intent. The court also rejected reliance on the FBR Circular, declaring it inconsistent with statutory provisions. Petition dismissed in limine.\nCase Law:\nCollector of Customs v. Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd., PTCL 2005 CL 652\nP.T.E.T. v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2017 SC 718", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(68),74,177(1),Second Schedule, Part IV, Clause 105AConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199(1)(a)(ii)", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-6280 of 2024, 20th January, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Taimoor Ahmed Qureshi, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. FAZLEE SONS (PVT.) LTD …… PETITIONER\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS ….. RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25882", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 607 = 2025 SLD 607 = 2025 PTCL 220", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYys", - "Key Words:": "Temporary Injunction against Pre-Suspension Notice\nRelief Sought: Temporary injunction against coercive action under a pre-suspension notice issued under section 21(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, read with Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006.\n________________________________________\nBackground:\n•\nThe Plaintiff challenged a pre-suspension notice issued by the Commissioner-IR, alleging that it was defective (unsigned, undated in part) and received after the stated date of hearing.\n•\nPlaintiff claimed the notice was malafide, alleging purchases were from vendors who were not suspended/blacklisted at the time and that some issues had already been settled earlier.\n________________________________________\nKey Observations by the Court:\n1.\nOn the Validity of the Notice Copy:\no\nThe impugned notice presented was a smartphone scan, not a proper photocopy.\no\nMissing signature or incomplete date could be due to poor image quality.\no\nCounsel should have verified the original from the Plaintiff before filing.\n2.\nOn Delay in Receipt:\no\nSince the Plaintiff submitted a reply and no denial of hearing was alleged, delay in receipt was held immaterial.\n3.\nOn Grounds of Challenge:\no\nPlaintiffs objections relate to facts and merits, not jurisdictional illegality.\no\nCourt emphasized that only jurisdictional defects warrant interference at the notice stage.\n4.\nOn the Statutory Remedy:\no\nUnder Section 21(5) (inserted by the Finance Act, 2024), the Plaintiff can now appeal before the Chief Commissioner if an adverse suspension order is passed.\n________________________________________\nLegal Principle Reaffirmed:\nCourts do not ordinarily interfere with show-cause or pre-suspension notices unless a jurisdictional error is shown, as such interference may hinder statutory fact-finding and remedies.\n(Reference: Established jurisprudence on judicial restraint in administrative proceedings)\n________________________________________\nORDER\nCMA No. 634/2025 is dismissed.\nThe Plaintiff has not demonstrated any jurisdictional defect warranting the grant of a temporary injunction.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12", - "Case #": "Suit No. [-] 83 of 2025, decided on 27th January, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY", - "Lawyer Name:": "Taimur Ali Mirza, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. UMAR TEXTILES\nVS\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25883", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 608 = 2025 SLD 608 = 2025 PTCL 255 = 2025 PTD 1206", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDYzk", - "Key Words:": "Re-Assessment of Cleared Goods under Section 80(3) – Reference Applications Dismissed\nCore Legal Question Rephrased by Court:\n“Whether the Department was justified in law to make re-assessment of the goods declaration (GDs) under Section 80(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 after out-of-charge/release of the goods?”\n________________________________________\nFactual Background:\n•\nThe Respondent imported Grafalon Injections for kidney transplant, claiming duty exemption under Sr. No. 23, Table-C, Part-II of the 5th Schedule of the Act.\n•\nAll consignments were cleared accordingly, and Goods Declarations (GDs) were assessed and marked out-of-charge.\n•\nSubsequently, a message through the Web Portal inbox informed the importer of re-assessment under Section 80(3), citing ineligibility for the exemption.\n•\nNo show cause notice under Section 32 was issued prior to this reassessment.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues and Findings:\nSection 80(3) Reassessment – Temporal Limitation\n•\nSection 80(3) permits reassessment only during checking of the GD under Section 79.\n•\nOnce goods are released, reassessment under Section 80(3) is no longer permissible.\n•\nThe Court emphasized that sub-section (3) must be read in conjunction with sub-section (1), which governs initial checking post-filing under Section 79.\nKey Holding: The power to reassess under Section 80(3) ceases once the GD is assessed and goods are released.\n________________________________________\nRequirement of Show Cause Notice under Section 32\n•\nNo show cause notice was issued under Section 32, which is the proper legal route for recovery after clearance.\n•\nCiting the Harris Silicones case (authored by the same Bench), the Court reiterated that any post-clearance recovery must comply with:\no\nSection 32 (for short-levy or misdeclaration),\no\nSection 193 (appeal),\no\nSection 195 (revision/review in exceptional cases).\n•\nThe Customs Computerized System (WeBOC) also mandates notice and hearing prior to reassessment.\nLegal Principle: Any demand or reassessment without issuing a proper show cause notice is void ab initio and lacks lawful authority.\n________________________________________\nPrecedents Cited:\n•\nHarris Silicones & Glass (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan – Held reassessment under Section 80(3) post-release as unlawful.\n•\nSupreme Court dicta emphasizing the mandatory nature of show cause notices before raising demands.\n________________________________________\nFinal Judgment & Holding:\nAnswer to Legal Question: No, the Applicant (department) was not justified in invoking Section 80(3) after the goods were out of charge and released.\n•\nImpugned reassessment actions set aside.\n•\nDemands raised through Web Portal or system-based recalculations declared unlawful.\n•\nAll connected Reference Applications dismissed.\n•\nA copy of the judgment ordered to be sent to the Customs Appellate Tribunal under Section 196(5) of the Act.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\n•\nSection 80(3) is not a post-clearance tool and cannot be used to reopen finalized assessments.\n•\nReassessment post-release requires statutory procedure under Section 32.\n•\nDigital communication through WeBOC is insufficient without legal compliance with procedural safeguards.\n•\nCustoms must exercise caution and jurisdictional restraint in invoking assessment powers under the Act.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=80(3),32,79,193,195", - "Case #": "Special Custom Reference Application No. 358 to 373/2024, decided on 18th December, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Rizwan Saeed, Advocate for Applicant. \nMr. Saad Fayyaz, Advocate for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S. ALLMED LABORATORIES, KARACHI & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25884", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 609 = 2025 SLD 609 = (2025) 131 TAX 149", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTc", - "Key Words:": "Legal Issues Addressed:\n•\nNature of liability under Section 147 (Advance Tax)\n•\nLegality of coercive recovery under Section 140 without due process\n•\nTaxpayers remedy under Section 127 (Appeal provisions)\n________________________________________\n1. Nature of Liability under Section 147 – Advance Tax\n•\nThe Court held that advance tax under Section 147, read with Section 4(6), is not optional but a mandatory statutory obligation and forms part of income tax as per Section 2(63) of the Ordinance.\n•\nThe liability accrues without assessment and is computed on a ‘pay-as-you-earn’ basis using formulas in Sections 147(4), 147(4B).\n•\nAdvance tax paid becomes a tax credit (not a loan or deposit) and can be adjusted or refunded under Sections 147(10), 170, 171.\n•\nSection 147(7) deems advance tax recoverable as if it were tax due under an assessment order.\n________________________________________\n2. Coercive Recovery Without Due Process is Illegal\n•\nThe Court declared that the Tax Department cannot recover advance tax coercively under Section 140 without prior compliance with:\no\nSection 137(2): Notice of demand\no\nSection 138(1): Notice before coercive recovery\n•\nRecovery without notice under Sections 137/138 violates Section 147(7) and Article 10A of the Constitution (due process).\n•\nIn tax years when the second proviso to Section 147(6) was not in force (e.g., 2023), the Commissioner had no authority to reject taxpayers’ estimates.\n________________________________________\n3. Taxpayer’s Remedy under Section 127 – Right of Appeal\n•\nThe rejection of a taxpayer’s estimate filed under Section 147(6) (when the proviso is in force) is an appealable order under Section 127, as it “increases the liability” of the taxpayer.\n•\nHowever, simple notices under Section 147 or coercive steps without a formal order are not appealable.\n•\nWhere no estimate was filed or the estimate was wrongly rejected without authority, the taxpayers recourse is writ jurisdiction under Article 199.\n________________________________________\nRelief Granted in Each Writ Petition\n•\nW.P. No.181/2019: Recovery of Rs. 1.37 billion without notice under Sections 137/138 declared illegal. Refund to be processed under Section 170, with interest under Section 171.\n•\nW.P. No.4497/2022: Advance tax based on annulled order under Section 122(5A). Recovery of Rs. 49 million declared illegal. Refund with interest ordered.\n•\nW.P. No.4558/2022: Valid estimate filed under Section 147(6). Commissioner had no authority to reject it in 2023. Coercive recovery of Rs. 35.27 million illegal. Refund directed.\n________________________________________\nCosts Imposed\n•\nRs. 100,000 cost imposed on respondent No.2 in each petition, payable to each petitioner within 30 days.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(63),4,4(6),114,120,147,147(4),147(4A),147(4B),147(5),147(6),147(7),147(10),170,171,205(1A),127Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 181/2019, Writ Petition No. 4497/2022, Writ Petition No. 4558/2022, date of hearing: 04.12.2024. date of order: 18-12-2024", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Babar Sattar, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Ch. Naeem ul Haq, Ch. Imran ul Haq and Ch. Faheem ul Haq, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Mr. Osama Shahid, Advocate for the Tax Department in Writ Petition No.181 of 2019.\nMr. Ghulam Qasim Bhatti, Advocate for the Tax Department in Writ Petition No.4497 & 4558 of 2022.\nMr. Aqeel Akhtar Raja and Raja Muhammad Jawad Arslan, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Pakistan Telecommunication Authority through its Director (Budget & Accounts)\nvs.\nFederation of Pakistan for the purpose of Service through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad & others\nM/s Communicator's Globe Private Limited through its General Manager (Development)\nvs.\nFederation of Pakistan for the purpose of Service through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad & others\nM/s Excel Labs Private Limited through its Assistant Manager (Accounts & Finance)\nvs.\nFederation of Pakistan for the purpose of Service through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25885", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 610 = 2025 SLD 610 = (2025) 131 TAX 202", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTY", - "Key Words:": "The Show Cause Notice (SCN) dated 28.05.2021 alleged liability for the period October 2014 to September 2015.\nThe Petitioner argued that the limitation period prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had expired.\nThe Respondents claimed that condonation of delay had been obtained from the FBR under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Section 32 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 via Order dated 05.05.2021 (C.No.3(13)ST & FE/Cond/2014/59895-R).\nNo other justification (e.g., ongoing audit or other procedural delay) was raised to extend the limitation.\nLegal Issues\nWhether the condonation of time by FBR under Section 74 overrides the statutory limitation period provided in Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?\nWhether a time-barred Show Cause Notice can be quashed under Article 199 of the Constitution despite the availability of alternate remedy?\nCourt’s Findings\n🔹 Limitation under Section 11(5), STA 1990\nSection 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 provides a time limit of five years for initiating recovery proceedings through issuance of SCNs.\nThe SCN issued in 2021 relates to tax periods ending in September 2015, meaning the SCN was issued more than five years later.\n🔹 Condonation under Section 74 STA / Section 32 FEA\nThe Court held that Section 74 of the STA, 1990 (general powers of FBR to condone certain procedural lapses or errors) does not empower FBR to override or extend express statutory limitations under Section 11(5).\nSimilarly, Section 32 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 is not a valid basis to override the limitation for issuance of SCNs under STA.\n🔹 Audit or Departmental Delay\nOngoing audit or departmental activity does not suspend limitation or justify delay under the statute.\nThe admitted delay and attempt to seek condonation confirms that the SCN was issued out of time, and therefore without jurisdiction.\n🔹 Exercise of Constitutional Jurisdiction\nThe Court emphasized that where a Show Cause Notice is facially time-barred, it can be quashed under constitutional jurisdiction, even if alternate remedies exist.\nForcing a taxpayer to pursue statutory remedies in such cases would be denial of justice.\nCase Law Relied Upon:\nPLD 1975 SC 244 – State cannot be exempted from limitation law; all are equal before law.\nPLD 1975 Lah 65 – Where limitation is facially expired, constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked.\n2000 SCMR 442 – Relief should not be denied when the law is clearly in favor of the aggrieved party.\nConclusion\nThe Court held that the Show Cause Notice dated 28.05.2021 was hopelessly time-barred under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and condonation obtained under Section 74 or any other excuse could not cure jurisdictional defect.\nAccordingly, the Show Cause Notice was quashed, and the petition was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(5),74Federal Excise Act, 2005=32Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C.P No. D- 4102 of 2021 and Misc. 16902 of 2021, date or order: 15.08.2024", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdul Raheem Lakhani along with Mr. Atta Muhammad Qureshi and Mr. Suneel Memon, Advocates for Petitioner.\nMr. Ayaz Sarwar Jamali, Advocate for Respondents.\nMr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S POPULAR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25886", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1977 1984 = 1977 SLD 1984 = 1977 AIR 90 = 1977 SCC 878", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTU", - "Key Words:": "ACT: Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Entry 22 Explanation Part I of Schedule, construction of word includes-Whether potteries Industry includes manufacture of Mangalore pattern roofing tiles.\nHEADNOTE: By a Notification issued under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Government fixed the minimum rates of wages in respect of potteries industry, on the basis of a committees report. Later, proceedings were started against the second appellant, a partnership firm .manufacturing Mangalore type roofing tiles, on the complaint of an inspector alleging that the partners of the firm had failed to produce their muster roll and the wages register for his examination. The Magistrate acquitted the appellant holding that Entry 22 did not cover roofing tiles. The High Court affirmed the acquittal on merits, but opined that manufacture of roofing tiles was included in the potteries industry. The appellants contended that the Articles mentioned in the explanation were exhaustive of the objects covered by entry 22, and did not cover roofing tiles, while the respondent State contended that the Explanation includes not only the objects mentioned therein, but other articles like roofing tiles.\nAllowing the appeal, the Court, \nHELD: (1) The word includes is generally used as a word of extension, but has been used here the sense of means; this is the only construction that the word can. bear in the context. In that sense it is not a word of extension, but limitation; it is exhaustive of the meaning which must be given to potteries industry for the purpose of Entry 22. [882 G-H] Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (1899 A.C. 105-106) applied.\n(2) The manufacture of Mangalore pattern roofing tiles is outside the purview of Entry 22. The explanation could not possibly have been introduced to extend the meaning of potteries industry or the articles listed therein added ex abundanti cautela. [882 D-F; 883 A]", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/10/1976", - "Judge Name:": "Bench: A.C. Gupta, Y.V. Chandrachud, P.K. Goswami", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "PETITIONER: SOUTH GUJARAT ROOFING TILES MANUFACTURER SASSOCIATION AND ANR\nVs.\nRESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25887", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1989 2829 = 1989 SLD 2829 = 1989 AIR 335 = 1988 SCC 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "ACT:\nAndhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957: Section 8 and Fourth Schedule Entry 7-Tobacco or any form of tobacco’-Whether includes ‘tobacco seeds’-Whether exempted from tax.\nHEADNOTE:\n The appellant-assessee had claimed before the Andhra Pradesh High Court that tobacco seed oil and tobacco seed cake, being forms of tobacco, were entitled to exemption under section 8, read with entry 7 of the Fourth Schedule, of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, which confers exemption from sales tax in respect of certain goods including ‘tobacco’. The petitioners in the writ petitions have claimed the same relief directly in this Court. \nThe High Court held that tobacco seed was not tobacco and that only leaf, stalks and stems of the tobacco plant could he said to be tobacco within the meaning of its definition. Before this Court it is urged on behalf of the Assessees that: (i) the word ‘tobacco’, in its ordinary connotation. takes in the tobacco plant and every part of it, including the seed (ii) the definition of ‘tobacco’ makes it clear that it takes in every form of tobacco, manufactured or unmanufactured; and (iii) tobacco seeds, not only when they are in their raw unmanufactured state but also when. on manufacture, they manifest themselves in the form of tobacco seed oil or tobacco seed cake will fall within the definition. On the other hand, on behalf of the state it is submitted that the definition, which covers both what the expression means as well as what it includes, is exhaustive, and tobacco seed does not come within either the first part or the second part of the definition. Dismissing the appeals and the petitions, it was, \nHELD: (1) The definition consists of two separate parts which specify what the expression means and also what it includes. The joint use of the words mean and include makes the definition exhaustive. [lO94C] PG NO 1089 Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps, [1899] C 99 referred to.\n(2) Tobacco seed does not come within the first part of the definition, for the expression tobacco cured or uncured, manufactured or unmanfactured has to be read as a whole and will not take in tobacco seed. It will not come under the second part because it specifically mentions leaves, stalks and stems but leaves out seeds. [1094A-B] \n(3) The definition, when it says that tobacco means any form of tobacco, lays emphasis that the item under consideration should be tobacco in form. [1096A] \n(4) Tobacco seed, once it is separated from the plant, is an item entirely different from tobacco and does not fall within the expression ‘tobacco or any form of tobacco’. [1096C]\n(5) Since tobacco seed does not fall within the definition, the oil and cake produced by the crushing of the seeds will not also be covered by the definition or eligible for the consequent exemption. [1094B] \n(6) The effect of accepting the assessee’s claim for exemption would be to automatically catapult them into the levy of excise and additional excise duties, but the fact that tobacco oil and cake have not been considered to be excisable commodities for the past several years is as indication as to how the legislature and administration understood and applied these provisions all along. [1096H; 1097B] C.I.T. v. Taj Mahal Hotel, [1971] 82 I.T.R. 44 S.C. Amara Purushotham Mamidi Obaiah v. State of A.P., [1962] 29 S.T.C. 654; and 1977 40 S.T.C. referred to.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/09/1988", - "Judge Name:": "BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "PETITIONER: MAHALAKSHMI OIL MILLS ETC. ETC.\nVs.\nRESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25888", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1995 1588 = 1995 SLD 1588 = 1995 AIR 1395 = 1995 SCC 348", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSS8", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issue:\nWhether private engineering (professional/technical) colleges fall within the ambit of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and the Rules framed thereunder.\n________________________________________\nRelevant Law\n•\nThe Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 (“the Act”)\n•\nTamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, 1976 (“the Rules”) – made under Section 53 of the Act\n•\nConstitution of India:\no\nArticle 356 – Presidential Rule\no\nArticle 357 – Parliament’s power to make laws for States\no\nSeventh Schedule:\n\nEntry 25, List III (Concurrent List) – Education\n\nEntry 66, List I (Union List) – Coordination and determination of standards in higher education\n________________________________________\nFindings\n1.\nDefinition Conflict:\no\nThe Act (Section 2(8)) defines “private college” broadly to include any college maintained by an educational agency and affiliated to a university.\no\nHowever, Rule 2(b) of the Rules exhaustively defines college to mean only Arts, Science, Teacher Training, Physical Education, Oriental, Social Work, and Music Colleges.\n➤ Engineering or technical institutions are not listed.\n2.\nInterpretation Principle:\no\nAlthough the Rules cannot override the Act, they can be used as “contemporanea expositio”—a legitimate tool to interpret ambiguous provisions of the Act.\no\nThe words “means and includes” in Rule 2(b) suggest an exhaustive definition—not an inclusive one.\n3.\nGrant-in-Aid Code & Directorate of Technical Education:\no\nTechnical and professional colleges are governed under a separate administrative and regulatory framework (Grant-in-Aid Code, Directorate of Technical Education, and AICTE directives).\no\nThe Rules reference only the Director of Collegiate Education, not the Director of Technical Education, indicating exclusion of technical institutions.\n4.\nHistorical & Administrative Consistency:\no\nBoth the Central and State Governments had consistently acted on the understanding that the Act and Rules do not apply to technical/professional colleges.\no\nThe principle of “communis error facit jus” (common error makes law) was invoked to support this consistent administrative practice.\n5.\nRejection of Partial Application Argument:\no\nArgument that only some rules (like Rule 11 on service conditions) should apply was rejected:\n➤ Either the Act applies entirely or not at all to a category of institution.\n6.\nConstitutional Angle:\no\nSince the case was decided on statutory interpretation, the Court did not rule on whether the Act was ultra vires Entry 66, List I (Union List), but noted that State legislation on education is subject to Parliament’s exclusive domain on standards in higher education.\n________________________________________\nHeld\n•\nThe Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and its Rules do not apply to professional or technical educational institutions, such as engineering colleges.\n•\nAppeals dismissed.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Doctrines & Principles\n•\nContemporanea expositio – interpretation of statutes based on administrative construction\n•\nCommunis error facit jus – consistent governmental understanding carries legal weight\n•\nDefinition clause interpretation: “Means and includes” is exhaustive (not illustrative)\n•\nDoctrine of Exclusivity (List I, Entry 66) – not adjudicated but acknowledged", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/03/1995", - "Judge Name:": "Bench: S.C. Agrawal, P.B. Sawant, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "PETITIONER: P.KASILINGAM & ORS\nVs.\nRESPONDENT: P.S.G. COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY & ORS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25889", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 611 = 2025 SLD 611 = (2025) 131 TAX 209 = 2025 PTD 1424", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSSs", - "Key Words:": "Refund of Excess Federal Excise Duty on Edible Oil Imports\nFacts:\nM/s Chiniot Enterprises, engaged in the manufacture of vegetable oil/ghee, imported edible oil as raw material. During customs clearance, Federal Excise Duty (FED) was levied at 17%, although the prevailing rate was 16%. The importer applied for a refund of the 1% excess FED, which was denied by the Collector Customs.\nOn appeal, the Collector (Appeals) allowed the refund.\nHowever, the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad reversed this and dismissed the refund claim.\nThe importer then filed a tax reference before the High Court.\nArguments:\nPetitioners (Customs Department):\nArgued that under the proviso to Section 33 of the Customs Act, 1969, refund cannot be granted unless it is proved that the burden of excess duty was not passed on to the buyer or end consumer.\nClaimed that the respondents failed to prove this, and hence no refund was legally permissible.\nRespondents (Chiniot Enterprises):\nContended that FED was levied at the import stage, and they did not increase product prices.\nThus, they absorbed the excess duty, and the burden was not transferred to intermediaries or consumers.\nTheir position was accepted by the lower appellate fora.\nDecision:\nThe High Court upheld the orders of both the Collector (Appeals) and the Customs Appellate Tribunal, allowing refund under Section 11 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005.\nThe key finding was that the burden of excess FED was not passed on to any third party.\nTherefore, the respondents were entitled to a refund, and there was no reason for interference by the High Court.\nPrecedent Cited:\nCollector of Customs Appraisement, Customs House Karachi v. M/s G. Kin Enterprises\n(2017 SCMR 339) – Supreme Court held that refund of duties/taxes is permissible when it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the incidence of such levies has not been passed on to the final consumer.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court confirmed that overpaid FED can be refunded to importers like Chiniot Enterprises when it is evident that the burden was not shifted downstream. The petition was dismissed, reaffirming the Collector (Appeals) and Tribunal’s orders were within the law.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=19A,33,196Federal Excise Act, 2005=11,12", - "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 14-A/2016, decided on 03.04.2024, date of hearing: 03.04.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IJAZ KHAN, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD FAHEEM WALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Waqas Naqvi, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nMr. Hassan Idrees Mufti, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR CUSTOMS & ANOTHER\nVS\nM/S CHINIOT ENTERPRISES (PVT) LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25890", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 612 = 2025 SLD 612 = (2025) 131 TAX 215 = 2025 PTD 1406", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FDSTk", - "Key Words:": "Refund of Penalty for Non-Integration with FBR POS System\nStatutes & Rules Involved:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990): Sections 2(43A), 3, 33, 33(24), 33(25A)\n•\nSales Tax Rules, 2006: Rule 150ZER\n________________________________________\nFacts:\n•\nRespondent No. 3 (a Tier-1 retailer) was served a notice requiring installation of Point of Sale (POS) software under Section 3(9A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n•\nUpon non-compliance, the Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue (IR) passed a sealing order on 24.05.2023.\n•\nOn 27.04.2023, Respondent No. 3 applied for de-sealing and paid a penalty of Rs. 500,000 under Section 33(24).\n•\nSubsequently, Respondent No. 3 filed a complaint before the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) seeking refund of the penalty.\n•\nThe FTO allowed the complaint, directing CIR to refund Rs. 500,000 within 30 days.\n•\nThe FBRs representation against this order was rejected by the President of Pakistan.\n•\nFBR (petitioner) filed a constitutional petition challenging the concurrent orders of the FTO and the President.\n________________________________________\nArguments:\nPetitioners Counsel (FBR):\n•\nArgued that FTO and the President had no authority to order refund of penalty which was lawfully imposed and paid.\n•\nClaimed the penalty under Section 33(24) was validly enforced and not subject to refund under the law.\n________________________________________\nDecision:\nThe High Court dismissed the constitutional petition, holding that:\n•\nNo jurisdictional infirmity was found in the orders passed by the FTO and the President of Pakistan.\n•\nSection 33(25A) proviso clearly provides that if a Tier-1 retailer integrates with the FBR’s computerized system after the first default but before the second, the penalty for the first default is to be waived.\n•\nIn this case, the respondent integrated his business with the FBR system after penalty imposition, and no second default occurred.\n•\nTherefore, the refund of Rs. 500,000 was justified, and the petition was dismissed in limine.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nThe court upheld the position that where a retailer complies with POS integration after initial default, Section 33(25A) mandates that the penalty for the first default be waived. Hence, the FTO and President’s decisions ordering refund were valid and lawful, and no interference was warranted.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(43A),3,33,33(24),33(25A)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=150ZER", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 793 of 2024, decided on 11.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Sohail Nawaz for the pertitioner", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (CIR)\nVS\nPRESIDENT’S SECRETARIAT (PUBLIC) AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25891", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FpNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 615 = 2025 SLD 615", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FpNDU", - "Key Words:": "Applicability of Section 122(5) vs. 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe appellant challenged an amended assessment order for Tax Year 2019 based on undisclosed bank transactions totaling Rs. 10,211,800. The initial amendment was made under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on grounds that the deemed assessment under Section 120(1)(b) was erroneous and prejudicial to revenue. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld this, but the matter was remanded by the Lahore High Court for re-hearing.\nUpon rehearing, the appellant argued that the department used new information (previously undisclosed bank account and transactions) which does not fall within the scope of Section 122(5A), which is limited to the existing record. Therefore, the assessment should have been amended under Section 122(5), which explicitly allows amendment based on “definite information” like newly discovered transactions indicating escaped income.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held that Section 122(5A) was wrongly invoked because the amendment was based on information not available at the time of the original assessment. Since the undisclosed bank transactions came to light after the initial assessment, the correct provision for amendment was Section 122(5). Accordingly, the orders passed by the lower authorities were annulled, and the appeal was accepted.\nCitations:\n•\nGlaxo Laboratories Ltd. v. IAC (1992 PTD 932)\n•\nM/s S.N.H. Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Dept. (2004 PTD 330)\n•\nCIR, Zone-I, LTU v. MCB Bank Ltd. (2021 PTD 1367)\n•\nHonda Atlas Cars (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Appellate Tribunal (2021 PTD 1806)\n•\nCaretex v. Collector of Sales Tax (2013 PTD 1536)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120(1)(b),122(5),122(5A),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 362/IB/2023, (Tax Year 2019). Date of Hearing & Order: 17.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shehzad Ahmed Malik, FCMA\nRespondent by: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Abu Bakar Siddique; House No.168, Mohallah Hali Road, Westridge-1, Rawalpindi - Appellant\nvs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25892", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FpNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 616 = 2025 SLD 616", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FpNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Legal Findings and Holding:\n1. Illegality of the Board’s Approval under Clause (105A):\n•\nThe approval for audit under Clause (105A) was issued by Member (IR-Ops) without any formal, gazetted notification under Section 8 of the FBR Act, 2007, and Rule 3(1) of the FBR Rules.\n•\nNo evidence of valid delegation by the “Board” (as defined in Section 2(5) of the FBR Act) was produced.\n•\nTherefore, the impugned approval dated 05.12.2024 is illegal, without jurisdiction, and void ab initio.\n________________________________________\n2. Invalidity of the “Meeting” held by the Board:\n•\nThe 7th Board-in-Council meeting was conducted via circulation (written comments) and not through physical/virtual assembly, violating Section 3(7) of the FBR Act.\n•\nA meeting requires real-time interaction and deliberation as defined in:\no\nBlack’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.)\no\nSharp v. Dawes (1876) 2 QBD 26\no\nPLD 1958 AndhPra 17\n•\nTherefore, such circulation cannot qualify as a valid “meeting” of the Board.\n________________________________________\n3. Rules Cannot Expand the Scope of the Act:\n•\nRule 3(3) & 3(4) of the FBR Rules allow interim exercise of Board powers by individuals (e.g., Member IR-Ops), subject to later ratification.\n•\nThis exceeds the authority granted under Section 9 of the FBR Act, 2007, which only cures technical defects—not unauthorized delegation.\n•\nHence, the Rules are ultra vires to the extent they expand powers not permitted under the parent statute.\n•\nSupported by case law:\no\nPLD 2023 SC 378\no\nPLD 2011 SC 619\no\n2016 SCMR 550\no\n2013 SCMR 363\no\n2022 SCMR 1787 (Farrukh Raza Sheikh case)\n________________________________________\n4. Approval Sought Through Chief Commissioner Instead of Commissioner:\n•\nUnder Clause (105A), only the Commissioner is authorized to request approval from the Board for audit selection.\n•\nIn this case, the Chief Commissioner sought approval instead—an unauthorized act.\n•\nThis procedural flaw further invalidates the approval, as held in:\no\nAjmal Ali Shiraz v. CIR (2023 SCMR 2084)\no\nMoulana Atta Ur Rehman v. Al-Hajj Sardar Umer Farooq (PLD 2008 SC 663)\n________________________________________\n5. Invalidity of the Order under Section 121:\n•\nThe assessment order under Section 121, dated 13.11.2024, is founded on the void approval dated 05.12.2024.\n•\nTherefore, by applying the principle that “when the foundation is void, the structure cannot stand,” the entire assessment order is declared null and void.\n________________________________________\nCase Law Relied Upon:\n•\nPLD 2008 SC 663 – (Moulana Atta Ur Rehman case)\n•\n2023 SCMR 2084 – (Ajmal Ali Shiraz case)\n•\n2010 SCMR 1746, 2008 CL 337 (SC) – (DG I & I vs Al-Faiz Industries)\n•\nPLD 2023 SC 378, 2016 SCMR 550, 2013 SCMR 363 – (Statutory interpretation, rule-making ultra vires)\n•\nPLD 2020 SC 1, PLD 2014 SC 389, 2022 SCMR 1787 – (Limits of delegated legislation)\n________________________________________\nFinal Disposition:\n1.\nITA No. 95/IB/2025 is allowed – Approval under Clause (105A) declared illegal and void ab initio.\n2.\nITA No. 1993/IB/2024 is allowed – Assessment order under Section 121 declared null and void as it was based on an illegal foundation.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121,177,177(1),214C,Clause 105A of Part-IV to the Second ScheduleFederal Board of Revenue Act, 2007=3,3(7),8,9General Clauses Act, 1956=2(41)", - "Case #": "ITA No.1993/IB/2024 (Tax Year 2020) ITA No.95/IB/2025, MA(Cond) No.68/IB/2025 (Tax Year 2020). Date of Hearing: 13.03.2025. Date of Order: 27.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Waheed Shahzad Butt, Advocate & Mr. Khurram Shahzad, ITP\nRespondent By: Mr. Ghulam Qasim Bhatti, LA, Mr. Sheryar Akram, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S SPRINT OIL AND GAS SERVICES, FZC PLOT # 5-B, MAIN ROAD, SECTOR I-10/3, ISLAMABAD ….. APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III, CTO, ISLAMABAD ….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25893", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FpNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 617 = 2025 SLD 617 = 2025 PTD 373", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FpNC8", - "Key Words:": "Scope of High Courts Jurisdiction under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 – Factual Controversy\n \nDetails:\nThe case involved the seizure of alleged smuggled goods and a vehicle. The Collectorate of Customs filed a Special Customs Reference against the judgment of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which had ruled against the Collectorate. The dispute arose around the mismatch between the Goods Declaration (GD) and the truck involved in the seizure. The Adjudicating Authority accepted the GD but rejected the claimants plea, asserting a mismatch between the GD and the truck without referencing any admissible documentary evidence.\nThe Tribunal, however, addressed and clarified the issue of excess items and the truck number mismatch with support from documentary evidence. This led to a conclusion that only factual controversies were involved. The Collectorate, in its reference before the High Court, did not raise any substantial legal question but focused solely on factual aspects.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the Special Customs Reference, holding that under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, its jurisdiction is limited to questions of law. The Tribunal is the final authority on factual determinations. As no legal question or jurisdictional defect was shown, the reference was not maintainable.\nCitations:\n•\nMessrs F.M.Y. Industries Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Income Tax and another, 2014 SCMR 907\n•\nCollector of Customs Karachi and others v. Messrs Haji Ismail Co. and others, 2015 SCMR 1383\n•\nPakistan State Oil Company Ltd. v. Collector of Custom, E & ST (Adjudication-II) and others, 2006 SCMR 425\n•\nCollector of Customs, Port Muhammad Bin Qasim, Karachi v. Messrs Kaghan Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., 2008 SCMR 1538\n•\nMessrs T & N Pakistan Private Limited v. The Collector Customs and others, 2022 SCMR 1119", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),8,16,56(1),89,196", - "Case #": "Special Customs References Applications (K) Nos.03 and 04 of 2024, decided on 5th December, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD EJAZ SWATI, JUSTICE AND SARDAR AHMED HALEEMI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Jawad Mehmood for Applicant.\nZakir Khan Kakar and Dawood Jan for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (ENFORCEMENT) KHUZDAR CAMP OFFICE AT CUSTOM HOUSE GADDANI\nVS\nATTAULLAH AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25894", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FpNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 618 = 2025 SLD 618 = 2025 PTD 380", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1FpNCs", - "Key Words:": "Requirement of Definite Information under Section 122(5), Income from Other Sources — Family Liability vs. Loan\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, Irfan Ullah of Irfan Traders, was issued a notice under Section 176(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, requiring proof of receipt of a liability—allegedly a loan—through a banking channel. The taxpayer clarified in response that the declared liability was not a loan, but a familial liability arising from a family settlement regarding inherited property shared with his brothers. The Department deemed the explanation unsatisfactory and proceeded with an amended assessment under Sections 122(5), 122(9), and 39(3), claiming the liability should be treated as “income from other sources” due to lack of banking documentation.\nThe only basis cited by the Assessing Officer (AO) was the non-disclosure of the corresponding receivable by the brother in his wealth statement. However, the Tribunal found that prior to issuing the notice under Section 176, the AO lacked any “definite information” that would support treating the liability as a loan received in the relevant tax year. The Tribunal also observed that the AO failed to conduct further verification (such as audit under Section 177) before initiating assessment proceedings.\nHeld:\nThe Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal set aside the amended assessment order, holding that the AO acted without lawful jurisdiction. It was ruled that there was no definite information within the meaning of Section 122(5) read with Section 39(3), and that the AOs inquiry amounted to a fishing expedition, which is not permitted under law. Consequently, the notice under Section 122(9) and the resulting amendment order were declared unlawful. The taxpayer’s appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=39(3),111,122,122(1),122(5),122(9),176,176(1),177", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 368/PB of 2023, decided on 30th January, 2024. Date of hearing: 30th January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M ABDULLAH KHAN KAKAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. SHAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Danish Ali Qazi for Appellant.\nMs. Fouzia Iqbal, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IRFAN ULLAH, IRFAN TRADERS \nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, UNIT-41, RANGE-1, (D.I. KHAN ZONE), RTO, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25895", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5SXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 682 = 2025 SLD 682 = 2025 YLR 271", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5SXk", - "Key Words:": "•\nConstitution of Pakistan: Arts. 4, 5, 10-A, 62(f), 218(3), 219(a)(b)\n•\nElections Act, 2017: Ss. 8(c), 9\n•\nCivil Procedure Code, 1908: O. XXVII-A\nHigh Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere with Election Commission’s Declaration – Constitutional Interpretation\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the issuance of notice and declaration by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), contending that the ECP lacked constitutional authority to pass such a declaration, as Article 218(3) of the Constitution limits ECP’s role to organizing and conducting elections. The case raised significant constitutional questions, particularly in light of Articles 4, 5, 10-A, 62(f), 218(3), 219(a)(b) of the Constitution and Sections 8(c) and 9 of the Elections Act, 2017.\nThe petitioner argued that the ECP had overstepped its constitutional jurisdiction, and before deciding the legality of the ECP’s action, it was necessary for the court to frame and examine constitutional moot points. Recognizing that the case involved the interpretation of constitutional provisions and affected fundamental rights, the High Court framed constitutional questions, issued notices to the respondents, and also served notices to the Attorney General for Pakistan and the Advocate General of Punjab under Order XXVII-A, C.P.C.\nThe High Court passed an interim injunctive order, restraining any adverse action against the petitioner, citing the principle that courts may intervene in ECP’s decisions when those involve illegal, mala fide, or manifestly arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction.\nHeld:\n•\nThe High Court was competent to entertain the petition as it involved constitutional interpretation and protection of fundamental rights.\n•\nConstitutional moot points were framed and notices were issued accordingly.\n•\nInterim relief was granted, restraining adverse action against the petitioner until final adjudication.\n•\nPetition was admitted for regular hearing.\n•\nCase Law Relied Upon:\no\nAli Asjad Malhi v. Syeda Nosheen Iftikhar PLD 2023 SC 1\no\nImran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 CLC 239\no\nPEMRA v. Labbaik Pvt. Ltd. PLD 2023 SC 27\no\nFederation v. Shafiq-ul-Hassan 2020 SCMR 2119\n•\nCase Law Referred:\no\nEjaz Ahmed Sandhu v. ECP 2018 SCMR 1367\no\nFaisal Vawd v. ECP 2020 SCP 358\no\nTariq Iqbal v. ECP PLD 2022 Lah. 607\no\nSaima Ashiq v. ECP 2022 MLD 2018\no\nMuhammad Umais v. Rawalpindi Cantonment Board PLD 2022 Lah. 148", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,5,10-A,62(f),218(3),219(a)(b)Elections Act, 2017=8(c),9", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 332 of 2023, decided on 5th January, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Senator Barrister Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court with Mohammad Azhar Siddique, Advocate Supreme Court along with Munir Ahmed, Mian Shakir Ismail, Barrister Nudrat B. Majeed, Salma Riaz, Amna Liaqat, Arshad Ali Azhar, Asfand Yar Khan Lodhi, Sikandar Sultan Ch. and Abdullah Arif for the Petitioner.\nNasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General and Nasir Javed Ghuman, Deputy Attorney General on Court's Call.\nRai Shahid Saleem Khan, Additional Advocate General with Syed Abul Ali Jafri, Assistant Advocate General.\nImran Arif Ranjha, Legal Advisor and Hafiz Adeel Ashraf, Law Officer for ECP on Court's Call.\nDr. Asim Murtaza Cheema, Civil Judge/Research Officer, Lahore High Court, Lahore.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMRAN AHMAD KHAN NIAZI-PETITIONER\nVS\nELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25896", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 683 = 2025 SLD 683 = 2025 YLR 277", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTc", - "Key Words:": "•\nKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013: S. 15\n•\nPakistan Penal Code: Ss. 302, 324, 34\nPossession of Illegal Weapon – Recovery on Pointation – Appreciation of Evidence\nDetails:\nUnder the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 (S.15), the appellants were charged with illegal possession of firearms. The case stemmed from an investigation into a murder and attempted murder case registered under Sections 302, 324 & 34, PPC, wherein the accused remained fugitives until their arrest on 14.04.2018.\nSubsequently, on 16.04.2018, during investigation, a police recovery witness testified that the accused led them to a cattle-shed at their home and recovered a 30-bore pistol and a .12 bore repeater from a pile of husk. The recovery memo was duly exhibited without objection and remained unchallenged.\nThe defense failed to discredit the recovery witness despite lengthy cross-examination. No firearm license or credible defense was produced by the appellants to establish lawful possession or to allege that the weapons were planted. The forensic evidence confirmed that the weapons recovered were used in the offence under investigation.\nThe Trial Court concluded that the prosecution had credibly established the accused’s involvement in both the main offence and illegal possession of arms, leading to their conviction.\nHeld:\n•\nRecovery was established on the accused’s pointation and remained unshaken.\n•\nWeapons were linked to the primary offence through forensic evidence.\n•\nAbsence of firearm licenses and failure to rebut prosecution’s case confirmed guilt.\n•\nNo material contradictions or legal infirmities were shown to merit interference.\n•\nAppeal was dismissed and conviction upheld.\n•\nCase Law Relied Upon:\no\nNazir Shehzad and another v. The State 2009 SCMR 1440", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, (XXIII of 2013)=15Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=302,324,34", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 326-A of 2020, decided on 13th December, 2022. Date of hearing: 13th December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): WIQAR AHMAD, JUSTICE AND FAZAL SUBHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Astaghfirullah and Usman Saleem for the Appellants.\nSardar Ali Raza, A.A.G. for the State.\nAtif Ali Jadoon for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAQIB AND ANOTHER-APPELLANTS\nVS\nTHE STATE AND ANOTHER-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25897", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 684 = 2025 SLD 684 = 2025 CLD 122", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTY", - "Key Words:": "Nominee in Life Insurance Policies – Legal Status and Distribution of Policy Proceeds\nDetails:\n(a) Meaning of Nominee :\nA nominee is someone designated to act on behalf of another, especially in legal or financial contexts. They may hold assets in trust or receive funds for others. A nominee has no ownership rights but acts in a fiduciary capacity.\n(b) Legal Status of Nominee under S.72 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000:\nThe nomination under S.72 confers only the right to receive the proceeds of a life insurance policy. It does not operate as a will or gift, and thus does not override Islamic inheritance laws. The nominee acts merely as a trustee for the benefit of all lawful heirs.\nCited Cases:\n•\nMst. Amtal Habib v. Mst. Musarat Parveen PLD 1974 SC 185\n•\nMalik Safdar Ali Khan v. Public At Large 2004 SCMR 1219\n•\nMst. Ameeran Khatoon v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar 2005 SCMR 512\n•\nPLI v. Muhammad Ishaque Butt 2022 CLD 309\n(c) Proceeds of Life Insurance Policy as “Tarka” and Right of Legal Heirs:\nIn cases where the deceased nominated a spouse (wife) as the nominee, and the mother of the deceased sought a succession certificate for her Quranic share (1/6), lower courts dismissed the petition holding the insurance amount as outside the scope of Tarka (inheritable estate).\nHowever, the High Court set aside the lower courts’ judgments, holding:\n•\nProceeds of life insurance do fall within the ambit of Tarka.\n•\nNominee cannot be treated as the exclusive beneficiary.\n•\nIslamic Law of Inheritance applies, and all legal heirs are entitled to their Quranic shares.\n•\nNomination is a procedural formality under S.72, not a testamentary disposition.\n•\nUnder S.72(5), in the absence of a nominee, the amount is payable to legal heirs or succession certificate holders — reinforcing the idea that the policy amount belongs to the deceased’s estate.\nCited Case:\n•\nMuhammad Umar v. IGI and others 2023 CLD 420\nHeld:\n•\nThe concept of nominee is alien to Muslim Law.\n•\nNominee is only an administrator/trustee—not a beneficiary.\n•\nThe insurance proceeds are distributable among all legal heirs as part of the deceased’s estate (Tarka).\n•\nCourts below committed legal error by not applying principles of Islamic inheritance and misreading the role of a nominee.\n•\nRevision petitions were allowed, recognizing the legal heirs’ rights over insurance proceeds.\nCitations:\no\nMuhammad Umar v. IGI 2023 CLD 420\no\nPLD 2020 Sindh 263, PLD 1982 FSC 143, PLD 1991 SC 731 – distinguished", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=72", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No. 44347 of 2023, decided on 1st October, 2024. Date of hearing: 1st October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Alamgir Khan for Petitioner.\nAkhtar Saeed Bhatti for Respondents Nos. 2-5.\nBarrister Humayun Faiz for Respondent No.6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. RAZIA BEGUM - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nPUBLIC AT LARGE AND OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25898", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 685 = 2025 SLD 685 = 2025 CLD 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTU", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Banking Court – Claim for Damages Against Financial Institution\nDetails:\nThe appellant (customer) filed a suit for declaration and damages against a bank, alleging that the bank unlawfully attempted to repossess a vehicle obtained through an auto finance facility. During this thwarted attempt, the customer claimed that personal items, including jewelry, were removed from the vehicle, causing him mental anguish.\nThe Banking Court returned the plaint, holding that the nature of the damages claimed (tortious acts and mental torture) did not fall within its jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\nOn appeal, the High Court held that:\n•\nClaims for pecuniary compensation arising from tortious acts or non-contractual breaches that do not pertain to a “finance” as defined in S.2(d) are indeed outside the scope of a Banking Courts jurisdiction.\n•\nHowever, when the claim for compensation arises due to a financial institution’s failure to fulfill obligations related to a financial facility, such a claim falls within the scope of S.9 of the Ordinance and is maintainable before the Banking Court.\n•\nIn such situations, only the non-maintainable portion of the claim (e.g., tortious damages) should be struck out, and the remainder of the case should proceed on its merits.\nThe High Court set aside the Banking Court’s decision and remanded the matter for reconsideration in light of this legal distinction.\nHeld:\nThe Banking Court had erred in returning the entire plaint without distinguishing between maintainable and non-maintainable claims. The matter was remanded for decision afresh.\nCitations:\n•\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001: Ss. 2(d), 9\n•\nCitibank N.A v. Syed Shahanshah Hussain 2009 CLD 1564\n•\nM/s M.M.K Rice Mills v. Grays Leasing and others 2006 CLD 1147", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=22", - "Case #": "I.A. No.187 of 2017, heard on 13th September, 2024.Date of hearing: 13th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE YOUSUF ALI SAYEED AND ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant in person.\nGhulam Rasool Korai for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ MIRZA-APPELLANT\nVS\nM/S STANDARD CHARTERED BANK LIMITED AND OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25899", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 686 = 2025 SLD 686 = 2025 CLD 6", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTQ", - "Key Words:": "•\nCompanies Ordinance, 1984: Ss. 39, 40\n•\nCompanies Act, 2017: S.13(3)\n•\nPunjab Land Revenue Act, 1967: S.42\nChange of Company Name – Revenue Record Mutation – Not a Sale\nDetails:\nThe petitioner company challenged an order by the revenue authorities which refused to incorporate a change of company name in the land Record of Rights, treating it instead as a sale transaction. The company had changed its name from National Sugar Industries Limited to Popular Sugar Mills Limited , with such change duly approved under Sections 39 and 40 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (now corresponding to S.13(3) of the Companies Act, 2017).\nThe revenue authorities, relying on S.42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, treated the name change as a transaction involving acquisition of rights by a different person, thus requiring sale formalities.\nThe High Court rejected this interpretation, holding that:\n•\nA mere change in name does not affect the legal personality of the company.\n•\nThe rights, obligations, and ownership status of the company remain unchanged.\n•\nS.42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act is relevant to situations where rights are acquired by a new person, not when a company undergoes a name change.\n•\nThe phrase “a person” under S.42 implies a change in ownership or tenancy, not mere change in nomenclature.\nTherefore, refusal to record the name change as a mutation entry and its treatment as a sale was legally erroneous. The constitutional petition was allowed, and the revenue authority’s decision was set aside.\nHeld:\nA change in company name does not constitute a transfer of rights under S.42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The companys legal identity remains the same; hence, mutation on the basis of name change must be allowed and cannot be treated as a sale.\nCitations:\n•\nAsghar Ali v. P.K. Shahani 1992 CLC 2282\n•\nHabib Safe Deposit Vault (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh 2015 PTD 1863\n•\nHira Textile Mills Ltd. v. EDO (Revenue), Kasur 2009 CLD 839\n•\nAdministrator, Thal Development v. Ali Muhammad 2012 SCMR 730\n•\nSalomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. 1897 AC 22 (HL)\n•\nLee v. Lee’s Air Farming Ltd. 1960 3 All ER / 1961 AC 12 (PC)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=39,40Companies Act, 2017=13(3)Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967=42", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.40356 of 2019, decided on 5th December, 2023. Dates of hearing: 21st September, 19th and 24th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Haq Nawaz Chattha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMs. Samia Khalid Additional Advocate General, Salman Asif Warraich, Assistant Advocate General with Ch. Rab Nawaz, Assistant Commissioner and Ijaz Ahmad, Tehsildar / Sub-Registrar Kot Momin for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S POPULAR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nDISTRICT COLLECTOR, SARGODHA AND 2 OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25900", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 687 = 2025 SLD 687 = 2025 CLD 15", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RS8", - "Key Words:": "•\nCompetition Act, 2010: Ss. 30, 31, 37\n•\nConstitution of Pakistan: Art. 199\nAbuse of Dominant Position – NOC Refusal – No Violation Found\nDetails:\nThe petitioner company filed a constitutional petition challenging the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP)’s report which declined to initiate proceedings against the Pakistan Hockey Federation (PHF). The dispute arose from PHF’s refusal to issue a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to the petitioner for organizing a junior hockey league event.\nThe petitioner alleged that PHF had abused its dominant position under Sections 30 and 31 of the Competition Act, 2010. An inquiry was initiated, during which the petitioner was given multiple opportunities to establish that PHF was indeed in a dominant position and had abused it by refusing to issue the NOC. However, the Inquiry Report found that:\n•\nPHF did not hold a dominant position in the relevant market for junior hockey leagues;\n•\nThere was no evidence of abuse of any such position;\n•\nRefusal to issue an NOC for a commercial sporting event did not amount to anti-competitive conduct.\nThe High Court held that:\n•\nFair process was followed by the CCP and procedural rights under S. 37 of the Act were not violated;\n•\nNo independent right to a hearing existed before a formal complaint is filed;\n•\nCCPs decision was within its statutory mandate and did not suffer from illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety;\n•\nThe refusal of NOC by PHF did not infringe any fundamental rights of the petitioner;\n•\nCCP, as a specialized statutory body, is entrusted with technical assessment and its conclusions cannot be lightly interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.\nHeld:\nThe Pakistan Hockey Federation was found to be not dominant in the relevant market, and its refusal to issue an NOC did not amount to abuse of dominance. The High Court upheld the Competition Commission’s report, finding no procedural or substantive fault, and dismissed the constitutional petition.\nCitations:\n•\nCompetition Commission of Pakistan v. Dalda Foods Limited 2023 CLD 1298\n•\nJustice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 483\n•\nFederation of Pakistan v. Durrani Ceramics 2014 PTD 2016\n•\nTelenor Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 PTD 1097\n•\nState v. Obaid Khan (Deceased) PLD 2024 SC 810", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=30,31,37Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.4526 of 2021, decided on 30th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE BABAR SATTAR, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Noman Amin Farooqi for Petitioner.\nCh. Ishtiaq Mehrban, Deputy Attorney General.\nAdnan Haider for Respondents Nos.2 to 7.\nM. Majid Bashir for Respondent No.8.\nMuhammad Haider Imtiaz, Law Officer, Competition Commission of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S STRAWBERRY SPORTS MANAGEMENT (PRIVATE) LIMITED, THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY FINANCE AND 7 OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25901", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 688 = 2025 SLD 688 = 2025 CLD 23", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RSs", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss.153 & 166(2)(e)-State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act (VII of 2023), S.29-Recruitment process for appointment of Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-Judicial review-Scope-Eligibility criteria and process for recruitment-Determination - PETITIONER(S) challenged the composition of recruitment board, increase in number of board members without calling Annual General Meeting, appointment of independent directors ignoring their inter se relationship being brothers and non-representation of female in the board-Validity-Section 166(2) of the Companies Act, 2017, does not serve to preclude two or more persons who are related inter se but as are otherwise unrelated to the sponsors/shareholders or directors representing otherwise their interests from being appointed as independent directors of a company-No requirement had been imposed by the Commission as to female representation in the board and the petitioner was also unable to point out any notification or directive in that regard-Section 29 of the State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operation) Act, 2023, empowers the Federal Government to exercise all the powers and rights of shareholders with the respondent being entirely owned by the Federal Government and its shareholding vesting solely in the President of Pakistan, which factual aspect remained unrefuted, thus, the argument that an Annual General Meeting ought to have been called for approving the increase in the size of its Board was fallacious and misconceived - PETITIONER(S) painted National Insurance Company Limited to be rife with malfeasance, with its incumbent CEO being at the epicentre thereof and to have so entrenched himself within the organisation so as to be able to orchestrate his own continuity in that role, which suggested that the Federal Government had conspired so as to expand the size of the Board and induct handpicked persons for the role of independent directors while excluding female representation for the ulterior motive of then tailoring the advertisement to fit the specification met by the incumbent so as to pave the way for his re-appointment, all of which was far-fetched to say the least-Disparate allegations had been conflated so as to cobble together a case against the recruitment process, which on examination, did not suffer from any contravention of law, rule, policy so as to warrant interference in exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=153,166(2))(e)", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-3201 of 2024, decided on 19th September, 2024.Dates of hearing: 6th, 11th and 19th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE YOUSUF ALI SAYEED AND ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmed Masood for Petitioner.\nZahid F. Ebrahim for Respondent No.3.\nZehrah S. Vayani, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED SAULAT HUSSAIN NAQVI - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25902", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 689 = 2025 SLD 689 = 2025 CLD 29", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTk", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Claim – Concealment of Pre-existing Illness – Utmost Good Faith – Partial Decree of Claim\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, mother of the deceased insured, filed an insurance claim asserting that her son had taken an insurance policy but died before the first premium payment. The respondent insurance company denied the claim on grounds of concealment of pre-existing ailments—specifically Hepatitis-A and C—which were not disclosed in the policy application. The petitioner admitted during cross-examination that the deceased had a history of Hepatitis and this fact was conveyed to the company. The policy documents showed that the insured had not declared any disease in his health form.\nHeld:\n•\nThe insurance contract is governed by the principle of uberrima fides (utmost good faith) under Section 75, requiring full disclosure by both parties.\n•\nThe deceased actively concealed material facts (Hepatitis-A and C), leading to a just rejection of the claim by the company.\n•\nHowever, since the insurer had received one premium payment, the Insurance Tribunal, under Section 81, directed a refund of Rs. 50,000 to the petitioner.\n•\nThe petitioners prayer for full death benefit was dismissed.\n•\nThe insurance application was partly decreed.\n________________________________________\nTopic: Insurance Claim – Rejection Due to Concealment – No Liquidated Damages\nDetails:\nFollowing the rejection of the insurance claim based on the deceased’s concealment of Hepatitis-A and C, the petitioner also sought liquidated damages.\nHeld:\n•\nDue to the proven concealment of material health information, the insurance claim was lawfully rejected.\n•\nSince the claim itself failed, no entitlement to liquidated damages arose.\n•\nThe Tribunal ordered the company to return the Rs. 50,000 premium under Section 81, and dismissed the main claim.\n________________________________________\nTopic: Requirement of SECP Permission – Filing of Insurance Petition\nDetails:\nThe insurance company argued that the petition should be dismissed as it was filed without prior permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) under Section 162.\nHeld:\n•\nNo such requirement exists under Section 162 for seeking SECP’s permission before filing an insurance petition in the Insurance Tribunal.\n•\nThe objection was rejected, and the Tribunal reiterated its earlier direction for refund of the premium and dismissal of the death claim.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=75", - "Case #": "Insurance Application Petition No.310 of 2022, decided on 27th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE JUSTICE (RTD.) ALI AKBAR QURESHI, CHAIRMAN AND ZAFAR IQBAL TARAR, MEMBER LEGAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahid Mehmood for Petitioner.\nBarrister Mian Ahmad Hamad for Respondent/company.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. JAMEELA RIAZ - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nIGI LIFE INSURANCE THROUGH HEAD OF BUSINESS AND OPERATION AND ANOTHER - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25903", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 690 = 2025 SLD 690 = 2025 CLD 34", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RTg", - "Key Words:": "SECP – Unauthorized Transfer of Shares – Maintainability of Second Appeal – Concurrent Findings of Fact\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a stock exchange broker, was accused of unauthorized transfer of shares belonging to the respondent as per trading records maintained by the Central Depository Company (CDC). The Director, Securities Market Division (SMD) of SECP, found the appellant liable, and the Appellate Bench of SECP upheld the order. The broker filed a second appeal, challenging the findings.\nThe broker contended that the shares were transferred with authorization under S.4(3) of the Central Depositories Act, 1997, which allows a broker, with written consent, to enter securities into his own account on behalf of a client without setting up a separate sub-account. However, no credible proof of authorization was presented.\nThe broker also allegedly extended credit to the complainant to purchase securities, a practice barred under S.16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.\nHeld:\n•\nThe High Court refused to interfere in the concurrent findings of fact by the SECP and its Appellate Bench.\n•\nUnder S.100 of the Civil Procedure Code, a second appeal can only be entertained if a substantial question of law arises. No such question was established.\n•\nThe broker failed to demonstrate any legal error, omission of material legal issue, or procedural defect in the decisions of SECP or its appellate forum.\n•\nThe second appeal was dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\nSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, Ss. 33 & 34\n•\nSecurities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, S. 16\n•\nCentral Depositories Act, 1997, S. 4(3)\n•\nCivil Procedure Code, 1908, S. 100\n•\nCases Referenced:\no\nMr. Saddiq Moti v. Appellate Bench to SECP (Civil Appeal No. 475/2006)\no\nHonorary Capt. (Retd.) Noor Ahmed v. Aly Osman, SEC 2006 CLD 304\no\nFayyaz Ahmed v. Muhammad Sarfraz Ghumman 2005 CLD 1229", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=33,34Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969=16Central Depositories Act, 1997=4(3)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=100", - "Case #": "SECP Appeal No.06 of 2015, decided on 19th November, 2024. Date of hearing: 31st October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE BABAR SATTAR, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shezada Mazhar for Appellant.\nShahzad Ali Rana for Respondents/SECP.\nRespondent No.3 in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SIDDIQ MOTI (DECEASED) THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS-APPELLANT\nVS\nAPPELLATE BENCH REGISTRY, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD AND 2 OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25904", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 691 = 2025 SLD 691 = 2025 CLD 44", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RXo", - "Key Words:": "Winding Up of Company – Execution Proceedings – Secured Creditor – Leave to Proceed Against Guarantors and Mortgagors\nDetails:\nDuring execution proceedings initiated by ZTBL for recovery under decrees against a company and individual guarantors/mortgagors, the company entered winding-up. ZTBL filed an application under S. 310 of the Companies Act, 2017 (previously S. 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984) seeking leave to proceed with execution petitions on the ground that the decrees were not solely against the company but also against individual guarantors and mortgagors.\nThe legal principle examined was that a secured creditor is not bound to prove debt in winding-up proceedings and may rely on and enforce their security independently. Furthermore, when individuals are jointly and severally liable alongside a company, execution against them should not be barred by the pendency of winding-up proceedings against the company.\nHeld:\n•\nA secured creditor is entitled to stand outside winding-up proceedings and enforce security.\n•\nExecution against individual guarantors and mortgagors is maintainable independently from the winding-up of the company.\n•\nThe winding-up court cannot proceed against personal properties of guarantors or mortgagors.\n•\nLeave to proceed was partially allowed:\no\nZTBL was permitted to proceed with execution against guarantors and mortgagors.\no\nExecution could not proceed against the company due to the winding-up order.\n•\nThe High Court has discretion to impose conditions while granting such leave.\nCitations:\no\nM/s Kashmir Theatres Ltd. v. Sh. Abdul Rehman, PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lah. 326\no\nSECP v. Innovative Investment Bank Ltd., C.O. No.46/2010, order dated 26.04.2018\no\nShafi Woolen Industries Ltd., PLD 1993 Lah. 691\no\nCapt. Muhammad Aqeel Siddiqi, PLD 1988 Kar. 72", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=316Companies Act, 2017=310", - "Case #": "C.O. No.30 of 2004, C.M. Nos.376 of 2016, 02 and 04 of 2022, decided on 16th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Irshad Ullah Chatha and Muhammad Jamil Rahi for Applicant (in C.M. No.02 of 2022).\nMohsin Ashfaq for Applicant (in C.M. No.04 of 2022).\nArshad Iqbal Tarar, JOL.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nKOH-I-NOOR EDIBLE OILS LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25905", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 692 = 2025 SLD 692 = 2025 CLD 50", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5RXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Protection of Well-Known Trademark – NTN vs. NBN\nFacts:\n•\nAppellant used the trademark NBN for ball bearings and taper rollers.\n•\nRegistrar of Trade Marks rejected the registration due to similarity with NTN, a well-known and internationally registered trademark of the respondent.\nLegal Reasoning:\n•\nSection 86: Protects well-known trademarks, even against applications for deceptively similar marks.\n•\nNTN was found to be widely registered and recognized internationally.\n•\nNBN resembled NTN, enough to confuse consumers and exploit the goodwill of the established brand.\n•\nThe principle of consumer protection is central in trademark law—to avoid confusion between products of different origins.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe appeal was dismissed, affirming that NBN infringed upon NTN.\n•\nNo error in the Registrar’s order.\nCited Precedents:\nCEC v. GEC; BEI v. BEL; ETC v. ATE; AEC v. GEC; AIR-1974.\n________________________________________\n(b) Trademark Infringement Tests – Application of Legal Tests\nAdditional Legal Analysis:\n•\nThree legal tests were applied to determine infringement:\no\n Moron in a Hurry Test – would even a careless or rushed consumer be confused?\no\n Class Trinity Test – similarity in appearance, sound, and meaning.\no\n LAPP Test (Likelihood of Association of Products and Purchasers) – assesses likelihood of confusion.\nFindings:\n•\nNBN failed all tests, especially due to its visual and phonetic similarity with NTN.\n•\nTrademark law doesn’t protect a party that adopts a mark with knowledge of a pre-existing well-known mark.\nConclusion:\n•\nRegistrar’s decision was upheld.\n•\nAppeal dismissed.\nCited Case:\nHamdard Laboratories (Waqf) Pakistan v. Muhammad Fahim 2016 CLD 2144.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Takeaways:\n•\nWell-known trademarks enjoy broad protection, even against similar marks used in the same industry.\n•\nIntent or awareness of an existing mark can be inferred from the choice of a similar mark.\n•\nConsumer confusion is the core issue—if confusion is likely, courts will intervene to protect the senior mark.\n•\nPakistani trademark law aligns with international principles regarding protection of reputation and market identity.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001=86", - "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No.42 along with Miscellaneous Appeal No.43 of 2007, decided on 6th February, 2024. Date of hearing: 6th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Naheed Akhtar holding brief for Muhammad Ali Zahid for Appellant.\nQamaruddin for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL WASIM-APPELLANT\nVS\nM/S NTN CORPORATION AND ANOTHER - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25906", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 693 = 2025 SLD 693 = 2025 CLD 53", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Communication, Policy Disclosure, and Duty of Insurer\nLegal Provisions Involved:\n•\nInsurance Ordinance, 2000: Sections 97, 118, 122(3)\n•\nInsurance Rules, 2017: Rules 41, 54, 56, 57\n•\nCorporate Insurance Agents Regulations, 2020: Regulation 18(f)\nFacts:\n•\nThe petitioner/policyholder alleged that the insurer failed to return the full premium and profit upon maturity.\n•\nThe insurer claimed the petitioner was regularly updated through Call Back Confirmations (CBCs).\nKey Findings & Principles:\n•\nInsurers are legally bound to provide full, transparent, and ongoing communication throughout the policy cycle regarding:\no\nPolicy status\no\nStatutory funds and units\no\nInvestments (names of companies or government securities)\n•\nThe phrase throughout the policy cycle and any ancillary matters reflects legislative intent to safeguard policyholders financial interests.\n•\nCBC recordings were held inadmissible as evidence:\no\nThey lacked crucial disclosures about creation/investment of funds.\n•\nInsurer failed to discharge burden of proof regarding legal CBC compliance.\nInsurance Tribunal’s Directions:\n•\nQualified Agents: Must be trained and certified.\n•\nFull Disclosure: Agents must explain all policy aspects in plain language.\n•\nVideo Recordings: Mandatory recording of policy explanation and Q & A for transparency.\n•\nInvestment Transparency: Disclose fund creation, unit allocation, and investment names.\n•\nPolicy Illustrations: Must be clear, standalone, and provided with sufficient time for understanding.\n•\nNeed Analysis: Performed by a certified person under Regln. 18(f).\n•\nAdditional Safeguards for:\no\nIlliterate persons\no\nWomen (whether literate or not) — require a male family witness for documentation.\n•\nBilingual Policy Documents: In both Urdu and English in simple language.\n•\nInvestment Guidelines: Preferably in AA+ rated companies (per PACRA ratings).\n•\nUniversal Access: SECP and insurers to have hotlines/websites for FAQs.\n•\nMandatory Compliance Documentation: Required at the time of filing insurance petitions.\nConclusion:\n•\nPetition allowed.\n•\nTribunal provided a comprehensive regulatory framework to be followed by all insurance companies.\nPrecedents Relied Upon:\n•\nPLD 2019 SC 675, 2021 SCMR 522, 2016 PLC (C.S.) 1219, 2023 PCr.LJ 1394\n________________________________________\n(b) Principle of Utmost Good Faith\nSection 75 – Insurance Ordinance, 2000\n•\nThe duty of utmost good faith applies from inception of the policy to its termination.\n•\nAssessed continuously, not just at the point of claim or issuance.\n________________________________________\n(c) Language of Policy Documents\nSection 77 – Insurance Ordinance, 2000\n•\nUse of plain and simple language is mandatory.\n•\nPolicyholders must be able to easily understand:\no\nTerms and conditions\no\nBenefits\no\nResponsibilities of insurer\n•\nFailure to comply bars insurers from using technical non-disclosures or misunderstandings as a ground to deny claims.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Takeaways:\n•\nPolicyholder rights are paramount in insurance law—regulatory compliance is strict and enforceable.\n•\nTransparency, accessibility, and accountability are central to insurer obligations.\n•\nInsurance Tribunal decisions are pushing toward consumer-centric reforms.\n•\nFailure of the insurer to prove communication or informed consent is fatal to their defense.", - "Court Name:": "Insurance Tribunal, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=97,118,122(3)", - "Case #": "Petition No.97 of 2023, decided on 7th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE (RETD.) ALI AKBAR QURESHI, CHAIRMAN AND ZAFAR IQBAL TARAR, MEMBER LEGAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Muhammad Aslam for Petitioner.\nArshad Farooq Ch. and Sher Dill Shehbaz Khagga for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD TARIQ - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nJUBILEE LIFE INSURANCE-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25907", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 694 = 2025 SLD 694 = 2025 CLD 73", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Trade Organizations Rules, 2013 – Election Oversight by DGTO\nRelevant Legal Provisions:\n•\nTrade Organizations Rules, 2013: Rr. 2(b), 2(g), 11(7), 18(3), 21(5)\n•\nDGTO’s Role: Regulator of trade bodies under the Trade Organizations Act, 2013\nFacts:\n•\nPetitioner: A Chamber of Commerce and Industry.\n•\nIssue: The Chamber challenged three orders of the Director General of Trade Organizations (DGTO) issued during the run-up to the 2024–2026 Executive Committee Elections.\n•\nDGTOs Directives:\no\nShare the voter list per membership class (Associate & Corporate).\no\nRevert security deposit from Rs. 100,000/- to Rs. 15,000/-.\no\nDecide the mode of polling.\no\nSubmit a compliance report on earlier orders.\nPetitioner’s Argument:\n•\nOrders were without jurisdiction, unjustified, and obstructed the election process.\nCourt’s Findings:\n•\nThe Articles of Association of the petitioner aligned with Rules 2(b), 2(g), 11(7), and 21(5), requiring:\no\nTwo membership classes: Corporate and Associate.\no\n50% Executive Committee representation from Corporate Members.\no\nElectoral college to be drawn from respective classes.\n•\nAny amendment to electoral procedure (e.g., electronic voting or increased security fee) requires approval from DGTO and incorporation into the Memorandum and Articles of Association, which was not done.\nConclusion:\n•\nDGTO acted within its statutory powers.\n•\nConstitutional petition dismissed as meritless.\n________________________________________\n(b) Constitutional Petition – Maintainability Under Article 199\nLegal Provision:\n•\nArticle 199 – Constitution of Pakistan: Jurisdiction of High Courts\nIssue:\n•\nCould the High Court interfere with the DGTO’s regulatory orders via a constitutional petition?\nCourt’s Reasoning:\n•\nArticle 199 does not substitute the appellate framework set out under the Trade Organizations Act/Rules.\n•\nHigh Court’s constitutional jurisdiction is limited to checking for:\no\nIllegality\no\nIrrationality\no\nProcedural impropriety\n•\nThe DGTO’s orders did not violate any of these principles.\n•\nTherefore, judicial restraint was appropriate.\nConclusion:\n•\nThe constitutional petition was not maintainable and thus dismissed.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Takeaways:\n1.\nDGTO has authority to regulate and oversee electoral processes of trade bodies to ensure compliance with statutory rules.\n2.\nClass-based representation is mandatory in Executive Committees under the Trade Organizations Rules, 2013.\n3.\nUnapproved amendments (e.g., enhanced fees, e-voting) have no legal force unless properly sanctioned by the regulator.\n4.\nConstitutional petitions under Art. 199 are not an alternative to the statutory appellate process and are limited to addressing gross illegality or procedural abuse.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-4398 of 2024, heard on 20th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 20th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, JUSTICE AND ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Javed for Petitioner.\nMaz Waheed and Usman Khan for Intervener.\nKafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Additional Advocate General, Sindh.\nKazi Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, D.A.G along with Ali Sufian Director, DGTO, Islamabad.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KARACHI CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY THROUGH SECRETARY GENERAL - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25908", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 695 = 2025 SLD 695 = 2025 CLD 78", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTU", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 34: Discretionary Power to Stay Legal Proceedings\nKey Legal Principles:\n1.\nSection 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940:\no\nGrants courts the discretionary power to stay proceedings where there exists a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.\no\nStay is not mandatory; it depends on the circumstances of the case.\n2.\nParty Requirement:\no\nOnly parties to the arbitration agreement can invoke Section 34.\no\nNon-signatories cannot compel arbitration unless exceptional circumstances apply (e.g., alter ego doctrine, group of companies doctrine—which were not present in this case).\n3.\nRectification of Register – Company Law Jurisdiction:\no\nDisputes involving rectification of the register, third-party rights, and corporate control fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Company Bench of the High Court under the Companies Act.\no\nSuch matters often involve factual controversies, multiple stakeholders, and statutory remedies, which are not well-suited for arbitration.\n4.\nPractical Concerns Against Arbitration in Multilateral Disputes:\no\nAllowing arbitration where not all parties are signatories can:\n\nCause bifurcation of proceedings.\n\nLead to conflicting decisions.\n\nIncrease litigation costs and cause delay.\n\nResult in substantial miscarriage of justice.\n________________________________________\nJudicial Findings:\n•\nThe applicants sought a stay of proceedings in a company petition and reference of the matter to arbitration.\n•\nHowever:\no\nAll parties in the main petition were not signatories to the arbitration clause.\no\nThe agreement containing the arbitration clause was a separate and distinct contract.\n•\nThe Court emphasized:\no\nCompany-related disputes, especially those affecting register of members, corporate control, and third-party interests, are more appropriately resolved by judicial forums.\no\nSuch disputes require framing of issues, recording of evidence, and binding adjudication, which arbitration may not effectively provide.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe application for stay and reference to arbitration was dismissed.\n•\nThe court exercised its discretion under Section 34 to retain jurisdiction, considering the interests of justice, scope of the dispute, and the non-applicability of the arbitration agreement to all parties involved.\n________________________________________\nNotable Case Law Referenced:\nWhile specific citations aren’t listed in the extract, the reasoning aligns with settled case law such as:\n•\nDallah Real Estate v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Pakistan (UKSC)\n•\nNissan Motors Co. Ltd. v. Muhammad Shafi\n•\nPakistani precedents emphasizing party consent and scope of arbitration.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=34", - "Case #": "C.M. No.3 of 2023 in C.O. No.48681 of 2023, heard on 24th June, 2024. Date of hearing: 24th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Talha for Respondent 4 (in main petition).\nZaki Rehman for Respondent No.5 (in main petition).\nArshad Tayebaly, Arshad Nazir Mirza, Talha Javed, Saad Amir, Amna Iqbal, Shakoh Zulqarnain and Nadia Iffat for Petitioners (in C.M. No.3 of 2023).", - "Petitioner Name:": "QATAR LUBRICANTS COMPANY W.L.L. (\"\"QALCO\"\") AND ANOTHER-APPLICANTS\nVS\nATIF NAEEM RANA AND OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25909", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 696 = 2025 SLD 696 = 2025 CLD 86", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTQ", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act, 2017 – Section 221: Inspection of Affairs of Company\nLegal Provision – S. 221 (1):\nThis section empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) to appoint inspectors to inspect the books of account, statutory records, and overall affairs of a company, provided there is a reasonable cause to believe that such inspection is necessary.\n________________________________________\nIssue: The petitioner company challenged the SECP’s order appointing inspectors under Section 221, arguing that the scope of this power was being overextended and used in an unauthorized or disproportionate manner.\nSECP’s Action:\n1.\nIssued a show-cause notice.\n2.\nPassed an order under Section 221 to initiate inspection.\n3.\nAppointed inspectors who subsequently requested company records and information.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Analysis & Findings:\n•\nThe Court acknowledged SECP’s jurisdiction under Section 221, but clarified that:\no\nIts powers must be exercised strictly within the statutory framework of that provision.\no\nThe scope of inspection must align with the grounds and limits prescribed in S. 221(1).\no\nAny action beyond the scope of S. 221 must be undertaken under other relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 2017.\n•\nImportantly, the Court did not bar the SECP from proceeding under other sections of the Act if facts later warranted such actions.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\n•\nThe High Court upheld the validity of the SECP’s inspection only to the extent permissible under Section 221.\n•\nThe constitutional petition was disposed of with the directive that SECP’s action must remain confined to the scope of Section 221.\n•\nHowever, SECP’s broader regulatory powers under other sections of the Act remained unaffected.\n________________________________________\nCase Law Referred:\n•\nSaif Power Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others – 2023 CLD 466\n(A case reinforcing the need for regulatory action to stay within defined statutory bounds).\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\n•\nSECP has the power to inspect, but it must stay within the limits of Section 221.\n•\nThe appointment of inspectors is valid only if proper cause and procedure is shown.\n•\nCompanies can challenge overreach, but they cannot deny legitimate regulatory oversight.\n•\nSECP may initiate further proceedings under other provisions if circumstances justify.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=221(1)", - "Case #": "C.P. No.D-8554 of 2019, decided on 11th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 11th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, CHIEF JUSTICE AND OMAR SIAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Ahad Nadeem for Petitioner.\nArshad Tayebally along with Raja Qasit Nawaz Khan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UNITY FOODS LTD. THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH CHAIRMAN AND ANOTHER - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25910", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 697 = 2025 SLD 697 = 2025 CLD 90", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QS8", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petitions Nos. 498 of 2022 and 1633 of 2024, heard on 9th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 09th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Taimoor Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with Uzair Shafie, Barrister Jahanzeb Awan and Arshad Mahmood, Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court with Aakif Majeed Butt, Hassan Ismail and Asim Tufail Farooqi for the Petitioner (in connected W.P. No. 1633 of 2024).\nSajid Ilyas Bhatti, Additional Attorney General with Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General, Barrister Asadullah Chattha and Barrister Ambreen Abbasi for Respondents/ Competition Commission of Pakistan with Hafiz Nasim, Senior Legal Advisor along with Musa Hayat Tarar, Adeel Peter and Hassan Raza, Legal Advisor for Competition Commission of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S SADIQ POULTRY (PRIVATE) LIMITED - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25911", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 698 = 2025 SLD 698 = 2025 CLD 111", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QSs", - "Key Words:": "Islamabad Consumer Protection Act (III of 1995)-\n-Ss. 2(c)(i), 2(f), 5 & 9-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.544-A-Consumer rights-Unfair trade practice-Appellant booked three pickup vehicles with respondents against payment of Rs. 29,97,000/-Respondents failed to provide the vehicles within stipulated period-Appellant filed a complaint, which was dismissed by the Consumer Court without recording evidence on the grounds that the booked vehicles constituted future goods within the meaning of Sale of Goods Act, 1930, thus civil suit was maintainable instead of a consumer complaint-Validity-Section 9(1) of Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995 provided that where any right of consumer required to be protected under S. 5 of the Act of 1995 is in any way infringed, the person responsible for such infringement shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to forty thousand rupees, or with both-Section 9(3) provided that the Authority (the Court of Session) may, where it deems appropriate, order for payment of compensation to the consumer to the extent the consumer has suffered any damage or loss through any unfair trade practice-Without prejudice to subsections (2) and (4), the function of the Authority is two-fold, (i) to determine criminal liability, and (ii) determination of the value of compensation-Both the determinations can be made together, but are not dependent upon one another-Unlike S.544-A, Cr.P.C., the award of compensation has not been made conditional to award of conviction by the Legislature-Section 544-A, Cr.P.C., opens with the words whenever a person is convicted of an offence , contrary to subsection (3) of S. 9 of the Act of 1995 where the Authority is empowered to award compensation keeping in view the extent to which a consumer suffers damage or loss through any unfair trade practice-Court below had confused the scheme of two distinct provisions of different statutes and the manner in which a Court had to proceed while dealing with cases thereunder-For the purpose of determining the value of compensation under the Act of 1995, the Authority has to frame separate issue and accept evidence in support thereof, so as to achieve the purpose for which the Act of 1995 is enacted-Each provision of the Act of 1995 carries meaning and is enacted for the purpose of achieving its object-Unless a statute itself provides an exception, deviation from the provisions of a statute is unlawful-Therefore, all subsections of S. 9 of the Act of 1995 were independent of each other and not conditional to conviction of a respondent in the consumer complaint-Findings of the Consumer Court to such extent were, therefore, not justified in law and were contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1995-Divergent claims of the parties available on record contained substantial disputed questions of facts and law, which could have been resolved after recording evidence of the parties-Consumer Court should have refrained from knocking out the complainant on erroneous interpretations of the expressions contained in the Act of 1995-In the case in hand, prima facie, the appellant fell within the meaning of consumer of service to the extent of delivery of vehicles-Therefore, the appeal was allowed by setting aside the impugned order and remanding the matter to the Consumer Court to decide the same afresh in accordance with the law after recording evidence of the parties.\nImperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni and others AIR 2021 SC 70; Chandigarh Housing Board v. Avtar Singh and others AIR 2011 SC 130; Rohit Chaudhary and others v. Vipul Ltd. AIR 2023 SC 4229; K V Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal AIR 1997 SC 628; National Insurance Company Limited v. Deepa Devi (2008) 1 SCC 414 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors 2023 SCC OnLine SC 409 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995=2(c)(i),2(f),5,9Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=544-A", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No.280 of 2022, decided on 23rd February, 2024. Date of hearing: 31st January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sajjad Haider Malik for Appellant.\nShahryar Tariq and Muhammad Taimoor Khan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOHSIN ABBAS-APPELLANT\nVS\nSUZUKI MOTORS COMPANY LTD. THROUGH GENERAL MANAGER AND ANOTHER - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25912", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 699 = 2025 SLD 699 = 2025 CLD 217", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTk", - "Key Words:": "Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S. 121(2)-Insurance Tribunals, constitution of-Objection was raised on constituting Insurance Tribunals under Insurance Ordinance, 2000, on the basis of judgment passed by Division Bench of High Court in the case of Premier Insurance Limited reported as 2023 CLD 135-Held, that Federal Government has power under S. 121(2) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 to appoint a serving or a retired Judge of High Court as Chairman, Insurance Tribunal with not less than two members who are persons of ability with integrity who have such knowledge or experience of life insurance, non-life insurance, actuarial science, finance, insurance economics, law, accountancy, administration or other discipline-Federal Government with consultation of Chief Justice of High Court issued notifications under proviso of S. 121(1) of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 and constituted Insurance Tribunal which were accordingly functioning before 03-10-2022-Government had rightly issued notification and validly constituted Insurance Tribunals, as such to that extent, any adverse findings rendered by Division Bench of High Court in case of Premier Insurance Limited reported as 2023 CLD 135 were declared as not sustainable as the same had no binding force of law-Full Bench of High Court directed the office to fix insurance appeals before appropriate Benches of High Court for decisions on merits-Question was decided accordingly.\nPremier Insurance Limited through Authorized Officer v M/s Ihsan Yousaf Textile Private Limited through Director and 3 others 2023 CLD 135 Overruled.\nHaji Muhammad Hanif v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman 2007 CLD 490; State Life Insurance Corporation v. Razi-ur-Rehman 2011 CLD 746; Premier Insurance Limited through Authorized Officer v. M/s Ihsan Yousaf Textile Private Limited through Director and 3 others 2023 CLD 135; Jalil Ahmed v. Additional District and Sessions Judge-I and others (Writ Petition No.7364/2017); Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and 2 others PLD 1995 SC 423; Qaiser and another v. The State 2022 SCMR 1641; Muhammad Jawad Hamid v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others PLD 2018 Lah. 836; Haji Muhammad Hanif v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman 2007 CLD 490 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another v. Mst. Naseem Begum 2009 CLD 1413 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Insurance Ordinance, 2000=121(2)", - "Case #": "Insurance Appeal No.195930 of 2018, (with other connected Appeals) heard on 11th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 11th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Abid Aziz Sheikh, Ch. Muhammad Iqbal and Anwaar Hussain, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Tariq Saeed Rana and Rao Usama for Appellants (in RFAs Nos.239730/18 and 245865/2018).\nIbrar Ahmed for Appellant (in R.F.A. No.10482/2022).\nAhsan Nasrullah for Appellant (in R.F.A. No.245865/2018).\nImtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Barrister Shehryar Kasuri, assisted by Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui and Ali Umrao for Appellant (in R.F.A. No.231965/2018).\nMian Khasham Ataullah, Mian Zargham Ataullah, Rana Zeeshan and Ch. Ali Usman for Appellants (in R.F.A. No.12395/2022).\nLiaquat Ali Butt for Appellant (in R.F.A. No.29341/2022.\nMs. Asma Hamid, Mustafa Khalid and Ms. Laiba Tariq for Appellant (in Insurance Appeal No.22680 of 2021).\nAhmed Farooq for Appellant (in R.F.A. No.12395/2022).\nMs. Shehzeen Abdullah, Addl. Advocate General, Punjab (in Insurance Appeal No.195930/2018).\nHammad Hussain and Ali Hussain Gilani for Respondents (in R.F.A. No.195930/2018).\nBarrister Tariq Saeed Rana and Rao Usama for Respondent No.1 (in R.F.A. No.195930/2018).\nAhsan Nasrullah for Respondent No.1 (in R.F.As. Nos.239729, 23973 and 241566 of 2018).\nLiaquat Ali Butt for Respondents (in R.F.A. No.46567/2022).\nNasir Mahmood Chaudhry for Respondents (in R.F.A. No.12395/2022).\nMs. Madiha Amin for Respondent (in R.F.As. Nos.245865 and 239730 of 2018).\nAli Ibrahim, Barrister Hussan Akhtar and Barrister Aneeq Sanotra for Respondent (in R.F.A. Nos.239729, 239730 and 245865 of 2018).\nMuhammad Haroon Mumtaz and Ali Khichi for Respondent (in R.F.A. No.231965/2018).\nRana Abu Harahrah for Respondents.\nShahzad Shaukat and Taha Shaukat for Respondents.\nWaqas Ahmad Mir assisted by Hamza Hayat, Amicus Curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAMIL TARIQ-Appellant\nVs\nNEW JUBILEE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED through Competent Authority and another - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25913", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 700 = 2025 SLD 700 = 2025 CLD 133", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QTg", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Ss. 14, 16 & 20-Award passed by arbitrators unanimously-Scope-Remitting (re-referring) matter to Arbitrators or umpire-Reconsideration-Scope-Provincial Government filed appeal against the order passed by the Civil Court whereby the award made by the umpire was made rule of court-Argument of the Appellant (Provincial Government) was that as earlier, during the proceedings before the Court, Arbitrators had passed award unanimously, the Court had wrongly accepted application of respondents/Company for remitting/re-referring the matter to the umpire-Contention of the respondents/ company was that it was provided under S. 16 of the Arbitration Act 1940 (the Act 1940) that the award could be remitted to the arbitrators or the umpire for reconsideration, therefore, the Trial Court had rightly remitted the award to the umpire, instead of arbitrators-Question as to whether in a case when an unanimous award has been passed, the matter may be re-referred/remitted to the arbitrators who passed the award or it could be referred to an umpire-Held, that S. 16 of the Act 1940 and Rr. 2, 4 & 5 of the First Schedule of the Act 1940 clearly demonstrate that the umpire can only take cognizance in the matter if there are the circumstances provided under R. 4, which, inter alia, include that both arbitrators could not agree on a particular issue-Therefore, an umpire cannot be called upon to act under R. 5 if the circumstances as provided under R. 4 do not arise-Thus, the contention of the respondents/company went counter to the scheme of S. 16 of the Act 1940, which clearly envisaged that where award had left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determined any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter could not be separated without affecting the determination of the matter referred to, the Court was competent to remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration of the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration-This clearly implies that if the ambiguity, as stated in S. 16 of the Act 1940, arises out of the award passed by the arbitrators, then the matter shall be referred to the arbitrators and in case the same is arising out of the award passed by the umpire, then obviously the same has to be referred for reconsideration to the umpire-Indeed, the word reconsideration is a determining fact implying the intention of legislation because the award passed by the arbitrator cannot be reconsidered by the umpire as the role of umpire comes into play only when there is disagreement between the arbitrators-Thus, the impugned order of the Trial Court remitting the award to the umpire was patently illegal and the entire edifice built upon the said order had to crumble to the ground being coram non judice and against the letter and spirit of S. 16 of the Act 1940 read with the First Schedule of the Act 1940-High Court set-aside the impugned order of the Trial/Civil Court to the extent of remitting the award to the umpire, the award passed by the umpire; and the impugned judgment/order of the Trial Court making the disputed award passed by the umpire as rule of the Court were also set aside and the matter was sent back to the Trial Court to redecide the application of the respondents/company, which it had filed under S. 16 of the Act, 1940-Appeal, filed by the Provincial Government, was allowed accordingly.\nMuhammad Farooq Shah v. Shakirullah 2006 SCMR 1657 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=14,16,20", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No.186 of 2023 with C.M. No.299 of 2023 with C.M. No.541 of 2023, decided on 20th May, 2024. Date of hearing: 20th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Yasir Khalid, A.A.G. for Appellants.\nBarrister Muhammad Yaseen Raza Khan and Barrister Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Afridi, Amici Curiae for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY, PESHAWAR AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nM/S HMA PUMPS (PVT.) LTD. PESHAWAR CANTT. AND ANOTHER - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25914", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 701 = 2025 SLD 701 = 2025 CLD 138", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S.20(4)-Cantonments Act (II of 1924), S.84-Appointment of arbitrator-Dispute arose between the parties with regard to initial work order and subsequent changes/enhancement in the costs for the project-Appointment of arbitrator was to be made in such manner as may be agreed upon between the parties in terms of the contract-Contention of the appellant was that an independent arbitrator ought to have been appointed instead of appointment of the arbitrator in terms of the contract owing to his biasness and partiality being part of the respondent-department as its appellate authority-Validity-Whole object underlying the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act) is to enforce the arbitration agreement whereby the parties bind themselves down to have their disputes, arising out of transaction to which such an agreement is applicable, adjudicated upon and decided by the domestic tribunal-Under clause (4) of S.20 of the Act, power of the Court to order reference to an arbitrator appointed by itself did not confer the authority on the Court to substitute the original agreement of the parties by an entirely new agreement of its own choice-If the parties out of their free-will and consent appointed a third person knowing fully well his relation with any one of the parties to dispute, such arbitration agreement shall not be invalided on the principle of bias and the arbitrator cannot be removed on this ground-Known interest of an arbitrator did not in any way invalidate his appointment, and it was only in a case where such an interest was concealed or came into existence after the appointment, that the appointment was rendered invalid or was liable to be revoked-Appellant was well aware of the authority and department of the arbitrator from the very first date and the Arbitrator was not the official of the respondent-department rather he was an Appellate Authority under S.84 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, who was appointed by the Government as defined under Pakistan Cantonment Service Rules, 1952-Arbitrator was not a participant in the meetings of Cantonment Board, therefore, any kind of allegation of biasness or partiality on his part was purely hypothetical and presumptuous, without any kind of evidence at all-Parties had already appointed the arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes arising out of the agreement and the appellant could not wriggle out from his commitment, and was precluded from approaching the court for appointing an arbitrator other than the arbitrator named in the agreement-Appellant could approach the already appointed arbitrator for redressal of his grievance and thereafter if there appeared any instance of biasness he could approach the Court for redressal of his grievance under relevant provisions of law-Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.\nM/s Commodities Trading International Corporation v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. and another 1987 CLC 2063; M/s Allied Engineering Consultants (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore v. M/s Sui Gas Transmission Company Ltd. 1989 CLC 1143; Director Housing, A.GS Branch, Rawalpindi v. M/s Makhdum Consultants Engineers and Architects 1997 SCMR 988; Engr. Inam Ahmad Osmani v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 MLD 1132 and University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore and another v. M/s Upright Engineers (Pvt.) Ltd. 2021 CLC 596 distinguished.\nM/s Hafiz Abdul Aziz Cotton Jinning Factory v. M/s Haji Ali Muhammad Abdullah & Co. and another PLD 1966 (W.P) Kar. 197; Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. M/s Allied Bank of Pakistan and another PLD 2003 SC 215; Lahore Stock Exchange Limited v. Fredrick J. Whyte Group, Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1990 SC 48; M.A. Ghani Sufi & Sons v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1957 (W.P) Lahore 363 and Pakistan Medical Commission (PMC) through Secretary (Successor of Registrar, PMDC), Islamabad Capital Territory v. Construction Experts (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive/Director, Islamabad and another PLD 2023 Isl. 01 rel.\n(b) Interpretation of document-\n-Documents or statutes are to be interpreted in their entire context following a full consideration of all provisions of the documents or statute, as the case may be-Every attempt must be made to save the document and for this purpose a difference between general statements and particular statements of the document should be differentiated properly to save the document rather to nullify it-No provision of the document should be read in isolation or in bits or pieces, but the entire document is to be read as a whole to gather the intention of the parties-Court for this purpose can resort to the correspondence exchange between the parties-Court should lean towards an interpretation, which effectuates rather than one which invalidates an instrument.\nSaudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited, Islamabad v. M/s Allied Bank of Pakistan and another PLD 2003 SC 215 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=20(4)Cantonments Act, 1924=84", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 24690 of 2024, decided on 3rd September, 2024. Date of hearing: 3rd September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid Saleem for Appellant.\nShahzada Muzaffar Ali with Sidra Azmat and Hanan Masood on behalf of LCB / Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S STACO-SHAHID BUILDERS JOINT VENTURE (JV)-APPELLANT\nVS\nLAHORE CANTONMENT BOARD-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25915", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 702 = 2025 SLD 702 = 2025 CLD 150", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5QXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Alternate Dispute Resolution Act (XX of 2017)-\n-S. 2(i)-Punjab Alternate Dispute Resolution Act (XVII of 2019), S. 2(b)-Balochistan Alternate Dispute Resolution Act (XXXI of 2022), S. 2(i)-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Alternate Dispute Resolution Act (XLVIII of 2020), S. 2(a)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) [as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Sindh Amendment) Act, 2018], S. 89-A(1)-Alternative Dispute Resolution ( ADR )-Mediation-Mediation is not merely an alternative to litigation but a complementary and necessary component of the justice system-Significance of mediation stated.\nMediation is evolving as a powerful mechanism for conflict resolution, bridging divides with creativity and fostering harmonious solutions. It is a testament to the potential of dialogue over confrontation. Mediation (and other mechanisms of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)) can be philosophically framed as essential tools to ensure access to justice in a country where millions of cases are pending. This approach aligns with a broader understanding of justice as being not only about achieving outcomes but also about the process itself being fair, efficient, and accessible. Traditional court system is adversarial and often resource-intensive, leading to delays and alienation of marginalized groups. Mediation embodies a collaborative model of justice that prioritizes dialogue and empowerment, ensuring parties are active participants in resolving their disputes. The sheer volume of pending cases often renders justice delayed, and as the saying goes, Justice delayed is justice denied. Mediation offers a timely and context-sensitive resolution that addresses the substance of disputes without being bogged down by procedural complexities. Philosophically, mediation reflects the relational nature of human beings. It prioritizes restoring relationships, preserving dignity, and finding mutually beneficial solutions over the zero-sum outcomes of litigation. Mediation accommodates the cultural, social, and economic diversity of disputing parties. It aligns with justice as capability enhancing, allowing parties to exercise their agency and reach solutions that reflect their lived realities. Mediation bridges modern legal systems with indigenous practices, thereby strengthening communal harmony while maintaining legal validity.\nMediation must be increasingly seen as a right of the parties within the litigation process. Access to justice includes the right to have disputes resolved in a timely and efficient manner. Mediation, as a faster and cost-effective alternative, satisfies this fundamental aspect of justice. Mediation respects the autonomy of the parties by giving them control over the process and outcome, unlike litigation, where outcomes are imposed by judges. Litigants have the right to avoid the adversarial consequences of litigation, such as financial strain, emotional distress, and reputational harm. Mediation provides a non-confrontational environment that mitigates these risks. Procedural justice emphasizes the fairness of the process, and mediation upholds this by ensuring participation, neutrality, and respect - core elements of a fair process. In contexts where economic inequalities limit access to legal representation, mediation ensures that the justice system remains accessible to the underprivileged. Many societies have strong traditions of community-led dispute resolution. Mediation builds on these traditions, ensuring justice remains culturally relevant. Mediation is at the heart of access to justice. Courts must embrace it as an essential tool for efficient and humane dispute resolution. In conclusion, mediation is not merely an alternative to litigation but a complementary and necessary component of the justice system.\nChief Justice Sundaresh Menons speech titled International Mediation and the Role of Courts at the Supreme Court of Indonesia, November 2023 ref.\nThe reasons which make mediation a compelling choice for an appropriate avenue to resolve disputes efficiently and effectively, inter alia, include: (i) Cost-effectiveness; mediation incurs lower legal fees and expenses due to shorter and less formal processes; (ii) Time efficiency; resolutions can often be reached much faster through mediation than through court proceedings, which can take years to conclude, (iii) Flexibility; the procedures in mediation are flexible, allowing parties to tailor the specific processes to their specific needs, including choosing their mediator and deciding the rules for the proceedings, (iv) Confidentiality; unlike trials in courts which are generally public, mediation processes are private. This confidentiality can be crucial for preserving personal relationships, protecting trade secrets or avoiding negative publicity, (v) Preservation of relationships; mediation encourages cooperation and communication, which can help maintain or even improve relationships between parties, a key consideration in business context or family disputes, (vi) Control over the outcome; parties have more control over the resolution as they are directly involved in negotiating the settlement, (vii) Expertise; parties can choose an expert in the field relevant to their dispute to act as the mediator, which can lead to more informed decisions and (viii) Reduced hostility; mediation tends to be less adversarial than court litigation, which can reduce tensions and hostility between parties.\nThe courts should not only encourage mediating more and litigating less but also exhibit a promediation bias which connotes a pre-disposition within the legal system for resolution of disputes through mediation rather than through litigation or other forms of dispute resolution. Such bias does not favor one party over another but rather prioritizes mediation as the preferred method of dispute resolution. It is grounded in the belief that settlements are generally more efficient and satisfactory for all parties involved compared to outcomes determined by a court. Mediation offers the best chance of a solution where both parties leave with dignity and satisfaction, as opposed to the all-or-nothing results of litigation.\nTaisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction 2024 SCMR 640; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. RYK Mills 2023 SCMR 1856; National Highway Authority v. Sambu Construction 2023 SCMR 1103; Orient Power Company v. Sui Northern Gas 2021 SCMR 1728; Federation of Pakistan v. Attock Petroleum 2007 SCMR 1095; Waqas Yaqub v. Adeel Yaqub 2024 CLD 990; Faisal Zafar v. Siraj-ud-Din, 2024 CLD 1; Fiaz Hussain Minhas v. SECP, C.O. No. 75025/2022 (unreported); Netherlands Financierings v. Morgah Valley 2024 CLD 685; Strategic Plans v. Punjab Revenue Authority PLD 2024 Lah. 545; Sohail Nisar v. Nadeem Nisar 2024 LHC 1435; M/s Alstom Power v. Pakistan Water PLD 2007 Lah. 581; Shehzad Arshad v. Pervez Arshad 2024 CLD 1121; Focus Entertainment v. Television Media 2021 CLD 885; Asif S. Sajan v. Rehan Associates PLD 2012 Sindh 388; M/s U.I.G v. Muhammad Imran Qureshi 2011 CLC 758; Miss Memoona Zainab Kazmi v. Additional District Judge 2023 CLC 207; Imperial Electric Company v. Zhongzing Telecom Pakistan 2019 CLD 609; Cowl v. Plymouth City Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1935 (per Lord Woolf LCJ) and Province of Punjab v. Haroon Construction Company 2024 SCMR 947 ref.\nEncouraging mediation aligns with the broader goals of justice systems worldwide: to resolve disputes in a manner that is fair, efficient, and conducive to the longterm well-being of all parties involved. [p. 158] E\nFrom a global perspective, the value of mediation as a method of amicably resolving disputes has been recognized in various international legal instruments including the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, known as, the Singapore Convention on Mediation , ( Singapore Convention ). The Convention provides a uniform and efficient framework for the recognition and enforcement of mediated settlement agreements that resolve international, commercial disputes - akin to the framework that the 1958 New York Convention provides for arbitral awards. To date, the Convention has 57 signatories, while only 12 states have ratified the same. To promote efficiency and align with the principle that in the future, it is likely that the traditional trial will be the exception rather than the rule it is recommended that Pakistan becomes a signatory to the Convention. This will not only reduce the alarming backlog statistics through enhancing faster access to justice but will also serve as a turning point towards a comprehensive and profound transformation of the legal and judicial system.\n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Ss. 17 & 20-Construction project-Disputes over extension of time and the encashment of Mobilization Advance Guarantees-Alternative Dispute Resolution ( ADR )-Mediation-In the present case the arbitral award passed by a two-member arbitral tribunal was made the Rule of Court by the Civil Court-Appeal was filed against the said judgment by the respondents before the High Court, which was allowed and the unanimous arbitral award was rendered a nullity -- RESPONDENT(S) after initially expressing their unease with out of court settlement or ADR finally agreed to resolve their dispute through mediation in both the appeals -- RESPONDENT(S), however, reserved their right to expand the scope of their dispute before the mediator, provided both the parties mutually agreed to such a change-Supreme Court disposed of present appeals as being sent out for mediation, and observed that in case mediation or any other mode of ADR was unsuccessful, the parties may approach the Supreme Court and apply for the refixation of present appeals-Appeals were, therefore consigned to the record.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2017=2(i)Punjab Alternate Dispute Resolution Act, 2019=2(b)Arbitration Act, 1940=17,20", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 256 and 257 of 2024 and C.M.As. Nos. 3039 and 3042 of 2024, decided on 6th November, 2024.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 06.01.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in R.F.As. Nos. 43092 and 37623 of 2022). Date of hearing: 6th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, JUSTICE, AYESHA A. MALIK, JUSTICE AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Ali Imran, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nSalman Mansoor, Advocate Supreme Court, Mian Shafqat Jan, Advocate Supreme Court, Barrister Khurram Raza, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record, Sukhan Ilyas Malik, Dy. Dir. Law (EOBI) and Imran Shanwari, CEO PRIMACO for Respondents.\nAssisted by Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S MUGHALS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED-APPELLANT\nVS\nEMPLOYEES OLD AGE BENEFITS INSTITUTION THROUGH DIRECTOR LAW, LAHORE AND OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25916", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 703 = 2025 SLD 703 = 2025 CLD 160", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODc", - "Key Words:": "Per Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, J. Muzamil Akhtar Shabir and Asim Hafeez, JJ agreeing.\n(a) High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders-\n-Vol. I, Ch. 3-Value of suit-Determination-Value of suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction, under Chapt. 3 of Vol. I of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, is the value mentioned in plaint by plaintiff-No specific valuation of suit is mentioned in Suits Valuation Act, 1887, thus, fixing appropriate value of suit for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction is left at the discretion of plaintiff-Ordinarily on the basis of value mentioned in plaint, pecuniary jurisdiction of Court is presumed to be the same, however, if Court modifies value of suit then the changed value is considered as value of the suit for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court.\nZahid Zaman Khan and others v. Khan Afsar and others PLD 2016 SC 409; Mst. Parveen (deceased) through LRs. v. Muhammad Pervaiz and others 2022 SCMR 64; M/s Mardan Ways Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited Station v. General Manager SNGPL and others 2022 SCMR 584 and Mumtaz Hussain v. Haji Muhammad Bashir and others PLD 2016 Lah. 97 rel.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9(a) & 19-Suit for recovery of finance-Execution proceedings-Valuation of suit-Pecuniary jurisdiction of Banking Court-Determination-Change in valuation-Effect-Dispute had arisen due to two different views taken by Judges in Chambers of High Court when one execution proceeding was kept pending before High Court despite the fact that amount decreed was less than Rs.100 million, whereas in another case reliance was placed on case titled Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited v. Faran Maiz Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (EFA No.1059/2016) and execution proceeding was sent to Banking Court-Held, that plaintiff is competent to fix value of suit for recovery under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-If Banking Court disagrees with the value fixed by plaintiff, it determines and fixes the value of suit as per provisions of Suits Valuation Act, 1887 after holding appropriate inquiry and collecting material-After such determination of value, the matter is liable to be adjudicated by Court of competent jurisdiction-Pecuniary jurisdiction should be ascertained from the value assessed by plaintiff in the plaint and if Court alters the value in appeal etc., in that eventuality pecuniary jurisdiction remains the same as mentioned in plaint-High Court, as a Banking Court, has jurisdiction to execute judgment and decree passed by it, irrespective of the quantum of amount so decreed-Full Bench of High Court set aside the order passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court in which execution was sent to Banking Court for further proceedings-Furthermore, the judgment passed by Division Bench of High Court in E.F.A No.1059/2016 titled as Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited v. Faran Maiz Industries (Pvt.) Limited [relied upon by one of the Judge in Chambers of High Court, while sending execution to Banking Court for proceedings], was declared to be passed in violation of S. 19 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as well as settled principle of law and was a judgment per incuriam-Decrees passed by High Court under Banking jurisdiction were liable to be exclusively executed by High Court itself-Question was answered accordingly.\nZarai Taraqiati Bank Limited v. Faran Maiz Industries (Pvt.) Limited (E.F.A No.1059/2016) Overruled.\nShafaqat Iqbal and others v. Ghulam Rasool and another PLD 2001 Lah. 139; Muhammad Saleem and 3 others v. Pak Brunei Investment Company Ltd. through Chief Manager/President 2022 CLD 84; Dr. Pir Muhammad Khan v. Khuda Bukhsh and others 2015 SCMR 1243; MCB Bank Limited through Duly Authorized Attorney v. Eden Developers (Pvt.) Limited and others 2019 CLD 219; Mashraq Bank v. M/s Amtul Rehman Industries (Pvt.) Limited and others 2002 CLD 336; MCB Bank Limited v. M/s Mazco Industries Private Limited and others 2023 CLD 410; Muhammad Jawad Hamid v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others PLD 2018 Lah. 836 and Qaiser and another v. The State 2022 SCMR 1641 rel.\nPer Asim Hafeez, J.:\n(c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 9(a) & 19-Suit for recovery of finance-Execution proceedings-Valuation of suit-Pecuniary jurisdiction of Banking Court-Determination-Change in valuation-Effect-Dispute had arisen due to two different views taken by Judges in Chambers of High Court when one execution proceeding was kept pending before High Court despite the fact that amount decreed was less than Rs.100 million, whereas in another case reliance was placed on case titled Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited v. Faran Maiz Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (EFA No.1059/2016) and execution proceedings were sent to Banking Court-Held, that suit proceedings, under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 stand converted into execution by operation of law, upon pronouncement of judgment and decree-Court which pronounces the judgment is obligated to act and exercise jurisdiction to execute the decree, without the necessity of re-visiting or re-determining its own pecuniary jurisdiction in the context of quantum of an adjudicated claim / decreed amount-Legislature, in its wisdom, has rightly absolved the Court executing decree to re-visit or re-determine its pecuniary jurisdiction while giving effect to decree under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001-Full Bench of High Court affirmed the order in which execution proceeding was retained in High Court and the order in which execution was sent to Banking Court for proceedings was set aside-Full Bench of High Court declared judgment passed in case of Faran Maiz Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (E.F.A. 1059 / 2016) contrary to law, hence, per-incuriam-Reference was decided accordingly.\nZarai Taraqiati Bank Limited v. Faran Maiz Industries (Pvt.) Limited (E.F.A No.1059/2016) Overruled.\nHabib Bank Limited through Attorneys v. M/s Rehmania Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Jhang Road Faisalabad and 30 others 2003 CLD 689 distinguished.\nMCB Bank Limited through duly authorized attorney v. EDEN Developers (Pvt.) Limited and others 2019 CLD 219; M/s United Bank Ltd. v. Mst. Rehana Raza PLD 1983 Kar. 467 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Bawany Industries Ltd. PLD 1983 Kar. 300 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9(a),19", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No.248622 of 2018, decided on 18th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 18th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE CH. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, JUSTICE, MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, JUSTICE AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Riaz for Appellants.\nAshar Elahi for Appellant (in E.F.A. No.43805 of 2021).\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AL-MAKKAH PRESS (PVT.) LTD. THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND 2 OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED-RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25917", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 704 = 2025 SLD 704 = 2025 CLD 181", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODY", - "Key Words:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumers Protection Act (VI of 1997)-\n-Ss.13(2), 11B & 17(2)-Consumer-Filing of complaint regarding exaggerated amount in electricity bill-Limitation-Application for rejection of complaint being time barred filed by the respondent (Electricity Supply Company) was accepted by the Consumer Court-Validity-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumers Protection Act, 1997 (Act) was promulgated to provide for healthy growth of fair commercial practices, the promotion and protection of legitimate interest of consumers and speedy redressal of their complaints and matters arising out of or connected therewith, which purpose and object clearly envisages that the enactment is consumer beneficial and as such, it requires to be treated in the same manner in order to provide and extend the consumers a fair chance qua protection of their legitimate rights-Section 13(2) of the Act provides that a complaint shall be submitted before the Consumer Court within 10 days of the sale, delivery or rendering of the service-Appellant had filed the complaint against the respondent-PESCO before the Consumer Court on 03.08.2022, while the disputed electricity bill was payable till 05.08.2022, thus, in the attending circumstances of the case, the question of limitation would at best be seen at the time of final determination of the matter by the Consumer Court; particularly, in the circumstances, when the first proviso to S.13(2) has conferred discretion upon the court to entertain a complaint filed beyond ten days within such time as it may allow if it is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not filing the same within the specified time subject to the provision of second proviso-Consumer Court was held to have committed gross illegality and jurisdictional error in rejecting the complaint of the appellant-Appeal was accepted, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.51-P of 2023, decided on 8th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE S M ATTIQUE SHAH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Umar Saeed for Appellant.\nHamid Ali for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AJMAL-APPELLANT\nVS\nS.D.O, PESCO SUB-DIVISION, NOWSHERA CANTT-01 AND 3 OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25918", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 705 = 2025 SLD 705 = 2025 CLD 184", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Lahore Development Authority Building and Zoning Regulations, 2019-\n-Regln. 2.5-Right of way-Connotation-Right of way means width of street between two opposite property lines-It does not mean merely the road on which vehicles are intended to ply-It also includes footpaths for passengers and also green areas which are required to be maintained outside buildings by owners.\n(b) Lahore Development Authority Building and Zoning Regulations, 2019-\n-Regln. 10.3.3 (g)-Pakistan Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997), S. 12-Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)-No Objection Certificate from Environmental Protection Agency-Petitioners were aggrieved of construction of a multi-storeyed Apartment Building by the respondent which required no objection certificate from Environmental Protection Agency-Validity-Decision to require EIA or IEE was for LDA to make and Regln. 10.3.3 of Lahore Development Authority Building and Zoning Regulations, 2019, did in fact require an EIA, but for this condition (Condition)-Policy regarding Apartment Buildings could not be viewed in insolation and in the setting of one particular building only-Canvas had to be widened and entire array of building which were under construction and their impact on environment had to be at the heart of the policy-Such condition was a serious clog on such effort which had to be struck down-High Court directed Lahore Development Authority to issue revised edition of Lahore Development Authority Building and Zoning Regulations, 2019 by deleting such condition-High Court further directed that henceforth any construction of Apartment Building would require EIA and NOC from EPA-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.\nStandard Chartered Bank Limited through Constituted Attorney v. Karachi Municipal Corporation through Administrator and 9 others 2015 YLR 1303 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997=12", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.17085 of 2022, decided on 29th February, 2024. Date of hearing: 21st February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ali Zafar, Jahanzeb Sukhaira, Talib Hussain, Asfand Waheed, Muhammad Adeel Chaudhry and Abdul Latif for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Iftikhar ud Din Riaz, Ahmad Abdul Rehman and Muhammad Umer Rafiq for Respondent No.3.\nSahibzada Muzaffar Ali for Respondent-LDA.\nHassan Ijaz Cheema, A.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NOORUDDIN FEERASTA AND OTHERS-PETITIONERS\nVS\nLAHORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LDA) AND OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25919", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 706 = 2025 SLD 706 = 2025 CLD 193", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 59-Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act (XXI of 2012), Preamble-Deceptive marketing practice-Competition Commission of Pakistan-Jurisdiction-Overriding effect-Provision of S. 59 of Competition Act, 2010 is non-obstante clause and no such provision exists in Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012-Commission could take cognizance of matters that include deceptive marketing practices, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law on the subject-matter-DRAP does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter and Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 does not impose any bar on exclusive mandate of Commission to prohibit and penalize deceptive marketing practices caused by false or misleading dissemination of information.\n(b) Words and phrases-\n-Inconsistency-Meaning.\nBlacks Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) rel.\n(c) Interpretation of statutes-\n-General and special law-Lex specialis derogat legi generali, principle of-Applicability-Where two laws address analogous factual scenario, the statute addressing specific subject matter (lex specialis) takes precedence over the statute governing general matters on the same subject (lex generalis).\nSyed Mushahid Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 SCMR 1218 rel.\n(d) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss.10 & 37-Deceptive marketing practice-False or misleading advertisement-Anti-competitive behaviour-Scope-False or misleading advertising is a matter of protecting competitors and consumers from anti-competitive behaviour and has to be dealt with under Ss. 10 & 30 of Competition Act, 2010.\n(e) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S. 18-Content of complaint-Affidavit, absence of-Procedural lapse-Effect-Omission of affidavit in a complaint that otherwise meets all other formal requirements constitutes a minor procedural lapse-Such lapse neither undermines substantive issue nor does it prejudice the other party-Procedural formalities are the tools to advance cause of justice and cannot be used to cause miscarriage of justice-Such minor omission of a procedural requirement does not warrant dismissal of complaint.\n(f) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-S.10-Deceptive marketing practice-Misleading information-Unauthorized use of Mark and Certification-Show cause notice was issued to respondent company for use of unauthorized and false CE (Confromit Europ ene) and QMS (Quality Management System) certification in total disregard to global standardization and certification-Validity-Respondent companys misuse of CE Mark and QMS Certification without prior substantiation amounted to a clear violation of S. 10(2) Competition Act, 2010, which had prohibited dissemination of false or misleading information that lacked a reasonable basis regarding character or quality of goods-Respondent company falsely represented its products as compliant with recognized EU standards and implied that they had been certified by an accredited body, SMIS-AGS, when they were not-Respondent company engaged in deceptive marketing practices and such actions had not only misled consumers but also distorted fair competition for the competitors who had actually adhered to required standards-Conduct of respondent company was direct infringement of statutory obligations under S.10(2)(b) of Competition Act, 2010, warranting legal accountability and corrective measures to ensure compliance with law and protection of consumer rights-Commission imposed cumulative penalty of Rs.20,000,000/- (Twenty Million) which was to be deposited in designated official account-Commission directed respondent company to immediately cease, if any, the use of unauthorized CE Mark and QMS Certification on its product packing and in its submissions to any procuring authority / office-Show cause notice succeeded in circumstances.\nBlacks Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition); Syed Mushahid Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 SCMR 1218; S.D.O/A.M., Hasht Nagri Sub-Division, PESCO Peshawar v. Khawazan Zad 2023 PLD 174; In the matter of China Mobile Limited and Pak Telecom Mobile Limited 2010 CLD 1478; in the matter of Procter and Gamble Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited 2010 CLD 1685; Federal Trade Commission v. Wellness Support Network, Inc., 2014 and Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. TVS Motor Company Ltd. AIR 2009 SCW 6018 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Competition Act, 2010=59,10,37", - "Case #": "File No. 345/RENACON/OFT/CCP/2021, decided on 8th November, 2024. Dates of hearing: 1st December, 2021, 21st February, 16th, 25th November, 2022, 28th November, 2023 and 22nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE SAEED AHMAD NAWAZ, MEMBERS AND SALMAN AMIN, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shahid Rafique Sheikh for Complainant.\nFaizan Saleem for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN THE MATTER OF: SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE ISSUED TO M/S 3N-LIFEMED PHARMACEUTICALS\nON COMPLAINT FILED BY\nM/S. RENACON PHARMA LTD. FOR DECEPTIVE MARKETING PRACTICES" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25920", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5OC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 707 = 2025 SLD 707 = 2025 PTD 418", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5OC8", - "Key Words:": "Refund of Input/Sales Tax — Subordinate Legislation vs. Parent Statute — Rule vs. Statutory Provision\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a registered company engaged in textile manufacturing and sales, challenged the order passed by the assessing officer rejecting its sales/input tax refund claim. The refund was denied on the grounds of alleged violation of Rule 34(1)(d) of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006. The appellant contended that the rule used to deny the refund was inconsistent with the parent statute — the Sales Tax Act, 1990, particularly Section 10 thereof.\nThe case revolved around the question of whether delegated legislation (rules) could override or contradict express provisions of the parent legislation.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Tribunal held that rules framed under a statute are subordinate legislation and must conform to the parent statute. They cannot contradict, override, or expand upon the provisions of the primary law. Rule 34(1)(d), to the extent that it restricted or conflicted with the refund entitlement under Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, was ultra vires the Act.\nSection 10(1) of the Act expressly provides for refund of excess input tax in cases involving zero-rated supplies or exports.\nSection 10(3) requires issuance of show-cause notices within a stipulated pecuniary and temporal jurisdiction. Since the impugned order and notice exceeded those limits (including the 60-day period), they were held to be null and void.\nThe Tribunal emphasized that refund claims must be adjudicated strictly in accordance with the procedure outlined under Section 10 of the Act and not arbitrarily denied based on inconsistent or ultra vires rules.\nThe appeal was accepted, and the orders of the lower authorities were set aside as illegal and void ab initio, both on legal and factual grounds.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8B(1),10,10(1),10(3)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=34(1)(d)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. NO. 2032/LB of 2021, decided on 22nd January, 2024. Date of hearing: 22nd January, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Imran Rashid for Appellant.\nMrs. Haida Sajjad, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S INSAF TEXTILE PRINTING INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LIMITED, FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CORPORATE ZONE, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25921", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5OCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 708 = 2025 SLD 708 = 2025 PTD 431", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5OCs", - "Key Words:": "Maintainability of Constitutional Petition under Art. 199 against Departmental Orders—Doctrine of Election of Remedy—Income Tax Proceedings\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a company, filed a constitutional petition challenging an order passed under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. It relied on the precedent set in Shell Pakistan Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2023 PTD 607), wherein Section 4C of the Ordinance was discussed. The petitioner had not challenged the vires of Section 4C, nor had it exhausted the alternate remedy provided under the tax hierarchy. The petitioner had already contested a Show-Cause Notice, and orders under Sections 124 and 129 were passed. The taxpayer was also pursuing appellate remedies.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the constitutional petition with costs, holding that the petitioner could not simultaneously avail two parallel remedies. The Court emphasized the Doctrine of Election, stating that a litigant must choose one remedy and cannot pursue multiple avenues for the same grievance. Since the petitioner had already engaged with the departmental hierarchy, it was barred from invoking constitutional jurisdiction without first challenging the vires of the provision or exhausting alternate remedies.\nCitations:\nShell Pakistan Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 PTD 607\nTrading Corporation of Pakistan v. Dewan Sugar Mills Limited and others PLD 2018 SC 828", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C,124,129,221Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-3066 of 2023, decided on 2nd May, 2024. Date of hearing: 2nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JSUTICE AND JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Emadul Hasan for Petitioner.\nAmedr Bakhsh Metlo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ORIENT ENERGY SYSTEMS (PVT.) LTD. THROUGH AUTHORIZED OFFICER\nVS\nTHE ASS1STANT/DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (AUDIT-II) INLAND REVENUE AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25922", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 709 = 2025 SLD 709 = 2025 PLD 25", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1F5ODk", - "Key Words:": "Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 11EE & Fourth Sched.-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 4-Affiliation with a proscribed organization, allegation of-Placing of name in the Fourth Sched. to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997-Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law-Scope - PETITIONER(S), a professional driver, was aggrieved of inclusion of his name in the Fourth Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, by concerned Deputy Commissioner (respondent) and his representation seeking review and reconsideration of the impugned order was dismissed-Validity-Fundamental rights of citizens, including the right to life, liberty, and security, has been guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan-Article 4 of the Constitution states that every citizen has the right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with the law-Provision of Art. 4 of the Constitution underscores the importance of safeguarding individual liberties against arbitrary state action-In the context of constitutional rights, the interpretation of laws that curtail the liberties of citizens is a critical aspect of legal jurisprudence-Principle of strict interpretation is grounded in the understanding that any law, which imposes restrictions on fundamental rights, must be clear, precise, and unambiguous-Fundamental rights are paramount to ordinary state-made laws and cannot be curtailed without clear legislative intent and such law is required to be scrutinized rigorously to ensure that it does not violate constitutional guarantees-Considering the impugned order on the touch stone of the settled principles of law, the same was based merely on surmises and conjectures to the extent of the petitioner which was neither justified and reasonable nor was in accordance with constitutional provisions - RESPONDENT(S) had failed to produce credible evidence, and not even a single document was produced to substantiate the claim that the petitioner was involved in terrorism; was an activist, or office-bearer or an associate of an organization kept under observation under S. 11D of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, or proscribed under S. 11B of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and/or in any way concerned or suspected to be concerned with such organization or affiliated with any group or organization suspected to be involved in terrorism or sectarianism or acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, any person or organization proscribed under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 - PETITIONER(S) had also sworn in an affidavit/executed a bond as envisaged under S. 11EE of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997-Deputy Commissioner (respondent) had acted beyond the scope of his authority by issuing the impugned order without any material evidence and through a non-speaking order based on surmises and conjectures-Such order was not only arbitrary but also violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan-High Court declared the impugned order illegal, unlawful and without lawful authority to the extent of the petitioner and the respondents were directed to delete the name of the petitioner from the Fourth Sched. of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997-Constitutional petition was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=11EEConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. 1807 of 2024, decided on 17th December, 2024. Date of hearing: 2nd December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, CHIEF JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD AAMIR NAWAZ RANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jameel Ramzan for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUNAWAR KHAN - PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nTHE GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY AND 8 OTHERS - RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25923", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 747 = 2025 SLD 747 = (2025) 131 TAX 27", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVS8", - "Key Words:": "Capital Value Tax (CVT) Liability – Locus Standi of Petitioner – Article 199 Constitutional Petition\nDetails:\n•\nFacts: Muhammad Rizwan Sohail (Respondent No.4) owned 46 kanals of land and appointed Nauraiz Asif (Respondent No.5) as his general attorney via a registered GPA on 28.6.2016. On 20.2.2020, Respondent No.4, in his personal capacity (not through the GPA), and one Asif Rasheed exchanged their collective 48 kanals of land with the Petitioner’s agricultural land in Mauza Mehmoodpur. This exchange was duly registered. The Petitioner later developed a housing scheme (Mubarak Town) on the exchanged land and reserved land for roads as required by the Municipal Committee.\n•\nDispute: When the Petitioner applied for Fard Malkiat (title document) to sell plots in the scheme, the Patwari refused, citing an outstanding CVT of Rs. 25,024,000/- related to the GPA executed by Respondent No.4 in favour of Respondent No.5. The Petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, arguing that the tax demand did not pertain to his transaction and that the notice issued to Respondent No.4 was being wrongfully used to block his property rights.\n•\nRespondents’ Stance: The Assistant Advocate General argued the Petitioner lacked locus standi and the notice was valid. Respondents No.4 and 5 supported the petition.\nHeld:\n•\nThe Court held that the Petitioner is an “aggrieved party” under Article 199 as the refusal to issue Fard Malkiat directly impacts his right to enjoy and transfer legally acquired property.\n•\nThe petition was maintainable.\n•\nThe Court interpreted section 6(3) of the Punjab Finance Act, 2012 in light of the noscitur a sociis rule, clarifying that not all powers of attorney attract CVT — only those through which property is actually acquired.\n•\nSince the Petitioner’s acquisition was through a registered exchange deed and not via the GPA in question, no CVT was payable in connection with his transaction, and the revenue authorities had no lawful basis to withhold the Fard.\n•\nTherefore, the Petitioner was not liable for the CVT, and the Notice could not be enforced against him to deny Fard Malkiat.\nCitations:\n•\nSub-Registrar (Rural), Rawalpindi v. Muhammad Ilyas (C.P. No.2926 of 2016, decided 05.10.2017)\n•\nMian Fazal Din v. LIT (PLD 1969 SC 223)\n•\nHafiz Hamdullah v. Saifullah Khan (PLD 2007 SC 52)\n•\nAssociated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Pakistan (PLD 1978 SC 151)\n•\nBisvil Spinners Ltd. v. Superintendent, Customs (PLD 1988 SC 370)\n•\nCIT v. Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. (2009 PTD 1392)\n•\nEx parte Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch.D. 458\n•\nAIR 1960 SC 610 – State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,199(1)(a),199(1)(a)(i),199(1)(a)(ii)Constitution of Pakistan, 1962=98(2)Punjab Finance Act, 2012 =6Punjab Finance Act, 2017=3Punjab Finance Act, 2010=6", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 7027/2022. Date of hearing: 26.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ SALEEM SHEIKH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. A.R. Aurangzeb, Advocate.\nFor Respondents No.1 to 3: Hafiza Mehnaz Nadeem Abbasi, Assistant Advocate General.\nFor Respondents No.4 & 5: Ch. Muhammad Azhar, Advocate.\nFor Respondent No.6: Mr. Mehmood Ahmad Bhatti, Advocate.\nResearch assistance: Mr. Sher Hassan Pervez, Research Officer, LHCRC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHAZANFAR AMIN\nVS.\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25924", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 748 = 2025 SLD 748 = 2025 PTD 433", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVSs", - "Key Words:": "Scope and Application of Federal Excise Duty under Federal Excise Act, 2005 – Validity of Prior Notifications\nDetails:\nThe case revolved around the applicability and scope of Federal Excise Duty under the Federal Excise Act, 2005, specifically in relation to the sale of soft drinks through vending machines. The taxpayer company challenged a demand raised by authorities who treated the sale as taxable. The key issues were whether the sale of such drinks constituted a taxable supply and whether the CEGO Notification No. 4 of 2002 retained its legal force after the repeal of the Central Excise Act, 1944.\nThe court analyzed the scheme of the 2005 Act, noting that Federal Excise Duty is an indirect tax meant to be passed on to the consumer. The tax becomes applicable upon the production or manufacture of excisable goods, or the provision of excisable services, with the rates specified in the First Schedule of the Act. Different rates existed for excise duty on concentrate versus aerated water with added sugar or flavorings.\nThe FBR had provided the option for bottling factories to either pay duties at the rate for concentrates or follow the rate for aerated water, which was held to be within their discretion and not inconsistent with the law. Furthermore, the court upheld the continued validity of Notification CEGO No. 4 of 2002 under Section 24 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa General Clauses Act, 1956, stating that such notifications remain effective after repeal unless specifically rescinded.\nHeld:\nThe notification CEGO No. 4 of 2002 remains valid and enforceable under the Federal Excise Act, 2005. The Reference was answered in the affirmative, upholding the legality of the demand and the mechanism prescribed by the FBR for the levy of duties.\n•\nMessrs Pakistan WAPDA Foundation v. The Collector of Customs, Sales Tax Lahore and others, 2023 SCMR 79", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=3,34,First Schedule, Table-I, Serial No. 5", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No.22-P of 2023, decided on 10th March, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barriter Hassaan Akhtar and Ishtiaq Ahmed (Sr.) for Petitioners.\nGhulam Shoaib Jally for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S NORTHERN BOTTLING COMPANY (PVT.) LTD.\nVS\nTHE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE, PESHAWAR AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25925", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 749 = 2025 SLD 749 = 2025 PTD 459", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVTk", - "Key Words:": "Key Laws Involved:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 (Section 11)\n•\nCivil Procedure Code (Section 9)\n•\nCivil Courts Ordinance, 1962 (Section 7)\n•\nConstitutional Jurisdiction (Article 25)\n________________________________________\nBackground & Issue:\n•\nThe plaintiff (ASG Metals Ltd.) challenged a Show-Cause Notice issued by tax authorities under Section 11(2) & (3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, demanding Rs. 59,712,503/- in alleged unpaid taxes.\n•\nInstead of first approaching the Adjudicating/Appellate Authorities, the plaintiff directly filed a civil suit before the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court.\n•\nThe defendants (Tax Authorities) objected to the suit’s maintainability, citing Supreme Court precedents (particularly Searle IV Solution v. Federation of Pakistan, 2018 SCMR 1444).\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles & Court’s Reasoning:\n1.\nJurisdiction of the High Court’s Single Bench:\no\nWhile the Single Bench of the Sindh High Court can hear tax-related suits, this jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly (as per Searle IV Solution).\no\nThe court is not obliged to entertain such suits as a matter of routine, especially when alternative remedies (adjudication/appeal) exist.\n2.\nCondition for Entertaining Tax Suits:\no\nAs per Searle IV Solution, plaintiffs must deposit 50% of the disputed tax amount before the court can proceed.\no\nThe plaintiff failed to comply with this condition, arguing that the tax amount was not yet calculated. The court rejected this argument, holding that it would defeat the purpose of the Supreme Court’s ruling.\n3.\nDirect Challenge to Show-Cause Notice Deprecated:\no\nCourts should not interfere at the show-cause notice stage unless there is a jurisdictional defect or legal incompetency.\no\nThe plaintiff should first exhaust remedies before tax authorities rather than approaching the civil court prematurely.\no\nThe Supreme Court in Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Jahangir Khan Tareen (2022 SCMR 92) held that abstaining from interference at the notice stage should be the normal rule. \n________________________________________\nDecision:\n•\nThe suit was dismissed for being non-maintainable due to:\no\nFailure to deposit 50% of the disputed tax as required.\no\nPremature challenge to the show-cause notice without exhausting administrative remedies.\n•\nThe court emphasized judicial restraint in tax matters and upheld the principle that civil suits should not bypass statutory appeal mechanisms.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\nHigh Court’s tax jurisdiction is discretionary, not mandatory.\nDirect challenges to show-cause notices are discouraged.\nPlaintiffs must first exhaust remedies before tax authorities.\n50% deposit rule (Searle IV Solution) is mandatory for maintainability.\nThis case reinforces the strict approach courts take against bypassing tax adjudication processes and highlights the limited scope of civil suits in tax disputes.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,11(2),11(3)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=9Customs Act, 1969=217(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "Suit No. 477 and C.M.A. No.6244 of 2024, decided on 27th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shaukat Hayat for Plaintiff.\nGhulam Asghar Pathan, Syed Ahsan Ali Shah, Mukesh Kumar Khatri for Defendants along with Mansoor Wisal, DCIR.\nKashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s ASG METALS LIMITED through Chief Executive Officer (CEO) / Director\nvs\nThe COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-IV and 5 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25926", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 750 = 2025 SLD 750 = 2025 PTD 399 = 2025 PTCL 261", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVTg", - "Key Words:": "Whether the amendment made through the Finance Act, 2024 substituting “post-dated cheques” with “pay orders” for import of plant, machinery, and raw material by industries located in erstwhile FATA/PATA—is constitutional and in line with the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Articles 18, 23, 24 & 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan.\n________________________________________\nBackground:\n•\nPrior to the 25th Constitutional Amendment, tax laws including Sales Tax Act, 1990 were not extended to FATA/PATA.\n•\nPost-merger, tax laws were extended, but exemptions were granted to tribal areas through SROs and Entry Nos. 151 & 152 of the Sixth Schedule.\n•\nInitially, post-dated cheques were provided as a security for tax exemption.\n•\nFinance Act, 2024 replaced this with pay orders, requiring upfront cash equivalent to sales tax payable.\n________________________________________\nPetitioners’ Arguments:\n•\nPay order requirement negates exemption under Entry 151 and Section 13 of the Act.\n•\nParliament cannot impose conditions under Section 13—only the Federal Government can.\n•\nThe Finance Act provision is not a money bill in true form (violates Article 7 of the Constitution).\n•\nThe condition is discriminatory and violates the freedom of trade, property rights, and equality.\n•\nCited cases:\no\nTaj Packages (PTCL 2016 CL 402)\no\nHazrat Hussain (PTCL 2018 CL 700) – upheld by Supreme Court\n________________________________________\nRespondents’ Arguments (FBR & Intervenors):\n•\nLaw passed by competent legislature and aims to prevent revenue leakage.\n•\nIntervenors (PVMA & PALSP) claimed exemption undermines level playing field for industries in settled areas.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Reasoning:\n1.\nExemption History:\no\nExemptions are rooted in historical constitutional and administrative treatment of FATA/PATA.\no\nExemption under Entry 151 remains valid and backed by SROs and policy directives.\n2.\nUnreasonable Condition:\no\nPay order requires upfront cash, turning exemption into de facto tax payment.\no\nConsumption certificate issuance process is vague, highly discretionary, and not codified.\n3.\nDiscrimination:\no\nNo other exemption in Sixth Schedule requires pay order as a condition.\no\nViolates Article 25 (Equality before Law) and Article 18 (Freedom of trade).\no\nFATA/PATA industries cannot be treated more onerously than other exempt entities.\n________________________________________\nKey Findings:\n•\nThe amendment is unreasonable, discriminatory, and violative of fundamental rights under Articles 18, 23, 24, and 25.\n•\nThe condition does not regulate tax, but regulates exemption, hence cannot be part of a Money Bill.\n•\nThe pay order requirement is struck down and replaced with the earlier practice of post-dated cheques.\n���\nPetitioners are entitled to return of pay orders and substitution with post-dated cheques.\n________________________________________\nFinal Order:\n“We hold that the amendment in Entry No. 151... does not qualify the test of reasonableness, besides it is discriminatory and ultra vires Articles 18, 23, 24 and 25 of the Constitution... accordingly struck down... the petitioners shall provide post-dated cheques... instruments of pay order already deposited... shall be returned.”\n________________________________________\nPrecedents Relied On:\n•\nTaj Packages (PTCL 2016 CL 402)\n•\nHazrat Hussain (PTCL 2018 CL 700)\n•\nM/S Lucky Cement Ltd.\n•\nWhitney vs. JR Commissioners (1926) 10 TC 88\n•\nMohammad Imran case (Pakistan SC)\n•\nPrag Ice Mills (Indian SC)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=18,23,24,25Sales Tax Act, 1990=13; and Sixth Schedule-Entry No. 151", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3509-P/2024 with C.M No. 1419-P/2024, decided on 22nd October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Isaac Ali Qazi for Petitioners\nSanaulah, DAG, Barrister Sarwar Muzaffar Shah, Ishtiaq Ahamd (Junior), Hassan Naeem Saber, Ehtisham-ud-Din, Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmad Khokhar, Aimal khan Barkandi along with Sharifullah, Assisstant Director (Legal) for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. TAJ VEGETABLE OIL PROCESSING UNIT (PVT.) LTD AND OTHERS - PETITIONER:\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS - RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25927", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 751 = 2025 SLD 751 = 2025 PTCL 285 = (2025) 132 TAX 484", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVXo", - "Key Words:": "Whether the Customs Tribunal and subordinate authorities were justified in determining the classification of partially imported goods (boilers and components) under HS Code 8402.1110 instead of HS Code 8502.3900, without first referring the matter to the Classification Centre, as required under CGO 12/2002 and recent Supreme Court precedents.\n________________________________________\nFactual Matrix:\n•\nApplicant imported a Steam Power Generation Plant in partial shipments, including boilers.\n•\nCustoms authorities initially cleared the goods under HS Code 8502.3900.\n•\nThe Directorate of Intelligence challenged this, alleging misclassification.\n•\nGoods were later seized, but the Customs Tribunal ruled:\no\nNo misdeclaration occurred.\no\nClassification should be under 8402.1110.\n•\nTribunals finding on classification was challenged in this Reference Application.\n•\nConnected Constitutional Petitions involved other components of the same plant, released on interim orders pending final classification.\n________________________________________\nSupreme Court Precedent Cited:\nK.S. Sulemanji Esmailji case (2023) – Classification is:\n•\nA technical task, requiring expert evaluation.\n•\nTo be finalized by the Classification Committee of FBR, whose decision is binding unless shown to be arbitrary or fanciful.\n________________________________________\nKey Observations by the High Court:\n1.\nTribunal & Department Failed:\no\nNeither sought opinion from the Classification Centre.\no\nBoth prematurely decided classification despite statutory procedure.\n2.\nPara 1(xi) of CGO 12/2002:\no\nMust be considered by Classification Committee.\no\nRecognizes that classification of plant/machinery arriving in parts should be unified under the main item’s HS Code.\n3.\nTribunal Order Partially Unsustainable:\no\nSince misdeclaration was not found, no grievance remained on that aspect.\no\nHowever, classification portion of the judgment is set aside.\n4.\nMatter Remanded:\no\nClassification Committee to determine correct HS Code for boilers and components imported in partial shipments.\no\nTheir opinion will be final, subject to rare exceptions per SC ruling.\n5.\nConnected Petitions:\no\nReleased consignments are to be governed by outcome of Classification Committee’s decision.\no\nSecurities already deposited will be subject to final classification outcome.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Final Order:\n•\nReference Application disposed of.\n•\nTribunal’s order on classification set aside.\n•\nMatter remanded to Classification Committee (FBR) for final decision.\n•\nConnected constitutional petitions also disposed of on similar terms.\n•\nSecured amounts will abide by the Committee’s findings.\n•\nCopies of the order to be sent to the Classification Centre, Respondent, and Collectorate of Customs Appraisement, Karachi.\n________________________________________\nLegal Significance:\nAffirms the primacy of the Classification Committee as per Pakistan’s obligations under the Harmonized Commodity Description System.\nStrengthens procedural discipline in classification disputes—technical matters to be handled by experts, not judicial or quasi-judicial forums.\nSets a precedent for strict adherence to CGOs and FBR internal procedures in classification of partial shipments under industrial projects.\n________________________________________\nPractical Implications for Importers:\n•\nClassification must align with CGO 12/2002, especially Para 1(xi).\n•\nPartial shipments of industrial plants should ideally be classified under a project-wide HS code, not fragmented.\n•\nAny customs clearance dispute involving classification should be referred to the Classification Centre before litigation.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=18,First Schedule", - "Case #": "Special Custom Reference No. 792 of 2023 along with C. P. No. D-6228/2021, C.P. No. D-20, 249, 481, 758/2022 and C. P. No. D-1696, 4643 & 4900/2024, decided on 13th January, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Ovais Ali Shah, Advocate.\nRespondents by: M/s. Agha Shahid Majeed Khan & Muhammad Zakir, Advocate. Mr. Khalid Mehmood Rajpar, in SCRA No. 792/2023. Mr. Pervaiz Ahmed Memon, Advocate C. P. No. D-6228/2021. Mr. Amir Ali Shaikh, Advocate in C. P. No. D-1696/2024. Mr. Khalilullah Jakhro, in C. P. No. D- 1696/2024. Mr. Imran Ahmed, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "LUCKY CORE INDUSTRIES LIMITED, KARACHI.\nVS\nTHE DIRECTOR, D.G. I&I (CUSTOMS) KARACHI & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25928", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 752 = 2025 SLD 752 = 2025 PTCL 293", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDVXk", - "Key Words:": "Powers of Customs Appellate Tribunal – Appointment of Local Commission – Nature of Goods and Jurisdictional Scope of Reference\nDetails:\nThe applicant challenged the judgment dated 10.04.2023 passed in Customs Appeal No. H-7255/2021 by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, raising three legal questions:\n•\n(A) Whether the Tribunal was justified in appointing its own employee (Assistant Private Secretary) as a Local Commissioner, thereby allegedly assuming the roles of judge, jury, and executioner in violation of the principles of justice.\n•\n(B) Whether the Tribunal could appoint a person without relevant expertise and without respondent’s consent to determine whether goods were imported or locally manufactured.\n•\n(C) Whether the Tribunal’s decision to release seized goods worth Rs. 2.4675 million, and related duty/taxes of Rs. 1.410 million, was justified despite the alleged lack of sales tax/import documentation.\nThe court held that under Section 194-C(6) of the Customs Act, 1969, the Customs Tribunal had powers akin to those of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including the power to issue commissions. Therefore, the appointment of a local commissioner was lawful. The court further observed that the applicant had not raised any timely objection to the commissioners appointment or qualifications, and could not now raise objections post facto.\nRegarding the findings on the nature of goods (local vs. imported), the Tribunal had determined based on the Commissioner’s report that the goods were locally manufactured and not imported, thus negating the smuggling allegation. The court emphasized that under pre-2024 law, factual findings of the Tribunal could not be disturbed in Reference Jurisdiction. The applicant failed to substantiate the smuggling allegation with documentary evidence.\nHeld:\n•\nQuestions (A) and (B) were answered against the Applicant: The Customs Tribunal had legal authority to appoint a local commissioner and the applicant waived its right to object.\n•\nQuestion (C) was also answered against the Applicant: The Tribunal’s finding that goods were locally manufactured stood unchallenged, and the applicant failed to prove smuggling.\n•\nThe Reference Application was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-C(6),196(5)", - "Case #": "S.C.R.A No. 1492 of 2023, decided on 31st October, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Khalilullah Jakhro, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Riaz, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR, COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS, HYDERABAD.\nVS\nFAZAL QADEER S/O SAEED REHMAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25929", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 753 = 2025 SLD 753 = 2025 PTCL 298 = (2025) 131 TAX 283 = 2025 PTD 1483", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTc", - "Key Words:": "Maintainability of Reference Application against dismissal of Rectification Application\nDetails:\nThe applicant filed a Reference Application challenging the dismissal of Rectification Application No. 3789/KB/2023 in ITA No. 910/KB/2022. The main contention was that the rectified assessment order lacked lawful authority under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, particularly in light of the Amnesty Scheme invoked by the applicant. However, the High Court noted that the Reference Application was filed against a rectification order, not the Tribunals main order dated 06.11.2023.\nThe Court held that a Reference under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 (similar provisions in Income Tax context) lies only against an order “disposing of an appeal” under Section 194B(3). Since a rectification order does not dispose of an appeal and merely addresses apparent mistakes, it is not maintainable as a basis for a Reference.\nThe Court reinforced its stance by relying on precedent from The Collector of Customs v. Messrs Pacific Oil Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. [2023 PTD 1268], which clearly states that rectification orders do not fall within the ambit of appeal-disposing orders under Section 194B(3), and hence, no Reference can be entertained under Section 196.\nThe Court also referred to earlier judgments such as Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ateed Riaz [2002 PTD 570] and discussed in depth the distinction between rectification and appeal orders, and the effect of limitation periods. The attempt to circumvent the 90-day limitation for filing a Reference by filing a rectification was found to be impermissible.\nHeld:\nThe Reference Application was dismissed in limine on the ground of non-maintainability, as it arose from the dismissal of a rectification application and not from a final appellate order. Pending applications were also dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\nThe Collector of Customs v. Messrs Pacific Oil Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. [2023 PTD 1268]\n•\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Ateed Riaz [2002 PTD 570]\n•\nPakistan Electric Fittings (discussed but not followed)\n•\nSections 194B(2) & (3), and 196 of the Customs Act, 1969\n•\nSection 122(5A), Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\n•\nSection 136 and 156, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (for comparative discussion)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(5A),132,133,135,136(1),221Customs Act, 1969=194B(1),194B(2),194B(3),196Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=136,156", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Application (“ITRA”) No. 274 of 2024, 3rd December, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Murtaza Khuhro, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUKESH KUMAR\nVS\nAPPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25930", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 754 = 2025 SLD 754 = 2025 PTCL 307", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTY", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues:\n1.\nWhether the assessment order dated 21.10.2022 was barred by limitation under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?\n2.\nWhether PESCO’s supply of free electricity to employees and miscellaneous income heads were liable to sales tax?\n3.\nWhether commissions on collection of Electricity Duty (ED) and TV Fee are taxable under Section 3?\n________________________________________\nFacts Summary:\n•\nPESCO received a show cause notice (SCN) on 02.11.2021 for Rs. 10.669 billion.\n•\nAfter reply, demand was reduced to Rs. 331 million via order dated 21.10.2022.\n•\nThe order was challenged before the CIR(A), who dismissed the appeal.\n•\nPESCO then appealed to the ATIR.\n________________________________________\nTribunals Findings:\n⮚ Issue 1: Limitation under Section 11(5)\n•\nSCN issued on: 02.11.2021\n•\nOrder received on: 25.10.2022 = 352 days later\n•\nAllowed period = 120 days + max 60 days (adjournments) = 180 days\n•\nHeld: Order passed beyond statutory period; no valid record of lawful extension from CIR or FBR; time-barred.\nCited cases:\n•\n2020 CLC Note 12\n•\n2015 PTD 1068\n•\n2022 PTD 1356\n•\n2009 PTD 1247 (SC)\n•\nPTCL 2022 CL 281 – requirement of hearing before granting extension\n•\n2011 SCMR 676 – mandatory timelines\n________________________________________\n⮚ Issue 2: Free Electricity to Employees\n•\nPESCO levies GST on employee electricity bills but pays it itself (negative balance reflects credit).\n•\nSupporting docs: Bills, MIS reports, Form CP-41, WAPDA meeting minutes\n•\nTribunal relied on earlier ATIR judgment: 2015 PTD (Trib.) 1112\n•\nHeld: Charges disproved; proper documentation provided; GST deposited.\n________________________________________\n•\nArguments:\no\nServices performed for Provincial Government / PTV, not for consideration in terms of sales tax.\no\nRule 13(2)(b) of Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007 excludes commissions from “value of electricity.”\no\nSection 2(46)(i) introduced via Finance Act, 2019, cannot apply retrospectively to 2018–19.\n•\nHeld:\no\nTribunal agrees with taxpayer.\no\nRules applicable during FY 2018–19 do not impose tax on commissions.\no\nCharging provisions are prospective.\no\nInterpretation must be liberal in favor of taxpayer.\nCited cases:\n•\n2007 SCMR 1367 – Lucky Cement\n•\n2023 PTD 1492 – fiscal interpretation in favor of taxpayer\n________________________________________\nFinal Disposition:\nAppeal allowed.\nSCN, Assessment Order, and Order-in-Appeal declared illegal, void ab initio.\nTribunal vacated entire proceedings as time-barred and without merit.\n________________________________________\nSignificance:\n•\nReinforces the mandatory nature of time limits under Section 11(5).\n•\nUpholds taxpayer-friendly interpretation of fiscal statutes.\n•\nEstablishes that commissions on ED/TV collection and employee electricity adjustments are not taxable during FY 2018–19.\n•\nUnderscores need for reasoned speaking orders, and due process before granting extensions.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(46),2(46)(i),3,3(1),11(2),11(5),14(2),25(5),33(5)Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007=13(2)(b)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A", - "Case #": "STA No. 152(PB) of 2023, decided on 1st February, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. M. ABDULLAH KHAN KAKAR JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. SHAH KHAN ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hussain Ahmad Sherazi, Mr. Mouzzam\nAli Butt, Advocate a/w Mr. Farooq Azam, ACCA", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD. (PESCO), WAPDA HOUSE, SHAMI ROAD, PESHAWAR\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER- INLAND REVENUE, (AUDIT-9/E&C-18), CORPORATE ZONE, RTO, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25931", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 755 = 2025 SLD 755 = 2025 PTCL 323 = (2025) 131 TAX 271 = 2025 PTD 753", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTU", - "Key Words:": "Definition of Sale under Income Tax Ordinance – Inter-company Transfers and Tax Liability\nDetails:\nThe case revolves around whether certain inter-company transactions involving the transfer of raw materials between associated entities within the same group—specifically between the respondent taxpayer and M/s Saritow Spinning Mills Ltd.—constitute sales under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The taxpayer, a public limited company engaged in the manufacturing and sale of yarn, was audited under Section 177 for Tax Year 2003. The taxation officer treated the inter-company transfer of raw materials as a sale, assessing tax under Section 169. The taxpayer contended that these were mere internal allocations without monetary consideration, thus not sales. The Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the taxpayer, holding the transactions lacked the essential element of monetary consideration. The Revenue challenged this finding under Section 133 before the High Court.\nHeld:\nThe Court reaffirmed the Tribunals view that a “sale” necessitates monetary consideration. Drawing from Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and Section 153(7)(iii) of the Income Tax Ordinance, the Court concluded that the ledger entries reflected internal transfers, not sales, as no money was exchanged. The High Court emphasized that mere entries or netting off amounts in financial statements do not establish the existence of a sale in the legal sense. Consequently, Section 153’s tax provisions were held inapplicable. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),133(1),153,53(6),153(7)(iii),169,177Sale of Goods Act, (III of 1930)=4", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A.1369-L/2022. Date of Hearing: 15.01.2025. Decided on 15th January, 2025\n(Against the order dated 16.03.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in PTR No. 260/2012)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Justice Munib Akhtar, Justice Athar Minallah and Justice Shahid Waheed", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Ahmad Pervaiz, ASC via video link from Branch Registry Lahore", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE ...PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nM/S AZAM TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED, LAHORE ...RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25932", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 756 = 2025 SLD 756 = 2025 PTCL 329 = 2025 PTD 635 = (2025) 131 TAX 269", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax – Input Tax Adjustment – Supplier Blacklisting and Good Faith Purchases\nDetails:\nThis case concerns the Revenue’s challenge under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, against the respondent taxpayer, who was accused of violating Section 8(1)(d) by claiming input tax adjustments based on allegedly fake invoices issued by two suppliers—I.J. Traders and DAG Enterprises. The Deputy Commissioner alleged the suppliers were blocked at the time of invoice issuance. In its defense, the taxpayer asserted it had verified the suppliers registration status via the Federal Board of Revenue’s official portal at the time of transaction and found them active. Payments were made through proper banking channels in compliance with Section 73.\nOn examination, the record supported the taxpayer’s claim: there was no evidence that invoices were issued while the suppliers were suspended or blacklisted. The Court highlighted that subsequent blacklisting does not retroactively invalidate input tax claims, provided the transactions were bona fide and in accordance with the law. Section 21(3) of the Act and legal precedent confirmed that input tax adjustments are valid if the suppliers were active at the time of supply and all conditions of Section 73 were satisfied.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that the input tax adjustments made by the respondent were lawful. The demand created by the Deputy Commissioner was found to be without basis and was rightly quashed by the appellate authorities. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7,8(1)(d),21(3),47,73", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. 2400-L/2022, decided on: 16-01-2025. Date of Hearing: 16.01.2025\n(Against the judgment dated 12.04.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in STR No.5/2014)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH AND JUSTICE SHAHID WAHEED", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE ... PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nM/S EAGLE CABLES (PVT) LTD, LAHORE ... RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25933", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 757 = 2025 SLD 757 = 2025 PTCL 332 = 2025 PTD 574", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUS8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax – Withholding Agent Obligations – Validity of Proceedings under Sections 161 and 205\nDetails:\nThis appeal, brought by the taxpayer with leave of the Supreme Court, challenged the opinion of the Lahore High Court regarding a reference made by the Revenue under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2000. The case arose from an order under Sections 161/205 of the Ordinance against an AOP engaged in the manufacture and sale of plastic shoes, which had declared purchases exceeding Rs. 491 million for Tax Year 2012, qualifying it as a withholding agent under Section 153(7).\nThe Revenue alleged non-compliance with withholding tax obligations and issued notices under Rule 44(4) and Sections 161/205. After a series of appeals, the Appellate Tribunal for Inland Revenue (ATIR) held that the original order under Section 161 was invalid due to the taxation officers failure to identify specific parties from whom tax was not withheld, referencing the necessity under Section 161(2). The Tribunal annulled the lower orders.\nThe High Court, however, reversed the Tribunal’s view, relying on Bilz and holding that once it was established that payments attracting withholding tax were made, the burden shifted to the taxpayer to demonstrate lawful non-deduction. There was no requirement for the taxation officer to identify specific recipients.\nThe Supreme Court opted not to endorse either the Tribunal’s or the High Court’s rationale but instead emphasized a different approach: under Section 161, taxpayers must file comprehensive statements disclosing all payments (including those exempt or not subject to withholding), complete with reasons and legal justifications. Failure to do so constitutes default.\nThe Court reiterated the threshold laid down in MCB Bank Ltd. v. CIR (2021 SCMR 1086), requiring objective grounds for initiating action under Section 161. The Court found the notice issued by the Revenue to be sufficiently detailed, identifying discrepancies and demonstrating a reasonable basis for issuing the notice. Therefore, the demand created was held to be valid.\nHeld:\nThe appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the notice under Section 161 met the threshold of objectivity, and the taxpayer’s failure to deduct or collect tax, coupled with inadequate disclosure, constituted a valid basis for default proceedings.\nCase Law:\nMCB Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2021 SCMR 1086)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Bilz (Pvt.) Ltd., PLD 2021 SC 422", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,149,150,152,153,153(7),155,156,161,161(2),205Income Tax Rules, 2002=43,44(4)", - "Case #": "C.A. 16 OF 2022, decided on: 14-01-2025. Date of Hearing: 14.01.2025\n(Against the judgment dated 26.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in ITR No.13/2015)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR JUSTICE ATHAR MINALLAH JUSTICE SHAHID WAHEED", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant(s): Ch. Mumtaz ul Hassan, ASC via video link from Branch Registry Lahore\nFor the Mr. Ahmad Pervaiz, ASC via video\nlink from Branch Registry Lahore", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S CHAWALA FOOTWEAR, LAHORE .... APPELLANT(S)\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE, ETC. .... RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25934", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 758 = 2025 SLD 758 = 2025 PTCL 340 = (2025) 131 TAX 598", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUSs", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction to decide constitutionality of statutory provisions – Referral to Collector of Customs without deciding vires of law\nDetails:\nThe Appellant challenged the impugned order dated 10.11.2020 passed by a learned Single Judge in Chamber in Writ Petition No. 2132/2014. In the original writ petition, the Appellant had challenged the constitutionality (vires) of Section 31A of the Customs Act, 1969 and Sections 6(1) and 6(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. However, rather than deciding the constitutional issues, the learned Single Judge had directed the Collector of Customs (Respondents No. 4 and 5) to decide the matter after affording a fair opportunity of hearing to the Appellant.\nThe Appellant contended that the Collector of Customs lacked jurisdiction to decide issues regarding the constitutionality of laws and that the learned Single Judge erred in referring the matter to them.\nThe Division Bench noted that despite attempts to mediate and obtain instructions from Respondents, no meaningful resolution occurred. The Bench further held that constitutional issues, particularly vires of legislation, cannot be adjudicated by departmental authorities such as customs officers.\nHeld:\nThe impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside.\nThe matter is remanded to be decided afresh by the learned Single Judge as per law.\nDirections issued to the Collector of Customs are declared without legal effect.\nAny consequential orders passed in compliance with the impugned order are also rendered without legal force.\nCitations:\nAbdul Majeed Khan through L.Rs. v. Ms. Maheen Begum (2014 SCMR 1524): Orders passed without jurisdiction are void and courts can rectify such errors under constitutional jurisdiction.\nMuhammad Ayub v. Member (Judicial-III), BOR, Punjab (2021 MLD 2110): Orders passed in disregard of law and without jurisdiction fall and all consequential actions based thereon also fall.\nPESCO v. Ishfaq Khan (2021 SCMR 637): Any superstructure built on a void order collapses.\nLDA v. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739): Principles for judicial review of constitutionality of laws.\nOther supportive references include:\nDr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 265)\nFederation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Sadiq (PLD 2007 SC 133)\nWatan Party v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 697)\nPakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2005 SC 719)\nIqbal Zafar Jhagra v. Federation of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1337)\nMaster Foam (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Govt. of Pakistan (2005 PTD 1537)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3Customs Act, 1969=194Sales Tax Act, 1990=6(1),6(1)(A),31(A)", - "Case #": "Intra Court Appeal No. 92 of 2020, decided on: 27-01-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUDGE AND SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUDGE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Sirdar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, ASC for the Appellant.\nMr. Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, Additional Attorney General with Tahir Raheel Awan, Assistant Attorney General-XIX for Respondent No. 1.\nYousaf Khan, S.O. I.R. Legal, RTO, Rawalpindi. Nemo for Respondents No.2 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ATTOCK REFINERY LIMITED \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25935", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 759 = 2025 SLD 759 = 2025 PTCL 347", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTk", - "Key Words:": "Suspension of Customs Agents Licenses without notice and reasons – Violation of due process\nDetails:\nThe Petitioners challenged identical suspension orders of their Customs Agent Licenses issued via Circular dated 01.02.2025 by the Collectorate of Customs (Appraisement-West), Karachi under Rule 102(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001. The said circular merely stated that the licenses were suspended with immediate effect and instructed not to process any documents from the Petitioners, but did not provide any reasons or justification.\nPetitioners contended that the suspension orders were issued without notice, reasons, or due process, violating principles of natural justice. The Respondents argued that the orders existed only in the computer system and no written reasoned order was available.\nThe Court held that even though Rule 102(4) allows immediate suspension without notice, it requires written reasons and must be exercised sparingly in extreme exigencies. The Court emphasized that:\nSuspension of licenses without reasons is unlawful.\nSuspension is a severe measure impacting business rights.\nThe power to suspend must be exercised with care, transparency, and justification.\nThe Court also noted that although show cause notices were subsequently issued, the vague nature of the allegations (based largely on WhatsApp messages) did not justify the urgency for such immediate suspension without a hearing.\nHeld:\nAll impugned suspension orders are set aside.\nPetitioners’ licenses are reinstated pending final adjudication of show cause notices.\nLicensing Authority is directed to decide the show cause proceedings expeditiously, strictly in accordance with law and after affording proper opportunity of hearing.\nPetitioners may seek further remedies if aggrieved by the final decisions.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Rules, 2001=102(4)", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-466 of 2025 along with C.P. Nos. 517, 518, 519, 536 & 537 of 2025, decided on 11th February, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ABDUR REHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Dr. Mohammad Farogh Naseem, Shahrukh Naseem, Abdul Rehman Adeed & Syeda Abida Bukhari, Advocates for Petitioner in C.P. No. D- 466 of 2025.\nM/s. Dr. Shahab Imam and Tanzeel Farooqui, Advocate for Petitioners in C.P. Nos.D-517, 518, 519, 536 & 537 of 2025.\nMr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. Sardar Zafar Hussain, Advocate for Respondent along with Jahanzeb Abbasi, ADC (West) COC, Karachi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HUMAYU SULTAN\nVS\nPAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25936", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 760 = 2025 SLD 760 = 2025 PTCL 381", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUTg", - "Key Words:": "Challenge to Pre-Suspension Notice under Section 21(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Request for Injunction\nDetails:\nThe Plaintiff challenged a pre-suspension notice dated 19.04.2024 issued by the Commissioner-IR under Section 21(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, alleging input tax adjustments on fake/flying invoices and purchases from a suspended vendor. Through CMA No. 6447/2024, the Plaintiff sought interim relief to restrain coercive action by the tax authority.\nThe Plaintiff’s counsel contended that:\nThe allegations in the notice are unfounded and lack evidentiary support.\nAt the time of transaction, the vendor was not suspended.\nThe notice was issued with malafide intent.\nIt was further argued that Section 21(5) of the Act (inserted via Finance Act 2024) provides a new remedy before the Chief Commissioner against suspension, and being procedural, it applies retrospectively.\nHowever, the Court emphasized the well-settled principle that courts should not interfere with show-cause notices or ongoing statutory proceedings unless a jurisdictional defect is present. The Plaintiff’s objections were factual in nature and did not challenge the Commissioner’s jurisdiction. The Plaintiff had already placed these facts before the Commissioner-IR, who was yet to adjudicate.\nHeld:\nThe impugned notice was not without jurisdiction.\nThe request for interim injunction would require the Court to pre-emptively decide disputed facts, which is premature.\nCMA No. 6447/2024 was accordingly dismissed.\nPlaintiff may pursue the available remedy under Section 21(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (as amended).\nCitations:\nStatutory amendments providing a remedy are procedural and apply retrospectively.\nCourts do not interfere with show-cause notices unless jurisdictional error is shown.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2),21(5)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12", - "Case #": "Suit No. 437 of 2024, date of hearing and order: 06-02-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Ovais Ali Shah, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Nisar Ali Naushad Babar, Assistant Attorney General.\nNemo.\nMr. Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Advocate along with Ms. Zakia, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "EXIDE PAKISTAN LTD. \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25937", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 761 = 2025 SLD 761", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUXo", - "Key Words:": "Federal Excise Duty – Section 3, 16, and 34A of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 – Section 2(23) of the FEA – Chapter 98, Pakistan Customs Tariff – Non-Banking Financial Companies – Asset Management Services – Applicability of Excise Duty – Sub-heading Specificity – Judicial Interpretation – Rule 6, General Rules of PCT Interpretation – Fiscal Statute – Doctrine of Strict Construction\n________________________________________\nThe High Court adjudicated two connected references involving the imposition of Federal Excise Duty (FED) on asset management services rendered by Habib Asset Management Limited and Alfalah GHP Investment Management Limited, both licensed NBFCs.\nThe primary legal question was whether FED could be levied under Section 3 read with Entry 8 of Table II of the First Schedule of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, in the absence of express mention of the concerned services in the sub-headings of Chapter 98 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff (PCT).\nJustice Mohammad Abdur Rahman held that:\n•\nThe charging provision in Section 3 must be read strictly with its Explanation and the definition of services in Section 2(23) of the FEA, both of which restrict the scope of excisable services to those enumerated in Chapter 98 of the PCT.\n•\nSection 16 of the FEA explicitly exempts all goods and services from FED unless specified in the First Schedule, thereby rendering all unspecified services non-taxable.\n•\nThe Court emphasized the interpretive mandate under Rule 6 of the General Rules for PCT Interpretation, affirming that classification must be based on sub-headings, not merely general headings.\n•\nRelying on the precedents set in Citibank NA v. CIR (2014 PTD 284) and PTV v. CIR (2017 SCMR 1136), the Court reiterated that only those services expressly listed in sub-headings are chargeable to FED. General references to Non-Banking Financial Companies in main headings do not suffice.\nAccordingly, as none of the sub-headings under PCT 98.13 specifically listed asset management services, the Court held that neither Habib Asset Management Ltd. nor Alfalah GHP Investment Management Ltd. were liable to pay FED for the relevant tax periods.\n________________________________________\nHeld:\n•\nITRA No. 175/2012 (now re-numbered as SFERA) was dismissed;\n•\nSpl.F.E.R.A No. 14/2016 was allowed.\nBoth in favour of the assessees, establishing that asset management services were not subject to FED absent express classification under PCT Chapter 98 sub-headings.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Doctrines Applied:\n•\nStrict construction of fiscal statutes\n•\nSub-headings govern taxability in classification under PCT\n•\nCharging provision and exemptions must be read harmoniously", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=2(23),3,16,34-A,Entry 8 of Table II of the First Schedule", - "Case #": "I.T.R.A No. 175 of 2012. Date of Hearing: 22 January 2025, Date of Judgement: 16 April 2025 & Special Federal Excise Reference No.14 of 2016. Date of hearing: 22 January 2025. Date of Judgement: 16 April 2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, Justice and Mohammad Abdur Rahman, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Nemo & Maaz Waheed\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi and Mr. Jam Zeeshan Ali", - "Petitioner Name:": "I.T.R.A No. 175 of 2012. Date of Hearing: 22 January 2025, Date of Judgement: 16 April 2025\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II, Regional Tax Office\nVs.\nM/s. Habib Asset Management Limited\nSpecial Federal Excise Reference No.14 of 2016. Date of hearing: 22 January 2025. Date of Judgement: 16 April 2025\nAlfalah GHP Investment Management Limited\nVs.\nFederation of Pakistan & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25938", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 762 = 2025 SLD 762", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDUXk", - "Key Words:": "Remand of Assessment Order Due to Violation of Natural Justice\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, an individual, filed their income tax return for Tax Year 2018 declaring taxable income of Rs. 450,000/-, which was deemed assessed under Section 120(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Officer Inland Revenue (OIR) initiated proceedings after observing an inflow of Rs. 80,000,000/- in the taxpayer’s wealth statement labeled as “inheritance,” but unsupported by documentary evidence. Notices under Sections 176(1), 111(1), and 122(9) were issued but remained uncomplied. Subsequently, an ex-parte amended assessment order under Section 121(1) was passed on 04.06.2024, adding Rs. 80,000,000/- under Section 111, resulting in a total tax liability of Rs. 27,377,000/-.\nThe taxpayer appealed the assessment, asserting that replies and documents were submitted but not considered, and contended that the OIR failed to provide a fair hearing, thereby violating the principles of natural justice under Article 10-A of the Constitution.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal found merit in the taxpayer’s argument, noting the violation of fair hearing principles and reliance on legal precedents including 2006 PTD 2654 and 2012 PTD 964. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of following due process under Section 218 of the Ordinance and FBR Circular No. 72 regarding service of notice and fair hearing. Though the Tribunal itself could not verify documents (e.g., death certificate and property ownership record), it remanded the case to the OIR with directions to re-examine the matter afresh. The OIR is instructed to consider the taxpayer’s evidence and pass a speaking order after affording fair opportunity of hearing. The taxpayer is expected to cooperate fully in the proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1),120(1),121(1),122(9),176(1),218Income Tax Rules, 2002=74Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-ACivil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30", - "Case #": "ITA No. 324/LB/2025 (Tax Year 2018), Date of hearing: 24.03.2025. Date of order: 25.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMAD, MEMBER AND IMRAN MUNIR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hasan Yousaf, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ahmad Naveed Fazal, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Umer Sultan, Wazirabad .... Appellante\nVs\nThe CIR, RTO, Lahore .... Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25939", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1983 2057 = 1983 SLD 2057 = 1983 PTCL 15 = 1942 AIR 461", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTTc", - "Key Words:": "Rectification of Share Register – Validity of Blank Transfer after Death of Transferor\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, Mahomed Solaiman Ariff, sought rectification of the share register of a company, asserting ownership of six shares originally held by his deceased grandmother, Mt. Fatma Begum. The shares were transferred in blank to A.S.A. Suhrawardy in 1928 and subsequently to the petitioner in 1940. Upon submission for registration, the company refused without explanation. A directors affidavit challenged the genuineness and timing of the signatures and alleged the form was completed posthumously and thus invalid. No evidence supported these claims.\nThe key issue was whether a blank transfer form, executed during the transferor’s lifetime but filled after her death, remained valid. The court examined legal principles and precedents on blank transfers, the nature of authority coupled with interest, and equitable entitlement. It held that such blank transfers were valid if executed and delivered during the lifetime of the transferor, even if particulars were filled posthumously by a bona fide transferee.\nHeld:\nThe petitioner is entitled to rectification of the register upon completion of the transfer form by inserting the date of transfer. The company is directed to register the petitioner as the holder of the shares. Application allowed with costs.\nCitations:\nIn re Tahiti Cotton Company; Ex parte Sargent (1873) 17 Eq. 273\nColonial Bank v. Cady (1890) 15 A.C. 267\nColonial Bank v. Hepworth (1887) 36 Ch.D. 36\nCarter v. White (1884) 25 Ch.D. 666\nPowell v. London & Provincial Bank (1893) 1 Ch. 612; (1893) 2 Ch. 555", - "Court Name:": "Calcutta High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "on 18 July, 1941", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): LORD WILLIAMS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "In Re: Bengal Silk Mills Co. Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25940", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1983 2058 = 1983 SLD 2058 = 1983 PTCL 46 = 1972 AIR 689 = 1971 SCC 697", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTTY", - "Key Words:": "Legal Issues:\nNature of Power under Proviso to Section 110(2), Customs Act, 1962:\nWhether the Collector of Customs power to extend the seizure period under the proviso is administrative or quasi-judicial, and whether it requires giving an opportunity of hearing to the affected party.\nValidity of Extension After Lapse:\nWhether the Collector can extend the period for issuing a notice under Section 124(a) after the initial or extended six-month period under Section 110(2) has expired.\nFacts:\nThe respondent operated a watch dealership in Calcutta.\nOn March 19, 1963, Customs authorities seized 218 foreign watches. Some were released after the respondent produced valid vouchers.\nOn March 6, 1964, a notice under Section 124(a), Customs Act, was issued for the rest, pending their confiscation.\nSection 110(2) mandates that if no notice is issued within six months of seizure, the goods must be returned unless an extension is granted for sufficient cause for up to six additional months.\nThe initial six-month period expired on September 19, 1963. A four-month extension was granted the same day ex parte.\nThe extended period expired on January 19, 1964. A second extension (two months) was applied for before expiry but granted after expiry on February 20, 1964, again ex parte.\nThe respondent challenged both extensions in the Calcutta High Court, contending they were void as no opportunity to be heard was given.\nJudgment:\nHigh Court Division Bench Finding:\nThe power under Section 110(2) proviso is quasi-judicial, requiring a judicial approach.\nRight to restoration of goods accrued after expiry of the initial/extended period cannot be divested without hearing.\nSecond extension was invalid as it was passed after the expiry of the first extension without hearing.\nShow cause notice under Section 124(a) was vague and defective.\nSupreme Court Ruling:\nAffirmed the quasi-judicial nature of the Collector’s power under Section 110(2) proviso.\nCollector must conduct an inquiry based on facts and give an opportunity of hearing before extending time.\nThe burden lies on Customs to show sufficient cause for the delay.\nCollector’s satisfaction must be based on facts, not subjective belief.\nEx parte extensions are invalid; thus, the order for the restoration of goods was upheld.\nNo need to address the issue of the vague show cause notice as it was not contested.\nKey Legal Principles:\nThe Collector’s power to extend seizure periods under Section 110(2) is quasi-judicial, not administrative.\nThe right to restoration of seized goods is a civil right protected under the law.\nExtension orders cannot be passed without hearing the person affected.\n Sufficient cause requires a factual basis, necessitating procedural fairness.\nCase Law Discussed:\nNarayanappa v. CIT Bangalore (63 ITR 219): Reasonable belief must be relevant.\nKraipak v. Union of India ([1970] 1 SCR 457): Distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions.\nDe Verteuil v. Knaggs ([1918] AC 557): Inquiry requiring fair opportunity to the affected party.\nSheikh Mohammed Sayeed v. Asst. Collector of Customs (AIR 1970 Cal 134): Distinguished and overruled in principle.\nGaneshmul Channilal Gandhi v. Collector of Central Excise (AIR 1968 Mysore 89): Rejected by Supreme Court.\nOutcome:\nAppeal Dismissed with Costs.\nRestoration of seized watches to the respondent upheld.\nQuasi-judicial obligation confirmed on Customs authorities for procedural fairness in extensions.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "on 19 February, 1971", - "Judge Name:": "Bench: J.M. Shelat, C.A. Vaidyialingam", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Asstt. Collector Of Customs \nvs \nCharan Das Malhotra" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25941", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 1983 2059 = 1983 SLD 2059 = 1983 PTCL 64 = 1980 AIR 1111 = (1980) 2 SCR 1158 = (1980) 3 SCC 57", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTTU", - "Key Words:": "Appeal: Special Leave Petition against the Bombay High Courts judgment dated November 1, 1973, which upheld the acquittal of the accused.\n________________________________________\nBackground & Charges:\nThe respondents (Mohd. Yakub, Shaikh Jamadar Mithubhai, and Issak Hasanali Shaikh) were accused of attempting to smuggle 43 silver ingots (weighing 1312.410 kg, worth ~₹8 lakhs) out of India in violation of:\n1.\nForeign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (Sections 12(1), 23(1), 23(d)).\n2.\nImports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 (Export Control Order violation).\n3.\nCustoms Act, 1962 (Sections 7, 8, 33, 34, and 135).\nProsecutions Case:\n•\nCustoms officers received a tip-off about silver being transported via a jeep (MRC-9930) and truck (BMS-796) from Bombay to Bassein for illegal export.\n•\nOn September 14, 1968, officers intercepted the vehicles near Kaman Creek (a coastal area).\n•\nAccused 1 (Mohd. Yakub) was driving the jeep; Accused 2 & 3 were in the truck.\n•\n15 silver ingots were found hidden in the jeep, 24 in the truck, and 4 near the creek.\n•\nA mechanized sea-craft was heard nearby, suggesting an attempt to load the silver for smuggling.\n•\nAccused 1 gave a false name during questioning and was found carrying a pistol, knife, and cash (₹2,133).\nTrial Court & Appeals:\n•\nTrial Court (Judicial Magistrate, Bassein): Convicted all accused under relevant laws.\no\nAccused 1: 2 years RI + ₹2,000 fine.\no\nAccused 2 & 3: 6 months RI + ₹500 fine.\n•\nSessions Court (Appeal): Acquitted the accused, holding that the acts were merely preparation , not an attempt to export.\n•\nBombay High Court: Upheld the acquittal, agreeing that no direct step towards export (like loading onto a boat) was proven.\n________________________________________\nSupreme Courts Analysis:\n1. Definition of Attempt (Sarkaria, J.)\n•\nAn attempt begins where preparation ends.\n•\nKey Tests:\no\nIntention to commit the crime.\no\nOvert act(s) towards commission (need not be the final act).\no\nProximity to completion (act must be closely connected to the offence).\n•\nApplied to Facts:\no\nThe accused transported silver clandestinely at night to a creek near the sea.\no\nUnloading had begun, and a sea-craft was heard (indicating imminent export).\no\nOnly remaining step: Loading onto the boat.\no\nConclusion: This was beyond preparation and constituted an attempt.\n2. Additional Observations (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n•\n Attempt vs. Preparation :\no\nPreparation: Remote acts (e.g., buying materials for a crime).\no\nAttempt: Proximate acts (e.g., reaching the crime scene with intent).\n•\nTest for Proximity:\no\nActs must clearly indicate criminal intent (not just desire).\no\nExample: If the truck was stopped earlier (e.g., at Shirsat Naka), it might only show preparation. But reaching the creek with unloading started shows attempt.\n•\nRejected Narrow Interpretation:\no\nCourts must not adopt a rigid last act test (e.g., requiring loading onto a boat).\no\nSmuggling laws must be interpreted broadly to curb economic offences.\n________________________________________\nFinal Decision:\n•\nAppeal Allowed.\n•\nConviction Restored under Section 135(a) of Customs Act, 1962 and Section 5 of Imports & Exports Control Act, 1947.\n•\nSentences:\no\nAccused 1 (Mohd. Yakub): 1 year RI + ₹2,000 fine (default: 6 months RI).\no\nAccused 2 & 3: 6 months RI + ₹500 fine (default: 2 months RI).\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles Established:\n1.\n Attempt requires:\no\nIntent + proximate act(s) (not just preparation).\no\nNo need for the final step (e.g., actual loading onto a boat).\n2.\nEconomic Offences: Courts must interpret smuggling laws strictly to prevent evasion.\n3.\nProximity Test: Acts must sufficiently demonstrate criminal intent (not just possibility).\nThis judgment broadened the scope of attempt in smuggling cases, ensuring that offenders cannot escape liability by claiming their acts were merely preparatory.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of India", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 335 of 1974. DATE OF JUDGMENT 04/03/1980", - "Judge Name:": "BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH AND REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "PETITIONER: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\nVs.\nRESPONDENT: MUHAMMAD YAKUB S/O ABDUL HAMID & ORS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25942", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 444 = 2024 SLD 444 = 2024 PLD 1028", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "Majority Opinion (Qazi Faez Isa, CJ; Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Amin-ud-Din Khan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Musarrat Hilali, JJ.):\n1.\nCore Holding:\no\nArticle 62(1)(f) is not self-executory. It cannot be enforced without enabling legislation specifying the competent court, procedure, and duration.\no\nThe lifetime disqualification interpretation in Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405) is overruled as unconstitutional.\no\nSection 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017 (as amended in 2023), which limits disqualification to five years, is valid and does not need further judicial scrutiny.\n2.\nKey Points:\no\nJudiciary cannot legislate or insert provisions into the Constitution; their role is to interpret only.\no\nCourts must apply harmonious interpretation, giving due effect to Articles 4, 10A, 17, 62(1)(f), and 63(1)(h).\no\nDisqualification must comply with due process, fair trial, and cannot be permanent without explicit constitutional backing.\no\nDisqualification is a restriction on democratic rights and must be cautiously applied.\no\nArticle 62(1)(f), without enabling law, serves merely as a guideline for voters.\no\nCourts currently lack jurisdiction to issue such declarations due to absence of enabling law.\n3.\nStandard of Proof:\no\nDeclarations of dishonesty or lack of integrity require clear and convincing proof, not mere civil standards.\n4.\nProgressive Interpretation:\no\nConstitution must evolve, but progressive interpretation cannot amount to amendment or reading into the text.\n________________________________________\nDissenting Opinion (Justice Yahya Afridi):\n1.\nCore Holding:\no\nArticle 62(1)(f) is self-executory, and declarations by courts remain valid until revoked.\no\nSami Ullah Baloch (PLD 2018 SC 405) was correctly decided and does not need overruling.\no\nSection 232(2) of the Elections Act cannot override the Constitution; any limitation on the duration of disqualification requires a constitutional amendment.\n2.\nKey Points:\no\nDisqualification persists as long as the court’s declaration exists.\no\nParliament cannot reverse a Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution through ordinary legislation.\no\nLegislative action can nullify effects of judgments only by altering the underlying law, not by contradicting constitutional provisions.\n________________________________________\nLegal Principles Established:\n1.\nSeparation of Powers:\no\nCourts cannot assume legislative power under the guise of interpretation.\n2.\nNon-Self-Executory Nature:\no\nWithout a specific law, Article 62(1)(f) lacks operational effect.\no\nComparable to Articles 62(1)(d), (e), and (g)—serves as guidance, not enforceable law.\n3.\nStare Decisis Exception:\no\nA prior decision that is plainly and palpably wrong may be overruled.\n4.\nIslamic Principles:\no\nLifetime disqualification violates Islamic principles of repentance (tawba) and reformation (islah).\n________________________________________\nImpact:\n•\nLifetime disqualification no longer valid without specific legislation.\n•\nFuture disqualifications under Article 62(1)(f) cannot exceed five years, per Section 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017.\n•\nThe electorate retains primary authority to judge a candidate’s character, not the courts, unless law provides otherwise.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=62(1)(f)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 982, 984 of 2018, 880 of 2015, C.M.As. Nos. 6370, 7534 of 2017, Civil Appeal No. 880 of 2015, Civil Appeal No. 1946 of 2023, Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 2680 of 2023, Civil Appeal No. 981 of 2018, C.M.As. Nos. 10919, 10920, 10921, 10939 of 2023, C.M.As. Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13 and 18 of 2024 in Civil Appeal No. 981 of 2018, Civil Appeal No. 985 of 2018, C.M. Appeals Nos. 22, 135 of 2022 in C.P. Nil of 2022 and Constitution Petition No. 40 of 2022, decided on 25th March, 2024. Dates of hearing: 2nd, 4th and 5th January 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants:\nM. Saqib Jilani, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 981 and 985 of 2018).\nKamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 982 of 2018).\nSh. Usman Karim-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 984 of 2018).\nM. Ahmed Qayyum, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 880 of 2015).\nWaleed Rehan Khanzada, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1946 of 2023).\nSyed Asghar Hussain Sabzwari, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 2680 of 2023).\nSaeed Khurshid Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court (in Const. P. No. 40 of 2022).\nSyed Ali Imran, Advocate Supreme Court/Secy., SCBA and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M. Appeal No. 22 of 2022).\nMir Aurangzeb, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M. Appeal No. 135 of 2022).\nFor the Applicants:\nNemo. (in C.M.A. No. 10919 of 2023).\nCh. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.A. No. 10920 of 2023).\nKhurram Mahmood Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 10921 of 2023).\nDil Muhammad Khan Alizai, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.A. No. 10939 of 2023).\nMian Abdul Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 3 of 2024), Shoukat Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 4 of 2024), M. Anwar Malik, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record (in C.M.A. No. 5 of 2024).\nM. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court, Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, Advocate Supreme Court, Barrister Imran Khan and Hamza Azmat Khan, Advocates (in C.M.A. No. 6 of 2024).\nCh. Munir Sadiq, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Ali Imran, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 18 of 2024).\nFor the Respondents:\nKhalid Ibn-e-Aziz, Advocate Supreme Court (For Respondent No. 1 in C.A. No. 981 of 2018) Nemo for Respondent No.3 (in C.A. No. 982 of 2018).\nNemo for Respondent No. 1. (in C.A. No. 984 of 2018).\nNemo for Respondent No.2. (in C.A. No. 880 of 2015).\nBarrister Khuram Raza, Advocate Supreme Court (For Respondent No.3 in C.A. No. 880 of 2015).\nOn Court's Notice:\nFor the Federation\nMansoor Usman Awan, Attorney-General for Pakistan, Assisted by Ms. Maryam Ali Abbasi, Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. A.G.P., Malik Javed Iqbal Wains, Addl. A.G.P. and Raja M. Shafqat Abbasi, D.A.G.\nFor Govt. of Punjab:\nKhalid Ishaq, Advocate-General, Punjab, Sana Ullah Zahid, Addl. A.G. Punjab and Wasim Mumtaz, A.A.G., Punjab.\nFor Govt. of Sindh:\nHassan Akhtar, A.G. Sindh, Suresh Kumar, A.A.G. Sindh (through video-link, Karachi).\nFor Govt. of KP:\nAmir Javed, Advocate-General and Sultan Mazhar Sher Khan, A.A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.\nFor Government of Balochistan:\nAyaz Khan Swati, Additional Advocate-General, Balochistan.\nFor Islamabad Capital Territory:\nAyaz Shaukat, Advocate-General, Isb.\nFor ECP:\nMuhammad Arshad, D.G. (Law) ECP and Falak Sher, Legal Consultant, ECP.\nAmici Curiae:\nUzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court, Faisal Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms. Reema Omer, who submitted amicus brief in writing.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Civil Appeal No. 982 of 2018\n(On appeal against the order dated 06.07.2018 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 224129 of 2018)\nHAMZA RASHEED KHAN-Appellant\nVersus\nELECTION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE and others-Respondents\nCivil Appeal No. 984 of 2018\n(On appeal against the order dated 11.07.2018 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 222868 of 2018)\nMUMTAZ AHMAD-Appellant\nVersus\nFAZAL MEHMOOD and others-Respondents\nCivil Appeal No. 880 of 2015\n(On appeal against the order dated 21.08.2015 passed by the Election Tribunal, Multan, in Election Petition No.352 of 2013 ECP, 25 of 2013 ETM)\nCh. MUHAMMAD ARIF HUSSAIN-Appellant\nVersus\nFAYYAZ AHMED KHAN GHOURI and others-Respondents\nC.M.A. No. 6370 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 880 of 2015\n[For setting aside ex -parte order]\nC.M.A. No. 7534 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 880 of 2015\n[For setting aside ex -parte order]\nCivil Appeal No. 1946 of 2023\n(On appeal against the order dated 19.10.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No. D-1082 of 2023).\nMUHAMMAD KHAN JUNEJO-Appellant\nVersus\nThe APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR SINDH and others-Respondents\nCivil Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 2680 of 2023\n(On appeal against the order dated 04.05.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Writ Petition No. 27043/2023)\nKASHIF MEHMOOD-Petitioner\nVersus\nMEHMOOD AHMED and others-Respondents\nCivil Appeal No. 981 of 2018\nSardar CONFCIUS IMAM QASRANI-Appellant\nVersus\nSardar Mir BADSHAH KHAN QAISARANI and another-Respondents\nC.M.A. No. 10919 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Concise statement from Ch. Javaid Ahmad]\nC.M.A. No. 10920 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Concise statement from Yousaf Ayub Khan]\nC.M.A. No. 10921 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Concise statement from Behram Khan]\nC.M.A. No. 10939 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Concise statement from Muhammad Aijaz Ahmed Chaudhry]\nC.M.A. No. 2 of 2024 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Concise statement from Sardar Mir Badshah Khan Qiasrani]\nC.M.A. No. 3 of 2024 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Impleadment on behalf of Rashda Yaqub]\nC.M.A. No. 4 of 2024 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Concise statement from Sardar Mir Shoaib Nosherwani]\nC.M.A. No. 5 of 2024 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Concise statement from Mian Zia-ur-Rehman]\nC.M.A. No. 6 of 2024 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Concise statement from Jahangir Khan Tareen]\nC.M.A. No. 13 of 2024 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Concise statement from Attorney-General for Pakistan]\nC.M.A. No. 18 of 2024 in Civil Appeal No.981 of 2018\n[Impleadment on behalf of Chaudhry Nazir Ahmed Jatt]\nCivil Appeal No. 985 of 2018\nSardar CONFCIUS IMAM QASRANI-Appellant\nVersus\nSardar Mir BADSHAH KHAN QAISARANI and another-Respondents\nC.M. Appeal No. 22 of 2022 in C.P.NIL of 2022\n(On appeal against the order dated 24.02.2022 of Assistant Registrar (Civil-II)).\nSUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Appellants\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and another-Respondents\nC.M. Appeal No. 135 of 2022 in C.P.NIL of 2022\nMOHABBAT KHAN-Appellant\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and another-Respondents\nConstitution Petition No. 40 of 2022\nMir MUHAMMAD AMIN UMRANI-Petitioner\nVersus\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25943", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2024 445 = 2024 SLD 445 = 2024 PLD 509", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1JDTS8", - "Key Words:": "Supreme Court Opinion on Presidential Reference Regarding Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Case (PLD 1979 SC 38 & PLD 1979 SC 53)\n________________________________________\n(a) Fair Trial and Due Process:\n•\nConstitutional Provisions Involved: Articles 4, 8, 9, 10A, 14, 25, and 186.\n•\nKey Finding: The trial proceedings before the Lahore High Court and appellate proceedings before the Supreme Court did not meet the standards of fair trial and due process as guaranteed under Articles 4, 9, and later enshrined under Article 10A.\n•\nLegal Consequence: Despite the finding of serious procedural and constitutional lapses, there exists no mechanism within the Constitution or law to annul or set aside the judgment post its finality through dismissal of the review petition.\n________________________________________\n(b) Binding Nature under Article 189:\n•\nConstitutional Provisions Involved: Articles 186 and 189.\n•\nKey Finding: The Reference did not specify any principle of law enunciated in the Bhutto case for review. Hence, the Supreme Court refrained from opining whether any principle stated therein remains binding or has been overruled.\n•\nLegal Consequence: The conviction of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is not considered a binding legal precedent in terms of Article 189, unless a specific legal principle is identified.\n________________________________________\n(c) Justification of Death Sentence and Judicial Bias:\n•\nConstitutional Provision Involved: Article 186.\n•\nKey Finding: The Supreme Court in its advisory jurisdiction cannot reassess evidence or re-open findings of fact to determine whether the death sentence was a result of judicial bias or deliberate miscarriage of justice.\n•\nLegal Consequence: While no reappraisal of evidence is permissible, the Court acknowledged significant constitutional and legal lapses in the fairness of the trial and due process, which will be elaborated in detailed reasoning.\n________________________________________\n(d) Compliance with Islamic Law and Repentance:\n•\nConstitutional Provision Involved: Article 186.\n•\nKey Finding: The Court did not receive adequate assistance regarding the application of Islamic injunctions or the doctrine of repentance from the Quran or Hadith in context of the Bhutto trial.\n•\nLegal Consequence: The Supreme Court declined to give an opinion on whether the trial conformed to Islamic legal standards or whether the doctrine of repentance could apply.\n________________________________________\nConcluding Remarks:\n•\nThe trial and appellate processes of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto were constitutionally deficient regarding fair trial and due process.\n•\nDespite recognizing the flawed nature of the proceedings, the Supreme Court stated it cannot undo a final judgment without a constitutional remedy.\n•\nNo binding principle of law under Article 189 was identified from the Bhutto case.\n•\nThe Court abstained from engaging with Islamic jurisprudence on repentance due to lack of substantial argumentation.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,8,9,10A,14,25,186", - "Case #": "REFERENCE NO. 1 OF 2011 [Reference by the President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution] Reference No. 1 of 2011, decided on 6th March, 2024. Dates of hearing: 12th December, 2023, 8th January, 20th, 26th, 27th, 28th February and 4th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Sardar Tariq Masood, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "In Attendance:\nOn behalf of President:\nMansoor Usman Awan, Attorney-General for Pakistan assisted by Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney-General, Malik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney-General, Raja M. Shafqat Abbasi, Deputy Attorney-General and Ms. Marium Ali Abbasi, Advocate.\nOn Court Notice:\nKhalid Ishaq, Advocate-General, Punjab, assisted by Sanaullah Zahid, Addl. A.G. Hassan Akbar, Advocate-General, Sindh assisted by Qazi M. Bashir, Addl. A.G. Amir Javed, Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, assisted by Sultan Mazhar Sher Khan, Addl. A.G. Asif Reki, Advocate-General, Balochistan assisted by M. Ayaz Swati, Addl. A.G.\nFor the LRs of the Late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto:\nFarooq H. Naek, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Iftikhar Shah and Sheraz Shaukat Rajpar, Advocates (on behalf of Bilawal Bhutto Zardari).\nMian Raza Rabbani, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Zeeshan Abdullah, Advocate (on behalf of Ms. Sanam Bhutto, Ms. Bakhtawar Bhutto and Ms. Aseefa Bhutto).\nZahid F. Ibrahim, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Altamash Arab, Advocate (on behalf of Ms. Fatima Bhutto and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto).\nAmicus Curiae\nManzoor Ahmad Malik.\nHon'ble former Judge, assisted by Ansar Nawaz Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court, Haider Rasul, Advocate Supreme Court and Shahryar Riaz, Advocate High Court.\nM. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court.\nKhalid Jawed Khan, Advocate Supreme Court.\nCh. Aitzaz Ahsan, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Ms. Zunaira Fayyaz Siwia, Advocate and Qaiser Nawaz, Advocate.\nAssadullah Khan Chamkani, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by M. Tariq Khan Hoti, Advocate Supreme Court.\nSalahuddin Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by Ehsan Malik and Aman Aftab, Advocates.\nComplainant:\nAhmed Raza Khan Kasuri, Advocate Supreme Court (in person).\nFor SCBA:\nAli Imran, Advocate Supreme Court.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Presidential Reference Regarding Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Case" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25944", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5YzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 763 = 2025 SLD 763", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5YzY", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe appellant, a private limited company engaged in interconnect and telecommunication services, was issued a notice on January 2, 2023, by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) for failing to deduct withholding tax on a payment of Rs. 102,419,112 made as royalty, as per Section 161(1A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. However, the appellant clarified in July 2023 that there were no royalty payments made, and the amount was incorrectly classified as royalty instead of Other Direct Expenses during the filing of the tax return for the tax year 2021. Despite this explanation, the assessing officer issued an order on August 29, 2024, imposing a tax liability of Rs. 21,196,547, including default surcharge and tax under Section 153B.\nIssues Raised:\n1.\nWhether the assessing officer followed the proper procedural framework before initiating proceedings under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n2.\nWhether the tax authorities provided the appellant with an adequate opportunity to reconcile discrepancies before proceeding with the imposition of tax.\nArguments:\n•\nAppellant’s Argument:\no\nThe appellant argued that the tax assessment was made based on a clerical error, and no royalty payments were made. The incorrect classification of expenses as royalty was clarified with supporting documents.\no\nThe appellant emphasized that the assessing officer had not followed the due process outlined under the Ordinance and had failed to provide a reasonable opportunity for reconciliation before issuing the tax demand.\n•\nRespondent’s Argument (DCIR):\no\nThe DCIR contended that the appellant had failed to deduct withholding tax on the royalty payments and that the default surcharge was correctly applied for the non-payment of the tax.\nAfter reviewing the case and the procedural shortcomings, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellant. The Tribunal found that the proceedings initiated by the assessing officer under Section 161(1A) were premature and did not follow the correct steps outlined under the Income Tax Ordinance and the Income Tax Rules. The deficiencies identified include:\n1.\nNon-Adherence to Identification of Non-Compliance (Step 1):\no\nThe assessing officer failed to verify whether the payment in question was indeed royalty and whether withholding tax was applicable, as required under judicial precedents and tax law procedures.\no\n\n2.\nFailure to Conduct Proper Reconciliation Before Issuing Notice (Step 5):\no\nThe assessing officer did not carry out a reconciliation of the withholding tax records, the tax return, and the financial statements before issuing the notice.\n3.\nFailure to Issue Confrontation Notice (Step 6):\no\nThe assessing officer did not issue a confrontation notice to the appellant before initiating formal proceedings, which is a procedural requirement to ensure fairness.\n4.\nFailure to Provide Adequate Time for Response (Step 7 & Step 8):\no\nThe notice issued by the assessing officer gave the appellant only 8 days to respond to a complex issue, which was deemed unreasonable. No follow-up or reminder was sent before the adverse action was taken.\n5.\nLack of Proper Evaluation of Taxpayer’s Explanation (Step 9):\no\nThe taxpayer’s explanation was not adequately reviewed by the tax authorities. The appellants clarification should have been examined before proceeding with formal default proceedings.\nConclusion:\nThe Tribunal annulled the order issued by the assessing officer on August 29, 2024, and remanded the case with instructions to strictly adhere to the prescribed procedures before issuing a new order. The Tribunal also emphasized that the proceedings under Rule 44 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, initiated by the DCIR after the impugned order, should be consolidated with the current case for a comprehensive review.\nRecommendations:\n•\nThe Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) is instructed to issue guidelines to all assessing officers to ensure strict compliance with the legal provisions and procedural steps outlined under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and the Income Tax Rules, 2002.\n•\nAssessing officers should be made aware of the serious consequences for failing to adhere to the prescribed procedures, which could lead to unnecessary litigation and inefficiencies in revenue collection.\nCost: The appellant is entitled to costs throughout the proceedings.\nFinal Decision: Appeal allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,161(1A),165,205Income Tax Rules, 2002=44", - "Case #": "ITA No.1889/IB/2024 (Tax Period, 2021). Date of Hearing: 29.01.2025. Date of Order: 29.01.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT; M. M AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER) AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Amraiz Khan, Advocate\nRespondent BY: Mr. Khurshid Alam, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Wise Communication Systems (Pvt) Limited; House No.96 10 Road, New Mulpur Satellite Town, Rawalpindi …. Appellant\nVs\nDeputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Range-II, LTO, Islamabad …. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25945", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5YzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 764 = 2025 SLD 764", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5YzU", - "Key Words:": "Brief Facts:\n•\nThe taxpayer, a Tier-1 Retailer, failed to integrate its Point of Sale (POS) with FBR’s computerized system as required under Section 3(9A) and Section 40C of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and SRO 1203(I)/2019.\n•\nA penalty of Rs. 500,000 was imposed under Section 33(25) of the Act due to non-compliance.\n•\nThe taxpayer challenged the penalty before CIR (Appeals), who upheld the order.\n•\nThis second appeal was filed before ATIR along with a stay application.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues:\n1.\nCan Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act be invoked solely for imposing a penalty under Section 33(25)?\n2.\nDoes Section 33 confer jurisdiction on Inland Revenue Officers to issue penalty orders independently?\n3.\nIs there a legislative gap in the Sales Tax Act regarding machinery provisions for enforcing such penalties, unlike Section 182 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?\n________________________________________\nTribunals Findings:\n❖ Nature of Penalty Proceedings:\n•\nThe penalty under Section 33 is civil in nature and not a criminal prosecution.\n•\nHowever, the Sales Tax Act lacks specific machinery provisions empowering officers to independently assess or enforce such penalties.\n❖ Scope of Section 11:\n•\nSection 11 relates to assessment of tax (not penalties alone) and requires tax dues or discrepancies as a triggering point.\n•\nThe penalty under Section 33(25) for non-integration of POS does not fall within any specific subsection of Section 11.\n❖ Legislative Comparison:\n•\nUnlike the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which contains built-in procedures under Section 182 for penalty imposition and right to appeal, the Sales Tax Act is silent on independent enforcement mechanisms for some standalone penalties (like S.No. 25).\n•\nThe term including penalty and default surcharge in Section 11 shows these are ancillary to tax assessment, not standalone provisions.\n________________________________________\nHeld:\n•\nImposition of penalty under S.No. 25 of Section 33 without invoking Section 11 for tax assessment is ultra vires the Sales Tax Act.\n•\nThere exists a legislative anomaly due to the absence of a procedural mechanism to enforce certain penalties under the Act.\n•\nThe tribunal declared the penalty order illegal and void due to lack of jurisdiction and due process.\n________________________________________\nConclusion / Final Order:\n•\nAppeal Accepted.\n•\nPenalty order annulled.\n•\nStay application disposed of as infructuous.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles Established:\n•\nPenalties under Section 33 (like at Sr. No. 25) cannot be imposed independently without a corresponding assessment under Section 11.\n•\nSales Tax Act lacks enforcement machinery for standalone penalties—legislative reform is required to address this gap.\n•\nMere failure to integrate POS without a tax assessment cannot be penalized independently under current provisions.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(29A),2(34),2(43A),3,3(9A),6(2),11,11(1),11(2),11(3),11(5),11(7),33(4),33,33(5),34,36,37B(11),40CSales Tax Rules, 2006=150ZA,150ZB,150ZC,150ZD,150ZE,Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=140,141,147,182,182(2),205,205(5)", - "Case #": "STA No.143/IB/2022, MA (Stay) STA No.188/IB/2022. Date of hearing & order: 28.02.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER) AND MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Affrasyab Kayani, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Sohail Khan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S GRAND MONGOLIA HOTELS (PVT) LTD., LOCATED AT PLAZA NO.142, (CAM-IV) CIVIC CENTRE, PHASE-4, BAHRIA TOWN, ISLAMABAD.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (ENFORCEMENT ZONE), CTO, ISLAMABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25946", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5YzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 765 = 2025 SLD 765", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5YzQ", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues\nValidity of Electronic Service of Notices under Section 218(2)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nCondonation of Delay in filing appeals due to alleged procedural violations.\nCompliance with Withholding Tax Obligations under Sections 153(7)(i)(b), 161, and 165 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nRelevant Legal Provisions\nSection 153(7)(i)(b): Defines the appellant as a prescribed person obligated to act as a withholding agent.\nSection 161: Imposes liability on withholding agents to collect/deduct tax and deposit it with the exchequer.\nSection 165: Requires submission of monthly withholding tax statements to the Commissioner.\nSection 218(2) (Service of Notices):\nClauses (a)-(c): Govern service on legal entities (companies) via representatives, registered offices, or Civil Procedure Code.\nClause (d): Allows electronic service but is restricted to non-resident individuals, not legal entities.\nRule 44(4) of Income Tax Rules, 2002: Mandates reconciliation of expenses and withholding tax compliance.\nSection 127(5): Specifies a 30-day limitation period for filing appeals from the date of service. \nTribunal’s Analysis\nInvalid Service of Notice (Section 218):\nThe appellant, being a company, falls under Section 218(2) for service of notices.\nClause (d) of Subsection (2) refers to electronic service on individuals , which the Tribunal interpreted to apply only to non-resident individuals, not legal entities.\nService via electronic means (Clause (d)) was invalid for the appellant (a company). Proper service should have followed Clauses (a)-(c) (e.g., registered office, representative).\nCondonation of Delay:\nThe Tribunal accepted the delay in filing appeals due to procedural irregularities (invalid service).\nRelied on Supreme Court precedents (2007 SCMR 834, 2007 SCMR 262) holding that limitation periods do not apply when orders violate mandatory legal provisions.\nViolation of Natural Justice:\nThe impugned order violated audi alteram partem (no opportunity for hearing).\nCited SCMR 2232 (1994) and PLD 536 (1996) to emphasize procedural fairness.\nRemand for Re-Adjudication:\nThe case was remanded to the assessing officer to redo proceedings in compliance with:\nFBR Instructions (C.No.3(08)SS (A & A)/2023 dated 19.02.2025).\nTribunal’s precedent in M/s Wise Communication Systems (Pvt) Limited Vs DCIR (ITA NO.1889/IB/2024).\nOutcome\nDelay Condoned: Applications for condonation of delay accepted.\nImpugned Orders Annulled: Due to invalid service and procedural violations.\nRemand Directions: Assessing officer directed to pass a fresh order after complying with legal requirements.\nKey Precedents Cited\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue Vs Miss Shabnam Riaz (Peshawar High Court):\nUpheld validity of electronic service for individuals but clarified its inapplicability to entities.\nWaqar Zafar Bakhtawari v. Mazhar Hussain Shah (PLD 2018 SC 81):\nEmphasized harmonious interpretation of statutes.\nReliance Commodities (Pvt) Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan (2020 PTD 1464):\nReinforced strict compliance with procedural laws.\nConclusion: The Tribunal prioritized strict adherence to procedural laws (Section 218) and natural justice principles, ensuring legal entities are not subjected to invalid service methods. The decision underscores the need for clarity in statutory interpretation, particularly in fiscal matters.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(2),2(12),80,127(5),131(1),153(7)(i)(b),161,161(1A),165,205,218,218(1)(d),218(2)(a),218(2)(b),218(2)(c),218(2)(d)Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4),74", - "Case #": "ITA No. 203/IB/2025, MA(Cond) No.114/IB/2025, MA(Stay) No.452/IB/2025 (Tax Year 2021), ITA No.204/IB/2025, MA(Cond) No.115/IB/2025, MA(Stay) No.453/IB/2025, (Tax Year 2023). Date of Hearing & Order: 24.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): M. M. Akram (Judicial Member), Muhammad Imtiaz (Accountant Member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Afrasayab Kayani, Advocate\nRespondent By: Ms. Naila Gul, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ABID JAMIL ENTERPRISES (PRIVATE) LIMITED; FLAT NO. 09, 3RD FLOOR, ROSE ARCADE, G-11 MARKAZ, ISLAMABAD …….. APPELLANT\nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, UNIT-I, ZONE-I, CTO, ISLAMABAD ….. RESPONDENT:" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25947", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Yy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 766 = 2025 SLD 766", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Yy8", - "Key Words:": "Possession of Mortgaged Property After Setting Aside of Decree\nDetails:\nRespondent No. 1 filed a suit against Respondents No. 2 to 4 in the Banking Court at Karachi for recovery of finance amounting to Rs. 36,519,151.06. The court decreed the case on 22.12.2009 and 10.02.2010. In execution of the decree, the mortgaged property (Plot No. DP-6A, Sector 12-D, North Karachi Industrial Area, Gabol Town, Karachi) was auctioned, and the appellant purchased it. However, the appellant was not granted possession. Subsequently, the judgment debtors (Respondents No. 2 to 4) filed an application under Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO 2001), claiming they were not served with the notice. This application was allowed, and the decree was set aside.\nThe appellants application under Section 19(5) read with Section 15(6) of FIO 2001, seeking possession of the property, was dismissed on the ground that the original judgment and decree had been set aside. During subsequent proceedings, a second decree in favor of the bank was passed. Meanwhile, one Muhammad Faisal Khursheed filed an application to be impleaded as a party, claiming possession through a purchase agreement with the judgment debtors.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that since the second decree also favored the bank and the property sale was not annulled, the Banking Court should rehear the appellants application for possession. The Banking Court must decide the matter considering the new developments, and the interveners right, if any, shall be addressed during the hearing. The Banking Court is directed to conclude the matter within two months.\nCitations:\nFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (Sections 12, 15(6), and 19(5))\nCivil Procedure Code, Order I Rule 10", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=12,15(6),19(5)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=10", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 64 of 2018. Date of order: 16.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Rehman Aziz Malik, advocate for Appellant.\nMr. Ali. T. Ibrahim, advocate for respondent No.1.\nMr. Muniruddin, advocate for respondents No. 2 to 4.\nRaj Ali Wahid, advocate holding brief for\nMr. M.G. Rehman Korai, advocate for applicant/intervener.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YOUNUS KHAMISANI \nVS. \nM/S. SUMMIT BANK LTD. & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25948", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Yys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 767 = 2025 SLD 767 = 2025 SHC 466 = (2025) 132 TAX 189", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Yys", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Input Tax Adjustment – Blacklisting of Suppliers & Scope of Section 8(1)(ca)\nDetails:\nThe Applicant challenged the ATIR order dated 05.11.2024 (STA No. 325/KB/2024), which upheld the disallowance of input tax claimed under Sections 7 & 8 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, on the basis that the suppliers were later suspended/blacklisted and that the tax was allegedly not deposited into the government treasury. The Applicant argued that:\nAt the time of purchase, suppliers were active on FBR’s web portal.\nPayments were made through proper banking channels in compliance with Section 73.\nThe department accepted the sales/output tax but denied corresponding input tax, which was raw material for taxable supplies.\nNo proper findings were recorded on penalty under Section 33(11)(13).\nHeld:\nThe Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Eagle Cables (Pvt.) Ltd. holding that input tax cannot be denied where suppliers were active at the time of supply, even if later suspended or blacklisted, provided payments were through legitimate banking channels. Regarding Section 8(1)(ca), the Court reiterated that it must be read together with Section 8A. The department must first prove that the buyer had knowledge or reasonable grounds to suspect that tax would remain unpaid before invoking Section 8(1)(ca). Without such proceedings under Section 8A, denial of input tax is premature. The Court also noted that input tax under Section 7 is admissible on tax paid or payable, and hence cannot be disallowed solely due to subsequent non-deposit by the supplier.\nAccordingly, the proposed questions were answered in favour of the Applicant, the orders of the lower forums were set aside, and the reference application was allowed.\nCase Law: \nEagle Cables (Pvt.) Ltd. (Supreme Court), Total Parco Pakistan, D.G. Khan Cement (LHC – Constitutionality of Section 8(1)(ca))", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7,8,8(1)(ca),8A,21(3),33(11),33(13),47(5),73", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Application No. 217 of 2024. Date of order: 21.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, ACJ AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Faheem Bhayo along with Mr. Muhammad Din Qazi, Advocate for Applicant\nBarrister Ghazi Khan Khalil, Advocate for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. RAMADA INDUSTRIES (PVT) LTD., KARACHI - (APPLICANT) \nVS \nTHE COMMISSIONER I. R. ZONE-VI, CTO, KAR. & ANOTHER - (RESPONDENT)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25949", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Yzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 768 = 2025 SLD 768 = (2025) 132 TAX 508", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Yzk", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Customs Authority in Reopening Assessment\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the judgment dated 13.11.2019 passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi Bench-II, which set aside the Order-in-Original dated 11.05.2017 issued by the Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Quetta. The case arose when M/s Byco Petroleum Pakistan Ltd. imported furnace oil from Fujairah Port, UAE, to CRL/SPM Gaddani. The import was partially empty, and dead freight charges were paid. The assessment was completed by the Appropriate Officer on 18.05.2015.\nSubsequently, during an audit on 12.05.2016, the Audit Officer raised an objection on the declared freight charges, claiming it was undervalued compared to the market rate. This led the Additional Collector to issue a show cause notice and demand Rs. 2,481,696/- in duty and taxes under Section 32(1) read with 32(3A) of the Customs Act, 1969. The importer contested the notice, arguing that the Additional Collector lacked jurisdiction to reopen the assessment and that only the Collector Customs could do so under Section 195. The Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the importer, setting aside the demand as being beyond legal authority.\nHeld:\nThe Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, noting that the assessment had already been completed by the competent authority under Sections 79 and 80 of the Customs Act, 1969. As the order was not appealed within the stipulated period, the Customs Authority became functus officio, and only the Collector could reopen the assessment within two years. The Court also affirmed that errors in the assessment require a thorough inquiry, which cannot be conducted through a reference. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.\nCitations:\nCollector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Quetta v. Messrs Al-Habib Enterprises and Engineering (2019 PTD 1712)", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=18,25,32(1),32(3A),79,80,193,195,196", - "Case #": "Custom Reference No. 02 of 2020 (CC-44689). Date of hearing. 19.08.2024 Announced on 08.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHAUKAT ALI RAKHSHANI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Raja Jawad Mehmood Advocate.\nRespondent (s) by: M/s. Dr. Pervaiz and Tahir Kaleem Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE \nVS\nM/S BYCO PETROLEUM PAKISTAN LIMITED AND OTHER." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25950", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Yzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 769 = 2025 SLD 769", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Yzg", - "Key Words:": "The Appellate Tribunal annulled the order of the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) and remanded the case for fresh adjudication, citing violations of procedural and substantive tax laws. Below is a structured summary:\n________________________________________\nKey Issues & Findings:\n1.\nVagueness in DCIR’s Order (Grounds 1–3):\no\nThe DCIR failed to identify specific transactions where tax was not withheld, violating the principle established in CIR v. MCB Bank Ltd. (2021 SCMR 1325).\no\nConsolidated tax demands under generic expense heads (e.g., salaries, repairs) without transaction-level details are legally unsustainable.\n2.\nFailure to Discharge Burden of Proof (Grounds 4–5):\no\nUnder Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance (ITO), 2001, the DCIR must prove:\n\nThe taxpayer was a withholding agent.\n\nSpecific transactions required tax deduction.\n\nThe exact tax amount and identifiable payees who should have borne the tax.\no\nThe DCIR did not discharge this burden, as no evidence or specific defaults were cited.\n3.\nIgnoring Exemptions/Thresholds (Grounds 4, 6):\no\nThe appellant claimed exemptions (e.g., payments below taxable thresholds) and submitted supporting documents. The DCIR’s failure to consider these violated natural justice and Section 161(2), which allows recovery of tax from the payee if withheld.\n4.\nDefault Surcharge Under Section 205 (Ground 7):\no\nCharging a 12% surcharge was unjustified, as the primary tax demand under Section 161 was invalid.\n________________________________________\nLegal Principles Applied:\n•\nSection 161 ITO, 2001: Requires identification of specific transactions/payees for liability. Blanket demands are impermissible (MCB Bank Ltd.).\n•\nNatural Justice (Article 10A, Constitution): The taxpayer must be given a proper opportunity to present evidence. The DCIR’s hasty order violated due process.\n•\nBurden of Proof: The department must prove default in withholding tax (Nokia Solutions v. CIR).\n•\nBenefit of Doubt: Ambiguities in penal provisions (e.g., Section 161) favor the taxpayer (PLD 1973 SCMR 14).\n________________________________________\nOutcome:\n•\nThe DCIR’s order was annulled for being bereft of proper objective basis and lacking legal authority.\n•\nThe case was remanded to the DCIR to:\no\nRe-examine the appellant’s evidence (e.g., exemptions, thresholds).\no\nApply the MCB Bank Ltd. precedent (transaction-specific analysis).\no\nPass a fresh order within 45 days after granting a proper hearing.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\n1.\nSection 161 demands specificity; vague demands are invalid.\n2.\nTax authorities must prove default with evidence, not assumptions.\n3.\nExemptions/thresholds under ITO must be respected.\n4.\nSurcharges under Section 205 collapse if the underlying tax demand is invalid.\nThis decision reinforces strict adherence to procedural fairness and evidentiary rigor in withholding tax disputes.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No.1553/KB/2024 (Tax Year 2018). Date of Hearing: 30-01-2025. Date of Order: 07-04-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Taimoor Ahmed, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Waqas Maqsood, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ISRA ISLAMIC FOUNDATION (GUARANTEE) LTD. HYDERABAD......APPELLANT\nV S\nDCIR, WHT ZONE, RTO, HYDERABAD......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25951", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Y3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 770 = 2025 SLD 770", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Y3o", - "Key Words:": "Employment Regularization - Janitorial Staff at National Bank of Pakistan (NBP)\nDetails:\nThe private respondents, appointed as janitorial staff at the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) through contractors, filed grievance petitions under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, before the NIRC, Quetta Bench, seeking regularization and back benefits. The NBP contended that the respondents were not bank employees but were hired through third-party contractors, thereby disputing their claim for regularization. After examining the evidence, including cross-examination and affidavits, the NIRC, Quetta, declared the respondents permanent employees of the NBP with all back benefits.\nThe NBP appealed to the NIRC Full Bench at Karachi, which partially allowed the appeal by setting aside the regularization orders but maintained that the respondents were entitled to the benefits of permanent workers. The NBP further challenged the decision, arguing that the respondents, being employees of outsourcing companies, had no direct employment relationship with the bank. Additionally, NBP argued that the grievance petitions were time-barred.\nHeld:\nThe court dismissed the petitions, holding that the respondents, having worked continuously since their initial appointment and received salaries directly from the bank, fell within the definition of permanent workmen as per the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The court held that the outsourcing arrangement could not be used to circumvent labor rights, and any delay in filing the grievance petitions was condoned since the NBP did not contest it at the relevant stage. The court also ruled that the NIRC orders did not suffer from any legal or jurisdictional infirmity.\nCitations:\nIkram Bari and 524 others Vs. National Bank of Pakistan (2005 SCMR 100)\nIFFCO Pakistan (Private) Limited Vs. Ghulam Murtaza and others (2024 SCMR 1548)\nRelevant provisions from the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968\nVarious other judgments concerning labor rights and employment regularization", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. 146 & 147 of 2024. Constitution Petition No.1195 of 2023. Constitution Petition No. 203 of 2022. Constitution Petition No. 355 of 2022. Date of hearing: 14.11.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR AHMAD HALEEMI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 by:\nMr. Malik Khushal Khan, Advocate\nPetitioner No.2 by: Mr. Khushal Khan Kasi, Advocate\nRespondent No.1 by: Mr. Azam Jan Zarkhoon, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Constitution Petition No.146 of 2024.\n(CC# 100107700318)\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN (NBP) HEAD OFFICE, KARACHI THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT/AUTHORIZED OFFICER SYEDA HAREEM JAFRI\nVS.\nJALALUDDIN & OTHERS AND OTHERS\nPetitioner by: Mr. Malik Khushal Khan, Advocate\nRespondent No.1 by: Mr. Azam Jan Zarkoon, Advocate\nRespondent No. 4 by: Mr. Khushal Khan Kasi, Advocate\nConstitution Petition No.147 of 2024\n(CC# 100107700319)\nNational Bank of Pakistan (NBP) Head Office, Karachi through its President/Authorized officer Syeda Hareem Jafri\nVs.\nNadeem Ahmed and others\nPetitioner by: Mr. Malik Khushal Khan, Advocate\nRespondent No.1 by: Mr. Azam Jan Zarkoon, Advocate\nConstitution Petition No.1195 of 2023\n(CC# 100107603248)\nNational Bank of Pakistan (NBP) Head Office, Karachi through its President/Authorized officer Muhammad Jaffar Sial & others\nVs.\nBashir Ahmed & others\nPetitioner Nos.1&3 by: Mr. Malik Khushal Khan, Advocate\nPetitioner No.2 by: Mr. Khushal Khan Kasi, Advocate\nConstitution Petition No.203 of 2022\n(CC# 100107500541)\nNational Bank of Pakistan (NBP) Head Office, Karachi through its President/Authorized officer Muhammad Jaffar Sial and another\nVs.\nIrshad Ali & others and others\nPetitioners by: Mr. Malik Khushal Khan, Advocate \nRespondent Nos. 1&2 by:\nMr. Azam Jan Zarkoon, Advocate\nConstitution Petition No.355 of 2022\n(CC# 10010751007)\nNational Bank of Pakistan (NBP) Head Office, Karachi through its President/Authorized officer Muhammad Jaffar Sial & others\nVs.\nHabibullah & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25952", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Y3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 771 = 2025 SLD 771", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5Y3k", - "Key Words:": "Cancellation of Bail Granted on Medical Grounds\nDetails:\nThe petitioners sought the cancellation of bail granted to the accused, Najib Ullah alias Najju, by the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC), Bannu Division, on medical grounds. Najib Ullah was initially arrested for charges under Sections 302, 324, and 353 PPC, along with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and Section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013, following the murder of ASI Kalim Ullah Khan during a police operation. Najib Ullah was granted interim bail, which was subsequently canceled due to non-prosecution. He later filed another bail application citing medical issues (blindness in one eye) after being injured in a police vehicle accident, and the ATC granted bail for six months or until recovery.\nSubsequently, the deceaseds family moved for bail cancellation, citing Najib Ullahs recovery. The ATC dismissed their application and extended the bail until trial completion, based on medical documents and the accused’s physical appearance. However, the reviewing court found that the medical reports did not establish life-threatening conditions or a lack of treatment options in jail, as required by law. The court concluded that the ATC had erred in granting bail solely based on personal observations rather than a thorough medical evaluation by an expert board.\nHeld:\nThe bail granted to the accused Najib Ullah was canceled, as the court deemed the previous decision legally flawed. The accused’s recovery and regular attendance at court sessions indicated that the special concession for bail on medical grounds was no longer applicable.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Penal Code, 1860=302,324,353Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, (XXIII of 2013)=15", - "Case #": "Cr. Misc. BCA No.30-B/2023. Date of hearing: 11.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD TARIQ AFRIDI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Mr. Wali-ur-Rehman, Advocate\nFor Mr. Ahmad Ali, Advocate (via video link).\nFor State: Mr. Abdul Waheed, A.A.G. along with Usman, ASI.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Samiullah Khan etc. \nvs\nNajib Ullah alias Najju, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25953", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 772 = 2025 SLD 772", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTc", - "Key Words:": "Legal Issues Raised:\nJurisdiction of Company Judge (Section 290 read with Sections 7 & 9):\nWhether the Company Judge could decide disputes involving allegedly forged Shareholder Agreements and factual controversies.\nDissent held: Yes – jurisdiction under Section 290 is not ousted merely due to factual disputes. Company Judge may frame issues and record evidence even in summary proceedings.\nNature of Proceedings (Section 9(3)):\nSummary procedure under Section 9(3) does not preclude the court from examining evidence or deciding complex issues.\nSupported by precedents: Platinum Insurance and Javed Amir cases.\nValidity of Evidence & Share Transfer (QSO, 1984):\nWhether secondary evidence (photocopies of Shareholder Agreements) could be relied upon.\nDissent held: Even without sole reliance on those Agreements, independent evidence (Board meeting discrepancies, SECP non-compliance, unexplained transfer) established oppression and unlawful transfer.\nApplicability of Section 148 (Trust of Shares):\nAppellants claimed 30% shares held in “trust” violated Section 148.\nDissent held: The safe custody argument does not amount to creation of trust under Section 148; the plea was raised belatedly and misconstrued.\nFindings & Reasoning:\nCompany Judge has original civil jurisdiction under Section 7 and procedural flexibility under Section 9.\nSummary proceedings do not bar factual adjudication; the Company Judge can decide disputes of fraud, mismanagement, and oppression without referring parties to civil court.\nBoard meeting records and SECP filings were procedurally inconsistent, lacking transparency and indicative of fraudulent conduct.\nTransfer of 7,499 shares to Sher Asfandyar Khan was oppressive and illegal, giving the Khan family disproportionate control over the company.\nConclusion of Dissent:\nDisagrees with the majority’s referral of the matter to civil court.\nUpholds the jurisdiction of the Company Judge under Section 290 to decide the case on merits, including factual disputes.\nEmphasizes corporate governance, transparency, and equitable shareholder protection.\nCivil Appeals rightly dismissed; transfer of shares found unlawful and oppressive.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=7,9,9(3),148,290Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "C.A. 1843/2019, date of Judgment: 08-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHER ASFANDYAR KHAN \nVS\nNEELOFAR SHAH & OTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25954", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 773 = 2025 SLD 773 = 2025 PLC 139", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTY", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Gilgit-Baltistan Service Tribunal regarding WAPDA employees\nDetails:\nThe appellant, an employee of WAPDA, submitted a service appeal to the Gilgit-Baltistan Service Tribunal. The Registrar returned the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction. The appellant subsequently pursued remedies before the Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court and the Supreme Appellate Court, Gilgit Baltistan, to resolve the jurisdictional issue.\nThe crux of the matter was whether the Gilgit-Baltistan Service Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the service appeal of WAPDA employees. The respondents, who are WAPDA officials, performed functions related to the Government of Pakistan. WAPDA, established under the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, operates under the federal government rather than the Gilgit-Baltistan Governance Order, 2018. The service conditions for employees in Gilgit-Baltistan, as per S.2(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 2011 and the Gilgit-Baltistan Service Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 2022, do not extend to WAPDA employees.\nThe appellant contended that since WAPDA is a federal entity created under the Constitution, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over their service matters.\nHeld:\nThe chamber appeal was dismissed, affirming that the Gilgit-Baltistan Service Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over WAPDA employees. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to civil servants as defined under S.2(b) of the Gilgit-Baltistan Civil Servants Act, 2011 and the Amendment Act of 2022, which do not encompass WAPDA employees governed by S.17(1)(b) of the WAPDA Act, 1958.\nCitations:\nHumayun Akhtar and others v. Chairman WAPDA and others PLJ 2008 Tr.C (Services) 374\n2013 SCMR 1707\nMuhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602\nMuhammad Din v. WAPDA through its Chairman and others W.P. No. 08/20418 along with C. Misc. No. 18/2018\n4o", - "Court Name:": "Gilgit Baltistan Service Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Service Appeal No. 476 of 2024, decided on 16th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 16th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUMTAZ AHMED, CHAIRMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aurangzeb Khan for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "REHMAT NABI\nVS\nPROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25955", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 774 = 2025 SLD 774 = 2025 PLC 36", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTU", - "Key Words:": "Constitutional Petition Challenging Show-Cause Notice by NAB Employee\nDetails:\nAn employee of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) filed a constitutional petition challenging a show-cause notice before the High Court. The petitioner asserted that this was the first constitutional petition on the subject matter. However, it was later revealed that the petitioner had previously filed a similar petition in another High Court challenging the same show-cause notice.\nThe High Court took notice of the misleading certificate, which falsely claimed that no prior constitutional petition had been filed on the same matter. Due to the concealment of facts and the submission of an incorrect certificate, the High Court declined to entertain the petition.\nHeld:\nThe constitutional petition was dismissed due to the petitioner’s failure to disclose the existence of a previously filed petition on the same issue, constituting concealment of material facts.\nCitations:\nSajjad Ahmad v. Chairman, Capital Development Authority 2016 CLC 896\nAbdur Rashid v. Pakistan 1969 SCMR 141\nRamzan v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1968 Lah. 258\nMuhammad Saddiq v. Ruqaya Khanum PLD 2001 Kar. 60\nDilawar Hussain v. District Coordination Officer 2004 CLC 324\nShaukat Medicos v. Government of the Punjab 2005 YLR 171\nMuhammad Akram v. Mansoor Sarwar Khan, Barrister-at-Law 2006 CLC 40\nBashir Ahmed v. Habib 2006 MLD 148\nLahore Development Authority v. Shamim Akhtar 2003 MLD 1543\nAbdul Majid v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2024 YLR 982\nAzim Khan v. Government of Punjab 2023 MLD 1611", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2396 of 2024, decided on 1st October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Afrasiab Khan for Petitioner along with the petitioner in person.\nYasir Saleem Rana, Senior Special Prosecutor and Muhammad Rafay Maqsood, Special Prosecutor, NAB for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NADEEM SAJID\nVS\nNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25956", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 775 = 2025 SLD 775 = 2025 PLC 42", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTQ", - "Key Words:": "Appointment of Teacher under Union Council-Based Recruitment Policy\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a female candidate, secured the highest position among female candidates in a teacher recruitment test conducted under a Union Council-based policy. Despite her success, she was not considered for appointment because she did not submit her Permanent Residence Certificate (PRC) Form-D by the cutoff date. The respondents claimed that she failed to approach their office with the required documents within the stipulated time.\nThe petitioner argued that her domicile certificate, issued well before the cutoff date, confirmed her residency in the concerned area. The PRC, submitted slightly late, should not have disqualified her since a domicile certificate issued under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, and the Pakistan Citizenship Rules, 1952, was sufficient to prove residency. The PRC in Sindh, governed by the Sindh Permanent Residence Certificate Rules, 1971, primarily served as supplementary evidence of residency rather than an absolute requirement.\nThe court held that while the government has the prerogative to establish appointment policies and qualification criteria, the petitioner’s situation was distinct. She had already cleared both the written test and the interview, and her appointment was unjustly withheld due to a minor delay in PRC submission.\nHeld:\nThe constitutional petition was disposed of, and the court ruled that the decision to withhold the petitioner’s appointment was erroneous. The late submission of the PRC should not have disqualified her since the domicile certificate was issued before the cutoff date, demonstrating her eligibility for the post.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-23 of 2020, decided on 16th May, 2024. Date of hearing: 16th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON AND MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Alam Sher Bozdar for Petitioner.\nGhulam Mustafa G. Abro Additional A.G. Sindh along with with Dilawar Soomro AEO/Focal Person District Education Officer (ES&HS), Ghotki for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MS. FIRDOS NOOR MALIK\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH THROUGH SECRETARY EDUCATION AND LITERACY DEPARTMENT SINDH SECRETARIAT, KARACHI AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25957", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 776 = 2025 SLD 776 = 2025 PLC 47", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WS8", - "Key Words:": "Quota System in Civil Service and Recruitment Policy\nDetails: The petitioners challenged the quota-based recruitment policy, arguing that appointments in government services should be made at the provincial level without adhering to area-based quotas. The High Court held that the allocation of reserved seats at various administrative levels (village, union council, tehsil, municipal committee, and corporation) aligns with the quota systems objectives as prescribed in the 3rd proviso of Art. 27 of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that policy formulation falls within the Executives domain, rooted in the principle of the trichotomy of powers: legislation, execution, and interpretation. The recruitment policy aimed to ensure merit-based, transparent, and fair competition for teacher positions while addressing the human resource gap in secondary education. The policy was deemed lawful and not subject to judicial intervention unless proven to be mala fide or an abuse of power.\nHeld: The Constitutional petition was dismissed as the recruitment policy did not violate constitutional provisions and aimed to uphold transparency and fair representation.\nCitations:\nConstitution of Pakistan, Arts. 25, 27, 199, 254\nPunjab Public Service Commission v. Hassnain Abbass 2021 SCMR 1017\nDr. Shahbaz Mujtaba Ghauri v. Punjab Public Service Commission (W.P. No. 257665/2018)\nPasban Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan (Constitutional Petition No. D-1906/2020)\nDefinition of Quota ", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25,27,199,254", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 313 of 2023, decided on 30th July, 2024. Date of hearing: 26th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, CJ AND SHAUKAT ALI RAKHSHANI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Manzoor Ahmed Rehmani for Petitioners.\nZahoor Ahmed Baloch, Additional Advocate General (\"\"AAG\"\") assisted by Najam-ud-Din Mengal, Deputy Attorney General (\"\"DAG\"\") for Respondents.\nMuhammad Akram Shah for Respondent No. 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM MURTAZA AND 4 OTHERS\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25958", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 777 = 2025 SLD 777 = 2025 PLC 55", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WSs", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Maintainability of Constitutional Petition under Arts. 199 & 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan.\nDetails: The petitioners, who were discharged from service as constables following departmental proceedings, challenged their discharge orders. They had previously approached the departmental appellate authority, the Service Tribunal, and the Centralized Re-examination Committee, all of which dismissed their appeals. Subsequently, they filed a Constitutional petition alleging discrimination, arguing that they were discharged under the Police Rules, 1934, rather than being proceeded against under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Sindh Ordinance, 2000.\nHeld: The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that matters relating to the competence of the Service Tribunal could not be challenged under Art. 199 due to the bar in Art. 212 of the Constitution. Since the petitioners had already approached the Service Tribunal and awaited the outcome from the Centralized Re-examination Committee before filing the petition, the proper recourse was to approach the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the petitioners did not challenge the decision of the Re-examination Committee before the High Court, and their plea of discrimination did not advance their claim for reinstatement.\nCitations:\nConstitution of Pakistan, Arts. 199 & 212\nRemoval from Service (Special Powers) Sindh Ordinance, 2000\nPolice Rules, 1934", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,212", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-293 of 2020, heard on 15th October, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM AND YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ashfaque Nabi Qazi for Petitioners.\nRafique Ahmed Dahri, A.A.G. for Respondents Nos.1 to 4.\nNemo for Respondents Nos.5 to 7.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADIL AND OTHERS\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25959", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 778 = 2025 SLD 778", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTk", - "Key Words:": "Bank’s Burden of Proof in TDR Encashment Dispute\nDetails:\nParties: Bank Al-Falah Ltd. (Petitioner) vs. Federation of Pakistan & Others (Respondents)\nFacts: Respondent No.4 approached Bank Al-Falah in 2019, seeking verification of a Term Deposit Receipt (TDR) valued at USD $10,374, issued in 1999. The bank stated that the TDR had been encashed on 20.11.1999 through a bearer bond, but no comprehensive record was available due to the passage of time. Dissatisfied, Respondent No.4 filed a complaint before the Banking Mohtasib Pakistan, who directed the bank to pay the amount to the complainant, citing a lack of convincing proof of encashment. The bank’s representation to the President of Pakistan was also dismissed.\nPetition: Bank Al-Falah challenged the Mohtasibs order, arguing that:\nThe impugned order was non-speaking and failed to address material issues.\nThe complaint was time-barred due to a lapse of 20 years.\nThe burden of proof lay with the complainant to show non-encashment.\nThe bank is only obligated to maintain records for 10 years.\nContentions of Respondent No.4:\nThe complainant argued that the TDR was not encashed and disputed the authenticity of the debit voucher presented by the bank.\nCourts Findings:\nThe bank’s stance on maintaining records for only 10 years contradicted its submission of a 1999 debit voucher.\nThe bank did not present adequate evidence of the withdrawal, such as original TDR documents or clear proof of the bearer bonds being issued.\nOnce the bank admitted the deposit of the disputed amount, the burden shifted to the bank to prove that the amount had been withdrawn.\nConcurrent findings of the Banking Mohtasib and the President of Pakistan were based on sound reasoning, and no illegality was found in their conclusions.\nHeld: The High Court dismissed the constitutional petition, endorsing the findings of the lower forums and ruling that the bank failed to discharge its burden of proof.\nCitations:\nBanking Companies Ordinance, 1962 (Section 82D)\nFederal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 (Section 9)\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 4", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D- 5267 of 2024. Date of order: 27.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Tahmasp Rasheed Rizvi, Advocates for petitioner \nMs. Shazia Hanjra, DAG.\nRespondent No.4 in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BANK AL-FALAH LTD. ….. PETITIONER\nVS.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS …… RESPONDENTS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25960", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 779 = 2025 SLD 779", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WTg", - "Key Words:": "This case involves a dispute between two groups (the Khan Group and the Shah Group) over the control and ownership of M/s. Ofspace Pvt. Ltd. The Khan Group comprises Sher Asfandyar Khan, Alamgir Khan, and Sajida Naeem, whereas the Shah Group consists of Neelofar Shah, her son Raza Shah, and Nazeer Shah. The dispute centers on a transfer of 30% shares, originally owned by Alamgir Khan, to his brother Sher Asfandyar Khan, which the Shah Group contests, alleging it violated shareholder agreements and amounts to corporate oppression.\nFactual Background:\nThe Company was incorporated in 1997, with 44% of shares allotted to the Shah Group and 56% to the Khan Group. The dispute arose in 1999 when Alamgir Khan transferred his 30% shareholding to his brother, Sher Asfandyar Khan. The Shah Group contends that the transfer violated the shareholder agreements, which they claim included provisions on trust and revenue allocation for Tower II of the company. The Khan Group disputes the authenticity of these agreements, alleging they were fabricated.\nCourt Proceedings and Lower Court Findings:\nThe Shah Group filed proceedings under Sections 290 and 291 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, for oppression and mismanagement. The Company Judge ruled in favor of the Shah Group, determining that the transfer was contrary to the agreements. This decision was upheld by the Division Bench of the Sindh High Court, which dismissed the appeals by the Khan Group.\nKey Legal Issues:\nSummary Procedure under Section 9 of the Companies Ordinance: Whether the dispute was appropriately handled through summary proceedings.\nFactual Disputes and Evidence: Whether the Company Judge properly exercised jurisdiction by resolving disputed facts without framing issues or recording evidence.\nClaim of Trust Over Shares: Whether the claim of a trust over the shares was legally tenable, considering Section 148 of the Companies Ordinance.\nAdmissibility of Secondary Evidence: Whether the Company Judge erred in admitting secondary evidence without complying with the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.\nGenuineness of Shareholders’ Agreements: Whether the Company Judge erred in treating the shareholder agreements as genuine despite allegations of forgery and fabrication.\nCourts Analysis and Decision:\nSummary Procedure:\nThe Court noted that while summary procedures under Section 9 of the Companies Ordinance are designed for efficiency, they must also ensure fairness. The Court found that the dispute involved complex factual issues, particularly concerning the authenticity of the shareholder agreements, which required a full evidentiary inquiry. The failure to frame issues and record evidence was deemed a procedural error.\nTrust Over Shares:\nThe Court ruled that the claim of trust over the 30% shares was legally untenable under Section 148 of the Companies Ordinance (now Section 121 of the Companies Act, 2017), which prohibits the recognition of trusts in corporate shareholding. Thus, the Shah Groups claim was dismissed.\nAdmissibility of Secondary Evidence:\nThe Court found that the Company Judge erred in admitting secondary evidence without meeting the conditions prescribed under Article 76 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order. The absence of proper justification for the non-production of original documents rendered the secondary evidence inadmissible.\nGenuineness of the Agreements:\nThe Court concluded that the Company Judges decision to treat the shareholder agreements as genuine, despite serious allegations of forgery, was flawed. The Court emphasized that the authenticity of key documents must be subject to proper scrutiny, particularly when allegations of fraud are raised.\nConclusion:\nThe appeals were allowed by a majority of 2 to 1. The impugned judgments of the High Court and the Company Judge were set aside. The case was remanded for proper adjudication in the civil courts, where the validity of the shareholder agreements and other contested issues should be addressed in accordance with the legal requirements for evidence and procedural fairness.\nOrder of the Court:\nThe appeals are allowed, and the impugned judgments are set aside. The civil courts will handle the case in compliance with proper legal procedures.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=9,148,290,291Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=76", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No. 1843 to 1846 OF 2019 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No.1138 of 2020. Date of Hearing: 11.02.2025\n(Against the judgment dated 16.09.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in High Court Appeals No.107/2012, 114/2012 and 109/2012)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ MR. JUSTICE AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants: Mr. Haider Waheed, ASC, Mr. Anis Muhammad Shahzad, AOR (In C.As. 1843 & 1846/2019), Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR (In C.As. 1844 & 1845/2019)\nFor Respondents 1-2: Mr. Wasim Sajjad, Sr. ASC, Mr. Shah Khawar, ASC, Mr. Muhammad Masood Khan, ASC, Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh, AOR\nFor Respondents 4-6: Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, ASC\nFor Respondent 7 (SECP): Mr. Omer Azad Malik, ASC\nFor the Applicant(s): Mr. Farooq H. Naek, Sr. ASC (In C.M.A. 1138/2020)", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHER ASFANDYAR KHAN - IN C.A.1843/2019 \nSAJIDA NAEEM - IN C.A.1844/2019\nM/S OFSPACE (PVT.) LTD., KARACHI - IN C.A.1845/2019 \nALAMGIR KHAN - IN C.A.1846/2019 ..... APPELLANTS\nVS\nNEELOFAR SHAH ETC. ….... RESPONDENTS (In all cases)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25961", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 780 = 2025 SLD 780 = 2025 PTCL 654 = 2025 SCP 172 = (2025) 132 TAX 294", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WXo", - "Key Words:": "Confiscation of Vehicle Used for Smuggling under Customs Act\nDetails:\nParties: Petitioner (Owner of LPG Bowser) vs. Customs Authorities (Respondents)\nFacts:\nAn LPG bowser was found parked on a roadside, containing foreign-origin high-speed diesel (HSD), suspected to be smuggled. The vehicle was seized under Section 171 of the Customs Act, 1969, followed by a show cause notice.\nThe petitioner argued that the vehicle was on a contractual lease with a third party and that he had no knowledge of the smuggling.\nThe Deputy Collector, Customs, ordered the outright confiscation of both the vehicle and HSD. The Collector of Customs (Appeals) upheld this order.\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal overturned the confiscation of the vehicle, stating that no clear link was established between the owner and the smuggled goods.\nCustoms authorities challenged the Tribunal’s decision under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, claiming misinterpretation of law.\nLegal Question:\nWhether the Tribunal misinterpreted Sections 2(s) and 157 of the Customs Act, 1969, by releasing the vehicle.\nCourts Findings:\nSection 157 explicitly provides for the confiscation of any conveyance used for transporting smuggled goods. The proviso allows for release pending adjudication, subject to guarantees.\nThe exemption under S.R.O. 499(I)/2009 does not apply to vehicles specifically altered for smuggling or carrying smuggled goods in hidden cavities.\nThe petitioner failed to prove that he had no knowledge of the smuggling, as required by law. The hidden cavities in the bowser indicated its modification for smuggling.\nThe purported hire agreement presented was insufficient to establish lack of involvement, as it did not contain essential details or satisfy legal standards under the Motor Vehicle Rules, 1969.\nHeld: The High Court upheld the confiscation, stating that the Tribunal erred in releasing the vehicle. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.\nCitations:\nRelevant Case Law: Abdul Razzak vs. Pakistan (PLD 1974 SC 5)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),157,171,180,196", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 690-K of 2022. Date of Hearing: 07.05.2025\n[Against the judgment dated 18.03.2022 of the High Court of Sindh Karachi passed in Special Customs Reference Application No. 05/2016]", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: \nMs. Dil Kurram Shaheen, ASC\nFor the Respondents: \nMr. Munawar Ali Memon, ASC. [Via video-link from Karachi]\nCh. M. Javed, Chief Customs.\nMr. M. Tahir, Director Law, Customs.\n[At Islamabad]\nOn Court Notice: Rana Asadullah, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAHZAD. ... PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (PREVENTIVE), KARACHI AND ANOTHER. ... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25962", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 781 = 2025 SLD 781", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5WXk", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nAskari Bank challenged show cause notices dated 08.04.2016 issued by the DC-IR, demanding Federal Excise Duty (FED) on banking services.\nThe appellant argued that after the 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010), the provinces became competent to levy sales tax on services, and therefore, FED on the same services could not be demanded.\nEntry No.8 in Table II of the First Schedule to the Federal Excise Act, 2005 covers services provided by banking companies. The amendment via the Finance Act, 2013, excluded Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) for digital payments.\nThe appellant contended that paying sales tax on services to the provinces should exempt them from FED liability on the same services.\nLegal Question:\nWhether the issuance of show cause notices for FED on banking services, after the introduction of provincial sales tax on the same services, is lawful.\nCourts Findings:\nThe court held that the mere issuance of a show cause notice does not amount to an adverse action and cannot be challenged through a writ petition unless it is wholly without jurisdiction.\nThe Federal Excise Act, 2005, still applies to banking services as entry No.8 has not been exempted, unlike entry No.6.\nThe issuance of FED notices was within the legal jurisdiction of DC-IR, and no constitutional violation was shown.\nThe court cited several precedents where writ petitions against show cause notices were deemed non-maintainable unless the notices were issued without jurisdiction or violated any statute.\nHeld: The intra-court appeals filed by Askari Bank were dismissed in limine, affirming that the challenge to show cause notices was premature.\nCitations:\nCustoms Act, 1969: Section 196\nFederal Excise Act, 2005: Entry No.8, Table II, First Schedule\nCase Law:\nMir Nabi Bakhsh Khan Vs. NBP (2000 SCMR 1017)\nZaver Petroleum Corporation Vs. FBR (2016 PTD 2332)\nAl-Ahram Builders Vs. ITAT (1993 SCMR 29)\nPakistan Tobacco Company Vs. Govt. of Pakistan (1993 SCMR 493)\nApna T.V. Channel Vs. PEMRA (2017 CLC 199)\nMuhammad Aslam Vs. Federation of Pakistan (2017 PTD 803)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=171,180,181,196Federal Excise Act, 2005=Entry No.8, Table II, First Schedule", - "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 973 of 2024. Date of order: 30.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR, JUSTICE AND MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Muhammad Idris and Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Advocates for the appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASKARI BANK LIMITED \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25963", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 782 = 2025 SLD 782 = 2025 PTCL 660 = 2025 SCP 173 = (2025) 132 TAX 291", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTc", - "Key Words:": "Obligation to Maintain Tax Records Beyond Statutory Period\nFacts:\nA writ petition was filed by the taxpayer challenging a notice dated 17.11.2016, claiming it violated the precedent set in Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. v. FBR (2016 PTD 2074).\nLahore High Court allowed the petition, allowing the audit to continue but exempting the taxpayer from producing records due to the lapse of the statutory timeframe (5 years) under Section 174(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe tax authority appealed, arguing that the proviso to Section 174(3) of the Ordinance requires maintaining records until the final decision of pending proceedings.\nThe taxpayer did not appear in court, resulting in ex-parte proceedings.\nThe dispute involved a show-cause notice and reassessment order issued on 27.02.2015, within the prescribed timeframe, for the tax year 2010.\nLegal Question:\nWhether the obligation to maintain tax records ceases after 5 years when a legal proceeding is pending.\nCourts Findings:\nThe Supreme Court held that Section 174(3) of the Ordinance requires maintaining records until the final decision of any pending legal proceedings, including assessments, appeals, revisions, and other relevant actions.\nThe initial notice was issued within the prescribed period, and as the case remained sub judice, the obligation to maintain records persisted.\nThe court cited Panther Sports and Rubber Industries (Pvt) Ltd. (2022 SCMR 1133), emphasizing that ongoing legal proceedings extend the retention period until a final judgment is rendered.\nHeld: The appeal was allowed, and the High Court’s decision exempting the taxpayer from maintaining records was set aside.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Section 174(1) and 174(3)\nCase Law:\nMaple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. v. FBR (2016 PTD 2074)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Panther Sports and Rubber Industries (Pvt). Ltd. (2022 SCMR 1133)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=174(1),174(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2135-L of 2020. Date of Hearing: 08.05.2025\n(Against the judgment/order dated 25.09.2020 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P.No.42411/2017)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners:\nMr. Muhammad Saeed Tahir, ASC. [Via Video-link from Lahore]\nDr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General Law, FBR.\nDr. Khalid Malik,\nDirector (Law), FBR\n[At Islamabad]\nRespondent No.1: Ex-Parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore and others. ... Petitioners\nVersus\nSalman Butt and others. … Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25964", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 783 = 2025 SLD 783", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTY", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) over Pension Disputes\nFacts:\nA retired UBL employee filed a complaint to the NCHR for pension enhancement. The NCHR issued an order directing UBL to increase the pension amount.\nUBL challenged the order in Writ Petition No. 4797/2016, arguing that NCHR overstepped its jurisdiction.\nThe learned Single Judge in Chambers set aside the NCHR order on 16.06.2022. Aggrieved, NCHR filed an Intra-Court Appeal (ICA).\nLegal Question:\nWhether the NCHR has jurisdiction to adjudicate pension disputes involving private sector employees.\nCourts Findings:\nThe court emphasized the distinction between human rights, constitutional rights, and service rights.\nNCHR’s jurisdiction is limited to investigating human rights violations by public servants under the NCHR Act, 2012.\nPension-related issues of private sector employees, such as those working in UBL, fall within the purview of private sector labor laws and employment contracts, not within NCHR’s jurisdiction.\nThe right to a dignified life under Article 9 of the Constitution does not convert contractual pension disputes into human rights violations.\nHeld:\nThe ICA was dismissed in limine, maintaining that NCHR overstepped its statutory authority by intervening in a pension dispute.\nThe retired employee was advised to seek redress through appropriate legal forums.\nCitations:\nBenazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416), 2018 SCMR 736", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=9National Commission For Human Rights Act, 2012=9(a)(i),9(a)(ii),18", - "Case #": "ICA No. 301/2022. Date of Order: 11.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): KHADIM HUSSAIN SOOMRO, JUSTICE AND INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, JSUTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr Adeel Wahid and Mr Salaar Khan, Advocates for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF PAKISTAN\nVS\nUNITED BANK LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25965", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 784 = 2025 SLD 784", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTU", - "Key Words:": "Liability of Surety for Payment of Decretal Amount\nFacts:\nThe Family Court issued an ex-parte decree against the judgment-debtor (Respondent No. 4) for recovery of maintenance, delivery expenses, and dowry articles.\nThe judgment-debtor was arrested and subsequently released after the petitioner stood as surety by submitting a surety bond for the remaining decretal amount on 10.04.2017.\nUpon the judgment-debtors failure to pay, the Executing Court initiated proceedings to auction the petitioner’s property to satisfy the decree.\nThe petitioner contended that his liability was limited to Rs.160,000/- as per the surety bond, and that the judgment-debtor’s arrest absolved him from further liability.\nLegal Question:\nWhether the surety’s liability is limited or joint and several with the judgment-debtor.\nWhether the surety’s liability is extinguished by the arrest of the judgment-debtor.\nCourts Findings:\nThe petitioner’s statement on the backside of the surety bond clearly undertook the responsibility for the entire remaining decretal amount in case of default.\nThere was ambiguity between the surety bond and the statement made by the petitioner; however, the court prioritized the explicit undertaking given by the petitioner.\nThe arrest of the judgment-debtor does not absolve the surety from liability as their obligation is joint and several under Section 45 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).\nHeld:\nThe petition was dismissed as the surety had voluntarily undertaken to satisfy the entire remaining amount.\nThe auction proceedings initiated by the Executing Court were deemed legal and valid.\nCitations:\nMuhammad Akram v. Additional District Judge and 5 others (2023 CLC 702)\nMuhammad Amin v. Judge, Family Court, Sahiwal and 3 others (2015 YLR 316)\nMuhammad Muzamal Riaz v. Additional District Judge, Shorkot (2020 CLC 970)\nMasood-ul-Hassan v. Additional District Judge and others (2024 CLC 1744)\nMessrs State Engineering Corporation Ltd. v. National Development Finance Corporation (2006 SCMR 619)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=45", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 29329 of 2020. Date of hearing: 15.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Khawar Ikram Bhatti, Advocate. Mr. Nazir Ahmad Ch., Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEHBOOB ALAM\nVS\nADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25966", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 785 = 2025 SLD 785 = 2025 SHC 1123", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTQ", - "Key Words:": "Suspension and Blacklisting under the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nFacts:\nThe petitioner challenged the order dated 17.02.2025 passed under Section 21(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, remanding the matter to the pre-blacklisting stage.\nThe Chief Commissioner observed that the original suspension and blacklisting orders were issued ex parte, as the petitioner did not have an opportunity to present arguments.\nThe Chief Commissioner remanded the case without setting aside the suspension order, creating an inconsistency since the blacklisting order was no longer in effect.\nThe petitioner argued that both the suspension and blacklisting orders should be set aside if the blacklisting itself was found to be procedurally flawed.\nLegal Question:\nWhether the suspension order can remain valid after the blacklisting order is set aside.\nWhether the Chief Commissioner acted judiciously while remanding the matter without setting aside the suspension order.\nCourts Findings:\nThe court found that the Chief Commissioner failed to act judiciously by not setting aside both the suspension and blacklisting orders.\nSince the blacklisting order was declared ex parte, the suspension order, based on the same facts, could not logically remain in effect.\nThe court emphasized that the Revisional Authority must exercise due diligence, especially since the Finance Act, 2024 removed the right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue.\nHeld:\nThe High Court set aside both the suspension order dated 21.08.2024 and the blacklisting order dated 09.09.2024.\nThe Commissioner was directed to proceed with the matter and pass an appropriate order after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(5)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-1600 of 2025. Date of order: 12.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): HON'BLE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Abdul Rahim Lakhani, Atta Muhammad Qureshi and Suneel Ali Memon, Advocate for Petitioner", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S SUNRISE INDUSTRIES (PETITIONER) \nV/S \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS (RESPONDENT)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25967", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 786 = 2025 SLD 786 = 2025 PLC 58", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VS8", - "Key Words:": "Civil Servants Right to Appeal and Representation\nDetails:\nA civil servant faced a penalty of stoppage of increments for two years. He exercised his right to make a departmental representation to the next higher authority against the penal order. The police department raised an objection, contending that the civil servant’s departmental representation was tantamount to an appeal, which was not permissible.\nHeld:\nThe court held that the Civil Servant Act, 1973, grants a civil servant the vested right to make a representation to a higher authority against a penal order. Such a right cannot be curtailed by any departmental instructions issued by the I.G. The court further clarified that there is technically no significant difference between a departmental appeal and a departmental representation. Consequently, the objection raised by the police department was dismissed, and the appeal of the civil servant was accepted.\nCitations:\nCivil Servant Act, 1973 (LXXI of 1973), Section 22(2)\nService Tribunals Act, 1973, Section 4(a)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2332 of 2024, heard on 3rd September, 2024. Date of hearing: 3rd September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Muhammad Ali Khan for Petitioner.\nImran Shaukat Rao, A.A.G along with Nasir Wilayat, Deputy Director (Admin.), ABAD for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MS. XENIA HAMAYUN SANIK\nVS\nTHE GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD, PUNJAB SECRETARIAT, LAHORE AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25968", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 787 = 2025 SLD 787 = 2025 PLC 62", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VSs", - "Key Words:": "Illegality of Relaxation in Physical Standards for Police Recruitment\nDetails:\nThe case involved the recruitment of police inspectors where the minimum physical standard, specifically a height requirement of 5 feet 7 inches, was not met by some candidates. Petitioners challenged the appointment of certain candidates, arguing that the Caretaker and elected governments had relaxed the physical standards without consulting the competent authority. The Caretaker Chief Minister, in particular, granted relaxations without seeking the necessary opinion, which undermined the transparency and fairness of the recruitment process. The court noted that many eligible candidates did not participate in the recruitment process, assuming they did not meet the physical criteria, while the relaxations granted to some candidates compromised the integrity and discipline of the police force.\nHeld:\nThe court held that the relaxations granted by both the Caretaker and elected Chief Ministers were illegal and void ab initio. It declared that such discretionary relaxations adversely affected the discipline of the uniformed force and violated the merit-based recruitment principles. The court set aside the relaxations and allowed the constitutional petition, thereby nullifying the illegal appointments.\nCitations:\nKhawaja Asif case (2013 SCMR 1205)", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. 253 of 2024, decided on 15th October, 2024. Date of hearing: 8th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD EJAZ SWATI AND MUHAMMAD AAMIR NAWAZ RANA, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zareef Ahmed Soomro for Petitioners.\nAmeer Hamza Jogezai, Additional Advocate General for Respondents Nos.1 to 3.\nMuhammad Ali Kanrani and Ali Mujtaba Buledi for Respondents Nos.4 to 7.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM YASEEN AND ANOTHER\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY HOME AND TRIBAL AFFAIRS AND 7 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25969", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 788 = 2025 SLD 788 = 2025 PLC 68", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTk", - "Key Words:": "Deceased Quota for Civil Servant Appointments\nDetails:\nThe petitioner applied for an appointment under the deceased quota following the death of his father, a civil servant who passed away in 2001. The respondent department contended that the petitioner was not entitled to an appointment because Rule 11-A, which created the deceased quota, was introduced in 2002, a year after the fathers death. The department argued that since the quota did not exist at the time of death, the petitioner had no right to claim an appointment.\nHeld:\nThe court held that the right to employment under the deceased quota had accrued to the children of deceased civil servants as per the Supreme Courts decision dated 10.08.2016 (C.Ps. Nos. 482-K and 503-K of 2016). The Supreme Court ruled that the two-year limitation for applying under the deceased quota, applicable to children who had applied before the rules enactment, was waived. Thus, the respondent departments argument was invalid. The court further emphasized that public employment should not discriminate against citizens on the grounds listed in Article 27 of the Constitution. The government has a duty to establish quotas to ensure adequate representation of less privileged groups. The constitutional petition was disposed of in favor of the petitioner.\nCitations:\nSindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1974, Rules 10-A & 11-A\nConstitution of Pakistan, Articles 27 & 199\nSupreme Court Decision (10.08.2016), C.Ps. Nos. 482-K and 503-K of 2016", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-08 of 2020, decided on 23rd April, 2024. Date of hearing: 23rd April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON AND MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sohail Ahmed Khoso for Petitioner.\nAli Raza Baloch, Assistant Advocate General, Sindh for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHULAM MUSTAFA MALLAH\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH THROUGH SECRETARY WORKS AND SERVICE DEPARTMENT, SINDH AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25970", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 789 = 2025 SLD 789 = 2025 PLC 72", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VTg", - "Key Words:": "Appointment of Vice Chancellors by Caretaker Government\nDetails:\nThe issue involved the appointment of Vice Chancellors (VCs) at public sector universities during the tenure of a caretaker government. Some members of the Academic Search Committee (ASC) resigned due to repeated interview cancellations. The caretaker government substituted these members and completed the interview process. Later, the elected provincial government re-advertised the posts, arguing that the caretaker government’s actions violated Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017, as it constituted a major policy decision.\nThe court examined whether the caretaker government overstepped its mandate under Section 230, which restricts major policy decisions but allows the management of day-to-day affairs. The court found that initiating the VC appointment process was a policy decision taken by the elected government before the caretaker setup. The caretaker government merely substituted members who resigned, which was a necessary administrative action rather than a policy decision. Therefore, the substitution did not contravene the Election Act, 2017.\nHeld:\nThe court held that the caretaker government was within its authority to substitute members of the ASC to ensure the continuity of an ongoing process initiated by the elected government. Consequently, the decision of the elected government to re-advertise the positions was struck down, and the constitutional petition was allowed.\nRelevant Case Laws:\nKhawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1205)\nMunawar Hassan v. Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan (2017 PLC (C.S.) 81)\nAbdul Aziz v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2015 PLC (C.S.) 958)\nMiss Farzana Oadir v. Province of Sindh (2000 PLC (C.S.) 225)\nMehboob Ali Rind v. Secretary Education Balochistan (2023 PLC (C.S) 1526)\nSyed Irfan Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan (2009 PLC (C.S.) 4)\nAmjad Ali Khan v. Ministry of Energy (2019 PLC (C.S.) 300)\nManaging Director, PPRA v. P.N. Boga (2019 PLC (C.S.) 1348)\nNadir Khan v. Qadir Hussain (2024 SCMR 770)\nMuhammad Awais v. Government of Pakistan (2024 MLD 422)\nGovernment of Balochistan v. Abdul Rauf (PLD 2021 SC 313)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Elections Act, 2017=224(1A),230", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3800-P of 2024, decided on 22nd August, 2024. Date of hearing: 22nd August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE IJAZ ANWAR AND MUHAMMAD IJAZ KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Amir Javed, Muhammad Tariq Afridi and Mubashir Manzoor for Petitioners.\nShah Faisal Utmankhel, Advocate General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Adnan Ali, A.A.G. and Sana Ullah, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DR. AURANGZEB KHAN AND OTHERS\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY, PESHAWAR AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25971", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 790 = 2025 SLD 790 = 2025 SLD 790 = 2025 PLC 83", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VXo", - "Key Words:": "Temporary Appointment of Doctors during COVID-19 and Assessment by SPSC\nDetails:\nDuring the COVID-19 pandemic, some doctors were appointed on a temporary basis to address the healthcare emergency. After the pandemic subsided, these doctors filed a petition seeking regularization of their appointments. The High Court directed that the Sindh Public Service Commission (SPSC) assess their suitability through interviews, as per the precedent set in Dr. Naveed Tufail and 72 others v. Government of Punjab (2003 SCMR 291). The SPSC conducted interviews and declared some petitioners unsuccessful. The petitioners challenged the process, alleging that SPSC did not properly assess their suitability as directed by the High Court.\nHeld:\nThe court held that the SPSC had complied with the High Courts directions by conducting interviews to assess the petitioners suitability. The High Court had only mandated that SPSC assess suitability through interviews and not to adopt any other process. The SPSC’s compliance was evidenced by a press release, and those not listed as successful had presumably failed the assessment. The court clarified that it could not act as a substitute for the SPSC or re-evaluate the candidates suitability. As the original petition had been disposed of with specific directions that were followed, no further judicial intervention was warranted. The constitutional petition was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-2674 and C.M.As. 13647 and 12213 of 2024, decided on 21st June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "BEFORE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MS. RASHIDA ASAD, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Naveed Tufail and 72 others v. Government of Punjab 2003 SCMR 291 rel.\nAbdul Karim Lakhiar for Petitioners.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DR. ABDUL ALEEM UQAILI AND 18 OTHERS\nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25972", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 791 = 2025 SLD 791", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5VXk", - "Key Words:": "Banking Fraud and Liability of Financial Institutions\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a bank, challenged the decision of the President of Pakistan and the Banking Mohtasib Pakistan, which directed the bank to compensate the respondent (account holder) for a fraudulent transaction. The fraud occurred when the respondent, after receiving a phone call from an unknown person posing as a bank representative, disclosed his OTP, leading to unauthorized transactions amounting to Rs. 43,02,244/-. The petitioner argued that the respondent himself was at fault for sharing personal information, and that the burden of proof rested on the consumer, not the financial institution, per the Payment System and Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 2007. The petitioner also contended that they complied with relevant State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) circulars and had generated multiple alerts during the transactions.\nHeld:\nThe court dismissed the petition, holding that the bank failed to prevent fraudulent activities and did not adequately monitor or restrict transactions exceeding the approved per-day limit of Rs. 1 million. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the financial institution under Section 41 of the Payment System and Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 2007. The court noted that the banks negligence was evident as it did not monitor unusual transaction patterns as required by SBP Directive Circular No. 09/2018. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed in limine.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962=82(d)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 1963/2024. Date of Order: 24.06.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MOHSIN AKHTAR KAYANI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ahmed Hassan, Advocate for petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASKARI BANK LIMITED \nVS\nPRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25973", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 792 = 2025 SLD 792", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTc", - "Key Words:": "Election and Inquiry in Cooperative Societies\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, Bijnor Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., challenged two orders issued by the Registrar Cooperative Societies Sindh:\nOrder dated 18.9.2020, directing the holding of elections for the President and the entire Managing Committee.\nOrder dated 16.10.2020, appointing an Enquiry Officer to investigate the Societys affairs.\nThe petitioner claimed that the original Managing Committee remained in place since the petitions filing and expressed willingness to conduct elections if overseen impartially. The court addressed the delay and ordered that fresh elections be held, supervised by a Commissioner. The court also set aside the second order as it lacked justifiable reasons for initiating an inquiry, emphasizing that exercising suo motu powers without basis violates natural justice principles.\nHeld:\nThe court directed that:\nFresh elections be conducted under the supervision of a Commissioner, with proper voter scrutiny and transparent procedures.\nThe Commissioners fee was fixed at Rs.300,000/-, payable by the Society.\nThe order dated 18.9.2020 for conducting elections was deemed infructuous.\nThe order dated 16.10.2020, appointing an Enquiry Officer, was set aside due to the lack of valid reasons. The Registrar may take future action strictly per the Sindh Cooperative Societies Act, 2020, with a proper basis.\nPetition disposed of with directions for compliance and election notification.\nCitations:\n2011 YLR 2121 (Delhi Mercantile Cooperative Society Ltd v. Registrar Cooperative Societies)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "General Clauses Act, 1897=24-A", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-5598 of 2020. Date of order: 08-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SANA AKRAM MINHAS JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Faiz Durrani, Advocate for Petitioner \nMs. Naheed A. Shahid, Advocate for Intervenors \nMr. Shaharyar Qazi, AAG, Sindh", - "Petitioner Name:": "BIJNOR COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD \nVS \nTHE PROVINCE OF SINDH & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25974", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 793 = 2025 SLD 793", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTY", - "Key Words:": "Post-Arrest Bail in Smuggling and Assault Case\nDetails:\nThe applicant, a truck driver, sought post-arrest bail after it was denied by the Special Judge (Customs, Taxation & Anti-Smuggling-I), Karachi. The FIR was lodged on 12.03.2025, alleging that the applicant was driving a truck carrying 5,885 liters of High-Speed Diesel (HSD), suspected to be smuggled from Iran. The Anti-Smuggling Unit intercepted the truck, but while escorting it to a warehouse, unknown persons allegedly snatched it. The truck was subsequently recovered, and the applicant was charged with smuggling under clause 89(i) of section 156(1) of the Customs Act and assaulting customs officers under clause 85(a) of section 156(1). The FIR was noted to be vague, with inconsistencies in how the truck was snatched and recovered, and lacked evidence to prove the diesels Iranian origin. The applicant maintained he was merely a hired driver, and the investigation did not establish a direct link to the alleged smuggling.\nHeld:\nThe court granted post-arrest bail, noting:\nThe FIRs vagueness and the absence of evidence linking the applicant to smuggling or assault.\nThe seized diesels origin (Iranian or otherwise) was not confirmed.\nThe applicants claim of being unaware of the trucks contents could not be ruled out.\nThe charges did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C., as the maximum imprisonment for the alleged offenses did not exceed six years.\nBail was granted against a surety of Rs. 300,000/- with a P.R. bond of an equivalent amount.\nThe court emphasized that the observations made were tentative and would not influence the trial.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497,497(2)Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,156(1),156(1)(85a),156(1)(89)", - "Case #": "Special Criminal Bail Application No. 109 of 2025. Date of hearing & order: 13-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant: Ranjhan Shar son of Mughal Khan through Mr. Ghulam Nabi Shar, Advocate.\nRespondent: The State, through Mr. Muhammad Ishaque Pirzada, Advocate. \nMr. Muhammad Khalid Javed Raan, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RANJHAN SHAR \nV. \nTHE STATE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25975", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 794 = 2025 SLD 794 = 2025 PTCL 664 = 2025 SCP 182 = 2025 PTD 1230", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTU", - "Key Words:": "Interpretation of Section 113(2)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe case pertains to the interpretation of Section 113(2)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically regarding the carry forward of minimum tax paid in the absence of an actual tax liability. The appeals and petitions involve conflicting judgments from the High Courts of Sindh, Lahore, and Islamabad. The central issue was whether the minimum tax paid under Section 113(1) can be carried forward for adjustment in subsequent years when no actual tax was payable due to losses. The High Court of Sindh held that the phrase actual tax payable requires a positive tax liability to carry forward the credit. In contrast, the Lahore and Islamabad High Courts allowed the carry forward of the minimum tax even in the absence of actual tax liability, interpreting the provision liberally as a beneficial measure for taxpayers.\nThe Supreme Court analyzed the literal interpretation of Section 113(2)(c), emphasizing that the language must be strictly construed without inferring implied meanings. It concluded that the expression actual tax payable in the section does not accommodate cases where no tax was payable due to losses. The Court held that the benefit of carrying forward minimum tax applies only when the tax paid exceeds an existing tax liability, and the Finance Act, 2021, which introduced a more inclusive proviso, is not retrospective. The Court also emphasized that fiscal statutes should not be interpreted to imply benefits not explicitly provided.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court dismissed civil appeals arising from the judgments of the Sindh High Court, confirming that the phrase actual tax payable strictly requires an existing tax liability to claim carry forward of minimum tax. It allowed leave to appeal against judgments from the Lahore and Islamabad High Courts, which had adopted a broader interpretation, and overturned those judgments. The Court reaffirmed the principle that fiscal statutes must be interpreted literally, without presuming legislative intent beyond the plain language.\nCitations:\nStar Textile Mills Ltd. Vs. Government of Sindh (2002 SCMR 356)\nProvince of the Punjab Vs. Muhammad Aslam (2004 SCMR 1649)\nAllied Bank Limited Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2023 SCMR 1166)\nM/s. Pakistan Television Corporation Vs. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2017 SCMR 1136)\nB.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd. Vs. Wealth Tax Officer (1996 SCMR 1470)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=113(2)(c)", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.743 OF 2014 AND CIVIL PETITION NO.IO-L OF 2017, CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 13838 OF 2021 IN CIVIL PETITION NO.IO-L OF 2017, CIVIL APPEALS NO. 1954 OF 2019 AND 404 OF 2020. CIVIL PETITIONS NO.3688-L OF 2019. 3689-L OF 2019, 746-L OF 2021 AND 3503 OF 2022. Date of Hearing: 20.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant(s)/ \nMr. Muhammad Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC assisted by Mr. Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, ASC, Mr. Tariq Aziz, AOR, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR and Sh. Mehmood Ahmad, AOR in C.A.s No.743 of 2014, 1954 of 2019 & 404 of 2020.\nMr. Muhammad Yahya, ASC (via video link (Lahore)) in C.P.L.A.s No.lO-L of 2017 & 3689-L of 2019.\nMr. Ibrar Ahmed, ASC (via video link (Lahore)) in C.P.L.A.s No.3688-L of 2019 & 746-L of 2021.\nDr. Farhat Zafar, ASC in C.P.L.A. No.3503 of 2022.\nDr. Ikram ul Haq, ASC (via video link (Lahore)) in C.M.A. No. 13838 of 2021.\nFor the Respondents: \nMr. Munawar Ali Mcmon, ASC and Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, AOR (via video link (Karachi)) in C.A. No.743 of 2014.\nDr. Farhat Zafar, ASC in C.A. No. 1954 of 2019.\nMr. Riaz Hussain Azam, ASC in C.A. No.404 of 2020.\nNemo in C.P.L.A.s No. 10-L of 2017, 3688-L of 2019, 3689-L of 2019, 746-L of 2021 & 3503 of 2022.\nDr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director General (Law), FBR, Islamabad.\nMs. Kiran Masood, Additional Commissioner, FBR, Lahore (via video link (Lahore)).", - "Petitioner Name:": "C.A. No. 743 of 2014\n1. M/s. Kassim Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited \nvs. \nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi\n(Against judgment dated 07.05.2013 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in I.T.R.A. No. 132 of 2011).\nC.P.L.A. No. 10-L of 2017\n2. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs. M/s. Educational Excellence Limited, Lahore\n(Against order dated 18.10.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.T.R. No.255 of 2016).\nC.M.A. No.13838 of 2021 in C.P.L.A. No. 10-L/2017\n3. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore \nvs. \nM/s. Educational Excellence Ltd. Lahore\n(Application for impleadment)\nC.A. No. 1954 of 2019\n4. Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited, Karachi \nvs. \nPakistan through its Secretary Revenue and Ex Officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad, etc.\n(Against order dated 16.08.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No.D-5264 of 2019).\nC.A. No. 404 of 2020\n5. Engro Polymer and Chemicals Limited, Karachi \nvs. \nPakistan through its Secretary Revenue and Ex-officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad, etc.\n(Against order dated 06.02.2020 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No.D-769 of 2020).\nC.P.L.A.No. 3688-L 2019.\n6. Federal Board of Revenue through of Member (Legal), Islamabad, etc. \nvs.\nM/s. Food Consults (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore, etc.\n(Against order dated 09.10.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No. 136592 of 2018).\nC.P.L.A. No. 3689-L of 2019\n7. Federal Board of Revenue through Member (Legal), Islamabad, etc. \nvs. \nM/s. Panther Tyres Limited, etc.\n(Against order dated 09.10.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No.170401 of 2018).\nC.P.L.A. No. 746-L of 2021\n8. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore \nvs. \nM/s. Big Feed (Private) Limited, Lahore\n(Against order dated 11.02.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.T.R. No.8992 of 2021).\nC.P.L.A. No. 3503 of 2022\n9. Commissioner Inland Revenue Legal Zone, Islamabad, etc. \nvs.\nM/s. Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited, Islamabad, etc.\n(Against judgment dated 26.05.2022 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R. No.45 of 2014)." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25976", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2016 3949 = 2016 SLD 3949", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTQ", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of High Court in Matters Related to Civil Servant Allowances\nDetails:\nThe petitioners, including Hafiz Muhammad Ilyas (Junior Clerk) and others, filed a constitutional petition on behalf of ministerial staff of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police department, seeking special and daily allowances granted to uniformed police personnel. They argued discrimination, as similar allowances had been given to civil secretariat staff and uniformed police personnel. The respondents contended that the petition was not maintainable before the High Court due to the constitutional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.\nThe petitioners claimed:\na) 20% Special/Secretariat allowance per a previous consolidated judgment (1997).\nb) 30% Special Allowance sanctioned for Civil Secretariat staff (2014).\nc) Fixed Daily Allowance of 7 days per month, as granted to uniformed police personnel.\nd) A proper service structure to enable promotions and up-gradation.\ne) Equal treatment with uniformed police personnel regarding allowances.\nThe respondents argued that the job duties of ministerial staff differ significantly from uniformed police personnel, who are exposed to higher risks, and that allowances form part of the terms and conditions of service, falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal as per Article 212.\nHeld:\nThe Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition in limine, ruling that allowances are part of the pay, and as such, fall within the terms and conditions of service. Consequently, any grievance related to such terms must be addressed before the Service Tribunal, not the High Court. The court cited precedents from the Supreme Court emphasizing the exclusive jurisdiction of service tribunals in matters involving terms and conditions of civil servants, including allowances.\nCitations:\nProvince of Punjab vs. Mirza Ahmad Khan (1994 SCMR 1263)\nPunjab Textbook Board vs. Muhammad Akhtar Sherani (PLD 2001 SC 1032)\nNational Assembly Secretariat vs. Manzoor Ahmad (2015 SCMR 253)\nI.A. Sharwani vs. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041)\nKhalid Mahmood Watto vs. Government of Punjab (1998 SCMR 2280)\nGovernment of Punjab vs. Muhammad Zafar Bhatti (PLD 2004 SC 317)\nPeer Muhammad vs. Government of Balochistan (2007 SCMR 54)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3509-P/2014. Date of hearing 29.9.2016. Date of announcement 28.10.2016", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ROOH-UL-AMINKHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by M/S Abdul Latif Afridi & Aamir Javed, Advocates. \nRespondent (s) by Syed Sikandar Hayat Shah, AAG.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAFIZ MUHAMMAD ILYAS ETC...\nVS\nGOVT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25977", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5US8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 796 = 2025 SLD 796", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5US8", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Appeal - Acquittal in Qatl-e-Amd (Murder) Case\nDetails:\nThe appellant, Mubashir, son of Munir, was convicted under Section 302(b) PPC for the murder of Mehr Mukhtar by the Additional Sessions Judge, Shorkot, District Jhang, on 21.11.2020, and sentenced to death as Tazir. He was also directed to pay compensation of Rs. 300,000 or undergo six months of simple imprisonment. Mubashir was acquitted of charges under Sections 324/34 PPC. The conviction stemmed from a private complaint alleging that on 18.06.2013, Mubashir and his co-accused attacked Mehr Mukhtar at his dera, resulting in his death. The prosecution alleged motive related to a prior FIR against Mubashir’s family, supported by the deceased. However, the prosecutions evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and forensic reports, revealed contradictions, especially regarding the preparation and timing of the FIR and inquest report. The court noted discrepancies between the evidence and the prosecution’s narrative, including inconsistencies regarding the recovery of the murder weapon and the motive. The credibility of the prosecutions witnesses and the investigating officer was questioned, and the benefit of the doubt was extended to the appellant.\nHeld:\nThe conviction and death sentence of Mubashir were set aside due to a lack of credible evidence, contradictions in prosecution testimony, and procedural flaws. The court emphasized that the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused. The appellant was acquitted and ordered to be released unless required in another case. The appeal against the acquittal of co-accused Muhammad Asif, Zahoor, and Tasadduq Hussain was also dismissed as the prosecution failed to present incriminating evidence.\nCitations:\nMuhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230)\nTariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345)\nAyub Masih v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 1048)\nThe State v. Mushtaq Ahmed (PLD 1973 SC 418)\nMst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others (2015 SCMR 1142)\nMuhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Ashgar and others (2003 SCMR 477)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Murder Reference No.140 of 2020, Crl. Appeal No.65436-J of 2020, P.S.L.A No.65434 of 2020, P.S.L.A No.65435 of 2020. Date of hearing: 07.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AALIA NEELUM, CHIEF JUSTICE AND ABHER GUL KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Irfan Riaz Gondal, Advocate\nState by: Mr. Muhammad Akhlaq, Deputy Prosecutor General\nComplainant by: Rai Bashir Ahmad, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Murder Reference No.140 of 2020 \nThe State\nvs \nMubashir\nCrl. Appeal No.65436-J of 2020 \nMubashir \nvs \nThe State\nP.S.L.A No.65434 of 2020\nShafqat Abbas\nVs \nMubashir, etc.\nP.S.L.A No.65435 of 2020 \nShafqat Abbas \nvs \nZahoor, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25978", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5USs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 797 = 2025 SLD 797 = (2025) 131 TAX 523 = 2025 PTD 1179 = 2025 PTCL 756", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5USs", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nThe Super Asia judgment (2017 SCMR 1427) dealt with the interpretation of certain time-limitation provisions in the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (1990 Act), particularly Section 11(5) and its predecessors (Section 36 and earlier versions of Section 11).\nThe main legal issue was whether the prescribed time limits for issuing orders under the Sales Tax Act are mandatory (strict and binding) or directory (flexible).\nThe provisions require the issuance of an order within 120 days of a show cause notice, extendable by the Commissioner by up to 90 additional days, with strict language such as “shall” and “in no case”.\nKey Provisions Considered:\nSection 11(5) of the 1990 Act (pre-2024):\nNo order shall be made unless a show cause notice is given within 5 years.\nThe order must be made within 120 days of the notice or within an extended period (max 90 days) allowed by the Commissioner with recorded reasons.\nCertain adjourned periods are excluded from the time computation.\nSection 11G(2) (post-2024 amendment) reflects these same provisions with slight wording changes but no substantive difference.\nEarlier Decision in Super Asia:\nHeld the time limits to be mandatory and not directory.\nAny order-in-original made beyond these prescribed periods (absent lawful extension) is invalid.\nThe language “shall” and the prohibitory phrase “in no case” indicated clear legislative intent to impose a hard boundary.\nThis applied not only in Sales Tax Act but also by analogy in the Customs Act, 1969 and Federal Excise Act, 2005, due to nearly identical language.\nReferral and Reservations:\nThe Wak Ltd. case (2018 SCMR 1474) expressed reservations, questioning the harshness of Super Asia, fearing:\nIt might enable tax evasion via procedural manipulation.\nNo penal consequences in statute for breaching the time limits suggested the provision should be directory.\nReferred the matter for a larger Bench consideration.\nLarger Bench’s Reasoning and Affirmation of Super Asia:\nTextual Interpretation:\nTwo instances of “shall” in the provision:\nThe initial order issuance period is mandatory.\nThe Commissioner’s extension power is discretionary but capped strictly (cannot exceed 90 days).\nThe phrase “in no case” is a clear negative, implying finality and unbreachability.\nReading “shall” as “may” (directory) for the first instance would render the second part meaningless, making the extension mechanism redundant.\nLegislative Intent:\nParliament deliberately inserted these periods via amendment in 2000, signaling clear intent to limit adjudication timeframes.\nIf the Court’s 2017 decision (Super Asia) was incorrect, Parliament could have amended the law; instead, similar provisions remain in the 2024 amendments without substantive change.\nMultiple layers of protection for taxpayers are constitutionally sound and help prevent prolonged harassment by tax authorities.\nComparison with Other Jurisdictions/Provisions:\nDistinction made between original adjudication (mandatory) and appellate adjudication (directory).\nCases like A.J. Traders and Sarwaq Traders II show that appellate time limits are generally directory to protect taxpayers’ fundamental rights.\nSuper Asia deals with original adjudication where the State’s functionaries must act promptly.\nSection 74 - Condonation Power:\nSection 74 allows the FBR to extend timelines but only reasonably and objectively.\nThe Court had earlier fixed a 6-month maximum extension under Section 74 to prevent open-ended delays.\nThis judicially-imposed limit on extension powers adds certainty and fairness.\nConsequences:\nOrders made beyond these mandatory periods, without lawful extension, are legally invalid.\nThe layered time limitations protect taxpayers from unending uncertainty and prevent abuse of authority by tax officials.\nThis promotes timely adjudication and resolution of tax disputes.\nDismissing Referral Objections:\nThe fears of abuse or “escape from tax liability” due to these mandatory timelines are speculative and can apply to any limitation period.\nMandatory timelines encourage diligence by tax authorities.\nAbsence of explicit penal consequences does not automatically make the provisions directory.\nConclusion:\nThe larger Bench confirms and affirms the Super Asia decision as correctly stating the law.\nReview petitions against Super Asia are dismissed.\nAppeals and leave petitions should be decided in light of this judgment.\nKey Takeaways:\nTime limits in original adjudication proceedings under Sales Tax and similar statutes are mandatory, not directory.\nOrders issued beyond prescribed periods without valid extension are invalid.\nThe legislative design balances efficient tax recovery and taxpayer protection via multi-layered time limitations.\nJudicial discretion (Section 74) to condone delays is limited and objective, with a maximum six-month extension.\nAppellate time limits differ, generally treated as directory due to constitutional protections on appeals.\nThis ruling provides certainty and finality in tax adjudication timelines, encouraging timely resolution of disputes.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,44(4),11(5),11A,11B,11C,11D,11E,11F,11G,11G(2),36,36(3),45,74Customs Act, 1969=194B(1)Federal Excise Act, 2005=14Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=189,254", - "Case #": "C.As.634 to 636, 1290 to 1295 of 2018, 1424 to 1430 of 2019, 1388 to 1392 of 2017, 57, 852, 1128 of 2020, C.P.L.As.2286-L, 2298-L, 2299-L, 2065-L of 2017, C.As.436, 1693 of 2021, C.P.L.As.1604-L, 1411-L of 2022, C.A.1486 of 2021, C.P.L.As.1397-L, 770-L, 1285-L of 2022, C.A.732 of 2012, 394 of 2013, 399, 712 of 2013, C.P.L.As.5107, 592-P of 2023, 2473-L and 2474-L of 2022 (On appeal against judgment dated 24.08.201, 16.01.2017, 18.01.2017, 19.01.2017, 12.02.2015, 12.02.2015, 03.04.2019, 20.11.2014, 23.11.2015, 08.05.2017, 12.06.2017, 14.06.2017, 30.05.2017, 24.05.2017, 26.01.2021, 07.03.2022, 09.03.2022, 08.12.2020, 09.03.2022, 24.01.2022, 01.03.2022, 06.06.2012, 05.04.2012, 05.04.2012, 05.02.2012, 17.10.2023, 11.05.2023 and 22.03.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench Bahawalpur, Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in STR No.33/2005, ETR No.1 of 2005 and STRs No.10 of 2006, 01/2011/BWP, 02/2011/BWP, 02/2013/BWP, 03/2013/BWP, 03/2016/BWP, STR No.169/2012, 10/2011, 165/2013, 96/2013, 82/2012, , 23/2012, 24/2012, 14/2008, 21/2009, 185/2011, 116/2007, 127/2007, 42/2011, 01/2008, 212/2015, 81/2013, 126/2013, 78/2014, 32435/2017, 22/2012, 4925/2021, 157/2012, 77/2013, 173/2011, 36459/2021, 79765/2021, Customs Reference No.29033/2019, Sales Tax Reference No.73/2010, 101/2010, 75/2011, 13/2011, 11/2014, 23-P/2022, ETR No.05/2011 and STR No.88/2011.) And C.M.As.1917-L, 1918-L, 1919-L, 966-L and 964-L /2015 (Stay) In C.A.1388, 1389, 1390, 1391 and 1392 of 2017 And C.R.Ps.153 and 154/2017 (For review of judgment dated 31.03.2017 passed by this Court in C.A.399/2013 and C.A.682/2008.) And C.M.A.5471/2019 (Permission to file and argue) In C.R.P.Nil/2019 In C.A.219/2011 C.A.634 to 636/2018 C.As.1290 to 1295/2018 C.As.1424, 1425, 1429, 1430/2019, 1693/2021, 1604-L, C.P.L.As. 1397-L. Dates of Hearing : 21.4.2025 & 28.04.2025. Date of order: 14-05-2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR, MR. JUSTICE IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, MR. JUSTICE SHAKEEL AHMAD, MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the private parties\nMr. Ali Sibtain Fazli, ASC (in CA 634-636/2018)\nCh. Hafeezullah Yaqoob, ASC (in CA 1291/18)\nDl. Muhammad Khan Alizai, ASC (in CA 1292-1294/2018)\nMr. M. Ajmal Khan, ASC (Via video-link, Lahore) (in CAs 1426/2019, 1486/2021)\nMr. Munawar-us-Salam, ASC (Via video-link, Lahore)\nMr. M. Shoaib Rashid, ASC (Via video-link, Lahore) (in CA 1128/2020)\nMr. Ijaz Ahmed Awan, ASC (Via video-link, Lahore) (in CA 1388-1392/2017)\nSyed Naveed Amjad, Indrabi, ASC (in CRP 154/2017)\nFor Commissioner Inland / FBR\nMrs. Kausar Parveen, ASC\n(in CA 634-636/2018 and CA 1292/18, 1428/19, CPLA 2298-L, 2299-L/17, 2065-L/17, 770-L/22)\nCh. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, ASC (in CA 1290, 1293, 1294, 1295/18 and CAs 1388-1392/17, 712/13, CPLA 1411-L/22, 1285- L/22, 2286-L/17)\nMr. Abdul Razzaq Raja, ASC (in CA 57/20 and CMA 5471/21)\nDr. Farhat Zafar, ASC (in CA 732/12)\nMian Yousaf Umar, ASC (Via video-link, Lahore) (in CA 1424/19, 1429/19, 1430/19, 852/20, 436/21, CPLA 1604-L/22)\nMalik Qamar Afzal, ASC (in CP 5107/23)\nMr. Sarfraz Ahmed Cheema, ASC (Via video-link, Lahore) (in CA 1425/19 and 1128/20)\nMr. Ahmed Pervez, ASC (Via video-link, Lahore) (in CA 1693/21)\nMr. Yahya, ASC (Via video-link, Lahore) (in CA 1291/18)\nMr. M. Saeed Tahir, ASC (Via video-link, Lahore) (in CA 1486/21)\nMr. Waqar A. Sh., ASC (Via video-link, Lahore) (in CA 1426 and 1427/19)\nMr. Izhar ul Haq, ASC\n(in CRP 153-154/17, CA 394/13 and 399/13)\nMs. Saba Saeed, ASC\n(in CPLA 1397-L/22, 2473-2474-L/22)\nMr. Ishtiaq Ahmad, ASC\n(in CP 592-P/23) (Via video-link, Peshawar)\nDr. Ishtiaq, DG (Law), FBR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. WAK Limited Multan Road, Lahore \nVS\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Bahawalpur\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore \nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone- 1, Regional Tax Office, Gujranwala Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-V, Regional Tax Office-II, Lahore, etc. Haseeb Waqas Sugar Mills Ltd., through its Authorized Representative Abdullah Sugar Mills Ltd., through its Authorized Representative\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II, RTO, Multan\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue, Zone- II, RTO, Gujranwala, etc.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Lahore The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-VII, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Lahore\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot\nCommissioner Inland (Rev.) Legal Division Regional Tax Office, Lahore The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala, etc.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone II R.T.O., Gujranwala\nDirector Intelligence & Investigation- FBR, Lahore\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Gujranwala\nCollector of Customs, Collectorate of Customs (Appraisement), Lahore Collector of Customs Federal Excise & Sales Tax, Multan\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad & another Commissioner Inland (Rev.) Legal Division Regional Tax Office, Lahore Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal Division), Large Tax Payers Unit, Islamabad\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Mardan Zone RTO, Mardan\nVs\nCollector Central Excise & Sales Tax, Lahore (Now Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTU, Lahore) and others M/s. Pak Papers Mils (Pvt.) Ltd.\nM/s. Khalid Modern Industries (Pvt.) Ltd.\nM/s. Asia Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.\nM/s. Blue Star Spinning Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. M/s. Abbas Cotton Factory \nM/s. Imran Agencies\nM/s. R.F.K Traders\nM/s. Pak Kuwait Textile, etc.\nM/s. Ibrahim Steel Casting, Dewan Road, More Emanabad Grid Station, Gujranwala\nM/s. Allah Tawakal Steel Mills, Near Ghugi Samanabad, Gujranwala M/s. Shahbaz Engineering Works, Javed Park, Kala Khatai Road, Shahdara, Lahore, etc.\nM/s. Alpine Textile Industries, Lahore M/s. A.R.R. Corporation, Lahore Govt. of Pakistan through its Secretary Finance, etc.\nLarge Taxpayers Unit (LTU), etc.\nAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore Bench, etc.\nGovt. of Pakistan through its Secretary Finance, etc.\nM/s. Imperial Agro Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd., Multan\nM/s. Ittehad Trading Corporation, Gujranwala\nM/s. Coca Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd., 5-E-II, Gulberg-III, Lahore M/s. Shahnawaz Textile Mills Ltd., KM, Manga Road, Raiwind, District, Lahore, etc.\nM/s. Hameeda Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore\nM/s. Barkat International, Company M/s. Rado Engineering Works, Gujrat M/s. Chaudhry Steel Re-Rolling Mills, LHR.\nM/s. Super Asia Mohammad Din & Sons M/s. Rauf Industries, Gujranwala M/s. Makerwal Collieries Limited, Lahore\nM/s. Pinnacle Magic Marketing, A, Nisar Colony, Lahore\nM/s. Ayub Textile Industries, Faisalabad\nM/s Fazal Brothers, Lahore\nM/s. Tahir Engineering Works, Gujranwala\nM/s. Hajvery Traders, Lahore, etc.\nM/s. Joyia Sadat Cotton Industries M/s. Mian Zafar & Co. & another M/s. Mirtex Enterprises, LHR, etc.\nM/s. Chaudhry Steel Re-Rolling Mills., LHR.\nM/s. Umer Textiles\nM/s Bahria Town Pvt. Ltd., Rawalpindi\nM/s. Redco Enterprises Cantonment\nPlaza, Mardan and another\nM/s. Coca Cola Export Corporation, Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25979", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 795 = 2025 SLD 795", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTk", - "Key Words:": "Case Background:\nPetitioner: Imran Muzaffar, former Admin Clerk at OPI.\nAllegation: In connivance with Nawaz Karim Khan (Accountant, Labour Contractor MEP), facilitated unauthorized advances from MEP staff for personal gain.\nService Termination: Initially terminated on 12.09.2015.\nLegal Proceedings:\nPetitioner challenged termination under Section 33, Industrial Relations Act (IRA), 2012 before NIRC Single Bench.\nSingle Bench allowed petition and directed de novo inquiry.\nPetitioner reinstated on 28.11.2021.\nPost de novo inquiry, petitioner found guilty; services terminated again on 17.02.2023.\nGrievance petition dismissed by NIRC Single Bench and Full Bench, leading to current writ petition.\nPetitioner’s Arguments:\nNo proper evidence substantiating the inquiry findings or termination order.\nSecond charge sheet impermissible under Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.\nAllegations do not constitute misconduct; no proof against petitioner.\nInquiry officer failed to summon key accountant witness.\nEvidence against petitioner is hearsay and unsubstantiated.\nNo documentary proof linking petitioner to unauthorized fund transfers.\nRespondent’s Position:\nConcurrent findings of fact by NIRC Single and Full Benches are valid.\nPetitioner was given a fair hearing opportunity.\nFundamental rights of petitioner not violated.\nCourt’s Findings:\nSecond charge sheet issued post reinstatement after NIRC order; de novo inquiry conducted.\nWitnesses’ testimonies mainly hearsay; no direct evidence that petitioner transferred or received funds.\nKey witnesses admitted amounts transferred from MEP account into their personal accounts; no proof of petitioner’s involvement.\nInquiry officer’s report relied heavily on allegations of Nawaz Karim Khan without documentary evidence or direct proof implicating petitioner.\nNo formal exhibition of inquiry report or recording of evidence before NIRC grievance forums.\nNIRC failed to comply with procedural safeguards under Section 33(5) IRA 2012 and NIRC Regulations 2016.\nNew allegations in de novo inquiry impermissible under Standing Orders.\nJudicial precedents stress fair inquiry process and prohibition on fresh charge sheets post initial inquiry in such cases.\nConclusion & Order:\nThe inquiry findings and termination orders are not substantiated by evidence and procedurally flawed.\nThe termination of petitioner is set aside.\nRespondent company directed to reinstate Imran Muzaffar immediately with all back benefits.\nLegal Significance:\nUpholds the principle of fair and evidence-based disciplinary inquiry.\nReinforces prohibition on fresh charge sheets with different allegations during de novo inquiries.\nEmphasizes the mandatory nature of procedural compliance under IRA 2012 and related regulations.\nProtects workmen against unsubstantiated and procedurally defective dismissals.\nCourts will interfere where no proper evidence or inquiry record is produced before adjudicatory forums like NIRC.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Industrial Relations Act, 2012=33,33(5)Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968=15,15(iii)(g)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 1501 of 2024. Date of decision: 22.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MOHSIN AKHTAR KAYANI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Muhammad Arif Khawaja, Advocate.\nRespondent No. 3 by: Hafiz Arfat Ahmed Ch., Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMRAN MUZAFFAR\nVS\nNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, ISLAMABAD, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25980", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 798 = 2025 SLD 798 = 2025 PLC 87", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UTg", - "Key Words:": "Contract Employment and Regularization under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tourism Act, 2019\nDetails:\nThe petitioners were employed on a contract basis against various posts in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Culture and Tourism Authority. After completing a contract period of three years, they sought regularization from the date of their initial appointment, alleging discrimination. They argued that their contracts were extended several times over three years, thus warranting regularization.\nUnder Section 32 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tourism Act, 2019, preference in fresh hiring after the completion of three years is to be given to candidates with good performance reports who had previously served the authority. Contract employment inherently terminates upon the expiration of the contract period, and there is no automatic right to regularization. The decision to extend or terminate a contract rests solely with the employer. Furthermore, neither the Act nor the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Culture and Tourism Authority Employees (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2020, provided any provision for extending contracts beyond three years.\nHeld:\nThe constitutional petition for regularization was dismissed, as the law did not grant the petitioners any vested right to regularization or extension beyond the contract period.\nCitations:\nKhushal Khan Khattak University and others v. Jabran Ali Khan and others 2021 SCMR 977\nVice-Chancellor Bacha Khan University Charsadda and others v. Tanveer Ahmad and others 2021 SCMR 1995\nMiss Noureen Naz Butt v. Pakistan International Airlines and others 2020 SCMR 1625\nProvince of Punjab through Secretary L & DD Department and others v. Dr. Javed Iqbal and others 2021 SCMR 767\nFederation of Pakistan through Secretary Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs v. Muhammad Azam Chatta 2013 SCMR 120\nMubashar Majeed v. Province of Punjab and others 2017 PLC (C.S.) 940\nPakistan Telecommunication through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others PLD 2011 SC 132", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 4397-P of 2024 with IR, decided on 10th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 10th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IJAZ ANWAR AND SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shumail Ahmad Butt for Petitioner.\nSyed Sikandar Hayat Shah, A.A.G along with Ali Gohar Durrani and Tashfeen Haider, DG (KPCTA) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NADEEM AHMED AND OTHERS\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, THROUGH SECRETARY, SPORTS, TOURISM, ARCHAEOLOGY, MUSEUMS AND YOUTH AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, PESHAWAR AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25981", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 795 = 2025 SLD 795 = (2025) 131 TAX 553 = 2025 PTD 717", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5UXo", - "Key Words:": "Taxation Law — Right to Revise Return vs. Audit Initiation\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a private limited company, filed a nil income tax return on 30.12.2023 due to pending finalization of audited accounts. Under Section 114(6) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the petitioner had 60 days to file a revised return. However, the Commissioner Inland Revenue issued an audit notice on 30.01.2024 under Section 177(1), before the 60-day period lapsed. The petitioner objected, but subsequent notices were issued, including a penalty notice under Section 182(2). The petitioner challenged the notices on the ground that initiating audit before the expiration of the 60-day period for revision rendered Section 114(6) redundant.\nThe respondents argued that the petitioner did not file a revised return even after receiving the audit notice and did not apply for an extension of the deadline. They also alleged that the revised return presented was tampered with and pointed out that Section 114(6) is subject to Section 114(6A), which links audit initiation to the revision process.\nHeld:\nThe court held that Section 114(6) grants taxpayers a substantive right to revise returns within 60 days of filing. Initiating an audit under Section 177(1) within this period infringes on this right and renders the provision redundant. The court emphasized a harmonious interpretation of the Ordinance, where self-assessment and voluntary correction of errors take precedence before audit. Therefore, the audit notices dated 30.01.2024 and 26.03.2024 were declared unlawful and set aside. However, the petitioner’s request for submitting a revised return after the lapse of the 60-day period without the Commissioners approval could not be granted.\nCitations:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad v. Messrs Zahid Jee Fabrics Limited (2021 PTD 1705)\nCollector of Sales Tax And Central Excise (Enforcement) v. Messrs Mesa Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 PTD 1933)\nMessrs Pakistan Television Corporation Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal), LTU, Islamabad (2017 PTD 1372)\nMessrs Master Foam (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan (2005 PTD 1537)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114(6),14(6A),122,122(9),177,177(1),182(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 81167 of 2024. Date of hearing 17.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Ch. Qamar uz Zaman and Arif Munir, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Mr. M. Umer Tariq Gill, Assistant Attorney General, Pakistan for respondent No. 1.\nSyed Zain ul Abideen Bokhari, Advocate for respondents No.2 to 5-department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Al-Qadir Seed Corporation (Pvt) Ltd. through its Director\nVs\nFederation of Pakistan, through Secretary Revenue Division, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25982", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5NHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 799 = 2025 SLD 799", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5NHo", - "Key Words:": "Ejectment – Wilful Default in Payment of Rent under Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963\nDetails:\nThe appellants (legal heirs of the late Iftikhar ud Din Khattak) filed an ejectment petition under Section 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, seeking the eviction of Askari Bank Limited and others (respondents) from rented commercial premises located at Satta Gadai, The Mall, Peshawar Cantonment. The grounds included:\nWilful default in rent payment since 21.12.1999 at the claimed rent of Rs.10,000/- per month per shop.\nSubletting of the upper portion to Askari Bank and another without permission.\nThe Rent Controller initially allowed the ejectment petition (17.10.2019), holding that:\nRespondents failed to rebut the default claim or provide evidence of rent adjustment.\nNo credible proof of prior loan adjustment, rent receipts, or documentary evidence regarding the rent amount or amalgamation of entities was produced.\nThe respondents were wilful defaulters.\nThe respondents filed RFA No. 281-P/2019 before the Peshawar High Court, which reversed the Rent Controller’s order on 16.12.2020, holding that:\nThere was no wilful default.\nRent was Rs.6,000/- per month based on earlier agreements and was being adjusted.\nPetition was dismissed but the respondents were allowed to seek fair rent under Section 7 of the Act.\nThe appellants then approached the Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. Leave to appeal was granted to consider whether:\nThe appellate court misread evidence regarding the landlord-tenant relationship.\nSubletting and wilful default were established but ignored.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court set aside the Peshawar High Court’s judgment and restored the Rent Controller’s ejectment decree, holding:\nThe Peshawar High Court misdirected itself by treating the dispute as one of fair rent, rather than wilful default in payment.\nRespondents failed to comply with the Tentative Rent Order dated 05.07.2006, and no credible proof of payment or adjustment of arrears from July 2006 to December 2012 was submitted.\nPlea of rent adjustment against a purported loan lacked evidentiary backing — even the respondents’ own witness failed to produce supporting documents.\nThe findings of wilful default by the Rent Controller were based on proper appreciation of the record, which were wrongly overturned by the High Court.\nSubletting issue was not pressed before the Court; hence, it was not examined.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963=17", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEAL NO.470 OF 2022. Date of hearing & order: 16.04.2025\n(Against the impugned judgment dated 16.12.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in RFA No.281-P/2019)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND MR. JUSTICE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants: Mr. Irfan Javed ASC\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Iftikhar Ahmad Bashir ASC\nMr. Khaliq uz Zaman ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "IFTIKHAR UD DIN (DEED..) THROUGH L.RS. ... APPELLANTS\nVS\nM/S ASKARI BANK LIMITED AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25983", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5NHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 800 = 2025 SLD 800", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1J5NHk", - "Key Words:": "The petitioners challenged investigation notices issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) under Sections 137, 139, and 141 of the Securities Act, 2015. These notices alleged market manipulation in the trading of Murree Brewery (MUREB) shares between December 2013 and October 2016. The petitioners denied the allegations and argued that the notices violated their constitutional rights under Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution and were issued without jurisdiction or specific details of the alleged offence.\nKey Legal Questions Considered\nMaintainability: Whether writ jurisdiction can be invoked at the preliminary investigation stage before any adverse action.\nSufficiency of Notice: Whether the notices lacked particulars as required by precedents like PLD 2012 SC 903 and PLD 2007 Karachi 469.\nRetrospective Application: Whether Sections 137 & 139 of the Securities Act 2015 could be applied to pre-enactment conduct (i.e., from 2013-2015).\nConstitutional Protection: Whether calling petitioners to appear before SECP amounted to self-incrimination under Article 13(1)(b).\nCourt’s Rulings\n🔹 On Maintainability:\nThe Court held that no fundamental right was violated by mere issuance of notices.\nPetitioners had adequate alternative remedies (appeal under Securities Act).\nCiting C.P No.4177/2024 (M/s Payoneer Inc.), Court reaffirmed that writ jurisdiction should not obstruct regulatory functions at the investigative stage.\n🔹 On Sufficiency of Notices:\nThe notices contained specific allegations: synchronized trading, 236% price hike, violation of Section 133(1)(a)(i) and (b)(ii & v).\nDate/time/venue for appearance, legal provisions, and purpose were also mentioned.\nThe Court found the notices adequately detailed, fulfilling legal standards set by PLD 2007 Karachi 469 and PLD 2012 SC 903.\n🔹 On Retrospective Application:\nSections 137 & 139 are procedural, not substantive.\nAs per 2025 SCMR 303 (MCB case), procedural laws apply retrospectively.\nInvestigation can be initiated for pre-enactment conduct if the procedural law was in effect at the time of investigation.\n🔹 On Article 13 Self-Incrimination:\nArticle 13(1)(b) applies only to natural persons being prosecuted for offences.\nSECP notices do not compel petitioners to be witnesses against themselves, but only require provision of information.\nThe Court distinguished 1996 SCMR 1668 (Alpha Insurance), clarifying that incorporated entities are not protected under Article 13.\nConclusion\nThe petition was dismissed. The Court held that:\nThe SECP acted within its legal mandate.\nNo violation of fundamental rights occurred at this stage.\nThe petition was premature and not maintainable under Article 199.\nRegulatory investigations into securities market activity must not be hindered unless exceptional circumstances are proven, which was not the case here.\nCitation Highlights\nPLD 2012 SC 903 – Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar v. Malik Riaz\nPLD 2007 Karachi 469 – Ghulam Hussain Baloch v. NAB\n2025 SCMR 303 – Muslim Commercial Bank v. PLAT\n2023 SCMR 1856 – RYK Mills case\nPLD 2022 SC 409 – Saif ur Rehman v. NAB\nPLD 2021 Lahore 343 – Chenab Flour Mills case\n2025 CLD 90 – Sadiq Poultry v. Federation of Pakistan", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities Act, 2015=133,133(1)(a)(i),133(1)(b)(ii),133(1)(b)(v),137,139,141Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=12,13(1),199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2363 of 2017. Date of Hearing: 09.04.2025. Date of order: 30-04-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mian Sami-ud-Din and Mr. Nasir Mehmood, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Raja Muqsit Nawaz Khan, Advocate along with Muhammad Waseem A. Rana, SPP, SECP.\nMuhammad Fahad.\nResearch Assistance by:", - "Petitioner Name:": "NAJEEB ULLAH DURRANI AND ANOTHER\nVS\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25984", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 801 = 2025 SLD 801", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzc", - "Key Words:": "Applicability of Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969 where Valuation Ruling under Section 25A exists\nDetails:\nThese Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal arose from four writ petitions decided by the Lahore High Court, where importers (Respondents) sought the release of goods under Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969, despite the existence of Valuation Rulings issued under Section 25A of the same Act. The High Court allowed provisional release of goods based on Rule 125 of the Customs Rules, 2001, interpreting that Section 81 grants the importer a right to provisional release in cases of valuation disputes.\nThe Collector of Customs challenged these orders, arguing that:\nSection 81 is not applicable when a Valuation Ruling under Section 25A exists.\nProvisional assessment is only permissible when the Customs Officer cannot assess the value due to a need for further inquiry or testing.\nA Valuation Ruling constitutes a final, pre-determined assessment value.\nThe proper remedy for disputing a Valuation Ruling lies in a review under Section 25D, followed by appeals under Sections 193 and 194-A.\nThe Respondents argued that:\nRule 125(2) allows provisional release under Section 81 in case of disputes over value.\nThey were entitled to provisional release while contesting the Valuation Rulings under Section 25D.\nA similar precedent was set by the Sindh High Court in Danish Jahangir v. Federation of Pakistan (2016 PTD 702).\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court allowed the petitions, holding that:\nSection 81 is applicable only in cases where the Customs Officer cannot make an assessment due to a need for testing or inquiry, and cannot be invoked as of right.\nValuation Rulings under Section 25A are pre-assessed, binding determinations of customs value and thus remove the necessity of provisional assessment under Section 81.\nRule 125(2) does not override the binding nature of a Valuation Ruling nor does it apply in cases where such a ruling is in place.\nThe proper recourse against a Valuation Ruling is through Section 25D (review) and, subsequently, appeals under Sections 193 and 194-A.\nThe High Courts orders granting provisional release under Section 81 despite existing Valuation Rulings were contrary to law and the legislative scheme of the Customs Act.\nFBR Clarification: Dated 17.09.2013 – provisional assessment not allowed when Valuation Ruling exists\nCase Law:\nFBR through Chairman v. Messrs Wazir Ali & Co. (2020 SCMR 959)\nMessrs Wasim Radio Traders v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 PTD 525)\nDanish Jahangir v. Federation of Pakistan (2016 PTD 702) – distinguished", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25A,25A(2A),25D,79,81,131194-ACustoms Rules, 2001=125,125(2)", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITIONS NQ.323-L TO 326-L OF 2014. Date of hearing: 23.02.2022\n[Against the orders dated 3.12.2013, 10.12.2013, 12.12.2013 and 10.1.2014, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Writ Petitions No.31010, 31839 & 32085 of 2013 and 466 of 2014]", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL, CJ, MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK", - "Lawyer Name:": "CP.323-L of 2014 \nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and another Vs. M/s Wasim Radio Traders, Lahore, etc.\nCP.324-L of 2014 \nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and others Vs. M/s Gateway international Lahore, etc.\nCP.325-L of 2014 \nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Labors and another Vs. M/s Hong Kong Telecom. Lahore, etc.\nCP.326-L of 2014 \nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and others Vs. M/s Kamla Brothers, Lahore, etc.\nFor the Petitioner(s) For Respondent No.l Respondent No. 1 Date of Healing\nMr. Sarfraz Ahmed Cheema, ASC (in all cases)\nMr. Shahid Tasawar Rao, ASC (in CPs.323-!. to 325-L of 2014)\nEx-parte\n(in CP.326-L of 2014)", - "Petitioner Name:": "CP.323-L of 2014 \nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and another Vs. M/s Wasim Radio Traders, Lahore, etc.\nCP.324-L of 2014 \nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and others Vs. M/s Gateway international Lahore, etc.\nCP.325-L of 2014 \nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Labors and another Vs. M/s Hong Kong Telecom. Lahore, etc.\nCP.326-L of 2014 \nCollector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and others Vs. M/s Kamla Brothers, Lahore, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25985", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 802 = 2025 SLD 802", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzY", - "Key Words:": "Background & Context\nTaxpayer: A private limited company engaged in cellular mobile services.\nTax Year: 2020\nInitial Action: Return filed under Section 120(1)(b) (deemed assessment).\nDispute: Tax authority amended assessment under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, creating a tax demand of over Rs. 6.7 billion.\nAppeals:\nCIR (Appeals) initially annulled the order on limitation grounds.\nFresh order issued under 122(5A) after fresh initiation.\nATIR upheld most disallowances.\nReference filed before High Court under Section 133(1), challenging legality and jurisdiction.\nMain Legal Issues & Findings\n1. Validity of Section 122(5A) Proceedings\nThe Court held that the Commissioner had valid jurisdiction under Section 122(5A) as both conditions— erroneous and prejudicial to revenue —were fulfilled.\nAt the time (pre-2021), the Commissioner was empowered to make inquiries (per Finance Act 2012)—hence, proceedings were lawful.\nNo audit under Section 177 was undertaken—rather, factual clarifications were sought, which do not amount to fishing inquiries.\nKey Case Laws Cited:\nBestway Cement (2018 PTD 977) – Inquiry power affects substantive rights → prospective in nature\nTelenor Pakistan (2024 PTD 619) – Correct computation of tax liability via clarifications is lawful\nPakistan Tobacco (2016 PTD 596) – Opportunity of hearing mandatory under Section 122(9)\n2. Expense Disallowances Confirmed by Tribunal\n(a) Advertisement, Marketing & Sales Promotion (Section 24)\nHeld as intangible with no ascertainable life → amortizable over 25 years.\nNo proof was provided to justify shorter useful life.\nTribunal’s decision was upheld.\n(b) Customer Acquisition Cost\nIncluded activation tax paid by telecom company on behalf of customers.\nUnder SRO 390(I)/2001, this is the customer’s liability, not a deductible business expense.\nPrecedents confirm the disallowance.\n(c) Stock Consumed & Inventory Written Off (Section 20)\nDisallowed for lack of documentation.\nPartial allowance made where proof existed, showing impartiality of the officer.\nFindings affirmed due to failure to prove the expenditure was wholly and exclusively for business. \n(d) Discounts (claimed as commissions)\nNot backed by invoices or contracts.\nTreated as unproven and unjustified.\n(e) Legal & Professional Charges (Rs. 2.46 billion)\nClaimed as paid to Telenor ASA (associated entity).\nNo documents or engagement terms submitted.\nDeduction rightly disallowed under Section 20(1).\n(f) Exchange Loss (Section 34)\nRs. 612 million treated as notional and unrealized.\nOnly realized losses accepted.\nAccrual accounting under Section 34 requires “reasonable accuracy”, which was not proven.\n(g) Tax Depreciation (Section 174(2) & Rule 12)\nApplicant failed to provide asset-wise breakup and specific details.\nUse of vague terms like “telecom equipment” insufficient.\nNon-compliance with mandatory filing particulars justified the disallowance.\n(h) Tax Credit u/s 148 (Import of Plant & Machinery)\nTelecom company was not an “industrial undertaking” in Tax Year 2020.\nInclusion came via Finance Act, 2021, with prospective effect.\nHence, tax withheld under Section 148 was minimum tax and not adjustable.\nRelevant Precedents:\nCM Pak Limited (ITR No. 234 of 2011) – Activation tax disallowable\nSCMR 111/2023 – Retrospective effect not to be implied unless expressly stated\nMaxwell/Bennion on Statutory Interpretation – Substantive amendments are prospective\n2025 SCMR 153, 2024 SCMR 853, 2023 SCMR 1502 – Manner prescribed by law must be followed\nFinal Holding\nAll questions of law were decided against the taxpayer.\nThe Appellate Tribunal’s order upheld in entirety.\nThe reference was dismissed under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nKey Takeaways\nSection 122(5A) is a distinct mechanism from audit (Section 177); inquiries for arithmetic or legal errors in return are valid.\nDeductibility under business income requires strict proof of exclusive business purpose and compliance with rules.\nTaxpayers failure to submit supporting documentation—not mere existence of expense—leads to disallowance.\nAmendments like inclusion of telecoms in “industrial undertaking” apply prospectively only, not retroactively.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=20(1),21(l),24(1),24(2),120(1)(b),120(2A),122(5A),132(3),133(1),148,174(2),177", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 01 of 2024. Date of hearing 15.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SARDAR MUHAMMAD SARFRAZ DOGAR, ACJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Shahzib Masud and Barrister Abdul Ahad Khokhar, Advocates.\nAssisted By: Ms. Bayyinah Ali Shah. Law Clerk, Mr. Afrasyiab Khan. Law Clerk, Mr. Muhammad Waqas Shah, Law Clerk", - "Petitioner Name:": "TELENOR PAKISTAN (PRIVATE) LIMITED. \nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AND FOUR OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25986", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 803 = 2025 SLD 803", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzU", - "Key Words:": "Disciplinary Proceedings Based on Alleged Misstatement in Service Appeals\nDetails:\nThe petitioners were civil servants who sought ante-dated promotions and succeeded in their appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal (FST) through a consolidated judgment dated 18.01.2022. The departments Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal (CPLA) and Review Petition before the Supreme Court were dismissed, affirming the FSTs decision. Despite this, the department initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners on the allegation that they had misstated facts in their service appeals. Charge sheets and statements of allegations dated 20.11.2024 were issued.\nThe petitioners challenged these proceedings in the Lahore High Court (LHC), arguing that the disciplinary action was:\nBased solely on pleadings made before a judicial forum.\nA violation of the directions issued by the Court in an earlier writ petition (Order dated 09.12.2024).\nA misuse of process to avoid implementing the final FST judgment.\nThe respondents argued that the proceedings were still pending and thus premature for judicial interference.\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings as void ab initio, holding:\nAny misstatement in pleadings before the FST could have been addressed by the department under Section 12(2) CPC or through Section 195 Cr.P.C, but no such action was taken.\nThe grounds cited did not fall within the ambit of Rule 3 of the Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 2020, which specifies the grounds for departmental proceedings.\nDisciplinary proceedings based on alleged misstatements in judicial pleadings (drafted by counsel) without establishing a nexus with official duties are unwarranted.\nThe department’s actions were possibly a malicious attempt to delay or obstruct implementation of the FSTs decision, which had attained finality.\nThe Court emphasized that even if the departmental proceedings had not yet culminated in an adverse order, continuation of such legally untenable and mala fide proceedings violates Article 4 of the Constitution.\nCitations:\n2025 SCMR 322 – All Public Universities BPS Teachers Association v. Federation of Pakistan\n2024 CLD 1350 – Muhammad Tariq Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan\n2024 LHC 1923 – Muhammad Akram Sohail v. Govt. of Punjab\n2024 PLC (C.S.) 1451 – Prof. Dr. Mahmood Baig v. Ministry of Science & Technology\n2023 PLC (C.S.) Note 4 – Fahad Faizan Khan v. Federation of Pakistan\n2018 PLC (C.S.) Note 36 – Samina Pathan v. Federation of Pakistan", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=195Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 10509 of 2025. Date of hearing: 08.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author: Shujaat Ali Khan, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Khawaja Omer Masood, Advocate.\nRespondents Ms. Babra Akram Jadoon, Assistant by: Attorney General, with Mirza Nauman\nKhurshid AO (GV-I), CGA Islamabad and M. Saleem AO (Legal), Director Postal Accounts, Lahore.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AAMIR NAZIR\nVS\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25987", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 804 = 2025 SLD 804", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Specific Performance – Privity of Contract – Second Appeal – Scope under Section 100 C.P.C.\nDetails:\nThe case involves a Second Appeal filed by the Appellants challenging the judgment of the IX-Additional District Judge, Karachi East, which had reversed the trial courts dismissal of a suit for specific performance filed by the Respondent (Plaintiff). The suit sought enforcement of a contract of sale, possession of an apartment, recovery of rent, and injunctive reliefs regarding Flat No. 603-A, Elite Residency, Karachi.\nThe core contention was whether a valid and enforceable contract existed between the parties, as the apartment was originally booked in the name of the Respondent’s deceased father. The Respondent claimed to have funded the purchase while abroad and alleged the flat was eventually transferred in his name.\nThe Trial Court dismissed the suit on the basis that there was no privity of contract between the parties. The Appellate Court reversed this, allowing the Respondent’s appeal and decreeing the suit. In the Second Appeal, the High Court examined the scope of interference under Section 100 C.P.C.\nHeld:\nThe High Court allowed the Second Appeal, set aside the Appellate Court’s decree, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment dismissing the suit. Key findings were:\nLimitation: The appeal was not barred by limitation as it was filed on the first working day after court vacations, within the permissible 90-day period under Article 156 of the Limitation Act, 1908.\nPrivity of Contract: No privity of contract existed between the parties. The flat was booked in the father’s name, and no power of attorney or legal heir status was asserted by the Respondent. Overwritten receipts and contradictory witness testimonies undermined the Respondents claim.\nOnus of Proof: The Respondent failed to establish his claim based on evidence and could not rely on weaknesses in the Defendants case.\nScope under Section 100 C.P.C.: The High Court held that the Appellate Court misread evidence and relied on extra-legal reasoning (“common sense” and “common practice”), which are not judicially noticeable facts under Articles 111 and 112 of the QSO, 1984.\nCitations:\nMeer Gul vs. Raja Zafar Mehmood through legal heirs and others (2024 SCMR 1496)\nSultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others (2010 SCMR 1630)\nSheikh Akhtar Aziz v. Mst. Shabnam Begum and others (2019 SCMR 524)\nSection 100, Code of Civil Procedure\nSections 37 & 39, Contract Act, 1872\nArticles 111 & 112, Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984\nArticle 156, Limitation Act, 1908", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908=100Contract, Act, 1872=37,39Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=111,112Limitation Act, 1908=156", - "Case #": "IInd Appeal No. 91 of 2024. Dates of Hearing: 14.03.2025, 24.03.2025 & 14.04.2025. Date of announcement: 14.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JAFFER RAZA", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Shahzad Mehmood, Advocate for the Appellants a/w Mr. Mustafa Mamdani Advocate.\nMr. Faiz Durrani, Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL QUDDOOS & 2 OTHER APPELLANTS\nVS\nKHALID YOUSUF RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25988", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 805 = 2025 SLD 805", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYy8", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax – Validity of Ex Parte Order under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe appellant, an individual involved in the manufacturing of plastic bottles, challenged an ex parte assessment order under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for the tax period July 2017 to June 2018. The impugned order, dated 28-06-2024, was purportedly passed by Ms. Minaa Tahir (DCIR), though she assumed office on 01-08-2024. The taxpayer argued that:\nThe order is legally void as it was passed after the statutory deadline of 30-06-2024.\nThe predecessor did not issue the order before relinquishing charge.\nThe taxpayer had fully complied with audit notices and submitted complete sales tax records in April-May 2021 and various dates in 2023–2024.\nThe input tax disallowance of Rs. 20,083,485/- was unjustified, as all banking documents and invoices were on record.\nThe taxpayer was denied access to the original order and informed that it could not be issued as it was allegedly passed by the predecessor, which was contradicted by the appearance of Ms. Tahirs name on the order.\nBank account attachment and recovery of Rs. 2,747,912/- was carried out without furnishing proper documentation or lawful service of the order.\nThe taxpayer also alleged the officer refused to issue the original order despite payment of the copying fee. A show-cause notice had been issued due to alleged non-compliance with audit notices under Section 25, and the order imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,069,174/- in addition to disallowing the input tax adjustment.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal found that the order was passed in a slipshod and ex parte manner without considering the voluminous documentary evidence submitted by the taxpayer. It held that the taxpayer was condemned unheard, violating the principle of audi alteram partem. The Tribunal emphasized the need for natural justice and FBRs procedural guidelines.\nAccordingly, the order was vacated and the matter was remanded to the DCIR with instructions to:\nProvide sufficient opportunity of hearing to the taxpayer.\nConsider all documentary evidence.\nPass a speaking order within 90 days from the receipt of the Tribunals remand.\nThe taxpayer was also directed to cooperate and furnish all relevant records.\nLegal Principle: Audi alteram partem – Right to be heard\nFBR Guidelines: Procedural fairness in ex parte proceedings", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),3,3(1A),11(1),11(2),11(3),25,26,33(9)(a)(b)(c),33(9)(a),33(9)(b),33(9)(c),33(13),34(1),73", - "Case #": "STA No. 681/KB/2024 (Tax Periods July-2017 to June-2018). Date of hearing: 16.01.2025. Date of order: 23.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AJJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ahmed Sohail Siddiqui, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Rehmatullah, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MODERN PLASTIC, PROP; SHAZIA IQBAL, KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE DCIR, ZONE-II, RTO-I, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25989", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 806 = 2025 SLD 806", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYys", - "Key Words:": "Banking Finance – Dismissal of Appeal Against Decree Passed Under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nFirst Women Bank Limited filed a suit under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for recovery of Rs. 370,383,869/- against seven defendants who had availed finance facilities and allegedly defaulted on their obligations. The defendants had executed various finance documents including hypothecation and mortgage deeds. They allegedly sold over 50% of hypothecated goods without depositing proceeds with the bank.\nDefendants filed an application for leave to defend under Section 10(2) of the Ordinance, claiming improper accounting by the bank, non-adjustment of amounts paid including insurance proceeds, and incorrect figures in the statement of account. Their application was dismissed, and the suit was decreed to the extent of certain reliefs (including recovery of principal and sale of secured assets).\nThe defendants appealed, arguing procedural irregularity, lack of proper account reconciliation, and that the bank’s appointed Chartered Accountant was biased. The appellate court appointed a Chartered Accountant with the parties’ consent, whose report mostly supported the banks claims, identifying only one discrepancy worth Rs. 665,100/-.\nHeld:\nThe appellate court upheld the decree of the learned single judge, dismissing the appeal.\nIt found that the appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law or fact as required under Section 10 of the Ordinance.\nThe court ruled that mere denial of the bank’s claims without credible supporting evidence, such as verified documentary proof, does not warrant grant of leave to defend.\nThe Chartered Accountant’s report was deemed impartial and comprehensive, refuting appellants’ objections.\nHowever, the decree was modified only to the extent of deducting Rs. 665,100/-, which the bank agreed was erroneously omitted from credit.\nCitations:\n2014 SCMR 1048 – cited by appellants on principles of granting leave to defend.\n2017 CLD 342 – cited by respondent to support bank’s claim.\nRelevant principles on summary judgment in banking suits and burden of proof under Section 10 were reaffirmed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,10(2),151", - "Case #": "Special H.C.A. No. 91 of 2018. 20.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Arif, advocate for Appellants.\nMr. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui for respondent along with Ms. Rabia Mehak, Law Officer of respondent bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. BITA TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. & OTHERS \nVS\nFIRST WOMEN BANK LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25990", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 807 = 2025 SLD 807", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzk", - "Key Words:": "Key Issue:\nCan individuals who claim to have purchased shares based on private agreements—but whose names were never entered in the company’s register of members—invoke the jurisdiction of the Company Court under Section 126(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2017 for rectification of share register?\nPetitioners’ Case:\nThe Petitioners claimed that:\nRespondents No.2 & 3 had sold them all their shares in Sohawa Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. via agreements dated 21.12.2019, 02.01.2020, and 04.01.2021.\nDespite receiving full consideration (partly in cash, partly through property), the Company and Respondents failed to record the transfer of shares in the share register.\nTherefore, the Petitioners sought rectification of the register under Section 126(1)(b) and asked SECP to update records accordingly.\nRespondents’ Defence:\nRespondents No.2 & 3 (original shareholders) denied executing valid share transfer deeds.\nArgued that:\nNo board approval was obtained for transfer (as required under Section 74–76).\nThe sale agreements were disputed, allegedly involving fraud and pending in civil litigation.\nNo transfer deed or proper share transfer instrument was ever executed or submitted.\nPetitioners are not members, hence Section 126(1)(b) is inapplicable.\nCourt’s Determination:\n1. Jurisdiction of Company Court:\nSection 126 of the Act allows an “aggrieved person” to seek rectification only if they are a member, shareholder, or debenture-holder, or were improperly excluded as such.\nMere claim of ownership through agreement does not create legal membership.\nA valid share transfer requires:\nDuly executed transfer deed.\nDelivery of share certificates.\nApproval of the Board in private companies.\nCompliance with Sections 74, 75, and 76 of the Act.\n2. Petitioners Failed to Prove Shareholder Status:\nPetitioners did not produce:\nTransfer deeds.\nShare certificates.\nProof of Board approval.\nEntry of names in the company register.\nTheir claim was based entirely on unproven private sale agreements.\nIndependent reports from Bahria Town and District Collector Rawalpindi showed:\nPetitioner No.1 was never recorded as owner of properties allegedly paid as consideration.\nProperties were transferred to Respondents, not Petitioners.\nPetitioners No.2 and 3, in whose favour relief was sought, were not even parties to the alleged sale agreements.\n3. Disputed Facts Not Suitable for Summary Jurisdiction:\nCourt reiterated:\nSection 126 can be invoked even where disputes exist, but not where foundational requirements of membership are absent.\nAs laid out in Alliance Textile Mills (2015 CLD 1532), disputed claims cannot be enforced through rectification unless statutory transfer conditions are met.\n4. Precedent & Legal Interpretation:\nCited judgments:\nKausar Rana Resources (2025 SCMR 517) – Company Bench is a special civil court.\nUnited Foam Industries (2016 CLD 393) – Factual controversies don’t bar jurisdiction if statutory prerequisites are met.\nKhursheed Ahmed Khan (PLD 1987 Lahore 1) and Fawwad Butt (2015 CLD 1309) – Private agreements are not enough; legal procedures under the Act must be fulfilled.\nTelenor Pakistan (2024 PTD 619) – Proper procedure for transfer and Board approval is mandatory.\nFinal Holding:\nPetitioners were not shareholders, members, or debenture-holders of the company.\nThey failed to meet the mandatory statutory requirements under Sections 74–76.\nConsequently, they could not invoke Section 126(1)(b) for rectification.\nPetition was dismissed as not maintainable.\nKey Legal Takeaways:\nRectification under Section 126 is only available to:\nRegistered members.\nPersons unlawfully excluded from membership.\nPrivate agreements, even if involving consideration, do not transfer legal title to shares unless statutory procedures are followed.\nCompany Court’s summary jurisdiction cannot be used to bypass civil remedies or resolve disputed title claims.\nProof of share transfer instrument, Board approval, and registry entry are prerequisites for legal recognition of membership in private companies.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=4,5,126,126(1)(a),126(1)(b),127,482", - "Case #": "Civil Original No. 06 of 2021. Date of hearing 20.11.2024, 28.01.2025 and 30.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by Mr. Sultan Mazhar Sher, ASC with Syed Asad Haider, Advocate.\nRespondent(s) by Barrister Usama Rauf Advocate with Malik Saqib Muhammad Khalid, Advocate for Respondent No.1.\nMr. Jamal Mehmood Butt, Advocate with Hafiz Muhammad Tanveer Nasir and Ms. Javeria Rehman Faisal, Advocates for Respondent No.2.\nMr. Tariq Mahmood Advocate on behalf of Respondent No.3.\nBarrister Omar Azad Malik, ASC, Husnain Raza and Fatima Shabbir, Advocates for Respondent No.4/SECP.\nBarrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate General on behalf of Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Imran Ahmed Malik and 2 others \nV/S \nSohawa Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Limited and 3 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25991", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 808 = 2025 SLD 808", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDYzg", - "Key Words:": "Condonation of Delay / Customs Reference / Revenue Recovery\nDetails:\nThe petitioner (Federal Board of Revenue or department under it) sought leave to appeal against three concurrent orders—Order-in-Original (13 August 2021), Order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal (25 January 2022), and Peshawar High Courts Order in Customs Reference No. 21-P/2022 (6 September 2022)—which went against the department in a case involving Rs. 2.8 million in customs duty. However, the petition for leave to appeal was filed with an 11-day delay.\nThe department requested condonation of delay via CMA No. 10322/2022, stating the delay was due to administrative formalities and awaiting permission from senior officials.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court (Justice Qazi Faez Isa) dismissed the application for condonation of delay, finding the reasons neither valid nor sufficient.\nThe Court criticized the department for risking a claim worth Rs. 2.8 million merely to save Rs. 250 in court fees.\nThe Court also questioned why no action was taken against the responsible person(s) for the delay.\nAs the condonation application was dismissed, the main petition for leave to appeal was also dismissed.\nA copy of the order was directed to be sent to the Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue.\nCitations:\nGeneral legal principle: Delay in filing appeal must be justified with valid reasons; mere internal administrative lapses are not sufficient grounds.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4145 of 2022. Date of Hearing & Order: 06.02.2023\n(Against the judgment dated 06.09.2022 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Customs Reference No. 21-P/2022)", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Mr. Yousaf Ali, ASC\nFor the Respondents: N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Collector of Customs, MCC (E&C) Customs House, Peshawar and another. ... Petitioners\nVs\nZain ul Abidin and others. ... Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25992", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 809 = 2025 SLD 809", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDY3o", - "Key Words:": "Super Tax under Section 4C – Jurisdiction and Applicability on Final Tax Regime (FTR) Income\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer filed an appeal against an order dated 28.02.2024 passed under Section 4C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by the ADCIR, MTO, Karachi for Tax Year 2023. The taxpayer challenged the order on multiple grounds, notably:\nThe officer lacked jurisdiction under Section 4C, which empowers only the Commissioner to pass such orders.\nThe income subjected to super tax included classes of income falling under the Final Tax Regime (FTR), and exempt capital gains, which are not subject to super tax.\nThe imputed income included by the department inflated the taxpayer’s total income beyond the Rs. 150 million threshold necessary to trigger Section 4C.\nThe order was arbitrary, non-speaking, and in violation of due process.\nThe taxpayer had declared income from property, business, profit on debt, and exempt capital gains totaling Rs. 538.79 million.\nThe taxpayer relied on the following key judgments:\nThese judgments held that:\nSection 4C does not apply to income under the FTR.\nImputed income should not be added when determining the Rs. 150 million threshold.\n4C is to be “read down” to exclude final-tax and exempt incomes.\nHeld:\nThe tribunal held that the ADCIR had no jurisdiction to pass the order under Section 4C, which is vested solely in the Commissioner.\nThe tribunal affirmed that 4C does not apply to income under FTR and excluded capital gains.\nIt held that imputable income should not be included when calculating the threshold under Section 4C.\nThe impugned order was thus found to be without legal authority, improperly computed, and not sustainable.\nConsequently, the appeal was allowed and the order annulled.\nCitations:\nFauji Fertilizer Company v. Federation of Pakistan, (2023) 128 Tax 141 (H.C. Isl.)\nWP No. 4044/2023, Islamabad High Court\n1984 SCMR 1014 (re: requirement for speaking orders)\nFauji Fertilizer Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan – [(2023) 128 Tax 141 (H.C. Isl.)]", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C,4C(4),114(1)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A,18,23,24General Clauses Act, 1897=24-A", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2590/KB/2024 (Tax Year-2023). Date of hearing: 17.04.2025. Date of order: 08.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER AND DR. HUMA SODHER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Taimoor Ahmed, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Zulifqar Ali, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. MUHAMMAD BOSTAN, KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE ASSISTANT/DEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-IV, MTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25993", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 810 = 2025 SLD 810", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDY3k", - "Key Words:": "Supersession of Civil Servant for Promotion on Basis of Intelligence Reports\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a BS-20 officer of the Information Group, was considered for promotion to BS-21 by the Central Selection Board (CSB) in its meeting on 01.08.2023. Despite an exceptional service record—13 ‘Outstanding’ and 22 ‘Very Good’ PERs—he was superseded and placed in Category ‘C’. The CSB, relying on reports from intelligence agencies (ISI and IB), concluded he had questionable integrity, assigning him 10 marks in the subjective portion of the evaluation—well below the required 75 aggregate for promotion under the Civil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules, 2019 (CSPR).\nThe intelligence reports were introduced for the first time during the CSB meeting and had not been shared previously with the recommending department or the petitioner. The petitioner challenged this on two key grounds:\nViolation of Article 10-A of the Constitution (due process), as he was denied the opportunity to rebut the intelligence reports.\nMisapplication of the CSPR Rules, particularly Schedule IV, which permits deduction of only 3 out of 30 discretionary marks for integrity concerns, not the 20 deducted.\nThe respondents contended that the reports were admissible under the 2022 amendments to the CSPR, specifically Rule 2(p) and Rule 4(5), which allowed “special vetting agencies” (SVAs) to provide intelligence reports to the CSB.\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court held the petition maintainable and allowed it on merits, finding gross violations of the petitioner’s fundamental rights and the CSPR framework. The Court observed:\nMaintainability: Reiterated that promotion is not part of the terms and conditions of service, thus Article 212 and the Federal Services Tribunal Act, 1973, do not bar constitutional jurisdiction (relying on Orya Maqbool Jan v. Federation, Aftab Ahmed Maneka, and I.A. Sherwani cases).\nViolation of Due Process: The reliance on secret intelligence reports introduced for the first time in the CSB meeting, without the petitioner being confronted, was a flagrant breach of Article 10A. Intelligence reports were vague, uncorroborated, and failed the standard of “tangible material” required for adverse findings (Muhammad Zafeer Abbasi and Govt. of Punjab v. Abdul Matloob Khan).\nRules Violated: The 2022 amendments (Rules 2(p) and 4(5)) were found to lack procedural safeguards, failing to specify the evidentiary value, due process, or thresholds for adverse findings.\nImproper Use of Discretionary Marks: Deducting 20 out of 30 discretionary marks under the guise of compromised integrity was held to be contrary to Schedule IV, which allows only 3 marks to be deducted for such reasons.\nMala fide Process: The Court condemned the procedural impropriety, noting that the service record of the petitioner was overridden by an “unsuitable” remark from anonymous reports, contradicting the Secretary Information Division’s earlier strong recommendation.\nConstitutional Violation: Allowing unverifiable intelligence reports to dictate promotion decisions effectively weaponizes agencies to control civil servants, undermining merit, fairness, and good governance, and creates a chilling effect on bureaucratic independence.\nCitations:\nOrya Maqbool Jan v. Federation of Pakistan, 2014 SCMR 817\nSecretary Establishment Division v. Aftab Ahmed Maneka, 2015 SCMR 1006\nI.A. Sherwani v. Govt. of Pakistan, 1991 SCMR 1041\nMuhammad Zafeer Abbasi v. Federation, 2003 PLC (CS) 503\nGovt. of Punjab v. Abdul Matloob Khan, 1990 SCMR 1431\nTariq Aziz-ud-Din case, 2010 SCMR 1301\nCivil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules, 2019, esp. Schedule IV and Rules 2(p), 4(5), and 18(3)(d)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A,212", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 941 of 2024. Date of hearing: 09.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s Mahmood A. Sheikh and Yasir Ahmed Rathore, Advocates\nRespondents by: Barrister Munawar Iqbal Duggal, Additional- Attorney General along with Mr. Yasir Arfat Abbasi, Assistant-Attorney General Manzoor Ali Sheikh-Additional Secretary, Sajid Mehmood-Joint Secretary (CP-II), Establishment Division. Asim- Joint Secretary (Lit), Aminullah Tareen- Deputy Secretary (CP), Jameel Sheikh, Deputy Secretary (Litigation), Abid Mehmood Ch., Section Officer (Legal), Waqas Harral, SO(Litigation) and Muhammad Sultan, Section Officer (CP), Dr. Sohail Aftab Director (Legal) Assisted by: Ms. Sakina Bangash, Law Clerk", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD TAHIR HASSAN \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25994", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 811 = 2025 SLD 811", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTc", - "Key Words:": "Custody of Minor – Effect of Mother’s Second Marriage\nDetails:\nThe petition was filed to challenge the judgment dated 07.08.2024 passed in Guardian and Ward Appeal No. 24/2024, which upheld the Family Court’s decision granting permanent custody of a three-year-old minor girl to the father (Respondent No.1). The mother (Petitioner) had contracted a second marriage during the pendency of the custody application, and it was argued that her remarriage, especially to a person within the prohibited degree of the child, disentitled her from custody. The Family Court and Appellate Court concurred in granting custody to the father based on this ground.\nThe Petitioner contended that her second marriage alone should not disentitle her from retaining custody, especially since the minor is a female child of tender age and there are no female members in the Respondent’s household. She further argued that Respondent No.1 failed to provide maintenance and that the custody application was filed mala fide.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that the second marriage of the mother does not automatically disqualify her from retaining custody. The decisive factor in such cases is the welfare of the minor, not rigid application of personal laws or presumptions arising from remarriage. Relying on a consistent line of authority from the Supreme Court, it was reiterated that the best interest of the child is paramount and must be considered holistically, including emotional, physical, and psychological well-being.\nThe Court found that:\nThe minor was well-settled with the mother.\nThe second marriage was not shown to be detrimental to the child’s welfare.\nThe father had failed to provide financial support despite court orders.\nThe judgment criticized the frequent misuse of the “disentitlement” argument based on remarriage, noting it often stems from misogynistic and vindictive motives.\nAccordingly, the petition was allowed, and both impugned orders were set aside, allowing the mother to retain custody of the minor.\nCitations:\nMuhammad Siddique v. Lahore High Court, PLD 2003 SC 887\nMst. Safia Bibi v. ADJ & others, 2022 CLC 262 [Lahore]\nAfshan Maureen v. Nadeem Abbas Shah, 1997 MLD 197 [Lahore]\nAyesha Altaf v. Fahad Ali, 2019 CLC Note 66 [Lahore]\nAsjad Ullah v. Mst. Asia Bano, Civil Petition No. 3920 of 2024\nMehmood Akhtar v. DJ Attock, 2004 SCMR 1839\nShaista Habib v. Muhammad Arif Habib, PLD 2024 SC 629\nRaja Muhammad Owais v. Mst. Nazia Jabeen, 2022 SCMR 2123\nMalik Mahmood Ahmad Khan v. Malik Moazam Mahmood, PLD 2025 SC 247\nUNCRC (ratified by Pakistan, 1990; reservation withdrawn, 1997)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Guardians and Wards Act, 1890=17,25", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. S-1168 of 2024. Dates of hearing: 18.03.2025 and 08.04.2025. Date of announcement: 16.05.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JAFFER RAZA", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Rashid Rizvi, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nMr. Ahmed Dawood, Advocate for the Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. WAJIHA FATIMA & ANOTHER ………………. PETITIONERS.\nVS\nSYED BADAR ABBAS JAFRI & OTHERS ……………… RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25995", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 812 = 2025 SLD 812", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTY", - "Key Words:": "Disallowance of Input Tax — Blacklisted Supplier — Penalties and Default Surcharge\nDetails:\nThe Appellant, M/s. Power Cement Limited, challenged Order-in-Original No. 10/197 dated 29.04.2024 passed by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR), Large Taxpayer Office, Karachi under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The dispute arose over disallowance of input tax amounting to Rs.14,686,443 related to purchases from M/s. Al-Junaid Impex, a supplier who was later blacklisted. The department also imposed penalties under Sections 33(5) and 33(11)(c) and levied default surcharge under Section 34. The DCIR alleged that the invoices were fake and used to illegitimately claim input tax.\nThe Appellant argued that:\nThe supplier was active and validly registered at the time of transactions.\nPayments were made via proper banking channels in compliance with Section 73.\nThe input tax claims were supported with valid documentation, including invoices, delivery records, and tax withholding under Section 153(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nSubsequent blacklisting of the supplier does not disentitle the Appellant from claiming input tax, citing judgments including 2019 PTD 56, CP No. D-2273 of 2011 (Sindh High Court), and 2023 SCMR 1797.\nThe department failed to prove any malafide intent or tax fraud on part of the Appellant, and no evidence was presented that tax was not deposited.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Tribunal found that:\nThe supplier was operative and not blacklisted at the time of transaction.\nPayments were made through banking channels and sales tax invoices were valid.\nThe department failed to establish that any tax fraud occurred or that the Appellant knowingly claimed inadmissible input tax.\nAs per settled law, subsequent blacklisting of a supplier does not affect the buyers right to input tax if due diligence was exercised.\nNo evidence was brought by the department to rebut the documentation submitted by the Appellant or to prove that the supplier did not have the goods or failed to deposit sales tax.\nAccordingly, the appeal was allowed, and:\nSales tax demand of Rs. 14,686,443/- was deleted\nPenalties under Sections 33(5) & 33(11)(c) were annulled\nDefault surcharge under Section 34 was vacated\nAll consequential proceedings were set aside\nCitations:\n2019 PTD 56 — K.B Enterprises v. CIR (Appeals), RTO Faisalabad\nCP No. D-2273 of 2011 — Sindh High Court\n2023 SCMR 1797 — Supreme Court of Pakistan\n2024 PTCL 44 — CIR v. Gadoon Textile Mills, Swabi", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7,7(2),9,33(5),33(11)(c),34,73Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(1)(b)", - "Case #": "STA No. 633/KB/2024 (Tax Year 2023). Date of hearing: 25.02.2025. Date of order: 05.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syeda Ayesha Mehmood & Mr. Mubashir Abid, Advocates.\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Masood Ahmed Gorsi, DR & Mr. Javed Nawab, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. POWER CEMENT LTD., KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nDCIR, ZONE-V, LTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25996", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 813 = 2025 SLD 813", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTU", - "Key Words:": "Execution of Decree — Right to Possession by Auction Purchaser under FIO, 2001\nDetails:\nRespondent No. 1 (a financial institution) filed a suit before the Banking Court, Karachi, against Respondents No. 2 to 4 for recovery of Rs. 36,519,151.06. The suit was decreed on 22.12.2009, followed by a decree on 10.02.2010. In execution, mortgaged property (Plot No. DP-6A, Sector 12-D, North Karachi Industrial Area) was auctioned and purchased by the appellant. However, the appellant was not handed possession. Later, the judgment-debtors (Respondents No. 2 to 4) filed an application under Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO), claiming they were not served notice; the Banking Court allowed the application, setting aside the decree. The appellant’s application under Sections 19(5) and 15(6) of FIO 2001 for possession was dismissed because the earlier decree had been set aside. The appellant challenged this dismissal.\nMeanwhile, a third party, Muhammad Faisal Khursheed, filed an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to be impleaded, claiming possession of the property through a sale agreement and had also filed a suit for specific performance.\nDuring the appellate proceedings, it was revealed that the bank had again obtained a second decree in its favour after the earlier one was set aside. However, the appellant had not filed a fresh application for possession in light of the new decree. The bank maintained that the auction-sale remained intact as it was not invalidated when the first decree was set aside.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that the Banking Court was correct in dismissing the initial application since no decree was in field at that time. However, due to subsequent developments (i.e., a second decree in favour of the bank and the appellant’s existing sale transaction), the matter should be reconsidered. The appellant was permitted to file or pursue the application under Sections 19(5) and 15(6) of FIO 2001 afresh. The Banking Court is directed to rehear and decide the application in view of the second decree, and also consider the intervener’s claim, if raised, within two months.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=12,15(6),19(5)", - "Case #": "First Appeal No. 64 of 2018. Date of order: 16.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Rehman Aziz Malik, advocate for Appellant.\nMr. Ali. T. Ibrahim, advocate for respondent No.1.\nMr. Muniruddin, advocate for respondents No. 2 to 4.\nRaj Ali Wahid, advocate holding brief for\nMr. M.G. Rehman Korai, advocate for applicant/intervener.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD YOUNUS KHAMISANI \nVS\nM/S. SUMMIT BANK LTD. & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25997", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 814 = 2025 SLD 814", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Sanction of Scheme of Amalgamation under Companies Act, 2017\nDetails:\nThe Petitioners, U & I Garments (Pvt.) Ltd. and Junaid Jamshed (Pvt.) Ltd. (JJPL), are private limited companies engaged in manufacturing and sale of ready-made garments. They filed a joint petition before the Company Bench of the High Court seeking sanction of a Scheme of Amalgamation under Section 282 read with Sections 279–281 of the Companies Act, 2017. The Scheme dated 20.11.2024 proposed the merger of JJPL into U & I, with the following key terms:\nTransfer of entire undertaking, assets, liabilities, and rights of JJPL to U & I.\nIncrease in U & Is authorized capital to Rs. 6.5 billion (65 million shares of Rs. 100 each).\nIssuance of 25,073,545 shares of U & I to shareholders of JJPL at a swap ratio of approx. 1.38:1.\nDissolution of JJPL without winding-up.\nPursuant to court order dated 29.11.2024, separate meetings of shareholders and secured creditors were held. The reports by the Chairmen of the meetings under Rule 57 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997 confirmed unanimous approval by shareholders and secured creditors. The Competition Commission of Pakistan had granted pre-merger clearance under the Competition Act, 2010.\nThe Court reviewed the Scheme and found:\nCompliance with procedural and statutory requirements, including approval by more than ¾ majority under Section 279(2).\nNo objections from the SECP.\nNo pending investigations under Sections 256–258 of the Act.\nIncrease in share capital through the Scheme was permissible without separate resolution, in light of prior precedents (e.g., Omer Iqbal Solvent, Kings Food).\nThe Scheme was commercially justified and based on reasonable business objectives like increasing operational capacity, rationalizing tax reporting, and reducing costs. The Court noted that once the Scheme is approved by the required majority and is prima facie fair and reasonable, the Court does not act as an appellate forum on commercial merits.\nHeld:\nThe High Court sanctioned the Scheme of Amalgamation without modification. Key directions included:\nTransfer of all assets, liabilities, and proceedings of JJPL to U & I under Section 282(3).\nIssuance of shares to JJPL shareholders and cancellation of JJPL shares.\nAutomatic increase in authorized capital of U & I and amendment of its constitutional documents.\nJJPL to be dissolved upon delivery of certified order to Registrar, who shall consolidate the corporate records.\nCitations:\nJoint Registrar SECP v. Omer Iqbal Solvent (Pvt.) Ltd., 2016 CLD 902\nKings Food (Pvt.) Ltd. & Hilal Confectionary (Pvt.) Ltd., 2014 CLD 961\nParamount Spinning Mills, 2020 CLD 1443\nIGI Insurance Ltd., 2018 CLD 572\nGadoon Textile Mills Ltd., 2015 CLD 2010", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=256,257,258,279,280,281,282,282(1),282(2),282(3)Companies (Court) Rules, 1997=19,57,97Competition Act, 2010=11", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 33 of 2024. Date of hearing & order: 13-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners: U&I Garments (Pvt.) Ltd. and Junaid Jamshed (Pvt.) Ltd., through Mr. Mikael Azmat Rahim Advocate.\nOn Court notice: Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan through Syed Ebad-ur- Rehman, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "In the matter of the Companies Act, 2017 \nAnd \nof (a) U&I Garments (Pvt.) Ltd. \n(b) Junaid Jamshed (Pvt.) Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "25998", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 815 = 2025 SLD 815", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWS8", - "Key Words:": "Post-Arrest Bail in Smuggling Offence under the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe Applicant, Zia-ud-din, sought post-arrest bail after being denied the same by the Special Judge (Customs, Taxation & Anti-Smuggling-I), Karachi on 25.03.2025. He was arrested on 04.03.2025 by the Anti-Smuggling Unit-II, Larkana, at Kashmore Toll Plaza while driving a van (BMB-100) allegedly carrying smuggled goods. Three other drivers escaped. The seized items included:\n50 cartons of foreign-brand cigarettes (Rs. 5,000,000/-)\n18 bags of foreign-origin betel nuts (Rs. 315,000/-)\n25 bags of Monosodium Glutamate (Ajinomoto, marked Made in China ) (Rs. 625,000/-)\nThe Applicant was charged under section 2(s) read with section 156(1), clause 89(i) of the Customs Act, 1969.\nKey legal and factual points considered:\nBetel nuts: No specific country of origin mentioned in the FIR, and no packaging details indicating foreign origin. Betel nuts are not banned under the Import Policy Order and may have been lawfully imported or bought from the local market. Supported by Sikandar A. Karim v. The State (1995 SCMR 387).\nMonosodium Glutamate (MSG): While banned under Appendix-A of the Import Policy Order, it has not been notified as a “smuggled good” under SRO 566(I)/2005 issued under section 2(s), hence may not qualify as “smuggled goods.” Cited cases:\nShabbir Ahmed Shah v. Pakistan, 1980 PCrLJ 349\nHiam Tabbara v. DG, Pakistan Coast Guards, PLD 1980 Karachi 44\nCigarettes: Were packed in cartons but not labeled externally. The Applicant’s plea—that he was merely a hired driver with no knowledge of the contents—could not be ruled out at this preliminary stage.\nOffence and Sentencing: The offence under clause 89(i) of section 156(1) of the Customs Act carries a maximum sentence of 6 years, therefore does not fall under the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C.\nHeld:\nPost-arrest bail was granted to Zia-ud-din subject to furnishing a solvent surety of Rs. 300,000 and a P.R. bond in like amount. The Court emphasized that its findings were tentative and would not prejudice the trial.\nCitations:\nSikandar A. Karim v. The State, 1995 SCMR 387\nShabbir Ahmed Shah v. Pakistan, 1980 PCrLJ 349\nHiam Tabbara v. DG, Pakistan Coast Guards, PLD 1980 Karachi 44", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),156(1)(89),156(1)(89)(i)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497", - "Case #": "Special Criminal Bail Application No. 92 of 2025. Date of hearing & order: 15-05-2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant: Zia-ud-din son of Alla-ud-din through Mr. Muhammad Jawad Mustafa, Advocate.\nRespondent: The State, through Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Arain, Advocate.\nMr. Muhammad Khalid Javed Raan, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZIA-UD-DIN \nVS\nTHE STATE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "25999", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 816 = 2025 SLD 816 = 2025 PTD 1465", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWSs", - "Key Words:": "Common Judgment disposing of W.P. No. 415-P/2020, 443-P/2020, 457-P/2020, 5627-P/2020 and connected matters challenging amendment in Section 65B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 via Finance Act, 2019.\nCourt’s Holding:\nThe amendment in Section 65B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2019, which:\nReduced tax credit from 10% to 5% for Tax Year 2019, and\nAdvanced the sunset clause from 30th June 2021 to 30th June 2019,\nis held to be prospective in nature and does not apply retrospectively to investments or transactions made prior to 1st July 2018.\nKey Legal Points & Findings:\nVested Rights Upheld:\nCompanies that invested in plant and machinery and completed purchase formalities (e.g., contracts, LCs) prior to 30th June 2018 have acquired vested rights under unamended Section 65B. Their tax credit of 10% cannot be curtailed retroactively.\nProspective Application of Amendment:\nThe Court held that the amended Section 65B applies only from 1st July 2018 onward, in line with the settled rule of statutory interpretation (per Maxwell, Gustavson Drilling, Al-Samrez, Mollasis Trading, Zila Council Jhelum, and others). There was no express or implied retrospective intent in the Finance Act, 2019.\nDifferentiated Relief Allowed:\nPetitioners who completed investment and installation before 30th June 2018 are entitled to 10% tax credit and carry-forward benefit under original Section 65B.\nPetitioners who purchased machinery and established LCs before 30th June 2018, but installed the same by 30th June 2021, are also entitled to 10% tax credit under original Section 65B.\nFor investments made on or after 1st July 2018, the amended law applies, limiting credit to 5% and requiring installation by 30th June 2019.\nLegislative Competence Not in Dispute:\nThe Court reaffirmed that only Parliament can legislate tax matters, and judicial review is limited to testing for lack of competence or constitutional violations, which was not found in this case.\nNo Retrospective Invalidation of Transactions:\nThe concept of past and closed transactions was applied, confirming that completed investments made under the old law cannot be invalidated by subsequent amendment unless clear legislative intent to do so exists—which it did not.\nFinal Order:\n“The Impugned Legislation does not require any interference being passed by a competent legislature having prospective effect, except that:\n(i) Companies who invested and installed machinery by 30th June 2018 are entitled to 10% credit and carry-forward;\n(ii) Companies who purchased machinery and executed binding contracts (e.g., LCs) before 30th June 2018, and installed by 30th June 2021, are also entitled to 10% tax credit under the old regime.”\nRelied Cases:\nSapphire Textile Mills Ltd v. Federation (CPD 8233/2019; 2023)\nMolasis Trading & Export (Pvt) Ltd (1993 SCMR 1905)\nGulshan Spinning Mills Ltd (2005 PTD 259)\nAl-Samrez Enterprises (1986 SCMR 1917)\nZila Council Jhelum v. Pakistan Tobacco (PLD 2016 SC 398)\nPLD 1997 SC 582 (Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd)\nNabi Ahmed v. Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1969 SC 189)\nQaisar Abbas (2021 SCMR)\nGustavson Drilling Ltd (SCC Canada)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=65B, 65B(1),65B(4),65E(7)Customs Act, 1969=19,31A", - "Case #": "W.P No. 6127-P/2019, W.P. No. 415-P/2020, W.P No. 443-P/2020, W.P No. 457-P/2020, W.P No. 5627-P/2020. Date of Hearing & Order: 07-09-2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SYED ARSHAD ALL JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner (s): M/s Salman Akram Raja & Qazi Ghulam Dastagir, Advocates.\nFor the Respondent (s): M/s Sanaullah DAG, Rehmanullah & Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocates, along with Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue.", - "Petitioner Name:": "W.P No. 6127-P/2019\nM/s Gadoon Textile Mills and 02 others vs. Federation of Pakistan and 02 others.\nW.P. No. 415-P/2020\nLucky Cement Limited and another vs Federation of Pakistan and 02 others.\nW.P No. 443-P/2020\nCherat Cement Company Limited and another vs. Federation of Pakistan and 02 others.\nW.P No. 457-P/2020\nCherat Packaging Limited and another vs. Federation of Pakistan and 02 others.\nW.P No. 5627-P/2020\nM/s Gadoon Textile Mills Ltd vs. Federation of Pakistan and 02 others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26000", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 817 = 2025 SLD 817", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTk", - "Key Words:": "Whether Pakistan Services Ltd (PSL) qualifies as a “Trans-Provincial Establishment” under Section 2(xxxii) of IRA 2012?\nWhether the Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU) had lawful jurisdiction to register Industry-Wise Trade Unions ?\nWhether the impugned referendum proceedings for determining Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) were legally sustainable?\nFindings of the Court:\n1. PSL is a Trans-Provincial Establishment:\nPSL owns and operates PC Hotels in multiple provinces.\nIts head office is in Islamabad (ICT).\nIt meets the definition of both establishment and industry as per Sections 2(x), 2(xvii), and 2(xxxii) of IRA 2012.\nEarlier admissions by PSL’s counsel in various forums confirmed its trans-provincial nature (Ref: 2006 PLC 288, statements on record).\nConclusion: PSL is trans-provincial, hence within the jurisdiction of the NIRC under the 2012 Act.\n2. RTU Had No Jurisdiction to Register Industry-Wise Trade Unions:\nChevron Case (W.P. No. 2188/2017) conclusively held that:\nOnly the NIRC (Commission) under Section 54(b) can register Industry-Wise Trade Unions.\nRTU’s jurisdiction is confined to ordinary trade unions under Section 11.\nHowever, since registrations of Labour Union and Staff Union occurred prior to the Chevron ruling, they are deemed valid as past and closed transactions.\nConclusion: Though the RTU lacked statutory authority, pre-Chevron registrations cannot be invalidated retrospectively. The law laid down in Chevron operates prospectively only (Ref: PLD 1987 SC 145, PLD 2000 SC 869, 2001 SCMR 1161).\n3. Referendum Proceedings and CBA Determination:\nThe referral of referendum to the Authorized Officer under Section 19 was held valid.\nStaff Union’s plea under Section 62 (determination of CBUs) did not legally preclude referendum under Section 19.\nThe process was initiated as far back as 2017 and had been delayed unnecessarily.\nConduct of secret ballot by the Authorized Officer was lawful and well within statutory timelines and procedures.\nConclusion: The referendum proceedings were legal and the Authorized Officer acted within his statutory mandate. Petitioners’ objections are unsubstantiated.\nScope of Judicial Review:\nThe Court reaffirmed the limited scope of writ of certiorari under Article 199(1)(a)(ii).\nSupervisory, not appellate, jurisdiction applies.\nNo jurisdictional error, procedural impropriety, or perversity found in orders of the Commission.\nConcurrent findings of the NIRC and RTU upheld.\nKey Cases Cited:\nPLD 2018 SC 28, 2020 SCMR 260, 2019 SCMR 919, 2009 SCMR 210, Essa Cement 1998 SCMR 1964, Chevron Case IHC (2020)\nFinal Order / Outcome:\nWrit Petitions No. 535 & 536 of 2022 (by PSL) dismissed.\nWrit Petitions No. 1853 & 1892 of 2022 (by Staff Union) also dismissed.\nPetitioners failed to establish any jurisdictional defect or illegality in the impugned orders.\nCosts to be borne by each party.\nKey Doctrines Applied:\nDoctrine of Prospective Overruling (Chevron not retrospective)\nPast and Closed Transactions\nCertiorari limited to jurisdictional error or error of law\nEstoppel by Conduct (PSLs own admissions about PC Hotels’ ownership)\nPresumption of Correctness in Judicial Records (SCMR 1611, 964, 60)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 535 of 2022. Date of Hearing: 10.08.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Syed Naeem Bukhari and Mr. Muhammad Imad Khan, Advocates for the petitioners in W.P. Nos. 535 of 2022 and 536 of 2022 as well as for respondent No.5 in W.Ps. Nos. 1892 of 2022 and 1853 of 2022.\nRespondents by: Hafiz Arfat Ahmed Ch., Ms. Kashifa Niaz Awan, Mr. Tariq Zaman Ch., Advocates for respondent No.3 in W.P. No.535 of 2022 as well as for respondent No.4 in W.P. No.536 of 2022.\nMr. Abdul Hafeez Amjad, Advocate for the petitioners in W.Ps Nos. 1892 of 2022 and 1853 of 2022 as well as for respondents No.4 in W.P. No.535 of 2022 as well as for respondent No.5 in W.P. No.536 of 2022.\nMr. Nasir Aman Sandhu, representative for the petitioners in W.Ps. No. 1853 of 2022 and 1892 of 2022.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN SERVICES LIMITED\nVS\nFULL BENCH, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION AND 03 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26001", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 818 = 2025 SLD 818 = 2025 PLC 93", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWTg", - "Key Words:": "Maintainability of Constitutional Petitions for Regularization of Contractual Employees in Absence of Statutory Right\nDetails:\nA large group of petitioners (3,359 in number) who had rendered services to Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGCL) on a contractual or contingent basis, often through third-party contractors, approached the High Court seeking regularization of their services. Their claims followed a remand order by the Supreme Court, which allowed the High Court to examine individual entitlements if merited.\nThe High Court (per Full Bench: Agha Faisal, Yousaf Ali Sayeed, and Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry, JJ.) reiterated that:\nThe petitioners had earlier been non-suited by the High Court due to lack of maintainability.\nUpon remand, the High Court declined to assess individual entitlements, finding that such assessment was not appropriate under constitutional jurisdiction.\nNo statutory provision or policy existed requiring the respondent company to regularize the petitioners.\nFurther, the High Court held:\nThe mere fact that the petitioners had served for a long duration under contractual terms, either directly or indirectly, did not confer a vested right of regularization.\nIn the absence of a legal or statutory mandate, such claims were not enforceable through constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution.\nHeld:\nThe constitutional petitions were dismissed. The High Court concluded that:\nNo enforceable legal or fundamental right existed to support the petitions.\nRegularization was not part of the petitioners terms of employment, nor did any law or policy confer a right to be regularized.\nThe jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked to create rights or alter contractual terms.\nPetitioners may pursue appropriate remedies before competent forums, as the High Court could not individually appraise entitlement in its constitutional jurisdiction.\nCase Law Relied:\nSalahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills, PLD 1975 SC 244\nHadayat Ullah v. Federation of Pakistan, 2022 SCMR 1691\nWorkers Welfare Board v. Raheel Ali Gohar, 2020 SCMR 2068\nSSGC v. Zeeshan Usmani, 2021 SCMR 609\nKhushal Khan Khattak University v. Jabran Ali Khan, 2021 SCMR 977\nVice-Chancellor Bacha Khan University v. Tanveer Ahmed, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 85\nPir Imran Sajid v. MD Telephone Industries of Pakistan, 2015 SCMR 1257\nPTCL v. Masood Ahmed Bhatti, 2016 SCMR 1362\nFauji Fertilizer Co. v. NIRC, 2013 SCMR 1253\nKhwaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2014 SC 206\nIkram Bari v. National Bank of Pakistan, 2005 SCMR 100", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=9,25,189,199,199(5)", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-875 of 2020 (and other connected petitions) decided on 22nd April, 2024. (And connected matters, particularized in the Schedule1 hereto.). Dates of hearing: 15th May, 11th, 18th September, 2023 and 12th and 19th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YOUSUF ALI SAYEED, ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY AND AGHA FAISAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Naeem Iqbal, Mohamed Vawda, Hamza Hidayatullah, Muhammad Nasir, Talha Abbasi, M.B. Khatyan, Imran Taj, Syed Shoa-un-Nabi, Saqib, Khan Zai, Khurram Memon, Ameer Ali, Saqib Soomro, Muhammad Khan Lakho, Ghulam Shabir Shar, Muhammad Asif Arain, Atia Kausar, Ravi Pinjani, Vera Awais, Chaudhry Muhammad Ashraf Khan, Uzma, Khadim Hussain, Syed Hussain Haider, Inayat Ali Mirza, Imtiaz Ali Mirza and Ghulamullah for Petitioners.\nIjaz Ahmed Zahid, Ghazi Khan Khalil, Qazi Umair Ali, Aleena Ahmed, Ameer Nausherwan Adil, Zeeshan Ahmed, Abdul Hakeem Junejo, Abdul Razzaque, Hayat Muhammad Junejo, Kumail Abbas, Muhammad Inzimam Sharif, Faisal Mahmood Ghani, Nida Faisal Ghani, Asim Iqbal, Farmanullah, Mukesh Kumar G. Karara, Nabi Bux Leghari, Sajid Ali, Kashif Hanif, Waqar Ahmed Zahid and Hashmatullah, Advocates; Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi (Assistant Attorney General), Amaar Saleem Butt (Manager Legal SSGC), Raja Love Kush (Deputy Manager Legal), Syed Asad Abbas Naqvi (Deputy Chief Manager Legal), and Asma Zehra (Deputy Manager, Legal, SSGC) for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ARIF AND 196 OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH FEDERAL SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL RESOURCES, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26002", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 819 = 2025 SLD 819", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWXo", - "Key Words:": "Alleged involvement in paper transactions and issuance/usage of fake or flying invoices linked to another blacklisted manufacturer, M/s Soni Impex.\nSuspicion of fraudulent input tax adjustments resulting in loss to the national exchequer.\nNo direct evidence that appellant itself committed tax fraud or issued fake invoices.\nAppellant’s Defense:\nFully compliant with import procedures; no detention or objection at customs.\nAll goods sold to active buyers after manufacturing.\nPaid substantial sales tax on manufactured goods.\nProduced import documents, payment receipts, client details, and other evidence at appeal stage.\nAllegation of mismatch in PCT headings due to transformation of raw materials in manufacturing, not fraud.\nBlacklisting order is vague, non-speaking, and does not specify evidential basis as required under law.\nViolates constitutional guarantees (Articles 4, 10-A, 18 & 25).\nNo prior audit objections or show cause notices issued before blacklisting.\nDepartment’s action is arbitrary, discriminatory, and malafide.\nAllegations based on assumptions without proper investigation.\nDepartment’s Case:\nAppellant linked to M/s Soni Impex involved in fake input tax adjustment fraud.\nSuspension and blacklisting triggered due to this alleged connivance.\nNo response or documentary evidence submitted by appellant during show cause notice stage.\nFindings and Reasoning of the Tribunal:\nLack of Direct Evidence:\nNo concrete, direct, or admissible evidence showing appellant was involved in tax fraud.\nAllegations are based on presumptions and association with another blacklisted entity.\nNo proof of mens rea (guilty knowledge) or actus reus (criminal act) by appellant.\nLegal Precedents:\nReliance on Total Parco Pakistan Ltd (PTCL 2021 CL 576): Section 8(1)(ca) cannot be invoked in isolation; must be read with Section 8A which requires proof of “knowledge and reasonable grounds” to suspect non-payment of tax by supplier.\nBurden of proof lies on the department to establish appellants knowledge and involvement.\nNo reverse onus or presumption of guilt on appellant.\nCiting Al-Abid Silk Mills (2023 PTD 1492): Department failed to conduct proper audit/inquiry before issuing show cause notice and blacklisting.\nCiting Gadoon Textile Mills (2024 PTCL 44 SC): Buyers cannot be held liable without official notice or evidence of suppliers tax default.\nProcedural Impropriety:\nNo pre-suspension notice served.\nBlacklisting was imposed without prior audit or inquiry to establish wrongdoing.\nBlacklisting is a severe sanction and must be based on solid evidence, not presumptions.\nDepartment acted prematurely, putting the cart before the horse by blacklisting before investigating appellant’s transactions.\nBlacklisting should be a last resort, not routine or on vague grounds.\nSubstantive Evidence Presented by Appellant:\nDocumentary proof of actual business activities, payments, manufacturing facility.\nRegistered manufacturing entity verified by FBR.\nNo prior adverse findings against appellant.\nDecision:\nThe blacklisting order dated 27.11.2020 is annulled for being unsustainable in law.\nActive status of appellant’s registration restored retrospectively from the date of suspension/blacklisting.\nAppeal allowed based on failure of department to prove tax fraud, lack of due process, and violation of natural justice.\nNo direct evidence to substantiate the serious charge of tax fraud or issuance of fake invoices by the appellant.\nDepartment must follow due procedure including audit and inquiry before resorting to suspension/blacklisting.\nLegal and Practical Takeaways:\nBlacklisting of registration under Sales Tax Act requires:\nStrong, direct evidence of tax fraud or issuance of fake invoices.\nCompliance with principles of natural justice (notice, opportunity of hearing).\nProper investigation and audit before ultimate penalty.\nMere association with a blacklisted party or presumptions is insufficient.\nBuyer of goods is not automatically liable for supplier’s tax default without knowledge or reasonable suspicion.\nAdministrative authorities must exercise discretion fairly, reasonably, and based on material evidence.\nJudicial scrutiny will protect taxpayers against arbitrary and non-speaking orders.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.114/KB/2021 (Tax Period 2019). Date of Hearing: 25.03.2025. Date of Order: 21.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Umer Farooq, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Mushtaq Ali Wagon, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Elysium Corporation, Karachi......Appellant\nVs\nThe Commissioner-IR, Zone-III, RTO-II, Karachi ......Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26003", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 820 = 2025 SLD 820", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDWXk", - "Key Words:": "Dismissal of Application to Set Aside Debarring Order for Non-Filing of Written Statement\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a bank, filed a High Court Appeal against an order dated 29.10.2015, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed its application under Rule 159 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules (Original Side). The application sought to set aside an earlier order dated 31.05.2011, which had debarred the appellant from filing a written statement in a civil suit (No.1397/2010) filed by the respondent for declaration, injunction, and damages. Despite repeated extensions, the appellant failed to file the written statement. A belated application, supported only by the affidavit of the court clerk (and not the parties themselves), was filed nearly two years later with no valid explanation for the delay.\nThe learned Single Judge refused to entertain the application, noting the lack of sufficient cause, violation of Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, and the failure to observe the direction of a Division Bench for expeditious disposal of the suit. It was further held that valuable rights had accrued in favour of the respondent due to the appellants inaction.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the order of the learned Single Judge. It held that:\nThe application under Rule 159 was filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay of two years.\nThe supporting affidavit from a court clerk held no evidentiary value.\nThe appellant was actively participating in related proceedings and should have been aware of its obligations.\nInaction amounted to negligence, and courts favour the vigilant, not the indolent.\nValuable rights had accrued to the respondent, and no illegality or jurisdictional error was shown in the impugned order.\nCitations:\n2020 CLC 1475\n1989 CLC 1949\n2025 SCMR 395\n1998 CLC 209", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "H.C.A. No.122 of 2016. Date of hearing & decision: 28.04.2025 : 28.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Through Mr. Muhammad Ahmar, Advocate \nRespondent No.1: Through Mr. Tarique Ahmed Memon, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Habib Bank Ltd. \nVs. \nFawad Fazal & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26004", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 821 = 2025 SLD 821", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVTc", - "Key Words:": "Sanction of Scheme of Amalgamation under the Companies Act, 2017\nDetails:\nThe case involved a petition by Union Fabrics (Pvt.) Ltd. (Petitioner No.1) and its wholly-owned subsidiary Union Apparel (Pvt.) Ltd. (Petitioner No.2) seeking the sanction of a Scheme of Amalgamation under sections 279–282 of the Companies Act, 2017. Both companies, categorized as Large Sized Companies, proposed the merger of Petitioner No.2 into Petitioner No.1 without issuance of new shares since Petitioner No.1 already owned all shares of Petitioner No.2.\nThe High Court, after ordering and reviewing meetings of shareholders and secured creditors (all of whom unanimously approved the Scheme), found that all statutory requirements were met. The Scheme included the transfer of all assets, rights, obligations, and liabilities from Union Apparel to Union Fabrics, dissolution of the former without winding up, and increase in the authorized share capital of Union Fabrics to Rs. 2 billion.\nThere were no objections raised by the SECP except a minor outstanding penalty, which was paid before the order. The court further observed that the Scheme served viable business reasons, such as cost efficiency, consolidation of operations, and tax rationalization.\nHeld:\nThe Scheme of Amalgamation dated 06.11.2024 was sanctioned by the High Court. All assets and liabilities of Union Apparel (Pvt.) Ltd. were ordered to be vested in Union Fabrics (Pvt.) Ltd. without further deed. Union Apparel stood dissolved without winding-up. The authorized capital of Union Fabrics was increased to Rs. 2 billion, and the Memorandum and Articles of Association were deemed amended accordingly. The companies were directed to file a certified copy of the order with the Registrar of Companies, and the Registrar was to consolidate records of both companies.\nCitations:\nJoint Registrar of Companies, SECP v. Omer Iqbal Solvent (Pvt.) Ltd., 2016 CLD 902\nKings Food (Pvt.) Ltd. & Hilal Confectionery (Pvt.) Ltd., 2014 CLD 961\nParamount Spinning Mills, 2020 CLD 1443\nIGI Insurance Ltd., 2018 CLD 572\nGadoon Textile Mills Ltd., 2015 CLD 2010", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "J.C.M. No. 27 of 2024. Date of hearing & order: 15-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Mikael Azmat Rahim Advocate.\nOn Court notice: Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan through Syed Ebad-ur- Rehman, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "In the matter of the Companies Act, 2017 And of (a) Union Fabrics (Pvt.) Ltd. (b) Union Apparel (Pvt.) Ltd.\nPetitioners: Union Fabrics (Pvt.) Ltd. and Union Apparel (Pvt.) Ltd.," - }, - { - "Case No.": "26005", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 822 = 2025 SLD 822 = 2025 PTCL 404 = 2025 PTD 695", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVTY", - "Key Words:": "Case Background:\nCustoms Department issued a show cause notice and confiscated goods with a fine and penalty imposed on M/s Seminar (Pvt) Limited, based on a retrieved invoice found inside the container, showing a much higher value (approx. USD 45,793) than the declared invoice (approx. USD 2,267).\nThe Department relied on the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969, which states that if a higher-value invoice is retrieved from the consignment, that invoice shall be used as the customs value regardless of any existing Valuation Ruling.\nRespondent contested that the retrieved invoice was placed erroneously by the shipper and was not relevant to their consignment.\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the Respondent, setting aside the Department’s order and remitting the fine and penalty.\nThe Department filed a Reference Application challenging the Tribunal’s order.\nLegal Issues:\nWhether the Tribunal correctly interpreted the proviso to Section 25A(2) regarding the use of retrieved invoice as transaction value.\nWhether the Tribunal was justified in remitting the redemption fine and penalty.\nKey Findings and Legal Reasoning:\nThe invoice retrieved from the container was admittedly placed by the shipper (Design Mecca Ltd., Hong Kong), though claimed to be inadvertent.\nThe Respondent’s invoice and the retrieved invoice were closely linked via Bill of Lading and shipping documents, showing nexus between seller and buyer.\nNo documentary evidence was provided to substantiate the claim that the retrieved invoice was mistakenly placed.\nSection 25A(2) proviso is clear: when a higher-value invoice is retrieved from the consignment, that value is to be taken as the customs value, regardless of existing Valuation Rulings.\nThe Respondent’s argument that the assessment should be based on the declared invoice or Valuation Ruling was rejected because the law mandates acceptance of the higher value invoice if retrieved from consignment.\nThe Tribunal erred by setting aside the Department’s order without requiring the Department to rely on the retrieved invoice as mandated by the statute.\nPrevious judgments cited by the Respondent (such as Urooj Autos, Hasnain Qutbuddin, and NETPAC) were distinguished based on facts, lack of direct relevance, or because the current law (post-2017 amendment) specifically addresses this issue.\nSupreme Court precedent in Junaid Traders v. Additional Collector of Customs (2012 SCMR 1876) supports the Department’s position that retrieval of an invoice showing higher value is sufficient to establish misdeclaration and justifies reassessment.\nThe Tribunal’s decision to remit the fine and penalty and accept the declared invoice was held to be contrary to law.\nThe Respondent failed to discharge the burden to prove that the retrieved invoice was unrelated or irrelevant.\nConclusion:\nThe High Court allowed the Reference Application of the Customs Department.\nThe Tribunal’s order was set aside.\nThe higher value on the retrieved invoice is to be taken as the correct transaction value for customs assessment.\nThe redemption fine and penalty imposed by the Department are justified.\nA copy of this judgment was ordered to be sent to the Tribunal for compliance.\nImportance:\nClarifies the mandatory application of the proviso to Section 25A(2) post-2017 amendment.\nConfirms that a retrieved invoice with higher value from the consignment overrides declared invoice/valuation rulings.\nEmphasizes that Customs must rely on such retrieved invoice unless the importer disproves its relevance.\nRejects the notion that Customs must verify market value or conduct further inquiries before reassessment on basis of retrieved invoice.\nReinforces the principle that misdeclaration on value leads to lawful confiscation, fines, and penalties under Customs Act.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25(1),25A(2),32,156(1)(14),208,209", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) No. 562 of 2024. Date of hearing & Judgment: 23-01-2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Ms. Masooda Siraj along with Mr. Javed Hussain, advocate\nRespondent by: Raj Ali Wahid Kunwar along with Mr. Kashif Khan, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (WEST) \nVS\nM/S. SEMINAR (PVT) LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26006", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 823 = 2025 SLD 823", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVTU", - "Key Words:": "Invalidity of Income Support Levy — Ultra Vires and Unconstitutional Levy\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer filed an appeal against the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-II), Karachi, challenging the levy of Income Support Levy under Section 5 of the Income Support Levy Act, 2013, along with associated default surcharge. The appellant argued that the levy was unconstitutional, discriminatory, and had been declared ultra vires by the Sindh High Court in 2020 PTD 1407. The Supreme Court in PTCL 2022 CL 346 dismissed the departments leave to appeal, effectively upholding the High Court’s declaration that:\nThe levy was not a tax under the Constitution.\nIt was enacted in violation of Article 73 as it was wrongly introduced as a Money Bill.\nIt was discriminatory, targeting only existing taxpayers.\nIt was repealed without any saving clause via Finance Act, 2014.\nFurthermore, the Tribunal noted that the law had been repealed without saving provisions, and the issuance of notices post-repeal lacked lawful authority. The Tribunal also referred to its earlier unreported judgment (ITA No. 274/LB/2019) where similar proceedings were annulled.\nHeld:\nThe appeal was allowed. The orders of the tax authorities below were annulled. The levy of Income Support Levy and associated default surcharge were declared unsustainable and without lawful authority.\nCitations:\n2020 PTD 1407 (Sindh High Court — Income Support Levy declared ultra vires)\nPTCL 2022 CL 346 (Supreme Court — Leave to appeal declined, confirming High Court’s decision)\nITA No. 274/LB/2019 (Unreported Lahore Tribunal judgment following Supreme Courts ruling)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Support Levy Act, 2013=5", - "Case #": "ITA No. 175/KB/2020 (Tax Year 2013). Date of Hearing: 07.03.2025. Date of Order: 17.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Farhan Mohib, ACA\nRespondent by: Mr. Ejaz Qaiser, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed Babar Ali, Karachi......Appellant\nVs\nThe Commissioner-IR, Zone-III, LTU, Karachi......Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26007", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 824 = 2025 SLD 824", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "Entitlement to Pension, Benevolent Grant, and Group Insurance – PTCL Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS)\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, widow of Muhammad Ramzan (a former PTCL employee), sought release of pension, benevolent grant, group insurance, and Rs. 6,28,070/- as post-retirement benefits after the death of her husband. Muhammad Ramzan had joined PTCL in 1982 and retired in 2008 under the VSS scheme. Although he accepted VSS benefits, PTCL denied him a monthly pension, asserting that he did not fulfill the required 20 years of qualifying service. The petitioner argued that Ramzan served for 19 years and 7 months in regular service, and thus his service should have been rounded up and condoned under Rule 2 of the Pension Rules, 1963. She also claimed entitlement to benevolent grant and group insurance under the Federal Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act, 1969.\nPTCL contended that the petition was time-barred and that the deceased accepted the Separation Bonus of Rs. 450,000 meant for employees with less than 20 years of qualifying service, thereby estopping any subsequent pension claim. They also argued that group insurance and benevolent fund were only payable if the employee died in service, not post-retirement.\nHeld:\nPension Claim: Rejected – The deceased voluntarily opted for VSS, accepted the separation bonus (available only to employees with less than 20 years of service), and signed the waiver form. This conduct attracted the doctrine of estoppel. The matter had already been settled by the Supreme Court in Mst. Tasneem Fatima & others vs PTCL (Civil Appeal No. 2506 of 2016), ruling that employees who accepted the separation bonus were not entitled to pension.\nBenevolent Grant & Group Insurance: Allowed – The petitioner is entitled to receive these benefits as per the Federal Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act, 1969. Since the deceased died before reaching 70 years of age and had contributed to the relevant funds, the widow qualified for lifetime benevolent grant and the group insurance sum assured. Delay in filing was not fatal due to the recurring nature of the claim and the failure of the department to process her application despite receiving it.\nThe Respondents were directed to process and pay the Benevolent Grant and Group Insurance within six weeks.\nCitations:\nMst. Tasneem Fatima & others vs PTCL & others, Civil Appeal No. 2506 of 2016 (Supreme Court)\nDirector General Civil Aviation Authority vs Abdul Touheed Khan, 2010 SCMR 468\nUmmar Baz Khan & others vs Jahanzeb Khan & others, PLD 2013 SC 268", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-1808 of 2020. Date of hearing: 11.02.2025. Date of Order: 05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM MR. JUSTICE NISAR AHMED BHANBHRO", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: Mst. Razia Bibi Through Syed Ansar Hussain Zaidi, Advocate. \nRespondents No 1 to 3: Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited Through Mr. Muhammad Azhar Mehmood for Federation of Pakistan\nThrough Mr. Raja Khaleeq-uz-Zaman Ansari, Assistant Attorney General 11.02.2025 .05.2025\nRespondent No 4:", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. RAZIA BIBI\nVS \nPTCL AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26008", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 825 = 2025 SLD 825", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVS8", - "Key Words:": "Habeas Corpus / Illegal Detention / Use of Surveillance Apps by Police\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, Irfan Ali, sought recovery of his cousin, Nauraiz Ahmed, allegedly detained illegally by the SHO, Police Station Sabzazar, Lahore. The Court appointed a bailiff, who recovered the detainee from a joint lock-up shared by Police Stations Sabzazar and Nawankot, Lahore. The detainee had been arrested by the Nawankot Police on 11.02.2025 on the basis of an FIR (No.185/2021 under Sections 381/34 PPC) registered in Karachi (Steel Town, District Malir). However, he was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours as required by Article 10(2) of the Constitution and Section 61 Cr.P.C.\nThe arrest was made using a digital surveillance system called the “Travel Eye App”, which flagged the detainee as a proclaimed offender when he tried to board a bus from Lahore to Rawalpindi. Despite repeated communication with the relevant Karachi police station, the Karachi police took no steps to take custody. Ultimately, on Court directions, the detainee was produced before a Lahore magistrate who granted transitory remand. The Lahore police themselves transported the detainee to Karachi and had him lodged in District Jail Malir.\nHeld:\nThe detainee’s prolonged custody without judicial authorization was a violation of Article 10(2) of the Constitution and Sections 60–61 Cr.P.C.\nThe police failed to follow mandatory procedures, including immediate production before a magistrate and appropriate inter-jurisdictional transfer of custody under Police Rules 1934, Rule 26.20.\nThe conduct of Steel Town Karachi police was criticized for its inaction despite repeated alerts.\nWhile the use of digital surveillance apps (e.g., Travel Eye, E-Police App, Hotel Eye, E-Gadget App) by Punjab Police was appreciated for aiding law enforcement, the Court noted a lack of legal framework or statutory backing for these technologies.\nThe Court urged the Inspector Generals of Police (Punjab and Sindh) and legislative bodies to formulate proper rules, subordinate legislation, or statutory cover for such applications.\nThe Registrar was directed to forward this order to concerned departments for legislation and accountability.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=34,381Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10(2)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=54,58,60,61,167", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 10470/2025. Date of hearing 28.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD WAHEED KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Asad Jamal, Advocate.\nState by: Hafiz Muhammad Zaheer Nasir, Assistant Advocate General. Mr. Muhammad Naveed Umer Bhatti, Deputy Prosecutor General. Rafi Ullah SHO/Inspector and Sarfraz S.I.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IRFAN ALI \nVS. \nTHE STATION HOUSE OFFICER ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26009", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 826 = 2025 SLD 826", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDVSs", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nApplicant/Registered Person engaged in Stevedores and Cargo Transportation Services, which fall under the Provincial Domain post 18th Amendment (Sindh Revenue Board jurisdiction).\nTax period under dispute: July 2020 to June 2021.\nInitial Show Cause Notice (SCN-1) issued on 11.05.2022, followed by a lengthy delay in passing the Order-in-Original, which was only received in November 2024.\nThe Appeal filed on 26.11.2024 was time-barred, prompting a Miscellaneous Application for condonation of delay.\nGrounds for Condonation of Delay:\nDelay due to late receipt of impugned order via previous tax consultant, with evidence of complaint and change of consultant.\nNo willful negligence or intent to delay.\nLegal precedent supports sympathetic consideration of delay in tax matters.\nDelay considered genuine and beyond control of appellant.\nGrounds of Main Appeal:\nProceedings re-initiated beyond the statutory 120-day period after SCN-1, making subsequent SCN-2 void and time-barred per Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nShow Cause Notices were vague, based on income tax returns without legal basis for sales tax application.\nNon-service of SCN-2 and hearing notices — appellant cannot be penalized for non-attendance when notices were not properly served.\nStevedoring and allied services are subject to Sindh Sales Tax, not Federal Sales Tax.\nThe appellant has filed nil returns with FBR but pays Sindh Sales Tax to SRB.\nFederal Excise Duty and Further Tax not applicable on services provided.\nPenalty and default surcharge wrongly imposed.\nLegal Reliance:\nMultiple judgments cited, including:\nM/s Yakin Co. v. Federation of Pakistan (2024 PTD 355) — issuance of second SCN after 120 days is illegal.\nChief Settlement Commission v. Muhammad Fazil Khan (PLD 1975 SC 331) — orders without jurisdiction are nullities.\nSupreme Court ruling (1986 SCMR 962) — orders without proper hearing and notice are void.\nTribunal Findings and Decision:\nThe appellant showed sufficient cause for delay; condonation application allowed.\nThe matter relates to services under provincial jurisdiction (Sindh Sales Tax Board), not Federal Government.\nAppellant correctly filed nil sales tax returns with FBR while paying Sindh Sales Tax to SRB.\nFederal proceedings for sales tax on stevedoring services are not maintainable.\nSCN-2 and subsequent proceedings are void and time barred.\nImpugned order is annulled.\nAppeal allowed.\nFinal Outcome:\nCondonation of delay application and main appeal are allowed. Impugned order is set aside.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),11(5)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131(4)", - "Case #": "MA (Cond.) No. 1062/KB/2024, STA No. 827/KB/2024 (Tax Period July 2020 to June 2021). Date of Hearing: 22-01-2025. Date of Order: 08.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Kazi Zeeshan Akbar, FCA\nResponder by: Mr. Saqlain Raza, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. INTEROCEAN CARGO SERVICES (PVT) LTD., KARACHI......APPLICANT\nVS\nTHE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER-IR, ZONE-I, MTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26010", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 827 = 2025 SLD 827", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDQTg", - "Key Words:": "Condonation of Delay – Limitation in Filing Appeal under Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe appellant company, a corporate member of the Karachi Stock Exchange, filed a suit under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 seeking declaration, recovery of damages of Rs. 33.628 million, and cost of funds against a respondent bank. The bank had allegedly:\nUnilaterally revised the haircut on pledged shares.\nIncreased banking spread without prior notice.\nRefused to release pledged shares despite cash offer.\nDisposed of pledged third-party shares without notice, causing loss.\nThe suit was dismissed by the Banking Court on 21.01.2016. The appeal was filed before the High Court on 15.10.2016, with a delay of over eight months. The appellant sought condonation of delay under Section 29 of the Limitation Act read with Section 24 of the Ordinance, 2001 and Section 151 CPC, citing illness and incapacitation of its authorized representative.\nThe appellant’s explanation included:\nCEO (his son) had moved to the USA in 2009.\nThe authorized representative suffered mental health issues in 2015-2016.\nA medical certificate from a doctor was provided, which was found vague and lacking detail.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and the appeal, holding that:\nThe prescribed period under Section 22 of the Ordinance, 2001 for filing an appeal is 30 days.\nDelay of every single day must be explained convincingly.\nThe medical certificate lacked specifics regarding duration and severity of the alleged condition.\nJustifications provided were vague, unsubstantiated, and not credible.\nNo sufficient cause was shown for condoning the significant delay.\nValuable rights had accrued in favour of the respondent bank, which cannot be lightly disturbed.\nCitations:\nMuhammad Nawaz and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others, 1974 SCMR 223\nAhmed Din v. Ghulam Muhammad through legal heirs and others, 2000 SCMR 647\nMst. Hajra Bibi & others v. Abdul Ghani, 2002 SCMR 1405\nIrshad Ahmed v. Pervez Akhter & others, 2000 MLD 1", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22,24Limitation Act, 1908=29Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=151", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 114 of 2016. 25.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Immad Qamar, advocate for Appellant.\nMr. Muhammad Baqar Raza, advocate for respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Salman Capital Investment (Pvt) Ltd \nVs \nMCB Bank Ltd." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26011", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 828 = 2025 SLD 828", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDQXo", - "Key Words:": "Maintainability of Injunction Suits Without Declaration under Specific Relief Act, 1877\nDetails:\nThis judgment pertains to a batch of Miscellaneous Appeals arising out of Society Suits filed by various appellants against the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Sindh and others, involving plots in Sector 15-A/3, KDA Scheme No. 33, Karachi. Each suit sought:\nIssuance of No Objection Certificates (NOC) for construction on their plots.\nInjunction restraining interference with possession.\nThe suits were dismissed by the Trial Court on 31.01.2025, holding them not maintainable for lacking a declaration of title under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The appeals argued that the ownership of the subject properties was not in dispute, hence no declaratory relief was needed.\nThe Respondents did not appear despite repeated notices, and the appeals were decided ex parte with assistance from the Appellants counsel.\nHeld:\nThe High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned judgments, and held that the absence of a declaratory relief under Section 42 of the Act of 1877 does not render the suits non-maintainable when the title is not disputed. The court relied on established precedents, holding:\nA suit for injunction is maintainable without declaratory relief where title is not denied, and the dispute concerns peaceful possession or ancillary rights.\nCourts should avoid technicalities that frustrate the cause of justice.\nSection 54 of the Specific Relief Act permits injunctions where a threat of invasion of rights exists, even without title denial.\nThe case was remanded to the Trial Court to decide the suits afresh on merits within 60 days.\nCitations:\nMuhammad Ilyas Hussain v. Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi, PLD 1976 SC 785\nClifton and Defence Traders Welfare Association v. President, Clifton Cantonment Board, PLD 2003 Karachi 495\nKPT Officers Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Government of Sindh, 2019 YLR 1671\nSultan Mahmood Shah v. Muhammad Din, 2005 SCMR 1872\nHazratullah v. Rahim Gul, PLD 2014 SC 380\nIlyas Ahmed v. Muhammad Munir, PLD 2012 Sindh 92\nNizar Ali v. Noorabad Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., PLD 1987 Karachi 676", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42", - "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No. 31 To 37 of 2025. Date of hearing: 09.05.2025. Date of announcement: 15.05.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JAFFER RAZA", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Riaz Ahmed Phulpoto, Advocate for the Petitioners.\nNone for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Miscellaneous Appeal No. 31of 2025\nSYED NAVEED HUSSAIN SHAH APPELLANT\nVS\nM/S. KDA EMPLOYEES COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LIMITED & ANOTHER RESPONDENTS\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 32 of 2025\nMrs. Fouzia Athar Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 33 of 2025\nMuhammad Yousuf Shah Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 34 of 2025\nAdnan Yousuf Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 35 of 2025\nWajid Ali Khan Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents \nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 36 of 2025\nEbadat Maqbool Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 37 of 2025\nBushra Naveed Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26012", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 829 = 2025 SLD 829 = 2025 PTD 490 = 2025 LHC 131 = 2025 PTCL 391 = (2025) 132 TAX 124", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDQXk", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdictional Overreach by Customs Authority – Doctrine of Functus Officio\nDetails:\nThe petition challenged a Corrigendum dated 10.06.2024 issued by the Additional Collector Customs (Adjudication) modifying Order-in-Original No.78 of 2023 (dated 15.12.2023, issued on 20.12.2023). The original order, passed under Section 179 of the Customs Act, 1969, directed the release of seized mobile phones belonging to the petitioners on payment of redemption fine, duties, and taxes, subject to a Certificate of Conformity (COC) or No Objection Certificate (NOC) from PTA. Additionally, a personal penalty of Rs.10,000/- was imposed on each petitioner.\nAfter the petitioners complied with the original order and deposited the amounts due, the mobile phones were not released, leading them to file Writ Petition No.17287/2024. The High Court allowed that petition and ordered compliance. Despite this, the department issued the impugned Corrigendum enhancing the penalty to Rs.7,922,048/-, equivalent to the assessed value of the phones.\nThe petitioners argued that the Customs officer had become functus officio after issuing the original adjudication and could not unilaterally amend it. The respondents supported the legality of the corrigendum.\nHeld:\nThe High Court allowed the petition and set aside the Corrigendum, holding:\nThe respondent acted functus officio after passing the order-in-original under Section 179 and could not modify it without appellate remand or statutory authority.\nThe doctrine of functus officio prohibits judicial or quasi-judicial authorities from altering final orders except to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes.\nSection 179 of the Customs Act provides no power to modify or rectify orders; such power is confined to the Customs Appellate Tribunal under Section 194-B(2) upon application by a party.\nThe issuance of the impugned Corrigendum was therefore ultra vires, without jurisdiction, and legally ineffective from inception.\nCase Law:\nKh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (2024 SCMR 1059) – Doctrine of functus officio elaborated.\nAnees-ur-Rehman v. Messrs Faysal Bank Ltd. (2020 CLD 473)\nIqbal Pervaiz v. Harsan (2018 SCMR 359)\nMuhammad Wahid v. Nasrullah (2016 SCMR 179)\nShujat Ali v. Muhammad Riasat (PLD 2006 SC 140)\nMuhammad Anwar v. Saeed Akhtar (PLD 2004 SC 911)\nBank Al Habib Ltd. v. Abu Bakar Textile Mills (2016 CLD 454)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=179,193,194-B(2)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 44573/2024. Date of hearing 29-01-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by Mr. Hassan Raza Shakir, Advocate.\nRespondents by M/s Nadeem Mahmood Mian and Huriya Fatima, Advocates.\nMs. Deeba Tasnim Anwar, Assistant Attorney-General for Pakistan along with Syed Babar Ali, Inspector (Customs).", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMIR KHAN ETC. \nVS. \nADDL. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26013", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 830 = 2025 SLD 830", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDODc", - "Key Words:": "Ex-Parte Assessment — Unsupported Estimations — Departmental Appeal Dismissed\nDetails:\nThe Department filed appeals against Order Nos. 726 & 727/2018 dated 15.01.2018 passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), Rawalpindi, relating to Tax Years 2014 and 2015. The respondent taxpayer declared taxable incomes of Rs. 510,400 and Rs. 527,000. The case was selected for audit under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Due to the taxpayers failure to provide books of accounts and supporting documents during audit, the Assessing Officer (AO) made ex-parte assessments, estimating and adding 30% of the declared purchases (Rs. 1,232,400 and Rs. 1,079,200) and disallowed P & L expenses (Rs. 103,200 and Rs. 111,000), resulting in assessed incomes of Rs. 1,846,000 and Rs. 1,717,080.\nOn appeal, the CIR(A) reduced the additions on purchases from 30% to 20% on the grounds that the original addition appeared excessive in view of the taxpayer’s business nature, but upheld disallowances on P & L expenses. Dissatisfied, the Department appealed to the ATIR, arguing that the CIR(A) had no legal justification to reduce the additions without proper reasoning.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue dismissed the Department’s appeals, holding that:\nThe original assessment order was based purely on estimation without any supporting evidence, third-party verification, or industry benchmarks.\nSimilarly, the CIR(A)s relief (reducing from 30% to 20%) was also based solely on assumption without cogent reasoning or documentation.\nBoth authorities acted arbitrarily, and such unsupported estimations are not sustainable in law.\nAdditions to income must be supported by tangible evidence or logical inference from factual data. The Tribunal emphasized that estimation without material backing is contrary to settled tax jurisprudence.\nConsequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIR(A)s orders and dismissed the departmental appeals.\nLegal Principle Reiterated:\nIncome tax assessments must rest on documentary evidence and reasoned analysis; estimation in the absence of supporting material renders the addition arbitrary and unlawful.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=214C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 522/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2014), ITA No. 523/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2015). Date of Hearing & Order: 05.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR\nRespondent By: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI ….. APPELLANT\nVS\nMALIK AKHTAR HUSSAIN, MALIK MEDICAL STORE, BUS STAND, ATTOCK. …. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26014", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 831 = 2025 SLD 831", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDODY", - "Key Words:": "Section 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Violation of Natural Justice – Non-Speaking Orders – Tax on Immovable Property\nDetails:\nThe appellant-taxpayer challenged the orders passed by the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (ACIR) and the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), Karachi, under Section 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The taxpayer filed a return declaring income of Rs. 469,800, which was deemed assessed under Section 120(1). However, the assessment was amended u/s 122(1) on the grounds that the taxpayer had not paid tax under Section 7E (deemed income from capital assets). The amendment was made ex parte, allegedly without issuing proper notices or providing a fair hearing.\nThe appellant argued:\nThe assessment was made in violation of Article 10-A of the Constitution (right to a fair trial).\nSection 7E is unconstitutional as it seeks to tax unrealized income from immovable property.\nOne of the assessed properties was in self-use (Plot No. B-69), and others were either below the threshold or not owned by the taxpayer (supported by sale deeds and rent agreements).\nNeither show-cause notices nor hearing notices were properly served, violating Section 218 of the Ordinance and relevant judicial precedents.\nThe department defended the assessment, claiming the order was lawful and based on legal provisions.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Tribunal found that:\nThe orders passed by ACIR and CIR(A) were non-speaking, lacked reasoning, and failed to address the taxpayer’s contentions.\nThe principle of natural justice and Article 10-A were violated as the taxpayer was condemned unheard.\nNo proper service of notices or opportunity of hearing was given, violating departmental Circular No. 7(2) dated 03.02.1994.\nThe CIR(A) simply confirmed the ex parte order without independent application of mind.\nIn light of these findings, the Tribunal annulled the orders passed by both authorities and remanded the matter back to the ACIR for fresh adjudication. The ACIR was directed to give adequate opportunity of hearing and pass a reasoned, speaking order within 45 days. The taxpayer was also directed to appear within 15 days.\nCitations:\n2023 128 TAX 84 (ATIR), 2010 101 TAX 139 (Trib), 2023 PTCL 337 (FTO) – Non-service of notices and violation of natural justice.\n2021 PTD 2024 (LHC) – Orders must contain reasoning.\n2023 PTD 758 (LHC) – Importance of appellate forum’s view.\nSTA No. 678/LIB/2011 & STA No. 729/LB/2014 (ATIR) – Requirement of speaking orders.\nSection 24-A, General Clauses Act, 1897 – Mandates reasoned decision-making.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=7E,218Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "ITA No. 63/KB/2024 (Tax Year 2022). Date of Hearing: 14.04.2025. Date of Order: 05.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. EMAD UL HASAN, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Nadir Hussain Abro, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Saad Ali, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. ASHFAQ ZAKARIA, KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER-IR, ZONE-V, CTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26015", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 832 = 2025 SLD 832", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDODU", - "Key Words:": "Application of Proportionality in Disciplinary Proceedings under Civil Service Law\nDetails:\nThe respondent, an Ahlmad (court record keeper) at District Courts, Jhang, was accused of receiving bribes totaling Rs. 380,000 in exchange for facilitating the recruitment of complainants relatives. The inquiry was conducted under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999. The Inquiry Officer found the respondent guilty and recommended dismissal. The District & Sessions Judge, as competent authority, imposed the penalty of dismissal on 17.10.2018. The respondent’s departmental appeal was not decided within time, leading him to file an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal.\nThe Tribunal found the charges of corruption to be proven, acknowledged the respondent’s failure to rebut the evidence, and noted his admission of receiving money but claiming it as a loan. Despite this, the Tribunal reduced the penalty from dismissal to forfeiture of two years of service, citing disproportionality without structured reasoning.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal’s decision, holding that the reduction of the penalty failed the structured proportionality test. The Court emphasized that proportionality is a structured constitutional principle requiring transparent reasoning, not subjective impressions. It held that in cases involving corruption by court staff—who serve critical roles in maintaining judicial integrity—the public interest in deterrence and accountability outweighs individual interests. Given the gravity of misconduct and its proven nature, dismissal was held to be a proportionate and necessary penalty to uphold public trust in the justice system.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,14,25", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 2987-L/2019. Date of hearing & order: 07.05.2025\n(Against the order dated 09.07.2019 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.872/2019)", - "Judge Name:": "Bench-II: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah Mr. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Khalid Masood Ghani, ASC.\nFor the Mr. Sher Aman, ASC.\nAssisted by: Mr. Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk", - "Petitioner Name:": "District & Sessions Judge (Authority), Jhang, etc. ….. Petitioner(s)\nVs\nGhulam Shabbir ….. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26016", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 833 = 2025 SLD 833", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDODQ", - "Key Words:": "Context:\nThe petitioners are lecturers appointed in 2012 by the Federal Government Educational Institution (F.G.E.I.), Rawalpindi, via the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). They challenged the appointment and regularization of respondents No.5 to 115, who were initially appointed on contract in 2007 without FPSC involvement and later regularized by a Cabinet Sub-Committee in 2012. The petitioners filed this writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution seeking issuance of writ of quo warranto questioning the legal authority behind respondents’ appointments.\nKey Legal Issues:\nLegality of Appointments and Regularization:\nRespondents were appointed on contract without FPSC approval and without following the prescribed procedure under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and related recruitment rules.\nRegularization was done via a Cabinet Sub-Committee recommendation, which was limited to BS-1 to BS-15 posts and lacked authority for BS-16 and above.\nNo referral to FPSC under Section 11B of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 was made to verify fitness and eligibility of respondents for permanent appointment.\nMaintainability and Jurisdiction:\nThe writ petition under Article 199 is maintainable; laches (delay) and past transaction doctrines do not bar it because quo warranto challenges the authority to hold office, a continuing cause of action.\nTerritorial jurisdiction lies with the High Court where the public office is located or has jurisdiction, not merely where the respondent physically works.\nThe petitioners are not barred by Article 212 of the Constitution because the petition challenges the legality of appointments themselves, not mere terms and conditions of service.\nDoctrine of Locus Poenitentiae and Past and Closed Transactions:\nSection 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 permits an authority to vary or rescind orders before decisive steps are taken.\nHowever, an illegal appointment or regularization cannot be protected by claiming “past and closed transaction.”\nRespondents cannot claim irrevocability of appointments made without lawful authority.\nAuthority of Cabinet Sub-Committee:\nThe Cabinet Sub-Committee’s mandate is supervisory and limited to posts BS-1 to BS-15.\nRegularization of BS-16 and above posts by Cabinet Sub-Committee is void ab initio as it bypasses constitutional and statutory recruitment processes.\nSupreme Court precedents affirm that executive action must conform to constitutional limits and recruitment rules.\nLegal Principles and Constitutional Provisions Cited:\nArticle 199(1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution: Empowers courts to issue writ of quo warranto to inquire under what authority a person holds public office.\nCivil Servants Act, 1973 (Section 5, Section 11B): Governs appointment procedures for federal civil servants; mandates FPSC involvement for BS-16 and above.\nCivil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973: Prescribes modes and procedures for appointment, including FPSC tests/examinations.\nGeneral Clauses Act, 1897 (Section 21): Allows authorities to vary or rescind orders unless decisive steps have been taken, but does not protect illegal orders.\nRelevant Case Law:\nFARZAND RAZA NAQVI v. MUHAMMAD DIN (2004 SCMR 400)\nN.-W.F.P. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. Dr. SAMIULLAH KHAN (1999 SCMR 2786)\nMOHSIN RAZA GONDAL v. SARDAR MAHMOOD (2025 SCMR 104)\nGOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB v. MUHAMMAD IMRAN (2019 SCMR 643)\nCourts Findings:\nThe writ petition is maintainable; objections of laches, territorial jurisdiction, and Article 212 are overruled.\nThe appointments and regularizations of respondents are illegal, having been made without FPSC involvement and proper procedure.\nCabinet Sub-Committee lacks authority to regularize posts BS-16 and above; its approval is void.\nThe respondents cannot claim protection under “past and closed transaction” or “locus poenitentiae” doctrines due to illegality.\nHowever, since respondents had no fault in the appointment irregularity and have served for years without challenge to their qualifications, their cases must be regularized fairly.\nCourt directs official respondents to refer respondents’ cases to FPSC under Section 11B of the Civil Servants Act for determination of fitness and eligibility.\nNo order as to costs.\nCourt’s Disposition:\nThe writ petition is partly allowed with the following directions:\nThe appointing authorities shall refer the respondents’ cases to the Federal Public Service Commission for adjudication of their eligibility and fitness under the law.\nThe Commission shall proceed in accordance with Section 11B of the Civil Servants Act, 1973.\nThe petitioners’ legal challenge against unlawful appointment and regularization is upheld, but respondents’ positions shall not be summarily terminated without proper FPSC review.\nNo order as to costs.\nSummary in Brief:\nThe court emphasized that appointments to public offices must follow constitutional and statutory procedures, particularly FPSC’s mandated role for BS-16 and above posts. Any appointments or regularizations made bypassing these rules are illegal and void. The writ of quo warranto is a powerful constitutional remedy to ensure lawful occupancy of public offices and can be invoked regardless of delay or past service. However, fairness requires that affected employees be given opportunity for assessment of fitness and eligibility by the FPSC. The decision affirms the primacy of constitutional recruitment procedures, limits executive discretion, and protects public office integrity.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25,199,199(1)(b)(ii),212General Clauses Act, 1897=21Service Tribunal Act, 1975=3", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1180 of 2022. Dates of hearing: 25.09.2024 & 16.04.2025. Date of order: 19-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MIRZA VIQAS RAUF JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. S.A. Mahmood Khan Saddozai, Advocate.\nRespondents No.1 to 4 by: Mr. Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General Pakistan.\nRespondents No.5 to 8, 10, 11, 14, 16 to 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 32, 34, to 39, 42 to 49, 54 to 57, 60, 62 to 67, 69 to 73, 76, 77, 79 to 86, 88, 90 to 95, 97, 98, 104 to 106, 108 & 112 to 115 Mr. Muhammad Ramzan Khan, Advocate.\nRespondents No.9, 12, 13, 15, 20, 22, 25, 27 to 31, 32, 33, 40, 41, 50 to 53, 58, 59, 61, 68, 74, 75, 78, 87, 89, 96, 99 to 103, 107 & 109 to 111. M/s Abdul Rahim Bhatti, Yasser Rahim Bhatti and Qaiser Rahim Bhatti, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAHIL BUTT AND 21 OTHERS \nVS\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, ISLAMABAD AND 114 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26017", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 834 = 2025 SLD 834", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDOC8", - "Key Words:": "ORDER:\nDANISH ALI QAZI (MEMBER):-.-\nThe Tax department has filed the titled appeal against the Order No.106/2017-18 dated 15.01.2018 passed by the learned Commissioner-IR (Appeals-III), Rawalpindi. [CIR(A)] whereby the demand created of Rs.2,700,963/- through the impugned order passed by the ACIR, Audit-III, Cantt. Zone, RTO, Rawalpindi was deleted and the appeal of the registered person was accepted.\n2. The brief facts of the case are that during the scrutiny of sales tax returns filed by appellant during the period October 2012 to October 2015, the assessing officer was observed that the registered person had declared exempt supplies amounting to Rs.75,901,015/- under serial 54 of the Table-1 of the Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (“the Act, 1990”) which allegedly was not applicable in its case and thus, the instant case was farmed against the appellant vide show cause notice dated 28.04.2016 for non-payment of sales tax of Rs.12,700,963/- due to violation of section 3(1),6,7,8,22,23 and 26 of the Act, 1990. The contravention proceedings so initiated culminated in passing of the impugned order whereby the above mentioned amount of sales tax was held recoverable along with default surcharge (to be calculated at the time of payment) and penalties under section 33(5) of the Act. The appellant had also applied for rectification of order dated 20.09.2016 but the same was rejected vide rectification order No.111/2017 dated 26.10.2017. Aggrieved with the treatment of the assessing officer, the appellant filed an appeal before learned CIR(Appeals-III), Rawalpindi, who vide order dated 15.01.2018, deleted the tax demands created by the assessing officer. The tax department, being dissatisfied with the treatment meted out by the CIR(A), filed the appeal before this Tribunal, hence the present proceedings.\n3. Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR represented the tax department and Mr. Agha Mujeeb Ahmed, FCA appeared on behalf of the taxpayer.\n4. This case came up for hearing on 21.04.2025. The learned DR reiterated the contentions contemplated in the grounds of appeal mainly [i] stating therein that though imports of educational, scientific and cultural material are exempt under serial No. 54 to Table-1 of the Sixth Schedule, however, local supply thereof are not exempt and [ii] no import has been made by the registered person himself, as the GDs provided by the registered person are in the name of Comsats Institute of Information Technology and the registered person made import in the name of Comsats Institute of Information Technology in order to avoid payment of taxes and duties at import stage under sub-Chapter-III of Chapter 99 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff. On the other hand, the learned AR of the respondent registered person stated that the order passed by the learned CIR (A) is a speaking order and there is no infirmity in the impugned order. He therefore, pleaded that the appeal be dismissed.\nWe have heard and perused the relevant record as well keeping in view the facts of the case and the law relevant thereto. The learned CIR (A) has aptly discussed all aspects of the case in detail. For the sake of clarity, operative para of learned CIR(A) is reproduced below:\n“5. I have perused the impugned order, grounds of appeal and submissions tendered by the AR. The learned AR has stated that supplies of scientific and research instruments were made to COMSATS after having been imported from Singapore which was signatory of UNESCO, hence such supplies were zero rated in terms of serial No.54 of the Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. In support of his stance, the learned AR has submitted copies of sales tax invoices, purchase orders, sales orders, import documents such as Airway Bills, Goods declarations, commercial invoices etc. The perusal of the said documents has shown that the appellant has imported educational and research materials from Singapore and has supplied the same to COMSAT. It has further been observed from the import documents that the material so imported has been assessed by the Customs Authorities as exempted from sales tax. The relevant entry No.54 of the Table-1 of the Sixth Schedule to section 13 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:\n54\nEducational, scientific and cultural material imported from a country signatory to UNESCO Agreement or a country signatory to bilateral commodity exchange agreement with Pakistan, subject to the same conditions as are envisaged for the purposes of exemption under the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969).\n99.15\nThe above reproduced provisions of law show that exemption has been granted through the said entry on educational, scientific and cultural material imported from a country signatory to the UNESCO Agreement. The documentary evidence produced by the appellant confirms that the supplies made by the appellant to COMSAT Institute of Information Technology consisted of educational material imported from Singapore, a signatory to UNESCO and the same is exempted from sales tax under Serial No.54 of the Table-1 of the Sixth Schedule to section 13 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Foregoing in view, the appellant’s stance has been found supported by documentary evidence and tenable under the law and therefore, the demand created on this account through the impugned order is directed to be deleted and accordingly the appeal stands accepted.”\nThe objection of the department that though imports of educational, scientific and cultural material are exempt under serial No. 54 to Table-1 of the Sixth Schedule, however, local supply thereof are not exempt is incorrect as evident from the fact that Table-1 of the Sixth Schedule deals both with imports and local supplies, meaning thereby that both import and local supply of the articles and goods mentioned in Table-1 to Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 are exempt. The second objection of the department that “…no import has been made by the registered person himself, as the GDs provided by the registered person are in the name of Comsats Institute of Information Technology and the registered person made import in the name of Comsats Institute of Information Technology in order to avoid payment of taxes and duties at import stage under sub-Chapter-III of Chapter 99 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff”, as taken in the ground of appeal in fact strengthen the registered person’s case i.e. educational, scientific and cultural material were imported by registered person under principal agency arrangement wherein the instant registered person being an agent of the Principal i.e. Comsats Institute of Technology. A principal agency contract, also known as an agency agreement, outlines the relationship between a principal and an agent, defining the scope of the agent’s authority and responsibilities. The principal delegates tasks or decision-making to the agent, who acts on their behalf. This agreement establishes the rights, duties, and liabilities of both the principal and the agent, as well as those of any third parties involved. In this case, it is clear from copies of sales tax invoices, purchase orders, sales orders, import documents such as Airway Bills, Goods declarations, commercial invoices etc., that Comsats Institute of hired registered person for import of goods in the name of Comsats Institute of Information Technology, thus, acting as an agent for and on behalf of aforesaid institute and as such being an authorized agent, any exemption which was available to Principal i.e. Comsats Institute of Information Technology under serial No. 54 of Table-1 of the sixth Schedule was always available to taxpayer. In this case, the registered person has shown imports and supplies of goods in sales tax return as an agent of Comsats Institute of Information Technology and not as an importer, therefore, even if the goods were taxable, no tax would have been leviable as aforesaid goods admittedly were imported by Comstats Institute of Information Technology itself and registered person could not legally make a taxable supply of the goods, he has not imported, and as such registered person had to declare the import and supply for being an agent and for documentation/record keeping. It is evident from the ground of appeal besides, during the hearing this much was admitted by the Department that import and supply of goods shown by registered person are the same which are imported by Comsats Institute of Information Technology, therefore, even otherwise sales tax could not be imposed. The last objection that the registered person has made import in the name of Comsats Institute of Information Technology to avoid payment of taxes and duties at import stage is not only extraneous to the cause of show cause notice, but also devoid of evidence, besides, this allegation would come within the ambit of tax fraud, however, no such allegation is raised in the show cause notice and the assessment order. Moreover, the objection is also untenable, because the transaction between the registered person and Comsats Institute of Information Technology is backed by proper documentation as already discussed above. \n6. As such, the appellant has failed to point out any legal or factual infirmity in the impugned appellate order and has not put forth any documentary or material evidence to rebut the observations and findings of the learned CIR(A).We find no infirmity in the impugned order of the learned CIR(A) and do not feel persuaded to interfere with the treatment meted out by the first appellate authority. Accordingly, the order passed by the learned CIR A) is upheld and the appeal filed by the department is hereby dismissed.\n7.This order consists of six (06) pages, and I have affixed my signature on each page.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 174/IB/2018 (Tax Period October 2012 to October 2015). Date of Hearing & Order: 21.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DANISH ALI QAZI, MEMBER AND M. NAEEM ASHRAF, MEMIBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR\nRespondent By: Mr. Agha Mujeeb Ahmed, FCA", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR (Cantt. Zone), RTO, Rawalpindi ….. Appellant\nvs\nM/s Research Institute & Measurement Systems (RIMS), House No.SD-149, Lane No.6, Askari-X, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26018", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 835 = 2025 SLD 835 = 2025 LHC 685 = (2025) 131 TAX 561 = 2025 PTCL 569 = 2025 PTD 864 = 2025 PLJ 607", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVES1NDNC8", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Show Cause Notice under Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012\nDetails:\nThe Petitioner challenged a show cause notice dated 06.09.2024 issued by the Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA) under Section 52 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012. The Petitioner contended that they are a withholding agent, not a taxpayer, and hence should have been dealt with under Section 14 of the Act. The impugned notice bypassed the mandatory requirement of issuing a prior notice under Section 52(1) and directly invoked Section 52(3), which pertains to tax recovery after adjudication.\nPetitioner relied on constitutional protections under Articles 4 and 10-A (due process and fair trial) and cited precedents, including:\nRahat Cafe v. Government of Punjab (2024 PTD 898)\nReliance Commodities v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 Lahore 632 = 2020 PTD 1464)\nChenab Flour Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2021 Lahore 343)\nFederal Govt Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed (PLD 2025 SC 11)\nService Global Footwear v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2023 Lahore 471)\nThe Court emphasized that Sections 14 and 14A, located in Chapter II (Scope of Tax), are special provisions for withholding agents and must be invoked prior to any action under Section 52 (Offences and Penalties). It also reiterated the principle of textualism—that statutory language must be applied as written, not inferred from intent or history.\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court held that:\nThe impugned show cause notice was issued without lawful authority.\nSection 14 is the correct provision for proceedings against withholding agents, not Section 52.\nThe notice violated Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution.\nThe show cause notice is set aside.\nThe matter is remanded to the Additional Commissioner, PRA Rawalpindi, to be treated as a representation under Sections 14 and 14A of the Act and to be decided through a speaking order within four weeks after providing proper hearing to the Petitioner.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=14,14A,14(2),16d,52,52(1),52(3)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10-A,199,201", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 2838/2024. Date of hearing: 04.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner By: Hafiz Muhammad Idris, ASC with M/s Hassan Askari Kazmi and Hafiz Muhammad Tanveer Nasir, Advocates.\nRespondents By: Barrister Raja Hashim Javaid, with Ms. Rahat Farooq Raja, Assistant Advocates General.\nMr. Zeeshan Zafar Hashmi, Advocate on behalf of the Punjab Revenue Authority with Ms. Nadia Murad, Legal Officer.\nMr. Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General alongwith Barrister Zoopash Khan, Advocate.\nResearch Assistance by: Mr. Mujtaba-ul-Hassan, Civil Judge/ Research Officer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAUJI CEMENT COMPANY \nVS \nGOVT. OF PUNJAB ETC. LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26019", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFDNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 836 = 2025 SLD 836", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFDNDk", - "Key Words:": "Petitioner was appointed as Officer Grade-III in Bank of Khyber on 05.07.2010.\nBetween 23.01.2014 to 04.08.2014, a financial fraud involving Rs. 31.7 million was committed at the branch.\nFIR No. 296/2014 was registered on 02.09.2014 against Malik Hamood ur Rehman (a co-employee).\nThe petitioner was suspended and charge-sheeted on 11.11.2014, allegedly for enabling 12 out of 28 fraudulent transactions via her ID (Rs. 4.6 million).\nPetitioner claimed her ID/password was hacked and she was not involved, pointing out that she was not given proper opportunity to defend, and inquiry was defective.\nShe was removed from service on 12.08.2015.\nProcedural History:\nNIRC Single Bench dismissed the grievance on 29.01.2019, holding that petitioner was not a workman.\nNIRC Full Bench on 31.07.2019 held that petitioner was a workman and remanded the case.\nBank filed Writ Petition No. 3821/2019, dismissed on 09.10.2020, confirming petitioner’s status as workman.\nPetitioner again approached NIRC, which dismissed her grievance on merits.\nShe filed Writ Petition No. 16520/2022, which was allowed with remand to NIRC.\nNIRC Single Bench then partially allowed her grievance—reinstated with one-step demotion and half back benefits.\nNIRC Full Bench on 22.02.2024 again set aside that relief and upheld removal from service.\nPetitioner’s Main Contentions:\nCharge-sheet was time-barred under Standing Order 15(4) (should be issued within 30 days).\nShe was denied a fair inquiry, including:\nNo opportunity to cross-examine witnesses\nInquiry held before her reply was considered\nNo copy of inquiry report was provided\nMalik Hamood ur Rehman admitted full guilt—no link or benefit was established against her.\nAt most, her role was negligence, not fraud, embezzlement or misconduct.\nInvoked PLD 1995 Karachi 347 and 1995 PLC 451, arguing that single instance of negligence cannot constitute “habitual negligence” under Standing Order 15(3)(i).\nChallenged NIRC for ignoring clear directions of Lahore High Court in WP No. 16520/2022.\nRespondent (Bank)s Main Arguments:\nPetitioner’s ID was used for 12 fraudulent transactions.\nShe never reported password misuse or hacking until after detection.\nOpportunity of personal hearing was provided.\nRemoval was done in compliance with Staff Service Rules.\nNegligence, even if not fraudulent, was serious enough to justify dismissal.\nCourt’s Observations & Findings:\nNo direct evidence of fraud or embezzlement by the petitioner.\nCo-accused (Hamood ur Rehman) admitted he acted alone.\nPetitioner’s charge-sheet was issued late—after 2 months of the FIR—violating Standing Order 15(4).\nInquiry findings merely attributed negligence , not misconduct or criminality.\nNegligence, even if proven, was not habitual—thus does not meet the test of “misconduct” under Standing Order 15(3)(i).\nCited PLD 1995 Karachi 347 and 1995 PLC 451 to reinforce the distinction between negligence and habitual negligence.\nAlso cited 2006 SCMR 63 – Punishment must be proportionate to the proven misconduct.\nMinor lapses should lead to reformation, not extreme penalties like removal.\nConclusion:\nWrit Petition allowed\nOrders of NIRC dated 22.02.2024 and 06.09.2023 set aside\nPetitioner reinstated with full back benefits from 12.08.2015\nCourt held that dismissal for a single act of negligence was disproportionate and contrary to law.\nKey Legal Doctrines Affirmed:\nProportionality of punishment in service law\nStrict construction of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968\nNo major penalty without habitual negligence or misconduct\nStrict limitation and procedural fairness in disciplinary inquiries", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968=15(4)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 882 of 2024. Date of Hearing: 12.03.2025. Date of order: 21.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ASIF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner By: Mr. Mirza Muhammad Afzal, Advocate\nRespondent By: Mr. Bilal Ahmed Kakaizai, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "IFFAT NAWAZ\nVs\nBANK OF KHYBER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26020", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFDNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 837 = 2025 SLD 837", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFDNDg", - "Key Words:": "Whether the Executing Court was correct in directing the financing charges under a decree (based on an arbitral award) to be calculated on a compound interest basis, as per Clause 14.8 of the Contract, or whether such charges should be computed on simple interest basis as claimed by NHA.\nContractual Background:\nContract Awarded: 25.04.2012 – Rehabilitation of Sarhad Bypass to Daharki Road (N-5) KM 552 to KM 576\nArbitration Clause Invoked: Under Arbitration Act, 1940\nArbitrator Appointed: Justice (R) Ijaz Nisar\nAward Date: 14.09.2021\nAward:\nNHA to pay Rs. 52,183,412/-\nPlus financing charges at 3% above SBP discount rate, compounded monthly, from 26.09.2014 until payment\nExecution & Appeal Chronology:\nAward made rule of court on 25.03.2022.\nNHA’s appeal against the decree was dismissed on 11.01.2023.\nExecution Petition No. 41/2023 was filed on 21.06.2022.\nNHA furnished a bank guarantee of Rs. 52 million (12.09.2022).\nOn 28.03.2023, the guarantee was encashed.\nDispute arose over calculation of financing charges:\nNHA’s stance: Rs. 56.5 million (simple interest)\nRespondent’s stance: Rs. 86.1 million (compound interest)\nOn 05.09.2023, the Executing Court referred the matter to HBL and JS Bank for expert calculation under Clause 14.8.\nBoth banks confirmed: charges to be compounded monthly.\nThe Executing Court accepted these findings and on 15.12.2023, directed recalculation on compound basis.\nNHA appealed this decision.\nNHA’s Arguments:\nExecuting Court cannot go beyond the decree (Section 47 CPC).\nDecree specifies rate, but not the compounding method.\nArbitrator did not expressly enforce Clause 14.8, hence simple interest applies.\nPayment via bank guarantee (12.09.2022) should have stopped accrual of further interest.\nRespondent’s Arguments:\nClause 14.8 of the Contract expressly provides for compound interest.\nArbitrator expressly adopted Clause 14.8 in award.\nExecution Court simply enforced what was already decided—no excess jurisdiction.\nBank guarantee was not actual payment; accrual continues until encashment (29.03.2023).\nCourt’s Key Findings:\nAward and decree clearly incorporate Clause 14.8, which mandates compound interest monthly.\nArbitrators language and findings on Issue No. 9 confirm intention to follow Clause 14.8.\nCourts must interpret awards as a whole and not in isolation—award explicitly binds NHA to compound financing charges.\nBank guarantee is not “payment” unless encashed—interest continues to accrue until actual disbursement.\nPrecedents (e.g., Waqar-ul-Hassan Shah Bukhari v. SBFC, 2024 CLD 1481) support that interest stops only upon actual receipt by decree-holder.\nBoth HBL and JS Bank reports corroborated the compound calculation.\nExecuting Court acted within jurisdiction; did not modify or expand the decree.\nResult:\nAppeal dismissed.\nExecuting Court’s Order dated 15.12.2023 upheld.\nNo costs awarded.\nKey Legal References:\nClause 14.8, Contract: Provides for compound monthly interest at 3% above SBP discount rate.\nArbitration Act, 1940: Section 17 – Award made rule of court; Section 29 – Arbitrator may award interest if contract permits.\nCase Law:\nPLD 2024 CLD 1481 – Interest accrues until actual payment, not just deposit.\nPLD 1990 MLD 2333 – Construction of decree via context and pleadings.\nAIR 1960 SC 388 – Harmonious reading of award and decree.\nImplication:\nThis judgment reinforces that:\nExecution courts must follow clear contractual stipulations and arbitrators intent.\nCompound interest clauses in commercial contracts are enforceable when clearly incorporated in awards.\nBank guarantees are not substitutes for actual payment when calculating delay charges.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=8", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 69 of 2024. Date of Hearing: 09.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Barrister Muhammad Hassan Alam. \nRespondent by: Mr. Jawad-ur-Rahim Malik, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY \nVS\nM/S. SARDAR MUHAMMAD ASHRAF D BALOCH (PRIVATE) LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26021", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFDNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 838 = 2025 SLD 838", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFDNHo", - "Key Words:": "GATT/WTO Valuation Agreement principles adopted in Pakistani law\nWhether the Tribunal was justified in rejecting assessments under Section 25(5) and holding that transactional values under Section 25(1) must be accepted?\nWhether the Tribunal was justified in distinguishing an earlier Tribunal decision (Customs Appeal No. K-713/2022)?\nWhether the Tribunal correctly held that Respondents provided sufficient proof of uninfluenced transactional value, thus Section 25(3) was satisfied?\nBackground:\nRespondent imported MG HS, MG ZS, and MG ZSEV vehicles.\nCustoms officials assessed values under Section 25(5) using a prior Goods Declaration dated 18.05.2020.\nRespondent challenged assessments. Collector (Appeals) set aside assessments and remanded for fresh evaluation.\nTribunal allowed Respondent’s appeal and dismissed the Departments appeal.\nDepartment filed multiple reference applications before the High Court.\nTribunal’s Findings:\nSection 25(5) allows comparison only with identical goods imported within 90 days ( at or about the same time ).\nThe Goods Declaration used for assessment was dated over 9 months earlier—not within the 90-day window under Rule 107(a).\nTribunal accepted transactional values under Section 25(1) as valid since:\nRespondent proved absence of price influence under Section 25(3).\nNo objections or inquiry was made by the Department under Section 25(4).\nThe earlier Tribunal order in Appeal No. K-713/2022 dealt with Section 25(9) (fallback method), whereas the present matter relates to Section 25(5) (identical goods method). Hence, inapplicable.\nHigh Court’s Decision & Reasoning:\nAssessment under Section 25(5) Invalid:\nThe reference GD was too old (dated 18.05.2020) relative to the current imports (from Feb 2021 – Mar 2022).\nSection 25(5) requires comparison with goods imported within 90 days, as per Rule 107(a).\nThus, assessment under Section 25(5) was illegal and baseless.\nTransaction Value under Section 25(1) Acceptable:\nTribunal correctly accepted declared transactional values.\nRespondent provided sufficient proof of absence of influence in relationship with seller under Section 25(3).\nDepartment made no inquiry or objection under Section 25(4).\nRelevance of K-713/2022 Judgment:\nThe earlier judgment related to fallback method under Section 25(9).\nPresent case relates to identical goods under Section 25(5).\nHence, distinguishable and not binding.\nValuation aligned with WTO/GATT:\nPakistan, as a signatory to WTO, must follow GATT valuation principles.\nCustoms must not apply arbitrary or retrospective valuations.\nArticle 7(2)(b)(g) of WTO Agreement prohibits use of highest of two values or outdated values.\nCourts Holding:\nAll rephrased questions answered in the affirmative\nReference Applications dismissed\nOrder dated 22.02.2024 upheld\nCopy to be sent to Customs Appellate Tribunal under Section 196(5)\nKey Citations Relied Upon:\nInternational Petrochemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Deputy Collector of Customs – 2017 PTD 370\nCollector of Customs v. Faisal Enterprises – 2019 PTD 1776\nIndus Motors case – CP No.D-1372 of 2018 (unreported)\n2008 PTD 1478 – Lahore High Court\nRYK Mills, MCB Bank, Sargodha Spinning Mills – Multiple Supreme Court decisions confirming Tribunals fact-finding is final\nConclusion:\nThis judgment reaffirms the hierarchy and procedure of customs valuation under WTO-aligned rules, emphasizing:\nStrict adherence to Section 25’s sequential structure\nProhibition on arbitrary value determination\nSupremacy of factual findings by Tribunal\nEnforcement of transaction value as the primary method unless properly rebutted", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25(1),25(3),25(4),25(5),196Customs Rules, 2001=107(a)", - "Case #": "Spl. Cus. Ref. A. 1355/2023 to 1557/2023. Date of hearing: 22.02.2024. Date of Order: 22.02.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR MR. JUSTICE ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicant(s): Mr. Faheem Raza, Advocate.\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Khalid Jawed Khan along with M/s. Irfan Ali & Uzair Shoro, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. 1355/2023\nThe Collector of Customs VS M/s JW SEZ (PVT.) LTD. Lahore\n2. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1356/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n3. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1357/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n4. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1358/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n5. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1359/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n6. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1360/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n7. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1361/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n8. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1362/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n9. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1363/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n10. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1364/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n11. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1365/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n12. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1366/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n13. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1367/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n14. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1368/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n15. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1369/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n16. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1370/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n17. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1371/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n18. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1372/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n19. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1373/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n20. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1374/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n21. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1375/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n22. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1376/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n23. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1377/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n24. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1378/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n25. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1379/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n26. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1380/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n27. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1381/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n28. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1382/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n29. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1383/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n30. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1384/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n31. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1385/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n32. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1386/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n33. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1387/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n34. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1388/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n35. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1389/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n36. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1390/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n37. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1391/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n38. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1392/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n39. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1393/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n40. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1394/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n41. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1395/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n42. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1396/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n43. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1397/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n44. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1398/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n45. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1399/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n46. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1400/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n47. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1401/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n48. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1402/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n49. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1403/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n50. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1404/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n51. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1405/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n52. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1406/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n53. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1407/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n54. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1408/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n55. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1409/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n56. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1410/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n57. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1411/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n58. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1412/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n59. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1413/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n60. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1414/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n61. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1415/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n62. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1416/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n63. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1417/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n64. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1418/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n65. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1419/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n66. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1420/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n67. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1421/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n68. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1422/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n69. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1423/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n70. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1424/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n71. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1425/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n72. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1426/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n73. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1427/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n74. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1428/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n75. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1429/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n76. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1430/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n77. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1431/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n78. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1432/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n79. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1433/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n80. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1434/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n81. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1435/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n82. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1436/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n83. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1437/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n84. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1438/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n85. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1439/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n86. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1440/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n87. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1441/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n88. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1442/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n89. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1443/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n90. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1444/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n91. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1445/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n92. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1446/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n93. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1447/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n94. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1448/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n95. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1449/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n96. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1450/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n97. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1451/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n98. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1452/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n99. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1453/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n100. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1454/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n101. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1455/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n102. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1456/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n103. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1457/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n104. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1458/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n105. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1459/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n106. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1460/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n107. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1461/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n108. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1462/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n109. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1463/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n110. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1464/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. MG JW Automobile Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n111. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1465/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n112. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1466/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n113. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1467/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n114. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1546/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr-(West) Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n115. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1547/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr.(West) Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n116. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1548/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr (West), Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n117. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1549/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr (West), Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n118. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1550/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr (West), Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n119. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1551/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr (West), Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n120. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1552/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr (West), Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n121. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1553/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr. (West) Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n122. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1554/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr. (West), Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n123. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1555/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr. (West), Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n124. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1556/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr. (West) Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore\n125. S pl. Cus. Ref. A. 1557/2023\nThe Collector of Customs, Appr. (West), Karachi VS M/s. JW SEZ (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26022", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFDNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 839 = 2025 SLD 839", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFDNHk", - "Key Words:": "The assessment order under Section 122(5A) was passed without fulfilling the twin legal conditions: (i) error on the face of record, and (ii) prejudice to revenue.\nDepartment issued notices without concluding prior proceedings under Section 111, thus violating SC precedent in Millat Tractors Ltd. (2024 PTD 483).\nAppellant explained and documented foreign remittances, including property sale in Canada and IT income from the USA.\nGift to wife was properly documented, and withholding tax credit was wrongly disallowed.\nOfficer ignored submissions, issued a non-speaking order, and failed to follow principles of natural justice.\nKey Documentary Evidence Submitted by Taxpayer:\nWealth Statements (Tax Years 2017, 2018)\nSale Agreement for Canadian property (CDN$ 668,000)\nBank Statements – RBC (Canada) & HMBL (Pakistan)\nProceeds Realization Certificates (PRCs)\nIT Services Agreement with SATMAP (USA)\nGift Deed and wife’s return showing receipt of gift\nTax deduction details for claimed credits\nTribunal’s Findings:\nOn Foreign Remittances:\nRemittances exceeding Rs. 5 million must be explained.\nAppellant fully explained source (sale of foreign property) and provided bank trail.\nAmounts were remitted through normal banking channels and documented via PRCs.\nAddition under Section 111(1) was not warranted; remittances are excluded by virtue of Section 111(4)(a).\nOn IT Income (Exempt):\nIncome from IT services rendered abroad is exempt under clause (133).\nIncome was wrongly taxed despite relevant agreements and bank receipts.\nOn Gift to Spouse:\nProper gift deed, bank entries, and declaration in wife’s return were provided.\nGift was genuine and disclosed—addition was unjustified.\nOn Withholding Tax Credit:\nOfficer erroneously disallowed Rs. 62,215 of tax credit, even though evidence of deduction was provided.\nOn Procedural Violations:\nInvoking Section 122(5A) without fulfilling the mandatory twin conditions is illegal.\nOfficer failed to conclude proceedings under Section 111 before amending return under Section 122—violates Millat Tractors SC decision.\nAddition of Rs. 69,530,378 was done without proper computation, and declared income was wrongly ignored.\nImportant Precedents Cited:\nMillat Tractors Ltd. (2024 PTD 483, SC) – Proceedings under Section 111 must be concluded first.\n2014 SLD 2034 / 2015 PTD 626 (ATIR) – Justified foreign remittances do not invoke Section 111(1).\n2015 PTD 1219 (LHC) & 2005 CL 616 (ATIR) – Assessment cannot be based on assumptions/guesswork.\nFive-Member ATIR Bench (2016) – Section 122(5A) requires error + prejudice to revenue, not fishing inquiries.\nConclusion & Order:\nAppeal allowed\nOrder-in-Original annulled in entirety\nAdditions under Section 111(1), disallowance of exemptions/credits, and foreign remittance adjustments were all unjustified\nHeld to be void ab initio due to legal, factual, and procedural infirmities", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1438/KB-2024 (Tax Year 2018). Date of Hearing: 12.12.2024. Date of Order: 28.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mrs. Fouzia Rasheed, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Kashif Khan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. AHSAN AMIN YAQINUDDIN, KARACHI ......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (APPEAL), ZONE-I, RTO-II KARACHI ...... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26023", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 840 = 2025 SLD 840", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzc", - "Key Words:": "The taxpayer filed a return declaring income of Rs. 234,790 for tax year 2015.\nThe case was selected for audit under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nTaxpayer failed to produce books of account and relevant documents during audit proceedings.\nThe assessing officer issued an amended assessment order under Section 122(1), raising income to Rs. 884,790.\nTaxpayer appealed; CIR(A) annulled the amended assessment.\nKey Legal Issues:\nWhether the assessing officer was justified in finalizing amended assessment under Section 122(1) without definite information or material evidence as required by Section 122(5).\nWhether the assessing officer should have instead used best judgment assessment under Section 121(1)(d) read with Section 177(10) due to non-production of documents.\nLegality and validity of the amended assessment order challenged by the Department.\nFindings of the Tribunal:\nIt is undisputed that taxpayer did not provide the required books of account and supporting evidence during audit under Section 177.\nThe assessing officer did not produce any definite information or tangible material to justify invoking Section 122(1).\nThe statutory procedure mandates that where records are not produced, the officer should exercise best judgment assessment powers under Section 121(1)(d) and Section 177(10).\nThe use of Section 122(1) without definite information or proper basis renders the amended order legally unsustainable.\nThe appellate authority (CIR(A)) correctly annulled the order.\nNo illegality or infirmity found in the CIR(A)’s order.\nConclusion:\nThe Department’s appeal is dismissed as devoid of merit.\nThe principle of statutory adherence to provisions for assessments is reaffirmed.\nProper recourse for non-compliance with audit demands is best judgment assessment, not amendment under Section 122(1) without definite information.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122(1),122(1)(d),122(1),122(5),177,177(10),214C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1048/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2015). Date of Hearing & Order: 12.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD NAEEM ASHRAF, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR\nRespondent By: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI …. APPELLANT\nVS\nMR. MUHAMMAD IFTIKHAR; M/S SANGUM JUICE, H. NO. C-155, LALA RUKH, WAH CANTT. ….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26024", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 841 = 2025 SLD 841", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzY", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nPetitioner appointed as Assistant Director Labour (BPS-17) in 1985.\nPromoted to Deputy Director Labour (2008), then Joint Director Labour (2019).\nDespite seniority and eligibility, petitioner bypassed for promotion to BS-20 in December 2018; juniors promoted instead.\nPetitioner filed departmental appeals (December 2019) challenging non-promotion and unlawful transfer to Sukkur (Feb 2019).\nAppeals remained unanswered.\nPetitioner retired on December 14, 2019 (notification issued Feb 2020) with appeals unresolved.\nPetitioner alleges favoritism, discrimination, and violation of constitutional rights.\nSeeks Court direction for decision on proforma promotion to BS-20.\nArguments:\nPetitioner’s Counsel:\nPetitioner was senior-most eligible officer unjustly overlooked.\nTransfer despite critical health (cardiac patient).\nNon-promotion and ignored appeals violate fundamental rights and service rules.\nEarlier Supreme Court rulings require timely and fair promotion decisions.\nRespondents (AAAG):\nProforma promotion post-retirement requires PSB/DPC recommendation as per Rule 7-A of Sindh Civil Servants Rules, 1974.\nNo such recommendation exists; petition is not maintainable.\nFindings:\nPetitioner’s seniority and eligibility for BS-20 proforma promotion established.\nJunior officers promoted before petitioner without valid basis.\nPetitioner’s appeals on non-promotion and transfer remain undecided despite retirement.\nPrima facie departmental apathy and procedural lapse in handling appeals.\nCourt references multiple Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the right to timely and fair promotions and remedy for service injustice:\nSecretary Schools of Education v. Rana Arshad Khan (2012 SCMR 126)\nFederation of Pakistan v. Jahanzaib (2023 PLC (C.S.) 336)\nHomeo Dr. Asma Noureen Syed v. Government of Punjab (2022 SCMR 1546)\nDr. Syed Sabir Ali v. Government of Punjab (2008 SCMR 1535)\nFederation of Pakistan v. Amir Zaman Shinwari (2008 SCMR 1138)\nDr. Muhammad Amjad v. Dr. Israr Ahmed (2010 SCMR 1466)\nOrder:\nCompetent authority directed to decide the petitioner’s pending departmental appeal on proforma promotion to BS-20 within three months.\nDecision to duly consider petitioner’s seniority, eligibility, and relevant law.\nPetition disposed accordingly.\nSignificance:\nReinforces the service law principle that senior eligible officers cannot be bypassed without just cause.\nHighlights courts’ role in ensuring due process and fair treatment in promotions, especially post-retirement proforma cases.\nStresses compliance with established Supreme Court service jurisprudence on promotion and departmental appeals.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974=7-A", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-1401 OF 2021. Date of hearing: 16-05-2025. Date of order: 16-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MOHAMMAD KARIM KHAN AGHA JUSTICE ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: through Mr. S. Inayat Hussain Shah Bukhari advocate\nRespondent Nos. 1 & 2: Mr. Ali Safdar Depar AAG", - "Petitioner Name:": "TANVEER SULTAN \nVS \nPROVINCE OF SINDH & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26025", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 842 = 2025 SLD 842", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzU", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nMuhammad Adil and co-accused Syed Muhammad Hassan allegedly entered a fraudulent property transaction with complainant Dr. Muhammad Shoaib Khan in June 2023 for a Karachi plot.\nThe complainant paid Rs.14 million, disposing of personal assets to fund the purchase.\nThe accused handed over a forged sale agreement in the name of Abdul Ejaz and original property documents, receiving Rs.300,000/- and the documents for registration.\nDespite repeated requests, registration was delayed, and fraud was suspected, leading to the FIR.\nEarlier bail was rejected by Sessions Court on 14.04.2025.\nApplicant’s Arguments:\nThe dispute is civil in nature, maliciously converted into a criminal case.\nThe applicant was merely a facilitator, introducing complainant to the true seller, Abdul Ejaz.\nThe agreement bears signatures of all parties, with no proof of forgery.\nThere was a prior joint venture with profit-sharing, and the complainant’s failure to meet obligations led to the dispute.\nApplicant invested Rs.2 million and gave post-dated cheques under a settlement which was misused by complainant.\nFIR filed after two months delay, undermining credibility.\nNo criminal antecedents; long custody causing hardship.\nBail should be granted pending trial under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.\nState’s and Complainant’s Arguments:\nApplicant and co-accused previously granted pre-arrest bail upon written undertakings to transfer property and provide possession within 90 days.\nThey failed to fulfill undertakings; post-dated cheques issued in a second settlement were dishonored, leading to another FIR for cheque dishonor (Section 489-F PPC).\nBail was canceled; accused declared proclaimed offenders after failure to surrender.\nDocumentary evidence including bank records shows receipt of Rs.3,195,000/- by applicant from complainant.\nInvestigation revealed “seller” Abdul Ejaz had no lawful title; documents were forged.\nAccused submitted forged documents to court, misled judiciary, absconded, violated bail terms, and misused legal process.\nCited Supreme Court rulings (2015 SCMR 1716) denying bail to accused involved in organized fraud and court violations.\nBail application opposed to protect public interest and prevent further abuse.\nCourt’s Findings:\nThe case involves calculated fraud, forgery, and conscious obstruction of justice.\nApplicant admitted transactional liability through court undertakings but breached them repeatedly.\nForged documents and dishonest financial conduct established on record.\nApplicant absconded despite bail cancellation and court directions, demonstrating bad faith and contempt for the legal process.\nThe crime transcends civil dispute and falls within serious penal liability under Sections 420, 468, 471, and 34 PPC.\nThe plea that the dispute is documentary and civil is rejected as the evidence shows deliberate economic fraud and breach of trust.\nBail is discretionary and must be refused where accused abuse court process and demonstrate propensity to evade justice.\nThe “financial murder” of the complainant via fraudulent means calls for firm judicial response.\nRecovery of money alone does not justify bail where offense involves economic fraud and forgery.\nThe newly raised “partnership” defense lacks evidentiary support and appears fabricated.\nCited precedents reinforce denial of bail to accused who violate court orders, submit forged documents, and abscond.\nOrder:\nBail application is dismissed.\nThe applicant is directed to remain in custody pending trial.\nCourt order is to be forwarded to trial court for necessary compliance.\nObservations are tentative and do not affect trial merits.\nSignificance:\nUpholds strict approach against white-collar crimes involving forgery, fraud, and breach of trust.\nDenies bail where accused misuse judicial process and fail to honor bail conditions.\nEmphasizes judicial responsibility to protect victims and public confidence in property transactions.\nAffirms that economic fraud accompanied by forged documents is a serious criminal offense, not a mere civil dispute.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=468,471", - "Case #": "Criminal Bail Application No.1079 of 2025. Date of hearing: 16.05.2025. Date of order: 19.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: KHALID HUSSAIN SHAHANI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Amir Shah, Advocate.\nM/s Qamaruddin & Tanseera Ayoub, Asstt. P.G. duly assisted by Arfan Hussain Shah, Advocate for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "APPLICANT: MUHAMMAD ADIL SON OF MUHAMMAD HAROON\nVS\nRESPONDENT: THE STATE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26026", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 843 = 2025 SLD 843", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Abstract\nThis article analyzes the recent decision of the High Court of Punjab wherein the Court set aside a show cause notice issued by the Punjab Revenue Authority under Section 52 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012. The petitioner contended that as a withholding agent, the proper legal provisions to invoke were Sections 14 and 14A of the Act, not Section 52, which pertains to offences and penalties. The judgment extensively discusses the statutory scheme, constitutional safeguards of due process, and the appropriate application of withholding tax procedures vis-à-vis penalty provisions.\nBackground\nThe petitioner was served a show cause notice under Section 52 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012, demanding tax liability. Challenging this, the petitioner argued that Section 14, relating to withholding agents, was the applicable provision governing their tax obligations. It was alleged that the Revenue Authority bypassed the proper statutory channels and violated constitutional guarantees of fair trial (Article 10-A) and protection against unlawful deprivation (Article 4).\nLegal Framework\nSection 14 empowers the Authority to prescribe procedures for withholding tax on services, requiring agents to deduct and remit tax.\nSection 14A allows for special procedures in tax collection and payment.\nSection 52 pertains to offences and penalties, including recovery of tax not levied or short levied, situated within Chapter VIII of the Act.\nThe petitioner, functioning as a withholding agent, falls squarely under the ambit of Sections 14 and 14A, which represent the primary charging and collection mechanisms. Section 52, being part of offences and penalties, is ancillary and not a direct charging provision.\nIssues Examined\nLegality of Show Cause Notice under Section 52 without invoking Section 14\nCompliance with principles of natural justice and constitutional due process\nProper statutory interpretation according to the Doctrine of Textualism\nJudicial precedents on issuance and scope of tax notices\nCourt’s Analysis\nThe Court reaffirmed that the issuance of a show cause notice must strictly adhere to the relevant provisions governing the taxpayer’s status. Since the petitioner acted as a withholding agent, the withholding provisions under Sections 14 and 14A must precede any penal action under Section 52. Invoking Section 52 directly, without complying with the procedural safeguards embedded in the withholding tax regime, was held ultra vires.\nThe Court emphasized the constitutional mandates under Articles 4 and 10-A, stressing the petitioner’s right to be heard through proper notice and adjudication processes. Reference was made to recent Supreme Court rulings expanding the ambit of fair trial rights in fiscal matters.\nThe judgment further highlighted the necessity of applying the plain language of the statute rather than resorting to extraneous legislative history or purposive interpretation, citing the Doctrine of Textualism.\nKey Precedents\nRahat Cafe v. Government of Punjab (2024 PTD 898): On procedural requirements under Section 52.\nReliance Commodities (Pvt) Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 Lahore 632): Scope of show cause notices.\nChenab Flour and General Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2021 Lahore 343): Taxpayer protections under tax statutes.\nFederal Government Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed (PLD 2025 SC 11): Constitutional due process in taxation.\nConclusion and Disposition\nThe Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the impugned show cause notice issued under Section 52 of the Act for being legally unsustainable. The matter was remanded to the Additional Commissioner Punjab Revenue Authority, Rawalpindi, for fresh consideration strictly under the withholding tax provisions of Sections 14 and 14A. The Authority was directed to provide the petitioner a fair hearing and to issue a speaking order within four weeks.\nThe judgment underscores the importance of procedural compliance and constitutional protections in tax administration, particularly for withholding agents, reinforcing the legal architecture designed to balance state revenue interests with taxpayer rights.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=14,14A,52", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 2838/2024. Date of hearing & order: 04.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner By: Hafiz Muhammad Idris, ASC with M/s Hassan Askari Kazmi and Hafiz Muhammad Tanveer Nasir, Advocates.\nRespondents By: Barrister Raja Hashim Javaid, with Ms. Rahat Farooq Raja, Assistant Advocates General.\nMr. Zeeshan Zafar Hashmi, Advocate on behalf of the Punjab Revenue Authority with Ms. Nadia Murad, Legal Officer.\nMr. Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General alongwith Barrister Zoopash Khan, Advocate.\nResearch Assistance by: Mr. Mujtaba-ul-Hassan, Civil Judge/ Research Officer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAUJI CEMENT COMPANY LIMITED\nVS \nGOVT. OF PUNJAB ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26027", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 844 = 2025 SLD 844", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYy8", - "Key Words:": "In the appeal against the sales tax demand on Government subsidy for the tax period July 2010 to June 2011, the Tribunal examined whether the subsidy paid by the Government to the appellant is subject to sales tax. The appellant argued that the subsidy is not consideration received from the recipient of taxable supply and thus not taxable under Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The department contended that the subsidy forms part of the total price received by the appellant and is taxable.\nAfter considering the arguments and relying on binding precedents from the Full Bench of the Tribunal, the court held that the subsidy does not constitute value of taxable supply and therefore sales tax cannot be levied on it. The impugned orders demanding sales tax on subsidy were accordingly annulled, and the appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 351/IB/2017 & MA (AG) STA No.23/IB/2020 (Tax Period July 2010 to June 2011). Date of Hearing: 11.01.2022. Date of Order: 04.03.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M.M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Mansoor Saeed, FCA\nRespondent By: Mr. Imran Shah, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S UTILITY STORES CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN (PVT) LTD, UTILITY STORES CORPORATION PLAZA, 20-E, 2ND FLOOR G-9 MARKAZ, ISLAMABAD ….. APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, ISLAMABAD ….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26028", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 845 = 2025 SLD 845", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYys", - "Key Words:": "Case Background:\nThe appeal arises from the dismissal of a suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant against Habib Bank Ltd. and others for recovery of Rs. 5.5 crore based on a contractual agreement dated August 1, 2012. The plaintiff claimed entitlement to this amount plus profit and costs. However, the bank allegedly breached the contract by refusing to pay as per the agreed terms.\nProcedural History:\nThe plaintiff first filed the suit before the District Judge Mirpur.\nThe suit was returned on September 21, 2019, under Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) for want of jurisdiction.\nSubsequently, the plaintiff filed the same suit before the Banking Court, which was also returned on August 30, 2021.\nThe plaintiff’s third attempt was to file the suit before the Additional District Judge Mirpur.\nThe Additional District Judge dismissed the suit on June 30, 2022, again on jurisdictional grounds, prompting the present appeal.\nLegal Issues and Court’s Findings:\nThe fundamental legal principle “Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium” (where there is a right, there is a remedy) was highlighted. This principle mandates that a party with a legal right should have access to a proper legal remedy unless jurisdiction is explicitly barred.\nUnder Section 9 of the CPC, civil courts have jurisdiction over all civil suits unless jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred.\nThe controversy involves a fixed amount and a dispute over agreed interest rates, but no loan or finance liability exists between the appellant and the bank.\nTherefore, the Banking Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this matter because:\nThe suit is not about recovery of a loan or finance facility.\nThe Banking Courts’ jurisdiction is limited to disputes arising out of finance or loan defaults under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\nThe appellant was neither a borrower nor a customer within the meaning of the Financial Institutions Ordinance since no finance facility was extended to her.\nThe suit pertains to a contractual dispute over an amount allegedly owed, which falls within the civil court’s jurisdiction.\nPrior judgments were cited to emphasize that suits for damages or recovery unrelated to finance or loan defaults are not maintainable in Banking Courts:\nNajeebullah Qureshi v. Citi Bank (2009 CLC 49)\nAllied Bank Ltd. v. Safa Textile (2013 CLC 2022)\nMerely being an account holder does not convert the plaintiff into a customer entitled to file a suit in the Banking Court.\nDeposits or opening of accounts are not considered “finance” under the Ordinance; thus, such disputes are outside Banking Court jurisdiction.\nDecision:\nThe appeal was accepted.\nThe impugned order dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction was set aside.\nThe suit was remanded to the trial court (civil court) with directions to adjudicate the matter in accordance with the law.\nThe record of the trial court was to be returned.\nThe case file was to be kept in the archive.\nDirections were also issued to the court registry to inform the parties and their counsel.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.171/2022. Date of institution 15.08.2022. Date of decision 12.10.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JUSTICE SYED SHAHID BAHAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Sohail Shamim, advocate for the Appellant.\nRaja Mohammad Taj, Advocate for Respondents No.1 to 6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zohra Bibi Maroof wife of Mohammad Maroof Caste Jatt r/o Dhangri Bala Tehsil & District Mirpur …. Appellant\nVS\n1. Habib Bank Ltd. Through President Habib Bank Ltd. Habib Bank Plaza II Chandreegar Road Karachi;\n2. President Habib Bank Ltd. Habib Bank Plaza II Chandreegar Road Karachi;\n3. Group Head Habib Bank Ltd. Habib Bank Plaza II Chandreegar Road Karachi;\n4. SRC Habib Bank Ltd, Region Mirpur Bank Square Nangi Mirpur;\n5. Habib Bank Ltd. Through Manager Habib Bank Ltd. Main Branch Chaksawari Tehsil & District Mirpur;\n6. Manager Habib Bank Ltd. Main Branch Chaksawari Mirpur Azad Kashmir;\n7. Qazi Arfan Mehmood s/o Abdul Majeed Qazi r/o House No.108 Sector E/4 Tehsil & District Mirpur … Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26029", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 846 = 2025 SLD 846", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzk", - "Key Words:": "Case Context:\nThis judgment pertains to an application under Section 6 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitral Agreement & Foreign Arbitral Award) Act, 2011, concerning the enforcement of an international arbitral award issued in favor of SpaceCom International LLC (“SpaceCom”), a US-based satellite communications company, against Wateen Telecom Limited (“Wateen”), a Pakistani telecom operator.\nParties & Contract:\nSpaceCom and Wateen entered into a Master Service Agreement (MSA) in 2014 governing the provision of satellite communication services. Previous MSAs existed from 2007 and 2013, as well as a settlement agreement in 2014.\nArbitration Clause & Seat Dispute:\nThe 2014 MSA included an arbitration clause stating disputes were to be resolved by arbitration in Dubai, UAE, pursuant to the rules of arbitration of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The parties disagreed whether the seat of arbitration was Dubai UAE (mainland Dubai) or the DIFC, an offshore financial free zone with its own legal system and arbitration rules (DIFC-LCIA).\nArbitration Proceedings:\nSpaceCom initiated arbitration under DIFC-LCIA rules in Dubai International Financial Centre, while Wateen contended that the seat of arbitration was Dubai mainland, not DIFC. This led to litigation over jurisdiction and seat of arbitration, including injunctions and anti-suit proceedings.\nAwards Rendered:\nThe arbitral tribunal rendered awards on merits and costs favoring SpaceCom, but Wateen challenged recognition/enforcement of these awards in Pakistan, citing procedural irregularities based on the incorrect seat of arbitration.\nLegal Issues:\nJurisdiction and Seat of Arbitration:\nThe Court emphasized that the seat of arbitration is critical as it determines the procedural law governing arbitration, the supervisory courts, and enforceability of awards.\nDistinction Between Dubai Mainland and DIFC:\nThe UAE Constitution and Federal laws establish DIFC as a financial free zone with independent laws separate from mainland Dubai. The DIFC-LCIA rules apply only to arbitrations seated within DIFC.\nParty Autonomy & Arbitration Law:\nThe parties had repeatedly agreed in prior agreements that the seat was Dubai, but not explicitly DIFC. The reference to DIFC arbitration rules in the 2014 MSA does not override the choice of Dubai as the seat.\nCourt’s Review Power:\nUnder Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention and the 2011 Act, the enforcement court may refuse recognition if the arbitration procedure or composition of tribunal was not as agreed. The court has the right and duty to conduct a de novo review of the parties arbitration agreement and the facts.\nFindings:\nThe arbitral tribunal wrongly accepted DIFC as the seat, relying heavily on DIFC court rulings which were not binding and exceeded their jurisdiction by determining seat issues prematurely.\nThe tribunal abdicated its power to decide jurisdiction properly, treating DIFC court decisions as res judicata, which the Court found erroneous.\nThe parties clearly intended Dubai mainland (not DIFC) as the seat of arbitration, evidenced by contractual history, consistent prior agreements, and correspondence.\nSpaceCom’s attempts to conflate the seat of arbitration with the procedural rules applicable were rejected.\nThe court emphasized the importance of respecting party autonomy in choosing the seat and procedural rules, reinforcing that the seat determines curial law and supervisory court jurisdiction.\nThe DIFC-LCIA institution refused initial arbitration requests due to lack of explicit agreement on DIFC rules and seat, underscoring the absence of consent.\nLegal Principles Applied:\nThe seat of arbitration designates the procedural law and forum for enforcement or challenge of awards.\nFailure to adhere to agreed seat or arbitration procedure may lead to refusal of award enforcement under Article V of the New York Convention.\nArbitration agreements and the parties’ intent are to be strictly interpreted, especially in international commercial arbitration.\nCourts are entitled to independently evaluate jurisdictional challenges, including the seat issue.\nThe contra proferentem rule (interpreting ambiguous contract terms against the drafter) was not applicable due to clear party intent and equal bargaining power.\nConclusion:\nThe Court refused recognition and enforcement of the arbitral awards in favor of SpaceCom because the arbitration procedure, specifically the seat of arbitration, was not in accordance with the parties agreement.\nThe application for enforcement was dismissed with costs", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Original No. 25854 of 2023. Date of Hearing. 06-11-2024. Date of order: 04-12-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: M/s Sameer Khosa, Momal Malik, and Hammad Hussain, Advocates.\nRespondent by: M/s Salman Akram Raja, Muhammad Umer Akram Chaudhry, Muhammad Ali Talib and Muhammad Hammad Amin and Waheed Ahmad, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "SPACECOM INTERNATIONAL, LLC\nVS\nWATEEN TELECOM LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26030", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 847 = 2025 SLD 847", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTYzg", - "Key Words:": "Parties and Context:\nThe Applicant challenged a decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal regarding duty and tax liability on spare parts imported under the Export Oriented Units and Small Medium Enterprise Rules, 2008 (“2008 Rules”).\nIssues Presented:\nWhether under Rule 10(1)(e) of the 2008 Rules, the Applicant was required to dispose of imported spare parts within ten years of importation and pay duties and taxes accordingly.\nWhether the second proviso to Rule 10(1)(e) applies to capital goods such as spare parts imported for use in an export-oriented unit.\nFacts and Background:\nThe Applicant imported spare parts duty-free under the exemption provided for export-oriented units.\nThe department issued a Show Cause Notice alleging the Applicant held onto the spares beyond the permissible period (alleged to be five years), thus liable to pay duties and taxes.\nThe Adjudicating Authority ruled in favor of the Applicant, vacating the Show Cause Notice and holding that Rule 10(1)(e) does not mandate compulsory disposal of plant, machinery, equipment, apparatus or capital goods within the retention period.\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal reversed this decision, ruling that the Show Cause Notice was justified and that the Applicant was liable.\nLegal Analysis:\nRule 10(1)(e) Overview:\nGrants duty exemption on plant, machinery, equipment, apparatus, including capital goods for use within an export-oriented unit, provided they are retained for ten years.\nContains a schedule specifying reduced rates of duties if disposal occurs within the 10-year period:\nDisposal before 5 years = full duties payable\nDisposal between 5 and 7.5 years = 50% duties\nDisposal between 7.5 and 10 years = 25% duties\nDisposal after 10 years = no duties payable\nCourt’s Interpretation:\nThe Rule does not impose any obligation to dispose of such goods within ten years if they are no longer in use.\nNo mandatory disposal mechanism or requirement is prescribed.\nDuties and taxes become payable only upon actual disposal, not mere retention or non-use.\nThe department’s attempt to demand duties on the basis of “imaginary disposal” or replacement is contrary to the law.\nThe Court criticized the Customs Appellate Tribunal for misinterpreting the Rule by imposing a compulsory disposal obligation that does not exist in the legal text.\nConclusion:\nThe Court answered both questions of law in favor of the Applicant and against the department.\nThe Applicant is not required to dispose of imported spares within ten years nor pay duties and taxes unless actual disposal occurs according to the rates prescribed.\nThe decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal was set aside, and the order of the Adjudicating Authority vacating the Show Cause Notice was upheld.\nOrders:\nThe Special Customs Reference Application was allowed.\nA copy of this judgment was directed to be sent to the Customs Appellate Tribunal as per statutory requirements.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Export Oriented Units and Small and Medium Enterprises Rules, 2008=10(1)(e)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) No. 725 of 2022. Date of hearing & Judgment: 30.04.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR ACJ. MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN,", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Jam Zeeshan Ali, Advocate.\nMr. Muhammad Bilal Bhatti, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "APPLICANT: ARTISTIC MILLINERS PVT. LIMITED THROUGH MR. JAM ZEESHAN ALI, ADVOCATE.\nVs\nRESPONDENTS: THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (EXPORT), PMBQ, KARACHI & ANOTHER THROUGH MR. MUHAMMAD BILAL BHATTI, ADVOCATE." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26031", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 848 = 2025 SLD 848", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTY3o", - "Key Words:": "Context:\nThis judgment concerns a reference application challenging an order related to the recovery of Punjab Sales Tax on Services from the applicant, who is a service recipient but not a service provider or registered person under the relevant law.\nKey Legal Questions:\nWhether the applicant, as a service recipient, can be held liable for recovery of tax under Section 52 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 (“the Act”).\nWhether the liability under Section 52 can be imposed on a withholding agent who is not a registered service provider.\nWhether the applicant is liable to pay tax for services when sales tax has already been paid under federal law.\nApplicability of Section 14 and the Punjab Sales Tax on Services (Withholding) Rules, 2015.\nImportant Legal Findings:\nSection 11 of the Act states that the liability to pay tax lies on the registered person providing services. Thus, two conditions must be met: the person must be registered and must provide the service.\nThe applicant does not meet either condition — they are neither registered nor a provider of services, but a recipient.\nSection 52 of the Act allows recovery of tax not levied or short-levied, but this section applies to persons liable to pay tax, i.e., registered service providers, not to service recipients.\nOther provinces like Sindh have amended their sales tax laws (e.g., Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011) to explicitly include withholding agents in the list of persons liable for recovery. Punjab has not done so.\nTherefore, no proceedings for recovery under Section 52 can be initiated against a service recipient acting as a withholding agent unless such an amendment exists.\nThe applicant argued correctly that sales tax had already been paid under federal law and that the tax was related to goods (manufactured by suppliers) rather than services, a distinction not considered in the impugned order.\nSection 24 of the Act deals with assessment of tax from registered service providers and supports that the assessment/recovery should be directed at the service providers, not the recipients.\nThe department could have initiated proceedings against the actual service providers but failed to do so for unknown reasons.\nThe Punjab Government’s Circular No. 2 of 2015 held in abeyance the levy of sales tax on inter-city transportation services, a relevant fact in this case, since no declaration was made for Truck Addas and thus tax could not have been lawfully levied.\nThe department’s reliance on Section 14 of the Act and the Punjab Sales Tax on Services (Withholding) Rules, 2015 was rejected.\nSection 14 authorizes special withholding procedures only after official gazette notification, which was lacking here.\nThe Rules, 2015 were made under a different section (Section 76), and thus cannot be relied on under Section 14.\nConclusion:\nThe court held in favor of the applicant, ruling that:\nThe applicant, being a service recipient and not a registered service provider, is not liable for recovery of sales tax under Section 52 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012.\nThe impugned order holding the applicant liable is set aside.\nThe reference application was allowed.\nOrder:\nThe impugned order is quashed.\nA copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Appellate Tribunal under the court’s seal as required by law.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,52Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=14,11,24,47(1B),52,67A,76", - "Case #": "Tax Ref. (PRA) No. 60652 of 2021. Date of Hearing: 05-06-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Ms. Asma Hamid, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S JAWA PHARMACEUTICALS (PVT.) LTD.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER PUNJAB REVENUE AUTHORITY & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26032", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 849 = 2025 SLD 849", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTY3k", - "Key Words:": "Background and Procedural History:\nThe appellant filed a return declaring a net income of Rs. 300,000 for Tax Year 2011.\nThe Assessing Officer obtained information about the appellant’s investment in immovable property worth Rs. 2,150,000.\nA show cause notice under sections 122(1)/122(5)/122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was issued alleging undisclosed income.\nDespite adjournments, the appellant failed to submit a reply during the assessment proceedings, leading to an amended order with additions under section 111(1)(b).\nThe appellant appealed to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) who dismissed the appeal for lack of satisfactory proof of source of investment (absence of registered sale deed or mutation).\nThe appellant then approached this Tribunal challenging the appellate order.\nKey Submissions by the Appellant:\nProduced the Iqrarnama (affidavit) dated January 3, 2011 regarding sale of property.\nSubmitted the registered sale deed and other relevant documents during Tribunal hearing.\nDeclared the property under the Assets Declaration Ordinance, 2019, paying the required tax on June 27, 2019.\nPresented tax payment challan and declaration to the Tribunal.\nDepartmental Representative did not dispute the authenticity of these documents or the applicability of the Assets Declaration Ordinance.\nFindings of the Tribunal:\nThe addition of Rs. 1,075,000 under section 111(1)(b) is not sustainable in law.\nThe initial assessment was rightly amended based on information about the property investment.\nHowever, failure to provide satisfactory response during assessment does not preclude the taxpayer from producing evidence at a later stage.\nSubmission of the registered sale deed and declaration under the Assets Declaration Ordinance, 2019 now fully substantiates the source of investment.\nThe Assets Declaration Ordinance grants statutory immunity from further proceedings once declaration and tax payment are made on the declared assets.\nAbsence of any rebuttal from the department supports the appellant’s case.\nConclusion and Order:\nThe appeal is allowed to the extent of the addition under section 111(1)(b) amounting to Rs. 1,075,000.\nThe impugned appellate order dated January 2, 2018, is modified accordingly.\nThe addition sustained by the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) under section 111(1)(b) is deleted.\nAny other parts of the assessment order not contested remain unaffected.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 983/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2011). Date of Hearing & Order: 13.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD NAEEM ASHRAF, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Inam ul Haq, ITP\nMr. Naeem Hassan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. AYAZ AHMAD S/O SARFRAZ AHMAD, H.NO.177,BLOCK-14,SARGODHA …… APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, SARGODHA." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26033", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 850 = 2025 SLD 850", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTc", - "Key Words:": "The appellant, National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), a federal statutory body established under the NCHR Act, 2012, filed this appeal against a judgment dated 16.06.2022 by a Single Judge, which allowed a writ petition filed by UBL.\nThe writ petition challenged an NCHR order directing UBL to enhance the pension of a retired employee of UBL.\nKey Legal and Factual Issues:\nThe NCHR is empowered to investigate and address complaints related to violations of human rights or negligence in preventing such violations by public servants.\nThe retired UBL employee was a private sector employee, not a civil or public servant; thus, his employment rights—including pension disputes—fall under private labor laws and contractual frameworks, not public service laws.\nPension and employment disputes in the private sector are subject to resolution by specialized forums and laws applicable to such matters, not by human rights commissions.\nThe NCHRs order to enhance pension exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and improperly encroached on the domain of other competent forums.\nThe role of NCHR is to promote and protect fundamental human rights broadly, not to intervene in contractual or employment matters best handled by appropriate courts or tribunals.\nHuman rights include the right to a dignified life, but pension disputes are essentially contractual/statutory issues outside NCHR’s mandate.\nCourt’s Analysis:\nThe Court explained the difference between human rights, constitutional rights, and service rights:\nHuman rights are universal and protected internationally and nationally;\nConstitutional rights are enforceable through courts for violations by the State;\nService rights for civil servants are regulated under specific civil service laws.\nThe Court highlighted that the retired UBL employee’s grievance should be pursued in appropriate forums that govern private employment disputes.\nThe NCHR’s intervention in this pension dispute sets a problematic precedent by blurring jurisdictional boundaries and undermining specialized legal forums.\nDecision:\nThe ICA filed by NCHR is dismissed in limine (without detailed hearing on merits).\nThe impugned order of the Single Judge allowing UBL’s writ petition and setting aside the NCHR order is maintained.\nThe retired employee is free to pursue his pension grievance before the proper legal forum, if advised.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ICA No. 301/2022. Date of Order: 11.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: KHADIM HUSSAIN SOOMRO, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Adeel Wahid and Mr. Salaar Khan, Advocates for Appellant", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF PAKISTAN\nVS\nUNITED BANK LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26034", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 851 = 2025 SLD 851", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTY", - "Key Words:": "Petitioners (legal heirs of Babu Noor Muhammad) filed a suit in 2008 claiming ownership of a property based on a registered sale deed dated 03.01.1956 executed by previous owner Balamkand.\nPetitioners alleged wrongful transfer of property in government records to Punjab Province and later Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA), Hazro, without mutation in their favor.\nTrial court initially ruled in favor of Petitioners, but Appellate Court reversed the decision in 2013, dismissing the suit. Petitioners challenged this reversal through civil revision.\nPetitioner’s Arguments:\nTrial court properly analyzed oral and documentary evidence supporting their ownership claim.\nAppellate court misread and ignored evidence, especially the registered sale deed and testimonies.\nRecurring wrong entries in revenue records give fresh cause of action; limitation should not bar their claim.\nOther legal heirs disassociated under pressure, but this was ignored.\nPetitioner sought interference by higher court citing legal precedents favoring their claim.\nRespondents’ Arguments:\nAppellate court judgment was sound, based on comprehensive review of evidence and records.\nLongstanding mutations and possession by government departments establish ownership by Punjab Province and TMA Hazro.\nPetitioners failed to prove mutation or possession; the registered sale deed was not adequately proved or authenticated.\nPetitioners’ case was time-barred and lacked locus standi due to delay and absence of continuous possession.\nSecondary evidence of sale deed was improperly admitted without required permission.\nCourt’s Findings:\nOn Ownership and Evidence:\nNo mutation was ever sanctioned in favor of Babu Noor Muhammad despite registered sale deed.\nAppellate court rightly found the sale deed unproven due to lack of attesting witnesses and proper authentication.\nDiscrepancies in testimonies and no official records showing possession or ownership by Petitioners or predecessors.\nProperty mutated to Provincial Government in 1965, then to TMA Hazro in 1990, with possession consistently with government entities.\nOn Possession:\nPossession follows title. Longstanding entries in revenue record favor government possession.\nLand was vacant and used by TMA for waste dumping, negating claim of Petitioners’ possession.\nContradictions in Petitioners’ pleadings further weakened case (claiming possession yet also seeking possession).\nOn Limitation:\nPetitioners delayed claim for decades (filed suit in 2008 though mutation to government was in 1965/1990).\nNo satisfactory explanation for delay or steps taken by deceased predecessor to assert ownership.\nSuit found hopelessly time-barred under Articles 120 and 142 of the Limitation Act.\nOn Legal Heirs and Procedural Issues:\nOther legal heirs surrendered claims and were removed as parties without objection.\nPetitioner failed to lawfully represent others via valid power of attorney.\nNon-decision of miscellaneous applications not fatal to merits of the appeal.\nOn Evidence Admissibility:\nSale deed was admitted as secondary evidence without following proper legal procedures for admissibility, making it legally insufficient.\nOn Precedents:\nCourt relied on multiple Supreme Court judgments affirming presumption of correctness of revenue entries, limitation principles, and evidentiary requirements for ownership claims.\nConclusion:\nThe Appellate Court’s well-reasoned judgment reversing the trial court’s decree was correct.\nNo jurisdictional error, illegality, or misreading of evidence was found to justify interference by this court.\nPetitioners failed to prove ownership or possession and the suit was barred by limitation.\nCivil revision was dismissed with no order as to costs.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Code of Civil Procedure of 1882=115,Order XLI Rule 33 CPCLimitation Act, 1908=120,142", - "Case #": "C.R. No. 654 of 2013. Date of Hearing: 07.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Barrister Syed Ali Nouman Shah and Arsalan Qaiser, Advocates\nRespondents by: Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate- General.\nMs. Nabila Rubab, Assistant Attorney General.\nSh. Zamir Hussain, Sr. ASC for the Respondent No.2/TMA, Hazro.", - "Petitioner Name:": "QAMAR-UL-ISLAM \nVS \nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26035", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 852 = 2025 SLD 852", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTU", - "Key Words:": "The appellant registered person was assessed by the tax authorities for under-declaration of sales for two tax periods: July 2010–June 2011 and July 2011–June 2012.\nDiscrepancies were found as declared sales were significantly less than aggregate bank deposits (Rs. 11.3 million and Rs. 11.05 million declared vs. Rs. 22.68 million and Rs. 25.52 million bank credits).\nAssessing Officer issued show cause notices and, due to non-response, passed ex-parte orders imposing sales tax, penalties under Section 33(11), and default surcharge under Section 34 on the alleged suppressed amounts.\nAppeals and Proceedings:\nRegistered person appealed before Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) [CIR(A)], who remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer to obtain and examine the registered person’s reply, citing lack of proper opportunity of hearing and procedural fairness.\nThe registered person remained dissatisfied and filed appeals before the tribunal.\nKey Contentions:\nAppellant (Authorized Representative) argued:\nAssessing Officer passed ex-parte orders without proper hearing.\nNo nexus was established between bank credits and sales, and it was wrong to treat all credit entries as taxable supplies.\nThe approach contradicted judicial precedents.\nRespondent (Departmental Representative) supported the CIR(A)’s order and prayed for its maintenance.\nFindings and Decision:\nTribunal examined the records and submissions.\nFound that Assessing Officer hastily passed ex-parte orders without giving adequate hearing opportunity to the registered person.\nThe CIR(A) rightly remanded the case to ensure procedural fairness, though directing the Assessing Officer to pass a new order without power was noted as improper, remand itself was justified.\nDirected the Assessing Officer to:\nProvide ample opportunity for hearing.\nProperly consider and evaluate documentary evidence submitted by the registered person.\nPass a reasoned speaking order in accordance with law.\nDisposition:\nAppeals are disposed of with the case remanded for fresh adjudication under the stated directions.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),33(11),34", - "Case #": "STA No. 226/IB/2014. STA No. 227/IB/2014. Date of hearing: 12.12.2023. Date of order: 01.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND SAJID NAZIR MALIK, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asad Azam FCA\nRespondent by: Mr. Shaharyar Akram, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ENVOY CONTINENTAL HOTEL (PVT.). LTD., ISLAMABAD …… APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, CTO, ISLAMABAD …… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26036", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 853 = 2025 SLD 853", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 6927 of 2021/BWP. Date of hearing: 05.12.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Amir Ajam Malik, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Ms. Riffat Yasmeen, Assistant Attorney General along with Ulfat Ali, Town Inspector.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. SAMINA ZIA \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26037", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 854 = 2025 SLD 854", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWS8", - "Key Words:": "Multiple petitions involving Mangla Metals Pvt. Ltd., Kohsar Hydro Pvt. Ltd., and associated parties were consolidated and heard together.\nPetitioners (shareholders/directors) alleged fraudulent activities, breach of trust, mismanagement, withholding of information, and financial irregularities by respondent CEO (also a shareholder) and related companies, including creation of sham companies and misappropriation of funds.\nPetitioners claimed wrongful withholding of dividends, unauthorized loans, embezzlement of millions of rupees, and conflict of interest by the respondent CEO.\nRespondents’ Position:\nRespondents denied all allegations, accused petitioners of concealment and misrepresentation, and questioned the maintainability of petitions.\nRespondents argued audits were conducted lawfully and with petitioner’s consent, and that allegations were afterthoughts motivated by internal disputes.\nRespondents highlighted availability of alternative legal remedies under the Companies Act, 2017.\nLegal Framework and Statutory Provisions:\nThe Companies Act, 2017 (adapted in Azad Jammu & Kashmir) provides mechanisms for investigation into company affairs (Sections 256–258).\nThe Commission has broad powers to investigate fraud, mismanagement, breach of trust, and other misconduct in company affairs.\nThe Court emphasized that statutory mechanisms, including appointing inspectors and conducting investigations, are the appropriate channels for resolving such disputes.\nCourt’s Observations and Reasoning:\nThe allegations involve complex factual and documentary evidence requiring detailed investigation beyond the scope of the Court’s immediate adjudication.\nPetitioners have failed to demonstrate sufficient prima facie evidence of fraud or mismanagement warranting the exercise of extraordinary powers under Section 286 of the Companies Act, 2017.\nThe petitions are premature because alternate remedies exist—namely, applications to the Commission for investigation and dispute resolution.\nThe Court underscored the principle that courts should promote Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) such as mediation and arbitration to resolve corporate disputes efficiently and avoid protracted litigation.\nMere allegations or isolated irregularities are insufficient to prove oppressiveness or fraudulent conduct necessary to invoke winding-up or other drastic remedies under Section 286.\nThe Court also noted principles of estoppel where petitioners participated in audits they now challenge.\nIt stressed that the Court cannot act as an investigative body and must allow statutory bodies empowered by law to conduct inquiries and investigations.\nConclusion and Orders:\nAll company petitions alleging fraud, mismanagement, and oppression are dismissed as premature and without sufficient basis for court intervention at this stage.\nPetitioners are at liberty to seek remedy by applying to the competent Commission for investigation under Sections 256, 257, and 258 of the Companies Act, 2017.\nThe Commission is legally obligated to consider such applications and conduct inquiries expeditiously and in accordance with law.\nThe file is ordered to be archived.\nSupporting Jurisprudence:\nCited case law includes precedents emphasizing:\nRequirement of cogent proof for court intervention under Section 286.\nPromotion of ADR mechanisms in corporate disputes.\nDoctrine of approbate and reprobate regarding participation in audits and later challenging their validity.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=242,243,256,257,258", - "Case #": "Company Petition No. 01/2023. Company Petition No. 02/2023. Date of Institution 17.01.2023. Date of Institution 17.01.2023. Date of decision. 26.11.2024. Company Petition No. 01/2024. Date of Institution 29.05.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JUSTICE SYED SHAHID BAHAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Adnan Nawaz Khan, Advocate for the petitioner-Mansoor Ahmed Khan.\nBarrister Humayun Nawaz Khan, Advocate for M/s Mengla Metals and Kohsar Hydro Power Ltd.-respondents, petitioner in writ No.01/2024. Ms. Farkhanda Ibrar, Advocate/Legal Advisor for respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Company Petition No. 01/2023. Date of Institution 17.01.2023. Date of decision. 26.11.2024.\nMansoor Ahmed Khan, Director of Mangla Metals (Pvt.) Ltd. R/o House No.149-E, Street No.34, Sector I-8/8, Islamabad …... Petitioner\nVs\n1. Kohsar Hydro Ltd. through its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) having office at Plot No.226-B, Small Industrial Estate, Mirpur Azad Kashmir, Kotli Road, Jari Kas, Mirpur.\n2. Mr. Zulfiqar Abbasi Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Kohsar Hydro (Pvt.) ltd. having office at Plot No.226-B, Small Industrial Estate, Mirpur Azad Kashmir, Kotli Road Jari Kas, Mirpur.\n3. Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies and Firms, near MDA office, Tariqabad, Muzaffarabad Azad Kashmir.\n4. Deputy Registrar of Companies, Mirpur Azad Jammu & Kashmir .... Respondents\nCompany Petition No. 02/2023. Date of Institution 17.01.2023.\nMansoor Ahmed Khan, Director of Mangla Metals (Pvt.) Ltd. R/o House No.149-E, Street No.34, Sector I-8/2, Islamabad ….. Petitioner\nVs\n1. Mangla Metals Pvt. Ltd. through its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) having office at Plot No.226-B, Small Industrial Estate Mirpur Azad Kashmir, Kotli Road, Jari Kas, Mirpur.\n2. Mr. Zulfiqar Abbasi Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Mangla Metals Pvt. Ltd. having office at Plot No.226-B, Small Industrial Estate, Mirpur Azad Kashmir, Kotli Road, Jari Kas, Mirpur.\n3. Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies and Firms, near MDA office, Tariqabad, Muzaffarabad Azad Kashmir.\n4. Deputy Registrar of Companies, Mirpur Azad Jammu & Kashmir …. Respondents \nCompany Petition No. 01/2024. Date of Institution 29.05.2024.\n1. M/s Mangla Metals (Pvt.) limited through its Chief Executive, Zulfiqar Abbasi, R/o Plot No. 226B, Small Industrial Estate Mirpur Azad Kashmir.\n2. M/s Kohsar Hydropower (Pvt.) Limited through its Chief Executive, Zulfiqar Abbasi, Plot No.226B, Small Industrial Estate, Mirpur Azad Kashmir.\n3. Mr. Zulfiqar Abbasi, Chief Executive of Mangla Metals (Pvt.) Limited & Kohsar Hydropower (Pvt.) Ltd. Plot No.226B, Small Industrial Estate, Mirpur Azad Kashmir ..... Petitioners\nVs\n1. Mansoor Ahmed Khan, Director Mangla Metals (Pvt.) Limited & Kohsar Hydropower (Pvt.) Ltd, R/o House No.149-E, Street No.34, Sector I-8/2, Islamabad.\n2. Commission constituted under section 3 of Companies (Adaptation) Act, 2021 through its Chairman C/O Joint Stock Companies & Firms, Near MDA Office, Muzaffarabad.\n3. Registrar, Joint Stock Companies & Firms, Near MDA Office, Muzaffarabad.\n4. The Manager, United Bank Limited, I/8 Markaz Branch, Islamabad.\n5. The Manager, MCB, I/8 Markaz Branch, Islamabad.\n6. The Manager, Bank Alfalah, I/8 Markaz Branch, Islamabad.\n7. The Manager, JS Bank, I/8 Markaz Branch, Islamabad.\n8. The Manager, JS Bank, I/9 Markaz Branch, Islamabad.\n9. The Manager, Bank Islami, I/8-2 Branch, Islamabad.\n10. The Manager, Meezan Bank, I/8 Markaz Branch, Islamabad.\n11. The Manager, Dubai Islamic Bank, I/8 Markaz Branch, Islamabad.\n12. The Manager, HBL, I/9 Branch, Islamabad .... Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26038", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 855 = 2025 SLD 855", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWSs", - "Key Words:": "Petition challenging the unlawful blocking/suspension of the Petitioner’s user ID/NTN under Section 155F of the Customs Act, 1969.\nFacts:\nThe Petitioner’s user ID was blocked/suspended by the Collector of Customs Appraisement (East), Karachi, based on a letter dated 11.03.2025 from Respondent No. 2, citing powers under Section 155F of the Customs Act.\nSection 155F governs cancellation or suspension of registration of a registered user of the Customs Computerized System under specific conditions, requiring notice and opportunity of hearing before suspension or cancellation.\nThe statute provides that suspension can be immediate only in exceptional circumstances but must be followed by notice and reasonable hearing.\nIssue:\nWhether the suspension/blocking of the Petitioner’s user ID was lawful and within the Collector’s jurisdiction.\nCourt’s Findings:\nNo notice was issued to the Petitioner, nor was any reasonable opportunity of hearing afforded before suspension.\nThe suspension thus violated the procedural safeguards prescribed under Section 155F.\nSuspension without compliance with the statutory procedure is without lawful authority and jurisdiction.\nOrder:\nThe Petition is allowed.\nThe blocking/suspension of the Petitioner’s user ID is declared unlawful and is set aside.\nThe Petitioner’s user ID is restored immediately.\nPending proceedings under Section 155F may continue in accordance with the law, ensuring due process.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-1257 of 2025. Date of hearing and order: 08.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. M. Saad Shafique Siddiqui & M. Aibak Ali shah, Advocates.\nMr. Khalid Mehmood Rajpar, Advocate.\nMs. Alizeh Bashir, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: Owner of M/s Simba Enterprises\nRespondent: Federation of Pakistan & Another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26039", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 856 = 2025 SLD 856", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTk", - "Key Words:": "Assessing Officer identified under-deduction of withholding tax related to Capital Work in Progress and administrative expenses for Tax Years 2015 and 2016.\nMultiple show cause notices issued under Section 161(1A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe appellant’s explanations were found unsatisfactory, resulting in demand of withholding tax amounts:\nRs. 870,202,884 for non-resident payments,\nRs. 63,813,262 for resident payments,\nRs. 47,639,014 for payments to holding company FFBL,\nplus default surcharge and penalties.\nAppeals to CIR(A) resulted in remand to Assessing Officer for fresh determination without full adjudication.\nAppellant challenges remand and seeks full resolution.\nKey Issue:\nWhether it was lawful and proper to consolidate the assessments for two distinct tax years into one order.\nFindings:\nEach tax year is a separate unit of assessment under tax law; liabilities must be determined independently for each year.\nThe Assessing Officer erred in consolidating the proceedings for both years in a single order.\nThe CIR(A) correctly identified the procedural lapse but did not fully address it.\nThe Department admitted that final adjudication was not segregated year-wise.\nOrder:\nThe appellate order of CIR(A) is modified.\nThe Assessing Officer is directed to:\nPass separate, detailed, and reasoned orders for Tax Year 2015 and Tax Year 2016.\nQuantify withholding tax liabilities separately for each tax year as per law.\nProvide the appellant a fair hearing opportunity before finalizing orders.\nEnsure compliance with principles of natural justice and issue speaking orders.\nThe Assessing Officer must complete the fresh adjudication and issue fresh orders preferably within ninety days from receipt of this order.\nResult:\nAppeals disposed of with modification as above.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161(1A),182(1),205", - "Case #": "ITA No. 94/IB/2018 Tax Year 2015), ITA No.95/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2016). Date of Hearing: 12.05.2025. Date of Order: 12.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD NAEEM ASHRAF, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Hafiz Muhammad Idris, ASC & Mr. Samiullah, AR \nRespondent By: Mrs. Naila Gul, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S FFBL POWER CO., LTD. FFBL TOWER C1, C2, SECTOR-B, JINNAH BOULEVARD PHASE-II, DHA ISLAMABAD ….. APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CTO, ISLAMABAD ….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26040", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 857 = 2025 SLD 857", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWTg", - "Key Words:": "The appellants sought directions to issue No Objection Certificates (NOCs) for construction on their respective plots and protection of their peaceful possession.\nDefendants were served and appeared; however, they were later debarred from filing written statements. Plaintiffs filed affidavits and evidence.\nTrial court dismissed the suits as not maintainable.\nIssues:\nWhether suits for injunction and possession could be maintained without a declaration of title under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?\nWhether Section 73 of the Sindh Cooperative Societies Act, 2020, as a special law, takes precedence?\nFindings:\nSection 42 of the Specific Relief Act requires declaration suits only where title is denied or disputed. In this case, no denial of ownership or title was pleaded or evident.\nReliance placed on the Supreme Court judgment in Muhammad Ilyas Hussain v. Cantonment Board (PLD 1976 SC 785) that injunction suits can be maintained without declaration of title where no dispute over title exists.\nOther judgments from Sindh High Court support the view that where title is not disputed and injunction is sought only to protect possession, the suit is maintainable.\nCourts should avoid frustrating justice on technical grounds and lean in favor of granting relief to suppress mischief and protect rights.\nConclusion and Order:\nThe suits filed by the appellants were maintainable as framed, even without seeking declaration of title.\nThe impugned judgments dismissing the suits are set aside.\nThe matter is remanded to the trial court to decide the suits afresh on merits within 60 days.\nCompliance report to be submitted to this court.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42", - "Case #": "Miscellaneous Appeal No. 31 to 37 of 2025. Date of hearing: 09.05.2025. Date of announcement: 15.05.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JAFFER RAZA", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Riaz Ahmed Phulpoto, Advocate for the Petitioners.\nNone for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Miscellaneous Appeal No. 31 of 2025\nSyed Naveed Hussain Shah Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 32 of 2025\nMrs. Fouzia Athar Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 33 of 2025\nMuhammad Yousuf Shah Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 34 of 2025\nAdnan Yousuf Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 35 of 2025\nWajid Ali Khan Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 36 of 2025\nEbadat Maqbool Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents\nMiscellaneous Appeal No. 37 of 2025\nBushra Naveed Appellant\nVs\nM/s. KDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited & another Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26041", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 858 = 2025 SLD 858", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWXo", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nPetitioner faced trial under FIR involving offences under Sections 295-A, 295-B, 298-C PPC and Section 11 of PECA, 2016.\nPetitioner applied for sanction under Section 196 Cr.P.C. for taking cognizance of offence under Section 295-A PPC.\nTrial court refused sanction application.\nLegal Framework:\nPECA, 2016 governs electronic crimes with specified investigation and trial mechanisms.\nSections 29 and 51 of PECA empower federal government to designate investigation agencies and courts for PECA offences.\nSection 28 of PECA provides that PPC provisions apply unless inconsistent with PECA.\nSection 50 of PECA clarifies PECA overrides contradictory laws but does not derogate PPC, Cr.P.C, and related laws.\nOffences under PECA and Sections 295-A, 295-B, 295-C, 298-C PPC are interlinked and tried by courts designated under PECA.\nEarlier related case (“Sheraz Ahmad vs. The State”) held that Section 196 Cr.P.C. does not apply where special statute provisions prevail.\nFindings:\nSection 196 Cr.P.C. sanction requirement is not applicable to courts constituted under PECA, which is a special statute inconsistent with Cr.P.C. provisions.\nTrial court’s order declining sanction was lawful and no illegality or irregularity found.\nNo interference warranted in exercise of inherent powers.\nConclusion:\nCriminal Revision dismissed without costs.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=196,439Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=298-CPrevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016=11,29,51", - "Case #": "Crl. Rev. No. 39709 of 2024. Date of hearing 14.05.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: AALIA NEELUM, CHIEF JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Sh. Usman Karim-ud-Din, Advocate\nState by: Syed Muhammad Farhad Tirmizi, Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. Rafaqat Ali Dogar, Deputy Attorney General, with Naveed S.I/F.I.A.\nComplainant By: Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sh., Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHIRAZ AHMAD\nVS\nTHE STATE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26042", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 859 = 2025 SLD 859", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTWXk", - "Key Words:": "Case Background:\nAppeal filed by a registered taxpayer against the order of Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-II), Islamabad dated 29.12.2023.\nAppeal concerns sales tax assessment for the tax period 2019-20, with tax assessed at Rs. 46,194/-.\nThe Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024 introduced new pecuniary jurisdiction rules for appeals under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, Federal Excise Act, 2005, and Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nKey monetary limits for appeals:\nSales Tax Act: Rs. 10 million\nFederal Excise Act: Rs. 5 million\nIncome Tax Ordinance: Rs. 20 million\nAppeals below these limits go to Commissioner (Appeals), above these limits go to ATIR.\nTransition period between May 3, 2024 and June 16, 2024 for cases transfer to ATIR based on limits.\nLegal Issue:\nWhether the amendments specifying pecuniary jurisdiction have retrospective effect and how they impact pending cases before the Commissioner (Appeals).\nWhether the appeal filed in this matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner (Appeals) or ATIR.\nFindings:\nBased on well-settled principles and Supreme Court precedents, the change of forum by statute is procedural and thus applies retrospectively unless it causes injustice or prejudice.\nSection 43A(4) of the Sales Tax Act mandates transfer of cases exceeding the pecuniary limit to ATIR from June 16, 2024.\nIn this case, tax assessed is Rs. 46,194/-, which is below the Rs. 10 million threshold for ATIR jurisdiction.\nAccordingly, the appeal properly lies before the Commissioner (Appeals).\nThe appeal before ATIR must be returned to the appellant for filing before the Commissioner (Appeals).\nOrder:\nThe objection regarding jurisdiction is upheld.\nThe appeal is to be promptly returned to the appellant.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=33ASales Tax Act, 1990=43A,43A(1),43A(2),43A(4),46,47Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A,126A(1),133,134A(11)", - "Case #": "STA No. 313/IB/2024, MA(Cond.) STA No.51/IB/2024 (Tax Period, 2019-20). Date of hearing & order: 10.06.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Respondent by: Mr. Naseer Ahmed, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S UNIVERSAL EXPRESS COURIER SERVICES, MR. MUHAMMAD NABEEL MUGHAL, PLOT NO.29, MAIN ROAD, NEAR HAMZA ARCADE, GHAURI GARDENS, ISLAMABAD.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, ISLAMABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26043", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 863 = 2025 SLD 863", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Challenge to Banking Mohtasib’s Order for Repayment of TDR\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, Bank Alfalah Ltd., filed a constitutional petition challenging the orders of the Banking Mohtasib and the President of Pakistan under Section 82D of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962. The dispute arose when Respondent No.4, after 20 years, approached the bank seeking details of an alleged Term Deposit Receipt (TDR) facility valued at USD 10,374 (dated 25.05.1999). The bank initially claimed inability to retrieve records due to the passage of time but later produced a debit voucher dated 20.11.1999, claiming encashment of the TDR. The Banking Mohtasib found the banks explanation unsatisfactory, holding that no credible evidence was produced to prove encashment, nor was the original TDR returned. The Mohtasib directed the bank to repay the TDR amount with profit. The President of Pakistan, in a non-speaking order dated 28.08.2024, upheld this decision. The bank’s petition sought to set aside these orders, arguing laches, non-speaking nature of the order, and insufficient evidence by the complainant.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the petition, holding that:\nThe burden of proof was on the bank, once deposit of funds was admitted.\nThe bank’s stance of no available records contradicted its own production of a debit voucher without supporting evidence such as original TDR or encashment request.\nThe bank failed to prove withdrawal of the TDR amount by Respondent No.4.\nThe concurrent findings of the Banking Mohtasib and President of Pakistan were not shown to be illegal, perverse, or based on extraneous considerations.\nThe bank’s argument regarding record retention for only 10 years was unsupported by any official policy or regulation.\nThe court thus upheld the findings of gross maladministration against the bank and confirmed the order for repayment of USD 10,374 with profit to Respondent No.4.\nCitations:\nSection 82D, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962\nSection 9, Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013\nArticle 4, Constitution of Pakistan\nPrinciples of burden of proof and laches in civil law", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962=82DFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=9Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=82D", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D- 5267 of 2024. Date of Order: 27-03-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Tahmasp Rasheed Rizvi, Advocates for petitioner Ms. Shazia Hanjra, DAG\nRespondent No. 4 in person", - "Petitioner Name:": "PETITIONER: BANK AL-FALAH LTD. ….. APPELLANT \nVS.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS …… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26044", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 864 = 2025 SLD 864", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQS8", - "Key Words:": "Tenant Default under Tentative Rent Orders and Scope of Arrears under Section 16 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979\nDetails:\nMultiple Constitutional Petitions were decided through a common judgment addressing two categories of cases:\nCategory A (C.P. No. S-390 & 437 of 2023): Disputes involving default in nonpayment of rentals under Tentative Rent Orders where arrears from November 2019 to August 2020 were directed to be deposited along with future monthly rent.\nCategory B (C.P. No. S-434, 435, 436 of 2023): Disputes over Tentative Rent Orders that required deposit of arrears for more than nine years (April 2011 to August 2020), which the Petitioner challenged as beyond the permissible three-year limit.\nKey Issues:\nValidity of Tentative Rent Orders requiring arrears beyond three years.\nWhether default in complying with these orders warrants eviction under Section 16(2).\nLimitation for filing appeals against orders striking off the tenant’s defence.\nImpact of rent already deposited in Miscellaneous Rent Cases (MRC).\nThe Petitioners argued that the Tentative Rent Orders were void ab initio, vague, and violated the Limitation Act (Art. 110) and Rent Law. They cited case law emphasizing that default must be willful, and technical delays or prior deposits in MRC do not amount to default.\nThe Respondents countered that appeals were time-barred, tenants failed to comply with orders, and cited precedents emphasizing that even a void order triggers limitation unless knowledge is lacking.\nHeld:\nCategory A (C.P. No. S-390 & 437 of 2023):\nThe Petitions were dismissed.\nThe Rent Controller’s Tentative Rent Orders and subsequent orders striking off the tenants’ defence were found to be within jurisdiction and legal.\nDelay in filing the appeals was not condonable; no illegality identified.\nCategory B (C.P. No. S-434, 435 & 436 of 2023):\nThe Petitions were allowed.\nTentative Rent Orders requiring arrears beyond three years were declared void ab initio, vague, and passed mechanically without proper inquiry.\nThe Appellate Court’s orders dismissing the appeals without condoning delay were set aside.\nThe cases were remanded to the Rent Controller for fresh decision within six weeks.\nThe Respondents may press their applications under Section 16(1) afresh.\nCitations:\nPetitioner’s Cited Cases:\nPLD 1991 SC 711 – Noor Muhammad v. Mehdi\n2007 YLR 363 – Mrs. Jumana Khursheed v. 1st ADJ Karachi East\n1987 CLC 1391 – Jamil Ahmad v. Mrs. Sultan Jehan Begum\nRespondent’s Cited Cases:\n1993 MLD 2186 – Mir Jawed Ali Talpur v. Mrs. Z. Shirazee\n2020 SCMR 2046 – Haji Wajdad v. Govt. of Balochistan\n2001 SCMR 2020 – Khawaja Muhammad Mughees v. Mrs. Sughra Dadi\nCourts References:\n2020 YLR 192 – Zahid Khan v. Mst. Razia Khatoon\nPLD 2001 SC 514 – Land Acquisition Collector, Nowshera v. Sarfaraz Khan\n2020 CLC Note 45 (Sindh) – Ghulam Nabi Qureshi v. Govt. of Pakistan", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=16(1)", - "Case #": "C. P. No. S-390, S-434, S-435, S-436, S-437 of 2023, Date of hearing: 16.02.2024 and 01.03.2024. Date of order: 10.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner [in all Petitions]: Sarfarazuddin, through M/s. Naeem Akhtar and Muhammad Kamran Mirza, Advocates.\nRespondent No.1: M/s Paras Commercial Company and Homi D. Ghadilly, through M/s. Junaid Alam Khan and Qazi Ajmal Khan, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "C. P. No. S-434 of 2023\n[Sarfarazuddin versus M/s Paras Commercial Company and others]\nC. P. No. S - 390 of 2023\n[Sarfarazuddin versus Homi D. Ghadilly and others]\nC. P. No. S - 435 of 2023\n[Sarfarazuddin versus M/s Paras Commercial Company and others]\nC. P. No. S - 436 of 2023\n[Sarfarazuddin versus M/s Paras Commercial Company and others]\nand\nC. P. No. S - 437 of 2023\n[Sarfarazuddin versus M/s Paras Commercial Company and others]" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26045", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 865 = 2025 SLD 865", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQSs", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Findings:\n1. Definition and Scope of Capital Goods:\nThe term “Capital Goods” as defined in SRO 575(I)/2006, Chapter 9917(2) of the Customs Tariff, and Part-I of the Fifth Schedule to the Customs Act is identical (pari materia).\nFollowing the precedent set in Aisha Steel Ltd. (2020 PTD 2032), prefabricated buildings and sheds fall within the scope of Capital Goods, hence eligible for exemption.\n Prefabricated factory buildings and sheds are integral and fall within the definition of plant, equipment, machinery and capital goods – Aisha Steel.\n2. Exemption under Chapter 9917(2):\nThe Applicant, a Zone Enterprise in an SEZ, was eligible for exemption on “Capital Goods” under Chapter 9917(2).\nThe Tribunal erred in assuming that only SEZ Developers can avail this benefit. The exemption explicitly extends to:\nZone Developers,\nCo-Developers,\nZone Enterprises (like the Applicant).\nThus, the Applicant is clearly within the eligible class of importers under SEZ framework.\n3. Tribunal’s Error in Interpreting 5th Schedule Explanation:\nThe Tribunal wrongly required dual compliance with clauses (a) & (b) of the “Capital Goods” definition.\nThe Court clarified that:\nThe definition is illustrative, not restrictive, and\nReference to Part-I is only to adopt the meaning of “Capital Goods,” not to impose conditionalities.\n4. Exemption under SEZ Act, 2012 read with SRO 41(I)/2009:\nEven if one excludes the above basis, the Applicant is separately eligible for exemption under:\nSection 37 of SEZ Act, 2012, and\nSRO 41(I)/2009, which grants full customs and sales tax exemption on capital equipment for SEZ projects.\nThe Court relied on its recent judgment in Hayat Kimya Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. (2024 PTD 456), which held:\nEquipment not explicitly defined (e.g., “plant” or “accessories”) under SRO 41/2009 is still eligible for exemption.\nOnly machinery is narrowly defined. Other capital equipment remains broadly eligible.\n5. Irrelevance of FBR’s Interpretation:\nFBR’s letter dated 02.03.2021 rejecting the exemption for prefabricated buildings has no binding legal value, being administrative and not quasi-judicial.\nQuoting precedents:\nRevenue authorities cannot dictate interpretations to quasi-judicial bodies like the Tribunal.\nTribunal’s reliance on FBR’s interpretation is contrary to settled law and amounts to a jurisdictional error.\n🔹 Final Verdict:\nThe proposed question of law is answered in favour of the Applicant.\nThe Tribunal’s and lower authorities orders are set aside.\nThe matter is remanded to grant exemption from customs duty and sales tax on prefabricated building structures under:\nChapter 9917(2),\nSEZ Act 2012, and\nSRO 41(I)/2009.\n🔹 Citations Relied Upon:\nAisha Steel Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan, 2020 PTD 2032 – on capital goods and prefabricated buildings.\nHayat Kimya Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., 2024 PTD 456 – on exemption under SRO 41/2009.\nVarious judgments confirming FBR’s opinion is not binding on quasi-judicial forums:\nPLD 1981 SC 377, 1999 PTD 1612, etc.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Special Economic Zones Act, 2012=37Customs Act, 1969=19,80,155D,196(5)Sales Tax Act, 1990=13(2)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) Nos. 1129 to 1135 of 2023. Date of hearing: 28-01-2005. Date of Judgment: 12-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, ACJ AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSITCE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Hyder Ali Khan, Advocate a/w M/s. Hamza Waheed & Sami-ur- Rehman, Advocates.\nMr. Faheem Raza Khuhro, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "APPLICANT IN ALL SCRAS: NATIONAL FOOD LIMITED\nVS\nRESPONDENTS IN ALL SCRAS: COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF APPRAISEMENT - WEST & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26046", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 866 = 2025 SLD 866", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQTk", - "Key Words:": "Ex-parte Assessment – Non-service of Notice, Natural Justice, and Validity of Amnesty Declaration\nDetails:\nThe Appellant, a salaried individual registered with the FBR since 19-07-2016, filed their return for Tax Year 2018, declaring income of Rs. 1,326,590/- with tax liability of Rs. 72,159/-. This return, constituting a deemed assessment under Section 120, was later amended by the DCIR under Section 122(1)/(5) based on an observed increase in wealth of Rs. 123,828,805/- (labeled as Others in the wealth statement). A show cause notice under Section 122(9) read with Section 122(5) and Rule 68 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, was issued solely through IRIS, with no physical service or follow-up. The Appellant contended they had availed of the Amnesty Scheme 2018 for the full amount in question and had properly filed the declarations in IRIS, which the department failed to consider. The DCIR’s ex-parte assessment created a tax demand of Rs. 42,951,729/-.\nThe Appellant argued:\nNon-service of statutory notice as per Section 218, with IRIS intimation insufficient.\nFailure to provide a fair opportunity of being heard, violating the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem).\nThe amnesty declarations for Rs. 123,828,805/- were properly filed, available in the system, and explained in the wealth reconciliation.\nThe AR cited various case laws, including:\nPLD 1988 SC 24 (Mirza Aslam Beg v. Saghir Iqbal): Condemnation without hearing is not permissible.\n1999 PTD 1358 (Siemens Pakistan Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan): Orders affecting rights must provide an opportunity to explain.\n2010 PTD 1271 and 111 TAX 447, 2015 PTD 2042: On the necessity of proper notice and fair hearing.\nFBR Circular No. 7(2)/1994: Three clear opportunities of 15 days each must be provided.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Authority held that:\nThe order of the A/DCIR was ex-parte, without proper service of notice as required under Section 218.\nThe Appellant was not afforded reasonable opportunity to present their case, violating principles of natural justice.\nThe ex-parte order was therefore unsustainable.\nThe assessment order was set aside and the matter remanded to the original stage for re-adjudication, directing the department to provide a fair opportunity to the taxpayer and pass a reasoned, speaking order based on documentary evidence.\nCitations:\nPLD 1988 SC 24 (Mirza Aslam Beg v. Saghir Iqbal)\n1999 PTD 1358 (Siemens Pakistan Eng. Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan)\n2010 PTD 1271\n111 TAX 447\n2015 PTD 2042", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1559/KB/2024 [Tax Year, 2018]. Date of hearing: 18.02.2025. Date of order: 07.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mian Waheed, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Waqas Mushtaq, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. MUHAMMAD HAMZA AMIN KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, ZONE-II, CTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26047", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 867 = 2025 SLD 867", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQTg", - "Key Words:": "Appellate Adjudication on Remand Orders under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 – Improper Remand and Taxpayer Rights\nDetails:\nThis case involves an appeal by the taxpayer against an order of the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 26.08.2014, which remanded the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) for de novo consideration. The DCIR had earlier raised a tax demand under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The taxpayer challenged the remand order on the grounds that it was mechanical, failed to address the legal and factual issues on record, and subjected the taxpayer to unnecessary procedural hardship, violating principles of natural justice.\nThe key factual and legal issues were:\nThe taxpayer had submitted complete certificates and undertakings under Section 153(5)(a) regarding purchases from commercial importers, negating any withholding obligation.\nExemption certificates from M/s Tetra Pak Pakistan Ltd. for plant, machinery, and spare parts were validly issued and relied upon.\nSalary and wage payments were below taxable thresholds, with no statutory obligation for withholding tax. The DCIR, however, applied a blanket 9% withholding rate without transaction-wise scrutiny, which was legally untenable.\nAdvertisement expenses included exempt payments to print media and small promotional costs that did not attract withholding tax under Clause 16A, Part-IV of the Second Schedule.\nBoth the DCIR and Commissioner (Appeals) failed to appreciate these factual positions, instead relying on generalizations and procedural remand, causing procedural harassment and denying the taxpayer finality of proceedings.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the DCIR. The Tribunal held that:\nThe remand order was unwarranted as the record contained sufficient material for adjudication.\nThe taxpayer had discharged its withholding obligations under the law by providing valid certificates and documentation.\nThe DCIRs blanket application of a 9% withholding rate was arbitrary, contrary to fiscal principles, and unsupported by evidence.\nThe remand order, lacking substantive reasoning, violated the taxpayer’s right to finality and due process.\nThe Tribunal, exercising its plenary appellate jurisdiction, annulled the tax demand in entirety and barred any further coercive or collateral proceedings against the taxpayer.\nThe Tribunal emphasized the principles laid down in:\nMessrs Crescent Textile Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax (2004 SCMR 1442)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. National Bank of Pakistan (2018 PTD 1342)\nThese precedents affirm that tax proceedings must be decided on merits where sufficient material is available and remand is not to be ordered as a matter of routine.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(5)(a),161,205", - "Case #": "ITA No.912/IB/2014 (Tax Year-2012). Date of hearing: 15-04-2025. Date of order: 13-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR IQBAL, MEMBER AND ZAHOOR AHMAD, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Tousif Riaz, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Shehryar Awan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RANI FOODS (PVT) LIMITED, SUIT NO.407, 2ND FLOOR, MILLENNIUM HEIGHTS, F-11/1, ISLAMABAD.\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, ISLAMABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26048", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 868 = 2025 SLD 868", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQXo", - "Key Words:": "Regularization of Contractual Service, Pay Protection, and Time-Scale Promotion in Sindh Education Sector\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a Junior School Teacher (JST) appointed on 16.01.2010 on a contractual basis, sought:\nRegularization from the initial appointment date under the Sindh Regularization of Teachers Appointed on Contractual Basis Ordinance, 2012.\nPay protection and pension benefits for prior contractual service.\nTime-scale promotion from BPS-16 to BPS-17 as of 27.01.2023.\nThe petitioner was appointed afresh as a High School Teacher (HST) on 25.09.2013 after qualifying through NTS and completing a separate recruitment process. The petitioner argued that his initial JST service should count toward his HST seniority, regularization, and time-scale promotion. He cited other cases where teachers were regularized from their initial appointment dates and claimed discrimination by the Education and Finance Departments.\nThe respondents argued:\nRegularization was granted under the Teachers Appointed on Contract Basis (Regularization) Act, 2018, effective from 18.04.2018.\nRegularization cannot be granted retrospectively under the Ordinance, 2012 or any other law.\nThe petitioners new appointment as HST through a fresh selection process does not allow continuity from JST service.\nTime-scale promotion to BPS-17 requires 9 years of regular service in BPS-16, which the petitioner has not completed.\nHeld:\nNo retrospective regularization: Regularization of service is prospective from the date of notification under the Regularization Act, 2018. The petitioner’s claim for regularization from the initial JST appointment in 2010 is misconceived.\nNo pay protection: The petitioner’s fresh appointment as HST through NTS breaks service continuity, disqualifying him from pay protection benefits.\nNo time-scale promotion eligibility: The petitioner does not meet the required 9 years of regular service in BPS-16 for promotion to BPS-17 as per the Finance Department’s policy dated 07.06.2010.\nNo discrimination: Other cited cases involved teachers continuously serving in the same post, unlike the petitioner, who joined a new post via a fresh process.\nPetition dismissed: The petitioner’s claims were found legally untenable and lacking merit. The petition and all connected applications were dismissed.\nCitations:\nC.P. No.D-2666 of 2020, Saeed Habib v. National Bank of Pakistan\nC.P. No.D-1239 of 2009 (referred by the petitioner, but distinguished)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CP No. D-798 of 2024. Date of Hearing: 16.04.2025. Date of Decision: 21.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE ARBAB ALI HAKRO AND MR. JUSTICE RIAZAT ALI SAHAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Farhan Ahmed Bozdar, Advocate.\nMr. Muhammad Sharif Solangi, A.A.G. Sindh along with Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Kumbhar", - "Petitioner Name:": "Petitioner: Safiyan \nvs\nRespondents: Director School Education Elementary, Secondary and Higher Secondary Mirpurkhas." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26049", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 869 = 2025 SLD 869", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTQXk", - "Key Words:": "Liability of Special Attorney in Recovery of Maintenance Allowance\nDetails:\nIn this case, the petitioner, acting as a Special Attorney for his brother Abdul Razzaq, challenged the initiation of recovery proceedings and attachment of his own immovable property for satisfaction of maintenance allowance decreed in favor of respondent No.5. The original order for recovery of maintenance was passed on 19.02.2004 by the Nazim, Union Council, Bhagwal, District Gujrat, against Abdul Razzaq (judgment-debtor), and the decree had attained finality after various legal challenges were dismissed. The respondents, however, sought to proceed against the petitioner, the Special Attorney, as if he were the judgment-debtor.\nThe key legal issue was whether a Special Attorney, who acted solely on behalf of the principal in procedural matters (filing cases, defending, appearing in court), can be held personally liable for the decretal amount in execution proceedings. The court analyzed the scope of the Special Power of Attorney executed by Abdul Razzaq, which authorized the petitioner only to act in legal representation—not to assume personal liability for payments or obligations.\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court held that a Special Attorney acting purely in a representational capacity does not incur personal liability for the principal’s obligations, unless there is express or implied authority or an independent undertaking to that effect. The petitioner, in this case, did not make any such commitment and therefore cannot be proceeded against for recovery of the decretal amount of maintenance allowance. The decree remains enforceable solely against the judgment-debtor (Abdul Razzaq). The respondents’ actions in proceeding against the petitioner and his immovable property were declared without lawful authority and contrary to settled legal principles. The court directed the authorities to pursue recovery proceedings against Abdul Razzaq under Section 13(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and restrained them from initiating any recovery or attachment proceedings against the petitioner.\nCitations:\nMuhammad Aslam v. Ayyan Ghazzanfar and 2 others (PLD 2012 Lahore 392)\nMuhammad Nawazish Ali vs. Family Judge and Others (2021 CLC 1841 Lahore)\nMuhammad Mohsin Fawad v. Hina Tayyaba Khalil and another (2018 YLR 2199)\nAmjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others (2015 SCMR 128)\nSawera Ikram v. Amir Naveed (PLD 2022 Lahore 600)\nNaeem Iqbal and 2 others v. Noreen Saleem and others (PLD 2009 Supreme Court 757)\nFarooq Ahmed & another v. Additional District Judge, Samundari, District Faisalabad and 5 others (PLJ 2015 Lahore 774)\nMuhammad Pervez v. Mst. Nabila Yasmeen and others (2004 SCMR 1352) [distinguished]", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 41936 of 2019. Date of hearing: 08.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Muhammad Ramzan Ch., Advocate.\nRespondents by: Ch. Amjad Hussain, Advocate (respondent No.5). Mr. Awais Ahmad Qazi, Additional Advocate General. Mr. Mohammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General on Court’s call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL HAQ \nVS\nPROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB THROUGH DISTRICT REVENUE OFFICER / COLLECTOR, GUJRAT & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26050", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 870 = 2025 SLD 870", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODc", - "Key Words:": "Core Legal Issues and Findings:\n1. Time-Barred Show Cause Notices (SCNs)\nHeld: SCNs dated 21.10.2020 for the period 01.07.2014 to 20.10.2015 are time-barred under Section 11(5).\nSCNs must be issued within 5 years of the relevant date.\nSupported by:\n2022 SCMR 634 (Packages Ltd.)\n2011 SCMR 1279 (PSO)\n2016 PTD 1188 (Army Welfare Sugar Trust)\n2. Time-Barred Assessment Orders (AOs)\nAOs dated 07.05.2021 were issued 196 days after SCNs, exceeding the maximum 120 + 90 days limit under the first proviso to Section 11(5).\nExtension granted by Commissioner was mechanical, without valid reasoning — void ab initio.\nRelied on:\n2017 SCMR 1427 (Super Asia)\n2019 SCMR 1989 (Abbasi Enterprises)\n2019 SCMR 1735 (Mujahid Soap)\n3. Use of Income Tax Returns to Impute Sales Tax Liability\nTribunal rejected the argument that sales tax proceedings can be initiated based solely on income tax data.\nCited:\n2013 PTD 2130, 2004 PTD 868, 1990 PTD 1088\nZ.U. Enterprises (2002 CL 236)\n4. Taxability of Construction Materials Supplied to Army\nSupplies of mud, sand, crushed stone were either exempt or beyond federal sales tax scope.\nTribunal found no valid evidence that tax was chargeable or collected.\nActivities pertained to construction and repair, not subject to sales tax.\nSection 65 applies—no penalty where genuine misunderstanding or alternate interpretation exists.\n5. Additional Tax and Penalties\nTribunal held that since ‘mens rea’ (intent to evade) was not established, penalty and additional tax were not justified.\nRelied on:\nPTCL 1992 CL 23, PLD 2002 Quetta 84, PTCL 2005 CL 304\n6. AO Based on Grounds Not in SCN – Legally Invalid\nTribunal noted that original SCNs alleged suppression based on tax return mismatch, while final AOs were passed on different grounds (e.g. taxability of construction materials).\nPer 1987 SCMR 1840, such adjudications are patently illegal.\n7. Invalid Contravention Reports (CRs)\nCRs not signed by competent authority (Commissioner).\nIssued by Additional Commissioner, making further proceedings jurisdictionally defective.\nRelied on:\nPLD 1995 Karachi 587, PLD 2009 CL 250 (Shahmurad Sugar Mills)\n8. Burden of Proving Extension Lies with Department\nDepartment failed to justify extension under Section 11(5) as required.\nAbbasi Enterprises (SCMR 1989) affirmed that proviso is an exception, requiring full compliance with procedural rigor.\nFinal Order:\n“All four Assessment Orders are declared void ab initio and non-est, being time barred and of no legal effect.”\nLegal Consequences:\nAppeals allowed in full.\nNo recovery, tax, or penalty can be enforced.\nSCNs and AOs were without lawful authority and infringing fundamental procedural requirements.\nKey Citations:\n2017 SCMR 1427 – Super Asia\n2019 SCMR 1989 – Abbasi Enterprises\n2022 SCMR 634 – Packages Ltd.\n2016 PTD 1188, PTCL 2009 CL 250, 1987 SCMR 1840", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,3(1A),6,11,11(5),22,23,25,26,65,73", - "Case #": "STA No.128/PB/2022 (Tax Periods: July-2014 to June-2015) STA No.129/PB/2022 (Tax Periods: July-2015 to June-2016) STA No.130/PB/2022 (Tax Periods: July-2017 to June-2018) STA No.131/PB/2022 (Tax Periods: July-2018 to June-2019). Date of Hearing :16.05.2024. Date of Order: 08.07.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: DR. SHAH KHAN, MEMBER AND M. ABDULLAH KHAN KAKAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant represented by Respondent represented by : Mr. Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, Advocate. Mr. Ishfaq Ahmed, DR o/w Qazi Haider and Mr. Aftab Paracha, Senior Auditors.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NASEEM IQBAL PROP: M/S IQBAL ENTERPRISES, MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN ROAD, RISALPURE, DISTRICT NOWSHERA …… ...APPELLANT.\nVS \nTHE COMMISSIONER-IR, (UNIT-35), MARDAN ZONE, RTO, PESHAWAR …… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26051", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 871 = 2025 SLD 871", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODY", - "Key Words:": "Dismissal of Second Appeal—Limitations on High Courts Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC—Rejection of Suit under Order VII Rule 11 CPC\nDetails:\nThe appellants, joint owners of a bank locker at Habib Bank Limited (HBL), filed a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, challenging concurrent findings of the trial court and appellate court. The dispute arose when the appellants claimed that their gold ornaments were missing from the locker, allegedly due to the assassination incident of Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The bank denied negligence and liability.\nThe appellants initially filed Suit No. 434/2013 in the Banking Court, which was returned for lack of jurisdiction. They then filed Suit No. 1979/2015 before the Vth Sr. Civil Judge Karachi (West), which was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for being time-barred and for suing wrong defendants.\nA subsequent suit (Suit No. 1339/2018) seeking recovery of articles or market value and damages of Rs. 1 crore was also rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, citing res judicata and limitation.\nThe appellate court (Civil Appeal No. 339/2019) upheld the rejection, observing no negligence on the part of the bank, lack of documentary evidence (e.g., tax returns/wealth statements), and limitation bar.\nIn the second appeal before the High Court, the appellants argued that the courts below erred in dismissing their claims without proper framing of issues and trial.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the second appeal, holding:\nThe concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on proper evaluation of facts and law. No misreading of evidence, legal infirmity, or jurisdictional error was found.\nThe High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is limited to substantial questions of law; the appellants failed to raise any such question.\nThe doctrine of res judicata applied, as the previous suit’s rejection on limitation grounds barred re-litigation on the same cause of action.\nThe rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was proper, as the suits were time-barred and lacked necessary documentary support.\nCitations:\nMuhammad Ali v. Province of Punjab & others (2009 SCMR 1079) – Rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on limitation bars re-litigation on the same cause of action.\nZafar Iqbal & others v. Naseer Ahmed & others (2022 SCMR 2006) – Scope of second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited to substantial questions of law.\nMuzafar Iqbal v. Mst. Riffat Parveen & others (2023 SCMR 1652) – High Court cannot reappreciate evidence in second appeal.\nKeramat Ali v. Muhammad Yunus Haji (PLD 1963 SC 191); Phatana v. Mst. Wasai (PLD 1965 SC 134); Haji Muhammad Din v. Malik Muhammad Abdullah (PLD 1994 SC 291) – Concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are binding unless material irregularity is shown.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "IInd Appeal No. 192 of 2021. Date of Hearing & Order: 14.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants: Through Qazi Hifz-ur-Rehman, Advocate\nRespondents: Nemo", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mrs. Shehla Hussain and another\nVS \nM/s. Habib Bank Ltd and others]" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26052", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 872 = 2025 SLD 872", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODU", - "Key Words:": "Legality of Land Acquisition Notification and Role of Competent Authority under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894\nDetails:\nThe petitions challenged a Notification dated 27.06.2016 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the Land Acquisition Officer of Respondent No.2 (SSGCL), which was later published in the Gazette by the Province of Sindh. Petitioners claimed ownership of agricultural land in Deh Shah Bukhari, Taluka Qasimabad, District Hyderabad, and objected to Respondent No.2’s actions of forcibly entering the land and laying an RLNG pipeline without lawful authority or compensation.\nRespondent No.2, SSGCL, a federally controlled entity, sought to acquire the land for public purposes related to uninterrupted gas supply. However, the Notification was issued by a self-appointed Land Acquisition Officer of SSGCL, rather than by the legally competent authority, i.e., the District Collector under the Land Acquisition Act.\nThe Deputy Commissioner, Hyderabad filed a statement clarifying that such powers cannot be exercised by an Assistant Commissioner or any officer of Respondent No.2. The Supreme Court had earlier remanded the case for reconsideration after the High Court had declared the Notification as non-gazetted and the act of entering the land as trespass.\nThe case considered the constitutional protection of property under Article 24 of the Constitution, emphasizing that no person can be deprived of property except in accordance with the law, for a public purpose, and with due compensation. Reliance was placed on multiple precedents, including PLD 2023 Lahore 1 (Kareem Nawaz’s case) and 2024 SCMR 1037 (Commissioner Rawalpindi v. Naseer Ahmad).\nHeld:\nThe Notification dated 27.06.2016 was issued by an unauthorized officer (SSGCL’s Land Acquisition Officer) and was therefore procedurally irregular. However, the publication in the Gazette of Sindh introduced an element of implied permission.\nThe Court refrained from declaring the Notification invalid, instead directing the Commissioner Hyderabad Division and Deputy Commissioner/District Collector Hyderabad to proceed with issuing the Award under the Land Acquisition Act within 60 days, ensuring compliance with due process, compensation, and legal formalities.\nThe petitioners’ claim for damages could not be adjudicated under Article 199 due to disputed questions of fact and were advised to seek appropriate remedies through civil litigation.\nThe emergency nature of the public purpose (RLNG pipeline) justified dispensing with some procedural formalities under the Act, but compensation to petitioners remains obligatory.\nCitations:\nPLD 2024 SC 256 (Hamza Rasheed Khan’s case – strict interpretation of exceptions in property rights)\nPLD 2023 Lahore 1 (Kareem Nawaz’s case – land acquisition notifications must be issued by competent authorities)\n2024 SCMR 1037 (Commissioner Rawalpindi v. Naseer Ahmad – property rights and compensation principles)\nPLD 1997 SC 582 (Elahi Cotton Mills case – doctrine of reading down)\n2016 SCMR 931 (Haroon-ur-Rasheed’s case – reading down doctrine)\nPLD 2014 SC 531 (Province of Sindh v. MQM – reading down and property protection)\n2017 SCMR 1218 (Syed Mushahid Shah’s case – interpretation of property rights laws)\nSpecial Secretary-II (Law & Order), Home Deptt. vs. Fayyaz Dawar (Civil Petition No.3750/2020) – writ jurisdiction not to decide disputed facts\nAsadullah Mangi v. PIA (2005 SCMR 445) – writs for enforcement, not establishment, of legal rights\nCol. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq (2006 SCMR 276) – disputed facts in writs\nFida Hussain v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990) – high courts cannot resolve disputed facts under Article 199\nDr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib (2011 SCMR 1813) – alternate remedies under Article 199", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. D-3678 OF 2016 and CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO.D-40 OF 2018. Date of hearing & order: 20.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE ARSHAD HUSSIN KHAN AND MR. JUSTICE DR. SYED FIAZ UL HASSAN SHAH.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Parkash Kumar, Advocate for petitioners.\nBarrister Ghazi Khan Khalil, Advocate for respondent No.2 in C.P. No.D-3678 of 2016 along-with Waseem Qazi D.M I/C Legal Services, SSGCL R.O Hyderabad.\nMr. Bashir Ahmed Almani, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nMr. Allah Bachayo Soomro, Additional Advocate General, Sindh along-with Mr. Zain-ul-Abedin Memon, Deputy Commissioner, Hyderabad and Hataf Siyal, Assistant Commissioner Qasimabad.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. D-3678 OF 2016\nKASHIF ALI SHORO AND ANOTHER \nVS \nPROVINCE OF SINDH & OTHERS\n&\nCONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO.D-40 OF 2018\nHAJI & OTHERS \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26053", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 873 = 2025 SLD 873", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODQ", - "Key Words:": "A. Whether the Customs Appellate Tribunal correctly interpreted the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969 regarding valuation based on an invoice retrieved from the consignment despite an existing Valuation Ruling.\nB. Whether the Tribunal was justified in remitting the redemption fine and penalty imposed under clause (14) of Section 156(1) read with SRO 499(I)/2009.\nBackground:\nAn invoice retrieved from the imported consignment showed a significantly higher value (USD 45,793.40) than the declared value (USD 2,267).\nThe Department issued a Show Cause Notice alleging misdeclaration and imposed confiscation, redemption fine (35% of customs value), and a penalty of Rs. 500,000.\nThe Respondent disputed the invoice’s relevance, claiming it was inadvertently placed by the shipper and not related to their consignment.\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal of the Respondent, setting aside the original order.\nTribunal’s Findings:\nTransaction value is primarily governed by Section 25(1) of the Customs Act as price actually paid or payable. \nThe Tribunal found the invoice retrieved from the consignment was not necessarily the authentic transactional value and that secondary valuation methods could have been used.\nNo evidence was presented to prove the uploaded invoice was bogus.\nThe Tribunal relied on case law including Junaid Traders, Urooj Autos, and Hasnain Qutbuddin to support its view that the invoice retrieved must be authenticated and not blindly accepted.\nIt was held that mere presence of a higher invoice does not automatically replace declared value; the department must verify its authenticity.\nThe penalty and fine were thus remitted.\nApplicant’s Contentions:\nThe proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 25A, added in 2017, mandates that if an invoice retrieved from the consignment shows a higher value than the declared or Valuation Ruling value, that higher value must be used for customs valuation.\nThe Department argued that the Respondent misdeclared the value warranting penalties.\nThe Respondent admitted the invoice was retrieved from the consignment but claimed inadvertent placement and lack of relevance.\nFindings of the Court on Reference:\nThe retrieved invoice was clearly linked to the Respondent’s consignment, confirmed by Bill of Lading and matching details such as shipper’s name and vessel.\nThe Respondent failed to produce credible evidence or documents to substantiate the claim that the retrieved invoice was unrelated or mistakenly placed.\nThe proviso to Section 25A(2) is clear and binding: the higher value in the retrieved invoice must be treated as the customs value notwithstanding the Valuation Ruling.\nPrior case law cited by the Respondent is distinguishable and does not override the statutory provision.\nThe Tribunal’s order ignoring the statutory proviso and setting aside penalties was held to be incorrect.\nThe penalties and valuation based on the higher invoice are legally justified.\nHence, the Reference Application was allowed, impugned order set aside, and the questions answered in favour of the Department.\nConclusion:\nThe Court reaffirmed the strict application of the proviso to Section 25A(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, holding that a higher value invoice retrieved from consignment must be the basis for customs valuation even if a Valuation Ruling exists. The Respondent’s denial was unsubstantiated, and penalties for misdeclaration were upheld. The impugned judgment of the Customs Appellate Tribunal was set aside accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) No. 562 of 2024. Date of hearing & Judgment: 23.01.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Masooda Siraj along with Mr. Javed Hussain, Advocate.\nRaj Ali Wahid Kunwar along with Mr. Kashif Khan, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: The Collector of Customs (West)\nvs\nRespondent: M/s. Seminar (Pvt) Limited" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26054", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 874 = 2025 SLD 874", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTOC8", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of the department under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 — validity of amended assessment order\nDetails:\nThe appellant filed an income tax return for Tax Year 2023, which was treated as deemed assessment under Section 120(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe department issued a show-cause notice under Sections 122(9) and 122(5A), contending that:\n(i) The appellant allegedly failed to declare the purchase of a property,\n(ii) The appellant declared loans from directors without satisfactory explanation, and\n(iii) Certain business expenses were liable to disallowance under Section 21(c).\nThe appellant did not respond to the notices, leading the department to pass an amended assessment order under Section 122(5A) on 30-12-2024. The issue regarding Section 21(c) was dropped.\nIn appeal before the Tribunal, the primary issues were:\nWhether the department could invoke Section 122(5A) to address non-declaration of property (alleged concealment).\nWhether the declared loans could be questioned under Section 122(5A) without following proper procedures under Sections 120(3) or 177.\nThe Tribunal observed that:\nAlleged concealment of property falls under Section 122(5), not 122(5A); invoking 122(5A) for concealment was without jurisdiction.\nVerification of loans requires calling for evidence under Section 120(3) or initiating audit under Section 177; not under Section 122(5A).\nThe department conceded that the proceedings under Section 122(5A) were beyond jurisdiction and legally unsustainable.\nHeld:\nThe amended assessment order dated 30-12-2024 passed under Section 122(5A) of the Ordinance was without lawful authority and annulled.\nHowever, the department is at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings, if necessary, in accordance with the law and after following proper procedures.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 29/IB/2025 (Tax Year, 2023). Date of Hearing & Order: 05.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imran ul Haq, FCA\nRespondent by: Mr. Shehryar Akram Awan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL (PVT) LIMITED; KH NO.88, VILLAGE LAKHOO, TEHSIL AND DISTT RAWALPINDI - APPELLANT\nVS\nADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, CTO, ISLAMABAD - RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26055", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 875 = 2025 SLD 875", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTOCs", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nThe appeals challenge the judgment of a Single Judge dismissing petitions seeking appointments under Rule 17-A, which provided special quota-based appointments for widows, widowers, and children of deceased civil servants.\nRule 17-A was rescinded on 24.07.2024.\nPetitioners claim entitlement to appointments under Rule 17-A either before or after its rescission.\nOne petition alleges defiance of the Single Judge’s judgment.\nKey Legal Issue:\nWhether the Supreme Court judgment in General Post Office, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Jalal (2024) regarding quotas for legal heirs of deceased civil servants applies retrospectively or only prospectively.\nRelevant Supreme Court Judgment (General Post Office):\nDeclared certain quotas under special circumstances ultra vires.\nCarved out two exceptions exempt from impact:\nAppointments already made before the judgment.\nBenefits for legal heirs of martyred personnel or civil servants who died due to terrorism, protected by specific policies/rules.\nCourt’s Analysis:\nThe Supreme Court’s rulings are binding on all courts.\nIt is a settled principle that such judgments operate retrospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise.\nPrecedents (e.g., Mian Pir Muhammad, Mst. Bashiran Begum, Haq Nawaz) confirm that superior court rulings apply retrospectively to pending matters.\nThe judgment in General Post Office protects only those whose appointments were already made before rescission.\nPetitioners who had not been appointed by the rescission date (24.07.2024) and whose cases were pending are not entitled to benefit from Rule 17-A post rescission.\nRule 17-A remains valid for appointments made prior to 24.07.2024 (a “closed chapter”).\nThe judgment in General Post Office applies retrospectively to pending appointment processes after rescission.\nNo mala fide or illegality was found in the insertion or rescission of Rule 17-A, so retrospective invalidation of appointments made before rescission is rejected.\nConclusion:\nThe Intra-Court Appeals (Appendix “A”) filed by the Province of Punjab etc. are allowed.\nThe earlier Single Judge judgments dated 18.12.2024 are set aside.\nThe petitions claiming appointments under Rule 17-A after its rescission (Appendix “B”) are dismissed.\nRule 17-A appointments made before 24.07.2024 remain valid.\nPending appointment claims after rescission must follow the Supreme Court ruling and cannot rely on the now rescinded Rule 17-A.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ICA No. 2407/2025. Date of hearing: 10.04.2025. Date of order: 05.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, JUSTICE AND MALIK WAQAR HAIDER AWAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants/Petitioners by: M/s Jahanzaib Inam and Rana Shamshad Khan, Additional Advocate Generals, Punjab/Government Pleaders in all ICAs.\nMr. Shahid Nawaz Awan, Advocate in WP No. 6592/2025.\nMr. Imran Haider Khan, Advocate in WP No. 9969/2025.\nMalik Ahmad Nawaz Awan, Advocate in WP No. 12501/2025.\nMr. Muhammad Nadeem Abbasi, Advocate in WP No. 79912/2024.\nRespondents by: M/s Allah Nawaz Khosa, Mian Muneeb Tariq and Rana Ansar, Advocates in ICA No. 2407/2025.\nMr. Habib Ullah Bhatti, Advocate in ICA No. 6023/2025.\nSardar Mehran Zafar, Advocate in ICA No. 6305/2025.\nRana Khalid Ishaq, Advocate in ICA No. 6310/2025.\nCh. Muhammad Akbar Warraich, Advocate in ICA No. 6016/2025.\nM/s Zafar Iqbal Chohan and Sajjad Saleem, Advocates in ICA No. 6124/2025.\nRana Mudassar Ali, Advocate in ICA No. 6307/2025.\nRaja F aisal Hayat Janjua, Advocate in ICA No. 6308/2025.\nSyed Mujahid Naqvi, Advocate in ICA No. 8425/2025.\nMr. Muhammad Nauman Khan, Advocate in ICA No. 8428/2025.\nMr. Andaz Jillani Khan, Advocate in ICA No. 9437/2025.\nMalik Riaz Ahmad Nonari, Advocate in ICA No. 10812/2025.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB ETC.\nVS\nSYED MUHAMMAD ALI RAZA SHAH" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26056", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 876 = 2025 SLD 876", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODk", - "Key Words:": "2025 SLD 876\nHIGH COURT OF AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR\n(1) Writ Petition No.866/A/2020. Date of institution 07.07.2020. Date of decision 14.05.2025.\nAUTHOR: SYED SHAHID BAHAR, JUSTICE\nMuhammad Altaf, son of Muhammad Maskeen, Driver B-4 in the office of Director Trade & Labour Dept. of Azad Jammu and Kashmir ……. Petitioner\nVs\n1. Secretary Industry, Labour and Mineral Resources Department, Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having his office at New Secretariat Muzaffarabad.\n2. Director Industries Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having his office at Lower Chatter Muzaffarabad.\n3. Joint Director Industries and Trade Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, new Industry Area Mirpur.\n4. Deputy Director Industries Mirpur, District Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, new Industry Area, Mirpur.\n5. District Accounts Officer District Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.\n6. Selection Committee of Industry for Grade 1-11 through its Chairman .....Respondents\n(2) Writ Petition No.2193/2023. Date of institution 13.06.2023.\nAbdul Waheed S/o Mir Zaman, Naib Qasid B-01 in Industry Labour and Mineral Resources Muzaffarabad, Azad Jammu and Kashmir ...Petitioner\nVs\n1. Secretary Industry, Labour and Mineral Resources Department, Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having his office at New Secretariat Muzaffarabad.\n2. Director Industries Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having his office at Lower Chatter Muzaffarabad.\n3. Joint Director Industries and Trade Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.\n4. Deputy Director Industries Mirpur, District Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.\n5. District Account Officer District Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.\n6. Muhammad Altaf S/o Muhammad Maskeen, Driver B-04 in the office Director Trade and Labour Department Muzaffarabad, Azad Jammu and Kashmir ….. Respondents\nCh. Shoukat Aziz, Mrs. Noshaba Iqbal, Advocates and Anees-ul-Arifeen Abbasi, Advocate for the petitioners in writ No.866/A/2020 and writ No.2193/2023.\nMiss Farhanda Ibrar, Advocate/Legal Advisor for Industry, Labour and Mineral Resources department.\nJUDGMENT:\n1. FACTS IN BREVITY\n1. The constitutional petition No.866/A/2020 has been filed under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 by the petitioner Muhammad Altaf, who is presently serving as Driver B-4 in the office of Director Trade & Labour Department of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, claiming that he deserves to be benefited from policy notification dated 29.09.1999 (having force of statutory rules) for consideration against the post of Junior Clerk BPS-11 under 20% quota reserved for the employees performing their respective jobs in grade I to IV. It is useful to reproduce the prayer clause made by the petitioner as infra:-\n It is therefore, humbly prayed by accepting this writ petition and declared the petitioner is entitled for appointment in the reserved 20% quota of the employee of grade B-1 to B-4, the non-petitioners may kindly be directed to fill up the post of Junior Clerk which become vacant in the office of Deputy Director Industry Mirpur according to the spirit of policy notification dated 29.09.1999 and issued seniority list amongst the employees of Grade B-1 to B-4 in the department then issue appointment order in favour of the petitioner. \n2. While in connected petition No.2193/2023 filed by one Abdul Waheed (temporarily performing duties of Junior Clerk) the petitioner solicited relief for considering him against 20% reserved quota of employees of grades B-1 to B-4 qua permanence against the post of Junior Clerk.\n3. Both the connected petitions have been consolidated and admitted for regular hearing. Written statement has been filed on behalf of respondents wherein the claim of the petitioners has been negated in detail.\n4. Today, the case was taken up for final arguments. Arguments heard and record perused. Proposition involved in the instant writ petition is quite simple and narrow.\nII. STANCE OF THE PETITIONERS\n5. Learned counsel for the petitioners reiterated the grounds already taken in their pleadings; vehemently contended that the Government policy notification qua reserving 20% quota for the employees of grade B-1 to B-4 is yet in field having force of statutory rules. Neither the aforesaid policy notification has been rescinded or reversed by the relevant quarter nor anybody challenged the said notification, therefore, same is liable to be implemented and adhered to in its pros and cons. \nIII. NARRATIVE OF THE RESPONDENTS\n6. While on the other hand, learned Legal Advisor for Industries, labour and Mineral Resources Department, staunchly opposed the prayer made by the petitioner and contended that as the post of driver is not specifically included in the policy notification, therefore, no relief can be asked for let alone given to the driver regarding a Junior Clerk position. However, the counsel for the respondents contended that in writ petition No.2193/2023, the case of the petitioner for permanence against the post of Junior Clerk will be considered by the relevant selection committee in accordance with law. She added that proposed rules are in the pipeline, which are yet to be finalized by the relevant quarter, wherein certain modifications have been proposed in the present policy notification/ rules by enhancing the qualification for the promotion under 20% quota reserved for employees of grade B-1 to B-4.\n7. The claim of the petitioner Muhammad Altaf in writ petition No.866/A/2020 is very simple. He is claiming right of consideration against the post of Junior Clerk under 20% quota reserved for grade B-1 to B-4 employees as well as adherence of the policy notification to the extent of Drivers as well. As per stance of the learned counsel for the petitioner Ch. Shoukat Aziz, Advocate, up till now, 20% quota of grade B-1 to B-4 has never been implemented or adhered to by the departmental quarter, which is sheer \ndiscrimination and malafide on the part of the official quarter as well as administrative injustice.\nIV. VERDICT\n8. It is unequivocally reflecting from the policy notification that same is yet in field, neither cancelled nor challenged by anyone. Until and unless the aforesaid notification is not amended, rescinded or revoked by the competent authority same is liable to be implemented and adhered to. Stance of the official quarter qua amending the proposed rules wherein qualification for the post of Junior Clerk from the quota of employees having grade I to IV is proposed to be enhanced bears no weight, thus, at the outset, discarded. Proposed rules cannot place any embargo until and unless, the rules are not modified or amended in accordance with law. Furthermore, his accrued rights under any piece of legislation/policy notification even otherwise cannot be obviated by way of amendment.[1]\nDOCTRINE OF CLASSIFICATION\n9. Law and equity recognize equality among equals. But vice versa there is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals.[2]\n10. Class legislation or for that matter policy making in a sense to declass a certain group or set of people similarly situated hit the guarantee of equal treatment, whereas reasonable classification among same class who are not on equal footing with reference to any claim is not covered under the doctrine of equality.\n(Emphasis supplied)\n11. Albeit under the doctrine of equality, in view of oscillating or wavering needs of dissimilar set of persons, which may have little in common can be treated differently on logical perspicuity, however for such classification to meet the standards of fairness, the self-actualization of two vital constituents must be fulfilled, first the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia[3] which may judiciously distinguish persons or thing that are grouped together from the others left out of the group, the second, the differentia must have a logical and sensible nexus with the object sought to be achieved.[4]\n(Emphasis supplied)\n12. It reveals from the policy notification that after enumerating some posts like Qasid and Naib Qasid and through term - /extra the broader room has been provided for all other categories of employees in the class of grade 1 to 4, thus drivers (subject to having requisite qualification and experience provided in the rules) are deemed included in the category of the employees of grade 1 to 4.\nTo declass the drivers from the said category by the pretext that as word 'driver' has not been specifically inserted in the policy notification, hence they cannot be given benefits of the said policy notification is self-assuming discriminatory and arbitrary, besides extra legem act which cannot be endorsed. Discrimination is fraud upon the Constitution.\n \n14. Thus, word extra - covers all the employees in grade 1 to 4 irrespective of the nature of job assigned to them.\n15. An intelligible differentia, as a premise, insinuates an act of exodus or taking refuge that is capable of making sense, extending beyond logic and reasoning.\n16. So far as the stance of the departmental quarter that post of Driver is not specifically included and inserted in the policy notification, so, they could not be benefited from the said policy notification, it is also discarded. It is specifically mentioned in the policy notification ---- that are liable to be considered against the post of Junior Clerk from the employees from grade B-1 to B-4. Simple construction of word etc./ - ) ” is that\nall other employees working in the department (might be driver as well) are liable to be considered against the post of Junior Clerk as the plain language is well-speaking in this regard, and as per the doctrine of textualism, the primary source of meaning of any legal instrument is its plain language. \n17. Crux of the above is that petition No.866/A/2020 is accepted and respondents are directed to adhere to 20% quota reserved for the employees of grade B-1 to B-4 and consider the case of the petitioner for promotion against the available post of Junior Clerk, within 02 months. While, the connected writ petition No.2193/2023 filed by Abdul Waheed petitioner is also accepted and official respondents are directed to take up the case of the petitioner for permanence against the post of Junior Clerk subject to qualification and requisite criteria of the said post. Compliance report be submitted to Registrar of this Court.\nBoth the writ petitions stands disposed of in the above indicated manner.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.866/A/2020. Date of institution 07.07.2020. Date of decision 14.05.2025. Writ Petition No.2193/2023. Date of institution 13.06.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SYED SHAHID BAHAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Shoukat Aziz, Mrs. Noshaba Iqbal, Advocates and Anees-ul-Arifeen Abbasi, Advocate for the petitioners in writ No.866/A/2020 and writ No.2193/2023.\nMiss Farhanda Ibrar, Advocate/Legal Advisor for Industry, Labour and Mineral Resources department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Muhammad Altaf, son of Muhammad Maskeen, Driver B-4 in the office of Director Trade & Labour Dept. of Azad Jammu and Kashmir ……. Petitioner\nVs\n1. Secretary Industry, Labour and Mineral Resources Department, Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having his office at New Secretariat Muzaffarabad.\n2. Director Industries Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having his office at Lower Chatter Muzaffarabad.\n3. Joint Director Industries and Trade Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, new Industry Area Mirpur.\n4. Deputy Director Industries Mirpur, District Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, new Industry Area, Mirpur.\n5. District Accounts Officer District Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.\n6. Selection Committee of Industry for Grade 1-11 through its Chairman .....Respondents\n(2) Writ Petition No.2193/2023. Date of institution 13.06.2023.\nAbdul Waheed S/o Mir Zaman, Naib Qasid B-01 in Industry Labour and Mineral Resources Muzaffarabad, Azad Jammu and Kashmir ...Petitioner\nVs\n1. Secretary Industry, Labour and Mineral Resources Department, Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having his office at New Secretariat Muzaffarabad.\n2. Director Industries Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having his office at Lower Chatter Muzaffarabad.\n3. Joint Director Industries and Trade Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.\n4. Deputy Director Industries Mirpur, District Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.\n5. District Account Officer District Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.\n6. Muhammad Altaf S/o Muhammad Maskeen, Driver B-04 in the office Director Trade and Labour Department Muzaffarabad, Azad Jammu and Kashmir ….. Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26057", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 877 = 2025 SLD 877", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFTODg", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of FBR over Stevedoring Services; Time-barred Proceedings under Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe Registered Person, engaged in stevedoring and cargo transportation services, filed an appeal against the Order-in-Original (ONO) No. 04 of 2023 dated 19.12.2023, passed by the Assistant Commissioner-IR, Zone-I, MTO, Karachi, which created a demand of Rs. 84,620,619 (principal tax, further tax, penalty, and default surcharge). The appeal was filed after a delay, prompting a Miscellaneous Application for condonation.\nThe taxpayer contended:\nThe services fall under the Sindh Sales Tax (SST) regime, not under the Federal Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe initial Show Cause Notice (SCN-1) dated 11.05.2022, covering tax periods July 2020–June 2021, became time-barred under Section 11(5) of the Act after 120 days.\nThe issuance of a second Show Cause Notice (SCN-2) dated 25.05.2023 for the same tax period was illegal.\nNon-service of SCN-2 and hearing notices rendered the order void.\nReliance was placed on M.J. Yakin Co. v. Federation of Pakistan (2024 PTD 355), Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Muhammad Fazil Khan (PLD 1975 SC 331), Inam Package (2007 PTD 2265), and 1986 SCMR 962.\nThe department argued that the ONO was lawful and maintainable.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal accepted the appeal and condonation application, holding:\nStevedoring and allied services are subject to Sindh Sales Tax (SST) under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, post-18th Constitutional Amendment.\nThe taxpayer rightly filed NIL sales tax returns with FBR as it is registered and paying SST to Sindh Revenue Board (SRB).\nThe issuance of SCN-2 after 120 days of SCN-1 expiry was illegal and void under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, following M.J. Yakin Co. precedent.\nNon-service of SCN-2 and hearing notices also vitiated the proceedings.\nThe impugned order was annulled, and the appeal was allowed.\nCitations:\nM.J. Yakin Co. v. Federation of Pakistan, 2024 PTD 355\nChief Settlement Commissioner v. Muhammad Fazil Khan and others, PLD 1975 SC 331\nInam Package, 2007 PTD 2265 (H.C. Lah)\n1986 SCMR 962", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),11(5)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131(4)", - "Case #": "MA (Cond.) No.1062/KB/2024, STA No.827/KB/2024 (Tax Period July 2020 to June 2021). Date of Hearing: 22-01-2025. Date of Order: 08.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJA AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Kazi Zeeshan Akbar, FCA\nRespondent by: Mr. Saqlain Raza, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. INTEROCEAN CARGO SERVICES (PVT) LTD., KARACHI......APPLICANT\nVS\nTHE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER-IR, ZONE-I, MTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26058", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 896 = 2025 SLD 896 = 2025 CLC 332 = (2025) 132 TAX 227", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpYzk", - "Key Words:": "The court was tasked with determining the validity of a gas price notification issued by OGRA on 30.12.2016. The sole surviving legal issue was whether this notification required the prior approval of the Federal Government (i.e., the Federal Cabinet) under Section 8 of the OGRA Ordinance, as established by the Supreme Courts precedent in Mustafa Impex.\nThe defendants argued that approval from the Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) was sufficient, that post-facto ratification by the Cabinet was valid, and that the Mustafa Impex ruling should be confined to specific constitutional articles.\nThe court rejected all these arguments. It held that:\nThe law requires prior approval from the Federal Cabinet, not the ECC.\nPost-facto ratification is unconstitutional and was explicitly disapproved by the Supreme Court in Mustafa Impex and A D Khawaja.\nThe principle in Mustafa Impex applies broadly to all exercises of power by the Federal Government and cannot be narrowly confined.\nConsequently, the court declared the impugned notification void ab initio (invalid from the outset) because it was issued without the mandatory prior approval of the Federal Cabinet. The operation of the judgment was suspended for 30 days.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=90,97,99,172,173Oil and Gas Development Corporation Ordinance, 1961 =8", - "Case #": "Suit No. 129 of 2017, (and connected matters, particularized in the Schedule hereto.), decided on 6th September, 2024. Dates of hearing: 27th, 28th and 29th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hussain Ali Almani, Ovais Ali Shah, Atif Chaudhry, Basim Raza, Mehek Azfar, Ameen Mohammed Bandukda, Sunder Lal Lohana, Ahmed Farhaj, Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Syed Mohsin Ali, Naveed Ahmed Khan, Khurram Ashfaq, Salman Yousuf, Rana Sajid Rasool, Naeem Suleman, Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Syed Irshad ur Rehman, Naveen Merchant, Mariam Salahuddin, Abdul Rehman Adeed, Tasleem Hussain Maitlo associate of Sofia Saeed Shah, Ali Qambar Askary, Tehmina Askary, Shakeel Akbar, Anas Makhdoom, Abdul Sattar, Masroor Ahmed Alvi, Aadil Khan Abbasi, Junaid Mukhtar Siddiqui, Abdul Sattar, Toqeer Randhava, Ghulam Mustafa Kolachi, Nareeta Hassan, Faheem Shah, Kashan Ahmed, Asghar, Faiz Durrani, Ghulam Muhammad, Syed Zeeshan Ali, Shazi Aziz Khan, Samiur Rehman Khan, Mazhar Imtiaz Lari, Mustafa Naqvi and Abdul Ahad Nadeem, for Plaintiffs.\nAsim Iqbal, Ghazi Khan Khalil, Ameer Nosherwan Adil, Farmanullah Khan, Syeda Mariam Mastoor, Syeda Khizra Fatima Chishti, Syed Naseebullah, Ghani Khan, Shahid Ali Qureshi, Abdul Hakeem Junejo, Hashim Irfan, Zeeshan Ahmed and Syed Kumail Abbas, for Defendants.\nZahrah Sehr Vayani, Assistant Attorney General.\nMuhammad Riaz, Aamir Jalil, Syed Asad Abbas Naqvi, Ammar Saleem Butt, Raja Love Kush, Muhammad Kamran, Fasih ud Din Fawad, on behalf of SSGC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PREMIUM TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED THROUGH DULY AUTHORIZED OFFICER AND 23 OTHERS -PLAINTIFFS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ISLAMABAD AND 2 OTHERS -DEFENDANTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26059", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 944 = 2025 SLD 944 = 2025 SCMR 690", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)-\n-S. 15-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A-Rent proceedings-Due process and fair trial-Scope-Rent Tribunal adjudicates upon civil rights and obligations in eviction proceedings, and parties thereto are entitled to a fair trial and due process under Article 10A of the Constitution.\nKhadim Mohy-Ud-Din v. Rehmat Ali Nagra PLD 1965 SC 459 and Shahid Raza v. Fauzia Shaheen 2003 MLD 1215 rel.\n(b) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)-\n-Ss. 15 & 17-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 17 & 79-Ejectment of tenant-Document-Proof-Provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-Applicability-Rent Tribunal dismissed ejectment application for failure of landlord to prove rent deed according to the provisions of Articles 17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-Lower Appellate Court allowed appeal filed by landlord and passed eviction order but High Court maintained the order of Rent Tribunal-Validity-Distinction must be drawn between invoking and applying general principles of law of evidence codified in Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 and any special provisions enacted therein-While adjudicating upon civil rights and obligations in eviction proceedings, Rent Tribunal should invoke and apply only those general principles of law of evidence codified in Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 that are necessary to give effect to fundamental rights of parties under Article 10A of the Constitution-Rent Tribunal need not apply all principles or any special provisions enacted in Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-Such distinction is rooted in summary nature of rent proceedings, which are designed to resolve disputes expeditiously and without procedural formalities of regular civil trials-General principles of evidence, such as burden of proof, relevance of evidence, and right to cross-examine, must nevertheless apply to safeguard Constitutional right to a fair trial-Lower Appellate Court rightly accepted eviction petition filed by landlord-Rent Tribunal legally erred in law by dismissing the petition, and High Court similarly erred in restoring its decision-Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court and upheld that of Lower Appellate Court, whereby respondent/tenant was evicted from the premises-Appeal was allowed.\nKhadim Mohy-Ud-Din v. Rehmat Ali Nagra PLD 1965 SC 459 and Shahid Raza v. Fauzia Shaheen 2003 MLD 1215; Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique PLD 2007 SC 45; Ahmad Ali v. Nasar-Ud-Din PLD 2009 SC 453; Jehangir Rustom v. State Bank of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1296 and F.K. Irani and Co. v. Begum Feroze 1996 SCMR 1178 rel.\n(c) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)-\n-S. 15-Landlord and tenant-Proof-In absence of any evidence to the contrary, owner of a property, by virtue of his title, is presumed to be landlord-Person in possession is presumed to be tenant of that property.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 =15Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10AQanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=17,79", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 3854 of 2024, decided on 25th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 14.05.2024, passed in Writ Petition No. 17731 of 2024). Date of hearing: 25th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Masood Jahangir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nMalik Ijaz Hussain Gorcha, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (through video link, Lahore Registry).\nRespondents Nos. 2 and 3 (Special Judge (Rent) and Additional District Judge) Pro forma Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZAFAR IQBAL and another -Petitioners\nVS\nSyed RIAZ HUSSAIN SHAH and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26060", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 945 = 2025 SLD 945 = 2025 SCMR 601", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSSs", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 42 & 54-Cooperative Societies Act (VII of 1925), S.27-Suit for declaration and injunction-Death of member-Transfer of interest-Nominee of member-Status-Petitioners/defendants claimed to be nominees of deceased member of cooperative society, whereas respondents/plaintiffs were among the legal heirs of deceased member-Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was dismissed by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court and High Court decreed the same in their favour-Validity-In presence of heirs of deceased member, the nominee and after his death petitioner/defendant could not succeed him, rather the share and interest of deceased established in the Society would devolve upon his legal heirs-Petitioner/defendant could not claim allotment on the basis of membership in society accorded prior to his birth-Some fraud was played by petitioner/defendant in order to deprive legal heirs of deceased member from their valuable rights accrued in their favour-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nMst. Amtul Habib and others v. Mst. Musarrat Parveen and others 1974 SCMR 185; Fazal Shah v. Muhammad Din and others 1990 SCMR 868; Manzoor Ahmad v. Mst. Salman Bibi and others 1998 SCMR 388 and Muhammad Bakhsh v. Mst. Ghulam Ghulam Fatima 2007 SCMR 1227 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54Cooperative Societies Act, 1925=27", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 2095-L of 2016, decided on 15th January, 2025.\n(Against the order dated 05.04.2016 passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in C.R. No. 29-D of 2001). Date of hearing: 15th January, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Vasif Naveed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MATLOOB and others -Petitioners\nVS\nTAJ DIN (deceased) through Legal Heirs and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26061", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 946 = 2025 SLD 946 = 2025 SCMR 606", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSTk", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983-\n-R.14-Acquired land-Restoration to original land owners-Non-utilization of land-Land was acquired from respondents/landowners with the promise to set up Waste Water Treatment Plant (WWTP) but that had not materialized for over three decades-Effect-Water And Sanitary Agencys (WASA) inaction over such years had represented a serious failure in upholding its commitment to both public welfare and private rights-If there was no success reported in September 2025, the question would be open before Supreme Court as to whether land acquired three decades ago for a public purpose, which had not been fulfilled, could result in the land being restored to its original owners as per Rule 14 of Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983-Supreme Court considering the importance of WWTP and its bearing on fundamental rights of the people, expected from WASA to reconsider its financial and technological options while pursuing its negotiations with French Development Agency (AFD)-Supreme Court extended time to the authorities to conclude the matter latest by end of August 2025-Supreme Court directed ECNEC to submit its final report to the Court before the next date of hearing-Supreme Court directed the office to fix the case in last week of September 2025 to assess whether the relevant authorities had successfully concluded the matter after exploring all possible financial and technological alternatives-Petition was adjourned.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 2918-L and 3039-L of 2015, decided on 31st January, 2025. Date of hearing: 31st January, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Umer Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in both cases) (via video link from Lahore).\nMohsin Mumtaz, Advocate Supreme Court along with Asad Ullah Khan, Secretary Housing and Urban Development, Punjab, Ghufran Ahmad, M.D. WASA, Lahore, Zeeshan Bilal, Director (P&D) WASA, Lahore and Muhammad Usman Asif, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed ALI HUSSAIN and others -Petitioners\nVS\nSENIOR MEMBER/MEMBER (REVENUE) BOARD OF REVENUE PUNJAB, LAHORE and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26062", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 947 = 2025 SLD 947 = 2025 SCMR 612", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 25-Employment-Regularization of service-Disabled person-Discrimination-Petitioner/National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) was aggrieved of direction passed by High Court to regularize services of respondent/employee-Validity-Petitioner/NADRA provided job opportunities to disabled persons based on their ability and capacity to work-If a disabled person, initially appointed on a contractual basis, had performed his duties for a considerable period of time to the satisfaction of his superiors/department, then proprietary demanded that he should be regularized as a permanent employee so that he could reap all employment benefits, rather than being dragged on contractual basis perpetually-Respondent/employee was only three days short of completing required one year of service, but was denied regularization, while other similarly situated employees, who were short by a greater margin than the respondent/employee were accommodated as directed by High Court without any challenge to that judgment-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court as there was no illegality or perversity-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nChairman NADRA, Islamabad, through Chairman, Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Ali Shah and others 2017 SCMR 1979; Federal Board of Revenue v. Messrs. Hub Power Company Ltd. and others PLD 2023 SC 207; NWFP Public Service Commission v. Muhammad Arif 2011 SCMR 848; Fida Hussain v. The State PLD 2002 SC 46; Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. v. Iqbal Nasir PLD 2011 SC 132; Imtiaz Ali Malik v. Mst. Surrya Begun 1979 SCMR 22; Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Samina Masood PLD 2005 SC 831; Accountant General for Pakistan (Revenue) through Auditor-General v. Zia Mohy-ud-Din PLD 2008 SC 164; Mst. Shohrat Bano v. Ismail Dada Adam Soomar 1968 SCMR 574; Punjab Employees Social Security Institution Lahore and others v. Manzoor Hussain Khan 1992 SCMR 441; Province of Punjab through Secretary Excise and Taxation, Government of Punjab v. Sargodha Textile Mills Ltd., Sargodha PLD 2005 SC 988 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Media Network PLD 2006 SC 787 ref.\n(b) Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981)-\n-Preamble-Islamabad Capital Territory Rights of Persons with Disability Act (XXXV of 2020), Preamble-Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act (XLII of 2022), Preamble-Sindh Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act (XLVIII of 2018), Preamble-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Act (XVI of 2012), Preamble-Balochistan Persons with Disabilities Act (II of 2017), Preamble-Rights of disabled persons-Object, purpose and scope-Raison detre of such legislation is not to merely provide some benefits as an act of compassion but to rejuvenate category of such persons who suffer from some disabilities, despite their challenges, and are differently abled, and deserve to live with dignity and contribute meaningfully to society-These are individuals who require encouragement and motivation so that they may also enjoy fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution, just as other citizens do-It is imperative for all government levels to facilitate their integration into mainstream, enabling them to leverage their abilities and sense of worth-This in turn, allows them to earn a livelihood with respect and independence, rather than relying on financial assistance or help, which may hurt their ego and undermine their self-esteem and dignity-Teachings of Islam also emphasize benevolence, care, and compassion towards such individuals, urging to adopt a wide ranging and solicitous approach to empower them for active participation in society with dignity and vitality.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 6059 of 2021, decided on 28th November, 2024. (On appeal from the Judgment, dated 18.10.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in W.P. No. 6539 of 2014). Date of hearing: 28th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz S.A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court along with Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Tariq, Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocates Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHAIRMAN, NADRA, NADRA HEADQUARTER, ISLAMABAD and others -Petitioners\nVS\nABDUL MAJEED and another -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26063", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 948 = 2025 SLD 948 = 2025 SCMR 629", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSXo", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324 & 337F (ii)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)-Attempt to Commit qatl-i-amd and ghayr jaifah badiah-Petition for cancellation of pre-arrest bail, dismissal of-Further inquiry, case of-Cross-version-Non-recovery of crime empty-Petitioner/complainant was aggrieved of grant of pre-arrest bail to respondent/accused by High Court-Validity-No crime empty was recovered from place of occurrence-Nothing remained to be recovered from respondent/accused as weapon allegedly used in commission of offence had already been taken into possession by police during investigation-High Court rightly observed that tentative assessment of incriminating material when considered alongside the stance of respondent/accused narrated in cross-version, prima facie indicated that case fell within the ambit of further inquiry-Such observation of High Court was in accordance with the material available on record and not contrary to it-Prosecution failed to present sufficient incriminating material to connect respondent/accused with commission of alleged offence-Supreme Court declined to interfere in bail granted by High Court as the order was neither perverse, nor against any settled principle of law-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nShahzada Qaiser Arfat v. State PLD 2021 SC 708 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=498Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=324,337F(ii)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Crl.P.L.A. No. 588 of 2024, decided on 3rd February, 2025.\n(Against the order dated 20.05.2024 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Criminal Misc. No. 840-B of 2024).\n Date of hearing: 3rd February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ and Shahid Waheed, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Riaz Hanif Rahi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMs. Chand Bibi, DPG Islamabad, Kaleem Ullah, SHO and Mansab Dar, SI/Investigating Officer for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SAEED -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE through A.G. Islamabad and another -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26064", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 949 = 2025 SLD 949 = 2025 SCMR 632", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpSXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)-\n-S. 4-Appeal-Object, purpose and scope-Misconduct-Departmental inquiry is to Determine whether a case of misconduct is made out and whether accused is found guilty by inquiry officer/committee-As a fact finding forum, Service Tribunal is obligated to ascertain whether due process of law or right to a fair trial, as envisaged under Article 10A of the Constitution, was followed-Regular inquiry cannot be considered or labeled as regular inquiry unless fair opportunity is provided to defend the charges.\n(b) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)-\n-S. 4-Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, R. 5-Departmental inquiry-Object, purpose and scope-Misconduct-Proof-Principle of natural justice-Applicability-Petitioner/civil servant was dismissed from service on the charges of misconduct and his appeal was also dismissed by Service Tribunal-Validity-Principles of natural justice require that delinquent should be afforded fair opportunity to contest charges before he is found guilty-No efforts were made by inquiry officer either intentionally or unintentionally to explore guilt of petitioner/civil servant-Such inquiry report could not be construed as fair and impartial, nor was it commensurate with the procedure provided under Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 for conducting an inquiry into allegation of misconduct-Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal and order passed by authorities imposing major punishment of dismissal from service was also set aside-Supreme Court remanded the matter to departmental authorities for conducting a de novo regular inquiry into the same allegation of misconduct jotted down in the charge sheet and provide fair opportunity to petitioner/civil servant to defend the charges, as inquiry proceedings and report were defective-Supreme Court directed the authorities to pass speaking order and convey the same to petitioner/civil servant-Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Service Tribunals Act, (IX of 1974)=4Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973=5", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 921-L of 2017, decided on 4th December, 2024.\n(On appeal from the Judgment dated 23.11.2016 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 5720 of 2015). Date of hearing: 4th December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court and Syeda B.H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nBaleegh uz Zaman, Addl. AG, Punjab and Muhammad Wasif, DSP (Legal) Bahawalnagar for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AAMIR AKBAR -Petitioner\nVS\nADDITIONAL SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, BAHAWALPUR and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26065", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 950 = 2025 SLD 950 = 2025 SCMR 639", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTc", - "Key Words:": "Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7 (ff)-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S.5-Explosive material, recovery of-Re-appraisal of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Defence version-Accused was convicted for recovery of explosive material from his possession and was sentenced to imprisonment for fourteen years-Validity-Accused produced compelling evidence which had raised serious questions about mode and manner in which police alleged to have arrested and investigated him-Besides reasonable doubts that could arise in a prudent mind due to evidence presented by accused, prosecutions own account of events was fraught with doubtful circumstances that had created doubt, which automatically favoured accused without reservation-Prosecution failed to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, rather existence of such doubts decisively favoured accused and such aspect was not considered by Trial Court and High Court-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nTariq Parvez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230; Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857; Mst Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048; Abdul Jabbar v. The State 2019 SCMR 129 and Maqsood Alam v. The State 2024 SCMR 156 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7(ff)Explosive Substances Act, 1908=5", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 972-L of 2017, decided on 24th January, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 17.05.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl.A. 140 of 2015).\n Date of hearing: 24th January, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arif Mehmood Rana, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSajjad Hussain, DPG for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL SAMAD -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26066", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 951 = 2025 SLD 951 = 2025 SCMR 646", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTY", - "Key Words:": "Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-\n-S. 4-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12 (2)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 212 (3)-Order of Service Tribunal-Plea of fraud, misrepresentation or lack of jurisdiction-Petitioner/Pakistan Railways was aggrieved of dismissal of its application to set aside order passed by Service Tribunal directing the petitioner/Pakistan Railways to upgrade post of respondent/employee-Validity-All sweeping grounds were alien to the provision of Section 12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside any judgment and decree, wherein applicant/person is obligated to characteristically and judiciously point out act of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction, if any-Elementary constituents were missing from the application filed by petitioner/Pakistan Railways before Federal Service Tribunal, which was rightly dismissed-Service Tribunal exercises exclusive jurisdiction as a fact finding forum in respect of matters relating to terms and conditions of service of civil servants and for the matters connected there with or ancillary thereto-Exclusive appellate jurisdiction is exercised by Service Tribunal in the cases of civil servants to vet and examine departmental orders passed against civil servants-Civil servants may approach Tribunal against an adverse order within the specified limitation period for filing an appeal, where either an order is passed on his departmental appeal, or if departmental appeal is not decided within the prescribed period of time, the aggrieved civil servant may approach and file appeal before Service Tribunal within the statutory period-Matter reaches Service Tribunal against adverse orders but after it has been filtered through departmental hierarchy or chain of command-Onerous duty of service Tribunal, as an appellate forum, is to determine whether departmental action taken against civil servant, complies with the law or not-Filing application under section 12(2), C.P.C. with the prayer to dismiss an application moved for implementation of a judgment of Federal Service Tribunal was no solution after the judgment had attained finality up to Supreme Court-Supreme Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Federal Service Tribunal as the same was based on correct exposition of law-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Service Tribunals Act, 1973=4Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 512 of 2022, decided on 11th December, 2024.\n(On appeal from an Order dated 29.11.2021, passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad on Misc. Petition No. 1893 of 2018 moved in Appeals Nos. 1879 to 1883 (R) CS of 2013).\nDate of hearing: 11th December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Umer Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link from Lahore).\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN RAILWAYS through Chairman Pakistan Railways, Islamabad and another -Petitioners\nVS\nMUHAMMAD AMIN -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26067", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 952 = 2025 SLD 952 = 2025 SCMR 653", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTU", - "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-\n-S. 4-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 17(2)(a)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2-Suit for recovery of money-Promissory note, non-attestation of-Evasive denial-Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below-Suit filed by respondent/plaintiff was decreed by both the Courts below in his favour and against the petitioner/defendant-Validity-Promissory note, under section 4 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is required to contain four essential ingredients: (i) an unconditional undertaking to pay; (ii) the sum should be the sum of money and certain; (iii) the payment should be to or to the order of a person who is certain, or to the bearer of the instrument; and (iv) the maker should sign it-If an instrument fulfills such four conditions, it is called a promissory note-Requirement of attestation of a document provided under Article 17 (2)(a) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 does not apply to promissory note-Petitioner/defendant took a vague stance and evasively denied allegations so made by the respondent/plaintiff as to his claim against petitioner/defendant-Such denial without any substantive proof could not be considered and approved-Trial Court and High Court minutely appreciated and evaluated pleadings of parties and had assessed evidence on the principle of preponderance-Both the Court below reached to a just conclusion that petitioner/defendant failed to successfully overturn the stand taken by respondent/plaintiff against him-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below in favor of respondent/plaintiff-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nSheikh Muhammad Shakeel v. Sheikh Hafiz Muhammad Aslam 2014 SCMR 1562 and Muhammad Ashraf v. Abdul Ghafoor and 4 others 1999 SCMR 2633 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=4Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=17(2)(a)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 1618 of 2024, decided on 17th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 06.03.2024 passed by Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench in R.F.A.No. 53-D of 2020 with C.M. No. 31-D of 2020). Date of hearing: 17th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Naeem Akhter Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nBurhan Latif Khaisori, Advocate Supreme Court for legal heirs Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ADNAN -Petitioner\nVS\nSALAH-UD-DIN -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26068", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 953 = 2025 SLD 953 = 2025 SCMR 656", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Civil Service-\n-Recruitment-Duties of Recruitment Committee-Principle-Exercise of recruitment is an onerous and conscientious duty and if it is assigned to a person or committee, they are obligated to conduct the process fairly and squarely and according to the mandate given by recruitment agency/department to recommend suitable candidates for filling up vacant positions/posts advertised for application by interested candidates-Selection/Recruitment Committee cannot travel beyond its mandate-Neither can it subtract any post nor add any post in selection process and it is obligated to adhere to the terms of reference and conduct recruitment process strictly for the sanctioned posts allowed to be included in written test and interview by candidates-Selection Board or Recruitment Committee can only recommend candidates for issuing offer or appointment letters who are strictly selected on merit for the sanctioned posts, without deviating from terms and conditions of advertisement published for the information of general public-Predominant task of Recruitment Committee should be selection of suitable candidates, which is the substratum of a fair, transparent and efficient recruitment process-Key responsibilities of Recruitment Committee are to first determine how many positions have been advertised for inviting applications; to scrutinize all applications for shortlisting; and to examine whether all required antecedents and credentials have been attached and vetted for the purpose of initial shortlisting of applicants; whether applicant joined competitive process and qualified written test, if any such condition is required to be complied with, then to assess marks on merits; and subsequently conduct interview according to the merit list, awarding interview marks-Recruitment Committee may also consider granting additional marks for additional/value-added qualifications or experience as mentioned in the advertisement inviting applications.\n(b) Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1979-\n-R. 3-Recruitment-Appointment letter, non-issuance of-Recruitment process, annulment of-Petitioner/authorities were aggrieved of direction issued by High Court to issue appointment letters to respondents/candidates who had been recommended for selection by Recruitment Committee-Held, that Recruitment Committee must undertake recruitment process according to conditions outlined by concerned department in consultation with Services and General Administration Department of Balochistan Government-Recruitment Committee was bound to strictly follow the criteria fixed for appointments with required number of posts-Committee was obligated to complete the process and send recommendations without deviating from or departing from benchmarks to achieve the goal-Recruitment process was declared null and void by competent authority, however it did not debar respondents/candidates from participating in competitive process initiated afresh by authorities for appointment to the same required post-All respondents/candidates could apply afresh in response to advertisement published in newspaper inviting applications for vacant situations-Supreme Court set aside the direction issued by High Court on Constitutional petitions filed by respondents/candidates-Appeal was allowed.\nUzma Manzoor and others v. Vice-Chancellor Khushal Khan Khattak University, Karak and others 2022 SCMR 694 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 100-Q of 2023, decided on 3rd December, 2024.\n(On appeal from the Judgment dated 14.03.2023 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Constitution Petition No. 2080 of 2022). Date of hearing: 3rd December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Ayaz Swati and Tahir Khattak, Addl. Advocates General, Balochistan for Petitioners.\nTaimoor Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record along with Ahmad Raza, in person for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN through Additional Chief Secretary Development, P&D Department, Quetta and another -Petitioners\nVS\nMUHAMMAD AKHTAR and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26069", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 954 = 2025 SLD 954 = 2025 SCMR 662", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRS8", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302 (b)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.103-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Withholding of evidence-Presumption-Recovery proceedings-Non-association of public witnesses-Motive not proved-Accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amd; one was sentenced to death whereas the other was sentenced to imprisonment for life-High Court maintained the conviction but converted death sentence into imprisonment for life-Validity-Complainant and other prosecution witnesses in their statements recorded at trial, made dishonest improvements for assigning specific roles to each accused-Such improvements created serious doubt about veracity of their testimony and it was not safe to place reliance on such statements-Eleven crime empties allegedly recovered from crime scene and one 30 bore pistol allegedly recovered on the pointing of one accused were sent together to Forensic Science Laboratory, wherefrom report was negative-No private witness of locality was associated to attest alleged recovery of crime weapon on the pointing of accused-Due to non-association of any private witness of locality to attest recovery of alleged weapon of offence, and due to lack of independent corroboration, the recovery was disbelieved-Prosecution did not produce an injured passerby and an eye-witness of the occurrence-Adverse inference was drawn under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 to the effect that had such witnesses been produced by prosecution at the trial, they would not have supported version of prosecution-Alleged motive lacked force necessary to connect accused persons with the commission of offence-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentences awarded to both the accused persons as prosecution failed to prove charge against them beyond reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed.\n2024 SCMR 1741; 2024 SCMR 1839; 2017 SCMR 898; 2024 SCMR 1310 and 2024 SCMR 1507 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=129(g)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=103", - "Case #": "Jail Petitions Nos. 314 and 315 of 2017 and Crl.P.L.A. No. 576-L of 2017, decided on 9th December, 2024.\n(Against a common judgment dated 15.03.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl.As. Nos. 1691 and 1692 of 2012, M.R. No. 438 of 2012 and Crl. Rev. No. 369 of 2016).\nDate of hearing: 9th December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Musarrat Hilali and Naeem Akhter Afghan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qaisar Mehmood Sara, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in J.Ps. Nos. 314 and 315 of 2017).\nMushtaq Ahmad Mohal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl.P. No. 576-L of 2017) (via video link from Lahore) (and also for the Respondents in J.Ps. Nos. 314 and 315 of 2017).\nMirza Abid Majeed, Addl. PG Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NASIR BUTT and 2 others -Petitioners\nVS\nThe STATE and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26070", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 955 = 2025 SLD 955 = 2025 SCMR 667", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRSs", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 42 & 54-Suit for declaration and injunction-Mutation of sale-Plea of abduction and coercion raised by plaintiff-Not proved-Respondent/plaintiff assailed sale mutation attested in favour of appellant/defendant on the plea that the same was a result of coercion while keeping him in illegal confinement-Suit was decreed by Trial Court in favour of respondent/plaintiff, whereas appeal and revision filed by appellant / defendant were dismissed by Lower Appellate Court and High Court respectively-Validity-Upon filing of suit and after that making a statement before Court on oath that he/she has not made the transaction and the instrument, the onus to prove such instrument shifts and the beneficiary must prove the transaction as well as valid registration/attestation of document-Respondent/plaintiff was a grown-up married person having a daughter, who pleaded that he was abducted by appellant/defendant who kept him in abduction for 4-5 days and got mutation in question attested and denied transaction of sale in favour of appellant/defendant-It was prime duty of respondent/plaintiff to prove the case pleaded by him but he failed to prove the same-Appellant /defendant produced Patwari as well as revenue officials in the court as witnesses, who had attested mutation in question and they fully supported the entrance and attestation of mutation-Supreme Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by three Courts below and dismissed the suit filed by respondent/plaintiff-Appeal was allowed.\nGhulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor PLD 1991 SC 957 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54", - "Case #": "C.P. No. 3151 of 2021, decided on 30th October, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 04.02.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 7582 of 2021). Date of hearing: 30th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Faiz Ahmad Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nJunaid Iftikhar Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.\nRana Muhammad Tariq, Tehsildar/Respondent No. 4 in person.\nSyed Muhammad Ashraf, Patwari/Respondent No. 5 in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASIF -Petitioner\nVS\nAMJAD IQBAL and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26071", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 956 = 2025 SLD 956 = 2025 SCMR 671", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTk", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.161-Income Tax Rules, 2022, R. 43-Withholding tax, non-deduction of-Show cause notice-Fishing inquiry, principle of-Applicability-Appellant/taxpayer was aggrieved of show cause notice issued by authorities to initiate proceedings for not deducting withholding tax-Validity-If a taxpayer fails to collect or deduct tax from payments made during a tax year, such inaction is deemed as a default under section 161 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Point that sets into motion the machinery of section 161 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to determine tax liability is the failure to either collect tax or deduct it-Show cause notice highlighted discrepancies in valuation of imports and specified categories under which tax was applicable-This indicated that there was careful consideration of any failures to deduct tax, along with an assessment of underlying bases and amounts involved, therefore, the notice was not simply a fishing expedition-Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court as demand created against appellant/taxpayer was well-founded-Appeal was dismissed.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 1325 and Messrs. Bilz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax, Multan and another 2002 PTD 1 = PLD 2002 SC 353 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161Income Tax Rules, 2002=43", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 16 of 2022, decided on 14th January, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in ITR No. 13 of 2015). Date of hearing: 14th January, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Munib Akhtar, Athar Minallah and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Mumtaz ul Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (via video link from Branch Registry Lahore).\nAhmad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Branch Registry Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs CHAWALA FOOTWEAR, LAHORE -Appellant\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26072", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 957 = 2025 SLD 957 = 2025 SCMR 676", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance (VIII of 1979)-\n-S.3-Qazf-Proof-Denial of paternity of child constitutes offence of Qazf as it amounts to attribution of Zina to childs mother.\nBadai al-Sanai fi Tartib al-Sharat (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 2003), vol. 5, p. 34 and Al-Hidayah fi Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtadi (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, n.d.), vol. 2, p. 270 rel.\n(b) Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance (VIII of 1979)-\n-S. 14-Lian-Applicability-Provision of Lianis applicable when the allegation is made at a time when marital bond between the couple is intact.\nAl-Mabsut (Beirut: Dar al-Marifah, n.d.), vol. 7, p. 49 rel.\n(c) Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance (VIII of 1979)-\n-Ss. 5 & 11-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 128-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 203F-Review of judgment-Qazf, offence of-Withdrawal of complaint-Effect-Legitimacy of child-Respondent/ex-husband was tried for committing Qazf on petitioner/ex-wife-Trial Court instead of deciding the matter of Qazf, left the same to be placed before Almighty Allah on the Day of Judgment-Federal Shariat Court partly allowed appeal filed by petitioner/ex-wife and declared that allegation of Qazf was established against respondent/ex-husband-Federal Shariat Court did not impose punishment of Hadd as Tazkiyat-al-Shuhudwas not done for the witnesses, resultantly punishment was awarded as Tazir-Respondent/ex-husband was acquitted by Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court-Petitioner/ex-wife sought review of the judgment passed by Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court-Held, that for enforcing Hadd of Qazf, it is necessary that complainant must not withdraw the complaint-Even silence on the part of complainant amounts to Shubhah (doubt) which becomes an obstacle in the way of enforcing Hadd punishment-Petitioner/ex-wife did not press for punishing respondent/ex-husband, therefore, Hadd could not be enforced-Respondent/ex-husband had already been released after the judgment was announced by Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court-Legitimacy of the child born to petitioner/ex-wife was conclusively established and she was entitled to all legal rights of a legitimate child under Islamic law and law of the land-Child born during subsistence of a valid marriage or within two years after its dissolution, under Article 128 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 is conclusive proof of legitimacy, provided that the woman remains unmarried after divorce-Act of respondent/ex-husband attracted rules of Qazf, not Lian-Proceedings for Qazf could not be allowed to continue after the petitioner/ex-wife withdrew from the allegation-Judgment passed by Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court was sustained to the extent of acquittal of respondent/ex-husband-Shariat review petition was allowed accordingly.\nAl-Mabsut (Beirut: Dar al-Marifah, n.d.), vol. 7, p. 49 and Ghazala Tehsin Zohra v. Mehr Ghulam Dastagir Khan and another PLD 2015 SC 327 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979=3,14", - "Case #": "Criminal Shariat Review Petition No. 2 of 2016 in Criminal Shariat Petition No. 24 of 2009, decided on 27th January, 2025. \nDate of hearing: 8th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Qazi Faez Isa, Chairman, Naeem Akhtar Afghan, Shahid Bilal Hassan, Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masud and Dr. Qibla Ayaz, Members", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nMs. Chand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor-General, Punjab for the State.\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, ASC/AOR for Respondent No. 2.\nDr. Muhammad Mushtaq Ahmad, Ex-Director-General, Shariah Academy as Amicus Curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. SAEEDA BEGUM -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE and another-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26073", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 958 = 2025 SLD 958 = 2025 SCMR 684", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRXo", - "Key Words:": "Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss.17, 181, 194-A & 196-Notification SRO 499 (I)/2009, dated 13-06-2009-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Transporting smuggled goods-Confiscation of vehicle-Option to pay fine-Aggrieved person-Scope-Petitioner was driver of vehicle which was confiscated by authorities for transporting smuggled goods-Owner of vehicle did not come forward, instead the petitioner sought release of vehicle against payment of fine-Validity-Vehicle was seized in year 2020 and it was outrightly confiscated-Before insertion of proviso to Section 157(2) of Customs Act, 1969 it remained effective for a short period and was omitted through Finance Act, 2022-Proviso inserted in section 157 of Customs Act, 1969 generally explained the extent of confiscation and did not in any manner affect, limit or interfere with the powers conferred on Federal Board of Revenue under Section 181 of Customs Act, 1969-In the context of giving an option to release goods in lieu of payment of fine, provisions of Sections 157 and 181 were independent of each other and the former could not be construed as having an overriding effect on the latter-Inserted and then omitted proviso was not relevant or attracted in the matter, as the vehicle was found carrying smuggled goods and was used exclusively for transportation thereof, which was covered under clause (b) of Preamble to Notification SRO 499(I)/2009, dated 13-06-2009 and the option contemplated under section 181 of Customs Act, 1969 could not have been given for its release-Aggrieved person is the one whose legal right have been invaded, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected-Expression aggrieved refers to a substantial grievance, denial of some personal pecuniary or property rights, or imposition upon a party for burden or obligation-Statutory right of appeal provided under Section 194A of Customs Act, 1969 is confined to an aggrieved person or an officer of customs-Petitioner was not owner of vehicle, nor had the latter sought benefit under section 181 of Customs Act, 1969-Petitioner was neither authorized by nor was acting as a lawful attorney on behalf of owner of vehicle-Supreme Court declined to interfere in the orders of confiscation of vehicle in question-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nCollector of Customs, Peshawar v. Wali Khan and others 2017 SCMR 585; Director-General, Intelligence and Investigation-FBR v. Sher Andaz and others 2010 SCMR 1746 and Director, Directorate-General of Intelligence and Investigation and others v. Al-Faiz Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2006 SCMR 129 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=17,181,194-A,196Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2330 of 2023, decided on 12th September, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 15.02.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Customs Reference No.36-P of 2021). Date of hearing: 12th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Munib Akhtar, Athar Minallah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naveed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Peshawar).\nShahid Qayyum, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Peshawar).", - "Petitioner Name:": "BASHIR AHMAD -Petitioner\nVS\nDIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION (CUSTOMS), FBR, PESHAWAR and another -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26074", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 959 = 2025 SLD 959 = 2025 SCMR 762", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpRXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S.154-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 140 & 153- First Information Report (FIR)-Scope-First Information Report by itself is not a substantive piece of evidence unless its contents are affirmed on oath in witness box by its maker and its maker is subjected to the test of cross-examination- First Information Report in view of Articles 140 and 153 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, is a previous statement and can only be used for contradicting its maker-Unless FIR is proved through its maker, it cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence in favour of prosecutions case.\nNasar Alis case AIR 1957 SC 366 and Ghaus Muhammad alias Ghaus and another v. The State 1979 SCMR 155 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.103-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Withholding of evidence-Recovery proceedings-Non-associating private witnesses-Accused was convicted and sentenced to death for committing murder of his wife-Validity-At the trial, prosecution did not produce owner of the house as witness, thus, adverse inference was drawn under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e- Shahadat, 1984 to the effect that had the above witness been produced by the prosecution at the trial, he would not have supported the version of the prosecution-Place of occurrence was surrounded by Abadi but investigating officer did not associate any person for the recovery of dead body-Investigating officer did not prepare recovery memo of dead body of deceased and simply made memo of iron box-No private witness of locality was associated to attest alleged iron box-Due to non-association of any private witness of locality to attest, the recovery memo lacked independent corroboration and the same was disbelieved-Judgments of Courts below were against the principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal dispensation of justice and the law settled by Supreme Court-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nMst Saima Noreen v. The State 2024 SCMR 1310; Muhammad Ismail v. The State 2017 SCMR 898 and Muhammad Ijaz v. The State 2024 SCMR 1507 rel.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Medical evidence-Scope-Medical evidence is a type of supporting evidence, which may confirm prosecutions version with regard to receipt of injury, nature of injury, kind of weapon used in occurrence but it cannot identify the assailant.\nMuhammad Hassan and another v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 1427 and Iftikhar Hussain alias Kharoo v. The State 2024 SCMR 1449 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=154,103Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=140,153,129(g)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 95 of 2022, decided on 20th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 22.02.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Cr. A. No. 190 of 2018 and Murder Reference No. 9 of 2018).", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sagheer Ahmad Qadri, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMs. Chand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD RAMZAN -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26075", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 960 = 2025 SLD 960 = 2025 SCMR 699", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTc", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 365-B, 376 & 496-B-Forcible abduction, forcible intercourse/rape and fornication-Reappraisal of evidence-Abduction-Proof-Punishment for fornication (Zina with consent) qua alleged abductee as a consenting party-Principle-Accused persons were convicted and sentenced by Trial Court for abducting daughter of complainant and committing Zina with her-Validity-Prosecution story of forcible abduction and rape of alleged abductee was the result of an afterthought of abductee and her family members after return of alleged abductee to her parents house-No ornament or cash amount was recovered from any accused-As per medico legal report, no mark of violence was noted on the body of abductee-Neither it was a case of forcible abduction punishable under section 365-B, P.P.C. nor it was a case of forcible intercourse/rape punishable under section 376 P.P.C.-In view of the provisions of section 496-B, P.P.C., the abductee was not liable to be convicted and sentenced for offence of fornication (Zina with consent) as she was not made accused in the case by Police-No charge was framed against abductee by Trial Court and she was not provided a chance to cross-examine prosecution witnesses to defend herself-Abductee could not be convicted and sentenced in absence of fulfilment of such legal requirements-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence of accused for the charge under Section 376(i) P.P.C. but he was convicted under section 496-B, P.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo five years imprisonment-Appeal was dismissed.\nMuhammad Imran v. The State Criminal Misc. Application No. 374 of 2024 in Criminal Petition No. 725 of 2023 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=365-B,376,496-B", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 481 of 2019, decided on 12th February, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 20.06.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 200049-J of 2018, 104943 of 2017 and Criminal Revision No. 104946 of 2017). Date of hearing: 12th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faiz Muhammad Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner No. 1.\nShahid Azeem, Aisha Tasneem, Advocates Supreme Court for Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3.\nSajjad Hussain Bhatti, DPG for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASIF MASIH and 2 others -Petitioners\nVS\nThe STATE -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26076", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 961 = 2025 SLD 961 = 2025 SCMR 704", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTY", - "Key Words:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9 (c)-Recovery of narcotic substance-Un-broken chain of custody-Proof-Accused was convicted for recovery of 1400 grams of charas from his possession and was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years-Validity-Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond reasonable doubt-Chain of custody remained unverified, and prosecution did not conclusively establish safe transmission of recovered contraband-Contradictions in handling of case property and failure to produce key witnesses responsible for its movement further weakened the prosecutions case-Where any link in chain of evidence remains doubtful, the benefit thereof must accrue to accused-Prosecution was under a bounded duty to establish each stage of recovery, storage, and transmission of case property with unimpeachable certainty, and its failure to do so had rendered the conviction unsustainable-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence imposed on accused by two Courts below and he was acquitted of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nZahir Shah v. The State 2019 SCMR 2004; Sarfraz Ahmed v. The State 2024 SCMR 1571; Muhammad Hazir v. The State 2023 SCMR 986 and Javed Iqbal v. The State 2023 SCMR 139 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9(c)", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 828 of 2024, decided on 17th February, 2025.\n(Against judgment dated 04.06.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Mirpurkhas in Cr. Appeal No. D-45 of 2024). \nDate of hearing: 17th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Musarrat Hilali, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Jamil, Muhammad Shabbir Rajput, Advocates Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nSiraj Ali Khan, APG for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD IQBAL -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE through P.G. Sindh-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26077", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 962 = 2025 SLD 962 = 2025 SCMR 708", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 10A-Civil service-Disciplinary proceedings-Due process-Affected civil servants must be granted a fair hearing, and disciplinary proceedings must adhere to legal requirements-Due process ensures that no officer is unjustly penalized without being given an opportunity to present their defense-Courts must exercise judicial restraint and avoid undue interference with executive discretion-Judicial review is necessary to prevent abuse of power-Courts must respect autonomy of Executive branch in managing its employees-Judicial intervention should be limited to cases involving clear illegality, arbitrariness, or mala fide intent-Courts must balance individual rights with the larger public interest.\n(b) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)-\n-Ss. 5 & 13(5)(ii), second proviso-Disciplinary proceedings-Major penalty, imposing of-Absence without leave-Principle of proportionality-Applicability-Punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed upon civil servant who remained absent from service for 48 days, without leave-Validity-Authority of competent authority in imposing any of the three major penalties is not restricted under second proviso to section 13(5)(ii) of Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, even where period of absence from duty is less than one year-Where competent authority elects to impose a major penalty in cases of absence from duty for less than a year, it must do so in accordance with the principle of proportionality-Civil servant remained absent from duty for a total of 48 days and imposition of major penalty of compulsory retirement failed to meet test of proportionality-Neither the punishment established rational nexus between misconduct and severity of penalty nor it considered less restrictive alternatives-Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court to the extent of the penalty imposed-Supreme Court directed that reinstatement of civil servant would be subject to a fresh determination by competent authority-Supreme Court directed competent authority to revisit case of civil servant and impose a penalty commensurate with the gravity of misconduct-Appeal was allowed.\nSunni Ittehad Council v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2025 SC 67; East and West Steamship v. Pakistan PLD 1958 SC 41; Pramath Nath v. Kamir Mondal PLD 1965 SC 434; Hamdard Dawakhana v. C.I.T PLD 1980 SC 84; Kadir Bux v. Province of Sindh 1982 SCMR 582; K.E.S.C. Progressive Workers Union v. K.E.S.C Labour Union 1991 SCMR 888; Nawaz Bibi v. Allah Ditta 1998 SCMR 2381; N S Bindra, Interpretation of Statutes Lexis Nexis, 13th Edition, 2022; De Smiths Judicial Review Sweet and Maxwell, 8th Edition, 2018; Sabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board PLD 2019 SC 189; Muhammad Iqbal Khan Noori v. NAB PLD 2021 SC 916 and Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Nadeem Raza 2023 SCMR 803 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10APunjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006=5,13(5)(ii)", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 3062 of 2022, decided on 25th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 30.05.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in W.P. No. 1806 of 2013). Date of hearing: 25th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haseeb Shakoor Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nHaroon Irshad, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NASIR ISMAIL -Petitioner\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Secretary Law and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Lahore and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26078", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 963 = 2025 SLD 963 = 2025 SCMR 716", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S.122-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)-Re-assessment-Definite information-Credit entries in bank record-Re-assessment of net worth of respondent/taxpayer was set aside by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and the order was maintained by High Court-Validity-Re-assessment proceedings were triggered on the basis of bank statement of respondent/taxpayer-All transactions in bank account did not necessarily demonstrate income of respondent/taxpayer, unless it was established that statements and/or entries therein had disclosed information of income which was definite-Banking instrument could not be applied as one having definite information-Neither Commissioner nor Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and High Court were of the view that all credit entries in statement of account disclosed income of respondent/taxpayer hence it did not constitute definite information-Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was the last fact finding forum and such question could neither be raised in reference jurisdiction of High Court nor before Supreme Court-Supreme Court declined to interfere with judgment of High Court-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I RTO, Rawalpindi v. Messrs Khan CNG Filling Station, Rawalpindi and others 2017 SCMR 1414 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Bahawalpur v. Messrs Bashir Ahmed (deceased) through L.Rs 2021 SCMR 1290 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 862 of 2024, decided on 27th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 18.11.2023 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R. No. 60 of 2015). Date of hearing: 27th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, (SPECIAL ZONE FOR BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS) REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, ISLAMABAD -Petitioner\nVS\nMessrs KHUDADAD HEIGHTS, ISLAMABAD -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26079", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 964 = 2025 SLD 964 = 2025 SCMR 721", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQS8", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-Ss. 497 & 103-Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S.9 (c)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.164-Recovery of narcotic substances-Bail, grant of-Recovery proceedings-Evidence through modern devices-Video recording not made-Accused was arrested for recovery of 1100 grams of heroin from his possession-Validity-Neither any video in shape of recording and photographs of alleged recovery was collected by police nor any private witness from locality was associated to prove alleged recovery from the possession of accused-Use of modern devices during recoveries, is not merely a procedural formality but a crucial safeguard to protect innocent persons from potential police atrocities-It provides an objective and unbiased account of recovery process, reducing risk of false implications to ensure that rights of accused are protected-In cases of stringent punishment, prosecution must present clear, cogent and reliable evidence to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt-In absence of video evidence and independent witnesses, prosecutions case relied on testimony of police officers involved in raid, which was insufficient to meet required standard of proof-Ultimate incarceration of guilty person could repair the wrong caused by mistaken relief of interim bail granted to him but no satisfactory reparation can be offered to an innocent man for his unjustified incarceration at any stage of case albeit his acquittal in long run-Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Court and bail after arrest was granted to accused-Petition was allowed.\nZahid Sarfaraz Gill v. State 2024 SCMR 934 and Manzoor v. State PLD 1972 SC 81 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497,103Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9(c)Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=164", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 146 of 2025, decided on 27th February, 2025.\n(Against the order/judgment dated 22.01.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Crl. Misc. No. 10324-B of 2024). Date of hearing: 27th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court/ Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nRai Akhtar Hussain, Additional PG for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ABID HUSSAIN -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE and another -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26080", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 965 = 2025 SLD 965 = 2025 SCMR 728", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQSs", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)-\n-Ss.7, 8 (1)(d), 21, 47 & 73-Input tax adjustment-Invoices-Proof-Subsequent blacklisting of suppliers-Authorities denied adjustment of input tax on the ground that invoices relied upon by respondent/taxpayer were issued by the suppliers who had later been blacklisted-Validity-Authorities failed to provide any concrete evidence indicating that invoices were issued to respondent / taxpayer during any period of suspension or blacklisting-At the time purchases were made, the suppliers involved were neither blacklisted nor inactive-Payments for such purchases were processed through legitimate banking channels, adhering to procedures delineated in section 73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990-If a transaction was conducted while the suppliers were active and duly registered, invoices issued were not automatically invalidated by a subsequent black listing or suspension of the suppliers-Denial of refunds could not be justified solely based on lateral black listing of a supplier-All purchases according to Section 21(3) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 including the respondent/taxpayer, who procured goods before suppliers registration were suspended or they were blacklisted, and who complied with the conditions outlined in section 73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 were entitled to claim an adjustment of input tax-Demand raised by the Deputy Commissioner of Inland Revenue was unjustified, and as such it was rightly set aside by subsequent higher forums that reviewed the matter, affirming position of respondent/taxpayer-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7,8(1)(d),21,47,73", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A No. 2400-L of 2022, decided on 16th January, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 12.04.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in S.T.R. No. 5 of 2014). Date of hearing: 16th January, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Munib Akhtar, Athar Minallah and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE -Petitioner\nVS\nMessrs EAGLE CABLES (Pvt.) LTD., LAHORE -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26081", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 966 = 2025 SLD 966 = 2025 SCMR 730", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Medical jurisprudence-\n-Suicide and asphyxia death-Necessary ingredients-If ligature mark is not round the neck, eyes are closed, ribs are not fractured and hands are not clenched then the case is of suicide-Such a report raises a very high probability of asphyxia death and killing by hanging, which under all probabilities is deemed to be a suicide/unnatural death and not homicide at all.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Medical evidence-Scope-Medical evidence is just a corroborative piece of evidence which does not identify the assailant-At most medical evidence is a supporting piece of evidence which may confirm ocular evidence with regard to receipt of injury, its locale, kind of weapon used for causing injury, duration between the injury and death-Medical evidence cannot tell the name of the assailant.\nZakir Hussain v. State 2008 SCMR 222 and Ata Muhammad v. State 1995 SCMR 599 rel.\n(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302-Qatl-i-amd- Re-appraisal of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Thumb impression, matching of-National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) record-Wife of accused died due to suicide but complainant produced an affidavit of deceased lady wherein she recorded apprehension to her life-Accused was convicted and sentenced on basis of such affidavit-Validity-Complainant produced an affidavit claiming to have been executed by deceased-Report of hand writing expert showed that thumb impression of deceased, available on record of NADRA, did not match with the thumb impression available on stamp paper allegedly executed by deceased recording apprehension to her life-On account of producing fake affidavit criminal case was lodged against complainant, which had lost his credibility-Alleged recovery of crime weapon from the room of accused was also not helpful for prosecution as the same was not stained with blood and no report of Chemical Examiner and Serologist was available on record-There was no need of many doubts in prosecution case, rather any reasonable doubt arising out of prosecution evidence pricking judicial mind was sufficient for acquittal of accused-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nTariq Pervez v. State 1995 SCMR 1345 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 231 of 2021, decided on 26th February, 2025.\n(Against the order/judgment dated 27.01.2021 passed by the Islamabad High Court in Crl. A. No. 83 of 2017). Date of hearing: 26th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Fakhar Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMs. Chand Bibi, DPG along with Sarfraz Ahmed, S.I. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD EHSAN SHAH -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE through A.G., Islamabad and another -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26082", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 967 = 2025 SLD 967 = 2025 SCMR 733", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQTg", - "Key Words:": "Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-\n-S. 4-Dismissal from service-Absence without leave-Interference in penalty-Principle-Substantial question of law of public importance-Scope-Petitioner/civil servant remained absent from service and was proceeded against departmentally and was dismissed from service-Penalty imposed by authorities was maintained by Service Tribunal-Validity-Tribunal or Court intervenes due to severity or nature of penalty imposed by competent authority by considering it unreasonable, perverse, excessively harsh, or by exercising leniency-Such interference is based on conclusion that penalty is disproportionate to proven misconduct as determined through test of proportionality-Interference with penalty imposed by department must be approached with caution and careful consideration, reserved for cases where order is entirely perverse or so clearly disproportionate and excessive to the misconduct that allowing it to stand would be unfair, unjust, and inequitable-Petitioner/civil servant was repeatedly served and called to present his defence but chose not to, particularly in the appeal and the revision which he himself filed yet failed to appear in or tender his defence-Cases of willful absence from duty are fairly straightforward as government officers who deliberately are absent from duty without permission are aware of the fact that they would be proceeded against for their absence from duty-Legal issue may qualify as a substantial question of law of public importance if it; (i) requires interpretation of law, rules, instructions, notifications or governmental policy; (ii) remains unresolved by Supreme Court or is subject to ambiguity, conflicting interpretations, or requires a discussion of alternative perspectives; (iii) exposes a lack of clarity in law, particularly where contradictory judicial precedents exist; or (iv) reveals a serious violation of due process that affects fundamental rights or procedural fairness under the Constitution-Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by Service Tribunal as petitioner/civil servant failed to raise any substantial question of law of public importance-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nTahira Waheed v. Director, Federal Government Educational Institutions 2003 SCMR 1090; Secretary to Government of the Punjab v. Zakir Ali 2022 SCMR 951; Fayyaz Hussain v. Executive District Officer (Education) 2023 PLC (C.S.) 422; Tasawar Hussain v. Deputy Commissioner 2023 PLC (C.S.) 69; Muhammad Ali S. Bukhari v. Federation of Pakistan through Establishment Secretary, Islamabad and 2 others 2008 PLC (C.S.) 428; Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Nadeem Raza 2023 SCMR 803; Secretary Revenue Division v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabassum PLD 2019 SC 563; Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services Faisalabad v. Muhammad Zafarullah 2021 SCMR 400; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal 2022 SCMR 2114 and Secretary Revenue Division v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabassum PLD 2019 SC 563 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Service Tribunals Act, 1973=4", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1354 of 2023, decided on 4th February, 2025.\n(Against judgment dated 30.01.2023 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 4271 of 2020). Date of hearing: 4th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Ayesha A. Malik and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mudassar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner with Petitioner.\nSanaullah Zahid, Additional Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUZAMMAL KHAN -Petitioner\nVS\nINSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, LAHORE and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26083", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 968 = 2025 SLD 968 = 2025 SCMR 739", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court-Judicial review-Scope-High Court, while exercising its powers of judicial review with respect to orders passed by Courts or Tribunals, should not substitute its own findings for those of such Courts or Tribunals.\nNawaza v. The Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 39 rel.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Art. 199-Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court-Writ of certiorari-Scope-Where High Court quashes a decision, it has discretion either to take judicial notice and rectify a jurisdictional error in the order or to remand the matter to the Court, Tribunal or the authority concerned with a direction to reconsider it and to reach a decision in accordance with the judgment given by High Court, while deciding a writ of certiorari.\nChief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141 rel.\n(c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5, Sched.-Family dispute-Maintenance-Quantum-Judicial review-Substituting findings of facts-Respondent/ex-wife filed suit for recovery of maintenance and gold jewellery etc. against appellant/ex-husband-Family Court decreed the suit in favour of respondent/ex-wife to recover gold jewellery and fixed maintenance allowance at Rs.3000/- per month-Lower Appellate Court modified judgment and decree and did not find respondent/ex-wife entitled to recover gold jewellery-High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction enhanced quantum of maintenance allowance to Rs. 10,000/- per month and also found her entitled to recover gold jewellery-Validity-High Court referred to testimony of 14 witnesses in holding that respondent/ex-wife was kept in her parents house without maintenance, and that this would entitle her to a higher quantum of maintenance than that granted to her by the Courts below-High Court was well within its rights to have partially set-aside judgment and decree of Lower Appellate Court but should have remanded the matter to Lower Appellate Court for a decision in the light of observations of High Court-Supreme Court set aside finding of High Court whereby it substituted its findings with those of Lower Appellate Court-Supreme Court maintained decision of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari with respect to judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court and remanded the matter to Lower Appellate Court to decide the appeal (on the question whether respondent/ex-wife was entitled to recovery of 04 tolas of gold ornaments and a higher quantum of maintenance) in the light of observations made by High Court-Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 923-P of 2023, decided on 17th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 13.10.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No.6921-P of 2019).\nDate of hearing: 17th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Ahad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nZia ur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (via video link, Peshawar).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MURAD KHAN and others -Petitioners\nVS\nMst. HUMAIRA QAYYUM and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26084", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 969 = 2025 SLD 969 = 2025 SCMR 744", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpQXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-Ss. 7 (a) & 7(e)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302 (b)-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5-Jail appeal-Condonation of delay-Jail appeal was barred by 2511 days-Supreme Court condoned the delay as reasons mentioned in application seeking condonation of delay were valid and sufficient for the purpose-Application was allowed.\n(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-Ss. 7 (a) & 7(e)-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302 (b)-Qatl-i-amd and abduction for ransom-Re-appraisal of evidence-Voice recognition, reliance on-Blind murder-Benefit of doubt-Accused persons were convicted and sentenced to death for allegedly abducting a minor child for ransom whose dead body was recovered later on-Held, that alleged murder remained unwitnessed and at some subsequent stage accused persons had been implicated on the basis of suspicion-Claim of complainant in respect of recognizing voice of one accused during ransom demand made over telephone, particularly in high stakes scenarios, was fraught with significant risks of error, bias and misinterpretation-Voice recognition, unlike fingerprints or DNA evidence, lacked standardized scientific framework for verification-Telephone calls, especially those made under duress, could suffer from poor audio quality, background noise or distortions, making it difficult to accurately identify the speaker-In absence of additional corroborative evidence (e.g., call records, witness testimony, or forensic analysis), relying solely on voice recognition was inherently unreliable-There was no evidence of recovery and discovery, legally incriminating in nature to connect necks of accused with crime in question-Retracted confession could not be made basis for conviction and that too on a capital charge entailing death penalty-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to both the accused persons and acquitted them of the charge, as prosecution failed to prove its case against accused persons beyond reasonable doubt-Appeal was allowed.\n(c) Criminal trial-\n-Retracted confession-Effect-Retracted confession, especially when it stands as the sole basis for conviction, raises significant legal, ethical and practical concerns-When coupled with dismissal of oral evidence furnished by complainant, relying on a retracted confession to secure a conviction becomes even more precarious.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Terrorism Act, 1997=7(a),7(e)Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 438 of 2018, decided on 25th February, 2025.\n(On appeal against the order dated 14.06.2011 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Crl. A. No. 825 of 2010 and M. R. No. 31 of 2010). Date of hearing: 25th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nKausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General for the State.\nNemo for Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMTIAZ NAEEM -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26085", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 970 = 2025 SLD 970 = 2025 SCMR 748", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODc", - "Key Words:": "Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-Ss.4 & 23-Acquisition of land-Compensation-Enhancement-Valuation of lands in same vicinity-Respondents/landowners received their compensation without filing any objections-Later other landowners in same vicinity in another award, received enhanced compensation through Referee Court-During execution proceedings of other landowners, respondents filed application before Executing Court to pay them enhanced compensation as well-Appellant/authorities were aggrieved of admitting of application of respondents/landowners for determination during execution proceedings-Validity-Respondents/landowners could claim compensation as per enhanced rate in the light judgment of Supreme Court in case titled Saddaqat Ali Khan through L.R.s and others v. Collector Land Acquisition and others reported as PLD 2010 SC 878, if at the end they were able to establish that nature and vicinity of both the lands i.e. their lands and lands acquired from other landowners was same-Lands of respondents/landowners were acquired way back in year 1995 and they had received compensation there and then whereas lands of other landowners were acquired after lapse of couple of years-Criteria laid down by Supreme Court would not be applicable simpliciter but required some probe-Supreme Court directed Executing Court to decide the matter expeditiously-Appeal was disposed of.\nSaddaqat Ali Khan through L.Rs and others v. Collector Land Acquisition and others PLD 2010 SC 878 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894=4,23", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 1612 of 2018, decided on 20th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 22.11.2018, passed by the Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench, D.I.Khan in R.F.A. No. 79-D with C.M. No. 64-D of 2018).\nDate of hearing: 20th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Abid Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nSyed Mastan Ali Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHAIRMAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PAKISTAN LAHORE and others -Appellants\nVS\nHaji ABDUL REHMAN and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26086", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 971 = 2025 SLD 971 = 2025 SCMR 751", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODY", - "Key Words:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXXI of 2019)-\n-S. 9(1)(d)-Recovery of narcotic substance-Re-appraisal of evidence-Chain of custody-Scope-Opium weighing 16215 grams was allegedly recovered from accused while transporting the same in a car-Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for life-Validity-For justifying conviction of accused, prosecution had to establish that chain of custody was safe, secure and indispensable in order to place reliance on the report of Chemical Examiner-Prosecution failed to establish such chain of safe custody and transmission of samples of narcotic from place of seizure to police station and thereafter to Chemical Examiner-Sanctity of chain of transmission stands as the cornerstone for maintaining integrity and evidentiary credibility, particularly in narcotics cases where law imposes severe and inexorable punishments-Any rupture or inconsistency in chain of custody strikes at the root of prosecutions case rendering evidence susceptible to doubt and challenge-Prosecution bears burden of ensuring unbroken, meticulously documented chain of custody so as to preclude any possibility of tampering, substitution or contamination-If prosecution fails to establish an unbroken chain of transmission of narcotic sample and any breakage or discrepancy is observed in custody of removed substance, the benefit of such lapse must necessarily be extended to accused-When prosecutions evidence is tainted with doubt, scales of justice must tilt in favor of accused-Any failure to prove safe and continuous handling of narcotic sample from seizure to forensic analysis, not only weakens prosecutions case, but also vitiates reliability of evidence entitling accused to benefit of doubt-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nJaved Iqbal v. The State 2023 SCMR 139; Qaiser Khan v. The State 2021 SCMR 363; Mst. Sakina Ramzan v. The State 2021 SCMR 451; Zubair Khan v. The State 2021 SCMR 492 and Asif Ali and another v. The State 2024 SCMR 1408 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Cr.P.L.A. No. 864 of 2023, decided on 4th March, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 03.06.2023 passed by Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat in Cr.Appeal No. 159-M of 2022). Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nZahid Yousaf Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL HAQ -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26087", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 972 = 2025 SLD 972 = 2025 SCMR 756", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODU", - "Key Words:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2-Suit for recovery of money on the basis of bank cheque-Leave to appear and defend the suit, grant of-Condition of furnishing surety-Petitioner/Insurance company instituted suit for recovery against respondents/defendants-Trial Court granted conditional leave subject to deposit of surety-Validity-Respondents/defendants denied issuance of cheques and had also denied having authorized petitioner/insurance company to encash the cheques-Question regarding maintainability of two suit was also raised-Trial Court exercised its discretion in accordance with law and principles settled in such regard-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments passed by Trial Court and maintained by High Court-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nMian Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. and another PLD 1996 SC 749; Fine Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; Kodak v. Alpha Film Corporation (1930) 2 K B 340 and Abdul Karim Jaffarani v. United Bank Ltd. and others 1984 SCMR 568 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=1,2", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 202-L and 203-L of 2022, decided on 15th November, 2024.\n(Against judgment dated 09.12.2021 the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Civil Revisions Nos.77081 and 77089 of 2021).\nDate of hearing: 15th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Munib Akhtar and Athar Minallah, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Farooq Amjad Meer, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADAMJEE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED -Petitioner\nVS\nTECHNO INTERNATIONAL and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26088", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 973 = 2025 SLD 973 = 2025 SCMR 790", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODQ", - "Key Words:": "Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-\n-S. 4-Terms and conditions of service-Pay package-Employments of two different creeds-Judgment per incuriam-Respondent/civil servant was employee of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), an autonomous body, who switched his service through Federal Public Service Commission and was appointed as Assistant Director-Respondent/civil servant was aggrieved of disallowing the benefit of pay protection by government-Service Tribunal allowed his appeal on the foothold that when contract employees, who were also non-civil servants, could get their pay-protection vide Finance Divisions O.M dated 31-05-2013, then it would be discriminatory not to allow benefit of pay-protection to other non-civil servants-Validity-There was no rationale to compare or equate two different creed of employees within the one and the same employment status/pattern to invoke or bring up equality clause or treating it discriminatory rather than considering grant of pay-protection strictly in accordance with applicable rules and policy-When any decision of Court or Tribunal was found in ignorance or lack of knowledge of a relevant statutory provision or a binding decision of Court of earlier provisions or decisions, it was called a decision per incuriam, i.e., the decision was made in unfamiliarity/ignorance or obliviousness of pertinent statues or precedents as done by Service Tribunal in the present case-Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal resultantly appeal filed by respondent / civil servant was dismissed-Appeal was allowed.\nMuhammad Azam Chaudhry v. Federation of Pakistan Civil Appeal No. 1158 of 2009; The Ministry of Finance through Secretary Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v. Atiq-ur-Rehman and another C.P. No. 5046 of 2017; Whartons Law Lexicon Fifteenth Edition; Satrucharla v. Vijayarama (2006) 1 SCC 212 and Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder and others v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2010 SC 483 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Service Tribunals Act, 1973=4", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 687 of 2022, decided on 5th December, 2024.\n(On appeal from the Judgment dated 05.01.2022 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 814(R)CS of 2019).", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance, Islamabad -Petitioner\nVS\nMUHAMMAD ATIQ-UR-REHMAN and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26089", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 974 = 2025 SLD 974 = 2025 SCMR 770", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpOC8", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss.39, 42 & 54-Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882),S. 52-Suit for cancellation of document, declaration and injunction-Lis pendens, doctrine of-Applicability-Respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit seeking cancellation of sale deed made in favour of defendant and Trial Court cancelled the same-During the pendency of trial, petitioner/subsequent purchaser, purchased disputed property from defendant-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction maintained the judgment passed in favour of respondents / plaintiffs-Validity-In the second round of litigation an issue was specifically framed as to whether defendant was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the agreement-Such issue was contested, and decided against defendant, which finding was upheld by Lower Appellate Court-Once the issue was decided it had shut the door to the claimed interest (i.e., title) of petitioner/subsequent purchaser-To accept petitioner/subsequent purchaser as an assignee of an interest on the basis of sale to him would in effect recognize the creation of assignments in what could be (effectively) an endless chain, with each link being a attenuated claim than the one before it-Finding that defendant was not a bona fide purchaser without notice, had set up an insuperable barrier which petitioner/subsequent purchaser could not surmount-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by High Court-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nSurraya Begum and others v. Suban Begum and others 1992 SCMR 652 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=39,42,54Transfer of Property Act, 1882=52", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 1808-L of 2015, decided on 25th February, 2025.\n(Against order dated 19.05.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 431 of 2004). Date of hearing: 25th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Munib Akhtar and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Noor Muhammad Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL SHAKOOR (deceased) through legal heirs -Petitioner\nVS\nMUHAMMAD HANIF (deceased) through legal heirs and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26090", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 975 = 2025 SLD 975 = 2025 SCMR 773", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpOCs", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss.42 & 54-Suit for declaration and injunction-Auction of land-Matching bid of highest bid-No concluded contact vesting interest in property-Appellants/plaintiffs were occupants of suit land who were given option to match the highest bid during auction of suit land-Suit filed by appellants/plaintiffs against respondent/Evacuee Trust Property Board was dismissed by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same against respondent/Board-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court-Validity-Bid at an auction was only an offer and without confirmation or approval it did not create any right in the property in favour of successful bidder-By matching bid of the highest bidder, appellants/plaintiffs merely stepped into their shoes-Status of appellants/plaintiffs upon exercising the option was no different from the highest bidder-Decision was made to re-auction suit land, and there was nothing preventing appellants/plaintiffs from participating in auction-Rejecting of highest bid and order of re-auction had afforded equal opportunity to persons whose bid had been rejected-Principles of natural justice were not deemed to have been violated-Acceptance of highest bid was subject to approval or confirmation by competent authority and unless and until such approval was granted or confirmation was made there was no concluded contract vesting the highest bidder with an interest in the property subjected to auction-Since approval contemplated by terms and conditions of auction was never issued in favour of appellants/plaintiffs, they were not entitled to a declaration to the effect that respondent/ETPB was legally bound to receive remaining amount of the highest bid and vested the appellants/plaintiffs with ownership rights in suit land-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court-Appeal was dismissed.\nJaved Iqbal Abbasi and Company v. Province of Punjab 1996 SCMR 1433; Captain-PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. A.W. Brothers 2004 SCMR 1956 and Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2, Lahore PLD 2005 SC 470 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Specific Relief Act, 1877=42,54", - "Case #": "C. A. No. 613 of 2020 and C.M.A. No. 3760 of 2022, decided on 3rd March, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 05.03.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in C.R. No. 647-A of 2009). C.M.A. No. 3760 of 2022. (For setting aside ex-parte order).\nDate of hearing: 3rd March, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Shahid Waheed and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Aman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nM. Siddique Aman, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZARIN KHAN and others -Appellants\nVS\nCHAIRMAN, EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD, LAHORE and others -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26091", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 976 = 2025 SLD 976 = 2025 SCMR 776", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODk", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302 (b), 331 & 338-G-Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007, Rr. 6 & 10-Qatl-i-amd-Inability to pay diyat-Petitioner/convict after compromise with legal heirs of deceased was unable to pay Diyat amount-Effect-Four types of remedies have been provided under Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007,for convicts/inmates unable to pay amounts of Diyat, Arsh or Daman subject to terms and conditions specified therein, namely (i) provisions of soft loans, (ii) grant out of the Fund, (iii) release on parole, and (iv) facilitation for jobs-Petitioner/convict was at liberty to approach administrative committee constituted under Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007 for management of the Fund-Petitioner/convict could also approach Trial Court under section 331 P.P.C. for payment of Diyat amount in installments-Petition was dismissed.\n2003 SCMR 658; 2011 SCMR 1964; PLD 2012 SC 769 and Government of Punjab v. Abid Hussain PLD 2007 SC 315 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b),331,338-G", - "Case #": "Criminal Misc. Application No. 714 of 2023 in Jail Petition No. 235 of 2021, decided on 28th February, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 07.06.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. A. No. 86478-J of 2017 and M. R. No. 545 of 2017). Date of hearing: 20th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nemo for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, Addl. Prosecutor General for the State.\nNemo for Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TANVIR HUSSAIN -Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26092", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 977 = 2025 SLD 977 = 2025 SCMR 780", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpODg", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Double murder-Motive shrouded in mystery-Benefit of doubt-Accused was alleged to have committed murder of two persons-Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death-Validity-Prosecution failed to prove any motive in the matter-It had nowhere been stated that as to what prompted accused to kill two brothers as neither was there any enmity alleged between the parties, nor there was any report with regard to any scuffle which took place between them prior to the incident-Matter was shrouded in doubt and in such eventuality, it would be legally and factually justified not to confirm death sentence awarded by two Courts below-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and by extended benefit of doubt, acquitted the accused of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nMuhammad Hassan v. State 2024 SCMR 1427 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302(b)", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2023, decided on 24th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.07.2018 of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench passed in Cr.A. 106-A of 2011, M.R. 7-A of 2011). Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sagheer Ahmed Qadri, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nSyed Kausar Ali Shah, Addl. Auditor General for the State.\nDr. Babar Awan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Complainant along with Majid brother of the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TARIQ MEHMOOD -Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE -Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26093", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 978 = 2025 SLD 978 = 2025 SCMR 787", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFFpOHo", - "Key Words:": "Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)-\n-Ss.3, 4, 7 & 8-Illegal dispossession-Re-appraisal of evidence-Petition against acquittal-Co-owner-Accused was a co-owner in property in question and High Court had acquitted him of the charge-Validity- Co-owner is deemed to be in constructive possession of every inch of joint holding unless a formal partition has been effected-Jurisprudence on co-ownership consistently affirms that one co-owner cannot allege dispossession at the hands of another without establishing exclusive possession through partition proceedings-Provision of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is not confined to cases involving land grabbers or Qabza Mafia but extends to any person who has been illegally dispossessed from immovable property, however it is applicable only where there is clear evidence of unlawful dispossession-In cases where parties are co-owners, question of forcible dispossession does not arise unless partition proceedings have concluded and exclusive ownership is established-Acquitted accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence-Appellate Court should exercise restraint in overturning an acquittal unless the judgment is manifestly perverse, arbitrary, or suffers from a glaring misreading or non-reading of material evidence-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment of acquittal passed in faovur of accused-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nShaikh Muhammad Naseem v. Mst. Farida Gul 2016 SCMR 1931; Niaz Ahmed v. Aijaz Ahmed PLD 2024 SC 1152 and Muhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Asghar and others 2003 SCMR 477 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005=3,4,7,8", - "Case #": "Crl. P.L.A. No. 504 of 2021, decided on 19th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 30.03.2021 of learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi in Cr.A. No. 588 of 2019). Date of hearing: 19th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Present: Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ilyas Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nIrfan Zia, Addl. Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Al-Haaj Malik MUHAMMAD ASHRAF -Petitioner\nVS\nJAVED AKHTAR and another -Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26094", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1001 = 2025 SLD 1001", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTY", - "Key Words:": "Financial Facilities & Default:\nCresox availed financial facilities from HBL, FBL, and Pak Oman.\nMortgaged Plot No. A/40 SITE, Survey No.21, Sheet No.35P/1-35/13 (5.039 acres) as security.\nDefaults led to multiple banking suits under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001:\nSuit No. B-02/2014 (Pak Oman): Decreed 26.07.2017 for Rs. 162 million.\nSuit No. B-21/2017 (HBL): Decreed 14.02.2022 for Rs. 332 million.\nSuit No. B-34/2017 (FBL): Decreed 14.02.2022 for Rs. 295 million.\nSuit No. 816/2017: Decreed for USD 554,402.82 & GBP 38,654.51.\nAgreement between Cresox & Lucky Tex (25.09.2017):\nSale of mortgaged land, building, and machinery for PKR 900 million.\nPayment to be used for settling bank liabilities.\nSpecial clause: Annexure A (sale of certain machinery) proceeds up to PKR 300 million to Cresox/Tariq Shafi, excess to Lucky Tex.\nBridge financing of PKR 10 million provided by Lucky Tex.\nLitigation by Lucky Tex (Suit No. 290/2018):\nFiled 10.02.2018 for specific performance of the agreement.\nInterim order (12.02.2018): Injunction restraining Cresox from creating third-party interest, subject to Lucky Tex furnishing bank guarantee of PKR 900 million.\nOrder confirmed (22.10.2018); HCA No. 402/2018 dismissed on 15.01.2020.\nSC appeal dismissed for non-prosecution.\nSubsequent Developments:\nCompromise Decrees (14.02.2022): Cresox entered into separate compromise agreements with HBL and FBL, leading to decrees in Suit No. B-21/2017 and B-34/2017.\nLucky Tex files JM No. 32/2022 & JM No. 33/2022 under Section 12(2) CPC to set aside the compromise decrees on grounds of fraud, concealment of earlier orders in Suit No. 290/2018.\nKey Legal Questions:\nWhether the agreement between Lucky Tex and Cresox (25.09.2017) is valid, given the mortgage and charge under the Ordinance, 2001 (Section 23).\nWhether the compromise decrees of 14.02.2022 are liable to be set aside under Section 12(2) CPC for suppression of material facts.\nKey Legal Provisions:\nSection 12(2) CPC: Application to set aside a decree obtained by fraud or misrepresentation.\nSection 23 of the Ordinance, 2001: Restriction on transfer/alienation of mortgaged assets post-decree; any such transfer is void.\nContract Act, 1872 (Section 23): Object of contract not to defeat the law.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=23(2)(1),Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "Suit No. 290 of 2018, Misc. No. 32, 33 of 2022. Dates of Hearing: 8 September 2023, 19 September 2023, 2 October 2023, 29 February, 2024 and 11 February 2025. Date of order: 22-02-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant in\nJ.M. No. 33 of 2022: Mr. Hanif Faisal Alam, Barrister-at-law\nRespondent No. 1\nIn J.M. No. 33 of 2022: Mr. Waqar Ahmed, Advocate\nRespondent No 2 and 4 In J.M. No. 33 of 2022: Mrs. Heer Memon, Barrister-at-law \nPlaintiff in Suit No. 290 of 2018: Through Mr. Ali Mehdi, Advocate\nDefendant in Suit No. 290 of 2018: Nemo", - "Petitioner Name:": "Suit No. 290 of 2018, Misc. No. 32, 33 of 2022\nM/S. LUCKY TEX (PVT.) LIMITED \nVS\nM/S. CRESOX (PVT.) LIMITED\nSuit No. 290 of 2018, \nDates of Hearing: 8 September 2023, 19 September 2023, 2 October 2023, 29 February, 2024 and 11 February 2025\nJudl. Misc. No. 32 of 2022\nM/s. Lucky Tex (Pvt.) Limited \nVs\nHabib Bank Limited & 4 others\nApplicant in\nJ.M. No. 32 of 2022: Mr. Hanif Faisal Alam, Barrister-at-law\nRespondent No. 1\nIn J.M. No. 32 of 2022: Mr. Waqar Ahmed, Advocate\nRespondent No 2 and 4 In J.M. No. 32 of 2022: Mrs. Heer Memon, Barrister-at-law\nJudl. Misc. No.33 of 2022\nM/s. Lucky Tex (Pvt.) Limited Versus\nFaisal Bank Limited & 4 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26095", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1002 = 2025 SLD 1002", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTU", - "Key Words:": "Enforcement of Arbitral Award against Ex-Directors of Dissolved Company under CEES 2012\nDetails:\nThis Order explains the rationale behind:\nAllowing CMA No.188/2024 (Decree-Holder’s application to implead and hold the former directors of the Judgment Debtor (CHEC) liable for payment of decretal amount with interest);\nAllowing CMA No.372/2019 (Decree-Holder’s application to be orally examined as to debts owed by the JD); and\nDismissing CMA No.1100/2023 (Decree-Holder’s application for annulment of CHEC’s striking off and restoration to the Register of Companies).\nKey Facts:\nQMR (Decree-Holder): Obtained arbitral awards (1997, 1998) against CHEC, culminating in a pending Civil Appeal No.319/2004 before the Supreme Court.\nCHEC: While the Supreme Court proceedings were ongoing, CHEC applied for and obtained dissolution under CEES 2012 via SECP Order dated 18.09.2013, without disclosing the pending arbitration-related liabilities or the pending case (CA 319/2004).\nEx-Directors/Shareholders: Filed affidavits under CEES 2012, undertaking to settle any lawful claims and indemnify claimants arising from the dissolution.\nSupreme Court and High Court Proceedings: Ex-Directors/Shareholders, along with counsel, failed to inform either court about CHEC’s dissolution, continuing to argue as if CHEC remained a live entity, thereby concealing material facts.\nQMRs Execution Application: Targeted enforcement of decree against the ex-directors/shareholders of CHEC based on their undertakings under CEES 2012 and misrepresentations to the courts.\nHeld:\nEx-Directors/Shareholders Liable:\nThe Court held that ex-directors/shareholders of CHEC are personally liable for the decretal amount under CEES 2012, including the indemnities and undertakings provided in their affidavits.\nThe statutory framework of CEES 2012 and Section 439 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 overrides common law corporate protections.\nTheir deliberate concealment of CHEC’s dissolution from the Supreme Court and High Court constitutes misrepresentation.\nThey cannot now shield themselves behind corporate veil principles or argue that enforcement must be against the defunct company.\nNo Restoration of CHEC:\nThe Court declined to restore CHEC in the Register of Companies, holding that the ex-directors/shareholders’ liability under CEES 2012 renders restoration unnecessary.\nImpleadment of Ex-Directors:\nThe Court allowed QMR’s execution application (CMA No.188/2024) to implead the ex-directors/shareholders for execution of the decree.\nOral Examination Application (CMA 372/2019):\nGranted, allowing Decree-Holder to examine the judgment debtors regarding debts or obligations.\nCitations:\nCompanies Ordinance, 1984 (repealed):\nSection 439 (liability post-dissolution).\nCEES 2012 Framework:\nClause (g), Annexure II, paras 8(c) and related undertakings.\nCase Law Principles:\nCorporate veil lifting in cases of fraud/misrepresentation.\nFinality of arbitral awards (Award = Debt upon declaration).\nRelevant Cases:\nSalomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. (1897) AC 22 (Corporate Veil - not applicable in fraud).\nAssociated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand AIR 1998 SC 596 (Arbitral award = debt).\nPakistani precedents on directors’ liability post-dissolution under CEES (Specific citations may follow based on jurisdictional authorities).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Execution Application No. 47/2019 (in Suit No. 1461/1998). Judgment Date: 25-02-2025. Date of hearing of viz. CMA No.1100/2023, CMA No.188/2024 and CMA No.372/2019 Date of Short Order in CMA No.1100/2023. 20-02-2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: JUSTICE JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Decree-Holder: A. Qutubuddin Khan (d/b/a “QMR Expert Consultants”) through his legal heirs (1) Mrs. Zahida Qutab, (2) Mr Nadeem Qutab, and (3) Mr Waseem Qutab through duly constituted attorney Mr Nadeem Qutab through Mr. Nadeem Qutub, Advocate\nJudgment-Debtor: CHEC-Millwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. through Mr. Aitezaz Manzoor, Advocate for judgment debtors for Directors (1) Munir Millwala and (2) Farazdak Millwala" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26096", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1003 = 2025 SLD 1003", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTQ", - "Key Words:": "Customs Reference Applications – Proper Framing of Questions of Law, Abuse of Process, and Procedural Irregularities by Customs Department\nDetails:\nThe Customs Reference Applications Nos. 616/2016 to 623/2016 were filed by the Customs Department against the decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, dated 19.07.2016 in Customs Appeal No. K-1379/2016 and connected cases.\nThe main legal issues raised were:\nWhether the Tribunal’s order dated 19.07.2016 was permissible when it had already passed an order on 27.06.2016 on the same Valuation Ruling (No. 859/2016).\nWhether the Tribunal became functus officio after its earlier order and could no longer entertain the appeals.\nWhether the Tribunal’s direction to apply an old Valuation Ruling (No. 421/2012) for the release of goods, absent legal provisions, was lawful.\nThe High Court of Sindh held that:\nThe Tribunal’s order dated 27.06.2016 in Appeals K-1408/2016 & K-1416/2016 was merely interim (provisional release orders) and not a final adjudication. Therefore, the Tribunal was not functus officio and was within its jurisdiction to pass the subsequent final order dated 19.07.2016.\nThe Applicant Department’s framing of these questions showed lack of application of mind, as the basic procedural context (interim vs. final orders) was ignored.\nThe Customs Department failed to provide import documents, Goods Declarations, or essential materials required to answer the third question. The Court, therefore, declined to address that issue.\nThe Court also strongly criticised the Customs Department for:\nPoorly framed and ill-considered questions of law.\nFiling Reference Applications without necessary documents.\nWasting Court time and resources.\nIncomplete addresses of respondents, hampering proper service.\nThe Court dismissed the Reference Applications as misconceived.\nHeld:\nThe Reference Applications were dismissed.\nThe Customs Department’s conduct in routinely filing poorly drafted Reference Applications without proper documents was deprecated.\nA copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to:\nChairman FBR for investigation and remedial measures.\nThe Customs Appellate Tribunal, under Section 196(5) of the Customs Act, 1969.\nCitations:\nPrinciple of functus officio: The Tribunal retains jurisdiction unless a final decision has been rendered.\nCase references: Not specifically mentioned, but the judgment reflects judicial precedents on procedural fairness, proper framing of legal questions, and the functus officio doctrine.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Applications Nos. 616 to 623 of 2016. Judgment Date: 03-03-2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Justice Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Justice Mohammad Abdur Rahman", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Applicant: Mr. Muhabbat Hussain Awan, Advocate.\nRespondents: Nemo.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. Special Customs Reference Application No. 616/2016 Director of Customs Valuation, Customs House, Karachi V. M/s. Zia & Co., Karachi\n2. Special Customs Reference Application No. 617/2016 Director of Customs Valuation, Customs House, Karachi V. M/s. M/s Miam Corporation, Karachi\n3. Special Customs Reference Application No. 618/2016 Director of Customs Valuation, Customs House, Karachi V. M/s. Gul Ahmed Trading Co.Karachi\n4. Special Customs Reference Application No. 619/2016 Director of Customs Valuation, Customs House, Karachi V. M/s. S.A Brothers, Karachi\n5. Special Customs Reference Application No. 620/2016 Director of Customs Valuation, Customs House, Karachi V. M/s. Maqbool Hussain & Co. Karachi\n6. Special Customs Reference Application No. 621/2016 Director of Customs Valuation, Customs House, Karachi V. M/s. Areeba Enterprises, Karachi\n7. Special Customs Reference Application No. 622/2016 Director of Customs Valuation, Customs House, Karachi V. M/s. Sea Trade Company, Karachi\n8. Special Customs Reference Application No. 623/2016 Director of Customs Valuation, Customs House, Karachi V. M/s. Yaddgar Traders, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26097", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1004 = 2025 SLD 1004", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WS8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Assessment under Section 122(5A) — Arbitrary Additions, Procedural Lapses, and Admission of Error by Department\nDetails:\nThe case pertains to M/s Hassan Abdullah Builders (Pvt) Ltd., a taxpayer whose appeal was transferred to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), Division Bench-I, Islamabad, from the office of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-I) under Section 126A(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 due to the assessed tax amount exceeding Rs. 20 million.\nKey Background Facts:\nThe appellant filed its return of income for the tax year 2022 under Section 114, declaring income of Rs. 40,791,003.\nA deemed assessment was initially passed under Section 120. However, the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue (Addl. CIR) concluded that the assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue.\nThe case was reopened under Section 122(5A), and a show-cause notice was issued on 20.11.2023, citing alleged:\nSuppression of revenue receipts under Section 153(1)(a)\nSuppression of contractual receipts under Section 153(1)(c)\nExcessive tax deduction claims under Section 153(1)(b)\nDiscrepancies in declared salary expenses\nThe taxpayer responded in detail on 07.12.2023 with supporting documents.\nDespite this, the Addl. CIR passed an amended assessment order dated 20.12.2023, creating a substantial tax demand of Rs. 43,977,137.\nProceedings Before the Tribunal:\nThe appellant argued that all alleged discrepancies were duly reconciled and supported by documentary evidence, which was ignored by the assessing officer.\nThe Tribunal directed the appellant’s AR and the Departmental Representative (DR) to reconcile the records and file a report.\nDespite repeated opportunities, the department failed to submit the reconciliation report.\nIn the final hearing, the DR (the same officer who reviewed the case) candidly admitted in open court that:\nThe appellant’s documents were complete.\nNo discrepancies remained.\nThe tax demand was not supported by any substantive evidence.\nHowever, the DR refused to sign the court order sheet documenting this admission, though he verbally confirmed the same in the hearing.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal found that the amended assessment order dated 20.12.2023 was arbitrary, unjustified, and devoid of legal merit.\nThe additions and disallowances made under Sections 153(1)(a), 153(1)(b), and 153(1)(c), as well as discrepancies in salary expenses, were unsupported by any material evidence.\nThe Tribunal strongly censured the department’s conduct, noting that such high-handedness undermines taxpayer confidence and harms the integrity of tax administration.\nThe tax demand of Rs. 43,977,137 was deleted in full, and the assessment order was annulled.\nA copy of the order was directed to be forwarded to the Director General (Legal), Federal Board of Revenue, for information and corrective action to prevent similar lapses in the future.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114,120,122(5A),122(9),126A(4),153(1)(a),153(1)(b),153(1)(c)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1421/IB/2024 & MA(AG) No. 70/IB/2025. Date of hearing & Order: 06-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. M. Waheed Iqbal, FCA\nRespondent BY: Mr. Shahyar Akram, DR", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Karakoram Security Services (Pvt) Limited: 2nd& 3rd Floor, Anas Plaza, Main Airport Road, Jhanda Chowk, Opposite Askari 10, Rawalpindi …… Applicant\nVs\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, Range-1, Zone-1,CTO, Islamabad ….. Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "ITA No. 1421/IB/2024 MA(AG) No.70/IB/2025 (Tax year, 2022). Date of Hearing & Order: 06.05.2025" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26098", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1005 = 2025 SLD 1005", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WSs", - "Key Words:": "Regularization and Continuation of Service – Alleged Fake Appointments in Sindh Education Department\nDetails:\nThe petitioners, employed as Naib Qasids and Chowkidars in the Education & Literacy Department, Government of Sindh, claimed regular appointments since 2012 and sought release of withheld salaries, protection from arbitrary dismissal, and continuation in service. They argued they were appointed through proper departmental processes, had received offer letters, medical fitness certificates, and pay slips, and had served continuously for five years. They alleged salaries were stopped without notice, inquiry, or legal justification, and that 23 similarly placed employees had their salaries restored after alleged bribes. They relied on principles of natural justice, length of service, and case law including 2006 SCMR 535, 2011 PLC (CS) 419, and others.\nThe respondents (Sindh Education & Literacy Department) argued that only Petitioner No.26, Muhammad Nadeem, was lawfully appointed via the District Recruitment Committee (DRC) after advertisement in Daily Ibrat (02.10.2011) and walk-in interviews (20.10.2011). The rest of the petitioners were not part of the DRC process, their documents were found fake upon verification, and they were drawing salaries beyond the sanctioned strength (SNE). The respondents contended the petitioners were not civil servants under the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, and that the length of service could not cure initial illegality in appointments.\nSome petitioners (Muhammad Nadeem and Sajid Iqbal) withdrew from the petition voluntarily. Petitioner Muhammad Hamid sought to withdraw post-hearing to file afresh, but this was disallowed.\nHeld:\nThe Court dismissed the petition against all petitioners (except Muhammad Nadeem, whose grievance had been redressed) as they failed to prove lawful recruitment.\nThe principle of natural justice (right to be heard before adverse action) was noted, but the lack of a valid appointment record could not be cured by procedural lapses.\nLength of service, pay slips, and biometric attendance do not confer legality in absence of lawful recruitment.\nFraud vitiates all claims; no vested right can be claimed on the basis of invalid or fake appointments.\nNo mala fide or arbitrariness was found in the respondents’ actions; salary restoration in 23 cases was based on verification.\nDepartmental inquiry ordered to identify and act against officials responsible for enabling unauthorized appointments and salary disbursements, with a compliance report to be submitted within three months.\nNo orders as to costs.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CP No. D-2928 of 2017. Date of Hearing: 17.03.2025. Date of Decision: 22.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE ARBAB ALI HAKRO MR. JUSTICE RIAZAT ALI SAHAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Petitioners: Maqbool Hussain and 26 others through Mr. Mumtaz Ahmed Lashari, Advocate.\nRespondents: Through Mr. Rafique Ahmed Dahri Assistant A.G. Sindh along with Abdul Jabbar Focal Person DEO." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26099", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1006 = 2025 SLD 1006", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTk", - "Key Words:": "Quashing of FIR Cancellation Order – Due Process under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and the Rights of Complainant\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a security officer of Bahria Town, challenged the cancellation of FIR No. 117/2025 registered at PS Aabpara, Islamabad, concerning alleged threats received by Malik Riaz (Ex-Chairman, Bahria Town) and his family. The FIR was under Sections 506(ii) PPC and 25-D Telegraph Act, 1885. The Magistrate accepted the polices cancellation report dated 04.02.2025, which was prepared hastily (within a week of the FIR) and without proper investigation or notice to the complainant. The complainant argued that:\nThe investigation was perfunctory and non-transparent.\nThe cancellation was approved without the complainants involvement or hearing.\nThe Magistrate acted mechanically, ignoring legal requirements, particularly under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and Rule 25.57 of the Police Rules, 1934, which mandates notice to the complainant.\nThe cancellation report process violated principles of natural justice, especially audi alteram partem (right to be heard).\nThe State opposed the petition, claiming the cancellation was proper due to the complainant’s non-cooperation. However, the record revealed that:\nThe complainant was not properly served with notice.\nThe Magistrate accepted the cancellation in undue haste, without ensuring procedural safeguards.\nHeld:\nThe Judicial Magistrate’s order dated 10.02.2025, accepting the cancellation report, is set aside.\nThe matter is remanded to the investigating agency for fresh investigation and submission of a proper report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., strictly following the law.\nThe Magistrate and the investigating agency are directed to ensure compliance with legal provisions, including issuing notice to the complainant and affording a fair hearing before any cancellation.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P No. 1346 of 2025. Date or order: 28.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD ASIF JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Tanveer Ahmed, Advocate for the petitioner.\nMs. Sumaira Khursheed, State Counsel with Zulfiqar Ali, Investigation Officer, P.S. Aabpara, Islamabad. Mr. Sajid Cheema, DSP (legal), Islamabad Police.\nMr. Wajid Munir, Deputy District Prosecutor.\nMr. Asim Ghaffar, SHO, Aabpara, Islamabad.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COL. (R) KHALIL UR REHMAN\nVS.\nJUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, SEC-30, ISLAMABAD WEST AND OTHERS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26100", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1007 = 2025 SLD 1007", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5WTg", - "Key Words:": "Input Tax Adjustment Denial — Service of Order & Non-examination of Records\nDetails:\nThe case involves M/s Hassan Abdullah Builders (Pvt) Ltd., a registered taxpayer engaged in services predominantly in Punjab, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who challenged the Order-in-Original No. 02 of 2024, dated 02.09.2024, issued by the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue (Unit-I, Special Zone for Builders and Developers, RTO Islamabad). The primary issue pertained to the disallowance of input tax adjustments totaling Rs. 17,107,146 on invoices issued by a blacklisted supplier.\nKey Facts:\nThe appellant did not respond to the Show Cause Notice dated 09.05.2024 within the stipulated period.\nThe reply was eventually submitted on 31.05.2024, followed by a further notice dated 30.07.2024, which the appellant did not comply with.\nThe Order-in-Original was passed on 02.09.2024 without fully examining the appellant’s records.\nThe appellant contended that the Order-in-Original was never properly served as per Section 56(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which prescribes mandatory modes of service (registered office, authorized representative, etc.).\nThe appellant claimed they became aware of the order only upon obtaining a certified copy on 14.01.2025 and filed the appeal within limitation, calculated from this date.\nDuring the hearing, the Assessing Officer admitted that the order was issued without properly examining the relevant records, citing excessive workload. The Departmental Representative (DR) could not provide documentary proof of valid service under Section 56(2).\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal allowed the application for condonation of delay, holding that no valid service of the impugned order had been established, and the appeal filed within the limitation period from the date of obtaining the certified copy was maintainable.\nOn merits, the Tribunal held that the disallowance of input tax was unfounded as the appellant had not claimed any such adjustment in their sales tax returns filed with FBR, as supported by documentary evidence.\nThe Order-in-Original No. 02 of 2024 dated 02.09.2024 was annulled, and the appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=56,56(2)(a),56(2)(b),56(2)(c),56(2)(d),", - "Case #": "STA No. 13/IB/2025, MA(Cond) STA No. 04/IB/2025 (Tax Year 2022-2023). Date of Hearing & Order: 29.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M.M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Raja M. Ibrar Ali, Advocate \nRespondent By: Mr. M. Shahzad, DR Mr. M. Mobeen Sajid, Assessing Officer", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S HASSAN ABDULLAH BUILDERS (PVT) LIMITED; OFFICE NO. 2, AL-ASSAD PLAZA, PLOT 7-K, F-10\nMARKAZ, ISLAMABAD ……….. APPELLANT \nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, UNIT-I, SPECIAL ZONE FOR BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS, RTO, ISLAMABAD ……….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26101", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1070 = 2025 SLD 1070", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODc", - "Key Words:": "Blacklisting Order - Jurisdiction, Limitation, and Revisional Powers under Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe appeal was filed by M/s Al Awan Electric Works under Section 46 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, challenging the order of the Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue (CCIR), RTO Islamabad, who remanded the order of blacklisting passed by the Zonal Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zonal CIR).\nKey facts:\nThe appellant’s registration was suspended by the Zonal CIR on 11.11.2024.\nA show cause notice for blacklisting was issued on 14.11.2024.\nThe order for blacklisting was issued on 11.03.2025, beyond the 90-day limitation prescribed under Rule 12(b)(iii) of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 (expiry: 14.02.2025).\nThe appellant challenged the blacklisting order before the CCIR, who remanded the case instead of deciding the legality of the blacklisting.\nThe appellant contended that the CCIR lacked jurisdiction to remand and could only modify the order under Section 21(5).\nThe AR also highlighted failure to consider replies submitted by the appellant and procedural lapses in the departmental action.\nThe DR supported the departmental orders, arguing that an opportunity to present the case was provided.\nHeld:\nLimitation: The order of blacklisting passed beyond 90 days was barred by limitation under Rule 12(b)(iii), rendering the suspension and blacklisting void ab-initio.\nJurisdiction: The CCIR under Section 21(5) had no power to remand; only to modify the order. The remand order was thus without jurisdiction.\nMerits: The Zonal CIR’s claim that no reply was submitted by the appellant was factually incorrect. Multiple replies were on record, demonstrating the appellant’s compliance.\nImpact of Blacklisting: Suspension/blacklisting should not be used to restrict business operations unless tax fraud or loss to exchequer is established, which was not the case here.\nThe orders of the Zonal CIR and CCIR were declared illegal and void ab-initio.\nAppeal of the appellant was allowed.\nCase Law:\n2006 SCMR 1713\n2008 PLD 663 (SC)\n2007 SCMR 1835\n2024 PTCL 381 (Sindh High Court)\nC.P. No. D-1076 of 2025 (Sindh High Court)\nSTA 176/PB/2018 dated 22.08.2019 (Zaib Enterprises v. CIR, RTO Peshawar)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2),21(5),46Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12(a)(vi),12(b)(iii)", - "Case #": "STA No. 95/IB/2025 (Tax Period August 2024). Date of Hearing & Order: 19.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHARIF UD DIN KHILJI, MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ismail ur Rehman, ITP/AR \nRespondent by: Mian Shahzad/DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S AL AWAN ELECTRIC WORKS, PLOT NO.195, ST. 1, 1-10/3, INDUSTRIAL AREA, ISLAMABAD ... APPELLANT\nVS.\nTHE CHIEF COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, ISLAMABAD ... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26102", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1071 = 2025 SLD 1071", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODY", - "Key Words:": "Tort of Malicious Prosecution – Claims by a Former Bank Executive against His Former Employer\nDetails:\nThe Plaintiff, a former General Manager of Dubai Bank Ltd. (later merged into Union Bank of the Middle East Ltd.), filed four suits for damages, alleging malicious prosecution by the Defendant bank (his former employer). The Plaintiff contended that the Defendants falsely and maliciously instituted four criminal complaints against him in the Special Courts of Sindh (Banks) under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984, without reasonable or probable cause, to harass him and avoid paying his rightful dues.\nThe suits arose from four distinct criminal complaints, each resulting in the Plaintiff’s acquittal or dismissal of proceedings, with no appeals filed by the Defendants (except in some cases where the High Court of Sindh dismissed belated constitutional petitions by the Defendants).\nKey cases:\nSuit No. 118/1987:\nAlleged misappropriation of a painting (Complaint No.4/1986).\nNo charge framed; complaint dismissed within 18 days.\nDamages claimed: Rs.2,500,000.\nSuit No. 119/1987:\nAlleged wrongful guarantee issuance and transfer of USD 1,540,000 (Complaint No.3/1986).\nAcquittal under Section 265-K CrPC.\nDamages claimed: Rs.15,000,000.\nSuit No. 593/1987:\nAlleged fraudulent withdrawal of loan security documents (Complaint No.2/1986).\nAcquittal on benefit of doubt.\nDamages claimed: Rs.25,000,000.\nSuit No. 592/1987:\nAlleged purchase of prize bonds despite SBP instructions (Complaint No.1/1986).\nAcquittal.\nDamages claimed: Rs.200,000,000.\nHeld:\nThe Court applied the settled test for malicious prosecution (as per Niaz v. Abdul Sattar and Abdul Khameed v. Muhammad Shabbir), requiring the Plaintiff to establish:\nProsecution by the Defendant.\nLack of reasonable and probable cause.\nMalice.\nFavourable termination of proceedings.\nDamage suffered.\nAfter assessing the facts:\nSuit No.592/1987 (regarding prize bonds) was partially decreed (damages awarded).\nSuits Nos.118/1987, 119/1987, and 593/1987 were dismissed, with no order as to costs.\nCitations:\nNiaz v. Abdul Sattar [PLD 1997 SC 268] (Elements of malicious prosecution)\nAbdul Khameed v. Muhammad Shabbir [PLD 2020 Lahore 329] (Right to liberty, dignity, fair trial)\nHicks v. Faulkner (1881) 8 QBD 167 (Definition of reasonable and probable cause)\nTempest v. Snowden (1952) 1 K.B. 130 (Malice irrelevant if reasonable and probable cause established)\nComments:\nThis case demonstrates a meticulous application of tort principles, balancing the right to institute legal proceedings with the protection of individuals from abusive litigation. The Court emphasized the importance of preventing false accusations that damage reputation and cause mental anguish. However, only the claim related to the prize bond matter succeeded, indicating that the Plaintiff failed to establish the full elements of malicious prosecution in the other suits.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Suit No. 118 & 119 of 1987, 592 & 593 of 1987. Dates of Hearing: 14.02.2025 and 21.02.2025. Date of announcement: 21.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JAFFER RAZA SUIT NO. 118 OF 1987", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Omar Soomro and Maria Khan, Advocates for the Plaintiff \nM/s Hassan Ali and Syed Zain-ul-Abdeen, Advocates for Defendants 1 & 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Anwar Majid ... Plaintiff.\nV \nEmirates Bank International PJSC (Formerly Union Bank of Middle East Ltd) & others … Defendants.\nSuit No. 119 of 1987 \nAnwar Majid … Plaintiff.\nVs\nEmirates Bank International PJSC (Formerly Union Bank of Middle East Ltd) & others …. Defendants \nSuit No. 593 of 1987 \nAnwar Majid ... Plaintiff.\nV \nEmirates Bank International PJSC (Formerly Union Bank of Middle East Ltd) & others … Defendants.\nSuit No. 592 of 1987\nAnwar Majid ... Plaintiff.\nV \nEmirates Bank International PJSC (Formerly Union Bank of Middle East Ltd) & others … Defendants." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26103", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1072 = 2025 SLD 1072", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODU", - "Key Words:": "Unilateral Termination of Contract by Public Authority Without Due Process\nDetails:\nThe Appellant, an insurance provider, successfully bid for and entered into an insurance agreement dated 28.04.2023 with Respondent No. 2, a public authority, to provide coverage for inter-provincial stage carriage passengers. A bank guarantee of Rs. 30 million was furnished.\nRespondent No. 2 later issued a cancellation letter dated 13.05.2024, unilaterally terminating the agreement, citing it as contradictory to law and therefore void.\nThe Appellant contended the cancellation was mala fide, arbitrary, and in violation of principles of natural justice, particularly as no prior notice or opportunity to respond was provided. Fresh tenders were issued by the Respondent soon after, under identical terms, raising suspicions of unfairness.\nRespondent No. 2 initially claimed the Appellant was blacklisted (without evidence or reference in the cancellation letter), later shifting stance to allege non-fulfillment of contractual obligations. They relied on Rule 4 of the Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010, Section 20 of the Contract Act, 1872, and Section 49 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965.\nHeld:\nThe Court allowed the Appeal and set aside the Impugned Order dated 04.11.2024 that had vacated the Appellant’s injunctive relief.\nKey findings include:\nThe blacklisting claim was unsupported: There was no evidence of blacklisting proceedings per Rule 35 of the 2010 SPP Rules, and a prior Islamabad High Court judgment in W.P. No.1669/2003 had set aside blacklisting orders against the Appellant.\nThe Respondents second justification (non-fulfillment of obligations) was contradictory and unsupported by the record, particularly as the cancellation letter cited the contract’s alleged illegality, not performance issues.\nThe Respondent’s conduct was contrary to natural justice (audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua) and the Appellant’s fundamental rights under Articles 4, 10-A, and 25 of the Constitution.\nThe Respondent cannot invoke the illegality of their own contract as a ground to evade obligations, as such a stance would encourage abuse and undermine contractual certainty.\nThe matter was remanded to the Trial Court (Suit No.1155/2024) for adjudication on merits.\nCitations:\nW.P. No.1669/2003, Islamabad High Court (blacklisting order against Appellant set aside).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10-A,25Contract, Act, 1872=5,20,22", - "Case #": "HCA 473 of 2024. Date of hearing & decision: 04.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Through Mr. Ahmed Ali Hussain, Advocate\nRespondent Nos 1 to 3: Through Syed Hassan Shah, Assistant Advocate General, Sindh", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE UNITED INSURANCE OF COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LIMITED \nVS \nPROVINCE OF SINDH AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26104", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1073 = 2025 SLD 1073 = 2025 PTCL 625", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODQ", - "Key Words:": "Tribunal’s Duty to Pass Reasoned Orders in Customs Matters – Remand of Cases for Fresh Decision\nDetails:\nThe Applicants challenged a common judgment dated 09.03.2024 passed by the Judicial Member Bench-I, Customs Appellate Tribunal at Karachi in Customs Appeal No. K-223 of 2018 and connected matters through these Reference Applications.\nThe Tribunal had dismissed the appeals by simply endorsing the reasoning of the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Karachi, without offering any independent or reasoned findings on the facts or law.\nThe High Court observed that the Tribunal’s order was perfunctory, slipshod, and devoid of any proper analysis—a recurring issue in such cases—resulting in wastage of judicial time and undue burden on both the importers and the department.\nThe Court emphasized that the Customs Appellate Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority in tax matters, as per settled law, and its failure to adjudicate factual issues independently prejudices parties and defeats the purpose of Reference Applications under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nHeld:\nThe impugned judgment was set aside.\nThe matter was remanded to the Tribunal to:\nDecide the matter afresh.\nPass a reasoned and speaking order after affording both parties a proper opportunity of being heard.\nThe Tribunal was directed to comply with the legal standards in line with its duties as the final fact-finding authority.\nA copy of the judgment was ordered to be sent to the Tribunal as per Section 196(5) of the Customs Act, 1969, and to be placed in the connected Reference Applications.\nCitations:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. RYK Mills Lahore (2023 SCP 226)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Sargodha Spinning Mills (2022 SCMR 1082)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. MCB Bank Limited (2021 PTD 1367)\nWateen Telecom Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2015 PTD 936)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196(5)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 386 TO 393 of 2024. Date of hearing & Order: 05.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Applicants: Mr. Imran Iqbal Khan, Advocate.\nRespondents: Mr. Sardar Zafar Hussain, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. Special Customs Reference Application No. 386 of 2024 Shaikh Pipe Mills (Pvt.) Limited V. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi & another\n2. Special Customs Reference Application No. 387 of 2024 Shaikh Pipe Mills (Pvt.) Limited V. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi & another\n3. Special Customs Reference Application No. 388 of 2024 Shafqat Rasheed V. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi & another\n4. Special Customs Reference Application No. 389 of 2024 Shafqat Rasheed V. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi & another\n5. Special Customs Reference Application No. 390 of 2024 M/s. Majeed & Sons Steels (Pvt) Ltd. Karachi V. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi & another\n6. Special Customs Reference Application No. 391 of 2024 M/s. Majeed & Sons Steels (Pvt) Ltd. Karachi V. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi & another\n7. Special Customs Reference Application No. 392 of 2024 M/s. Majeed & Sons Steels (Pvt) Ltd. Karachi V. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi & another\n8. Special Customs Reference Application No. 393 of 2024 M/s. Majeed & Sons Steels (Pvt) Ltd. Karachi V. The Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi & another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26105", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5OC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1074 = 2025 SLD 1074", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5OC8", - "Key Words:": "Audit under Section 177, Best Judgment Assessment under Section 121, and Amendment of Assessment under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe appeal arose from the impugned order dated 31.05.2023, passed by the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-City, RTO, Rawalpindi, for the tax year 2019. The taxpayer had filed a return declaring taxable income of Rs. 627,401, which was deemed assessed under Section 120 of the Ordinance. The case was selected for audit under Section 177(1), and multiple notices were issued to the taxpayer to produce books of accounts and supporting documents, but the taxpayer failed to comply. Subsequently, an order was passed under Section 122 without issuing an audit report or a notice under Section 122(5).\nThe key legal issue involved was whether the assessment could be amended under Section 122 without completing the audit procedure under Section 177 or whether the matter should have been finalized under Section 121(1)(d) through best judgment assessment due to the taxpayer’s failure to produce records.\nThe Tribunal examined the procedural framework laid down under Sections 177, 121, and 122 of the Ordinance. It emphasized that:\nAudit under Section 177 must be completed by issuing an audit report after obtaining explanations from the taxpayer on issues raised.\nIn case of non-compliance by the taxpayer (failure to provide records), the Commissioner is empowered to proceed under Section 121(1)(d) for best judgment assessment.\nAmendment under Section 122 can only follow an audit after due compliance with procedural safeguards, including issuing a notice under Section 122(5) and satisfying conditions under Section 122(5).\nNon-compliance with procedural requirements, including failure to issue notice under Section 122(5) and the absence of an audit report under Section 177(6), renders the proceedings void ab initio.\nThe Tribunal referred to multiple precedents, including:\nNestle Pakistan Limited v. FBR (2017 PTD 686)\nCIR v. Allah Din Steel & Re-rolling Mills (2018 PTD 1444)\nFauji Oil Terminal v. Additional Commissioner (2006 PTD 734)\nBilz (Pvt.) Ltd v. DCIR (2002 PTD 1 SC)\nIAC Income Tax v. Micro Pak (Pvt.) Ltd (2002 PTD 877 SC)\nThese cases established the principle that the audit must be completed through an audit report, and the amendment of assessment under Section 122 can only proceed after satisfying the statutory conditions, including issuing notice under Section 122(5).\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 122 without completing the audit process under Section 177 and without issuing a notice under Section 122(5) were unlawful, void ab initio, and could not be sustained. It was further held that in cases where the taxpayer fails to provide the books of accounts for an audit, the proper course of action is to proceed under Section 121(1)(d) for best judgment assessment. The assessment treated to have been made on the basis of return or revised return in such cases has no legal effect.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A,175(3)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121,121(1)(d),122,122(4),122(9),126A(4),174,177,177(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No.1599/IB/2024 (Tax year, 2019). Date of Hearing & Order: 12.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Hafiz M. Idrees, Advocate \nRespondent by: Mrs. Hira Nazir, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Muhamad Farooq, DD-85, 86, Murree Road, Rawalpindi ………… Applicant\nVs\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, Unit-II, Zone City, RTO, Rawalpindi ……… Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26106", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5OCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1075 = 2025 SLD 1075", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5OCs", - "Key Words:": "Bar of Constitutional Jurisdiction under Article 199 for Civil Servants – Remedy through Service Tribunal under Article 212\nDetails:\nThe petitioners, employees of the Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service, filed a constitutional petition challenging:\nAmendments in the Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2006 (Act 2006).\nAmendments in the Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) (Amendment) Act 2015.\nThe non-grant of 75% promotion quota.\nOrder dated 16.02.2021 by Respondent No.1.\nAmendment through notification dated 16.04.2018 fixing 32% quota for District Public Prosecutors (BS-19).\nAppointments of Respondents No.6 to 12 through notifications dated 01.09.2020.\nPetitioners argued they were public servants (not civil servants) and could invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to challenge the vires of laws, notifications, and rules, contending that Service Tribunals cannot declare laws unconstitutional.\nThe Law Officer and private respondents countered that:\nPetitioners were civil servants.\nTheir grievance related to terms and conditions of service.\nExclusive jurisdiction vested in the Punjab Service Tribunal under Article 212 and the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974.\nThe Court examined:\nThe Supreme Court’s jurisprudence (Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Anwar Mandokhel, 2024 SCMR 298; I.A. Sharwani, 1991 SCMR 1041; Muhammad Hassanullah, 2025 SCMR 134) confirming that:\nCivil servants must seek remedy through Service Tribunals, even when challenging vires of laws/rules/notifications affecting service terms.\nArticle 212 bars constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 in such cases.\nEarlier decision in Rukhsana Yasmeen v. Province of Punjab (W.P. No.51475/2023, decided 09.04.2025) holding that, except the Prosecutor General, employees of the Punjab Prosecution Service are civil servants governed by the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974.\nAct 2006 and Rules 2007 clearly govern appointments and terms of service, including references to the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974.\nThe Court also distinguished the case from Province of Sindh v. Prosecutor-General Sindh (2012 SCMR 307), noting differences between Punjab and Sindh laws.\nHeld:\nPetitioners are civil servants under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974.\nFor grievances concerning terms and conditions of service—including challenges to laws, rules, or notifications—exclusive remedy lies before the Punjab Service Tribunal.\nThe constitutional petition under Article 199 is not maintainable.\nPetition dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.\nCitations:\nMuslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel (2024 SCMR 298)\nI.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041)\nMuhammad Hassanullah v. Chief Secretary Balochistan (2025 SCMR 134)\nRukhsana Yasmeen v. Province of Punjab (W.P. No.51475/2023, decided 09.04.2025)\nAli Azhar Khan Baloch v. Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456)\nNational Assembly Secretariat v. Manzoor Ahmed (2015 SCMR 253)\nMuhammad Akram v. Mst. Zainab Bibi (2007 SCMR 1086)\nMuhammad Anwar v. Mst. Ilyas Begum (PLD 2013 Supreme Court 255)\nSheikh Ghulam Hussain v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (2016 YLR 285)\nMuzaffar Ali Anjum v. Government of Punjab (2015 PLC (CS) 986)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 =212", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 42822/2021. Date of hearing: 29.04.2025. Date of order: 05-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MALIK WAQAR HAIDER AWAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr. Muhammad Amin Sandhila, Advocate.\nRespondents No. 1 to 5 by: Rana Shamshad Khan, Additional Advocate General, Punjab. Khurram Khan, Law Officer.\nRespondents No. 6 to 12 by: M/s Zohaib Imran Sheikh, Ahtisham ud Din Khan, Sajjad Saleem and Mubashar Akram, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TASSAWAR ALI KHAN RANA ETC.\nVS\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26107", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1076 = 2025 SLD 1076", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODk", - "Key Words:": "Bail Rejection – Female Accused in Narcotics Case with Minor Child\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a woman, sought post-arrest bail under Section 497 Cr.P.C. in an FIR registered under Sections 6, 9(c), and 3(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, alleging recovery of 3600 grams of Charas from her possession. The petitioner’s primary ground for bail was that she had a suckling baby with her in jail. The defense cited various precedents, including Mst. Nusrat v. The State (1996 SCMR 973), Mst. Tahira Batool v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 764), Mst. Nadia v. The State (2023 YLR 171), Mst. Asiya v. The State (2023 SCMR 383), and Mst. Ishrat Bibi v. The State (2024 SCMR 1528).\nThe court, however, found the petitioner prima facie connected with the crime. The recovery of a large quantity of narcotics, video evidence of the seizure, and the lack of any animus or mala fide on part of the ANF negated the defense’s arguments. The court emphasized that the mere presence of a minor child with the accused does not entitle her to bail automatically, citing multiple precedents, including Mst. Nasira Bibi v. The State (PLD 1998 Lahore 146), Mst. Tai Bibi v. The State (PLD 1989 Quetta 60), and Mst. Fursan v. The State (2022 SCMR 1950), which held that women involved in narcotics cases are not entitled to bail merely on the ground of motherhood unless specific circumstances warrant it. The court also highlighted the societal harm caused by drug trafficking and the tactic of using women and minors as cover for criminal activities.\nHeld:\nBail application was dismissed. The court directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings, even at the cost of day-to-day hearings, considering the special circumstances of the accused having a suckling child in jail.\nCitations:\nMst. Nusrat v. The State (1996 SCMR 973)\nMst. Tahira Batool v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 764)\nMst. Nadia v. The State (2023 YLR 171)\nMst. Asiya v. The State (2023 SCMR 383)\nMst. Ishrat Bibi v. The State (2024 SCMR 1528)\nMst. Nasira Bibi v. The State (PLD 1998 Lahore 146)\nMst. Tai Bibi v. The State (PLD 1989 Quetta 60)\nMst. Amna v. The State (PLD 1989 Kar 40)\nMst. Akhtar Bibi v. The State (1989 PCrLJ 83)\nMst. Fursan v. The State (2022 SCMR 1950)\nMst. Nazo v. The State (2013 MLD 1860)\nMalita Syed Shah v. The State (2009 YLR 1029)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997=6,9(c),51Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497", - "Case #": "Crl. Misc No.355 of 2025. Date of order: 27.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author: Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Khan, Advocate for the petitioner. \nRana Zulfiqar Ali, Special Prosecutor ANF with Miss Rabia Fida S.I and Usama ASI, ANF", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. SAIMA BIBI ALIAS SHAMA \nVS\nTHE STATE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26108", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1077 = 2025 SLD 1077", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFF5ODg", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction and Procedure for Audit under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Legality of Ex-Parte Proceedings and Limitation under Section 11(5)\nDetails:\nThe appellant challenged the Order-in-Original No. 2021 dated 19.11.2021 passed by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, and the subsequent appellate order (No.71/2021 dated 22.12.2021) of the CIR (Appeals-I), Islamabad. The core issues revolved around:\nWhether the assessing officer could proceed ex-parte under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 without first obtaining the prescribed records from the appellant.\nWhether the issuance of a show-cause notice dated 05.10.2021 for the tax period January 2016 to December 2016 was time-barred under Section 11(5) of the Act.\nKey facts:\nThe appellant’s case was selected for audit via parametric computer ballot under Section 72B for the tax period Jan-Dec 2016.\nThe audit proceedings were initiated, and the appellant failed to provide records as required under Section 22.\nThe assessing officer proceeded to issue a show-cause notice under Section 11 and subsequently passed an ex-parte order.\nThe appellant argued that the proceedings were void ab-initio, as Section 25 does not empower ex-parte proceedings without following due process under Sections 37, 38, 38A, and 40.\nThe appellant also contended that the show-cause notice dated 05.10.2021 was issued beyond the five-year limitation period under Section 11(5) of the Act for the tax periods from January 2016 to August 2016.\nHeld:\nThe tribunal ruled that the assessing officer could not proceed ex-parte under Section 25 without obtaining records and following the prescribed procedure under the Act. The Sales Tax Act does not contain provisions (like Section 177(10) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001) to empower best judgment assessments in the absence of records under Section 25.\nThe proper recourse, upon failure to obtain records, was to invoke powers under Sections 33, 37, 38, 38A, 38B, and 40 before proceeding further under Section 25.\nThe show-cause notice dated 05.10.2021 was time-barred for the tax periods January 2016 to August 2016 under Section 11(5). Consequently, the proceedings for those periods were held to be void ab-initio.\nThe tribunal relied on case law including Byco Petroleum Pakistan Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 1386), M/s Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd v. Collector (Appeals) (2010 PTD 251), and Ibrahim Textile Mills Ltd (1992 SCMR 1898).\nAccordingly, the tribunal set aside the impugned orders to the extent of the periods barred by limitation and where the audit was conducted without due compliance with statutory requirements.\nCitations:\nByco Petroleum Pakistan Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2021 PTD 1386)\nM/s Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd v. Collector (Appeals) (2010 PTD 251)\nFederation of Pakistan v. Ibrahim Textile Mills Ltd (1992 SCMR 1898)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(5),22,25,25(1),33,33(9),37,38,38A,38B,40,72BIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001=170(10)", - "Case #": "STA No.145/IB/2022 (Tax Period Jan.2016 to Dec.2016). Date of hearing & order: 01.06.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Aqeel Ahmed, FCA\nRespondent by: Mr. Imran Shah, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Zhongxing Telecom Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. Plot No.36, Gulistan Plaza, F-11 Markaz, Islamabad.\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Unit-X), LTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26109", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1094 = 2025 SLD 1094 = 2025 PLJ 465 = (2025) 131 TAX 568 = 2025 PTD 893 = 2025 PTCL 805", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJDYy8", - "Key Words:": "Retrospective Imposition of Capital Gain Tax on Disposal of Securities\nDetails:\nThe case involved a challenge to the imposition of capital gains tax under Section 37A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, following amendments introduced through the Finance Act, 2022, specifically a proviso added in Division VII of Part I of the First Schedule. The petitioner had disposed of securities acquired before 01.07.2013 and was taxed at 12.5%, contrary to the earlier provision which allowed 0% tax on such disposals.\nThe petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, which was dismissed. However, on appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the appellate court found in favour of the appellant.\nHeld:\nThe appellate court held that the retrospective application of the newly inserted proviso was impermissible in the absence of clear legislative intent. The amendment could not take away vested rights, and its application to past transactions was unconstitutional and discriminatory. The court emphasized that fiscal statutes must be construed strictly, especially where they create or increase tax liabilities.\nAccordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the imposition of capital gain tax on the appellant was declared invalid.\nCitations:\nPLD 2006 Lahore 240\n2001 SCMR 564\n2011 SCMR 1560", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=37AConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "ICA No. 155 of 2024, decided on 27.2.2025. Date of hearing. 14.1. 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Shams Mehmood Mirza and Abid Hussain Chattha, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Mian Ashiq Hussain, Muhammad Arshad and Muhammad Rameez Arshad Advocates for Appellant.\nMr. Ahmad Pervez Advocate for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MANZUR-UL-HAQ-Appellant\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26110", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1221 = 2025 SLD 1221", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWS8", - "Key Words:": "Bank’s Right to Recover Finance Facility Despite Loss of Hypothecated Goods – Insurance Claims Not Bar to Bank’s Recovery\nDetails:\nThe case concerns an appeal filed by the legal heirs of the deceased proprietor of M/s. Sunny Petroleum Service against the judgment of the Banking Court, which decreed the Respondent Banks suit for recovery of Rs. 27,25,763/- (plus costs of funds) based on a Cash Finance Facility granted to the deceased. The appellants had availed the facility, signed the necessary finance documents, and provided a mortgage as security.\nThe appellants main defense was that their hypothecated stock was destroyed in a fire incident (arising from a mob attack after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on 27-12-2007) and that the Bank, having facilitated insurance on the hypothecated stock, should have claimed the amount from the insurance company instead of suing the appellants. They argued that the fire incident and loss of stock, an act of God, exonerated them from liability.\nThe Bank countered that the insurance was for additional security only, the premium was paid by the appellants, and the Bank was not obliged to pursue recovery from the insurer. They relied on established case law, arguing that the loss of hypothecated stock did not absolve the customer’s liability.\nThe Court noted that:\nThe finance facility was availed, and the execution of documents was admitted.\nThe appellants failed to prove that the Bank had any contractual obligation to claim the insurance on their behalf.\nThe appellants also failed to substantiate the fire damage with documentary or witness evidence.\nFIRs and oral assertions alone were insufficient proof.\nThe insurance policy did not contain any clause absolving the appellants from their repayment obligations in case of loss.\nCase law (including Messrs Jan Sher Khan Petroleum Service v. Allied Bank Limited 2013 CLD 526, Riaz Ahmad v. Bank of Punjab 2016 CLD 596, Bhatti v. United Bank Limited 2005 CLD 472, and Imran Enterprises v. Muslim Commercial Bank 2016 CLD 74) firmly established that a bank’s right to recover finance is unimpaired by insurance claims or loss of hypothecated goods.\nHeld:\nThe appeal was dismissed. The appellants remained liable for the finance facility despite the destruction of hypothecated goods. The Bank was under no legal obligation to pursue the insurance claim on the appellants’ behalf.\nCitations:\nMessrs Jan Sher Khan Petroleum Service v. Allied Bank Limited, 2013 CLD 526\nRiaz Ahmad (Rana Riaz Anjum) v. Bank of Punjab, 2016 CLD 596\nBhatti v. United Bank Limited, 2005 CLD 472\nImran Enterprises v. Muslim Commercial Bank, 2016 CLD 74\nMessrs Nawaz Enterprises v. Habib Bank Limited, 2013 CLD 1125\nAdieu (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Platinum Commercial Bank Ltd., 2002 CLD 645\nPakistan General Insurance Co. v. Muslim Commercial Bank, 2002 CLD 655\nUnited Bank Limited v. Adamjee Insurance Co., 1997 CLD 1360\nEFU General Insurance Ltd. v. Chairman, Banking Tribunal No.1, 2003 CLD 497\nEvergreen Press v. Bank of Punjab, 2016 CLD 1257\nGrace Textile Mills v. Habib Bank Ltd., 2003 CLD 951\nNBP v. Punjab Road Transport Board, 1998 CLD 1540\nP.M. Packages v. Silk Bank Limited, 2021 CLD 783", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9(1)", - "Case #": "1st Appeal No. D-14 of 2022. Date of hearing & decision: 18-03-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MAHMOOD AHMAD KHAN AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD HASAN (AKBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Sunder Das Advocate.\nMr. Imran Ali Borano Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Appellant: M/s. Sunny Petroleum Service \nVS\nRespondent: National Bank of Pakistan" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26111", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1222 = 2025 SLD 1222", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWSs", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Proceedings, Supersession of Arbitration, Powers of Civil Court, Restoration of Suit\nDetails:\nThe Appellant entered into an agreement dated 31.07.1990 with Respondent No.1 for sub-leasing a plot in Karachi for 25 years, to establish a tank terminal and bonded warehouse. A security deposit of Rs. 3,677,000 was paid by the Appellant. Due to alleged defaults by Respondent No.1, the Appellant sought return of their funds via legal notice. When no refund was made, the Appellant filed Suit No.1725/2000 in the Sindh High Court for recovery of Rs. 25,484,524.96.\nThe case history involves:\nRespondent No.1 seeking a stay of the Suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and referring the matter to arbitration. This was allowed by the Trial Court.\nArbitrators were nominated by both parties, but arbitration never commenced because Respondent No.1 failed to pay their arbitrator’s fees.\nThe Appellant filed CMA No.2885/2007 under Section 151 CPC for restoration of the Suit, which was allowed by order dated 15.09.2008, and the arbitration agreement was superseded.\nThe Trial Court dismissed the Suit through Judgment and Decree dated 26.04.2018 and 16.05.2018, holding the restoration order as void and that the Suit was barred under Section 32 of the 1940 Act.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Court (Division Bench) allowed the appeal and set aside the Impugned Judgment and Decree.\nThe Court held:\nThe order dated 15.09.2008 restoring the Suit had attained finality as it was not challenged under Section 39 of the 1940 Act. The Trial Court could not sit in appeal over its own previous order.\nThe Trial Court retained inherent powers under Section 151 CPC and Section 41 of the 1940 Act to restore the Suit.\nThe arbitration agreement could be superseded when Respondent No.1 failed to remain ready and willing to proceed with arbitration (non-payment of arbitrator’s fee).\nSection 34 of the 1940 Act uses discretionary language ( may ), unlike the mandatory nature ( shall ) in Section 4 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011.\nThe Suit was not barred under Section 32 of the 1940 Act, as it was a Suit for recovery, not a challenge to an arbitration agreement or award.\nProcedural technicalities (e.g., wrong provision cited for restoration) should not defeat substantive justice.\nThe principle of “actus curiae neminem gravabit” applied: an act of the Court should not prejudice any party.\nThe matter was remanded to the Trial Court for final arguments and adjudication on merits.\nCitations:\nPLD 1997 SC 3 (Abbasia Cooperative Bank case - jurisdiction of civil courts)\nPLD 2018 SC 40; PLD 2002 SC 1111; 1994 SCMR 1555; 1982 SCMR 494 (wrong provision of law not fatal)\n2023 SCMR 1451 (Abid Jan v. Ministry of Defence - actus curiae neminem gravabit)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Arbitration Act, 1940=8(1)(c) ,12,25,32,34,39,41Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=151", - "Case #": "H.C.A. 211 of 2018. Date of hearing & decision: 06.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Through Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Dars, Advocate.\nRespondent Nos. 2: Through M/s. Aqib Hussain and Abdur Razzak, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED (PSO) \nVS\nM/S. GILLANI (PVT.) LTD. & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26112", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1223 = 2025 SLD 1223 = 2025 PTCL 611 = 2025 PTD 1012", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWTk", - "Key Words:": "Challenge to Office Order No. 16/2025—Grant of Interim Afghan Transit Cargo Operations to NLC\nDetails:\nThe Petitioners, licensed custom-bonded carriers under Rule 638 of the Customs Rules, 2001, challenged Office Order No. 16/2025 dated 25.01.2025, which implemented a decision of the Licensing Committee (09.01.2025) under the Tracking and Monitoring Rules, 2023. This order granted interim responsibility for the transportation of Afghan Transit Cargo to Respondent No. 4 (NLC) until 31.03.2025.\nThe Petitioners’ contentions:\nThe order creates a monopoly for Respondent No. 4.\nThe Licensing Committee has no authority under the 2023 Rules to restrict bonded carriers.\nPetitioners, as licensed bonded carriers, have not breached any regulations.\nRespondent No. 4 cannot simultaneously operate as a tracking provider and a bonded carrier (reference: E-Movers (Pvt) Ltd., 2022 SCMR 1021).\nThe decision forces Petitioners into a subcontractor relationship with Respondent No.4, causing financial loss.\nReliance on Rule 1124 of the Customs Rules, 2001 was misplaced.\nRespondents’ position:\nNLC (Respondent No. 4) was not assigned to transport but to provide manual monitoring services due to security challenges and technical deficiencies in tracking systems.\nThe arrangement was temporary, necessitated by law and order issues, and agreed upon by the bonded carriers’ association (evidenced by the Resolution dated 17.01.2025 signed by Petitioners 2 & 3).\nCharges for services were agreed to by the Association of Bonded Carriers.\nPetitioners themselves participated in the new system, undermining their challenge.\nRule 1124 empowers the Committee to take emergent measures for such interim arrangements.\nBy 31.03.2025, a permanent tracking solution would be operational.\nThe Respondents argued the Petitioners had no locus standi, as they had voluntarily participated in the agreed procedure.\nHeld:\nThe Court dismissed the Petition, holding:\nThe Petitioners, by participating in the new system, were estopped from challenging it.\nThe impugned order was an interim measure to address emergent logistical and security issues.\nThe Petitioners’ conduct of selectively accepting benefits while challenging the system lacked clean hands required for invoking discretionary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199.\nNo unlawful exercise of authority by the Respondents was established.\nCitations:\nFederation of Pakistan v. E-Movers (Pvt) Ltd. (2022 SCMR 1021)\nCollector of Customs v. Sheikh Spinning Mills (1999 SCMR 1402)\nYousaf Enterprises v. Collector (2005 PTD 21)\nMahmood & Co. v. Assistant Collector, Sales Tax (2005 PTD 72)\nUniversal Recycling v. Federation of Pakistan (2024 PTD 754)\nSabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board Peshawar (PLD 2019 SC 189)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Pakistan Beverage Ltd. (2018 SCMR 1544)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Rules, 2001=638Customs Act, 1969=3AA", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D- 609 of 2025. Dates of hearing: 25.02.2025, 26.02.2025, & 03.03.2025. Date of Judgment: 03.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. Muhammad Anas Makhdoom, Advocate.\nMr. Khalid Jawed Khan Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Petitioners: Western Freight Shipping (PVT.) LIMITED & OTHERS\nvs\nRespondents No.1&2: Federation of Pakistan & another\nRespondents No. 3&4.: Directorate General of Transit Trade (HQ) & another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26113", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1224 = 2025 SLD 1224", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWTg", - "Key Words:": "Applicability of Pecuniary Jurisdiction under Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024 for Appeals in Income Tax Cases\nDetails:\nThe appellant, Mr. Altaf Hussain, filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) against an order of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), RTO Rawalpindi, for the tax year 2017, assessed at Rs. 16,633,470/-. The appeal was filed on 20.05.2024, post-enactment of the Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024, which introduced pecuniary limits for appeals:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Rs. 20 million\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Rs. 10 million\nFederal Excise Act, 2005: Rs. 5 million\nUnder this regime, appeals where the tax assessed is Rs. 20 million or less lie before the Commissioner (Appeals), while appeals exceeding Rs. 20 million fall under the jurisdiction of the ATIR. The Tribunal examined the retrospective applicability of these provisions and the procedural implications of transitioning to the new regime.\nThe Tribunal highlighted key aspects of the law:\nA change in forum, including pecuniary jurisdiction, is procedural and has retrospective effect unless it affects substantive rights.\nThe Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024 expressly clarifies the transitional mechanism:\nCases pending before the CIR(A) with tax/refund > Rs. 20 million as of 16.06.2024 shall stand transferred to the ATIR.\nCases below Rs. 20 million remain with the CIR(A).\nApplying the law, the Tribunal held that appeals concerning tax assessments below the pecuniary threshold should be filed before the CIR(A), not the ATIR. Thus, the appeal in question, involving an assessed tax of Rs. 16.6 million (below Rs. 20 million), did not fall within the jurisdiction of the ATIR and was required to be filed before the CIR(A).\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the appeal as per the pecuniary limits introduced by the Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024.\nThe objection raised by the office is upheld.\nThe appeal is returned to the appellant for appropriate filing before the CIR(A).\nFor future cases, references against orders of the CIR(A) (including those decided post-amendment) must be filed before the High Court under section 133.\nCitations:\nGul Hassan & Co. vs. Allied Bank of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 237)\nAdnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal (PLD 1969 SC 187)\nBashir v. Wazir Ali (1987 SCMR 978)\nMuhammad Shabbir v. Quaid-e-Azam University (2022 SCMR 487)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A,126A(1),131,131(1),133Sales Tax Act, 1990=43A,43A(1)Federal Excise Act, 2005=33A,33A(1)", - "Case #": "ITA No.782/IB/2024 (Tax Year 2017) Date of hearing & order: 31.07.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M.M. AKRAM (JUDICIAL MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Waqar Ali, ITP \nRespondent by: Mr. M. Hayat, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Altaf Hussain, Post Office Kala Gujran, Kantrili, Jhelum \nVs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26114", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1225 = 2025 SLD 1225", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWXo", - "Key Words:": "Proforma Promotion of Civil Servants – Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 199 – Bar under Article 212 of the Constitution – Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a senior police officer, joined the Police Service of Pakistan in 1985 and rose through the ranks to BS-21 in 2014. He became eligible for promotion to BS-22 in May 2016 but was not considered due to the non-convening of the High Powered Selection Board (HPSB). Several vacancies in BS-22 arose in March 2017, but the HPSB could not meet due to the Prime Minister’s engagements, particularly the Panama Papers case. The petitioner retired on 30.07.2017 without being considered for promotion, though his juniors were later promoted. He made a representation seeking proforma promotion, which was ultimately declined by the Establishment Division on 11.10.2018. The petitioner then filed a writ petition under Article 199 seeking mandamus for proforma promotion.\nThe government opposed the petition, arguing that the petitioner’s case was considered in earlier HPSB meetings but could not be finalized due to a lack of vacancies. Further, the representation for proforma promotion was rejected, and the petitioner failed to challenge this rejection before the Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Therefore, the writ petition was barred under Article 212(2) of the Constitution.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that:\nThe bar under Article 212(2) of the Constitution is absolute and excludes the High Court’s jurisdiction in matters concerning the terms and conditions of civil servants.\nProforma promotion is not a vested right but a notional advancement based on administrative discretion and a satisfaction by the appointing authority that the officer was wrongfully prevented from promotion through no fault of their own.\nThe petitioner’s remedy lay before the Federal Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and not before the High Court.\nThe High Court cannot assume the functions of the appointing authority or the Service Tribunal.\nThe petitioner’s representation was declined, and no determination of fitness for promotion was made by the competent authority.\nThe petition was, therefore, not maintainable and dismissed.\nCitations:\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973: Article 199, Article 212\nService Tribunals Act, 1973: Sections 2, 4, 4A, 5\nCivil Servants Act, 1973: Section 9\nFundamental Rule 17(1) (prior to its omission via SRO No.965(I)/2022)\nKey Precedents:\nSecretary Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Anwar (2025 SCMR 153)\nGovt. of Pakistan v. Hameed Akhtar Niazi (PLD 2003 SC 110)\nChief Secretary, Punjab v. Shamim Usman (2021 SCMR 1390)\nProvince of Punjab v. Hafiz Muhammad Kaleem-ud-Din (2024 SCMR 689)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199,212Service Tribunals Act, 1973=2,4,4A,5Civil Servants Act, 1973=9", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 236915/2018. Dates of hearing: 20.12.2024 & 25.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: TARIQ SALEEM SHEIKH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Muhammad Saqib Jillani, Advocate.\nFor the Respondent: Mr. Munir Ahmad, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUNIR AHMAD CHISHTI\nVS.\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26115", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1226 = 2025 SLD 1226", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTWXk", - "Key Words:": "Conviction for Possession and Transportation of Narcotics – Section 9(c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997\nDetails:\nThe appellant, Jahangir Khan, was convicted by the learned Judge, Special Court (Control of Narcotics Substances), Islamabad, for an offence under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA) and sentenced to life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 35,000/- (with default imprisonment of six months). The FIR (No.78/2019) was registered on 13.04.2019 at PS ANF-RD North Rawalpindi, following a spy information report that the appellant was transporting a large quantity of narcotics in a Honda motorcar (Reg. No. AY-700 Islamabad).\nOn 12.04.2019, the ANF apprehended the appellant at Motorway Toll Plaza M-1 and recovered 13.2 kg of opium and 4.8 kg of charas concealed in a secret cavity of the vehicle. The co-accused Zeeshan Sami was acquitted by the trial court. The appellant denied the charges and claimed false implication, but no evidence was presented in his defence. He challenged the conviction, arguing procedural defects, violation of Section 103 Cr.P.C., and improper safe custody and transmission of the narcotics.\nHeld:\nThe appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence were upheld.\nThe Court found the prosecution evidence consistent, corroborated, and in compliance with the CNSA (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001.\nThe chain of safe custody was established through the testimony of PWs (Abdul Razzaq, PW.2, and Mazhar Ali, PW.3). Reports of the Chemical Examiner (Exh.PJ to Exh.PL) confirmed adherence to testing protocols.\nThe Court rejected the defence’s objections regarding Section 103 Cr.P.C., citing Section 25 CNSA, 1997, which excludes its applicability in narcotics cases.\nThe presumption under Section 29 of CNSA, 1997 was held applicable, shifting the burden to the appellant, who failed to rebut the prosecution’s case or provide any plausible explanation.\nThe recovery of narcotics from the vehicle under the appellant’s control established his knowledge and possession, citing Muhammad Noor v. The State (2010 SCMR 927).\nThe prosecution’s case was deemed proven beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on precedents including Faisal Shahzad v. The State (2022 SCMR 905) and Ajab Khan v. The State (2022 SCMR 317).\nCitations:\nFaisal Shahzad v. The State, (2022 SCMR 905)\nAjab Khan v. The State, (2022 SCMR 317)\nMuhammad Noor v. The State, (2010 SCMR 927)\nZaffar v. The State, (2008 SCMR 1254)\nSalah-ud-Din v. The State, (2010 SCMR 1962)\nThe State/ANF v. Muhammad Arshad, (2017 SCMR 283)\nNadir Khan v. State, (1988 SCMR 1899)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9(c),15,25,29Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=103,342", - "Case #": "Jail Appeal No. 29 of 2022. Date of hearing: 03.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD ASIF (ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Malik Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Advocate. \nThe State by: Rana Zulfiqar Ali, Special Prosecutor for ANF.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAHANGIR KHAN \nVS \nTHE STATE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26116", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1227 = 2025 SLD 1227 = 2025 PTCL 597", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTc", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax on Renting of Immovable Property – Distinction Between Rental Income and Business Support Services\nDetails:\nThe Applicant challenged an order dated 12.12.2023 passed by the Appellate Tribunal, Sindh Revenue Board (SRB), which had upheld the imposition of sales tax, default surcharge, and penalty on the Applicant under the head of Business Support Services for the tax period July 2015 to June 2018. The key issues admitted for hearing were:\nWhether mere renting of immovable property by a landlord for consideration constitutes a taxable service under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, as per the Youngs Private Limited case law.\nWhether default surcharge and penalty could be imposed on the Applicant.\nThe Applicant argued that they provided rental space along with ancillary services, issuing separate invoices specifying services and taxes. They claimed tax @3% was already paid on the rental portion, and reliance was placed on the Youngs (Pvt) Ltd judgment, which held that mere renting of property is not a taxable service.\nThe Court found that:\nThe Applicant’s practice of issuing separate invoices for distinct services substantiated their claim.\nTax on rental income from immovable property is not chargeable based on the Youngs (Pvt) Ltd precedent (2019 PTD 389; upheld by Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2133/2017, judgment dated 05.09.2022).\nThe attempt to classify the services under infrastructural support services was not part of the show cause notice and could not be raised later.\nMere registration under a certain category or objects clause in the Memorandum and Articles of Association does not establish tax liability; actual services rendered are determinative.\nReliance on Indian case law was misplaced due to differences in legal provisions.\nHeld:\nBoth questions were answered in favor of the Applicant. The orders of the forums below were set aside. The renting of immovable property by the Applicant is not subject to sales tax under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, as per the Youngs (Pvt) Ltd precedent. Default surcharge and penalty could not be imposed in the absence of liability.\nCitations:\nYoungs (Private) Limited v. Province of Sindh (2019 PTD 389)\nProvince of Sindh etc. v. Youngs (Pvt) Ltd and others (SC Judgment dated 05.09.2022 in Civil Appeal No. 2133/2017)\nSindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, Section 2(19) (Business Support Services), Section 2(72C) (Renting of immovable property - post-2017 amendment)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=2(19),2(72C),63(3)", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Applications No. 07 of 2024. Date of hearing & Judgment: 17.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "APPLICANT: M/S. REGUS EXECUTIVE CENTER KARACHI (PRIVATE) LIMITED THROUGH MR. SAUBAN TASLEEM, ADVOCATE.\nVS\nRESPONDENTS: ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (UNIT- 04), SRB, KARACHI & ANOTHER THROUGH MR. SHAMSHAD AHMED ADVOCATE." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26117", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1228 = 2025 SLD 1228", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTY", - "Key Words:": "Application for Unconditional Leave to Defend under Section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nPlaintiff: A banking company incorporated under the laws of Pakistan.\nDefendant No.1: A public limited company availing finance facilities from the plaintiff.\nDefendants No. 2 to 8: Personal guarantors/directors involved in the finance arrangements.\nThe defendants availed various finance facilities, fully utilized them, and defaulted in repayment.\nThe plaintiff restructured the outstanding amount of Rs.492,887,117/- (including Rs.481,967,000/- as principal and Rs.10,920,117/- as frozen markup) through a Restructuring Agreement dated 30.03.2016 for six years.\nThe defendants again defaulted, and as of 31.12.2018, the outstanding liability was Rs.576,204,667.25.\nThe defendants applied for unconditional leave to defend, raising objections on:\nThe authority of the plaintiff’s signatories without board resolution,\nAlleged inaccuracies in the accounts,\nNon-provision of details of outstanding amounts,\nDisputing the computation of markup,\nViolation of the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891,\nClaim of markup over markup (not permissible).\nThe defendants failed to provide any substantive documentary proof of repayments or specific denials with dates and amounts.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that the defendants failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 10(4) and (5) of the Ordinance, 2001 by not clearly stating the amounts availed, repayments made, and amounts disputed.\nThe objections raised were found to be general denials, not supported by documents, and insufficient to warrant leave to defend.\nThe application for leave to defend was dismissed.\nThe suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff for an amount of Rs.576,204,667.25 (inclusive of markup) along with cost of funds under Section 3 of the Ordinance from the date of default till realization.\nThe decree included the sale of mortgaged properties and hypothecated assets as per the prayer clauses.\nCitations:\nApollo Textile Mills Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Ltd. [PLD 2012 SC 268] – Compliance with Section 10(4) and (5) mandatory; failure leads to rejection of leave to defend.\nJamal Tube (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore v. First Punjab Modarba, Lahore [2021 CLD 1372]\nBank of Punjab v. International Ceramics Ltd. [2013 CLD 1472]\nMessrs Soneri Bank Limited v. Messrs Compass Trading Corporation (Pvt.) Limited [2012 CLD 1302 Sindh]\nMessrs ICEPAC Limited v. Pakistan Industrial Leasing Corporation Limited [2005 CLD 1186]\nHaq Feed Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. National Development Finance Corporation [2007 CLD 975]\nHabib Bank Ltd. v. A.B.M. Graner (Pvt.) Ltd. [PLD 2001 Karachi 264]", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=3,10(3),10(4),10(5),10(6),10(11)Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881=118", - "Case #": "Suit No. B-10 / 2019. Date of hearing: 04.11.2024\nFOR HEARING OF CMA 5921/2019\n[u/s 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001]\nRead with Section 151 CPC", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MR. JUSTICE ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Waqar Ahmed, Advocate for the Plaintiff.\nMr. Muhammad Umar Javed, Advocate for the Defendants", - "Petitioner Name:": "SONERI BANK LIMITED \nVS\nQUETTA TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26118", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1229 = 2025 SLD 1229", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTU", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Consumer Protection Court in Banking Service Disputes (ATM Card Services)\nDetails:\nTwo appeals filed by United Bank Ltd., Jamshoro Branch, under Section 34 of the Sindh Consumer Protection Act, 2014, challenged orders passed by the Consumer Protection Court, Jamshoro, in Claim Nos. 11/2023 and 07/2023. The Claimant, an account holder of the bank, alleged that on two occasions—on 16.09.2023 (Rs.6,000/-) and on 17.06.2023 (Rs.20,000/-)—he used the banks ATM card at a Sindh Bank booth. Although the amounts were debited, cash was not dispensed, and reversals were made after 20 and 10 days, respectively. The Claimant contended mental agony and inconvenience and sought compensation, which the Consumer Court awarded as Rs.300,000/- per claim.\nThe bank, in its appeals, argued that:\nThe Consumer Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 7(4) of the FIO, 2001.\nThe Claimant, as an account holder, was not a consumer under the Act of 2014.\nATM services were not services within the meaning of the Act.\nThe Claimant countered that ATM services are indeed services under the Act and that the Consumer Court has jurisdiction.\nHeld:\nThe Claimant qualifies as a consumer under Section 2(e) of the Sindh Consumer Protection Act, 2014.\nThe ATM card service is a service under Section 2(q) of the Act, thus falling within the Consumer Protection Court’s jurisdiction.\nSection 7(4) of the FIO, 2001, does not bar the Consumer Court’s jurisdiction over such disputes, as they involve a service deficiency, not a financial facility or loan.\nThe compensation awarded by the Consumer Court was excessive. The Court modified the awards:\nRs.10,000/- for Claim No. 11/2023 (Rs.6,000/- transaction with 20-day delay).\nRs.15,000/- for Claim No. 07/2023 (Rs.20,000/- transaction with 10-day delay).\nRs.20,000/- litigation costs in each claim.\nThe modified awards are to be paid within 15 days, failing which enforcement under Section 33(2) of the Act of 2014 may be initiated.\nCase Law Cited by Appellant-Bank:\n2015 CLD 196\n2016 CLD 1546\n2016 CLD 383\nCase Law Cited by Claimant:\nPLD 2022 Sindh 430", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Consumer Protection Act, 2014=2(e), 2(q),7, 3,14,15,32,33Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(a)(ii),2(c),7(4)", - "Case #": "Misc: Civil Appeals No.S-11 and 12 of 2024. Dated of hearing: 31.01.2025. Date of decision: 14.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Siddique, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Herchand Kumar, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "UNITED BANK LTD \nVS\nDR. FAROOQUE ADIL ABBASI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26119", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1230 = 2025 SLD 1230", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "Interpretation of Rule 10(1)(e) of the Export Oriented Units and Small Medium Enterprises Rules, 2008 – Whether mandatory disposal of spares and payment of duty/taxes is required within 10 years.\nDetails:\nThe Applicant, an Export-Oriented Unit (EOU), imported spare parts duty-free under the exemption granted by SRO 327(I)/2008 and the Export Oriented Unit Rules, 2008. A Show Cause Notice dated 19.05.2021 alleged that the Applicant failed to dispose of the imported spare parts within ten years as required under Rule 10(1)(e), and was therefore liable to pay the full amount of duties and taxes.\nThe Adjudicating Authority, in its Order-in-Original dated 08.10.2021, held in favour of the Applicant, finding no compulsion in law requiring the disposal of such goods within ten years, and no liability to pay duties and taxes unless the goods were actually disposed of or sold before that period.\nHowever, the Customs Appellate Tribunal reversed this decision and ruled in favour of the department, interpreting the Rules as requiring payment of duties and taxes if the goods were retained beyond ten years.\nThe Applicant challenged the Tribunal’s order before the High Court through the present Special Customs Reference Application.\nHeld:\nThe High Court (Sindh) ruled in favour of the Applicant, holding:\nRule 10(1)(e) does not compel EOUs to dispose of spares, capital goods, or machinery within ten years; rather, it prescribes reduced rates of duty and taxes if the goods are disposed of within specified periods (before 5 years, between 5–7.5 years, and 7.5–10 years).\nThere is no liability to pay duties and taxes if the goods are retained beyond ten years, provided they are not disposed of.\nThe Customs Department’s interpretation requiring payment of duties and taxes after ten years, even without disposal, is unsustainable in law.\nThe Tribunal erred in reversing the Adjudicating Authority’s decision. Therefore, the Tribunal’s judgment dated 14.09.2022 was set aside, and the Applicant’s appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196(10)Export Oriented Units and Small and Medium Enterprises Rules, 2008=10(1)(e)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) No. 725 of 2022. Date of hearing: 30.04.2025. Date of Judgment: 30.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR ACJ. AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: Artistic Milliners Pvt. Limited Through Mr. Jam Zeeshan Ali, Advocate.\nVS\nRespondents: The Collector of Customs (Export), PMBQ, Karachi & another Through Mr. Muhammad Bilal Bhatti, Advocate." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26120", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1232 = 2025 SLD 1232", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVS8", - "Key Words:": "Proportionality in Disciplinary Penalties – Corruption by Ahlmad\nDetails:\nThe case involved an Ahlmad (court record keeper) in the District Courts, Jhang, who was charged under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999 for accepting bribes through multiple cheques to assist in the recruitment of relatives of a complainant. The Inquiry Officer and the District & Sessions Judge (competent authority) found the charges of corruption proved and imposed a major penalty of dismissal from service. The Punjab Service Tribunal partially allowed the respondent’s appeal, reducing the penalty to forfeiture of two years of service, stating the punishment of dismissal was “grave and harsh” and that the respondent deserved a second chance. The Tribunal’s reasoning was vague and lacked a structured proportionality analysis.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court held that the Tribunal’s decision to reduce the penalty lacked a structured and transparent proportionality assessment and failed to balance public interest against private rights. Given the proven charges of corruption involving substantial sums and the critical role of an Ahlmad in upholding judicial integrity, the dismissal from service was justified. The Tribunal’s decision was set aside, and the dismissal from service was restored.\nCitations:\nPunjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973 (Articles 4, 14, 25)\nPrinciples of Proportionality in Constitutional Law (referenced from international and comparative sources)\n[Relevant case law not explicitly cited in the judgment, but proportionality analysis principles discussed]", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 2987-L/2019. Date of hearing: 07.05.2025.\n(Against the order dated 09.07.2019 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.872/2019)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH MR. JUSTICE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI", - "Lawyer Name:": "DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE (AUTHORITY), JHANG, ETC. ….. PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nGHULAM SHABBIR …… RESPONDENT", - "Petitioner Name:": "For the Mr. Khalid Masood Ghani, ASC.\nFor the Mr. Sher Aman, ASC.\nAssisted by: Mr. Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26121", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1231 = 2025 SLD 1231", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVSs", - "Key Words:": "Rectification of appellate order under Section 221 – Alleged concealment of income on unexplained bank credits – Remand of case to Assessing Officer for fresh decision.\nDetails:\nParties:\nAppellant: Taxpayer (Individual, Sanam Oil Traders)\nRespondent: Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), RTO Sialkot\nBackground:\nThe taxpayer, an individual deriving income from business, filed a return for Tax Year 2017 under Section 120, declaring taxable income of Rs. 924,636. Later, the Assessing Officer (AO) received definite information under Section 120(8) that the taxpayer maintained an undisclosed bank account at NBP, Gujrat (A/C No. 139072348), with credits of Rs. 15,000,000. The AO, invoking Sections 122(1) & 122(5)(ii), treated this as concealment under Section 111(1)(d)(ii), added the amount to income, and raised additional tax liability.\nFirst Appeal:\nThe taxpayers appeal before the CIR(A) was dismissed on 15-09-2023. The taxpayer then filed a rectification application under Section 221, arguing that the credits represented lawful funds (e.g., property sale proceeds, lifelong savings), supported by the wealth statement.\nCIR(A) Rectification:\nThe CIR(A), upon considering the rectification application, found that the taxpayers explanations were not adequately examined by the AO and rectified the earlier order by remanding the matter to the AO for de novo proceedings (Order dated 17-01-2024).\nSecond Appeal to ATIR:\nThe taxpayer appealed against the remand order, arguing that the rectification was not warranted and that the original additions were unjustified. The department defended the CIR(A)s rectification as lawful.\nThe Tribunal held that:\nThe CIR(A) was within his powers under Section 221 to rectify an error apparent from the record, especially where the AO had failed to evaluate the taxpayer’s explanations and evidence.\nThe remand for fresh assessment proceedings was justified, as the taxpayer’s claims regarding lawful sources of funds and reconciliation of wealth statement required factual verification.\nNo procedural or legal infirmity was found in the CIR(A)’s order.\nThe appeal was dismissed, upholding the CIR(A)’s order dated 17-01-2024.\nCase Law:\nZahoor Ahmed v. CIR 2019 PTD 1052 – Inadvertent omissions in wealth statement do not constitute concealment if not deliberate.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(d)(ii),120,120(8),122(1),122(5)(ii),122(9),129,131,221", - "Case #": "ITA No. 790/B/2024 (Tax Year 2017). Date of Hearing & Order: 06.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MIAN ABDUL BASIT, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Ch. Naeem ul Haq, Advocate\nRespondent By: Mr. Saqib Malik, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. KHALIL AHMED PROP: SANAM OIL TRADER, OPP. OCTRI POST NO. I, KALARA KHASA, G.T. ROAD, GUJRAT.\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (GUJRAT ZONE), UNIT-XIII, RANGE-I, SIALKOT." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26122", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1233 = 2025 SLD 1233", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTk", - "Key Words:": "Repatriation of Pakistani Prisoners under the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002 and UK-Pakistan Bilateral Agreement, 2007\nDetails:\nThree writ petitions were filed seeking directions for the repatriation of Pakistani nationals imprisoned in the UK under the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002:\nWP No. 3480 of 2022 – Petitioner Amanullah Khan sought repatriation of his son, Muhammad Hammad, serving a life sentence at Long Lartin Prison, UK.\nWP No. 1175 of 2023 – Petitioner Ibrar Hussain sought repatriation of his brother, Muhammad Shafi, serving a life sentence at HMP Garatree, UK.\nWP No. 2167 of 2023 – Petitioner Ghazala Shaheen sought repatriation of her son, Muhammad Awais Durani, sentenced to 23 years at HMP High Down, UK.\nDespite fulfilling documentation requirements, delays arose due to:\nLegal gaps in Pakistans Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002.\nUKs concerns over Pakistans legal framework and reciprocity assurances.\nIssues regarding final release dates and remission policies in Pakistan.\nEfforts involved:\nConsular access to prisoners.\nDetailed reports on release dates, remissions, and prison rules.\nContinuous correspondence between Pakistani and UK authorities.\nEventually, the prisoners were repatriated:\nMuhammad Hammad on 10 September 2024.\nMuhammad Shafi on 06 August 2024.\nMuhammad Awais Durani on 04 October 2024.\nHeld:\nThe Court acknowledged:\nRepatriation depends on mutual consent of both sovereign states and the offender.\nThe process requires compliance with international agreements, including the 2007 UK-Pakistan Transfer Agreement.\nThe probable and final release dates must align with UK sentencing, with remission policies applicable post-transfer under Pakistani law.\nThe Asad Javed case (2017 SCMR 1514) governs the application of remission and pardon for repatriated prisoners under the 2002 Ordinance.\nThe Court issued directions:\nEstablish a designated helpline for regular prisoner communication.\nEnsure consular access and reporting to families and authorities.\nMaintain a database of Pakistani prisoners abroad, covering health, legal, and psychological status.\nStrengthen liaison between Pakistani missions abroad and the Ministry of Interior for data sharing and compliance.\nThe Court appreciated the collaborative efforts of Pakistani and UK authorities in facilitating repatriation.\nCitations:\nTransfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002\nUK-Pakistan Bilateral Agreement on Transfer of Prisoners, 2007\n2017 SCMR 1514 (Asad Javed v. Federation of Pakistan)\nPLD 2016 Islamabad 53 (Federation of Pakistan v. Asad Javed & others)\nPakistan Prison Rules, 1978 (Chapter 8, Rule 199-215)\nUNODC Handbook on International Transfer of Sentenced Persons\nInternational Human Rights Instruments (UN CAT, ICCPR)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=45", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 3480-2022, W.P. No. 1175-2023, W.P. No. 2167-2023. Date of Decision: 03.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MOHSIN AKHTAR KAYANI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Ms. Farah Rana, Advocate for petitioners.\nRespondents by: Mr. Usman Rasool Ghumman, AAG. Mr. Asad Khan Burki, Legal Advisor, M/o Foreign Affairs. Muhammad Taimoor Janjua, State Counsel.\nAssisted by: Ms. Aymen Azeem, Law Clerk, I.H.C.", - "Petitioner Name:": "W.P. No. 3480-2022\nAMAN ULLAH KHAN\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC.\nW.P. No. 1175-2023\nIBRAR HUSSAIN\nVUS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC.\nW.P. No. 2167-2023\nGHAZALA SHAHEEN \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26123", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1234 = 2025 SLD 1234", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVTg", - "Key Words:": "Maintainability of Constitutional Petition under Article 199 against Ad-Interim Order of Appellate Tribunal - Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged an ad-interim order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Sindh Revenue Board (SRB), which required the deposit of 10% of the principal tax amount while granting a stay against recovery proceedings. The petitioner sought:\nA direction for the Appellate Tribunal to decide the appeal in accordance with law,\nA restraint on the respondents from taking any adverse/coercive action until the appeal is decided, plus an additional seven days thereafter to file a statutory appeal, and\nGeneral relief and costs.\nThe petition was argued on the maintainability point, as it challenged an ad-interim order of the Tribunal, which had already granted partial relief by reducing the statutory pre-deposit requirement from 25% to 10%. The Court noted that:\nThe petitioner was earlier granted an ad-interim stay by the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 58(4) of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, but the statutory time period of 120 days had lapsed.\nThe Tribunal’s order was reasonable, discretionary, and in favour of the petitioner.\nThere was no cause of action to invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199.\nThe petitioner approached the Court with unclean hands, seeking restraining orders without depositing any amount, contrary to statutory requirements.\nHeld:\nThe petition was dismissed with costs of Rs. 25,000/-, noting:\nConstitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked against ad-interim orders unless exceptional circumstances exist.\nThe Tribunal’s ad-interim order was reasonable and did not warrant interference.\nThe petitioner’s conduct in bypassing statutory remedies without making any deposit was not appreciable.\nThe Court also directed that the petitioner’s CNIC (of the authorized representative) be blocked in case of non-payment of costs within 15 days.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011=58(4),66(1)", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D- 6223 of 2023. Date of hearing & Order: 15.01.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Petitioner: Nestle Pakistan Limited Through Mr. Aitazaz Manzoor Memon, Advocate.\nVS\nRespondents: The Province of Sindh & others Through Mr. Fahad Hussain Areejo." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26124", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1235 = 2025 SLD 1235", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVXo", - "Key Words:": "Rectification Jurisdiction under Section 57 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Tribunal’s Power to Review Its Own Order\nDetails:\nThe case arose from a Show Cause Notice dated 06.06.2012 issued by the Inland Revenue Officer, culminating in Order-in-Original No.29/2012 dated 31.12.2012 against the petitioner. The sequence of proceedings is as follows:\nFirst Round of Litigation:\nThe petitioner’s appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was dismissed on 21.02.2013.\nThe petitioner’s further appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) (STA No.401/LB/2013) was allowed on 28.08.2013, setting aside the orders below and quashing the FIR.\nThe Department’s Reference (STR No.15/2014) was partially allowed by the Lahore High Court (LHC) on 11.05.2017—two questions of law were answered in favour of the Department, but the third question (regarding Clause 42(b) of STGO No.3/2004) was not answered as the Tribunal had not given findings on it.\nPetitioner’s CPLA No.3717/2017 against this LHC decision was withdrawn on 14.01.2020.\nSecond Round (Rectification Attempt):\nPetitioner filed M.A (R) No.254/LB/2018 before the Tribunal seeking fixation/rectification of the earlier 28.08.2013 order, arguing that the Tribunal had overlooked the liability under the normal tax regime.\nThe Tribunal, treating this as a rectification application, modified its own earlier order on 12.10.2018, once again deciding in favour of the petitioner.\nThe Department challenged this rectification via STR No.39113/2019 before the Lahore High Court, which was allowed on 17.12.2024, holding that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction.\nCurrent CPLA:\nPetitioner argued:\nThe 2017 LHC Order was a remand order, obligating the Tribunal to decide the unanswered question.\nThe Tribunal had the power to rectify its earlier order under Section 57 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nSupreme Court’s Findings:\nThe 2017 LHC Order was not a remand order; the appeal had been finally disposed of by the Tribunal in 2013.\nThe Tribunal’s rectification power under Section 57 is limited to mistakes apparent on the face of the record. It cannot be used to re-adjudicate issues or modify substantive findings.\nThe Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction by modifying its earlier decision on a matter already settled.\nThe Tribunal cannot act as an appellate forum of its own order.\nThe rectification application was in essence an attempt to re-open a concluded matter, which is not permissible.\nHeld:\nThe petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.\nThe High Court’s decision in STR No.39113/2019 was upheld, affirming the limited scope of rectification under Section 57 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe Tribunal’s earlier modification of its own order was beyond jurisdiction and unlawful.\nCitations:\nLahore High Court, STR No.11/2014 (11.05.2017): High Court order deciding questions of law.\nLahore High Court, STR No.39113/2019 (17.12.2024): Reference accepted; Tribunal’s rectification jurisdiction curtailed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=57", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 312 of 2025. Date of Hearing & Order: 22.05.2025\n[Against the judgment dated 17.12.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in STR No.39113/2019]", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Muhammad Ali Raza, ASC.\nFor the Respondent: Mrs. Kausar Parveen, ASC.\nDr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S CHAUDHARY STEEL FURNACE ….. PETITIONER\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, SIALKOT ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, SIALKOT …. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26125", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 7046 = 2022 SLD 7046", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTVXk", - "Key Words:": "Estimation of Sales and Tax Liability in Ceramics Industry — Validity of Estimation Based on Utility Consumption Ratios\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a registered person, challenged the orders of the adjudicating authority and the CIR (Appeals), Gujranwala, which upheld the estimation of sales and tax liability for the period July 2018 to June 2019. The tax authorities, during scrutiny, observed alleged under-declaration of production and sales by the appellant, based on an estimated industry average of 4.34 times of utility bills (gas consumption). Accordingly, a show cause notice was issued under sections 11(2) and 11(4) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, demanding unpaid sales tax of Rs. 6,643,082/-, additional tax of Rs. 1,172,309/-, default surcharge under section 34(1)(c), and penalty under section 33(5). The appellant contested the estimation methodology, arguing that there was no statutory provision allowing sales estimation based on utility bills, and that the CIR(A) relied on prior orders that had been set aside. The appellant also contended that the estimation was inconsistent with other similar cases, which used a 2.01 times utility ratio, and failed to account for differences in production methods, location, and plant type (manual vs. automatic).\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal accepted the appellant’s arguments, noting that:\nEstimating sales based on utility consumption lacks explicit statutory backing under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe method applied by the adjudicating officer (4.34 times utility bills) is arbitrary, lacks a consistent legal basis, and disregards differences in industrial capacity, machinery, and processes.\nNo inspection report or concrete evidence substantiated the estimated figures.\nReliance on unrelated cases (e.g., CNG stations, other listed ceramic companies from different provinces with different operational parameters) was misplaced.\nCiting Karachi High Court’s judgment (2004 PTD 868), the Tribunal emphasized that tax liability must arise from clear statutory provisions and cannot be imposed based on assumptions or estimations without explicit legal authority.\nAccordingly, the orders of the adjudicating authority and the CIR (Appeals) were vacated, and the appeal of the registered person was allowed.\nCitations:\nKarachi High Court Judgment — 2004 PTD 868: Principle that taxation requires clear statutory authority and cannot be based on assumptions or industry averages.\nPrior adjudicating officer’s orders under section 25 of the Sales Tax Act — Set aside in related cases.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 648/LB/2022. Date of hearing 12.04.2022. Date of order 23.04.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD WASEEM CH., JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mian Abdul Ghaffar, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Atif Bashir, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. MOOSA CERAMICS, GUJRANWALA. APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, GUJRANWALA. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26126", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1166 = 2025 SLD 1166", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTc", - "Key Words:": "Amended Assessment under Section 122(5A) — Violation of Natural Justice — Audi Alteram Partem\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, an individual, filed an appeal against the order dated 27.02.2023 passed by the CIR(A), Gujranwala, which confirmed an amended assessment order under section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, passed by the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO Gujranwala, for Tax Year 2021.\nThe original return filed by the taxpayer was deemed assessed under section 120(1).\nThe assessing officer issued a show cause notice under section 122(9) based on certain discrepancies, but the taxpayer did not respond.\nThe assessing officer proceeded ex parte and passed an amended assessment order on 15.06.2022, creating a tax liability of Rs. 2,741,656/-.\nThe taxpayer’s appeal before the CIR(A) was dismissed, leading to the current appeal before the Tribunal.\nThe taxpayer’s primary contention was that the assessing officer did not provide a fair opportunity of hearing, violating the principles of natural justice. The departmental representative did not oppose the contention and consented to the matter being remanded.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held:\nThe amended assessment order was passed without providing the taxpayer a fair opportunity of hearing, violating the principle of audi alteram partem.\nThe order was, therefore, void as per established legal principles, including precedents from the Supreme Court of Pakistan:\nNazir Ahmad Panhwar v. Government of Sindh (2005 SCMR 1814)\n2005 SCMR 678\n2000 SCMR 907\nThe CIR(A) also erred in dismissing the appeal without addressing the lapse in opportunity of hearing and without properly calculating the appeal period.\nThe orders of both the assessing officer and CIR(A) were annulled, and the matter was remanded to the assessing officer with the following directions:\nProvide the taxpayer a fair and adequate opportunity of being heard.\nPass a speaking order after considering the documents and explanations provided by the taxpayer.\nIf any deficiencies are observed, confront the taxpayer with such observations before finalizing the order.\nPrinciple of audi alteram partem: No adverse order can be passed without providing the affected party an opportunity to be heard.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "MA (A. G.) No.64/LB/2025, ITA No.2294/LB/2023 (Tax Year 2021). Date of hearing: 12.05.2025. Date of order: 15.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMAD, MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Hassan Yousaf, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ali Imran, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. MUHAMMAD ASIM, GUJRANWALA ... APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, GUJRANWALA …. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26127", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1167 = 2025 SLD 1167", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTY", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax — Compulsory Registration — Scope of Departments Power — Applicability of Sales Tax Prior to Registration\nDetails:\nThe Applicant (Federal Board of Revenue) filed a reference application under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 against the order dated 06.03.2023 passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), Islamabad in S.T.A. No. 770/IB/2022.\nThe Applicant raised the following questions of law:\nWhether every person liable under Section 14(1) of the Act must get registered, and if not, the Department can compulsorily register such person?\nWhether the Department can invoke Rule 6(3) of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 for compulsory registration upon failure to respond to a notice under Rule 6(1)?\nWhether the Department can charge sales tax under Section 3 for periods prior to registration?\nWhether the Department can enforce registration retrospectively from the date the person became liable?\nWhether the failure of a person to register voluntarily causes losses to the exchequer, justifying retrospective application?\nWhether the Tribunals decision is contrary to Commissioner IR, Gujranwala v. S.K. Steel Casting Gujranwala (2019 PTD 1493), which allows charging sales tax for periods prior to compulsory registration?\nThe ATIR had ruled against the Applicant, holding that under the current law, especially after the omission of Section 19 of the Act by Finance Act, 2004 and the amendment to Rule 6 via SRO 494(I)/2015, the Department can only enforce compliance from the date of compulsory registration and not retroactively.\nThe Reference Application contended that the ATIR failed to appreciate the law and the facts correctly.\nHeld:\nThe High Court rejected the Reference Application, holding:\nThe questions framed were not questions of law arising from the impugned order but were based on factual findings and proper interpretation of the law by the ATIR.\nThe Tribunal had correctly interpreted the relevant provisions, including the repeal of Section 19, the amended Rule 6(4), and the precedents, such as:\nFatima Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Collector (GST 2003 CL 413)\nCommissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax Companies Zone-II, Lahore v. Lahore Cantt. Cooperative Housing Society (2009 PTD 700)\nAbdul Razzaq v. Muhammad Sharif (PLD 1997 Lahore 1)\nThe S.K. Steel Casting case (2019 PTD 1493) was distinguished because the Tribunal’s finding was that post-2004, the law does not allow retrospective charging of sales tax from the date a person becomes liable to register; rather, liability starts from the date of compulsory registration.\nTherefore, the Tribunal’s order was upheld, and the Reference Application was dismissed.\nCitations:\nFatima Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Collector (GST 2003 CL 413)\nCommissioner IR, Gujranwala v. S.K. Steel Casting Gujranwala (2019 PTD 1493)\nCommissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax Companies Zone-II, Lahore v. Lahore Cantt. Cooperative Housing Society (2009 PTD 700)\nAbdul Razzaq v. Muhammad Sharif (PLD 1997 Lahore 1)\nFinal Order:\nThe Reference Application was dismissed as no substantial question of law arose from the ATIR’s order. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal was upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 25 of 2023. Date of Order: 08.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ MAHMOOD BAJWA, JUSTICE AND JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the applicant alongwith Yousaf Khan, S.O. IR (Hqrs), RTO, Rawalpindi.\nMr. Imran-ul-Haq, Advocate vice counsel for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue \nV/S \nAbdul Waheed Khan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26128", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1168 = 2025 SLD 1168", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTU", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction and authority of the ATIR to extend stay orders beyond 90 days under Section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, vis-à-vis administrative directions issued by the Director General, Directorate of District Judiciary, Lahore High Court, Lahore.\nDetails:\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), Lahore, heard applications for extension of stay orders beyond the 90-day period stipulated under Section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. A split decision emerged between the learned Members:\nMr. Nasir Mahmood (Member): Rejected the extension applications, citing the 90-day limit under the Ordinance and binding instructions issued by the Director General, District Judiciary, Lahore High Court, via letter No.590/DG(DDJ) dated 29.04.2025. He opined that the Tribunal, being a subordinate forum, could not disregard directives issued by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan through the National Judicial Policy Making Committee (NJPMC).\nRao Muhammad Nasir Jamil (Member): Disagreed, holding that the directions were directory, not mandatory. He emphasized that the third proviso to Section 131(5) permits the continuation of stay beyond 90 days where the appeal is not decided within the statutory timeframe, and that no administrative instructions could override this legal provision. He raised questions about the binding nature of the directives, the jurisdiction of the Director General (District Judiciary) over the ATIR, and whether the Lahore High Courts cited judgments (2016 PTD 1702, 2019 PTD 2082, 2020 PTD 2151) allow such restrictions.\nThe Tribunal also noted conflicting precedents:\nSome ATIR benches were granting stay extensions.\nSome were refusing based on the directives.\nThis inconsistency, it was argued, created discrimination and violated the principle of consistency in judicial decisions.\nThe ARs arguments included:\nThe 90-day limit is directory, not mandatory, as per the third proviso to Section 131(5).\nTaxpayers should not suffer due to administrative delays.\nDirections by the District Judiciary cannot override statutory provisions.\nReference to precedents like 2007 SCMR 569, 2007 SCMR 554, and 2021 SLD 2541 emphasizing that no one should suffer for the acts of public functionaries.\nThe Tribunal has inherent powers to grant interim relief where final relief is within its jurisdiction (2002 PTD 679).\nThe right to appeal and interim relief must be meaningful, not illusory (2003 PTD 1746).\nHeld:\nThe Third Member, resolving the difference, held that:\nThe 90-day period for stay under Section 131(5) is not mandatory. The third proviso allows for an extension until the finalization of the appeal where it is not decided within the statutory timeframe.\nAdministrative directions, including those by the Director General, District Judiciary, Lahore High Court, cannot override statutory provisions of the Ordinance or settled case law.\nThe ATIR is not subordinate to the Director General, District Judiciary, and the administrative directions issued in the NJPMC meeting or via letter No.590/DG(DDJ) are not binding on the Tribunal.\nThe Tribunal is empowered to grant extension of stay beyond 90 days where the main appeal is pending decision, in order to prevent hardship to the taxpayer and ensure the efficacy of appellate relief.\nTaxpayers cannot be penalized for delays in decision-making attributable to the Tribunal itself.\nThe principle of consistency must be maintained across benches; differential treatment in identical cases violates fundamental principles of justice.\nAccordingly, the stay applications were allowed and extended until the final decision of the appeals.\nCitations:\nSection 131(5), Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n2007 SCMR 569, Overseas Pakistanis Foundation v. Syed Mukhtar Ali Shah.\n2007 SCMR 554, Province of Punjab v. Haji Yaqoob Khan.\n2021 SLD 2541, Mumtaz Alias Bhutto v. State.\n2002 PTD 679, Pak-Saudi Fertilizers Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan.\n2003 PTD 1746, Z.N. Exports (Pvt) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax.\n2016 PTD 1702, 2019 PTD 2082, 2020 PTD 2151 – Judgments on stay and procedural directives (reiterated as still in force).", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=130(5),131(5),132(1)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=5(2)", - "Case #": "MA(Stay) No. 2049/LB/2025, 1982/LB/2025,1986/LB/2025, 2037/LB/2025, 2016/LB/2025, 2007 to 2009/LB/2025, 2032/LB/2025 (Tax Year 2023) & 2046/LB/2025. Date of hearing : 26.05.2025. Date of order : 29.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Imran Khan, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MA(Stay) No. 2049/LB/2025 \n(Tax Year 2015)\nM/s. Parco Pearl Gas, Lahore ….. Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore ….. Respondent\nApplicant by: Sh. Aqeel Ahmad, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmad, DR.\nMA(Stay) No. 1982/LB/2025\nM/s. King Hero Motorcycle, Gujranwala ... Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, RTO, Gujranwala. ... Respondent\nApplicant by: Rana M. Afzal, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad, DR.\nMA(Stay) No. 1986/LB/2025\nM/s. Nestle Pakistan Ltd., Lahore ... Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore. ... Respondent\nApplicant by: Mr. Shujahat Mushtaq, ACA.\nRespondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmad, DR.\nMA(Stay) No. 2037/LB/2025\nM/s. Association for Academic Quality (Afaq) Lahore ... Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore. ... Respondent\nApplicant by: None.\nRespondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmad, DR.\nMA(Stay) No. 2016/LB/2025\nM/s. King Paper & Board Mills, Sheikhupura ... Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore. ... Respondent\nApplicant by: Mr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad, DR.\nMA(Stay) Nos. 2007 to 2009/LB/2025\nM/s. D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd., Lahore ... Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore. ... Respondent\nApplicant by: Mr. Saad Mehmood Butt, ACA.\nRespondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmad, DR.\nMA(Stay) No.2032/LB/2025 (Tax Year 2023)\nM/s. Avanceon Limited, Lahore ….. Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, LTO, Lahore.\nApplicant by: Rana Muhammad Afzal, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Iqtidar Ahmad, DR.\nMA(Stay) No.2046/LB/2025\nM/s. Al-Wahab Garden, Lahore ….. Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, CTO, Lahore." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26129", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1236 = 2025 SLD 1236", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Key Issues & Findings:\n1.\nBusiness Income on Advances vs. WIP:\no\nTax officer treated the difference between customer advances and WIP as business income (Rs. 150 million).\no\nTribunal held that no “definite information” existed to justify amendment under Section 122(5).\no\nEven on merits, figures did not support profit; in fact, there was a net loss.\nAddition annulled.\n2.\nUndisclosed Property Purchase (Rs. 52.5 million):\no\nTax department alleged purchase but provided no evidence or property details.\no\nTaxpayer denied the purchase.\nAddition annulled due to lack of proof.\n3.\nInterest-Free Loan to Director:\no\nDCIR added Rs. 8.7 million as notional interest income on loan of Rs. 58.4 million to director.\no\nInvoked Section 108 (transfer pricing).\no\nTribunal ruled:\n\nMere directorship ≠ associate under Section 85.\n\nNo audit was conducted.\n\nRelying only on financial statements is not definite information under Section 122(8).\n\nLater ATIR decisions (e.g., 2021 PTD 1718) do not allow creation of notional income under Section 108.\nAddition annulled.\n________________________________________\nConclusion:\nAll three additions made by the DCIR were annulled due to lack of legal basis or evidence. The Tribunal emphasized that Section 122(5) requires definite information, and misapplication of provisions continues to cause loss to revenue due to weak assessments. Direction issued to FBR’s training directorate to improve audit and assessment standards.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 247/IB/25 (TAX YEAR 2023). DATE OF HEARING & ORDER: MAY 21, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUHTOR(S): IMRAN LATIF MINHAS (MEMBER) AND SHARIF UD DIN KHILJI (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ch. Naeem ul Haq, Advocate, Ch. Faheem ul Haq, Advocate\nRespondent by: Ms. Amna Batool", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED PROPERTY DEVELOPERS & CONSULTANTS OFFICE # 1, SYED GOLD MALL, BUSINESS DISTRICT, PHASE 8, BAHRIA TOWN RAWALPINDI ….. APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CTO, ISLAMABAD …. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26130", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1238 = 2025 SLD 1238", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUS8", - "Key Words:": "Unregistered Taxpayer (Bakery Business) v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), RTO Peshawar\nFacts of the Case:\nThe appellant, engaged in the manufacture and taxable supply of bakery and sweets products with sales totaling Rs. 54,628,920 during the relevant tax period, remained unregistered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The department, upon scrutiny of income tax records, concluded that the taxpayer was liable for sales tax registration under section 14 read with section 2(5AB) of the Act but had failed to register.\nA show cause notice dated 05.10.2016 was issued. The taxpayer did not respond. Consequently, an Order-in-Original dated 03.03.2017 was issued under section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, raising a demand of Rs. 9,064,987, along with default surcharge under section 34 and penalties under sections 33(5), 33(7), and 33(8).\nOn appeal, the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) upheld the original order. The taxpayer then filed the present second appeal before the ATIR.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issue:\nWhether a taxpayer who is not registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 can be subjected to sales tax liability, surcharges, and penalties without first undergoing compulsory registration in accordance with Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006?\n________________________________________\nArguments:\n•\nTaxpayer’s Representative (AR):\no\nCited that the appellant was not registered at the time of issuance of show cause notice or the Order-in-Original.\no\nAs per legal precedent and statutory provisions, sales tax cannot be imposed unless a person is duly registered.\no\nThe entire proceedings were ultra vires the Act, lacking lawful basis.\n•\nDepartmental Representative (DR):\no\nArgued that under section 2(25), a person liable to be registered is deemed to be a registered person .\no\nTherefore, the department was justified in creating liability based on taxable activity.\n________________________________________\nFindings of the Tribunal:\nThe Tribunal conducted a detailed review of the statutory framework and judicial precedents and ruled as follows:\n1.\nSection 2(25) and Rule 6 Interpretation:\nA person liable to be registered must be compulsorily registered first by the department following due process under Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, before any liability can be imposed under section 3(1)(a) of the Act.\n2.\nCase Law Relied Upon:\no\n2016 PTD (Trib.) 1377: Sales tax cannot be imposed before registration; invoice issuance is limited to registered persons.\no\n2018 PTD (Trib.) 536: Without registration, a person cannot issue invoices or collect tax.\no\n2019 PTD 1493: Even for retrospective contraventions, registration must precede any enforcement action.\no\nUnreported Judgment STR No. 25/2023 (LHC Rawalpindi Bench): Reaffirmed that provisions apply only post-registration.\no\nSTA No. 474/IB/2021 (ATIR Order dated 17.11.2021): Section 3 and related compliance only apply from date of registration.\n3.\nCottage Industry Exemption Argument:\no\nNot addressed in detail, as the entire liability was held invalid ab initio for lack of registration.\n4.\nKey Observation:\no\n“The appellant has neither voluntarily registered nor was compulsorily registered by the tax authorities. Therefore, any proceedings under section 11 or others are legally untenable.”\n________________________________________\nHeld:\n•\nThe sales tax demand, default surcharge, and penalties created without compulsory registration were illegal and without lawful authority.\n•\nThe appeal was allowed, and the orders of the lower authorities annulled in full.\n________________________________________\nRatio Decidendi:\nA person liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 cannot be subjected to sales tax liabilities, including penalties or surcharge, unless such person has first been duly registered by the tax department following the procedure prescribed under Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006. Without registration, any attempt to impose tax or enforce compliance is unlawful.\n________________________________________\nSignificance:\nThis decision reaffirms the principle that the Sales Tax Act cannot operate retrospectively on unregistered persons unless due process of registration has been observed. It emphasizes the mandatory procedural safeguards prior to enforcement, shielding taxpayers from arbitrary liabilities.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(5AB),2(25),3,3(1)(a),14,23,23(2),33(5),33(7),33(8)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=6,6(1),6(3),6(4)", - "Case #": "STA No.102/IB/2015 (Tax period 2012 to 2015). Date of Hearing: 07.05.2025. Date of Order: 12.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. NAEEM ASHRAF (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Naeem ul Haq, Advocate\nRespondent By: Syed Zubair Shah, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. AJMAL MIR KHAN; PROP: M/S MIR BAKERS & SWEETS, MOHALLAH KUND MAIN BAZAR, G. T ROAD, HARIPUR ….. APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, ABBOTTABAD ….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26131", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1237 = 2025 SLD 1237", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUSs", - "Key Words:": "The respondent taxpayer filed a return declaring income of Rs. 466,250. The case was selected for audit under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. During audit proceedings, the taxpayer failed to produce books of accounts or supporting records. Consequently, the assessing officer made an ex-parte best judgment assessment under the Ordinance and determined income at Rs. 1,889,211, primarily by:\nDisallowing Rs. 1,383,104 from purchases (25% of total declared purchases)\nDisallowing Rs. 39,857 under P & L expenses\nOn appeal, the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), Rawalpindi reduced the disallowance from 25% to 20%, citing the nature of business. The disallowance of P & L expenses was upheld. Aggrieved, the Department filed a second appeal before the ATIR, challenging the partial relief granted on purchases.\nIssue:\nWhether the CIR(A) was justified in reducing the disallowance from 25% to 20% in the absence of cogent reasoning or supporting evidence.\nArguments:\nDepartmental Representative (DR):\nAsserted that the CIR(A) reduced the addition arbitrarily without substantiating rationale.\nUrged restoration of the original 25% addition.\nAuthorized Representative (AR) for Taxpayer:\nSupported the appellate order.\nFindings of the Tribunal:\nThe Assessing Officer’s addition of 25% was made purely on estimation without conducting any third-party verification or relying on comparative data or industry norms.\nThe CIR(A)’s reduction to 20% was also based on estimation and not supported by any analytical reasoning, material evidence, or precedent.\nBoth the original assessment and the appellate modification lacked evidentiary foundation, violating settled principles of tax law which require that additions must be based on tangible material or reasoned inference.\nEstimation without evidentiary backing is unsustainable in law.\nHeld:\nThe departmental appeal was dismissed. The order of the CIR(A) was upheld only to the extent appealed, but the Tribunal found no legal infirmity justifying interference. The entire addition lacked legal sustainability due to its arbitrary and unsubstantiated nature.\nLegal Principle Affirmed:\nAdditions to declared income must be based on clear evidence or logical inference. Arbitrary estimation—whether at the assessment or appellate stage—without substantiating data or industry benchmarks, is not sustainable in tax law.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=214C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 529/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2015). Date of Hearing & Order: 06.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M.M. AKRAM (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR\nRespondent By: Ch. Iftikhar, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI ……. APPELLANT\nVS\nMR. FAZAL DAD: PROP: M/S MADNI DAWAKHANA, NEAR HANFIA MASJID, ATTOCK …… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26132", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1239 = 2025 SLD 1239 = 2025 PTD 1391", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTk", - "Key Words:": "Whether the learned Tribunal was justified to hold that the prefabricated building structure imported by the Applicant is liable to payment of customs duties and sales tax?\nFacts:\nThe applicant, a Zone Enterprise setting up a food manufacturing plant within the Special Economic Zone (SEZ), Faisalabad, imported a prefabricated steel building structure and overhead cranes for industrial use. It sought exemption from customs duty and sales tax under:\nSection 37 of the SEZ Act, 2012 read with SRO 41(I)/2009\nChapter 9917(2) of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff\nPart-I of the Fifth Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969, which defines “Capital Goods”\nThe customs department denied exemption on the basis that prefabricated buildings were not capital goods as defined under the applicable tariff heads and also referred to an FBR opinion dated 02.03.2021 which denied such classification. Appeals before the Collector (Appeals) and subsequently before the Customs Appellate Tribunal failed.\nApplicants Arguments:\nPrefabricated buildings constitute capital goods under both the Customs Act and SRO 41(I)/2009.\nThe SEZ Act, 2012 has an overriding effect, providing independent exemption rights.\nThe Tribunal erred in relying solely on a restrictive FBR view without considering binding precedent.\nThe Aisha Steel judgment (PLD 2015 Sindh 146) by the Division Bench of Sindh High Court had already held prefabricated buildings to be capital goods, entitled to exemption.\nRespondent’s Arguments (Customs):\nThe prefabricated structure did not qualify as machinery or “capital goods.”\nRelied on FBR’s interpretation and the view that exemption was only for Zone Developers, not Enterprises.\nArgued that the tribunal had rightly interpreted the tariff headings and denied exemption.\nCourt’s Findings:\nDefinition of Capital Goods:\nThe Court reaffirmed that the definition of capital goods under Chapter 9917(2) and SRO 575(I)/2006 is pari materia (substantially the same). The Aisha Steel case conclusively held that prefabricated buildings and sheds used in industrial plants qualify as capital goods and are therefore entitled to exemption.\nMisinterpretation by the Tribunal:\nThe Tribunal narrowly relied on Para 45 of the Aisha Steel judgment, ignoring broader findings in Paras 43–44, which had extended exemption to prefabricated buildings even without overhead cranes.\nClassification under Chapter 9917(2):\nThe Court clarified that the exemption is available to three categories:\nZone Developers\nCo-developers\nZone Enterprises (which includes the Applicant)\nTherefore, the Tribunal’s finding that the Applicant was not a Developer and hence not entitled to exemption under Chapter 9917(2) was erroneous.\nSRO 41(I)/2009 and SEZ Act:\nThe Court held that Section 37 of SEZ Act, 2012 read with SRO 41 allows exemption for capital equipment—which includes plant, machinery, equipment and accessories—not just machinery as defined. Since prefabricated buildings were not excluded or specifically defined, they fall within the broader scope.\nFBRs Advisory Not Binding:\nThe Court criticized the Tribunal’s reliance on FBR’s opinion dated 02.03.2021 and held that FBR cannot issue binding interpretations on judicial forums or quasi-judicial authorities like Customs Officers or the Tribunal. Judicial precedent—not administrative advisories—is controlling.\nHeld / Order:\nThe Reference Application was allowed.\nThe Tribunal’s order was set aside.\nThe Court declared that prefabricated building structures are capital goods entitled to customs duty and sales tax exemption under:\nChapter 9917(2)\nSRO 41(I)/2009\nSEZ Act, 2012\nFifth Schedule to the Customs Act\nA copy of the order was directed to be sent to the Customs Appellate Tribunal under Section 196(5) of the Customs Act, 1969.\nLegal Principle Established:\nPrefabricated industrial buildings, when used as integral components in SEZ-based projects, fall within the ambit of capital goods under the Customs Act and SEZ Act, thereby qualifying for import duty and tax exemptions. Judicial interpretation (e.g., Aisha Steel) overrides administrative advisories by FBR.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Special Economic Zones Act, 2012=37Customs Act, 1969=19,80,155D", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) Nos. 1129 to 1135 of 2023. Date of hearing: 28.01.2025. Date of Judgment: 12.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, ACJ AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "APPLICANT IN ALL SCRAS: NATIONAL FOOD LIMITED THROUGH MR. HYDER ALI KHAN, ADVOCATE A/W M/S. HAMZA WAHEED & SAMI-UR- REHMAN, ADVOCATES.\nVS \nRESPONDENT IN ALL SCRAS: COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF APPRAISEMENT - WEST & ANOTHER THROUGH MR. FAHEEM RAZA KHUHRO, ADVOCATE." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26133", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1240 = 2025 SLD 1240", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUTg", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nRespondent No. 1 (Muhammad Ramzan) availed a crop loan of Rs. 262,000/- from ZTBL (Respondent No. 2) during Rabi season 2014-15, by mortgaging agricultural land.\nThe loan was compulsorily insured with Adamjee Insurance (Appellant) under the Crop Loan Insurance Scheme (CLIS) as per SBP directives.\nIn September 2014, a devastating flood struck Moza Maasan, District Jhang, damaging crops, livestock, and property of the respondent.\nThe area was officially declared a calamity-hit area by the Government of Punjab vide Notification dated 25.09.2014.\nThe insurance claim for the Kharif 2014 crop was filed by the respondent but allegedly denied by the insurance company and the bank.\nThe Insurance Tribunal accepted the respondents claim for Rs. 131,000/- with 5% liquidated damages from October 2014 under Section 118(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.\nIssue:\nWhether the Insurance Tribunal rightly allowed the insurance claim for loss of crops and awarded liquidated damages?\nAppellant’s Arguments (Adamjee Insurance):\nNo direct privity of contract existed between the insurer (Adamjee) and respondent No. 1.\nThe documents presented by the respondent should be inadmissible since they were submitted by counsel.\nClaimed that the insurance payout was already made to ZTBL but failed to provide conclusive evidence or testimony from the bank.\nRespondent’s Position:\nLoan was compulsorily insured and linked with the crop loan.\nArea declared calamity-hit through valid government notification.\nAll required documents were submitted including policy letters, land ownership, and loss evidence.\nDespite multiple requests, the insurance claim was unjustly denied.\nFindings of the High Court:\nValid Insurance Coverage:\nThe Court held that the loan was duly insured with the appellant as part of the CLIS. Clause 13 of the policy required indemnification up to 300% of premium collected in the event of large-scale calamity. Hence, the claim was clearly covered.\nProof of Calamity:\nGovernment Notification dated 25.09.2014 declared the area calamity-hit, justifying the respondents claim.\nEvidence:\nThe documents presented were:\nFrom public record\nNot rebutted\nPer se admissible\nThe appellant failed to produce any representative from ZTBL to substantiate the claim that the payout was already made.\nLegal Validity:\nThe Insurance Tribunal rightly interpreted the evidence, and there was no misreading or non-reading of material facts. The appellant failed to point out any jurisdictional defect.\nLiquidated Damages Justified:\nThe awarding of 5% liquidated damages under Section 118(2) of the Insurance Ordinance was found to be legally tenable.\nAbuse of Process by Insurer:\nThe Court criticized the insurer for filing a meritless appeal despite the meager claim of Rs. 131,000/-, citing the Supreme Court precedent in 2018 SCMR 939 (FBR v. Hazrat Hussain) which discourages frivolous litigation that wastes public resources.\nHeld:\nAppeal Dismissed.\nJudgment of Insurance Tribunal Jhang dated 05.03.2022 upheld.\nNo order as to costs.\nLegal Principles:\nPublic documents and government notifications carry a presumption of correctness unless rebutted.\nIn insurance claims linked with calamity declarations, the burden of proof shifts to the insurer once official notification and loss are established.\nLiquidated damages under Section 118(2) are enforceable when insurer defaults post-declared loss.\nFrivolous appeals by departments or institutions are discouraged under public interest and judicial economy doctrines.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=124(2)Insurance Ordinance, 2000=118,118(2)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=11", - "Case #": "Insurance Appeal No. 29992/2022. Date of hearing: 29.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Malik Waqar Haider Awan, Justice and Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by Mr. Ahmad Farooq, Advocate\nRespondent No.1 by Mr. Munir Ahmed Khan Sadhana, Advocate\nRespondent No.2 by Mr. Saifullah Maan, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "Adamjee Insurance Company Limited\nVS\nMuhammad Ramzan and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26134", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1241 = 2025 SLD 1241", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUXo", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nDefendant No. 1, a public limited company, established a banking relationship in 2007 with the Plaintiff Bank and availed various finance facilities over time.\nIn 2019, due to outstanding liabilities, the company requested restructuring of short-term finances and lease obligations, which culminated in a Restructuring Agreement dated 08.01.2020, followed by addenda in March 2020 and July 2020.\nUnder the restructuring:\nDemand Finance-I (DF-I) was created for Rs. 229.45 million, repayable in 20 quarterly installments from 31.12.2021 to 30.09.2026, with markup payable quarterly.\nDemand Finance-II (DF-II) comprised Rs. 18.49 million (accrued markup), payable in four equal quarterly installments after full settlement of DF-I.\nDefendants No. 2 to 4 were personal guarantors.\nDefendant No. 1 acknowledged the restructured liability in its 2020 Annual Report, admitting to the facilities and default in payment.\nIssues Raised by Defendants (PLA):\nMaintainability – Suit filed by unauthorized person; documents allegedly fake.\nMarkup Calculation – Plaintiff bank allegedly charged excessive markup (>8%), in contravention of restructuring terms.\nNo need for evidence – Disputed amounts and issues pertain to accounting adjustments, not factual conflict.\nFindings:\nAuthority to File Suit:\nPlaintiff acted through a registered power of attorney, backed by a Board Resolution (Clause 18).\nStatement of accounts properly certified per Section 9 of the Ordinance.\nAdmissions by Defendants:\nDefendant No. 1’s Annual Report (2020) (Clause 11.6) acknowledged the loan, restructuring, and default, thereby admitting liability.\nAllegation of forged documents held as bald, unsupported, and contradicted by public admission.\nNature of Restructuring as ‘Finance’:\nRestructuring qualifies as “finance” under Sections 2(d)(iii), 2(d)(ix), and 2(e)(i) of the Ordinance.\nParties validly agreed to cost of funds (markup), which is recoverable even post-default.\nExcess Markup Adjusted:\nThe agreed markup cap of 8% was breached post-March & June 2020.\nCourt disallowed excess markup and reduced claim accordingly.\nPlaintiffs entitlement limited to amount reconcilable under contract terms and certified statements.\nHeld:\nPLA of Defendants No. 1 to 4 was rejected.\nSuit decreed for Rs. 256,687,153/- with:\nCosts of the suit.\nCost of funds from 30.06.2021 (date of default) till realization.\nPLA of Proforma Defendants No. 5 to 7 disposed of as they only hold charges over assets, their rights preserved for execution stage.\nIf decretal amount not paid within 30 days, the decree shall automatically convert into execution under Section 19(1) of the Ordinance.\nLegal Significance:\nReinforces the enforceability of restructured debt as valid “finance” under law.\nUpholds bank’s right to cost of funds, but subject to agreed caps (markup limit of 8% respected).\nDemonstrates that annual financial statements can serve as binding admissions against a corporate debtor.\nClarifies that restructuring agreements are not fresh disbursements, but recognized financial arrangements within the ambit of banking law.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 55735 / 2022 & P.L.A. Nos. 67952, 66029, 75802 & 68570 of 2022. Date of Judgment: 14.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff By: Mr. Hasham Ahmad Khan, Advocate Mr. Isa Ahmad Jalil, Advocate\nDefendants No. 1 to 4 By: Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate\nDefendant No. 7 By: Mr. Nawaz Asif, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE BANK OF PUNJAB \nVS\nM/S HIRA TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED AND 08 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26135", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1242 = 2025 SLD 1242", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTUXk", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nPetitioners were initially appointed on contract basis in 2007 in the Prosecution Department.\nTheir services were terminated, leading to litigation. A Division Bench judgment dated 29.09.2016 held them entitled to the benefits of the notification dated 10.11.2010 regarding regularization of BS-16 and above employees.\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the Government’s appeal against this finding on 27.02.2019.\nPursuant to contempt proceedings, the Secretary, PPSC, assured the Supreme Court that regularization would be processed per notification.\nPetitioners were eventually regularized via appointment orders dated 11.03.2022 and 08.04.2022, respectively.\nThe core grievance: Their regularization was treated as fresh appointment, denying them seniority and benefits from 10.11.2010 (the date of the notification).\nPetitioner’s Arguments:\nPetitioners argued their appointments should date back to 10.11.2010.\nThe State’s action in treating them as new appointees ignored their earlier service and Supreme Court-affirmed rights.\nRelied on Ikram Bari v. National Bank of Pakistan (PLJ 2005 SC 435), arguing for retrospective regularization and seniority/emoluments accordingly.\nRespondent’s Arguments:\nOpposed retrospective application of regularization.\nStated that appointment orders were issued afresh, hence no backdated benefits or continuity of service could be claimed.\nIssues for Determination:\nWhether the petitioners were entitled to retrospective regularization from 10.11.2010.\nWhether the notification of 10.11.2010 grants any automatic or backdated regularization rights.\nCourts Findings:\nThe notification dated 10.11.2010 does not automatically or retrospectively confer regularization.\nIt merely provides a policy framework for considering eligible contract employees for regularization.\nThere is no vested right for contract employees to be regularized from their initial appointment date or from the date of policy issuance.\nThe case of Ikram Bari is distinguishable as it pertained to daily wagers, not contract employees under formal government policy.\nThe relevant precedent is Province of Punjab v. Dr. Javed Iqbal (2021 SCMR 767):\nThe Supreme Court held that regularization is prospective, not retrospective.\nContractual and regular employees operate under different legal regimes, and their service benefits and seniority must remain distinct.\nRetrospective regularization would unfairly displace existing regular employees.\nHeld:\nNo direction can be issued for retrospective regularization or for decision of the pending applications seeking such.\nThe petitioners’ regularization is valid only from the actual date of their appointment in 2022, not from 10.11.2010.\nBoth the present and connected petitions were dismissed as meritless.\nNo order as to costs.\nLegal Significance:\nAffirms prospective effect of regularization policies.\nDistinguishes contract employment from regular service for the purposes of seniority and benefits.\nReinforces that policy-based regularization does not rewrite employment history.\nEmphasizes the need to balance rights of contract employees with existing regular employees.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 52251 of 2022. Date of Hearing: 15.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Ch. Imran Arshad Naro, Advocate. Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Dhudhi, Advocate.\nPetitioner in connected W.P. No.3447 of 2023 by: Mr. Safdar Hussain Tarar, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Hafiz Muhammad Latif Khawaja, Additional Advocate General. along with Mr. Adnan Ali, Law Officer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TARIQ MEHMOOD AAMIR \nVS \nGOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26136", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1243 = 2025 SLD 1243", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTc", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nRespondent No. 2, Dr. Anwar Aman, filed a consumer complaint on 24.08.2024 under Section 25 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, alleging defective goods.\nPetitioner delivered the goods on 05.05.2024.\nPetitioner raised preliminary objection that the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 28(4) of the Act.\nPetitioner filed an application under Section 35 seeking summary dismissal as frivolous and time-barred.\nTrial Court rejected the application via impugned order dated 18.03.2025, prompting the petitioner to file the current constitutional petition.\nArguments:\nPetitioner’s Position:\nCited Pak Suzuki Motors Co. Ltd. v. Faisal Jameel Butt (PLD 2023 SC 482).\nAsserted that complaint was filed beyond the 30-day statutory limitation, and therefore should be summarily dismissed.\nAlso invoked Section 35 to argue that the claim was frivolous or vexatious.\nRespondent’s Position (implicitly adopted by Court):\nClaimed that negotiations were ongoing between the parties.\nFiled an application for condonation of delay, invoking the Court’s discretion under the provisos to Section 28(4).\nLegal Issues for Determination:\nWhether the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act.\nWhether the complaint could be summarily dismissed under Section 35 as frivolous or vexatious.\nWhether the Trial Court acted properly in not dismissing the complaint at a preliminary stage.\nFindings:\nLimitation under Section 28(4):\nPrimary limitation is 30 days from the accrual of cause of action.\nHowever, first proviso empowers Court to allow delayed filing if sufficient cause is shown.\nSecond proviso extends the outer limit to:\n60 days from warranty expiry, or\nOne year from delivery, if no warranty specified.\nThus, discretion is embedded in the statutory scheme.\nOngoing negotiations cited by respondent raise factual issues that require evidentiary determination.\nSummary Dismissal under Section 35:\nSection 35 only applies to frivolous or vexatious claims.\nFrivolous = lacking legal basis; vexatious = filed to harass.\nCourt held that limitation-barred claims are not necessarily frivolous.\nExistence of a real consumer-service provider relationship means the claim was not groundless.\nLimitation disputes are mixed questions of law and fact, not resolvable without trial.\nApplicability of Pak Suzuki Motors Case:\nCourt distinguished PLD 2023 SC 482, stating that it upheld the 30-day rule but did not bar condonation under the statutory provisos.\nHence, the Trial Court’s discretion was preserved.\nConclusion:\nPetition dismissed in limine.\nTrial Court rightly refused to summarily dismiss the complaint.\nCourt directed that, during final adjudication, the Trial Court must decide:\nWhether the explanation for delay is justified,\nWhether claim falls within permissible extension period, and\nWhether complaint is ultimately barred or maintainable.\nLegal Significance:\nReinforces that limitation under consumer law is flexible, subject to judicial discretion.\nDifferentiates between time-barred and frivolous claims.\nClarifies that Section 35 does not provide a tool for pre-trial disposal of all time-sensitive claims.\nEncourages evidence-based inquiry before rejecting complaints on limitation grounds.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005=25,28,28(4),35", - "Case #": "Case No. W.P. No. 28913 of 2025. Date of order: 14-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Hammad-ur-Rehman Mazari assisted by Mr. Saif Ahmed Qureshi and Mr. Mohammad Hassan Shaigan, Advocates for the petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYMPL Energy Pvt Ltd. \nVs \nPresiding Officer, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26137", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1244 = 2025 SLD 1244", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTY", - "Key Words:": "Refund claims rejected as time-barred under Section 170(2)(c)(i) (2-year limitation period).\nTax Years 2015 & 2016:\nRefunds denied based on Section 234A(4), alleging tax withheld under Section 235 (electricity bills) is non-refundable.\nKey Ruling:\nSection 234A(4) does NOT apply to refunds for tax deducted under Section 235 (electricity bills).\nSuch tax constitutes advance tax and is refundable/adjustable under Section 170.\nBinding under Article 189 of the Constitution of Pakistan.\n TRIBUNALS DECISION\nAllowed all appeals (consolidated order).\nDirections to Assessing Officer:\nRe-process refund claims afresh per the Supreme Courts ruling in Mashallah CNG.\nIssue refunds within 45 days if admissible.\nCritical Observations:\nLimitation (2009/2014): Technicalities cannot override substantive justice if tax retention is unjust.\nSection 235 Refunds (2015/2016): Rejection based on Section 234A(4) is legally untenable post-Mashallah CNG.\nDepartmental Concession: The Departmental Representative admitted refunds are now granted to similarly placed taxpayers.\n6. REFUND CLAIMS DETAILS\nTax Year\nRefund Claim (PKR)\n2009\n421,421\n2014\n713,344\n2015\n154,896\n2016\n24,512\nKey Takeaway:\nRefunds for tax deducted under Section 235 (electricity bills) are admissible as advance tax, and Section 234A(4) is inapplicable per the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Mashallah CNG. Time-barred claims (2009/2014) must also be re-examined to prevent injustice.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=170,170(1),170(2)(c)(i),170(4),234A(4),235", - "Case #": "ITA No. 584/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2009), ITA NO. 585/ID/2018 (Tax Year 2014), ITA NO. 586/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2015), ITA NO. 587/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2016). Date of Hearing & Order: 08-05-20205", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate \nRespondent By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S IQBAL SONS, OFFICE NO.1, 1ST FLOOR, SATELLITE PLAZA, 6TH ROAD, RAWALPINDI …… APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI ….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26138", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1245 = 2025 SLD 1245 = (2025) 132 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTU", - "Key Words:": "Petitioner was issued a show cause notice (06.06.2012).\nAdverse Order-in-Original (No. 29/2012) passed on 31.12.2012.\nAppeal to Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed on 21.02.2013.\nAppeal before ATIR accepted on 28.08.2013 — orders below set aside and FIR quashed.\nReference by Department (2014–2017):\nSales Tax Reference No. 15/2014 filed by FBR.\nHigh Court, in decision dated 11.05.2017, answered two legal questions in FBR’s favor but declined to address the third, as the Tribunal had not made findings on it.\nPetitioner’s Actions (2018):\nPetitioner withdrew CPLA No. 3717/2017.\nFiled Misc. Application (M.A. No. 254/LB/2018) seeking fixation/rectification of ATIR’s earlier order.\nATIR modified its own order on 12.10.2018, vacating both lower orders again in petitioner’s favor.\nDepartments Counter-Reference:\nSTR No. 39113/2019 challenged the Tribunal’s rectification jurisdiction.\nHigh Court allowed this reference on 17.12.2024, ruling Tribunal exceeded its authority.\nSupreme Court’s Reasoning\nNo Remand: The High Court’s 2017 order did not remand the case to the Tribunal for answering the third legal question. The case had attained finality.\nNo Pending Appeal: Once STA No. 401/LB/2013 was decided on 28.08.2013, no appeal was pending. Thus, no basis existed for “fixation.”\nRectification Power Misused:\nSection 57 of the Sales Tax Act allows rectification of a mistake apparent from the record , not substantive reconsideration.\nTribunal acted beyond its mandate by reviewing its previous decision on merits — this amounts to being an appellate forum of its own order, which is legally impermissible.\nThe SC cited Commissioner of Income Tax v. Abdul Ghani (2007 PTD 967) in support.\nConclusion\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Lahore High Courts interpretation of limited rectification jurisdiction under Section 57.\nTribunal’s attempt to revive a disposed appeal and decide new issues was beyond its legal powers.\nLegal Takeaways\nRectification powers must not be used to substantially revisit final orders.\nOnce an appeal is disposed of and not revived via remand, no “fixation” or reopening can be done through procedural pretexts.\nTribunals cannot act as appellate courts of their own final decisions.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=57", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 312 of 2025. Date of Hearing & Order: 22.05.2025\nAgainst the judgment dated 1 7.12.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in STR No. 39113/2019", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. CHIEF JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Muhammad Ali Raza, ASC.\nFor the Respondent: Mrs. Kausar Parveen, ASC.\nDr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S CHAUDHARY STEEL FURNACE. ... PETITIONER\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, SIALKOT ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, SIALKOT. ... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26139", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1246 = 2025 SLD 1246", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTQ", - "Key Words:": "ORDER:\nMUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE:-.-\nWith the assistance of learned counsel for the petitioner we have gone through the impugned order of the learned High Court and also seen the last order made by this Court. Since then, the decision of the Larger Bench of this Court has been announced, which upholds the principles laid down in the case of Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons and others 2017 SCMR 1427 (“Super Asia”). Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to place reliance on paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment. These dealt with s. 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (“1990 Act”), and considered the possibility of the grant of an extension of time in terms thereof. Section 74 was held to apply in terms as stated in para 12 of the judgment in Super Asia. Learned counsel submits that in this case an extension of time was granted by the Federal Board of Revenue (“Board”) and therefore the impugned decision is not sustainable. \n2. We have considered this point. Firstly, this matter has arisen under the Customs Act, 1969 and the relevant statutory power which is claimed was exercised by the Board was conferred by subsection (4) of s. 179 of the said Act, which is reproduced below:\n“The Board shall have the powers to regulate the system of adjudication including transfer of cases and extension of time-limit in exceptional circumstances.”\nAs is obvious from a perusal of the said provision the power to grant an extension is circumscribed, and is to be exercised only in “exceptional circumstances”. Section 74 of the 1990 Act on the other hand provides that the Board is empowered to grant an extension to the extent found “appropriate”. There is an obvious and clear difference between the two provisions and, as here relevant, the power under s. 179(4) is much narrower and circumscribed. Therefore, the paragraphs of Super Asia sought to be relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, with respect, have no relevance. Furthermore, we may also note that the Larger Bench has also made some observations with regard to s. 74 of the 1990 Act.\n3. Secondly, it must also be noted that on a query from the Court learned counsel for the petitioner has candidly (and quite properly) stated that the permission/letter of extension that was granted by the Board was not placed on the record before the Appellate Tribunal. Indeed, this was specifically noted by the learned Tribunal in its order as follows: “However, the plea taken by the respondents is that they have taken approval from FBR as mentioned in section 179(4) but no such approval was placed before the Honourable Tribunal”.\n4. This matter comes to this Court from a tax reference and it is well established that beyond the stage of the Appellate Tribunal (at any rate, in terms of the law as it stood at the relevant time), it is only questions of law that can be taken to the High Court. It is well settled that (again with reference to the law as it stood at the relevant time) the record on the basis of which the questions of law can be decided is in terms of the record as it stood before the Appellate Tribunal. That record cannot be added to and certainly not on a point that requires factual determination (here, the existence and content of any extension granted by the Board). Since the position is that the aforesaid letter by which it is claimed extension of time was granted by the Board was never placed on the record before the Appellate Tribunal, it is impermissible for any reliance to be placed on the same in this Court (or indeed, for that matter, before the learned High Court). The settled position being what it is we are, with respect, not inclined to entertain the point now being taken. Any departure from the well settled position would allow a party to a tax reference to alter the record either before the High Court or this Court which is not permissible. Accordingly, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, with respect, cannot be accepted. This petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A.466-K of 2025. Date of Hearing & Order: 29.05.2025\n(Against order dated 17.01.2025 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in S.C.R.A. No.1518/2023).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC (at Islamabad), Mr. Imran Afzal, Addl: Dir (via video link (Karachi).\nFor the Respondents: Not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE & INVESTIGATION (CUSTOMS) ...... PETITIONER\nVS\nALTAF HUSSAIN & ANOTHER …… RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26140", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1247 = 2025 SLD 1247", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTS8", - "Key Words:": "Meezan Bank Limited filed petitions challenging concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and Appellate Court under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (SRPO), on the ground of alleged rent default.\nThe Bank denied default and relied on a rent receipt dated 30.06.2020 covering January 2019 to June 2020, followed by cheques dated 26.11.2020 for subsequent rent. However, the court noted delay in rent payment post-June 2020 and held that the Bank failed to tender rent within the statutory limit.\nThe Bank invoked the proviso to Section 15(2)(ii) of SRPO, which allows dismissal of a rent application if the tenant admits liability on the first hearing and default does not exceed six months.\nThe court held that although the rent application was based solely on default, Meezan Bank did not admit liability on the first hearing, thus failing a key requirement under the proviso.\nThe court also considered whether acceptance of accumulated rent could waive default. Relying on precedents, it held that such acceptance does not nullify statutory default, and tenants must pay rent within time regardless of landlord’s conduct.\nHeld:\nPetitions were dismissed. The concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and Appellate Court were upheld.\nThe High Court reaffirmed the limited scope of judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution, emphasizing that it cannot reappraise facts or disturb well-reasoned concurrent findings unless theres a jurisdictional error or misreading of evidence.\nThe tenant (Meezan Bank) failed to qualify for relief under the proviso to Section 15(2)(ii) due to non-admission of liability and repeated defaults.\nCitations:\nAllies Book Corporation v. Sultan Ahmad, 2006 SCMR 152\nShajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique, PLD 2007 SC 45\nAamir Aslam Shaikh v. IVth Rent Controller Karachi, C.P. No.S-518 of 2013\nHaji Abdul Ghani v. VIIth ADJ Karachi, 2008 CLC 1598\nShakila Appa v. Nadeem Ghani, 2022 CLC 1146\nMrs. Alima Ahmad v. Amir Ali, PLD 1984 SC 32\nSyed Waris Ali Tirmizi v. Liaquat Begum, 1980 SCMR 601\nPragma Leather Industries v. Sadia Sajjad, PLD 1996 SC 724", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=15(2)(ii),16(1)", - "Case #": "C.P. No. S-194 to S-196 of 2025. Date of Hearing & Order: 30.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAFFER RAZA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner through: Mr. Ali T. Ebrahim, Advocate. \nRespondent through: Mr. Shan ur Rehman, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "C.P. No. S-194 of 2025\nMeezan Bank Limited …… Petitioner\nVs\nEduljee Dinshaw Pvt. Ltd. & others …… Respondent\nC.P. No.S-195 of 2025\nMeezan Bank Limited …… Petitioner\nVs\nEduljee Dinshaw Pvt. Ltd. & others …… Respondent\nC.P. No. S-196 of 2025\nMeezan Bank Limited …….. Petitioner\nVs\nEduljee Dinshaw Pvt. Ltd. & others …….. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26141", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1248 = 2025 SLD 1248", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTSs", - "Key Words:": "Banking – Enforcement of Guarantee – Limitation – Leave to Defend\nDetails:\nParties: MCB Bank Ltd. (Appellant) vs. Uzma Tehreem & Others (Respondents)\nBackground:\nRespondent No.4 (Tanveer Weavings Pvt. Ltd.) through its Directors (Respondents Nos.1-3) availed various short-term finance facilities from PICIC Commercial Bank, later amalgamated into NIB Bank, and then MCB Bank.\nA series of finance agreements were executed between 2004–2009, ultimately culminating in a Restructuring Agreement dated 15th June 2009 converting the RF facility into a term loan of Rs. 70 million.\nDespite repeated defaults and partial payments, NIB Bank (now MCB) filed a recovery suit in 2013 for Rs. 108.5 million.\nLHC decreed the suit against all respondents in 2017. In appeal (RFA No.116017/2017), the Division Bench upheld the decree for respondents 2–4 but granted leave to defend to respondent No.1 (Uzma Tehreem), holding that she raised substantial questions and didn’t provide a fresh guarantee under the 2009 agreement.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court allowed the appeal by MCB Bank and set aside the LHC Division Bench’s judgment granting leave to defend to respondent No.1.\nThe Court found:\nThe appeal filed by respondent No.1 was time-barred by 173 days without any application for condonation of delay.\nRespondent No.1 had executed a continuing Guarantee in 2007 and also signed the 2009 Restructuring Agreement, affirming that all guarantees shall remain binding.\nThe Guarantee terms explicitly waived her right to dispute liability, and Section 133 of the Contract Act 1872 (regarding variance without suretys consent) was not applicable as she had consented to the restructuring.\nAs such, no substantial question of law or fact existed to warrant recording of evidence or granting leave to defend.\nCitations:\nSiddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan, PLD 1984 SC 289\nAsad Ali v. Bank of Punjab, PLD 2020 SC 736\nController Land Acquisition v. Fazal-ur-Rehman, 2009 SCMR 767\nLDA v. Muhammad Rashid, 1997 SCMR 1224\nAftab A. Sheikh v. Trust Leasing Corp. Ltd., 2003 CLD 702\nIndustrial Development Bank v. Hyderabad Beverage Co., 2016 CLD 560\nSection 133, Contract Act 1872", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=3,9Contract, Act, 1872=133", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.164 of 2025. Date of Hearing & Order: 23.04.2025\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 13.01.2025 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in RFA No.116017 of 2017)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE NAEEM AKHTER AFGHAN, JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND JUSTICE SHAKEEL AHMAD", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Salman Aslam Butt, Sr. ASC Syed and Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR\nFor the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4: Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, ASC\nFor the Respondent Nos. 5 & 6: Nemo", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB BANK LIMITED .... APPELLANT\nVS\nUZMA TEHREEM & OTHERS …. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26142", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1249 = 2025 SLD 1249", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTk", - "Key Words:": "Issue: Whether the petitioner was entitled to proforma promotion to BS-22, after retirement, due to administrative delay in consideration by the High-Powered Selection Board (HPSB).\nFactual Background\nThe petitioner was due for promotion to BS-22 in April 2012 but was not considered due to paucity of time. \nHe retired in June 2012 and sought proforma promotion, which was directed by the FST in 2013.\nDespite FSTs judgment attaining finality (i.e., no appeal was filed), the Establishment Division failed to implement it.\nHis Miscellaneous Petition for enforcement was dismissed by FST, claiming implementation had occurred — without verifying actual compliance.\nSupreme Court’s Reasoning\nPromotion after Retirement is Lawful\nBased on precedent (e.g., 2010 SCMR 1310, Hameed Akhtar Niazi case), retirement does not preclude an officer from being considered for proforma promotion, especially when the delay was not the officers fault.\nEqual Treatment Under Article 25\nOther similarly placed officers were granted proforma promotions. Denying the same to the petitioner constituted discrimination.\nFST Failed to Enforce Its Own Judgment\nThe Court criticized the FST for abdicating its jurisdiction, reminding it of its duty under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to enforce its decisions.\nThe FST should have examined whether the judgment was implemented in accordance with its spirit, rather than mechanically disposing of the MP.\nImportance of Finality and Implementation\nThe SC stressed that judgments must be given effect; otherwise, justice is undermined.\nReferred to Ravinder Kaur v. Ashok Kumar (AIR 2004 SC 904): Courts must prevent obstruction of decrees by administrative delay or neglect.\nFinal Order\nCivil Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed.\nImpugned FST order was set aside.\nCase remanded to HPSB to reconsider the petitioner’s proforma promotion to BS-22 within 2 months, specifically in light of paragraphs 8–12 of the original FST judgment dated 11.07.2013.\nLegal Takeaways\nProforma promotions must be considered if an officer was eligible but not considered due to administrative fault.\nFST has both adjudicatory and enforcement powers and must ensure meaningful implementation.\nOnce a judgment attains finality, departments must comply, or risk being penalized for contempt or delay.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Servants Act, 1973=9(1)", - "Case #": "CPLA No. 44 of 2022. Date of Hearing & Order: 14.01.2025\n(On appeal against order dated 17.11.2021 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Misc. Petition No.241/2019 in Appeal No.3124(R)CS/2012)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND JUSTICE SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Habib Ahmed Bhatti, ASC\nFor Respondents: Mr. Ashiq Mahmood, ASC\nOn Court Notice: Rana Asadullah Khan, Additional Advocate General for Pakistan Along with Sajid-ul-Hassan, S.O., Establishment.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AHMED OWAIS PEERZADA, CHIEF COMMISSIONER (RTD) FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION, ISLAMABAD ...PETITIONER\nVS\nPRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER’S SECRETARIAT, ISLAMABAD & OTHERS …….. RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26143", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1250 = 2025 SLD 1250", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTTg", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdictional Ambiguity Between CNSA & Drugs Act\nPregabalin and Tramadol are not listed in CNSA schedules; they are lawfully manufactured drugs under the Drugs Act, 1976.\nRivotril (Clonazepam) is listed, but in pure chemical form; the tablet formulation alters its legal classification, requiring further inquiry.\n2. Chemical Report: Procedurally and Substantively Defective\nDelayed report (issued after 33 days, violating Rule 5 of CNSA Chemical Analysis Rules, 2001).\nNo mention of protocols, testing methods, or molecular composition.\nLacks conclusive proof that the substances fall within CNSAs scope.\nCited Imam Bakhsh (2018 SCMR 2039) and Khair-ul-Bashar (2019 SCMR 930) to emphasize the mandatory nature of protocols.\n3. No Direct Nexus to Applicants\nTheir names do not appear on any documents (bill of lading, invoice, customs paperwork).\nAlleged presence at the port is unverified, and no CDRs, surveillance footage, or tracker data presented.\nAllegation that they were brought forcibly from a restaurant by ANF was unrebutted.\n4. CNSA Saving Clauses (Sections 72–74) Apply\nCNSA does not override Drugs Act where registered pharmaceutical products are involved.\nMisapplication of CNSA’s harsh provisions would violate Article 4 of the Constitution ( no punishment without law ).\nCourt’s Conclusion\nCase falls under “further inquiry” as per Section 497(2) Cr.P.C..\nBail granted to all three applicants upon furnishing Rs. 100,000 surety each and personal bonds.\nCourt clarified these are tentative observations, not to influence the trial.\nPrecedents Relied Upon\nMairajuddin & Others (Crl. Bail Appl. 1989/2021)\nMuhammad Zafar Iqbal v. State (FIR 25/2024)\nKhair-ul-Bashar v. State (2019 SCMR 930)\nImam Bakhsh v. State (2018 SCMR 2039)\nQaiser Javed Khan v. State (PLD 2020 SC 57)\nLegal Takeaways\nLawfully registered drugs cannot be prosecuted under CNSA unless properly classified and tested.\nDeficiencies in chemical reports can fatally weaken the prosecution at the bail stage.\nCourts must protect liberty when classification is legally ambiguous.\nCNSA’s technical rules and time limits are enforceable safeguards.\nLet me know if youd like this summarized in Urdu, or converted into a legal brief or case comment.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997=9(2)(9),14,15", - "Case #": "Criminal Bail Application No.1141 of 2025. Date of hearing: 21-05-2025. Date of order: 27-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: KHALID HUSSAIN SHAHANI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicants : i. Qurban Ali son of M. Chand Badshah, ii. Rizwan son of Muhammad Chand Badshah Through Mr. Shoukat Hayat, Advocate \nCriminal Bail Application No.1211 of 2025\nApplicant : Nisar Ahmed son of Muhammad Younus Through Mr. Raja Babar Hamid, advocate. \nRespondent : The State through Mr. Sarfaraz Ahmed Mangi, Special Prosecutor ANF." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26144", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1169 = 2025 SLD 1169 = 2025 PTD 465", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTXo", - "Key Words:": "Mis-declaration of Customs Value and Composition – Request for Re-export of Frustrated Cargo\nDetails:\nThe case involves Customs Appeal No. 1673/2023, filed by M/s. NorTex Corporation against Order-in-Original No. 829962/2023 dated 08.09.2023, passed by the Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication-I), Karachi.\nThe appellant filed a Goods Declaration (GD No. KAPW-HC-13153-25-07-2023) through their clearing agent for import of “Abrasive Filaments made of Ceramic Grit,” declaring the invoice value as EUR 1,368.59 for 824.5 kg of goods under PCT 6805.3000.\nHowever, physical examination under Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1969 revealed a significantly higher invoice inside the container—EUR 19,965.07, 1359% more than declared, with weight discrepancies (declared: 825 kg; actual: 862 kg). The laboratory analysis also revealed that the filaments were coated with silica grit, not ceramic, contradicting the declaration.\nThe Adjudicating Officer held that this was a deliberate mis-declaration, amounting to a fraudulent attempt to evade Rs. 3,741,387 in duties and taxes. The defense of the importer that the invoice was mistakenly placed in the container and belonged to M/s. Nortal Corporation was considered an afterthought. Re-export under Section 138 of the Customs Act was denied on grounds of mala fide conduct.\nCustoms imposed:\nConfiscation of the goods under Section 156(1), Clauses 14 and 144.\nRedemption fine of Rs. 2,281,952/- (35% of goods value).\nPersonal penalty of Rs. 300,000/- on the importer.\nPenalty of Rs. 100,000/- on the clearing agent for connivance.\nThe importer appealed, arguing:\nMistaken shipment and invoice mix-up.\nGoods belonged to another party (M/s. Nortal Corporation).\nFirst-time importer with limited import history.\nRequest for re-export of frustrated cargo under IPO 2022, clause 20(d) and SRO 450(I)/2001.\nThe Department rebutted:\nEvidence of fake invoice, switch invoicing, and attempted fraud.\nAll specifications except the name matched the actual goods.\nInvoked Section 32 and Section 25A(2) of the Customs Act, and cited Junaid Traders v. Additional Collector of Customs (2012 SCMR 1876).\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal upheld the Order-in-Original. It found that:\nThe declaration was incorrect regarding both value and composition.\nThe importer failed to produce compelling evidence to refute the department’s case.\nAttempted re-export was an attempt to avoid penalties after detection of fraud.\nThe request for relief under Section 138 or IPO provisions was rejected due to established mala fide intent.\nCitations:\nJunaid Traders v. Additional Collector of Customs, Appraisement (2012 SCMR 1876)\nUniversal Enterprises v. Customs Appellate Tribunal (2022 PTD 94)", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,79(1),80,138,156(1)(14),156(1)(144),209(3)Sales Tax Act, 1990=6Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-1673 of 2023, decided on 10th January, 2024. Date of hearing: 20th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHAKIL AHMED ABBASI, MEMBER JUDICIAL-III", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sallah Uddin Junejo for Appellant.\nZulfiqar Ali Shah, A.O. for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S NORTEX CORPORATION\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOM (ADJUDICATION-I) CUSTOMS HOUSE, KARACHI AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26145", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1170 = 2025 SLD 1170 = 2025 PTD 473", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTTXk", - "Key Words:": "Legality of Provisional Assessment Order without issuance of mandatory notice under Section 114(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, Azad Jammu and Kashmir Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (AJK TEVTA), filed a writ petition under Article 44 of the AJK Interim Constitution, 1974, challenging a Provisional Assessment Order for Tax Year 2010 dated 27.06.2015 issued by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue Circle-10, Muzaffarabad, and the Order dated 09.03.2016 passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, AJK.\nThe petitioner contended that:\nIt is a statutory body established under Act III of 2007 and not engaged in any commercial activity.\nIt does not fall within the definition of a company under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe Provisional Assessment Order was passed without issuance of a mandatory notice under Section 114(4) of the Ordinance.\nThe scope of Section 127 of the Ordinance bars appeals against orders passed under Section 122(C), making writ jurisdiction the only remedy.\nThe respondents argued that:\nThe petitioner had alternate remedies under tax laws.\nVarious notices were issued to AJK TEVTA but no return was filed.\nA revision under Section 122-A was filed but was not maintainable against a provisional order.\nPreviously, the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court, but the Supreme Court of AJK remanded the case for decision on merits.\nHeld:\nNo notice under Section 114(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was served to AJK TEVTA.\nIn absence of such notice, the Provisional Assessment Order under Section 122(C) was without lawful authority.\nAt the time of filing the petition (22.04.2016), Section 127 explicitly excluded orders under Section 122(C) from appellate jurisdiction, validating the invocation of writ jurisdiction.\nThe respondents failed to follow statutory procedure before initiating assessment proceedings.\nThe High Court declared the entire proceedings illegal, and set aside both the Provisional Assessment Order dated 27.06.2015 and the Order dated 09.03.2016 by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, AJK.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114(4),122(C),127", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1391 of 2016, decided on 27th September, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SADAQAT HUSSAIN RAJA, CJ AND KHALID RASHEED CHAUDHARY, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Mohammad Hanif Khan for Petitioner.\nSardar M. R. Khan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AUTHORITY (TEVTA) THROUGH CHAIRMAN\nVERSUS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR CAMP OFFICE MIRPUR AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26146", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1171 = 2025 SLD 1171 = 2025 PTD 495", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTc", - "Key Words:": "FTO Jurisdiction and Tax Rebate for Full-Time Teachers under Clause (2), Part III, Second Schedule of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) filed a writ petition challenging the President’s Secretariat’s order dated 16.08.2024, which had upheld the Federal Tax Ombudsman’s (FTO) recommendation dated 10.05.2024. The FTO found maladministration on the part of the FBR for denying a 25% income tax rebate to school heads (headmasters, principals, etc.) under Clause (2) of Part III of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The FBR argued that the rebate applied only to individuals employed purely as full-time teachers or researchers, excluding those with administrative roles.\nFBR relied on Section 9(2)(b) of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, to claim that the FTO lacked jurisdiction since the matter involved tax assessment and interpretation of tax law. The Court rejected this argument, holding that Section 9(2)(b) requires the presence of an appealable, reviewable, or revisable order, which was absent in this case.\nThe Court also rejected FBR’s reliance on Circular No. 6 of 2013 (interpreting full-time teacher narrowly) as inconsistent with the plain statutory language. It emphasized that the complainants were designated in the teaching cadre, and performed teaching duties in addition to administrative functions.\nHeld:\nThe writ petition was dismissed in limine. The Lahore High Court upheld the findings of both the FTO and the Presidents Secretariat, ruling:\nFTO had jurisdiction as no appealable/reviewable/revisable order was involved.\nThe interpretation of “full-time teacher” must align with statutory text, not administrative circulars.\nThe denial of rebate constituted maladministration under Section 2(3) of the FTO Ordinance.\nThe rebate could not be denied merely because the teachers also performed administrative duties.\nCitations:\nCircular No. 6 of 2013, FBR\nFacebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021) — re: Series-Qualifier Canon\nPakistan through Secretary Finance vs Messrs Lucky Cement, 2007 SCMR 1367 — re: Avoiding absurd interpretation\nOxford University Press vs Commissioner of Income Tax, 2019 SCMR 235 — re: exemption interpretation\nMessrs Gas Master CNG Station vs Federation of Pakistan, 2019 PTD 2025 — distinguished\nShakeel Ahmed Kasana vs FTO, 2024 PTD 1 — distinguished", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3),9(2)(b)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=Clause (2), Part III, Second Schedule", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 242/2025. Date order: 22.01.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Ahsan Ahmad Khokhar, advocate for the petitioners", - "Petitioner Name:": "FBR THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN AND OTHERS \nVS\nPRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26147", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1172 = 2025 SLD 1172 = 2025 PTD 540", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTY", - "Key Words:": "Cross-Appeals — Sales Tax Audit, Alleged Suppression of Sales and Production, Inadmissible Input Tax, and Refund Adjustment\nDetails:\nThese are cross-appeals filed by both the Registered Person (taxpayer) and the Department (FBR) against Order-in-Appeal No. 287 of 2018 dated 31.05.2018, passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), Peshawar. The tax periods under consideration are July 2013 to June 2016.\nThe audit identified multiple discrepancies, including:\nUndeclared sales through advances from customers (Rs. 501.9 million; Sales Tax: Rs. 94.7 million).\nSuppression of sales based on variance between returns and finished goods data (Rs. 5 million; Sales Tax: Rs. 951,317).\nSuppressed production of 99,008 kg (Rs. 18.2 million; Sales Tax: Rs. 3.46 million).\nConcealment of imported raw material (Rs. 10.1 million; Sales Tax: Rs. 1.92 million).\nUnexplained receipts in bank (Rs. 538.5 million; Sales Tax: Rs. 100.5 million).\nInadmissible input tax adjustment on utility bills of labor colonies/offices (Rs. 4.25 million, including Rs. 905,982 under SRO 490(I)/2004).\nAn assessment order was passed creating a sales tax demand of Rs. 202.4 million, plus default surcharge under section 34, and a penalty of Rs. 10.1 million under section 33(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nUpon appeal, the CIR (Appeals) vacated most of the demand (Rs. 198.6 million), confirming only Rs. 3.82 million along with applicable surcharge and penalty. Both parties then appealed further.\nHeld:\nDepartment’s Appeal Dismissed:\nThe ATIR found no legal or factual infirmity in the CIR(A)s order and upheld it. The department failed to rebut the CIR(A)’s findings or submit convincing evidence.\nTaxpayer’s Appeal Allowed:\nThe Tribunal accepted the registered person’s contentions regarding:\nAlleged suppression of production: Proper supporting documentation was submitted (invoices, payments under section 73, bank statements, tax challans).\nInput tax on electricity consumed in labour colonies: The AR cited judgments of:\nThe Collector of Sales Tax v. Maitari Sugar Mills (SSTA No. 148 of 2005, SHC, 28.01.2021)\nCollector Sales Tax v. Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., 2020 PTD 776 (IHC)\nBoth allowed such input tax.\nThe ATIR directed the revenue to either refund Rs. 5,773,805 (recovered during appeal pendency via challan dated 18.06.2020) or adjust it against future tax liability under section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nCase Law:\nThe Collector of Sales Tax v. Maitari Sugar Mills, SSTA 148/2005 (SHC)\nCollector ST v. Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., 2020 PTD 776 (IHC)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8(1)(a),33(5),34,66,73", - "Case #": "S.T.As. Nos. 123/PB and 124/PB of 2018, decided on 10th July, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S); M.M AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ishfaq Ahmad, DR for Appellant (in S.T.A. No.123/PB of 2018).\nDanish Ali Qazi for Respondent (in S.T.A. No.123/PB of 2018).\nDanish Ali Qazi for Appellant (in S.T.A. No.124/PB of 2018).\nIshfaq Ahmad, DR for Respondent (in S.T.A. No.124/PB of 2018).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CORPORATE ZONE, RTO, PESHAWAR\nvs\nM/s G.A. POLYMER (PVT.) LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26148", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1173 = 2025 SLD 1173 = 2025 PTD 552", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTU", - "Key Words:": "Input Tax Adjustment Beyond 90% — Procedural Lapse Under Section 8B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThis Sales Tax Reference Application was filed by the department under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, challenging the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), Lahore dated 18.04.2017. The main legal question involved was:\n“Whether, on facts and circumstances of the case, the ATIR failed to appreciate the mandatory provisions of Section 8B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and merely vacated the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) by treating the deviation as a procedural defect?”\nThe case involved the adjustment of 100% input tax by the respondent-taxpayer, instead of the statutory limit of 90% under Section 8B(1). The departments position was that this violation justified not only reversal of the adjustment but also recovery of tax along with penalty and default surcharge. However, it was undisputed that the taxpayer had deposited the full tax liability and that no fraudulent intent or ineligibility was alleged regarding the excess 10% input adjustment.\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court dismissed the departments reference and upheld the ATIRs order, clarifying as follows:\nSection 8B(1), while couched in mandatory language, is procedural in nature.\nThe taxpayers adjustment of 100% input tax instead of 90% is a technical lapse that does not invalidate the substantive right to input tax credit, which can be claimed through Section 66 (refund provision).\nThis view was supported by binding precedent in the case of Commissioner IR v. M/s Malik Enterprises (2021 PTD 945).\nSince there was no allegation of fraud or ineligibility of input tax, recovery of the excess amount was not justified.\nThe only consequence for the procedural lapse is liability to penalty and default surcharge, which was accepted by the taxpayer.\nAccordingly, the High Court answered the proposed question in the negative — against the department and in favour of the taxpayer, with the modification that the penalty and default surcharge as per original adjudication order shall be payable.\nCase Law:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s Malik Enterprises, 2021 PTD 945 (LHC)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8,8B,8B(1),47,47(5),66", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 68393 of 2017, decided on 21st June, 2018", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND SHAHID JAMIL KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Pirzada Aurang Zaib for Applicant\nShahbaz Butt for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE\nVS\nM/S ARCO PLASTICS (PVT.) LIMITED LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26149", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1174 = 2025 SLD 1174 = 2025 PTD 556", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTQ", - "Key Words:": "Use of Income Tax Returns for Assessment of Sales Tax Liability — Scope of Charging Section\nDetails:\nThis Sales Tax Reference was filed under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by the petitioner, challenging the order dated 17.06.2022 passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), Special Division Bench, Peshawar, which had upheld an assessment of sales tax liability based on discrepancies between the petitioner’s income tax returns and sales tax returns for the tax year 2018.\nThe assessing officer had noted a significant discrepancy between the turnover declared under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and the sales shown in the sales tax returns. Based on this, a Show Cause Notice was issued, ultimately resulting in an assessment order under Section 11(2) of the Act for sales tax and further tax totaling approximately Rs. 8.9 million, plus default surcharge under Section 34(1).\nThe petitioner argued:\nHe filed income tax returns under the Voluntary Tax Compliance Scheme (VTCS) as per Circular No.03 of 2016.\nHe was not required to register under sales tax laws, having discharged his liability under the Sales Tax Special Procedure, 2007 based on electricity consumption.\nThe assessing officer’s reliance on income tax returns was misplaced and not supported under the Sales Tax Act.\nThe first appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the second appeal before the Tribunal were both dismissed.\nHeld:\nThe Peshawar High Court accepted the reference and held:\nSales tax is an indirect tax, levied only upon the occurrence of taxable supplies and in furtherance of a taxable activity, as defined in Section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nTurnover declared under income tax laws cannot automatically be treated as evidence of taxable supplies under the Sales Tax Act unless accompanied by proof of taxable activity.\nThe assessing officer had not conducted any audit under Sections 22 and 25 of the Act nor established a nexus between the declared income and taxable supplies.\nReliance on income tax records alone for determining sales tax liability is impermissible, as these documents are governed by a different statutory regime and are not recognized as sales tax records under Section 22.\nCiting judgments such as Haii Sultan Ahmed v. CBR (2008 PTD 103) and Al-Hilal Motors (PTCL 2004 CL), the Court reiterated that both elements — taxable supply and taxable activity — must coexist to trigger liability.\nThe entire assessment was based on an “alien consideration” — i.e., income tax turnover — thus the order was declared void.\nConclusion: The reference was answered in the positive in favor of the petitioner. The orders of the authorities below were set aside, and a copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Tribunal in terms of Section 47(5) of the Act.\nCase Law:\nHaii Sultan Ahmed v. CBR, 2008 PTD 103\nMessrs Al-Hilal Motors Stores v. Collector Sales Tax, PTCL 2004 CL\nMuhammad Siddique v. Deputy Collector Excise and Taxation, PTCL 1991 CL 108", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,11(2),22,25,34(1),47", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 93-P/2022. Date of order: 04.10.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE ABDUL SHAKOOR AND MR. JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner (by): Mr. Ishtiaq Ahmad (Senior). Advocate\nRespondent (by): Ms. Nazish Muzaffar. Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RED CO ENTERPRISES \nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER IR & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26150", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1175 = 2025 SLD 1175 = 2025 PTD 566", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSS8", - "Key Words:": "Legality of Additions under Section 122(5A) without Proper Inquiry or Evidence\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, an individual, filed an income tax return declaring income from property (Rs. 264,000), prize bonds (Rs. 2,918,000), and amnesty (Rs. 200 million). The return was deemed assessed under Section 120(1). The Additional Commissioner invoked Section 122(5A) on grounds that sources of investment in property and prize bonds lacked documentary evidence. Due to the taxpayer’s non-compliance, additions were made under Section 111.\nOn appeal, the taxpayer argued that the Additional Commissioner lacked authority post-Finance Act 2021 to conduct inquiries and should have relied on selection under Section 177. The taxpayer also produced evidence of prize bond winnings (supported by cheques and tax challans) and valid Amnesty Declarations for 2018 and 2019. The Department argued that the taxpayers non-participation warranted the additions and defended the Additional Commissioner’s action.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Tribunal found that the Additional Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction under Section 122(5A) by initiating inquiries and demanding documentation without legal authority. Furthermore, the Tribunal highlighted inconsistent treatment by the Department—accepting a Rs. 6.3 million amnesty under 2019 but rejecting Rs. 200 million declared in 2018, both recorded in the wealth statement for Tax Year 2018. The order under Section 122(5A) was held to be illegal, non-application of mind, and contrary to facts. The appeal was allowed and the order vacated.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,120(1),122(5A),177", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 3276/LB/2019, decided on 28th August, 2024. Date of hearing: 21st August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD TAHIR AND TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMED, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmed Nauman, ITP for Appellant.\nUmair Khan, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s KHADIJA WASEEM BUTT, LAHORE\nvs\nThe COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE RTO,LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26151", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1176 = 2025 SLD 1176 = 2025 PTD 569", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSSs", - "Key Words:": "Taxability of Gain on Sale of Inherited Property & Tribunals Failure to Provide Reasoned Order\nDetails:\nThis reference application, arising from the order dated 24.07.2012 of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), Lahore, was initially dismissed but later restored upon application supported by an affidavit of counsel. The primary legal issue raised was whether the ATIR erred in holding that the sale of inherited properties was not in the nature of trade, particularly in light of Sections 75, 76, and 77 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which deal with taxation of capital gains from properties received without cost, including via inheritance.\nThe case related to Tax Year 2005. Despite service of notice and submission of power of attorney, no one appeared for the taxpayer. The court declined further adjournments due to prolonged pendency since 2012.\nThe department argued that the Tribunal failed to properly apply the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance and passed a non-speaking order, merely referring to an earlier decision in ITA No. 374/LB/2012 without offering specific reasons or analysis to justify that the facts were indeed similar. The phrase “two members of AOP” used in the Tribunals order was ambiguous and unexplained.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that the Tribunal’s decision lacked proper reasoning, failed to consider relevant provisions of the law, and did not adequately address the factual and legal context of the taxpayers sale of inherited properties. The order was therefore set aside and the matter remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision, with directions for proper adjudication and application of the Income Tax Ordinance.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=75,76,77,130", - "Case #": "P.T.R. No. 520 of 2012, decided on 19th December, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE AND SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mugtedir Akhtar Shabir and Mirza Shahryar Beg for Applicant-department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nvs\nMUHAMMAD ZUBAIR ALAMGIR and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26152", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1177 = 2025 SLD 1177 = 2025 PTD 571", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTk", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Customs Authorities for Recovery of Taxes Post-Clearance of Goods (Pre-2014 Amendment)\nDetails:\nThis Special Customs Reference Application challenged the judgment of the Customs Appellate Tribunal in Customs Appeal Nos. K-1113 of 2014 and K-661 of 2015, arising from a show-cause notice dated 21.02.2014 and Order-in-Original No. 50 of 2014-2015.\nThe dispute concerned the recovery of short-levied income tax on imported raw materials, where the customs authorities claimed authority to recover under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969. The respondent/importer challenged the jurisdiction of customs authorities on the ground that the alleged contravention occurred prior to the 2014 amendment to Section 32 of the Act.\nThe High Court examined whether customs authorities had jurisdiction, post-clearance, to recover short-levied income tax, excise duty, and sales tax under the Customs Act before the amendment. The Court noted that prior to the 2014 amendment, Customs acted merely as a collecting agent at the time of import, and once the goods were cleared, further recovery of uncollected taxes fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of relevant tax departments (i.e., Inland Revenue under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and Sales Tax Act, 1990).\nThe show-cause notice dated 21.02.2014, issued based on a contravention report of 10.12.2012, was held to be beyond the jurisdiction of the customs authorities under the pre-amendment regime. As such, the core question regarding the powers of customs under Section 32 and Section 202 was answered in the negative, i.e., against the applicant and in favor of the respondent.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the Special Customs Reference Application, holding that prior to the 2014 amendment, customs authorities lacked jurisdiction to independently recover short-levied income tax after clearance of goods. The responsibility lay with respective revenue departments.\nOutcome: Reference dismissed; order to be sent to Appellate Tribunal under Section 196(5), Customs Act, 1969", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.1236 of 2015 and C.M.A. No.3314 of 2015, decided on 10 September, 2021. Date of hearing: 07.09.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE AND AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Kashif Nazeer for applicant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nM/S SINGER PAKISTAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26153", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1178 = 2025 SLD 1178 = 2025 PTD 574 = (2025) 131 TAX 386 = 2025 SCMR 671", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSTg", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Proceedings Under Section 161/205 of Income Tax Ordinance — Burden of Proof and Adequacy of Notice\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, an Association of Persons (AOP) engaged in manufacturing and selling plastic footwear, challenged a Lahore High Court judgment through this appeal to the Supreme Court. The case stemmed from a demand created under Section 161 read with Section 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for the Tax Year 2012.\nThe taxpayer had declared total purchases of over Rs. 491 million, thus qualifying as a prescribed person under Section 153(7), obligated to deduct withholding tax. The Taxation Officer initiated proceedings upon detecting discrepancies in the taxpayers withholding obligations and issued a detailed notice under Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2022. Despite the taxpayer’s response, a demand order was issued on 31.05.2013.\nThe Commissioner (Appeals) partially confirmed and partially deleted the charges in order dated 18.06.2013, leading to cross-appeals before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR). The Tribunal annulled the entire demand on the ground that the Revenue had not identified specific payees, thereby rendering recovery under Section 161(2) impractical.\nThe Revenue challenged the Tribunal’s order through a reference to the Lahore High Court, which reversed the Tribunal’s decision, relying on the precedent in Bilz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. DCIT (2002 PTD 1) and held that once a payment subject to withholding is established, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to show that no default occurred — whether by exemption, lawful non-deduction, or otherwise.\nOn appeal, the Supreme Court held that both the Tribunal and the High Court missed the correct interpretation. Referring to its judgment in MCB Bank Ltd. (2021 SCMR 1325), the Court emphasized that the power to initiate proceedings under Section 161 is not unfettered, and the Revenue must possess objective reasons or information justifying the belief of a withholding default.\nUpon examining the notice issued to the taxpayer, the Court found it to be sufficiently detailed and specific — including names of payees, discrepancies in declared vs. verified purchases, and applicable heads of withholding. Therefore, the notice met the threshold of objectiveness required under the MCB precedent.\nHeld:\nThe appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Section 161 proceedings, confirming that the Revenue had valid and objective grounds for initiating recovery, and the burden had lawfully shifted to the taxpayer. The demand created by the Taxation Officer was held to be valid and in accordance with law.\nCitations:\nMCB Bank Ltd. Case: Commissioner Inland Revenue v. MCB Bank Ltd., 2021 SCMR 1325\nBilz Case: Messrs Bilz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. DCIT, 2002 PTD 1 = PLD 2002 SC 353\nOrder Dates: 31.05.2013 (original), 18.06.2013 (CIR Appeals), 13.02.2014 (Tribunal)\nOutcome: Appeal dismissed; Revenue demand upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,149,150,152,153,153(7),155,156,160,161,161(2),205Income Tax Rules, 2002=43,44(4)", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 16 of 2022, decided on 14th January, 2025. Date of hearing: 14th January, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 26.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in ITR No. 13 of 2015).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE, ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE AND SHAHID WAHEED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Mumtaz ul Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (via video link from Branch Registry Lahore).\nAhmad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from. Branch Registry Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S CHAWALA FOOTWEAR, LAHORE \nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26154", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1179 = 2025 SLD 1179 = 2025 PTD 582 = 2025 PTCL 434 = (2025) 131 TAX 377 = 2025 SCMR 716 = 2025 PLJ 264", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSXo", - "Key Words:": "Definite Information – Reassessment under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe case involved a reassessment initiated by the tax authorities under sections 122(1), 122(5), and 122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 against a taxpayer for the tax year 2006. The original assessment had been finalized under section 120. The basis for reassessment was solely a bank statement, presumed to reveal undeclared income.\nThe taxpayers explanation regarding the bank transactions was partially accepted by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), and upon further challenge by both parties, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the taxpayer, finding the reassessment unjustified. The department challenged the Tribunal’s decision through a reference before the Islamabad High Court, which also ruled in the taxpayer’s favour. The department then sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court and Tribunals decision. The Court held that not every piece of financial information amounts to “definite information” required under section 122(5) for reassessment. Specifically:\nA bank statement alone, without more, does not constitute definite information of undisclosed income.\n“Definite information” must be clear, specific, and capable of leading to a conclusion regarding escapement of income without requiring further subjective interpretation or scrutiny.\nIn contrast to M/s Khan CNG Filling Station where the volume of natural gas (a quantifiable and definitive metric) was used, bank transactions are ambiguous and not inherently reflective of taxable income.\nThe Court emphasized the role of context, comparing the present case to Bashir Ahmed, where high-value asset purchases did not constitute definite information absent a link to income.\nThe Tribunal’s finding as the final fact-finding authority was upheld, and the scope of “definite information” was declared to be case-specific.\nCitations:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I RTO, Rawalpindi v. M/s Khan CNG Filling Station, Rawalpindi and others, 2017 SCMR 1414\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Bahawalpur v. M/s Bashir Ahmed (deceased) through L.Rs, 2021 SCMR 1290", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,120,122,122(1),122(5),122(9)Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=65", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 862 of 2024. Date of Hearing & Order: 27.02.2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 18.11.2023 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R.No. 60/2015)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CHIEF JUSTICE AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC. Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR.\nFor the Respondent: Not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, (SPECIAL ZONE FOR BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS) REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, ISLAMABAD ……. PETITIONER\nVS\nM/S KHUDADAD HEIGHTS, ISLAMABAD …... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26155", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1180 = 2025 SLD 1180 = 2025 PTD 596", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTSXk", - "Key Words:": "Limitation for Adjudication under Section 179 of the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe Collector Customs, Peshawar, filed a Custom Reference under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, challenging the decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal dated 25.09.2018. The case pertained to an audit observation whereby the respondent (M/s. Deans Industries Pvt. Ltd.) and their clearing agent allegedly evaded duty/taxes amounting to Rs. 3,812,260 by violating Section 32(2)(2A) of the Customs Act, 1969, and Section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nPursuant to the show-cause notice issued on 14.07.2014, the Order-in-Original was passed on 28.04.2015. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, setting aside the Order-in-Original on the grounds of limitation under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the Custom Reference, upholding the Tribunal’s decision. It ruled that the adjudication had not been completed within the statutory period of 90 days (extendable by 60 days with recorded reasons) as required under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969. No extension was obtained or recorded by the adjudicating officer, and the Order-in-Original was rendered after 288 days, violating the prescribed timeframe. Relying on Messrs Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal (2019 SCMR 1735), the Court emphasized that a decision must be both rendered and communicated within the statutory period. Consequently, the Order-in-Original was held to be without legal effect.\nCitations:\nMessrs Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-1, Islamabad and Others – 2019 SCMR 1735\nCollector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia Muhammad Din and Sons – 2017 SCMR 1427", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=156(1)(14),179,179(3),196Sales Tax Act, 1990=32(2)(2A),33", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No. 40-P of 2018, decided on 6th June, 2023. Date of hearing: 6th June, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ABDUL SHAKOOR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdur Rauf Rohaila for Petitioner.\nQazi Danish Ali for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE, PESHAWAR\nVS\nM/S DEANS INDUSTRIES, INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26156", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1181 = 2025 SLD 1181 = 2025 PTD 602", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTc", - "Key Words:": "Disallowance of Input Tax – Scope of Section 8 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a government-owned company engaged in distribution of electricity, challenged the Appellate Order No. 76 dated 09.06.2021 passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-II), Multan, under Section 45B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The controversy arose from a scrutiny of the appellant’s records during which input tax of Rs. 1,146,872 was disallowed for tax periods 08/2019, 01/2020, 05/2020, and 06/2020 on items such as office equipment, mineral water, travel sets, soaps, and sugar. The department issued a show cause notice under Section 11(2) of the Act, along with default surcharge and penalty under Sections 34 and 33 respectively.\nThe Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (DCIR) passed Order-in-Original No. 03/2021 dated 13.04.2021 disallowing the input tax. The CIR (Appeals) upheld this order. The appellant contended before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) that being a government company, all input tax was related to taxable supplies, and that the burden of proof to the contrary lay on the department, which had not been discharged.\nHeld:\nThe ATIR allowed the appeal. It held that:\nThe disallowance of input tax was made on grounds not contained in the original show-cause notice, rendering the order void ab initio (2018 PTD (H.C. Lah.) 253).\nThe items purchased (e.g., Chain Pulley Block, Auto Station, Security Shoes, Electric Accessories, Pumps, Motors, etc.) were not shown to fall under categories disallowed under Section 8(1)(a), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of the Act.\nThe department failed to establish how the goods in question were for personal or non-business use or were permanently attached to immovable property.\nThe Tribunal reiterated that input tax is allowable on goods used directly or indirectly in taxable activity, citing Coca Cola Beverages case (2012 PTCL CL 475) and other precedents such as 2007 PTD 2391, 1999 PTD (H.C. Lah.) 2174, 1999 PTD (SC Pak) 1892, and 2005 PTD (H.C. Pesh) 2012.\nThe Tribunal concluded that both the original and appellate orders were based on erroneous application of law and incorrect appreciation of facts, and thus set them aside.\nCitations:\n2018 PTD (H.C. Lah.) 253\n2012 PTCL CL 475 (Coca Cola Beverages case)\n2007 PTD 2391\n1999 PTD (H.C. Lah.) 2174\n1999 PTD (SC Pak) 1892\n2005 PTD (H.C. Pesh) 2012", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8,8(1)(a),8(1)(f),8(1)(g),8(1)(h),8(1)(i),11(2),33,34,45B", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 09/MB/2022, decided on 25th May, 2022. Date of hearing: 7th March, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARFRAZ ALI KHAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND RIZWAN AHMED URFI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan for Appellant.\nTariq Bhatti, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S FAISALABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD., FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LARGE TAXPAYERS' OFFICE, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26157", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1182 = 2025 SLD 1182 = 2025 PTD 608 = 2025 PTCL 425 = (2025) 131 TAX 393 = 2025 SCMR 684", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTY", - "Key Words:": "Outright Confiscation of Vehicle Used in Smuggling – Scope of Section 181 of the Customs Act, 1969 and Locus Standi of Driver\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, Bashir Ahmed (driver), filed a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution against the High Court judgment dated 10.05.2023, which upheld the departments stance in a customs-related matter. A vehicle, described as a Hino LPG Gas Bowzer, was detained by customs officials on 04.06.2020 for carrying smuggled foreign-origin betel nuts, rather than LPG, in its tank. The vehicle and goods were seized under Sections 157 and 168 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nAlthough the petitioner disclosed he was only the driver and provided the owners details, the owner failed to respond or participate in the investigation or proceedings. The Adjudicating Officer confiscated both the goods and vehicle without giving the option for redemption under Section 181 of the Act, citing SRO 499(I)/2009.\nOn appeal, the Customs Appellate Tribunal upheld the confiscation of goods but allowed the vehicles release against redemption fine, interpreting SRO 499 as permitting such discretion when the vehicle had no previous involvement in smuggling.\nThe department challenged this before the High Court under Section 196 of the Act. The High Court ruled in the department’s favor, rejecting the Tribunal’s interpretation.\nHeld:\nThe vehicle was used exclusively for transporting smuggled goods, falling squarely within the prohibition under clause (b) of the preamble to SRO 499(I)/2009, which bars the exercise of discretion under Section 181.\nThe amendment to SRO 499 dated 20.08.2024 and the temporary proviso to Section 157(2) (inserted in 2021 and omitted in 2022) were held inapplicable.\nSection 157 (extent of confiscation) and Section 181 (discretion to allow redemption) were deemed independent provisions, with the latter unaffected by amendments to the former.\nThe driver lacked locus standi to file the appeal before the Tribunal as he was neither the owner nor the authorized agent. Section 181 limits the option of redemption to owners. The driver thus did not qualify as an “aggrieved person” under Section 194-A.\nCitations:\nCollector of Customs, Peshawar v. Wali Khan and others (2017 SCMR 585) – On the Board’s powers under Section 181.\nDirector-General, Intelligence and Investigation-FBR v. Sher Andaz and others (2010 SCMR 1746) – On the interpretation of “aggrieved person”.\nDirector, Directorate-General of Intelligence and Investigation v. M/s Al-Faiz Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others (2006 SCMR 129) – Relevant precedent for customs proceedings.\nOutcome:\nPetition dismissed; leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2330 of 2023, decided on 12th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 12th September, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 15.02.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Customs Reference No.36-P of 2021).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): PRESENT: MUNIB AKHTAR, ATHAR MINALLAH, JUSTICE AND SYED HASAN AZHAR RIZVI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Naveed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Peshawar).\nShahid Qayyum, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Peshawar).", - "Petitioner Name:": "BASHIR AHMAD\nvs\nDIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION (CUSTOMS), FBR, PESHAWAR and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26158", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1183 = 2025 SLD 1183 = 2025 PTD 614", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTU", - "Key Words:": "Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) — Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe petitioner filed a second writ petition seeking interim relief due to the Federal Board of Revenue’s (FBR) inaction in forming an ADR Committee under Section 134A(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, as amended by the Finance Act, 2023. In a prior writ petition (W.P. No. 2309 of 2024), the Court had directed FBR to resolve the tax dispute within a month and to provide interim relief in the meantime. However, the petitioner contended that the ADR committee was still not constituted, effectively denying him a forum for dispute resolution.\nThe petitioner relied on constitutional and statutory principles, particularly the mandatory language of Section 134A(1) for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and judicial pronouncements encouraging mediation in tax disputes. He cited Shell Pakistan Ltd. v. Govt. of Punjab (2020 PTD 1607) and Shaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 2126), among others, arguing that denial of ADR impinged upon the right to fair dispute resolution. The petitioner also emphasized the binding nature of Supreme Court jurisprudence under Article 189 of the Constitution.\nThe Court acknowledged the delay in forming the ADR committee and reviewed leading judgments promoting ADR, including:\nFederation of Pakistan v. Attock Petroleum Ltd. (2007 SCMR 1095)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs RYK Mills (2023 SCMR 1856)\nProvince of Punjab v. M/s Haroon Construction Company (2024 SCMR 947)\nStrategic Plans Division v. Punjab Revenue Authority (PLD 2024 Lahore 545)\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the Federal Government to immediately constitute the ADR Committee under Section 134A(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Until such committee is established, no coercive measures are to be taken against the petitioner. The Court emphasized that failure to establish ADR frustrates the purpose of legislative and judicial intent aimed at reducing litigation and improving access to justice.\nCitations:\nSection 134A(1), Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (as amended by Finance Act, 2023)\nFederation of Pakistan v. Attock Petroleum Ltd. (2007 SCMR 1095)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs RYK Mills (2023 SCMR 1856)\nProvince of Punjab v. M/s Haroon Construction Company (2024 SCMR 947)\nStrategic Plans Division v. Punjab Revenue Authority (PLD 2024 Lahore 545)\nShell Pakistan Ltd. v. Govt. of Punjab (2020 PTD 1607)\nShaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 2126)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=134A(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2613 of 2024, decided on 12th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Tanser Bukhari for Petitioner.\nImran Shaukat Rao, A.A.G. (on Court call).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S NATIONAL LOGISTICS CELL\nVS\nASSISTANT/DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26159", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1184 = 2025 SLD 1184 = 2025 PTD 618", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Extra Tax Levy under SRO No. 1222(I)/2021 – Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe Petitioners challenged SRO No. 1222(I)/2021 dated 17.09.2021, issued under Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which imposed an additional tax on the billed amount (excluding federal taxes) for supply of electricity and natural gas to persons with industrial or commercial connections but who either lacked Sales Tax registration or were not on the Active Taxpayers List maintained by the FBR. The Petitioners, consisting mainly of charitable institutions, hospitals, schools, or businesses, argued that they were exempt from registration due to engaging exclusively in exempt or non-taxable supplies, hence not liable for the extra tax imposed via electricity bills.\nThe controversy arose after earlier judgments, notably the Sindh High Court’s decision in Al-Zarina Glass Industries (2018 PTD 1600), which struck down the predecessor SRO 509(I)/2013 on similar grounds favoring taxpayers. However, the Supreme Court, in The Chief Commissioner (IR) Region v. Al Zarina Glass Industries (Civil Appeal No. 920/2018, order dated 15.09.2022), overturned that decision, holding that the High Court had erred by invalidating the SRO prior to issuance of show-cause notices and by not adhering to correct legal principles concerning Section 3(1A) of the Act.\nThe Court highlighted that the issue before it was substantially identical to that adjudicated by the Supreme Court, with the only difference being the tax rates notified. The Petitioners’ attempts to invoke the Hajvairy Steel (2023 SCMR 681) judgment as contrary authority were dismissed on the basis that facts and legal provisions were materially different in that case.\nThe Court clarified that the extra tax under Section 3(5) is levied on the supply of electric power and natural gas, independent of the taxable status of the consumer’s activities. It is a tax on consumption rather than on the business activity, which may be exempt. The nature of the tax as non-refundable or non-adjustable does not render it illegal.\nHeld:\nThe Court dismissed all petitions challenging SRO 1222(I)/2021, holding that the Supreme Court has conclusively ruled the issue against the Petitioners. There is no merit to their grounds post the Apex Court judgment. The levy of extra tax on electricity and gas consumers not registered for sales tax is valid under Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nCitations:\nSRO No. 1222(I)/2021 dated 17.09.2021 (under Section 3(5), Sales Tax Act, 1990)\nAl-Zarina Glass Industries v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 PTD 1600)\nThe Chief Commissioner (IR) Region v. Al Zarina Glass Industries (Supreme Court, Civil Appeal No. 920/2018, 15.09.2022)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Hajvairy Steel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (2023 SCMR 681)\nZak Re-Rolling Mills v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (2020 SCMR 131)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1),3(1A),3(5)", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-4880 of 2022 (and other connected petitions) decided on 24th August, 2023. Date of hearing: 24th August, 2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MS. SANA AKRAM MINHAS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Tariq Masood, Syed Aijaz Hussain Shirazi, Shams Mohiuddin Ansari, Naeem Suleman, Zafar Hussain, Mian Ashfaq Ahmed, Ehsan Ghulam Malik, Shariq A. Razzak, Manzoor Arain, Riaz Moin Siddiqui, Rehmat Shakil, M. Anjum Khan, Syed Hamza Ahmed Hashmi, Atir Aqeel Ansari, Imran Iqbal Khan, Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Jahanzeb Awan, Shahan Karimi, Rashid Khan Mehar, Abdullah Azzam Naqvi, Mohsin Kadir Shahwani, Adnan Ali Khan Sherwani, Muhammad Taimur Ahmed, Ghulam Akbar Lashari and Waheed Hussain for Petitioners.\nSyed Ahsan Ali Shah, Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Aamir Ali Shaikh, Zulfiqar Ali Mirjat, Bilal Bhatti, Zohaib, Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Imran Ahmed Maitlo, Ali Tahir Soomro, Burhan Jagirani, Ghazi Khan Khalil, Ameer Nausherwan Adil, Abdul Hakeem Junejo, Abdul Razzak, Syed Kumail Abbas, Muhammad Shahid, Irfan Mir Halepota and Qaim Ali Memon for Respondents.\nG.M. Bhutto, Assistant Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAFFER IMAM\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26160", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1185 = 2025 SLD 1185 = 2025 PTD 622 = 2025 PTCL 419 = (2025) 131 TAX 382 = 2025 PLJ 268", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRS8", - "Key Words:": "Admissibility of Input Tax Adjustment on Electricity and Gas Consumed in Labour Colony within Factory Premises\nDetails:\nThis case arose from a show-cause notice dated 18.02.2003 issued to a respondent-company challenging the input tax adjustment claimed on electricity and gas bills for the months of January and February 2000. The utilities were supplied through a common commercial meter to both the factory and its adjacent residential colony for workers located within the same boundary and registered manufacturing premises.\nThe department contended that such consumption by the labour colony does not qualify as a taxable supply and thus does not entitle the respondent to input tax adjustment under Section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The original adjudication decided against the company, but the Tribunal reversed it on appeal, holding that the adjustment was permissible. The High Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision in Sales Tax Reference No. 14 of 2008. The department’s civil appeal challenged these concurrent findings.\nThe Supreme Court examined whether the residential use of utilities by workers has any nexus with the taxable activity of the factory. It noted that:\nThe residential colony existed within the factory’s registered premises.\nThe facility was provided to ensure uninterrupted labour for manufacturing activities.\nThe input tax adjustment is allowed under Section 7(1) as long as a legitimate connection exists between input and output tax.\nThe Court emphasized a liberal interpretation of Section 7(1), guided by precedent (Sheikhoo Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan, 2001 SCMR 1376), and found that the utilities use in the labour colony is part of the direct manufacturing expenditure, thus satisfying the condition of nexus with taxable supplies.\nHeld:\nThe appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the Tribunal and High Court, affirming that input tax adjustment on utility consumption in a labour colony within factory premises is permissible under Section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nCitations:\nSheikhoo Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan (2001 SCMR 1376 = 2001 PTD 2097)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 316 of 2022 and Civil Petition No. 483-K of 2021, decided & heard on 26th February, 2025\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 11.03.2020 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in S.T.R. No. 14 of 2008).\n(Against the judgment dated 04.02.2021 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Special Sales Tax Appeal No. 148 of 2005).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YAHYA AFRIDI, CHIEF JUSTICE, MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE AND MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General, Law, FBR and Sharif Ullah, AD, Legal for Appellant (in C.A: No. 316 of 2022).\nIsaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 316 of 2022).\nIrfan Mir Halepota, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Chamar, Advocate-on-Record, Sharjeel Ahmed, Addl.\nCommissioner, FBR for Petitioner (in C.P. No. 483-K of 2021) (via video link from Karachi).\nNemo for Respondent (in C.P. No. 483-K of 2021).", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CORPORATE ZONE, RTO PESHAWAR\nVS\nM/S FLYING KRAFT PAPER MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED, CHARSADDA AND ANOTHER\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 11.03.2020 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in S.T.R. No. 14 of 2008).\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL LTO, KARACHI\nvs\nMATTARI SUGAR MILLS, KARACHI\n(Against the judgment dated 04.02.2021 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Special Sales Tax Appeal No. 148 of 2005)." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26161", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1186 = 2025 SLD 1186 = 2025 PTD 626", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRSs", - "Key Words:": "Confiscation of Vehicle Used for Smuggling and Inapplicability of SRO 499(I)/2009\nDetails:\nThis case arises from the seizure of a passenger bus (Registration No. SGM-851) by Customs authorities on 23.09.2019. Upon intelligence and subsequent inspection, 6080 liters of Iranian smuggled diesel oil were discovered concealed in built-in secret cavities of the bus. The bus was being driven by its owner, Mehraj s/o Barkat. The smuggled diesel and the bus were seized, and a show-cause notice was issued for violation of Sections 2(s), 156(2), and 157(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, punishable under clauses 8 and 89 of Section 156(1), read with Section 3(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950.\nThe Deputy Collector of Customs passed Order-in-Original No. 323/2017-2018 on 26.10.2017, confiscating the diesel and allowing the bus to be redeemed upon payment of a 20% redemption fine under Section 181 of the Customs Act, citing SRO 499(I)/2009. A personal penalty of Rs. 25,000 was also imposed.\nOn appeal, the Collector (Appeals) modified this order and set aside the redemption option, noting that the owner himself used the vehicle for smuggling. However, the Customs Appellate Tribunal (CAT) reversed this decision and restored the DCs order permitting redemption on fine.\nThe department filed a Special Customs Reference Application (SCRA) challenging CAT’s order. The High Court framed and answered the key legal question:\nWhether under the facts and circumstances, the CAT was justified in directing the release of the bus after payment of redemption fine?\nHeld:\nThe High Court answered in the negative. It held:\nThe respondent was both the driver and the owner, and fully aware of the secret cavities used for smuggling.\nThe benefit of SRO 499(I)/2009 applies only when the owner is unaware of the use of the vehicle for smuggling.\nThe CAT erred in law in granting redemption.\nPrior judgments of the Balochistan High Court (SCRA Nos. 10 & 29 of 2020), affirmed by the Supreme Court (C.Ps. 730-K to 760-K/2020), and several precedents of the Sindh High Court were cited in support.\nThe order of CAT was set aside, and the SCRA was allowed in favour of the department.\nCitations:\nSRO 499(I)/2009 dated 13.06.2009\nDirector I & I (Customs) v. Nasir-ul-Haq, SCRA No. 443/2019, 2022 PTD 1193\nDirector I & I v. Aurangzaib, SCRA No. 700/2019, 2021 PTD 1026\nCollector of Customs v. Niaz Muhammad, 2022 PTD 1174\nSCRA Nos. 10 & 29 of 2020, BHC, affirmed by SC in C.Ps. 730-K to 760-K/2020 (11.02.2021)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(Ss),156(1)(8),156(1)(89),156(2),157,157(2),168,181Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No.459 of 2019, decided on 22nd November, 2022. Dates of hearing: 20th October and 17th November, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE AND ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Pervez Ahmed Memon for Applicant.\nNemo for Respondents, despite proper service.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (PREVENTATIVE), CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI\nVS\nMEHRAJ AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26162", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1187 = 2025 SLD 1187 = 2025 PTD 631", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTk", - "Key Words:": "Computation of Stay Period and Unlawful Tax Recovery under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a company engaged in petroleum sales, challenged the withdrawal of Rs. 1,678,081/- from its bank account by the tax department despite an active stay order by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR). The stay order against a super tax demand was granted on 31.01.2024 for 30 days. On 01.03.2024, the department issued a notice under Section 140 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which led the bank to transfer the disputed amount to the department. However, the Tribunal had extended the stay on 29.02.2024 for another 30 days.\nThe High Court held that while computing limitation, Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies — the date of the order (31.01.2024) is excluded, so the 30-day period commenced from 01.02.2024 and expired on 01.03.2024. Since the stay was extended on 29.02.2024, the notice and consequent recovery on 01.03.2024 were during the currency of the stay, making the departments action unlawful.\nHeld:\nThe High Court declared the department’s recovery action illegal and ultra vires. The impugned notice dated 01.03.2024 and the action of attaching and withdrawing funds from the petitioner’s bank account were set aside. The department was ordered to refund the amount, and the ATIR was directed to decide the appeal on merit.\nCitations:\nBalochistan v. Abdul Rasheed, 2002 SCMR 1903\nMessrs Malik Muhammad Nawaz Haji Aziz Ahmad v. Syed Mehmood Hussain, 1997 SCMR 264", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C,4C(4),133,138(1),140Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199General Clauses Act, 1897=9Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956=9", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 14535 of 2024, heard on 7th May, 2024. Date of hearing: 7th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Shakeel for Petitioner.\nCh. Imtiaz Elahi, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondent No.1.\nBarrister Ahtasham Mukhtar for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S SITARA DILDAR FUELS (PRIVATE) LIMITED THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY FINANCE AND 3 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26163", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1188 = 2025 SLD 1188 = 2025 PTD 638", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRTg", - "Key Words:": "Compulsory Registration with Balochistan Revenue Authority (BRA) – Withholding Sales Tax on Services\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a branch office of Coca-Cola Export Corporation, USA, challenged the Order-in-Original No. 884/2023-24 dated 15.11.2023 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Operations), BRA, and Order-in-Appeal No. BRA-CA/AO-03/2024 dated 05.03.2024 passed by Commissioner (Appeals), BRA. The dispute centered around whether the appellant, already registered with the Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA), was required to get registered with BRA due to receipt of advertising services within Balochistan and withholding of sales tax thereon.\nThe appellant argued:\nIt was not a “resident” nor had a place of business in Balochistan.\nIt had correctly paid withheld sales tax to the PRA.\nThe recovery proceedings initiated by BRA were in violation of the Balochistan High Court’s order to provide an opportunity of being heard.\nThe BRA contended:\nThe appellant had a virtual place of business in Balochistan by virtue of conducting economic activity (advertising services) there.\nUnder section 25 of the Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act, 2015, the appellant was obligated to register and deposit withheld sales tax with BRA.\nFailure to do so justified compulsory registration under section 27.\nThe Tribunal held that:\nDefinitions of place of business in Balochistan [Section 2(115)] and resident [Section 2(139)] covered virtual presence and economic activity conducted via agents, branches, or otherwise.\nThe appellant, by acquiring services in Balochistan and withholding tax, had created a virtual presence in the province and was thus required to register with BRA.\nCompulsory registration by the Assistant Commissioner was upheld.\nRegarding the second issue (non-provision of hearing in recovery proceedings), the Tribunal found merit in the appellant’s complaint. It was held that:\nThe recovery orders dated 11.12.2023 were passed without affording a proper opportunity of hearing, contrary to Balochistan High Court’s order dated 04.08.2023.\nThese orders were rightly remanded back by Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh adjudication after providing a proper hearing.\nHeld:\nThe appeal against compulsory registration was dismissed.\nThe Assistant Commissioner, BRA, was directed to re-adjudicate the pending recovery proceedings after granting a proper hearing, in line with the directions of the Balochistan High Court and Commissioner (Appeals).\nCitations:\nC.P. Nos. 506/2023 to 510/2023, Balochistan High Court Order dated 04.08.2023\nOrder-in-Original No. 884/2023-24 dated 15.11.2023\nOrder-in-Appeal No. BRA-CA/AO-03/2024 dated 05.03.2024\nOrder-in-Appeal No. BRA-CA/AO-04/2024 dated 05.03.2024 (on recovery)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act 2015=2(115)(b),2(139),25,27,27(1),48Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Rules, 2018=3", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Appeal No.06 of 2024, decided on 26th April, 2024. Date of hearing: 19th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, CHAIRMAN, HAIDER ALI SHIKOH AND SAIFULLAH KHAN, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aimal Khan Kakar for Appellant.\nJam Saka for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S COCA-COLA EXPORT CORPORATION PAKISTAN THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER APPEALS, BALOCHISTAN REVENUE AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26164", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1189 = 2025 SLD 1189 = 2025 PTD 645 = (2025) 131 TAX 314", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRXo", - "Key Words:": "Classification of Automotive Calcium Batteries under HS Code – Customs Duty\nDetails:\nThe Applicant (Customs Department) challenged the order dated 30.01.2015 passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, in Custom Appeal No. K-786/2014. The dispute centered on the correct classification of imported Automotive Calcium Premium Batteries. The department contended that the batteries fell under HS Code 8507.1020 (Lead-acid batteries for specific vehicle subheadings), attracting 35% Customs Duty and 15% Additional Customs Duty. The Respondent claimed classification under 8507.2090 (Other lead-acid accumulators) with only 20% duty. The Tribunal, however, classified the goods under HS Code 8507.8000 (Other types of batteries), chargeable to 10% Customs Duty.\nThe Tribunal reasoned that:\nThe batteries were not established as lead-acid batteries, a prerequisite for classification under HS Code 8507.1020.\nExamination reports twice confirmed the description “Calcium Premium Batteries,” without evidence of lead-acid composition.\nClassification under HS Code 8507.8000 was proper based on tariff structure and the General Rules of Interpretation by the WCO.\nThe High Court upheld the Tribunal’s findings, observing that the classification proposed by the Applicant lacked evidentiary support and failed to recognize that not all automotive batteries are classifiable under HS Code 8507.1020—only those specifically of lead-acid type and intended for starting piston engines.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal was justified in classifying the Automotive Calcium Batteries under HS Code 8507.8000. The Reference Application was dismissed. The court clarified that only one question of law arose—whether the classification by the Tribunal was lawful—and answered it in the affirmative.\nCitations:\nCollector v. SG Enterprises, 2021 PTD 815", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-A(4) ,196(5)", - "Case #": "Special Custom Reference Application No. 1135 of 2015 and C.M. No. 4762 of 2015. Date Order: 06.05.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Parvaiz A. Memon, Advocate for Applicant \nMr. Ahmed Ali Hussain, Advocate for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nM/S. ROHAIL ENTERPRISES" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26165", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1190 = 2025 SLD 1190 = 2025 PTD 650", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTRXk", - "Key Words:": "Applicability of Section 153 – Withholding Tax on Membership Fee – Doctrine of Mutuality\nDetails:\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue filed a Reference under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 against the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue dated 17.10.2012. The dispute pertained to whether the Respondent (taxpayer) was obligated to deduct withholding tax under Section 153(1)(c) of the Ordinance on the payment of Rs. 2,730,000/- made to the DHA Country & Golf Club as membership fee.\nThe department argued that the payment fell within the scope of “services” under Section 153(1)(c). The taxpayer contended that the payment was purely for acquiring membership and not for any service as defined under Section 153, and hence no tax was deductible.\nThe Court considered the doctrine of mutuality as laid down in earlier judgments, particularly:\nKarachi Golf Club (Pvt) Ltd v. Province of Sindh (2021 PTD 558)\nSindh Club v. CIT, South Zone, Karachi (ITR 445/1990, 2021 PTD 658)\nThese judgments confirmed that where funds are collected by a members’ club from its members and used for the mutual benefit of the members, such income is not subject to tax under the doctrine of mutuality. Since no one can earn income from themselves, the income is not treated as income under tax law.\nHeld:\nThe payment of membership fee by the Respondent to DHA Club was covered under the doctrine of mutuality and did not constitute consideration for services under Section 153(1)(c). The Appellate Tribunal’s order was upheld. Petition dismissed; questions of law were answered in the negative (against the department and in favour of the taxpayer).\nCitations:\nSindh Club v. CIT, 2021 PTD 658\nChelmsford Club case (India)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133,133(5),153,153(1),153(1)(c)Income Tax Act, 1922=22", - "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 22-P/2013. Date of hearing: 04.02.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE AND SYED MUDASSER AMEER, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ghulam Shoib Jally, Advocate, for the appellant. \nMr. Issa Ali Qazi, Advocate, for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR.\nVS\nM/S SWAT CERAMICS COMPANY (PVT) LTD, SHAIDU NOWSHERA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26166", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1191 = 2025 SLD 1191 = 2025 PTD 656", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTc", - "Key Words:": "Illegality of NTN Blocking Without Statutory Show Cause Notice\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the demand-cum-hearing notice dated 16.02.2023 and the blocking of its National Tax Number (NTN) by customs authorities. The respondent department relied on Section 155-M of the Customs Act, 1969 to justify the action, alleging non-responsiveness from the petitioner.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that:\nThe impugned notice did not cite any statutory provision justifying its issuance.\nBlocking the NTN without a proper adjudication process or issuance of a valid show cause notice under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 was illegal and ultra vires.\nRecovery actions must follow due process, including adjudication and utilization of recovery mechanisms under Section 202 of the Customs Act.\nMere non-response to a vague hearing notice does not authorize such coercive action.\nCiting precedents (including Shoe Planet and Harris Silicones), the court reaffirmed that demand notices without statutory show cause notices are unlawful.\nThe Court accordingly allowed the petition and directed that the petitioners NTN be immediately de-blocked, while permitting the department to proceed afresh in accordance with law, particularly under Section 32 of the Act.\nCase law referenced:\nShoe Planet v. Federation of Pakistan\nHarris Silicones v. Federation of Pakistan", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32,155-M,202", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-2866 of 2023, decided on 12th June, 2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Amjad Hay at for Petitioner.\nZafar Hussain for Respondent No.2.\nQazi Ayazuddin, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAHIR NAWAZ\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26167", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1192 = 2025 SLD 1192 = 2025 PTD 662", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTY", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax – Suspension and Blacklisting of Sales Tax Registration under Section 21 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThis consolidated judgment relates to Sales Tax References filed by the tax department challenging the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue dated 23.05.2022. The department suspended the sales tax registration of the respondent taxpayer (M/s A.K. Tariq Foundry) under Section 21(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006. The suspension was based on the dishonor of post-dated cheques furnished by the taxpayer for exempt imports under Serial No. 151 of the Sixth Schedule to the Act, owing to failure to provide consumption certificates required for FATA/PATA-based exemptions.\nThe department contended that such failure constituted tax fraud and justified the suspension. However, the Tribunal and subsequently the High Court held that mere non-submission of consumption certificates did not automatically establish tax fraud or issuance of fake invoices – the only statutory bases under Section 21(2) for suspension or blacklisting.\nThe Court emphasized that taxpayers registered under the Act are subject to a self-assessment scheme, can be audited under Section 25, and discrepancies must be adjudicated under Section 11 before declaring any liability or applying penal provisions. Furthermore, post-dated cheques are conditional instruments, and failure to honor them does not by itself fulfill the criteria of fraud or fake invoicing under the law.\nHeld:\nThe suspension of registration under Section 21(2) of the Act was unjustified, as the ingredients of fake invoices or tax fraud were not met. The Appellate Tribunal’s order was upheld as legally sound and based on a correct interpretation of the law. The department’s references were dismissed and answered in the negative.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(5),21(2),22,25,25(5),33, 4, 2BSales Tax Rules, 2006=12", - "Case #": "STR No. 76-P/2022. Date of hearing & Order: 25.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Qurat-ul-Ain, along with Sharifullah, Assistant Director. \nMr. Mufariq Shah, Advocate, for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE CORPORATE ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR \nVS\nM/S AL-HAJ STEEL FOUNDRY, DISTRICT KHYBER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26168", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1251 = 2025 SLD 1251 = (2025) 131 TAX 307", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTU", - "Key Words:": "Withholding Tax – Applicability of Section 153 on Use of System Charges (UoSC) – Default Surcharge\nDetails:\nThis consolidated judgment addresses Tax Reference No. 01/2023 and connected references (02-P, 03-P/2023) involving Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) regarding withholding tax obligations under Section 153(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on payments made to National Transmission and Despatch Company (NTDC).\nThe Revenue alleged that PESCO failed to deduct tax on payments for Use of System Charges (UoSC), even though NTDC later discharged its tax liability belatedly. Consequently, PESCO was held liable for default surcharge under Sections 161(1B) and 205 of the Ordinance. The Assessing Officer and CIR(A) upheld the default surcharge, albeit with instructions to correct the calculation. On second appeal, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the orders.\nThe court addressed the main issue of whether UoSC payments fall within the exemption under Clause 46AA of the Second Schedule, which at the relevant time only exempted “supply of electricity” from Section 153. The court observed that while UoSC and electricity charges were invoiced separately, the transmission system (covered by UoSC) plays an integral role in electricity supply. The phrase supply of electricity was thus open to two interpretations—one narrow, excluding UoSC, and another broader, including it.\nImportantly, the Finance Act, 2021 later amended Clause 46AA to include the term transmission of electricity, clarifying this ambiguity. The court treated this amendment as curative and remedial in nature, hence applicable to the pending case to give effect to legislative intent.\nMoreover, the court emphasized the principle that fiscal statutes imposing liability must be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer. It also applied the principle from D.G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd. that default surcharge or penalty cannot be imposed unless the taxpayer’s conduct was willful or mala fide, which was not the case here.\nHeld:\nPayments made by PESCO to NTDC for UoSC were part of the “supply of electricity” and hence exempt from withholding under Section 153 pursuant to Clause 46AA of the Second Schedule, even prior to the 2021 amendment.\nThe 2021 amendment was curative/remedial in nature and retrospectively applicable to pending matters.\nImposition of default surcharge under Section 161(1B) was unwarranted as PESCO’s omission was not willful or mala fide.\nTax Reference answered in the negative in favor of the taxpayer.\nCitations:\nD.G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd. [PTCL 1992 CL 23; PTCL 1995 CL 415; PTCL 2001 CL 627]\nShahnawaz Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (Finance Act, 1973 amendment case)\nPrinciples from Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition on “Remedial” and “Curative” statutes\nGeneral principles of strict interpretation in fiscal statutes:\nCIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd., (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC)\nK.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 131 ITR 597 (SC)\nUnion of India v. Onkar S. Kanwar, (2002) 258 ITR 761 (SC)", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(1)(b),161(1B),205", - "Case #": "TR No. 43-P/2022. Date of hearing: 11.06.2024. Date of Judgment: 29-06-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocate, along with Siraj Muhammad Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue.\nFor Respondents: Mr. Hussain Ahmad Sherazi, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE CORPORATE ZONE, PESHAWAR ……. PETITIONER\nV/S\nM/S PESHAWAR ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LIMITED, WAPDA HOUSE, PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER …… RESPONDENTS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26169", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1252 = 2025 SLD 1252 = (2025) 131 TAX 347 = 2025 PTD 1549", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Search and Seizure under Sections 38 and 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a manufacturer/importer/exporter of sanitary and hygienic products, challenged the order dated 04.10.2023 issued under Sections 38(1) and 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, authorizing respondent officials to inspect and seize business records. The basis for this action was a desk audit suggesting concealment of sales exceeding Rs. 340 million. A search warrant was also obtained under Section 40, leading to a raid and seizure of documents listed in the Resumption Memo.\nThe petitioner argued that:\nSection 38 allows only routine inspection and not forcible seizure unless the documents are in plain sight or voluntarily made available.\nSection 40 permits a search only if proceedings under the Act are pending and the records are relevant thereto. No such proceedings were pending.\nThe department defended the raid based on the desk audit findings.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that Section 40 could not be invoked, as it requires pending proceedings under the Act and a specific reason to believe that the relevant documents are useful and in danger of removal. A desk audit/investigation does not qualify as “proceedings”.\nUnder Section 38, access to documents is limited to those in plain sight or voluntarily provided. Officers cannot forcibly seize documents not voluntarily offered.\nThe Court found no specific claim by the petitioner that the records were forcibly taken, nor did the department confirm the records were voluntarily produced.\nConsequently, this factual dispute could not be conclusively resolved in constitutional jurisdiction.\nFollowing precedent, the respondents were directed to return the original documents to the petitioner, retaining only duplicate copies.\nCitations:\nCollector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 PTD 1933)\nPakistan Chipboard (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2015 PTD 1520)\nGhulam Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 1379)\nMessrs Apple Paper Products (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 PTD 787)\nAgha Steel Industries Ltd. v. Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (2019 PTD 2119)\nDirector Intelligence & Investigation v. M/s Biocos International (PLJ 2020 Lahore 1)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=38,38(1),40", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 75402/2023. Date of hearing 29.11.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by M/s Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Omer Wahab and Azeem Ullah Virk, Advocates.\nRespondents by Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate/Legal Advisor alongwith Muhammad Ayaz Nawaz, Deputy Commissioner, Inland Revenue Zone-V, RTO Lahore.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S PAK HYGIENIC INDUSTRIES \nVS \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26170", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1253 = 2025 SLD 1253 = (2025) 131 TAX 363", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQS8", - "Key Words:": "Customs Valuation and Amendment of Goods Declaration — Sections 25A, 29, and 196 of the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (I & I), Customs Quetta, alleged that the importers of pistachios from Iran undervalued their goods and claimed excessive tare weight, leading to revenue loss. The consignment was cleared based on a declared value of US$ 1.32/kg, which was found to be consistent with directions from the Directorate General of Customs Valuation (DG Valuation). However, it was alleged that the tare weight (packing weight) claimed—ranging from 12% to 36%—was abnormally high.\nThe Adjudicating Authority accepted the declared value but found the tare weight excessive. On appeal, the Appellate Tribunal held that once the goods had been cleared and physically removed from Customs custody, any re-assessment of tare weight or amendment of goods declaration was not legally tenable under Section 29 of the Customs Act. Both importers and customs authorities filed references to the High Court.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed all Customs References (Nos. 15 to 66 of 2023), affirming the decisions of the Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Tribunal:\nCustoms Value: The value of US$ 1.32/kg was upheld as fair, being consistent with past clearances and DG Valuation’s directions. Application of an earlier Valuation Ruling (No. 1031/2017) was held unjustified and against Section 25A, especially when no dispute resolution was initiated under Section 25A(3) between conflicting valuations.\nTare Weight: Section 29 prohibits amendments to goods declarations once goods have been removed from customs premises. Hence, reassessment of tare weight post-clearance was impermissible, particularly in the absence of any evidentiary basis for alleging excessive weight.\nThe Directorate’s attempt to apply tare percentages of 2% and 7% without proper reasoning or standard was rejected.\nThe Adjudicating Authority was found to have exceeded jurisdiction by attempting to verify tare weight based on unrelated consignments post-clearance, which was also declared impermissible.\nCitations:\nBalochistan High Court: C.P. No. 198/2021 and C.P. No. 1062/2021\nSupreme Court of Pakistan: Dismissal of CPLA Nos. 6075 & 3164 of 2021 on 25.03.2022\nKarachi Customs Appellate Tribunal Bench-III Judgment dated 22.11.2022", - "Court Name:": "Quetta High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25-A,25-A(3),25D,29,32,196", - "Case #": "Customs References Applications Nos.15 to 66 of 2023 decided on 31.05.2023. Date of hearing: 15.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDULLAH BALOCH AND IQBAL AHMED KASI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Iftikhar Raza Khan for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE DIRECTOR DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION CUSTOMS FBR, QUETTA THROUGH DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND OTHERS\nVS\nM/S INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS HUB AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26171", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1254 = 2025 SLD 1254 = (2025) 131 TAX 53", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQSs", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax – Chargeability of Further Tax on Supplies to Government Department\nDetails:\nThe case concerns scrutiny of Sales Tax records and physical stock checking for the period June 2014 to July 2016 under section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which revealed suppression of supplies worth Rs. 36.68 million, involving tax of Rs. 6.60 million. A show cause notice alleged tax fraud and sought recovery of suppressed tax, default surcharge, penalty, and Further Tax under section 3(1A) of the Act for supplies made to unregistered persons (worth Rs. 1.89 million).\nThe taxpayer deposited the suppressed tax, resolving that part of the dispute. However, the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) [CIR(A)] upheld the imposition of further tax, default surcharge, and penalty. The taxpayer contended that the supplies were made to the Director General Agriculture Water Management Punjab, a government department, for its own consumption, i.e., construction of watercourses, and thus did not constitute supplies in the course or furtherance of taxable activity.\nThe department argued that the department was unregistered and thus liable for further tax.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) held:\nNo further tax is chargeable on supplies made to government departments that are not required to be registered under the Sales Tax Act and purchase goods for own consumption rather than for resale or further taxable activity.\nThe Director General Agriculture Water Management Punjab was using the goods (construction material) to build aqueducts (watercourses), which did not qualify as a taxable activity or supply.\nThe department was thus the end consumer, and in terms of section 3(1A) read with SRO 648(I)/2013, no further tax was applicable.\nCIR(A) and adjudication orders were annulled, and the appeal was accepted.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 353/IB/2019. decided on 08.09.2021. Date of hearing: 07.09.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMTIAZ AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Umer Ashraf Bhatti, Advocate, for the Appellant.\nMr. Muhammad Akram, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASHIRAF PROP: MS GONDAL RCC PRODUCTS GOJRA, DISTRICT MANDI BAHAUDDIN\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER IR, ZONE-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, SARGODHA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26172", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1255 = 2025 SLD 1255 = 2025 PTCL 385 = (2025) 132 TAX 479", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTk", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction and Validity of Notice under Rule 9 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a registered taxpayer under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, engaged in manufacturing and selling fertilizers, received a notice dated 20.04.2016 under Rule 9 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006. The notice alleged that the movement of goods to unspecified warehouses may be treated as sale, attracting sales tax. The petitioner had earlier informed the department about the warehouses via a letter dated 19.02.2016. It challenged the notice on grounds of jurisdiction, vagueness, and mala fide.\nThe petitioner contended that Rule 9 pertains only to filing applications with the Commissioner when online filing is not possible and does not empower the issuance of such a notice. The respondents failed to establish how the transfer of goods to non-notified warehouses constituted a taxable sale under the Act or Rules.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that the impugned notice was without lawful authority and jurisdiction. Rule 9 did not support the basis for issuing the notice, and the mere movement of goods to warehouses—regardless of notification status—did not constitute a sale or taxable activity under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The department could not demonstrate any provision of law being violated or show how the activity fell within the scope of “sale” or “supply.” The petition was declared maintainable, and the notice was quashed.\nCitations:\nPLD 1965 SC 671 – Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Hamid Khan (on mala fide and jurisdiction)\nPLD 1990 SC 399 – Edulji Dinshaw Ltd v. Income Tax Officer (writ maintainability for wrongful notices)\n1993 SCMR 1798 – Adamjee Insurance Co. Ltd v. Pakistan\n2009 PTD 1392 – CIT v. Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd (writ jurisdiction in case of mala fide/without authority)\n2017 PTD 2296 – Pak Telecom Mobile Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan (interpretation of sale/supply under the Act)\nICA No. 301/2019 dated 13.10.2022 – Telenor Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan\n2021 SCMR 1154 – FBR v. Abdul Ghani", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Rules, 2006=9Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 1574/2016. Date of Hearing : 06.11.2024. Date of Order: 28-01-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: AAMER FAROOQ, CHIEF JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner By: Sardar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera and Mr. Sikandar Sukhera, Advocates.\nRespondents By: Mr. Riaz Hussain Azam Bopera, Advocate. Mr. Sarfraz Rauf, Learned Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAUJI FERTILIZER COMPANY LIMITED \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26173", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1256 = 2025 SLD 1256 = 2025 PTCL 441 = (2025) 131 TAX 619 = 2025 PTD 1125", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQTg", - "Key Words:": "Whether the plaint challenging income tax audit notices under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was rightly rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by the Single Judge.\nKey Findings & Reasoning\nRejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC:\nThe plaint was validly rejected suo motu by the Single Judge. Courts are mandated to reject plaints if they appear barred by law, even without a formal application (Order VII Rule 11 CPC).\nThe word appears implies a prima facie assessment, not full proof.\nJurisdiction in Fiscal Matters:\nSearle IV Solution (SC) holds:\nCivil suits against tax actions are barred by ouster clauses (e.g., Section 227 of Income Tax Ordinance, Section 217 of Customs Act).\nException: Original civil jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court (Karachi) remains available but must be exercised sparingly, not routinely.\nAllahdin Steel (SC) clarifies:\nAudit notices under Section 177 are non-adverse administrative steps, granting taxpayers multiple opportunities to defend returns.\nNo cause of action arises from mere audit selection.\nMala Fides Plea Inadequate:\nAppellant’s generic allegations of mala fides ( discrimination due to anti-government stance ) lacked specific details, evidence, or damages claims as required under Order VI Rule 4 CPC.\nMere pleading mala fides is insufficient to bypass statutory hierarchies.\nAlternative Remedies:\nAppellant should have submitted to audit, availed remedies under Income Tax Ordinance (e.g., Section 122 amendment, appellate forums), and challenged adverse orders later.\nInjunction Correctly Denied:\nNo prima facie case, irreparable loss, or balance of convenience justified injuncting audit notices (Order XXXIX Rule 1–2 CPC).\nConclusion\nAppeal Dismissed:\nThe plaint was correctly rejected as:\n(a) Barred by law (Section 227, Income Tax Ordinance + SC precedents);\n(b) Disclosing no cause of action (audit notices ≠ adverse orders);\n(c) Lacking specific mala fides.\nGuidance: Taxpayers must exhaust statutory remedies before approaching civil courts.\nFinal Order:\n In view of the above, the impugned order is upheld. The appeal is dismissed. ", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177,227Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=11,15Customs Act, 1969=217", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 324 of 2024. Dates of Hearing: 04-11-2024. Date of order: 13-01-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. ARY COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED THROUGH MR. ABID S. ZUBERI, ADVOCATE.\nVS\nABDUL QADIR SHAIKH, COMMISSIONER (AUDIT) INLAND REVENUE-III, CTO, KARACHI THROUGH MR. AMEER BAKSH METLO, ADVOCATE ALONG WITH MS. ZAKIA KHAN, ADVOCATE." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26174", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1257 = 2025 SLD 1257 = 2025 PTCL 470", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQXo", - "Key Words:": "Determination of Manufacturer Status & Deletion of Sales Tax Demand under Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, registered as an importer and trader under the name M/s Wali Trading (Nada & Suffah), filed sales tax returns claiming manufacturer status under Section 2(17) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Director of I & I (IR) reported misuse of manufacturer status, alleging evasion of value addition tax at import stage. Acting on this, the Assessing Officer issued a show cause notice under Section 11(3) (erroneously citing a repealed provision) demanding Rs. 316.7 million in sales tax along with default surcharge and penalties under Sections 33(5) and 33(15).\nThe taxpayer rebutted, arguing procedural lapses (including omission of Section 11E in SCN), and submitted evidence including:\nPhysical verification reports by RTO Karachi and RTO Peshawar confirming manufacturing activity.\nRegistration under trademark law, food manufacturing licenses, and proof of WWF payment applicable to industrial undertakings.\nPrior acceptance of manufacturer status by CIR (Appeals) and ATIR.\nThe appellate forum held that:\nThe foundational basis of the demand (I & I report) was invalidated by official RTO reports.\nThe process of cleaning, crushing, grinding, blending, and packing of imported and local spices to create new branded products constituted manufacture as per Section 2(17), read with Rule 58B of Chapter X of the Special Procedure Rules.\nPrecedents including ORI Tech Oils (2017 PTD 1497; affirmed by SC in 2019 PTD 1342), Al Khyber Tea and Food Co. (PTCL 2023 CL. 266), and 2000 PTD 874 supported the taxpayer’s stance.\nAdditionally, the Tribunal found:\nThe imposition of default surcharge and penalties (under Sections 33(5), 33(13), and 33(15)) unsustainable due to lack of proven mens rea or fraudulent intent.\nAllegation of tax fraud under Section 2(37) was not substantiated by the department as required under law.\nHeld:\nThe taxpayer was rightly categorized as a manufacturer. The impugned order dated 27.09.2024 was vacated. Consequently:\nSales tax demand of Rs. 316.7 million along with default surcharge was deleted.\nAll associated penalties under Sections 33(5), 33(13), and 33(15) were also deleted.\nAppeal accepted in full; proceedings quashed.\nCitations:\nORI Tech Oils Pvt. Ltd. – 2017 PTD 1497, affirmed in 2019 PTD 1342 (SC)\nAl Khyber Tea and Food Co. – ATIR 369/PB/2017, affirmed in PTCL 2023 CL. 266 (Peshawar High Court)\n2000 PTD 874\n2004 PTD 868 – burden of proof on department for tax fraud", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(17),11E,11(3),15,33(5),33(15)Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2007=58B(1)(i)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29C)", - "Case #": "STA No. 712/KB/2024 (Tax Period July 2018 to May 2024), decided on 13th December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naeem-ul-Haq, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Jafri, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "APPELLANT: M/S. WALI KHAN TRADING COMPANY, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE CIR, ZONE-II, RTO-1, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26175", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1258 = 2025 SLD 1258 = 2025 PTCL 489", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTQXk", - "Key Words:": "Eligibility of Industrial Undertaking Status – Manufacturing Process – Refund under Section 170(4) – Scope of Rectification under Section 221\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, operating under the name M/s Wali Trading Company with NTN 1710235269419, imported spices, processed them through grinding, mixing, and blending, and sold the final products under the brands “Suffa” and “Nada.” He declared import-stage tax as adjustable and claimed refunds accordingly under Section 170(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The refund claims were processed and allowed by the department after due verification, including confirmation of the taxpayer’s status as a manufacturer.\nLater, based on a report from the Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation (I & I), which alleged misuse of “industrial undertaking” status and declared the taxpayer non-existent at the stated Karachi address, the department initiated proceedings under Section 221(2), asserting that an error had occurred in allowing the refund due to misclassification. The AO rejected the taxpayer’s submissions and issued rectification orders, creating tax demands.\nThe taxpayer challenged the rectification, arguing denial of natural justice, non-appreciation of factual verification reports from RTO Karachi and RTO Peshawar, and prior settled position by departmental authorities, CIR(A), and ATIR acknowledging the taxpayer as a manufacturer. It was also contended that the findings were based on a refuted I & I report and amounted to a change of opinion.\nHeld:\nThe appellate authority accepted the taxpayer’s appeal and vacated the orders passed under Section 221(1), holding them as illegal and passed without lawful jurisdiction. It was concluded:\nThe taxpayer qualifies as an industrial undertaking as per Section 2(29C) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe processes of grinding, mixing, blending, and packing substantially change the original condition of goods, and therefore qualify as manufacturing.\nPrior physical verifications by RTO Karachi and RTO Peshawar validated the taxpayer’s manufacturing activity and contradicted I & I’s claims.\nRulings by the ATIR and case law (e.g., 2000 PTD 874, 2018 PTD 1188, and 2018 PTD 726) confirm that blending and mixing are manufacturing activities.\nThe departments own earlier refund orders under Section 170(4) had recognized the taxpayer’s manufacturing status; the subsequent action under Section 221 was deemed a mere change of opinion, which is impermissible under law.\nAccordingly, all tax demands and consequential proceedings under Section 221 were annulled, and the refund orders under Section 170(4) were directed to be processed under the law.\nCitations:\n2000 PTD 874\n2018 PTD 726\n2018 PTD 1188\nITA No. 369/PB/2017, dated 07.02.2019 (Al Khyber Tea & Food Co. case)\nTelenor Pakistan, 2017 PTD 118 (re: interpretation of “process”)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29c),148(7),153(7)(iv)(b),170(4),221,221(1),221(2)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2013/KB/2024 (Tax year 2018) ITA No. 2014/KB/2024 (Tax year 2019) ITA No. 2015/KB/2024 (Tax year 2020) ITA No. 2016/KB/2024 (Tax year 2021), ITA No. 2017/KB/2024 (Tax year 2023), decided on 13th December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naeem-ul-Haq, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Jafri, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "APPELLANT: M/S. IKRAM UDDIN, KARACHI\nVS \nRESPONDENT: THE DCIR, UNIT-4, RANGE-B, ZONE-II, RTO-1, KARACHI." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26176", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1259 = 2025 SLD 1259 = 2025 PTCL 506", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODc", - "Key Words:": "Customs Valuation – Application of Transactional Value and Identical Goods Method under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe Reference Applications under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, were filed by the Collector of Customs (East) and Collector of Customs (West) challenging a common judgment dated 07.06.2023 passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi. The judgment in question related to various appeals filed by importers against assessments made under Section 25(5) of the Customs Act, 1969, where customs authorities rejected declared transactional values and instead assessed the imports using the identical goods method based on earlier imports made by the same importers.\nThe High Court observed that the department had failed to properly formulate questions of law and criticized the vague and excessive number of questions posed. The Court proceeded to rephrase and limit the questions to the following core issues:\nWhether assessment under Section 25(5) based on outdated Goods Declarations was lawful?\nWhether the importers transactional values should be accepted under Section 25(1)?\nWhether earlier Tribunal judgment in Customs Appeal No. K-713/2022 applied?\nThe Court found that:\nThe assessments made under Section 25(5) were based on Goods Declarations dated May 2020, whereas the contested imports occurred from February 2021 onwards. Since Section 25(5), read with Rule 107(a) of the Customs Rules, 2001, allows for comparisons only within 90 days of the importation date, reliance on the May 2020 GD was misplaced.\nThe importers had provided sufficient evidence under Section 25(3) to prove that the declared values were not influenced by any relationship with the sellers. The department failed to raise any inquiry or objections under Section 25(4), nor did it produce evidence to disprove the transactional values.\nThe earlier decision in K-713/2022 was based on assessments under Section 25(9) (fallback method), which is fundamentally different from Section 25(5). Thus, the Tribunal rightly held it was not applicable to the current cases.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed all Reference Applications and upheld the Tribunals findings. It held that:\nThe use of identical goods method (Section 25(5)) based on outdated transactions violated the 90-day rule under Rule 107(a).\nThe declared transactional values qualified under Section 25(1) read with Section 25(3), as no valid objections were raised by the department under Section 25(4).\nThe Tribunal was correct in distinguishing the prior judgment in K-713/2022 as it pertained to a different valuation method (Section 25(9)).\nThe Court emphasized the binding nature of factual determinations made by the Tribunal and warned the customs department against poorly drafted reference applications, stating that future instances could attract costs or dismissal for improper prosecution.\nCitations:\n2008 PTD 1478 – Lahore High Court ruling on procedural obligations of customs authorities under Section 25(4)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25(1),25(3),25(3)(b)(1),25(5),25(9),81,193,193(A)(3),196Customs Rules, 2001=107(a) ,110,117", - "Case #": "Spl. Cus. Ref. A. 1355 to 1467, 1546 to 1557/2023. Date of hearing & order: 22.02.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR MR. JUSTICE ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicant(s): Mr. Faheem Raza, Advocate.\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Khalid Jawed Khan along with M/s. Irfan Ali & Uzair Shoro, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, APPR. (WEST), KARACHI \nVS \nM/S. JW SEZ (PVT) LTD., LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26177", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1260 = 2025 SLD 1260", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODY", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax – POS Integration – Penalty for Non-Compliance – Scope of Tier-1 Retailer Definition\nDetails:\nThe appeal concerned the imposition of a penalty of Rs. 500,000/- on a registered person (taxpayer) for failure to integrate with FBR-approved Point of Sale (POS) vendors, as required for Tier-1 retailers under Sections 2(43A), 3(9A), and 40C of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Rule 150ZEA of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006.\nThe Inland Revenue Officer passed Order-in-Original No. 08/2021 dated 30.12.2021, imposing the penalty. The taxpayer appealed the decision before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), Multan, who annulled the penalty order on 03.02.2021, holding that:\nThe taxpayer’s shop size was less than the prescribed 1000 sq. ft. limit.\nThe Assessing Officer failed to verify the actual area or refute the taxpayer’s claim with any documentary evidence.\nThe order was passed arbitrarily, without discussing the merits or documentary facts and in violation of due process.\nThe department filed a second appeal to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), challenging the annulment. It contended that even one qualifying condition under Section 2(43A) was enough to categorize a retailer as Tier-1 and justify POS integration.\nHowever, the Tribunal, per Member Ch. Muhammad Azam, upheld the CIR(A)s order, finding that:\nThe Assessing Officers order was based on assumptions and lacked evidentiary support.\nThere was no verification of the shop’s size, and the taxpayer’s documents were not rebutted.\nThe entire proceedings lacked due process, and the penalty was unjustified.\nThe appeal was filed within the limitation period (communicated 10.03.2022; filed 30.04.2022).\nHeld:\nThe penalty order was annulled for being unlawful and unsubstantiated. The appeal filed by the Department was dismissed. The order emphasized the importance of fair trial, verification, and due process in fiscal proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(43A),3(9A),40C,33(25)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=150ZEA", - "Case #": "STA No. 117/MB/2022. Date of Hearing & Order: 16.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mashooq Hussain, DR.\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Shahid Saleem, ADV.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE CIR, RTO, MULTAN ….. Appellant\nVs\nM/S CITY MALL, KOT ADDU …… Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26178", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1261 = 2025 SLD 1261 = (2025) 132 TAX 111", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODU", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax on Legal Practitioners under Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012\nDetails:\nThe Lahore High Court Bar Association, Lahore Tax Bar Association, and Lahore Bar Association challenged the applicability of Entry 52 of the Second Schedule to the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012, arguing that legal practitioners (as defined under the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act, 1973) are not subject to sales tax under the said entry. The dispute centered on whether legal practitioners providing services such as corporate and tax consultancy fall within the scope of taxable services listed in Entry 52.\nThe Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA) contended that the term corporate law consultants used in Entry 52 should be interpreted to include legal practitioners. However, the petitioners maintained that neither the term legal practitioners nor advocates appears in the first column of Entry 52, even though the classification code 9815.2000 (which includes legal practitioners) is mentioned in the second column.\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. It held that:\nLegal practitioners are not mentioned in the first column of Entry 52 and thus cannot be subjected to tax under that entry.\nClassification codes in the second column are only relevant if corresponding service providers are listed in the first column.\nLegal practitioners and corporate law consultants are distinct and mutually exclusive professions.\nA taxing provision must be interpreted strictly; no tax liability can be imposed by implication or inference.\nThe deliberate exclusion of legal practitioners from Entry 52 reflects legislative intent not to tax their services.\nThe Court allowed the petitions, declaring that legal practitioners as defined in the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act, 1973, do not fall within the ambit of Entry 52 and therefore are not liable to pay sales tax under the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012.\nCitations:\nPLD 1967 Lahore 227 (A.M. Khan Leghari v. Govt. of Pakistan)\n2007 PTD 67 (Haji Muhammad Sadiq case)\n2017 PTD 1372 (PTV v. CIR)\n2020 SCMR 420 (CIR v. WI-TRIBE)\n2007 SCMR 1367 (Lucky Cement case)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=Entry 52 of the Second ScheduleLegal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973=2(e)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 26565 of 2015. Date of hearing: 16-04-2025. Date of order: 02.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Muhammad Ahmad Qayyum and Faisal Islam Advocates for petitioners.\nSyed Ijaz Hotiyana Advocate for respondent/PRA.\nMr. Hussain Ibrahim Assistant Advocate General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "LAHORE HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS \nVS\nPROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26179", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1262 = 2025 SLD 1262", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODQ", - "Key Words:": "Sales Tax – POS Integration – Penalty for Non-Compliance by Tier-1 Retailer\nDetails:\nThe appellant/Department filed an appeal against the order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), Multan, which had annulled the penalty imposed on the respondent (a registered person) for failing to integrate their business with FBR-approved Point of Sale (POS) systems, as required under Section 3(9A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe department had charged the respondent under Sections 2(43A), 3(9A), and 40C of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and Rule 150ZEA of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, for non-compliance and imposed a penalty of Rs. 500,000/- under Section 33(25). The respondent contended that they did not qualify as a Tier-1 retailer, particularly because their shop area was less than the 1000 square feet threshold prescribed under Section 2(43A)(e) of the Act.\nThe CIR(A) annulled the penalty, holding that the respondents claim was backed by documentary evidence, and that the Assessing Officer had arbitrarily issued the penalty without verifying the facts or discussing the shop size in the order. It was noted that the tax authority did not verify the respondent’s contentions nor did it present any measurements or supporting documents. Moreover, two other taxpayers operated from the same premises, further questioning the assumption of Tier-1 status.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal upheld the CIR(A)’s order and dismissed the departments appeal. It confirmed that the Assessing Officer acted without due process and based the penalty on mere assumptions. Since the registered person did not meet the conditions of a Tier-1 retailer, the penalty for non-integration with POS under the Sales Tax law was unjustified.\nEmphasis on due process and fair trial, consistent with constitutional rights.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(43A),3(9A),33(25),40CSales Tax Rules, 2006=150ZEA", - "Case #": "STA No. 115/MB/2022. Date of Hearing & Order: 16.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Mashooq Hussain, DR.\nRespondent by: Mr. M. Shahid Saleem, ADV.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE CIR, MULTAN ZONE, RTO, MULTAN ….. Appellant\nVs\nM/S: UNITY SUPER SOTRE, KOT ADDU …… Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26180", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1263 = 2025 SLD 1263", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTOC8", - "Key Words:": "Condonation of Delay & Interim Stay – Failure of Lawful Service of Order under Sales Tax Act\nDetails:\nThe appellant sought condonation of delay in filing an appeal against an ex parte assessment order dated 28.06.2023, passed by the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue, Rawalpindi, on the ground that the order was never served as required under Section 56 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe appellant contended that the order was only discovered during recovery proceedings when the department approached their bank for enforcement. Upon becoming aware, they immediately obtained a certified copy of the order and filed the present appeal. The AR submitted that no statutory notices or the impugned order were lawfully served on the taxpayer, and the record was devoid of any credible evidence of service. Notably, the taxpayer’s certified copy of the order lacked any acknowledgment of receipt, while the department’s copy bore one, which appeared suspicious and potentially interpolated.\nThe Tribunal examined both copies and requisitioned the original assessment file, which was found incomplete, missing essential order sheet entries and proof of due service. The Tribunal held that the department failed to establish lawful service of the order, and hence the delay in filing the appeal was justified. The appeal was deemed to have been filed promptly upon actual knowledge of the order, satisfying the legal standard for condonation of delay.\nOn the stay application, the Tribunal noted that the department had issued a recovery notice under Section 48 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, dated 10.04.2025. Since related matters for the same tax year were already pending before the Tribunal under Section 11(2), and recovery could cause irreparable harm, an interim stay was granted.\nHeld:\nCondonation of Delay: Allowed. The delay was attributable solely to the department’s failure to serve the order lawfully and was thus excusable.\nStay Application: Allowed. Interim stay granted for 30 days against recovery proceedings. The department was directed to detach any attached bank accounts and refrain from coercive recovery until the next hearing scheduled for 12.06.2025.\nEstablished jurisprudence on service of orders, right to fair hearing, and condonation of delay due to lack of knowledge of impugned order.\nLegal maxim: No litigant benefits from delaying their own appeal.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),48,56", - "Case #": "MA (Cond) STA No.67/IB/2025, MA (Stay) STA No.127/IB/2025, In STA No.102/IB/2025 (Tax Period-2019-20s). Date of hearing & Order: 26-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Nasir Iqbal, Member AND Danish Ali Qazi, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate & Mr. Zafran Yousaf, Advocate \nRespondent by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Waheed Shah Khattak, M/s Al-Majeed Marble & Granite, Industrial Area, Range Road, Westridge-III, Rawalpindi \nvs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, Cantt Zone, Unit-III, RTO, Rawalpindi." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26181", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1264 = 2025 SLD 1264", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTOCs", - "Key Words:": "Departmental Appeal – Dismissal Due to Misapplication of Annexure “F” as Stock Statement\nDetails:\nThe department filed an appeal against the appellate order dated 08.02.2017 passed by the CIR (Appeals), Multan, challenging the annulment of the original assessment order. The assessing officer had alleged tax evasion for the tax periods from 07/2011 to 06/2012, asserting that the registered person suppressed raw material stocks in sales tax returns, in violation of Sections 3, 6, 22, 23, 26(2), and 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The officer imposed sales tax liability of Rs. 11,427,302 along with default surcharge under Section 34 and penalty under Section 33.\nThe CIR (Appeals) observed that the department had treated differences in figures between the sales tax return (Annex-F) and income tax return as suppressed supplies. However, Annex-F being newly introduced was incomplete, as the taxpayer did not show monthly consumption. Once consumption was factored in, closing stock figures reconciled with income tax records. Therefore, the CIR (Appeals) deleted the original order.\nThe department challenged this relief on the ground that the CIR(A) ignored the stock discrepancy and failed to provide the department an opportunity of hearing as required under Section 45B(2) of the Act.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal dismissed the department’s appeal, holding that:\nThe CIR(A)s decision was supported by proper reasoning and record examination.\nAnnex-F cannot be equated with a proper stock statement for purposes of creating sales tax liability.\nThe departments attempt to rely solely on Annex-F data without considering consumption figures or providing contrary evidence was unjustified.\nThe department failed to raise any convincing legal or factual argument warranting interference.\nCitations:\nITA No. 2641/LB/2022 – M/s Haroon Brothers v. CIR: Annex-F cannot be treated as conclusive stock statement for tax liability across statutes.\nEmphasis on substance over form and proper procedural compliance in assessments.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.719/LB/2017. Date of Hearing: 21.07.2023. Date of Order: 07.08.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. MUHAMMAD NAEEM, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Qaswar Hussain, DR. \nRespondent by: Mr. Kanwar Tanveer Anjum, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE CIR, RTO, MULTAN …….. APPELLANT \nVS \nM/S. AHMED INDUSTRIES (PVT) LTD. ……. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26182", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1265 = 2025 SLD 1265", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODk", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Ex-Parte Assessment Order under Section 122(1) – Jurisdictional Error and Violation of Natural Justice\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, Bano Feeds (Pvt.) Ltd., filed a first appeal directly before the Appellate Tribunal under the newly enacted Tax Laws (Amendments) Act, 2024, against an ex-parte amended assessment order dated 28.02.2025 passed under section 122(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The case was selected for audit under section 177 for the tax year 2020, and despite issuance of notices, no compliance was made by the taxpayer.\nThe assessing officer, without procuring any record or issuing notice under section 177(10), finalized an ex-parte order under section 122(1). The taxpayer challenged this on multiple legal grounds, including that:\nNo best judgment assessment under section 121 was made despite complete non-compliance;\nSection 122(1) was wrongly invoked without satisfying conditions under section 177(6A);\nNo specific and separate notice under section 111 was issued for additions made thereunder;\nNatural justice was violated by failing to give adequate opportunity of being heard.\nThe Tribunal held that the assessing officer had committed a jurisdictional error by proceeding under section 122(1) when the case warranted action under section 121, in terms of section 177(10), due to non-compliance. Moreover, absence of due opportunity, failure to issue notice under section 111, and reliance on assumptions and presumptions vitiated the assessment process.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal annulled the ex-parte amended assessment order dated 28.02.2025 in toto, declaring it to be illegal, coram non judice, and without lawful authority. The appeal of the taxpayer was accepted.\nCitations:\n2012 PTD 964 – Requirement of proper opportunity before ex-parte order\n2012 PTD (Trib.) 312; 2013 PTD (Trib.) 790; 2015 PTD (Trib.) 1242 – Invalidity of additions u/s 111 without proper notice\n2024 PTD 483 – CIR v. Millat Tractors Ltd. – Jurisdictional requirement for separate notice u/s 111", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,121(1)(d),122(1),177(6),177(10)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 91/MB/2025. Date of Hearing: 16-05-2025. Date of Order: 29-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, MEMBER AND CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM,\nMEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Niaz Ahmad Khan, Adv., Rehan Ahmad Khan, Adv. \nRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Ahmad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Bano Feeds (Pvt.) Ltd., Pakpattan …… Appellant \nVs \nCIR, Okara Zone, RTO, Sahiwal …… Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26183", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1266 = 2025 SLD 1266", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTODg", - "Key Words:": "Legality of Action under Section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a registered person under the Sales Tax Act, filed an appeal directly before the Tribunal against the impugned order dated 24.04.2025 passed u/s 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR), Okara Zone. The CIR had authorized access to the appellant’s business premises and the examination of sales tax records for the tax period July 2024 to February 2025. The action was based on analysis of tax returns but not on any prior audit or formation of opinion under Section 25 about involvement in tax fraud.\nThe Tribunal examined whether the CIR could invoke Section 38 powers without first forming an opinion based on an audit under Section 25. It held that action under Section 38 for suspected tax fraud is contingent upon prior audit and substantiated evidence indicating tax evasion or fraud. The absence of such audit and due process rendered the CIR’s order unlawful.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal declared the impugned order under Section 38 to be illegal, void ab initio, and without jurisdiction. The detention of records was also held unlawful. The CIR was directed to return all seized documents to the appellant. The appeal was accepted.\nCase Law:\nMuhammad Azim v. CIT, (1991) 63 Tax 143 (H.C. Kar)\nM/s Iqbal and Sons v. Federation of Pakistan, PTCL 2017 CL 627 (H.C.)\nW.P No. 24062 of 2016 (regarding preconditions for invoking S.38 based on S.25 audit)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=25,38,40Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "STA No. 106/MB/2025. Date of Hearing: 16-05-2025. Date of Order: 29-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD MOHSIN VIRK, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Niaz Ahmad Khan, Adv. alongwith Mr. Rehan Ahmad Khan, Adv. \nRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Ahmad, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S BANO FEEDS (PVT.) LTD., 14-KM, BUREWALA ROAD, ARIFWALA, PAKPATTAN ….. APPELLANT \nVS \nCIR, OKARA ZONE, RTO, SAHIWAL ……. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26184", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1267 = 2025 SLD 1267", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTOHo", - "Key Words:": "Disallowance of Head Office Expenditure – Interpretation under Pak-China DTT\nDetails:\nM/s BGP Pakistan International (NTN:0757432-7), a Permanent Establishment (PE) of a Chinese non-resident entity, filed an appeal against an order dated 27.06.2022 under Section 124 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, disallowing head office expenditures of Rs. 1.4 billion. The PE was audited for Tax Year 2015, where a demand of Rs. 241.19 million was raised. After partial remand by CIR(A), the DCIR again disallowed the head office expenditures. The matter was then transferred to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) under Section 126A(4) of the Ordinance.\nThe central issue was whether the head office expenditures were allowable under Article 7(3) of the Pak-China Double Taxation Treaty (DTT), which allows deduction of expenses “for the purposes of the business of the permanent establishment.” The taxpayer submitted an auditor’s certificate and financials supporting its allocation under Section 105(2) of the Ordinance.\nThe Tribunal examined the interaction between Article 7(3) of the DTT and domestic provisions, specifically Section 105(2). It held that any restriction under Section 105(2) that does not apply equally to resident companies violates Article 25(2) of the DTT, which mandates non-discrimination. Accordingly, head office expenses incurred for the overall business are deductible by the PE if reasonably allocated.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal accepted that head office expenses incurred for the overall business, including the PE, are deductible, provided they are supported by documentation.\nSection 105(2) of the Ordinance cannot restrict the deduction due to Article 25(2) of the Pak-China DTT, which prohibits discriminatory treatment.\nHowever, factual confirmation is required through a revised auditor’s certificate verifying that only executive and administrative expenditures incurred for the overall business were included.\nThe case was remanded to DCIR with directions to obtain such revised documentation. If the taxpayer fails to provide it, the burden of proof would lie on them.\nJudgment Referred: M/s Iqbal and Sons v. Federation of Pakistan (PTCL 2017 CL 627)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=105,105(2),107,122(5),124,126A,214C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1644/IB/24 (Tax Year 2015). Date of hearing: May 08, 2025. Date of Order: June 03, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN LATIF MINHAS (MEMBER) AND SHARIF UD DIN KHILJI (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ms. Maryam Fatima (ITP) KPMG Taseer Hadi & Co. \nRespondent by: Mr. Farrukh Amir Sial", - "Petitioner Name:": "BGP PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL HOUSE NO. 06, HILL ROAD, F-6/3 ISLAMABAD \nVS \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTO, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26185", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1268 = 2025 SLD 1268", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTOHk", - "Key Words:": "Suspension of Sales Tax Registration – Violation of Rule 12 of Sales Tax Rules, 2006\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a registered person under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, challenged the order dated 25-03-2024 passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO Multan, under Section 21(2) of the Act. The registration was suspended based on allegations that the appellant had received input tax invoices from a bogus entity, M/s Sardar International, and sold goods to another fictitious entity, M/s Techno Parts Engineering Services. Physical verification found the latters business premises to be non-existent. Despite this, the appellant claimed no notice of the proceedings and argued that the suspension was arbitrary and in violation of procedural safeguards. The department failed to produce proof of service or issuance of the mandatory show cause notice under Rule 12(a)(vi) of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, within seven days of suspension. The appellant relied on precedent from W.P. No. 39468/2018; 2018 PTD 1042, asserting violation of due process and principles of natural justice.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held that failure to issue a show cause notice within seven days of the suspension, as mandated by Rule 12(a)(vi), renders the suspension void ab initio under Rule 12(a)(vii). Since no notice was issued nor evidence of service produced, the suspension order was declared legally non-existent from inception. The sales tax registration of the appellant was ordered to be restored immediately. Any future proceedings must strictly follow the law and principles of natural justice.\nCitations:\nW.P. No. 39468/2018, 2018 PTD 1042", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),21(2),46(1)(b)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12(a)(i)(A),12(a)(i)(C)", - "Case #": "STA No. 219/MB/2024, MA (Stay) No. 390/MB/2024, Tax Periods: 09/2023 to 10/2023. Date of hearing: 09.04.2024. Date of Order: 05.05.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, MEMBER AND CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Safdar Ansari, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Mashooq Hussain, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. TECHNO PARTS & ENGINEERING. SERVICES, 33-V, SERVICE ROAD, NEW MULTAN ….. APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, MULTAN ZONE, RTO, MULTAN …… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26186", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1269 = 2025 SLD 1269", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDc", - "Key Words:": "Input Tax Adjustment on Invoices from Blacklisted or Fake Suppliers – Burden of Proof and Validity of Suspension\nDetails:\nThe department filed a Reference Application under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, against a judgment dated 16.01.2024 by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), Islamabad, which had ruled in favor of the taxpayer, M/s. Galaxy Enterprises. The department alleged that the respondent had claimed input tax of Rs. 7,109,019/- during Tax Years 2019–2022 on invoices issued by blacklisted/suspended/fake entities, constituting tax fraud under Section 2(37). The Assistant Commissioner passed an ex parte recovery order after no reply to the Show Cause Notice. The CIR(A) upheld the decision, but the ATIR reversed it, holding that no inquiry was conducted, and suppliers were active at the relevant time.\nThe department posed two questions of law centered on whether input tax claimed on fake invoices could be disallowed under Section 8(1)(d) and whether the ATIR erred in failing to recognize that the invoices had no nexus with actual supply of goods.\nHeld:\nThe High Court upheld the ATIR’s decision, emphasizing that:\nThere was no evidence of suppliers being blacklisted at the time of invoice issuance.\nThe department failed to establish that sales tax was not deposited.\nMere presumption of tax fraud due to later blacklisting of suppliers does not suffice.\nThe Court reiterated principles from 2023 PTD 1492 and STR No.18/2010 requiring the department to prove that invoices were issued during the period of blacklisting or suspension and that no tax was deposited. Since the Revenue did not discharge this burden, the questions of law were answered against the department, and the reference application was dismissed.\nCitations:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd., 2023 PTD 1492 (SC)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Rafaqat Marketing, STR No. 18 of 2010 (LHC – Larger Bench)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),7,8(1)(ca),8(1)(caa),8(1)(d), 8A,22,23,26,47,73", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 01 of 2025. Date of hearing: 13.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE AND RASAAL HASAN SYED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate with Yousaf Khan, S.O. IR (Hqrs) RTO, Rawalpindi.\nRespondent No. 1 by:\nMr. Imran ul Haq, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE\nV.\nM/S GALAXY ENTERPRISES AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26187", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1270 = 2025 SLD 1270", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDY", - "Key Words:": "Tribunals Key Observations\nProcedural Flaws in Audit:\nAudit proceedings lacked due process:\nReused content from earlier notices without fresh analysis.\nFailed to issue a proper Audit Report under Section 177(6), violating legal requirements.\nDelayed issuance of the Audit Report by 3 years, indicating inefficiency.\nRecommendations: Improved training for officers, comprehensive document requests (IDRs), and adherence to timelines.\nSubstantive Rulings on Disallowances:\nAdvertisement & Marketing (Rs. 16.5M):\nRuling: Deleted. Expenses are revenue in nature (not capital). Relied on *Islamabad High Court (ITR 249/2011)*.\nLegal & Professional Charges (Rs. 13.7M):\nRuling: Deleted. Withholding tax applies at payment (not accrual).\nRent Expense (Rs. 11.2M):\nPartial Allowance: Rs. 7.1M (warehousing services) allowed; Rs. 4M disallowed for non-compliance.\nSalaries & Travel Expenses:\nRemanded for verification of withholding compliance.\nActuarial Loss (Rs. 6.9M):\nRuling: Deleted. Payments from a recognized gratuity fund are tax-exempt.\nCosts linked to CMPAK/HEC (Rs. 719.9M):\nRuling: Deleted. No valid confrontation; accounting adjustments ≠ taxable income.\nUSF Subsidy (Rs. 395.9M):\nRemanded to verify if subsidy was offered for tax.\nUnabsorbed Depreciation/Losses (Rs. 14.3B):\nRemanded to verify based on prior years’ assessments.\nTax Credit u/s 148 (Rs. 27.2M):\nRuling: Adjustable (not final tax). Import tax is final only if income arises from resale (not for own use).\nOther Additions Deleted:\nOperating costs of discontinued operations (WiMax), customer service charges, and disallowed depreciation.\nFinal Outcome\nAllowed: Deletions totaling ~Rs. 1.3B (A, B, F, G, H, I, J, K, N).\nPartially Allowed: Rent expense (partial).\nRemanded: Salaries, travel, USF subsidy, unabsorbed losses (M, O), and brought-forward losses.\nTax Credit: Adjustable (u/s 148).\nSignificance\nLegal Precedents:\nAdvertising ≠ intangible asset (*Islamabad HC, ITR 249/2011*).\nImport tax u/s 148 is adjustable for service-sector companies unless goods are resold.\nSystemic Reforms: Tribunal urged FBR to improve audit quality, training, and compliance with timelines.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1635/IB/24 (Tax year 2015). Date of hearing: May 15, 2025. Date of order: June 01, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHARIF UD DIN KHILJI (MEMBER) AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mirza Taqi ud Din (FCA) A.F. Ferguson & co.\nRespondent by: Mr. Farrukh Amir Sial", - "Petitioner Name:": "WATEEN TELECOM (PVT) LTD MAIN WALTON ROAD, OPPOSITE BAB-E-PAKISTAN, WALTON CANTT, LAHORE\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTO, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26188", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1277 = 2025 SLD 1277", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDU", - "Key Words:": "Whether the Banking Court had jurisdiction to hear a property dispute involving a non-banking finance company (Respondent No. 1) when the appellant (property owner) was not a customer under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO 2001).\nBackground\n•\nThe appellant’s property papers were submitted as bail surety in a 2003 criminal case but never returned.\n•\nIn 2007, Respondent No. 1 (Pak Gulf Leasing) claimed the property was mortgaged to them and threatened auction, despite no prior relationship with the appellant.\n•\nThe appellant sued first in civil court (2007), then in Banking Court (Suit 578/2007) after being redirected.\n•\nThe Banking Court conducted a full trial but dismissed the suit at the final stage for lack of jurisdiction, ruling the appellant was not a customer under FIO 2001.\nHigh Court’s Decision\n1.\nJurisdiction Issue Upheld:\no\nBanking Courts only handle disputes between financial institutions and their customers (FIO 2001, Section 2(c)).\no\nThe appellant, having no banking relationship, rightly fell outside this scope.\n2.\nProcedural Justice Violated:\no\nThe Banking Court erred by raising the jurisdiction issue after a full trial, causing 18 years of delay.\no\nCourts must resolve jurisdictional doubts early (actus curiae neminem gravabit: court errors must not prejudice parties ).\no\nSending the appellant between courts without remedy breached natural justice.\n3.\nRelief Granted:\no\nTransferred Suit 578/2007 from Banking Court to the competent civil court.\no\nDirected the civil court to:\n\nResume proceedings from the final arguments stage (using existing evidence).\n\nDecide the case within 3 months of transfer.\nKey Legal Principles\n•\nInherent Powers (CPC Section 151): Appellate courts may transfer cases to prevent injustice.\n•\nEx debito justitiae: Litigants must be restored to their rightful position if court errors cause harm.\n•\nConstitutional Rights: Protections under Articles 4, 10-A, 23–25 (due process, property rights) were infringed by procedural delays.\nOutcome\nAppeal allowed: Case remanded to civil court for expedited disposal.\n(Summary: 198 words)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(C),7(4)Code of Civil Procedure of 1882=Order VII Rule 10,11", - "Case #": "1st Appeal No. 103 of 2018. Date of hearing: 11.02.2025. Date of decision: 26.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant: Through M/s Abdul Shakoor and Fahad Ali, Advocates\nRespondent: Nemo.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ANIS \nVS\nM/S. PAK GULF LEASING COMPANY LIMITED & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26189", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1276 = 2025 SLD 1276", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Whether the SECP Registrars order (13.05.2020) directing B.R.R Guardian Modaraba’s directors to provide undertakings and initiate recoveries was legally valid.\nPetitioners Arguments\n1.\nJurisdiction: Registrar appointed by SECP, not Federal Government (violating Section 3, Modaraba Ordinance 1980).\n2.\nProcedural Flaws:\no\nShow-cause notice issued 18 months after inquiry (alleged mala fide).\no\nImpugned order passed 6 months post-hearing (undue delay).\n3.\nPersonal Liability: Directors (Petitioners 3–9) condemned unheard (violating Article 10A, Constitution).\nCourt’s Findings\n1.\nNo Action Taken: Impugned order was cautionary (no coercive steps yet), negating malice claims.\n2.\nRegistrar’s Appointment Valid:\no\nSECP empowered under Section 20(4)(o), SECP Act to exercise Registrar’s functions.\no\nPetition not a quo warranto challenge (Registrar not personally impleaded).\n3.\nNo Illegal Delay:\no\nShow-cause issued 9 months post-inquiry report (14.01.2019 → 29.10.2019), not 18 months.\no\nNo precedent voids orders for procedural delays.\n4.\nDirectors’ Liability:\no\nUndertaking directive is general and aligns with regulatory duties.\no\nRecovery actions require prior case analysis (per Para 30 of order).\n5.\nRegulatory Duty: SECP must protect certificate holders; inquiry revealed uncoded payments/uninsured losses.\nOutcome\nPetition dismissed:\n•\nNo fundamental rights violation (Article 199 jurisdiction not invoked).\n•\nSECP acted within statutory mandate to ensure Modaraba compliance.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Modaraba Companies and Modaraba (Floatation and Control) Ordinance, 1980=3,8(4)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A,199Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, (XLII of 1997)=20(4)(o)", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-3523 of 2020. Date of Hearing: 02.09.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, CJ MR. JUSTICE JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: Through Mr. Sameer Tayebally Advocate.\nRespondents No.1: Through Mr. Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Attorney General.\nRespondents No.2 and 3: Through Mr. Furqan Ali Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "B.R.R Guardian Modaraba & others \nVs\nFederation of Pakistan & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26190", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1271 = 2025 SLD 1271", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNC8", - "Key Words:": "The Department challenged Order No. 793/2018 by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), Rawalpindi, which remanded the taxpayer’s case back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for reassessment.\nBackground:\nInitial Assessment:\nTaxpayer declared income of Rs. 929,083 for Tax Year 2014 (deemed accepted under Section 120).\nCase selected for audit under Section 214C.\nDiscrepancy found: Bank records (Faysal Bank & MCB) showed credit entries of Rs. 15,518,812 and closing balances of Rs. 3,179,050 – inconsistent with declared income.\nAmended Assessment:\nAO issued show-cause notice under Sections 122(9), 111(1)(b), and 111(1)(d)(i).\nTaxpayer did not respond.\nAO revised income to Rs. 21,000,342 under Section 122(4).\nAppeal to CIR(A):\nTaxpayer appealed the amended assessment.\nCIR(A) remanded the case (Order dt. 18.01.2018), directing the AO to:\nRe-examine material aspects overlooked initially.\nAfford the taxpayer due opportunity.\nIssue a fresh assessment order.\nDepartment’s Grievance & Tribunal’s Findings:\nDepartment’s Claim: Challenged the remand order as prejudicial.\nTribunal’s Observations:\nRemand was procedural fairness, not final relief to the taxpayer.\nCIR(A) acted within jurisdiction to ensure just adjudication by addressing AO’s lapses.\nNo prejudice to Department: Remand allows proper reassessment; no legal infirmity identified.\nDepartment failed to demonstrate how the remand order harmed revenue interests.\nOutcome:\nDepartment’s appeal dismissed.\nRemand order upheld to enable fair reassessment.\nKey Legal Points:\nRemand Authority: Higher appellate bodies (like CIR(A)) have inherent power to remand cases for re-adjudication.\nBurden of Proof: Department must prove prejudice from remand; failed here.\nProcedural Justice: AO must consider all material facts and grant hearing opportunities.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),111(1)(d)(i),120,122(1),122(4),122(5),122(9),176,214C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 675/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2014). Date of Hearing & Order: 07.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR\nRespondent By: Sheikh Saifullah, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI ……. APPELLANT\nVS\nMR. RASHID MEHMOOD: M/S SM SHAFI 7 CO. BB-720-14, DOSEHRA GROUND, ASGHAR MALL ROAD, RAWALPINDI ….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26191", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1272 = 2025 SLD 1272", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNCs", - "Key Words:": "Core Legal Issue\nWhether the Commissioner of Inland Revenue has jurisdiction under Section 221(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to rectify mistakes in deemed assessment orders issued under Section 120 (where returns are automatically treated as assessment orders without active review by the tax authority).\nBackground\nDeemed Assessments (Section 120): When taxpayers file complete returns, the law deems these returns as formal assessment orders issued by the Commissioner.\nRectification Power (Section 221): Allows the Commissioner to amend any order passed by him to correct mistakes apparent from the record.\nHigh Courts Ruling: Both Lahore & Islamabad High Courts held that Section 221(1) does not apply to deemed assessments under Section 120. Their reasoning:\nDeemed orders lack application of mind by the Commissioner.\nThe phrase order passed by him (Section 221) excludes deemed orders (Section 120).\nSupreme Courts Decision\nKey Holdings\nDeemed Orders Are Rectifiable:\nSection 120(1) creates a dual legal fiction:\nClause (a): Deems the Commissioner to have made an assessment. \nClause (b): Deems the return to be an assessment order. \nThis fiction implies the Commissioner applied his mind to the return. Thus, deemed orders qualify as orders passed by him under Section 221(1).\nRejection of High Courts View:\nThe High Courts erred by ignoring the sequential deeming process in Section 120(1). Clause (a) (deemed assessment) precedes Clause (b) (deemed order), establishing jurisdictional basis for rectification.\nStatutory Interpretation:\nLegal fiction under Section 120 must be given full effect (Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner applied).\nExcluding deemed orders from Section 221 would leave taxpayers without recourse to correct mistakes, even beneficial ones.\nOutcome:\nAppeals ALLOWED.\nCommissioner has jurisdiction to rectify mistakes in deemed assessment orders.\nImpugned High Court judgments set aside.\nPractical Implications\nTax authorities may now rectify errors (e.g., computational mistakes, omissions) in returns processed under Section 120.\nTaxpayers can seek rectification of deemed assessments under Section 221.\nFinal Order\nAll departmental appeals allowed.\nCases remanded to High Courts to decide pending legal questions per this judgment.\nNo costs awarded.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=120,120(1),120(2A),122,221,221(1),", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No.2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2034 of 2022, Civil Appeals No.308, 503 of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.3468-L, 3477-L, 1917-L, 1918-L, 2149-L, 2150-L, 2607-L, 2608-L, 2788-L, 2789-L, 2790-L of 2022, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No. 905-L, 1463-L, 1464-L, 1465-L of 2023, 3665-L of 2022, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No. 2352-L, 2353-L, 2354-L, 3177-L, 3399-L, 3400-L of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.106-L, 1155-L, 1268-L, 1450-L of 2024, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.216-L of 2025, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.156-L of 2024, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal No.2627-L of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.3659-L, 3660-L,.3661-L, 3662-L of 2022, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.3327-L, 3328-L, 3329-L, 3330-L, 431-L, 3014-L of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal No.2340 of 2024, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.4583,.4584, 4585 of 2023, Civil Petition for Leave to Appeals No.5359 and 531-L of 2024(On appeal against judgments dated 27.04.2022, 17.05.2022, 15.06.2022, 23.02.2023, 03.04.2023, 04.04.2023, 07.03.2022, 25.05.2022, 18.10.2022, 09.05.2023, 12.10.2023, 30.10.2023, 30.11.2023, 12.12.2023, 20.05.2024, 08.05.2024, 13.05.2024, 14.01.2025, 30.11.2023, 12.06.2023, 19.10.2022, 18.09.2023, 22.11.2022, 26.06.2023, 11.03.2024, 20.09.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore and Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in PTRs No.334/2013, 335/2013, 336/2013, 333/2013, 337/2013, 286/2014, ITR No.55/2016, 04/2016, 34473/2022, 29379/2022, PTR No.121/2014, ITR No.65930/2022, 65929/2022, 18361/2022, 18366/2022, 475/2015, 476/2015, PTR No.208/2011, 209/2011, 255/2014, 256/2014, 257/2014, ITR No.10198/2023, 21986/2023, 21979/2023, 21991/2023, 224/2015, 225/2015, 226/2015, 227/2015, 228/2015, 229/2015, 63076/2022, 30039/2023, 30071/2023, 30135/2023, 66961/2023, 71684/2023, 78778/2023, 81673/2023, 31022/2024, 28057/2024, 29173/2024, 1542/2025, 78977/2023, 38844/2023 PTR No.237/2012, 238/2012, 239/2012, 240/2012, ITR No.58743/2023, 58757/2023, 58760/2023, 58768/2023, 567/2010, 43943/2023, 01/2021, 44/2012, 43/2012 and 42/2012.). Date of Hearing: 08-04-2025. Date of Order: 05-06-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK MR. JUSTICE SHAHID WAHEED", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants/: Mr. Ahmad Pervaiz, ASC\n(via video link, Lahore in CA Nos.2026-2028/2022, CA.2034/2022, 308/2023, 503/2023, CPLA No.1917-L/2022, 1918-L/2022, 2788-L to 2790-L/2022, 2352-L to 2354-L, 156-L/2024, 2627-L/2023) \nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR\nMr. Ibrar Ahmad, ASC\n(in CA Nos.2029 to 2031, 2033 of 2022, CPLA Nos.3468-L, 3477-L, 2149-L, 2150-L of 2022, 905-L/2023, 1463-L to 1465-L/2023, 3177-L, 3399-L, 3400-L of 2023, 106-L/2024, 1155- L/2024, 531-L/2024, 1268-L of2024 and 216- L of 2015)\nMr. Shahbaz Butt, ASC\n(via video link, Lahore in CPLA Nos.2326-L to 2331-L of2022)\nMr. M. Yahya, ASC\n(via video link, Lahore in CPLA Nos.3665-L, 3659-L to 3662-L of 2022, 3327-L to 3330-L of 2023)\nMian Yousaf Umar, ASC\n(via video link, Lahore in CPLA No.1450-L/2024)\nMr. Amir Wakeel Butt, ASC\n(via video link, Lahore in CPLA No.431-L/2023)\nMr. Babar Bilal, ASC\n(in CPLA Nos.4583 to 4585/2023)\nMalik Qamar Afzal, ASC\n(in CPLA No.5359/2024)\nFor the \nMr. Shahbaz Butt, ASC\n(via video link, Lahore in CA Nos.2031/2022, 2034/2022, 503/2023)\nMr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, ASC\n(in CPLA No. 106-L/2024)\nMr. Muhammad Amjad Khan, ASC \n(via video link, Lahore in CA No.308-L/2023)\nMs. Asma Hamid, ASC\n(via video link, Lahore in CPLA Nos.2326-L to 2331-L/2022)\nMr. Wasif Majeed, ASC\n(via video link, Lahore in CPLA Nos.3659-L to 3662-L/2022)\nMr. Manzoor Hussain, ASC (in CPLA No.2340/2024)\nFor the Federation: Mr. Munawar Iqbal Duggal, Addl. AGP\nFor the Department: Dr. Ishtiaq, D.G. (Law) FBR, Ms. Sobia Mazhar, Addl. Commissioner, Mr. Hassan, Addl. Commissioner", - "Petitioner Name:": "C.As.2026, 2027, 2028/2022\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Sialkot\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot: \nC.As.2029 to 2033/2022, C.P.L.As.3468-L, 3477-L , 2149-L, 2150-L /2022, 905-L, 1463-L, 1464-L, 1465-L, 3399-L to 3400-L /2023\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore: \nC.As.2034/2022, 308, 503/2023, C.P.L.As.1917-L, 1918-L, 2607-L, 2608-L , 2788-L, 2789-L, 2790-L /2022, 2352-L to 2354-L, 3177-L /2023, 106-L, 1155-L, 1268-L/2024, 216-L/2025, 156-\nL/2024, 2627-L/2023, 3659-L, 3660-L to 3662-L/2022, 431-L, 3014-L /2023 and 531-L/2024 \nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad:\nC.P.L.A.3665-L/2022 \nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-VI, CTO, Lahore: \nC.P.L.A.1450-L/2024\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Gujranwala: \nC.P.L.As.3327-L to 3330-L/2023\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (South Zone), Regional Tax Office (RTO), Islamabad:\nC.P.L.A.2340/2024 \nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-I), Large Taxpayers Unit, Islamabad: \nC.P.L.As.4583, 4584 and 4585/2023 \nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Corporate Tax Office, Islamabad \nCorporate Tax Office, Islamabad ……………. Appellants / Petitioners\nM/s White Gold Steel Mills, S.I.E. Daska\nC.A.2026/2022 and C.P.L.A.2354-L/2023\nM/s Chaudhary Steel Mills, S.I.E., Daska\nC.A.2027/2022\nM/s Royal Steel Mills S.I.E. Daska\nC.A.2028/2022 and C.P.L.A.2352-L/2023 \nM/s M.M. Steel Mills, S.I.E. Daska\nC.A.2029/2022 and C.P.L.A.2353-L/2023\nM/s Islam Steel Mills, S,I,E. Daska\nC.As.2030/2022 and 1465-L/2023\nM/s Ch. Mushtaq & Co. Sialkot \nC.A.2031/2022 \nM/s Muhammad Kamran Butt\nC.A.2032/2022 \nImran Aslam\nC.A.2033/2022 \nM/s Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd., Lahore\nC.A.2034/2022 \nM/s Jamhoor Textile Mills Ltd., Lahore\nC.A.308/2023\nM/s Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Lahore\nC.A.503/2023 \nKamran Haider\nC.P.L.A.3468-L/2022 \nSyed Nadeem Abbas Sharazi\nC.P.L.A.3477-L/2022 \nM/s Crescent Bahuman Ltd., Lahore\nC.P.L.As.1917-L and 1918-L /2022\nMr. Ghulam Farid, Sialkot\nC.P.L.As.2149-L and 2150-L /2022\nM/s Punjab Oil Mills, etc., Ltd., Lahore, etc.\nC.P.L.As.2607-L and 2608-L /2022\nM/s Chenab Steel Re-Rolling Mills, Lahore\nC.P.L.As.2788-L to 2790-L /2022 \nMuhammad Hanif\nC.P.L.A.905-L/2023 \nM/s Allah Din Steel & Re-Rolling Mills, Daska\nC.P.L.A.1463-L/2023 \nM/s Mubarak Traders, Opposite NBP, Sambrial\nC.P.L.A.1464-L/2023 \nM/s Ikrama Cotton Factory Jhang Road, Gojra, etc.\nC.P.L.A.3665-L/2022\nM/s Qavi Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore \nC.P.L.A.3177-L/2023 \nM/s Qaiser Electronics, Sialkot\nC.P.L.A.3399-L, 3400-L//2023\nM/s Gate Healthcare 1 Pak (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore\nC.P.L.A.106-L/2024\nSyed Nadeem Abbas\nC.P.L.A.1155-L/2024\nM/s Family Hospital (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore\nC.P.L.A.1268-L/2024 \nM/s Shabbir Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.\nC.P.L.A.1450-L/2024 \nMaverick International (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore\nC.P.L.A.216-L/2025\nM/s Central Media Network (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore\nC.P.L.A.156-L/2024 \nM/s Raaziq International (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore\nC.P.L.A.2627-L/2023 \nM/s Lahore University of Management & Sciences, Lahore\nC.P.L.A.3659-L to 3662-L /2022\nM/s Usman International (Pvt.) Ltd., Gujranwala\nC.P.L.A.3327-L to 3330-L /2023 \nM/s Rafi Electronics Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore\nC.P.L.A.431-L/2023 \nM/s Potential Engineers (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore\nC.P.L.A.431-L/2023 \nM/s Liquid Fuels, Islamabad\nC.P.L.A.2340/2024 \nM/s AAR & Co., Civic Centre, Islamabad\nC.P.L.A.4583 to 4585/2023 \nM/s ITC Logistics (Pvt.) Ltd. through its Assistant Manager and others Mr. Shafqat Riyasat\nC.P.L.A.5359/2024" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26192", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1273 = 2025 SLD 1273", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Grant of Bail – Tax Fraud – Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe applicant, Syed Abu Bilal Imam, sought bail in two separate FIRs involving allegations of tax fraud under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The first FIR (No. 01/2023) accused him of using fake and flying invoices through his proprietorship M/s. Bilal Enterprises to fraudulently claim input tax adjustments without any real trading activity. A related second FIR (No. DC-IV/Zone-I/LTO/01) originally targeted Nawab Khan and Aftab Ahmed of two other entities (M/s. A.H. Impex and M/s. Malik Aftab & Imtiaz Brothers), where the applicant was later implicated through a supplementary challan as a part of the supply chain issuing fake invoices.\nWhile an ex-parte adjudication under Section 11(2) had declared a large amount of sales tax evaded by the applicant, no refund of sales tax was proven to have been granted. The main issue was the use of fake invoices, including from Saeed & Co., whose proprietor was deceased. However, the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the suppliers were suspended or blacklisted at the time of transaction or how the applicant obtained fake invoices.\nMoreover, the alleged offences occurred before the Finance Act, 2024, which increased the punishment under Section 33(11) from 3 years to 10 years. Hence, the offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 CrPC.\nImportantly, the principal accused in the second FIR had already been granted bail, and therefore, the applicant was granted bail on the rule of consistency.\nHeld:\nBail granted in both FIRs on the grounds that:\nThe offence did not fall under the prohibitory clause;\nPrincipal accused in the related FIR had already been granted bail;\nThe evidence required further inquiry;\nThe allegations did not justify denial of bail on the basis of crime against society alone.\nCitations:\nTaj International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FBR, 2014 PTD 1807\nDirectorate of I & I-FBR v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd., SC Short Order dated 04.12.2024\nAli Shan v. Directorate of I & I (IRS), 2017 PCr.LJ Note 189", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),11(2),33,33(11)Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497", - "Case #": "Spl. Cr. Bail Application No. 110 & 111 of 2025. Date of hearing & Order: 29-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Khalid Javed Raan, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Spl. Cr. Bail Application No. 110 of 2025.\nAPPLICANT: SYED ABU BILAL IMAM SON OF ABU NASSAR THROUGH MR. ABDUL SAMAD MEMON, ADVOCATE.\nVS\nTHE STATE: THROUGH MR. GHULAM ASGHAR PATHAN, ADVOCATE ALONG WITH I.O. JAVED NAWAB.\nSpl. Cr. Bail Application No. 111 of 2025\nAPPLICANT: SYED ABU BILAL IMAM SON OF ABU NASSAR THROUGH MR. ABDUL SAMAD MEMON, ADVOCATE.\nVS\nTHE STATE: THROUGH MR. NADEEM YASEEN, ADVOCATE." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26193", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1274 = 2025 SLD 1274", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNDg", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Remand of Tax Assessment Appeal – Limitation and Lack of Evidence – Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012\nDetails:\nThe appeal arose from the order dated 20.12.2023 issued by the Commissioner (Appeals), Punjab Revenue Authority, Lahore, whereby the assessment order was affirmed and the appellant’s contentions were dismissed. The appellant raised two principal issues:\nLack of Evidentiary Basis: The Commissioner (Appeals) allegedly failed to disclose or substantiate the evidence on which it was concluded that the appellant had begun providing taxable services before the relevant taxable period.\nLimitation Period: The order ignored Section 24 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012, which bars assessment beyond eight years prior to the issuance of notice. No findings were provided to explain whether any part of the tax period assessed fell outside this statutory limit, especially regarding services provided prior to the enactment of the 2012 Act.\nThe Tribunal noted that the impugned order lacked detailed reasoning, failed to demonstrate evidentiary support for the Commissioner’s conclusions, and did not address jurisdictional limitation under Section 24. It emphasized that jurisdictional facts must be clearly adjudicated, particularly where limitation issues arise, as failure to do so could render the assessment invalid.\nHeld:\nThe appeal was allowed for the limited purpose of remand.\nThe Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the Commissioner (Appeals), PRA, Lahore, with directions to:\nRe-examine and articulate any evidence proving provision of taxable services prior to the relevant period.\nSpecifically address and determine whether the assessment is time-barred under Section 24.\nNext Hearing Date: 26.08.2024 before Commissioner (Appeals-II), PRA.\nCitations:\nPunjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012, Section 24 (Limitation)\nPrinciples of due process and burden of proof in tax adjudication", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=24", - "Case #": "Appeal No: 101/2024. Date of Decision: 05.08.2024", - "Judge Name:": "Coram: Bakht Fakhar Bahzad, Chairperson. Raza Ashfaq Sheikh, Accountant Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Imran Sujrani, Advocate / AR for the Appellant. \nMuhammad Afzal, Deputy Secretary (Legal-II), DR for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RIVER GARDEN HOUSING SCHEME ...... Appellant\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER (APPEALS-II) PUNJAB REVENUE AUTHORITY, LAHORE. etc. ..... Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26194", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1275 = 2025 SLD 1275 = (2025) 132 TAX 403", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNHo", - "Key Words:": "Key Facts\n1.\nSeizure: Customs intercepted the vehicle in Peshawar (2022), suspecting smuggling due to:\no\nNo record in customs database.\no\nChassis number showed no tampering (FSL report).\n2.\nLower Courts:\no\nCustoms Appellate Tribunal: Released the vehicle (Nov 2024).\no\nPeshawar High Court: Upheld release, citing:\n\nVehicle was duly registered under Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965.\n\nBurden of proof shifted to Customs under Section 187, Customs Act.\n\nNo obligation for owner to retain import records beyond 5 years (Section 211).\n________________________________________\nSupreme Courts Decision\nDismissed Customs petition. Key rulings:\n1.\nBurden of Proof (Section 187):\no\nVehicle registration under provincial law creates a presumption of lawful import.\no\nBurden shifts to Customs to prove smuggling if registration documents are produced.\n2.\nRecord-Keeping (Section 211):\no\nOwners need not retain import records beyond 5 years.\no\nNon-production of old documents cannot justify seizure.\n3.\nLawful Excuse vs. Authority:\no\n Lawful excuse (defense for possession under Section 156) ≠ lawful authority (Section 187).\no\nRegistration provides a lawful excuse against smuggling allegations post 5-year period.\n4.\nPrecedents Followed:\no\nAdditional Director, FBR v. Imran Khan (2021 PTD 1683): Registration documents discharge initial burden.\no\nFederation v. Muhammad Jamal Rizvi (2012 PTD 90): Mere chassis tampering allegations insufficient without proof of smuggling intent.\n________________________________________\nFinal Outcome\n•\nVehicle release upheld.\n•\nCustoms cannot seize registered vehicles >5 years old solely for non-production of import documents.\n•\nCritical Directive: Customs must collaborate with Motor Registration Authorities to verify vehicles at registration stage, not arbitrarily seize them later.\nSignificance\nClarifies that provincial vehicle registration trumps customs suspicion in absence of concrete evidence of smuggling, especially for older vehicles.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3),187Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,156(1)(8),156(1)(89),156(2),168(1),196,211Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1),3(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 288-P/2025. Date of Hearing & Order: 23.04.2025\n(Against the order dated 12.02.2025 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Custom Ref. No. 154-P/2024 with CM No. 100-P/2024)", - "Judge Name:": "BENCH-II: MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR, MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA MALIK AND MR. JUSTICE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Ishtiaq Ahmad, ASC (Via Video Link, Peshawar)\nFor the Respondents: N.R.\nAssisted by: Ms. Zainab Bashir, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION (CUSTOMS), FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE …… PETITIONER\nVS\nZAMAN KHAN 85 OTHERS ……. RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26195", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1278 = 2025 SLD 1278", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJTNHk", - "Key Words:": "Dispute: Employees sought reinstatement and regularization after termination. Labour Court & Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLAT) ruled in their favor. GEPCO challenged these decisions.\nKey Groups:\nSchedule-A: Employees terminated after contract expiry despite satisfactory service.\nSchedule-B: Employees terminated for concealing higher qualifications (above Matriculation).\nGEPCOs Arguments\nJurisdiction: Labour Court lacks jurisdiction because:\nEmployees governed by statutory rules (WAPDA Rules 1978), not labour laws.\nGEPCO is a federal entity (electricity = federal subject under Constitution).\nState-Owned Enterprises Act, 2023 overrides labour laws.\nRegularization:\nNo policy for regularization; contracts explicitly stated no regularization. \nBan on permanent recruitment by federal government justified contractual hires.\nSchedule-B: Termination valid due to fraudulent concealment of qualifications.\nEmployees Arguments\nJurisdiction:\nGEPCO is a commercial/industrial establishment under ICESO Ordinance 1968 (distributes/sells electricity).\nNo statutory rules apply; relationship is master-servant (labour courts have jurisdiction).\nPermanent Status:\nCompleted 9+ months of satisfactory service → automatic permanent status under ICESO 1968.\nDiscrimination: Co-employee Sulman Rafique regularized; others denied despite identical service.\nSchedule-B: Qualification clause in advertisement was ambiguous; termination disproportionate.\nCourts Key Findings\n1. Jurisdiction of Labour Court\nGEPCO is an industrial establishment under ICESO 1968:\nEngages in electrical undertaking (Section 2(bb)).\nDistributes/sells electricity → commercial activity.\nNo statutory rules apply:\nMere adoption of WAPDA Rules 1978 does not make them statutory for GEPCO.\nEmployees governed by master-servant principle → labour courts have jurisdiction.\n2. Permanent Status & Regularization\nEmployees appointed against permanent posts (Assistant Lineman).\nCompleted 9+ months satisfactory service → deemed permanent workmen under ICESO 1968 (Standing Order 1(b)).\nDiscrimination proven: Co-employee Sulman Rafique regularized → violation of Article 25 (Constitution).\n3. Schedule-B Cases (Concealment of Qualification)\nAdvertisement clearly disqualified over-qualified candidates.\nEmployees concealed higher qualifications → appointments void ab initio.\nLabour Court/PLAT erred in ignoring this → termination justified.\n4. Other Issues\nState-Owned Enterprises Act, 2023: Does not regulate employee terms → labour laws prevail.\nMalafide Conduct: GEPCO applied repealed laws (Removal from Service Ordinance 2000) in appointment letters.\nDecision\nSchedule\nOutcome\nReasoning\nA (32 Petitions)\nDismissed\nEmployees permanent; discrimination proven; reinstatement/regularization upheld.\nB (6 Petitions)\nAllowed\nAppointments void due to concealment; Labour Court/PLAT orders set aside.\nCosts: None awarded.\nReporting: Approved as precedent.\nKey Precedents Cited\nPakistan Electric Power Co. v. Syed Salahuddin (SCMR 2022): Non-statutory rules → master-servant relationship.\nTown Administration v. Mohammad Khalid (SCMR 2024): 9+ months service → permanent status.\nSui Southern Gas Co. v. Federation (SCMR 2018): Provincial labour laws apply to federal commercial entities.\nFinal Order\nSchedule-A: GEPCO to reinstate/regularize employees.\nSchedule-B: Terminations upheld; no relief to employees.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2296 of 2020. Dates of hearing: 04.12.2024 & 22.05.2025. Date of order: 29-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Syed Mujib-ul-Hassan, Advocate alongwith Muhammad Azhar Toor, Deputy Manager (HR), GEPCO.\nRespondent No. 1 by: M/s Mirza Aamer Baig and Abdul Aleem Khan, Advocates in Writ Petition Nos. 22374/2020, 22376/2020, 22379/2020, 22383/2020 and 22387/2020.\nMr. Azfar Hakeem Awan, Advocate in Writ Petitions Nos.2282/2020, 2283/2020, 2292/2020, 2294/2020, 2308/2020, 2311/2020, 2312/2020, 2315/2020, 2317/2020, 2318/2020, 2323/2020, 2327/2020, 2328/2020, 2333/2020, 2334/2020, 2335/2020 & 2336/2020.\nRana Saaib Mumtaz, Advocate in W.P. No.22386/2020.\nMr. Salman Riaz Ch., Advocate in Writ Petitions No. 2293/2020, 2314/2020 and 2338/2020.\nMr. Khalid Ismail, Advocate in Writ Petitions Nos. 2284/2020, 2309/2020 & 2324/2020.\nMr. Usama Zubair, Advocate for respondent No. 1 in WP No.2332/2020.\nOazi Waaar Majeed, Advocate in Writ Petition Nos. 2291/2020, 2296/2020, 2325/2020, 2326/2020, 2329/2020, 2331/2020, 2339/2020 & 2340/2020.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GUJRANWALA ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY ETC. \nVS\nAHSAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26196", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1279 = 2025 SLD 1279", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzc", - "Key Words:": "Core Legal Issues\nApplicability of Criminal Breach of Trust (Sections 405/406 PPC)\nThe court clarified that entrustment (property given as amanat with an obligation to return) is essential for establishing criminal breach of trust under Section 405 PPC.\nBusiness transactions (e.g., sale agreements with partial payments) do not constitute entrustment. Ownership transfers to the buyer, making the dispute civil (breach of contract) rather than criminal.\nMere use of terms like trust or amanat in the FIR is insufficient without fulfilling the legal elements of Section 405 PPC.\nBail Jurisprudence (Section 497 CrPC)\nOffences not covered by the prohibitory clause (i.e., punishable by <10 years imprisonment) favor bail as a rule, with refusal being an exception.\nExceptions for refusal (per Tariq Bashir v. State):\nRisk of absconding.\nThreat to evidence/prosecution witnesses.\nDanger of repeating the offence.\nPrevious conviction.\nMere registration of other FIRs is not grounds for bail denial; only proven convictions matter.\nCase-Specific Findings\nNo Entrustment: The vehicles were transferred via sale agreements (partial payments made), not as amanat. Thus, Section 406 PPC was inapplicable.\nBail Entitlement:\nOffence fell outside Section 497(1) CrPC’s prohibitory clause.\nNo exceptional circumstances (e.g., flight risk, evidence tampering) justified denial.\n5-month delay in FIR registration and non-recovery of vehicles further favored bail.\nBroader Judicial Directives\nPrevent Misuse of Criminal Law:\nCourts must scrutinize whether civil disputes (e.g., breach of contract) are improperly framed as criminal breach of trust.\nCriminal proceedings should not be weaponized to pressure parties in business disputes.\nBinding Precedents (Article 189, Constitution):\nLower courts must follow Supreme Court precedents (e.g., Tariq Bashir).\nBail in non-prohibitory clause cases must be granted unless exceptional circumstances exist.\nNon-compliance is judicial indiscipline.\nOutcome\nBail granted to the petitioner subject to bonds/sureties.\nCopies of judgment to be circulated to all High Courts and District Courts for strict compliance.\nSignificance\nThis judgment:\nReinforces the distinction between civil disputes and criminal breach of trust.\nStrengthens bail rights for offences outside Section 497(1) CrPC’s prohibitory clause.\nCondemns misuse of criminal law in contractual disputes.\nMandates adherence to binding precedents by subordinate courts.\nCase Citation: Muhammad Amjad Naeem v. The State (2025 SLD 1279, Supreme Court of Pakistan).", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=406", - "Case #": "CRIMINAL PETITION NO.170-L OF 2025. Date of Hearing: 23.04.2025. Date of Order: 19-05-2025\n(On appeal against the order dated 2 1.01.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. No.74957-B/2024)", - "Judge Name:": "Author(S): MR. JUSTICE SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD AND MR. JUSTICE MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the State: Mr. Waqar Ahmad Hanjra, ASC (through video link from Lahore)\nFor the Mr. Muhammad Jaffar, Addl. P.G, Pb., Mr. Rizwan, DSP, Mr. Shahbaz SI (through video link from Lahore)\nAssisted by: Mian Johar Imam Law Clerk, Mr. Habib Law Clerk", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AMJAD NAEEM …….. PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE STATE THROURGH PG PUNJAB AND ANOTHER …….. RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26197", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1280 = 2025 SLD 1280", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzY", - "Key Words:": "Background\n•\nThe respondent (M/s Safe Way Gas) filed refund claims under Section 170(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for excess advance tax collected under Section 235 (electricity consumption):\no\n2011: PKR 350,281\no\n2012: PKR 301,306\no\n2015: PKR 280,878\no\n2016: PKR 228,782\n•\nThe Assessing Officer rejected claims under Section 170(4), citing Section 234A(4) (bar on adjusting withholding tax under other heads).\nProcedural History\n•\nThe taxpayer appealed to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), Rawalpindi.\n•\nDuring proceedings, the Department revealed the matter was already before the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO), which issued an order (14.11.2017).\n•\nCiting Section 18 of the Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 (exclusive jurisdiction of FTO), the CIR(A) declined to adjudicate and disposed of appeals (08.03.2018).\n•\nThe Department appealed to the Tribunal against non-adjudication on merits.\nTribunal’s Key Finding\n•\nAt hearing (09.05.2025), the taxpayer’s counsel confirmed:\no\nIdentical appeals for the same tax years were already decided by the Tribunal on 08.05.2025.\n•\nVerification established the underlying dispute was resolved in prior proceedings.\nDisposition\n•\nDepartmental appeals dismissed as infructuous (no live controversy).\n•\nNo merits examined due to pre-resolution of core issues in earlier adjudication.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaway:\nAppeals become infructuous where the substantive dispute is resolved in parallel proceedings. Tribunals may dismiss appeals summarily without merits review in such cases.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=170(1),170(4),234A(4),235", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1073/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2011). ITA No. 1074/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2012), ITA No. 1075/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2015), ITA No. 1076/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2016). Date of Hearing & Order: 09.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR\nRespondent By: Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI …….. APPELLANT\nVS\nM/S SAFE WAY GAS, OFFICE NO. 01, 1ST FLOOR, SATELLITE PLAZA, 6TH ROAD RAWALPINDI …… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26198", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1281 = 2025 SLD 1281", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzU", - "Key Words:": "Core Legal Issues\n1.\nProcedural Validity of Unexplained Income Addition:\nWhether the Appellate Tribunal erred in remanding the case for de novo proceedings despite:\no\nNo separate notice under Section 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 being issued for additions under Section 111(1)(b).\no\nThe limitation period for amending assessments (expiring 30.06.2020) having lapsed.\n2.\nAdmissibility of Revised Wealth Statement:\nWhether the taxpayer could legally revise his wealth statement under Section 116(3) after receiving a show-cause notice (SCN) but before the assessment order.\nBackground\n•\nTax Year: 2014\n•\nInitial Assessment: Deemed assessment under Section 120(1) based on filed return and wealth statement.\n•\nShow-Cause Notice (20.01.2017):\no\nIssued under Section 122(5A) read with Section 122(9).\no\nProposed addition of PKR 33.94M as unexplained income under Section 111(1)(b).\n•\nRevised Statement (19.04.2017):\no\nTaxpayer submitted revised wealth statement before assessment order.\n•\nAssessment Order (30.06.2017):\no\nAdded unexplained income (PKR 33.94M), creating tax demand of PKR 11.35M.\no\nIgnored revised wealth statement.\n•\nFirst Appeal: Commissioner (Appeals) annulled the assessment (03.08.2017).\n•\nTribunal Order (11.12.2024): Remanded for de novo proceedings.\nArguments\nTaxpayer’s Contention:\n1.\nMandatory Separate Notice:\no\nMillat Tractors (2024 SCMR 700) requires separate Section 111 notice before additions.\no\nSCN cited Section 111 but was issued under Section 122(9) – invalid basis.\n2.\nTime-Barred Remand:\no\nLimitation to amend assessment expired on 30.06.2020 (per Section 122(2)).\no\nRemand effectively revives time-barred proceedings (ultra vires).\n3.\nRevised Statement Valid:\no\nSection 116(3) permits revision until assessment order – ACIR erred in disregarding it.\nDepartment’s Defense:\n•\nSCN confronted taxpayer with Section 111(1)(b) allegations – complied substantively.\n•\nRemand valid for fresh inquiry into sources of assets.\nCourt’s Analysis & Decision\n1.\nSeparate Notice Mandatory:\no\nFollowed Millat Tractors:\n Before amending assessment under Section 122 based on Section 111, proceedings under Section 111(1) must be initiated via separate notice. \no\nSCN issued under Section 122(9) is insufficient for Section 111 additions.\no\nFinance Act 2021 explanation (allowing combined notices) applies prospectively only.\n2.\nLimitation Bars Remand:\no\nPower to amend assessment lapsed on 30.06.2020 – no jurisdiction to reopen.\no\nRemand for de novo proceedings after limitation expiry is illegal (Falah ud Din Qureshi, 2021 PTD 192).\n3.\nRevised Wealth Statement Admissible:\no\nSection 116(3) permits revision anytime before assessment order – ACIR wrongly rejected it.\nDisposition\n•\nReference allowed.\n•\nTribunal’s remand order quashed.\n•\nCommissioner (Appeals)’s order annulling assessment restored.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\n1.\nStrict Procedural Compliance:\nAdditions under Section 111 require standalone notice – combined SCNs under Section 122 are void.\n2.\nLimitation Sanctity:\nRemand cannot revive time-barred proceedings (violates res judicata principles).\n3.\nTaxpayer’s Revision Rights:\nWealth statements can be revised until assessment order under Section 116(3).", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITR No. 24/2025. Date of hearing: 13.03.2025. Date of Order: 13.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MALIK MUHAMMAD AWAIS KHALID, JUSTICE AND BID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Adnan Haider, Advocate\nRespondents by: Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate Mr. Iftikhar Majid, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "KAMRAN HAIDER \nVS \nADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER, INLAND REVENUE & 05 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26199", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1282 = 2025 SLD 1282 = (2025) 132 TAX 422", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Key Issues\n1.\nLegality of Raid & Seizure: Whether the raid/seizure at Sanga Brothers premises violated Section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n2.\nMaintainability of Petition: Whether the petition was barred due to pending proceedings or alternative remedies.\n________________________________________\nPetitioner’s Arguments\n•\nRaid conducted without a specific warrant for Sanga Brothers (warrant named other entities: M/s Allah Baksh & Co. and Sanga Petroleum).\n•\nNo reasons to believe disclosed for the search.\n•\nNo independent witnesses during seizure (violating Section 40(2) read with Section 103 Cr.P.C.).\n•\nRaid conducted despite ATIR’s stay order against coercive recovery.\n•\nSection 40B violation: No officer lawfully appointed at premises.\n________________________________________\nRespondent’s Defense\n•\nEntities shared premises/proprietor; warrant covered the location, not specific labels.\n•\nSearch based on credible information of tax fraud (under-invoicing/suppression).\n•\nSection 103 Cr.P.C. (witness requirement) is directory, not mandatory in tax matters.\n•\nStay order only barred recovery, not investigation.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Findings\n1. Maintainability\n•\nPending cases (Sales Tax Ref. No. 77141/2024 & W.P. No. 54994/2024) involved distinct issues (recovery validity & criminal proceedings).\n•\nAlternative remedies (Sections 45B/46) do not cover procedural violations of Section 40.\n•\nPetition maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution.\n2. Violations of Section 40\n•\nNo Specific Warrant: Warrant omitted Sanga Brothers despite being a separate entity (NTN proof).\n•\nNo Valid Reasons to Believe :\no\nApplication cited supervision under Section 40B for coal sales, but no proof of officer’s appointment.\no\nPending proceedings (Order-in-Appeal/ATIR stay) not disclosed in warrant application.\n•\nAbsence of Independent Witnesses:\no\nSection 40(2) mandates compliance with Section 103 Cr.P.C. (independent witnesses).\no\nPrecedents (Master Enterprises, Food Consults, Pakistan Chipboard) reaffirm this as mandatory.\no\nRespondent’s fiscal exception argument rejected.\n3. ATIR Stay Order \n•\nStay order only restricted recovery, not investigative actions.\n•\nNot a bar to lawful search under Section 40.\n________________________________________\nDecision\n•\nRaid & seizure declared ILLEGAL for violating Section 40.\n•\nRespondents directed to:\n(i) Return seized records immediately.\n(ii) Refrain from using records against Petitioner.\n________________________________________\nLegal Principles Reaffirmed\n1.\nSection 40 Requirements:\no\nSpecific warrant naming the entity.\no\nValid reasons to believe backed by evidence.\no\nIndependent witnesses mandatory during search/seizure.\n2.\nSeparate Entities: Warrant for one entity cannot justify raiding co-located but distinct entities.\n3.\nProcedural Compliance: Tax authorities must strictly adhere to statutory safeguards.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaway: This judgment reinforces strict compliance with search/seizure procedures under tax law, emphasizing that procedural safeguards protect fundamental rights against arbitrary state action.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=40,40(1),40(2),40B,45B,46Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=103Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W. P. No. 47550 of 2024. Date of Judgment: 02.06.2025. Date of order: 12.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner By: Barrister Muhammad Umer Riaz, Advocate, Rana Rehan, Advocate, Barrister Ali Aun Awan, Advocate\nRespondents By: Ms. Riaz Begum, Advocate / Legal Advisor Syed Ali Raza Abbas, Assistant Attorney General", - "Petitioner Name:": "MALIK AMEER HAIDER SANGHA\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND 05 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26200", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1283 = 2025 SLD 1283 = 2025 PTD 1575", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYy8", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues\n1.\nLiability for Federal Excise Duty (FED):\nWhether PTVC (service recipient) is liable for FED under Section 3 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, or if liability rests solely with the service provider.\n2.\nMandatory ADR for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs):\nWhether PTVC (an SOE) must resolve disputes via Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) under Section 38 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005.\n3.\nRetrospective Application of Law:\nWhether Section 38 ADR requirements apply retrospectively to disputes initiated before the Act’s enactment.\nArguments\nApplicant (PTVC):\n•\nContested FED liability, arguing Section 3 imposes duty on service providers, not recipients.\n•\nChallenged retrospective application of Section 38 ADR mandate.\n•\nCited an unreported Lahore High Court judgment supporting prospective application of amendments.\nRespondents (Revenue Authorities):\n•\nAsserted PTVC’s liability based on agreements with foreign telecom service providers (1994–2004).\n•\nEmphasized mandatory ADR under Section 38 for SOEs, per proviso to Section 38(1).\n•\nHighlighted Supreme Court precedents (e.g., Elahi Cotton Mills) upholding legislative intent and constitutionality of fiscal statutes.\nCourt’s Analysis\n1.\nADR Mandate for SOEs (§38):\no\nThe proviso shall apply imposes a mandatory obligation on SOEs to use ADR.\no\n Shall denotes legislative intent for compulsory compliance (Haji Abdul Karim v. Florida Builders; Safear Travels).\no\nPTVC, as an SOE under the *State-Owned Enterprises Act, 2023*, must adhere to this mechanism.\n2.\nFiscal Statute Interpretation:\no\nLegislative wisdom in creating ADR for SOEs cannot be questioned (Elahi Cotton Mills).\no\nCourts must preserve laws unless ex facie unconstitutional.\n3.\nBinding Precedent:\no\nLahore High Court judgments are persuasive but not binding on Islamabad High Court (Articles 189 & 201, Constitution).\no\nEach High Court operates independently within Pakistan’s federal structure (Shahtaj Sugar Mills).\n4.\nRetrospectivity of §38:\no\nADR is a beneficial provision for dispute resolution and applies retrospectively as it does not impair vested rights.\nDisposition\n•\nReferences dismissed.\n•\nPTVC directed to resolve the dispute via ADR Committee under Section 38 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005.\n•\nOffice ordered to transmit the judgment to the Appellate Tribunal per Section 34A(5).\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaway:\nState-owned entities must exhaust ADR under §38 of the Federal Excise Act before judicial recourse, irrespective of retrospective application challenges. The word shall in statutory provisions implies mandatory compliance.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=34A,38Sales Tax Act, 1990=47A,68Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=16(2)", - "Case #": "Federal Excise Reference No. 174 & 175 of 2011. Date of hearing: 05.05.2025. Date of order: 21-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, JUSTICE AND INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Hafiz Muhammad Idrees Advocate.\nRespondents by: Barrister Muhammad Usama Rauf Advocate for respondents No. 2 & 3. Muhammad Saqib, proxy counsel for the respondent No. 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FEDERAL EXCISE REFERENCE NO. 174 OF 2011\nPAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION LIMITED \nVS\nTHE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE AND OTHERS\n&\nFEDERAL EXCISE REFERENCE NO. 175 OF 2011\nPAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION LIMITED \nVS.\nTHE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26201", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1284 = 2025 SLD 1284", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYys", - "Key Words:": "Key Facts\n1.\nShow Cause Notice: Issued on 31.01.2022 alleging smuggling.\n2.\nAdjudication Delay: OIO not passed within 30-day limit (Section 179(3)).\n3.\nExtension Request:\no\nFiled by Customs Collector on 28.09.2022 (after limitation expired).\no\nSought generic extension for 27 cases without individual justifications.\no\nFBR granted extension retrospectively.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issue\n*Whether FBRs extension under Section 179(4) validates an OIO passed beyond the 30-day limit?*\n________________________________________\nCourts Ruling\n1.\nTime Limit Mandatory:\no\nSection 179(3) deadline is mandatory, not directory.\no\nFailure to adhere invalidates adjudication (citing SC precedents):\n\nCollector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia Mohammad Din (2017 SCMR 1427).\n\nMujahid Soap & Chemical Industries v. Customs Appellate Tribunal (2019 SCMR 1735).\n\nA.J. Traders v. Collector of Customs (PLD 2022 SC 817).\n2.\nExtension Invalid:\no\nRequest made after limitation expired is impermissible.\no\nGeneric request for multiple cases without case-specific reasons is defective.\nResult:\n•\nReference Application DISMISSED.\n•\nTribunals judgment upheld (OIO void as time-barred).\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principle\nStatutory deadlines in tax/customs proceedings are STRICT. Extensions cannot cure time-barred actions, especially when sought belatedly without valid grounds.\nDate: 17 January 2025\nJudge: Arshad (Initials)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=16(1),16(2)Customs Act, 1969=2(s),179(3),179(4),196(5)", - "Case #": "S.C.R.A. No. 1518 / 2023. Date of order: 17.01.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): HON'BLE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR (AUTHOR), HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN (AUTHOR)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Khalid Rajpar, Advocate for Applicant", - "Petitioner Name:": "(DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION (CUSTOMS)\nVS\nALTAF HUSSAIN)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26202", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1285 = 2025 SLD 1285", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzk", - "Key Words:": "1.\nLimitation: Whether petitions were filed within the 30-day appeal period.\n2.\nTentative Rent Orders: Validity of orders directing deposit of:\no\nCategory A: Arrears from Nov 2019–Aug 2020 + future rent.\no\nCategory B: Arrears from April 2011–Aug 2020 (9+ years).\n3.\nStriking Off Defence: Landlord’s applications under Section 16(2) of Sindh Rent Law (SRPO 1979) granted (21.07.2022).\n________________________________________\nCourts Ruling\nCategory A (CP 390/2023 & 437/2023) – DISMISSED\n•\nTenant failed to challenge the 21.07.2022 order (striking off defence) within 30 days.\n•\nInstead, filed recall applications under Section 151 CPC (not rent law), which were dismissed.\n•\nNo illegality in orders; limitation strictly applied (citing *1993 MLD 2186*).\nCategory B (CP 434/2023, 435/2023, 436/2023) – ACCEPTED\n•\nTentative rent orders void ab initio for claiming arrears beyond 3 years (violating SRPO + Limitation Act).\n•\nRent Controller acted mechanically without inquiry into:\no\nExact rent rate.\no\nPeriod of arrears.\no\nTenant’s existing rent deposits in separate MRC.\n•\nAppellate authority erred in not condoning delay; remanded to Rent Controller for fresh decision within 6 weeks.\n________________________________________\nLegal Principles Applied\n•\nArrears Limit: Tentative rent orders cannot cover arrears >3 years (*2020 YLR 192*).\n•\nLimitation: Runs even against void orders; no condonation without proof of lack of knowledge (*1993 MLD 2186*).\n•\nCourt Errors: Must not prejudice parties (PLD 2001 SC 514).\n________________________________________\nFinal Order\nCategory\nOutcome\nConsequence\nA (CP 390 & 437)\nDismissed\nStriking off defence upheld.\nB (CP 434, 435, 436)\nAccepted\nOrders set aside; remanded to Rent Controller.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979=16(1),16(2)", - "Case #": "C. P. No. S - 434 of 2023, C. P. No. S - 390 of 2023, C. P. No. S - 435 of 2023, C. P. No. S - 436 of 2023. Date of order: Dated: 10.04.2025. Date of hearing: 16.02.2024 and 01.03.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner [in all Petitions]: Sarfarazuddin, through M/s. Naeem Akhtar and Muhammad Kamran Mirza, Advocates.\nRespondent No. 1: M/s Paras Commercial Company and Homi D. Ghadilly, through M/s. Junaid Alam Khan and Qazi Ajmal Khan, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "C. P. No. S - 434 of 2023\n[SARFARAZUDDIN VERSUS M/S PARAS COMMERCIAL COMPANY AND OTHERS]\nC. P. No. S - 390 of 2023\n[SARFARAZUDDIN VERSUS HOMI D. GHADILLY AND OTHERS]\nC. P. No. S - 435 of 2023\n[SARFARAZUDDIN VERSUS M/S PARAS COMMERCIAL COMPANY AND OTHERS]\nC. P. No. S - 436 of 2023\n[SARFARAZUDDIN VERSUS M/S PARAS COMMERCIAL COMPANY AND OTHERS]\nand\nC. P. No. S - 437 of 2023\n[SARFARAZUDDIN VERSUS M/S PARAS COMMERCIAL COMPANY AND OTHERS]" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26203", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1286 = 2025 SLD 1286", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpYzg", - "Key Words:": "•\nKey Disputes:\n1.\nValidity of Suit No. 290/2018 (Lucky Tex vs. Cresox for specific performance of a 2017 property sale agreement).\n2.\nLegality of compromise decrees (dated 14-02-2022) in banking suits (*B-21/2017*: HBL vs. Cresox; *B-34/2017*: FBL vs. Cresox).\n3.\nMaintainability of JM Apps 32/2022 & 33/2022 (challenging the compromise decrees).\n________________________________________\nCore Issues\n1.\nWhether Suit 290/2018 (specific performance) is barred under Section 23 of the Financial Institutions Ordinance, 2001, which restricts transfers of mortgaged assets during litigation.\n2.\nWhether the compromise decrees (2022) were obtained fraudulently by suppressing court injunctions (*Suit 290/2018* and *HCA 402/2018*).\n3.\nWhether an agreement to sell (without transferring title) violates Section 23.\n________________________________________\nCourts Ruling\n1. On Suit 290/2018 (Specific Performance)\n•\nAgreement Valid but Transfer Barred:\no\nThe sale agreement (25-09-2017) for mortgaged property (Plot A/40) is not void under Section 23, as it only transfers the equity of redemption (right to reclaim property), not the property itself.\no\nHowever, actual transfer via registered instrument would violate Section 23(1) & (2) since:\n\nBanking suits (*B-21/2017*, *B-34/2017*, *B-02/2014*, *816/2017*) were filed/published before the agreement.\n\nDecree in *Suit B-02/2014* (Pak Oman) was passed earlier (26-07-2017).\n•\nJurisdiction Lacking: Civil courts (not Banking Courts) cannot enforce the agreement due to Section 23 restrictions.\n•\nResult: Suit 290/2018 is rejected. Security deposited by Lucky Tex ordered released.\n2. On Compromise Decrees (JM Apps 32/2022 & 33/2022)\n•\nNo Fraud/Misrepresentation:\no\nHBL/FBL’s mortgage rights existed before the injunctions (2018). The decrees (2022) merely confirmed these pre-existing rights.\no\nNo suppression of facts: Banks were aware of injunctions but the decrees did not create new third-party interests.\n•\nResult: JM Apps 32/2022 & 33/2022 dismissed.\n3. On Section 23 Interpretation\n•\nAgreement ≠ Transfer: An agreement to sell only creates personal rights (to seek performance), not property rights. Thus, it does not violate Section 23.\n•\nActual Conveyance Void: Registered transfers without Banking Court permission are void under Section 23 if done post-summons/decree in banking suits.\n________________________________________\nFinal Order\n1.\nSuit 290/2018: Rejected for lack of jurisdiction.\n2.\nJM 32/2022 & 33/2022: Dismissed.\n3.\nCosts: No order as to costs.\nKey Legal Principles\nSection 23, Ordinance 2001: Bars transfers/alienations of mortgaged assets during banking suits without court permission.\nEquity of Redemption: Mortgagor retains the right to redeem/sell mortgaged property (subject to mortgagee’s rights).\nAgreement vs. Conveyance: Only registered instruments transfer title; agreements merely confer contractual rights.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "Suit No. 290 of 2018, Judl. Misc. No. 32 & 33 of 2022. Dates of Hearing: 8 September 2023 19 September 2023, 2 October 2023, 29 February, 2024 and 11 February 2025. Order date: 22-02-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff in Suit No. 290 of 2018: Through Mr. Ali Mehdi, Advocate \nDefendant in Suit No. 290 of 2018: Nemo\nRespondent No. 1: J.M. No. 32 of 2022: Mr. Hanif Faisal Alam, Barrister-at-law\nIn J.M. No. 32 of 2022: Mr. Waqar Ahmed, Advocate\nRespondent No 2 and 4 In J.M. No. 32 of 2022 : Mrs. Heer Memon, Barrister-at-law", - "Petitioner Name:": "Suit No. 290 of 2018\nM/S. LUCKY TEX (PVT.) LIMITED \nVS\nM/S. CRESOX (PVT.) LIMITED\nJudl. Misc. No. 32 of 2022\nM/s. Lucky Tex (Pvt.) Limited \nVs\nHabib Bank Limited & 4 others\nJudl. Misc. No. 33 of 2022\nM/s. Lucky Tex (Pvt.) Limited \nVs\nFaisal Bank Limited & 4 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26204", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1287 = 2025 SLD 1287", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpY3o", - "Key Words:": "Core Legal Issues\n1.\nJurisdictional Competence:\nWhether the High Court retains jurisdiction over a service matter after the Punjab Service Tribunal (PST) becomes functional, where the petition was initially entertained due to PST’s non-functionality.\n2.\nAbatement of Proceedings:\nWhether pending High Court proceedings automatically abate under Article 212(2) of the Constitution upon PST becoming functional.\n3.\nMaintainability of Challenge:\nWhether allegations of mala fides or lack of departmental appeal against inquiry proceedings override the constitutional bar under Article 212.\nBackground\n•\nPetitioner, a civil servant, challenged:\no\nInitiation of fresh departmental inquiry (allegedly reopening a past and closed transaction ).\no\nPersonal hearing notice.\n•\nPetition filed in High Court (05.07.2024) when PST was non-functional due to vacancy.\n•\nInterim relief granted (no coercive action).\n•\nPST became functional on 14.01.2025.\n•\nDepartmental inquiry concluded during proceedings (report submitted).\nArguments\nPetitioner’s Contention:\n•\nHigh Court assumed valid stop-gap jurisdiction during PST vacancy and must decide merits.\n•\nNo departmental appeal against inquiry initiation – warrants High Court intervention.\n•\nInquiry tainted by mala fides (violates earlier Supreme Court exoneration).\nDepartment’s Defense:\n•\nProceedings abate automatically under Article 212(2) once PST functional.\n•\nExclusive jurisdiction over service matters (including disciplinary inquiries) rests with PST.\nCourt’s Analysis & Decision\n1.\nAutomatic Abatement under Article 212(2):\no\nConstitutional Bar Absolute: Article 212(2) mandates abatement of pending proceedings before any other court once PST established/functional.\no\n Establishment Includes Resumption of Functionality: PST’s operational revival equates to establishment (Sarfraz Saleem v. Federation, PLD 2014 SC 232).\no\nStop-Gap Jurisdiction Ceases: High Court’s interim jurisdiction during PST vacancy dissipates upon PST becoming functional.\n2.\nNo Exception for Alleged Mala Fides or Lack of Appeal:\no\nDisciplinary proceedings fall squarely within PST’s exclusive domain under Article 212(1)(a).\no\nAllegations of mala fides or procedural irregularities must be raised before PST, not High Court (Peer Muhammad v. Govt. Balochistan, 2007 SCMR 54).\no\nFinal inquiry report is appealable to PST – petitioner not remedy-less.\n3.\nProcedural Compliance:\no\nSection 8, Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974: Confirms abatement; allows 90 days to refile before PST post-abatement.\nDisposition\n•\nPetition dismissed.\n•\nProceedings abated as of 14.01.2025 (when PST became functional).\n•\nPetitioner may approach PST within statutory timeframe.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\n1.\nArticle 212 is Non-Negotiable:\nHigh Courts lose jurisdiction over service matters the moment PST becomes functional, irrespective of pending proceedings.\n2.\nStop-Gap Jurisdiction is Temporary:\nEntertaining petitions during PST vacancy is an exception, not a permanent vesting of jurisdiction.\n3.\nPST is Sole Forum for Service Disputes:\nChallenges to inquiries – even on grounds of mala fides or procedural defects – must route through PST.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212,212(2)Punjab Service Tribunals Act, (IX of 1974)=8", - "Case #": "W.P No. 43029/2024. Date of Hearing: 29.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Muhammad Shahzad Hanif, Advocate, along with petitioner.\nRespondents by: Mr. Muhammad Saad Bin Ghazi, Assistant Advocate General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SARFRAZ \nVS\nSECRETARY, SPECIALIZED HEALTHCARE AND MEDICAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26205", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1288 = 2025 SLD 1288", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpY3k", - "Key Words:": "Core Legal Issue\nWhether post-bid submission of missing compulsory documents (affidavits/undertakings) constitutes a curable procedural defect under Rule 33(2) of the Punjab Procurement Rules 2014 (PPRA Rules), or a substantive non-compliance warranting bid rejection.\nBackground\n•\nTender: Procurement of surgical gloves by Jinnah Hospital, Lahore (2024-25).\n•\nPetitioner (Kaumedex): Technically qualified bidder.\n•\nRespondent 6 (Comedex): Bid rejected for failing to submit five compulsory undertakings (Clauses k–o) by submission deadline (14.05.2024), including:\no\nNon-prosecution for spurious devices (Clause m).\no\nNon-blacklisting status (Clause n).\n•\nGrievance History:\no\nTechnical Evaluation Committee (TEC) and Grievance Redressal Committee (GRC) upheld Comedex’s disqualification.\no\nPPRA overturned decisions (27.01.2025), permitting Comedex to submit documents post-deadline under Rule 33(2).\nArguments\nPetitioner’s Contention:\n•\nPPRA’s order illegally altered bid criteria by allowing post-dated documents, violating procurement integrity.\n•\nCompulsory requirements are non-waivable; non-compliance renders bid non-responsive. \nPPRA/Respondents’ Defense:\n•\nRule 33(2) permits post-bid clarifications for defects not affecting bid substance.\n•\nUndertakings were procedural affirmations (not technical/financial terms), curable without unfair advantage.\nCourt’s Analysis & Decision\n1.\nDistinction: Procedural vs. Substantive Defects:\no\nSubstantive Elements: Bid security, licenses, financial turnover, certifications (Clauses a–j) – impact commercial/technical merit and cannot be cured post-bid.\no\nProcedural Elements: Undertakings (Clauses k–o) affirm regulatory compliance – absence doesn’t alter bid’s core substance.\n2.\nRule 33(2) Permits Curing Procedural Lapses:\no\nPPRA validly allowed Comedex to submit missing documents as they:\n\nDid not change bid price, specifications, or competitiveness.\n\nWere factual affirmations (no disputed content).\no\nPolicy Rationale: PPRA advisories discourage disqualifying bids for mere procedural omissions – aligns with fairness and efficiency.\n3.\nNo Prejudice to Petitioner:\no\nComedex’s post-bid compliance conferred no undue advantage; procurement integrity remained intact.\nDisposition\n•\nPetition dismissed.\n•\nPPRA’s order upheld as legally sound under Rule 33(2).\n•\nCosts: None awarded.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaways:\n1.\nBid Compliance Hierarchy:\no\nSubstantive Defects (price, technical specs, financial capacity): Fatal to bid validity.\no\nProcedural Defects (affidavits, declarations): Curable post-bid if no impact on bid substance.\n2.\nRegulatory Flexibility:\nPPRA may intervene to prevent technical disqualifications where procedural lapses don’t undermine competition.\n3.\nDrafting Guidance:\nProcuring agencies should clearly distinguish between substantive and procedural requirements in tender documents.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014=33(2)", - "Case #": "W.P No. 14049/2025. Date of Hearing 22.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mian Muhammad Aslam, Advocate\nRespondents 1 to 4 by: Hafiz Muhammad Latif Khawaja, Additional Advocate General alongwith Awais Safdar, Assistant Director (Legal) on behalf of respondents No. 1 to 3.\nRespondent No. 5 by: Barrister Amar Saeed Sheikh, Advocate\nRespondent No. 6 by: Syed M. Ghazenfur, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "KAUMEDEX\nVS\nMANAGING DIRECTOR, PUNJAB PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26206", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1289 = 2025 SLD 1289 = (2025) 131 TAX 61", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTc", - "Key Words:": "Courts Decision\n1. Deletion of Agricultural Income Addition:\n•\nThe addition of Rs. 3,500,000 under Section 111(1)(d) (income from other sources) is deleted.\n•\nReason: Agricultural income from Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) is exempt under Section 41 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n2. Key Legal Grounds:\n•\nNo Agricultural Tax Regime in ICT:\no\nProvincial laws (e.g., Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act) do not apply to ICT.\no\nNo federal law imposes agricultural income tax on ICT land.\n•\nProviso to Section 111(1)(d) Inapplicable:\no\nThe proviso (requiring proof of agricultural tax payment) applies only if tax is payable under provincial law.\no\nSince ICT has no such law, the taxpayer’s explanation of agricultural income suffices.\n•\nExemption Under Section 41:\no\nAgricultural income is statutorily exempt; the burden to prove otherwise lies with the department.\n3. Department’s Errors:\n•\nFailed to issue a mandatory separate notice under Section 111 before invoking Section 122(5A).\n•\nIgnored the location-specific exemption for ICT agricultural income.\n•\nProvided no legal basis for treating exempt income as taxable.\n________________________________________\nFinal Outcome\n•\nAppeal Allowed: Assessment order and appellate confirmation annulled.\n•\nTax Demand Quashed: Addition of Rs. 3,500,000 deleted.\n________________________________________\nSignificance\nThis ruling:\n1.\nConfirms ICT Agricultural Income Exemption: Absent specific legislation, such income cannot be taxed.\n2.\nLimits Section 111(1)(d): The proviso applies only where provincial agricultural tax exists.\n3.\nReinforces Procedural Compliance: Separate Section 111 notices are mandatory for unexplained income additions.\nPractical Impact: Taxpayers with agricultural income from ICT need not pay income tax or prove tax payments until a valid law is enacted.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaway: Tax authorities must consider jurisdictional limitations and exemptions before making additions.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=41,111,111(1),111(1)(d),120(1),122(5A),122(9),122,131", - "Case #": "ITA No. 623/IB/2024 decided on 25.09.2024. Date of hearing: 25.09.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND NASIR IQBAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Khurshid, Advocate for the Appellant.\nMr. Shumail Tareen, DR., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "QAISAR AZEEM, SHIALA BAGH, P.O. SHIALA, ISLAMABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR, RANGE - I, ZONE SOUTH, RTO, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26207", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1290 = 2025 SLD 1290", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTY", - "Key Words:": "Key Issues\n1.\nAudit Legality:\no\nThe respondent’s case was selected for audit under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\no\nThe taxpayer objected, claiming exemption under FBR’s Audit Policy criteria.\no\nThe Assessing Officer overruled the objection and finalized an amended assessment (total income: Rs. 7,970,755).\n2.\nRefund Delay:\no\nThe Assessing Officer failed to process a refund under Section 70(4) within the statutory timeframe.\n________________________________________\nTribunal’s Ruling\n1.\nAudit Selection Invalid:\no\nThe FBR’s Audit Policy is binding delegated legislation.\no\nThe taxpayer’s case did not meet the criteria for audit selection under the policy.\no\nThe audit and subsequent assessment were unlawful and vitiated due to non-compliance.\no\nThe Department failed to provide evidence justifying the audit selection.\n2.\nRefund Direction Upheld:\no\nThe delay in issuing the refund was a departmental lapse.\no\nThe Commissioner Appeals’ (CIR-A) direction to process the refund within 45 days was lawful and reasonable.\n________________________________________\nFinal Decision\n•\nThe Tribunal dismissed the Department’s appeals.\n•\nThe CIR-A’s orders (Nos. 1245 & 1246 of 2017) were upheld as legally sound.\n•\nNo interference warranted due to the Department’s failure to prove legal/procedural errors.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles\n•\nAudit Policy Compliance: Field formations must strictly adhere to FBR’s Audit Policy. Deviations invalidate proceedings.\n•\nRefund Timeliness: Refunds must be processed within statutory deadlines; delays constitute a lapse.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2001=70(4),122(1),214C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 501/IB/2018, ITA No. 502/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2014). Date of Hearing & Order: 07.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M.M. AKRAM (Judicial Member)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Syed Zubair Shah, DR\nRespondent By: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, ABBOTTABAD ……. APPELLANT\nVS\nMR. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, CONTRACTOR, OGHI, MANSEHRA …….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26208", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1291 = 2025 SLD 1291", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTU", - "Key Words:": "•\nChallenge to Appellate Tribunal’s judgment upholding tax demands against PMCL for tax year 2018.\n________________________________________\nBackground\nPMCL transferred its telecom tower assets to wholly-owned subsidiary Deodar (Pvt.) Ltd. in 2017, recording an accounting gain of PKR 59.3 billion. PMCL claimed this transaction was tax-neutral under Section 97 of the Income Tax Ordinance (ITO), 2001 (no gain/loss on intra-group transfers). The tax department rejected this, levied taxes, and imposed Alternative Corporate Tax (ACT) under Section 113C.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision & Reasoning\n1. Jurisdiction of Commissioner\n•\nIssue: Whether Commissioner could pass reassessment order when power was delegated to Additional Commissioner.\n•\nRuling: Commissioner retains concurrent power under Sections 209–211 ITO. Delegation does not denude Commissioner’s authority.\n•\nKey Precedents:\no\nMuhammad Rafiq v. State (2019 SCMR 846)\no\nAllied Bank Ltd. v. CIR (2023 SCMR 1166)\n2. Section 97 ITO Benefit (Intra-Group Transfer)\n•\nPMCL’s Claim: Transaction qualified for tax deferral as PMCL and Deodar formed a wholly-owned group [Section 97(4)(a)].\n•\nTax Dept’s Argument: PMCL’s non-resident parent (VEON) controlled the group; accounting gain reflected real income.\n•\nRuling: Benefit denied.\no\nTransaction recorded at fair market value (USD 940M), not at written-down value.\no\nViolated Section 97(1)(c): Liability assumed by Deodar exceeded PMCL’s asset cost.\no\nSection 97 is a deferral provision, not exemption – cannot ignore economic reality.\n3. Taxability of Accounting Gain\n•\nIssue: Whether ACT under Section 113C applies to accounting gain (PKR 59.3B).\n•\nRuling: ACT applicable if accounting gain is not exempt under Section 113C(8).\no\nBut: Since Section 97 benefit was denied, ACT analysis was rendered moot.\n4. Industrial Undertaking Status\n•\nIssue: Whether PMCL qualifies as industrial undertaking for import tax relief [Section 148(7)].\n•\nRuling: Not an industrial undertaking in 2018.\no\nDefinition under Section 2(29C) amended in 2021 to include telecom companies.\no\nPre-amendment, telecom services did not involve manufacture or material processing. \n•\nRemedy: Remanded to Commissioner to determine if PMCL derived income from imports (per Telenor Pakistan precedent).\n5. Depreciation/Amortization\n•\nIssue: Tribunal’s failure to address carry-forward benefits.\n•\nRuling: No directions issued – pending adjudication for prior years.\n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nPMCL’s Appeal Dismissed on all grounds except:\no\nRemand on import tax demand [Section 148(7)] for factual inquiry.\n•\nTax Demand Upheld: PKR 59.3B gain is taxable.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles\n1.\nStatutory Delegation: Commissioner retains powers despite delegation to subordinates.\n2.\nSection 97 ITO:\no\nRequires transfer at written-down value (not fair market value).\no\nNot an exemption – defers tax until asset leaves the group.\n3.\nAccounting vs. Taxable Income:\no\nAccounting gain (per IFRS) ≠ Taxable income, but Commissioner can consider it under ITO.\n4.\nPurposive Interpretation:\no\nLimited to GAAR cases (Section 109 ITO). Textual interpretation preferred for fiscal statutes.\n5.\nIndustrial Undertaking: Subsequent legislative amendments clarify legislative intent.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29C),97,97(1),97(1)(a),97(4)(b),113C,122(5A),122(6),148(7),211(2)", - "Case #": "I.T.R No. 32 of 2020. Date of hearing 19.03.2025. Date of order: 11-06-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "PAKISTAN MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED (PMCL)\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (ZONE-IV) LARGE TAXPAYERS UNIT, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant by: Sardar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera and Mr. Sikandar Sukhera, Advocates\nRespondent by: M/s Asma Hamid, Mustafa Khalid, Saima Kamila, Zulqarnain Bhatti, Shehr Yar Khan and Khayyam Mushir, Advocates, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, D.G (Law) FBR, Mr. Amjad Zubair Tiwana, Commissioner Inland Revenue." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26209", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1292 = 2025 SLD 1292 = (2025) 131 TAX 479 = 2025 PTD 1074", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Whether an audit spanning 18 months (July 2016–Dec 2017) violates Section 25(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which limits audits to once in a year. \n________________________________________\nKey Dispute\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal annulled the audit, ruling that an 18-month audit exceeded the statutory limit of once in a year under Section 25(2).\n•\nThe Department argued no explicit bar exists for auditing periods >1 year.\n________________________________________\nCourts Analysis of Section 25\n1. Subsection (1): Record Production\n•\nAuthorities may demand records for any period (no time restriction), provided:\no\nRecords fall within the retention period under Section 24.\no\nDemand for 18 months (Jul 2016–Dec 2017) was valid and non-arbitrary.\n2. Subsection (2): Audit Limitation\n•\n Once in a year means once every 12 months, but year is undefined in the Act.\n•\nCritical ambiguity:\no\n Year could mean calendar year (Jan–Dec) or financial year (Jul–Jun).\no\nTribunal failed to:\n\nDefine year or examine the Department’s intent.\n\nConsider splitting the audit into two compliant 12-month periods (e.g., Jul 2016–Jun 2017 + Jul 2017–Dec 2017).\n•\nError: Tribunal wrongly annulled the entire audit instead of adjusting the period.\n3. Rejected Precedent\n•\nFESCO v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 PTD 1780) is inapplicable (addressed a since-omitted proviso).\n________________________________________\nLegal Question Answered\n An officer may demand records for any period under Section 25(1), but audit under Section 25(2) must cover 12 months (financial/calendar year), depending on:\n•\nDepartment’s intent (evident from records),\n•\nConventional practice. \n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nTribunal’s order SET ASIDE.\n•\nCase REMANDED to the Appellate Tribunal to:\no\nRe-examine if the audit can be split into valid 12-month segments per Department practice.\no\nDecide the appeal afresh.\nKey Principles:\nAudit period must align with a 12-month year (financial/calendar).\nDepartment must clarify intent via records or established practice.\nNon-compliant audits should be modified, not wholly voided.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,24,25,25(1),25(2),47", - "Case #": "STR No. 69/2022. Date of order: 14-10-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, Advocate for the applicant / department.\nM/s Inayat-ur-Rehman and Sahid Hussain Mitroo, Advocates for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE LEGAL ZONE, LARGE MULTAN TAXPAYERS OFFICE MULTAN\nVS\nM/S USMAN TRADE LINKERS, MULTAN" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26210", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1293 = 2025 SLD 1293 = (2025) 131 TAX 506 = 2025 PTD 232", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWS8", - "Key Words:": "Burden of Proof in Confiscation of Vehicle – Validity of CAT Decision – Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe case arose from a Special Customs Reference Application (SCRA) filed by the Customs Department challenging the order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal (CAT) dated 11.10.2019, which had allowed the appeal against confiscation of a Toyota Hiace Van (Registration No. JF-5108) on allegations of smuggling and being non-duty paid.\nThe vehicle was intercepted by the customs authorities based on information and was seized due to non-availability of import and registration documents at the time of interception. An Order-in-Original (ONO) dated 17.06.2019 was passed by the Additional Collector confiscating the vehicle. The vehicle owner later appeared during adjudication and submitted ownership and import documents, but the AC disregarded this evidence and proceeded with confiscation.\nThe CAT reversed the ONO, holding that:\nThe department failed to prove smuggling or non-payment of duty.\nThe respondent provided sufficient documentary evidence of lawful ownership.\nThe Excise Department corroborated the ownership claim.\nThe documents presented were not proven to be fake or forged.\nThe department argued that the Tribunal erred in law in not accepting that lack of documents at interception was sufficient for confiscation and misinterpreted sections 2(s), 156(1)(89), 156(2), and 187 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that the CAT was correct in setting aside the confiscation and had rightly evaluated the evidence.\nThe burden of proof was discharged by the vehicle owner.\nThe Customs Department failed to rebut the authenticity of the submitted documents.\nThe Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority, and its decision was based on factual and documentary evidence.\nAnswers to Questions of Law:\nNegative – CAT did not err in accepting registration and ownership documents as sufficient proof.\nAffirmative – CAT correctly interpreted the relevant provisions of the Customs Act.\nAffirmative – CATs findings were based on examined and undisputed documents; no presumption or assumption was involved.\nThe SCRA was dismissed as meritless, and the short order dated 24.05.2022 was confirmed.\nCitations:\nPrinciple: Tribunal as final fact-finding authority", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),156(2),156(1)(89),187", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 12 of 2020. Date of hearing: 24.05.2022. Date of order: 25-05-2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE IRFAN SAADAT KHAN MR. JUSTICE MAHMOOD A. KHAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the applicant: Mr. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Advocate.\nFor the respondent No. 1: Ms. Dil Khurram Shaheen, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE \nVS\nSHAFI MUHAMMAD & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26211", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1294 = 2025 SLD 1294", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWSs", - "Key Words:": "Challenge to Order dated 06.08.2024 (which dismissed recall application against Order dated 23.05.2024 permitting re-examination of witnesses).\n________________________________________\nBackground\n1.\nRent Case: Respondent No. 2 (Landlord) filed Rent Case No. 308/2022 for ejectment under Section 15, SRPO 1979.\n2.\nWitness Examination:\no\nLandlord’s witnesses examined-in-chief.\no\nTenant’s counsel cross-examined them.\n3.\nLandlord’s Request: Filed statement (23.05.2024) seeking permission to re-examine witnesses solely to clarify issues from cross-examination.\n4.\nLower Court Order: Rent Controller allowed re-examination (Order dated 23.05.2024).\n5.\nTenant’s Challenge: Filed application to recall Order dated 23.05.2024 → dismissed (Impugned Order: 06.08.2024).\n________________________________________\nParties’ Arguments\n•\nPetitioner (Tenant):\no\nRe-examination would let landlord improve his case (fix lacunas/ambiguities not raised in cross-examination).\no\nNo genuine ambiguity requiring re-examination.\n•\nRespondent No. 2 (Landlord):\no\nRe-examination strictly limited to clarifying cross-examination and explaining exhibited documents.\no\nCited Para-D of Counter Affidavit detailing scope.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision & Reasoning\n1.\nLegal Provision: Article 133, Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984 governs witness examination:\no\nExamination-in-Chief → Cross-Examination (if adverse party desires) → Re-Examination (if party calling witness desires).\n2.\nKey Principles from Article 133:\no\nRe-examination is an unalienable right of the party calling the witness.\no\nScope of Re-Examination:\n\nMust explain matters raised in cross-examination.\n\nNo application needed if limited to clarifying cross-examination.\n\nNew matters: Require court permission → opens door for further cross-examination.\n3.\nPrecedent Relied On:\no\nMuhammad Shahid v. Aqeel & Others (2021 PCr.I.J 537):\n\nRe-examination is an absolute right to clarify ambiguities from cross-examination.\no\nHalsbury’s Laws of England: Re-examination explains evidence construed unfavorably during cross-examination; no new matters without leave.\n4.\nRuling:\no\nTenant’s petition devoid of merit.\no\nLandlord entitled to re-examine witnesses within statutory scope (no new matters).\no\nRent Controller directed to ensure re-examination complies with Article 133(3).\n5.\nOutcome:\no\nPetition dismissed. No costs imposed.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Takeaways\n•\nRe-Examination Right: Absolute if confined to clarifying cross-examination.\n•\nNo Procedural Hurdle: Party need not file application for routine re-examination.\n•\nJudicial Restraint: Courts cannot deny re-examination unless it introduces new matters (requires permission).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=133", - "Case #": "C.P. No. S-965 of 2024. Date of hearing & Order: 20-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JAFFER RAZA", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Naheed A. Shahid, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nM/s. Chaudhry Atif Rafiq and Nadeem Ahmed, Advocates for the Respondent No. 2.\nMr. Falak Zeb, Advocate for the J.S. Bank.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NOOR MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER \nVS \nTHE IIND RENT CONTROLLER KHI (WEST) & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26212", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1295 = 2025 SLD 1295", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTk", - "Key Words:": "Background\n1.\nTermination & Settlement:\no\nAppellant dismissed from UBL (12.9.1997), later converted to compulsory retirement.\no\nAppellant submitted affidavit (15.8.2007) forfeiting claims to back benefits/entitlements.\no\nReceived dues settlement letter (21.11.2016); disputed amount and filed suit (Suit No. 1979/2019) on 3.12.2019 for recovery.\n2.\nLower Court Ruling:\no\nOriginal suit dismissed (22.3.2022) as time-barred under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.\no\nAppellate Court upheld dismissal (Appellate Judgment: 23.5.2024).\n________________________________________\nAppellant’s Argument for Review\n•\nLimitation Period: Claimed cause of action arose from 5.1.2017 (date of his letter to UBL disputing dues).\n•\nIf limitation under Article 64, Limitation Act 1908 (3 years) started from 5.1.2017, suit (filed 3.12.2019) would be within time.\n•\nAlleged error apparent on record as courts overlooked this argument.\n•\nCited Cases: Muhammad Ahmed v. Govt. of Sindh (1999 SCMR 255), Muhammad Mashuzzaman v. Federation (PLD 1992 SC 825).\n________________________________________\nRespondent’s (UBL) Opposition\n•\nAppellant breached undertaking (2007 affidavit) not to claim benefits.\n•\nReview application exceeds scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Decision & Reasoning\n1.\nRejection of Appellant’s Limitation Argument:\no\nStarting limitation from Appellant’s own letter (5.1.2017) is fallacious and illogical. \no\nWould allow claimants to arbitrarily delay limitation indefinitely, defeating the purpose of limitation laws.\n2.\nReview Application Inadmissible:\no\nOrder 47 Rule 1 CPC permits review only for errors apparent on the face of the record (self-evident, no detailed analysis needed).\no\nAppellant’s argument requires extensive reasoning → not an apparent error. \no\nReview cannot substitute an appeal.\no\nPrecedents Cited: Forte Pakistan v. Azam Khan (2017 MLD 1049), Masroor Ahmed Zai v. Province of Sindh (2016 CLC 1861).\n3.\nOutcome:\no\nReview Application dismissed. No costs imposed.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Points\n•\nLimitation Trigger: Cause of action accrues from the defendant’s act (e.g., settlement letter), not the claimant’s subsequent letter.\n•\nReview Jurisdiction: Extremely narrow; only for glaring errors, not re-examination of merits.\n•\nFinality: Appellate Judgment (dismissing suit as time-barred) stands.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Code of Civil Procedure of 1882=114,151", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 163 of 2022. Date of hearing & order: 14-04-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SANA AKRAM MINHAS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Imtiaz Ali Effendi, Advocate for Appellant\nMr. Suleman Hudda, Advocate for Respondent No.1 (UBL)\nSyed Bashir Hussain Shah, Assistant Attorney General", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYED SULAIMAN JAFRI \nVS \nUNITED BANK LIMITED & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26213", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1296 = 2025 SLD 1296", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWTg", - "Key Words:": "•\nPetition allowed – De-notification declared null and void; Petitioner reinstated.\n________________________________________\nBackground\n1.\nAppointment:\no\nPetitioner appointed as Ombudsperson on 17.06.2021 for 2 years.\no\nAmendment Act 2021 (effective 12.01.2022) extended tenure to 4 years. Petitioner’s term extended to 4 years via notification dated 01.04.2022.\n2.\nDe-notification:\no\nCaretaker Punjab Government issued notification (04.08.2023) de-notifying petitioner, citing ECP’s directive to remove political appointees for free/fair elections.\n3.\nPetitioner’s Challenge:\no\nDe-notification violated Section 7 of the Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2010 and Section 230 of Elections Act, 2017.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Reasoning & Decision\n1. Tenure Extension Valid\n•\nAmendment Act 2021 ( shall come into force at once ) applied immediately to incumbent Ombudsperson.\n•\nPetitioner’s extended 4-year tenure (until 2025) was lawful (Khurshid Soap v. Federation, PLD 2020 SC 641).\n2. Removal Without Due Process Illegal\n•\nSection 7(6) of the Act only provides for resignation – no statutory provision for removal.\n•\nFixed-term appointees can only be removed for proven misconduct/incapacity after due process (Article 10A, Constitution).\n•\nSection 16, General Clauses Act (power to appoint includes removal) inapplicable – would undermine quasi-judicial independence (Badshah Gul Wazir v. KP Govt., 2015 SCMR 43).\n3. Caretaker Government Exceeded Authority\n•\nArticle 224(1A) Constitution and Section 230, Elections Act 2017 limit Caretaker Governments to:\no\nDay-to-day administration.\no\nAssisting ECP in elections.\no\nNo power for major policy decisions or irreversible actions (e.g., removing statutory appointees).\n•\nDe-notification was a major policy decision beyond caretaker mandate (Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation, 2013 SCMR 1205).\n4. ECP’s Directive Unlawful\n•\nECP’s order (22.01.2023) to remove political appointees exceeded its authority:\no\nNo power under Articles 218–220, Constitution or Sections 4–8, Elections Act to order removals.\no\nRule 170(1), Election Rules 2017 only permits transfers (with ECP approval), not terminations.\n•\nECP failed to assess if petitioner could influence elections – mandatory per High Court’s order (22.02.2023 in W.P. No. 6125/2023).\n5. Past Political Affiliation Irrelevant\n•\nSection 7 of the Act does not disqualify individuals with political backgrounds.\n•\nOmbudsperson’s conduct in office (not prior affiliations) determines impartiality.\n________________________________________\nDirections\n1.\nPetitioner reinstated with continuity of service.\n2.\nFuture Appointments:\no\nPunjab Govt. directed to establish transparent, merit-based process (public advertisement, PSC evaluation) for Ombudsperson appointments.\nKey Legal Principles\n•\nFixed Tenure: Statutory appointees protected from arbitrary removal.\n•\nCaretaker Limits: Cannot make irreversible decisions affecting institutional independence.\n•\nECP’s Role: Ensures election integrity but cannot override statutory tenures.\n•\nQuasi-Judicial Independence: Ombudsperson must be free from executive interference.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=175(3),193(2)(a),199Elections Act, 2017=230,230(1)(c)General Clauses Act, 1897=16Elections Rules, 2017=170(1)", - "Case #": "W. P. No. 51439 of 2023. Dates of Hearing 05.12.2023, 06.12.2023 and 09.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: RAHEEL KAMRAN JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the petitioner Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan, Adnan Ahmad Chaudhry, Jahangir Ahmad Bhatti, Shahrukh Shahbaz, Ms. Zarish Fatima, Amjad Ali Shah, Ch. Umar Latif and Ms. Uzma Razzaq Khan, Advocates.\nFor Govt. of Punjab Barrister Hassan Khalid Ranjha, Additional Advocate General, Punjab, Mr. Muhammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab with Ibrar Ahmad, Law Officer, I&C Wing, S&GAD.\nFor Election Commission of Pakistan Mr. Imran Arif Ranjha, Advocate/Legal Advisor with Bashir Arshad, Deputy Director (Law), Ms. Bushra Rasheed, Senior Law Officer ECP and Hafiz Adeel Ashraf, Assistant Law Officer ECP.\nAmicus Curiae M/s Aaminah Qadir and Zeeshan Zafar Hashmi, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NABILA HAKIM ALI KHAN\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26214", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1297 = 2025 SLD 1297", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWXo", - "Key Words:": "Challenge against a fine of Rs. 450,000 imposed for practicing quackery (unauthorized allopathy) at a medical store.\n________________________________________\nKey Facts\n1.\nViolations by Petitioner:\no\nOperated as an unlicensed allopathic practitioner from a medical store.\no\nPremises were sealed 4 times by PHC officers; petitioner illegally de-sealed it each time without judicial orders.\no\nSubmitted an affidavit admitting guilt and apologized during PHC proceedings.\n2.\nPHC Action:\no\nPHC’s Enforcement Managers (Anti-Quackery) gathered evidence under the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 and Regulations, 2016.\no\nA PHC committee imposed the fine; petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.\n________________________________________\nPetitioner’s Arguments\n1.\nCoercion Claim: Affidavit admitting guilt was signed under pressure. \n2.\nProcedural Illegality:\no\nInspection violated Section 22 of the 2010 Act (requires specific procedures for healthcare establishments).\no\nRegulations, 2016 cannot override the parent Act.\no\nOnly the PHC (not committees) can impose fines under Section 28.\n3.\nLegal Precedent: Cited Manzoor Elahi v. District Judge (PLD 2021 Lahore 843).\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Analysis & Decision\n1. Rejection of Factual Defenses:\n•\nPetitioner’s affidavit admission, repeated illegal de-sealing, and apology proved guilt.\n•\nNo evidence supported the coercion claim; retraction appeared opportunistic.\n•\nQuackery is a strict-liability offense; proof of wrongful act suffices.\n2. Upholding PHC’s Authority:\n•\nRegulations, 2016 (enabled by Section 40 of the Act) are valid for combating quackery.\n•\nEnforcement Managers are authorized to inspect, seal premises, and gather evidence.\n•\nSection 22 applies only to healthcare establishments – not quacks. Thus, inspections were lawful.\n3. Committee’s Power to Impose Fine:\n•\nPHC, as a juridical entity, operates through committees as its alter-ego. \n•\nRegulation 7(4) empowers committees to impose fines; this aligns with Section 28.\n•\nSupreme Court in PHC v. Muhammad Tariq Javaid (2025) overturned the Manzoor Elahi precedent, validating committees’ authority.\n4. Penalty Justified:\n•\nFine commensurate with gravity of offenses (endangering public health, repeated defiance).\n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nConstitutional petition DISMISSED.\n•\nPHC’s fine of Rs. 450,000 upheld.\n•\nNo order as to costs.\nKey Legal Principles:\nQuackery inspections fall under Regulations, 2016, not Section 22.\nPHC committees validly exercise delegated powers under the parent Act.\nAdmissions in affidavits bind the petitioner unless proven coerced.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010=22,31,40", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 23462/2025. Date of order: 09-05-2025. Dated of order: 03-06-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Abbas Majeed, Advocate for petitioner.\nMr. Waheed Alam, A.A.G.\nM/s Barrister Hammad Babar and Mehran Shah, Legal Advisor on behalf of Punjab Healthcare Commission.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AHMAD \nVS \nDISTRICT JUDGE, PAKPATTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26215", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1298 = 2025 SLD 1298 = (2025) 131 TAX 403 = 2025 PTD 1410", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpWXk", - "Key Words:": "Constitutional challenge to Section 99D of Income Tax Ordinance 2001 and SRO 1588(I)/2023 imposing 50% tax on windfall gains from foreign currency fluctuations.\n________________________________________\nKey Legislative Provisions\n1.\nSection 99D (Inserted 2023):\no\nAllows retrospective tax (up to 3 prior years) on windfall income from economic factors like forex fluctuations.\no\nFederal Government may specify sectors, rates (≤50%), and mechanisms via notification.\n2.\nSRO 1588(I)/2023:\no\nImposes 50% tax on banking sector gains exceeding 5-year average forex profits (Tax Years 2020-2023).\n________________________________________\nPetitioners Arguments\n1.\nUnconstitutional Retrospectivity:\no\nViolates vested rights (closed transactions post-tax-year).\n2.\nLegislative Incompetence:\no\nBeyond Entry 47 (Federal Legislative List: taxes on income ).\n3.\nUltra Vires SRO:\no\nIssued by caretaker government (violates Mustafa Impex doctrine).\no\nFailed to define windfall gains adequately.\no\nNot placed before Parliament within 90 days.\n4.\nDiscriminatory Potential:\no\nCould target banks arbitrarily (Article 25 violation).\n________________________________________\nCourts Analysis & Decision\n1. Constitutionality of Section 99D:\n•\nLegislative Competence:\nEntry 47 + Article 260 explicitly cover excess profits tax – upheld (Elahi Cotton Mills, PLD 1997 SC 582).\n•\nRetrospectivity Valid:\nParliament has power to tax past transactions (Mekotex, PLD 2025 SC 1168).\n•\nNo Discrimination:\nMere potential for misuse insufficient to strike down law.\n2. Validity of SRO 1588(I)/2023:\n•\nProperly Issued:\nCaretaker government authorized under Elections Act 2017 (public interest, reversible by elected govt).\n•\nCompliant with Section 99D:\nClearly defined forex gains using 5-year average methodology.\n•\nTimely Parliamentary Placement:\nSRO issued 21.11.2023; placed before Parliament 16.02.2024 (within 90 days).\n3. Delegated Legislation Valid:\nSRO under Article 77 ( levied by/under Act of Parliament ) ≠ excessive delegation (Zaibtun Mills, PLD 1983 SC 358).\n________________________________________\nFinal Ruling\n•\nAll petitions DISMISSED.\n•\nInterim suspension of SRO LIFTED immediately (rejecting banks plea for extension).\nCritical Observations:\n Interim orders suspending tax laws undermine revenue collection (Pakistan Oilfields, 2024 SCMR).\nBanks forex gains – unearned windfalls – are legitimate tax targets.\n________________________________________\nJudges: Agha Faisal, Abdul Mobeen Lakho\nDate: Decided on 20 February 2025 (reasons published 3 April 2025).\nSignificance:\nConfirms states power to impose retrospective windfall taxes during economic crises.\nValidates caretaker governments authority for urgent fiscal measures.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,114,122C,122G,122(5)Limitation Act, 1908=5", - "Case #": "C.P. D-713 of 2024. Dates of hearing: 18th & 20th February 2025. Date of order: 03-04-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: AGHA FAISAL, JUSTICE AND ABDUL MOBEEN LAKHO, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Farogh Naseem, Khalid Jawed Khan, Qazi Umair Ali, Lubna Pervez, Mariam Salahuddin, Shahrukh Farogh Naseem, Sagar Ladhani, Abdul Rehman Adeed, Saima Anjum, Pooja Kalpana, M. Umer Akhund, Uzair Qadir Shoro, Syed Muhammad Aijaz and Muhammad Imran Khan, advocates for the petitioners.\nShahzaib Masud, Ahmed Mujtaba and Saqib Soomro, advocates for the Federal Board of Revenue. \nZia-ul-Haq Makhdoom Additional Attorney General\nKashif Nazeer Assistant Attorney General\nMirza Nasar Ahmed Additional Attorney General\nAlizeh Bashir Assistant Attorney General", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS\n(And connected matters, particularized in the Schedule[1] hereto.)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26216", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1307 = 2025 SLD 1307 = (2025) 131 TAX 371 = 2025 PTCL 603 = 2025 SCP 85 = 2025 PTD 837", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTc", - "Key Words:": "Validity of income tax assessment proceedings for Tax Year 2013 and limitation of departmental appeal.\n________________________________________\nKey Facts\n1.\nAssessment Proceedings:\no\nPetitioner, a biscuit distributor for M/s Ismail Industries, faced proceedings for undisclosed purchases of Rs. 21.03 million (Tax Year 2013).\no\nMultiple notices (Sections 114, 122C, 122(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001) issued; petitioner failed to respond or submit required documents.\no\nAssessing Authority (AA) computed income at Rs. 21.48 million, creating tax demand of Rs. 5.09 million.\n2.\nAppellate History:\no\nCIR(A) upheld AA’s order.\no\nAppellate Tribunal (ATIR) annulled AA’s order, citing jurisdictional errors and invalid addition under Section 111.\no\nHigh Court reversed ATIR, restoring AA’s order.\n________________________________________\nPetitioner’s Arguments\n1.\nLimitation Issue:\no\nDepartment’s appeal to High Court (ITR) filed 8–9 days late after curing defects.\no\nHigh Court did not rule on limitation despite petitioner’s objection.\n2.\nJurisdictional Error:\no\nAA (Unit 04, RTO Lahore) lacked jurisdiction; petitioner assessed in another zone.\n3.\nInvalid Addition:\no\nPurchases from verifiable entity (M/s Ismail) cannot be treated as undisclosed income under Section 111.\n________________________________________\nDepartment’s Defense\n1.\nLimitation:\no\nITR filed within time; delay due to curing minor defects. \no\nApplication for condonation (Section 5, Limitation Act) impliedly allowed by High Court.\n2.\nMerits:\no\nPetitioner ignored repeated notices; addition under Section 111 justified.\n________________________________________\nSupreme Court’s Decision\n1. Limitation Issue Critical:\n•\nDelay Not Mere Technicality :\nLimitation expiry creates vested rights (reaffirmed Asad Ali v. Bank of Punjab, PLD 2020 SC 736).\n•\nHigh Court Erred:\no\nFailed to expressly rule on condonation application despite petitioner’s objection.\no\nImplied condonation invalid – vested rights cannot be waived by implication.\n•\nRemand Ordered:\no\nCase remanded to High Court to decide condonation application after hearing both parties.\n2. Avoidance of Merits:\n•\nDeclined to examine jurisdictional/tax issues pending limitation resolution.\n________________________________________\nFinal Order\n•\nLeave petition DISPOSED OF.\n•\nCase REMANDED to High Court to:\no\nDetermine if delay in filing ITR was condonable.\no\nPass a clear and speaking order on the condonation application.\nKey Legal Principles:\nCourts must expressly decide limitation objections (Abdul Jabbar Shahid v. NBP, PLD 2019 Lahore 76).\nVested rights from lapsed limitation cannot be overridden implicitly.\nLimitation is a mixed question of law and fact requiring preliminary determination.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2100/2024. Date of Hearing & Order: 04.03.2025\nAgainst the order dated 27.02.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in ITR No. 41034/2017", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ AND MR. JUSTICE IRFAN SAADAT KHAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Hassan Kamran Bashir, ASC\nFor the Mrs. Kausar Parveen, ASC, Dr, Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG (Law)FBR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S MUHAMMAD FAISAL PROP, F.A. TRADERS, LAHORE ...... PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO-II, Lahore ...... RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26217", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1308 = 2025 SLD 1308 = (2025) 131 TAX 399 = (2025) 131 LHC 681", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTY", - "Key Words:": "Constitutional challenge to Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024 abolishing the Appellate Tribunal (ATIR) stage in tax appeals.\n________________________________________\nKey Amendment Challenged\n• Prior appellate chain: Commissioner (Appeals) → Appellate Tribunal (ATIR) → High Court (via Tax Reference under Section 133).\n• Post-amendment: Direct appeal from Commissioner (Appeals) to High Court, removing ATIR.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Critical Observations\n1. Systemic Burden on High Court:\no Only 7 benches nationwide handle tax references (1 Bahawalpur, 1 Multan, 2 Rawalpindi, 3 Lahore).\no Commissioner (Appeals) orders often lack reasoning, causing remands and backlog (e.g., Chenab Flour Mills, PLD 2021 Lahore 343).\no FBR files frivolous references (exempt from court fees), while taxpayers pay Rs. 50,000 per reference.\n2. Constitutional Violations:\no Article 37(d): State must ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice. Removing ATIR contradicts this.\no Articles 4 & 10-A: Discriminatory access to justice; taxpayers disadvantaged vs. FBR.\n3. FBR’s Contradictory Stance:\no FBR claims amendment aims to reduce Rs. 2 trillion stuck in litigation and discourage frivolous appeals. \no Court rebuts: FBR itself is the primary filer of weak appeals, causing delays.\n________________________________________\nPrecedents Cited\n• Shaheen Merchant (2021 PTD 2126): Specialized tribunals ensure efficient justice.\n• Rizwan Ali Sayal (PLD 2024 Lahore 54): Emphasized need for qualified ATIR members.\n• Service Global Footwear (PLD 2023 Lahore 471): Statutes must be interpreted by plain text (doctrine of textualism).\n________________________________________\nInterim Directive\n• Dr. Ishtiaq A. Khan (DG, FBR) directed to:\no Personally appear before the court.\no Submit a detailed report by 25 March 2025 explaining:\n Rationale and objectives of the amendment.\n How it aligns with constitutional mandates for accessible justice.\n Impact on judicial backlog and taxpayers’ rights.\n________________________________________\nNext Hearing\n• 25 March 2025 for FBR’s response and further proceedings.\nKey Implications:\nAmendment risks overburdening High Courts and violating constitutional rights to fair, efficient justice.\nFBR must justify why removing a specialized tribunal (ATIR) serves public interest.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=133", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 2420 of 2024. Date of Order: 06.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Zahid Shafiq and Faisal Rasheed, Advocates for the Petitioners.\nMr. Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, Additional Attorney General with Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General. Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate-General. Malik Itaat Hussain Awan and Mr. Atif Raheem Burki, Advocates for FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MIAN MUHAMMAD AKRAM \nVS \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26218", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1309 = 2025 SLD 1309 = (2025) 131 TAX 417 = 2025 PTD 1095", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTU", - "Key Words:": "Validity of tax assessment based on evidence seized without witnesses during a raid.\n________________________________________\nKey Facts\n1.\nTax Evasion Allegations:\no\nRespondent issued a show-cause notice (07.05.2014) for alleged sales tax evasion (FY 2007–2014).\no\nAssessment order (17.09.2014) imposed tax, surcharge, and penalties.\n2.\nAppellate History:\no\nCIR(A): Partially upheld assessment but vacated pre-2009 dues on limitation grounds (15.01.2015).\no\nAppellate Tribunal: Annulled entire assessment (31.08.2015), citing illegal seizure of documents during raid.\n________________________________________\nLegal Question\n Whether non-appearance of two witnesses on recovery memo (as required under Sections 102/103 Cr.P.C.) is a mere procedural infirmity? \n________________________________________\nCourts Analysis\n1. Mandatory Procedural Compliance:\n•\nSection 40, Sales Tax Act 1990: Requires searches to follow Cr.P.C. procedures.\n•\nSection 103 Cr.P.C.: Mandates searches in presence of two respectable local witnesses; seizure list must be signed by them.\n•\nDepartments Failure: Raid conducted on 19.11.2013 had no witness signatures on recovery memo.\n2. Precedents Reinforce Strict Adherence:\n•\nMaster Enterprises (2003 PTD 1034): Evidence from non-compliant searches inadmissible.\n•\nHaq Cotton Mills (2007 SCMR 1039): Tax authorities cannot combat evasion through illegal methods.\n•\nMedora of London Distinguishable: Cited by department was a leave-granting order, not applicable here.\n3. Public Policy Rationale:\n•\nUnwitnessed raids enable harassment and violate taxpayer rights.\n•\n Illegality cannot eradicate illegality – strict compliance is non-negotiable.\n________________________________________\nFinal Ruling\n•\nQuestion answered in AFFIRMATIVE: Non-compliance is fatal, not procedural.\n•\nDepartments reference DISMISSED.\n•\nAppellate Tribunals order annulling assessment upheld.\nKey Principle:\nEvidence from searches without witness signatures is inadmissible in tax proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=96,98,99,100,102,103Sales Tax Act, 1990=38-A,40,40(2),40-A,47(5)", - "Case #": "STR No. 256 of 2015. Date of hearing: 18.02.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE AND SHAHID KARIM, JUDGE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: M/s. Liaquat Ali Ch., Shahid Sarwar Chahil and Akhtar Ali Monga, Advocates (in STR No. 256 of 2015).\nMalik Abdullah Raza, Advocate (in STR No. 73779 of 2022)\nRespondent by: Barrister Shehryar Kasuri, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui and Haider Aziz Sheikh, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-VIII, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE-II, LAHORE \nVS\nM/S SIKA PAINT INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26219", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1310 = 2025 SLD 1310 = (2025) 131 TAX 421", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTQ", - "Key Words:": "The applicant (local manufacturer) claimed exemption from sales tax on:\nImported raw materials (not locally available) used to manufacture oil/gas equipment.\nSubsequent supply of finished equipment to petroleum sector companies (E & P companies).\nBasis: Clause 4 of SRO 678(I)/2004.\nTax authorities denied the exemption, demanding sales tax on the finished goods supplied. Appellate courts upheld this demand.\nCourts Analysis & Ruling\nWhether local manufacturers qualify for sales tax exemption on finished goods supplied to petroleum companies under Clause 4 of SRO 678?\nArguments\nApplicant:\nClause 4 should extend exemption to both imported raw materials and finished goods.\nPolicy intent was to encourage local manufacturing (job creation, forex savings).\nNo revenue loss (tax would be adjustable if charged).\nTax Department:\nClause 4 only exempts imported raw materials, not finished goods.\nClause 1 explicitly covers import and subsequent supply ; Clause 4 omits this language.\nExemptions must be strictly interpreted; applicant failed to meet the burden of proof.\nCourts Reasoning\nClause 4 vs. Clause 1:\nClause 1: Explicitly exempts both import and supply of finished goods.\nClause 4: Exempts only imported raw materials (subject to conditions).\nNo language in Clause 4 exempts sales tax on finished goods.\nConditions in Clause 4:\nFocus solely on qualifying imported inputs (e.g., use for manufacturing goods specified in Clauses 1/2, supply to petroleum companies).\nDo not extend exemption to finished goods.\nInterpretation Principles:\nTax exemptions require strict interpretation.\nBurden is on taxpayer to prove eligibility; applicant failed.\nNo ambiguity → beneficial interpretation for taxpayer not applicable.\nPolicy intent ≠ legal text; court cannot read exemptions into law.\nOutcome\nClause 4 exemption applies ONLY to imported raw materials.\nSales tax is payable on finished goods supplied to petroleum companies.\nAppellate Tribunal’s decision upheld; demand for sales tax valid.\nOther Questions\nQuestion 7 (Default Surcharge): Imposition is automatic; no proof of intent required.\nRemaining Questions: Deemed irrelevant or answered implicitly by the core ruling.\nFinal Decision\nAgainst the applicant.\nNo sales tax exemption for locally manufactured goods supplied to petroleum companies under SRO 678. Tax demand and penalties affirmed.\nKey Takeaway\nTax exemptions must be unambiguously stated. Where wording differs between clauses (e.g., Clause 1 vs. Clause 4), courts will not infer broader exemptions based on policy goals.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,7,13,13(2)Customs Act, 1969=First Schedule", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 27/2022. Date of order: 04.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE AND SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Syed Tauqeer Bukhari and Syed Ali Murtaza Abbas, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Barrister Atif Rahim Burki, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ADOS PAKISTAN LIMITED, ISLAMABAD \nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ISLAMABAD, & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26220", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1311 = 2025 SLD 1311 = (2025) 131 TAX 456", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVS8", - "Key Words:": "Whether amended tax assessments for special tax year filers were time-barred under Section 122(2) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\n________________________________________\nKey Background\n•\nAll petitioners operated under special tax year (1 Jan–31 Dec) approved under Section 74(5).\n•\nReturns filed u/S 120(1)(b) deemed assessment orders on filing date.\n•\nDepartment issued notices to amend assessments beyond 5-year limitation period.\n________________________________________\nDepartments Argument\n•\nLimitation period runs from end of financial year (30 June) in which deemed assessment issued.\n•\nBased on Article 260 Constitution + General Clauses Act: Financial year = 1 July–30 June.\n•\nNotices issued within 5 years from 30 June of relevant year (e.g., notice for 2010 tax year issued 2015–2017).\n________________________________________\nPetitioners Argument\n•\nFor special tax year filers, limitation runs from 1 January following the tax year end (31 Dec).\n•\nSection 74(10) explicitly includes special tax year in financial year definition.\n•\nNotices issued after 31 Dec of 5th year were time-barred (e.g., notice for 2010 tax year issued post-31.12.2015).\n________________________________________\nCourts Analysis\n1. Section 74(10) Is Decisive:\n A reference to a particular financial year shall... include a special tax year unless context otherwise requires. \n•\nSpecial tax year (1 Jan–31 Dec) = financial year for limitation purposes.\n2. Limitation Computation:\n•\nDeemed assessment date: Date of return filing (e.g., 30.10.2010 for 2010 tax year).\n•\nLimitation starts: 1 January after tax year end (e.g., 1.1.2011 for 2010 tax year).\n•\nDeadline: 31 December of 5th year (e.g., 31.12.2015 for 2010 tax year).\n3. Outcome for Petitioners:\nPetition\nTax Year\nNotice Date\nDeadline\nOutcome\nC.P. 3752/2016\n2010\n30.06.2016\n31.12.2015\nTime-barred\nC.P. 3780/2017\n2011\n16.05.2017\n31.12.2016\nTime-barred\nC.P. 860/2021\n2015\n31.12.2020\n31.12.2020\nBarred (same day)\n________________________________________\nFinal Ruling\n•\n13 petitions ALLOWED: Notices quashed as time-barred.\n•\n2 petitions (C.P. 3524/2022, 3543/2022): Severed for separate hearing (different facts).\nKey Legal Principle:\nFor special tax year filers, the 5-year limitation u/S 122(2) runs from 1 January following the tax year end (31 Dec), ending on 31 December of the 5th year.\n________________________________________\nImpact:\nProtects taxpayers with approved special tax years from belated assessments.\nReinforces strict adherence to limitation periods under tax law.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=74(3)74(5),74(10),112,114,120,120(1)(b),122,122(5)", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-3062, D-3752/2016, D-3780/2017, D-4293/2017, D-4320/2017, D-3036/2020M D-860/2021, D-3235/2021, 3760/2021, 3761/2021, 3846/2021, D-3125/2022, 3523/2022, 3524/2022 & D-3543/2022 of 2020. Date of Hearing: 10.05.2023 and 28.10.2024. Date of order: 21.11.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, CJ AND MR. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners in all petitions Through M/s. Hyder Ali Khan, Furqan except C.P. No. D-860 of Mushtaq, Samar Ali Khan, Hamza Waheed 2021: and Sami ur Rehman, Advocates.\nPetitioners in C.P. No. D- Through Mr. Ovais Ali Shah Advocate. 860 of 2021:\nRespondent Federation of Through Ms. Wajiha Mahdi, D.A.G. Pakistan:\nRespondent Departments: Through Mr. Ameer Bakhsh Metlo along with Ms. Zakia Khan, Mr. Shahid Ali Qureshi, Ms. Huma Sodhar, Mr. Asad Aftab Solangi, Mr. Faheem Raza, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Domki, Mr. Mukesh Kumar Khatri, Syed Irshad-ur- Rehman, Mr. Abdul Ghaffar, Syed Shohrat Hussain Rizvi, Mr. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SABRE TRAVEL NETWORK PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD.\nVS\nPAKISTAN & OTHERS ALONG WITH\n1-C.P. No. D-3752/2016 DHA \nGlobal Forwarding Pakistan v. Pakistan & others\n2-C.P. No. D-3780/2017 \nAlpha Insurance Company Ltd v. Pakistan & others\n3-C.P. No. D-4293/ 2017 \nInternational Air Transport Association v. Pakistan & others\n4-C.P. No. D-4340/2019 \nSabre Travel Network Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan & others\n5-C.P. No. D-3036/2020 \nEni Pakistan Limited v. Pakistan & others\n6-C.P. No. D-860/2021 \nJ&P Coats Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan & others\n7-C.P. No. D-3235/2021 \nJS Global Capital Limited v. Pakistan & others\n8-C.P. No. D-3760/2021 \nHapag Llyod Pakistan Limited v. Pakistan & others\n9-C.P. No. D-3761/2021 \nSabre Travel Network Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan & others\n10-C.P. No. D-3846/2021 \nInternational Air Transport Association v. Pakistan & others\n11-C.P. No. D-3125/2022 \nSanofi-Aventis Pakistan Limited v. Pakistan & others\n12-C.P. No. D-3523/2022 \nDubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited v. Pakistan & others\n13-C.P. No. D-3524/2022 \nDubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited v. Pakistan & others\n14-C.P. No. D-3543/2022 \nCitibank N.A. v. Pakistan & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26221", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1312 = 2025 SLD 1312 = (2025) 131 TAX 493 = 2023 SHC 608 = 2025 PTD 1324", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVSs", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and SRO 896(I)/2013 imposing an additional 2% sales tax via delegated legislation.\n________________________________________\nKey Legislative Provisions\n1.\nSection 3(5), Sales Tax Act 1990:\no\nEmpowers Federal Government to levy extra tax (≤17%) beyond base tax u/S 3(1).\no\nTax may be imposed via rules on specific goods/persons.\n2.\nSRO 896(I)/2013:\no\nAmended Rules 58S & 58T of Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules 2007.\no\nImposed 2% extra tax on specified industries (e.g., textiles, oils, autos).\no\nProvided exemption from subsequent sales tax (e.g., retail stage).\n________________________________________\nPetitioners Arguments\n1.\nUnconstitutional Delegation:\no\nSection 3(5) delegates essential legislative function (taxation) to Executive, violating Article 77 (taxes must be levied by Parliament).\n2.\nExcessive Discretion:\no\nNo guidelines for tax rate/application → arbitrary/unfettered power.\n3.\nDouble Taxation:\no\nExtra tax + base tax = confiscatory burden.\n4.\nProcedural Invalidity:\no\nSRO issued before Mustafa Impex judgment (PLD 2016 SC 808) but void ab initio.\n________________________________________\nCourts Analysis & Decision\n1. Delegated Legislation Valid:\n•\nPrecedent (Zaibtun Textiles, PLD 1983 SC 358):\nLegislature may delegate non-essential functions (e.g., tax mechanics) if policy framework exists.\n•\nSafeguards in Section 3(5):\no\nTax capped at 17% (same as base rate).\no\nRules subject to parliamentary oversight.\n•\nNo Abdication of Power:\nLegislature retained control; delegation limited to implementation.\n2. No Double Taxation:\n•\nExtra tax replaced retail-stage tax (Rule 58T(5)) → net benefit to petitioners.\n•\nBurden on end-consumer, not petitioners (indirect tax).\n3. Prospective Application of Mustafa Impex:\n•\nSRO issued pre-Mustafa Impex → validity governed by contemporary law (PMDC v. Fahad Malik, 2018 SCMR 1956).\n4. Economic Policy Deference:\n•\nTax design involves experimentation; courts avoid interference unless constitutionally flawed.\n________________________________________\nFinal Ruling\n•\nAll petitions DISMISSED.\n•\nSection 3(5) and SRO 896(I)/2013 upheld as constitutionally valid.\nKey Legal Principles:\nParliament may delegate procedural aspects of taxation (rates, applicability) if policy framework exists.\nDelegated legislation invalid only if:\n•\nViolates Constitution, or\n•\nContravenes parent statute.\nEconomic laws enjoy judicial deference.\n________________________________________\nImpact:\nAffirms FBRs authority to impose sector-specific taxes via SROs under Section 3(5).\nValidates simplified tax mechanisms (e.g., single-stage collection).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1),3(5)", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition D-1089/2016, etc. Date of hearing: 23.01.2023, 02.02.023, 01.03.2023. Date of Order: 15.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "Advocates for the Petitioners\nM/s. Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, Ameen Bandukda, Fouzia Rasheed, Ahmed Hussain, Ammar Yasser, Naeem Suleman, Arshad Hussain Shehzad, Kashan Ahmed, Asghar Bangush, Tauqir Randhawa, M. Saad Shafiq Siddiqui, Saiyed Younus Saeed, Ajeet Kumar, Nadir Hussain Abro, Raghib Ibrahim Junejo, Fahad Khan, Mushtaque Hussain Qazi, Ghazala Rafiq, Ellahi Buksh Qureshi, Muhammad Arif, Abdul Sattar Silat, Muhammad Arif, Zain A. Jatoi, Muhammad Mustafa Namdani, Syed Arshad Ali, Sagar Ladhani, Shehanshah Hussain, Syed Irshad-ur-Rehman, Abdul Rehman Adeed, Mariam Salahuddin, M. Adeel Awan, Duaa Aryaan and Asadullah, Muhammad Jehangir holding brief for Is mat-un- Nissa.\nAdvocates for the Respondents\nM/s. Shahid Ali Qureshi, Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Dr. Shah Nawaz, Nusrat Ali Shar, Imran Ahmed Metlo, Abdul Mujeeb Zeeshan, Afsheen Aman, Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi, Khalid Rajpar, Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Nuzhat Shah, Fozia M. Murad, Zohaib Ahmed, Abdul Saim Malik, Muhammad Taseer Khan, Abdul Sami Malik, Muhammad Idress Rahimoon, Qaim Ali Memon, Syed Ahsan Ali Shah, Bilal Memon, Waleed Khanzada, Muhammad Bilal Bhatti, Fayaz Ali Metlo, Farha Naz Qazi, Ashfaq Ali Gilal, Kashif Nazeer, Preetam Das, Jawed Hussain, Irshad Ali Tunio, Sajjad Ali Solangi, Ghulam Rasool Korai, Masooda Siraj, Umer Zd Gul, Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, M. Rashid Arfi, Ayaz Sarwar Jamali, Mohsin Mithani, Danyal Muzaffar, Syed Shohrat Hussain Rizvi, Pervaiz Ahmad Memon, Bushra Zia for Muhammad Zubair Qureshi.\nMr. Qazi Ayazuddin Qureshi, Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. G. M. Bhutto Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi Additional Advocate General Sindh.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. Const. P. D- 1089/2016\nMAL Pakistan Ltd. Vs. Pakistan & Another\n2. Const. P. 1720/2016\nMuhammad Kashif VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n3. Const. P. 1950/2016\nMuhammad Imran VS Fed. of Pakistan & ors\n4. Const. P. 5038/2016\nM/s Zahid Majeed Corp. VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n5. Const. P. 5039/2016\nM/s I.T Impex VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n6. Const. P. 5708/2016\nM/s Khurram Enterprises VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n7. Const. P. 5709/2016\nM/s Aziz Sons VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n8. Const. P. 5710/2016\nM/s MSMS Trading Co. VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n9. Const. P. 6495/2016\nM/s S.Q.M & Ors VS Govt of Sindh & Ors\n10. Const. P. 1054/2017\nMuhammad Ateeq Shaikh VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n11. Const. P. 2275/2017\nM/s Precision Polymres (Pvt) Ltd and Ors VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n12. Const. P. 2471/2017\nM/s Rashid Autos VS Govt. of Pakistan and Ors\n13. Const. P. 2650/2017\nM/s Tariq Autos Traders VS Govt. of Pakistan and Ors\n14. Const. P. 2982/2017\nM/s Saz Enterprises VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n15. Const. P. 2983/2017\nM/s R.K Co. VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n16. Const. P. 2984/2017\nM/s Fatima Enterprises VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n17. Const. P. 4470/2017\nFaraz Brothers VS Government of Pakistan & Ors\n18. Const. P. 4699/2017\nShahzad Riaz VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n19. Const. P. 4733/2017\nSajjad Riaz VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n20. Const. P. 4946/2017\nM/s Ateeq Auto Traders VS Govt of Sindh & Ors\n21. Const. P. 5046/2017\nMuhammad Anwar Rashid VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n22. Const. P. 5103/2017\nM/s Sonia International VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n23. Const. P. 5320/2017\nAyesha Abdul Samad VS Fed. Of Pakistan and Ors\n24. Const. P. 7139/2017\nM/s Ori Tech Oils (Pvt) Ltd and Ors VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n25. Const. P. 7172/2017\nM/s Cotex (Pvt) Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n26. Const. P. 7204/2017\nMuhammad Danish VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n27. Const. P. 8670/2017\nM/s Mehran Oil (Pvt) Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n28. Const. P. 8725/2017\nOvais Suleman and Ors VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n29. Const. P. 1843/2018\nFutur Tech VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n30. Const. P. 1879/2018\nM/s A.R Corp & Ors VS Govt of Sindh & Ors\n31. Const. P. 1950/2018\nM/s World Trader Management VS Dir: Investigation & Intelligence & Ors\n32. Const. P. 2137/2018\nM/s Bath & Beyond VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n33. Const. P. 2234/2018\nM/s Rabia Corp. VS Govt. of Pakistan and Others\n34. Const. P. 2383/2018\nM/s Export Apparel VS Govt of Sindh & Ors\n35. Const. P. 5263/2018\nM/s Attractive International & Ors VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n36. Const. P. 530/2018\nM/s Mehran Oil (Pvt) Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n37. Const. P. 5892/2018\nM/s A.S & Sons & Ors VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n38. Const. P. 63/2018\nM/s R.R International VS Fed. of Pakistan and Ors\n39. Const. P. 7534/2018\nM/s Basil Impex & Ors VS Govt. of Pakistan & Others\n40. Const. P. 7763/2018\nM/s Precision Appliances (Pvt) Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n41. Const. P. 7910/2018\nM/s Ahmed Trading Co. VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n42. Const. P. 7911/2018\nM/s Aliza Traders VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n43. Const. P. 7912/2018\nM/s A.S Autos VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n44. Const. P. 7913/2018\nM/s Emaan Enterprises VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n45. Const. P. 7914/2018\nM/s H.F Corp VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n46. Const. P. 7915/2018\nM/s Ihsan & Sons VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n47. Const. P. 7916/2018\nM/s Kalwala & Sons VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n48. Const. P. 7917/2018\nM/s Magoon Brothers VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n49. Const. P. 7918/2018\nM/s Shaikh Brothers VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n50. Const. P. 7919/2018\nM/s Shakeel Traders VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n51. Const. P. 8131/2018\nM/s Mehrab Traders VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n52. Const. P. 8195/2018\nSaud Younus VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n53. Const. P. 8605/2018\nMuhammad Younus VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n54. Const. P. 8795/2018\nMuhammad Shahid and Ors VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n55. Const. P. 8811/2018\nSamir Shafi Khan VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n56. Const. P. 1378/2019\nZainab Salman VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n57. Const. P. 2049/2019\nM/s Oil Ind Pakistan Pvt Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n58. Const. P. 2242/2019\nM/s Matrix Enterprises and Ors VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n59. Const. P. 2483/2019\nM/s Al Wasi Trading VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n60. Const. P. 4518/2019\nM/s Mehran Oil Pvt Ltd VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n61. Const. P. 5314/2019\nDawood Muhammad Yousuf VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n62. Const. P. 2353/2021\nAamir Dada VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others\n63. Const. P. 468/2021\nM/s Oil Ind Pakistan VS Fed. of Pakistan and Others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26222", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1313 = 2025 SLD 1313 = (2025) 131 TAX 464", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTk", - "Key Words:": "Court Ruling on Mandatory Notice Requirement\nReference Allowed in favor of the taxpayer. The Appellate Tribunals order confirming the assessment is set aside.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Findings\n1.\nSeparate Notice under Section 111 is Mandatory:\no\nThe Supreme Court (in Civil Petition No. 2447-L/2022) and High Court precedents (Zubair Khan v. CIR, Faqir Hussain, Falah ud Din Qureshi) consistently held:\n\nProceedings under Section 111 (unexplained income/assets) must precede action under Section 122.\n\nA separate notice under Section 111 is required to confront the taxpayer with specific allegations.\no\nDefect in Proceedings: The Department issued only a Section 122(9) notice (14.12.2021) but failed to issue a separate Section 111 notice. This vitiated the assessment.\n2.\n Definite Information Requirement under Section 122(5) Not Met:\no\n Definite information (a prerequisite for amending assessments under Section 122) can only crystallize after:\n\nIssuing a Section 111 notice →\n\nAllowing the taxpayer to explain →\n\nThe Commissioner forming an opinion on the explanation.\no\nHere, no Section 111 notice was issued → No valid definite information existed → Section 122 proceedings were invalid.\n3.\nBinding Precedents Applied:\no\nSupreme Court (2024 in Civil Petition 2447-L/2022):\n Before amending an assessment under Section 122, proceedings under Section 111(1) must be initiated via a separate notice... culminating in the Commissioners opinion. This becomes definite information for Section 122(5). \no\nHigh Court (Zubair Khan v. CIR, 2024 PTD 1112):\nReiterated that non-issuance of Section 111 notice causes prejudice and violates mandatory procedure.\n________________________________________\nFinal Decision\n•\nQuestion of Law Answered: The Appellate Tribunal erred in confirming the assessment without verifying:\n(i) Mandatory issuance of Section 111 notice, and\n(ii) Existence of valid definite information under Section 122(5).\n•\nOutcome: Assessment annulled. Reference allowed in taxpayer’s favor.\nSignificance\n•\nProcedural Safeguard: Tax authorities cannot bypass Section 111 by relying solely on a Section 122(9) notice.\n•\nTemporal Scope: This ruling applies to cases before 2020 (pre-Finance Act amendment to Section 122(5)).\nOrder Communicated to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 133(5) of the Ordinance.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29),111,111(1),122,122(1),122(4),122(5),122(5)(i),122(5)(ii),122(5)(iii),122(8),122(9),133,133(5)", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 32 of 2022. Order dated: 13.11.2024. Date of hearing: 13.11.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN AND ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JJ.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Imam ul Haq, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Malik Ataat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the Respondent's with Yousaf Khan, S.O. IR (Legal) (Hqrs), RTO, Rawalpindi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUBASHIR YAMEEN\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26223", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1314 = 2025 SLD 1314 = (2025) 131 TAX 471 = 2025 PTD 883", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVTg", - "Key Words:": "Courts Ruling on Questions of Law\n1. Authority to Remand Time-Barred Appeals (Section 127(5))\n•\nAnswer: NO\no\nThe Appellate Tribunal lacks authority to remand a case where the appeal is time-barred under Section 127(5).\no\nKey Reasoning:\n\nThe appeal was filed 40 days late (statutory limit: 30 days from service of order).\n\nThe Commissioner (Appeals) correctly dismissed it as time-barred.\n\nThe Tribunal’s remand for merits-based rehearing effectively revived a time-barred appeal, violating the Ordinance’s mandatory limitation period.\n2. Validity of Electronic Service (Section 218(1)(d))\n•\nAnswer: YES\no\nService via electronic means is valid and equivalent to personal/service by registered post.\no\nKey Reasoning:\n\nSection 218(1)(d) explicitly recognizes electronic service as a standalone valid method.\n\nRule 74(2): Service is deemed complete upon:\n\n(a) Fax transmission confirmation, or\n\n(b) Server receipt confirmation for emails.\n\nThe taxpayer received the order electronically on 05.08.2020 (confirmed under Rule 74).\n\nLimitation for appeal commenced from this date.\n________________________________________\nCourts Final Decision\n•\nTribunal’s Order Set Aside:\no\nThe Tribunal erred in:\n(i) Ignoring the statutory limitation period (appeal filed 40 days late), and\n(ii) Creating a false distinction between electronic service and attested copy receipt – a requirement absent in law.\n•\nCommissioner (Appeals)’ Order Restored:\no\nThe appeal was rightly dismissed as time-barred.\n________________________________________\nCritical Legal Principles\n1.\nElectronic Service is Legally Effective:\no\nSection 218(1)(d) + Rule 74 establish electronic service as equal to traditional methods.\no\nNo requirement for attested copies to trigger limitation.\n2.\nStrict Adherence to Limitation Periods:\no\nSection 127(5) uses shall – making the 30-day limit mandatory.\no\nTribunals cannot condone delay or remand time-barred appeals.\n3.\nLegislative Intent:\no\nThe 2018 introduction of Section 218(1)(d) aimed to modernize service – courts must uphold efficiency, not undermine it.\n________________________________________\nOrder\n•\nTax Reference allowed in favor of the tax department.\n•\nTribunal’s order dated 11.02.2022 quashed.\n•\nCopy of judgment sent to Appellate Tribunal under Section 133(5).\nFinal Outcome: The taxpayer’s appeal remains dismissed as time-barred.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 2001=117,127,127(5),133,133(5),161,218,218(1),218(1)(d),218(2)Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "Tax Reference No. 17-P/2022. Order dated: 05.11.2024. Date of Hearing 05.11.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IJAZ ANWAR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate alongwith Mr. Siraj Muhammad, Assistant Commissioner-IR for the Petitioner.\nMr. Ghulam Haroon, Advocate for the Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE PESHAWAR ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR\nVs\nMISS. SHABNAM RIAZ" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26224", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1315 = 2025 SLD 1315 = (2025) 131 TAX 550 = 2025 SCP 153 = 2025 PTD 1023 = 2025 SCMR 1096", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVXo", - "Key Words:": "Key Issue:\nWhether the petitioner was entitled to zero customs duty under SRO 565/2006 (amended by SRO 474/2016) for importing surfactants (HS Codes 3402.1190 & 3402.1300) used in pesticide manufacturing.\nSupreme Courts Ruling\nPetition Dismissed – Exemption not granted.\n________________________________________\nCritical Findings\n1.\nExemption Conditions Not Met:\no\nSRO 474 mandates Ministry of National Food Security & Research approval for zero-duty exemption (Column 2, Serial 3 of SRO Table).\no\nPetitioner admitted:\n\nNo registration/approval from the Ministry.\n\nNot a recognized manufacturer/formulator of agricultural pesticides.\n2.\nPetitioner’s Argument Rejected:\no\nClaimed exemption solely based on HS Code classification and role as an importer/formulator of surfactants (stabilizers, emulsifiers).\no\nCourt held: HS Code alone is insufficient; Ministry approval is mandatory.\n3.\nPrecedent Distinguished:\no\nPetitioner relied on *Constitution Petition No. D-8496/2017* (relating to Sales Tax Act).\no\nCourt clarified: The Sales Tax case dealt with different statutory provisions (Clause 133, Sixth Schedule) and did not impose the same restrictions as SRO 474.\n4.\nConstitutional Challenge Left Open:\no\nPetitioner alleged discrimination and sought to challenge SRO vires.\no\nCourt noted: No rights were curtailed; petitioner may separately challenge the SRO’s constitutionality if desired.\n________________________________________\nFinal Outcome\n•\nLeave to appeal declined.\n•\nCivil petitions dismissed.\n•\nExemption denied: Customs duty applies to petitioner’s imports.\n________________________________________\nKey Takeaway\nTax exemptions under SROs are strictly conditional. Failure to comply with specific prerequisites (e.g., agency approvals) voids eligibility, regardless of the goods’ end-use or classification. Constitutional challenges to SROs must be pursued independently.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=Clause 133 of the Sixth Schedule", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No. 5029 to 5032 of 2024. Date of Hearing & Order: 18-04-2025\n(Against the orders/judgments dated 12.09.2024 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Const. P. No. D-4002/19, Const. P. No. D-6074/21 and Const. P. Nos. 774 and 2385/22)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE SHAKEEL AHMAD", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner (In all cases): Mr. Taimur Aslam Khan, ASC, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR.\nFor Respondent (FBR) (In CPs.5029, 5031-5032/24): Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC.\nFor the Respondents (In CP.5030/24): Not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SURFACTANT CHEMICALS COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED, KARACHI ….. PETITIONER (IN ALL CASES)\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY M/O FINANCE, GOVT. OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS (in all cases) ……. RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26225", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1316 = 2025 SLD 1316 = (2025) 131 TAX 579", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpVXk", - "Key Words:": "Key Legal Issues:\n1.\nTaxability of Insurance Proceeds:\no\nWhether insurance receipts constitute taxable supply under Section 3(1)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n2.\nExemption on Disposal of Fixed Assets:\no\nWhether proceeds from disposal of vehicles, building materials, and electrical appliances are exempt under SRO 490 read with Serial No. 6, Table 2, Sixth Schedule.\n3.\nValidity of Penalties:\no\nWhether default surcharge and penalties under Section 33(5) can be imposed without proving mens rea or valid tax liability.\n________________________________________\nCourts Ruling\n1. Insurance Proceeds (Question 1)\n•\nNot Taxable:\no\nInsurance claims are actionable claims excluded from the definition of goods (Section 2(12), Sales Tax Act).\no\nReceipt of insurance compensation does not constitute supply under Section 2(33) (no transfer of ownership of damaged goods).\no\nPrecedents Relied On:\n\nSunrise Associates v. Govt. of NCT Delhi (2006 SCC 603)\n\nLIC of India v. Insure Policy Plus (2016 SCC 507)\n\nFBR Circular No. 2(10)STP/97 (18.10.2001).\n2. Disposal of Fixed Assets (Question 2)\n•\nExempt from Sales Tax:\no\nVehicles, building materials, electrical appliances, etc., qualify as fixed assets (defined commercially as long-term business assets).\no\nSRO 490 (issued under Section 8(1)(b)) prohibits input tax adjustment on these assets.\no\nSerial No. 6, Table 2, Sixth Schedule exempts disposal of such fixed assets from sales tax.\no\nDepartments error: Demanding proof of non-availment of input tax was legally unfounded.\n3. Penalties (Question 3)\n•\nInvalid:\no\nSince no sales tax was payable, penalties under Section 33(5) and default surcharge under Section 34 cannot be imposed.\no\nCritical Note: The court questioned whether tax officers (Executive) have authority to impose criminal penalties under Section 33 without judicial determination.\n________________________________________\nFinal Decision\n•\nAll questions answered in favor of the taxpayer (Pak Telecom).\n•\nOrders generating tax demand set aside:\no\nAppellate Tribunals order (24.04.2019)\no\nOrder-in-Remand (20.06.2017)\no\nCommissioner (Appeals) order (30.10.2017)\n•\nRefund/adjustment of any tax/surcharge/penalty paid.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles\n1.\nInsurance Proceeds:\no\nCompensation for loss ≠ supply of goods. \no\nActionable claims fall outside the ambit of sales tax.\n2.\nFixed Assets Exemption:\no\nAssets like vehicles, building materials, and machinery used for business operations (not stock-in-trade) qualify.\no\nExemption under Sixth Schedule is automatic if input tax adjustment is barred by SRO.\n3.\nPenalties:\no\nRequire proven tax liability and mens rea (culpable intent).\no\nExecutive officers lack jurisdiction to impose criminal penalties.\nJudgment communicated to Appellate Tribunal under Section 133(5).\n________________________________________\nSignificance: Landmark clarification on non-taxability of insurance recoveries and fixed-asset disposal exemptions.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(33),2(41),3(1),3(1)(a),2(41),8(1),13,33(5)Transfer of Property Act, 1882=2(35)", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 19/2019. Date of order: 04.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant: Syed Hasnain Ibrahim Kazmi, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Babar Bilal, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S PAK TELECOM MOBILE LIMITED, ISLAMABAD \nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, ISLAMABAD, & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26226", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1317 = 2025 SLD 1317 = (2025) 131 TAX 643", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTc", - "Key Words:": "Courts Decision\n1. Temporary Relief Granted:\n•\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Lahore) must decide the petitioners appeal within 2 months.\n•\nCoercive tax recovery actions (e.g., asset seizure, bank attachments) are stayed until the appeal is decided.\n2. Key Legal Principles:\n•\nDoctrine of Ripeness (Exhaustion of Remedies):\no\nTaxpayers must exhaust statutory appellate remedies (Commissioner Appeals → Tribunal) before approaching High Courts.\no\nRecovery of disputed tax during pending appeals violates due process (Articles 4 & 10A, Constitution).\n•\nInbuilt Stay Mechanism:\no\nTax statutes (e.g., Income Tax Ordinance, 2001) provide implicit stay protection during appeals.\no\nAuthorities cannot bypass this safeguard via coercive recovery.\n•\nPrecedents Relied On:\no\nReliance Commodities (Pvt) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 Lahore 632).\no\nShell Pakistan Ltd. v. Government of Punjab (2020 PTD 1607): Statutory appeals include time-bound adjudication with automatic stay.\no\nShaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 2126): Tribunals must decide appeals within mandated timelines.\n________________________________________\nFinal Order\n•\nTribunal Directed: To decide the appeal within 2 months and report compliance to the Deputy Registrar.\n•\nRecovery Stayed: No coercive action until appeal disposal.\n•\nPetition Disposed: No further High Court intervention needed.\n________________________________________\nSignificance\nThis ruling reinforces:\n1.\nTaxpayer Due Process: Authorities cannot recover disputed taxes while appeals are pending.\n2.\nJudicial Restraint: High Courts will not interfere prematurely if statutory remedies exist.\n3.\nEfficiency Mandate: Tribunals must resolve appeals expediently (60-90 days as per law).\nPractical Impact: Taxpayers facing coercive recovery during appeals can seek similar relief via writ petitions.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10-A,199,199(1),199(4)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 64793/2024. Date of order: 28.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Faisal Rasheed Ghouri, Advocate for the Petitioner. \nBarrister Shahjahan Khan, Advocate for the FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S IQBAL AVENUE CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LIMITED \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26227", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1318 = 2025 SLD 1318 = (2025) 131 TAX 657", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTY", - "Key Words:": "Courts Decision\n1. Validity of Notification (SRO) Challenged:\n•\nUpheld: Notification No. FD.SO(MPR)1-46/BST/20203714-48 (04.05.2020) is valid.\n•\nReason: The notification merely clarifies the BSTS Act, 2015 and does not override statutory provisions.\n2. Tax Applicability on Composite Contracts:\n•\nEntire Contract Value Taxable: BSTS applies to the full contract amount (goods + services), not just the service portion.\n•\nReason: Works contracts (e.g., construction) are composite transactions where bifurcation is impractical.\n•\nOptions for Contractors:\no\n15% rate with input tax adjustment, or\no\n4% rate (from 01.07.2023) without adjustment.\n3. Liability for BSTS Payment:\n•\nContractors Bear Burden: Government of Balochistan is a withholding agent, not the end consumer. \n•\nEnd Consumer Defined:\no\nNot registered under tax laws.\no\nCannot claim input adjustments.\no\nUltimately bears the tax burden (e.g., public using infrastructure).\n4. Tax Rates Compared to Other Provinces:\nProvince\nStandard Rate (with input adj.)\nReduced Rate (without input adj.)\nPunjab\n16%\n5%\nSindh\n13%\n–\nKPK\n–\n5% (general), 2% (ADP/PSDP projects)\nBalochistan\n15%\n4% (from 01.07.2023)\n•\nCourts View: Rates are province-specific and not discriminatory.\n5. Application to Running Bills:\n•\nTax Applies: BSTS is chargeable on all payments, including running bills for ongoing contracts.\n________________________________________\nFinal Outcome\n•\nPetitions Dismissed: No merit found in challenges.\n•\nBSTS Levied Lawfully:\no\nContractors must comply with BSTS Act, 2015.\no\nGovernment acts as a withholding agent, not the end-user.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles\n1.\nComposite Contracts: Works contracts (goods + services) cannot be split for tax purposes.\n2.\nTax Chain Mechanism:\no\nSuppliers/service providers collect tax → Adjust input/output tax → Burden shifts to end consumer (public).\no\nGovernment is a participant in this chain, not the final consumer.\n3.\nProvincial Autonomy: Tax rates reflect regional fiscal policies and are not subject to judicial interference.\nSignificance: Affirms provincial authority to design tax regimes for composite contracts and clarifies the end consumer concept in sales tax jurisprudence.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act 2015=2(14),2(86),6", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. 819 of 2020, 1312 of 2020. Date of hearing: 10.11.2023. Announced on: 27.11.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "In C.P. No. 819 of 2020. Date of hearing: 10.11.2023. Announced on: 27.11.2023\nPetitioners by: Muhammad Ishaq Nasar, Advocate.\nOfficial respondents by: Mr. Shai Haq Baloch, Additional Advocate General.\nRespondent No.2 by: Mr. Jam Saka, Advocate assisted by Mr. Noor-ul-Haq Baloch, Chairman, BRA.\nIn C.P. No.1312 of 2020. Date of hearing: 10.11.2023\nPetitioners by: Nemo.\nOfficial respondents by: Mr. Shai Haq Baloch, Additional Advocate General.\nRespondent No.2 by: Mr. Jam Saka, Advocate assisted by Mr. Noor-ul-Haq Baloch, Chairman, BRA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Constitutional Petition No. 819 of 2020.\nM/s Constructor Association of Pakistan and others.\nvs\nGovernment of Balochistan through Chief Secretary and others.\nConstitutional Petition No. 1312 of 2020.\nM/s Government Constructors Association and others.\nVs\nGovernment of Balochistan through Chief Secretary and others." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26228", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1319 = 2025 SLD 1319 = (2025) 131 TAX 450 = 2024 SHC 1458 = 2025 PTD 1433", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTU", - "Key Words:": "Invalid Assessment & Appellate Orders due to Lack of Reasoning – Requirement of Speaking Orders\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the orders passed by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals), which imposed turnover tax at 1% under Section 122(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, while the petitioner claimed entitlement to the reduced rate of 0.2% on grounds that the product (Rusk) qualified as a Fast-Moving Consumer Good (FMCG). Both authorities passed one-line orders without discussing facts, law, or giving proper reasons. The High Court noted that such non-speaking orders violate Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and judicial standards set by the Supreme Court.\nHeld:\nThe Sindh High Court allowed the reference, set aside the impugned orders, and remanded the matter to the original authority to pass a reasoned, speaking order after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. The Court also criticized the increasing trend of poorly reasoned tax orders and directed FBR to train and instruct adjudicating officers on proper judicial standards.\nCase Law:\nMollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan, PTD 1970 SC 173\nGovt. of Sindh v. Muhammad Juman, 2009 SCMR 1407\nMuhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. GOP, 2015 SCMR 630\nMuhammad Ashraf Tiwana v. Pakistan, 2013 SCMR 1159\nGovt. of Pakistan v. Farheen Rashid, 2011 SCMR 1", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,122(1),122(9),129,133General Clauses Act, 1897=24A", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Application Nos. 342 and 343 of 2024, order & hearing date: 10-12-2024", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, Justice and Muhammad Abdur Rahman, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Amin-u-Din, Advocate holds brief for Mr. Zia Ahmed =, Advocate for Applicant\nMr. Irshad-ur-Rehman, Advocate for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S AL MASOOM PRODUCTS\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER (APPEAL-VI) INLAND REVENUE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26229", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1193 = 2025 SLD 1193 = (2025) 131 TAX 673 = 2025 PTD 1072 = 2025 PTCL 734", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTQ", - "Key Words:": "This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal was filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, challenging the judgment dated 31.01.2024 of the Lahore High Court. The dispute centered around the interpretation and applicability of Section 2(36) read with Section 100C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and SRO No. 754(I)/2016 dated 15.08.2016.\nThe respondent-taxpayer, a welfare society, had filed its income tax return for Tax Year 2019 on 26.12.2019. The Petitioner issued a show cause notice dated 12.02.2021 under Section 122(9) read with Section 122(5A), arguing that the taxpayer was not entitled to claim tax credit because their approval under Section 2(36) had allegedly expired in 2010. The Petitioner relied on the 2016 SRO, asserting that it imposed a three-year validity limit on approvals, making the 2007 approval invalid for TY 2019.\nThe taxpayer challenged this, and while both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Assessing Officer ruled against the taxpayer, the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) sided with the taxpayer. The Tribunal held that the three-year validity period introduced by the 2016 SRO could not apply retrospectively to approvals issued prior to the SROs issuance. Consequently, the approval granted in 2007 would remain valid until three years after the SRO—i.e., until August 2019.\nThe Lahore High Court upheld the Tribunals view, maintaining that retrospective application of tax statutes or subordinate legislation like SROs was impermissible unless explicitly provided.\n________________________________________\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the Civil Petition and refused leave to appeal. It held that the central issue concerned whether the 2016 SRO amending Rule 214 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, had retrospective effect.\nThe Court observed:\n•\nOriginally, Rule 214 stipulated that an approval granted under Rule 212 remained in force unless withdrawn under Rule 217.\n•\nThe 2016 SRO amended Rule 214 to limit the approval’s validity to three years from the date of the SRO, unless earlier withdrawn.\n•\nThere was no express provision in the SRO suggesting it was to apply retrospectively.\n•\nThe phrase “subsequent three years” in the amended rule indicated prospective applicability.\n•\nIt is a settled principle of tax law that no fiscal provision can be applied retrospectively unless explicitly stated, as retrospective tax burdens offend the principle of legality and predictability in taxation.\nThus, the approval granted in 2007 remained valid until August 2019, as per the three-year window triggered by the SRO in August 2016. Accordingly, the taxpayer’s tax credit claim for Tax Year 2019 was valid and lawful.\n________________________________________\nCitations:\no\nMessrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582)\no\nFBR v. Searle Pakistan Ltd. (2022 SCMR 306) – Retrospective tax provisions must be express", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(36),100C,122(5A),122(9),237(1)Income Tax Rules, 2002=212,214,217", - "Case #": "CIVIL PETITION NO. 687-L OF 2024. Date of Hearing & Order: 23.04.2025\n[Against order dated 31.01.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in ITR No.77169 of 2022]", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK MR. JUSTICE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner(s) : Mrs. Kausar Parveen, ASC\nFor the Respondent(s) : Mr. M. Amir Sohail, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Corporate Zone, Regional Tax Office, Faisalabad ...Petitioner(s)\nVs\nM/s National Public Welfare Society, Jinnah ...Respondent(s) Colony, Faisalabad and another" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26230", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1194 = 2025 SLD 1194 = (2025) 131 TAX 676 = 2025 PTD 823", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUS8", - "Key Words:": "The petitioner, a U.S.-incorporated non-resident entity, engaged in home remittance transactions with Mobilink Microfinance Bank Limited under a Home Remittance Agreement. These transactions involved transferring funds from customers located outside Pakistan to beneficiaries within Pakistan.\nOn 11.11.2020, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) issued a notice under Section 176 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO), seeking information regarding the petitioner’s compliance with Pakistani tax laws concerning offshore digital services or digital presence in Pakistan.\nThe petitioner replied on 18.12.2020, denying any physical or digital presence in Pakistan and asserting that its activities involved only remittance facilitation. It subsequently registered with the FBR on 26.03.2021. However, on 28.04.2021, the FBR issued notices under Section 114(4) for Tax Years 2019 and 2020, requiring the petitioner to file income tax returns under Section 114(1) of the ITO.\nThe petitioner claimed protection under the Double Taxation Treaty between Pakistan and the United States, asserting that as a non-resident entity without a permanent establishment in Pakistan, it should not be taxed. It filed Writ Petition No. 1670 of 2021 before the Islamabad High Court, challenging the legality of the FBRs actions. The writ was dismissed on 20.06.2021, prompting this petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the Civil Petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the High Court’s ruling. Key findings included:\nNo Coercive Action by Registration Alone:\nThe petitioner’s argument that registration with the FBR (and issuance of a National Tax Number) required prior notice was rejected. The Court held that registration does not amount to a coercive action or tax liability in itself and is not subject to challenge via writ.\nAdequate Statutory Remedies Available:\nThe petitioner had not exhausted the statutory remedies available under the ITO, such as appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals), Appellate Tribunal, and reference to the High Court. The Court reiterated that writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is not to be invoked when an efficacious alternate remedy exists under the law.\nReference to Geofizyka Case Inapplicable:\nThe petitioner’s reliance on Geofizyka Krakow Sp. z o.o. was found misplaced. In that case, issues relating to double taxation treaties and jurisdiction were resolved through the revenue hierarchy (Tax Reference No. 16/2005), and not directly through writ petitions.\nFailure to File Intra-Court Appeal (ICA):\nThe petitioner bypassed the statutory remedy of an Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) against the single judge’s order of the High Court. The Supreme Court emphasized that only under exceptional circumstances can direct petitions to the apex court be entertained—such circumstances were not present in this case.\nNo Lack of Jurisdiction in Issuance of Notice:\nIssuance of a show-cause or compliance notice under the ITO cannot be presumed to be without jurisdiction, especially when factual determinations about residence, permanent establishment, and treaty protection are pending.\nDouble Taxation Treaty:\nConvention between the United States and Pakistan for Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion (U.S.–Pakistan Tax Treaty)\nCase Law:\nGeofizyka Krakow Sp. z o.o. v. FBR, Tax Reference No. 16 of 2005\nMetropole Cinema Case (SC)\nHub Power Company Ltd. v. WAPDA (PLD 2000 SC 841) – Principle on exhaustion of alternate remedy\nConclusion:\nThe Supreme Court upheld the Islamabad High Court’s decision dismissing the writ petition. It reiterated that non-resident entities must first approach tax forums under the ITO rather than seeking direct constitutional relief, especially when the alleged actions (like registration and show-cause notices) do not amount to final adverse tax determinations.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114(1),114(4),176", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4177 of 2024. Date of Hearing & Order: 09.04.2025\n(Against the judgment dated 20.06.2024 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Writ Petition No. 1670/2021)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE SHAKEEL AHMAD", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: For the Respondents:\nMr. Jahanzeb Awan, ASC.\nMr. Imtiaz Ahmed, ASC.\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S PAYONEER INC., THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER. ... PETITIONER\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, M/O FINANCE, GOVT. OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS. ... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26231", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1299 = 2025 SLD 1299", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUSs", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Amendment under Section 122(5A) – Retrospective Application of Exemption Approval\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer filed a return for Tax Year 2013, declaring exempt income of Rs. 8.77 million. The return was accepted under Section 120(1) as a deemed assessment. Later, the Department sought to amend the assessment under Section 122(5A), claiming the exemption was wrongly allowed because formal approval under Section 2(36) was granted only in 2016, after the tax year in question.\nThe assessing officer raised a tax demand of Rs. 3.89 million based on the delayed approval. The taxpayer appealed to the CIR(A), who annulled the amendment, holding that the exemption was substantively justified and the delay was administrative.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal upheld the CIR(A)’s decision, ruling that:\nThe return had attained finality under Section 120(1).\nNo new tangible material was presented to justify amendment.\nThe entity was substantively eligible for exemption during the tax year.\nDelay in formal approval could not be used to deny exemption retroactively.\nThe Department’s appeal was dismissed.\nRelevant principles of tax jurisprudence on exemption interpretation and procedural fairness.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(36),120(1),122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 221/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2013). Date of Hearing & Order: 06.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Sheharyar Akram, DR\nRespondent By: Mr. Faizan Ahmed Mirza, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, APPELLANT RAWALPINDI.\nVS\nM/S CHANGE IN EDUCATION; 454, STREET-16, SCHEME-III, RAWALPINDI. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26232", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1300 = 2025 SLD 1300", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTk", - "Key Words:": "The consolidated reference application and others (as per attached Schedule-T) were filed by land developers against orders of the Appellate Tribunal, Punjab Revenue Authority. The Reference Applicants were served notices for failing to pay Punjab Sales Tax on Services from July 2013 to October 2017, as per Entry No. 15 of the Second Schedule (introduced via Finance Act, 2013), which includes services of developers, builders, and promoters.\nShow cause notices were issued under Sections 3, 10, 11, 18, 24, and 35 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012, and tax liability was assessed at Rs. 100 per square yard, along with penalty and default surcharge. Though penalty and surcharge were later dropped in appeals, the base tax liability was upheld.\nThe Reference Applicants raised the following key legal questions:\nWhether the applicants’ land development activities fall within the ambit of “economic activity” or “taxable services” under Sections 6 and 7.\nWhether land surrendered to public authorities (RDA, NHA) could be included in tax base.\nWhether sales tax should only apply on actual saleable land, not entire developed area.\nHeld:\nThe Court dismissed the Reference Applications, holding:\nTaxable Services Validly Charged: Land development falls under Entry No. 15 of Second Schedule of the Act. As such, developers are providing taxable services within the meaning of Section 3 and are engaged in economic activity under Section 6.\nInclusion of Surrendered Land: Land given to RDA (e.g., parks, roads) and to NHA (for road connectivity) forms part of the integrated development project, enhancing overall project value. Therefore, such land contributes to the taxable service.\nStage of Tax Demand Valid: Tax need not wait for sale to buyers. Liability arises once services are provided or billed — as per Section 18 of the Act. The fact that cost may be passed on to buyers does not affect taxability.\nDistinction from Sindh Case: Reliance on Association of Builders and Developers of Pakistan v. Province of Sindh (2018 PTD 1487) was misplaced, as it related to the vires of notices under the Sindh Act in a writ jurisdiction context, whereas the present case involved a statutory reference under Section 67A of the Punjab Act.\nBinding Precedent: The judgment relied on another Division Bench order dated 17.04.2025 (M/s Defence View Housing Scheme v. Appellate Tribunal PRA) which had held that developers and town planners are taxable under Entry No. 15.\nConclusion:\nThe Reference Applications were found devoid of legal merit and dismissed. The activities of land developers are taxable under the 2012 Act, and land surrendered to public authorities is part of the value-added service.\nCitations:\nPunjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012: Ss. 2(43), 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 18, 24, 35, 67A\nEntry No. 15, Second Schedule\nAssociation of Builders and Developers of Pakistan v. Province of Sindh, 2018 PTD 1487 (Distinguished)\nM/s Defence View Housing Scheme v. Appellate Tribunal PRA, TR(PRA) No. 8952 of 2024 (relied upon)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=2(43),3,6,7,10,11,18,24,35,67A", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 13 of 2020. Date(s) of hearing 15.5.2025 and 21.5.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RASAAL HASAN SYED, JUSTICE AND MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant(s) by M/s. Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Ch. Imran ul Haq, Syed Muhammad Imran Haider, Hassan Askari Kazmi, Muhammad Bilal, Farzam Ausaf Satti, Muhammad Anas Shakir, Muhammad Ali Chaudhry, Rai Azhar Iqbal Kharal, Sanmar Naveed Malik, Faizan Ahmad Mirza, Syed Farid Ahmed Bukhari, Kashif Ali Malik, Zahid Ahmad Raja and Osama Mehboob, Advocates.\nRespondent(s) by M/s. Hassan Kamran Bashir and Muhammad Fatehyab Kamran, Advocates along with Ms. Nadia Murad, Legal Officer Punjab Revenue Authority, Lahore.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DYNAST ASSOCIATES\nVS\nADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB REVENUE AUTHORITY AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26233", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1301 = 2025 SLD 1301", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUTg", - "Key Words:": "This case arose from a show-cause notice issued under the Customs Act, 1969 to a DTRE user (duty and tax remission for export scheme). Under Section 179(3), the adjudicating authority had 120 days (with a possible 60-day extension) to issue the order-in-original. The order-in-original was eventually passed on 14.11.2012, but an extension request was made after the expiry of the original time limit. The Customs Tribunal and later the High Court both set aside the order-in-original as time-barred. The Department sought leave to appeal, arguing that the extension was sought in time and that “exceptional circumstances” existed due to the large tax amount involved.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. It held:\nThe timelines in Section 179(3) of the Customs Act are mandatory, not directory, as previously settled in Super Asia case (2017 SCMR 1427) and reaffirmed in Wak Ltd. (CA 634/2018, decided 14.05.2025).\nAny extension granted by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under Section 179(4) must be based on exceptional circumstances .\nIn the present case, there was no objective evidence or proper application of mind by the Board regarding the existence of such exceptional circumstances.\nThe Collector’s argument—that a large sum of duties was at stake—did not qualify as exceptional circumstances and instead highlighted administrative inefficiency.\nA letter dated 22.10.2012 placed on record by the Department was not contemporaneously relied upon and was thus irrelevant.\nCitations:\nCollector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia Muhammad Din (2017 SCMR 1427; 2017 PTD 1756)\nMujahid Soap and Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal (2019 SCMR 1735)\nWak Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue, CA 634/2018 (judgment dated 14.05.2025)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=179(3),179(4),224Sales Tax Act, 1990=74", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. 2475-L/2024. Date of Hearing & Order: 26.05.2025\n(Against order dated 15.10.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in Customs Reference No.1 /2015.)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Sultan Mahmood, ASC (via video-link, Lahore)\nMr. Rizwan Basharat, Collector (Faisalabad)\nFor the Respondents: N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, FAISALABAD THROUGH COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS ... PETITIONER\nVS\nM/S. FATIMA ENTERPRISES, MULTAN & ANOTHER ….... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26234", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1302 = 2025 SLD 1302", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUXo", - "Key Words:": "The Applicant, Shamsuddin, filed a civil suit (F.C. Suit No. 30/2003) for Declaration and Permanent Injunction claiming ownership of land measuring 31-20 acres based on an alleged oral sale in 1985 from Umer Hayat. The sale was purportedly recorded before a Mukhtiarkar. Entry No. 72 in the revenue record was made accordingly, but was later cancelled by the Deputy District Officer (Revenue), Miro Khan, on 22.01.2003, after holding it to be bogus. The Applicant neither challenged the cancellation order under the revenue laws nor produced strong evidence of possession or ownership.\nBoth the Trial Court and the Appellate Court rejected the Applicant’s claim, finding the sale and the associated entry to be fraudulent. A registered Power of Attorney from Umer Hayat in favor of Defendant No. 1 (Nadir Hussain) was held to be genuine. The Applicant’s failure to challenge the DDO’s order in the appropriate revenue forum and lack of credible possession evidence further weakened the claim.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Application, upholding the concurrent findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts. It held that:\nThe oral sale and Entry No.72 were not proven by reliable evidence.\nThe Applicant did not utilize remedies available under the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967.\nCivil courts cannot override lawful administrative orders under special laws unless shown to be illegal or mala fide.\nNo exceptional circumstances under Section 115 C.P.C. were shown to warrant interference with concurrent factual findings.\nCitations:\nAdministrator, Thai Development through EACO Bhakkar v. Ali Muhammad, 2012 SCMR 730 – Civil courts jurisdiction barred when administrative remedies not exhausted.\nRasool Bukhsh v. Muhammad Ramzan, 2007 SCMR 85 – Registered documents carry legal presumption of authenticity.\nAbdul Aziz v. Abdul Hameed, 2022 SCMR 842 – Presumption of correctness for registered documents under the Registration Act and QSO.\nHaji Wajdad v. Provincial Govt. of Balochistan, 2020 SCMR 2046 – Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC limited to exceptional cases involving misreading/non-reading or illegal exercise of jurisdiction.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=115", - "Case #": "Civil Revision Application No. S-13 of 2006. Date of hearing: 07-05-2025. Date of Judgment: 16-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAN ALI JUNEJO, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: Shamsuddin s/o Ahmed Khan Lankan Through Mr. Vinod Kumar G. Jessrani, Advocate\nRespondent No.1: Nadir Hussain Bhand (since deceased) through his L.Rs respondents No.01(a) to 01(l) Through Mr. Habibullah G. Ghouri, Advocate Through Mr. Abdul Waris Bhutto, Asstt A.G Government of Sindh:" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26235", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1303 = 2025 SLD 1303", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpUXk", - "Key Words:": "The deceased appellant had filed a suit in 2010 for recovery of Rs. 150 million as damages for malicious prosecution against the respondent bank. During pendency of proceedings, the appellant passed away. Upon confrontation, his counsel conceded that the claim for damages could no longer be maintained due to the personal nature of the cause of action. However, the appellants counsel argued that the suit could survive to the extent of outstanding service benefits, which were allegedly due from the bank.\nThe respondents counsel rebutted this by arguing that no such claim regarding service benefits was made in the original suit and that it constituted a separate cause of action, requiring a distinct legal proceeding.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that:\nThe claim for malicious prosecution is not inheritable and stood abated upon the death of the plaintiff.\nLegal heirs cannot pursue damages based on personal suffering of the deceased.\nHowever, the legal heirs are permitted to file a separate suit for recovery of outstanding service benefits, if any, before a competent Civil Court.\nThe question of limitation will not bar such a fresh suit, as the heirs have been actively pursuing the matter since 2024.\nThe High Court Appeal (HCA) was accordingly disposed of.\nCitations:\nNo specific case law cited in the order, but principles applied include:\nPersonal tort claims such as malicious prosecution do not survive the deceased (based on general tort law).\nClaims for monetary entitlements like service benefits are heritable rights and can be claimed independently by legal heirs.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "H.C.A No. 112 of 2024. Date of order: 22-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Mukesh Kumar G. Karara and Sajid Ali Channa, Advocates for the appellants\nMr. Faiz Mehmood Durrani, Advocate for respondent No.1 None present for respondent No. 2", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD SALEEM MANGI THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS \nVS\nUNITED BANK LIMITED AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26236", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1304 = 2025 SLD 1304", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTc", - "Key Words:": "The petitioners were appointed through a competitive process in 2009 as Naib Qasid and Driver on a contract basis under the Land Administration and Revenue Management Information System (LARMIS) project by the Board of Revenue, Sindh. One petitioner, Jawed, later assumed roles such as dispatcher, record keeper, and focal person with contract extensions until the present.\nThe petitioners contended:\nTheir contracts were repeatedly extended and covered by regular budgets.\nThey were not contingency employees, but appointed against sanctioned contractual posts.\nThey are entitled to regularization under The Sindh Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees Act, 2013, and in line with the Court’s orders in C.P. No. D-4291/2020 and C.P. No. D-7528/2018, upheld by the Supreme Court in CPLA No. 517-K/2023.\nThe respondents/AAG opposed the petitions, arguing:\nPetitioners transitioned to temporary 89-day appointments (contingent in nature), thus outside the purview of the 2013 Act.\nThe petitioners lacked qualifications for regular positions (e.g., Record Keeper post).\nPetitioners should compete afresh through open recruitment as per prevailing rules.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held:\nPetitioners were appointed through a competitive process, fulfilling a pre-condition for regularization as supported by Muhammad Ashraf Sangri v. Federation of Pakistan, 2014 SCMR 157.\nTheir appointments were for regular posts under a public project (LARMIS), taken over by the Government with budget allocations in 2017–2018.\nA summary dated 09.12.2021, floated by the Senior Member, Board of Revenue, supported the petitioners retention in public interest.\nPetitioners stand similarly placed as others who were regularized pursuant to the orders in C.P. No. D-4291/2020 & D-7528/2018, and the Supreme Court’s order of 24.08.2023 in CPLA No. 517-K/2023.\nConclusion:\nThe petitions were allowed, directing that the petitioners’ cases for regularization as Naib Qasid and Driver be processed in accordance with law, treating them on the same footing as colleagues already regularized. All pending applications were also disposed of.\nCitations:\nMuhammad Ashraf Sangri v. Federation of Pakistan, 2014 SCMR 157\nGovernment of KPK v. Adnanullah, 2016 SCMR 1375\nC.P. No. D-4291/2020 and C.P. No. D-7528/2018\nSupreme Court Order dated 24.08.2023 in CPLA No. 517-K/2023\nThe Sindh Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees Act, 2013", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CP. No. D-3835 of 2021, CP. No. D-3836 of 2021. Date of Hearing: 26.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD KARIM KHAN AND AGHA MR. JUSTICE ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. G.M. Bhutto advocate for the petitioners.\nMr. Ali Safdar, Depar Assistant Advocate General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CP. No. D-3835 of 2021\nJUNAID KHALIL \nVS\nPROVINCE OF SINDH & OTHERS\nCP. No. D-3836 of 2021\nJAWED SOLANGI \nVS \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26237", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1305 = 2025 SLD 1305", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTY", - "Key Words:": "Grant of Post-Arrest Bail in Murder Case (Section 302 PPC)\nDetails:\nThe petitions for post-arrest bail were filed by Mst. Mariyam and Imtiaz Hussain, co-accused in FIR No. 921/2024 dated 17.05.2024 registered under Section 302 PPC at P.S. Sharqpur Sharief, Sheikhupura. The case pertained to the alleged murder of Fiza Batool, whose body was found under a motorway interchange. Initial reports by the complainant stated the body was of an unknown woman, later identified through fingerprint as Fiza.\nThe investigation revealed:\nFiza had left home on 06.05.2024 and later claimed to have married.\nLast communication was on 13.05.2024; body was found on 17.05.2024.\nWitnesses claimed to have seen her with three unknown men but gave no facial description.\nImtiaz Hussain was arrested under Section 54 Cr.P.C. and identified by witnesses in jail. The deceased’s ID was recovered from him.\nCo-accused Ashiq Hussain named Mst. Mariyam as a participant in throwing Fiza out of a moving vehicle using a dopatta, though neither the dopatta nor corroborative evidence was recovered.\nMedical report concluded cause and manner of death were undetermined.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that:\nThe case against both petitioners required further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.\nMst. Mariyam’s role was not substantiated by independent evidence.\nImtiaz Hussain’s identification and recovery of deceased’s ID did not conclusively implicate him at this stage.\nGiven prolonged detention without conclusive evidence, continued incarceration was unjustified.\nBail was allowed with each furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 500,000/- with surety.\nCitations:\nPLD 2022 SC 475, Chairman NAB v. Nisar Ahmed Pathan: “To err in granting bail is better than to err in declining.”\nSection 497(2) Cr.P.C. – Bail granted on grounds of further inquiry.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=302Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=497(2)", - "Case #": "Case No. Crl. Misc. No. 9980-B/2025. Date of Order: 29.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: FAROOQ HAIDER, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Safdar Bhatti, Advocate for the petitioner (Crl. Misc. No.9980-B/2025).\nMalik Azhar Abbas Waseer, Advocate for the petitioner (Crl. Misc. No.11391-B/2025).\nRana Muhammad Imran Anjum, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State alongwith Sadaqat, S.I. and record of the case.\nRana Muhammad Ramzan, Advocate for Noman-ul-Hassan (brother of deceased of the case namely Fiza Batool).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MST. MARAYAM \nVS \nTHE STATE, ETC" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26238", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1320 = 2025 SLD 1320", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTU", - "Key Words:": "Eligibility of Tax Credits under Section 100C – Non-Profit Organization Status\nDetails:\nThe reference arose from the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue dated 07.12.2021, which denied tax credits under Section 100C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to the applicant — a Section 42 company registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984.\nThe applicant claimed that it qualified for exemption under Section 100C(2)(a) and that the Tribunal erroneously applied Section 100C(2)(c). However, the tax department argued that approval as a non-profit organization under Section 2(36) of the ITO was a prerequisite to claiming any relief under Section 100C(1) or 100C(2)(a). The applicant lacked such approval during Tax Years 2015, 2016, and 2017.\nHeld:\nThe Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, ruling that:\nApproval under Section 2(36) is mandatory to claim benefits of Section 100C(1) or 100C(2)(a).\nSince the applicant had no certification from the Commissioner Inland Revenue as a non-profit organization for the relevant tax years, it did not qualify for any tax credit/exemption.\nThe Court did not address the Tribunal’s application of Section 100C(2)(c), holding that the lack of approval alone was sufficient to deny relief.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(36),100C(1) ,100C(2)(c),100C(2)(a)", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 13 of 2022. Date of order: 27.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE AND SARDAR EJAZ KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Ali Murtaza Abbas and Syed Tauqeer Bukhari, Advocates for the applicant \nMr. Osama Shahid, Advocate for respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S DHAI EDUCATION SYSTEM \nVS\nAPPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26239", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1321 = 2025 SLD 1321", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTQ", - "Key Words:": "Validity of Remand Order by CIR(A) – Ex-Parte Assessment Reopened for Fair Hearing\nDetails:\nThe appeal was filed by the Department challenging Order No. 753/2018 dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), RTO Rawalpindi, relating to Tax Year 2015.\nThe taxpayer had filed a return showing income of Rs. 1,549,190, but the case was selected for audit under Section 214C. Due to the taxpayer’s failure to produce records during audit, an ex-parte assessment was made, enhancing income to Rs. 36,255,731 via additions to cost of sales and disallowed expenses.\nThe taxpayer appealed, and the CIR(A) remanded the matter to the assessing officer with directions to allow a fair opportunity of hearing, as material aspects were not considered during the ex-parte proceedings.\nThe Department then approached the Appellate Tribunal, claiming to be aggrieved by the remand.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held that:\nThe CIR(A) acted within jurisdiction by remanding the case for de novo proceedings, ensuring fairness.\nNo final relief had been granted to the taxpayer; thus, the Department had no real grievance.\nThe Tribunal has independent power to remand cases under appellate jurisdiction.\nThe Department failed to demonstrate any procedural illegality or legal error in the CIR(A)’s order.\nConsequently, the appeal lacked merit and was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 672/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2015). Date of Hearing & Order: 09.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR\nRespondent By: Mr. Imran Abid, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI ……. APPELLANT\nVS\n\nMR. QAISER JABBAR; M/S QJ BUILDERS, 15-BASEMENT, AL MUSTAFA PLAZA, CHANDNI CHOWK, RAWALPINDI …….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26240", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1322 = 2025 SLD 1322", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTS8", - "Key Words:": "Remand of Best Judgment Assessment – Denial of Fair Hearing under Section 121\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer, an individual engaged in retail business, filed return for Tax Year 2017, which was treated as deemed assessment under Section 120. The case was selected for audit through computerized balloting under Section 214C.\nDue to repeated non-compliance with notices (served electronically and via courier), the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue (ACIR) proceeded under Section 121(1)(d) and passed an ex-parte best judgment assessment based on available information, raising a tax demand of Rs. 415,598.\nThe taxpayer challenged the order before the CIR(A), Karachi, but the appeal was dismissed on 31.08.2023, as no supporting evidence was presented to counter the assessment. The CIR(A) confirmed the ex-parte assessment.\nThe taxpayer then filed the present second appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, arguing that the orders were passed without granting fair opportunity, and were illegal and arbitrary.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of both the ACIR and CIR(A), remanding the case to the original authority with directions:\nTo provide the taxpayer a fair and reasonable opportunity of being heard.\nThe taxpayer must also cooperate and provide all necessary records in the reassessment proceedings.\nThe Tribunal relied on settled case law including:\n2002 PTD 407 – Best judgment assessments must be based on fair reasoning, not punishment.\n1979 PTD 473, PLD 1968 Kar 858 – Honest, not capricious or vindictive assessments are permissible.\n2013 PTD 682 – Arbitrary assessments are not allowed even in ex-parte situations.\nCitations:\n2002 PTD 407\n2013 PTD 682\n1979 PTD 473\nPLD 1968 Kar 858\nPak Co. v. CIT (1985) 51 Tax 181 (SC Pak)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=121,121(1),121(1(d),177(10),214C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 478/KB-2024 (Tax Year-2017). Date of Hearing: 21.04-2025 and Date of Order : 15.05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Zubair, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Kashif Hafeez, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ADIL KHAN GHOURI, KARACHI ……… APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR ZONE-I RTO-I ......RESPONDENT ……… KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26241", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1323 = 2025 SLD 1323", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTSs", - "Key Words:": "Annulment of Sales Tax Demand on Alleged Sales to Unregistered Persons\nDetails:\nThe appellant, M/s. Mansoor Store, a registered importer and taxpayer, was subjected to proceedings under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, by DCIR, Zone-II, MTO, Karachi, for the tax periods July 2021 to June 2023. The DCIR alleged that the appellant made taxable sales to unregistered persons without paying further tax, resulting in a demand of Rs. 23,811,208, plus default surcharge and penalty under Sections 33(19) and 34(1)(a).\nThe appellant denied these claims, stating:\nAll sales were made to registered entities.\nNo opportunity of hearing was granted due to lack of proper service of notices.\nThe assessment misinterpreted transactional data and ignored available records.\nApplication of Section 3(1A) was erroneous, especially for sales to end-consumers which are exempt under SRO 648(I)/2013.\nThe appellant further relied on case law:\nPTCL 2001 CL 1 – Validates imposition of further tax only on actual supplies to unregistered persons.\nPTCL 2023 CL 900 – Further tax is not leviable on sales made directly to end-consumers.\nHeld:\nThe Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue found that:\nThe DCIR failed to verify the appellant’s sales records adequately.\nThere was a violation of procedural fairness and Article 10A (right to fair trial).\nThe application of Section 3(1A) was not justified, and the demand was unsupported by evidence.\nConsequently, the Tribunal annulled the impugned order dated 14-10-2024, deleted the tax demand, and set aside all additions made under Sections 3(1A), 33(19), and 34(1)(a) as being without legal merit.\nCitations:\nPTCL 2001 CL 1\nPTCL 2023 CL 900\nSRO 648(I)/2013 dated 09-07-2013\nArticle 10A, Constitution of Pakistan", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=3(1A), 11(2), 33(19), 34(1)(a)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "STA No. 792/KB/2024 (Tax Period July 2021 to June 2023). Date of hearing: 25.02.2025 & Date of order: 12.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syeda Abida Bukhari, Advocate & Syeda Ayesha Mehmood, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Wazir Ahmed, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. MANSOOR STORE, PROP. MANSOOR AHMED, KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER-IR, ZONE-II, MTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26242", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1324 = 2025 SLD 1324 = (2025) 132 TAX 143", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTk", - "Key Words:": "Dismissal of Tax Petition Due to Absence of Board’s Approval on Record\nDetails:\nThe petitioner sought relief on the basis that the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) had granted an extension of time under Section 179(4) of the Customs Act, 1969, which allows for such extensions in exceptional circumstances. The petitioner attempted to rely on the Super Asia case (2017 SCMR 1427), which interpreted Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, suggesting that the FBR may grant extensions as deemed appropriate. \nHowever, the Supreme Court distinguished the two statutes:\nSection 179(4) of the Customs Act requires “exceptional circumstances”, making it a more restrictive provision than Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, which allows broader discretion.\nThe principles in Super Asia were deemed irrelevant as they interpreted Section 74, not Section 179(4).\nMoreover, the alleged FBR approval letter granting an extension was never placed on record before the Appellate Tribunal, a fact acknowledged by petitioner’s counsel and recorded by the Tribunal itself. The Court emphasized that:\nIn tax references, only questions of law can be entertained.\nFactual evidence not presented before the Tribunal cannot be introduced at the High Court or Supreme Court stage.\nHeld:\nThe petition was dismissed as the claim regarding FBRs extension of time was unsupported by record and could not be considered at this stage. The Court refused to allow factual additions to the record at the Supreme Court level, maintaining settled procedural jurisprudence for tax references.\nCitations:\nCollector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons (2017 SCMR 1427)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=179(4)Sales Tax Act, 1990=74", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A.466-K of 2025. Date of Hearing: 29.05.2025\n(Against order dated 17.01.2025 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in S.C.R.A. No.1518/2023)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC (at Islamabad), Mr. Imran Afzal, Addl: Dir (via video link (Karachi).\nFor the Respondents: Not represented.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE & INVESTIGATION (CUSTOMS) ….. PETITIONER\nVS\nALTAF HUSSAIN & ANOTHER ……. RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26243", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1325 = 2025 SLD 1325 = (2025) 132 TAX 463", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTTg", - "Key Words:": "Maintainability of Constitutional Petition Without Exhausting Alternate Remedies\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a charitable educational institution registered under Section 42 of the Companies Ordinance (now Companies Act, 2017), challenged the demand of property tax and conservancy charges by the Cantonment Board under Regulation No. 51 dated 23.11.2022. It relied on an exemption notification dated 15/16.05.1956, arguing that the institution is exempt from such charges and that the act of sealing its premises merely due to outdated ownership records is unjustified. Petitioner invoked constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.\nThe respondent (Cantonment Board) objected, asserting that the petition is premature as the petitioner failed to exhaust the statutory remedies under the Cantonment Act, 1924. The law requires the petitioner to first approach the Assessment Committee (Section 68), and in case of an adverse order, avail appeals (Section 84), review (Section 88), and revision (Section 277). The respondent also pointed to a Policy of 2009, stating the petitioner could seek exemption upon submission of required documentation.\nThe Court noted that:\nWrit jurisdiction under Article 199 is not a substitute for statutory remedies.\nSeveral Supreme Court decisions—including 2021 SCMR 624, 2023 SCMR 316, 2023 SCMR 1247, 2023 SCMR 1442, PLD 2025 SC 339, and 2025 SCMR 249—underscore the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Remedies and the Court’s duty to avoid resolving factual disputes through writs when alternative remedies exist.\nHeld:\nThe petition was disposed of as not maintainable due to the availability of adequate alternate remedies under the Cantonment Act, 1924, which the petitioner had not pursued. However, the Court directed that a copy of the petition and annexures be forwarded to the Assessment Committee, which must provide a fair hearing and decide the case through a speaking order within four weeks. The petitioner is to cooperate by submitting all required documentation under the 2009 Policy.\nCitations:\nProvince of Punjab v. Yasir Majeed Sheikh (2021 SCMR 624)\nSana Jamali v. Mujeeb Qamar (2023 SCMR 316)\nMian Azam Waheed v. Collector of Customs (2023 SCMR 1247)\nSpecial Secretary-II v. Fayyaz Dawar (2023 SCMR 1442)\nSyed Masood Ali v. Mst. Feroza Begum (PLD 2025 SC 339)\nState Life v. Muhammad Nisar (2025 SCMR 249)\nDr. Abdul Nabi v. Executive Officer, Cantonment Board Quetta (2023 SCMR 1267)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Ordinance, 1984=42Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 683/2023. Date of order: 30-04-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Rizwan Niaz, ASC for the Petitioner.\nMr. Muhammad Arshad Malik, Assistant Attorney General.\nCh. Muhammad Yaqoob, ASC on behalf of the Respondents No.2 and 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "QUALITY SCHOOLS FOUNDATION \nVS \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26244", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1326 = 2025 SLD 1326", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTXo", - "Key Words:": "Core Disputes\nSuit 01/2009 (NBP’s Recovery Claim):\nBMB defaulted on loan facilities (enhanced from Rs. 62M to Rs. 550M between 2002–2008).\nPledged ship scrap (11,724 MT) allegedly embezzled by BMB with custodian’s connivance (Dec 2008).\nNBP sought recovery of Rs. 431.7M + cost of funds.\nSuit 02/2019 (BMB’s Damages Claim):\nBMB accused NBP of misappropriating pledged stock and lodging a false FIR.\nSought Rs. 938M as market value of lost stock.\nCourt’s Key Findings\nSuit 01/2009 (NBP’s Favor)\nLiability Admitted:\nBMB admitted availing loans and executing security documents (contradicting their initial denial).\nGuarantors (Defendants 2–4) failed to prove fraud/blank signatures.\nEmbezzlement:\nPledged stock was under BMB’s physical control per loan agreements.\nBMB failed to explain disappearance of stock (29–31 Dec 2008) or indemnify NBP.\nDecree:\nDefendants ordered to pay Rs. 431.7M + cost of funds (from 31 Mar 2008) jointly/severally.\nMortgaged properties to be sold for recovery.\nSuit 02/2019 (Dismissed)\nNo Proof Against NBP:\nBMB failed to prove NBP embezzled the stock.\nCustodian (Asif Associates) not impleaded; suit defective.\nLimitation:\nSuit filed in 2019 (cause of action accrued in 2009); barred by limitation (3-year period under Limitation Act).\nDamages Unsubstantiated:\nBMB did not plead/quantify special damages or provide evidence of loss.\nCritical Legal Points\nGuarantor Liability: Guarantors’ liability is co-extensive with the principal debtor (BMB) under Contract Act, 1872.\nBurden of Proof: Defendants failed to prove:\nFraud in document execution.\nNBP’s role in stock loss.\nPossession of Stock: Loan terms placed risk of loss on BMB (not NBP).\nOutcome\nSuit 01/2009: Decreed in favor of NBP.\nSuit 02/2019: Dismissed with costs.\nKey Takeaway: The judgment underscores the importance of contractual obligations, burden of proof in fraud allegations, and strict adherence to limitation periods. BMB’s inconsistent pleadings and failure to substantiate claims led to dismissal of their suit, while NBP’s evidence secured recovery.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Suit 01 & 02 of 2009. Date of hearing 02 June 2025. Announced on 13 June 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: GUL HASSAN TAREEN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Suit 01 of 2009 (CC# 100106200051) \nM/S NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, THROUGH ITS BRANCH MANAGER, HUB CHOWKI \nVS \nM/S BISMILLAH MARITIME BREAKERS THROUGH ITS PARTNERS AND OTHERS.\nPlaintiff by: Mr. Muhammad Akram Shah, Advocate.\nDefendants 1 (I to iii) and 3 by: Mr. Mujeeb Ahmed Hashmi, Advocate.\nDefendants 2, 4 and 5 by: Ex-parte.\nSuit 02 of 2019 (CC# 100107204093)\nM/S BISMILLAH MARITIME BREAKERS THROUGH ITS MANAGING PARTNER \nVS\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER.\nPlaintiff by: Mr. Mujeeb Ahmed Hashmi, Advocate.\nDefendants by: Mr. Muhammad Akram Shah, Advocate." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26245", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1327 = 2025 SLD 1327", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpTXk", - "Key Words:": "Constitutional Petition Barred by Laches in Government Recruitment Matter\nDetails:\nThe petitioner challenged the non-issuance of an appointment and posting order despite having successfully passed the recruitment process initiated through a public advertisement dated 15.03.2012 for the post of Junior Physical Education Teacher. He claimed to have cleared all requisite stages, including medical and character clearance, and was issued an offer letter dated 29.11.2012. He alleged that less qualified but politically connected candidates received appointments while he was denied one arbitrarily.\nThe petitioner sought judicial intervention under Article 199, contending that he had a vested right to appointment and invoked the principle of parity, citing Constitution Petition D-426 of 2013 (allowed by the same Court), which involved a similar grievance arising from the same 2012 recruitment policy.\nThe respondent objected to the maintainability of the petition on grounds of gross delay—over 11 years—arguing the petition is barred by laches, and that the petitioner failed to provide any credible explanation for the prolonged inaction.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that:\nThe petition is barred by laches, citing the petitioner’s failure to assert his rights within a reasonable time.\nNo satisfactory or documentary explanation was provided for the delay of over a decade.\nReliance on CP D-426/2013 was misplaced, as that petition was filed promptly in 2013 and was not hit by delay.\nJudicial precedents, including 2012 PLC (C.S.) 218, PLD 2007 SC 472, 1995 SCMR 698, and 2014 PLC (C.S.) 1292, support that discretionary relief under Article 199 can be refused where there is inordinate and unexplained delay, even if the original grievance had merit.\nFinal Outcome:\nPetition dismissed on grounds of being non-maintainable due to laches.\nCitations:\nState Bank of Pakistan v. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2012 PLC (C.S.) 218)\nJawad Mir Muhammad v. Haroon Mirza (PLD 2007 SC 472)\nChairman PCSIR v. Dr. Khalida Razi (1995 SCMR 698)\nAsghar Khan v. Province of Sindh (2014 PLC (C.S.) 1292)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-292 of 2023. Date of Hearing & order: 21.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE ZULFIQAR ALI SANGI, MR. JUSTICE ABDUL HAMID BHURGRI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Petitioner: Mukhtiar Ahmed son of Muhammad Ismaeel bycaste Channa through Mr. J.K Jarwar, Advocate\nRespondents: Province of Sindh and others through Mr.Ali Raza Balouch, Additional Advocate General Sindh." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26246", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1328 = 2025 SLD 1328", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTc", - "Key Words:": "Negligence by Courier Company in Self-Collection Delivery – Compensation Upheld\nDetails:\nMuhammad Siddique Ghumman (respondent) booked an insured OPPO mobile phone for self-collection delivery via TCS Courier (appellant) to a Facebook acquaintance named Shazia Saeed. However, the parcel was wrongly handed over to Muhammad Amar, who impersonated the consignee and admitted to the deception. TCS acknowledged its mistake after a legal notice was served, and later recovered the phone from Amar.\nTCS argued in appeal that the respondent was careless in not knowing the consignee personally and that since the phone was returned, no damages should be payable. The respondent countered that TCS had a clear duty to verify identity and that the negligence caused financial and mental distress. He originally sought Rs.24,000 but due to being drawn into litigation, the court awarded Rs.124,000.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that:\nThe self-collection service requires strict ID verification, especially for valuable, insured items.\nTCS’s failure to verify identity was a clear breach of duty and constituted negligence.\nThe consumer’s naivety or the fact that the fraudster was a Facebook acquaintance did not absolve TCS.\nTCS’s admission of fault and recovery of the item did not undo the harm caused nor the claim for compensation.\nThe mental distress, inconvenience, and litigation justified the awarded amount.\nHeld: Appeal dismissed. Trial courts award of Rs.124,000/- in compensation upheld. No order as to costs.\nPrinciples of consumer protection and contractual negligence in service delivery", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005=33", - "Case #": "FAO No. 36959/2022. Date of Hearing: 03.06.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants by: Ch. Arshad, Advocate, assisted by Raja Waqas Ahmed, Advocate.\nRespondent No.1 by: In person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TCS ETC. \nVS \nMUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE GHUMMAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26247", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1338 = 2025 SLD 1338 = 2025 CLD 517", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTY", - "Key Words:": "An appeal challenges orders (05.10.2022 & 13.10.2022) that dismissed objections to an auction sale and confirmed the sale in favor of a decree-holder bank (Respondent No. 1). The appellants argue the auction violated mandatory legal procedures.\nKey Facts\nBackground:\nA bank obtained a decree (07.03.2017) against the appellants and initiated execution.\nAuction scheduled for 18.07.2022 was adjourned twice due to lack of bids.\nOn 12.08.2022, three bidders participated:\nHighest bidder (Abid Hussain): ₹517.7 million (defaulted on 25% deposit).\nSecond bidder: ₹517.5 million (also defaulted).\nDecree-holder bank: ₹513.6 million (barely above reserve price).\nAuction Irregularities:\nAfter the highest bidder’s default, auctioneers offered the property to the second bidder (who defaulted) and then to the bank, instead of conducting a fresh auction.\nThe bank claimed set-off (waiving cash payment) and was declared the purchaser.\nLegal Issues\nViolation of Rule 84, Order XXI, CPC:\nAppellants argued that upon the highest bidder’s default, the auctioneers must conduct a fresh re-sale—not offer the property to lower bidders.\nCourt agreed: Rule 84 mandates forthwith re-sale upon default, rendering the continuation of proceedings illegal.\nDeposit of 20% (Rule 90, Order XXI):\nAppellants failed to deposit 20% of the sale amount to file objections.\nCourt’s ruling: Despite non-deposit, objections are valid if the sale is void ab initio due to gross illegality (e.g., violating Rule 84).\nCompetitive Bidding Requirement:\nOffering the property to the last-standing bidder (the bank) resulted in a non-competitive auction with one bidder, violating public auction principles.\nCourt’s Findings\nRule 84 Violation: Auctioneers illegally bypassed mandatory re-sale, extending an aborted auction to benefit the bank.\nNullity of Sale: The sale was declared void due to:\nProcedural fraud (repeated adjournments facilitating the bank’s bid).\nSubstantial injury to appellants (property sold barely above reserve price).\nDeposit of 20%: Waived because the sale’s illegality rendered it a nullity.\nOutcome\nAppeal Allowed: Auction sale in favor of the bank set aside.\nOrders Dated 05.10.2022 & 13.10.2022 Quashed.\nKey Legal Principles Affirmed\nRule 84, Order XXI: Default by the highest bidder necessitates fresh re-sale; no option to lower bidders.\nVoid Sales: Non-compliance with mandatory rules invalidates sales, overriding procedural lapses (e.g., non-deposit under Rule 90).\nCompetitive Auctions: Single-bidder auctions violate public auction spirit.\nFinal Ruling: Auction declared null and void; property to be re-auctioned afresh.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=19,22Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=72,84184(1)", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No. 30 of 2022, heard on 22nd October, 2024. Date of hearing: 22nd October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE AND ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Sulaman Bhatti, Peer Muhammad Masood Chishti, Qaisar Abbas and Naveed Qadir Khan for Appellants.\nSyed Muhammad Ali Gillani and Anwar Kamal for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RAFI COTTON INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. AND OTHERS-APPELLANTS\nVS\nBANK AL-HABIB AND OTHERS-RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26248", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1339 = 2025 SLD 1329", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTU", - "Key Words:": "The department challenged the partial relief granted by the Commissioner (Appeals), who had reduced an addition for unverifiable purchases from 30% to 20% without detailed justification. The original assessment was ex-parte due to the taxpayer’s failure to produce records during audit proceedings initiated under section 214C. The Tribunal held that both the assessing officer and the appellate authority made arbitrary estimations without any supporting evidence, material inquiry, or industry benchmarks. Emphasizing that tax additions must rest on cogent evidence rather than assumptions, the ATIR found no legal basis to uphold either the 30% or 20% disallowance.\nHeld:\nDepartmental appeal dismissed. The assessment was found to be arbitrary and devoid of evidentiary backing.\nRatio Decidendi:\nUnsubstantiated estimations in tax assessments, whether by the original authority or appellate forum, are not sustainable in law.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,214C", - "Case #": "ITA No. 530/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2015). Date of Hearing & Order: 05.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER and IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR\nRespondent by: None.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI ……… APPELLANT\nVS\nMR. USMAN GHANI, HAJI GHULAM SARWAR & SONS JEWELLERS, SARAFA BAZAR, ATTOCK." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26249", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1330 = 2025 SLD 1330 = (2025) 132 TAX 146 = 2025 PTCL 863", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTQ", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe petitioner, a subsidiary of a multinational company engaged in food product sales, was issued a show cause notice by the DCIR for failure to charge and deposit further tax @ 1% under section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for supplies allegedly made to unregistered persons during various tax periods of 2013 and 2014. The petitioner contended all supplies were made to registered persons and produced supporting documents. Relief was partially granted at various appellate stages, culminating in a reference under section 47 raising three questions of law.\nIssues Raised:\nWhether ATIR’s non-speaking order upholding further tax under section 3(1A) was lawful.\nWhether the 2022 amendment to section 3(1A) could be applied retrospectively to tax periods 2013–2014.\nWhether supplies made to registered persons who were blacklisted/suspended could still attract further tax under section 3(1A).\nHeld:\nThe High Court answered question (1) against the petitioner and found question (2) not arising from the record. On question (3), the case was remanded to ATIR for reconsideration. Upon final hearing, the Court examined the proper interpretation of section 3(1A) and reaffirmed long-standing principles of strict construction in fiscal statutes. It held that supplies made to persons who had obtained registration—even if later suspended or blacklisted—did not fall within the scope of section 3(1A), which applies only to supplies made to unregistered persons.\nRatio Decidendi:\nStrict construction applies to fiscal charging provisions: no tax can be levied unless expressly imposed by clear statutory language.\nMere suspension or blacklisting of a registered person does not equate to non-registration.\nAdditional 1% tax under section 3(1A) can only be levied if the recipient has not obtained registration, not if their registration is inactive or under legal disability.\nOutcome:\nPetition converted into appeal and allowed. Judgment of the High Court dated 15.10.2024 was set aside. ATIR’s interpretation of section 3(1A) found to be legally flawed.\nKey Authorities Cited:\nCape Brandy Syndicate\nHirjina & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd.\nJabees Ltd.\nHashwani Hotels Ltd.\nAl-Abid Silk Mills", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14),3(1A),6,7,22,23,26,11(2),33,34(1),47", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2672-L of 2024. Date of Hearing & Order: 27.05.2025\n[Against the order dated 15.10.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Sales Tax Reference No. 43/20230]", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Khan, ASC. [Via video-link from Lahore]\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Muhammad Yahya, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RAFHAN MAIZE PRODUCTS CO. LIMITED ….... PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE, MULTAN AND OTHERS …… RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26250", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1331 = 2025 SLD 1331", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSS8", - "Key Words:": "The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals by tax authorities, holding that:\nCriminal prosecution (arrest/FIR) under Sections 37A/37B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 cannot be initiated before assessing tax liability under Section 11.\nKey Reasons\nLegal Violation:\nArrests/prosecution without tax assessment violate Articles 4 (rule of law) and 10A (fair trial) of the Constitution.\nPenalties Require Assessment:\nFines under Section 33 (e.g., for tax fraud ) depend on quantified tax dues, which must be determined first via Section 11.\nSROs Invalid:\nNotifications SRO 775/2011 and SRO 776/2011 were struck down as ultra vires.\nOutcome\nAll FIRs/arrests made without prior tax assessment (Section 11) were quashed.\nHigh Court judgments (Lahore, Sindh, Peshawar, Islamabad) blocking such prosecutions were upheld.\nRelevant Laws\nSales Tax Act, 1990\nConstitution of Pakistan\n• Section 11 (Tax Assessment)\n• Article 4 (Rule of Law)\n• Section 33 (Penalties)\n• Article 10A (Fair Trial)\n• Sections 37A/37B (Arrest/Prosecution)\n\nIn Short: Tax authorities must determine tax dues (via Section 11) before pursuing criminal charges for evasion/fraud.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,33,37A,37BConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "W.P No. 3266-P/2025 with IR. Date of Hearing 15.05.2025. Date of Judgment: 11.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI & JUSTICE MUHAMMAD FAHEEM WALI MAHMOOD SHAH", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by: Mr. Aamir Bilal, Advocate.\nRespondent(s) by: M/S Rahat Ali Khan Nahaqi, Assistant Attorney General and Ehtesham-ud-Din, Advocate alongwith Zahir Muhammad Additional Collector.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S KHYBER INTERNATIONAL OFFICE THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR ZUBAIR KHAN AND OTHERS ...... PETITIONERS.\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION/CHAIRMAN, FBR, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS ....... RESPONDENTS." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26251", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1332 = 2025 SLD 1332", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSSs", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue\nWhether the Punjab Government’s 2024 notifications hiking royalty rates for limestone/clay used in cement production violated:\nKey Legal Provisions\n1. Regulation of Mines Act, 1948\nSection 2(4):\nEmpowers government to set rules for royalty rates payable by mining leaseholders.\n2. Punjab Mining Concessions Rules, 2002\nRule 65: Mandates royalty payment for mineral extraction.\nRule 66(1)(a): Allows government to notify royalty rates for industrial minerals (e.g., limestone, clay).\nAmended Rule 66(1)(a) (01.08.2024):\nLinks royalty to 6% of ex-factory cement/clinker sale price (previously based on mineral’s market value).\n3. Lease Agreements (04.09.2004)\nClause xxxii: Allows royalty rate revision by the government.\nClause xliv: Lessees must comply with amended rules.\nCourt’s Ruling\n1. Validity of Amendments\nUpheld the 2024 notifications:\nGovernment acted within Section 2(4) of the 1948 Act and Rule 66(1)(a).\nRoyalty is a contractual share (not a tax ), payable for mineral use.\n2. No Violation of Due Process\nRejected petitioners’ argument for a pre-amendment hearing:\nRule changes are legislative actions – no requirement for prior consultation.\n3. Reasonableness of Royalty Hike\n6% rate justified due to:\nCurrency devaluation.\nMinerals constituting 90% of cement ingredients.\nNot arbitrary; approved by Provincial Cabinet (09.07.2024).\n4. Precedent Cited\nMessrs Pioneer Cement v. Govt. (SC Pakistan):\nConfirmed government’s authority to set royalties under the 1948 Act.\nOutcome\nAll writ petitions DISMISSED.\nNotifications dated 01.08.2024 UPHELD:\nCement manufacturers must pay 6% royalty based on cement/clinker sale price.\nKey Takeaway\nGovernments can revise royalty rates for minerals under mining leases without prior hearings, provided amendments:\nFall within statutory authority (1948 Act, Rule 66).\nAre non-arbitrary and reflect economic realities.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 49176/2024. Date of hearing 28.04.2025, 30.04.2025, 05.05.2025, 06.05.2025, 12.05.2025, 14.05.2025 & 19.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: CH. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, JUSTICE, HASSAN NAWAZ MAKHDOOM, JUSTICE AND (MALIK WAQAR HAIDER AWAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by Mr. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Muhammad Ahmed Tariq Rahim, Hissam Tariq Rahim, Hashim Tariq Rahim, Manahil Ahmad Khan, Waqar Hassan, Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Nawal Asif, Advocates\nRespondents by Mr. Jahanzeb Inam, Additional Advocate General alongwith Raja Mansoor Ahmad, Director General of Mines Punjab and Rashid Bhatti, Law Officer.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DG KHAN CEMENT COMPANY \nVS\nTHE PROVINCE OF PUNJAB ETC. LIMITED ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26252", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1333 = 2025 SLD 1333", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTk", - "Key Words:": "Details:\nThe respondent, Shahid Bin Azim, filed a complaint before the Consumer Protection Court, Karak, against TCS Private Limited for delayed delivery of a medicinal ointment intended for his ailing sister and niece. The ointment was sent by Dr. Amir Hussain from Sibi, Balochistan, through TCS, after payment of Rs. 1000/- (including courier charges) by the respondent via EasyPaisa. Due to the late delivery (received on 05.08.2020 instead of within 48 hours), the respondent claimed Rs. 21,05,000/- for mental anguish, negligence, and endangerment of life. The Consumer Court awarded him Rs. 16,20,000/- as compensation under Section 15(1)(d) of the Act. TCS challenged this decision in appeal under Section 17 of the Act.\nHeld:\nThe High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the Consumer Court, holding:\nLimitation Objection Rejected: The appeal was filed within time, as per Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, considering the actual date of delivery of certified copies (08.09.2023), not their preparation date.\nNo Locus Standi: The respondent was not the consumer to whom TCS provided services; rather, the sender (Dr. Amir Hussain) was the contracting party with TCS. Although the respondent was a beneficiary, Section 13(1)(a) limits the right to complain to the actual consumer of services.\nLack of Jurisdiction: The Consumer Court lacked jurisdiction as the primary claim was for damages (tortious liability), which are adjudicated under civil law (Section 9, CPC). The consumer forum, being a limited jurisdiction tribunal, cannot entertain such civil disputes unless they directly arise under the Consumer Protection Act.\nThe complaint should have been filed in a civil court as the nature of claim pertained to compensation for mental torture and endangerment, not directly due to a violation of consumer rights as defined under the Act.\nCitations:\nKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumers Protection Act, 1997, Sections 2(c)(ii), 13(1)(a), 15(1)(d), 17\nLimitation Act, 1908, Section 12 (especially subsection 5, added via Amendment Act, 1991)\nCPC, Section 9\nKP Civil & Criminal Courts Copy Rules, 2021, Rules 24 & 25", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Cr. A NO. 378-B/2023. Date of hearing & order: 12.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD TARIQ AFRIDI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For appellants: Mr. Rehman Ullah Shah Advocate (via video link).\nFor respondent: Mr. Abdullah Khattak Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "INCHARGE, TCS OFFICE, NEAR NATIONAL BANK, KARAK ETC.\nVS\nSHAHID BIN AZIM" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26253", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1334 = 2025 SLD 1334", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSTg", - "Key Words:": "Details:\nPetitioners, employed in MIS/IT cadre of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) since 1994 (in roles such as Computer Programmer BS-17, MIS Officer BS-16, etc.), filed a constitutional petition seeking upgradation of their posts based on analogies with other departments where similar posts were upgraded through O.M. dated 24.01.2013. They argued this amounted to discrimination and violated their rights under Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution. They also referenced internal recommendations and O.M.s recognizing anomalies in service structure.\nRespondents, through the learned AAG, argued that the petition was not maintainable under Article 212, which confers exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Service Tribunal over civil servant matters. They emphasized that the petitioners’ cadre had a clear promotion path up to BS-20 under the recruitment rules and was thus ineligible for upgradation as per O.M. dated 11.09.2018, which only applies to isolated cadres.\nHeld:\nThe Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding:\nThe petition was not maintainable due to the bar under Article 212.\nThe claim for upgradation is legally unsustainable since petitioners’ cadre has defined promotion avenues under SRO 953(I)/2012 and is therefore not an isolated cadre.\nUpgradation cannot be claimed as a vested right, nor used as a tool for promotion.\nThe cited Office Memorandum of 2013 was conditional and does not support the petitioners’ claim.\nRelief must be sought through appropriate forums, particularly the Federal Service Tribunal.\nCitations:\n2015 SCMR 456\nCivil Appeals No. 101 & 102-P of 2011\nOffice Memoranda dated 24.01.2013 & 11.09.2018\nSRO 953(I)/2012", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=212", - "Case #": "CP. No. D-2872 of 2021. Date of hearing and Order: 29.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD KARIM KHAN AGHA AND MR. JUSTICE ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ali Asadullah Bullo advocate for the petitioners.\nMs. Wajiha Mehdi, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMIR ALI & OTHERS \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26254", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1335 = 2025 SLD 1335", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSXo", - "Key Words:": "CCTV Footage: Upheld as primary evidence under:\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (Art. 73 Expl. 3-4, Art. 46-A)\n Silent Witness Theory (Intl precedents: US v. Taylor, R v. Atkin, R v. Nikolovski).\nFootage showed petitioner assaulting victim, locking her in cabinet, and dragging her inside.\nForensic Reports:\nDNA confirmed sexual assault (Sec. 376 PPC).\nWeapon stained with victim’s blood recovered.\n2. Circumstantial Evidence Validity\nConviction based on circumstantial evidence permissible if:\nChain of evidence is unbroken and points exclusively to guilt.\nEvidence includes:\nBody recovered from petitioner’s house.\nPetitioner’s failure to explain victim’s presence/death.\n3. Modified Sentences\nOffence\nSection PPC\nSupreme Court’s Decision\nMurder\n302(b)\nDeath upheld\nRape\n376(1)\nDeath reduced to life imprisonment\nKidnapping\n364\nAcquitted\nWrongful confinement\n342\n 1-year RI upheld\n4. Co-Convicts\nWatchman (Muhammad Iftikhar) & Cook (Muhammad Jan):\nConvictions upheld but sentences reduced to time already served.\nOrdered released immediately.\n5. Complainant’s Petitions\nRequests for enhanced sentences and challenging acquittals dismissed.\nKey Legal Principles\nDigital Evidence (CCTV):\nAdmissible as primary evidence if:\nAuthenticity verified (State v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh).\nObtained from reliable source (unedited footage + forensic report).\nCircumstantial Evidence:\nMust form complete chain excluding innocence.\n Silent Witness Theory:\nCCTV footage can speak for itself without eyewitness testimony.\nFinal Outcome\nZahir Jaffar: Death for murder + life for rape upheld.\nCo-convicts: Released after sentence reduction.\nComplainant’s appeals: Dismissed.\nSignificance: Landmark validation of digital evidence and circumstantial proof in high-profile criminal cases.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=109,118,176,201,302,364,365,368,376(1),511Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=382-B", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition Nos. 467, 441, 442, 468, 469 and 485/2023. Date of order: 20-05-2025. Date of Hearing: 19 and 20.05.2025\n(Against the judgment/order dated 13.03.2023 passed by Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in J. A. No. 117/2022, Crl. Rev. No. 28/2022, Crl. A. Nos. 111, 123 & 136/2022 and M. R. No. 3/2022)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, JUSTICE ISHTIAQ IBRAHIM AND JUSTICE ALI BAQAR NAJAFI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Attendance\nIn Crl. P. No. 467/2023:\nFor the Mr. Salman Safdar, ASC Assisted by Mirza Ali Haider (with permission of the Court)\nFor the Mr. Shah Khawar, ASC Mr. Nisar Asghar, ASC\nIn Crl. P. Nos. 441-442/2023:\nFor the Mr. Shah Khawar, ASC, Mr. Nisar Asghar, ASC\nIn Crl. P. Nos. 468-469/2023:\nFor the Mr. Humayoun Rashid, ASC\nFor the Mr. Shah Khawar, ASC, Mr. Nisar Asghar, ASC \nIn Crl. P. No. 485/2023:\nFor the Nemo\nFor the State (in all): Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Nihung, P.G., Ms. Chand Bibi, DPG and assisted by Barrister Abdullah Sarwar\nResearch Assistance: Mr. Aqib Aman, Research Officer", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zahir Zakir Jaffar (in Crl. P. 467/2023)\nShaukat Ali Mukadam (in Crl. Ps. 441 & 442/2023)\nMuhammad Jan (in Crl. P. 468/2023)\nMuhammad Iftikhar (in Crl. Ps. 469 & 485/2023) ……… Petitioner(s)\nVs\nThe State and another (in Crl. Ps. 467-469/2023)\nZakir Jaffar, etc. (in Crl. P. 441/2023)\nZahir Zakir Jaffer, etc. (in Crl. P. 442/2023)\nShaukat Ali Mukadam and another (in Crl. P. 485/2023) ………… Respondent(s)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26255", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1336 = 2025 SLD 1336 = 2025 PTD 1337 = (2025) 132 TAX 431", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpSXk", - "Key Words:": "Case Background\nPetitioners: Zahir Zakir Jaffar (main convict) and co-accused (Shaukat Ali Mukadam, Muhammad Jan, Muhammad Iftikhar).\nCharges: Murder (302 PPC), rape (376 PPC), kidnapping (364 PPC), wrongful confinement (342 PPC), and other offenses related to the death of Noor Mukadam on 20.07.2021 at Jaffar’s residence in Islamabad.\nLower Courts:\nTrial Court: Convicted Jaffar (death under 302(b), 25 years under 376(1), 10 years under 364, 1 year under 342).\nHigh Court: Upheld convictions and enhanced rape sentence to death.\nSupreme Court’s Key Findings\nCircumstantial Evidence:\nProsecution relied on CCTV footage, forensic reports (DNA, weapon recovery), and absence of eyewitnesses.\nCourt affirmed conviction based on circumstantial evidence if it forms an unbroken chain linking the accused to the crime.\nCCTV Footage Admissibility:\nAdmitted under the Silent Witness theory (no sponsoring witness needed if authenticity proven).\nFootage showed Jaffar assaulting Noor, locking her in a cabinet, and dragging her inside.\nForensic report (Ex.PBH) confirmed footage was unedited, and facial recognition matched Jaffar.\nDigital Evidence Validity:\nCited amendments to Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 and Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002, granting digital evidence primary status.\nReferenced international jurisprudence (UK, Canada, US) supporting CCTV as substantive evidence.\nJaffar’s Defense Rejected:\nClaimed innocence, alleging a drug party led to Noor’s death by unknown persons.\nFailed to explain Noor’s presence in his house or refute forensic/DNA evidence.\nFinal Decision\nZahir Zakir Jaffar:\nDeath sentence (302(b) PPC) upheld.\nRape conviction (376(1) PPC) upheld, but sentence reduced to life imprisonment.\nKidnapping conviction (364 PPC) quashed; wrongful confinement (342 PPC) upheld.\nCo-Accused (Muhammad Iftikhar & Muhammad Jan):\nConvictions upheld but sentences reduced to time already served.\nComplainant’s Petitions (for enhanced sentences/against acquittals): Dismissed.\nLegal Principles Affirmed\nCircumstantial evidence suffices for conviction if chain is complete and excludes innocence.\nCCTV footage is admissible as a Silent Witness upon authentication.\nDigital evidence is primary evidence under Pakistani law post-legislative amendments.\nDate of Judgment: 20.05.2025\nJudges: Kakar (author), Ibrahim, Najafi (concurring).\nSummary: Jaffar’s death sentence for murder upheld; rape sentence reduced to life; co-accused released. CCTV evidence deemed conclusive under Silent Witness doctrine.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=65,111,111(1)(a),111(1)(b),111(1)(c),111(1)(d),114(6),114(6A),120,121,122,122(1),122(5),122(9),133", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference No. 109 of 2024. Date of hearing: 02.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): RASAAL HASAN SYED, JUSTICE AND MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Manzoor Hussain, Advocate, alongwith Yousaf Khan, S.O. I.R Legal (HQ) RTO, Rawalpindi.\nRespondent No.1 by: In person", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CANTT ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, RAWALPINDI\nVS\nMR. LAL FAQEER & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26256", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1339 = 2025 SLD 1339", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTc", - "Key Words:": "Tribunals Key Findings & Decision\nSuppliers Were Legally Compliant:\nSuppliers (Pegasus Mills, Moonlight Systems, Yazman Traders) were active and registered during the transaction period (Jan-Jun 2024).\nExemption certificates under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Section 153(4)) were issued to all suppliers by the department itself.\nAppellant’s Transactions Valid:\nPayments made via crossed cheques (banking channels), complying with Section 73 of Sales Tax Act.\nSubmitted documentary evidence: Sales tax invoices, weighbridge slips, bank statements, STRNs.\nNo collusion or fraud proven by the department.\nLegal Violations by Tax Authority:\nRetroactive Penalization: Suppliers blacklisted after transactions; settled law (Eagle Cables, Sky Pak Enterprises) bars retrospective disallowance.\nJurisdictional Error: No valid gazette notification authorized proceedings.\nDue Process Breach: Allegation of returned payments via relatives was not in show-cause notice and unsupported by evidence.\nMisapplication of Law: Invoked Section 8(1)(ca) incorrectly without nexus to Section 8A.\nBinding Precedents Upheld:\nBurden of proof for tax fraud (Section 2(37)) not discharged by department.\nBuyer (appellant) cannot be penalized for supplier’s defaults if transactions were bona fide (Gadoon Textile Mills, PTCL 2023 SC 44).\nOutcome\nOrder-in-Original (05.05.2025) set aside.\nTax demand and penalty deleted.\nAppeal allowed in full.\nCore Legal Principles Affirmed\nBlacklisting has no retrospective effect.\nBuyers acting in good faith with valid documentation are shielded from supplier defaults.\nAdjudication must strictly align with show-cause notice allegations.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 181/KB/2025 (Tax Period Feb, 2024 to Jun, 2024). Date of Hearing: 22.05.2025. Date of Order: 29.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. EMAD UL HASAN, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Hasham Khan, Adv.\nRespondent by: Mr. Mukhtar Shar, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. CENTURY ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES (PVT) LTD, PLOT # A-29, SUPER HIGHWAY, S.I.T.E, KARACHI. ...... APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR ZONE-II, LTO, KARACHI. ...... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26257", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1337 = 2025 SLD 1337", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTY", - "Key Words:": "Details:\nThe taxpayer, a government contractor in the construction sector, filed a return deemed assessed under Section 120. The case was later selected for audit under Section 177. The taxpayer was duly issued IDR and provided requisite documents including tax certificates and bank statements. However, without completing the audit or issuing an audit report as per Section 177(6), the ACIR issued a show-cause notice under Section 122(9) and passed an amended assessment order, creating an additional tax liability of over Rs. 126 million under Section 111.\nIn appeal, the taxpayer contended that the entire assessment process was void ab initio as the mandatory requirement of issuing an audit report under Section 177(6)/(6A) prior to amendment under Section 122 was not complied with. The Department argued the issuance of the audit report was not mandatory and sufficient opportunity had been provided.\nHeld:\nThe appellate authority held in favor of the taxpayer, concluding:\nAs per Section 177(6) and newly inserted Section 177(6A), issuance of an audit report after obtaining taxpayer’s explanation is mandatory before any amendment under Section 122 can be made.\nFailure to follow the prescribed legal audit process violates due process under Article 10A of the Constitution.\nThe amendment without an audit report was therefore illegal and without jurisdiction.\nCiting various precedents including Nestle Pakistan Ltd. v. FBR (2017 PTD 686), Allah Din Steel Mills (2018 PTD 1444), and 2024 PTD 1029, the appellate authority annulled the assessment order and deleted the entire tax demand.\nThe appeal was thus allowed purely on legal grounds, without delving into the merits.\nCitations:\nNestle Pakistan Ltd. v. FBR, 2017 PTD 686\nCIR v. Allah Din Steel Mills, 2018 PTD 1444 (SC)\nLahore High Court Judgment, 2024 PTD 1029", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(c),111(1)(d)(i)120,121(1),122(1),122(5),122(9),177(5),177(6),177(6A)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "ITA No. 08/IB/2025 (Tax year 2022). Date of hearing & order: 13.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BÄSIT, MEMBER AND SAJIDD NAZIR MALIK, MEMBER\nMEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Ch. Naeem ul Haq, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. CHANGEZ IQBAL, NEAR POWER HOUSE, CHOI WEST, ATTOCK ……… APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, JHELUM ZONE, RTO, RAWALPINDI …….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26258", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1340 = 2025 SLD 1340", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTU", - "Key Words:": "Confiscation of Alleged Smuggled Vehicle – Burden of Proof under Customs Law\nDetails:\nThe case pertained to the confiscation of a Toyota Hiace Van (Reg. No. JF-5108) by customs authorities on suspicion of being smuggled and non-duty paid. At the time of interception, the driver failed to present any import or registration documents. The vehicle was taken into custody, and after issuance of a Show Cause Notice and adjudication by the Additional Collector (AC), it was ordered to be confiscated.\nThe respondent (claimant/owner) produced ownership and import documents during proceedings before the AC, but these were disregarded. The Customs Appellate Tribunal (CAT), upon appeal, ruled in favour of the respondent and ordered unconditional release of the vehicle, finding that the burden of proof had been duly discharged and the department failed to prove smuggling or non-payment of duty. The department filed a Special Customs Reference Application (SCRA) before the High Court challenging this decision.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the SCRA, holding that:\nThe CAT rightly concluded, based on un-rebutted documentary evidence and Excise Department verification, that the vehicle was not smuggled or non-duty paid.\nThe Tribunal, as the final fact-finding authority, correctly found that the respondent had discharged the burden of proof.\nThe questions of law raised by the department were in fact questions of fact already settled by the Tribunal.\nThus, the Tribunal’s order did not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference.\nCitations:\nSCRA: Customs Reference Application against Order dated 11.10.2019 of the Customs Appellate Tribunal\nCAT Appeal No. H-881/2019\nOrder-in-Original No. 125/2019 dated 17.06.2019", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 12 of 2020. Date of hearing: 24.05.2022. Date of order: 25.05.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND MR. JUSTICE MAHMOOD A. KHAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the applicant: Mr. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Advocate.\nFor the respondent No.1: Ms. Dil Khurram Shaheen, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE \nVS\nSHAFT MUHAMMAD & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26259", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1341 = 2025 SLD 1341", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTQ", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview\nPlaintiff: Anwar Majid (Former GM of Dubai Bank/Union Bank)\nDefendants: Emirates Bank International PJSC (formerly Union Bank) & officials\nSuits: Four consolidated suits (118, 119, 592, 593 of 1987) seeking damages for malicious prosecution.\nCore Allegation: Bank filed false criminal complaints after Majid protested demotion post-merger (1985) to avoid paying dues and tarnish his reputation.\nLegal Test for Malicious Prosecution¹\nTo succeed, plaintiff must prove:\nProsecution by Defendant: Criminal complaints initiated.\nAbsence of Reasonable/Probable Cause: No objective basis for prosecution.\nMalice: Improper motive (e.g., harassment, not justice).\nFavorable Termination: Acquittal/discharge in criminal cases.\nResulting Damage: Reputational/financial harm.\nCourts Findings on Each Suit\nSuit 118/1987 (Painting Sale Allegation)\nComplaint: Accused of misappropriating bank-owned painting (Cr. Complaint 4/1986).\nOutcome: Dismissed in 18 days; court held GM had authority to sell assets.\nRuling: Dismissed\nNo prosecution (no summons/warrants issued).\nNo malice: Complaint withdrawn after complainant admitted GMs authority.\nNo damages proven.\nSuit 119/1987 (Bank Guarantee Allegation)\nComplaint: Issued guarantee using foreign currency without depositor consent (Cr. Complaint 3/1986).\nOutcome: Acquitted immediately; SBP rules prohibited foreign currency as security at the time.\nRuling: Dismissed\nReasonable cause existed initially (prima facie case).\nNo malice: Swift acquittal based on legal admission.\nNo damages.\nSuit 593/1987 (Loan Document Fraud)\nComplaint: Accused of fraudulently withdrawing mortgaged property documents (Cr. Complaint 2/1986).\nOutcome: Acquitted on benefit of doubt after 5-month trial.\nRuling: Dismissed\nReasonable cause existed (cognizance valid under Cr.P.C. §204).\nAcquittal ≠ false implication; insufficient proof of malice.\nSuit 592/1987 (Prize Bonds Investment)\nComplaint: Purchased prize bonds (Rs. 99.8M) violating SBP circular, causing loss (Cr. Complaint 1/1986).\nOutcome: Acquitted after 4.5 months; prosecution witnesses contradicted allegations.\nRuling: Decreed in Favor of Plaintiff (Rs. 5M + 10% interest)\nAbsence of Reasonable Cause:\nPrize bond purchases were standard bank practice.\nNo evidence of loss or SBP action.\nProsecution witnesses testified under duress; admitted allegations were speculative.\nMalice Proven:\nWitnesses confirmed bank’s campaign to destroy [Majid] professionally and personally. \nUK High Court (1988) validated Majid’s actions, calling allegations worthless. \nDamage: Reputational harm due to public prosecution.\nKey Legal Principles Affirmed\nMalice Inference: Absence of reasonable cause + retaliatory intent → malice (Abdul Khameed v. Muhammad Shabbir).\nSocietal Impact: False prosecutions harm dignity (Art. 14, Constitution) and warrant damages.\nDamages Calculation:\nNo strict proof needed for general damages (loss of liberty/dignity).\nCourt may award proportional compensation (Abdul Majeed Khan v. Tawseen Abdul Halcem).\nFinal Outcome\nSuit 592/1987: Decreed for Rs. 5,000,000 + 10% p.a. interest.\nSuits 118, 119 & 593/1987: Dismissed.\n¹ Per Niaz v. Abdul Sattar (PLD 2006 SC 432) & Abdul Khameed v. Muhammad Shabbir (PLD 2021 Islamabad 405).", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Suit No. 118, 119, 592, 593 of 1987. Dates of Hearing: 14.02.2025 and 21.02.2025. Date of announcement: 21.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author: Mr. Justice Muhammad Jaffer Raza", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Omar Soomro and Maria Khan, Advocates for the Plaintiff Defendants.\nM/s Hassan Ali and Syed Zain-ul-Abdeen, Advocates for Defendants 1 & 2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Suit No. 118 of 1987\nAnwar Majid ………….. Plaintiff\nVs \nEmirates Bank International PJSC (Formerly Union Bank of Middle East Ltd) & others ………….. Defendants\nSuit No. 119 of 1987\nAnwar Majid ………….. Plaintiff\nVs \nEmirates Bank International PJSC (Formerly Union Bank of Middle East Ltd) & others ………….. Defendants\nSuit No. 593 of 1987 \nAnwar Majid ………….. Plaintiff\nVs \nEmirates Bank International PJSC (Formerly Union Bank of Middle East Ltd) & others ………….. Defendants\nSuit No. 592 of 1987\nAnwar Majid ………….. Plaintiff\nVs \nEmirates Bank International PJSC (Formerly Union Bank of Middle East Ltd) & others ………….. Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26260", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1342 = 2025 SLD 1342", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRS8", - "Key Words:": "Removal from Service for Absence from Duty – Discretion under PEEDA Act and Principle of Proportionality\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a Computer Operator in Punjab Emergency Services Department, was removed from service via order dated 05.03.2022 for willful absence from duty from 01.01.2022 to 05.03.2022 (63 days), without regular inquiry under Section 5(1) of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA). The departmental representation was also rejected.\nThe petitioner argued that:\nNo show-cause notice was served.\nLeave had been applied for on 30.12.2021 and was allegedly granted, as evidenced by his name not appearing on the January 2022 duty roster.\nThe penalty of removal was disproportionate for an absence less than one year, relying on Section 7(f)(ii) of PEEDA and Muhammad Nasir Ismail v. Govt. of Punjab (2025 SCMR 708).\nThe department defended the penalty citing the petitioner’s poor service record and invoked Fayyaz Hussain v. EDO (2021 SCMR 1358) and NBP v. Zahoor Ahmed Mangal (2021 SCMR 144).\nThe Court observed:\nSection 7(f)(ii) of PEEDA requires structured discretion when imposing major penalties for absences less than one year.\nRemoval without providing specific reasons or proportional justification is arbitrary.\nPrior service record was neither charge-sheeted nor part of the proceedings, and using it as a basis for removal amounted to double jeopardy.\nNo cogent justification or application of proportionality principles was present in the impugned orders.\nHeld:\nThe Court set aside both impugned orders, reinstated the petitioner to service, and directed the competent authority to reassess the penalty under Section 4 of PEEDA in a reasoned and proportionate manner, based solely on the proven charge. The petitioner was not granted back benefits, as reinstatement was due to procedural defect and not on merits.\nCitations:\nPunjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, Sections 4(1)(b)(v), 5(1), 7(f)(ii)\nMuhammad Nasir Ismail v. Govt. of Punjab (2025 SCMR 708)\nMuhammad Sharif v. IGP Punjab (2021 SCMR 962)\nFayyaz Hussain v. EDO (2021 SCMR 1358) [Distinguished]\nNBP v. Zahoor Ahmed Mangal (2021 SCMR 144) [Distinguished]", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006=4(1)(b)(v),5(1),7(f)(ii)", - "Case #": "Case No. W.P. No. 27688/2023. Date of hearing 17.6.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by M/S Aurangzeb Tarar and Ch. Muhammad Asif Shahzad, Advocates.\nRespondents by Ms. Shehzeen Abdullah, Additional Advocate General, Punjab alongwith Syed Mohsin Hassan Raza, Law Officer, Rescue 1122.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABUZAR GHAFFARY \nVS\nPROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB ETC" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26261", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1343 = 2025 SLD 1343", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRSs", - "Key Words:": "The respondent applied for the post of School Health & Nutrition Supervisor in Multan but failed to secure the minimum qualifying marks (41/100 against a benchmark of 45). After various rounds of litigation, including writ petitions and intra-court appeals, the respondent secured a favorable judgment from the learned Single Judge directing his appointment based on an inquiry report recommending him to avoid litigation, though he never qualified on merit.\nThe department challenged this order through the present Intra-Court Appeal. The Appellants argued that:\nThe respondent was ineligible ab initio due to failure to meet the minimum marks requirement.\nThe recommendation by the inquiry committee lacked legal backing and jurisdiction.\nJudicial intervention substituting departmental discretion was misplaced.\nHeld:\nThe Division Bench allowed the Intra-Court Appeal. The order dated 08.10.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 3373 of 2023 was set aside. The Court held:\nThe respondent had no enforceable right as he did not meet the qualifying criteria.\nInquiry committee recommendations without legal authority or assessment of merit are not binding.\nPublic service appointments must strictly conform to merit and rules.\nThe High Court, under Article 199, should not act as a selection authority.\nAccordingly, the writ petition was dismissed, reaffirming the supremacy of merit and statutory compliance in public appointments.\nCitations:\nGOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN v. MUHAMMAD AKHTAR (2025 SCMR 656) – Committee cannot exceed mandate in recruitment.\nDr. MIR ALAM JAN v. Dr. MUHAMMAD SHAHZAD (2008 SCMR 960) – High Court not to act as selection authority.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3", - "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 244/2024 in W.P. No. 3373/2023. Date of hearing. 08.05.2025. Date of order: 16-06-2025", - "Judge Name:": "MALIK JAVID IQBAL WAINS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant- Department by Kanwar Sajid Ali, Assistant Advocate-General Punjab for the Punjab for the appellant alongwith Nauman Arshad, Litigation Officer, CEO (DHA), Multan.\nRespondent No.1 by Rao Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate for respondent No. 1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB THROUGH CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER/DISTRICT HEALTH AUTHORITY, MULTAN.\nVS.\nZIA AKRAM & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26262", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1344 = 2025 SLD 1344", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTk", - "Key Words:": "Annulment of Tax Demand under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a private limited company engaged in pharmaceutical manufacturing for 26 years, challenged an order dated 28.06.2024 issued by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue under section 161(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for Tax Year 2018. The tax demand amounted to Rs. 57.9 million along with default surcharge of Rs. 45.1 million under section 205.\nProceedings were initiated due to non-compliance with a notice under Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002. The appellant responded to subsequent notices under section 161, but the assessing officer passed the order by confronting lump sum payments without identifying specific transactions or parties involved.\nThe appellant argued that the order violated the ratio laid down in 2021 SCMR 1325 (CIR vs. MCB Ltd.) and 2023 PTD 732 (Pepsi Cola Intl. vs. FOP), which require the tax authorities to provide specific grounds and not merely presume default based on lump sum payments. It was asserted that the appellant had deducted tax wherever applicable and had submitted supporting documentation, which was not rebutted or analyzed by the assessing officer.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal annulled the impugned order under sections 161 and 205, holding that the assessing officer acted arbitrarily by initiating recovery based on unsubstantiated lump sum figures without identifying specific defaults or parties. The assessing officer’s failure to confront discrepancies, issue specific notices, or assess the appellants response violated principles of due process and the Supreme Court’s guidance in 2021 SCMR 1325 and 2023 PTD 732. The tax demand and default surcharge were deleted.\nCitations:\nCIR, Zone-I, LTU, Lahore vs. MCB Ltd., 2021 SCMR 1325\nPepsi Cola International (Pvt) Ltd vs. FOP, 2023 PTD 732", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148,153(1)(a),161,161(1),205Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA.NO. 1235/IB/2024 (Tax year 2018). Date of Hearing & Order: 20.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJID NAZIR MALIK (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Syed Tanseer Bokhari, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Mohabat Khan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL (PVT) LTD, PLOT NO. 22,23, INDUSTRIAL TRIANGLE, KAHUTA ROAD, ISLAMABAD ...... APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, LTO, ISLAMABAD ...... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26263", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1345 = 2025 SLD 1345", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRTg", - "Key Words:": "Limitation and Estoppel in Punjab Sales Tax Adjudication\nDetails:\nThe Reference Applicant, a land developer, challenged the legality of proceedings initiated by the Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA) under the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 on the ground of limitation under Section 24(3) read with Section 52(4). The challenge was primarily to two show-cause notices dated 20.07.2018 and 29.12.2018, contending that they were time-barred and thus any orders based on them were void ab initio. The applicant relied on 2017 SCMR 1427 and 2016 PTD 786, which emphasized the mandatory nature of limitation provisions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe dispute originated from the PRA’s inclusion of property developers as taxable service providers via the Finance Act, 2013, and the issuance of a show-cause notice in December 2016. After a series of appeals and remands spanning over three rounds of litigation, including orders dated 27.03.2018, 07.01.2019, and 04.02.2025, the matter was re-adjudicated multiple times. Ultimately, the Appellate Tribunals order dated 15.10.2024, which upheld the PRA’s tax imposition after recalculations, was not further challenged and thus attained finality.\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court dismissed the Reference Application. It held that the taxpayer was estopped from raising the limitation objection at this stage as the matter had already been adjudicated in multiple rounds of appeal and the relevant objection had been rejected in the final round, culminating in the unchallenged Appellate Tribunal order dated 15.10.2024. Participation in the adjudication process and failure to challenge adverse orders negated the right to reopen the limitation issue. Consequently, both questions of law were answered in the negative.\nCitations:\n2017 SCMR 1427\n2016 PTD 786\nCommissioner (Appeals) Order dated 31.05.2018\nAppellate Tribunal Orders dated 11.12.2018, 03.06.2021, 15.10.2024\nOrder-in-Original dated 04.02.2025", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=24(3),52(4),60,67A", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 38 of 2021. Date of hearing 03.6.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: RASAAL HASAN SYED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by Syed Tauqeer Bukhari, Advocate.\nRespondents by M/s. Hassan Kamran, Fateh Yab Kamran and Abdul Wakeel, Advocates along with Nadia Murad, Legal Officer, Punjab Revenue Authority.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S BAHRIA TOWN (PVT.) LTD.\nV.\nADDL. COMMISSIONER PRA AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26264", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1350 = 2025 SLD 1350", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRXo", - "Key Words:": "The petitioners, who were defendants in a civil suit for possession and mesne profits, challenged the judgment dated 13.11.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which upheld concurrent decrees of the trial and appellate courts in favor of the respondents (plaintiffs/owners of the property). The respondents had sought possession and mesne profits on the ground that the petitioners were illegally occupying their property. The petitioners failed to establish any lawful possession or ownership rights. The trial court decreed possession but declined mesne profits; however, the appellate court granted mesne profits at Rs.10,000/month with 10% annual increase, accepting respondents cross-objections.\nThe petitioners limited their arguments before the Supreme Court to:\nImproper award of mesne profits,\nBar of suit under res judicata,\nWrongful refusal of their application for additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal. Key findings included:\nThe award of mesne profits by the appellate court was based on valid reasoning considering the respondents’ lawful ownership and illegal possession by petitioners. Even though no direct evidence supported the exact amount claimed, the court’s discretion under Order XX Rule 12 CPC was lawfully exercised.\nThe argument of res judicata was rejected due to lack of evidence showing any prior adjudication between the same parties over the same subject matter. Petitioners failed to produce necessary documentary evidence.\nRegarding additional evidence, the Court held that the petitioners made a vague application lacking necessary particulars. Though the appellate court failed to decide the application, remanding the case would serve no useful purpose as petitioners had no proven nexus with the property.\nPetitioners did not raise the question of mesne profits in their leave petition nor argue it properly at hearing, which amounted to waiver.\nCitations:\nFateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405\nHidayatullah v. Khurshid Khan, 1987 CLC 832\nAdministrator, LMC v. Abdul Hamid, 1987 CLC 1261 (Distinguished)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=2(12),11,Order XX Rule 12, Order XLI Rule 27", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.182 of 2025. Date of Hearing & Order: 13.05.2025\n[Against the order dated 13.11.2024, passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in Civil Revision No.190-D of 2022]", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD AND MR. JUSTICE MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Ibad-ur-Rehman Lodhi, ASC Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR\nFor the N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IFTIKHAR ALI ABBASI AND OTHERS ……. PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nGHULAM QADIR AND OTHERS ���…. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26265", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1351 = 2025 SLD 1351", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpRXk", - "Key Words:": "Details:\nThe taxpayer filed a return for Tax Year 2016 declaring taxable income of Rs. 717,350. During scrutiny, an amount of Rs. 13.5 million was declared in the wealth statement as a gift received in the form of prize bonds from the taxpayer’s real brothers. The department questioned the genuineness of the gift, issued a show-cause notice under section 122(9), and ultimately added the amount to taxable income under section 39(3) of the Ordinance.\nThe Commissioner (Appeals) partially accepted the taxpayer’s plea by reducing the addition to Rs. 11.88 million, still treating it as income under section 39(3). The taxpayer appealed to the ATIR.\nThe taxpayer argued that:\nThe gift was made by real brothers.\nThe donors had sufficient financial capacity (evidenced by sale of immovable property and wealth statements).\nNo documentation is generally executed for gifts between close blood relatives.\nPrize bonds are not “cash” under section 39(3).\nAffidavits and wealth reconciliations supported the gifts genuineness.\nThe department maintained the addition was justified.\nHeld:\nThe ATIR accepted the appeal and deleted the addition of Rs. 11.88 million. The Tribunal held that:\nThe gift was genuine, voluntary, and supported by adequate documentary and financial evidence.\nThe wealth statements of donors and the affidavits established the source and capacity.\nSince the department did not challenge the finding that prize bonds are not “cash” under section 39(3), that finding had attained finality.\nThus, the impugned orders were annulled.\nCitations:\n2012 PTD 1750\n2008 PTD 19", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=39(3),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1348/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2016). Date of Hearing & Order: 22.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. NAEEM ASHRAF, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Imran Abid, Advocate\nRespondent By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHEIKH MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM; H. NO. P-989, MOHALLAH ANGATPURA, SAIDPUR ROAD, RAWALPINDI …….. APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI ……… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26266", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1352 = 2025 SLD 1352", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTc", - "Key Words:": "Details:\nThe appeal was filed by M/s Islamabad Feeds (Pvt) Ltd against an advance tax assessment order passed under section 147 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for the first quarter of Tax Year 2025. The order computed a tax liability of Rs. 49,123,315, alleging the taxpayer’s failure to submit a prescribed estimate within time.\nThe taxpayers representative argued that:\nThe advance tax was arbitrarily computed without legal or factual basis.\nThe turnover and tax deduction at source figures were incorrect.\nThere is no mandatory legal obligation under section 147 to submit an estimate for the first quarter.\nThe department, through its representative, justified the order based on the proviso to section 147(4), allowing use of 120% of the latest year’s turnover to compute quarterly advance tax where the taxpayer fails to provide turnover.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal annulled the assessment order, holding:\nSection 147 does not require a taxpayer to file an estimate for the first quarter mandatorily.\nThe use of the proviso to section 147(4) (relating to assumption of turnover at 120%) is permissible only when the taxpayer fails to provide actual turnover, which was not the case here.\nThe payment analysis cited by the officer had no legal basis for determining advance tax liability.\nThe impugned assessment was factually and legally erroneous and therefore liable to be annulled.\nLegal principle: An assessment based on faulty assumptions cannot be sustained in law.\nOutcome:\nAppeal allowed. Order under section 147 annulled.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=147,147(4) ,168", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1918/IB/24 (Tax Year 2025). Date of hearing & order: May 13, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IMRAN LATIF MINHAS (MEMBER) AND SHARIF UD DIN KHILJI (MEMBER)", - "Lawyer Name:": "APPELLANT BY: MR. ZAHID MEHMOOD GRANT THORNTON ANJUM RAHMAN\nRESPONDENT BY: MR. FARRUKH AMIR SIAL", - "Petitioner Name:": "ISLAMABAD FEEDS (PVT) LTD., 99-D, SATELLITE TOWN RAWALPINDI ……… APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTO, ISLAMABAD …….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26267", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1353 = 2025 SLD 1353 = (2025) 132 TAX 181", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Maintainability of Reference Application against Tribunal’s Remand Order\nDetails:\nThe applicant filed income tax return for 2018, declaring foreign income as exempt.\nThe department found undeclared property purchases worth Rs. 11,340,000 and foreign remittances, leading to amended income of Rs. 17,086,614 and tax liability of Rs. 5,199,814.\nAppeals before Commissioner (Appeals) and later before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) were unsuccessful.\nEarlier, in I.T.R. No. 01/2024, the High Court had remitted the case back to the Tribunal with observations regarding the issuance of notice under Section 111 before Section 122(9).\nTribunal, instead of deciding on merits, remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for de novo proceedings.\nApplicant challenged this remand order, arguing Tribunal was bound by Court’s earlier directions and could not remand.\nHeld:\nSection 132(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 expressly empowers the Tribunal to remand cases.\nEarlier High Court directions did not curtail Tribunal’s statutory powers.\nReference under Section 133 is maintainable only against final orders of the Tribunal, not against remand orders (relying on Bank Al-Habib Ltd., 2016 PTD 2548, and other precedents).\nSince the Tribunal’s order was only a remand, no conclusive finding had been given, hence no question of law arose.\nThe reference application was therefore not maintainable and dismissed.\nCitations:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Millat Tractors Ltd. (2024 PTD 483)\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Multan v. Bank Al-Habib Ltd. (2016 PTD 2548)\nChairman, WAPDA, Lahore v. Gulbatkhan (1996 SCMR 230) — distinguished\nOther supporting precedents: Haji Muhammad Yousaf (2006 PTD 72), E.M. Oil Mills (2011 PTD 2708), Electronic Industries Ltd. (1988 PTD 111), etc.\nFinal Order: Reference application dismissed with no order as to costs.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,122,122(9),132,132(4),133", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 40 of 2025 decided and hearing date: 14.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE AND RASAAL HASAN SYED, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid Shafique, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMalik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate alongwith Yousaf Khan S.O. I.R. Legal (HQ) RTO, Rawalpindi for Respondents-department.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. AMIR SAJJAD\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, Jhelum Zone and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26268", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1354 = 2025 SLD 1354", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTU", - "Key Words:": "Whether the Customs Appellate Tribunal erred in setting aside Valuation Ruling No. 1452/2020 (which determined customs values for imported polyester fabric) and accepting importers’ declared values under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969.\nKey Findings of the Court\nTribunal’s Critical Error:\nThe Tribunal incorrectly held that the Directorate General of Valuation (DGoV) used the fall back method (Section 25(9)) to determine customs values.\nReality: The DGoV applied the deductive value method (Section 25(7)), based on market inquiries, after rejecting Sections 25(1), 25(5), and 25(6) sequentially.\nMisapplication of Sequential Valuation:\nThe DGoV followed the statutory sequence:\nSection 25(1) (transaction value): Rejected due to inconsistent declared values and lack of documentary proof from importers.\nSections 25(5)/(6) (identical/similar goods): Rejected for insufficient evidence.\nSection 25(7) (deductive method): Applied via market surveys.\nThe Tribunal wrongly accused the DGoV of jumping directly to Section 25(9).\nTribunal’s Unjustified Acceptance of Declared Values:\nThe Tribunal accepted importers’ declared values under Section 25(1) without evidence or discussion of supporting documents.\nImporters had failed to provide documents proving transactional values during the DGoV’s stakeholder meetings.\nAssociation of Importers in Market Surveys:\nThe DGoV consulted 80+ stakeholders and requested evidence, but none complied.\nThe Court held it is impractical to involve every future importer; industry bodies adequately represent importers.\nProposed Questions Answered:\nThe Tribunal misread Section 25A(2) and valuation rules (Question 1).\nThe DGoV correctly applied sequential valuation (Question 2).\nThe Tribunal exceeded jurisdiction by directing assessment under Section 25(1) (Question 6).\nFinal Ruling\nReference Applications ALLOWED.\nThe Tribunal’s order is set aside for:\nMischaracterizing the valuation method.\nIgnoring factual findings (non-submission of documents by importers).\nAccepting declared values without evidence.\nValuation Ruling No. 1452/2020 is reinstated.\nKey Legal Principles\nValuation methods must follow the sequential order (Sections 25(1) to 25(9)).\nCourts cannot revisit factual findings in reference jurisdiction (e.g., importers’ failure to provide documents).\nMarket inquiries under Section 25(7) are valid even if not all importers are individually consulted.\nResult: The customs department’s valuation method is upheld; importers’ declared values are rejected.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25-A,25-D25(1),194-A(1)(e)Customs Rules, 2001=110", - "Case #": "Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 220 to 249 / 2022. Dates of hearing: 28.02.2023; 2.03.2023 & 15.3.2023. Date of Judgment: 17.03.2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Applicants: Mr. Khalid Rajpar, Advocate (in SCRA Nos. 233, 235 to 239 of 2022), Mr. Aamir Raza Advocate (in SCRA Nos. 220 to 222, 225, 227, & 234 of 2022), Mr. Irfan Mir Halepota, Advocates. (in SCRA Nos. 244 to 249 of 2022)\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Khawaja Shamsul Islam, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 220 / 2022 \nThe Collector of Customs Karachi Vs. M/s. Raz Textile Karachi\n2. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 221/2022 \nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. SKF Collection, Karachi\n3. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 222/2022 \nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/S. A. R. Industries, Karachi\n4. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 225/2022\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. S.M. Industries, Karachi\n5. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 227/2022\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. Radium Slik Factory, Karachi\n6. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 233/2022\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. Raz Textile, Karachi\n7. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 234/2022\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. Brother Enterprises, Karachi\n8. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 235/2022\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/S. S.K.F. Collection, Karachi\n9. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 236/2022\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/S. A. R. Industries, Karachi\n10. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 237/2022\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. S.M. Industries, Karachi\n11. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 238/2022\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. Brother Enterprises, Karachi\n12. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 239/2022\nThe Collector of Customs, Karachi VS M/s. Radium Slik Factory, Karachi\n13. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 244/2022\nThe D. G. Customs Valuation, Karachi & another VS M/s. Radium Slik Factory, Karachi\n14. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 245/2022\nThe D. G. Customs Valuation, Karachi & another VS M/s. Brother Enterprises, Karachi\n15. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 246/2022\nThe D. G. Customs Valuation, Karachi & another VS M/s. S.M. Industries, Karachi\n16. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 247/2022\nThe D. G. Customs Valuation, Karachi & another VS M/S. A. R. Industries, Karachi\n17. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 248/2022\nThe D. G. Customs Valuation, Karachi & another VS M/s. SKF Collection, Karachi\n18. Spl. Cus. Ref. A. No. 249/2022\nThe D. G. Customs Valuation, Karachi & another VS M/s. Raz Textile, Karachi" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26269", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1355 = 2025 SLD 1355", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Details:\nThe respondent Shahid Bin Azim filed a consumer complaint before the Consumer Protection Court, Karak, under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumers Protection Act, 1997, against TCS (Tranzum Courier Service) seeking Rs. 21,05,000/- as compensation for delayed delivery of a medical ointment urgently required for his sister and niece suffering from Leishmania. The parcel was sent by Dr. Amir Hussain of Ismail Unani Dawakhana, Sibi, and dispatched through TCS on 23.07.2020 but was delivered late on 05.08.2020.\nThe Consumer Court allowed the complaint and awarded Rs. 16,20,000/- as compensation under Clause (d) of Section 15(1). TCS filed an appeal against this order.\nKey Issues:\nWhether the respondent had the legal locus standi to file a complaint under Section 13(1)(a)?\nWhether the matter fell within the jurisdiction of the Consumer Court or was of a civil nature?\nWhether the appeal was within limitation?\nHeld:\nLimitation: The appeal was held to be within time under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, particularly in view of sub-section (5), which excludes the period between application and actual delivery of certified copies.\nLocus Standi: The respondent was not the person to whom the service was provided, as per Section 13(1)(a) of the KPK Consumers Protection Act, 1997. The service was hired by Dr. Amir Hussain, the sender, not the respondent. While the respondent may be a beneficiary (under Section 2(c)(ii)), that does not confer a right to lodge a complaint under Section 13(1)(a).\nJurisdiction: The primary relief claimed—compensation for mental torture, negligence, and endangerment to life—constituted tortious and civil claims, which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Section 9 of CPC. The Consumer Court, being a court of limited jurisdiction, erred in assuming jurisdiction.\nOutcome:\nThe appeal was allowed, the Consumer Courts judgment dated 04.07.2023 was set aside, and the respondent was granted liberty to approach the competent civil court for redress.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Cr. A No. 378-B/2023. Date of hearing & Order: 12.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD TARIQ AFRIDI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For appellants: Mr. Rehman Ullah Shah Advocate (via video link).\nFor respondent: Mr. Abdullah Khattak Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "INCHARGE, TCS OFFICE, NEAR NATIONAL BANK, KARAK ETC.\nVS\nSHAHID BIN AZIM" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26270", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1357 = 2025 SLD 1357", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQS8", - "Key Words:": "Departmental Inquiry – Right to Cross-Examination – Fair Trial under Article 10-A\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a Superintendent of Police (BS-18), challenged the dismissal of his appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal (FST) through judgment dated 09.03.2021 in Appeal No. 73(K)CS/2019. Disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against him under Rule 3(a), (b), and (c) of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, on charges of inefficiency, misconduct, and corruption. An inquiry was conducted during which statements of 138 witnesses were recorded, but the petitioner was not allowed to cross-examine any of them. The inquiry resulted in a major penalty of “Reduction to Lower Stage in Time Scale for Three Years.” The petitioner’s departmental appeal went undecided, and the FST upheld the disciplinary action without addressing the denial of cross-examination.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court held that the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses constituted a serious violation of the principles of natural justice and Article 10-A of the Constitution, which guarantees a fair trial. It emphasized that cross-examination is essential for evaluating the credibility of evidence and exposing possible bias or falsity in testimony. The Court found that the Service Tribunal failed to scrutinize the procedural irregularities in the inquiry. Accordingly, the petition was allowed, the judgment of the FST was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Secretary Establishment for a de novo inquiry within two months, ensuring the petitioner is given a fair chance to cross-examine the witnesses.\nCitations:\nFederation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Zahid Malik, 2023 SCMR 603\nUsman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO, Karachi, 2022 SCMR 745\nConstitution of Pakistan, Article 10-A\nGovernment Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1973, Rules 3(a)(b)(c) & 4(b)(ii)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=10AGovernment Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973=3(a)(b)(c),4(b)(ii)", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A No. 579-K/2021. Date of Hearing: 04.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Malik Naeem Iqbal, ASC, Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, AOR.\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Khaleeq Ahmed, DAG.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI WASSAN ……. PETITIONER\nVS\nTHE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN & ANOTHER …… RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26271", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1358 = 2025 SLD 1358", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQSs", - "Key Words:": "Advance Tax on First Transfer of Property – Section 236C(4)(b), Income Tax Ordinance – Interim Relief Granted\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a real estate developer of the project “EIGHTEEN” in Rawalpindi, challenged a demand raised by the Punjab Land Record Authority (PLRA) through its web portal requiring payment of advance tax under Section 236C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on the first sale/transfer of developed immovable properties to its customers. The petitioner argued that such tax is not applicable to first-time sales as per the clear exception under Section 236C(4)(b), which exempts sales by original allottees. It was contended that the PLRA, being established under the Punjab Land Records Authority Act, 2017, had no statutory authority to impose such tax. The FBR submitted a reply without supporting documents, and no one appeared for PLRA.\nThe petitioner relied on constitutional protections under Articles 4, 10-A, and 18, and judgments promoting fair trial, due process, and ease of doing business, including M.C.R. (Pvt) Ltd. v. MDA (2021 CLD 639), to argue the illegality of the tax demand. Interim relief was sought to allow property transfers without tax until a final decision, citing multiple tax law precedents supporting their position.\nHeld:\nThe Court observed that neither PLRA nor FBR had clearly explained the legal basis for imposing the tax, nor had FBR issued any express directive authorizing PLRA to collect it. In view of the constitutional requirement of fair trial and absence of legal clarity, the Court granted interim relief permitting the petitioner to proceed with the transfer of 128 properties subject to:\nSubmission of post-dated cheques for the tax amount.\nAn undertaking that in case of an adverse judgment, the tax shall be paid immediately and FBR can recover it per applicable procedure.\nThe matter was adjourned for hearing on 28.04.2025 with direction for both PLRA and FBR to appear along with complete record.\nCitations:\nM.C.R. (Pvt) Ltd. v. MDA, 2021 CLD 639\nIkram Ullah Associates v. Govt. of KPK, 2020 PTD 1060\nAbid Foundry v. Federation of Pakistan, 2019 PTD 1652\nUsman Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan, 2017 PTD 2340\nTelenor Microfinance Bank Ltd. v. CIR, 2022 PTD 1619\nChenab Flour & General Mills v. Federation, PLD 2021 Lahore 343\nRamzan Sugar Mills Ltd. v. FBR, 2021 PTD 1321\nFederation v. Shafia-ul-Hassan, 2020 SCMR 2119", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=236C(4)(b)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10A,18", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 1064 of 2025. Date of Order: 17-04-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Asad Ladha, ASC for the Petitioner with Muhammad Shakeel Mughal and Moazim Sheikh, Advocates.\nMr. Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General on Court’s call.\nBarrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate-General on Court’s call.\nMr. Riaz Hussain Azam, Advocate for FBR with Malik Muhammad Waseem, ADLR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ELITE ESTATES \nVs \nFEDERATION OF (PRIVATE) LIMITED PAKISTAN, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26272", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1359 = 2025 SLD 1356", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTk", - "Key Words:": "Whether the Banking Court validly served summons on the defendant company under Section 9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (FIO), 2001, and if the delay in filing the Leave to Defend application should be condoned.\nKey Findings & Courts Decision\n1. Defective Service of Summons\nWrong Address: Summons were sent to the defendant’s old registered address (Suite 105-106, Clifton) despite its new registered office (20th Floor, Sky Tower, Clifton) being updated with SECP/PSX in April 2021.\nNon-Compliance with Law:\nService via registered post and courier lacked proof of delivery (no acknowledgment due/delivery reports).\nBailiff service (10.11.2022) was at the correct address but not ordered by the court – done at the bailiff’s own volition. \nPublication in Newspapers (Jang & The News on 21.10.2022) was invalid because:\nThe summons contained the incorrect address.\nOther mandatory service modes (post/courier/bailiff) were defective.\n2. Legal Violations\nSection 9(5) FIO, 2001: Requires summons to be served simultaneously via:\nBailiff, Registered Post (Acknowledgment Due), Courier, and Publication.\nFailure to comply: No proof of post/courier service + incorrect address vitiated all modes (Deutsche Bank v. Fateh Textile Mills, 2019 CLC 285 applied).\nOrder XXIX CPC: For corporations, service must be at the registered office – not done here.\n3. Condonation of Delay Allowed\nLeave to Defend (filed 09.12.2022) was deemed within time:\nLimitation period (30 days) began from actual service date (Bailiff service: 10.11.2022).\nCMA No. 18906/2022 (condonation application) allowed.\nLeave to Defend Application (CMA No. 18907/2022) accepted for hearing on merits.\n4. Courts Reasoning\nNatural Justice & Fair Trial (Article 10-A Constitution):\nDefendant must have actual notice of proceedings.\nPublication alone is insufficient if other service modes are defective (Combine Products v. SME Leasing, 2015 CLD 1188).\nBank’s Due Diligence Failure:\nPlaintiff bank should have verified the defendant’s registered address via SECP records before filing the suit.\nContractual obligation (Musharaka Agreement) to notify address changes does not override statutory requirements.\nOutcome\nDefendant’s application for condonation of delay GRANTED.\nLeave to Defend application admitted for hearing.\nPlaintiff directed to file a replication if desired.\nKey Precedents Relied On:\nDeutsche Bank AG v. Fateh Textile Mills Ltd. (2019 CLC 285)\nCombine Products v. SME Leasing Ltd. (2015 CLD 1188)\nMubarak Ali v. First Prudential Modaraba (2011 SCMR 1496)\nEssence: Strict compliance with statutory service procedures is mandatory in banking suits. Defective service invalidates subsequent proceedings, warranting condonation of delay.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9", - "Case #": "Banking Suit No. B-45 of 2022. Dates of Hearing: 22.05.2023, 23.05.2023. Date of Order: 21.08.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSITCE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff Bank: Mr Behzad Haider and Mehmood Ali, Advocates\nDefendant Customer: Ms Alizeh Bashir, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE BANK OF PUNJAB \nVS\nHASCOL PETROLEUM LIMITED" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26273", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1361 = 2025 SLD 1361", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQTg", - "Key Words:": "The taxpayer, an individual, e-filed return for Tax Year 2017, which was deemed assessed under section 120. The tax department issued a show-cause notice under sections 122(9) and 122(5A) due to a declared previous years net assets of Rs. 84,243,300/- without disclosure of its source, proposing addition under section 111(1)(b). No response was filed by the taxpayer, and an ex-parte order was passed.\nOn appeal, the Tribunal noted the following:\nThe order was passed in a slipshod and non-speaking manner, without discharging the quasi-judicial duty.\nSimultaneous proceedings under sections 122(5A) and 111 were irregular, and as per 2024 SCMR 700, proceedings under section 111 must be concluded first before invoking section 122(5A).\nThe matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, with directions to follow due process and Supreme Court guidelines.\nThe Tribunal also cautioned the taxpayer for non-cooperation and directed strict compliance with timelines in the remanded proceedings.\nHeld:\nImpugned ex-parte order under section 122(5A) was set aside. Case remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh decision after finalizing proceedings under section 111 and affording due opportunity of hearing.\nCitations:\n2024 SCMR 700 – CIR Lahore v. Millat Tractors Ltd.\n2024 PTD 483\n2021 PTD 1182\n2013 PTD 900 (Trib.)\nITA No. 1013/KB/2023 (24.07.2023)\nITA No. 3193/LB/2024 (11.09.2024)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114(1),120,122(5A),122(9),111(1)(b),218", - "Case #": "ITA No. 15/KB/2025 (Tax Year 2017). Date of hearing: 27.05.2025. Date of Order: 04.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. KASHIF NAZEER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Imtiaz Ali, Advocate.\nRespondent by: Mr. Mushtaq Ali Wagan, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDULLAH, KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE ADCIR, ZONE-III, RTO-II, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26274", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1362 = 2025 SLD 1362 = (2025) 132 TAX 151 = 2025 PTD 1270 = 2025 PTCL 869", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQXo", - "Key Words:": "Whether criminal prosecution for tax fraud under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, can be initiated before formal assessment of tax liability.\nKey Legal Questions\nJurisdiction of Tax Authorities:\nCan the Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR register FIRs, arrest suspects, and initiate criminal proceedings under Sections 37A/37B of the Sales Tax Act without first determining tax liability through assessment under Section 11?\nValidity of SROs:\nLegality of notifications (e.g., SRO 48/2008, SRO 56/2010) authorizing tax officers to exercise powers under the Act.\nConstitutional Safeguards:\nWhether pre-assessment criminal proceedings violate Articles 4 (due process) and 10-A (fair trial) of the Constitution.\nSupreme Courts Decision\nAssessment Precedes Prosecution:\nCriminal proceedings for tax fraud cannot commence before tax liability is formally assessed under Section 11.\nPenalties under Section 33 (e.g., fines, imprisonment) depend on quantified tax involved or tax due, which requires prior civil adjudication.\nSections 37A/37B Misapplied:\nArrest and prosecution powers under Sections 37A/37B are not standalone enforcement tools. They must follow assessment.\nTax authorities’ practice of using criminal proceedings as a preferred choice for recovery is unlawful.\nSROs Partially Invalid:\nNotifications (e.g., SRO 775/2011) issued without proper authority under Sections 30/30E of the Act are ultra vires.\nConstitutional Violations:\nPre-assessment arrests/prosecutions violate due process and fair trial rights (Articles 4, 10-A).\nRationale\nStatutory Scheme: The Sales Tax Act prioritizes civil assessment (Section 11) before penalties (Section 33) or prosecution (Sections 37A/37B).\nTax Fraud Definition: Tax fraud under Section 2(37) requires intent to evade tax, which must be proven after liability is established.\nLegal Certainty: Quoting Adam Smith’s canons of taxation, the Court emphasized that tax enforcement must be certain, non-arbitrary, and proportionate.\nPrecedents: Affirmed High Court rulings (e.g., Taj International v. FBR, Zaheer Ahmed v. DG I & I-IR) quashing FIRs for lack of jurisdiction.\nFinal Outcome\nAll appeals dismissed.\nHigh Court judgments upheld:\nFIRs and criminal proceedings initiated without tax assessment are illegal and without jurisdiction.\nAffected parties discharged from criminal liability.\nTax authorities must first determine tax liability through civil proceedings before pursuing criminal action.\nSignificance\nLandmark Ruling: Reinforces that tax recovery must follow due process; criminal prosecution cannot replace civil assessment.\nDeterrence Against Abuse: Curbs arbitrary arrests and coercive tactics by tax authorities.\nClarity on SROs: Mandates valid delegation of powers under the Sales Tax Act.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),11,30,30A,30E,33,37,37A,37A(4),37B,37B(13),38,38A,38B,40,45B,46,47Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=265-KConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "CIVIL APPEALS NO.350 TO 698 OF 2016, 424, 511, 512, 673, 1183 AND 1184 OF 2020, CIVIL PETITION NO.1066 OF 2018, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.177 OF 2019 AND C.M.A. NO.12231 OF 2021 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.673 OF 2020. Order dated: 04-12-2024\n(Against the judgments/order dated 19.09.2013, 20.03.2014, 02.04.2015, 07.04.2015, 16.03.2015, 26.07.2016, 18.10.2017 and 11.12.2018 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, High Court of Sindh, Karachi, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Writ Petitions No.5047/2012, 17743/2012, 11294/2012, 27865/2011, 21612/2012, 873/2011, 28231/2012, 10852/2012, 11297/2012, 10698/2012, 2726/2011, 18221/2012, 10456/2012, 9652/2012, 11519/2012, 22738/2011, 11455/2012, 7918/2012, 6743/2012, 20298/2011, 18058/2011,27422/2011, 26489/2011, 9020/2011,12384/2012, 10908/2011, 7029/2011, 18029/2012, 10330/2012, 8256/2011, 9654/2012, 11268/2012, 27863/2011, 21725/2011, 15927/2011, 417/2012, 9736/2012, 5634/2012, 6794/2012, 25182/2011, 11746/2012, 12568/2011, 27864/2011, 9048/2012, 20261/2012, 10838/2012, 14436/2011, 9324/2012, 11555/2012, 418/2012, 11030/2012, 20160/2012, 9616/2012, 11745/2012, 5048/2012, 21611/2012, 15791/2012, 10688/2012, 7188/2012, 8695/2011, 17106/2012, 9936/2012, 26855/2011, 5381/2012, 25622/2012, 9017/2012, 9017/2012, 8402/2012, 10246/2012, 26857/2011, 25623/2012, 9655/2011, 9107/2012, 10499/2012, 9653/2012, 15281/2012, 17286/2012, 11921/2012, 9570/2012, 8257/2011, 15660/2012, 15470/2012, 9104/2012, 14136/2012, 11922/2012, 9354/2011, 13991/2012, 29671/2011, 15179/2012, 6391/2012, 18098/2012, 10330/2012, 9019/2011, 6848/2011, 10331/2012, 10331/2012, 16754/2012, 16997/2012, 887/2012, 6878/2013, 5300/2012, 9086/2012, 5334/2014, 7802/2011, 7895/2011, 8190/2012, 21449/2013, 9742/2012, 9742/2012, 11665/2012, 11021/2012, 21884/2013, 7686/2011, 21671/2012, 8568/2012, 10674/2011, 13721/2011, 9047/2012, 9087/2012, 13721/2011, 9651/2012, 11298/2012, 12159/2011, 18521/2011, 5885/2012, 22737/2011, 6572/2013, 15471/2012, 22075/2012, 10598/2012, 19218/2012, 8926/2011, 7670/2012, 20657/2012, 17332/2012, 26554/2010, 3173/2012, 3173/2012, 19219/2012, 7877/2012, 20297/2011, 10341/2012, 6001/2012, 8740/2012, 13969/2012, 7917/2012, 24736/2012, 24736/2012, 11923/2012, 17447/2012, 9614/2012, 19673/2012, 20658/2012, 8271/2012, 6547/2013, 5246/2013, 5139/2013, 9041/2011, 19862/2011, 31741/2012, 8359/2011, 9157/2012, 9355/2013, 8226/2012, 9500/2012, 14205/2012, 20657/2012, 22447/2012, 8786/2012, 17447/2012, 8191/2012, 20657/2012, 11268/2012, 7648/2012, 19674/2012, 11300/2012, 11744/2012, 8848/2012, 11027/2012, 15251/2012, 8494/2012, 20922/2012, 8492/2012, 20674/2012, 9506/2012, 8943/2012, 9047/2012, 7658/2012, 9872/2012, 9512/2012, 8270/2012, 9504/2012, 7514/2012, 9503/2012, 9505/2012, 9505/2012, 12631/2012, 9113/2012, 9616/2012, 9615/2012, 9876/2012, 17918/2012, 26440/2012, 11137/2012, 14874/2012, 13838/2012, 11138/2012, 9166/2012, 6572/2013, 11544/2012, 888/2013, 888/2013, 13426/2012, 367/2013, 14784/2012, 14784/2012, 13805/2013, 368/2013, 5450/2013, 9255/2012, 16622/2011, 9486/2012, 16328/2012, 13577/2012, 27742/2012, 9158/2012, 11020/2012, 16810/12, 16811/12, 16812/12, 16813/12, 7657/2012, 10926/2012, 14784/2012, 17815/2012, 18758/2012, 25801/2012, 5109/2013, 5138/2013, 6412/2013, 8994/2012, 12461/2012, 22571/2012, 6572/2013, 20452/2013, 17589/2012, 5450/2013, 132/2013, 7074/2013, 22231/2013, Const.P.D-2273/2011, C.P.D-814/2012, 21438/2013, 21440/2013, 21440/2013, 26815/2012, 9920/2012, 22594/2012, 29753/2012, 21439/2013, 9873/2012, 12160/2011, 29411/2012, 18015/2011, 27352/2012, 11296/2012, 8154/2011, 1082/2012, 29563/2012, 11666/2012, 7406/2011, 20004/2012, 16607/2011, 9656/2011, 58/2013, 26568/2010, 109/2013, 22908/2013, 9045/2012, 11359/2011, 15800/2012, 2941/2012, 1110/2013, 9219/2011, 12493/2012, 20092/2012, 7056/2013, 29603/2012, 28912/2012, 8647/2011, 27866/2011, 110/2013, 23251/2010, 5333/2012, 9018/2011, 28142/2012, 26856/2011, 57/2013, 11256/2011, 12153/2011, 4580/2011, 9118/2011, 711/2013, 2145/2013, 5049/2012, 4478/2010, 2379/2012, 1985/2012, 19644/2011, 1043/2012, 11343/2011, 61/2013, 21441/2013, 4439/2010, 29751/2012, 11972/2012, 23402/2012, 29582/2011, 19107/2011, 59/2013, 27266/2011, 27803/2012, 10498/2012, 13031/2012, 1686/2012, 60/2013, 9423/2012, 7695/2012, 13657/2011, 8015/2012, 12670/2012, 4440/2010, 4440/2010, 26814/2012, 21770/2013, 17671/2013, 10935/2012, 26555/2010, 27578/2012, 24686/2011, 29653/2012, 6795/2012, 26769/2010, 12104/2012, 1879/2013, 6230/2012, 1076/2012, 1400/2011, 7315/2013, 34364/2015, 33510/2015, 45696/2017 and Cr.A.134/2017).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE SHAHID WAHEED, MR. JUSTICE IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND MR. JUSTICE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)/Applicant(s): Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC alongwith Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG (Law) FBR. Mr. Aqeel A. Sidduqui, DG I&I-IR Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, ASC Mr. Muhammad Umer Riaz, ASC. (via video link from Lahore). Mr. Izhar ul Haq, ASC (via video link from Lahore). Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC.\n(in CA No. 600/16)\nFor the Syed Ali Zafar, ASC, Mr. Nadeem Mehmood Mian, ASC assisted by Huriya Fatima, Advocate High Court. Sh. Zafar ul Islam, ASC alongwith Mr. Tanveer Ahmad, ASC. Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmad, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Idris, ASC. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR. Sh. Mehmood Ahmad, AOR. Mr. Ali Sibtain Fazli, ASC. along with Hasham Ahmad, ASC. (associated by Isa Ahmed, Adv. Mr. Abdul Bari Rashid, ASC. Ch. Munir Sadiq, ASC. Dr. Farhat Zafar ASC. Mr. Babar Bilak, ASC and Syed Tauqeer Bukhari, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Munir Paracha ASC. Qazi Isaac Ali, ASC. For the Mr. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, ASC through Branch alongwith Mr. Shehryar Kasuri, ASC. Registry Lahore Mr. Shahbaz Butt, ASC. Mr. Shahid Baig, ASC. Mr. Haroon Duggal, ASC. Mr. Saood Nasrullah, ASC. Ch. Muhammad Ali, ASC. Mr. Tahir Munir Malik, ASC. Mr. Ibrar Ahmad ASC. Rana Munir Hussain, ASC. Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Khan, ASC. Mian Ashiq Hussain, ASC. Ms. Tabinda Islam, ASC. Mr. Hassan Kamran Bashir, ASC. Assisted by: Ms. Zainab Bashir, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Petitioner Name:": "C.A.350/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Taj International (Pvt) Ltd & others \nC.A.351/2016\nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Matchless Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.352/2016\nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Arsalan Traders\nC.A.353/2016\nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Aamir Akram & others\nC.A.354/2016\nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Riaz Qadeer Butt & others\nC.A.355/2016\nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Metal Extraction (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.356/2016\nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Boxworks & others\nC.A.357/2016\nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Star International & others\nC.A.358/2016\nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Standard Oil Company \nC.A.359/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Iqra Industries & another\nC.A.360/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Halcyon Global (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.361/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Amin Metal Industries\nC.A.362/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s 2-K Industries\nC.A.363/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Maham Enterprises & another\nC.A.364/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Skyline Traders & another\nC.A.365/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Kent Motors\nC.A.366/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Larsa Lubricants & another\nC.A.367/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Kashif Becalite Store & another\nC.A.368/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Abdul Basit & others\nC.A.369/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Muhammad Imran & another\nC.A.370/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Packages Ltd & others\nC.A.371/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Dynamic Engineering Company & others\nC.A.372/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Bajwa Agro Industries & others\nC.A.373/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Abdur Rehman & another\nC.A.374/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Choudhry Enterprises\nC.A.375/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Town Carrier Printers & others\nC.A.376/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Lion Steel (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.377/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Nadeem Engineering Company\nC.A.378/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s M.K.M. Enterprises\nC.A.379/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s SGWI Associates\nC.A.380/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & C.A.381/2016 Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Kareem & Sons \nC.A.381/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s A.S. Packages & others\nC.A.382/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Amir Akram Packages & others\nC.A.383/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s New Asia Automobiles & others\nC.A.384/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Pirani Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.385/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s SGWI (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.386/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Al-Barkat Traders & others\nC.A.387/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Briter Engineering Company (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.388/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Zafar Minhas Electroplating\nC.A.389/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Super Tech Industries & others\nC.A.390/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Azhar & Sons\nC.A.391/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s ZR Engineering & another\nC.A.392/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Aamir Akram & others\nC.A.393/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Vital Tech Engineering & others\nC.A.394/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Telcon Communications (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.395/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Aamir Enterprises & others\nC.A.396/2016 \nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Uni-Commerce (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.397/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Uni-Commerce (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.398/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Nabeel Industries (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.399/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s SGWI (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.400/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Swift Papers & Chemicals\nC.A.401/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Shafiqur Rehman & another\nC.A.402/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Trust Traders & another\nC.A.403/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Apex Trading Establishment\nC.A.404/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Taj International (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.405/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Riaz Qadeer Butt & others\nC.A.406/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/S K.K. Power International (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.407/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/S Hamza Enterprises & another\nC.A.408/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/S Siraj Paper Board\nC.A.409/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/S Plum Qingqi Motors (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.410/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/S Sawan Paper & Packages\nC.A.411/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/S Prime Chemicals\nC.A.412/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/S ACE Indigo Industries (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.413/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/S Greener Machines Engineering Industries (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.414/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/S Nisar Tradin Company\nC.A.415/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Muhammad Azam Qadri & others\nC.A.416/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Eastern Cone (SMC-PVT) Ltd\nC.A.417/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Cafe Lamis\nC.A.418/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Al-Pine Metal Technologies & another\nC.A.419/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s EAC Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.420/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Taimoor Traders\nC.A.421/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Ikhlaq Ahmad &others\nC.A.422/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Pinnacle Auto Engineering\nC.A.423/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & C.A.424/2016 Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Haider Enterprises\nDirectorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Wahab Traders & Stationers & another\nC.A.425/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Advance Concern tech (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.426/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Two Star Engineering Services (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.427/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Master Key\nC.A.428/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Pakistan Business Center\nC.A.429/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s SGWI (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.430/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Bismillah Printers & others\nC.A.431/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s TNW Engineering Works & others\nC.A.432/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s New Generation Technologies\nC.A.433/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Husnain Ilyas Printers & others\nC.A.434/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Universal Engineering & Fabrication & others\nC.A.435/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s F.F. Trading Corporation & others\nC.A.436/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s J.M. Corporation & others\nC.A.437/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Saifullah\nC.A.438/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s III Laptop & others\nC.A.439/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s CAP Engineering & another\nC.A.440/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s T.Z. Technologies\nC.A.441/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s M.K.H. Enterprises\nC.A.442/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Muhammad Yousaf & another\nC.A.443/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Ibrahim Steel Casting\nC.A.444/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Nasim Engineering Works\nC.A.445/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Hamid Steel Traders & others\nC.A.446/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Samex Enterprises & others\nC.A.447/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Matchless Engineering (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.448/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Al-Hussnain Paper & Board Mills & others\nC.A.449/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Super Sharp Graphics\nC.A.450/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Hamza Corporation & another\nC.A.451/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Maqbool Engineers\nC.A.452/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s The Fuelers Corporation\nC.A.453/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s M.B.-Dyes Chemical & Silk Industries & another\nC.A.454/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Rehan Can Pvt (Ltd)\nC.A.455/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Panther Sports & Rubber Industries (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.456/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Gaias Butt & others\nC.A.457/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Ashrafia Enterprises\nC.A.458/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Irfan Corporation\nC.A.459/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s New Rose Computers & others\nC.A.460/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. K.S. Traders Godown& others\nC.A.461/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s The Outdoor Factory & others\nC.A.462/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Creative Electronics (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.463/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Raza Brothers Steel Re-rolling Mills\nC.A.464/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Madine Enterprises & others\nC.A.465/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Usman & Sons & another\nC.A.466/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Shaheen Gatta Factory & another\nC.A.467/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Israr Sons & others\nC.A.468/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Saddique Corporation\nC.A.469/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Shaheen Gatta Factory & another\nC.A.470/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Nadeem Traders & another\nC.A.471/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Rizwan Oil Company\nC.A.472/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Shahsons Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.473/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Khawaja Shahbaz Ahmad & others\nC.A.474/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Pearl Corporation\nC.A.475/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Azhar Engineering Works & another\nC.A.476/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Chaudhry Enterprises & others\nC.A.477/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Pak Euro Engineering & others\nC.A.478/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Ar Sea Ind & another\nC.A.479/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Kirana Trading Services & others\nC.A.480/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Jawad Brothers\nC.A.481/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Pak Hero Industries (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.482/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Rasheed Packages & another\nC.A.483/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Raffay Printers and others\nC.A.484/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Seeseem Advertising\nC.A.485/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Raffay Printers & others\nC.A.486/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Super Oil Traders & others\nC.A.487/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Metal Craft through its Partner\nC.A.488/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s G.H. Traders & others\nC.A.489/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Novelty Engineers\nC.A.490/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Ali Sheraz & another\nC.A.491/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Al-Barkat Traders & another\nC.A.492/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s T.X. Engineering\nC.A.493/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Waqar Usman Autos Engineering\nC.A.494/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Burraq Motor Company (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.495/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Malik Traders & another\nC.A.496/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Qadri International & others\nC.A.497/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s K.S. Traders & others\nC.A.498/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Master Key & others\nC.A.499/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s A.M. Enterprises & another\nC.A.500/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Anipak & another\nC.A.501/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Trilogy Trading Corporation & others\nC.A.502/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Steel Craft (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.503/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Malik Board & Paper Industries & another\nC.A.504/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd & others\nC.A.505/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Fazal Cloth Mills Ltd & others\nC.A.506/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Jamhoor Textile Mills Ltd & others\nC.A.507/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Zain Steel Industries & others\nC.A.508/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Faisal Sanitary fittings Industries & others\nC.A.509/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-Inland Revenue, through its Director & others v. M/s Boxworks & others\nC.A.510/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Atlas Battery Ltd & another\nC.A.511/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-Inland Revenue, through its Director & others v. M/s Haleem Sons Paper Mills Ltd & another\nC.A.512/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Yunas Metal Works (Pvt) Ltd\nC.A.513/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Tariq Ploy Pack (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.514/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Royal Enterprises & another\nC.A.515/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Genesis International & others\nC.A.516/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Creative Engineering & another\nC.A.517/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Ch. Aamir Ghafoor Brothers & another\nC.A.518/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Idrees & Co. & another\nC.A.519/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s A.M. Enterprises & others\nC.A.520/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Anwar Rashid Industries\nC.A.521/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Zahid Packages through its proprietor\nC.A.522/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s A.S. Packages & others\nC.A.523/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Zahid Packages & another\nC.A.524/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Pervaiz Chemical Trading & others\nC.A.525/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Uty Art Press & others\nC.A.526/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Ali Packages & another\nC.A.527/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Trilogy Trading Corporation & another\nC.A.528/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Ali Packages & another\nC.A.529/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Universal Tobacco Company (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.530/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Shifa Board (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.531/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Qadir Engineering & another\nC.A.532/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Shifa Board (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.533/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Maaher Food Industries & another\nC.A.534/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Naeem Containers & others\nC.A.535/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Tajjula Board &another\nC.A.536/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Israr Sons & others\nC.A.537/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Pilot Computer System\nC.A.538/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Prime Cartons Company Ltd & another\nC.A.539/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Royal Enterprises & another\nC.A.540/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Malik Board & Paper Industries\nC.A.541/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s New Master Pack\nC.A.542/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Siraj Paper Board Mills & another\nC.A.543/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Shabbir Packages & another\nC.A.544/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Best Paper Board Mills\nC.A.545/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Excellent Packers (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.546/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Salman Ali Packages & others\nC.A.547/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Al-Makka Press (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.548/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Trust Traders & another\nC.A.549/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s New Falcon Packages & another\nC.A.550/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Crest Pack & another\nC.A.551/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Al-Badar Engineering Company (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.552/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, through its Director & others v. M/s Amir Engineering & others\nC.A.553/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Amtex Ltd & others\nC.A.554/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s MMTI Marketing (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.555/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Diamond Paper & Board Mills (Pvt) Ltd & another\nC.A.556/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Shama Export Pvt Ltd & others\nC.A.557/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Vital Engineering & Services & others\nC.A.558/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Chaudhry Enterprises & others\nC.A.559/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Adnan Traders & another\nC.A.560/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Gujranwala Paper & Board Mills & others\nC.A.561/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Gujranwala Paper & Board Mills & others\nC.A.562/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Fame Exports &Inam Papers Mills & others\nC.A.563/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Golden Industries & another\nC.A.564/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Aamir Enterprises & others\nC.A.565/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Chawla Enterprises & others\nC.A.566/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Autogic& another\nC.A.567/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Evergreen Enterprises & another\nC.A.568/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Al-Karim Industry & others\nC.A.569/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s New Popular Steel & another\nC.A.570/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Zafar Fabrics (Pvt) Ltd & others\nC.A.571/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Muhammad Asif Nadeem Khan & others\nC.A.572/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M.s Taj Packrite & another\nC.A.573/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Tariq Jamal ud Din Awan & others\nC.A.574/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. M/s Anmol Engineering Works & others\nC.A.575/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Saba Asif & another\nC.A.576/2016 Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director & others v. Kamran Rashid & others\nC.A.577/2016 The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot v. M/s LAGOS Enterprises, etc\nC.A.578/2016 The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot v. M/s Moanto Enterprises, etc\nC.A.579/2016 The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot v. M/s Dogar Impex, etc\nC.A.580/2016 The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot v. M/s Anees Enterprises, etc\nC.A.581/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s Pervaiz Chemical Trading Co., Lahore, etc\nC.A.582/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director\nC.A.583/2016 Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s New Royal Printing and Packrite (Pvt.)Limited, Lahore, etc\nDirectorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Islamabad through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s Chawla Enterprises, through its Proprietor Mahfooz Ahmad, etc\nC.A.584/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore, etc\nC.A.585/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s C.C. Factory Pvt. Ltd.\nC.A.586/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s. ACE Indigo Industries (SMC- Pvt.) Ltd, Lahore, etc\nC.A.587/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation -IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation - IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s. Tribal Textile Mills, Lahore, etc\nC.A.588/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s. Lahore Textile & General Mills Ltd., Lahore etc\nC.A.589/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s. Colony Mills Limited through its Chief Financial Officer Mr. Atta Mohy- ud-Din Khan, Lahore, etc\nC.A.590/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s UTY Art Press, Lahore, etc\nC.A.591/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s Salman Ali Packages, Farrukh Abad Baradari Road, Shahdara, Lahore , etc\nC.A.592/2016 Assistant Director/Investigating Officer, Director Intelligence & Investigation- IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s Ittefaq Straw Board Industry, Gujranwala , etc\nC.A.593/2016 Deputy Director, Directorate of Intelligence * Investigation-IR, through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, etc v. M/s Chaudhry Enterprises, Faisalabad , etc\nC.A.594/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s. Shahmim Majeed papar Mills, Sahiwal, etc\nC.A.595/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s. Malik Traders, Lahore, etc\nC.A.596/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s. Al-Karim Industry (Pvt.), etc\nC.A.597/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s. Zephyr Textiles Ltd., etc\nC.A.598/2016 Directorate Intelligence & Investigation- IR, Lahore, etc v. Javed Iqbal, etc\nC.A.599/2016 Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation-IR through Director Intelligence & Investigation-IR, Lahore, etc v. M/s. Qazafi Steel Casting, Faisalabad\nC.A.600/2016 Director Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation (FBR) and others v. Waseem Ahmed and others\nC.A.605/2016 M/s Universal Electric House v. Director Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation (FBR) and others\nC.A.606/2016 The Director General of Intelligenc" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26275", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1363 = 2025 SLD 1363", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpQXk", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary:\nThe complainant imported Silico Manganese valued at USD 59,400 but faced significant delays in the release of consignments due to non-issuance of Delivery Order (DO) by the Shipping Line, despite payment of detention charges totaling Rs.2.517 million. Customs authorities cleared the Goods Declaration (GD) on 03.01.2024, yet failed to facilitate release or compel the Shipping Line to issue the DO. The Principal Shipping Line had earlier communicated that no detention would be charged, yet the Shipping Agent demanded and received payment. The Customs Department and Shipping Line failed to act despite multiple directions by the FTO.\nHeld:\nThe FTO held the Customs authorities’ inaction and failure to regulate the Shipping Line as maladministration under Section 2(3) of the FTO Ordinance, 2000. It recommended:\nImmediate release of goods by Customs after payment of port charges.\nDirection to the Shipping Line to issue DO or revocation of its license for violation of Rule 665(1).\nRefund of Rs.2.517 million to the Complainant.\nIssuance of a Delay and Detention Certificate by the Collector (Appraisement-West).\nCitations:\nFederal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, 2(3), 10(1), 10(4)\nFederal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013, § 9(1)\nCustoms Act, 1969, § 80(1)\nCustoms Rules, 2001, Rule 665(1)(b)(d)(g)", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=2(3),10(1),10(4)Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reform Act, 2013=9(1)Customs Act, 1969=80(1)Customs Rules, 2001=665(1)(b),665(1)(b),(d),665(1)(b),(g)", - "Case #": "COMPLAINT NO. 1751/LHR/CUST/2024, Order dated: 14-06-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: Dr. Asif Mahmood Jah, Fedral Tax Ombudsman", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer: Ms. Adila Rehman, Advisor\nAppraising Officer: Dr. Arslan Subuctageen, Advisor\nAuthorized Representative: Complainant in person\nDepartmental Representatives: Ms. Saima Zalb, D.C Customs, Mr. Faizan Arif, D.C, Enforcement (Ports)", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. ABDUL RAZZAQ, E-144, PHASE-1, DHA, LAHORE …….. COMPLAINANT\nVS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD …….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26276", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1364 = 2025 SLD 1348", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODc", - "Key Words:": "These two appeals by United Bank Ltd. challenged orders dated 21.03.2024 passed by the Consumer Protection Court, Jamshoro, in Claim Nos. 07 and 11 of 2023. The respondent (consumer) had filed complaints regarding failed ATM transactions where amounts were debited but not dispensed and reversed only after 10–20 days. The lower court awarded Rs.300,000/- in each case as compensation for mental agony and litigation costs.\nThe bank contended that jurisdiction lay exclusively with the Banking Court under Section 7(4) of FIO, 2001, and the ATM service did not qualify as a “service” under the Sindh Consumer Protection Act. The High Court rejected this argument, holding that ATM services are consumer services under Section 2(q) of the 2014 Act and that the claimant was a consumer per Section 2(e). Thus, the Consumer Protection Court had jurisdiction.\nHowever, the High Court found the awarded compensation excessive and reduced it, awarding Rs.10,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively for the two claims, along with Rs.20,000/- litigation costs in each case.\nHeld:\nAppeals partially allowed. Compensation modified to Rs.10,000/- and Rs.15,000/- with Rs.20,000/- litigation costs per claim. Impugned orders upheld as modified.\nCitations:\nPLD 2022 Sindh 430 (relied upon by respondent)\n2015 CLD 196, 2016 CLD 1546, 2016 CLD 383 (cited by bank but distinguished)", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sindh Consumer Protection Act, 2014=34Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=7(4)", - "Case #": "Misc: Civil Appeals No. S-11 and 12 of 2024. Date of hearing: 31.01.2025. Date of decision: 14.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Siddique, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Herchand Kumar, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "UNITED BANK LTD \nVS. \nDR. FAROOQUE ADIL ABBASI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26277", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1365 = 2025 SLD 1365", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODY", - "Key Words:": "The appellants (legal heirs of deceased judgment-debtor Aziz Ahmed) challenged the dismissal of their objection petition under Order XXI Rule 89 CPC by the Banking Court. The property had already been auctioned in 2014 and the deceased had earlier filed objections under Rule 90, which were dismissed and upheld up to the Supreme Court. The Banking Court confirmed the sale in 2020, and the legal heirs later attempted to re-agitate the matter via a new petition. The appellants argued that notice under Rule 22 CPC was mandatory upon death of the judgment-debtor and they had an independent right to object.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the deceased had exhausted all remedies in his lifetime under Order XXI Rule 90 without opting for Rule 89. Once his objections were dismissed and the sale confirmed under Rule 92(1), no further right survived for legal heirs to challenge. Notice under Rule 22 CPC was not required post finality of proceedings. The auction sale stood confirmed as absolute.\nCitations:\nZakaria Ghani v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon (2016 CLD 480)\nMir Wali Khan v. ADBP (PLD 2003 SC 500)\nMuhammad Hussain v. IDBP (2014 MLD 192)\nJanak Raj v. Gurdial Singh (AIR 1967 SC 608)\nR. Rajamma v. Avula Saraswathamma (1973 AIR (A.P.) 132)\nMuhammad Khalil v. Faisal MB Corporation (2019 SCMR 321) – distinguished", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908=89", - "Case #": "EFA No. 66967 of 2021. Date of hearing 22.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by Mr. Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat, ASC and Mr. Nadeem Irshad, Advocate\nRespondent(s) by Mr. Ashar Elahi, ASC", - "Petitioner Name:": "AKMAL AZIZ AND 3 OTHERS \nVS\nHABIB BANK LIMITED AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26278", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1366 = 2025 SLD 1366", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODU", - "Key Words:": "The petitioner, a bank employee removed from service on 12.08.2015 for alleged involvement in embezzlement of Rs. 31.7 million, challenged the removal through successive litigation. The co-accused, Malik Hamood ur Rehman, admitted sole responsibility, while no direct evidence of fraud or misconduct was found against the petitioner except for a charge of negligence. The charge sheet was served beyond the mandatory 30-day period under Standing Order 15(4), and inquiry proceedings failed to establish habitual negligence required under Standing Order 15(3)(i). The court held that a solitary instance of negligence does not amount to misconduct warranting dismissal, and emphasized proportionality in punishment.\nHeld:\nWrit petition allowed. Orders dated 22.02.2024 and 06.09.2023 of the Full and Single Bench of NIRC set aside. Petitioner reinstated into service with full back benefits.\nCitation:\nSaifi Development Corporation Ltd. v. Workers Union, PLD 1995 Karachi 347\nOPAL Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Raheela, 1995 PLC 451\nAuditor-General of Pakistan v. Muhammad Ali, 2006 SCMR 63", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 882 of 2024. Date of Hearing: 12.03.2025. Date of Order: 21-04-2025", - "Judge Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASIF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner By: Mr. Mirza Muhammad Afzal, Advocate\nRespondent By: Mr. Bilal Ahmed Kakaizai, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "IFFAT NAWAZ\nVS\nBANK OF KHYBER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26279", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1367 = 2025 SLD 1367", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODQ", - "Key Words:": "The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in FIR No.25/2025 registered under Section 489-F PPC at Police Station Ramna, Islamabad, alleging dishonour of two cheques totaling Rs. 3.7 million, issued in repayment of a Qarz-e-Hasna (benevolent loan). One of the cheques amounting to Rs. 500,000 was dishonoured. The Court observed that the nature of the transaction and whether the cheques were issued in discharge of a legal obligation is a matter for trial determination.\nRelying on precedents including Tariq Bashir (PLD 1995 SC 34), Muhammad Anwar (2024 SCMR 1567), and Abdul Saboor (2022 SCMR 592), it was held that offences under Section 489-F PPC do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C. The Court emphasized that civil remedy under Order XXXVII CPC remains available for recovery, and that continued detention serves no investigative purpose.\nFurther, the presence of other criminal cases does not preclude bail where the accused makes a prima facie case on merits (PLD 1990 SC 934, 2024 SCMR 1596).\nHeld:\nBail granted subject to furnishing of bail bonds worth Rs. 200,000 with two sureties. Observations are tentative and shall not influence trial proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)=489-F,497(1)", - "Case #": "Crl. Misc. No. 455 of 2025. Date of Order: 25.03.2025. Date of Hearing: 04.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SARDAR MUHAMMAD SARFRAZ DOGAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Arslan Nawaz Marth, Advocate for the petitioner.\nSyed Wajid Ali Shah Gillani & Zahid Mahmood Raja Advocates with the complainant Mr. Adnan Ali DDPP for the State with Shakeel A.S.I.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AWAIS QARNI \nVS\nTHE STATE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26280", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1368 = 2025 SLD 1368", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpOC8", - "Key Words:": "Key Disputes\nWithholding Tax on Transportation Payments (Rs. 267.5M)\nTax Officer’s Action: Imposed 20% withholding tax (Rs. 53.5M) on payments allegedly made to non-resident individuals under Section 153(1)(b).\nAppellant’s Defense:\nPayments were made in Pakistani Rupees to local transporters (listed with CNIC details).\nAll transactions routed through local banks (Bank of Khyber); no foreign remittance.\nDocuments (CNICs, bank advices) submitted via FBR’s IRIS portal.\nProcedural Irregularity\nOrder passed on 30.09.2024 (hearing was fixed for 23.09.2024), violating due process.\nReliance on case laws (e.g., 14975 PTD 58) affirming illegality of orders passed on non-hearing dates.\nOther Disallowed Expenses\nClearing Charges (Rs. 965,309) & SGS Pakistan Payment (Rs. 1.79M):\nNo tax deducted, but recipients discharged tax liability in returns → Only default surcharge u/s 161(1B) applicable, not full tax recovery.\nIndirect Expenses (Rs. 3.06M):\nPetty cash expenses under valid heads (e.g., office maintenance, software) but disallowed due to ITR format limitations.\nTribunal’s Findings\nNon-Resident Payment Claim Unsubstantiated:\nNo evidence of foreign remittances; all payments domestic.\nFailure to prove recipients were non-residents.\nSection 161 Misapplied:\nPrecedents (MCB Bank Ltd., PepsiCo) emphasized:\nTax authorities cannot use Section 161 for fishing expeditions. \nMust first prove:\n(i) Taxpayer is a withholding agent,\n(ii) Transaction liable for deduction,\n(iii) Specific tax not deducted.\nOrder set aside due to lack of nexus with legal requirements.\nProcedural Violation:\nOrder passed on non-hearing date → Illegal and void.\nDecision\nImpugned Order Annulled: Original assessment order quashed.\nRemand: Case sent back to DCIR for fresh decision within 45 days.\nDirections:\nDCIR must grant proper hearing and examine appellant’s documentary evidence.\nAppellant to submit documents within 15 days.\nDefault Surcharge: If applicable, only surcharge u/s 161(1B) imposable (not full tax).\nLegal Principles Reaffirmed\nBenefit of doubt favors taxpayer (SCMR 1973/1977).\nSection 161 not a charging provision; requires concrete evidence of withholding failure.\nTax authorities must avoid arbitrary financial burden on taxpayers (Islamabad HC).", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=21,21C,153,153(1)(b),155(2),161,161(1),161(2),161(1B),169,172,177,205Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2224/KB/2024 (Tax Year 2023). Date of Hearing: 25.03.2025. Date of Order: 14.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Irshad Alam, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Tariq Aziz, D.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. TOOCHI MINERALS, KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE AC/DCIR, ZONE-II, LTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26281", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1369 = 2025 SLD 1369", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpOCs", - "Key Words:": "The taxpayer filed a return for Tax Year 2016 declaring income of Rs. 1,762,042. The case was selected for audit under section 214C. Due to non-compliance with a section 122(9) notice, the AO finalized the assessment under section 122(1), enhancing income to Rs. 3,000,000 and raising a tax demand of Rs. 469,500. On appeal, the CIR(A) found that the AO had made estimations without evidence, failed to conduct any field inquiry, and denied the taxpayer a fair hearing. The CIR(A) reduced the income to Rs. 700,000.\nHeld:\nThe ATIR dismissed the Department’s appeal, upholding the CIR(A)s order. It held that the assessment was flawed due to lack of evidence and procedural fairness. The CIR(A) had rightly modified the assessment.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 760/MB/2022 (Tax Year 2016). Date of Hearing: 29.05.2025. Date of Order: 02.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mian Abdul Bari Rashid, Member and Ch. Muhammad Azam, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Akhtar Suraj, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Muhammad Safdar, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "CIR, MULTAN ZONE, RTO, MULTAN …….. APPELLANT\nVS\nMR. NADEEM AHMAD, MULTAN ……. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26282", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1370 = 2025 SLD 1370", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODk", - "Key Words:": "The taxpayer, a company engaged in manufacturing oil and ghee, was charged under sections 161/205 of the Ordinance for failure to deduct withholding tax under sections 148, 149, and 153. The AO passed an order on assumptions, without properly identifying recipients, payment amounts, or tax deducted. On appeal, CIR(A) annulled the order and remanded the matter to the AO for fresh examination.\nThe Department challenged the remand, contending CIR(A) lacked authority to remand under settled law. The ATIR concurred, holding that while CIR(A) cannot remand, the Tribunal is empowered under section 132(4)(b) to do so. Observing procedural unfairness and non-application of mind by the AO, the ATIR vacated both the assessment and appellate orders, and remanded the matter to AO for fresh proceedings after providing the taxpayer a proper hearing.\nHeld:\nAppeal disposed of; case remanded to AO/DCIR with direction to re-conduct proceedings in accordance with law and provide due opportunity to the taxpayer.\nCitations:\nCIR v. MCB Bank Ltd (2021) 124 Tax 2011\nPTD 2017 Lah. 2480, 2012 PTD 122, 2014 109 Tax 187 (Trib.), 2000 PTD 3396\nSupreme Court: Shahid Gul & Partners v. DCIR (CAs 2244–2249/2016)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No.187/MB/2021 (Tax Year 2016). Date of Hearing: 04.06.2025. Date of Order: 13.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IJAZ ALI BHATTI, Member AND CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ali Raza Gillani, DR.\nRespondent by: Mr. Shabbir Fakhar-ud-din, ITP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE CIR, LEGAL LTO, MULTAN ……. Appellant\nVs\nM/s ROOMI INDUSTRIES (Pvt) Ltd., 7-KM, Abbaspur, Khanewal Road, Multan ……. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26283", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1407 = 2025 SLD 1407 = 2025 PTD 708", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpODg", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Appellate Forums & Retrospective Application of Law\nThe case addressed the appellate forum for income tax cases based on pecuniary jurisdiction after the Finance Act, 2024 and Tax Law (Amendment) Act, 2024. The High Court held that where tax/refund value was below Rs. 20 million, the appeal lies with the Commissioner (Appeals); otherwise, with the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), provided the order was communicated after the commencement of the Finance Act, 2024. It was declared that:\n•\nAppeals pending before the Commissioner (Appeals) on 31-12-2024 exceeding Rs. 20 million were transferred to ATIR.\n•\nAppeals of Rs. 20 million or less pending before ATIR as of 31-12-2024 would remain with ATIR.\n•\nReferences filed against orders post-commencement of the Amendment Act, 2024 would lie with the High Court.\n•\nAll pending and remanded cases must follow this interpretation.\n•\nATIR was empowered to re-transfer references to the High Court for jurisdictional compliance.\nThe principle in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (continuing operation of repealed law) was held inapplicable due to express retrospective effect provided in the new law.\nCitations:\n•\nManzoor Ali and 39 others v. United Bank Limited (2005 SCMR 1785)\n•\nBadshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2015 SCMR 43) – relied upon.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "General Clauses Act, 1897=6", - "Case #": "C. P. Nos. 6552-P, C. Rs. Nos. 1057-P of 2024, 830-P of 2011, 380-A of 2012, W. Ps. Nos. 1418-P of 2022 with IR; 2124-P of 2021 with IR; 272-B of 2024, Income Tax Reference No. 86-P of 2024 and Criminal Appeal No. 142-B of 2023, decided on 13th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE AND WIQAR AHMAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Shoaib Jally for Petitioner.\nAbdullah Shah for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RAFI JULIAH AND OTHERS\nVS\nLIAQAT AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26284", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1408 = 2025 SLD 1408 = 2025 PTD 724", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpOHo", - "Key Words:": "•\nDispute: Challenge to anti-dumping duties imposed by the NTC on imports of One Side Coated Duplex Board from China, Indonesia, and South Korea.\n•\nKey Dates:\no\nFinal duties imposed: 29.07.2017 (ranging from 14.98% to 18.57%).\no\nAppellate Tribunal upheld duties: 29.01.2020.\no\nHigh Court appeal filed: 2021.\n________________________________________\nCore Issues Raised by Appellants\n1.\nDomestic Industry Standing:\no\nAlleged M/s Century Paper (58% market share) was ineligible to file the anti-dumping application due to its relationship with Merit Packaging (an importer).\no\nClaimed this violated Sections 2(d) and 20 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015.\n2.\nInjury Determination:\no\nNTC failed to consider alternative causes of injury (e.g., gas shortages, power outages) affecting domestic production, violating Section 18 (causal link analysis).\n3.\nProcedural Deficiencies:\no\nFinal determination (27.07.2017) was not issued within 180 days of the preliminary determination (11.05.2017), per Section 39(1).\n4.\nDuty Imposition:\no\nDuties exceeded the margin necessary to remove injury.\n________________________________________\nCourts Findings & Decision\n1.\nDomestic Industry Validity:\no\nRejected. M/s Century Paper and Merit Packaging had no operational control over each other despite one common director.\no\nMerit’s imports were insignificant (0.5% of total imports) and for self-consumption.\no\nCentury Paper qualified as domestic industry under Section 2(d).\n2.\nCausal Link Analysis (Section 18):\no\nUpheld NTC’s approach. The Commission:\n\nExamined non-dumped factors (demand, technology, trade practices).\n\nConcluded injury was primarily due to dumped imports (price undercutting, volume surge).\no\nGas shortages (raised by appellants) were structural issues, not requiring attribution analysis per WTO jurisprudence.\n3.\nTimeline Compliance:\no\nFinal determination (27.07.2017) was issued within 180 days of the preliminary determination (11.05.2017).\no\nInvestigation concluded within 18 months (per Section 29), despite litigation delays.\n4.\nDuty Quantum:\no\nDuties were within dumping margins and necessary to offset injury.\n5.\nScope of Appeal:\no\nTreated as a second appeal (limited to legal errors, akin to Section 100, CPC).\no\nNo legal infirmity found in concurrent findings of NTC and Appellate Tribunal.\n________________________________________\nFinal Outcome\n•\nAppeal dismissed.\n•\nAnti-dumping duties upheld.\n•\nNo costs awarded.\nKey Quote:\n Anti-dumping duty is not a tax but a trade remedial measure to offset the injurious effect of dumping... [It] protects the domestic industry. (Paragraph 20)*", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015=18,20,20(2)(b),23(1),23(4),27,37,37(1),37(2),37(3),39,39(1),39(4),43,43(1),50,58(1),58(3),59,70(13),70(1)(ii)", - "Case #": "C.M.A. No. 12 of 2021. Date of Hearing: 10.06.2024 and 27.01.2025. Date of Judgment: 28-1-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants by: Mr. Asad Ladha, Advocate\nRespondents by: Mr. Waqas Amir, Advocate for respondent No.1.\nM/s Salman Zaheer Khan and Khalil K. Sahibzada Advocates for respondent No.2", - "Petitioner Name:": "DAWN CONVERTEC SMC-PRIVATE LIMITED AND OTHERS\nVS\nNATIONAL TARIFF COMMISSION AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26285", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1409 = 2025 SLD 1409 = 2025 PTD 740", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpOHk", - "Key Words:": "Penalty imposition for misdeclaration of imported goods under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969.\n•\nKey Facts:\no\nRespondent imported both-sided coated duplex board (Manila Back) but declared it as one-sided coated duplex board (grey back) in Goods Declaration (GD) CRN-874052 (10.01.2009).\no\nHS Code (4810.9200) and assessed duties were identical for both descriptions.\no\nCustoms detected misdeclaration during scrutiny but confirmed no revenue loss (duties unchanged).\no\nAdjudication:\no\n\n\nOriginal Order (12.02.2009): Penalty/fine imposed for misdeclaration.\n\nAppellate Order (14.03.2009): Penalty waived since HS code/duties matched.\n\nTribunal Order (22.02.2011): Upheld appellate decision.\nAdmitted Legal Questions\n1.\nQuestion 4: Whether incorrect self-assessment causing revenue loss attracts Section 32 penalties, irrespective of duty equivalence?\n2.\nQuestion 8: Whether Customs General Order (CGO) 12/2002 (administrative) overrides statutory notification SRO 487(I)/2007?\nCourt’s Analysis & Holdings\nOn Misdeclaration (Question 4)\n•\nLegal Principle:\n An importer’s duty to declare goods accurately under Section 79 is absolute, irrespective of duty implications. \n•\nKey Reasoning:\no\nPhysical examination proved material discrepancy in goods description (grey back vs. Manila back).\no\nSection 32(1) & (2) applies: Misdeclaration of particulars constitutes an offense even if duties/HS codes align.\no\nPrecedent Relied On: Collector v. BNN Enterprises (2022 PTD 1418):\n\nPenalty valid where misdeclaration (e.g., used vs. new goods) attempts duty evasion, regardless of outcome.\n•\nTribunal Error: Waiving penalty solely based on duty equivalence ignored statutory mandate for truthful declarations.\nOn CGO vs. SRO (Question 8)\n•\nHierarchy of Laws:\no\nStatutory Notification (SRO) prevails over administrative orders (CGO).\n•\nCGO 12/2002 Inapplicable:\no\nPara 101 of CGO (waiver if duties unchanged) applies only to HS code disputes, not material misdescription.\no\nRespondent’s case involved factual inaccuracy in goods’ physical attributes, not classification conflict.\nDecision\n•\nQuestions 4 & 8 Answered in Affirmative:\no\nPenalty justified under Section 32 for misdeclaration, regardless of duty equivalence.\no\nCGO cannot override statutory provisions where material facts are misrepresented.\n•\nOutcome:\no\nTribunal’s order set aside.\no\nOriginal penalty/fine restored.\nKey Legal Takeaway\n Truthful declaration under Section 79 is sacrosanct. Duty neutrality does not immunize importers from penalties for material misdescription of goods. \n________________________________________\nNote: Case involved non-appearance by respondent. Court relied on documentary evidence and precedents to uphold strict compliance with declaration requirements under customs law.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=32(1),32(2),79(1)(b),155-D,155- E", - "Case #": "Spl. CRA No. 409 of 2011. Date of hearing: 10.11.2022. Date of order: 16.11.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, JUSTICE AND ZULFIQAR AHMED KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Iqbal M. Khurram, Advocate for applicant\nNemo for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS\nVS\nM/S KHALID IMPEX" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26286", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1410 = 2025 SLD 1410 = 2025 PTD 757", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDc", - "Key Words:": "Core Issues\n1.\nRetrospective Application of Clause 105A:\no\nPetitioner claimed exemption from TY 2018 audit since its last audit (TY 2017) concluded in 2021, arguing the four-year bar runs from the audit’s culmination.\n2.\nJurisdiction & Legality:\no\nWhether the audit notice violated Clause 105A and constitutional rights (Arts. 4, 10-A).\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Holdings\n1. Clause 105A Applies Prospectively\n•\nStatutory Interpretation:\n The phrase preceding four tax years refers to the year audited (e.g., TY 2017), not the year of audit completion. \n•\nNo Retroactivity:\no\nClause 105A enacted 01.07.2022 (TY 2023) with no express retroactive intent (M/s RAJBY Industries v. Federation, 2023 SCMR 1407 followed).\no\nPetitioner’s TY 2017 audit fell outside the preceding four years (2018–2021).\n2. FBR’s Interpretation Rejected\n•\nFBR Circular Invalidated:\no\nAn FBR circular suggesting the four-year period runs from audit completion was struck down (*Sindh HC in D-6280/2024*), as it conflicted with the statute.\n•\nAudit Year Controls:\no\nExemption depends on the tax year audited (TY 2017), not the year of finalization (2021).\n3. No Constitutional Violation\n•\nArticle 4 & 10-A:\no\nAudit initiation under Section 177 is a valid regulatory tool to verify self-assessed returns (CIR v. Allah Din Steel, 2018 SCMR 1328).\no\nNo actionable injury arises from mere audit selection.\n________________________________________\nOperational Principles\nplaintext\nCopy\nDownload\nClause 105A Exemption Test: \n----- \nAudit conducted in TY-1, TY-2, TY-3, or TY-4? \n↓ \nYes → Exempt from new audit \nNo → Audit permissible \n(TY = Tax Year, e.g., 2018–2021)\n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nWrit Petition Dismissed:\no\nAudit notice for TY 2018 upheld as valid.\no\nKey Directive: Petitioner must participate in audit proceedings.\n________________________________________\nSignificance\n•\nFiscal Statute Interpretation: Amendments lacking express retroactive language apply prospectively.\n•\nAudit Exemptions: Preceding four tax years refers to the years audited, not audit completion timelines.\n•\nRegulatory Power: Random audit selection under self-assessment regimes is constitutional.\n Beneficial legislation requires curative intent for retroactivity; mere concession is insufficient. (Para 11)", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=74(1),177,177(1),214C,Clause 105A of Part IV of the Second ScheduleConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=199General Clauses Act, 1897=10-A,24-A", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3422/2022. Date of hearing: 27.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Wasim Abid and Abuzar Salman Khan, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Mr. Ali Nawaz Kharal Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAK TELECOM MOBILE LIMITED\nVs\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26287", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1411 = 2025 SLD 1411 = 2025 PTD 765", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDY", - "Key Words:": "Background\n•\nApplicant: Collector of Customs (challenging Tribunals order).\n•\nRespondents: Importers of tires/tubes from India.\n•\nDispute: Reassessment of customs value post-clearance based on data from Indian portal www.icegate.gov.in, alleging undervaluation.\n•\nKey Trigger:\no\nGoods initially assessed/released under Valuation Ruling No. 659/2014 (issued under Section 25A, Customs Act 1969).\no\nLater, Customs used IceGate data (showing higher export prices in India) to demand additional duties via show-cause notices.\n________________________________________\nLegal Issues\n1.\nWhether post-clearance reassessment under Section 25 (transaction value) is valid when a Section 25A Valuation Ruling exists?\n2.\nWhether IceGate data can override statutory Valuation Rulings?\n3.\nLegality of penalties under Section 32 for alleged misdeclaration.\n________________________________________\nCourts Analysis & Holdings\n1. Hierarchy of Valuation Provisions (Section 25A Prevails)\n•\nSection 25A begins with a non-obstante clause, overriding Section 25.\n•\nOnce a Valuation Ruling is issued (e.g., for tires/tubes), assessment must follow it – not transactional values under Section 25.\n•\nCritical Observation:\n Assessment under Section 25 is impermissible when a Section 25A Valuation Ruling is in force. \n2. IceGate Data Lacks Legal Sanctity\n•\nNo Evidentiary Value:\no\nIceGate data is uncertified by Indian authorities.\no\nExporters may inflate values for rebates/benefits in India.\n•\nProcedural Flaws:\no\nImporters were not confronted with specific unit values from IceGate.\no\nShow-cause notices contained vague allegations, violating natural justice.\n3. No Misdeclaration Under Section 32\n•\nImporters declared values as per prevailing Valuation Ruling – no intent to evade duties.\n•\nIceGate data ≠ direct evidence of misdeclaration under Rule 107(a) or CGO 12/2002.\n________________________________________\nFinal Decision\n•\nSCRAs Dismissed in limine (no merit).\n•\nTribunals Order Upheld:\no\nReassessment demands and penalties quashed.\n•\nReframed Question Answered:\n Pre-Finance Act 2017, goods cannot be reassessed under Section 25 when a Section 25A Valuation Ruling exists. ", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25A,32(1),32(2),32(3A),79,196(5)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application (“SCRA”) No. 727 of 2019 a/w SCRA NO. 728 to 730, 732 to 735 / 2019. Date of hearing & Order: 04.02.2021", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE AGHA FAISAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS THROUGH ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (LAW) MCC APPRAISEMENT (EAST), CUSTOMS HOUSE, KARACHI THROUGH MR. GHULAM MURTAZA, ADVOCATE.\nVS\nM/S ZAHID ALI & COMPANY, ROOM # 18, 1ST FLOOR, SHAH MARKET M. A. JINNAH ROAD, KARACHI. THROUGH NEMO" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26288", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1412 = 2025 SLD 1412 = 2025 PTD 780 = (2025) 132 TAX 313", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDU", - "Key Words:": "1.\nIssue: Challenged an order (dated 10.02.2025) rejecting its claim for adjustment of extra tax and further tax (penalties) charged on electricity bills during October-November 2024.\n2.\nBackground:\no\nPetitioner’s Sales Tax Registration (STRN) was wrongfully suspended (28.10.2024) due to revenue authorities error.\no\nSTRN was later restored (24.12.2024) after the petitioner provided proof of compliance (payments under Section 73, Sales Tax Act 1990).\no\nDespite restoration, tax authorities refused to refund penalties levied during the suspension period.\nCourt’s Reasoning:\n1.\nUnjust Deprivation:\no\nPenalties were imposed solely due to the revenue department’s error (suspension without petitioner’s fault).\no\nAuthorities admitted and rectified the error by restoring STRN.\n2.\nLegal Principles Violated:\no\nRestitution: Tax authorities cannot retain benefits from their own mistakes (Woolwich Equitable Building Society).\no\nLegitimate Expectation: Petitioner entitled to restoration of benefits.\no\nEquality Before Law (Article 25, Constitution):\n\nAnother entity (M/s Ali Steel Re-Rolling Mills) received relief in identical circumstances (order dated 30.04.2023).\n\nDenying the petitioner similar treatment was arbitrary and discriminatory.\no\nMaxim Ubi eadem ratio, ibi idem jus : Same facts warrant same legal outcome.\n3.\nPrecedents Cited:\no\nSherin v. Fazal Muhammad (1995 SCMR 584): No one should suffer due to state errors.\no\nE.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (India): Arbitrariness violates equality.\nJudgment:\n•\nPetition ALLOWED.\n•\nImpugned order (10.02.2025) set aside as illegal.\n•\nRespondent No. 2 (Commissioner Inland Revenue) directed to:\n Extend similar treatment to the petitioner as was given to M/s Ali Steel Re-Rolling Mills \n(i.e., adjust/refund the illegally charged extra tax and further tax).\nSignificance:\nThe court reinforced that state errors cannot penalize citizens and upheld constitutional equality in tax administration, mandating consistent treatment for similarly placed taxpayers.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21,21(5),73Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=25", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 17285 of 2025. Date of hearing: 09.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD SAJJAD MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Farrukh Ilyas Cheema, Advocate.\nRespondents by: M/s. Muhammad Zain Qazi, Assistant Attorney General and Muhammad Saad Bin Ghazi, Assistant Advocate General. Mr. Bilal Munir, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S MADINA STEEL MILLS \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION / CHAIRMAN, FBR, ISLAMABAD & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26289", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1413 = 2025 SLD 1413 = 2025 PTD 786", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Key Facts:\n1.\nPlaintiff: Challenged suspension of Sales Tax Registration.\n2.\nInterim Relief: Registration was temporarily restored via ad-interim order (31.05.2024).\n3.\nDefense Argument:\no\nTax authorities issued a pre-suspension notice (23.04.2024) complying with Saleem Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 1813).\no\nPlaintiff claimed no opportunity was provided despite the notice.\nCourt’s Reasoning for Dismissal:\n1.\nAvailability of Alternate Remedy:\no\nPlaintiff should have pursued remedies under Section 46, Sales Tax Act, 1990 (e.g., appeal to appellate authorities) instead of filing a suit.\no\nPre-suspension notice met legal requirements; plaintiff’s contention was misconceived. \n2.\nBinding Precedent:\no\nSearle IV Solution v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 1444, Para 17):\n\nHigh Courts must exercise original jurisdiction sparingly and with caution in tax matters.\n\nSuits should be disposed of within 1 year with a 50% deposit of disputed tax – conditions not met here.\no\nFailure to follow this precedent makes the suit non-maintainable.\n3.\nJurisdictional Restraint:\no\nCourt cannot mandatorily exercise jurisdiction under Section 9 CPC/Section 7 Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 for routine tax disputes.\nOutcome:\n•\nSuit DISMISSED with all pending applications.\n•\nReason: Lack of maintainability + failure to exhaust alternate remedies.\nSignificance:\nReinforces that taxpayers must first use statutory remedies (e.g., appeals) before approaching High Courts, which will only intervene exceptionally per Supreme Court guidelines.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=9", - "Case #": "SUIT NO. 606 / 2024 AND CMA No. 8931/2024. Date of Order: 27.06.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Danial Muzaffar, Advocate for Plaintiff.\nMr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General.\nMr. Zulfiqar Ali Khan Jillani, Advocate for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S GALAXY IMPEX THROUGH SOLE PROPRIETOR \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY REVENUE, ISLAMABAD AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26290", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1414 = 2025 SLD 1414 = 2025 PTD 789", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNC8", - "Key Words:": "Key Facts:\n1.\nAppellant: Attock Refinery Limited\n2.\nChallenge: Impugned order dated 10.11.2020 (from Writ Petition No. 2132/2014), where a Single Judge referred constitutional challenges to the Customs Collector instead of adjudicating them.\n3.\nCore Issue: Whether the Single Judge erred by delegating the determination of vires (constitutional validity) of:\no\nSection 31(A) of the Customs Act, 1969\no\nSection 6(1) & (1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990\nto the Customs Collector (Respondents 4–5), who lack jurisdiction over constitutional matters.\nCourt’s Reasoning:\n1.\nJurisdictional Error:\no\nThe Single Judge improperly referred constitutional challenges to administrative authorities (Customs Collector), who cannot adjudicate vires of laws.\no\nReliance on precedents:\n\nAbdul Majeed Khan v. Maheen Begum (2014 SCMR 1524): Courts must rectify orders passed without jurisdiction.\n\nMuhammad Ayub v. Member Judicial-III (2021 MLD 2110): If a foundational order is void, all subsequent actions collapse.\n2.\nPrinciples for Declaring Laws Unconstitutional:\no\nCited Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739):\n\nPresumption of constitutionality exists; laws can only be invalidated if irreconcilable with the Constitution.\n\nCourts must avoid constitutional questions if narrower grounds exist.\no\nEmphasized judicial restraint: Only higher courts (not administrative bodies) can determine vires.\n3.\nMediation Attempts Failed:\no\nThe court attempted mediation (Dec 2022–Jan 2025), but Respondents 4–5 failed to engage.\nJudgment:\n•\nAppeal ACCEPTED.\n•\nImpugned order (10.11.2020) set aside for being illegal and exceeding jurisdictional limits.\n•\nWrit Petition No. 2132/2014 restored to be heard afresh by a Single Judge.\n•\nConsequential orders (if any) passed under the void order struck down.\nSignificance:\nReaffirms that constitutional challenges must be decided by courts, not administrative authorities. Reinforces the presumption of validity of laws and the judiciary’s role in safeguarding constitutional boundaries.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972=3Customs Act, 1969=194Sales Tax Act, 1990=6(1),6(1)(A),31A", - "Case #": "Intra Court Appeal No. 92 of 2020. Date of order: 27.01.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE AND SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Sirdar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, ASC for the Appellant.\nMr. Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, Additional Attorney General with Tahir Raheel Awan, Assistant Attorney General-XIX for Respondent No. 1.\nYousaf Khan, S.O. I.R. Legal, RTO, Rawalpindi. \nNemo for Respondents No.2 to 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ATTOCK REFINERY LIMITED \nV/S \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26291", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1415 = 2025 SLD 1415 = 2025 PTD 795 = 2025 SCP 119", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNCs", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue\nWhether customs authorities can confiscate vehicles registered under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, alleging smuggling due to absence of import documents, especially when registration occurred years prior and statutory retention periods under customs law have expired.\n________________________________________\nKey Findings & Reasoning\n1.\n Smuggled Goods Definition (Sections 2(s) & 156(89), Customs Act):\no\nVehicles not originally classified as smuggled goods until 1998. Pre-1998 imports require proof of entry via unauthorized routes.\no\nMere absence of import documents ≠ automatic smuggling presumption.\n2.\nStatutory Time Bar (Section 211):\no\nImport records must be retained for 5 years (post-2007; 3 years pre-2007).\no\nIf seizure occurs after this period, owners have a lawful excuse for not producing documents.\no\nExample: A vehicle auctioned in 1999 (registered 2005) seized in 2008 → Retention period expired → Confiscation invalid.\n3.\nPresumption of Legality for Registered Vehicles:\no\nGovernment registration implies due diligence on tax/duty payment.\no\nVerified registration books create bona fide ownership presumption.\no\nBurden shifts to customs to prove fraud (e.g., chassis tampering).\n4.\nCritical Distinction:\no\nLawful excuse (S.156(89)) ≠ Lawful authority (S.187):\n\n Lawful excuse (e.g., expired document retention period) suffices as defense against smuggling allegations.\n\n Lawful authority requires stricter proof (e.g., valid import permits).\n5.\nExceptions:\no\nConfiscation valid if chassis/engine numbers are tampered to match auctioned vehicles (unless disclosed in auction reports).\n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nAll 23 appeals DISMISSED.\n•\nVehicles seized without proof of post-registration tampering or within statutory periods must be released.\n•\nCustoms authorities cannot penalize owners for inability to produce documents beyond retention periods.\nSignificance\n•\nReinforces bona fide purchaser protection and legal certainty for registered assets.\n•\nLimits customs power to confiscate based solely on absent historical documents.\n•\nDirects authorities to collaborate with registration bodies to prevent fraud at source.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),156(1)(89),156(1)(90),187,211", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No.1088, 1231 to 1236/13, 142-K OF 2015, 938 OF 2018 and 453 TO 466 OF 2022, Decided on 27th April, 2025. Date of Hearing: 03-03-2025. \n(On appeal from the judgments/orders dated 06.02.2013, 15.02.2013, 22. 02.2013, 20. 03.2013 and 23. 05.2013 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P.1377-D/11, C.P.No.2172/11, Special Customs Reference Nos. 245, 253, 263/08, 22/09 and Special Custom Reference Application No. 187/20)\nAND\nCivil Appeals No.142-K/2015 and 938/18\n(On appeal from the judgments/orders dated 04.09.2014 and 30.05.2017 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P.D- 568/12 and C.P. No. 11-D/2017)\nAND\nCivil Appeals No. 453 to 466 of 2022\n(On appeal from the judgments dated 09.07.2020 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Special Customs Reference Application Nos. 35/10, 311/13, 110/14, 219/14, 2391/15, 42, 419, 420, 541, 905/17, H. C. A. No.334/17, C.P No. D-3351, 7527/17/ and C.P No. D-5163/18)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, MR. JUSTICE IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants: \n(In CA. 1088/13) Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, ASC.\n(In CAs.1231, 1233 & 1234/13): Mr. M. D. Shehzad Feroze, ASC. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR. Mr. Shabbir Hussain, Supdt Customs. \n(In CAs. 1232, 1235 & 1236/13): Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC. Mr. Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani, Collector (Enforcement), Karachi.\n(In CAs. 142-K/15 & 462-463/22): Raja Muhammad Iqbal, ASC. Mr. Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani,\nCollector (Enforcement), Karachi.\n(In CA. 938/18): Mr. Kafeel Ahmed, ASC. [via video-link from Karachi]. \n(In CAs.453-461 & 464-466/22): Mr. Akhtar Hussain, Sr. ASC. Mr. K. A. Wahab, ASC. [both via video-link from Karachi] \nFor Appellant (department):\nMr. Masood Ahmed, Director, Intelligence & Investigation, Customs. Mr. Imran Afzal, Additional Director. Mr. Shaheer Ahmed, ETO/ E&T, Department. [via video-link from Karachi]\nFor Respondent No. 2:\n(In CA. 458/22) Mr. M. Younas Thaheem, ASC.\nAll other Respondents: Ex-parte. \nAmicus Curiae: Sirdar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, ASC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation, FBR and others Vs. Abdul Karim. \nCA No.1088/13\n2. The Director of Intelligence and Investigation FBR Vs. Muhammad Nasir and another. \nCA No.1231/13\n3. The Collector of Customs, MCC (Preventive), Customs House, Karachi Vs. Omar Ehsan Khan and another. \nCA No.1232/13\n4. The Director of Intelligence and Investigation, FBR Vs. Imdad Hussain and another. \nCA No.1233/13\n5. The Director of Intelligence and Investigation, FBR Vs. Javed Iqbal. \nCA No.1234/13\n6. The Additional Collector, Collectorate of Customs, (Preventive), Customs House, Karachi Vs. Saif-ur-Rehman and others. \nCA No.1235/13\n7. Additional Director through Director, Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation FBR, Karachi Vs. Arshad Ali Rind and another. \nCA No.1236/13\n8. Additional Collector, Govt. of Pakistan and another Vs. Rana Moeen Akhtar and others \nCA No.142-K/15\n9. Director, Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation FBR (CAS) Vs. Mohabbat and others. \nCA No.938/18\n10. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Imran CA No.453/22\n11. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Abdul Rehman and others. \nCA No.454/22\n12. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Liaquat Ali and others.\nCA No.455/22\n13. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Muhammad Mansoor and another. \nCA No.456/22\n14. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Muhammad Mohsin and others. \nCA No.457/22\n15. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Murtaza Khan and others. \nCA No.458/22\n16. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Muhammad Usman \nCA No.459/22\n17. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Muhammad Saeed and others. \nCA No.460/22\n18. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Sheikh Umer Imtiaz \nCA No.461/22\n19. The Collector of Customs Vs. Mumtaz Ali \nCA No.462/22\n20. The Collector, Government of Pakistan MCC, Karachi Vs. Khalil-ur-Rehman and others. \nCA No.463/22\n21. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Shiraz Qureshi and others. CA No.464/22\n22. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) Vs. Zain Un Nisa and others \nCA No.465/22\n23. Directorate General Intelligence and Investigation Customs Vs. Raza Khan Pathan (Owner) CA No.466/22" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26292", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1416 = 2025 SLD 1416 = 2025 PTD 811", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDk", - "Key Words:": "Core Dispute\nThe tax authorities created sales tax liability of Rs. 485.4 million (for 2020-2021) against the appellant, alleging concealment of supplies. This was based solely on discrepancies between:\n•\nIncome tax returns (declaring Rs. 1.51B/2020 and Rs. 915M/2021 as other revenue )\n•\nSales tax returns (not declaring equivalent amounts).\nAppellants Defense\n1.\nNo Taxable Supplies:\no\nThe other revenue in income tax returns represented transportation/carriage services, exempt from GST.\no\nSupplies to tribal areas (under SRO 1212(I)/2018) were tax-exempt.\n2.\nReconciled Figures:\no\nProvided breakdown showing other revenue comprised:\n\nExempt sales (SRO 1212)\n\nFTR payments (Section 153, Income Tax Ordinance)\n\nTransportation revenue (non-taxable).\nTribunals Decision\n•\nAllowed the appeal, quashing the tax demand.\n•\nKey Reasons:\n1.\nIllegal Basis for Assessment:\n Income tax records alone cannot create sales tax liability without corroborating evidence of taxable supplies. \n\nRelied on Siddique Enterprises (2013 PTD 2130) and Red Co. Enterprises (STR 93-P/2022).\n2.\nNo Proof of Taxable Activity:\n\nDepartment failed to prove:\n\nThe other revenue involved taxable supplies (crushed stones).\n\nTransactions occurred in taxable territories (not exempt tribal areas).\n3.\nViolation of Charging Provisions:\n\nGST requires taxable supply + taxable activity (Section 3, Sales Tax Act).\n\nAbsent these, liability is void (Haji Sultan Ahmed, 2008 PTD 103).\nSignificance\n•\nBurden of Proof: Tax authorities must prove concealment of taxable supplies – not rely on presumptions from unrelated records.\n•\nJurisdictional Limits: Assessments based on alien considerations (e.g., income tax data) without nexus to GST provisions are illegal.\nOutcome: Entire demand (Rs. 485.4M) set aside as without legal basis.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A),11(2),25(1),25(2)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153", - "Case #": "S.T.As. Nos. 396/IB and 397/IB of 2024, decided on 27th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 18th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND SAJID NAZIR MALIK, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Imran Rashid for Appellant.\nNiaz Ahmed, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s AMIR MAJEED KHAN NIAZI\nvs\nThe DCIR, RTO, SARGODHA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26293", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1417 = 2025 SLD 1417 = 2025 PTD 817", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNDg", - "Key Words:": "Illegal income tax deduction from salaries of lecturers hired by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government colleges.\n________________________________________\nKey Findings\n1.\nTax Authoritys Error:\no\nTax deducted under Section 153(1)(b) (20% for non-filers) treating lecturers as private service providers.\no\nCorrect classification: Lecturers are employees, so tax should be under Section 149 (Salary) at progressive rates.\n2.\nLegal Violations:\no\nSection 12(2), Income Tax Ordinance 2001: Salary includes any payment from employment, regardless of permanency (ad-hoc/temporary/contract).\no\nSection 149: Mandates tax deduction based on estimated salary income, not flat rates for services.\no\nTax authorities wrongly relied on KP Appointment Act 2017 (irrelevant to tax status).\n3.\nMaterial Facts:\no\nLecturers hired via formal KP government process:\n\nTransparent selection committees.\n\nStandardized terms of employment.\n\nPaid from college funds.\no\nClear master-servant relationship exists → Employment status confirmed.\n4.\nMaladministration:\no\nExcessive deductions (20% vs. progressive salary rates) caused undue hardship.\no\nViolates Section 2(3)(i)/(ii), FTO Ordinance 2000:\n\nArbitrary exercise of authority.\n\nDeprivation of rightful tax treatment.\n________________________________________\nFTO Recommendations\n1.\nImmediate Relief:\no\nReclassify all complainants as employees under Section 149.\no\nRefund excess tax deducted under Section 153(1)(b).\n2.\nSystemic Reforms:\no\nIssue clarification to all withholding agents:\n\nEmployees (even temporary/ad-hoc) taxed under Section 149, not Section 153(1)(b).\no\nAudit and rectify similar cases across KP.\n3.\nCompliance Deadline:\no\nFBR must report implementation within 30 days.\n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nComplaints ALLOWED.\n•\nFBR directed to correct tax treatment and prevent recurrence.\nSignificance\n•\nEmployment status > Contractual labels: Tax treatment hinges on substance (employer-employee relationship), not hiring duration.\n•\nProgressive salary rates apply to all government-hired staff, irrespective of temporary/permanent status.\n•\nFTO intervention crucial to halt arbitrary high deductions from low-income educators.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=9(1),10(1)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=12,12(2),153(1)(b)", - "Case #": "Complaint Nos. 1488, 1485, 1491, 1493, 1495, 1496, 1502, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1509, 1510, 1524, 1525, 1526, 1527, 1528, 1529, 1530 and 1531/PWR/IT/2022, decided on 25th May, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ziauddin Wazir, Advisor Dealing Officer.\nMuhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor for Appraisement.\nNemo. for Authorized Representative.\nNemo. for Departmental Representative.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAHAD NAJEEB\nvs\nThe SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26294", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1418 = 2025 SLD 1418 = 2025 PTD 827", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNHo", - "Key Words:": "The department alleged that Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) undercharged sales tax to CNG stations, resulting in a shortfall recoverable from the respondent (CNG station owner). The ATIR quashed this demand, prompting the departments reference under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Issues & Courts Findings\n1.\nInvalid Basis for Tax Demand:\no\nThe demand relied solely on an audit by DG Audit Inland Revenue (DG AIRR), which lacks jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Sales Tax Act.\no\nPrecedent: Makk Beverages (2010 PTD 1355) – DG AIRR audits cannot form the basis for assessments unless verified by competent officers.\n2.\nMisapplication of Section 3B:\no\nSection 3B (tax liability for excess collection from consumers) was invoked without proof that the CNG station:\n\nCollected more tax from consumers than payable to SNGPL.\n\nRetained any excess amount.\no\nThe department failed to provide evidence of over-collection from end consumers.\n3.\nSpecial Tax Regime for Natural Gas:\no\nSection 3(8) governs CNG sector taxation:\n\nSNGPL must charge 9% sales tax (inclusive of value addition) on OGRA-notified prices.\n\nTaxable value = Total Value-Added Cost (SRO 236(I)/2014).\no\nCNG stations merely pass through SNGPLs billed tax → No independent liability.\n4.\nTribunals Order Upheld:\no\nATIR correctly held that:\n\nThe demand was based on non-jurisdictional audit reports.\n\nNo evidence proved the respondent collected excess tax from consumers.\n\nSection 3B is inapplicable without proof of over-collection.\n________________________________________\nCourts Decision\n•\nReference DISMISSED.\n•\nAll 10 questions of law answered in NEGATIVE.\n•\nATIRs order setting aside the tax demand upheld as lawful.\n________________________________________\nCritical Legal Principles\n1.\nJurisdictional Limits:\n Assessments based on DG AIRR audits without independent verification are void. \n2.\nBurden of Proof:\n Section 3B applies only if revenue proves taxpayer collected excess tax from consumers. \n3.\nSector-Specific Rules Prevail:\n Special provisions (S.3(8) + SRO 236) override general tax mechanisms for CNG sector. \nSignificance: Reinforces that tax demands must align with sector-specific rules and evidentiary standards. Authorities cannot shift liability to downstream entities without proof of wrongdoing.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(46),3B,3(8),47,47(5)Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007=20(2)(c)", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 38-P of 2022, decided on 4th October, 2023. Date of hearing: 4th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ishtiaq Ahmad (Junior) for Petitioner.\nDanish Ali Qazi for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (MARDAN ZONE), MARDAN \nVS \nM/S BASHER’S CNG FILLING STATION NOWSHERA AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26295", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1419 = 2025 SLD 1419 = 2025 PTD 833", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJpNHk", - "Key Words:": "Core Dispute\n•\nTax Demand: Rs. 10,560,000 (alleged shortfall in sales tax for April-June 2016).\n•\nDepartments Allegation:\nAppellant failed to deposit 4/5th of sales tax after 1/5th was withheld by government departments under Rule 2(2), Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2007.\n•\nAppellants Defense:\no\nFull tax was paid via sales tax returns for supplies to Secondary Education Department, Peshawar.\no\nProcedural Violations: No proper hearing during assessment; order passed without evidence examination.\n________________________________________\nTribunals Key Findings\n1.\nProcedural Irregularities:\no\nAssessment order passed on 03.04.2017 without scheduling a hearing for that date → Violates due process (Commissioner v. Sakhi Contractor, 1981 PTD 210).\no\nOnly 2 notices issued (20.01.2017 & 27.02.2017); appellants absence doesnt justify bypassing evidence verification.\n2.\nSubstantive Issues Ignored:\no\nAppellants claim of tax payment via returns for supplies to Education Department was not examined by lower forums.\no\nOrders based on presumptions without inspecting appellants records.\n3.\nFBR Circular Non-Compliance:\no\nAssessing Officer failed to grant minimum 3 opportunities as mandated by FBR Circular No. 7(2) dt-14/94 (01.02.1994).\n________________________________________\nDecision & Directions\n1.\nOrders Set Aside:\no\nOrder-in-Original (03.04.2017) & Order-in-Appeal (26.03.2018) quashed.\n2.\nRemand to Assessing Officer:\no\nFresh adjudication within 60 days of this order.\no\nAppellant must:\n\nSubmit complete records/evidence.\n\nRespond to written discrepancies from the Officer.\no\nAssessing Officer must:\n\nGrant proper hearing (comply with FBR Circular).\n\nExamine appellants sales tax returns and payment proofs.\n\nIssue written notice for any additional evidence.\n________________________________________\nCritical Observations\n•\nBurden of Proof: Department must verify non-payment claims through records, not presumptions.\n•\nDue Process: Tax assessments require meaningful engagement with taxpayer defenses.\n•\nRemedy Purpose: Remand ensures fair chance to prove tax was paid, aligning with Section 3 & 7, Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nAppeal Disposed – Case remanded for fresh adjudication.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3,11Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007=2(2)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 108/PB of 2018, decided on 21st February, 2023. Date of hearing: 21st February, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DR. SHAH KHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Danish Ali Qazi for Appellant.\nDost Muhammad, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S TRADE ZONE INTERNATIONAL, ROHILA MANSION, PESHAWAR\nVs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26296", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1420 = 2025 SLD 1420 = 2025 PTD 842", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yzc", - "Key Words:": "Core Dispute\n•\nTax Demand: Rs. 414,865 (2018-19) + Rs. 270,000 (2019-20) for withheld but unpaid sales tax on billboard advertising services in Balochistan.\n•\nBRAs Allegation:\nAppellant withheld tax from Balochistan service providers but paid it to Sindh Revenue Board (SRB) instead of BRA.\n•\nAppellants Defense:\no\nPayments processed from Karachi head office → Tax paid to SRB (Sindh jurisdiction).\no\nSection 52(6) inserted in 2019 cannot apply retroactively to 2018-19 period.\n________________________________________\nTribunals Key Findings\n1.\nJurisdictional Ambiguity:\no\nBRAs orders failed to examine:\n\nWhether service providers were registered with BRA.\n\nIf service providers filed returns under Balochistan law.\no\nNo analysis of virtual presence under Section 2(115)(b) despite appellants ads targeting Balochistan consumers.\n2.\nProcedural Deficiencies:\no\nEx-parte assessment (due to appellants non-appearance) lacked:\n\nDiscussion of retroactivity of Section 52(6) for 2018-19.\n\nScrutiny of appellants SRB payment evidence.\no\nOrders were non-speaking → Violated principles of natural justice.\n3.\nLegal Oversights:\no\nBRA ignored double taxation risk: Appellant already paid tax to SRB; recovery by BRA would amount to duplication.\no\nNo consideration of Section 25 (registration requirements) or Rule 3, Balochistan Withholding Rules, 2018.\n________________________________________\nDecision & Directions\n1.\nOrders Quashed:\no\nOrder-in-Original (12.07.2024) and Order-in-Appeal (03.10.2024) set aside.\n2.\nRemand to BRA Assistant Commissioner:\no\nRe-examine case considering:\n\nJurisdictional nexus of services (Balochistan vs. Sindh).\n\nRetroactivity of Section 52(6) for 2018-19.\n\nProof of SRB payment by appellant.\n\nRegistration status of service providers.\no\nGrant proper hearing to appellant within 15 days of this order.\no\nPass a speaking order with detailed reasoning within 60 days.\n________________________________________\nCritical Observations\n•\nTax Liability Principle:\n Tax must be paid to the province where services are consumed, not where payments originate. \n•\nAvoiding Double Taxation:\nBRA must coordinate with SRB for refund/adjustment if tax was erroneously paid to Sindh.\n•\nRemedy Purpose:\nEnsures fair determination of whether appellant qualifies as resident under Balochistan law (Sections 2(115)/(139)).\nAppeal Disposed – Case remanded for fresh adjudication.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Balochistan Sales Tax on Services Act 2015=2(115)(b),2(139),4,17,48,52(6)Balochistan Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2018=1(3),3", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Appeal No.50 of 2024, decided on 19th December, 2024. Date of hearing: 6th December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, CHAIRMAN AND HAIDER ALI SHIKOH AND SAIFULLAH KHAN, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Basir for Appellant.\nJam Saka Dashti and Sarmad Ahmed for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BONANZA GARMENT INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED, KARACHI\nvs\nASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, QUETTA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26297", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5YzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1421 = 2025 SLD 1421 = 2025 PTD 848", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5YzY", - "Key Words:": "Core Dispute\n•\nTax Demand: Rs. 12,269,000 (for 2014–2017), alleging:\no\nConcealment of sales (Rs. 32.2M) in income tax returns.\no\nShort payment of sales tax (17%) + further tax (Section 3(1A)).\n•\nAppellants Defense:\n1.\nTime-Barred for 2014: Assessment order issued beyond 5-year limitation (Section 11(2), Sales Tax Act).\n2.\nIllegal Basis: Demand based solely on income tax returns without proof of taxable supplies.\n3.\nRegistration Suspended: GST registration suspended since 2015.\n________________________________________\nTribunals Key Findings\n1.\nTime-Barred Demand (2014):\no\nOrder issued on 10.07.2018 for tax period 07/2013–06/2014 → Exceeds 5-year limitation under Section 11(2).\no\nResult: Demand for 2014 quashed.\n2.\nInvalid Use of Income Tax Records:\no\nTax demand based solely on income tax returns without:\n\nEvidence of taxable supplies (crushed stones).\n\nProof that alleged income represented taxable activities under Section 3, Sales Tax Act.\no\nPrecedents Followed:\n\nSiddique Enterprises (2013 PTD 2130): Income tax records cannot alone create sales tax liability.\n\nRed Co. Enterprises (STR No. 93-P/2022): Assessments based on alien considerations (e.g., income tax data) are void.\n3.\nNo Proof of Taxable Supply/Activity:\no\nSales tax requires:\n\nTaxable supply (goods/services).\n\nTaxable activity (business/trade).\no\nDepartment failed to link alleged income to physical delivery of goods or taxable transactions.\n4.\nRegistration Suspension Irrelevant:\no\nSuspension (2015) does not negate liability for prior periods but demand already invalidated on other grounds.\n________________________________________\nDecision\n•\nAppeal ALLOWED.\n•\nEntire demand (Rs. 12,269,000) quashed as:\n Illegal, null, void ab initio, and based on no legal evidence. \n•\nImpugned orders (Original + Appellate) set aside.\n________________________________________\nCritical Legal Principles Reaffirmed\n1.\nLimitation Periods Are Mandatory:\n Assessments beyond 5 years under Section 11(2) are time-barred. \n2.\nCharging Provisions Cannot Be Expanded:\n Sales tax liability requires proof of taxable supply + activity – not presumptions from unrelated records. \n3.\nBurden of Proof on Revenue:\n Department must corroborate allegations with evidence of actual taxable transactions. \nSignificance: Reinforces that tax demands must align with legal charging provisions and evidentiary standards – not extrapolations from other tax filings.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A),11(2)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 830/IB/2023, decided on 22nd January, 2025. Date of hearing: 28th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND SAJID NAZIR MALIK, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Niaz Ahmed, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s MASOOD AHMED KHAN NIAZI CONTRACTOR, SARGODHA\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, SARGODHA" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26298", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5YzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1422 = 2025 SLD 1422 = 2025 PTD 853", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5YzU", - "Key Words:": "Key Question of Law\nWhether unabsorbed depreciation from prior years can be adjusted against Income from Other Sources under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nCourts Ruling\nYES, unabsorbed depreciation can be adjusted against Income from Other Sources .\nThe Appellate Tribunals order is upheld, and the Reference Application is dismissed.\n________________________________________\nCritical Findings\n1.\nIncome Classification:\no\nInterest from bank deposits (earned on electricity bill collections) is business income for FESCO (an electricity distribution company).\no\nReason: Income is incidental to FESCOs core business operations and derived from its statutory functions.\n2.\nLegal Provisions:\no\nSection 56(1): Business losses (including unabsorbed depreciation) can be set off against any head of income.\no\nSection 57(4): Unabsorbed depreciation is an admissible expense deductible against income under any head.\n3.\nDistinguished Precedent:\no\nCIT v. Khairul Hayat Amin & Co. Ltd. (2000 PTD 363) is inapplicable.\n\nIn that case, interest income was not linked to the assessees business (money-lending).\n\nHere, FESCOs bank deposits are integral to its electricity distribution business.\n4.\nFESCOs Business Scope:\no\nAs a distribution company, FESCO is not authorized to conduct non-electricity business.\no\nAll income (including bank interest) is ancillary to its core operations → Taxable as Business Income. \n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nTax Departments Argument Rejected:\nInterest income cannot be isolated as Income from Other Sources. \n•\nTribunals Order Validated:\nUnabsorbed depreciation can be adjusted against all income heads.\n________________________________________\nSignificance\n•\nBusiness Integration Test: Income derived from activities incidental to core business operations qualifies as Business Income. \n•\nLoss Set-Off Flexibility: Unabsorbed depreciation follows Section 56(1), allowing adjustment against any income head.\n•\nPrecedent Limited to Facts: Khairul Hayat Amin is confined to cases where income lacks business nexus.\nReference Dismissed – No legal error in Tribunals order.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=56,56(1),57,57(4),120(1),122(9),133,133(8)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 145 of 2016, heard on 10th February, 2025. Date of hearing: 10th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Legal Advisor for Applicant.\nMian Ashiq Hussain for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, RTO, FAISALABAD\nvs\nM/s FAISALABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY (FESCO) LTD., FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26299", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5YzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1423 = 2025 SLD 1423 = 2025 PTD 856", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5YzQ", - "Key Words:": "Whether tax authorities correctly imposed sales tax liability (Rs. 2.99M) + 100% penalty on M/s Powerline Trading Co. for issuing flying invoices without actual supplies or tax payment.\n________________________________________\nTribunals Key Findings & Decision\n1.\nAdmitted Violations:\no\nAppellant filed Annex-C (showing supplies + output tax) but never filed sales tax return for Tax Period 03/2021.\no\nNo tax deposited despite declaring output tax → Buyers illegally claimed input tax credits.\n2.\nContradictory Defense Rejected:\no\nAppellants claim of inadvertent error (before tribunal) vs. system error (before CIR-A) deemed false and willful.\no\nNo evidence of genuine transactions (invoices produced were paper transactions ).\n3.\nTax Fraud Established:\no\nActions fall under Section 2(37) (tax fraud):\n Issuing fake invoices to facilitate illegal input tax adjustments without actual supplies/tax payment. \no\nViolates Sections 8(1)(ca), 23, 26 (non-filing/non-payment) and 73 (fraudulent documentation).\n4.\nLegal Consequences:\no\nOutput tax demand (Rs. 2.99M) upheld as liability arose from fraudulent Annex-C.\no\n100% penalty justified due to deliberate fraud.\no\nStay application dismissed – No prima facie case.\n________________________________________\nCritical Legal Principles\n•\nSection 8(1)(ca): Input tax credit disallowed if supplier doesnt deposit corresponding sales tax.\n•\nTax Fraud Definition (S. 2(37)): Includes falsifying invoices to enable unlawful tax benefits. \n•\nBurden of Proof: Appellant failed to prove genuine transactions despite opportunity.\nAppeal Dismissed – Orders of tax authorities upheld in full.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(14) ,2(37).3,6,7,8,8A,8(1)(ca),9,21,22,23,26,73", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 272/LB/2025 and MA (Stay) No. 1382/LB/2025, decided on 21st April, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, MEMBERS AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rani Amir Ejaz Kharal for Appellant.\nKazim Bhatti, D.R. for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S POWERLINE TRADING COMPANY, FAISALABAD\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26300", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1424 = 2025 SLD 1424 = 2025 PTD 871", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yy8", - "Key Words:": "Whether mandatory cash deposit under Section 23C(4) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 for filing an appeal violates fundamental rights.\n________________________________________\nKey Facts\n1.\nPetitioner: M/s. Pak Terry Mills Pvt. Ltd. (exporters penalized for non-repatriation of foreign exchange proceeds).\n2.\nProceedings:\no\nAdjudicating Officer declared petitioner a willful defaulter under FERA 1947.\no\nAppellate Board required cash deposit to hear appeal (per Section 23C(4)).\n3.\nPetitioners Claim:\no\nDeposit requirement violates fundamental rights (cited Lahore HC judgment *W.P. No.36748/2022* deeming it unconstitutional).\no\nSought stay on coercive action (relied on interim order in *C.P. No.D-1075/2024*).\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Reasoning & Decision\n1.\nNo Violation of Fundamental Rights:\no\nArticle 10-A (fair trial) applies to original proceedings, not appeals.\no\nStatutory deposit for appeals is a reasonable condition tied to statutory rights (Seth Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 2097).\n2.\nBinding Precedents:\no\nSearle IV Solution v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 1444): Upheld 50% tax deposit for litigation, confirming such conditions are constitutional.\no\nIndian SC rulings (Anant Mills, Gujarat Agro) support that legislatures may attach conditions to appeals.\n3.\nCritical Distinction:\no\nPetitioner did not challenge vires of Section 23C(4) itself – only contested its application.\no\nLahore HC’s interim order (*C.P. No.D-1075/2024*) is non-binding and unrelated to constitutional validity.\n4.\nPolicy Rationale:\no\nDeposit requirements prevent frivolous appeals and secure public revenue.\no\n Appeal is a creation of statute – conditions (e.g., deposits, security) do not infringe due process.\n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nPetition DISMISSED in limine (at threshold) with all applications.\n•\nDeposit requirement upheld as valid under FERA 1947.\n________________________________________\nSignificance\n•\nReinforces that statutory preconditions for appeals (e.g., deposits) do not violate fundamental rights.\n•\nAffirms legislative power to impose financial safeguards in revenue litigation.\n•\nHighlights necessity to directly challenge provisions (not merely their application) for constitutional scrutiny.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947=4,12(1),23BConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=10A", - "Case #": "C. P. No. D-3066 of 2024. Decision date: 21-06-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, JUSTICE AND RASHIDA ASAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Kamran Iqbal Bhutta for Petitioner", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. PAK TERRY MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED THROUGH DIRECTOR / CEO\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY FINANCE AND 5 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26301", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1425 = 2025 SLD 1425 = 2025 PTD 876", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yys", - "Key Words:": "Core Legal Reasoning\n1.\nPCT Heading 2709.0000 Includes Condensate:\no\nSRO 549/2008 zero-rates petroleum crude oil (PCT 2709.0000) .\no\nWCO Explanatory Notes (authentic interpretation under Pakistan Customs Rules) explicitly classify gas condensates under PCT 2709.0000 as crude oils (12-13).\no\nThe ATIR erred in ignoring this binding classification and instead relied on irrelevant physical distinctions between condensate and crude oil (16).\n2.\n Import and Supplies is Disjunctive:\no\nThe phrase import and supplies thereof in SRO 549 does not require importation as a precondition for zero-rating.\no\nFollowing Commissioner v. Sapphire Dairies (2023 PTD 44), supplies covers domestically produced/sold goods (18).\n3.\nATIRs LNG Classification is Legally Unsustainable:\no\nThe ATIR erroneously classified condensate as liquefied natural gas (PCT 2711) based on non-binding definitions. This was scientifically and legally flawed (17).\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles Established\n•\nPCT Headings Control Tax Classifications:\nGoods must be classified per WCO Explanatory Notes where a PCT code is referenced (11-13).\n•\nExpressio Unius Does Not Apply Here:\nMentioning petroleum crude oil alongside PCT 2709.0000 does not exclude condensate, as the PCT code expressly includes it (9, 16).\n•\nConditions in Notifications are Read Disjunctively:\n Import and supplies means zero-rating applies to either imported OR domestically supplied goods (18).\n________________________________________\nCritical Takeaways\n•\nTechnical Distinctions are Irrelevant:\nDifferences in extraction methods/API gravity between condensate and crude oil are immaterial when the PCT code explicitly encompasses both (9, 16).\n•\nDepartment Cannot Override PCT Classifications:\nTax authorities cannot exclude goods covered under a PCT heading referenced in a notification (16).\n•\nAbsurd Interpretations are Rejected:\nATIRs conclusion that condensate = LNG was legally and technically untenable (17).\nPrecedent Relied Upon\n•\nSapphire Dairies (2023 PTD 44): Interpretation of import and supplies as disjunctive.\n•\nUsmania Glass (PLD 1971 SC 2025): Technical terms must be interpreted per trade/industry meaning.\n________________________________________\nConclusion\nCondensate is zero-rated under SRO 549/2008 as it falls under PCT 2709.0000 per WCO guidelines. The ATIRs orders are quashed, and the taxpayers stance is upheld.\nResult: All STRs (17/2021, 79/2022, 80/2022, 82/2022) allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=4(c),47", - "Case #": "S.T.Rs. Nos. 17 of 2021, 79, 80 and 82 of 2022, decided on 10th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 28th January, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MOHSIN AKHTAR KAYANI, JUSTICE AND SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abuzar Salman Khan Niazi, Wasim Abid, Sardar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, Sikander Sukhera, Muhammad Shaheer Roshan Sheikh and Muhammad Saqib Nafees for Applicants.\nOsama Shahid and Muhammad Abual Hassan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOL PAKISTAN OIL AND GAS THROUGH AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES\nVS\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE THROUGH CHAIRMAN AND 5 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26302", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1426 = 2025 SLD 1426 = 2025 PTD 903", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yzk", - "Key Words:": "Whether customs audit notices demanding financial/tariff records from shipping agents exceed statutory powers under Sections 26A, 26B, and 155M of the Customs Act, 1969.\n________________________________________\nKey Facts\n1.\nPetitioners: Licensed shipping agents under Section 207, Customs Act.\n2.\nAudit Notices (08.03.2024):\no\nDemanded 5 years of financial records (e.g., tariffs, freight charges, remittances abroad).\no\nIssued under Sections 26A, 26B, 155M to verify compliance with Shipping Agent Rules (SRO 450(I)/2001).\n3.\nPetitioners Challenge:\no\nNotices are ultra vires, mala fide, and a roving inquiry beyond customs jurisdiction.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Reasoning & Decision\n1.\nLimited Regulatory Scope of Customs:\no\nShipping agents’ role under Section 207 is confined to:\n business relating to entrance/departure of conveyances, customs clearance, import/export of goods/baggage. \no\nNo liability for customs duties → Audits cannot probe unrelated financials (e.g., income, remittances).\n2.\nAudit Powers Misapplied:\no\nSections 26A/26B only allow audits for:\n\nVerifying duty/tax liability.\n\nEnsuring compliance with customs-administered laws.\no\nDemanded records (e.g., freight charges, remittances) fall under income tax (Section 177, Income Tax Ordinance 2001) or State Bank jurisdiction.\n3.\nCritical Defect in Notices:\no\nNotices failed to specify how sought information ensures compliance with laws administered by customs. \no\nAbsent this nexus, audits amount to unlawful roving inquiries. \n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nPetitions ALLOWED.\n•\nAudit notices quashed as:\n ultra vires, arbitrary, illegal, void, and based on mala fide. \n________________________________________\nSignificance\n•\nReinforces that regulatory powers must align with statutory mandates.\n•\nPrevents authorities from using audit powers for fishing expeditions into unrelated business affairs.\n•\nClarifies jurisdictional boundaries between customs, tax, and foreign exchange regulators.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=26A,26B,155M", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-1820 & D-1821 of 2024. Date of hearing: 4 November 2024. Date of order: 06-02-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: Dr. Shahab Imam, Advocate\nRespondent No. 1: Mr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General\nRespondents No. 2 & 3: Mr. Khalid Mehmood Rajpar", - "Petitioner Name:": "C.P. No. D-1820 of 2024\nM/S MARINE SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED \nVS\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE & OTHERS\nAND\nC.P. No. D-1821 of 2024\nPORTLINK INTERNATIONAL SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED\nVS.\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26303", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1427 = 2025 SLD 1427 = 2025 PTD 914", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Yzg", - "Key Words:": "Whether criminal prosecution (via FIRs) against tribal-area manufacturers for non-submission of consumption certificates under Sales Tax Act, 1990, is lawful when tax liability remains unadjudicated.\n________________________________________\nKey Facts\n1.\nPetitioners: Manufacturers in erstwhile FATA/PATA, importing raw materials tax-free under Entry 151, Sixth Schedule, Sales Tax Act.\n2.\nProcedure:\no\nImporters provided post-dated cheques as security for potential tax liability.\no\nRequired to submit consumption certificates (proving local use) to reclaim cheques.\n3.\nDispute:\no\nPetitioners failed to submit certificates → Customs encashed cheques and registered FIRs for tax evasion.\no\nPetitioners argued liability must first be adjudicated civilly, not criminally.\n________________________________________\nCourt’s Reasoning & Decision\n1.\nViolation of Due Process:\no\nCriminal prosecution (FIRs) initiated without determining tax liability violates:\n\nArticle 10-A (fair trial) and Article 4 (due process) of the Constitution.\n\nSections 11 & 25, Sales Tax Act (mandating civil adjudication first).\no\nReliance on Taj Packages Co. v. FBR (2014 PTD 1807):\n Criminalization cannot precede tax assessment. Hauling taxpayers for recovery without determination of liability is brutally unconstitutional. \n2.\nLegal Defects in Prosecution:\no\nNo presumption of evasion: Failure to submit certificates ≠ tax fraud.\no\nConsumption certificates: Mechanism unclear in law; FBR circulars cannot override statutory procedures.\no\nCheque encashment premature: Security instruments should only be enforced after liability adjudication (Section 11).\n3.\nTribal-Area Context:\no\nHistoric tax immunity (pre-25th Amendment) preserved via SRO 1212-1213/2018.\no\nProsecution ignores concessionary regime for FATA/PATA industries.\n________________________________________\nOutcome\n•\nAll petitions ALLOWED.\n•\nFIRs QUASHED as:\n Unconstitutional, ultra vires, and without lawful authority. \n•\nDirections:\no\nCustoms may audit petitioners (Section 25) to determine liability.\no\nIf discrepancies found, proceed via civil adjudication (Section 11), not criminal prosecution.\n________________________________________\nSignificance\n•\nReinforces due process in tax enforcement: Criminal prosecution must follow civil liability determination.\n•\nProtects tribal-area industries from coercive recovery tactics.\n•\nAffirms Taj Packages precedent: Tax recovery cannot masquerade as criminal justice.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(1),11,13(1),22,25,25(5),26,30A,33,37A,40-D,72B,Entry No. 151 of the Sixth Schedule,Entry No.74 of the 8th ScheduleConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,9,10-A,199,247", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 2350-P/2022, decided on 17th May, 2023. Date of hearing: 17.05.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABDUL SHAKOOR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s. Isaac Ali Qazi, Mufariq Shah and Abdur Rahim Jadoon, Advocates, for the petitioner.\nM/s. Sanaullah DAG, Abbas Bakhtiar, Ishtiaq Ahmad (Junior)\nNeelam A. Khan and Sabahat Ali Bukhari, Advocates, for the respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S M.K STEEL MILLS \nVS\nCOLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MCC CUSTOM HOUSE, PESHAWAR & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26304", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Y3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1428 = 2025 SLD 1428 = 2025 PTD 932 = 2025 LHC 2758 = 2025 PTCL 681 = (2025) 132 TAX 468", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Y3o", - "Key Words:": "1. Procedural Fairness & Due Process\n•\nEqual Treatment (Art. 25 Constitution):\nCourts consistently strike down discriminatory actions (e.g., Madina Steel Mills [780.pdf] – penalties imposed due to department error must be refunded; Peshawar High Court [914.pdf] – tribal-area industries cannot face criminal prosecution without prior tax adjudication).\n•\nLegitimate Expectation:\nAuthorities must treat similarly situated taxpayers equally (Madina Steel Mills).\n2. Jurisdictional Boundaries\n•\nCustoms vs. Other Agencies:\nCustoms cannot demand unrelated financial records (e.g., Sindh High Court [903.pdf] – shipping agents income/remittances fall under FBR/State Bank, not customs).\n•\nConstitutional Challenges:\nOnly superior courts (not administrative bodies) can decide vires of laws (Attock Refinery [789.pdf]).\n3. Appellate Rights & Retroactivity\n•\nVested Rights Protection:\nAppellate remedies available when proceedings begin cannot be abolished mid-litigation (Lahore HC Larger Bench [932.pdf]).\n•\nClarity via Legislation:\nFinance Act 2024 clarified that reference applications to High Courts apply only if appellate orders are communicated after 03.05.2024 (Tax Laws Amendment Act commencement).\n4. Tax Enforcement & Penalties\n•\nNo Penalty Without Fault:\nPenalties invalid if:\no\nImposed due to revenue department errors (Madina Steel Mills).\no\nLacking prior civil adjudication of liability (Peshawar HC [914.pdf]).\n•\nBona Fide Purchaser Protection:\nVehicles with valid registration cannot be confiscated solely for missing import documents beyond statutory retention periods (5 years) (Supreme Court [795.pdf]).\n5. Tribal-Area Exemptions\n•\nFATA/PATA Industries:\no\nImmune from income/sales tax on imports for local consumption.\no\nCriminal prosecution unlawful without first determining liability via audit/adjudication (Peshawar HC).\n6. Key Doctrines Reinforced\n•\nAgainst Roving Inquiries :\nAuthorities cannot conduct fishing expeditions beyond statutory mandates (Sindh HC [903.pdf]).\n•\nRestitution Principle:\nBenefits wrongfully denied must be restored (Madina Steel Mills).\n•\nLawful Excuse vs. Lawful Authority:\nExpired document retention periods provide valid defense (Supreme Court [795.pdf]).\n________________________________________\nConclusion\nPakistani courts prioritize due process, jurisdictional clarity, and taxpayer fairness:\n1.\nEqual treatment and legitimate expectations are constitutionally safeguarded.\n2.\nAgencies must operate within statutory limits – no overreach into unrelated domains.\n3.\nRetroactive curtailment of appeals is invalid; vested rights protected.\n4.\nPenalties require fault determination; bona fide owners shielded.\n5.\nTribal-area concessions respected with strict adherence to procedure.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=131,133Sales Tax Act, 1990=46,47(2)", - "Case #": "STR No. 41/2024. Date of order: 29.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE, JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE AND ASIM HAFEEZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Mohsin Nazir, Advocate for the applicant.\nHafiz Muhammad Idrees, Advocate for the applicant in STRNo.21/2024.\nM/s Malik Itaat Hussain Awan and Manzoor Hussain, Advocates for respondents-department along with Yousuf Khan, Section Officer, I.R (Legal) H.Q. RTO, Rawalpindi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RUKSHANDA ASAD \nVS \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26305", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Y3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1429 = 2025 SLD 1429 = 2025 PTD 936", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5Y3k", - "Key Words:": "Core Legal Reasoning\n1.\nProcedural Invalidity:\no\nThe tax department failed to issue a mandatory separate notice under Section 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, before amending the assessment under Section 122(9).\no\nSupreme Court Precedent (Commissioner v. Millat Tractors, 2024 SCMR 700):\n\nFor tax years prior to 2021, a specific Section 111 notice must be issued and concluded before Section 122(9) proceedings.\n\nEven after the 2021/2022 Finance Acts (which allowed combined notices), proceedings under Section 111 must be finalized first to form definite information for Section 122.\n2.\nSubstantive Invalidity:\no\nAgricultural Income is Exempt under Section 41 of the Ordinance. Post-18th Constitutional Amendment, taxation of agricultural income is a provincial matter, not covered by federal law.\no\nPayment of Provincial Tax Cures Defect:\n\nThe taxpayer paid Balochistan agricultural tax (challan QA7277, dated 10.05.2023) during appellate proceedings.\n\nProviso to Section 111(1) mandates that such payment must be accepted as proof of agricultural income, nullifying federal tax demands.\n3.\nNo Concealment by Taxpayer:\no\nThe taxpayer declared agricultural income upfront in their return (Code No. 6100). The department’s allegation of concealment under Section 111 was unfounded.\n________________________________________\nKey Legal Principles Established\n•\nHierarchy of Proceedings: Section 111 proceedings must conclude before Section 122(9) amendments.\n•\nProvincial Exclusivity: Federal authorities cannot tax agricultural income or penalize delays in provincial tax payments.\n•\nCuring Defects: Belated payment of provincial agricultural tax during appeals invalidates federal tax demands.\nPrecedents Relied Upon\n•\nCommissioner v. Millat Tractors (2024 SCMR 700)\n•\nCommissioner v. Bashir Ahmed (2021 SCMR 1290)\n•\nCommissioner v. Ranipur CNG Station (2017 PTD 1839)\nConclusion\nThe department’s assessment was procedurally defective (no valid Section 111 notice) and substantively invalid (agricultural income is exempt). Payment of provincial tax during appeals extinguished the federal tax liability. The Tribunal’s decision to set aside the demand was legally sound.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=41,111,111(1)(a),111(1)(b),111(1)(c),111(1)(d),120,120(1),122,122(5),122(5A),122(9),133,182", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Application No.03 of 2023, decided on 21st March, 2025. Date of hearing: 14th March, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD EJAZ SWATI, AGJ AND MUHAMMAD AAMIR NAWAZ RANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Iftikhar Raza Khan Applicant.\nMs. Riffat Naeem Ja for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, QUETTA\nVS \nKHALID HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26306", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1430 = 2025 SLD 1430 = 2025 PTD 945 = (2025) 132 TAX 72", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTc", - "Key Words:": "Due Process & Fair Trial (Articles 4, 9, 10-A Constitution)\n•\nTax Liability Must Precede Prosecution:\nCriminal proceedings (FIRs) cannot initiate before civil adjudication of tax liability (Peshawar HC [914.pdf] – Quashed FIRs against tribal-area manufacturers).\n•\nNo Penalty Without Fault:\nPenalties invalid if imposed due to state errors (Madina Steel Mills [780.pdf]) or without proving dishonest intent (Supreme Court [795.pdf]).\n2. Equality Before Law (Article 25 Constitution)\n•\nConsistent Treatment Mandatory:\nTax authorities must treat similarly situated taxpayers equally (Madina Steel Mills).\nExample: Identical relief for Ali Steel and Madina Steel.\n•\nArbitrary Actions Void:\nDifferential treatment without justification violates constitutional equality (Madina Steel Mills; Supreme Court [795.pdf]).\n3. Jurisdictional Boundaries\n•\nCustoms vs. Other Regulators:\nCustoms cannot demand unrelated financial records (e.g., shipping agents income/remittances fall under FBR/State Bank) (Sindh HC [903.pdf]).\n•\nConstitutional Challenges:\nOnly superior courts (not administrative bodies) can decide vires of laws (Attock Refinery [789.pdf]).\n4. Appellate Rights & Retroactivity\n•\nVested Rights Protected:\nAppellate remedies available when proceedings begin cannot be abolished mid-litigation (Lahore HC [932.pdf]).\n•\nClarity via Legislation:\nFinance Act 2024 clarified reference applications to High Courts apply only for orders communicated after 03.05.2024.\n5. Tax Enforcement Principles\n•\nBona Fide Purchaser Protection:\nValid vehicle registration creates presumption of legality; confiscation requires proof of tampering (Supreme Court [795.pdf]).\n•\nStatutory Time Bars:\nAuthorities cannot demand documents beyond retention periods (e.g., 5 years for import records) (Supreme Court [795.pdf]).\n6. Tribal-Area Concessions\n•\nFATA/PATA Industries:\nImmune from income/sales tax on imports for local consumption; criminal prosecution unlawful without prior liability determination (Peshawar HC [914.pdf]).\n7. Strict Construction of Tax Laws\n•\nAmbiguity Favors Taxpayer:\nRebates/concessions interpreted liberally (e.g., university teachers retain 40% tax rebate despite administrative duties) (Peshawar HC [945.pdf]).\n•\nNo Roving Inquiries :\nAudits must stay within statutory purposes (Sindh HC [903.pdf]).\n________________________________________\nRecurring Doctrines\nDoctrine\nCase Application\nLegitimate Expectation Identical relief for similarly placed taxpayers (Madina Steel Mills).\nRestitution\nRestore benefits wrongfully denied (Madina Steel Mills).\nLawful Excuse\nDefense when statutory periods expire (Supreme Court [795.pdf]).\nAgainst Unjust Enrichment\nState cannot retain gains from its errors (Madina Steel Mills).\n________________________________________\nConclusion\nPakistani courts consistently prioritize:\n1.\nProcedural fairness over coercive recovery.\n2.\nJurisdictional discipline among agencies.\n3.\nTaxpayer rights against arbitrary state action.\n4.\nLegislative clarity in retroactive amendments.\nThese principles reinforce constitutional supremacy and rule of law in fiscal governance.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=Clause (2) in Part-III of the Second Schedule", - "Case #": "W.P No. 87-P/2022 with IR with COC No. 518-P/2022. Date of hearing: 29.01.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAKEEL AHMAD, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners (by): Syed Aziz-ud-Din Kakakhel. Advocate\nRespondents (by): M/S Rahat Ali Khan Nahai. Assistant\nAttorney General and Muhammad 7afar Khan Tahirkheli. Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DR. SHAH ALAM KHAN, PROFESSOR & CHAIRMAN DEPARTMENT OF PLANT PROTECTION/PRESIDENT AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER\nVS\nVICE CHANCELLOR UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE PESHAWAR AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26307", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1371 = 2025 SLD 1371", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTY", - "Key Words:": "The appellant, a private limited company engaged in furniture and furnishing business, filed a revised return for Tax Year 2017 under Section 114(6), declaring a loss of Rs. 1.69 million. The return was deemed amended under Section 122(3). Later, the case was selected for audit under Section 177. Despite issuance of multiple statutory notices and reminders, the taxpayer failed to comply or attend hearings. Consequently, assessment was amended under Section 122(4), raising income to Rs. 86.48 million.\nThe taxpayer challenged the order, arguing primarily that notices were not duly served in accordance with Section 218 and that it was denied a fair opportunity of hearing. The AR further submitted that documents in support of the taxpayer’s stance were available and could be produced.\nThe Departmental Representative maintained that proper opportunity was given.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held:\nThe audit was lawfully conducted under Section 177, and the challenge to Section 122(1) assessment based on ITA No. 519/MB/2022 was not applicable due to differing facts.\nHowever, the service of notice was defective, as the OIR failed to show proof of proper service under Section 218.\nCiting precedents (2013 PTD 243, 2013 PDS 112), the Tribunal concluded that failure to serve notice properly renders the order arbitrary.\nOrder:\nThe impugned assessment order is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Officer Inland Revenue (OIR) for fresh proceedings. The taxpayer is directed to cooperate and submit complete documentary evidence. The OIR shall pass a speaking order after affording due opportunity of hearing.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=114(6),121,122(1),122(3),122(4),126A,122(9),132(4)(b),176(6),177,177(1),177(6),218", - "Case #": "ITA No. 704/MB/2024 (Tax Year 2017). Date of Hearing: 03.06.2025. Date of Order: 12.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S0: MUHAMMAD IJAZ ALI BHATTI, Member AND CH. MUHAMMAD AZAM, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Shabbir Fakhar-ud-din, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Akhtar Suraj, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S GULTEX (PRIVATE) LIMITED, VEHARI ROAD, MULTAN …………. APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, MULTAN ………… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26308", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1372 = 2025 SLD 1372", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTU", - "Key Words:": "Ex-parte order passed without due process — Remand for fresh adjudication\nDetails:\nM/s. Ever Green Dairy Products & Foods challenged an ex-parte order dated 15.05.2024 passed by A/DCIR, Zone-IV, RTO-II, Karachi under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, alleging concealed sales and tax evasion. The department conducted a physical verification under Section 38 and impounded certain documents. Despite being given opportunities, the taxpayer allegedly failed to respond, leading to an ex-parte order demanding sales tax of Rs. 167.25 million, further tax of Rs. 35.89 million, default surcharge, and penalty.\nThe taxpayer argued that:\nProducts like whipping cream were exempt under Table-2 of the Sixth Schedule if unbranded or in bulk.\nThe site inspection was unauthorized and documents were impounded by an unauthorized person (a driver).\nThe order lacked reasoning and failed to address objections or submitted replies.\nThe department rebutted, asserting that the products were branded and sold to bakeries (e.g., Hobnob) with 18% tax, negating any exemption claim.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held that the impugned order was non-speaking, devoid of reasoning, and failed to reflect application of mind—violating principles laid down in Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan (PLD 1970 SC 173) and Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act. As such, the order could not be sustained.\nGiven the disputed factual questions and absence of documentary evidence from both parties, the Tribunal remanded the case for fresh adjudication by the department with clear direction to:\nAfford proper opportunity of hearing to the taxpayer.\nAllow submission of documents and objections.\nPass a well-reasoned, speaking order in accordance with law.\nCitations:\nPLD 1970 SC 173", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),34(1),35(5),38,48General Clauses Act, 1897=24-AConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4", - "Case #": "STA No. 464/KB/2024 (Tax period 2018 to 2023). Date-of hearing: 27-05-2025. Date-of order: 11-06-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. KASHIF NAZEER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Tipu Saeed, Advocate Mr. Raja Umair, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Mushtaq Ali Wagan, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. EVERGREEN DAIRY PRODUCTS & FOOD......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE ACIR, UNIT-06, ZONE-IV,RTO-II, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26309", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1373 = 2025 SLD 1373", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTQ", - "Key Words:": "Blocking of User ID without notice — Violation of due process under Customs Act, 1969\nDetails:\nThe Petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking declaration that the blocking of its user ID / NTN on the Customs computerized system (as shown on record at Page 21) was unlawful. Counsel for the Customs Department referred to a letter dated 11.03.2025, whereby Respondent No. 2 requested the Collector of Customs Appraisement (East), Karachi to suspend the Petitioners user ID under Section 155F of the Customs Act, 1969.\nSection 155F allows the Collector to suspend or cancel a users registration only after providing notice and reasonable opportunity of hearing. The Court observed that no notice was issued, and no hearing was afforded prior to blocking the ID.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that the blocking/suspension of the Petitioners user ID was without lawful authority, in violation of Section 155F, and contrary to the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the Petition was allowed, and the user ID was ordered to be restored forthwith. However, any pending proceedings under Section 155F may continue in accordance with law.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=155(1)(a),155(1)(b),155(1)(c),155F,155C(3),155D(3)", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-1257 of 2025. Date of hearing: 08.04.2025. Date of order: 08.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: Owner of M/s Simba Enterprises, Through M/s. M. Saad Shafique Siddiqui & M. Aibak Ali shah, Advocates.\nVs\nRespondent: Federation of Pakistan & Another Through Mr. Khalid Mehmood Rajpar, Advocate. Ms. Alizeh Bashir, Assistant Attorney General." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26310", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1374 = 2025 SLD 1374", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WS8", - "Key Words:": "The petitioner purchased land measuring 49 Kanals 2 Marlas through a registered sale deed, valuing it as industrial land (Flour Mill above 4 Kanals) at Rs. 82,280,000/- per Bigga per D.C. Valuation Table (2018–2019). However, during audit, it was discovered that the petitioner paid stamp duty for only 1 Bigga instead of the total 12.275 Biggas. The Auditor impounded the instrument under Section 33 of the Stamp Act and referred the case to the District Collector for further action under Section 40. The petitioner challenged subsequent demand notices totaling Rs. 46,374,350/- as deficient duty through successive writ petitions, ultimately raising constitutional challenge before the High Court.\nHeld:\nThe Court held that the petitioner’s own admission to using the industrial valuation rate of Rs. 82,280,000/- per Bigga triggered the obligation to pay duty proportionately for the entire land (12.275 Bigga). The audit correctly identified under-stamping, and the Collector lawfully initiated recovery. The Court emphasized that the stamp duty should be calculated in line with the value declared by the petitioner, especially when the rate used was from the notified D.C. table. No illegality or procedural lapse was found in the issuance of demand notice or the underlying proceedings.\nPetition dismissed.\nCitations:\nPLD 2020 Lahore 801 – NAZIR A.M. JOINT VENTURE v. NHA\n2024 PTD 32 – RIZWAN ALI SAYAL v. Federation of Pakistan\n2002 CLD 823 – BAYER PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD. v. Board of Revenue\nPLD 2024 Lahore 94 – NASTLE PAKISTAN LTD. v. Sub-Registrar, Lahore\nPLD 2016 SC 604 – LAFARGE PAKISTAN CEMENT CO. v. District Collector, Chakwal", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=23,31,33,199Stamp Act, of 1899=27-A,31,32,33,40", - "Case #": "WRIT PETITION NO. 2649 of 2023. Date of hearing: 27.05.2025. Date of Order: 19-06-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: M/s Syed Tassadaq Mustafa Naqvi and Muhammad Adnan Awan, Advocates.\nRespondents by: M/s Malik Amjad Ali, Additional Advocate General and Rahat Farooq Raja, Assistant Advocate General Punjab.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL SATTAR\nVs\nGOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Secretary Taxes, Revenue Department, Lahore and 3 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26311", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1375 = 2025 SLD 1375", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WSs", - "Key Words:": "Guarantee Liability and Suretyship under Banking Agreements\nDetails:\nRespondent No.4 (Tanveer Weavings Pvt. Ltd.), through its directors (Respondents Nos. 1–3), availed various running finance facilities from PICIC Commercial Bank Ltd. totaling Rs. 70 million. Multiple finance agreements and renewals were executed between 2004 and 2007, backed by hypothecations and personal guarantees. Respondent No.1, a director, executed a continuing guarantee on 24-02-2007. After default, a Restructuring Agreement was signed on 15-06-2009, in which respondent No.1 again signed as a guarantor, acknowledging liability.\nRespondent No.1 later denied executing the 2007 Guarantee and the 2009 Restructuring Agreement, claiming forgery and raised limitation objections. The Lahore High Court granted her leave to defend, holding the claim not time-barred.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court held that the conduct of the respondents was contumacious. The 2007 Guarantee was a continuing one and had not been revoked. The Restructuring Agreement of 2009, signed by respondent No.1, confirmed the continuation of liabilities. Section 133 of the Contract Act was not attracted as the guarantor had pre-consented to future variations. Thus, the respondent could not be discharged from liability. The appeal was accepted, and the High Court’s decision to grant leave to defend to respondent No.1 was set aside. The suit was held time-barred and devoid of merit to her extent.\nCitations:\nAsad Ali v. Bank of Punjab\nController Land Acquisition v. Fazal-ur-Rehman\nLDA v. Muhammad Rashid\nIndustrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Hyderabad Beverage Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.\nAftab A. Sheikh", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9Contract, Act, 1872=133", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.164 of 2025. Date of Hearing: 23.04.2025. Date of Order: 29-05-2025\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 13.01.2025 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in RFA No.116017 of 2017)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE NAEEM AKHTER AFGHAN, JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND JUSTICE SHAKEEL AHMAD", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant: Mr. Salman Aslam Butt, Sr. ASC, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR \nFor the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4: Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, ASC\nFor the Respondent Nos. 5 & 6: Nemo", - "Petitioner Name:": "MCB Bank Limited Uzma Tehreem & others For the Appellant .... Appellant\nVs\nUzma Tehreem & others ……. Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26312", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1376 = 2025 SLD 1376", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTk", - "Key Words:": "The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector, was dismissed from service on allegations of faulty investigation but reinstated with a reduced penalty (two-stage pay reduction) by appellate authority. Dissatisfied, he challenged the penalty before the Punjab Service Tribunal, which modified it to one-stage reduction despite concluding that no credible evidence existed to substantiate the charges and that the inquiry violated principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court found that this partial penalty was inconsistent with the Tribunal’s own findings and misapplied the doctrine of proportionality. It held that proportionality cannot justify any penalty in absence of proven misconduct and that fairness required full exoneration. The Court set aside the impugned order, exonerated the petitioner, and ordered reinstatement from the original date of dismissal with all consequential benefits.\nHeld:\nPetition converted into appeal and allowed. Tribunals order set aside. Petitioner exonerated and reinstated with all back benefits.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Service Tribunals Act, (IX of 1974)=5Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,14,25", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 2283-L/2016. Date of Hearing: 12.05.2025\n(Against the judgment dated 02.02.2016 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 2308/2015)", - "Judge Name:": "BENCH-II: MR. JUSTICE SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH AND MR. JUSTICE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Javed Imran Ranjha, ASC. (Through Video Link, Lahore)\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Khalid Masood Ghani, AAG, Pn. a/w Mr. Nasir Abbas, DSP Legal, Mr. Shoaib Inspector, Legal.\nAssisted by: Mr. Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NIAZ KHAN …….. PETITIONER\nVS\nR.P.O. SHEIKHUPURA REGION AT LAHORE, ETC. ……. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26313", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1377 = 2025 SLD 1377", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WTg", - "Key Words:": "The key legal issue was whether a party can produce witnesses not named in the list submitted under Order XVI Rule 1(1) CPC. In a recovery suit, the plaintiffs had presented witnesses in court on several occasions, but their evidence was not recorded due to adjournments sought by the defendants. On the adjourned date, the defendants objected to recording evidence of witnesses not listed under Rule 1(1), and the Civil Judge disallowed the testimony. The District Judge upheld that decision in revision.\nThe High Court held that the embargo under Rule 1(2) applies only to witnesses summoned through court process and not to those voluntarily produced by parties. It relied on Rule 7 of Order XVI CPC, which empowers courts to record evidence of any person present in court. The trial and revisional courts had wrongly interpreted Rule 1(2). The impugned orders were set aside and the trial court was directed to record the evidence of the present witnesses.\nHeld:\nWrit petition allowed. Impugned orders set aside. Trial court directed to record evidence of voluntarily produced witnesses and conclude trial within two weeks.\nCitations:\n2020 SCMR 2155\n1981 SCMR 150", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2348 of 2017. Date of hearing: 19.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SADAQAT ALI KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by:- M/s. Muhammad Yasir and Ikram ul Haq Sheikh, Advocates.\nRespondents by:- M/s. Ajam Naz Malik, Shahbaz Ahmad Rajpoot, Ms. Sidra Shaikh and Ansa Mehnaz Satti, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NASIR JABBAR \nVS. \nKHALID MAHMOOD AKHTAR (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS REAL FATHER AS HIS LR, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26314", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1378 = 2025 SLD 1378", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WXo", - "Key Words:": "Issue: Challenge against Super Tax (Rs. 114.7 million) imposed under Section 4C on capital gains (Rs. 1.14 billion) from the sale of ancestral property held >6 years.\nAppellant’s Claim: Gains taxed at 0% (per First Schedule, Division VIII) are exempt and thus outside Super Tax scope.\nKey Arguments by Appellant\n0% Tax = Exemption: Gains not income under Section 2(29) as they are not chargeable to tax.\nSuper Tax Applies Only to Taxable Income : Section 4C targets taxable income (Section 9), not total income (Section 10).\nPrecedents: Relied on Eastern Textiles case (ITA 1649/KB/2021) where similar gains were held exempt from Super Tax.\nInterpretation Principle: Ambiguous tax laws must favor taxpayers (Kunjah Textile Mills principle).\nTribunal’s Findings & Decision\n0% Tax ≠ Exemption:\nGains are chargeable under Section 37 but taxed at 0% due to holding period.\nExempt income (e.g., under Second Schedule) is excluded from taxable income; 0%-rated income remains part of taxable income.\nSection 4C Explicitly Includes Capital Gains:\nSection 4C(2)(i) lists capital gains as income subject to Super Tax, regardless of the applicable rate (even 0%).\nPrecedent Misapplied:\nEastern Textiles misinterpreted the law; it is not binding here due to factual and legal distinctions.\nNo Ambiguity in Law:\nSection 4C’s language is clear: Super Tax applies to income, including 0%-rated gains. No need for taxpayer-favorable interpretation.\nLegislative Intent:\nIf gains were meant to be exempt, they would be in the Second Schedule (exempt income list). Their inclusion in the tax rate table (First Schedule) confirms taxable status.\nOrder\nAppeal Dismissed: Super Tax imposition upheld.\nKey Conclusion:\n Capital gain taxed at 0% is not exempt; it forms part of taxable income and is subject to Super Tax under Section 4C. \nTribunal’s Legal Reasoning\nCritical Distinction:\nExempt Income (e.g., agricultural income)\n0%-Rated Income (e.g., this capital gain)\nNot included in taxable income.\nIncluded in taxable income.\nNot chargeable to tax.\nChargeable to tax (at 0% rate).\nSection 4C Scope: Independent charging provision targeting all income (including 0%-rated) above threshold, not limited to taxable income under Section 9.\nFinal Outcome: Assessing officer’s order sustained; Super Tax recovery valid.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29),2(63),4B,4C,9,10,12,15,8,37,37A,39,53,120(1)", - "Case #": "ITA NO. 127/IB/2025, MA(Stay) No. 628/IB/2025 (Tax Year, 2024). Date of Hearing & Order: 16.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND (MUHAMMAD NAEEM ASHRAF) MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Aamir Javed, FCA, Mr. Shariq Tanveer, Advocate\nRespondent BY: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. KHAIRULLAH KHAN; HOUSE NO. F-151, STREET NO.07, PHASE-II, OFFICERS COLONY, WAH CANTT, TAXILA, RAWALPINDI …….. APPELLANT \nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-CANTT., RTO, RAWALPINDI …….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26315", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1379 = 2025 SLD 1379 = 2025 PTD 1558", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5WXk", - "Key Words:": "The Supreme Court considered whether plastic films used for packaging (BOPP, PET, CPP Metalized, CPP Milky) qualify as Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) for purposes of availing reduced minimum tax rate under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The taxpayer, a distributor of such packaging films, had declared turnover and claimed a reduced 0.2% tax rate applicable to FMCGs. The department, however, applied a 1% minimum tax rate, treating these as industrial inputs rather than retail consumer goods.\nThe taxpayer succeeded before the Appellate Tribunal and the Peshawar High Court, which accepted that these items met the FMCG criteria. However, the Supreme Court found that the films were not directly consumed by end-users, but were packaging materials for consumer products. As such, they were not consumer goods within the meaning of section 2(13AB), nor did they meet the retail and direct-consumption test under section 2(22A).\nHeld:\nPetitions converted into appeals and allowed. High Court’s judgment dated 22.11.2023 set aside. Packaging films do not qualify as Fast Moving Consumer Goods; 1% minimum tax under section 113 applies.\nCitations:\nHigh Court judgment: Peshawar High Court, dated 22.11.2023 (reversed)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=3(13AB),2(22A),113,122(1),122(5A),177", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions No. 885 to 887 of 2024. Date of Hearing: 23.05.2025. Date of order: 24-06-2025\n[Against the judgment dated 22.11.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Tax Reference Nos. 22-P to 24-P of 2019]", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Respondent: [In all cases] Mr. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, ASC. Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR. \nFor the Petitioner: [In all cases] Mr. Muhammad Tariq, ASC. [Via video-link from Peshawar]", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE, PESHAWAR [IN ALL CASES] ……. PETITIONER\nVS\nM/S SUFI TAHIR NADEEM [IN ALL CASES] …….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26316", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1380 = 2025 SLD 1380 = 2025 PTD 1429", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTc", - "Key Words:": "The applicant sought condonation of a 16-day delay in filing a reference under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The delay was explained on the ground that although the impugned order (dated 14.02.2025) was received by the applicant’s authorized representative on 24.02.2025, it was only handed over to the applicant on 11.03.2025. The Court rejected this justification, holding that the representative’s knowledge was attributable to the applicant, and the limitation began from 24.02.2025.\nThe Court emphasized that statutory limitation periods must be strictly adhered to and cannot be extended without compelling justification. It reiterated that each day’s delay must be properly explained and that mere negligence or internal delay within the applicants team does not constitute sufficient cause.\nHeld:\nApplication for condonation of delay dismissed.\nReference application also dismissed as time-barred.\nDirection issued to send a copy of the order to Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), Islamabad under Section 47(5) of the Act.\nCitations:\nAsad Ali v. Bank of Punjab (PLD 2020 SC 736)\nState Bank of Pakistan v. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2012 SCMR 280)\nLDA v. Sharifan Bibi (PLD 2010 SC 705)\nRehmat Din v. Mirza Nasir Abbas (2007 SCMR 1560)\nMuhammad Nawaz v. The State (2004 SCMR 945)\nNazakat Ali v. WAPDA (2004 SCMR 145)\nAftab Iqbal Khan Khichi v. United Distributors (1999 SCMR 1326)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=47,47(5)", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 05 of 2025. Date of order: 03.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR AKBAR ALI, JUSTICE AND JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Shafiq, Advocate for the applicant.\nMalik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the Respondents Yousaf Khan, S.O. IR (Hqrs), RTO, Rawalpindi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ALI SHER TRADERS \nV/S \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26317", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1381 = 2025 SLD 1381", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTY", - "Key Words:": "Whether KGTL must honor Delay & Detention Certificates (DDCs) issued by Customs under Section 14A(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, which mandates terminal operators to waive charges for delays not caused by importers.\nParties’ Arguments\nHospital:\nGoods are critical for free maternal/child healthcare.\nDelays beyond their control (Customs procedures, documentation).\nKGTL:\nChallenged Section 14A(2)’s validity in Supreme Court (CPLA 426/2020).\nClaimed SC’s interim order (requiring monthly accounts) suspends enforcement.\nOne consignment already cleared after payment (Rs. 0.977m).\nCustoms:\nPartial delays attributable to hospital (e.g., late submission of DRAP certificate).\nIssued DDCs only for periods under Customs control.\nFTO’s Findings\nSection 14A(2) is Binding:\nKGTL’s challenge does not suspend the law; SC’s order only requires account submission.\nMultiple high courts (Sindh & Islamabad) upheld Section 14A(2) post-SC order.\nMaladministration by Customs:\nFailed to enforce DDCs against KGTL (Violation of Section 14A(2).\nDid not issue DDCs for the entire detention period (Jan/Sep 2023 onwards).\nHumanitarian Grounds:\nDelays harm public health; equipment serves impoverished patients.\nRecommendations\nCustoms Appraisement-East (Karachi) must:\nRe-issue DDCs covering full detention period (Jan/Sep 2023 to present).\nEnsure KGTL releases goods within 7 days without payment.\nFBR to report compliance within 20 days.\nOutcome\nComplaint upheld against Customs for maladministration.\nKGTL ordered to release remaining consignment unconditionally.\nKey Takeaway: The FTO prioritized public health over procedural delays, reinforcing that terminal operators must comply with valid DDCs despite pending litigation.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=9(1),10(1),40(4)Customs Act, 1969=14A,14A(2)", - "Case #": "COMPLAINT NO. 0875/LHR/CUST/2024. Dated of hearing: 12.02.2024. date of order: 20-05-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FTO", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer: Ms. Adila Rehman, Advisor\nAppraising Officer: Dr. Arslan Subuctageen, Advisor\nAuthorized Representatives: Mian Abdul Sattar, Mr. ljazAhmad Sheikh\nDepartmental Representatives: Ms. Hijab Zahra, D.C Customs (zoom), Ms. Umme Kalsoo, D.C Customs\nFrom Karachi Gateway Terminal: Mr. Najeeb-ur-Rehman Abbasi, Advocate, Syed lmtiaz Hussain Shah from KP T", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENT, SIR GANGA RAM HOSPITAL, LAHORE ……. COMPLAINANT\nVS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD …… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26318", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1382 = 2025 SLD 1382", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTU", - "Key Words:": "", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Stamp Act, of 1899=47Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=141,142,177", - "Case #": "W.P No. 7002 of 2020. Date of Hearing. 26-02-2025. Date of Order: 24-03-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE:", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONERS BY: M/s. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Shahzad Ata Elahi, Gohar Mustafa Qureshi, Shahryar Kasuri, Khawaja Omer Ghias, Syed Kamal Ali Haider, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Ali Umrao, Haider Aziz Sheikh, Muhammad Mohsin Malik, Asad Abbas Butt, Muhammad Asif, Ms. Ayesha Qazi, Awais Ahmed, Malik Muhammad Zarif, Ali Ahmad Toor and Syed Ali Ahmad Gillani, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Mr. Abdul Muqtadir Khan, Advocate for respondent No.4-FBR. Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Addl. Attorney General. Mr. Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G. Mr. Jahanzeb Inam, Addl. Advocate General. Mr. Hassan Ijaz Cheema, A.A.G.", - "Petitioner Name:": "EFU GENERAL INSURANCE LIMITED & ANOTHER\nVS\nTHE PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26319", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1383 = 2025 SLD 1383", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTQ", - "Key Words:": "The petitioners challenged show cause notices issued by SBP for non-realization or delayed realization of export proceeds, citing alleged violation of Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The notices were issued under the authority of Circular No. 2 of 2023, which added para 33A to Chapter 12 of the FE Manual. This Circular directed Authorized Dealers (ADs) to place liens on delayed export proceeds and deposit fines on behalf of exporters before adjudication.\nHeld:\nThe Lahore High Court declared Circular No. 2 of 2023 ultra vires the law and struck it down, holding that:\nSBP’s instructions, particularly para 33A, preempted the adjudication process under Section 23B of the FERA and violated the constitutional right to fair trial under Article 10A.\nSBP could not unilaterally impose a lien or penalties prior to adjudication.\nOnly Adjudicating Officers duly appointed under Section 23B were competent to impose fines after due process.\nThe lien imposed by Circular No. 2 violated Articles 9, 10A, 14, and 18 of the Constitution.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947=12(1),20(3),23B,23J", - "Case #": "W.P No. 79375 of 2023. Date of Hearing. 21-01-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONERS BY: M/s Barrister Muhammad Umer Riaz, Saqib Haroon Chishti, Abdul Waheed, Muhammad Amin, Rana Rehan, Haseeb Tariq, Barrister Hassan Safdar Khan, Rashid Khan, Rana Muhammad Afzal Razzaq Khan, Sajid Asghar Langhra, Awais Toseef Rana, Faisal Anwar Minhas, Hafeez Ullah Maan, Asif Amin Goraya, Nazakat Abbas Bhatti and Muhammad Sohail Anjum, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Mr. Ahmed Pervaiz, Advocate for SBP. Mr. Azmat H. Lodhi, Advocate for FBL. Mr. Zahid Mahmood Arain, Advocate for UBL. Mr. Muhammad Riaz, Advocate for Bank Al- Falah. Mr. Kashif Hussain, Advocate for Meezan Bank. Mr. Zameer ud Din Ibad, Advocate for Sindh Bank. Mirza Abdul Basit, Advocate for Soneri Bank. Mr. Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G with Muhammad Waqar Khalique, Law Officer, SBP.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S MUMTAZ GHANI TEXTILE (PVT.) LTD. & OTHERS\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26320", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1384 = 2025 SLD 1384", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VS8", - "Key Words:": "ervice Termination of Ex-PTC/PTCL Employees – Jurisdiction and Protection under Statutory Rules\nDetails:\nPetitioners, former employees of PTC/PTCL, challenged disciplinary actions and termination orders issued under the PTCL Service Regulations, 1996. Their common grievance was based on allegations of misconduct and subsequent penalties. The matter had previously been decided in favour of the petitioners, declaring the terminations unlawful, but was remanded by the Supreme Court for fresh adjudication.\nThe High Court categorized the petitions into two sets:\nAppendix A: Involving former PTC employees who joined PTCL post-privatization. The Court held these petitioners had remedies under labour laws and dismissed the petitions, observing that they were workmen and did not enjoy statutory protection.\nAppendix B: Involving T & T Department employees, originally civil servants before their transfer first to PTC (1991) and then PTCL (1996). The Court found they retained statutory terms of service protected by sections 35 and 36 of the 1996 Act. Based on Supreme Court judgments in Masood Ahmed Bhatti (2012 SCMR 152) and its reaffirmation (2016 SCMR 1362), the Court ruled their service conditions remained statutory and could not be altered to their disadvantage.\nHeld:\nPetitions in Appendix A: Dismissed due to alternate remedies under labour law (non-statutory terms).\nPetitions in Appendix B: Allowed. Impugned termination orders set aside. PTCL was directed that any disciplinary action must proceed strictly under the Civil Servants (E & D) Rules, 1973.\nCitations:\nMasood Ahmed Bhatti v. Federation of Pakistan (2012 SCMR 152)\nP.T.C.L. v. Masood Ahmed Bhatti (2016 SCMR 1362)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996=35,36Companies Ordinance, 1984=121", - "Case #": "W.P No.10380 of 2012. Date of Hearing: 19-02-2025. Date of order: 13-3-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHAHID KARIM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONERS BY: M/s Tariq Bashir, Ishtiaq A. Chaudhry and Hassan M. Rana, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: M/s Shahid Anwar Bajwa, Mirza Amir Baig, Rana Muhammad Nafees, Saad Chohan, Rai Ali Shan Marth, Muhammad Asif and Abdul Aleem Khan, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASGHAR ALI\nVS\nPTCL THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26321", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1385 = 2025 SLD 1385", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VSs", - "Key Words:": "The dispute involved competing suits for specific performance regarding the same property. The appellants relied on an agreement to sell dated 23.11.1999, allegedly executed by respondent No.3 (common vendor), with whom they were also tenants. Respondent No.3 admitted the execution and receipt of consideration and also conceded before the Trial Court. Respondents No.1 and 2 (step-sisters of respondent No.3) claimed a prior agreement dated 09.09.1999 and filed a separate suit. Both suits were consolidated. The Trial Court decreed in favor of the appellants. However, the Appellate Court reversed the decree citing non-production of attesting witnesses and suspicion over respondent No.3’s conceding statement.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that the execution of the agreement in favor of the appellants was duly admitted by the vendor (respondent No.3), and such an admission recorded before the Court overrides the requirement of two attesting witnesses under Article 79 of the QSO, especially when read harmoniously with Article 113. The Appellate Court erred by ignoring this legal principle and the continuous possession and tenancy of the appellants. The agreement claimed by respondents No.1 and 2 lacked the vendor’s thumb impression, casting doubt on its authenticity. The Court found probable collusion between respondent No.3 and respondents No.1 and 2. Consequently, the High Court restored the Trial Court’s decree in favor of the appellants.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)=17,79,113", - "Case #": "RSA No. 50 of 2014. Date of Hearing: 27.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellants by: Mr. Iftikhar Ahmad Chohan, Advocate. Mr. Arshad Jahangir Joja, advocates.\nRespondents No. 1 & 2 by: Proceeded against ex-parte on 19.05.2025.\nRespondent No. 3 by Proceeded against ex-parte on 10.08.2015", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE, ETC. \nVS\nMST. JAMSHED BIBI, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26322", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1386 = 2025 SLD 1386", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTk", - "Key Words:": "Withholding Tax Default – Section 161 Proceedings – Burden of Proof and Reconciliation\nDetails:\nThe appellant, a branch of a Chinese company executing infrastructure works for K-Electric Ltd., challenged an order passed under Sections 161 and 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, alleging non-deduction of tax. The order was passed by the ADCIR, Zone-I, MTO, Karachi. The taxpayer contended that it had complied with the withholding tax requirements, and any differences were due to the accrual-based accounting system vis-à-vis withholding on payment basis. Reconciliations and documentary evidence including audited accounts and withholding statements were submitted during appellate proceedings.\nThe department had alleged default based on audit observations and referenced the Supreme Court judgment in Messrs Bilz (Pvt) Ltd, which the taxpayer argued was inapplicable due to factual compliance and submission of required data. During the hearing, the DR acknowledged the tax deduction of Rs. 36.83 million on Rs. 518.4 million payments. Objections raised concerning heads like salaries and commission were found to be outside the scope of the original order, making such grounds irrelevant for adjudication.\nHeld:\nThe ATIR allowed the appeal and annulled the impugned order under Sections 161/205. It held that the taxpayer had sufficiently demonstrated tax deduction and deposit through reconciliation and documentary evidence. The department’s objections on items not included in the show cause notice were not sustainable. The Tribunal found the impugned order to be without lawful basis.\nCitations:\nCase Law: 2012 SLD 755 – Establishes requirements for a valid Section 161 default (withholding agent, nature of payment, identifiable recipient).", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=32(2),120,153(1)(b) ,153(1)(c) ,161,161(1),161(1A),176,182(1)(15)205Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1634/KB/2024 (Tax Year 2018). Date of hearing: 20.03.2025. Date of order: 09.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Muhammad, ACA.\nRespondent by: Mr. Majid Ali, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S SHANGHAI ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION ENGINEERING COMPANY LIMITED, KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE ASSISTANT/DEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, MTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26323", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1387 = 2025 SLD 1387", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VTg", - "Key Words:": "The appeal was filed by M/s Spectrum International Corporation against an ex-parte order dated 20.01.2025 passed by ADCIR, Zone-I, CTO Karachi under Section 11E of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, whereby sales tax liability of Rs. 16,222,491/- was adjudged on account of inadmissible input tax from blacklisted suppliers. The appellant argued that they were condemned unheard, as no proper opportunity was given and the SCN was not duly served. The Tribunal observed that the impugned order was non-speaking, passed in a slipshod manner, and without ensuring lawful service of SCN or proper adjudication.\nHeld:\nThe impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the concerned officer with directions to pass a well-reasoned speaking order after affording due opportunity of hearing to the appellant, within 30 days.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),7,8(1)(a),8(1)(ca),8(1)(caa),8(d),8(1)(d),8A,11E,33(13),21(2),21(3),22,23,26,33(13),34,34(1)(a)(c),73", - "Case #": "STA No. 70/KB/2025 (Tax Years 2023). Date of hearing: 23.05.2025. Date of order: 03.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. KASHIF NAZEER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asif Ali Advocate & Mr. Faisal Rasheed, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ghafoor Nasir-DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "SPECTRUM INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION KARACHI …….. APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE ADCIR, ZONE-1, CTO, KARACHI ……… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26324", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1388 = 2025 SLD 1388", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VXo", - "Key Words:": "The Department challenged the Order dated 23.11.2022 passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Karachi. The main legal question (Q. iv) related to whether the Order-in-Original passed on 01.08.2022—after 112 days from issuance of the Show Cause Notice dated 07.04.2022—was valid under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969. The Court held that in cases invoking Section 2(s), the law mandates adjudication within 30 days, extendable by only 60 days with reasons. No valid extension within time was shown; hence, the order was passed beyond the permissible 90-day limit. The Court referred to its earlier ruling in SCRA No. 119/2024 (Director I & I vs. M/s Chase Up) and emphasized that time limitation under Section 179(3) is mandatory, not directory. The Supreme Court has also held in Super Asia, Mujahid Soap, and A.J. Traders that such time bars must be strictly adhered to.\nHeld:\nThe Reference Application was dismissed. The impugned Order-in-Original was declared time-barred and invalid. The Tribunal’s decision was upheld, and the matter concluded without addressing the remaining questions as they were deemed academic.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),179(3),179(4),196(5)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 811 of 2023. Date of hearing & Judgment: 30-05-2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: The Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation-Customs, Hyderabad. Through Mr. Pervaiz Ahmed Memon, Advocate.\nRespondents: Ajab Khan, Through M/s. Sardar Muhammad Ishaque and Amjad Hayat, Advocates." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26325", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1390 = 2025 SLD 1390", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5VXk", - "Key Words:": "Whether Section 23C(4) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (FERA) and Rule 8 of the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1998 – which require depositing the penalty amount or furnishing equivalent security before an appeal can be admitted – violate constitutional rights.\nLahore High Court Ruling\nStruck down both provisions as unconstitutional (order dated 01.02.2023).\nSupreme Courts Decision (Dismisses Petition)\nLeave refused, petition dismissed (upholds Lahore High Courts judgment).\nKey Reasoning\nViolation of Fundamental Rights:\nThe deposit requirement infringes Article 10A of Pakistan’s Constitution (right to fair trial/due process) and Article 9 (security of person, interpreted to include access to justice).\nIt creates a wealth-based barrier to appeal, denying justice to those unable to pay.\nRight to Appeal is Fundamental:\nAn appeal is a substantive right to correct errors/miscarriages of justice.\nDenying this right violates principles of natural justice and Islamic injunctions (Adl, Qist, Ehsan).\nConditions on Appeals Must Be Reasonable:\nWhile legislatures can impose conditions, they must be proportionate and justified.\nRequiring full penalty deposit is unreasonable, oppressive, and disproportionate, effectively denying the right to appeal.\nIslamic Jurisprudence Supports Appeal Rights:\nQuranic precedents (Surah Sad 38:21-24, Surah An-Nisa 4:59) and practices of Caliph Umar emphasize correcting judicial errors through review.\nDenial of appeal contravenes Islamic injunctions (as held in precedents like Khan Asfandyar Wali, Federation of Pakistan).\nExisting Safeguards Render Deposit Redundant:\nSection 23J of FERA already provides mechanisms for penalty recovery, making the pre-appeal deposit unnecessary.\nRejected Arguments\nThe discretion of the Appellate Board to accept security instead of cash does not cure unconstitutionality.\nCourts cannot reinterpret ( read down ) unconstitutional provisions.\nOutcome\nSection 23C(4) of FERA and Rule 8 of the 1998 Rules (to the extent it enforces the deposit) are void for violating the Constitution and Islamic principles.\nThe Lahore High Court’s judgment is upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947=23B(4),23C,23C(4)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1477 of 2023. Date of hearing: 20.03.2025\n(Against the order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 01.02.2023 passed in W.P. No. 36748 of 2022)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, SENIOR JUDGE JUSTICE JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, JUSTICE NAEEM AKHTER AFGHAN, JUSTICE SHAKEEL AHMAD, JUSTICE AAMER FAROOQ", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Mr. Faisal Siddiqui, ASC, Dr. Muhammad Usman, AOR\nFor respondent No.1: Rana Asadullah Khan, Addl. AGP\nFor respondent No. 8: Mr. Waqas Ahmad Mir, ASC\nFor respondents 2-7: Not represented", - "Petitioner Name:": "SENIOR JOINT DIRECTOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE OPERATIONS DIVISION SBP ……… PETITIONER(S)\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS ……… RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26326", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1391 = 2025 SLD 1391", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTc", - "Key Words:": "The petitioner, a former Officer Grade-III at National Bank of Pakistan (NBP), challenged the bank’s failure to reinstate him with retrospective seniority and benefits from 1996, despite an unproven charge of willful absence and subsequent reinstatement as a Senior Assistant under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009. He alleged illegal termination without written notice, procedural violations, discriminatory treatment under Article 25, and non-compliance with Section 10 of the 2010 Act, which entitled him to promotion to OG-II. The bank contended that he was ineligible at the time of initial appointment, had accepted reinstatement with benefits under the 2009 Ordinance, and was barred by estoppel and laches from further claims. The Court held that following the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision declaring the Ordinance and Act ultra vires, the petitioner’s original grievance revives. The Court directed the NBP to reconsider the legality of the 1996 termination and decide the matter afresh within three months.\nHeld:\nPetition disposed of. Bank directed to re-evaluate the petitioner’s termination and possible reinstatement from 1996 strictly in accordance with law and policy.\nCitations:\nSuper Asia Case\nMujahid Soap Case\nA.J. Traders Case\nSupreme Court Judgment (2021) declaring the Sacked Employees Ordinance and Act unconstitutional", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-5570 of 2017. Dates of hearing & order: 08-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUHTOR(S): Mohammad Karim Khan Agha, Justice AND Adnan-ul-Karim Memon, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners: through Ms. Raana Khan advocate.\nRespondents No. 1: through Mr. Aamer Latif advocate\nRespondent No. 2 to 5: through Ms. Zehra Sehar, Assistant Attorney General", - "Petitioner Name:": "AMJAD ALI PECHUHO \nVS\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26327", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1392 = 2025 SLD 1392", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTY", - "Key Words:": "Impleadment of subsequent purchaser during pendency of appeal—Lis pendens—Discretion under Order I Rule 10 CPC\nDetails:\nThe case concerned two consolidated suits involving title disputes to property. After the trial court decreed the suit in favor of respondents No.1 & 2 and dismissed the applicants suit, an appeal was filed. During the pendency of this appeal, respondent No.3, a subsequent purchaser from respondents No.1 & 2, moved an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to be impleaded in the appeal. The application was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Attock.\nThe applicant (original rival party) challenged this impleadment, arguing that the purchaser was neither a necessary nor a proper party, and the sale was hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (lis pendens). Respondent’s counsel contended that impleadment was justified to prevent denial of natural justice and multiplicity of litigation.\nHeld:\nThe High Court dismissed both civil revisions. It held that impleadment of a subsequent purchaser during appeal proceedings is permissible under Order I Rule 10 CPC and Section 146 CPC, even if such purchase is made during pendency of litigation. While the principle of lis pendens prevents such transferee from claiming superior rights over the original litigant, it does not bar their inclusion in proceedings. Citing various Supreme Court precedents (e.g., Rashid Ahmad, Fazal Karim, Muhammad Shahban), the Court affirmed that impleading a transferee pendente lite helps preserve natural justice and avoid future litigation. The trial court’s discretion was exercised legally and properly, with no jurisdictional error warranting interference in revision.\nCitations:\nRashid Ahmad v. Mst. Jiwan (1997 SCMR 171)\nFazal Karim v. Muhammad Afzal (PLD 2003 SC 818)\nMuhammad Shahban v. Falak Sher (2007 SCMR 882)\nMukhtar Baig v. Sardar Baig (2000 SCMR 45) – distinguished on facts\nMuhammad Sharif v. Mst. Fateh Bano (2004 SCMR 813) – not followed\nEngineer Jameel Ahmad Malik v. Shaukat Aziz (2007 CLC 1192)\nMst. Hira Rehman v. Chancellor GCU Lahore (2011 CLC 377)\nMuhammad Hanif v. Muhammad Sadiq (2019 MLD 846)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "CIVIL REVISION NO. 1133 of 2014. Date of hearing: 18-06-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Ahmed Nawaz Khan, Advocate. Nemo.\nRespondents No. 1 & 2 by: Nemo\nRespondent No. 3 by: Sardar Bilal Firdous, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JAMIA MASJID HANFIA ATTOCK THROUGH PRESIDENT RASHID REHMAN\nVS\nMST. SURRAYA BIBI AND 2 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26328", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1393 = 2025 SLD 1393 = (2025) 132 TAX 89", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTU", - "Key Words:": "Jurisdiction of Commissioner to Rectify Deemed Assessment Orders under Section 221(1), Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nMultiple appeals by the Department stemmed from the question of whether the Commissioner of Inland Revenue has jurisdiction under Section 221(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to rectify a deemed assessment order issued under Section 120. Both the Lahore High Court (principal judgment dated 27.04.2022 in Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Chaudhry Steel Mills, 2025 PTD 101) and the Islamabad High Court (principal judgment dated 20.09.2023) had earlier ruled in the negative, holding that the Commissioner could not rectify such deemed orders as they were not orders passed by him .\nThe Supreme Court, however, disagreed. It held that the deeming provisions under Sections 120(1) and 122(3) establish legal fictions that treat assessment and amended assessment orders (including those resulting from revised returns) as orders issued by the Commissioner for all purposes of the Ordinance . Therefore, such orders must be regarded as having been passed by the Commissioner within the meaning of Section 221(1). Hence, they are open to rectification of mistakes apparent from the record.\nThe judgment also clarified that while Section 114(6) allows the taxpayer to file a revised return (requiring the Commissioners approval), such revisions do not retrospectively replace the original deemed assessment but rather create a deemed amended assessment order. The legal framework supports continuity and recognizes that rectification jurisdiction applies to both the original deemed order and its deemed amendment.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court allowed the Department’s appeals, overruling both High Court judgments. It held that the Commissioner does possess jurisdiction under Section 221(1) to rectify mistakes apparent from the record in deemed assessment orders under Section 120.\nCitations:\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Chaudhry Steel Mills (2025 PTD 101, LHC)\nEast and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. (PLD 1963 SC 395)\nJalal Muhammad Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 395)\nMehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner (2020 SCMR 1184)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(64),114(6),120,120(2A),122,122(1),122(3),221(1)", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals No. 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2034 of 2022, Civil Appeals No.308, 503 of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.3468-L, 3477-L, 1917-L, 1918-L, 2149-L, 2150-L, 2607-L, 2608-L, 2788-L, 2789-L, 2790-L of 2022, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No. 905-L, 1463-L, 1464-L, 1465-L of 2023, 3665-L of 2022, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No. 2352-L, 2353-L, 2354-L, 3177-L, 3399-L, 3400-L of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.106-L, 1155-L, 1268-L, 1450-L of 2024, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.216-L of 2025, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.156-L of 2024, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal No.2627-L of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.3659-L, 3660-L,.3661-L, 3662-L of 2022, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.3327-L, 3328-L, 3329-L, 3330-L, 431-L, 3014-L of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal No.2340 of 2024, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals No.4583,.4584, 4585 of 2023, Civil Petition for Leave to Appeals No.5359 and 531-L of 2024 (On appeal against judgments dated 27.04.2022, 17.05.2022, 15.06.2022, 23.02.2023, 03.04.2023, 04.04.2023, 07.03.2022, 25.05.2022, 18.10.2022, 09.05.2023, 12.10.2023, 30.10.2023, 30.11.2023, 12.12.2023, 20.05.2024, 08.05.2024, 13.05.2024, 14.01.2025, 30.11.2023, 12.06.2023, 19.10.2022, 18.09.2023, 22.11.2022, 26.06.2023, 11.03.2024, 20.09.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore and Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in PTRs No.334/2013, 335/2013, 336/2013, 333/2013, 337/2013, 286/2014, ITR No.55/2016, 04/2016, 34473/2022, 29379/2022, PTR No.121/2014, ITR No.65930/2022, 65929/2022, 18361/2022, 18366/2022, 475/2015, 476/2015, PTR No.208/2011, 209/2011, 255/2014, 256/2014, 257/2014, ITR No.10198/2023, 21986/2023, 21979/2023, 21991/2023, 224/2015, 225/2015, 226/2015, 227/2015, 228/2015, 229/2015, 63076/2022, 30039/2023, 30071/2023, 30135/2023, 66961/2023, 71684/2023, 78778/2023, 81673/2023, 31022/2024, 28057/2024, 29173/2024, 1542/2025, 78977/2023, 38844/2023 PTR No.237/2012, 238/2012, 239/2012, 240/2012, ITR No.58743/2023, 58757/2023, 58760/2023, 58768/2023, 567/2010, 43943/2023, 01/2021, 44/2012, 43/2012 and 42/2012.). Date of Hearing: 08.04.2025. Date of Order: 05-6-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR MRS. JUSTICE AYESHA A. MALIK MR. JUSTICE SHAHID WAHEED", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellants/ Petitioners: Mr. Ahmad Pervaiz, ASC (via video link, Lahore in CA Nos.2026-\n2028/2022, CA.2034/2022, 308/2023, 503/2023, CPLA No.1917-L/2022, 1918-L/2022, 2788-L to 2790-L/2022, 2352-L to 2354-L, 156-L/2024, 2627-L/2023)\nSyed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR\nMr. Ibrar Ahmad, ASC\n(in CA Nos.2029 to 2031, 2033 of 2022, CPLA Nos.3468-L, 3477-L, 2149-L, 2150-L of 2022, 905-L/2023, 1463-L to 1465-L/2023, 3177-L, 3399-L, 3400-L of 2023, 106-L/2024, 1155-L/2024, 531-L/2024, 1268-L of 2024 and 216-L of 2015)\nMr. Shahbaz Butt, ASC \n(via video link, Lahore in CPLA Nos.2326-L to 2331-L of 2022) \nMr. M. Yahya, ASC (via video link, Lahore in CPLA Nos.3665-L, 3659-L to 3662-L of 2022, 3327-L to 3330-L of 2023)\nMian Yousaf Umar, ASC (via video link, Lahore in CPLA No.1450-L/2024)\nMr. Amir Wakeel Butt, ASC (via video link, Lahore in CPLA No.431-L/2023)\nMr. Babar Bilal, ASC (in CPLA Nos.4583 to 4585/2023)\nMalik Qamar Afzal, ASC (in CPLA No.5359/2024)\nFor the Mr. Shahbaz Butt, ASC (via video link, Lahore in CA Nos.2031/2022, 2034/2022, 503/2023)\nMr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, ASC (in CPLA No.106-L/2024)\nMr. Muhammad Amjad Khan, ASC (via video link, Lahore in CA No.308-L/2023)\nMs. Asma Hamid, ASC (via video link, Lahore in CPLA Nos.2326-L to 2331-L/2022)\nMr. Wasif Majeed, ASC (via video link, Lahore in CPLA Nos.3659-L to 3662-L/2022)\nMr. Manzoor Hussain, ASC (in CPLA No.2340/2024)\nFor the Federation: Mr. Munawar Iqbal Duggal, Addl. AGP\nFor the Department: Dr. Ishtiaq, D.G. (Law) FBR \nMs. Sobia Mazhar, Addl. Commissioner\nMr. Hassan, Addl. Commissioner", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Sialkot: C.As.2026, 2027, 2028/2022\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot: C.As.2029 to 2033/2022, C.P.L.As.3468-L, 3477-L, 2149-L, 2150-L /2022, 905-L, 1463-L, 1464-L, 1465-L, 3399-L to 3400-L /2023\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore: C.As.2034/2022, 308, 503/2023, C.P.L.As.1917-L, 1918-\nL, 2607-L, 2608-L, 2788-L, 2789-L, 2790-L /2022, 2352-L to 2354-L, 3177-L /2023, 106-L, 1155-L, 1268-L/2024, 216-L/2025, 156-L/2024, 2627-L/2023, 3659-L, 3660-L to 3662-L/2022, 431-L, \n3014-L /2023 and 531-L/2024\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad: C.P.L.A.3665-L/2022\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-VI, CTO, Lahore: C.P.L.A.1450-L/2024\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Gujranwala: C.P.L.As.3327-L to 3330-L/2023\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (South Zone), Regional Tax Office (RTO), Islamabad: C.P.L.A.2340/2024\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-I), Large Taxpayers Unit, Islamabad: C.P.L.As.4583, 4584\nand 4585/2023\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Corporate Tax Office, Islamabad: C.P.L.A.5359/2024… Appellants / Petitioners\nVs\nM/s White Gold Steel Mills, S.I.E. Daska: C.A.2026/2022 and C.P.L.A.2354-L/2023\nM/s Chaudhary Steel Mills, S.I.E., Daska: C.A.2027/2022\nM/s Royal Steel Mills S.I.E. Daska: C.A.2028/2022 and C.P.L.A.2352-L/2023\nM/s M.M. Steel Mills, S.I.E. Daska: C.A.2029/2022 and C.P.L.A.2353-L/2023\nM/s Islam Steel Mills, S,I,E. Daska: C.As.2030/2022 and 1465-L/2023\nM/s Ch. Mushtaq & Co. Sialkot: C.A.2031/2022 \nM/s Muhammad Kamran Butt: C.A.2032/2022\nImran Aslam: C.A.2033/2022\nM/s Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd., Lahore: C.A.2034/2022\nM/s Jamhoor Textile Mills Ltd., Lahore: C.A.308/2023\nM/s Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Lahore: C.A.503/2023\nKamran Haider: C.P.L.A.3468-L/2022\nSyed Nadeem Abbas Sharazi: C.P.L.A.3477-L/2022\nM/s Crescent Bahuman Ltd., Lahore: C.P.L.As.1917-L and 1918-L /2022\nMr. Ghulam Farid, Sialkot: C.P.L.As.2149-L and 2150-L /2022\nM/s Punjab Oil Mills, etc., Ltd., Lahore, etc.: C.P.L.As.2607-L and 2608-L /2022\nM/s Chenab Steel Re-Rolling Mills, Lahore: C.P.L.As.2788-L to 2790-L /2022\nMuhammad Hanif: C.P.L.A.905-L/2023\nM/s Allah Din Steel & Re-Rolling Mills, Daska: C.P.L.A.1463-L/2023\nM/s Mubarak Traders, Opposite NBP, Sambrial: C.P.L.A.1464-L/2023\nM/s Ikrama Cotton Factory Jhang Road, Gojra, etc.: C.P.L.A.3665-L/2022\nM/s Qavi Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore: C.P.L.A.3177-L/2023\nM/s Qaiser Electronics, Sialkot: C.P.L.A.3399-L, 3400-L//2023\nM/s Gate Healthcare 1 Pak (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore: C.P.L.A.106-L/2024\nSyed Nadeem Abbas: C.P.L.A.1155-L/2024\nM/s Family Hospital (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore: C.P.L.A.1268-L/2024\nM/s Shabbir Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.: C.P.L.A.1450-L/2024\nMaverick International (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore: C.P.L.A.216-L/2025\nM/s Central Media Network (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore: C.P.L.A.156-L/2024\nM/s Raaziq International (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore: C.P.L.A.2627-L/2023\nM/s Lahore University of Management & Sciences, Lahore: C.P.L.A.3659-L to 3662-L /2022\nM/s Usman International (Pvt.) Ltd., Gujranwala: C.P.L.A.3327-L to 3330-L /2023\nM/s Rafi Electronics Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore: C.P.L.A.431-L/2023\nM/S Potential Engineers (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore: C.P.L.A.3014-L/2023\nM/s Liquid Fuels, Islamabad: C.P.L.A.2340/2024\nM/s AAR & Co., Civic Centre, Islamabad: C.P.L.A.4583 to 4585/2023\nM/s ITC Logistics (Pvt.) Ltd. through its Assistant Manager and others: C.P.L.A.5359/2024\nMr. Shafqat Riyasat: C.P.L.A.531-L/2024 … Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26329", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1394 = 2025 SLD 1394", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTQ", - "Key Words:": "The appellant, M/s Spectrum International Corporation, challenged an ex-parte Order dated 20-01-2025 passed under Section 11E of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by ADCIR, CTO Karachi. The order adjudged Rs. 16,222,491/- against the appellant for claiming input tax on purchases from subsequently blacklisted suppliers based on allegedly fake/flying invoices. The taxpayer deposited the principal amount of Rs. 6,870,032/- but contested the default surcharge and penalties.\nThe Appellate Tribunal observed that the adjudication officer failed to confirm whether the Show Cause Notice (SCN) was duly served and passed a non-speaking ex-parte order without affording proper opportunity of hearing or examining the merits of the case. The order was termed slipshod and lacking judicial reasoning, violating principles of natural justice and constitutional duty of a quasi-judicial officer.\nHeld:\nThe impugned Order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the adjudicating officer for fresh decision in accordance with law after affording due opportunity of hearing and addressing legal/factual objections. The case was to be finalized preferably within 30 days.\nPrinciples laid down by superior courts regarding natural justice and duty of quasi-judicial authorities", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(37),7,8(1)(a),8(1)(ca),8(1)(caa),8(1)(d),8A,11E,21(2),21(3),22,23,26,33(13),34,34(1)(a)(c),73", - "Case #": "STA No. 70/KB/2025 (Tax Years 2023). Date of hearing: 23.05.2025. Date of Order: 03.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. KASHIF NAZEER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Asif Ali Advocate & Mr. Faisal Rasheed, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Ghafoor Nasir-DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "SPECTRUM INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, KARACHI …………… APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE ADCIR, ZONE-1, CTO, KARACHI ………… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26330", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5US8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1461 = 2025 SLD 1461", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5US8", - "Key Words:": "The appellant (a telecom company) challenged an amended tax assessment order raising an additional demand of Rs. 16.87 billion for Tax Year 2021. The tribunal annulled the demand, ruling the proceedings were illegal and void ab initio.\nKey Findings & Rationale\nApplicable Law (Section 122(5A))\nThe 2021 amendment (removing the Commissioner’s power to conduct inquiries) is procedural and applies retrospectively.\nThe department erred in applying the pre-amendment law.\nCommissioner’s Jurisdiction\nThe phrase if he considers requires objective evidence—not subjective suspicion—to amend an assessment.\nThe show-cause notice was based on conjecture, not tangible material, making it a fishing inquiry (invalid).\nPremature Proceedings\nThe return must first be deemed complete under Section 120(6) (after 180 days) before amendment.\nIssuing a notice within 60 days (during the revision window under Section 114(6) violated the taxpayer’s statutory rights.\nViolation of Rights\nPremature action:\nRendered the taxpayer’s revision right (Section 114(6) ineffective.\nBreached procedural fairness and legitimate expectation.\nDefects in Show-Cause Notice\nAll 10 grounds (e.g., ad costs, customer acquisition, depreciation) lacked evidence-based analysis.\nThe issues required audit (Section 177), not amendment proceedings.\nOutcome\nOrders of lower authorities annulled for lack of jurisdiction.\nThe department may initiate fresh proceedings strictly per law.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 274/IB/2023 (Tax Year, 2021). Date of Hearing & Order: 15.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD NAEEM ASHRAF, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Rashid Mehmood, FCCA\nMr. Zainul Hassan, ACA\nRespondent BY: Mr. Hassan Ali Khan, L.A\nMr. M. Alam, Addl. CIR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Pakistan Mobile Communications Limited; Jazz Digital Head Office, 1-A, IBC-1 Building, F-8 Markaz, Islamabad …….. Appellant\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Range-IV, LTO, Islamabad …….. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26331", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5USs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1603 = 2025 SLD 1603 = 2025 PTD 1001 = (2025) 132 TAX 17", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5USs", - "Key Words:": "The taxpayer, engaged in wholesale/distribution of kitchen/table glassware, was charged 1% minimum turnover tax under Section 113 by treating the goods as outside the scope of “fast moving consumer goods” (FMCG). The department relied on the amended 2017 definition of FMCG (“excluding durable goods”) to deny the reduced rate of 0.2%.\nThe Court held that:\nEach tax year is a separate unit; amendments in 2017 cannot be applied retrospectively to Tax Year 2015.\nTable glassware qualifies as “consumer goods” under the pre-2017 FMCG definition.\nDistributors of table glassware are entitled to the same reduced tax rate (0.2%) as distributors of electronic appliances; higher taxation violates Article 25 and fiscal equity principles.\nTax authorities must ensure uniformity in tax treatment for comparable consumer durables.\nDecision: Reference allowed in favour of taxpayer; minimum tax rate of 0.2% applicable for Tax Year 2015.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 01 of 2017, decided on 03.03.2025. Date of hearing: 03.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN AND MALIK JAVID IQBAL WAINS, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Shafique, Advocate for the applicant.\nMalik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the respondents alongwith Yousaf Khan, Staff Officer, I.R (Legal)(Hqrs), R.T.O., Rawalpindi.\nHafiz Muhammad Idrees, Advocate/amicus curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHEIKH NASEEM AKHTAR\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (LEGAL) ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26332", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1604 = 2025 SLD 1604 = 2025 PTD 1025", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTk", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nIn 2016, NTC initiated an anti-dumping investigation under Section 20 of the Act against imports of Coated Bleached Board / One Side Coated Folding Box Board with White Back from China.\nFinal determination (10.04.2018): Imposed anti-dumping duties for 5 years.\nSunset review (2022): Duties extended for another 5 years from 28.02.2022.\nIn 2024, domestic producers (Respondents 3 & 5) alleged circumvention of these duties by Chinese exporters through slight modification of the product — applying a thin (<20 gsm) coating to the other side and classifying it as Two Side Coated Bleach Board.\nChallenged Action:\nNTC’s notice dated 04.05.2024 initiating anti-circumvention investigation under Section 63(4) of the Act and Rules 26–27.\nNotice invited “all interested parties” to submit comments, information, and documents within 45 days.\nPetitioners’ Arguments:\nCustoms classification finality: Customs had already classified goods as Two Side Coated Bleach Board (Order dated 21.01.2023), which NTC cannot override.\nLack of verification: NTC initiated investigation without seeking Customs determination on product nature.\nUltra vires action: Notice issued solely on documents provided by domestic industry, without independent verification.\nViolation of rights: Action alleged to be unconstitutional and without lawful authority.\nNTC’s & Domestic Industry’s Arguments:\nPremature petitions: No adverse order has been passed; investigation only initiated.\nAlternate remedies: Petitioners can participate in the investigation and later appeal under Section 70 of the Act.\nEvidence-backed complaint: Application contained 7 years of data (2017–2023) showing circumvention practices.\nRegulatory function: NTC is empowered under Section 63 to investigate circumvention, even if Customs has classified goods differently.\nCourtâ€���s Observations:\nNature of Proceedings: Anti-dumping and anti-circumvention are both trade remedies but deal with different issues:\nAnti-dumping: Prevents unfair low-price imports harming domestic industry.\nAnti-circumvention: Prevents evasion of existing duties through methods like slight product modification, misclassification, or third-country routing.\nNotice contents: The impugned notice simply invited interested parties to participate; no duty imposed yet.\nNo adverse order: Following PLD 2025 Lahore 57 (Sadiq Poultry), a show-cause or initiation notice is not an adverse order and generally not challengeable in writ jurisdiction.\nDisputed facts: Whether circumvention occurred is a factual question for NTC, not the High Court under Article 199.\nPrecedents: Sindh High Court (CP D-4261/2024, Tasneem Enterprises) and Peshawar High Court (WP 3396-P/2024, Niaz Ahmad) both dismissed similar writs as premature.\nRegulator role: NTC is a statutory regulator (per Shaheen Merchant v. NTC, 2021 PTD 2126) mandated to investigate trade remedy cases.\nKey Legal Principles Applied:\nDoctrine of exhaustion of remedies: Parties must first avail statutory remedies before invoking writ jurisdiction.\nMaintainability of writs:\nShow-cause/initiation notice is not an adverse order unless issued without jurisdiction or with proven mala fide.\nAvailability of alternate remedies under the Act (participation, hearing, appeal) bars writ petitions.\nPrematurity: Investigations at preliminary stage cannot be quashed before evidence is examined by the competent authority.\nDecision:\nPetitions dismissed as not maintainable for being premature.\nPetitioners directed to file replies/objections with evidence before NTC.\nCourt emphasized that participation in the statutory process is the correct course before approaching constitutional jurisdiction.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.1695 of 2024. Dates of hearing 16.01.2025, 11.02.2025, 19.02.2025, 25.02.2025, 06.03.2025, 26.03.2025, 24.04.2025, 30.04.2025 and 06.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner(s) by M/s. Shafqat Mehmood Chohan, ASC with Wasi Ullah Surrani, Advocate.\nRespondent(s) by Barrister Zain Mansoor and Naila Rubab, Assistant Attorney Generals on behalf of Respondent No.1.\nBarrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate General with Ms. Talat Nisar, Advocate.\nM/s. Waqas Amir and Azfar Naeem, Advocates for Respondent No.2.\nM/s Saif Ullah Khan and Rais Mahmood Ali, Advocates for Respondents No.3 and 5.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S EJAZ BROTHERS \nV/S \nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, NATIONAL TARIFF COMMISSION ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26333", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1605 = 2025 SLD 1605 = 2025 PTD 1039", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UTg", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nIn 2018, NTC imposed anti-dumping duties on dumped imports of coated bleached paperboard / one-side coated folding box board with white back from China.\nIn 2022, following a sunset review, duties were extended for another five years; the review report explicitly excluded “two-side coated bleached paperboard” from the investigated product.\nIn 2024, domestic producers (Respondents 4 & 5) applied under Section 63 alleging circumvention of duties: claiming Chinese exporters were slightly modifying one-sided coated board (adding thin coating <20 gsm to the other side) and declaring it as “two-side coated bleached paperboard” to evade duties.\nNTC issued an initiation notice dated 04.05.2024 for anti-circumvention investigation, inviting “all interested parties” to submit comments, information, and evidence within 45 days.\nPetitioner’s Position:\nProduct exclusion argument: The investigated product (“two-side coated bleached paperboard”) was excluded in both the 2018 final determination and 2022 sunset review; no final determination exists for this product, so an anti-circumvention investigation is misconceived and mala fide.\nProcedural flaw: NTC acted without first making a final determination on the excluded product.\nPrior appeal: Petitioner appealed to Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal under Section 70, which dismissed the appeal (27.08.2024) for lack of jurisdiction to hear appeals at the initiation stage.\nConstitutional challenge: Filed writ petition under Article 199 to set aside the initiation notice and restrain NTC from demanding any duties that may result.\nRespondents’ Position (NTC & domestic industry):\nPetition is premature — investigation is ongoing; no final determination made yet.\nPetitioner has alternate remedies:\nRegister as an “interested party” under Section 2(j).\nSubmit comments/evidence, request hearing under Rule 14.\nAppeal after final determination under Section 70(1)(ii).\nPetition raises factual disputes (nature/classification of product) that must be decided by NTC through statutory investigation, not by writ court.\nKey Legal Issues:\nMaintainability under Article 199 – whether a writ can be filed against an initiation notice of anti-circumvention investigation.\nRight of appeal under Section 70 – whether petitioner, not being the complainant-applicant under Section 20, could appeal against initiation.\nDoctrine of exhaustion of remedies – requirement to first utilize statutory mechanisms under ADD Act before approaching constitutional court.\nJurisdiction of Appellate Tribunal – whether dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction was correct.\nCourt’s Findings:\n1. Nature of Relief & Article 199 Scope\nPrimary relief sought: declaration that initiation notice is “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”.\nSuch relief falls within Article 199(1)(a)(ii) — judicial review against actions taken without lawful authority.\nHowever, court must first determine if action is amenable to writ at this stage.\n2. Adequate Statutory Remedies Exist\nADD Act provides multiple procedural rights to interested parties:\nSection 33 – inspect information submitted to NTC.\nSection 35 – submit data, evidence, and participate in investigation.\nRule 14 – request hearing within 30 days of notice.\nSection 38 – submit written arguments.\nPetitioner bypassed these remedies (“frog-leaped” to court).\nSupreme Court in Mian Azam Waheed emphasized doctrine of exhaustion of remedies — statutory process must be followed before writ jurisdiction is invoked.\n3. Right of Appeal under Section 70\nSection 70(1)(i) allows appeal against initiation only to applicant-complainants under Section 20 whose application was rejected or affected at preliminary stage under Sections 23 & 24.\nPetitioner was not the applicant-complainant; hence, had no cause to appeal under Section 70(1)(i).\nSection 70(1)(ii) allows appeal against final determinations to any interested party — remedy available after investigation concludes.\nTribunal’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction (27.08.2024) was correct in law.\n4. Factual Controversy\nDispute over whether product is truly “two-side coated” or a slightly modified “one-side coated” product.\nDetermination of such facts involves technical investigation — within NTC’s mandate under Section 35 & related rules.\nCourt will not conduct fact-finding in writ jurisdiction.\n5. Legislative Intent\nLegislature deliberately limited interlocutory appeals to applicant-complainants.\nAllowing writs at initiation stage would undermine statutory framework and delay investigations.\nDecision:\nPetition dismissed as not maintainable.\nPetitioner has no right to appeal at initiation stage and must participate in ongoing investigation as an interested party.\nNo constitutional breach shown beyond invoking Article 199(1)(a)(ii).\nAnti-circumvention investigation to continue to logical conclusion without court interference.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition No. D-4561 of 2024. Date of Hearing : 29.10.2024. Date of Judgment : 28.01.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, CJ AND MR JUSTICE JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Tasneem Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd., through its duly authorized Attorney, through Mr. Junaid Ahmed and Syed Kawish Hussain Naqvi, Advocate \nVS\nRespondent No.1: National Tariff Commission and \nRespondent No.2: Federation of Pakistan through the DAG, Mr Khaleeq Ahmed and Ms. Wajiha Mehdi AAG\nRespondent No.3: Collector of Customs through Ms Tania Alam Advocate\nRespondent Nos.4&5: Century Paper & Board Mills Limited through its CEO (Respondent No.4) and Bulleh Shah Packaging (Private) Ltd. through its CEO (Respondent No.5), both Respondent Nos. 4 & 5 through Mr Rais Mahmood Ali, Advocate" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26334", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1606 = 2025 SLD 1606 = 2025 PTD 1053", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UXo", - "Key Words:": "The Islamabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by M/s Raz Textiles, challenging the show cause notice (SCN) dated 20.01.2022 issued under Sections 168(1) and 157 of the Customs Act, 1969. The court quashed the impugned seizure report, recovery notice, and SCN, declaring them void ab initio.\nKey Points:\nJurisdiction of DG I & I:\nThe Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation (DG I & I) lacked jurisdiction to seize the petitioners goods in Islamabad, as the goods had already been assessed and released by the Customs Collector in Karachi.\nDG I & Is authority under SRO 486(1)/2007 is limited to preventing smuggling and does not extend to reassessing customs duties or detaining goods based on non-application of valuation rulings.\nValuation Ruling:\nThe valuation ruling dated 04.06.2020 could not be applied to goods imported in 2021, as such rulings are valid only for 90 days per the Sindh High Courts decision in Sadia Jabbar Vs. Federation of Pakistan (2018 PTD 1746).\nNon-application of a valuation ruling does not constitute an offense under Section 32 of the Customs Act, as it is not a document or statement furnished by the importer.\nAuthority of Collector Customs (Adjudication):\nThe Additional Collector (Adjudication) in Islamabad had no authority to order confiscation of goods under Section 180 of the Customs Act without prior adjudication of duties and taxes under Section 179(1).\nThe SCN was defective as it sought to penalize the petitioner without first establishing liability for short levy or non-levy of duties and taxes.\nAssessment of Income Tax and Sales Tax:\nCustoms authorities are not empowered to adjudicate short levy of income tax or sales tax once goods are released and out of charge. Such matters fall under the jurisdiction of the Inland Revenue Circle and must be addressed through the relevant tax statutes (Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and Sales Tax Act, 1990).\nThe court agreed with the Sindh High Courts ruling in Nestle Pakistan Ltd. Vs. FBR (2023 PTD 527), which limited customs authorities jurisdiction to the import stage.\nFinal Ruling:\nThe seizure and subsequent SCN were declared illegal and without jurisdiction.\nThe security deposited by the petitioner for the release of goods was ordered to be released forthwith.\nConclusion:\nThe judgment underscores the limits of DG I & Is powers and reaffirms that customs authorities cannot reassess duties or taxes based on valuation rulings once goods are cleared. It also clarifies the jurisdictional boundaries between customs and tax authorities, ensuring due process in tax and duty adjudication.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 285 of 2022. Date of Hearing: 31.10.2024. Date of order: 14-01-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Asad Raza Khan, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Ch. Imtiaz Ahmed, Advocate.\nMr. Aqeel Akhtar Raja, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S RAZ TEXTILES THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED ATTORNEY\nVS\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26335", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1607 = 2025 SLD 1607 = 2025 PTD 1078", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5UXk", - "Key Words:": "Key Issues:\nMaintainability of the Reference (Limitation & Authority):\nThe Collector of Customs filed the Reference within 90 days (as per Section 196), but it was returned for defects (unsigned memo, uncertified annexures).\nThe re-filed Reference was delayed by 21 days, making it time-barred (as per PLD 2020 SC 736 and other precedents).\nThe Collector did not sign the Reference, but the Supreme Court (in Civil Appeal No. 1172-1173/2012) held that if filed by an authorized counsel, it remains valid.\nSubstantive Legal Issues:\nDTRE Violations:\nThe company failed to achieve 15% value addition and misused duty-free imports (some materials were sold in the open market).\nUnaccounted imports (not reflected in sales tax returns) were detected.\nTribunals Decision:\nThe Tribunal partially allowed the appeal, setting aside the Collectors order for goods that were exported but remanded the case for the remaining goods.\nRespondents Objections:\nLimitation: The Reference was time-barred due to late re-filing.\nLack of Collectors Signature: The Collector did not sign the Reference, but the Supreme Courts ruling saved it.\nNon-Impleadment of Company: The company (M/s RG Match) was not made a respondent, but the Court held that since the Director (Syed Aftab-ul-Hassan) filed the appeal, the Reference was maintainable.\nCourts Decision:\nThe Reference was dismissed as time-barred (due to late re-filing).\nEven if not time-barred, the substantive issues (DTRE violations) would have required further adjudication on remand.\nKey Takeaways:\nStrict Adherence to Limitation Periods:\nSection 196 of the Customs Act mandates filing within 90 days; defects must be cured promptly to avoid dismissal.\nAuthority to File References:\nA Collectors signature is preferable, but a Reference filed by an authorized counsel (with proper vakalatnama) is valid.\nDTRE Compliance is Mandatory:\nFailure to meet 15% value addition or misuse of duty-free imports leads to duty/tax recovery and penalties.\nFinal Ruling:\n The Reference is dismissed as time-barred. ", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Custom Ref. No. 59-P/2019. Date of hearing: 05.06.2024. Date of judgment: 21.08.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IJAZ ANWAR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "For Respondents: Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad Maneri, Advocate.\nFor the Petitioner: Barrister Syed Mudassir Ameer, Advocate.\nThe Customs Reference was filed under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, challenging the judgment of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, Peshawar Bench, dated 18.12.2018. The dispute arose from an audit report concerning M/s RG Match Industries (Pvt) Ltd, which allegedly violated DTRE (Duty and Tax Remission for Exports) Rules by failing to meet the 15% value addition requirement and misusing duty-free imported raw materials.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COLLECTOR CUSTOMS, PESHAWAR - PETITIONER.\nV/S\nSYED AFTAB-UL-HASSAN - RESPONDENT." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26336", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1608 = 2025 SLD 1608 = 2025 PTD 1100", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTc", - "Key Words:": "The petitioner, a long-standing bidder in Customs auctions for over 22 years, challenged an order dated 01.08.2022 that barred him from participating in future auctions after he raised concerns about irregularities in the auction of Lot No. 100/21-22 (14,000 liters of foreign-origin cooking oil).\nKey Allegations by Petitioner:\nUnfair Auction Process:\nThe petitioner submitted a bid of Rs. 4,000,000, but the lot was allegedly sold secretly to another bidder for Rs. 2,530,000 a significant loss to the national exchequer.\nThe auction was initially withheld due to a court stay, yet the goods were later sold without transparency.\nRetaliatory Action:\nAfter filing a complaint, the petitioner was verbally abused and threatened by an Additional Deputy Collector to withdraw his complaint.\nInstead of investigating his grievance, the Customs Department blacklisted him from future auctions without due process.\nViolation of Fundamental Rights:\nThe impugned order violated:\nArticle 4 (Right to due process and protection of law).\nArticle 18 (Right to lawful profession/trade).\nArticle 25 (Equality before law).\nRespondents Defense:\nThe auction was conducted as per Rule 71 of Customs Rules, 2001.\nThe petitioner did not participate in the auction, and no bid from him was recorded.\nAn inquiry concluded that the petitioner was pressuring officials to accept lower bids, justifying his exclusion.\nCourts Findings:\nProcedural Irregularities in Auction:\nThe sale price (Rs. 2.53M) was significantly lower than the petitioners offer (Rs. 4M), raising suspicion of favoritism.\nRules 58, 61, and 66 of Customs Rules mandate transparency, public notice, and fair bidding none of which were followed.\nViolation of Natural Justice:\nThe petitioner was not given a fair hearing before being blacklisted.\nNo show-cause notice or inquiry report was provided to him.\nThe order was retaliatory, not based on proven misconduct.\nConstitutional Violations:\nThe order arbitrarily deprived the petitioner of his livelihood (Article 18).\nIt was discriminatory (Article 25) since no action was taken against others involved in the auction.\nCourts Decision:\nPetition ALLOWED.\nImpugned order (01.08.2022) SET ASIDE—declared unconstitutional, illegal, and void.\nCustoms Department directed to allow the petitioners participation in future auctions.\nKey Takeaways:\nGovernment auctions must be transparent & fair.\nBlacklisting requires due process (show-cause notice, hearing).\nCitizens cannot be penalized for exposing irregularities.\nFundamental rights (Articles 4, 18, 25) protect against arbitrary state action.\nFinal Ruling:\n The impugned order is quashed. The petitioner shall be allowed to bid in Customs auctions as before. ", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Hyderabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P No. D-175 of 2023. Date of Hearing & Decision: 11.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Mr. Justice Arbab Ali Hakro and Mr. Justice Riazat Ali Sahar", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner: Mirza Aslam Baig through Syed Babar Ali Kazmi, Advocate.\nRespondent No.1: Through Mr. Ghulam Abbas Sangi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.\nRespondents No. 2 to 4: Through Mr. Muhammad Nadeem Tagar, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MIRZA ASLAM BAIG \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN & OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26337", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1609 = 2025 SLD 1609 = 2025 PTD 1113 = 2025 PTCL 527", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTY", - "Key Words:": "The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority (KPRA) filed 9 consolidated references challenging the Appellate Tribunals orders that declared tax assessments time-barred under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013. The key issue was whether the limitation period for adjudication was correctly computed under Sections 40 and 68 of the Act.\nKey Legal Issues:\nApplicability of Sections 40 vs. 68:...\nSection 40 governs audit-based assessments (unlimited exclusion of adjournment time).\nSection 68 applies to default-based assessments (max 30-day exclusion for adjournments).\nThe Tribunal wrongly applied Section 68s 30-day cap to an audit case under Section 40, leading to an incorrect time-barred ruling.\nPrinciple of Limitation in Tax Law:\nLimitation ensures certainty and fairness but must align with legislative intent.\nMandatory vs. Directory Provisions:\nSection 40(4): No cap on adjournment exclusions Mandatory.\nSection 68(5): 30-day cap Mandatory (strict compliance required).\nSubstantive Justice vs. Procedural Compliance:\nThe Tribunal prioritized perceived fairness over statutory procedure, misapplying Section 68 to an audit case.\nCourts must balance justice but cannot override clear statutory limits.\nCourts Findings:\nTribunals Error:\nThe Show Cause Notices were issued post-audit (Section 40), but the Tribunal wrongly applied Section 68s 30-day rule.\nCorrect Approach: Under Section 40(4), all adjournment days (not just 30) should be excluded.\nAssessment Was Timely:\nIf adjournments (sought by taxpayers) are fully excluded, the adjudication falls within the 120-day limit.\nThe Tribunal erred in declaring it time-barred.\nRemand for Fresh Decision:\nThe Tribunal must recompute limitation under Section 40 (no 30-day cap) and decide on merits.\nFinal Decision:\nReferences ALLOWED.\nCases REMANDED to the Appellate Tribunal for fresh adjudication under correct legal framework (Section 40).\nKey Takeaways:\nAudit cases (Section 40) Default cases (Section 68) Different adjournment rules apply.\nTax authorities must strictly follow statutory procedures no equitable overrides.\nLimitation periods are mandatory; misapplication invalidates the decision.\nOrder:\nTribunal directed to exclude all adjournment days (no 30-day cap) and re-examine if assessment was timely.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022=71", - "Case #": "Sale Tax Reference No. 95-P of 2022. Date of hearing & order: 06.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ARBAB ALI HAKRO, JUSTICE AND RIAZAT ALI SAHAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Atif Rahim Burki for the petitioner.\nM/s Imran Javed, Shahid Jan and Nadia Gul, Advocates for the respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DIRECTOR GENERAL KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA REVENUE AUTHORITY, PESHAWAR.\nVS\nM/S BEE LINE, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26338", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1623 = 2025 SLD 1623 = (2025) 132 TAX 27", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTU", - "Key Words:": "Facts of the Case\nImpugned Notice:\nDated 18.01.2022\nIssued under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDirected PTCL to provide information for audit of Tax Year 2018.\nPetitioner’s Arguments:\nNotice is illegal, without jurisdiction, and in violation of Articles 4 & 10-A of the Constitution.\nClause 105A bars audit within four years after an audit has been conducted.\nPTCL’s last audit was for Tax Year 2014, concluded on 30.06.2019 → hence, audit of 2018 barred until 2023.\nClause 105A is beneficial legislation and should be applied retrospectively.\nNotice is non-speaking, arbitrary, and issued without application of judicial mind.\nRespondents’ Arguments:\nClause 105A applies only if audit conducted in Tax Year 2018 or later.\nPTCL’s last audit was for Tax Year 2014, which is outside the four-year exemption period.\nClause 105A came into force from 01.07.2022 (Tax Year 2023), so it does not affect an audit initiated in January 2022.\nAudit selection for Tax Year 2018 was within jurisdiction and lawful.\nIssues for Determination\nWhether Clause 105A applies to bar the audit of PTCL for Tax Year 2018.\nWhether Clause 105A has retrospective effect.\nWhether the completion date of the audit (2019) or the audit year itself (2014) is relevant for calculating the four-year exemption.\nCourt’s Findings\nMeaning of “preceding four tax years”:\nRefers to tax years in which audit was conducted, not the year audit was concluded.\nPTCL’s audit was for Tax Year 2014, so the preceding four years from 2018 (i.e., 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014) only include one audited year (2014).\nNo audit conducted in any of the four years preceding 2018, so Clause 105A exemption not applicable.\nRetrospective Application:\nNo express language in Clause 105A for retrospective effect.\nBeneficial legislation may be interpreted liberally, but retrospective application is only possible if curative/remedial or explicitly stated.\nClause 105A is prospective; it came into effect on 01.07.2022.\nSince the Impugned Notice was issued on 18.01.2022 (before Clause 105A’s enactment), PTCL cannot claim its benefit.\nFBR Circular & Sindh High Court Decision:\nFBR Circular dated 21.07.2022 (calculating four years from audit completion) was rejected by Sindh High Court as contrary to the Ordinance.\nOnly the audit year is relevant, not the completion date.\nPurpose of Audit Selection:\nSelection for audit is part of self-assessment checks to verify returns’ accuracy.\nMere selection for audit does not cause actionable injury.\nCited precedent: Commissioner Inland Revenue, Sialkot v. Allah Din Steel & Rolling Mills (2018 SCMR 1328).\nDecision\nPetition dismissed.\nClause 105A does not bar audit of PTCL for Tax Year 2018.\nAmendment applies prospectively from 01.07.2022.\nAudit selection was within lawful jurisdiction.\nKey Legal Principles Established\nClause 105A Interpretation: Four-year bar applies only if audit conducted within preceding four tax years, not based on audit completion date.\nProspective Application of Fiscal Laws: Unless expressly stated, amendments to tax statutes operate prospectively.\nAudit Selection Jurisdiction: Mere selection for audit is lawful and not a violation of taxpayer rights.\nJUDGMENT\nMUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, JUSTICE:-.-\n(1) The Petitioner [Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited], has filed the instant Writ Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (“Constitution”) challenging therein the Notice dated 18.01.2022 issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Audit-II), Large Taxpayers Office, Islamabad (“Respondent No. 1”).\n2. The brief facts giving rise to the filing of the instant Writ Petition are that on 18.01.2022, the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Respondent No.1) issued a notice (Impugned Notice”) ostensibly under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (“Ordinance of 2001”) wherein it was informed that Respondent No.1 intends to carry out an audit of Tax Year 2018 of the Petitioner, therefore, information listed in the impugned notice be provided to the Respondent No.1. Being aggrieved of the Impugned Notice, the Petitioner has filed the instant Writ Petition.\n3. The learned counsel for the Petitioner argued that the Impugned Notice is illegal, unlawful, ultra vires, of no legal effect, and without jurisdiction and hence is liable to be set aside; that the Impugned Notice is non-speaking, arbitrary, capricious and violative of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside; that the Impugned Notice has been issued without application of judicial mind, therefore, the same being arbitrary exercise of power is liable to be set aside; that it is evident from bare reading of Clause 105A of Part IV of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance that income tax affairs of a person cannot be audited for four years after an audit has been conducted; that the Petitioner’s audit was conducted for the tax year 2014 which concluded on 30.06.2019, therefore, audit of tax year 2018 cannot be undertaken by the Respondents, in view of Clause 105A of Part IV of the Second Schedule of the Ordinance of 2001 (“Clause 105A”); that even otherwise, the audit of the Petitioner for the tax year 2014 was concluded on 30.06.2019; that in view of Clause 105A, the audit of the Petitioner cannot be undertaken till the year 2023, therefore, Impugned Notice is without jurisdiction as the Respondents are barred from exercising jurisdiction in terms of Clause 105A; that it is settled law that an act which is without jurisdiction is malafide; that the Impugned Notice being without jurisdiction, suffers from malafide and is liable to be set aside; that the Impugned Notice is in violation of the Petitioner’s rights guaranteed under Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution. Lastly, the learned counsel prayed for declaring and setting aside the Impugned Notice as being illegal, unlawful, ultra vires the Constitution, without jurisdiction, and of no legal consequence. He also prayed that the Respondents be directed not to conduct audit of the Petitioner for four years in accordance with Clause 105A and to restrain from proceeding with the Impugned Notice till final disposal of the instant Writ Petition.\n4. On the other hand, the learned counsel on behalf of the Respondents argued that the Petitioner availed the opportunity to defend the initiation of audit proceedings vide its response dated 01.02.2022 and the Petitioner did not seek a personal hearing; that by operation of Clause 105A, a taxpayer would be exempted from provisions of Section 177 and 214C of the Ordinance of 2001 if their audit was conducted in the Tax Year 2018 onwards, however, the Petitioner’s audit was conducted in the Tax Year 2014, which falls beyond the scope and ambit of Clause 105A; that the Petitioner’s reliance on Clause 105A is based on an unsustainable and erroneous interpretation of law; that once initiated, audit proceedings cannot be quashed by retrospective operation in the absence of express language to that effect; that the Impugned Notice is not violative of law and is based on sound legal reasoning, which was already furnished to the Petitioner prior to its audit selection; that the Impugned Notice has been issued in accordance with the established legal position that ongoing audit proceedings, commenced in accordance with law, would not be affected by the enactment of Clause 105A; that Clause 105A was enacted with effect from 01.07.2022, which constitutes the Tax Year 2023; that upon plain reading of Clause 105A, it is evident that exemption thereunder would apply if audit proceedings were conducted for the Tax Years 2020, 2021, 2019 or 2018, however, the Petitioner’s last audit was conducted for the Tax Year, 2014, hence, it does not fall within the scope of Clause 105A; that the Petitioner’s audit selection for the Tax Year 2018 was in accordance with law and well within the jurisdiction of the Respondents. Lastly, the learned counsel prayed for the dismissal of the instant Writ Petition and for the issuance of direction to the Petitioner to participate effectively in the audit proceedings for the Tax Year 2018.\n5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the available record with their able assistance.\n6. The main contention of the Petitioner is that after the insertion of a new amendment under Clause 105A in the Second Schedule of the Ordinance of 2001, the Income Tax department cannot seek an audit of the Petitioner for the tax year 2018, on the ground that it’s a beneficial legislation and will effect retrospectively.\nFor ready reference, the newly amended Clause 105A is reproduced hereunder:—\n“(105A): The provisions of Section 177 and 214 C shall not apply to a person whose income tax affairs have been audited in any of the preceding four tax years:\nProvided that the commissioner may select a person under section 177 for audit with approval of the board.”\n7. This new clause 105A was inserted by the Finance Act, 2022. Meaning thereby that the audit of an income taxpayer cannot be audited in the tax years 2021, 2020, 2019, and 2018. The audit of the Petitioner has already been conducted for the tax year 2014, which culminated on 30.06.2019. Thus, according to the version of the Petitioner, given the new amendment, the audit of the tax year 2018 will be illegal and against the express provision of the Ordinance of 2001; that in light of FBR’s interpretation of Clause 105A ibid, the four years’ time is to be calculated from the year the audit proceedings culminated. The second point raised by the Petitioner is that the new amendment being beneficial legislation is to be given retrospective effect from the date of amendment, in favor of the taxpayer.\n8. The newly promulgated provision 105A in the Ordinance of 2001 is provided under the Chapter of exemptions from applicability of certain provisions, which reflects that it is a kind of concession or benefit and provides that audit under Section 177 and audit under Section 214C of the Ordinance of 2001 shall not apply to a person whose income tax affairs have been audited in any of the “preceding four tax years”. This clearly provided that the said exemption or concession is only available if the taxpayer has been audited in any of the preceding four tax years. The word “tax year” is defined under Section 74 (1) of the Ordinance of 2001, which is reproduced herein below:-\n“74. Tax year.- (1) For the purpose of this Ordinance and subject to this section, the tax year shall be a period of twelve months ending on the 30th day of June (hereinafter referred to as ‘normal tax year’) and shall, subject to sub-section (3), be denoted by the calendar year in which the said date falls.”\n9. The new amendment referred to “preceding four tax years” and it means that the audit of a particular tax year and not the date or year in which the audit is completed. Therefore, the Petitioner’s selection of audit for the tax year 2018 (notwithstanding its completion in the year 2019) would be of the tax year 2018 and not of the tax year 2019 to claim any benefit of Clause 105A ibid. It is immaterial when the audit is completed as it will remain an audit for a particular tax year and it is only that tax year (2014 in this matter) which is relevant for calculating the period of concession under Clause 105A ibid. The finalization of the audit in a particular tax year is not at all relevant nor is it provided in Clause 105A. The Circular dated 21.07.2022 issued by FBR, whereby an example is given that if an audit of a taxpayer for the tax year 2017 has been finalized in the tax year 2022, then the said taxpayer can only be audited again after four tax years i.e. in the tax year 2027, has been discarded by the Sindh High Court in Constitution Petition No.D-6280 of 2024 vide order dated 20.01.2025, as it conflicts with the main provision of law. Scrutiny of record of the Petitioner reflects that the audit for the tax year 2014 was conducted and concluded in the year 2019, meaning thereby that no audit/proceedings under Section 177 (1) were conducted for any of the preceding four tax years as per the mandate of Section 105A of the Ordinance of 2001, hence, the Petitioner cannot claim the benefit provided under the Finance Act, 2022.\n10. As far as the contention raised by the Petitioner’s counsel that the new amendment has a retrospective effect is concerned, it is to be mentioned here that in the absence of any indication of its retrospective operation, it must not be given retrospective effect. Generally, beneficial legislation is to be given liberal interpretation, however, for the said legislation to have a retrospective effect, the beneficial legislation must carry curative or remedial content. Such legislation must, therefore, either clarify an ambiguity or an omission in the existing law and must therefore be explanatory or clarificatory. In the instant case, there is no specific wording that the concession shall apply retrospectively; hence, it cannot be construed by any canon of interpretation that said amendments have a retrospective effect. Consequently, in the absence of any indication in the statute that the legislature intended for it to operate retrospectively, it must not be given retrospective effect. Reliance is placed on M/s RAJBY Industries Karachi and others versus Federation of Pakistan and others, 2023 SCMR 1407. In any case, the Impugned Notice was issued to the Petitioner on 18.01.2022, while the amendment of Section 105A in the Ordinance of 2001 was enacted with effect from 01.07.2022, hence, the Petitioner cannot benefit from the new amendment. Even otherwise, the enactments relating to fiscal statutes will be interpreted to apply prospectively, rather than retrospectively.\n11. In addition to the above, the power to select for audit through random or parametric balloting is provided under the law. More selection for audit does not cause any actionable injury to the taxpayer and the reason and objective for conducting an audit under a scheme of self-assessment is the regime provided by the Ordinance of 2001 to check the accuracy, truthfulness, and veracity of the returns filed by the taxpayers. Reliance is placed on Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Sialkot versus Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills, 2018 SCMR 1328.\nIn light of the above discussion, this petition, being devoid of any merits, is hereby dismissed.\nPetition dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=74,177,214C,Clause (105)of Part IV of Second Schedule", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 799 of 2023. decided on 26.03.2025. Date of hearing: 27.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Wasim Abid and Abuzar Salman Khan, Advocates for the Petitioner.\nMr. Tabar Afzal, Proxy counsel for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANY LIMITED\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE AUDIT-II, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26339", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1624 = 2025 SLD 1624 = 2025 SLD 1624 = (2025) 132 TAX 60", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTQ", - "Key Words:": "The petitioner challenged an interim order dated 07.08.2024 of the Appellate Tribunal, Punjab Revenue Authority (PRA), which required the deposit of 1/3rd of the disputed withholding tax within 30 days as a condition for stay.\nPetitioner’s Argument:\nThe Tribunal’s stay powers under Section 67(3) are unrestricted, and no condition like 1/3rd deposit should be imposed, especially without reasons.\nRespondent’s Argument:\nPetition is not maintainable under Article 199 due to an alternate remedy under Section 67A (Tax Reference). The order being interlocutory is not challengeable.\nCourt’s Findings:\nMaintainability: A Tax Reference lies only against final decisions; interim orders (like the impugned one) are not communicated under law and hence cannot be challenged via reference.\nArticle 199 Jurisdiction: Constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked in exceptional circumstances where no other remedy exists, especially where there is flagrant illegality or manifest injustice.\nMerits: The Appellate Tribunal failed to provide reasons for imposing the 1/3rd deposit condition and did not establish any basis of admission or legal requirement under Section 68.\nInterpretation of Section 68: The Court read down the provision to align with Article 10A (fair trial), holding that deposit can only be compelled where liability is admitted, determined by Tribunal, or based on settled law.\nFinal Decision:\nPetition Allowed.\nImpugned condition (deposit of 1/3rd tax) set aside as arbitrary and unlawful.\nDirection: Tribunal to decide the appeal within 90 days.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=35,67,67A,68", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 48782 of 2024. decided on 09.10.2024. Date of hearing: 23.09.2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: RAHEEL KAMRAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan, Advocate for the petitioner.\nMr. Abdul Muqtadir Khan, Advocate for the Respondents/PRA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAISALABAD ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD\nVs\nTHE CHAIRMAN PUNJAB REVENUE AUTHORITY, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26340", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1631 = 2025 SLD 1631 = 2025 SCMR 802", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TS8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(ii) & 452-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 237, 342 & 537-Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, ghayr-jaifah damiyah, ghayr-jaifah badiah and house-trespass-Re-appraisal of evidence-Right to a fair trial-Defective charge-Fact not confronted to accused-Grave procedural irregularity-Effect-Sentence reduced-Accused was convicted by Trial Court for committing three murders and was sentenced to death on three counts-Validity-Omission to frame a charge for a distinct offence is a substantial illegality, rendering the trial a nullity- Such omission is not a mere irregularity, that can be cured under section 537, Cr.P.C. rather, is a defect, that strikes at the root of proceedings, necessitating intervention to prevent miscarriage of justice-Procedural safeguard under section 342, Cr.P.C. ensures that accused is confronted with all incriminating evidence to afford him opportunity to explain circumstances against him-Omission to frame a charge , coupled with failure to put a material accusation to accused under section 342, Cr.P.C., was a grave procedural irregularity that could not be remedied under section 537, Cr.P.C., as it resulted in a fundamental breach of the right to a fair trial-In such mitigating circumstances imposition of maximum penalty was not warranted-Absence of a proven motive, coupled with circumstances indicating absence of premeditation, necessitated reconsideration of quantum of punishment-Accused was entitled to a lesser sentence, as Courts are obligated to ensure that punishment awarded is proportionate to facts and circumstances of case-Supreme Court maintained conviction of accused but converted sentence of death into imprisonment for life-Appeal was allowed.\nM. Younus Habib v. The State PLD 2006 SC 153; Arbab Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 755; Khan Zado v. The State 2015 PCr.LJ 1561; Noor Muhammad Khatti v. The State 2005 PCr.LJ 1889; Md. Mosaddar Hoque v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131; Zahid Shahzad v. The State 1981 PCr.LJ 844; Nemai Adak v. The State AIR 1965 Cal 89; Istahar Khondkar v. Emperor AIR 1936 Cal 796; Muhammad Akram alias Akrai v. The State 2019 SCMR 610 and Ghulam Rasool v. The State 2025 SCMR 74 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Sentence, quantum of-Death sentence, commuted to imprisonment for life-Principle-If offence resulted from a spontaneous altercation rather than a premeditated act, death sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 2023, order dated: 7th March, 2025, hearing date: 20th February, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 31.01.2018 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench in Crl.A. No. 132-A of 2013 with Murder Reference No. 87-A of 2013).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nKausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General for the State.\nComplainant in person.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHABEER ALI ............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nThe STATE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26341", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1632 = 2025 SLD 1632 = 2025 SCMR 905", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TSs", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss.302(b) & 302(c)-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.7(a)-Qatl-i-amd and terrorism-Re-appraisal of evidence-Right of self-defence-Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to death-Plea raised by accused was that he had acted in his right of self-defence-Validity-Only consideration for self-defence is that a person threatened with danger of injury should not exceed the limits fixed by law-This depends upon reasonable apprehension of danger to the person under particular circumstances of the case-Reasonableness of apprehension is a question of fact which depends upon weapon used, the manner of using it, the nature of assault or other surrounding circumstances-There were three fire shots on the person of deceased who was not holding any weapon-Accused exceeded his right of self-defence, therefore, provision of section 302(c), P.P.C., was not attracted-Supreme Court considering the mitigating circumstances, reduced the sentence of death to imprisonment for life and set aside conviction and sentence awarded under section 7(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997-Appeal was allowed.\nGhulam Hussain and others v. The State and others PLD 2020 SC 61; Waris Ali and 5 others v. The State 2017 SCMR 1572; Faiz v. State 1983 SCMR 76; Sultan Khan v. Sher Khan PLD 1991 SC 520 and Shabbir Ahmads case PLD 1995 SC 343 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Cr.A. No. 623 of 2022 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 867 of 2019, order dated: 24th February, 2025, hearing date: 24th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 30.05.2019 passed in Cr.A No.129-T of 2013 with Murder Reference No. 01-T of 2013, by the Islamabad High Court Islamabad).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Umer Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court along with Dawood Akhtar, brother of appellant for Appellant.\nMs. Chand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASIM ............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nThe STATE and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26342", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1633 = 2025 SLD 1633 = 2025 SCMR 819", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-\n-Ss. 4 & 5-Service Tribunal, duties of-Pro forma promotion-Retirement of civil servant-Grievance of civil servant was that his case for promotion to BS-22 was placed before High Power Selection Board but due to paucity of time matter could not be decided and before next meeting he had retired from service-Directions issued by Service Tribunal were not complied with by the authorities-Validity-Federal Service Tribunal is the first judicial fact finding forum provided for civil servants, to ensure implementation of its orders/ judgments, come what may, unless it is set aside by Supreme Court-It is the function of Federal Service Tribunal to execute its orders and judgments in letter and spirit-To ensure timely and proper execution and implementation of its judgments and orders, Federal Service Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under section 5 of Service Tribunals Act, 1973, is always deemed to be a Civil Court with all powers as are vested in such Court under Civil Procedure Code,1908 for execution-In case of delay or evasion, Service Tribunal should take all necessary steps to enforce compliance with its judgments and orders to alleviate suffering of recipient of judgment or order, rather than divesting itself of jurisdiction or simply disposing of miscellaneous petition of civil servant without ensuring proper implementation-Supreme Court set aside order passed by Service Tribunal and remanded the matter to High Power Selection Board to consider case of civil servant for proforma promotion to BS-22-Appeal was allowed.\n(b) Maxim-\n-Interest republicaeut sit finis litium-Connotation-It is in the interest of State that there should be an end to litigation.\nRavinder Kaur v. Ashok Kumar AIR 2004 SC 904 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 44 of 2022, order dated: 14th January, 2025, hearing date: 14th January, 2025.\n(On appeal against order dated 17.11.2021 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Misc. Petition No. 241 of 2019 in Appeal No. 3124(R)CS of 2012).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Habib Ahmed Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nAshiq Mahmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.\nRana Asadullah Khan, Additional Advocate General for Pakistan along with Sajid-ul-Hassan, S.O., Establishment on Court Notice.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AHMED OWAIS PEERZADA, CHIEF COMMISSIONER (RTD) FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION, ISLAMABAD ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nPRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT, ISLAMABAD and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26343", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1634 = 2025 SLD 1634 = 2025 SCMR 830", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TTg", - "Key Words:": "Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)-\n-S. 23-Acquisition of land-Compensation-Object, purpose and scope-Authorities were aggrieved of enhancing of compensation in favour of respondents/landowners by Referee Court and the same was maintained by High Court-Validity-Compensation is a very wide term, indicating that land owners, for various reasons, are to be compensated and not merely paid price of land which is just an interaction of supply and demand fixed between a willing buyer and a willing seller-Mere classification or nature of land, can be taken as a relevant consideration for the purposes of determining compensation but it is not an absolute one-Factors such as location, neighbourhood, potentiality or other benefits cannot be disregarded either-Place and situation of acquired land are paramount considerations that must be accorded due and thoughtful attention in the fair assessment of compensation-Supreme Court declined to interfere in compensation assessed and determined by Referee Court as the same was just and reasonable and the Court had adverted to every aspect of the case and advanced valid and cogent reasons in support of its findings-Appeal was dismissed.\nAsad Ali and others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Mst Iqbal Begum and others PLD 2010 SC 719; The Province of Sindh v. Ramzan and others PLD 2004 SC 512; Malik Aman and others v. Land Acquisition Collector and others PLD 1988 SC 32; Fazalur Rahman and others v. General Manager, SIDB and another PLD 1986 SC 158; NWFP through Collector, Abbottabad Land Acquisition and others v. Haji Ali Asghar Khan and others 1985 SCMR 767; Land Acquisition Collector Abbottabad and others v. Muhammad Iqbal and others 1992 SCMR 1245; Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. v. Province of NWFP and 3 others 1993 SCMR 1700; Murad Khans case 1999 SCMR 1647 and Nisar Ahmad Khan and others v. Collector Land Acquisition, Swabi and others PLD 2002 SC 25 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 119-L of 2022 and 3952 of 2022, order dated: 6th March, 2025, hearing date: 6th March, 2025.\n(Against judgments dated 20.09.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in R.F.As. Nos. 77386 and 54663 of 2021).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shakeel Ahmad and Aamer Farooq, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Masood Ghani, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab (in C.A. No. 119-L of 2022, as well as for the respondents in C.A. No. 3952 of 2022) along with Zakir Shah, Senior Law Officer, CNW for Appellants.\nSyed Iqbal Hussain Gillani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 119-L of 2022 as well as for the appellant in C.A. No. 3952 of 2022) (via video link from Lahore).", - "Petitioner Name:": "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through District Collector/ District Officer (Rev), Lahore and others -Appellants\nVS\nMalik ABDUL LATIF AMAR ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26344", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1635 = 2025 SLD 1635 = 2025 SCMR 835", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TXo", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302 (b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Confession of co-accused-Exculpatory statement-Benefit of doubt-Five persons were alleged to have been involved in the case but four were acquitted of the charge-Accused was convicted for committing qatl-i-amd and sentenced to imprisonment for life by Trial Court on the basis of exculpatory confession of one co-accused who appeared as prosecution witness-Validity-Exculpatory confession of co-accused who appeared as prosecution witness was recorded on 19-12-2011 while he was arrested on 13-12-2011-Exculpatory statement was not believed to the extent of co-accused himself, who had been acquitted by Trial Court-Such exculpatory confession which had not been taken into consideration for conviction against its maker, i.e. the co-accused, could not be used against accused-On the basis of same evidence, four co-accused persons had already been acquitted and no appeal had been filed by complainant or the State-Supreme Court extended benefit of doubt to accused, set aside conviction and sentence awarded by Trial Court and acquitted him of the charge, as there was no independent corroboration of evidence to his extent-Appeal as allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Crl. A. No. 429 of 2022, order dated: 19th February, 2025, hearing date: 19th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 09.12.2016 passed by Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Crl. A. No. 119 of 2015).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nChand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor General along with Complainant for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAJJAD KHAN alias Shahzad Khan ............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nThe STATE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26345", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1636 = 2025 SLD 1636 = 2025 SCMR 838", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5TXk", - "Key Words:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S.497-Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss. 20 & 21-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Sexual harassment and blackmailing-Bail, grant of-Case not falling in prohibitory clause-Complainant alleged sexual harassment and blackmailing against her husband on the basis of sharing her objectionable images on social media-Trend of such like activities is rising pointing towards deterioration of cultural values-Duty is cast upon Court to see whether from the facts and peculiar circumstances a case of bail is made out-Offences alleged in F.I.R. fell outside prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. and maximum punishment of imprisonments for them were five years and three years respectively-Accused was behind the bars for the last 2-3 months-Grant of bail in such-like cases was a rule and refusal was an exception-Supreme Court granted bail to accused as no exceptional circumstances were pointed out to refuse concession of bail-Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 94 of 2025, order dated: 21st February, 2025, hearing date: 21st February, 2025.\n(On appeal against the order dated 22.01.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Crl. Misc. No. 10453-B of 2024).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Ahmad Mahmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nRashdeen Nawaz Kasuri, Addl. AGP and Adnan Ali, S.I. for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed MUHAMMAD ALI JAFERI ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nThe STATE and another ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26346", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1637 = 2025 SLD 1637 = 2025 SCMR 841", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STc", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 8, 42 & 54- Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.100-Suit for possession, declaration and partition-Thirty years old document-Presumption of genuineness............. Appellant(S)/plaintiff claimed to be owner of suit property on the basis of gift made by her aunt in his favour-Aunt of appellant/plaintiff was owner on the basis of dower deed, which was a thirty years old document-Suit was dismissed by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same in favour of appellant/plaintiff-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction restored judgment and decree passed by Trial Court in favour of respondent/defendant-Validity-Dower deed which was more than thirty years old had presumption of genuineness, but such presumption was always rebuttable by the party questioning genuineness thereof-Unsuspicious character of a document, its proper custody and other circumstances are the foundation to raise presumption of its execution-If prima facie dispute to its execution and proper custody is raised then it becomes duty of Court to determine the question of its genuineness-Donor was unable to satisfy through reliable evidence that by virtue of a dower deed, title of house was conveyed to his aunt-It might have been several years old instrument but that alone could not succeed if doubt was created about genuineness of document-Corroborative evidence should have been made available before Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court-Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction to re-appraise evidence for another view-Judgment exercised by Revisional Court and conclusion drawn was the outcome of evidence available on record-Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by Trial Court-Appeal was dismissed.\nAllah Ditta v. Aimna Bibi 2011 SCMR 1483 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 156-P of 2013, order dated: 24th February, 2025, hearing date: 24th February, 2025.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 27.05.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Civil Revision No. 1211 of 2011).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Waheed, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shah Faisal Nasapi, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nZia-ur-Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ISRAR ............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nJEHANZEB and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26347", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1638 = 2025 SLD 1638 = 2025 SCMR 844", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STY", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 120-B, 302, 324, 435 & 436-Criminal conspiracy, qatl-i-amd, attempt to qatl-i-amd and causing damage to property-Re-appraisal of evidence-Suicide bombing-Location of prosecution witnesses- Benefit of doubt-Accused was alleged to be a suicide bomber wearing explosive jacket and was apprehended from the place of occurrence where two suicide bombers had already detonated themselves-Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death-Validity-Suicide bomber, who had detonated explosives, had also used pellets which had caused severe injuries to several innocent victims in a large radius-There was no explanation as to how complainant and six officials accompanying him, and the accused and two unidentified co-accused remained unharmed-Presence of witnesses at crime scene was not proved through unimpeachable evidence, nor the fact that accused was apprehended in the manner as was deposed by prosecution witnesses-Accused and complainant, who were 30 paces from the suicide bomber when the explosion took place, could not remain unscathed, and in such a situation of extreme distress and commotion, no one could identify or apprehend another person wearing a jacket laden with explosives-It was an incident in which impact and its harm was seen much further than thirty paces-Prosecution did not bring on record any evidence to establish that accused was a member of proscribed organization or that he was motivated by or was working for a terrorist group-Prosecution failed to discharge its obligation of proving guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentences handed down by Trial Court and upheld by High Court and acquitted the accused from all charges framed against him by extending benefit of doubt to him as of right-Appeal was allowed.\nAyub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048; Muhammad Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1731; Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Abdul Qadeer v. The State 2024 SCMR 1146 and Muhammad Zaman v. The State 2014 SCMR 749 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 2021, order dated: 14th January, 2025, hearing date: 14th January, 2025.\n(Against judgment dated 01.02.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Crl. A. No. 62 of 2011 and S.C.R. No. 01-T of 2011).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Athar Minallah, Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nSajjad Hussain, Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAMEEDULLAH ............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nThe STATE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26348", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1639 = 2025 SLD 1639 = 2025 SCMR 851", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STU", - "Key Words:": "Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-\n-S. 5, Sched.-Land in lieu of dower money-Scope-Concurrent findings of facts by three Courts below................... APPELLANT/defendant was aggrieved of judgments and decrees passed by all Courts below declaring respondent/plaintiff as owner of land in question given to her by her deceased husband in lieu of dower money during his life time-Validity-There was no dispute with regard to relationship between respondent/plaintiff and her deceased husband-Scriber affirmed that agreement of suit land was reduced into writing as per the directions of deceased husband of respondent / plaintiff, who at that time had also confirmed handing over possession of suit property in her favour, in presence of marginal witnesses who had endorsed signing of the agreement and had also verified the same to be genuine-High Court had rightly dealt with the question of jurisdiction, exercised by Family Court, in an elaborate and eloquent manner which suffered from no defect-Supreme Court declined to interfere with concurrent findings recorded by three Courts below-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nFozia Mazhar v. Additional District Judge, Jhang and others PLD 2024 SC 771 and Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and another v. Messrs Rashid Builders (Pvt.) Limited 2024 SCMR 1816 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3455-L of 2022, order dated: 3rd March, 2025, hearing date: 3rd March, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 07.9.2022 passed by Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench in W.P. No. 6902 of 2013).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, CJ, Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Ozair Chughtai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link, Lahore).\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AJMAL and others -Petitioners\nVS\nMst. NOOR KHATOON and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26349", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1640 = 2025 SLD 1640 = 2025 SCMR 856", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STQ", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Punishment of Qisas not applicable-Grave and sudden provocation-Accused was convicted under section 302(b), P.P.C. for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to imprisonment for life-Validity-It could not be ruled out that one of the deceased had created a situation of sudden provocation due to which the case fell under section 302(c), P.P.C.-Law maker had left it to the Court to decide on a case to case basis depending upon gravity and intensity of provocation and the time taken for reaction-It was a case of spontaneous reaction and accused was rightly convicted, however, his case was to be considered within the frame of section 302(c), P.P.C.-Supreme Court converted conviction of accused awarded under section 302(b), P.P.C. into one under section 302(c),P.P.C. and his sentence of imprisonment for life on two counts was reduced to imprisonment for fourteen years-Appeal was allowed.\nState v. Muhammad Hanif and 5 others 1992 SCMR 2047 and Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad PLD 1996 SC 274 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 344 of 2018, order dated: 5th March, 2025, hearing date: 5th March, 2025.\n(Against the order dated 16.11.2017 of the Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench passed in Criminal Appeal No. 73-D of 2016).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmed Ali, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nSyed Kauser Ali Shah, Additional Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.\nSaleem Ullah Ranazai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MEHBOOB ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nThe STATE and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26350", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5SS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1641 = 2025 SLD 1641 = 2025 SCMR 860", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5SS8", - "Key Words:": "Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 42 & 54-Suit for declaration and injunction-Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below-Revisional jurisdiction of High Court, exercise of-Principle-Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was dismissed by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court on the ground that they could not prove their relationship with deceased allottee of suit property-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below-Validity................... RESPONDENTS/plaintiffs could not establish and prove their relationship with allottee of suit land by leading confidence inspiring, trustworthy and independent evidence-Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was rightly dismissed by Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court and High Court had wrongly evaluated evidence on record while setting aside concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below-High Court had ample powers to undo and disturb concurrent findings of Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. but if the same were found to be based on any illegality or irregularity and wrong exercise of jurisdiction-No such occasion was available with High Court; therefore, when position was as such, concurrent findings of two Courts on facts should not have been interfered with-Supreme Court set aside judgment and decree passed by High Court and restored those of Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court-Appeal was allowed.\nMuhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 and Mst. Khair-Ul-Nisa and 6 others v. Malik Muhammad Ishaque and 2 others PLD 1972 SC 25 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No. 151-P of 2013 and C.M.As. Nos. 11-P of 2014, 213-P of 2017, 530-P of 2018 and 2570 of 2024, order dated: 21st February, 2025, hearing date: 21st February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment and decree dated 21.01.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench passed in C.R. No. 52 of 2009).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Waheed, Shahid Bilal Hassan and Aamer Farooq, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (for appellants and applicants in C.M.A. No. 11-P of 2014) (via video-link from Peshawar).\nSyed Abid Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for applicant(s) (in C.M.A. No. 213-P of 2017).\nAhmed Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for applicant(s) (in C.M. Nos. 530-P of 2018 and 2570 of 2024).\nSyed Mastan Ali Shah Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 6.\nRashdeen Nawaz Kasuri, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan on Court's call.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Rana MUHAMMAD YAMEEN and another -Appellants\nVS\nMUHAMMAD JAMIL (decd.) through L.Rs. and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26351", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5SSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1642 = 2025 SLD 1642 = 2025 SCMR 868", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5SSs", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22-High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Volume III, Chapter 11, Part-C-Police Rules 1934, Volume 3, Chapter 26, R. 26.32-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Identification parade-Accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amd and were sentenced to death-Validity-Separate statements of witnesses were not recorded by Magistrate who conducted identification parade-Prosecution witness who identified accused persons by their names, had come to know about the names when Magistrate called accused persons by their names-Magistrate admitted that the witness did not identify any of the accused with their specific role at the time of occurrence-Other prosecution witnesses also did not identify nor mention specific roles of accused persons-For proper dispensation of justice while carrying out identification parades, parameters as enshrined under Article 22 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 read with Volume III of Chapter 11, Part-C of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders and Rule 26.32 of Chapter 26, Volume 33 of Police Rules, 1934 had to be fulfilled-Prosecution failed to discharge its initial burden to prove case against accused beyond shadow of doubt-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and acquitted accused persons of the charge-Appeal was dismissed.\nKanwar Anwaar Ali v. The State PLD 2019 SC 488; Subha Sadiq v. The State 2025 SCMR 50; Abdul Samad v. The State 2025 SCP 31; Abdul Hayee and Abdullah alias Ghazali and another v. The State 2025 SCMR 281 and Syed Fida Hussain Shah v. The State 2024 SCMR 1622 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 282-L of 2020 and Criminal Petition No. 461-L of 2015, hearing date: 18th February, 2025.\n(Against the order dated 02.02.2015 of the Lahore Multan Bench passed in Crl.A. No. 39 of 2010-ATA, Crl. Revision No. 405 of 2010-ATA and CSR. No. 8 of 2010).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Ayesha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nSajjad Hussain Bhatti, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.\nMuhammad Usman, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "RASHID and others -Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26352", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1643 = 2025 SLD 1643 = 2025 SCMR 880", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 154-First Information Report-Scope-Prosecutions story is foundation on which entire edifice of case is built and occupies a crucial status-Such story should stand to reason and must be natural, convincing and free from any inherent improbability-It is neither safe to believe such story of prosecution which does not meet such requirements nor prosecutions case based on improbable story can sustain conviction of accused.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 365-A-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(e)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)-Abduction for ransom-Re-appraisal of evidence-Payment of ransom-Proof-Description and denominations of currency notes-Withholding of evidence-Presumption-Accused persons were convicted and sentenced for abduction for ransom and sentenced to imprisonment for life-Validity-Complainant did not furnish detailed description of currency notes and their denominations which had raised questions regarding authenticity of payment of ransom as claimed by the complainant-Failure to provide specific details about ransom money, such as denomination and serial numbers, diminishes reliability of entire ransom allegation-Prosecutions failure to identify the place where ransom money was paid had created doubt in prosecutions case-Prosecution witnesses in whose presence ransom amount were paid to abductors were abandoned-Persons from whom complainant allegedly managed/collected ransom amount were neither cited as prosecutions witnesses nor produced in witness box-Testimony of witnesses who were present at critical moments of crime, such as payment of ransom, was inevitable for corroborating complainants narrative-Failure to produce such witnesses had cast doubt on veracity of complainants version and raised reasonable suspicion about nature of the incident-Non-production of such material witnesses also amounted to withholding of best available evidence, therefore, adverse inference within the meaning of Article 129 (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was drawn against prosecution that had those witnesses been produced they would not have supported prosecutions case-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons and they were acquitted of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nMst. Saima Noreen v. The State 2024 SCMR 1310 rel.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Benefit of doubt-Scope-When case of the prosecution is found to be doubtful, then every doubt, even the slightest one, is to be resolved in favour of accused.\nMuhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Abdul Jabbar v. The State and another 2019 SCMR 129 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 679 of 2020, order dated: 4th March, 2025, hearing date: 4th March, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 24.05.2016, passed by the learned Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 290-J of 2013).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Basharatullah Khan and Muhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for appellants.\nNemo for the Complainant.\nMs. Memoona Ihsan ul Haq, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD QASIM and others -Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26353", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1644 = 2025 SLD 1644 = 2025 SCMR 888", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5STg", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302 (b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Absconsion-Post mortem report-Scope-Benefit of doubt-Accused was convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to death but High Court converted death sentence into imprisonment for life-Validity-Mere absconsion cannot by itself form sole basis of conviction-Absconsion may be treated as a corroborative piece of evidence, but it cannot be read in isolation, nor can it compensate for inherent defects and shortcomings in prosecutions case-Post-mortem report merely confirms cause of death, nature of injuries, and kind of weapon used but does not, in any matter, establish identity of assailant-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused, as the prosecution had failed to establish charge against him beyond reasonable doubt-Accused was acquitted of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nSalman Akram Raja v. Government of Punjab 2013 SCMR 203; Ali Haider alias Pappu v. Jameel Hussain and others PLD 2021 SC 362; Basharat and another v. The State 1995 SCMR 1735; Rohtas Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 566 and Muhammad Khan v. State 1999 SCMR 1220 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 441 of 2017, order dated: 10th March, 2025, hearing date: 10th March, 2025.\n(Against judgments dated 13.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Cr.A. No. 34 of 2013 and M.R. No. 7 of 2013).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Athar Minallah, Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MASOOD alias Mithu ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nThe STATE and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26354", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5SXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1645 = 2025 SLD 1645 = 2025 SCMR 894", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5SXo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Multiple murders-Phenomena of substitution-Accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amdof five persons and were sentenced to death-Validity-Presence of complainant and other eyewitnesses at the scene of crime on the day of incident remained undisputed-Accused persons failed to provide any plausible reason for their alleged false implication in the case while allowing actual perpetrators to escape justice-Accused persons committed a brutal and ruthless act by murdering five members of same family over a land dispute-Crime was premeditated and carried out in cold blood-Supreme Court declined to commute death sentence to life imprisonment as accused persons were not so entitled due to severity and deliberate nature of offense-Appeal was dismissed.\nMuhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shehzad 2024 SCMR 51; Khadim Hussain v. The State 2010 SCMR 1090; Muhammad Afzal v. The State 2017 SCMR 1645; Munir Ahmad v. The State 2019 SCMR 79; Muhammad Makki v. The State 2021 SCMR 1672; Sardar alias Sadaruddin v. The State Criminal Jail Appeal No. S-26 of 2019; Amanullah Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 527; Muhammad Abbas v. The State 2023 SCMR 487; Nasir Ahmed v. The State 2023 SCMR 478; Muhammad Usama v. The State 2022 SCMR 2143; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2022 SCMR 2024; Makeen Ullah v. The State 2017 SCMR 1662; Mst Razia alias JIA v. The State 2009 SCMR 14; Liaquat Ali v. The State 2009 SCMR 91; Dilbar Masih v. The State 2006 SCMR 1801; Kausar Irshad v. The State 1998 SCMR 1148; Taj Muhammad v. The State 1990 SCMR 416; Khairu and another v. The State 1981 SCMR 1136; Haji v. The State 2010 SCMR 650; Nasir Ahmed v. The State 2023 SCMR 478 and Muhammad Hayat and another v. The State 2021 SCMR 92 rel.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Motive-Scope-Motive holds even greater value in cases of direct evidence, and hits the last hammer in support of the prosecution at its conclusion.\nMaqbool Ahmed Case 1992 SCMR 2279 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeals Nos. 229 and 230 of 2021, order dated: 25th February, 2025, hearing date: 25th February, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgments dated 01.02.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Murder References Nos. 36 of 2014, 105 of 2009 and Crl.A. No. 10-J of 2014 and Crl.As. Nos. 14-J, 81 and 96 of 2009).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Basharatullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nRai Akhtar Hussain, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.\nSheikh Ahsan-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant (in Crl. A. 229 of 2021) and Nemo (in Crl. A. 230 of 2021).\nAssistance by Muhammad Subhan Malik (Judicial Law Clerk).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHER AFZAL and another -Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26355", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5SXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1646 = 2025 SLD 1646 = 2025 SCMR 993", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5SXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 367(5)-Qatl-i-amd-Quantum of sentence-Determining factor-Expression having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case is of significance in the context of exercising discretion by Court in handing down one of the two prescribed punishments-If accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death and Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, then under S. 367(5), Cr.P.C. the reason why sentence of death was not passed has to be recorded in the judgment.\nDadullah and another v. The State 2015 SCMR 856; Khurram Malik and others v. The State and others PLD 2006 SC 354; Muhammad Aslam and another v. The State 2007 SCMR 1412; Ms. Najiba and another v. Ahmed Sultan and others 2001 SCMR 988; Khalid Mehmood and others v. The State 2011 SCMR 664; Asad Mahmood v. Akhlaq Ahmed and another 2010 SCMR 868 and Nadeem alias Nanha alias Billa Sher v. The State 2010 SCMR 949 rel.\n(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Mitigating circumstances-Motive not proved-Effect-Accused and three co-accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for committing Qatl-i-amd of wife of accused and were sentenced to imprisonment for life-High Court acquitted three co-accused persons while sentence of accused was enhanced to death-Validity-Factum of motive was not proved by prosecution by bringing on record reliable and confidence inspiring evidence-All mitigating factors justified not handing down the sentence of death-Trial Court mentioned mitigating factors which had led to awarding sentence of life imprisonment-High Court had erroneously assumed that Trial Court did not record reasons-High Court enhanced sentence because, in its opinion, a harsher sentence should have been awarded-Supreme Court maintained conviction of accused as the prosecution had proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt but sentence of death was reduced to imprisonment for life as awarded by Trial Court-Appeal was partly allowed.\nDilawar Hussain v. The State 2013 SCMR 1582; Hassan and others v. The State and others PLD 2013 SC 793; Ghulam Mohyuddin alias Haji Babu and others v. The State 2014 SCMR 1034; Muhammad Asif v. Muhammad Akhtar 2016 SCMR 2035; Zafar Iqbal v. The State 2017 SCMR 1721; Hassan v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793; Abdul Haque v. The State PLD 1996 SC 1; Amjad Shah v. The State PLD 2017 SC 152 and Haji Muhammad Ilahi and others v. Muhammad Altaf alias Tedi and others 2011 SCMR 513 rel.\n(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-\n-S. 417-Appeal against acquittal-Scope of interference with acquittal is narrow-There is a heavy burden on prosecution as there is a presumption of double innocence.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 530 of 2022, order dated: 29th January, 2025, hearing date: 29th January, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 12.10.2022 of the High Court of Sindh Circuit Court Hyderabad passed in Crl. A. No. D-118 of 2020).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ghulam Sajjad Gopang and Qari Abdul Rasheed, Advocates Supreme Court for Appellant.\nGhulam Shabbir Shar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant (though video link from Karachi)\nSaleem Akhtar, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FIDA HUSSAIN alias Saboo ............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nThe STATE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26356", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1647 = 2025 SLD 1647 = 2025 SCMR 912", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTc", - "Key Words:": "(a) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)-\n-S. 47-Registered sale deed- Scope- Sale gets completed on the day of execution of sale deed and not on the day of registration of the same.\n(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)-\n-Ss. 13 & 31(d)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Limitation-Registered sale deed-Petitioners/pre-emptors filed suit for pre-emption when mutation was attested after registration of sale deed-Trial Court decreed the suit but Lower Appellate Court and High Court concurrently dismissed the suit-Validity-Subsequent attestation of mutation did not give rise to a fresh cause of action in favour of petitioners/pre-emptors-Sale in question was completed but petitioners/pre-emptors failed to file their pre-emption suit under section 31(d) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987-Suit of petitioners/plaintiffs was rightly dismissed by two Courts below as it was barred by limitation-Petitioners/pre-emptors had knowledge of sale much prior to alleged date of knowledge as shown in suit-Such blunder was a stumbling block in the way of petitioners/pre-emptors to exercise their right of pre-emption-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by High Court and Lower Appellate Court, as petitioners/pre-emptors failed to establish their first jumping demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat and such deficiency alone was sufficient to disentitle them from exercise of their right of pre-emption-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nJangi v. Jhanda and others PLD 1961 (W.P) Baghdad-ul-Jadid 34; Muhammad Amin Khan v. Mst. Parveen Ramzan and others PLD 1998 SC 1506; Muhammad Tariq and others v. Mst. Shamsa Tanveer and others PLD 2011 SC 151 and Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs. and others PLD 2007 SC 302 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 331-P of 2014, order dated: 2nd December, 2024, hearing date: 2nd December, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 03.03.2014, passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Civil Revision No. 544 of 2005).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Peshawar).\nMian Mohibullah Kakakhel, Advocate Supreme Court and Saif Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Peshawar).", - "Petitioner Name:": "Nawabzada MUHAMMAD FATEH KHAN ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nMUMTAZ AHMAD and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26357", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1649 = 2025 SLD 1649 = 2025 SCMR 918", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTU", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Recovery-Effect-Judicial confession-Proof-Benefit of doubt-Accused persons were convicted for qatl-i-amd-Male accused was sentenced to death while the female accused was sentenced to imprisonment for life-Validity-Recovery of Chaddar on pointing out of female accused was not stained with any incriminating material, like blood, froth, etc. of deceased-No Forensic Science Laboratory report was available on record regarding the Chaddar, which was available in every house-Recovery of Chaddar was not sufficient to connect accused persons with alleged offense-Prosecution also produced evidence of torn shirt of female accused from her possession, which was allegedly torn during the occurrence but no such statement was made by sole eyewitness that during the occurrence shirt of female accused was torn who had changed the shirt after the occurrence-Such recoveries were inconsequential for the prosecution-There was no independent corroboration of judicial confession of accused persons-Evidence of sole eyewitness was not worthy of reliance-Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused persons beyond shadow of doubt-If there was a single circumstance which had created doubt in prosecution case, the same was sufficient to acquit accused persons-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons as there were number of circumstances which had created serious doubts in prosecutions story-Resultantly accused persons were acquitted of the charge by extending them the benefit of doubt-Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 647 of 2022, order dated: 26th February, 2025, hearing date: 26th February, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 24.04.2019 passed by the learned Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Appeal No. 330-P of 2018 and Murder Reference No. 13 of 2018).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.\nSyed Kausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMRAN and another -Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26358", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1650 = 2025 SLD 1650 = 2025 SCMR 923", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Maxim-\n-Communi observantia non set recedendum-Connotation-When law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, the same must be done accordingly and if prescribed procedure is not followed, it would be presumed that the same had not been done in accordance with law.\nNoman Mansoor v. State PLD 2024 SC 805; Ahmed Ali v. State 2023 SCMR 781; Ameer Zeb v. State PLD 2012 SC 380 and Muhammad Hashim v. State PLD 2004 SC 856 rel.\n(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-\n-S. 9(c)-Police Rules, 1934, R. 22.70, Register No. XIX-Recovery of narcotic substance-Re-appraisal of evidence-Safe custody and transmission of case property-Collective forensic report of all samples-Accused was arrested for recovery of 100 packets of charas, weighing 100 grams each-Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused to imprisonment for life-Validity-Safe custody and safe transmission of alleged drug from the spot of recovery till its receipt by Narcotic Testing Laboratory were not satisfactorily established-It was mandated in Police Rules, 1934 that case property must be kept in Malkhana and entry of the same must be recorded in Register No. XIX of that police station-It was duty of police and prosecution to establish that case property was kept in safe custody, and if required to be sent to any laboratory for analysis, to further establish its safe transmission and also record it in the relevant register, including road certificate etc.-Procedure in Police Rules, 1934 ensured that case property, when it was produced before Court, had remained in safe custody and was not tampered with until that time-Complete mechanism was provided in Police Rules, 1934 regarding safe custody and safe transmission of case property to concerned laboratory and then to Trial Court-Each sample was to be tested separately and individual reports must be prepared for each sample-Collective forensic report not only diminished credibility of chemical examination but also raised serious questions regarding representative nature of samples sent for analysis-In the present case. there were serious procedural violations, absence of credible forensic evidence and failure to establish safe custody and transmission-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused as prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and accused was acquitted of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nAmeer Zeb v. State PLD 2012 SC 380; Asif Ali v. State 2024 SCMR 1408 and Zain Shahid v. State 2024 SCMR 843 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1187 of 2021, order dated: 14th March, 2025, hearing date: 10th March, 2025.\n(Against the order/judgment dated 20.09.2021 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, in Crl. A. No. (T)67 of 2021).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Saddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shabbir Rajput, Advocate Supreme Court and Asif Ali Talpur, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMs. Rubina Butt, State Counsel for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JEEHAND ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General Balochistan ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26359", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1651 = 2025 SLD 1651 = 2025 SCMR 930", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RS8", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 114 & 133-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3 & 5-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Reference to High Court-Limitation-Office objection-Condonation of delay................... APPELLANT/tax-payer was aggrieved of order passed by High Court on tax reference of authorities, which was filed beyond the time frame given by office of High Court-Validity-If objections raised by office of High Court were not removed within the time specified by the office and in the meantime limitation for filing appeal stood expired, such appeal would be rendered as time barred-Limitation is not a mere technicality, as once limitation expires a vested right is created in favour of other side by operation of law which cannot be taken away lightly-High Court had passed the order on merits of the case but failed to discuss averments of application with regard to limitation by specifying whether the same was allowed or rejected-High Court should have decided such objection of limitation as a preliminary issue-Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Court and remanded the matter for decision afresh on application for condonation of delay-Petition for leave to appeal was disposed of.\nAsad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Abdul Jabbar Shahid and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 2019 Lahore 76; Abdul Hafeez Abbasi and others v. Managing Director, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi and others 2002 SCMR 1034 and Collectors of Customs E & S.T. and Sales Tax v. Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd 2005 SCMR 1636 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 2100 of 2024, order dated: 4th March, 2025, hearing date: 4th March, 2025.(Against the order dated 27.02.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.R. No. 41034 of 2017).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, CJ and Irfan Saadat Khan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hassan Kamran Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG (Law) FBR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD FAISAL Prop., F.A.Traders, Lahore ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO-II, LAHORE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26360", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1652 = 2025 SLD 1652 = 2025 SCMR 935", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RSs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Eye-witness account-Location of fire shots-Benefit of doubt-Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life-Plea raised by accused was that ocular account of injuries was not supported by medical evidence-Validity-Person witnessing an incident of firing cannot be expected to give account of location of each fire shot on the person of deceased and direction of each fire shot with exactitude-Prosecution established presence of eye-witnesses at the spot at the time of occurrence, who had furnished straight forward and truthful account of occurrence-Single ground of conflict between ocular account and medical evidence was not sufficient to be made basis for acquittal-Supreme Court declined to interfere in conviction and sentence awarded to accused-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.\nAsfandiyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009; Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487; Aman Ullah v. The State 2023 SCMR 723 and Imran Mehmood v. The State 2023 SCMR 795 ref.\nSaeedullah Khans case 1996 SCMR 1026; Abid Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 208; Ali Taj and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 900; Muhammad Iqbal v. Muhammad Akram 1996 SCMR 908; Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2010 SCMR 1025 and Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 rel.\n(b) Criminal trial-\n-Interested witness-Evidence-Principle-There is no universal principle that in every case interested witness should be disbelieved or disinterested witness should be believed-It all depends upon the rule of prudence and reasonableness to hold that a particular witness was present at scene of crime and that he was making a true statement.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1366 of 2018, order dated: 10th March, 2025, hearing date: 5th March, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 14.11.2018 in Crl. Appeal No. 358 of 2016, of the Lahore High Court Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Basharat Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Aurangzeb Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.\nMs. Memoona Ihsan-ul-Haq, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AKBAR SAEED ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nThe STATE and another ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26361", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1653 = 2025 SLD 1653 = 2025 SCMR 939", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTk", - "Key Words:": "Land Reforms Act (II of l977)-\n-S. 6-Land holdings-Void transfers-Doctrine of election-Applicability-Appellants assailed order of resumption of land under Martial Law Regulation No. 115, by Land Commission which order was maintained by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction-Validity-Appellants under the hierarchy of Land Reforms Act, 1977 invoked jurisdiction of Land Commissioner by filing their respective appeals which were taken to their logical end-By applying principle of doctrine of election, appellants could not be permitted to have another bite of the cherry by invoking original jurisdiction of Civil Court for a similar recourse-As per the doctrine of election a person aggrieved of an order/judgment may have a host of remedies to challenge the same but he has to elect one of those remedies and after choosing one he may not avail another remedy-Appellants themselves had chosen to be ousted from availing jurisdiction of Civil Court long back when they opted to invoke jurisdiction in pursuance of Land Reforms Act, 1977-Neither any mala fide could be attributed to actions taken by Land Commissioner nor could resumption of excess area in pursuance of Land Reforms Act, 1977, be termed as void or without jurisdiction-All that was done was within the frame of Land Reforms Act, 1977-Supreme Court declined to interfere with well-reasoned and comprehensive judgment encompassing all questions involved therein-High Court was well within its right to intervene while exercising jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C., as there was jurisdictional defect-Appeal was dismissed.\nTrading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Ltd. PLD 2018 SC 828 and Government of Pakistan v. Qazalbash Waqf 1993 SCMR 1697 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 112-K to 116-K of 2022, order dated: 21st March, 2025, hearing date: 19th March, 2025.\n(Against the order dated 07.10.2022 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Revision Applications Nos. 73 to 77 of 2004).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Yousaf Laghari, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.\nSuresh Kumar, Additional Advocate General, Sindh, Ms. Lubna Pervaiz, Advocate-on-Record and Ghazanfar Ali Abbasi, Deputy Secretary BoR for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Qazi MUMTAZ HUSSAIN and others -Appellants\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF SINDH through Secretary Revenue and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26362", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1654 = 2025 SLD 1654 = 2025 SCMR 944", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RTg", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S. 302(b)-Qatl-i-amd-Re-appraisal of evidence-Night occurrence-Source of light, absence of-Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to death-Validity-Occurrence took place on the night of 11-01-2011 at 20:15 pm, however no source of light was mentioned in the FIR-In absence of any source of light, identification of accused in the darkness of night was not free from doubt-No recovery was effected insofar as source of light was concerned-In absence of any source of light having been mentioned in FIR and recovery of such source, identification of accused was not free from doubt-Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond shadow of doubt-If there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in prosecution case, then the same is sufficient to acquit accused-Case against accused was repleted with number of circumstances, which had created serious doubts in the prosecution story-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and by extending him benefit of doubt acquitted him of the charge-Appeal was allowed.\nUsman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2011 SCMR 1473; Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed 2017 SCMR 344; Zahir Yousaf v. The State 2017 SCMR 2002; Mst. Nazia Anwar v. The State 2018 SCMR 911 and Muhammad Azhar alias Ajja v. The State 2016 SCMR 1928 rel.\n(b) Criminal Trial-\n-Medical evidence-Ocular account-Conflict-Medico-ocular conflict regarding number of injuries sustained by deceased is fatal to prosecution case.\nUsman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 137 and Muhammad Shafi alias Kuddoo v. The State 2019 SCMR 1045 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 94 of 2023, order dated: 6th March, 2025, hearing date: 6th March, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 22.03.2017 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Cr. Appeal No. D-45 of 2014 and Confirmation Case No. 9 of 2014).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Athar Minallah, Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Salahuddin Panhwar, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nKhadim Hussain, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State.\nPrem (In person) along with Kanta, Sahil and Davsi for the Complainant (via video link Karachi).", - "Petitioner Name:": "CHETAN ............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nThe STATE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26363", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1655 = 2025 SLD 1655 = 2025 SCMR 952", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RXo", - "Key Words:": "Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)-\n-S. 114-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 185(3) & 199-Constitutional jurisdiction-Alternate and efficacious remedy-National Tax Number, issuance of-Tax non-resident, plea of................... APPELLANT/company was aggrieved of notice issued by tax authorities after issuing National Tax Number-High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the notice issued by authorities-Validity-Registration alone under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 or issuance of National Tax Number does not qualify as a coercive action against any entity-No prior notice before registration would have made any difference-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment of High Court in Constitutional petition, which was directly assailed before Supreme Court without exhausting remedy of Intra Court Appeal-Only under exceptional circumstances, to be adjudged by Supreme Court itself, such indulgence could be extended which did not exist in the present case-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Legal Division), LTU, Islamabad v. Messrs Geofizyka Krakow Pakistan Limited 2017 PTD 1526; Metropole Cinemas case 2014 SCMR 649 and Hub Power Company Ltd.s case PLD 2023 SC 207 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4177 of 2024, order dated: 9th April, 2025, hearing date: 9th April, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 20.06.2024 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 2021).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, CJ Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Jahanzeb Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nImtiaz Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs PAYONEER INC., through authorized officer ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Revenue Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26364", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1656 = 2025 SLD 1656 = 2025 SCMR 955", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5RXk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-Ss. 42 & 54-Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 42-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120-Suit for declaration and injunction-Mutation of gift-Proof-Plea of fraud-Onus to prove............. Appellant(S)/plaintiff claimed to be owner of suit land and assailed mutation of gift on the plea of fraud, allegedly attested on her behalf in favour of respondents/defendants-Validity-Beneficiaries under mutation in question had burden to demonstrate validity of original transaction-This entailed meeting a threefold burden-Firstly, there was a pleading burden; respondents / defendants had to articulate all relevant facts and material particulars regarding purported gift in their written statement-Secondly, respondents/defendants had the burden of producing evidence, which meant presenting documents or testimony supporting their claims-Thirdly, they carried burden of persuasion, effectively convincing the Court of the legitimacy of their assertions regarding original gift transaction-Such burdens were not abstract legal formalities and formed the bedrock of fairness in civil litigation-Burden of pleading ensures proper framing of issues; the evidentiary burden establishes factual basis; and the burden of persuasion is the ultimate determinant of legal entitlement............. Appellant(S)/plaintiff was justified in delaying any legal action until the threat to her rights had become overt and undeniable-This point accrued when respondents/defendants formally denied her claim before revenue authorities-Such event culminated in an order directing appellant/plaintiff to pursue her claim in civil Court-Appellants/plaintiffs suit was instituted within the stipulated limitation period-Supreme Court set aside concurrent findings of facts by all the Courts below as they were fundamentally flawed and the suit filed by appellant/plaintiff was decreed-Appeal was allowed.\nNirman Singh v. Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh AIR 1926 PC 100; Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani and 10 others 1992 SCMR 1832; Muhammad Akram and another v. Altaf Ahmad PLD 2003 SC 688; Muhammad Iqbal and another v. Mukhtar Ahmad through L.Rs. 2008 SCMR 855; Peer Baksh through L.Rs and others. v. Mst. Khanzadi and others 2016 SCMR 1417; Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276; Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85; Sher Baz Khan v. The State PLD 2003 SC 849; Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Rafiq 2002 SCMR 1291; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Sakina Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 1021; Atta Muhammad and others v. Mst. Munir Sultan (deceased) through her L.Rs and others 2021 SCMR 73; Farhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and another 2021 SCMR 179; Mst. Farid-un-Nisa v. Munshi Mukhtar Ahmad and another AIR 1925 PC 204; Tara Kumari v. Chandra Mauleshwar AIR 1931 PC 303; Janat Bibi v. Sikandar Ali and others PLD 1990 SC 642; Muhammad Saeed v. Mst. Sharaf Elahi and another 2010 SCMR 1358; Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338; Muhammad Ashraf v. Bahadur Khan and others 1989 SCMR 1390; Mangal Sen v. Emperor AIR 1929 Lahore 210; Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash AIR 1972 SC 975; Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1979 SC 1708; Land Acquisition Collector, Nowshera and others v. Sarfaraz Khan and others PLD 2001 SC 514; Raj Bibi v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Okara 2001 SCMR 1591; Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others 2007 SCMR 262; Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan AIR 1930 PC 270; Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh AIR 1931 PC 89; Izzat v. Allah Dita PLD 1981 SC 165 and Wali and others v. Akbar and others 1995 SCMR 284 rel.\n(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 42-Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 122-Gift, reason of-Principle-Donor is not legally obligated to provide a rationale for his/her decision to make a gift-It is generally uncommon for a gift to be made without some form of explanation or justification, unless the donor suffers from a serious impairment in mental capacity-Superficial or frivolous gifts are often made, particularly to disadvantage female family members and undermine their inheritance rights-Courts retain the power to scrutinize motives and circumstances surrounding a gift, ensuring that rightful ownership is protected and that established lines of inheritance are respected.\nBarkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 and Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85 rel.\n(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-\n-Arts. 59 & 84-Fingerprints-Forensic analysis-Dactyloscopy-Object, purpose and scope-Practice of utilizing fingerprints for identification, called dactyloscopy, has gained widespread acceptance and has become an indispensable tool to law due to its straightforward nature and cost-effectiveness-Dactyloscopy operates on the foundational principle that no fingerprints are alike and that an individuals fingerprint patterns remain constant throughout life-Such uniqueness makes fingerprints an invaluable asset in forensic science.\n(d) Maxim-\n-Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant-Meaning-Fraud and justice never dwell together.\n(e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-\n-S. 18-Fraudulent transactions, challenging of-Limitation-Fraud, by its very nature, unravels all aspects of any transaction, regardless of how solemnly it may have been conducted under the law-Any transaction born of deceit must be declared void, allowing the matter to be judged based on its substantive merits-This is important to prevent entrenchment of fraudulent actions, regardless of any time limitation issues.\n(f) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-\n-S. 42-Mutation-Scope-Mutation does not confer title in favour of any party but constitutes merely an official record for fiscal purposes-Illegal approval of any mutation by Revenue Officer has no bearing on the title and can be treated as a nullity.\nChunder Nath Chowdhry v. Tirthanund Thakoor and another 3 Calcutta 504; Tallapragada Sundarappa and another v. Boorugapalli Sreermalulu and another 30 Madras 402 and Sheedi v. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others PLD 1980 Lah. 477 rel.\n(g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-\n-S. 42-Suit for declaration-Right to sue, accrual of-Principle-Declaratory suit that seeks to establish title to a particular property represents a subsisting right-Right to institute such a suit is a continuing right, remaining intact as long as the claimant (plaintiff) possesses rights to disputed property-Pivotal point at which right to sue accrues arises when opposing party denies or challenges specific rights associated with property in question or at least exerts an unequivocal threat to infringe that right-In situations characterized by successive acts of denial, a new cause of action arises each time as there is a significant challenge to the claimants (plaintiffs) rights.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 113-L of 2010, order dated: 25th March, 2025, hearing date: 25th March, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 07.07.2003 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in C.R. No. 43 of 1991).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Amin-ud-Din Khan and Shahid Waheed, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Fayyaz A. Sherazi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nSahibzada Anwar Hameed, Advocate Supreme Court for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. RAMZANU BIBI ............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nIBRAHIM (deceased) through L.Rs. and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26365", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1657 = 2025 SLD 1657 = 2025 SCMR 967", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTc", - "Key Words:": "Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-\n-S. 7(ff)-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 5-Explosive substance, recovery of-Re-appraisal of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Safe custody and transportation of case property-Explosive substance was alleged to have been recovered from accused who was riding a motor cycle which was being driven by co-accused-Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for fourteen years, whereas the co-accused was acquitted-Validity-Prosecution failed to prove that accused was owner of the motor cycle used in the occurrence, which was being driven by co-accused-Investigating officer handed over parcels of case property to Moharrar but Moharrar of Maal Khana of police station did not appear in witness box-Safe custody and transportation of parcels of explosive substance etc. was not proved during trial-Single circumstance, which creates doubt in prosecution case is sufficient to acquit accused-Case against accused was repleted with number of circumstances which had created serious doubts in prosecution story-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused by Trial Court and acquitted him of the charge by extending benefit of doubt-Appeal was allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 681 of 2017, order dated: 14th February, 2025, hearing date: 14th February, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 12.04.2016 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Appeal No. 723-P of 2015).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSyed Kosar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAH HUSSAIN ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nThe STATE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26366", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1658 = 2025 SLD 1658 = 2025 SCMR 969", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTY", - "Key Words:": "(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-Ss. 2 (s), 156 (1) (89) & 211 (2)-Notification SRO 491(I)/85, dated 23-05-1985-Smuggled vehicles-Possession-Lawful excuse, plea of-Authorities were aggrieved of order passed by High Court in exercise of Reference jurisdiction pertaining to confiscation of vehicles in question which were alleged to be smuggled-Validity-Condition precedent for Section 156(1)(89) of Customs Act, 1969 to apply, is that goods in question should be smuggled, in terms of Section 2(s) of Customs Act, 1969, read with applicable notification thereunder-Vehicles in question could be considered smuggled if either (i) at the relevant time, the applicable notification in terms of Section 2(s)(ii) of Customs Act, 1969 included vehicles, or (ii) in terms of Section 2(s)(iii) of Customs Act, 1969 the vehicles were brought in by any route other than a route declared under Section 9 or 10 of Customs Act, 1969 or from any place other than the customs station-In cases of registered vehicles, if at the time the vehicle was intercepted, more than 3 years had elapsed for cases prior to Finance Act, 2007 and 5 years for cases thereafter, the defence of lawful excuse was indefeasible-It was reasonable to assume that if a vehicle stood registered, the government was presumed to have exercised due care and diligence with respect to its obligation to see whatever duties and taxes as payable to the government before a vehicle could be registered, stood paid-Vehicles in question were registered, which registration was duly verified, and they were presumed to have been brought lawfully; after completion of notified period in case of used vehicles also-Without any proof it could not be said that a person (last owner) was involved in registration of vehicle knowing fully well that no duties and taxes, as required under the law, were paid, and that therefore the vehicle was fraudulently registered, and the vehicle could be seized from him on his failure to produce documents of import and payment of duties and taxes thereon, and even beyond the period of three years or five years, as the case would be, as required under Section 211(2) of Customs Act, 1969-In most of the cases since first registration, the vehicles had changed many owners on the strength of registration book and no adverse inference could be drawn for the ultimate bona fide owners unless otherwise proved by the authorities, in which exercise they had failed-Verified registration book and official record was enough for bona fide presumption that a valid title existed-Vehicles in question were those which were either auctioned or were brought into Pakistan and were registered through a statutory process and the auction papers or registration papers of some other vehicles were not being used fraudulently-Where it was established that chassis/engine numbers had been tampered with after auction or registration to match the description of auctioned or registered vehicle, the lawful excuse was not available-Supreme Court declined to interfere in the orders passed by High Court as the questions had been answered cumulatively-Appeal was dismissed.\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. Panther Sports 2022 SCMR 1135 rel.\n(b) Interpretation of statutes-\n-Pari materia provisions-Interpretation-Principle-Where two provisions are pari materia, by applying doctrine of statutory construction, there cannot be a different interpretation for them.\n(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)-\n-S. 156 (1)(89)-Expression lawful excuse -Scope-Lawful excuse is an expression that is of wider import and (carries) lesser degree of burden than lawful authority-For proving a lawful excuse, which falls short of lawful authority, it is the excuse put forward by accused, rather than handling smuggled goods, that must be shown to be lawful.\nPLD 1955 PC 29 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1088, 1231 to 1236 of 2013, 142-K of 2015, 938 of 2018 and 453 to 466 of 2022, order dated: 17th April, 2025, hearing date: 3rd March, 2025.\n(On appeal from the judgment dated 27.05.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Civil Revision No. 1211 of 2011).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, CJ, Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 1088 of 2013).\nM. D. Shehzad Feroze, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record and Shabbir Hussain, Superintendent Customs for Appelants (in C.As. Nos. 1231, 1233 and 1234 of 2013).\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani, Collector (Enforcement), Karachi for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1232, 1235 and 1236 of 2013).\nRaja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani, Collector (Enforcement), Karachi for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 142-K of 2015 and 462-463 of 2022).\nKafeel Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 938 of 2018) (via video-link from Karachi).\nAkhtar Hussain, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and K. A. Wahab, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 453-461 and 464-466 of 2022) (both via video-link from Karachi).\nMasood Ahmed, Director, Intelligence and Investigation, Customs, Imran Afzal, Additional Director and Shaheer Ahmed, ETO/E&T, Department for Appellant (department) (via video-link from Karachi).\nM. Younas Thaheem, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 458 of 2022).\nEx-parte for all other Respondents.\nSirdar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, Advocate Supreme Court Amicus Curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION, FBR and others -Appellants\nVS\nABDUL KARIM and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26367", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1659 = 2025 SLD 1659 = 2025 SCMR 986", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTU", - "Key Words:": "Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-Ss. 302(b) & 449-Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(i)(a)-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 3 & 4-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)-Qatl-i-amd, loss to property and use of explosive substance-Re-appraisal of evidence-Withholding of best evidence-Benefit of doubt-Failure to produce Medico Legal Report of injured accused-Arrest before occurrence-Proof-Accused persons were alleged to have used explosive substance during their attack on a religious building, causing deaths, injuries to different persons and loss to property-Trial Court convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to death-Plea raised by accused persons was that they were already in custody in injured condition when the occurrence took place-Validity-If accused was apprehended on the day of occurrence in injured condition and medical treatment was provided to him at a hospital then why his medico legal report was not produced in evidence-Such fact supported claim of accused that they were earlier apprehended by the police and kept in illegal confinement during which they were physically tortured and they were made scapegoats in the case-Duration of injuries in the medico legal report showed that accused had injuries, which were caused 4/5 days earlier to the date of occurrence-Such fact had created further dent in the prosecution story-Medico Legal Report (MLR) of accused was the best evidence to show presence of accused at the time of occurrence which had not been produced in prosecution evidence-Adverse inference under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 could validly be drawn against prosecution that had that MLR been produced in the evidence, the same would not have supported prosecution case against accused-If there is a single circumstance which creates doubt in the prosecution case then the same is sufficient to acquit the accused-Case against accused persons was repleted with number of circumstances, which had created serious doubts in prosecution story-Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons and they were acquitted of the charges-Appeal was allowed.\nKhial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490; Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846; Riaz Ahmed v. The State 2010 SMCR 846; Abdul Oadeer v. The State 2024 SCMR 1146; Riasat Ali v. The State 2024 SCMR 1224; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Crl. P.L.A. No. 790 of 2017 and Jail Petition No. 527 of 2017, order dated: 13th March, 2025, hearing date: 13th March, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgments dated 17.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 176 of 2015, as well as, Criminal Appeal No. 175 of 2015 and Capital Sentence Reference No. 07-T of 2015 respectively).", - "Judge Name:": "Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka and Adil Aziz Qazi, Advocates Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nMirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Lawyer Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Athar Minallah, Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDULLAH alias Muhammad alias Masab and another -Petitioners\nVS\nThe STATE ............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26368", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1660 = 2025 SLD 1660 = 2025 CLD 408", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTQ", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss.55, 136, proviso, 160 & 197 (3)-General Meeting and election of directors-Proof-Limitation to assail such meeting-Petitioners assailed extra ordinary general meeting (EOGM) and change of directors made pursuant to such meeting................... RESPONDENTS contended that period to assail such meeting was thirty days-Validity................... RESPONDENTS should have first persuaded or at least demonstrated with some certainty the EOGM had actually taken place and then to seek shelter of period provided by law to make their challenge................... RESPONDENTS failed to file return or forms for such a long time period, and even return in terms of S. 197(3) of Companies Act, 2017 for change claimed in pursuance to so-called EOGM in question did not exist and this position was confirmed by SECP................... RESPONDENTS instead of explaining reasons for non-compliance of several provisions of Companies Act, 2017 were simply seeking to escape on the basis of period to make challenge................... RESPONDENTS could not even produce copy of notice, the mode adopted under S. 55 of Companies Act, 2017 or any affidavit to show date of issuance of notice of EGOM inviting all entitled to notice, attend and vote in EOGM-High Court directed the parties to hold EOGM afresh as proceedings in question were invalid-Petition was allowed in said terms, in circumstances.\nKhalid Mehmood and 4 others v. Messrs Multi Plus Corporation Private Limited and 2 others 2017 CLD 1737; Nizam Hashwani v. Hashwani Hotels Limited and 14 others 1999 CLC 1989; In the matter of the Karnal Distillery Company Ltd., Karanaland of the application of Mr. L.P. Jaiswal PLD 1956 Lah. 731 and Tariq Aziz and others v. Makhdum Ahmed Mahmud and others 2022 CLD 1279 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.O. No.62104 of 2023, heard on 4th June, 2024, hearing date: 4th June, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Bilal Kashmiri for Petitioners.\nFaisal Islam for Respondents Nos.1 to 5.\nRuman Bilal for Respondent No.6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHAHID MAHMOOD & COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED and 2 others-Petitioners\nVS\nZAHID MAHMOOD and 5 others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26369", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1661 = 2025 SLD 1661 = 2025 CLD 230", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QS8", - "Key Words:": "High Court – Appeal Dismissed – Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), Ss. 17 & 29 – Arbitral award as rule of Court – Contractual liabilities – Interest on decretal amount – Mere furnishing of bank guarantee did not constitute payment; financing charges accrued until actual payment – NHA could have avoided substantial interest by prompt compliance with award/decree – Non-compliance despite awareness of contract terms attracted adverse consequences – Claim of decree holder supported by bank reports and award – Executing Court’s direction to provide accurate calculation of outstanding amount upheld – No illegality found – Appeal dismissed.\n Jajodia (Overseas) (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Ltd. 1993 (2) SCC 106; Azad Govt. of AJK v. Muhammad Aslam Khan 1990 MLD 2333; Bhavan Vaja v. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang AIR 1972 SC 1371; Topanmal Chhotamal v. M/s. Kundomal Gangaram AIR 1960 SC 388; Syed Waqar-ul-Hassan Shah Bukhari v. Small Business Finance Corporation 2024 CLD 1481 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 69 of 2024, order dated: 22nd January, 2025, hearing date: 9th December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Muhammad Hassan Alam for Appellant.\nJawad-ur-Rahim Malik for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nMessrs SARDAR MUHAMMAD ASHRAF D BALOCH (PRIVATE) LIMITED............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26370", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1662 = 2025 SLD 1662 = 2025 CLD 241", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QSs", - "Key Words:": "High Court – Application for Recognition & Enforcement Dismissed – Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (XVII of 2011), Ss. 3 & 6; New York Convention, 1958, Arts. V(1)(d), V(2)(b) – Foreign arbitral award – Foreign seat of arbitration – Autonomy of parties – Seat signifies curial law of arbitration; may differ from proper law of contract – Parties’ choice of seat is legally binding regardless of physical venue of hearings – Respondent proved composition of arbitral authority/procedure not in accordance with agreed terms (seat: Dubai, UAE vs. DIFC-LCIA), undermining award’s legitimacy – Enforcement court bound to re-examine evidence under Art. V – Agreed procedure not followed, violating rule of dual control – Recognition and enforcement refused – Application dismissed. Christopher Brown Ltd. v. Genossenschaft Osterrreichischer [1954] 1 QB 8; Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 407 U.S. 1; Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co. 417 U.S. 506; Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse S.A. v. Acro Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 2018 Lah. 597; Zaver Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Saif Energy Ltd. (C.S No.1/2019); Encyclopaedia Universalis SA v. Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. (2005); Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Systems, Inc. 623 F.3d 832; Dallah v. Pakistan [2008] EWHC 1901; [2010] UKSC 46; ST Group Co. Ltd. v. Sanum Investments Ltd. [2019] SGCA 65; Enka v. Chubb [2020] UKSC 38; Gaetan Inc. v. Geneva Investment Groups LLC [2015] ARB 010 rel.; Russel on Arbitration (21st Ed.) rel.; New York Convention, Dr. Reinmar Wolff (2nd Ed., 2019) rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Original No.25854 of 2023, order dated: 4th December, 2024, hearing date: 6th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: Shahid Karim, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sameer Khosa, Momal Malik and Hammad Hussain for Applicant.\nSalman Akram Raja, Muhammad Umer Akram Chaudhry, Muhammad Ali Talib and Muhammad Hammad Amin and Waheed Ahmad for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SPACECOM INTERNATIONAL, LLC through Special Attorney-Applicant\nVS\nWATEEN TELECOM LIMITED............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26371", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1663 = 2025 SLD 1663 = 2025 CLD 270", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTk", - "Key Words:": "High Court – Appeal Dismissed – Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (XLVI of 2001), Ss. 9 & 22; Contract Act, 1872 (IX of 1872), S. 124 – Suit for recovery of bank guarantee – Bank issued guarantee securing finance facility; borrower defaulted – Guarantor equally liable upon principal debtor’s default – Partial performance does not absolve remaining obligation – Bank’s failure to fulfill contractual duties justified decree in favour of finance company – No legal infirmity or jurisdictional defect found – Appeal dismissed. PLD 1975 Kar. 672; 2003 CLD 1142; 2004 CLD 587; 2003 CLD 931; AIR 1983 Kar. 73; 2022 CLD 1478 ref.; Hyesons Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Consolidated Sugar Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 996 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=9,22", - "Case #": "I.As. Nos. 16, 17 and 18 of 2022, order dated: 29th October, 2024 Dates of hearing: 12th, 24th September and 3rd October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yousuf Ali Sayeed and Arbab Ali Hakro, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Naheed A. Shahid for Appellant.\nAbdul Qayyum Abbasi along with Raja Safeer Ahmed, Muhammad Abdullah and Imran Rind for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED through Authorized Attorney............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nMessrs SAUDI PAK INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26372", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1664 = 2025 SLD 1664 = 2025 CLD 277", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QTg", - "Key Words:": "Lahore High Court – Suit for Recovery – Territorial Jurisdiction – Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause – Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, Ss. 9 & 10; CPC, O. VII R. 10 & O. XIII R. 1 – The plaintiff filed a suit at Rawalpindi for recovery under the Ordinance, 2001. Agreements (including Diminishing Musharakah Financing Agreement) contained clear and unambiguous clauses conferring exclusive jurisdiction on Karachi courts. All agreements were executed at the defendant’s registered office in Karachi and acknowledged by both parties. Held: High Court at Rawalpindi/Lahore lacked territorial jurisdiction; plaint returned under O. VII R. 10 CPC for presentation before competent court at Karachi. Suit disposed of. – Faysal Bank Ltd. v. Usman Enterprises 2023 CLD 1563; Eden Builders 2022 SCMR 2044; State Life Ins. Corp. 1987 SCMR 393; Kadir Motors 1992 SCMR 1174 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Original Suit No. 6 of 2023, order dated: 30th September, 2024, Dates of hearing: 23rd April and 30th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: Jawad Hassan, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court, Aakif Majeed and Asim Tufail Farooqi for Plaintiffs.\nMs. Samia Faiz Durrani, Advocate Supreme Court, Faiz Durani, Advocate Supreme Court with Salman Khan Baryalay and Arshad Mehmood for Defendant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s SADIQ POULTRY FARMS (PVT.) LIMITED through Authorized Director and 2 others-Plaintiffs\nVS\nFIRST HABIB MODARABA, A SUBSIDIARY OF HABIB METRO BANK through Authorized Representative-Defendant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26373", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1665 = 2025 SLD 1665 = 2025 CLD 288", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QXo", - "Key Words:": "SECP Appellate Bench – Window Takaful Operations – Delegation of Powers – Violation of Takaful Rules – Penalty – Insurance Ordinance, 2000, Ss. 156 & 167; Takaful Rules, 2012, Rr. 10(1)(k), 12 & 20(1); General Clauses Act, 1897, S. 24-A; SRO 1545(I)/2019 – Appellant (insurance company with WTO licence) challenged penalty for violations of Rr. 10(1)(k) & 20(1), raising objections to delegation of powers under S. 156, terming order non-speaking, claiming penalty could only be imposed under R. 12, disputing treatment of “wakala fee” as liability, and seeking leniency. Held: SRO lawfully delegated adjudicatory powers to Commissioners/HODs/Wing Heads; impugned order was reasoned; R. 12 not a penal provision – penalties under S. 156 valid; “wakala fee” adjustment without actual Qarz-e-Hasna funding violated solvency requirements; plea of leniency not sustainable. Appeal dismissed. – 2005 SCMR 728, CIT v. Papers & Board Mills 2006 PTD 386, Takaful Pakistan Ltd. 2016 CLD 840 distinguished.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "General Clauses Act, 1897=24-A", - "Case #": "Appeal No.19 of 2022, order dated: 1st January, 2025, hearing date: 22nd August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Ibrahim for Appellant.\nShafiq-ur-Rehman, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LIMITED............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nThe DIRECTOR/HOD, ADJUDICATION-I, ADJUDICATION DIVISION, SECP, ISLAMABAD............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26374", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1666 = 2025 SLD 1666 = 2025 CLD 296", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5QXk", - "Key Words:": "High Court – Investigation into Affairs of Company – Alternate Remedy – Disputed Questions of Fact – Companies Act, 2017, Ss. 256, 257, 258 & 286 – Petitioners alleged fraud and embezzlement against respondents; respondents made counter-allegations. Bulk of documentary evidence required detailed investigation. Held: Commission under Ss. 256–258 has vast powers to inquire into such allegations, fix criminal/civil liability, and resolve disputed facts; efficacious statutory remedy available. High Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under S. 286 in absence of cogent proof, as alternate forum existed. Principle: where statute creates right/liability and provides special remedy, it must be availed first. Petition dismissed. – 2011 CLD 1485, 2021 CLD 7, PLD 1965 SC 221, 2024 CLD 990 ref.", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "Companies Act, 2017=256,257,258,286", - "Case #": "Company Petitions Nos. 01, 02 of 2023 and 01 of 2024, order dated: 26th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: Syed Shahid Bahar, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Adnan Nawaz Khan for Petitioner - Mansoor Ahmed Khan.\nBarrister Humayun Nawaz Khan for Respondents/Petitioner in Writ No.01/2024).\nMs. Farkhanda Ibrar, Legal Advisor for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MANSOOR AHMED KHAN, DIRECTOR OF MANGLA METALS (PVT.) LTD., ISLAMABAD................... APPELLANT\nVS\nKOHSAR HYDRO LTD. through Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Mirpur and others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26375", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1667 = 2025 SLD 1667 = 2025 CLD 313", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODc", - "Key Words:": "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-\n-Ss. 73, 80 & 96-Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012), Ss. 16, 17 & 18-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 54-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11-Suit for injunction and recovery of damages-Rejecting of plaint-Infringement of trade mark during pendency of suit............. Appellant(S) / plaintiff filed suit before District Court and during pendency of the suit, Registrar Trade Marks revoked trade mark in question-Validity-Suit concerning Trade Mark was already pending before District Court, therefore revocation/ invalidation/rectification application under Ss. 73, 80 & 96 of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 was required to be filed before District Court or when the same was filed before Registrar, the Registrar was required to refer the same to District Court where the suit was already pending-High Court set aside orders passed by Registrar as well as by the District Court-High Court remanded the matters to Intellectual Property Tribunal and District Court for decisions afresh on application of respondent and suit of appellant / plaintiff, respectively-Appeal was allowed accordingly.\nThe State through Advocate General, N.W.F.P., Peshawar v. Naeemullah Khan (2001 SCMR 1461; Italfarmaco S.P.A. v. Himont Pharmaceuticals (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2017 CLD 1382; Royal PVC (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Officer v. Registrar of Trade Marks and another 2011 CLD 833; Messrs H & B, General Trading Company through Director v. Messrs International Marketing Company through Proprietor and 2 others 2009 CLD 1028; Messrs H & B General Trading Company through Director v. Messrs International Marketing Company through Proprietor and 2 others 2009 CLD 318; Messrs H & B General Trading Company through Director v. Messrs International Marketing Company through Proprietor and 2 others 2009 CLD 354; Muhammad Multazam Raza v. Muhammad Ayub Khan and others 2022 SCMR 979 and Messrs Shaheen Chemist through Proprietors and 3 others v. Zahid Mehmood Chaudhry and another 2023 CLD 1 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "F.A.O No.433 and R.F.As. Nos.1073, 1074, 1077 of 2014 heard on 30th October, 2024, hearing date: 30th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Abid Aziz Sheikh, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raheel Ahmad Sheikh and Tahir Maqsood Butt for Appellant.\nBarrister Syed Sajjad Haider Rizvi, A.A.G.-Pk, for Registrar of Trade Marks Respondent No.1.\nRespondent No.2. (in F.A.O. No.433 of 201) and Respondent (in R.A.Fs. Nos.1073 and 1074 of 2014) already proceed against ex parte on 19-11-2020 and (in R.F.A. No.1077 of 2014) on 22-11-2023.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD QASIM............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nREGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS and others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26376", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1668 = 2025 SLD 1668 = 2025 CLD 319", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODY", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-\n-S. 20(4)(o)-Modarba Companies and Modarba Rules, 1981, R. 8(4)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199-Constitutional petition-Inquiry, initiation of-Issuance of show cause notice-Petitioners were aggrieved of show cause notice issued by SECP in order to safeguard interests of Modarba Certificate holders-Validity-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, in terms of S. 20(4)(o) of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 is empowered to perform such functions and exercise such powers of the Authority, including any powers of Federal Government delegated to the Authority and under any other law for the time being in force under which any function or power has been conferred on the Authority including, but not limited to, the functions and powers set out in Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan after hearing petitioners and/or their representatives passed order in question-Payments to different individuals on different heads were made without codal formalities and/or providing legitimacy of such payments-There were some incidents of fire which resulted in loss to company in view of absence of insurance coverage/Takafal-Huge payments needed to be scrutinized, and if the Regulator would keep a blind eye on it, then entire scheme set out in relevant laws to maintain a system of check and balance on companies would become redundant-High Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution as the petitioners failed to point out the fundamental right which had been infringed, as High Court was not sitting in appeal over order in question-Petitioners raised controversies factual in nature and the same were not warranted while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution-It was primary duty of regulatory authorities to safeguard interests of certificate holders and order in question was an attempt to achieve such goal-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No. D-3523 of 2020, order dated: 23rd September, 2024\n, hearing date: 2nd September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, C.J. and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sameer Tayebally for Petitioner.\nKhaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Attorney General for Respondent No.1.\nFurqan Ali for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "B.R.R. GUARDIAN MODARABA and 8 others-Petitioners\nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice and 2 others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26377", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1669 = 2025 SLD 1669 = 2025 CLD 324", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [Since repealed]-\n-Ss. 265(a) & 265(b)-Investigation of Companys affairs-Appointing of Inspector-Scope-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Powers and discretion-Scope-Provisions under S.265(a) of the Ordinance, 1984 stipulates that the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission), under S. 265(a) of the Ordinance, 1984, can appoint Inspector subject to fulfillment of pre-conditions mentioned therein but such pre-conditions are not applicable to its suo motu powers, under S. 265 (b) of the Ordinance 1984, to appoint an Inspector-Commission has only to satisfy itself, prima facie, on the basis of the material placed before it, that case for investigation through an Inspector is called for-The matter, in fact, vests in the discretion of the Commission, to be decided after following the summary procedure-In proceedings under S. 265 of the Ordinance 1984, full-fledged inquiry in the form of a trial is not required to be held nor any formal evidence is to be recorded before passing the order under S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984-Authority has to only satisfy itself prima facie, of course, on the basis of the material placed before it that a case for investigation through an Inspector is called for and it is for the Inspector to ascertain and determine the truth or otherwise of the allegation during the investigation to be conducted by him whereafter he has to submit report to the concerned Authority.\n(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [Since repealed]-\n-S. 265-Investigation of companys affairs-Appointing of Inspector-Scope-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, powers of-While a Civil (Original) Suit, regarding dispute of company left by predecessor of parties (Company), was being adjudicated upon by the High Court, one of the parties filed a petition, with certain submission/prayer for the decision of the dispute between the parties ; High Court directed /ordered to transmit the matter to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan ( Commission) for decision of the same-Commission while exercising the power under S.265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (the Ordinance, 1984), appointed a Chartered Accountant as Inspector for carrying out investigation into the affairs of the Company (impugned order)-A few share-holders of Company (petitioner) filed constitutional petition assailing the vires of impugned order passed by the Commission/respondent-Grievance of the petitioners was that the impugned order was violative of the direction given by the High Court as no direction was given to pass any order in terms of S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984-Validity-Provisions under S. 265 (a) of the Ordinance, 1984 stipulate that the Commission, under S. 265 (a) of the Ordinance, 1984 , could appoint Inspector subject to fulfillment of pre-conditions mentioned therein-Commission has only to satisfy itself, prima facie, on the basis of the material placed before it, that case for investigation through an Inspector is called for-The matter, in fact, vests in the discretion of the Commission, to be decided after following the summary procedure-In proceedings under S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984, full-fledged inquiry in the form of a trial is not required to be held nor any formal evidence is to be recorded before passing the order under S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984-The Authority has to only satisfy itself prima facie, of course, on the basis of the material placed before it that a case for investigation through an Inspector is called for and it is for the Inspector to ascertain and determine the truth or otherwise of the allegation during the investigation to be conducted by him whereafter he has to submit report to the concerned authority-In the present case, the Commission (Respondent), before passing the impugned order, issued Show-Cause Notices to the Chief Executive and Directors of the Company, and after going through the facts of the case, evidences produced as well as arguments advanced by the parties, and while observing that the affairs of the Company warranted deeper probe through appointment of a competent Inspector(s), appointed a Chartered Accountants as Inspector for carrying out investigation into the affairs of the Company as per annexed Terms Of Reference (TORs)-Therefore , respondent /SECP had rightly passed the impugned order by appointing the Chartered Accountant as an Inspector in terms of S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984-No illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect on the part of respondent (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan) had been noticed while passing the impugned order-Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed , in circumstances.\n(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [Since repealed]-\n-S. 265-Investigation of Companys affairs-Appointing of Inspector-Scope-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, powers of-While a Civil (Original) Suit, regarding dispute of company left by predecessor of parties (Company), was being adjudicated upon by the High Court, one of the parties filed a petition ,with certain submission/prayer for the decision of the dispute between the parties ; High Court directed/ordered to transmit the matter to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission) for decision of the same-Commission while exercising the power under S.265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (the Ordinance 1984), appointed a Chartered Accountant as Inspector for carrying out investigation into the affairs of the Company (impugned order)-A few share-holders of Company (Petitioners) filed constitutional petition assailing the vires of impugned order passed by the Commission / Respondent-Grievance of the petitioners was that the impugned order was violative of the direction given by the High Court as no direction was given to pass any order in terms of S.265 of the Ordinance, 1984-Validity-Record reflected that said constitutional petition was disposed of by the High Court on very submission of said private respondent/share-holder (then petitioner ) that he would be satisfied if the matter be referred to the SECP to investigate the allegations levelled by him in terms of S. 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and thereafter decide the case in accordance with law-Thus, then High Court directed the SECP to decide the same in accordance with law i.e. in terms of S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984-No illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect on the part of respondent (Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan was noticed while passing the impugned order-Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances.\n(d) Administration of justice-\n-Petition-Expression disposed of accordingly -Meaning-Said expression significantly means that the petition was disposed of in terms of the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner-So, an order stating that counsel for the petitioner wishes to withdraw this petition after arguments . disposed of accordingly means that subject petition is terminated, settled, ended, concluded or closed as desired by the counsel for the petitioner after arguments and consideration of the merits of the case.\nMuhammad Saqlain v. The State and others 2024 YLR 2568 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahalwalpur", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No.8594 of 2016/BWP, order dated: 28th February, 2024, hearing date: 28th February, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Ahmad Nadeem Arshad, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Aejaz Ahmad Ansari for Petitioners.\nM. Yaseen Kamran and Ch. Muhammad Jameel, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. HALEEMA and others-Petitioners\nVS\nEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, C&C DEPARTMENT SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26378", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1670 = 2025 SLD 1670 = 2025 CLD 343", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODQ", - "Key Words:": "Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 6(11),11, 134(3), 279, 280, 281, 282, 283 & 285-Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, R.19-Competition (Merger Control) Regulations, 2016, Regln.5-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.37(d)-Scheme of arrangement and merger, approval of-Duty of Court-Interference of Court in business decision of merger-Scope-Substitution of collective wisdom of the shareholders through courts decision-Pre-merger clearance-Fulfillment of legal formalities-Sanction of Scheme of Arrangement meant for amalgamation of companies was sought-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan pressed pre-merger clearance-Held, that Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited and Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Limited filed a petition for merger, in which Court approved the merger, noting that it had been established like mid-day-sun that all legal/statutory requirements qua holding of meetings by the Chairmen, requisite publication, issuance of notices to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan SECP and Competition Commission of Pakistan CCP , filing of NOCs of all secured creditors, interest of whole body of shareholders and approval of the Scheme by majority of shareholders was obtained-It ultimately will prove to be beneficial for the shareholders and the companies and there remained no impediment to grant sanction of the Scheme of Arrangement of the petitioners-All legal requirements were met, including obtaining NOCs from secured creditors, pre-merger notification from the CCP, and approval from the SECP-Shareholders unanimously approved the Scheme-Court emphasized the importance of timely decisions in commercial matters and cited precedents supporting judicial non-interference in business decisions when legal formalities were fulfilled and the Scheme was fair and reasonable-Merger was held to be beneficial for stakeholders-Once the requirements of a Scheme for getting sanction of the court were found to have been met, the Court would have no further jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the commercial wisdom of the majority of the class of persons, who with their open eyes had given their approval of the Scheme-Petition was allowed and the Scheme was sanctioned and approved in terms thereof, in circumstances.\nFauji Cement Company and Askari Cement Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others 2022 CLD 604; M.C.R. (Pvt.) Ltd., Franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority and others 2021 CLD 639; Waqas Ayub v. Adeel Yaqub and others 2024 CLD 990; Taisei Corporation and another v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640; Lt. General (Retd.) Mahmud Ahmad Akhtar and another v. M/s Allied Developers (Private) Limited and others 2022 CLD 718; Shaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan/National Tariff Commission and others 2021 PTD 2126; Dewan Salman Fiber v. Dhan Fibers Limited PLD 2001 Lah. 230; International Complex Projects Limited and another 2017 CLD 1468; Gadoon Textile Mills and others case 2015 CLD 2010; Roomi Foods (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Joint Registrar of Companies 2020 CLD 900; MS Fazal Cloth Mills Ltd. v. MS Fazal Weaving Mills Ltd. 2021 CLD 182; Presson Descon International (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Joint Registrar of Companies 2020 CLD 1128 = PLD 2020 Lah. 869; Dilsons (Private) Limited and others v. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and another 2021 CLD 1317; Nadeem Power Generation (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2023 CLD 652; Chancellor Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford and Oxford University Press Pakistan (SMC-Private) Limited 2023 CLD 1111 and SPI Insurance Company Limited and the United Insurance Company of Pakistan Limited 2023 CLD 1088 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Original No.04 of 2024, order dated: 18th November, 2024, hearing date: 18th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Jawad Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Raja Jibran Tariq, Asim Shafi, ASC with Mikael Azmat Rahim, ASC and Furqan Khan for Petitioners.\nShahzad Ali Rana, Special Public Prosecutor on behalf of the SECP with Fatima Shabbir and Hassnain Raza for Petitioners.\nGulfraz Arshad, Law Officer on behalf of the CCP.\nMuhammad Ahmad for United Bank Limited.\nShah Jahan, Law Officer for Meezan Bank Limited.\nRahil Sikandar Khawaja for Faysal Bank Limited with Raja Faisal Ghanni for Petitioner.\nRaja Arshad Mahmood for Bank of Punjab with Sardar Haseeb Arshad, Abdul Waheed and Muhammad Nasrullah Rehman for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Asif, Law Officer on behalf of Askari Bank Limited.\nMuhammad Tauseef Akhlaq, Law Officer for Bank Al-Habib Limited with Abid Jan, Bank Representative.\nShahzada Moteen Hasan, Manager Legal Affairs on behalf of MCB Bank Limited with Nouman Israr, Bank Representative.\nFaheem Farooq, Manager/Representative on behalf of Soneri Bank Limited.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAUJI FERTILIZER COMPANY LIMITED AND FAUJI FERTILIZER BIN QASIM, LIMITED................... APPELLANT\nVS\nSECURITIES YAND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and another............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26379", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5OC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1671 = 2025 SLD 1671 = 2025 CLD 355", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5OC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 2(1) (q), 2(1)(b) & 4-Dairy and Cattle Farmers Associations-Association of undertakings-Scope-Whether the number of Dairy and Cattle Farmers Associations based in different level/cities (Respondents/Associations) are undertakings-Held, that as per the definition of undertaking under S. 2(1)(q) of Competition Act, 2010, the undertaking shall include an association of undertaking , and formal membership of an association of undertakings is not required for the application of the Competition Act, 2010-Agreement, understandings or acquiescence to decisions of association of undertakings that aim to restrict free market competition shall fall within ambit of S. 2(1)(b) read with S. 4 of the Act, 2010-Emphasis is placed on the substance of the arrangement and its effect on competition, rather than formal membership of an association of undertakings-Thus, an association of undertakings, howsoever, established and whether or not it has formal membership, will fall within the ambit of S. 2(1) (q) of the Act, 2010, even without being directly involved in economic activities.\nIn the matter of Show-Cause Notice issued to M/s Pakistan Flour Mills Association 2020 CLD 433 and In the matter of Show-Cause Notices Issued to Pakistan Automobile Manufacturers Authorized Dealers Association (PAMADA) and its Member Undertakings 2016 CLD 289 ref.\n(b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 2(1)(b), 2(1)(q), 4(1) & 4(2)(a)-Price of fresh milk (in Karachi), fixing of-Dairy and Cattle Farmers Associations as Association of undertakings, role of -Anti-competitive practices-Whether the number of Dairy and Cattle Farmers Associations based on different level/cities (Respondents/Associations being Undertakings) were responsible for price hike of fresh milk in Karachi-Held, that despite absence of compelling evidence regarding the element of coercion upon wholesalers and retailers, statements/ findings recorded by the Enquiry Committee/Report reveal that both wholesalers and retailers are bound / restrained to follow the rates fixed by the Respondents / Associations , and both cannot afford to go against the rates set by the Respondents / Associations, as the Respondents / Associations will stop the milk supply to them and create an artificial shortage of milk by hoarding it in ice factories and then selling that milk in interior Sindh-Wholesalers and retailers, admitted during the hearing, that they primarily follow the presidents of the Respondents / Association directly or indirectly, at different stages-The legitimate role of any association is to serve as a link between the traders and the Government by representing their interest and assisting in favorable policy formulation and its implementation-It plays a pivotal role in standardization, supporting growth and development of particular sector and benefit to the public in the longer run-Thus, the Respondents/Associations have the ability to influence fresh milk prices in Karachi-Video evidence and testimonies support the claim that the Respondents/Associations exert substantial influence over bhandi rates, mandi rates, wholesale rate and in turn retail prices of the milk-The exercise of the said control as well as the evidence of coordination among the Respondents / Associations is glaringly obvious-Had other parties not adhered to the prices set by the Respondents, there would have been some price competition among the milk producers and retailers operating across various districts of Karachi, which suggests that the Respondents / Associations effectively suppressed natural equilibrium in the absence of Commissioner Karachis price setting role and hindered the emergence of competition among dairy farmers-Thus, the Respondents / Associations have colluded on pricing mechanism of the sale of fresh milk which is contravention of Ss. 4(1) & 4(2)(a) of the Competition Act, 2010-Competition Commission of Pakistan imposed a lenient financial penalty on Respondents / Associations while directing them to submit a written commitment to the Commission that they will refrain from engaging in any form of market abuse, manipulation or any other anti-competitive practices prohibited under the Competition Act, 2010-Show-Cause Notice against the Dairy and Cattle Farmers Associations succeeded accordingly.\nIn the Matter of Show-Cause Notice issued to M/s. Pakistan Poultry Association 2011 CLD 42 ref.\n(c) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)-\n-Ss. 4(1) & 4(2)(a)-Sindh Essential Commodities Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 2005 (IX of 2006), Preamble-Price of fresh milk (in Karachi), fixing of-Dairy and Cattle Farmers Associations as Association of undertakings, role of-Anti-Competitive Practices-Failure of the Commissioner Karachi regarding setting prices in dairy market-Argument of the Dairy and Cattle Farmers Associations (Respondents/Associations) was that their input costs increased significantly during the relevant period but the Commissioner Karachi failed to adjust inflationary pressures despite multiple appeals; consequently, they had no other option available but to raise prices-Validity-Despite failure of Commissioner Karachi to fix the prices in alignment with inflationary pressures under the Sindh Essential Commodities Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 2005, in normal market settings, each dairy farmer would have fixed its own prices taking into account demand and supply, costs incurred and economies of scale in case of bigger dairy farmers-Contrary to this the evidence /record, especially the video graphic evidence, indicates that Respondents/Associations colluded, coordinated, congregated a crowd of farmers before manipulating the milk price and key representatives of Associations announced prices of fresh milk which highlight their direct involvement in price setting mechanism, indicating manipulation of market dynamics to profit and to exploit consumers-No legal or regulatory framework should be manipulated to hinder competition or harm consumers-Any attempt to misuse regulations to conceal anti-competitive behavior to undermine market mechanism may constitute violation of the Competition Act, 2010-Representatives of the Respondents / Associations are engaged in anti-competitive activities by making decisions that set the prices of fresh milk in Karachi in violation of Ss. 4(1) & 4(2)(a) of the Competition Act, 2010-Competition Commission of Pakistan, however, in levying penalties, took a lenient view on account of failure of administrative role by the Commissioner Karachi as envisaged under the Sindh Essential Commodities Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 2005, and imposed a financial penalty on Respondents /Associations while directing them to submit a written commitment to the Commission that they will refrain from engaging in any form of market abuse, manipulation or any other anti-competitive practices prohibited under the Competition Act, 2010-Show Cause Notice against the Dairy and Cattle Farmers Associations succeeded accordingly. [p. 368] F, G & H", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "File No.360/Milk-Karachi/C&TA/CCP/2021, order dated: 19th December, 2204, Dates of hearing: 15th July, 10th September, 4th November of 2021, 14th November and 15th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Dr. Kabir Ahmed Sidhu, Chairman and Abdul Rashid Sheikh, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Present on behalf of the Respondents:\nGhazi Khan, Fawaz Khan, for DCFA.\nTayyab Malik for DFAK.\nSikandar Nagori for KDFA.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN THE MATTER OF SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE ISSUED TO M/S DAIRY AND CATTLE FARMERS ASSOCIATION KARACHI (DCFA) M/S DAIRY FARMERS ASSOCIATION KARACHI (DFAK) M/S KARACHI DAIRY FARMERS ASSOCIATION (KDFA)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26380", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5OCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1672 = 2025 SLD 1672 = 2025 CLD 369", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5OCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S.9-Suit for recovery of finance-Entries of statement of account-Proof-Parties prove facts stated in pleadings-Statement of account is simply the ledger maintained by bank reflecting outstanding amount of a finance facility but its entries are required to be proved by underlying documents by evidence led by the plaintiff.\n(b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Suit for recovery of finance against surety-Maintainability-Pre-condition-Existence of a debt is a sine qua non for an action against surety even if it is separately and independently brought against it-Foundation or basis of claim even in suit against surety is liability of principal debtor.\n(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-\n-S. 45-Execution proceedings-Several co-defendants-Principle-Plaintiff who has obtained judgment against several co-defendants who are jointly and severally liable, can take execution proceedings against any one of the co-defendants, or any combination of them or all of them.\n(d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Suit for recovery of finance-Debtor and guarantor, joining of-Principle-Even if contract of guarantee by its terms makes guarantor not jointly liable and cause can be said to be separate, the creditor can bring an action by joining principal debtor and surety as defendants.\nBank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad and another [1969] 1 SCR 620 rel.\n(e) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-S. 9-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.II, R.2-Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 128-Suit for recovery of finance-Liability of surety-Joint cause of action-Plaintiff/bank filed suit against principal borrowers and surety for failure to repay finance facilities-Validity-Plaintiff/bank by provisions of O. II, R. 2, C.P.C. was precluded from splitting claim which had its foundation in joint cause of action against all defendants-Provision of Explanation to O. II, R. 2, C.P.C. supported case of plaintiff/bank in treating cause of action against all defendants as unified and joint-Plaintiff/bank proved its case against defendants for recovery of amounts under finance facilities in question and mark-up under Running Finance facility in addition to preliminary decree that was passed earlier-High Court decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff/bank and against defendants, jointly and severally-Suit was decreed accordingly.\nSaudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Limited v. B.A Rajput Steel and Re-rolling Mills (Pvt.) Limited and others 2016 CLD 465; Sri Sri Raja Lakshmi Narayan Jew and others v. The Province of East Pakistan 1969 SCMR 898; Mst. Bakht Bibi v. Muhammad Aslam Khan and others 2016 MLD 1411; Loo Chay Sit v. Estate of Loo Chay Loo (2010) 1 SLR 286; Muhammad Luqman v. The State PLD 1969 Lah. 257; High Noon Textile Limited and others v. Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited and 4 others 2010 CLD 567; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd). Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others 1992 SCMR 1174; National Construction Limited v. Standard Insurance Co. Limited 1984 CLC 286 and Kamila Aamir and another v. Additional District and Sessions Judge and others PLD 2023 Lah. 601 ref.\n(f) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-\n-S. 128-Word coextensive -Scope-Word coextensive in S. 128 of Contract Act, 1872 refers to the extent to which surety is liable towards creditor-Surety is not liable for more than what is due from principal debtor-Surety, under S. 128 Contract Act, 1872 may impose limits on restricting its liability by entering into a special contract.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 28 of 2014, order dated: 13th May, 2024, hearing date: 18th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Shams Mehmood Mirza, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ashar Elahi and Syed Majid Ali Bukhari for Plaintiff.\nHaq Nawaz Chattha for Defendants Nos.1 to 8.\nZaki ur Rehman for Defendant No.9.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FAYSAL BANK LIMITED-Plaintiff\nVS\nMessrs DYNASEL LIMITED and others-Defendants" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26381", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1673 = 2025 SLD 1673 = 2025 CLD 393", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Non-Banking Finance Companies and Notified Entities Regulations, 2008-\n-Reglns. 66A(c)(i), 66A(c)(iv), 66A(d) & 66A(f)-Investing in Equity/Mutual Funds-Mis-selling / concealed investment risks, allegation of-Risk categorization of investor............. Appellant(S) (Fund Management Company) was penalized by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission) on complaint of lady investor (a housewife who had invested an inherited amount) who redeemed the availed plan owing to loss of principal investment allegedly due to contraventions on the part of the Appellant-Validity-To influence the investment decision of investors, it is a practice of the sales agents to highlight the returns without adequately explaining the associated risks and potential downside of equity investment through mutual funds-At the time of making investment respondent (lady complainant), received a welcome call informing her of the risks and exposure involved-Despite that, respondent (complainant) had proceeded with her investment-If respondent (complainant) had been deceived by the appellants relationship manager / sales staff, she should have made a wise choice after receiving the welcome call and information about the risks associated with investing in equity, as required by the Caveat Emptor (buyer beware) doctrine, which holds the respondent (complainant), responsible for her investment decision............. RESPONDENT(S) (complainant) also failed to proceed vigilantly-The recorded call log between the representative of appellant and respondent (complainant) mitigates the assertion made by respondent (complainant) regarding mis-selling or concealed investment risks, however, this fact does not completely absolve the appellant............. RESPONDENT(S) / complainant is a housewife, therefore, she cannot be considered well-informed and vigilant Investor who can understand the risk-bearing factors of equity funds ; thus, the appellant had not acted in her best interest and failed to ensure reasonable care regarding the suitability of the investment product offered to her-However, appellant has apprised the Appellate Bench that without admitting the guilt and on compassionate grounds, a compromised deed has been executed between the parties with the amount of loss suffered by respondent having been paid to her-Appellate Bench, while appreciating said compassionate act of compensation, converted the penalty into a warning-Appeal was disposed of accordingly.\n(b) Non-Banking Finance Companies and Notified Entities Regulations, 2008-\n-Reglns. 66A(c)(i), 66A(c)(iv), 66A(d) & 66A(f)-Investing in Equity/Mutual Funds-Mis-selling / concealed investment risks, allegation of-Risk categorization of investor............. Appellant(S) (Fund Management Company) was penalized by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission) on complaint of lady investor (a housewife who had invested an inherited amount) who redeemed the availed plan owing to loss of principal investment allegedly due to contraventions on the part of the appellant-Validity-Purpose of the need assessment section of the Account Opening Form (AOF) was to determine the suitability of a person for certain investments, however, the appellant failed to proceed in the required manner and in result thereof, a major part of investment of respondent (complainant) was allocated to the high-risk equity fund (average investment in equity funds during the plan duration remained 66.11%)-Respondent (complainant) was a housewife and the invested her inherited amount, therefore, for all practical purposes her risk appetite tolerance level may not be considered as moderate, rather the risk tolerance level should have been recorded as low-Notwithstanding, as per the risk assessment section of the AOF, respondent (complainant), who had been assigned a moderate risk tolerance level, should have been admitted to a capital protection fund and other balanced funds, however, her major investment was made in an equity fund-Importantly, in the AOF, the equity investment solution has been provided for a high tolerance level client-Instead of offering a capital protection hand, she had been admitted to an equity fund............. RESPONDENT(S) / complainant is a housewife, therefore, she cannot be considered well-informed and vigilant Investor who can understand the risk-bearing factors of equity funds ; thus, the appellant had not acted in her best interest and failed to ensure reasonable care regarding the suitability of the investment product offered to her-However, appellant apprised the Appellate Bench that without admitting the guilt and on compassionate grounds, a compromised deed had been executed between the parties with the amount of loss suffered by respondent having been paid to her-Appellate Bench, while appreciating said compassionate act of compensation, converted the penalty into a warning-Appeal, was dispose of accordingly.\n(c) Non-Banking Finance Companies and Notified Entities Regulations, 2008-\n-Reglns. 66A(c)(i), 66A(c) (iv), 66A(d) & 66A (f)-Investing in Equity/Mutual Funds-Mis-selling / concealed investment risks, allegation of-Risk categorization of Investor-Account Opening Form (AOF)-Object and purpose............. Appellant(S) (Fund Management Company) was penalized by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission) on complaint of lady investor (a housewife who had invested an inherited amount) who redeemed the availed plan owing to loss of principal investment allegedly due to contraventions on the part of the appellant-Stance of the appellant was that at the time when respondent / complainant made the Investment there was no specific law requiring it to consider specific risk categorization and the same were later introduced vide Circular No. 2 of 2020-Validity-Though appellate Bench endorsed said stance, however, this was not the case against the Appellant that it failed to follow any specific risk categorization-The case against the appellant was that it failed to accurately categorize the risk tolerance level of respondent / complainant as per the given data and information............. Appellant(S) had failed to understand the object of Account Opening Form (AOF) and admitted the major part of respondents investment was in equity fund-Account Opening Form (AOF) was not a mere formality rather it was a key document to determine the investment tolerance level of respondent, however, the appellants relationship manager/sales staff committed serious irregularities in said regard-The sanctity of the AOF cannot be undermined and the appellant also has no mechanism to check and verify the accuracy and suitability of data provided by the relationship manager/sales staff to avoid incidents of incorrect risk categorizations............. RESPONDENT(S) / complainant is a housewife, therefore, she cannot be considered well-informed and vigilant investor who can understand the risk-bearing factors of equity funds ; thus, the appellant had not acted in her best interest and failed to ensure reasonable care regarding the suitability of the investment product offered to complainant-However, appellant had apprised the Appellate Bench that without admitting the guilt and on compassionate grounds, a compromised deed had been executed between the parties with the amount of loss suffered by respondent having been paid to her-Appellate Bench, while appreciating said compassionate act of compensation, converted the penalty into a warning-Appeal, was dispose of accordingly.\n(d) Non-Banking Finance Companies and Notified Entities Regulations, 2008-\n-Reglns. 66A(c)(i), 66A(c)(iv), 66A(d) & 66A(f)-Investing in equity/Mutual Funds-Investment risks-Scope-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan-Powers and responsibilities............. Appellant(S) (Fund Management Company) was penalized by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission) on complaint of lady investor (a housewife who had invested an inherited amount) who redeemed the availed plan owing to loss of principal investment allegedly due to contraventions on the part of the appellant-Plea of the appellant was that any adverse decision (in this appeal ) may undermine the growth of the mutual funds industry in Pakistan-Validity-Appellate Bench, while rejecting the appellants plea, was of the view that while protecting the growth of mutual funds or other regulated activities, the Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan (the Commission) cannot overlook the violations committed by the regulatees and especially when cases of investor exploitation by the regulatees are evident-As per the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, the Commission has the responsibility to protect both: whether it is a regulated entity or an investor-However, appellant had apprised the appellate bench that without admitting the guilt and on compassionate grounds, a compromised deed had been executed between the parties with the amount of loss suffered by Respondent having been paid to her-Appellate Bench, while appreciating said compassionate act of compensation, converted the penalty into a warning-Appeal, was dispose of accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Appeal No.21 of 2020, order dated: 4th July, 2024, hearing date: 2nd May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdur Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant.\nSahar Iqbal (Counsel), Yasir Qadri (CEO) and Hadi Hassan Mukhi (Head of Risk and Compliance).\nFor the Respondents.\nMahboob Ahmed, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and Ms. Asima Wajid, Additional Joint Director (Adjudication-I), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UBL FUND MANAGEMENT LIMITED............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nMs. MOMY KAMAL and another................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26382", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1674 = 2025 SLD 1674 = 2025 CLD 402", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5ODg", - "Key Words:": "Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]-\n-Ss. 284 & 285-Companies Court Rules, 1997, R. 55-Scheme of Arrangement-Secured and unsecured creditors-Rights-Petitioners were minor share-holders of respondent company, who were aggrieved of sanctioning of Scheme of Arrangement by High Court-Plea raised by petitioners was that Scheme of Arrangement catered only for interest of secured creditors while ignoring interest of minority creditors and share-holders-Validity-All codal formalities were complied with-Objectors before High Court were minor share-holders and unsecured creditors, who could not point out any illegality or violation of the provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984, in the Scheme of Arrangement between respondent company and its creditors, nor could refer to any legal defect or procedural irregularity in order passed by High Court while sanctioning the Scheme of Arrangement-Pursuant to the order of High Court, meeting of all stakeholders including creditors and members was held, wherein, 100% share-holders of respondent company and 95.09% in value of secured creditors pursuant to vote at the meeting, consented to and also passed a resolution approving Scheme of Arrangement, which fact alone was sufficient to reflect upon the will of majority creditors/share-holders while considering Scheme of Arrangement as in the best interest of respondent company and its share-holders-Secured creditors, who were majority share-holders, did not suffer from any legal infirmity or procedural defect-Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court as petitioners failed to raise any substantial question of law-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1721-K of 2021, order dated: 19th December, 2024, hearing date: 19th December, 2024.(Against the order dated 25.10.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in J.C.M. No. 49 of 2016).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nCh. Atif Rafiq, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI ................... APPELLANT\nVS\nNINA INDUSTRIES LIMITED, KARACHI and others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26383", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5OHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1675 = 2025 SLD 1675 = 2025 CLD 543", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5OHo", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss.19 & 22-National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000), S. 18-Execution proceedings-Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), blocking of-Appellants / judgment debtors were aggrieved of direction issued by Executing Court to block their CNICs during execution proceedings-Validity-CNIC is essential for enjoyment of a number of fundamental rights, therefore, no person can be deprived of it without due process-Agricultural land of appellants / judgment debtors had already been redeemed and another agricultural land was under mortgage-Executing Court could have passed an order regarding property under mortgage which was permissible under law-High Court set aside direction issued by Executing Court, as there was no justification of such order and the same was illegal, unlawful and was passed without observing prerequisites-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nMessrs Azhar & Co. and others v. National Bank of Pakistan 2018 CLD 830; Muhammad Asif v. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited through Manager 2022 CLD 1021; Muhammad Umar v. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2017 Sindh 585; Hafiz Awais Zafar v Judge Family Court, Lahore and 2 others PLD 2022 Lah. 756 and Urooj Tabani v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2021 Isl. 105 ref.\nHabib Ahmad v. Haji Munir Ahmad 2004 YLR 1540; Messrs 3-A Trade Impex through Partner and 2 others v. Askari Commercial Bank Ltd, through Branch Manager 2005 CLD 1379; Abdul Basit Zahid v. Modaraba Al-Tijarah through Chief Executive and 2 others PLD 2000 Kar. 322 and Muhammad Kaleem v. Arslan Aslam and others 2023 CLC 796 rel.\n(b) Constitution of Pakistan-\n-Arts. 9 & 14-Right to identity-Scope-Right to identity is also associated to right to life (Article 9) and would also be read into Art. 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees dignity of man.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No.26 of 2023, heard on 16th April, 2024, hearing date: 16th April, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi and Raheel Kamran, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Suleman Bhatti for Appellants.\nRespondent fEx parte.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs AL-HARMAIN & CO. through Sole Proprietor and 2 others-Appellants\nVS\nM.C.B. BANK LIMITED through Manager / Attorney............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26384", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5OHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1676 = 2025 SLD 1676 = 2025 CLD 420", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5OHk", - "Key Words:": "(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Ss. 14(2) & 39-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched. Art.178-Award made rule of court-Filing of award in court by the Arbitrator upon application made by the appellant-Filing of application by the respondent for return of award due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of civil court to entertain and make award Rule of Court-Upon acceptance of application, the award was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction (District Court)-Limitation-Provisions of Art.178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, apply to application under S.14(2) of Arbitration Act, 1940, made by a party to Court............. Appellant(S) was prompted by the application of appellant to file the award in the Civil Court-Article 178 to First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, applies only to cases where a party to the arbitration proceedings applies to the court for the filing of an award but it does not apply to an application filed by a party to the arbitrator for filing the award in the Court-Application to have the award filed in Court must be moved by any party within ninety days of the date on which he receives notice of the making of the award and no such application can be made after the expiry of this period-When the award is filed in the Court by the arbitrator, the limitation as may be applicable to a party is not applicable to him-No period of limitation is prescribed for the arbitrator to file the award in the Court and no limitation runs against a party to the arbitration proceedings requesting the arbitrator to file the award in the Court-Arbitrator is also not placed under an obligation to file the award in the Court within the limitation period of 90 days prescribed in Art.178-Limitation period under the said Article applies for the purpose of filing an application to the court for a direction to the Arbitrator to file the award in the Court-High Court converted the appeal into civil revision and accepted the same, in circumstances.\nOil and Gas Development Company Limited v. Muhammad Nazir Khan 2024 CLC 988; Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Sabir PLD 1960 (W.P.) Lah. 591; Sindh Industrial Trading Estates v. Sindh Employees Social Security Institution 1993 MLD 1258; Vaseem Construction Co. v. Province of Sindh 1991 CLC 1081; Telecom Foundation v. Asko Enterprises 2020 CLC 1605; Champalal v. Mst. Samrathbai AIR 1960 SC 629; Balwant Singh v. Partap Singh AIR 1968 Punjab and Haryana 265; Hoora v. Abdul Kareem AIR 1970 Rajhastan 22 and Babu Nazir Ahmad v. M/s. Premsukh Shyamsukh & Sons AIR 1987 Madhya Pradesh 240 rel.\nMuhammad Mushtaq Saigal v. Muhammad Wasi Saigal 2001 SCJ 96; Rambilas v. Durga Bijai Prasad AIR 1965 Patna 239; Muhammad Hassan v. Muhammad Anwar AIR 1968 Patna 82 and District Cooperative Development Federation Limited v. Ram Samujh Tewari AIR 1973 All 477 distinguished.\n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Ss.14(2) & 39-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115-Appeal-Maintainability-Revisional jurisdiction of High Court-Scope-Conversion of appeal into revision-Legality-Order as to declaring the award filed in the court as time barred-Legality-Such order passed by the Court of the District Judge did not fall within any of the categories enumerated in S. 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which explicitly provides that an appeal shall lie from the orders listed in the said Section and from no others -Appeal filed by the appellant against the order passed by the District Judge holding that the award was barred by law was not maintainable, however, by holding that the award was barred by the law, the District Judge had, in effect, refused to proceed further in the matter to exercise jurisdiction over the appellants application to make the award a rule of Court-Such non-exercise of jurisdiction could be checked and corrected in the revisional jurisdiction of High Court under S. 115, C.P.C.-In case of satisfaction of court that the circumstances of the case justified conversion of an appeal into proceedings under S. 115, C.P.C., there was no legal bar to such a conversion-Decision by a subordinate court contrary to the law laid down in judgments of superior courts is a material irregularity or illegality within the meaning of S.115, C.P.C., which results in error of jurisdiction.\n(c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S.39-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115-Conversion of proceedings in an appeal into proceedings under S. 115, C.P.C.-Scope-If a court is satisfied that the circumstances of the case justified conversion of an appeal into proceedings under S. 115, C.P.C., there was no legal bar to such a conversion.\nLiaqat Ali v. Bashiran Bibi 2005 CLC 11; Tayab v. Muhammad Siddiq 2006 YLR 111; Capital Development Authority v. Khuda Bakhsh 1994 SCMR 771; Jane Margrete William v. Abdul Hamid Mian 1994 SCMR 1555; Muhammad Hanif v. Muhammad PLD 1990 SC 859; Muhammad Ramzan v. Fatima PLD 2004 Lah. 17; Karam Khan v. Allah Bakhsh PLD 1995 Lah. 462 and Oil and Gas Development Corporation v. Clough Engineering Limited 2003 YLR 353 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No.20 of 2024, order dated: 20th December, 2024, Dates of hearing: 30th October, 21st and 28th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Habiba Alvi and Sidharth Rashid Raza for Petitioner.\nRaza Ullah Khan Niazi, Farhan Gul and Muhammad Amin for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The IMPERIAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (PVT.) LTD.-Appellant\nVS\nM/s. ZHONGXING TELECOM PAK (PVT.) LTD.-Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26385", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1677 = 2025 SLD 1677 = 2025 CLD 435", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDc", - "Key Words:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)-\n-S. 33(1)(a)-Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed], S. 231-Administrative (Inspection) order passed by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)-Appeal before the Appellate Bench of SECP-Maintainability............. Appellant(S) (Textile Mills) assailed inspection order passed by the Director-Corporate Supervision Department (CSD), SECP, (Respondent) under S. 231 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (the Ordinance, 1984)-Validity-Impugned order was an order to inspect the books and records of the Appellant which had been passed in accordance with law-Section 33(1)(a) of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 states that no appeal shall lie against an administrative direction given by a Commissioner or an officer of the Commission -Exercise of powers under S. 231 of the Ordinance, 1984 was administrative in nature and limited to conducting inspection and preliminary inquiries into the affairs and books of accounts and papers of a company-If the orders passed by the Commission in terms of S.231 of the Ordinance, 1984 were subject to challenge that would paralyze functions of the Commission which would not be expected to perform its regulatory functions-It is the prime responsibility of the Commission as a regulator to collect information for effective enforcement of the laws being administered by it, and in the absence of such information, the Commission cannot be expected to make fair and impartial decisions-Therefore, it is extremely important for the regulatees /concerned persons to fully cooperate for providing such information-There was no reason to interfere in impugned inspection order-Appeal, being non-maintainable, was dismissed, in circumstances.\nOfspace (Private) Limited v. Federation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 3 others 2012 CLD 923 and Saif Power Limited v. Federation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2022 CLD 1382 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Appeal No.81 of 2017, order dated: 4th July, 2024, hearing date: 30th May, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Akif Saeed, Chairman/Commissioner and Abdul Rehman Warraich, Commissioner", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sardar Qasim Hassan Khan for Appellant.\nMuhammad Tanver Alam, Additional Director, Supervision Division, SECP for Respondent.\nKashif Ali, Joint Director, Supervision Division, SECP for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HAJRA TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED................... APPELLANT\nVS\nDIRECTOR, CORPORATE SUPERVISION DEPARTMENT, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26386", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1678 = 2025 SLD 1678 = 2025 CLD 441", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDY", - "Key Words:": "Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)-\n-Ss. 5, 6, 30, 72, 73 & 84-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII-Suit for recovery on the basis of negotiable instruments (nine cheques)-Pre-requisites-Presentment of cheque before the bank-Seven out of nine claimed cheques (cheques-in-question) not having been presented before the bank, were produced by the respondent/plaintiff in his statement recorded before the Trial Court-Trial Court decreed recovery of whole amount regarding nine cheques-Validity-Record reveals that appellant/defendant in his written statement denied the factum of outstanding amount, and that the respondent/plaintiff through a representative of concerned branch of the Bank, being one of his (plaintiffs) witnesses, only succeeded to produce(get exhibited) two cheques (amounting to Rs. 5 lac each) issued by the appellant/respondent which were dishonored; the remaining seven cheques (cheques-in-question) were produced by the respondent/plaintiff in his statement recorded before the Trial Court-Admittedly, there was no evidence on record produced by the plaintiff for presentment of the cheques-in-question to the concerned branch of the Bank-Section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, (the Act 1881) defines bill of exchange and S. 6 of the Act 1881 defines cheque as a bill of exchange drawn on specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand-It appears that dishonor by non-acceptance or non-payment gives rise to an immediate right to recourse against the drawer of the bill of exchange-Section 68 of the Act 1881 deals with all negotiable instruments including cheques while S. 73 of the Act 1881 deals with the cheque and provides the time of presentment and its consequence; this section further provides that a cheque must be presented for payment within reasonable time after its delivery to the holder-It is the mandate of the Act 1881 that all negotiable instrument should be presented for payment within a reasonable time-According to S. 72 of the Act 1881, the drawer of the cheque is the principle debtor and he cannot avoid his liability towards the holder except in case of non-presentment of a cheque within a reasonable time-Sections 72 & 84 of the Act 1881 stipulate that unless a cheque is presented for payment within a reasonable time of its issue no right to recover the amount would accrue-Presentment of a cheque, being a bill of exchange, is a condition precedent in order for a payee to charge the drawer/maker of a cheque; thus, for filing suit under O. XXXVII, C.P.C. based on a cheque, it is necessary to present the said cheque to the bank, as presentment under the provisions of the Act 1881 is the cause of action, in a suit based upon such an instrument-In the present case, admittedly there was no evidence of presentment of the seven cheques (in-question) having been exhibited/produced by the plaintiff in his statement before the Trial Court to the concerned branch of the Bank, therefore, to the said extent suit of the respondent/plaintiff under O. XXXVII, C.P.C., was not maintainable, however to the extent of two cheques duly exhibited [total amount of Rs.10,00,000/- (ten lac only)], the impugned judgment was maintained-High Court set-aside impugned judgment/ decree to the extent of said seven cheques and suit to that extent filed by the respondent/plaintiff was dismissed-However, impugned judgment/ decree to the extent of two duly exhibited cheques was maintained-Appeal filed by the defendant, was partly allowed.\nNational Bank of Pakistan v. Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1370; Al-Hamd Edible Oil Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive v. Syed Waseem Hyder 2008 CLC 1578 and Khalifa Azhar Mumtaz v. Ghulam Akbar 2014 CLC 1448 ref.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No. 3 of 2022, order dated: 24th October, 2023, hearing date: 18th October, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Muhammad Ejaz Swati and Nazeer Ahmed Langove, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rehmatullah Barech for Appellant.\nMian Badar Munir for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed MATIULLAH AGHA............. Appellant(S)\nVS\nHaji MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN alias Haji MUHAMMAD HASSAN............. RESPONDENT(S)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26387", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1679 = 2025 SLD 1679 = 2025 CLD 446", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDU", - "Key Words:": "(a) Securities Act (III of 2015)-\n-Ss.7 & 8-Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) Regulations-Futures Eligibility Criteria (FEC)-Scope-Futures Eligibility Criteria (FEC) is part and parcel of PSX Regulations and is regulated by statute under S.7 of Securities Act, 2015-Component of FEC does not fall outside the domain of S. 7 of Securities Act, 2015 and is part of PSX Regulations-Framework of Securities Act, 2015 provides that regulations framed by PSX are statutory in nature and must be framed within the contours of parent statute as stated therein.\n(b) Securities Act (III of 2015)-\n-Ss. 7 & 8-Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) Regulations-Futures Eligibility Criteria (FEC)-Approval of regulations or amendments to regulations of Securities and Exchange Commission of the Pakistan (SECP)-Scope-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) when approving proposed regulations has two options under section 8 of Securities Act, 2015 i.e. either (i) to approve them, or (ii) to refuse to approve them-There is no third option available to SECP under S. 8 of Securities Act, 2015.\n(c) Securities Act (III of 2015)-\n-Ss. 7, 8 & 169 (4)-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 18 & 25-Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) Regulations-Futures Eligibility Criteria (FEC)-Approval of regulations or amendments to regulations of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)-Scope................... APPELLANT / Stock Exchange Brokers Association assailed eligibility criteria for selection of securities eligible for trading in Deliverable Futures Contract and Cash Settled Futures Contract Markets referred to as Futures Eligibility Criteria (FEC), amending Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) Regulations for enhancement of Future Market-Held, that there was no publication of PSX Regulations, after SECP had introduced Criteria 4 (i) of FEC to PSX Regulations-Once SECP introduced a new provision, i.e. Criteria 4 (i) to FEC, SECP triggered precondition of public notice under S. 169(4) of Securities Act, 2015-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistans contribution to PSX s proposed regulations of introducing criteria 4 (i) to FEC constituted making or amending a regulation under Securities Act, 2015 which mandated publication of such amendment by SECP-Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan failed to meet statutory condition set out in S.169(4) of Securities Act, 2015, i.e. eliciting public opinion on its draft version of PSX Regulations, which included Criteria 4 (i) of FEC-Criteria 4 (i) of FEC did not meet the test of introducing amendments to PSX Regulations under Securities Act, 2015-Criteria 4 (i) was illegal and unlawful made in contravention of Securities Act, 2015, thus, was of no legal effect-Eligibility notice dated 17-06-2021 issued by PSX at the material time suspended by High Court s interim order removing entities from approved list of eligibility securities on account of Criteria 4 (i) of FEC was not in accordance with law and the same was set aside-High Court declared that contents of Criteria 4 (i) of FEC to the extent of ousting securities of companies which obtained stay order from a Court against any inquiry / investigation initiated by Commission to be ineligible for trading in future market, was ultra vires of Arts. 9 & 25 of the Constitution-High Court stuck down Criteria 4 (i) of FEC to PSX Regulations as the same was un-Constitutional-Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P. No.D-4449 of 2021, order dated: 21st October, 2024, Dates of hearing: 15th August, 23rd September and 3rd October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, CJ and Jawad Akbar Sarwana, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid F. Ebrahim for Petitioner.\nJam Asif Mehmood for Respondent No.1.\nRaja Qasit Nawaz for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN STOCK BROKERS ASSOCIATION................... APPELLANT\nVS\nPAKISTAN STOCK EXCHANGE LIMITED through Chief Executive Officer and another................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26388", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1680 = 2025 SLD 1680 = 2025 CLD 507", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDQ", - "Key Words:": "(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)-\n-Ss. 126, 127 & 278-Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss. 18 & 34-Pro-arbitration approach of Courts-Arbitration-Filing of award-Dispute pertaining to transfer of shares was initiated before High Court where proceedings were neither stayed under Arbitration Act, 1940 nor the matter was referred to Arbitrator-Validity-In addition to Supreme Court adopting a pro-arbitration approach, stance of referring for arbitration was also bolstered by the framework of Companies Act, 2017, which, through its Preamble, affirmatively advocated for alternative mechanisms to ensure expeditious resolution of corporate disputes-Companies were explicitly encouraged under section 278 of Companies Act, 2017 to refer any existing or future disputes, whether between companies or involving any other persons, to arbitration-Supreme Court with pro-arbitration approach and with the consensus of parties referred the matter to Arbitrator-Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court and accepted application under section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940-Supreme Court stayed proceedings under sections 126 and 127 of Companies Act, 2017 concerning alleged fraudulent transfer of shares and rectification of register of members (shareholders)-Supreme Court directed that award made by Arbitrator would be filed in High Court in accordance with the proceedings under Arbitration Act, 1940, as the matter fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of Court established under the Companies Act, 2017-Appeal was allowed.\nChannel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. [1993] AC 334; Brother Steel Mills v. Ilyas Miraj PLD 1996 SC 543 and Nilmoni Singh v. Taranath ILR 9 Cal 295 rel.\n(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-S. 2(c)-Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S. 5(4)-Term Civil Court -Civil Courts of special jurisdiction-Scope-Courts exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to specific matters, such as the Court established under Companies Act, 2017 cannot be read into the exception clause of section 2(c) of Arbitration Act, 1940-Term Civil Court mentioned in section 2(c) of Arbitration Act, 1940 does not refer exclusively to Civil Courts of general jurisdiction but also encompasses Civil Courts of special jurisdiction.\n(c) Arbitration-\n-Economic benefits-Scope-Significant economic benefits of arbitration are cost-effective, efficient and confidential means of resolving disputes-Arbitration alleviates burden on national Courts, enhances business productivity and provides faster resolution process, thereby minimizing disruptions to businesses-Ability to enforce international arbitration awards strengthens trade and commerce, while arbitrations stable and predictable dispute resolution mechanism promotes investor confidence, making the country an attractive destination for foreign investment-Such factors collectively foster a favourable business environment, drive economic growth and enhance countrys competitiveness on the global stage.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 4468 of 2024, order dated: 2nd December, 2024, hearing date: 2nd December, 2024.\n(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 24.06.2024, passed in C.M. No. 3 of 2023 in C.O. No. 48681 of 2023).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Iftikhar-ud-Din Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Haroon Mumtaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nArshad Mohsin Tayebaly, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KAUSAR RANA RESOURCES (PRIVATE) LIMITED and others -Petitioners\nVS\nQATAR LUBRICANTS COMPANY W.L.L. (QALCO) and others ................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26389", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1681 = 2025 SLD 1681 = 2025 CLD 517", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NC8", - "Key Words:": "(a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-\n-Ss. 19 & 22-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908),O. XXI, Rr.69 & 84-Execution proceedings-Auction-Aborted sale............. Appellant(S) / judgment debtor assailed auction proceedings on the plea that the highest bidder defaulted and property was sold to respondent-Validity-Practice of continuing further with an aborted sale, is not permitted under O. XXI, R. 84, C.P.C., if default has been committed by successful purchaser-By offering the option to purchase to the lower and then to the lowest bidder tantamount to hedging the success of auction and this is not required under O. XXI, R. 84, C.P.C.-High Court declared auction in favour of respondent as nullity and set aside order confirming auction sale-Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.\nMst. Nadia Malik v. Messrs Makki Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and others 2011 SCMR 1675; Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2, Lahore and 8 others PLD 2005 SC 470; Muhammad Ashraf and others v. U.B.L and others 2019 SCMR 1004; Muhammad Ali Asghar Sabir Raja v. Mst. Sajida Bashir and others 2006 SCMR 801; Mst. Samrana Nawaz and others v. M.C.B. Bank Ltd and others PLD 2021 SC 581; Messrs Habib and Company and others v. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited and others PLD 2020 SC 227 and Mst. Samrana Nawaz and others v. MCB Bank Ltd and others PLD 2024 SC 873 ref.\nHudaybia Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. and others PLD 1987 SC 512 distinguished.\n(b) Auction-\n-Single bidder-Scope-Presence of single bidder or availability of single bid is contrary to the spirit of public auction.\nMuhammad Shoaib Arshad and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice Human Rights and Parliamentary Affairs and 4 others 2020 CLD 638; Al-Hadi Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and 4 others v. MCB Bank Limited and 6 others 2023 CLD 85; Summit Bank Limited, Lahore v. Messrs M.M. Brothers Proprietorship Concern through Proprietor and others 2023 CLD 297 rel.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "E.F.A. No.30 of 2022, heard on 22nd October, 2024, hearing date: 22nd October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Asim Hafeez and Anwaar Hussain, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Sulaman Bhatti, Peer Muhammad Masood Chishti, Qaisar Abbas and Naveed Qadir Khan for Appellants.\nSyed Muhammad Ali Gillani and Anwar Kamal for Respondent No.1.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs RAFI COTTON INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. and others-Appellants\nVS\nBANK AL-HABIB and others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26390", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1682 = 2025 SLD 1682 = 2025 CLD 527", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NCs", - "Key Words:": "(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-\n-S.425-Mischief-Scope-In mischievous acts, no gain is normally found accrued to wrong doer and only damage to someone elses property is caused.\n(b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)-\n-S.121-Insurance claim-Proof-Non-filing of FIR............. Appellant(S) / insurance company was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Insurance Tribunal directing to pay to respondent depreciated value of his vehicle which was allegedly stolen-Validity............. Appellant(S) / insurance company rightly declined claim of respondent-Insurance Tribunal wrongly allowed claim of respondent to the extent of depreciated value of truck on the basis of Naqal Mad entered at Police Station Dargai, Malakand-Neither any FIR was registered in the light of Daily Diary in question nor nominated accused in Daily Diary had been detained/arrested-Truck in question was not recovered and there had been no inquiry or investigation report on the part of police............. RESPONDENT(S) was not entitled to submit claim before Insurance Tribunal-Whole insurance amount or depreciated value of the vehicle could not be paid to respondent-High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Insurance Tribunal and suit of respondent was dismissed resultantly-Appeal was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "R.F.A. No.168-P of 2015, order dated: 4th October, 2024, hearing date: 10th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Ishtaiq Ibrahim and Wiqar Ahmad, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arshad Jamal Qureshi for Appellants.\nShumail Ahmad Butt for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "EAST WEST INSURANCE CO. LTD. and others-Appellants\nVS\nAURANGZEB and others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26391", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1683 = 2025 SLD 1683 = 2025 CLD 537", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDk", - "Key Words:": "Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-\n-Ss. 5, 11, 14, 17, 33 & 41(a)-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115, O.II, R.6-A & O.XVI, R.5-Consolidation of petitions and issues by the Arbitrator-Application of provisions of Civil Procedure Code in arbitration proceedings................... APPELLANT filed a petition under S.14 read with S.17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act), which was resisted by way of filing a counter petition under Ss.5 & 11 of the Act-Issue involved in both the petitions emanated out of the same cause, so order of consolidation of petitions was passed and consolidated issues were framed-Contentions of the petitioner were that provisions of C.P.C. were not stricto sensu applicable to the Act and in terms of S. 33 of the Act the civil court was obliged to decide the dispute on the basis of affidavit-Validity-Proviso to S.33 of the Act ordains that where the court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing and other evidence also, and it may pass such order for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit-Section 41 of the Act provides procedure and powers of the court and in terms of S.41(a) of the Act, the provisions of C.P.C. are applicable to all the proceedings before the court under the Act-Applicability of the provisions of C.P.C. are not meant to hamper the arbitration proceedings but for ensuring the advancement of ends of justice-In view of joint reading of above two provisions the contention of the petitioner that under the Act, framing of issues was not permissible was highly ill-founded and misconceived................... APPELLANT itself moved an application under O. XIV, R. 5 of C.P.C. for framing of additional issue as such it was estopped by words and its conduct-Since there was no specific impediment in the way of the court proceeding under the Act, so consolidation of the petitions and framing of consolidated issues, did not warrant invoking revisional jurisdiction-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No.326 of 2024, order dated: 12th September, 2024, hearing date: 12th September, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Mirza Viqas Rauf, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qausain Faisal Mufti and Muhammad Saifullah Khan for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Habib-ullah Khan and Faisal Shakrani for Respondent No.1.\nSardar Muhammad Obaid Khan for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Messrs 7SKY DIGITAL MARKETING (PVT.) LIMITED through authorized representative................... APPELLANT\nVS\nMessrs ASR BUILDERS through L.Rs. and others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26392", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1684 = 2025 SLD 1684 = 2025 CLD 540", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NDg", - "Key Words:": "Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)-\n-S.28-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5-Consumer Court proceedings-Limitation-Condonation of delay-Complaint filed by petitioner/consumer was barred by 90 days-Plea raised by petitioner/consumer was that delay could have been condoned under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908-Validity-Provision of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable to the proceedings before Consumer Court-Supreme Court declined to condone the delay in filing of complaint-Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No.944-L of 2014, order dated: 18 November, 2024, hearing date: 18th November, 2024.\n(Against the judgment dated 02.06.2014 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in F.A.O. No. 305 of 2014).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Rafique Shah, Advocate Supreme Court (through Video Link from Lahore) for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Raja SHAHZAD AHMAD................... APPELLANT\nVS\nINCHARGE BAGGAGE ROUTING PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE, LAHORE and others................... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26393", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1699 = 2025 SLD 1699 = (2025) 132 TAX 117", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NHo", - "Key Words:": "Petitioner assailed notice dated 14.01.2022 under s.177 for audit of Tax Year (TY) 2018 and letter dated 24.08.2022 rejecting its request to withdraw the notice, relying on Clause 105A (inserted via Finance Act, 2022) granting exemption from audit for “preceding four tax years” after an audit. Petitioner contended: last audit (TY 2017) concluded in 2021; four-year bar to be reckoned from conclusion year; Clause 105A is beneficial legislation to be applied retrospectively; impugned actions were without jurisdiction and violated Arts. 4 & 10-A. Respondents argued Clause 105A applies prospectively from 01.07.2022 (TY 2023), exempts only if audit was in TY 2018 onward; petitioner’s TY 2017 audit falls outside scope; audit selection was lawful and not barred.\nHeld: “Preceding four tax years” in Clause 105A refers to the tax year audited, not the year audit concluded; TY 2017 is outside the four-year exemption window, hence TY 2018 audit permissible. Clause 105A contains no express retrospective application; fiscal statutes are construed prospectively unless expressly made retrospective. Beneficial legislation applies retrospectively only if curative/remedial, which Clause 105A is not. Impugned notice preceded the amendment; no legal bar to ongoing audit. Selection under s.177 does not cause actionable injury and is part of self-assessment verification. Reliance placed on M/s Rajby Industries, 2023 SCMR 1407 and CIR v. Allah Din Steel, 2018 SCMR 1328.\nPetition dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3422 of 2022, decided on 26.03.2025. Date of hearing: 27.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Wasim Abid and Abuzar Salman Khan, Advocates for the Petitioners.\nMr. Ali Nawaz Kharal Advocate for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAK TELECOM MOBILE LIMITED\nVs\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26394", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1700 = 2025 SLD 1700 = (2025) 132 TAX 129 = 2025 PTD 1249", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFJ5NHk", - "Key Words:": "Petitioner impugned notice dated 14.01.2022 under s.177 for audit of Tax Year (TY) 2018 and letter dated 24.08.2022 rejecting request to withdraw the same. It relied on Clause 105A (inserted via Finance Act, 2022) granting immunity from audit for “preceding four tax years” after a concluded audit, contending: last audit was of TY 2017, concluded in 2021; four-year bar should run from conclusion year; Clause 105A being beneficial should apply retrospectively; and impugned action violated Arts. 4 & 10-A.\nRespondent submitted: Clause 105A applies prospectively from 01.07.2022 (effective TY 2023), covers only cases where one of the preceding four audited years is in question; petitioner’s TY 2017 audit falls outside that scope; impugned notice was lawfully issued before the amendment.\nHeld: “Preceding four tax years” in Clause 105A means counting back from the tax year selected for audit, not from the year of conclusion of previous audit. For TY 2018, preceding years were TYs 2017, 2016, 2015, and 2014; only TY 2017 was audited, hence no bar to TY 2018 audit. Clause 105A lacks express retrospective operation; fiscal statutes are construed prospectively unless explicitly made retrospective. The provision is not curative or procedural in nature, thus cannot be applied to past selection notices. Impugned notice having been issued before the amendment was unaffected. Selection for audit under s.177 is part of the self-assessment system and causes no enforceable injury.\nPetition dismissed; reliance placed on M/s Rajby Industries, 2023 SCMR 1407 and CIR v. Allah Din Steel, 2018 SCMR 1328.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=177Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,10-A,105A", - "Case #": "W.P No. 72-P of 2021 with IR decided on 20.11.2024. Date of hearing: 20.11.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IJAZ ANWAR, JUSTICE AND SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Qazi Jawad Ehsanullah, Advocate for the Petitioners.\nM/s Adnan Ali, AAG alongwith Yasir Ali, Advocate for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "DR. MUSA KALIM, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR PEDIATRICS LADY READING HOSPITAL-MTI, PESHAWAR\nVS\nGOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY CIVIL SECRETARIAT PESHAWAR AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26395", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1708 = 2025 SLD 1708", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzc", - "Key Words:": "Key Findings of the Tribunal\nTaxpayer’s Income Sources:\nForeign salary (UAE): Rs. 50,501,418\nRental income from UAE property: Rs. 53,568,480\nLegal Issue:\nWhether Pakistan could tax UAE-sourced income under the Pakistan-UAE Double Taxation Treaty (DTT).\nThe Additional Commissioner-IR (AdCIR) had imposed tax, arguing the income was taxable in Pakistan since it was not offered for taxation in the UAE.\nTribunal’s Ruling:\nArticles 6 & 17 of DTT grant exclusive taxing rights to the UAE (source country) for:\nImmovable property income (Article 6)\nDependent personal services/salary (Article 17)\nThe term may be taxed in the DTT does not grant discretion to Pakistan but allocates exclusive jurisdiction to the UAE.\nActual tax payment in UAE is irrelevant—the right to tax (not its exercise) determines exemption in Pakistan.\nPrecedent Cited:\nITA No. 4299/LB/2022: Held that UAE rental income is taxable only in UAE.\nSupreme Court rulings: Confirmed that may in legal contexts can mean shall when public interest or rights are involved.\nOverriding Effect of DTT (Section 107, Income Tax Ordinance 2001):\nThe DTT prevails over domestic law and provides relief from double taxation.\nOrder:\nThe AdCIR’s assessment was annulled.\nCase remanded with directions to:\nExempt UAE-sourced income per DTT.\nFollow binding precedent (ITA No. 4299/LB/2022).\nPass a reasoned order within 45 days.\nConclusion\nThe Tribunal quashed Pakistan’s taxation of UAE income, affirming that the DTT allocates exclusive taxing rights to the UAE, irrespective of whether the UAE enforces taxation. The decision reinforces treaty supremacy and precedent-based adjudication.\nFinal Disposal: Appeal allowed in favor of the taxpayer.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=103,107,107(2)(a),109(1),114(1),120(1),122(5A),122(9),124,132,163(4)Convention between the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation=6,6.1,10,10.2,11,11.2,17", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2145/KB/2024 (Tax Year 2021). Date of Filing: 22.10.2024. Date of Hearing: 29.04.2025. Date of Order: 31.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. EMAD UL HASAN, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Asif, FCA\nRespondent by: None", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. DURAID QURESHI, HYDERABAD......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER-IR, ZONE-V, CTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26396", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1483 = 2025 SLD 1483", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Rectification of Tribunal Order – Condonation of Delay in Filing Appeal\nDetails:\nApplicant/taxpayer: Excise & Taxation Department, Government of Balochistan, acting as withholding agent under Section 234, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (advance tax on motor vehicle tax).\nA show-cause notice under Sections 161/205 was issued for non-collection of tax, resulting in ex parte order (17-09-2013) raising demand of Rs. 651,360,000 (tax + default surcharge).\nFirst appeal before CIR(A), Quetta dismissed as time-barred (filed after 2653 days).\nTaxpayer then filed ITA No.797/QB/2022 with MA(Cond) No.1181/QB/2022 before ATIR, Quetta. The Tribunal’s earlier order (08-01-2024) dismissed condonation.\nTaxpayer filed miscellaneous application for rectification of order dated 08-01-2024, arguing:\nTribunal had earlier (07-04-2022 in MA(Cond) No.1045 & 1046/KB/2022) condoned delay in identical circumstances for the same tax year.\nThe Hon’ble High Court of Balochistan (Income Tax Reference No.6/2022) upheld Tribunal’s earlier order allowing condonation.\nThe Quetta Bench wrongly ignored binding precedents and principles of judicial discipline.\nHeld:\nTribunal acknowledged that in taxpayer’s own case, condonation had already been allowed in 2022, and the same was upheld by the High Court.\nThe divergent view taken in the order dated 08-01-2024 was erroneous and required rectification.\nRectification allowed: Order dated 08-01-2024 was modified to align with earlier precedent.\nDelay condonation granted; taxpayer’s appeal revived and directed to be decided on merits by CIR(A), Quetta.\nMiscellaneous application disposed of accordingly.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Sections 161, 205, 234, 131(5).\nGeneral Clauses Act, Article 24A (requirement of reasoned orders).\nCase law cited by High Court:\n2007 PTD 1 (LHC)\n2002 PTD 608 (LHC)\n2002 PTD 1035 (LHC)\n2002 PTD 506 (LHC)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=161,205,234,131(5)General Clauses Act, 1897=24A", - "Case #": "M.A (Rect) No.2321/KB/2024. In: ITA No.797/KB/2022 & M.A(Cond)No.1181/KB/2022 (Tax Year 2013). Date of hearing: 22-05-2025, Date of order: 23-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. EMAID-UL-HASAN, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Muhammad Murtaza, ITP\nRespondent by: Mr. Masroor Ahmed, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Excise & Taxation Department Baluchistan, Quetta ......Applicant\nVs\nCIR (Appeals) & WHT Zone, Quetta......Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26397", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1722 = 2025 SLD 1722", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzU", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview: The appeal was filed by M/s Karwan Al-Zahidia International (Pvt) Ltd., a Hajj tour operator, against an order upholding a penalty of Rs. 30,000 for failing to file monthly withholding tax statements for July-December 2016.\nTribunals Decision: The appeal was accepted, and the penalty was deleted.\nKey Reasons for Allowing the Appeal:\nLack of Jurisdiction: The Tribunal found that the appellants business was located in Rawalpindi, placing it under the jurisdiction of the Regional Tax Office (RTO) there. The show-cause notice and the subsequent penalty order were issued by an officer from RTO Islamabad, who had no legal authority over the appellant. Therefore, the entire proceeding was declared void ab initio (invalid from the outset).\nViolation of Natural Justice: The appellant was given only one hearing opportunity, and the ex-parte order was passed on a date when no hearing was scheduled. This was a violation of the principle of audi alteram partem (hear the other side) and contrary to FBR instructions mandating at least three opportunities and 15 days for a response.\nLegal Incapacity to Impose Penalty Alone: The Tribunal reiterated its settled position that Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, does not allow for the imposition of a penalty by itself. A penalty can only be levied as part of an assessment order for unpaid or short-paid tax. Since there was no assessment of any underlying tax due, the penalty order was legally invalid.\nAbsence of Mens Rea (Guilty Mind): Relying on a judgment from the Sindh High Court, the Tribunal ruled that for a penalty under Section 33 to be imposed, the tax authority must establish mens rea—that the default was willful, dishonest, or contumacious. In this case, the appellant was out of business and no actual tax was withheld or lost by the treasury. Therefore, no guilty mind could be attributed to the appellant for the technical breach of not filing statements.\nConclusion: The penalty was overturned on multiple substantive legal grounds: the officer lacked jurisdiction, the process violated natural justice, the law does not allow for a standalone penalty without a tax assessment, and there was no evidence of intent to evade tax.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No.158/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2017). Date of Hearing 13.05.2025. Date of Order 22.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S); DANISH ALI QAZI, MEMBER AND NASIR IQBAL, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By Mr. Zahid Masood Chatta, Adv. & Mr. Ali Raza, Adv.\nRespondent By Ms. Nila Gull, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Karwan Al-Zahidia International (Pvt) Ltd. N-67, Murree Road, Waris Khan, Appellant\nRawalpindi - Appellant\nvs\nThe CIR, Unit-II, Withholding Zone, CTO, Islamabad - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26398", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1737 = 2025 SLD 1737 = 2025 PTCL 546", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax Appeal – Powers of Commissioner IR under Section 45A(4) of Sales Tax Act, 1990\nDetails:\nThe appellant Tax Department filed an appeal against the order dated 23.11.2022 passed by the Learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), Peshawar, which had accepted the appeal of the respondent company. The respondent company, engaged in the purchase, transmission, and distribution of electrical energy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, was issued an Assessment Order No. 11/2020 dated 26.06.2020 by the Deputy Commissioner-IR, creating a sales tax demand of Rs. 22,522,070/- under section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, along with default surcharge (s. 34(1)) and penalty (s. 33(5)). The company had appealed before the L/CIR(A), which vacated the order of the Assessing Officer.\nThe appellant contended that:\n•\nThe L/CIR(A) erred in law by vacating the Assessing Officer’s order.\n•\nThe respondent claimed inadmissible input tax against exempt supplies and misdeclared electricity units, resulting in short payment of tax.\n•\nAs no appeal was filed against the order passed by the Commissioner IR under s. 45A(4), L/CIR(A) could not review or vacate it.\nThe respondent argued that:\n•\nL/CIR(A) correctly held that the Commissioner IR could not delegate powers to the Assessing Officer under s. 45A(4).\n•\nThe provision empowers the Commissioner to pass any order deemed fit but does not authorize referral back to the Assessing Officer.\nHeld:\nThe tribunal held that:\n•\nSection 45A(4) empowers the Commissioner IR to examine records and pass an order but does not allow delegation of powers to the Assessing Officer.\n•\nL/CIR(A) correctly vacated the order passed by the Assessing Officer, as delegation of statutory powers is not permitted unless expressly provided.\n•\nThe departmental appeal lacked merit and was dismissed.\nCitations:\n•\nCase law: PTCL 2019 CL. 377 (Lahore High Court)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(2),33(5),34(1),45A(4)", - "Case #": "STA No. 14/PB/2023, decided on 7th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Mr. M. Abdullah Khan Kakar, Member and Mr. Dr. Shah Khan Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Ishfaq Ahmed, DR.\nRespondents by: Mr. Hussain Ahmad Sherazi, Mr. Mouzzam Ali Butt, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner-Inland Revenue, Corporate Zone, RTO, Peshawar.\n\nVS\nM/s. Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. (PESCO), WAPDA House, Shami Road, Peshawar." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26399", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1738 = 2025 SLD 1738 = 2025 PTCL 579", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYy8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Customs Seizure and Adjudication – Legally Imported Goods / Redemption Fine\nDetails:\nThe appeal was filed by Syed Azhar ud Din Shah, Director of Alpha Polymers (Pvt.) Ltd., Peshawar, and others against Order-in-Original No. 99 of 2024 dated 30.04.2024 passed by the Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Islamabad Camp Office, Peshawar.\nOn 31.03.2024, the Customs Intelligence & Investigation (FBR) intercepted a Mazda Mini Truck loaded with 5,000 kg of Chinese origin Hot Melt Adhesive at Hayatabad Toll Plaza, Peshawar. The driver could not initially provide valid import documents or a Sales Tax Invoice. The goods were detained under Section 2kk of the Customs Act, 1969 and other relevant provisions, as they were suspected to be non-duty paid/smuggled.\nThe appellant company claimed ownership of the goods and submitted documents, including import GD No. PAKI-HC-9074 dated 18.03.2024, asserting that the goods were legally imported and the seizure was unlawful. The goods were originally purchased from M/s Gillani Hygienic Products (Pvt.) Ltd., Islamabad, and due to non-payment of the remaining contract amount, were being returned to the seller when intercepted by Customs.\nThe adjudicating authority released the goods on payment of duty/taxes and imposed a 20% redemption fine on both goods and vehicle. The appellants challenged this decision, arguing that:\n•\nThe goods were legally imported and duty paid.\n•\nAll relevant documents, including Sale Invoice, bilty, and payment evidence, were available.\n•\nThe seizure and redemption fine were unjustified.\nThe Customs department opposed the appeal, asserting that the goods were non-duty paid and smuggled.\nHeld:\nThe tribunal observed that:\n•\nThe goods were legally imported by M/s Gillani Hygienic Products and subsequently sold to the appellant.\n•\nThe seizure occurred during a private transaction between the importer/seller and purchaser, supported by relevant documents.\n•\nThe redemption fine was not justified as the goods were legally imported and properly documented.\nDisposition:\n•\nImpugned Order-in-Original No. 99 of 2024 set aside.\n•\nGoods released unconditionally.\n•\nRedemption fine of 20% on the vehicle remitted.\nOutcome:\nAppeal accepted; case disposed of in favor of appellant.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,17,168,181,186Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1),3(3),156(1)", - "Case #": "Cus. 163/PB/2024, decided on 27th September, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mr. Hafiz Ansar ul Haq, Member Judicial/Chairman.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Saleem Ahmad Khan, Advocate\nRespondent by: Raja Bilal Naseem, Deputy Director I&I, Peshawar", - "Petitioner Name:": "Syed Azhar u Din Shah Director Alpha Polymers (Pvt.) Ltd., Peshawar ......... Appellant\nVs\nDirector Intelligence & Investigation Customs Peshawar ............ Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26400", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1739 = 2025 SLD 1739 = 2025 PTCL 687", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYys", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax – Input Tax Adjustment on Subsidy Paid by Government\nDetails:\nThe appeal was filed by Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) against a show cause notice (C. No. ST/150 dated 10.11.2023) and Assessment Order No. 11/2024 dated 28.02.2024 issued by Deputy Commissioner-IR, seeking recovery of Rs. 1.597 billion as input tax adjustment allegedly claimed incorrectly on government-paid subsidies. The issue arose from zero-rated electricity supplies for the period July 2021 to June 2022, where PESCO adjusted input tax of Rs. 1.597 billion corresponding to amounts subsidized by the Government of Pakistan. The Deputy Commissioner held that subsidies are not taxable, and input tax claimed on them is disallowed.\nPESCO contended that:\n•\nElectricity supply remains taxable even if partially financed by government subsidy.\n•\nSection 8(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 does not apply, as subsidy does not convert taxable supply into non-taxable/exempt supply.\n•\nPrevious decisions of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), including Faisalabad Electric Supply Company (2014 PTD (Trib.) 1629), support the claim of input tax adjustment on subsidized electricity.\n•\nThe issuance of show cause without audit violates procedural provisions under Section 25 of the Act.\n•\nConcessions or subsidies do not constitute non-taxable goods under sections 2(12), 2(39), 2(41), and 2(46)(i) of the Act.\nThe Department argued that:\n•\nPESCO illegally adjusted input tax without following proper procedure under Section 66 of the Act.\n•\nSection 8(2) disallows input tax on non-taxable supplies, which includes subsidized portions.\nHeld:\n•\nThe subsidy paid by the Federal Government is a welfare measure and does not alter the taxable nature of electricity.\n•\nSection 8(2) does not disallow input tax adjustment in this case; mere concession does not render supply exempt or non-taxable.\n•\nEarlier rulings of ATIR are binding and support PESCO’s claim.\n•\nThe assessment order and show cause notice were vacated as unsustainable in law.\nCitations:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990 – Ss. 2(11), 2(12), 2(39), 2(41), 2(46)(i), 3, 7, 8(2), 25, 43A, 46, 66\n•\nRelevant ATIR Cases: Faisalabad Electric Supply Company 2014 PTD (Trib.) 1629; 2023 PTD (Trib.) 344; 2018 PTD 2170\n•\nOther case law: PTCL 2006 CL. 389; 2024 PTD 1021; PLD 1990 SC 68; 2007 SCMR 1367; Mehran Associates Ltd. v. CIT, Karachi (1992) 66 Tax 246\n•\nConstitutional provisions: Article 18, Constitution of Pakistan\nDisposition:\n•\nImpugned Assessment Order No. 11/2024 and show cause notice vacated.\n•\nAppeal allowed in favor of PESCO.", - "Court Name:": "Customs Appellate Tribunal, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(11),2(12),2(39),2(41),2(46)(i),3,7,8(2),25,43A,46,66sealConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=18", - "Case #": "STA No. 152/PB/2024 (Tax Periods: July-2021 to June-2022), decided on 12th November, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Mr. M. Abdullah Khan Kakar, Member and Dr. Shah Khan Member.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hussain Ahmad Sherazi, Mr. Mouzzam Ali Butt, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Ishfaq Ahmed, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. (PESCO), WAPDA House, Shami Road, Peshawar ...... Appellant:\nVS\nThe Commissioner-Inland Revenue, (Audit-9/E&C-18), Corporate Zone, RTO, Peshawar ...... Respondents:" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26401", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1740 = 2025 SLD 1740 = 2025 PTD 1159 = 2025 LHC 2854 = (2025) 132 TAX 303", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Punjab Sales Tax on Services – Taxability of Salaries Paid to Employees by Service Providers\nDetails:\nThe petitions challenged the levy of Punjab Sales Tax on Services (PSTS-Act, 2012) on amounts paid by service providers as salaries and allowances to security personnel, labour, and manpower deployed at the sites of recipients of service. The petitioners (service providers) argued that these salaries do not form part of the taxable consideration for the services provided, as the employees remain under their control, and the recipients of service cannot dictate how duties are performed. The respondent-authority contended that tax is leviable on the entire invoice amount, including the salaries, treating them as part of the gross consideration for taxable services under sections 3 and 7 of the PSTS-Act.\nThe Court analyzed relevant provisions of the PSTS-Act, including:\n•\nSections 2(38), 2(45), 3, 6, and 7 – defining “service,” “taxable service,” economic activity, and the value of taxable service.\n•\nSection 6(3) excludes activities of employees providing service to their employer from the definition of economic activity.\n•\nSection 7(1), amended by Punjab Finance Act 2014, clarifies that “gross amount” refers to amounts including taxes or duties, not salaries or reimbursements.\nRelying on precedents, including Messrs Quick Food Industries, and constitutional principles (Entry No. 49, Fourth Schedule, Constitution of Pakistan), the Court concluded that:\n•\nSalaries paid by service providers to their employees do not form part of the consideration for taxable services.\n•\nTax liability arises only on the value of the services rendered, not on amounts reimbursed as employee salaries.\n•\nInterpretation of “gross amount” to include salaries contradicts section 6(3) and results in redundancy.\nHeld:\n•\nOnly the quantum and component of the service itself is taxable under PSTS-Act.\n•\nSalaries and allowances reimbursed by the recipient to the service provider for employees are not taxable.\n•\nPetitions allowed, exempting service providers from paying sales tax on salaries of their employees.\nCitations:\n•\nMessrs Quick Food Industries – Supreme Court of Pakistan\n•\nSami Pharmaceuticals – Sindh High Court\nDisposition:\n•\nPetitions allowed; tax levy restricted to actual value of taxable services, excluding salaries and allowances of deployed employees.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012=2(38),2(45),3,6,6(3),7,7(1),10Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=70(4),Fourth Schedule, Entry 49", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 13433 of 2023. Date of hearing: 28.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by\nBarrister Muhammad Hamza Akhtar and Syed Hasnain Abbas, learned Advocate.\nRespondent No. 1 by\nMr. Muhammad Nasim Saqlain, learned Assistant Attorney General.\nRespondent No. 2 by\nMr. Salman Asif Warraich, learned Assistant Advocate General.\nRespondents No. 3 to 5 by Mr. Sajid Ijaz Hoitana, Mr. Tanzzellur-Rehman, Mr. Ali Javaid Bajwa, Mr. Abubakar Attique and Mr. Muhammad Nouman Yahya, learned Legal Advisors of Punjab Revenue Authority.\nAmicus Curiae Mr. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, learned Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s GB Security Services (PVT) Limited\nVs.\nThe Federation of Pakistan and 4 Others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26402", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1741 = 2025 SLD 1741 = 2025 PTD 1169", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDYzg", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income Tax – Section 108 (Transaction between Associates) and Section 21(m) (Payment of Salaries through Banking Channel)\nDetails:\nThe Applicant challenged the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue’s order (ITA No. 35/KB/2011 for tax year 2009) regarding:\n1.\nLoan/Advance of Rs. 15,000,000/- to Portlink International Services (Pvt.) Ltd., an associated concern, and whether interest under Section 39 and adjustments under Section 108 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (“Ordinance”) were applicable.\n2.\nSalaries/wages of Rs. 825,645/- paid to individuals without using proper banking channels, and applicability of Section 21(m) of the Ordinance.\nThe Applicant contended that:\n•\nThe amount advanced to the associated company was not income and no deeming clause exists; thus, Section 108 should not apply.\n•\nThe salaries paid below the prescribed threshold should not be added under Section 21(m).\nThe Respondent department maintained that:\n•\nSection 108 empowers the Commissioner to adjust income from non-arm’s length transactions between associated persons.\n•\nSalaries and payments not made through banking channels fall under Section 21(1) and 21(m).\nFindings:\n•\nSection 108 / Advances to Associates:\no\nThe amount of Rs. 15,000,000/- was given to an associated concern and did not result in ownership of assets by the Applicant.\no\nSection 108 allows the Commissioner to treat transactions between associates on an arm’s length basis and adjust income accordingly.\no\nThe Tribunal correctly held that interest on such non-arm’s length advances is taxable, and the Commissioner’s decision was justified.\n•\nSection 21(m) / Salaries through Banking Channels:\no\nSalaries of Rs. 795,000/- were within the prescribed threshold and accepted.\no\nOther payments of Rs. 825,645/- were not contested and were rightly added to income by the Assessing Officer under Section 21(m).\no\nThe Tribunal erred in considering both amounts; its order was modified to reflect the Assessing Officer’s findings.\nHeld:\n•\nQuestion 1 (advance to associated concern): In favour of Respondent; Section 108 applicable, income from non-arm’s length advance taxable.\n•\nQuestion 2 (salaries/wages through non-banking channels): Partially in favour of Respondent; Rs. 825,645/- taxable, Rs. 795,000/- not taxable.\n•\nReference Application dismissed with above modification.\nCitations:\n•\nITA No. 35/KB/2011, Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi\nDisposition:\n•\nReference Application dismissed; advance to associate and non-banked payments added to taxable income in accordance with law.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 1922=21(l),21(m),39,69,85,108Income Tax Rules, 2002=23", - "Case #": "Income Tax Reference Application No. 64 of 2012. Date of hearing: 19.03.2025. Date of Judgment: 28.04.2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Applicant: Premier Mercantile Services (Pvt.) Ltd. Through Mr. Shams Mohiuddin Ansari, Advocate.\nvs\nRespondent: Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTU, Karachi through Mr. Muhammad Ageel Qureshi, Advocate." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26403", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2022 7047 = 2022 SLD 7047", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDY3o", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Sales Tax Appeal – Liability Prior to Compulsory Registration\nDetails:\nAppellant: Registered person under Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nRespondent: FBR through CIR (Appeals), Sargodha.\nPeriod in dispute: Tax Year 2016 (07/2015 – 06/2016).\nIssue: Appellant supplied Ghee & Cooking Oil but was compulsorily registered on 19.02.2020. Revenue sought to levy sales tax for periods prior to registration.\nImpugned Orders:\nAssessing Officer imposed tax of Rs.2,988,080 including default surcharge and penalty.\nCIR(A) confirmed liability in Sales Tax Order in Appeal No. 775/2021 dated 29.04.2021.\nAppellant argued:\nLiability arises only from the date of compulsory registration (Rule 6(4), Sales Tax Rules, 2006).\nNot registered during the tax period; did not charge tax from customers; cannot be retrospectively assessed.\nRevenue argued:\nSection 2(25) includes persons liable to be registered; liability arises from date of taxable supply.\nCompulsory registration under Section 14 + Rule 6 enables retrospective assessment.\nHeld:\nDefinition of “registered person” has two parts:\nActually registered person with sales tax number.\nPerson liable to be registered (legal fiction).\nCharging provisions under Section 3 and other related provisions (Sections 6, 7, 8, 23, 26, 33, 34) apply only to persons actually registered.\nCompulsory registration under Rule 6(4) makes the provisions of the Act applicable from the date of registration, not retroactively.\nLiability for sales tax prior to compulsory registration cannot be imposed, especially when no tax was collected from purchasers.\nThe cited judgment in Commissioner Inland Revenue vs. M/s S.K. Steel Casting (2019 PTD 1493) was held to be obiter dicta and not binding.\nAppeal allowed on legal grounds, without need to address merits of case.\nRelevant Case Law:\nSyed Muhammad Haider Zaidi vs Abdul Hafeez (1991 SCMR 1699)\nExcise & Taxation Officer vs Burmah Shell (1993 SCMR 338)\nChairman FBR vs M/s Al-Technique Corp (PLD 2017 SC 99)\nFasih-ud-Din Khan vs Govt of Punjab (2010 SCMR 1778)\nCommissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax vs Lahore Cantt Cooperative Housing Society (2009 PTD 799)\nConclusion:\nSales tax liability arises only after actual registration.\nRetroactive taxation on periods before compulsory registration is not permitted.\nAppellant’s appeal allowed on legal grounds.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(25),3,6,7,8,8A,11,14,23,25,26,33,34Sales Tax Rules, 2006=6", - "Case #": "STA No. 202/IB/2021 (Tax Period 07/2015 to 06/2016). Date of hearing & order: 15.03.2022", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Muhammad Bashir Malik, Advocate, Mazhar Ali Shah, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Abdul Shakoor Paracha, LA, & Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Muhammad Shoaib C/o Shoaib Traders, Chak Da Roza Bhera ....... Appellant\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, RTO, Sargodha ....... Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26404", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1749 = 2025 SLD 1749 = 2025 PTD 1211", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDY3k", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Appeal against additions to wealth statement under Income Tax Ordinance\nDetails:\n•\nThe Taxpayer, an individual physician, filed his income tax return declaring income from salary and practice. This return was treated as a deemed assessment under Section 120(1).\n•\nThe Additional Commissioner considered the deemed assessment erroneous and prejudicial to revenue, asking for supporting documents for assets declared in the wealth statement.\n•\nThe Taxpayer failed to initially produce documents; the Additional Commissioner made additions to assets under Section 111, leading to this appeal.\nContentions by Taxpayer (AR):\n1.\nNotices were issued only through IRIS, not by post; taxpayer unaware due to limited computer knowledge and no SMS alerts.\n2.\nProceedings under Section 122(5A) were initiated without satisfying prerequisites of erroneousness and prejudice to revenue.\n3.\nShow-cause notice under 122(5A) did not specify any discrepancy in the wealth statement or reconciliation.\n4.\nDocumentary evidence was later produced, including:\no\nVoluntary declaration of domestic assets\no\nForeign remittance (total Rs. 25,328,046.21) for tax year 2018\no\nIncome tax payment under Section 236K (tax Rs. 1,011,000)\n5.\nAssets were reconciled with sources, thus additions under Section 111 were unjustified.\n6.\nAdditions were made without proper notice under Section 111 or completion of 111 proceedings before 122(9).\nContentions by Department (DR):\n•\nTaxpayer failed to provide documentary evidence initially; additions under Section 111 were lawful.\nHeld:\n•\nThe Additional Commissioner was not justified in initiating proceedings merely based on presumed erroneousness without pointing out discrepancies.\n•\nNotices via IRIS without acknowledgment by email or post were improper.\n•\nThe Additional Commissioner ignored the Voluntary Declaration of Domestic Assets and income records in FBR portal, including tax paid under Section 236K, which reconciled the declared assets.\n•\nThe order under Section 122(5A) was illegal and against facts, and thus is vacated.\nOutcome:\n•\nAppeal allowed.\n•\nOrder of the Additional Commissioner cancelled.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,120(1),122(5A),122(9),236K", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 3263/LB/2024, decided on 30th August, 2024. Date of hearing: 29th August, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): TARIQ IFIIKHAR AHMED AND MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmad Nauman Sh., ITP for Appellant.\nAli Khalid, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SAEED TAJ DIN, LAHORE\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ZONE RTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26405", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1750 = 2025 SLD 1750 = 2025 PTD 1215", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWTc", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Challenge to pre-suspension notice under Sales Tax Act\nDetails:\n•\nThe Plaintiff filed a suit challenging a ‘pre-suspension notice’ issued by the Commissioner-IR for initiating suspension/blacklisting proceedings under Section 21(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, read with Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006.\n•\nThe Plaintiff also filed C.M.A. No. 634/2025 seeking a temporary injunction restraining the Commissioner-IR from taking coercive action.\n•\nAlleged procedural irregularities included:\no\nNotice lacking signature of Commissioner-IR.\no\nNotice date incomplete (“-12-2024”).\no\nNotice received by Plaintiff on 10-01-2025, after the hearing date (27-12-2024).\no\nCopy of notice filed was a smartphone-scanned version.\nContentions by Plaintiff (through counsel):\n1.\nPurchases made by Plaintiff were from vendors not suspended or blacklisted at the relevant time.\n2.\nSome transactions cited were already dealt with in a previous show-cause notice, with recovery already made.\n3.\nAlleged that the impugned notice was mala fide.\nContentions by Court / Findings:\n•\nThe impugned notice is a show-cause notice preceding suspension/blacklisting, and by Section 21(5) (Finance Act 2024 amendment), remedy exists before the Chief Commissioner after suspension.\n•\nCourts generally do not interfere with show-cause notices issued by statutory authorities except on jurisdictional grounds.\n•\nThe Plaintiff’s factual objections do not challenge jurisdiction; the Commissioner-IR can still examine the facts and respond.\n•\nThe temporary injunction effectively required the Court to determine factual issues, which is inappropriate at this stage.\nHeld:\n•\nNo jurisdictional defect was established.\n•\nC.M.A. No. 634/2025 dismissed.\nCitations / Sections Referenced:\n•\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Section 21(2), Section 21(5)\n•\nSales Tax Rules, 2006: Rule 12\nOutcome:\n•\nApplication for temporary injunction dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=21(2),21(5)Sales Tax Rules, 2006=12", - "Case #": "Suit No. [-] 83 of 2025, decided on 27th January, 2025. Date of hearing: 21st January, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Taimur Ali Mirza for Plaintiff.\nNemo. for Defendants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s UMAR TEXTILES\nvs\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26406", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1751 = 2025 SLD 1751 = 2025 PTD 1217", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Challenge to personal penalty under Income Tax Ordinance due to jurisdictional dispute\nDetails:\n•\nThe petitioner, CEO of Faisalabad Electric Supply Company (FESCO), challenged order dated 16.06.2023 passed under Section 182 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, imposing a personal penalty of Rs. 135,719,105/-.\n•\nThe penalty was imposed on the ground that certain bulk challans of FESCO fell under the jurisdiction of LTO Faisalabad rather than LTO Multan, where FESCO filed returns and paid taxes.\n•\nThe petitioner contended:\n1.\nNo evasion, short payment, or revenue loss occurred.\n2.\nFESCO’s payments were made via bulk challans under LTO Multan.\n3.\nImpugned order was issued without proper jurisdiction; petitioner could not appeal via automated FBR system.\n4.\nJurisdictional notifications of FBR (dated 12.10.2020) show FESCO falls under LTO Multan.\n•\nRespondents argued:\n1.\nAppeal under Section 127 of the Ordinance was available, including manual filing.\n2.\nSubsequent jurisdictional circulars place FESCO under LTO Faisalabad.\nCourt Findings:\n•\nThe petition is maintainable due to:\n1.\nAutomated FBR system preventing appeal.\n2.\nSerious jurisdictional dispute between LTO Faisalabad and LTO Multan.\n•\nPetitioner is caught in overlapping/conflicting jurisdiction of LTOs without any default, malice, or wrongdoing.\n•\nNo evasion or loss of revenue involved, corroborated by show-cause notice and impugned order.\n•\nTo resolve jurisdiction issue and verify any revenue concerns, FBR intervention is necessary.\nHeld:\n•\nImpugned Order set aside.\n•\nPetition transmitted to Chairman FBR as a representation under Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007.\n•\nChairman FBR to hear petitioner and concerned LTOs and pass a speaking order determining jurisdiction and any issues of evasion or loss of revenue.\nOutcome:\n•\nPetition allowed.\n•\nPersonal penalty annulled; matter referred to FBR Chairman for final determination.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=127,182,209Sales Tax Act, 1990=30(1),31Federal Excise Act, 2005=29(1)", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 45219 of 2023, decided on 17th April, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: Khalid Ishaq, justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Ashiq Hussain for Petitioner.\nQamar Hanif, Assistant Attorney General.\nAbdul Muqtadir Khan for Respondents Nos.3 and 5.\nMuhammad Yahya Johar for Respondent No.4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "BASHIR AHMED\nvs\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY FINANCE, ISLAMABAD AND 4 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26407", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1752 = 2025 SLD 1752 = 2025 PTD 1227", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWTU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Taxation of Foreign Remittances under Income Tax Ordinance & Double Taxation Treaty (Germany)\nDetails:\nTaxpayer, a German national and non-resident, filed return for Tax Year 2016 declaring foreign remittances of Rs. 5,708,080/-.\nOIR issued notice under sections 122(9) & 122(5A) alleging taxpayer failed to meet conditions of section 111(4).\nAdditions were made under section 111(1)(b) read with section 111(4), later confirmed by CIR(A).\nTaxpayer filed second appeal before the Tribunal.\nContentions by Taxpayer (AR):\nAppellant is a non-resident German national protected under Pakistan–Germany Double Taxation Treaty, Article 4(c).\nForeign remittances (48,780 Euros) were transferred through banking channels and encashed via State Bank-approved Money Exchange dealers.\nFBR Circular No. 05 of 2021 validates remittances through MSBs, Exchange Companies, and MTOs as recognized channels under section 111(4)(a).\nTaxation of such remittances would discourage overseas Pakistanis and violate treaty obligations.\nCourt Findings:\nThe Pakistan–Germany Double Taxation Treaty prevails over conflicting provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance (2023 SCMR 1011 relied upon).\nRemittances were duly made via recognized banking/exchange channels.\nBeing a non-resident and German national, the taxpayer is not liable to tax on these remittances.\nCIR(A) erred in upholding assessment without proper appreciation of law and treaty obligations.\nHeld:\nAddition under section 111 was wrongly made.\nCIR(A) order set aside.\nTaxpayer’s appeal allowed.\nCitations:\nIncome Tax Ordinance, 2001: Ss. 111(1)(b), 111(4), 122(9), 122(5A)\nFBR Circular No. 05 of 2021\nPakistan–Germany Double Taxation Treaty, Article 4(c)\nSupreme Court of Pakistan: 2023 SCMR 1011\nOutcome:\nForeign remittances held non-taxable.\nTribunal allowed taxpayer’s appeal.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Income Tax Appeal No. 4397/LB of 2023, decided on 23rd June, 2025. Date of hearing: 23rd June, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAFAQAT ALI, MEMBER AND ZAHID SIKANDAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Usman Ali, FCA for Appellant.\nImran Saeed, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ANEES UR REHMAN\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26408", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1774 = 2025 SLD 1774 = 2025 PLJ 128", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Court: Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court\nCase Number: [Not Provided]\nLaw & Sections:\nAzad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974), S. 44\nTopic: Jurisdiction of District Magistrate in Partition of Joint Property\nDetails:\nThe petitioner, a co-owner of joint undivided property, had applied for partition before the Revenue Officers. While the matter was pending, the respondent filed forged applications before the District Magistrate seeking eviction and demolition of the petitioner’s constructed house. The District Magistrate passed an ex-parte order, which was later challenged in revision and dismissed. The petitioner challenged the dismissal, contending that the District Magistrate lacked jurisdiction in partition matters.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass any order of eviction or demolition regarding immovable property that was subject to partition proceedings. Partition of joint property falls exclusively within the domain of Revenue Officers, and until partition is finalized, every co-sharer is deemed joint owner of every inch of the undivided property, regardless of possession. Even if a co-sharer occupies more than his share, the remedy is to seek partition through revenue authorities, not criminal proceedings. Criminal law cannot be invoked by one co-sharer against another under the guise of excess possession. Petition was accepted.\nCitations:\nAzad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (VIII of 1974), S. 44", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 735 of 2021, decided on 28.2.2025. Date of hearing: 28.2.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Shahid Bahar, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Raja Manzoor Khan, Advocate for Petitioner.\nRaja Mohammad Ejaz Khan, Advocate for Respondent No. 6.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MOHAMMAD ISHAQ KHAN-Petitioner\nvs\nDISTRICT MAGISTRATE BAGH having its office at District Complex Bagh Azad Jammu & Kashmir and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26409", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1775 = 2025 SLD 1775 = 2025 SLD 41", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNDWS8", - "Key Words:": "Court: Supreme Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir\nCase Number: [Not Provided]\nLaw & Sections:\nSpecific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877), S. 54\nTopic: Suit for Perpetual Injunction – Effect of Commission Report – Possession Rights\nDetails:\nThe plaintiff filed a suit for perpetual injunction against forceful dispossession from shamilat deh land (20 kanals). The suit was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, it was noted that a local commission had been appointed with the consent of parties, and neither side had objected to the commission’s report. The report confirmed that the plaintiff and proforma defendants were in possession of part of the land. Despite this, the trial court ignored the report and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff challenged the dismissal.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court of AJ & K held that since the local commission was appointed with mutual consent and no objections were raised, its report had attained finality and effectively became binding like that of a referee. Both parties were bound by it. The court emphasized that no one could be dispossessed without due process of law. Accordingly, the suit was decreed to the extent of 3 kanals and 4 marlas found in possession of the plaintiff and proforma defendants. The appeal was accepted.\nCitations:\nPLJ 2011 SC (AJ & K) 68\nPLD 2011 SC (AJ & K) 25", - "Court Name:": "High Court (AJ&K)", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.A. No. 194 of 2019, decided on 6.12.2024, date of hearing. 2.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Chaudhary Khalid Rasheed, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Chaudhary Riaz Ahmed Alam, Advocate for Appellant.\nMr. Wajid Hussain Mirza, Advocate for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHALID HUSSAIN-Appellant\nvs\nMst. SHAHEEN AKHTAR and others-Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26410", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1879 = 2025 SLD 1879", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview\nMatter: Appeal against confiscation of almonds and vehicle by Customs authorities\nKey Facts\nInitial Seizure (September 29, 2023)\nCustoms Intelligence intercepted a Hino truck (Registration JV-1313) near Khanozai\nVehicle was traveling from Chaman to Poshi via Surkhab to Multan\nSeized goods: Various quantities of almonds (with and without shell) totaling approximately 12,990 kg valued at over Rs. 15 million\nDriver could not produce import documents for the foreign-origin almonds\nClaimants Defense\nThe appellant claimed the almonds were locally produced and provided:\nPurchase agreements with local cultivators in Zhob district\nTwo transport permits (Rahdaris) dated 28-09-2023 from Additional Deputy Commissioner, Zhob\nCertificate of Origin from Agriculture Department, Zhob\nAuthentication certificates listing various local almond varieties\nCustoms Authoritys Position\nGoods were of foreign origin and smuggled\nDocuments were fabricated/spurious\nVehicle was intercepted on a different route than specified in permits\nPackaging differed from claimed local produce\nLegal Proceedings\nFirst Adjudication (November 20, 2023)\nGoods: Confiscated as smuggled foreign goods\nVehicle: Option given to redeem against 20% fine + Rs. 100,000 penalty\nFirst Appeal & Remand (April 27, 2024)\nTribunal found the adjudication order lacked proper analysis\nCase remanded for de novo consideration with directions for detailed scrutiny\nRemand Proceedings Issues\nAdjudicating authority refused to re-decide the case\nClaimed Tribunal had no power to remand under Section 194-B of Customs Act 1969\n Returned the case without proper adjudication\nThis action was deemed ultra vires, perverse and coram non judice by the Tribunal\nFinal Tribunal Decision\nKey Findings\nDocument Authenticity: The road passes/permits were genuine and specifically mentioned:\nCorrect vehicle registration number (JV-1313)\nProper quantities matching seized goods\nValid dates (issued 28-09-2023, seizure 29-09-2023)\nAuthorized destination (Multan)\nLocal Origin Established: Agriculture certificates confirmed almonds were local produce of Zhob district with detailed variety listings\nRoute Justification: Minor deviation from prescribed route did not invalidate the legitimate transportation\nLegal Analysis: Rule 126 of Customs Rules (import documentation trail) was irrelevant since goods were of local origin, not imported\nFinal Orders\nAppeal ALLOWED\nGoods ordered to be returned to appellant as legitimate owner\nVehicle confiscation set aside\nAny paid redemption fine and penalty to be refunded immediately\nOriginal confiscation order set aside as unsustainable\nLegal Significance\nThis judgment establishes important precedents regarding:\nBurden of proof in customs cases involving claimed local produce\nValidity of administrative permits and certificates\nLimits of customs authorities powers when proper documentation exists\nTribunals authority to remand cases for proper consideration\nProtection of legitimate trade against arbitrary seizures\nThe case demonstrates the importance of proper documentary evidence in establishing the local origin of goods and the courts willingness to protect legitimate traders against overzealous customs enforcement.", - "Court Name:": "", - "Law and Sections:": "Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,156(1),156(8),156(89),157(2),171", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. Q-52/2025. Date of Hearing: 06.05.2025. Date of Order: 11.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Mr. Mazhar Ali Ghallu / Member Judicial, Bench-II Karachi and Mr. Ihsan Ali Shah, Member Technical, Karachi Bench-III.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Nasrullah Khan Kakar, Advocate for the Appellant.\nIO Aijaz as DR, for the Respondents M/s Director of Customs Intelligence and Investigation, Quetta.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. M/s. Gul Marjan Khan, District Zhob. (Players to set aside confiscation of Goods Almond without and with shell) ...... Appellants\n2. Ameen Ullah S/O Abdullah, R/O Pishin, (For vehicle) ...... Appellants\nVs\n1. The Director, Intelligence & Investigation, Customs Quetta.\n2. The Collector Adjudication, Quetta. ...... Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26411", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1877 = 2025 SLD 1877", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWS8", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe taxpayer filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal against an order dated 16 March 2023 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Sargodha.\nThe taxpayer claimed that the order was never duly served upon him, and he only became aware of it by chance. He filed the appeal on 16 November 2023, after obtaining a copy of the order on 2 November 2023.\nThe Departmental Representative (DR) opposed the application, claiming that the taxpayer’s assertion of non-service was false, supported by documentary evidence showing that the order was served on 11 April 2023 to the taxpayers authorized representative (AR) through his assistant.\nThe Authorized Representative (AR) of the taxpayer argued that the order was never served and claimed the taxpayer only obtained a copy after visiting the office of the Commissioner (Appeals).\nLegal Points & Sections:\nSection 56 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 – The DR produced a certificate of service under Section 56 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which confirmed that the order was served on the taxpayer’s authorized representative on 11 April 2023. This section deals with the manner of service and the procedure for issuing a certificate of service by the Commissioner (Appeals).\nSection 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 – The claim for condonation of delay in filing an appeal is based on the taxpayer’s assertion that non-service of the order caused the delay. This provision relates to the limitation period for filing appeals and also the grounds for condoning delay under the Income Tax Ordinance.\nDoctrine of Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt – The tribunal cited this principle, which translates to the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. This principle emphasizes that delays in filing an appeal without a valid cause, particularly when the taxpayer fails to act diligently, should not be condoned.\nAppeals under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Section 56 and related provisions govern the procedures for filing appeals and the time limits for doing so. The taxpayer’s appeal was found to be time-barred as it was not filed within the required timeframe.\nEvidence and Burden of Proof – The tribunal emphasized the importance of producing official evidence and following proper procedures for obtaining certified copies of orders. The AR did not produce any formal written request or receipt to prove that the taxpayer was unaware of the order.\nTribunal’s Findings:\nThe taxpayer’s claim of non-service was contradicted by documentary evidence presented by the DR, which included the certificate of service, an acknowledgment signed by the assistant of the taxpayers then AR, and the filing of the appeal with the original signed order.\nThe taxpayer failed to follow the statutory procedure for obtaining a certified copy, which would have triggered an official departmental response confirming or denying earlier service.\nThe tribunal found that the order was validly served on 11 April 2023 and that the taxpayer had possession of the original signed order when filing the appeal. Therefore, the claim of non-receipt was deemed false and misleading.\nThe delay in filing the appeal was due to the taxpayers failure to act promptly and in accordance with procedural requirements, as evidenced by the fact that no request for a certified copy was made, nor was any payment made for such a copy.\nConclusion:\nThe application for condonation of delay was dismissed, as the taxpayer failed to demonstrate valid reasons for the delay or act with due diligence in filing the appeal.\nThe appeal was rejected as time-barred, and the application for a stay was also dismissed.\nThe tribunal highlighted the importance of truthful disclosure and acting with due diligence, in line with the legal maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt and the statutory limitations under Section 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=56Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111", - "Case #": "MA Cond. STA No.66/IB/2023, MA(Stay) STA Ext.959/IB/2025, STA No.789 /IB/2023 (Tax Period 2019-2020). Date of Hearing: 06.08.2025. Date of Order: 12.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Nasir Iqbal, Member AND Danish Ali Qazi, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Hamad Khan, Advocate\nRespondent By: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. SHAFIQ UR REHMAN, M/S JEWEY LASANI SARKAR STONE CRUSHER, KHAS CHAK NO.119 MORE, SARGODHA ……..APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, SARGODHA …….. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26412", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1878 = 2025 SLD 1878", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWSs", - "Key Words:": "Issue: Whether payments made by the appellant for technical and support services constitute franchise fees subject to Federal Excise Duty (FED).\nLower Court Rulings: The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Appeals) both ruled against the appellant, ordering payment of FED, surcharges, and penalties.\nTribunals Decision: APPEAL ALLOWED. The orders of the lower authorities are annulled.\nKey Reasons for Decision:\nLack of Franchise Relationship: The tribunal found the tax department failed to prove a franchisor-franchisee relationship between the appellant and the service providers (IWCPL and Orascom). This relationship is a mandatory condition under the definition of franchise in Section 2(12a) of the Federal Excise Act, 2005.\nNature of Services: The payments were for specific, invoiced technical and administrative support services (e.g., corporate advisory, tax consultancy, HR). The department did not classify these services but summarily treated all payments as franchise fees without examining the evidence.\nLegal Precedent: The tribunal relied on a judgment from the Islamabad High Court (later upheld by the Supreme Court) which established that a franchisor-franchisee relationship must be proven for FED to apply. The department could not distinguish this case from the appellants situation.\nHS Code Restriction: For the relevant tax period, FED on services was leviable only under a specific customs code (9823.0000) for franchise services. The legislatures subsequent amendment to broaden the scope confirmed that the earlier law was restrictive and did not apply to general technical service fees.\nAmended Agreement: A clause in an original agreement that suggested a franchise relationship was later removed by an amended agreement, which explicitly stated that the appellant did not use the franchisors brand name and that royalty provisions were redundant.\nDistinguished Case Law: A case cited by the department (CM Pak) was found inapplicable because it involved proven payments to a franchiser, a fact absent in this case.\nOutcome: The appeal was successful. The demand for FED of Rs. 573,914,257/-, along with associated surcharges and penalties, was canceled.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=2(12a),3(1)(d),8,14,19(1),19(2A),34Federal Excise Rules, 2005=7,9,19,43A,44,45,47", - "Case #": "FEA No. 28/IB/2012 (Tax Period January 2010 to December 2010). Date of Hearing: 07.08.2025. Date of Order: 07.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN ABDUL BASIT, Member AND ZAHOOR AHMAD, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Masoor Saeed, ACA\nRespondent by: Mr. Imran Shah, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Pakistan Mobile Communication Ltd., Islamabad ......... Appellant\nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-II), Large Taxpayers Unit, Islamabad ...... Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26413", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1876 = 2025 SLD 1876", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWTk", - "Key Words:": "Outcome: The appeal was disposed of. The impugned order was set aside and the case was remanded (sent back) to the original stage for a fresh hearing.\nKey Details:\nSubject of Appeal: The appellant challenged an order (barcode No. 100000126631148) dated 30.06.2022 passed under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nOriginal Demand: The Assessing Officer had amended the assessment by treating the declared turnover of Rs. 98,131,000 as income and created a tax demand of Rs. 33,333,088 after adjustment.\nAppellants Key Arguments:\nProcedural Flaws: The order was passed without providing adequate opportunity of hearing. Only one show-cause notice was issued, and no subsequent notice was given after the appellant submitted a reply.\nViolation of Natural Justice: The principle of audi alteram partem (hear the other side) was violated.\nIncorrect Tax Rate: The officer applied a 1% minimum tax rate instead of the correct rate of 0.2% applicable to rice mills under Division IX of Part-I of the First Schedule.\nRes Judicata: The department had already taken up and withdrawn the same issue previously.\nNo Notice u/s 111: The officer failed to issue a separate notice under Section 111 for penalty proceedings.\nNon-Service of Order: The appellant was not served a copy of the order and discovered the demand through their bank.\nTribunals Reasoning & Decision:\nThe tribunal agreed with the appellant that sufficient opportunity of being heard was not provided, violating principles of natural justice and established legal precedent (citing PLD 1988 SC 24 and 1999 PTD 1358).\nThe tribunal referenced an FBR circular mandating three opportunities of 15 days each be given to an assessee before passing an order.\nDue to these procedural irregularities, the tribunal did not rule on the merits of the case (e.g., the correct tax rate).\nThe order of the A/DCIR was set aside.\nThe case was remanded back to the Assessing Officer with directions to:\nRe-examine the facts afresh.\nAllow the appellant to present concrete documentary evidence.\nProvide a proper opportunity for a hearing.\nPass a fresh, fair, and speaking order.\nFinal Ruling: The appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds, and the matter was sent back for a re-hearing in accordance with the law.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,120,122,5A,122,9,113,235,233,218", - "Case #": "ITA No. 226/KB/2025 [Tax Year, 2016]. Date of hearing: 19.06.2025. Date of order: 25.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Faheem Bhayo, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Haider Abbas Abbasi, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Ronaq Rice Mills, Hyderabad ……… Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, Zone-II, CTO, Hyderabad ……… Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26414", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1893 = 2025 SLD 1893", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWTg", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview:\nThis judgment pertains to Customs Appeal filed by the appellant against Order-in-Original No. 27/2025 passed by the Additional Collector of Customs (Adjudication) in Quetta on 11 March 2025, concerning the seizure of a launch and Iranian diesel for alleged smuggling.\nFactual Background:\nOn 15 January 2025, the Pakistan Coast Guards received credible information about smuggling of Iranian Diesel from Gwadar to Karachi.\nDuring their search near Astola Island, three launches were found carrying 30,000 liters of Iranian diesel.\nThe Coast Guards seized the diesel and the launches, citing violations under Section 156(1) & Section 157(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, including the illegal transportation of goods without proper documentation.\nThe Additional Collector issued an ex-parte order, confiscating the seized diesel and launches on the grounds of smuggling, despite the absence of any formal defense or rebuttal from the appellant.\nAppellants Grounds of Appeal:\nArbitrary Confiscation: The appellant claims that the order is perverse and arbitrary, as the appellant had not violated any law or committed an offence.\nLawful Ownership: The appellant is the lawful owner of the Sufyan-e-Mustafa Launch, which he uses for fishing, and the confiscation has caused undue financial hardship.\nMisapplication of Law: The appellant argues that the Customs Act, 1969, particularly Sections 2(s) and 16, does not apply in this case, as there is no evidence of smuggling or criminal intent.\nLack of Evidence: The diesel was allegedly for operational use on the launch and was not intended for smuggling. The seizing agency did not conduct a laboratory test to confirm the diesel’s origin.\nViolation of Legal Procedures: The appellant points out the failure of the seizing agency to follow proper procedures, including issuing a detention slip or a receipt at the time of seizure.\nInfringement of Rights: The appellant argues that the confiscation violates fundamental rights, as no clear evidence links the appellant to smuggling activities.\nLegal Analysis:\nConfiscation of Conveyance: Section 157(2) allows confiscation of any conveyance used in the transport of goods liable to confiscation. However, the phrase liable to confiscation does not mean automatic confiscation; evidence of the owners involvement is necessary.\nCourt Precedents: The court relied on the principle established in Suleman v. The State (PLD 1962 (W.P) Lahore 11), which emphasizes that liable to confiscation does not equate to shall be confiscated. The liability must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.\nBusiness Practice: The launch, being a public transport vehicle, is commonly used for the transportation of goods and passengers. The appellant claimed that the diesel was meant for the vessel’s operational use, which is a legitimate practice in the transport sector.\nAbsence of Evidence: The adjudicating officer failed to establish that the launch was used for smuggling. There were no secret compartments or alterations to the vessel, and no evidence showed the appellants intent to smuggle.\nJudgment:\nThe appeal was allowed based on the failure of the Customs Department to provide sufficient evidence to support the confiscation of the launch.\nThe impugned order was modified, and the Sufyan-e-Mustafa Launch was ordered to be released to the appellant, subject to the payment of 40% redemption fine based on the launch’s value, pending verification of its legal status.\nThe adjudicating officer’s decision was considered premature and without adequate evidence to justify the confiscation of the vessel.\nConclusion:\nThe court emphasized the right to a fair trial and due process under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which guarantees equality before the law. The decision reflects a careful assessment of evidence and procedural compliance, with a strong inclination towards substantial justice for the appellant.", - "Court Name:": "CUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, QUETTA BENCH, 3RD FLOOR JAMIL CHAMBER, SADDAR, KARACHI (CAMP OFFICE AT KARACHI)", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,103,156(1),157(2)", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. G-305/2025/829. Date of Hearing: 22-05-2025. Date of Judgment: 05-08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. HAFIZ ANSAR UL HAQ, CHAIRMAN / MEMBER JUDICIAL, LAHORE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. M. Usman Malik, (Advocate), for the Appellant\nMr. Haroon (Naik), present for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Jamshed Khan S/o Abdul Karim R/o New Hajji Camp, MT Road, Sultan Abad, Karachi. (Claimant / owner of Sufyan-e-Mustafa Launch bearing Regd No. B-24124)......Appellant\nVS\n1. The Additional Collector of Custom (Adjudication) Quetta Camp Office @ Custom House, Gaddani.\n2. The Director General, Pakistan Coast Guard, Karachi. ......Respondents." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26415", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1898 = 2025 SLD 1898", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWXo", - "Key Words:": "Key Details:\nSubject of Dispute: The appeal challenged a remand order from the Commissioner (Appeals). The Commissioner (Appeals) had set aside an original order from the Deputy Commissioner (DCIR) and sent the case back for a fresh hearing.\nOriginal Case: The DCIR had raised a demand of Rs. 2.3 million against the appellant under Sections 161 and 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The demand was for alleged failure to deduct withholding tax on certain payments.\nAppellants Defense: The appellant argued that the payments in question were year-end payables that were actually paid (and tax was deducted) in the subsequent tax year.\nCommissioner (Appeals) Decision: The Commissioner (Appeals) found that the DCIR had not properly investigated the facts or given the appellant a fair chance to provide evidence. The Commissioner set aside the demand order and remanded the case back to the DCIR for a fresh proceeding.\nAppeal to Tribunal: The appellant (the non-profit organization) itself appealed this remand order, seemingly unhappy that the case was sent back instead of being decided in their favor outright.\nTribunals Ruling: The tribunal dismissed the appeal. It found no legal error in the Commissioner (Appeals)s decision to remand the case. The tribunal agreed that:\nThe initial proceedings by the DCIR were conducted in an unduly hasty manner. \nThe appellant was not given a meaningful opportunity to substantiate its claims with evidence.\nThe remand was a reasonable and balanced approach that safeguarded the interests of both the taxpayer and the revenue, ensuring a fair hearing.\nFinal Result: The case is sent back to the Deputy Commissioner (DCIR) for a de novo (new) hearing, as ordered by the Commissioner (Appeals). The appellants attempt to overturn the remand order failed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=7,44,4,161,205,153", - "Case #": "ITA No. 805/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2016). Date of Hearing & Order: 04.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s); Nasir Iqbal and Danish Ali Qazi, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S TROCAIRE, 3RD FLOOR, WESTERN HALF, PLOT NO.72-W, JINNAH AVENUE, G-7/F-7, ISLAMABAD ............ APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, RTO, ISLAMABAD ............. RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26416", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1899 = 2025 SLD 1899", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTWXk", - "Key Words:": "Key Details:\nSubject of Appeal: The appellant challenged the rejection of a sales tax refund claim of Rs. 5,000,000 for the tax period 2017-18. This refund was for zero-rated supplies made to Export Oriented Units (EOUs).\nReason for Rejection: The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the claim because the appellant failed to physically produce the buyers (the EOUs) for verification, despite several opportunities.\nAppellants Argument: The appellant argued they had provided all necessary supporting documents (invoices, goods receipts, bank statements) to prove the supplies and receive payment. They contended that the department rejected the claim without pointing out any specific flaws in this documentation or conducting its own independent inquiry.\nDepartments Argument: The department supported the rejection, maintaining that physical verification by the buyers was a necessary requirement and the appellants failure to produce them justified the denial.\nTribunals Decision & Reasoning: The tribunal ruled in favor of the appellant. The key reasons were:\nThe department did not identify any specific defects in the documents provided by the appellant.\nThe department failed to conduct its own independent inquiry to verify the supplies.\nIt is unreasonable to force the appellant to produce the buyers, as they cannot compel another company to appear before the tax authorities.\nFinal Ruling: The tribunal did not immediately order the refund. Instead, it:\nSet aside the previous orders rejecting the refund.\nRemanded the case back to the Deputy Commissioner.\nDirected the department to conduct its own independent inquiry to verify the supplies to the EOUs.\nInstructed the department to then make a fresh decision on the refund claim in accordance with the law, after giving the appellant a chance to be heard.\nDirected the appellant to cooperate with the verification process.\nResult: The appellant won the appeal on the point of law. The case is sent back to the original officer to re-decide the refund claim properly, following a verification process.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4,7,44,153,161,205", - "Case #": "STA No. 129/KHI/2022 (Tax Year 2017-18). Date of Hearing: 05.08.2025. Date of Order: 05.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. MUHAMMAD ASLAM, MEMBER TECHNICAL AND NASIR IQBAL, MEMBER JUDICIARY", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Muhammad Ali, FCA\nRespondent By: Mr. Muhammad Saleem, AR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. AL-KARAM TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LTD., PLOT NO. 4/1, SECTOR 20, KORANGI INDUSTRIAL AREA, KARACHI ........... APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, LTU, KARACHI ........... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26417", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1886 = 2025 SLD 1886", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTc", - "Key Words:": "Key Details:\nSubject of Dispute: The Pakistan Coast Guards seized the appellants launch, Junaid Sudais (Reg. No. B-24008), near Astola Island on 15.01.2025. It was allegedly carrying 30,000 liters of Iranian diesel suspected of being smuggled. The launch was confiscated outright by the Adjudication officer.\nAppellants Argument: The appellant claimed the diesel was for the vessels own operational use during lawful deep-sea fishing, a standard practice. He argued there was no evidence of secret compartments or prior smuggling activity. He also contended that the seizure procedure was flawed (e.g., using department personnel as witnesses/musheers, no notice given to the captain at sea).\nDepartments Argument: The department supported the confiscation, arguing the launch was on an unauthorized voyage laden with non-duty paid, smuggled goods.\nTribunals Decision & Reasoning: The tribunal found the outright confiscation of the conveyance (the launch) unjustified. Its key reasons were:\nLack of Connivance: The adjudication order itself confirmed the appellant had no incriminatory role. The law requires establishing the owners liability for confiscation, not automatic confiscation.\nNature of Conveyance: The launch was a transport vessel. Carrying fuel for its own consumption is a normal business practice and does not inherently imply smuggling.\nNo Aggravating Factors: There was no evidence of false cavities or modifications to hide goods, nor any history of the vessel being used for smuggling.\nBurden of Proof: The seizing agency failed to prove its case beyond any shadow of doubt. \nFinal Ruling: The tribunal did not fully exonerate the appellant. It:\nSet aside the order for outright confiscation.\nOrdered the release of the launch to its lawful owner.\nImposed a condition: The release is subject to payment of a redemption fine of 40% of the ascertained value of the boat (after verifying its legal status).\nResult: The appellant successfully challenged the penalty of losing his vessel permanently. However, he must pay a significant fine (40% of the boats value) to secure its release. The decision on the confiscated diesel itself is not explicitly overturned in this summary.", - "Court Name:": "CUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, QUETTA BENCH, 3RD FLOOR JAMIL CHAMBER, SADDAR, KARACHI (CAMP OFFICE AT KARACHI)", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2,3,16,26,156,157,162,163,171", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. G-307/2025/307. Date of Hearing: 22.05.2025. Date of Order: 25.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author: Mr. Hafiz Ansar ul Haq, Chairman / Member Judicial, Lahore", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Usman Malik, Advocate, present for the Appellant.\nMr. Haroon Naik, present on behalf of Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "Javed Khan S/o Fazal Ur Rehman, R/o Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai Road House No.40/A. Muhallah Daryabad, Karachi (Claimant/owner of Launch Junaid Sudais bearing Regd No.B-24008). ...... Appellant\nVs\n1.\nThe Additional Collectorate of Customs (Adjudication) Quetta Camp office @ Custom House, Gaddani. \n2.\nThe Director General, Pakistan Coast Guards, Karachi ......Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26418", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1884 = 2025 SLD 1884", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTY", - "Key Words:": "Key Details:\nSubject of Appeal: The Department challenged an order from the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Appeals) [CIR(A)] that had annulled an assessment order made against the taxpayer.\nOriginal Case History:\nA provisional assessment was issued against the taxpayer under Section 122C.\nThe taxpayer filed a return in response.\nThe Assessing Officer (AO) was not satisfied with the supporting documents provided and issued a fresh order, rejecting the return. This new order was framed under Sections 122C(2) and 177.\nTaxpayers Challenge: The taxpayer appealed the new order, arguing the AO had no legal authority to amend a concluded provisional assessment order.\nCommissioner (Appeals) Decision: The CIR(A) agreed with the taxpayer. The key findings were:\nAn order under Section 122C attains finality and can only be amended under specific conditions (Section 122(5)), which were not met.\nThe AO could not use Section 177 (audit) because there was no evidence the case was lawfully selected for audit by the competent authority.\nTherefore, the new assessment order was unlawful and was annulled.\nTribunals Ruling: The tribunal dismissed the Departments appeal and upheld the CIR(A)s decision. The tribunal concluded:\nThe AOs actions were without lawful authority and devoid of legal merit. \nThe provisional assessment was final, and the AO had no power to simply reopen and change it without definite information or a proper audit selection.\nThe relief granted by the CIR(A) was correct.\nFinal Result: The taxpayer won. The unlawful assessment order remains annulled. The provisional assessment under Section 122C stands.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=122,122C,127,129,177", - "Case #": "ITA No.1101/IB/2018 (Tax Year, 2013). Dated of order: 19.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DANISH ALI QAZI, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Naeem Hassan, D.R\nMr. Idris Ali, ACA", - "Petitioner Name:": "The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III), RTO, Rawalpindi ....... Appellant\nvs\nSyed Ali Rizwan Kazmi; M/s Syed Property Consultant, H. No.270, Gali No.2, Phase-7, Bahria Town, Rawalpindi ........ Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26419", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1885 = 2025 SLD 1885", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTU", - "Key Words:": "Key Details:\nSubject of Dispute: The Sales Tax department issued an order under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, creating a total demand of Rs. 69,871,674/- against the appellant. This demand comprised:\nRs. 59,390,926/- in output sales tax.\nRs. 10,480,748/- in further tax.\nDefault surcharge and a 100% penalty.\nReason for Demand: The department alleged the appellant made sales to four buyers who were on the blacklist. They argued this made the sales inadmissible, leading to the demand.\nAppellants Argument:\nFactual: The appellant argued they had appeared before the officer and submitted all required documents, contradicting the officers claim that the order was passed ex-parte.\nLegal: The appellants core argument was that the buyers were active and operational at the time of the sales transactions. They contended that subsequent blacklisting of these buyers could not retroactively invalidate the transactions or create a tax liability for the seller. Imposing output tax again would result in double taxation.\nTribunals Investigation & Decision: The tribunal conducted a crucial factual check by verifying the status of the buyers on the FBR portal for the exact periods when the sales occurred. The verification proved the appellant correct:\nAll four buyers were listed as Active on the FBRs system at the time of the supplies.\nLegal Precedent: The tribunal relied on a recent judgment from the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Eagle Cables (Pvt.) Ltd., 2025), which established the legal principle that:\n if a transaction is conducted while the suppliers are active and duly registered, any invoices issued are not automatically invalidated by a subsequent blacklisting or suspension of those suppliers. \nFinal Ruling: Applying this settled law to the confirmed facts, the tribunal found the departments demand was based on a misapplication of law and an incorrect factual premise. The appeal was allowed, and the entire impugned order demanding tax, surcharge, and penalty was annulled.\nResult: The appellant won the case. The tax demand was canceled because the sales were made to active, registered persons at the time of transaction, and their subsequent blacklisting could not create a liability for the appellant.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,21,33,34,43A", - "Case #": "STA No. 856/KB/2024 (Tax Periods May-2020 to August-2021). Date of hearing: 08.04.2025. Date of order: 24.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AJIAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant: S. Rehmal Shakil, Advocate\nRespondent: Mr. Ghulam Nabi, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Al-Habib Twisting, Karachi …………… Appellant\nVs\nThe DCIR, Zone -I, MTO, Karachi …………… Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26420", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1871 = 2025 SLD 1871", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTQ", - "Key Words:": "Based on the judgment authored by Justice Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, the core issue revolves around whether the Order-in-Original was passed within the mandatory time limit prescribed under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, after the issuance of a show-cause notice on December 5, 2014.\nKey Findings:\nTime Limit Calculation:\nThe law at the time required the adjudicating authority to decide the case within 120 days from the issuance of the show-cause notice.\nAn additional 30 days of adjournment was permissible under the second proviso to Section 179(3), making the total permissible period 150 days.\nComputation of Period:\nThe show-cause notice was issued on December 5, 2014.\nThe 150-day period ended on May 4, 2015.\nDiscrepancy in Order Date:\nThe Order-in-Original was dated May 19, 2015, on the title page, but signed on June 4, 2015.\nBoth dates are beyond the permissible limit of May 4, 2015.\nInvalid Extension:\nAn alleged extension request under Section 179(4) was dated May 20, 2015, which was also after the expiry of the statutory period and hence invalid.\nMandatory Nature of Time Limit:\nReferring to precedents, including Super Asia Mohammad Din (2017 SCMR 1427) and Wak Limited (2025 SCMR 1280), the Court reaffirmed that the time-bound adjudication process under Section 179(3) is mandatory.\nConclusion:\nThe Order-in-Original was passed beyond the statutory time limit and is therefore time-barred. Consequently, all proceedings under the show-cause notice are invalid.\nOutcome:\nThe petition was converted into an appeal and allowed.\nThe impugned order of the High Court was set aside.\nThe stay application (CMA No.5968/2025) was disposed of.\nThis judgment underscores the strict adherence required to statutory time limits in customs adjudication proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.110 of 2023. Date of Hearing: 20.08.2025. Date of order: 28-08-2025 (Against the impugned order dated 28.11.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Customs Ref. No.74659 of 2022) AND CMA No. 5968 of 2025 (Stay application)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Sh. Zafar ul Islam, ASC. a/w Mr. Tanveer Ahmad, ASC. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR.\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Izhar ul Haq, ASC. Ali Hassan Raza D.C Customs.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S COMMANDER AGRO (PRIVATE) LIMITED .... PETITIONER\nVS\nCUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL BENCH-I, LAHORE ETC. .... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26421", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1869 = 2025 SLD 1869", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVS8", - "Key Words:": "Key Findings:\nInvalid Jurisdiction under Section 124: The Appellate Commissioner had annulled the original amended assessment order in an earlier proceeding. This annulment was absolute and did not contain any directions for a fresh assessment or recomputation. Therefore, the Assessing Officer had no lawful authority to initiate fresh reassessment proceedings under Section 124, as this section can only be invoked to give effect to a specific directive from an appellate order.\nViolation of Finality and Res Judicata: The taxpayers eligibility for the Section 65D tax credit and its status as an industrial undertaking (as defined in Section 2(29C)) had already been verified, accepted, and refunds issued by the department in prior years. This was further validated by a previous order under Section 221. Reopening these conclusively settled issues without any new facts or law violated the principles of finality, consistency, and res judicata.\nTime-Barred Proceedings: The reassessment notice was issued in February 2024. The law (Section 124(1)) requires such proceedings to be initiated within two years from the end of the financial year in which the appellate order was served. The appellate order was passed on April 14, 2021, making the deadline June 30, 2023. The proceedings were therefore barred by limitation.\nConclusion:\nThe reassessment order was illegal, without jurisdiction, and time-barred. It was a mere reiteration of an order that had already been annulled.\nOutcome:\nThe appeal was allowed.\nThe impugned reassessment order dated May 16, 2024, was declared without lawful authority and cancelled.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2,29C,65D,120,122,122(5A),122(9),124,129,148,221", - "Case #": "ITA No. 878/IB/2024 (Tax Year-2019). Date of hearing: 06.08.2024. Date of order: 06.01.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Nasir Iqbal, Member AND Mian Abdul Basit, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Fraz Fazal Sheikh, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Naeem Hassan, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "HM Extraction Ghee & Oil Industries (Pvt) Limited, AW Tower, Plot No.176, Industrial Area, 1-10/3, 2nd Floor, Islamabad.\nVs\nThe Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTO, Islamabad." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26422", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1870 = 2025 SLD 1870", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVSs", - "Key Words:": "Key Findings & Decision:\nReduced Dispute: After a court-directed reconciliation, the disputed amount of inadmissible input tax was drastically reduced from Rs. 86,402,243/- to Rs. 3,886,482/-.\nLegal Principle Clarified: The Tribunal reaffirmed the legal framework:\nSection 7 grants a right to adjust input tax on goods and services used for making taxable supplies.\nSection 8 imposes restrictions on this right, which can override Section 7, even if the goods are used for taxable supplies.\nRemand for Factual Verification: The core issue of whether the specific goods fall under the exclusions in Section 8(1)(h) and (i) was deemed a question of fact. The Tribunal remanded the case back to the assessing officer to:\nExamine the appellants evidence (invoices, purchase orders).\nDetermine if the goods are expressly excluded by the law.\nPass a detailed, speaking order based on the findings.\nOutcome:\nThe impugned order was modified. The case was sent back (remanded) to the assessing officer for a fresh decision limited to the reconciled amount of Rs. 3,886,482/- in accordance with the law.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2,3,7,8,8(1),8(1)(a),8(1)(b),8(1)(f),8(1)(g),8(1)(h),8(1)(i),33,33(5),34", - "Case #": "STA No. 04/IB/2025 (Tax Period, 2020-2021). Date of Hearing & Order: 18.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND DANISH ALI QAZI, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Imran Younis, FCA\nRespondent By: Mr. Imran Shah, FCMA/DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ATTOCK PETROLEUM LIMITED, ATTOCK HOUSE, MORGAN, RAWALPINDI ........ APPELLANT\nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III, LTO, ISLAMABAD ......... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26423", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1823 = 2025 SLD 1823", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTk", - "Key Words:": "The appeal was filed by the tax Department to challenge an appellate order that had annulled an assessment against a retired army officer for Tax Year 2015. The Departments appeal was dismissed and the appellate order was upheld for three key reasons:\nViolation of Natural Justice (Section 218): The Department failed to prove that statutory notices were served to the taxpayer, a fundamental procedural requirement. This failure alone rendered the original assessment order invalid.\nProcedural Irregularity: The show-cause notice proposed an addition under Section 111(1)(b) for unexplained income. However, the final assessment order taxed the amount under Section 37(1A) for capital gains without notifying the taxpayer or providing an opportunity to respond, which is a serious legal defect.\nIncorrect Application of Law (Section 37(1A)): The property sold was initially allotted in 1991 under an army housing scheme. Following an FBR clarification, the holding period for capital gains tax calculation commenced from this 1991 date, not the formal allotment in 2013. As the holding period exceeded the legal threshold, the gain was not taxable under Section 37(1A).\nAdditionally, the disallowance of a tax credit was found to be unjustified as the taxpayer had provided valid certificates from their employer and bank. The appellate order was found to be legally sound.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=37,37(1A),111,111(1)(b),122,122(1),122(5),122(9),214C,218", - "Case #": "ITA No. 706/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2015). Date of Hearing & Order: 07.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD NAEEM ASHRAF, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR\nRespondent By: Mr. Inam ul Haq, Taxpayer in person", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, RAWALPINDI .......... APPELLANT\nVS\nMR. MUHAMMAD INAM UL HAQ, H. NO. 15, STREET NO.13, SECTOR F-7/2, ISLAMABAD ....... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26424", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1822 = 2025 SLD 1822", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVTg", - "Key Words:": "This appeal challenged a 1998 Tribunal order that denied a company the right to carry forward a business loss of Rs. 3,249,290 for the assessment year 1997-98. The denial was based solely on the fact that the company, which was newly incorporated and had incurred legitimate start-up expenses (e.g., franchising global brands), had not yet generated any revenue.\nThe High Court allowed the appeal, ruling in favor of the appellant company. The Court held that the Tribunals order was incorrect in law. The key findings were:\nDefinition of Business: The expenses were incurred for a business as broadly defined under Section 2(11) of the 1979 Ordinance. The generation of revenue is not a prerequisite for an activity to be considered a business.\nAdmissibility of Loss: The nature of the expenses was not disputed and was relevant to the business. A loss, as defined under Section 2(24), can exist and be carried forward even if incurred before any profit is made.\nCarry Forward of Loss: The right to carry forward a business loss is granted under Section 35. The Court found no legal basis in the Ordinance to deny this right simply because the loss was incurred in a pre-revenue phase of the business.\nThe Court answered all four framed questions of law in the affirmative, concluding that the loss was deductible and should be carried forward to be set off against future profits. The impugned order was set aside.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=2,2(11),2(24),15,23,23(1)(v),34,35,36,133,136", - "Case #": "Income Tax Appeal: 166 of 1999. Date/s of hearing: 28.08.2025. Date of announcement : 28.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, C.J. AND AGHA FAISAL, J.", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Appellant : Mr. Hamza Waheed, Advocate\nMr. Sami-ur-Rehman, Advocate.\nFor the Respondent: Mr. M. Aqeel Qureshi, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "CUPOLA PAKISTAN LIMITED \nVS.\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26425", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1774 = 2025 SLD 1774", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVXo", - "Key Words:": "The appeal was filed by the tax Department challenging an appellate order that allowed a banking companys claim for an initial allowance under Section 23 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on office equipment and computers for Tax Year 2019. The Departments appeal was dismissed.\nKey Issues & Tribunals Findings:\nEligible Depreciable Asset (Sections 22(15), 23(5)): The Tribunal rejected the Departments argument that computers and office equipment are furniture and thus excluded. Citing judicial precedent (2006 PTD 1800, 2020 PTD 2119), it held that a functional test applies. These assets are indispensable tools for modern banking operations and thus qualify as plant and machinery, which are eligible for the initial allowance.\nEligible Taxpayer (Section 23(1)): The Tribunal rejected the Departments claim that the initial allowance is only for manufacturers. The law uses the term person and the phrase used for the purposes of his business. Therefore, the allowance is available to all businesses, including service providers like banks, when an asset is placed into service for the first time.\nAccounting Standards vs. Tax Law (Section 3): The Tribunal held that classification under accounting standard IAS-16 (as Furniture, Fixture & Equipment) is irrelevant for tax purposes. The provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, which expressly overrule other laws, and the functional judicial test are the sole determinants.\nPrescription of Rates (Third Schedule): The Tribunal found that the absence of a specific rate for office equipment in the Third Schedule is not a bar. As the assets qualify as plant and machinery, the general rates for that category apply.\nConclusion: The appellate order was upheld. The bank was entitled to claim the initial allowance on its computers and office equipment as they are essential plant and machinery used in its business. The Departments appeal was dismissed for lacking merit.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2,2(10),3,22,22(15),23,23(1),23(2),23(5),23(5)(a),23(5)(b),23(5)(c),23(5)(d),24,120,120(1)(b),122,122(4),122(9),133,136", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1031/IB/2023 (Tax Year, 2019). Date of hearing & order: 19.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DANISH ALI QAZI, MEMBER AND M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. M. Alam, DR\nRespondent by: Mr. Bilal Ali, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (APPEALS-V), LTO, ISLAMABAD.\nVS\nM/S ASKARI BANK LIMITED; FINANCE DIVISION, AWT PLAZA, THE MALL ROAD, RAWALPINDI." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26426", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1767 = 2025 SLD 1767", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTVXk", - "Key Words:": "This appeal was filed against an appellate order that had remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision.\nOutcome: The appeal was disposed of as infructuous (meaning it had no practical purpose anymore).\nReason: The appellants representative informed the Tribunal that the Assessing Officer had complied with the remand directions and passed a fresh amended order on March 25, 2019. Since the appellants grievance had been addressed by this new order, they did not wish to press the appeal. The Tribunal therefore concluded the appeal was no longer necessary.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "ITA No. 566/IB/2018 (Tax Year 2006). Date of hearing & order: 07.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD NAEEM ASHRAF, MEMBER AND M.M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by Mr. Khurram Shahzad Warraich, Advocate\nRespondent by Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. WARIS NADEEM; NEW SATELLITE TOWN, SARGODHA .......... APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, SARGODHA ......... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26427", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1769 = 2025 SLD 1769", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTc", - "Key Words:": "Nature of Case: The appellant had filed an appeal challenging the Commissioner (Appeals) order which had remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.\nCurrent Status: During hearing on 07.07.2025, the appellants AR submitted that:\nThe Assessing Officer had complied with remand directions\nA fresh amended order dated 25.03.2019 was passed\nThe appellants grievance stood redressed\nDisposition: The appeal was rendered infructuous since the fresh order had already addressed the appellants concerns. The Tribunal disposed of the appeal accordingly.\nKey Point: The case demonstrates that when appellate remand directions are complied with and a fresh order is passed, the original appeal becomes infructuous and is disposed of without further adjudication on merits.\nOutcome: Appeal disposed of as infructuous.", - "Court Name:": "CUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, QUETTA BENCH, 3RD FLOOR JAMIL CHAMBER, SADDAR, KARACHI (CAMP OFFICE AT KARACHI)", - "Law and Sections:": "Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950=3(1)Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. KHz-457/2024. Dates of Hearing: 27.02.2025. Date of Order: 28.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: IHSAN ALI SHAH, MEMBER TECHNICAL, QUETTA BENCH", - "Lawyer Name:": "Advocate Suneel Ali Memon for Appellants\nDr. Advocate Shensha Amjad Khan along with Seizing Officer Inspector Khurram Inspector for the Respondents i.e. M/s MCC Khuzdar.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. Makran Steel, Plot No. 3/3, Khasha No. 54, Sangai District Kech, Tehsil Dasht, Turbat,\nBalochistan.\n(Players to set aside the confiscation of Iron Scrap in shape of Sarya in pieces [old] 19 Tons Approx and confiscation/redemption of conveyance/vehicle on 20% fine and personal penalty Rs.100,000/- imposed on the claimant) ...... Appellants\nVs\n1)\nThe Model Customs Collectorate, Khuzdar.\n2)\nThe Collectorate of Customs (Adjudication), Quetta Camp Office, Custom House, Gadani. …… Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26428", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1760 = 2025 SLD 1760", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTY", - "Key Words:": "Initial Assessment: The Assessing Officer added Rs. 186,085,000 to taxable income under Section 111(1) comprising:\nGift amount: Rs. 177,085,000\nCapital gain: Rs. 9,000,000\nafter the taxpayer failed to respond to multiple notices including:\nSection 111(1) notice (02.10.2024)\nSection 122(9) show cause notice (29.11.2024)\nFinal reminder (13.02.2025)\nAppeal Grounds: The appellant contested:\nGenuineness of gift received from father\nProper declaration of capital gain in tax return\nTribunals Action: Directed reconciliation through the Assessing Officer who verified:\nAuthenticity of gift through documentary evidence\nProper declaration of capital gain\nOutcome: Based on the reconciliation report (Letter No. 731 dated 27.06.2025) confirming:\nGift was genuine and lawful\nCapital gain was duly declared\nThe appeal was allowed and all additions were deleted.\nFinal Order: Appeal allowed. Impugned additions of Rs. 186,085,000 deleted.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,111(1),122,122(1),122(9)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 166/IB/2025 (Tax Year 2021). Date of Hearing & Order: 14.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD NAEEM ASHRAF, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Muhammad Shoeb, ITP\nRespondent BY: Mr. Saqib Malik, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. ATIF NAZAR; HOUSE NO.250, STREET NO. 55, I-8/3, ISLAMABAD ...... APPELLANT\nVS\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, ISLAMABAD ....... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26429", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1762 = 2025 SLD 1762", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTU", - "Key Words:": "Background: M/s. MA Haq Textile filed an export Goods Declaration (GD) under the Export Facilitation Scheme (EFS), declaring three items with a total weight of 23,830 kg. Physical examination revealed only one item was present, weighing 7,936 kg, indicating gross misdeclaration.\nKey Violations:\nMisdeclaration of description, weight, and quantity of exported goods.\nFraudulent attempt to debit EFS quota for duty-free imported inputs without actual export.\nEvasion of duties and taxes totaling Rs. 12,972,822.\nLegal Provisions Invoked:\nSections 32(1) & 32(2): For misdeclaration of goods.\nSection 156(1): Penalties under clauses 14 and 44.\nSection 168: Seizure of goods.\nEFS Rules 882(1) & 884: Misuse of scheme benefits.\nAppellant’s Defense:\nClaimed inadvertent error by staff.\nArgued missing items were available in warehouse.\nContended no mens rea (citing jurisprudence like Xavier Company case).\nDepartment’s Rebuttal:\nPhysical absence of declared items in shipment proved intentional fraud.\nPast compliance does not absolve current violation.\nWarehouse presence irrelevant to misdeclaration in GD.\nTribunal’s Findings:\nMisdeclaration was deliberate, not inadvertent.\nMens rea established by examination report and failure to respond to notices.\nEFS privileges require strict compliance; misuse attracts penalties.\nOutcome: Appeal dismissed. Order-in-Original upheld, confirming:\nRecovery of evaded duties/taxes (Rs. 12,972,822).\nPenalty of Rs. 1,000,000.\nPotential suspension/cancellation of EFS license.\nFinal Order: Impugned order sustained. Appeal dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "CUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL QUETTA BENCH (Camp Office), 2ND FLOOR JAMIL CHAMBER, CO-OPERATIVE MARKET, SADDAR, KARACHI.", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2,21,21(A),32,32(1),32(2),83,83(2),131,156,156(1),168,179,179(3),187,209", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-60/2025/4022. Date of Hearing: 21.05.2025. Date Judgment: 30.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MR. IHSAN ALI SHAH, MEMBER TECHNICAL-III, KARACHI AND MR. MAZHAR ALI GHALLU, MEMBER (JUDICIAL-U, KARACHI.", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Abdul Wahab Advocate is present for the Appellant.\nMr. Raja Shakeel A.O is present for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. MA HAQ TEXTILE, STREET NO.04, MSC STREET CHAK NO.209 RB, JURAN, FAISALABAD ........ APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS (ADJUDICATION-I) ......... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26430", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1755 = 2025 SLD 1755", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Background: The appellant challenged Valuation Ruling No. 51/2025, which set minimum customs values for Polyester Filament Yarn, arguing it disregarded actual transaction values and violated sequential valuation methods under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969.\nKey Issues:\nSequential Valuation: The Directorate failed to follow the mandatory sequence under Section 25, skipping the transaction value method without justification.\nLocal Taxes: The ruling used prices from international publications (CCFEI) without adjusting for local taxes, inflating values.\nRemand Contradiction: The Director General’s revision order acknowledged flaws but remanded the case to the same Directorate while keeping the impugned ruling in force, rendering the review ineffective.\nTribunal’s Findings:\nSection 25-D Misapplication: The Director General’s remand violated Section 25-D, which requires him to either rescind or determine the value afresh himself, not delegate it back to the Directorate.\nIncomplete Review: The revision order failed to substantively address the core issue of local tax adjustments, leaving the valuation process incomplete.\nProcedural Flaw: Keeping the flawed ruling in force during remand prejudiced the appellant and undermined the review’s purpose.\nOutcome: The Tribunal set aside the revision order and remanded the case back to the Director General Valuation with directions to:\nConduct an exhaustive review as mandated by Section 25-D.\nPersonally determine the value afresh or rescind it, ensuring compliance with sequential valuation methods and proper adjustment for local taxes.\nFinal Order: Impugned order set aside. Case remanded to Director General Valuation for proper review under Section 25-D.", - "Court Name:": "CUSTOMS APPELLATE TRIBUNAL QUETTA BENCH (Camp Office), 2ND FLOOR JAMIL CHAMBER, CO-OPERATIVE MARKET, SADDAR, KARACHI.", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25,25(1),25(5),25(7),25(8),25(9),25(10),25(13),25A,25D", - "Case #": "Customs Appeal No. K-547/2025/4014. Date of Hearing: 22.05.2025. Date of Order: 28.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): IHSAN ALI SHAH, MEMBER TECHNICAL, KARACHI BENCH-III AND MAZHAR ALI GHALLU / MEMBER JUDICIAL, KARACHI BENCH-I", - "Lawyer Name:": "Advocate Obaid Mirza for Appellant.\nAdditional Director Ghulam Nabi Kamboh along with AO\nMuhammad Ali for the respondent M/s DG Valuation, Karachi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Muhammad Usman, Karachi. …….. Appellants\nVs\n1.\nThe Director, Directorate General of Customs Valuation, Custom House, Karachi.\n2.\nThe Director General of Valuation, Custom House, Karachi. …….. Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26431", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1753 = 2025 SLD 1753", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUS8", - "Key Words:": "Nature of Case: The appellant, an Association of Persons (AOP) acting as a withholding tax (WHT) agent under Section 153(7), challenged orders passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) under Section 161(1) for Tax Years 2019 and 2021. The orders pertained to the taxpayers failure to adequately respond to notices and furnish details of expenses subject to WHT.\nKey Issues:\nThe AO concluded proceedings without properly examining the taxpayers claims of exemptions under Section 100D and supporting documents.\nThe AO imposed penalties under Section 182 for default, alongside WHT and default surcharge, without following the mandatory procedure of issuing a specific penalty notice.\nTribunals Findings:\nRemand for Re-adjudication: The AO erred by not identifying specific deficiencies in the taxpayers reply or allowing a final opportunity to present the complete record. The case is remanded to the AO with specific directions:\nRecommence proceedings from the Section 161 notice stage.\nThe taxpayer must submit complete records within 15 days.\nThe AO must examine the records, convey observations, and provide a final hearing.\nComplete fresh proceedings within 60 days.\nInvalid Penalty: The penalty imposed under Section 182 was deleted because the AO failed to issue a separate penalty notice as required by law, confusing income tax procedures with sales tax practices.\nOutcome: The appeals were partly allowed. The substantive matter (WHT default) was remanded for a proper de novo proceeding, while the penalty was categorically deleted for both tax years due to a fundamental procedural error.\nFinal Order: Impugned orders set aside to the extent of penalty. Case remanded to AO for fresh adjudication on merits following due procedure.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=100D,126A,126A(1)(b),153,153(7),161,161(1),182,205", - "Case #": "ITA No.1294/IB/2024 (Tax Year 2019), ITA No.1280/IB/2024 (Tax Year 2021). Date of Hearing & Order: 02.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "(IMRAN LATIF MINHAS) \nMEMBER\nSD/-\n(TAUQEER ASLAM) \nCHAIRMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Shahid Jan, Adv/AR\nRespondent By: Mr. Muhammad Mobeen Sajid, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S V. ONE ASSOCIATES, HOUSE NO.3, STREET NO.08, SECTOR J-2, PHASE-2, HAYATABAD, PESHAWAR ............ APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE COMMISSIONER-IR, BUILDING DEVELOPERS ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, ISLAMABAD." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26432", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1754 = 2025 SLD 1754 = 2025 PTD 1519 = (2025) 132 TAX 472", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUSs", - "Key Words:": "The High Court allowed a Reference Application challenging an order from the Appellate Tribunal that upheld a penalty imposed under Section 33(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question was whether the assessing officer was justified in imposing the penalty without establishing mens rea (a guilty mind).\nThe Court found critical legal flaws in the penalty imposition:\nProcedural Defect: The Show Cause Notice was issued under Section 11(1) for non-filing of returns, but the penalty was levied under Section 33(1), which specifically applies to violations of Section 26. No separate notice for violating Section 26 was ever issued, denying the applicant a proper opportunity to defend against that specific charge. The law requires a penalty notice to specify the exact clause being invoked.\nAbsence of Mens Rea and Tax Liability: The court reaffirmed the legal principle that mens rea is generally a necessary element for imposing a penalty, unless a statute explicitly rules it out. Unlike the amended Section 34 (which includes wilful or otherwise ), Section 33 contains no such language creating strict liability. The applicant had no sales during the period, so no sales tax was evaded or short-levied. The failure to file returns, under these circumstances (no business activity), was not found to be wilful, dishonest, or malafide.\nConsequently, the Court ruled that imposing the maximum penalty was unjustified. The impugned orders from the lower forums were set aside, and the penalty was quashed. The question of law was answered in favor of the applicant.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,26,33,34,47", - "Case #": "Special Sales Tax Reference Application No.160 of 2024. Dated: 16.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Taimoor Ahmed Qureshi, Advocate for Applicant\nBarrister Syed Ahsan Ali Shah, Advocate for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "NEW ERA FABRIC\nVS \nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26433", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1916 = 2025 SLD 1916 = (2025) 132 TAX 187", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Mandatory ADR mechanism for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in tax disputes\nDetails:\nPIAC (a State-Owned Enterprise under the State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operation) Act, 2023) filed a Reference Application against an ATIR Karachi order dated 29.06.2017.\nAmendments to Section 38 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, read with Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, introduced a mechanism requiring SOEs to pursue Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) for adverse orders by Inland Revenue.\nCounsel for PIAC stated that instructions were awaited.\nThe Department relied on recent Supreme Court orders referring similar SOE tax disputes to the Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC), including:\nC.P. No. 2106/2024 (CIR v. IESCO),\nCivil Appeals No. 649–652/2022 (State Life Insurance v. ACIT, Karachi),\nC.P. Nos. 886-K to 888-K/2023 (Trading Corporation v. CIR, Karachi).\nHeld:\nThe Court disposed of the Reference Application.\nThe matter was referred to FBR for constitution of a Dispute Resolution Committee under Section 38 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, read with Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nUntil the DRC issues a final decision, no coercive recovery measures shall be taken against PIAC.\nIf aggrieved by the Committee’s decision, PIAC may pursue further legal remedies as per law.\nCaselaw:\nCIR v. IESCO (C.P. No. 2106/2024)\nState Life Insurance v. ACIT, Karachi (Civil Appeals 649–652/2022)\nTrading Corporation v. CIR, Karachi (C.P. 886-K–888-K/2023)\nFinal Order: Reference Application disposed of; matter referred to FBR’s Dispute Resolution Committee; no recovery action against PIAC until DRC’s decision.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=134AFederal Excise Act, 2005=38", - "Case #": "Special Federal Excise Reference Application No. 840 of 2017 decided & hearing date: 30.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR ACJ AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Uzair Shoro, Advocate for Applicant.\nMr. Zakia Jatoi holding brief for Mr. Ameer Bakhsh Metlo, Advocate for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION\nVs\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26434", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1917 = 2025 SLD 1917 = (2025) 132 TAX 195", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUTg", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Scope of exemption under Clause 105A (Finance Act 2022) – selection for audit under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nDetails:\nPetitioner challenged audit notice dated 31.08.2023 under Section 177(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for Tax Year 2022.\nClaimed exemption under Clause 105A, Part IV, Second Schedule (inserted via Finance Act 2022), arguing that since audit for Tax Year 2015 was completed in 2020, no further audit could be initiated for four tax years (till 2024).\nPetitioner argued the provision should apply retrospectively and relied on principles of beneficial legislation.\nRespondent argued Clause 105A applied prospectively from 01.07.2022 (Tax Year 2023), and only if audit was conducted in any of the preceding four tax years (2018–2021). Since last audit was for Tax Year 2015, exemption was not applicable.\nHeld:\nClause 105A provides exemption only if audit was conducted in any of the “preceding four tax years,” not based on the year of completion of audit.\nPetitioner’s audit for Tax Year 2015 does not fall within preceding four tax years of Tax Year 2022; hence, Clause 105A does not apply.\nBeneficial legislation is not automatically retrospective unless expressly stated; Clause 105A is prospective.\nCircular of FBR (21.07.2022) suggesting otherwise has already been discarded by Sindh High Court.\nMere selection for audit under Section 177 does not constitute actionable injury, as audit ensures veracity of returns under self-assessment regime.\nPetition dismissed as devoid of merit.\nCitations:\nCIR, Sialkot v. Allah Din Steel & Rolling Mills (2018 SCMR 1328)\nRAJBY Industries Karachi v. Federation (2023 SCMR 1407)\nFESCO v. Federation (2019 PTD 1780)\nNovitas International v. ITO (1991 PTD 968)\nFinal Order: Writ Petition dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=74,105A,177,214CConstitution of Pakistan, 1973=4,18,25,199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 4252 of 2023 decided on 26.03.2025. Date of hearing: 7.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Nasir Muhammad Malik, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nMr. Abual Hassan Chaudhry Advocate for Respondents Nos.1 to 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HOTEL MARGALA (PRIVATE) LIMITED\nVs\nCHIEF COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTO, ISLAMABAD, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26435", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1930 = 2025 SLD 1930 = (2025) 132 TAX 1", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUXo", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Rectification under Section 221 – Scope & Limitations\nDetails:\nThe appellant, an Association of Persons engaged in cotton ginning, filed its return for Tax Year 2019 under the Final Tax Regime (FTR). A variance was found between claimed tax deductions (Rs. 9,635,904/-) and system-verified deductions (Rs. 8,463,328/-). The Assessing Officer issued a notice under Section 221(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, requiring the appellant to provide documentary evidence. After partial verification, a rectification order under Section 221(1) was passed, creating a demand of Rs. 1,282,401/-. The CIR (Appeals) upheld the order, observing that sufficient opportunities were granted to the appellant. The taxpayer challenged this before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), contending that Section 221 was wrongly invoked for verification of deductions — which amounts to reassessment rather than rectification — and that its evidence had been ignored.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held that the case did not fall within the scope of Section 221, which is limited to rectifying patent and obvious mistakes apparent from the record and does not permit investigation, verification of documents, or reopening of assessments. Issuance of a notice calling for evidence constituted an inquiry outside the permissible ambit of rectification. Relying on CIT v. National Food Laboratories (1992 SCMR 687) and CIT v. Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. (2012 SCMR 371), the Tribunal held that the rectification jurisdiction cannot involve controversy, reassessment, or fresh evidence. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIR (Appeals) was declared legally untenable and set aside, and the demand was annulled.\nCitations:\nCommissioner of Income Tax Companies-II, Karachi v. National Food Laboratories (1992 SCMR 687)\nCommissioner of Income Tax v. Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. (2012 SCMR 371)\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Karachi v. Abdul Ghani (2007 PTD 967)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=221,221(2),221(1),153(1)(a)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 2661/KB/2023, decided on 10.07.2025. Date of hearing: 23.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND DR. HUMA SODHER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Din Qazi, Advocate for the Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S JETHANI COTTON INDUSTRIES & OIL MILLS SANGHAR\nVs\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO HYDERABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26436", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1931 = 2025 SLD 1931 = (2025) 132 TAX 7", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTUXk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Mandatory ADRC Reference for SOEs under Section 134A – Non-Maintainability of Appeal\nDetails:\nPakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), a public company listed on the PSX and majority-owned (67.51%) by the Government of Pakistan, challenged the order dated 30.12.2024 passed by the Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-V, LTO Karachi for Tax Year 2024. During hearing, the Tribunal confronted the taxpayer regarding the amendment to Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (via Finance Amendment Act, 2024), which made it mandatory for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to apply to FBR for constitution of an Alternate Dispute Resolution Committee (ADRC) and withdraw pending litigation before pursuing appellate remedies. The taxpayer argued that it had challenged the vires of Section 134A through a writ petition before the Islamabad High Court but did not produce any restraining order.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal held that PPL qualifies as a “public sector company” under Section 2(54) of the Companies Act, 2017 and is therefore an SOE within the meaning of the SOE Act, 2023, making Section 134A applicable. In absence of any restraining order from the High Court, the Tribunal ruled that the appeal was non-maintainable and referred the matter to FBR for constitution of ADRC as per the statutory mandate. The Tribunal relied on the Sindh High Court judgment in Civil Aviation Authority v. Federation of Pakistan (CP No. D-1513/2024) affirming that Section 134A provides a mandatory internal mechanism for SOEs to resolve tax disputes.\nCase Law: Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan & others (CP No. D-1513/2024, SHC)", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(54),2(d)(i),3,131(1),134A,134A(2)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 72/KB/2025, decided on 03.07.2025. Date of hearing: 05.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER AND DR. HUMA SODHER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Uzair Memon, FCA for the Applicant\nMr. Ejaz Qaisar, DR for the Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S PAKISTAN PETROLEUM LIMITED, KARACHI\nVs\nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-V, LTO, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26437", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1933 = 2025 SLD 1933", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTc", - "Key Words:": "Issue: The company appealed penalties and surcharges imposed for late filing of sales tax returns and delayed tax payments from July 2023 to October 2024.\n \nTaxpayers Defense: Argued delays were due to technical glitches (SRO 350(i)/2024) and late submissions by suppliers, not willful neglect. Also claimed that since the principal tax was paid before the show-cause notice, no penalties should apply.\n \nTribunals Decision:\n \nDefault Surcharge (S.34): Upheld. This is a strict liability; it must be paid regardless of intent or reason for delay. The case was remanded only for recalculation of the surcharge amount.\nPenalties (S.33): Deleted. The Tribunal ruled that penalties require proof of mens rea (willful intent to default). The department failed to establish this, and the law does not impose strict liability for penalties.\n \nOutcome: Appeal partially allowed. The company must pay the recalculated default surcharge but is relieved from all penalties. The ruling reinforces the critical legal distinction between a strict liability surcharge and a penalty that requires proof of intent.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "STA No. 129/KB/2024 (Tax period 2023 to 2024). Date of hearing: 05-06-2025. Date of order: 26-08-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. KASHIF NAZEER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Ali Raza Lanjar, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Gori Khan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. MASKATIYA INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LTD., KORANGI KARACHI, ......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE ADCIR, ZONE-VI, LTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26438", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 1932 = 2025 SLD 1932", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTY", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Income Tax – Audit, Estimated Disallowance, and Unexplained Bank Credits\nDetails:\nThe appellant, an individual taxpayer operating as M/s Eastern Veterinary Services, Rawalpindi, declared taxable income of Rs. 6,263,343/- for Tax Year 2022. The return was deemed assessed u/s 120(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The case was selected for audit u/s 177(1) and notices were issued, but the taxpayer allegedly failed to produce proper books of accounts and respond to notice u/s 111(1)(b). Consequently, the assessing officer amended the assessment u/s 122(1), making additions for unexplained bank credits (Rs. 206.39 million), disallowance of cost of sales and management expenses on an estimated 20% basis, disallowance of exempt capital gains (Rs. 105.93 million), and unsubstantiated liabilities.\nIn appeal, the taxpayer contended that the order was illegal, passed in violation of mandatory requirements of sections 177(2), (6), (6A) and sections 122(5) & 122(8), and that arbitrary disallowances without head-wise verification or proper confrontation were unlawful. Reliance was placed on CIR v. Asif Kamal (2022 PTD 965), CIR v. Allah Din Steel Rolling Mills (2018 SCMR 1328), and 2024 LHC 2543.\nThe department defended the order as lawful and justified. Both sides submitted written reconciliations during the proceedings, but no final settlement emerged.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal found that:\nThe preliminary objection regarding absence of an audit report was misconceived as the report formed part of the record.\nDisallowance of 20% cost of sales (Rs. 30,074,269/-) and 20% administrative expenses (Rs. 6,811,395/-) on an arbitrary basis was inconsistent with section 174(2), which requires disallowance only to the extent evidence is not produced.\nAdditions u/s 111(1)(b) lacked proper reconciliation of credit entries with declared receipts.\nFindings regarding undeclared bank accounts and disallowance of exempt capital gain were passed without adequate confrontation or a speaking order.\nOrder: The impugned assessment was set aside and the matter remanded to the assessing officer with directions to:\nConduct head-wise verification of cost of sales and expenses and disallow only specific unverifiable amounts.\nReconcile bank credits with declared income and determine their nature in accordance with law.\nExamine the exempt capital gain claim in detail.\nPass a reasoned and speaking order after affording proper opportunity of hearing.\nCitations:\nCIR v. Asif Kamal (2022 PTD 965)\nCIR v. Allah Din Steel Rolling Mills (2018 SCMR 1328)\n2024 LHC 2543 (Lahore High Court)\nArticle 25, Constitution of Pakistan", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Division Bench-I, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1)(b),120(1),122(1),122(5),122(8),122(9),172(2),172(6),172(6A),174(2),177(1),177(6)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 140/IB/2025, MA(AG) No.108/IB/2025 (Tax Year 2022). Date of Hearing & Order: 11.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MUHAMMAD NAEEM SHRAF, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Ch. Nazir Ahmed, Adv\nRespondent By: Mr. Naeem Hassan, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Shaukat Hussain Ch., 1.2, F.A Plaza, Rawalpindi ........... Appellant\nVs\nDeputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, City Zone, RTO, Rawalpindi ........ Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26439", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2004 = 2025 SLD 2004 = 2025 PTCL 709", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTU", - "Key Words:": "Core Legal Issue: Whether a pharmaceutical manufacturer, paying sales tax at a fixed rate of 1% under the Eighth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, is also liable to pay a further tax of 3% on sales made to unregistered persons under Section 3(1A) of the Act.\nBackground & Procedural History:\nThe appellant company declared sales to unregistered/inactive entities but did not charge the additional 3% further tax.\nThe tax department issued a show-cause notice and subsequently an assessment order, demanding:\nSales Tax: Rs. 168,747/-\nDefault Surcharge: Rs. 10,125/-\nPenalty: Rs. 10,000/-\nThe appellant appealed to the Commissioner (Appeals), who upheld the assessment order.\nThe appellant then filed the present appeal and a stay application with the Appellate Tribunal.\nAppellants Arguments:\nAs a manufacturer of pharmaceutical goods, the appellant falls under Serial No. 81 of the Eighth Schedule of the Act.\nThis entry mandates a final sales tax of 1% on its supplies, which constitutes a final discharge of its tax liability.\nThe term Final Tax means no further tax, including further tax under Section 3(1A), can be levied, regardless of the buyers registration status.\nSubsequent sellers (wholesalers, retailers) of these goods are exempt from sales tax and are therefore not required to be registered. Charging further tax on sales to them is illogical.\nTax Departments Arguments:\nSupported the orders of the lower authorities, arguing that the appellate order was well-reasoned.\nTribunals Analysis & Decision:\nThe Tribunal accepted the appellants appeal and annulled the orders of the lower authorities. The key reasoning was:\nPrimacy of the Eighth Schedule: The appellants tax liability is governed by the special procedure under Section 71 and Serial No. 81 of the Eighth Schedule. This special regime, which prescribes a 1% tax as a final discharge, overrides the general provisions of the Act, including Section 3(1A).\nInterpretation of Section 3(1A): The further tax under Section 3(1A) is an additional levy on the standard tax rate. It does not apply when a specific, final tax rate under a special procedure (like the Eighth Schedule) has already been discharged.\nJurisprudence: The Tribunal relied on established case law (Digicom Trading (Pvt.) Ltd., M/s. Zia Brothers, M/s. Al-Zarina Glass Industries) which consistently held that:\nOnce a final tax is paid under a special procedure, no further tax can be demanded.\nFurther tax cannot be charged on sales to persons who are not required to be registered because they are dealing in exempt supplies.\nOutcome:\nThe appeal was accepted.\nThe impugned assessment order and the appellate order confirming it were annulled.\nThe associated stay application was also disposed of as a consequence.\nIn essence, the Tribunal ruled that a manufacturer discharging its tax liability under a final tax regime in the Eighth Schedule is not subject to the additional further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(41),3(1A),3(2)(aa),3(1),4,8(6),8(1)(b),11(2),71,Eighth Schedule, Sixth Schedule", - "Case #": "STA No. 119/PB/2013, MA (Stay) STA No. 183/PB/2023, decided on 12th November, 2023", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MR. M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr Munib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Ishfaq Ahmad, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. LEGACY PHARMACEUTICAL (PVT.) LTD., PESHAWAR\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, PESHAWAR." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26440", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2005 = 2025 SLD 2005 = 2025 PTCL 717", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTQ", - "Key Words:": "This judgment addresses a Sales Tax Reference concerning a pharmaceutical company, M/S Legacy Pharmaceutical (Pvt.) Ltd. The tax department demanded the company pay a 3% further tax on its sales to unregistered entities. The company argued that its tax liability was fully discharged by paying a final tax of 1% under the Eighth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nThe High Court upheld the Appellate Tribunals decision in favor of the company. The court ruled that the special procedure and final tax regime under Section 71 of the Act, read with the Eighth Schedule, override the general charging sections. Therefore, the company was not liable to pay the additional further tax under Section 3(1A). The court affirmed that once a final tax liability is fixed under a special procedure, no further tax can be demanded.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(2)(aa),3(1A),3(2),3(1B),3(1),3(5),3(6),4,71", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 89-P/2023, decided on 10th April, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE SYED ARSHAD ALI AND MR. JUSTICE DR. KHURSHID IQBAL", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Mr. Rahman Ullah, Advocate & Mr. Aziz Ur Rahman, Assistant Director Legal, RTA, Peshawar.\nRespondents by: Mr. Alamzeb, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AUTHOR(S): COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE CORPORATE ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, PESHAWAR.\nVS\nM/S LEGACY PHARMACEUTICAL (PVT.), LIMITED AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26441", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2006 = 2025 SLD 2006 = 2025 PTCL 748", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTS8", - "Key Words:": "This case involves an appeal by a registered person (RP) against a tax demand created by the Assistant Commissioner, Inland Revenue. The tax department, upon auditing the RPs records from July 2022 to June 2023, alleged that the RP had concealed sales and declared a lower value addition than a presumed standard of 30%. This led to an initial demand of over Rs. 42 million, which was later reduced to approximately Rs. 12.9 million by applying a 15% value addition rate based on a Sales Tax General Order (STGO) No. 09/2023.\nThe Appellate Tribunal allowed the RPs appeal and set aside the tax demand for the following key reasons:\nNon-Retrospective Application: The STGO, which introduced the 15% value addition benchmark, was explicitly effective from March 2023. Applying it to tax periods from July 2022 to February 2023 was illegal, as it was not given retrospective effect.\nFlawed Application of Law of Averages : The department selectively applied the 15% benchmark only to months where the RPs value addition was lower, while ignoring months where it was higher. The Tribunal ruled that this pick and choose method was unjust and against statistical principles.\nLack of Legal Basis: The Tribunal found no provision in the Sales Tax Act, 1990, that empowers the revenue authority to arbitrarily fix a value addition rate or to tax based on presumptions and estimates rather than the actual, declared value of supplies.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(46)(e),11(2),11(5),34(1),33(5),46(1)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 1238/LB of 2024, decided on 20th August, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): CH. MUHAMMAD TARIQ, MEMBER AND MR. TARIQ IFTIKHAR AHMAD, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Asad Rehman, (DR)", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. FAMOUS TEXTILE INDUSTRIES, FAISALABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR (JHANG ZONE), RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26442", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2007 = 2025 SLD 2007", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTSs", - "Key Words:": "This case involves an appeal by M/s. PESCO Limited Company, an electric power distribution company, against an amended tax order for the tax year 2020. The tax department had charged the company with a substantial minimum tax under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on a subsidy it received from the Federal Government.\nThe Appellate Tribunal allowed PESCOs appeal and vacated the tax demand, but its reasoning was based on procedural grounds rather than the core issue of whether the subsidy was taxable. The key reasons for allowing the appeal were:\nLack of Jurisdiction: The officer who issued the notice and passed the order did not have lawful jurisdiction over the case at the time, as a related FBR notification had been suspended by the High Court. Any order passed without jurisdiction is void.\nInadequate Opportunity: The show-cause notice gave the company only six days (including two holidays) to respond, violating the principles of natural justice.\nBeyond the Scope of Notice: The final order addressed issues (amortization and pension obligations) that were not part of the original show-cause notice.\nNotably, the Tribunal strongly disagreed with PESCOs substantive argument. It held that, based on Supreme Court precedent, the subsidy does constitute income and forms part of turnover for the purposes of the minimum tax under Section 113. The exemption from normal income tax under Clause (102A) does not grant an exemption from this minimum tax. However, due to the fatal procedural errors, the departments order could not stand.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Peshawar", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(29),49,53,113,113(1),113(3),120,122(5A),122(9),126A(4),131(1),Second Schedule, Part IV, Clause (11A),Second Schedule, Part I, Clause (102A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 440/PB/2024 (Tax Year 2020), decided on 5th March, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Mr. M. Abdullah Khan Kakar, Member and Mr. Dr. Shah Khan Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Hussain Ahmad Sherazi, Mr. Mouzzam Ali Butt, Advocates\nRespondent by: Mr. Faheem Sikandar, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. PESHAWAR ELECTRIC Supply Company (PESCO) Ltd., Peshawar\nVS \nTHE COMMISSIONER- INLAND REVENUE, RTO, PESHAWAR" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26443", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2008 = 2025 SLD 2008 = 2025 PTCL 835", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTk", - "Key Words:": "This case involves a taxpayer (a mobile phone seller) who appealed against a tax order requiring them to pay a higher minimum tax rate. The key dispute was whether mobile phones should be taxed at 0.25% (as Fast Moving Consumer Goods or FMCG) or at 1.5%.\nThe Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the taxpayer, but its decision was based on procedural errors by the tax authorities, not on the main argument about the tax rate. The Tribunal annulled the tax demand for two key reasons:\nViolation of the Doctrine of Merger : A lower-ranking officer (Additional Commissioner) had already passed an order on this matter, which was a continuation of an earlier Tribunal order. According to the legal doctrine of merger, this order merged with the Tribunals decision. Therefore, a higher-ranking officer (Commissioner) could not later amend this same order.\nIllegal Use of Power: The Commissioner used his power of amendment under Section 122(5A) incorrectly. He failed to identify a specific error in the original order that was prejudicial to revenue and instead conducted a general fishing inquiry, which is not permitted by law.\nDue to these procedural flaws, the higher tax demand was cancelled.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(22A),2(13AA),113,120,122,122(1),122(4),122(5A),122(5AA),122(9),122A,122A(3),124,132,210,211,211(2)", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 5763/LB of 2024, decided on 3rd February, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate\nRespondents by: Ms. Zainab Hussain, (DR)", - "Petitioner Name:": "AFTAB AHMAD, SHALIMAR TOWN, FAISALABAD\nVS:\nCIR (LYALLPUR ZONE), RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26444", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2009 = 2025 SLD 2009 = 2025 SLD 846", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTTg", - "Key Words:": "This case involves a private club (the taxpayer) that appealed against a tax addition made by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) for the Tax Year 2017.\nThe Core Dispute:\nThe tax department added Rs. 76,410,000 to the clubs income. This amount represented long-term refundable security deposits collected from members. The department treated this as unexplained income taxable under Section 111(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nThe Taxpayers Argument:\nThe club argued that these security deposits were not income but a refundable liability. As per the clubs rules, these deposits were obligatory payments from members, refundable upon the termination of their membership or the winding up of the club. The nature and source of the funds were fully explained in the financial statements, so Section 111 should not apply.\nThe Tribunals Decision:\nThe Appellate Tribunal allowed the clubs appeal and deleted the addition. The decision was based on two key findings:\nIllegal Invocation of Section 122(5A): The Tribunal ruled that the tax officer incorrectly used the powers under Section 122(5A) to amend the original assessment. For this section to apply, two conditions must be met simultaneously:\nThe assessment must be erroneous.\nThe error must be prejudicial to the interest of revenue.\nThe Tribunal found that merely questioning an accounting entry (showing a liability) without proving it was concealed income did not satisfy these conditions. The officers action was based on a mere presumption and constituted an illegal fishing expedition. \nSection 111 Does Not Apply: On the merits, the Tribunal agreed with the club. The security deposits were clearly explained and documented as liabilities according to the clubs rules and financial statements. Since the nature and source of the funds were verifiable, the stringent provisions of Section 111 for taxing unexplained income were not applicable.\nOutcome:\nThe tax orders from the lower authorities were cancelled, and the addition of Rs. 76,410,000 was deleted.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111,111(1)(a),120(1),122(1),122(3),122(5A),122(9)", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1601/LB of 2024, decided on 14th May, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. MUHAMMAD JAMIL BHATTI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Khubaib Ahmad, Advocate\nRespondents by: Ms. Ghazala Nasir Siddique, (DR)", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE CIRCLE CLUB (PVT.) LIMITED, FAISALABAD\nVS \nCIR (CORPORATE ZONE), RTO, FAISALABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26445", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2010 = 2025 SLD 2010 = 2025 SLD 857", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTXo", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nThe taxpayer, Asim Munir, filed his income tax return for the tax year 2018. During scrutiny, the tax officer found that the taxpayer had declared a gift of Rs. 8,045,000 from his father. The officer treated this amount as unexplained income and added it to the taxpayer’s taxable income under Section 111(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, read with Section 39 (Income from Other Sources). The First Appellate Authority (CIR-A) partially upheld the addition, leading to this appeal.\nKey Issues:\nWhether the cash gift of Rs. 8,045,000 from the taxpayer’s father was adequately explained?\nWhether the provisions of Section 111(1)(b) were correctly invoked?\nTaxpayer’s Arguments:\nThe taxpayer provided a gift deed dated February 14, 2018, proving the gift from his father.\nThe father had sufficient sources of income, including the sale of his share in a property.\nCash gifts between family members are a common practice in Pakistani society and are recognized under Muslim Personal Law.\nThe taxpayer relied on precedents where cash gifts from parents to children were accepted as valid.\nTax Department’s Arguments:\nThe taxpayer failed to provide a money trail or sufficient documentary evidence to prove the genuineness of the gift.\nThe gift was deemed an afterthought and not verifiable.\nTribunal’s Findings:\nValidity of the Gift Deed:\nThe Tribunal found the gift deed to be genuine and not an afterthought, as it was executed on a stamp paper dated February 14, 2018.\nCultural and Legal Recognition of Gifts:\nThe Tribunal acknowledged that cash gifts between family members, particularly from parents to children, are a common and legally recognized practice under Muslim Personal Law. The three essential conditions for a valid gift—donor’s intention, donee’s acceptance, and delivery of the gift—were satisfied.\nApplicability of Section 111(1)(b):\nThe Tribunal held that Section 111(1)(b) applies only when the taxpayer fails to explain the nature and source of the funds. In this case, the taxpayer provided a satisfactory explanation and evidence, including the gift deed and the father’s source of funds.\nDecision:\nThe Tribunal allowed the taxpayer’s appeal and deleted the addition of Rs. 8,045,000. The orders of the lower authorities were vacated.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=39,120,111,111(1)(b),122(5A),122(9)", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 5841/LB of 2024, decided on 4th February, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MIAN TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. MUHAMMAD TAHIR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Asim Munir, Faisalabad\nVs\nCIR (Lyallpur Zone), RTO, Faisalabad" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26446", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2032 = 2025 SLD 2032 = 2025 PTD 1244", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTTXk", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether the appellant was required to charge and pay Further Tax on its supplies of steel pipes to unregistered buyers.\nBackground:\nThe tax department issued a show-cause notice demanding Further Tax of Rs. 3,199,843/- for supplies made to unregistered persons from August 2019 to May 2023.\nThe appellant argued it was exempt under S.R.O. 1223(I)/2021, which added Supplies by steel sector to the list of exemptions from Further Tax.\nBoth the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) rejected this argument, ruling that steel pipes were not covered under the steel sector exemption, which they interpreted as being limited to primary producers like steel melters, re-rollers, and ship breakers.\nTribunals Decision:\nAllowed the taxpayers appeal.\nSet aside the orders of the lower authorities.\nTribunals Reasoning:\nPlain Meaning of Steel Sector : The Tribunal held that the term steel sector in its general meaning includes any product made of steel, including steel pipes. To exclude specific steel products was deemed misconceived rather absurd. \nLegislative Intent: The Tribunal found it illogical to restrict steel sector to only melters, re-rollers, and ship breakers, as these were already explicitly listed as a separate exemption (Serial No. 9) in an earlier notification (S.R.O. 585(I)/2017). The subsequent creation of a new, distinct entry for Supplies by steel sector (Serial No. 14) indicated the legislatures intent to broaden the exemption to the entire sector, not just primary producers.\nConclusion: The lower authorities interpretation was found to be incorrect, and charging Further Tax in the presence of a clear exemption was ruled illegal, unlawful and without any basis. \nResult: The appellant successfully proved its eligibility for the exemption, and the demand for Further Tax, along with associated surcharge and penalty, was quashed.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A),33(5),34(1)", - "Case #": "S.T.A. No. 913/LB of 2024, decided on 26th May, 2025. Date of hearing: 19th May, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Shafaqat Ali and Zahid Sikandar, Members", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hamza Sajid for Appellant.\nImran Saeed, DR for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s RUBY STEEL CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD.\nvs\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, RTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26447", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2033 = 2025 SLD 2033 = 2025 PTD 1264", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTc", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary: Appeal Against Unexplained Foreign Asset Addition\nCore Issue: The tax department added Rs. 272,654,009 to the appellants income for the tax year 2018, treating an undeclared foreign bank account as an unexplained investment under Section 111(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nTaxpayers Argument: The appellant argued that the funds in the Bank of Singapore account were not his own but were inherited from his late father. He claimed his father, a distinguished bureaucrat who later worked for international organizations, accumulated the wealth legally during his employment abroad. The appellant provided documents, including his fathers employment letter, bank statements, and emails tracing the fund transfer from his fathers account to the confronted account.\nDepartments Argument ( & Lower Courts Ruling): The Deputy Commissioner (DCIR) rejected the explanation, stating the taxpayer failed to provide a verifiable money trail or sufficient evidence during the assessment proceedings to prove the source of the funds was his fathers legitimate income. Consequently, the amount was added to his taxable income as unexplained.\nTribunals Decision: The Tribunal set aside the DCIRs order and remanded the case back for a fresh decision.\nTribunals Reasoning:\nThe appellant presented new, substantial documentary evidence (bank statements, etc.) before the Tribunal that was not adequately presented or scrutinized at the assessment stage.\nThe veracity and genuineness of these new documents need to be properly verified by the assessing officer.\nIn the interest of justice, the appellant deserves a full opportunity to have this evidence officially examined.\nOutcome: The case is sent back to the DCIR with instructions to:\nVerify the newly submitted bank statements and documents.\nPass a fresh order in accordance with the law after providing the appellant a proper hearing.\nComplete this process within 30 days.\nThe appellant is directed to cooperate fully and submit all required documents during the new proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=111(1),111(1)(b),116(2),122(5),122(9),176(4)", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 1483/KB of 2024, decided on 19th September, 2024. Date of hearing: 15th August, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AIJAZ AHMED KHAN AND FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Faiz Ahmed for Applicant.\nImran Falak Sher, D.R. for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUSTAFA AKHUND\nvs\nDCIR, ZONE AEOI, UNIT-4, RANGE-B" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26448", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2034 = 2025 SLD 2034 = 2025 PTD 1313", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTY", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether an appeal against a preliminary determination imposing provisional anti-dumping duties becomes irrelevant ( infructuous ) after the tax authority issues its final determination on the same matter.\nBackground:\nThe appellant challenged a preliminary determination notice dated January 31, 2025, which imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of BOPP Self Adhesive Tape from China.\nThese provisional duties were imposed for a maximum period of four months as per the law.\nBefore the appeal could be decided, the National Tariff Commission issued its Final Determination on May 24, 2025, imposing definitive duties for five years, retroactively covering the period of the provisional measures.\nArguments:\nCommissions Argument: The appeal against the preliminary determination is now infructuous. The provisional order was an interim step that has legally merged into the final order, which is now the only operative decision. The appellant can, and should, challenge the final determination instead, where all their grievances can be addressed.\nAppellants Argument: The right to appeal a preliminary determination is a substantive right granted by the Anti-Dumping Act. Dismissing the appeal would deprive them of this statutory right and the subsequent right to a second appeal to the High Court. They argued the case should be heard alongside other appeals against the final determination.\nTribunals Decision: The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as infructuous.\nTribunals Reasoning:\nProvisional Nature of the Order: The law explicitly states that provisional anti-dumping duties are temporary, lasting only four months, and are meant to prevent injury during the investigation. They are not final.\nDoctrine of Merger: The Tribunal applied the legal principle that an interim or provisional order merges into the final decision. Once a final order is passed, the interim order ceases to have independent legal existence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has firmly upheld this doctrine.\nStatutory Framework: The Act itself, specifically Section 55, outlines the fate of provisional duties after a final determination. It ensures that any difference between provisional and final duties is reconciled (e.g., excess is not collected, and the difference is refunded), confirming that provisional measures are subsumed by the final outcome.\nEfficiency and Avoiding Redundancy: Hearing an appeal against a spent provisional order would be a waste of judicial resources when a comprehensive appeal against the final determination, which covers the same issues, is available.\nRight to Appeal Preserved: The appellants right to a second appeal is not lost, as they can appeal the Tribunals decision to dismiss the case as infructuous. Their substantive arguments can be fully raised in a direct appeal against the Final Determination.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Dumping Duties Ordinance (LXV of 2000)=31,37,37(2),39,43,45,55,55(2),70,70(1)(ii),70(13)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=12(2)", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 674 of 2025, decided on 17th July, 2025. Dates of hearing: 17th, 24th, 30th April, 25th, 26th June, 8th July, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MRS. SURAIYA AHMED BUTT, CHAIRMAN USMAN AHMAD RANJHA AND MUHAMMAD SAQIB AYYAZ, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Salman Farooq for Appellants.\nAzfar Naeem, Senior Legal Advisor for Respondent No. 1.\nSaifullah Khan, Ms. Sumaira Kanwal and Rais Mahmood Ali for Private Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S TAPE TOWN AND OTHERS\nVS\nNATIONAL TARIFF COMMISSION AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26449", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2035 = 2025 SLD 2035 = 2025 PTD 1357", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTU", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Tax credit entitlement of Non-Profit Organization (NPO) under Section 100C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nDetails:\nThe taxpayer (a foundation registered on 06.04.2011 under the Societies Registration Act, 1860) operates as a Non-Profit Organization (NPO) for charitable and welfare purposes.\nTax return declared a surplus of Rs. 695,221 for the relevant year.\nProceedings were initiated under Section 122(8) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, based on discrepancies in bank deposits versus declared turnover. Initial issue was resolved, but later, an addendum alleged violation of Section 100C(2)(a) on account of Rs.169,898,000 received from M/s Vision Developers (Pvt) Ltd.\nDonor company treated the funds as an interest-free loan in its accounts, while the taxpayer treated them as donations. The Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed tax credit under Section 100C, determining a liability of Rs. 89,657 (order dated 30.06.2022 under Section 122(4)).\nOn appeal, Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the AO’s order (07.04.2023), holding that the taxpayer failed to substantiate the donation.\nThe taxpayer filed a second appeal, arguing that it had already been granted NPO status via approval under Section 2(36) (Letter No. J-1605 dated 28.10.2013) and tax credit under Section 100C was duly allowed in earlier years (2015, 2017), as well as in audit proceedings (order dated 06.08.2018). The taxpayer also produced bank statements and a donor’s certificate.\nHeld:\nThe Tribunal observed that:\nThe taxpayer had valid NPO status under Section 2(36)(c), recognized by the department.\nTax credit under Section 100C had been allowed in prior and subsequent years, and even in audit proceedings for the same year.\nNo evidence suggested misuse of funds or personal benefit to members.\nThe donation from M/s Vision Developers (Pvt) Ltd. was duly substantiated with bank records and a certificate.\nIt was held that the rejection of tax credit was arbitrary, without jurisdiction, and contrary to facts.\nThe taxpayer was entitled to 100% tax credit under Section 100C, and the orders of the AO and CIR(A) were annulled. The appeal was allowed in full.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(36)(c),100C,111,122(1),122(4),122(5),122(8),122(9),214C", - "Case #": "I.T.A. No. 2880/LB of 2023, decided on 20th December, 2025. Date of hearing: 28th December, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Mian Tauqeer Aslam, Chairman and Muhammad Jamil Bhatti, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Zafar Iqbal for Appellant\nAhmed Sheikh, DR for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "ABDUL ALEEM KHAN FOUNDATION\nvs\nCOMMISIONER INLAND·REVENUE, CTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26450", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2036 = 2025 SLD 2036 = 2025 PTD 1448", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTQ", - "Key Words:": "The taxpayer, a foundation registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, had been granted approval as a Non-Profit Organization (NPO) under Section 2(36)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Approval Letter No. J-1605 dated 28.10.2013). For the relevant tax year, it declared a surplus of Rs.695,221. During audit proceedings under Section 122(8), the Assessing Officer (AO) initially questioned discrepancies in bank deposits but later alleged violation of Section 100C(2)(a) on account of Rs.169,898,000 received from M/s Vision Developers (Pvt) Ltd. The AO treated the amount as questionable since the donor had recorded it as an “interest-free loan” instead of a donation, and disallowed tax credit under Section 100C, raising a demand of Rs.89,657 via order under Section 122(4).\nOn first appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the AO’s findings, holding that the taxpayer failed to substantiate the donation and justify entitlement to tax credit.\nIn second appeal, the taxpayer contended that:\nIt had recognized NPO status under Section 2(36)(c) and approval from the department.\nTax credit under Section 100C had been duly allowed in earlier years (2015, 2017) and even in audit proceedings for the same year (order dated 06.08.2018 under Section 122(1)).\nThe amount received was a genuine voluntary donation, substantiated with donor’s certificate and bank statements.\nThere was no allegation or evidence of misuse of funds or private benefit.\nThe Tribunal observed that:\nNPO status once granted by the Commissioner entitled the taxpayer to benefits of Section 100C, subject to statutory conditions.\nThe department itself had accepted this status and allowed tax credit in past and subsequent years.\nThere was no legal or factual basis for denial in the year under consideration.\nThe donation was duly established through banking channels and supporting documentation.\nHeld: The AO and CIR(A) orders were declared illegal, arbitrary, and without jurisdiction. The taxpayer was held entitled to 100% tax credit under Section 100C. Appeal allowed in full.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=20(1),21(n),34(3),65B,85,108,111,116(2),120,122(5),122(5A),122(9),129,154", - "Case #": "I.T.As. Nos. 2106/LB and 1978/LB of 2016, decided on 2nd June, 2025. Date of hearing: 15th May, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAHID SIKANDAR, AND SHAFAQAT ALI, MEMBERS", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sheikh Aqeel Ahmed for Appellants.\nUsman Azam Bhatti, DR for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S NISHAT CHUNIAN LTD. AND ANOTHER\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, LAHORE AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26451", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2044 = 2025 SLD 2044", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSS8", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Tax Credit under Section 65A – Scope of “Sales” and 90% Threshold Requirement\nDetails:\nThe Income Tax Reference Application was filed under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 against the Tribunal’s order dated 29.05.2017.\nIssue: Whether the taxpayer was entitled to tax credit under Section 65A, given that only 85.32% of sales were made to a registered person (Coca Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd.), while 14.68% sales were exports to Habib Gulzar (Afghanistan entity, neither registered nor liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990).\nRevenue’s stance: Section 65A requires 90% of all sales (including exports) to registered persons; since only 85.32% sales were to a registered person, credit is not available. Strict interpretation required for exemption/benefit provisions.\nTaxpayer’s stance: The term “sales” in Section 65A is confined to local sales to registered or liable-to-be-registered persons. Exports are excluded, so 90% threshold was met.\nHeld:\nCourt held that “sales” in Section 65A refers only to local sales made to “registered persons” under the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nExports cannot be included in the 90% threshold calculation since foreign buyers are neither registered nor liable to be registered in Pakistan.\nInterpretation must align with the scheme of the Ordinance: “sales” refers to local supplies, while “imports/exports” are separately dealt with under Sections 148 and 154.\nPrinciple applied: Whole Text Canon – statute must be read as a whole, avoiding interpretations that render provisions redundant.\nEven if ambiguity exists, benefit goes to taxpayer (well-settled canon of tax law).\nConsequently, the Tribunal’s order allowing the taxpayer’s claim was upheld; Reference Application dismissed.\nCitations:\nSales Tax Act, 1990: Section 2(25) (definition of registered person).\nPrinciples of statutory interpretation: Whole Text Canon, strict construction of exemptions, benefit of ambiguity to taxpayer.\nCase law cited: Imperial Electric Company; Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd.; jurisprudence on harmonious construction and statutory interpretation.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=65A,120,122(5A),122(9),129,131,133Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(25)", - "Case #": "ITR No. 68412 of 2017. Date of Hearing & Order:17.09.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): HASSAN NAWAZ MAKHDOOM, JUSTICE AND KHALID ISHAQ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Liaquat Ali Chaudhry, Advocate\nRespondent by: M/s. Umair Ahmad & Haris Irfan, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Large Taxpayers Unit, Lahore\nVs\nM/s. Coca Cola Export Corporation" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26452", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2045 = 2025 SLD 2045", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSSs", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Effect of Omission of Section 126A – Jurisdiction for Reference Applications\nDetails:\nA Reference Application under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was filed against an order dated 28.02.2025 of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals).\nBackground of Amendments:\nBefore 03.05.2024, Section 133 allowed a Reference Application before the High Court only against orders of the Tribunal.\nOn 03.05.2024, by the Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024, Section 126A was inserted, allowing a Reference Application before the High Court against orders of Commissioner (Appeals) as well as Tribunal.\nLater, through the Finance Act, 2025 (27.06.2025), Section 126A was omitted and Section 133 was restored to its pre-2024 position, limiting References to Tribunal orders only.\nApplicant’s stance: After omission of Section 126A, all pending references against orders of Commissioner (Appeals) must be transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), as procedural amendments apply retrospectively. Relied on earlier Division Bench decisions:\nCIR vs. M/s Darya Khan Sugar Mills Ltd. (ITR No.79/2024, 10.09.2025)\nIbrar Iqbal vs. CIR (Appeals) Sahiwal (ITR No.28/2025, 15.09.2025)\nDepartment’s stance: Agreed, since in earlier cases the department itself took the same position.\nHeld:\nThe Court ruled that:\nAmendments to Section 133 and omission of Section 126A through Finance Act, 2025 are procedural in nature and apply retrospectively.\nParties have no vested right in procedural law or forum of appeal; hence, pending References against orders of Commissioner (Appeals) must be transmitted to the Tribunal for adjudication.\nThe doctrine of past and closed transaction protects cases already decided by the High Court or Tribunal prior to the amendment.\nPrecedents applied:\nCIR v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2024 SC 1168)\nDHA v. FBR (2025 PTD 530)\nService Global Footwear Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2024 PTD 1271)\nMCB Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (2025 SCMR 303) – distinction between substantive and procedural law.\nCIT v. Café Student Karachi (2016 PTD 1072) – fiscal law amendments prospective unless expressly retrospective.\nCIR v. Ghausia Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. (2015 PTD 772), A.G.E. Industries (2010 PTD 1850), Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. (1992 SCMR 1652), CIT v. Shahnawaz Ltd. (1993 SCMR 73) – procedural amendments apply retrospectively if beneficial.\nCourt fee: Since the matter was not adjudicated on merits, as in Ibrar Iqbal supra, the applicant is entitled to return of court fee, but must pay the requisite fee before the Tribunal.\nFinal Order: The Reference Application is transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue to be treated as an appeal against the Commissioner (Appeals). The matter stands disposed of.\nCitations:\nTax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024; Finance Act, 2025.\nCIR v. M/s Darya Khan Sugar Mills Ltd. (ITR 79/2024, 10.09.2025).\nIbrar Iqbal v. CIR (Appeals) Sahiwal (ITR 28/2025, 15.09.2025).\nCIR v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2024 SC 1168).\nDefence Housing Authority v. FBR (2025 PTD 530).\nService Global Footwear Ltd. v. Federation (2024 PTD 1271).\nMuslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (2025 SCMR 303).\nCIT v. Café Student Karachi (2016 PTD 1072).\nCIR v. Ghausia Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. (2015 PTD 772).\nA.G.E. Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. IAC (2010 PTD 1850).\nArmy Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation (1992 SCMR 1652).\nCIT v. Shahnawaz Ltd. (1993 SCMR 73).", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A,133", - "Case #": "ITR No. 21137/2025. Date of hearing 29-09-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUSTICE AND MALIK JAVID IQBAL WAINS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicants by M/s Barrister Saffi-ul-Hassan, Muhammad Ajmal Khan, M. Mansha Sukhera, Omer Wahab, Rana Usman and M. Zafar Iqbal Mian, Advocates.\nRespondents by M/s Shahid Sarwar Chahil, Kausar Parveen and Rana Waqas Habib Khan, Advocates", - "Petitioner Name:": "HARRIS HASAN SYED \nVS. \nTHE COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26453", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2046 = 2025 SLD 2046 = 2025 PTD 1364", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTk", - "Key Words:": "This case involves the interpretation of Section 147 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which deals with the payment of advance tax. The court consolidated three writ petitions (No. 181 of 2019, No. 4497 of 2022, and No. 4558 of 2022) as they all raised issues concerning the recovery of advance tax, though each had distinct factual backgrounds.\nKey Legal Issues and the Courts Analysis\n1. Nature of Advance Tax Liability under Section 147\nAdvance Tax is Income Tax: The court held that advance tax is not a provisional payment but a form of income tax imposed under the charging provision of the Ordinance (Section 4). It falls within the definition of tax under Section 2(63).\nPay-as-You-Earn Principle: Advance tax is based on the principle of paying tax on income as it is earned during the year, rather than waiting until the end of the tax year. The liability is computed using statutory formulas (Sections 147(4) and 147(4B)) and must be paid by specified due dates (Sections 147(5), (5A), (5B)).\nProvisional but Mandatory: While advance tax is adjustable against the final tax liability after assessment, it is a mandatory obligation. Failure to pay attracts penalties and recovery actions.\n2. Consequences of Default and Coercive Recovery\nRecovery is Permissible: If a taxpayer fails to pay advance tax voluntarily, the tax department can coercively recover it under Section 147(7), which treats advance tax as tax due under an assessment order. \nDue Process Must Be Followed: The tax department must issue notices under Sections 137 and 138 before resorting to coercive measures (e.g., attaching bank accounts under Section 140). These notices afford the taxpayer an opportunity to pay voluntarily and challenge the demand.\nIllegality of Recovery Without Due Process: Recovery without issuing Sections 137 and 138 notices violates due process (Article 10A of the Constitution) and is illegal.\n3. Remedies Against Advance Tax Demands\nAppeal Against Rejection of Estimate: If the tax department rejects a taxpayers estimate filed under Section 147(6) (claiming reduced liability), the rejection order is appealable under Section 127, as it enhances the taxpayers liability.\nNo Appeal Against Collection Notices: Notices issued for collection/recovery of advance tax (under Sections 137, 138, 140) are not orders and cannot be appealed. The remedy is to file a writ petition if due process is violated.\nApplication to the Cases\nWrit Petition No. 181 of 2019\nFacts: The tax department recovered advance tax directly from the petitioner’s bank account under Section 140 without issuing Sections 137/138 notices. The petitioner claimed it had filed an estimate showing no liability and was due a refund.\nRuling: The recovery was illegal due to lack of due process. The tax department was directed to process the petitioner’s refund application within 60 days and consider interest for delayed refund under Section 171.\nWrit Petition No. 4497 of 2022\nFacts: Advance tax was demanded based on a reassessment order that was later annulled. The tax department continued recovery efforts post-annulment.\nRuling: Recovery based on an annulled order was illegal. The tax department was directed to process the refund claim within 60 days and consider interest for delay.\nWrit Petition No. 4558 of 2022\nFacts: The petitioner filed an estimate under Section 147(6) reducing its advance tax liability. The tax department disregarded the estimate and coercively recovered the higher amount.\nRuling: For the relevant tax year, the tax department lacked authority to reject the estimate. Recovery was illegal. The department was directed to process the refund within 60 days with interest for delay.\nConclusion\nThe court allowed all three petitions, declaring the recoveries illegal due to violations of due process or authority.\nCosts of Rs. 100,000 were awarded to each petitioner, payable by the tax department within 30 days.\nThe tax department was directed to expedite refunds and consider interest for delays under Section 171.\nThis judgment reinforces that advance tax is a mandatory liability but its recovery must adhere to due process. Taxpayers have protections against arbitrary actions, including the right to file estimates and challenge improper recoveries through writ petitions.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(63),4,4(1),4(6),53,87,120,122,122(5A),137,138,140,147,147(1),147(1)(d),147(2),147(4),147(4A),147(4B),147(5A),147(6)Income Tax Act, 1961=18A(5),207,211Income Tax Ordinance, 1979=87", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 181 of 2019, 4497 and 4558 of 2022. Announced in the open Court on 18.12.2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONERS BY: Ch. Naeem ul Haq, Ch. Imran ul Haq and Ch. Faheem ul Haq, Advocates.\nRESPONDENTS BY: Mr. Osama Shahid, Advocate for the Tax Department in Writ Petition No.181 of 2019.\nMr. Ghulam Qasim Bhatti, Advocate for the Tax Department in Writ Petition No.4497 & 4558 of 2022.\nMr. Aqeel Akhtar Raja and Raja Muhammad Jawad Arslan, Assistant Attorney General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "1. Writ Petition No. 181/2019\nM/s Pakistan Telecommunication Authority through its Director (Budget & Accounts)\nvs.\nFederation of Pakistan for the purpose of Service through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad & others\n2. Writ Petition No. 4497/2022\nM/s Communicator's Globe Private Limited through its General Manager (Development)\nvs\nFederation of Pakistan for the purpose of Service through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad & others\n3. Writ Petition No. 4558/2022\nM/s Excel Labs Private Limited through its Assistant Manager (Accounts & Finance)\nvs.\nFederation of Pakistan for the purpose of Service through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26454", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2047 = 2025 SLD 2047 = 2025 PTD 1439", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSTg", - "Key Words:": "Core Dispute: The Petitioner challenged the legality of an anti-dumping duty imposed on its imported goods via a Notice of Final Determination dated 08.02.2017.\nKey Arguments of the Petitioner\nThe Petitioner argued that the anti-dumping proceedings were illegal and void from the start for the following reasons:\nLegal Vacuum: The investigation was initiated based on an application (filed 29.06.2015) made under an Ordinance that had already lapsed. The new Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, was not yet enacted, creating a legal vacuum. Therefore, the NTC had no jurisdiction to initiate the investigation.\nInvalid Application: The NTC never received a valid application under the new 2015 Act, rendering the entire process flawed.\nProcedural Delay: The NTC issued its provisional determination 419 days after initiating the investigation, far beyond the 180-day period mentioned in the Act.\nRequested Relief: The Petitioner sought to have the anti-dumping notice declared void and to be allowed to clear its goods without paying the duty.\nKey Arguments of the Respondents\nAlternative Remedy: The petition is not maintainable because the Petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy: the right to appeal to the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal under Section 70 of the Act.\nNo Legal Vacuum: The Ordinance was validly extended retrospectively by a Resolution of Parliament under Article 89 of the Constitution, so there was no period where the law was not in effect.\nLegislative Validity: The Parliament has the power to legislate retrospectively, and the extension of the Ordinance was a valid exercise of this power.\nCourts Analysis & Decision\nThe court dismissed the Petitioners Writ Petition, ruling in favor of the Respondents. The key findings were:\nNo Legal Vacuum Existed: The court held that Parliament has the power to extend an Ordinance retrospectively under Article 89 of the Constitution. The Resolution passed on 30-07-2015, which retrospectively extended the Ordinance, was valid. Therefore, the law was continuously in force, and the NTCs initiation of the investigation was lawful.\nContinuity of Proceedings: The subsequent enactment of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, provided continuity to the proceedings that began under the Ordinance.\nTimeframe is Directory, Not Mandatory: The court ruled that the 180-day period for a provisional determination is directory, not mandatory. Since the Act does not specify any consequences for missing this deadline, the NTCs 419-day delay, while not ideal, did not invalidate the proceedings.\nAlternative Remedy Available: The court agreed that the Petitioner should have first exhausted the statutory remedy of appeal to the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal under Section 70 of the Act instead of directly filing a constitutional petition.\nNo Violation of Fundamental Rights: The court found that the anti-duty law imposes a reasonable restriction on the freedom of trade (Article 18) to protect local industry, which is in line with Pakistans international trade commitments.\nFinal Outcome\nThe Writ Petition was dismissed. The anti-dumping duty was upheld, and the Petitioner was directed to pursue its statutory right of appeal if it wished to challenge the matter further.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Rules, 1922=20,23,37,39,70Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=73(2),73 (2)(a)(ii) ,89,199(1)", - "Case #": "W.P. NO. 4937 OF 2018. Date of hearing : 6.2.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by : Mr. Muhammad Afzal Awan, Advocate\nRespondents by : Mr. Abu Muhammad Azfar, Advocate for the Respondent No. 3.\nMr. Saif Ullah Khan, Advocate for the Respondent No. 4.\nRaja Zamir ud Din Ahmed and Ms. Asia Batool, AAGs.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S AL-UBAID ASSOCIATES\nVS\nTHE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LAW, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26455", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2048 = 2025 SLD 2048 = 2025 PTD 1491 = 2025 PTCL 922", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSXo", - "Key Words:": "This is a summary of a courts decision on a tax reference, where the court ruled in favor of the taxpayer (the applicant) and against the Tax Department on all key issues.\n1. Background & Core Dispute:\nThe Tax Department had demanded sales tax from a company on funds received from:\nInsurance proceeds for damaged assets.\nDisposal of fixed assets like vehicles, building materials, and office equipment.\nThe company argued these receipts were not subject to sales tax. The lower appellate forums (Commissioner Appeals and Appellate Tribunal) had upheld the tax demand without providing detailed reasoning.\n2. Key Legal Questions & Courts Ruling:\nQuestion 1: Are insurance proceeds taxable as a supply under the Sales Tax Act?\nCourts Ruling: NO. The court concluded that an insurance contract is an actionable claim (a right to receive money upon a contingency), not a contract for the sale of goods. The payment from the insurer is compensation for a loss, not consideration for a sale. Therefore, receiving insurance money does not constitute a taxable supply and is not subject to sales tax.\nQuestion 2: Is sales tax on the disposal of fixed assets (vehicles, building materials, etc.) exempt?\nCourts Ruling: YES. The court found that the disposed items were indeed fixed assets of the company (not stock for resale). The law provides an exemption from sales tax for the supply of fixed assets if input tax was not claimable on them originally. A government notification (SRO 490) explicitly lists these very categories of assets (vehicles, building materials, electrical appliances, etc.) as ineligible for input tax. Therefore, their disposal is exempt from sales tax.\nQuestion 3: Was the company liable for a default surcharge and penalty?\nCourts Ruling: NO. Since the court found that no sales tax was actually due in the first place (based on its rulings on Questions 1 and 2), the foundation for imposing a default surcharge or penalty collapsed. The question of penalty was rendered academic.\n3. Final Outcome:\nThe court set aside all the previous orders that had created the tax demand against the company. The judgment was decided entirely in favor of the taxpayer.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(12),2(33),2(35),2(41),3(1),3(1)(a),8(1)(b),13,33,33(5),34Transfer of Property Act, 1882=3", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 19/2019. Date of order: 04-02-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE AND SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Syed Hasnain Ibrahim Kazmi, Advocate.\nRespondents by: Mr. Babar Bilal, Advocate.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Pak Telecom Mobile Limited, Islamabad \nVs\nCommissioner Inland Revenue, LTU, Islamabad, & others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26456", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2071 = 2025 SLD 2071 = 2025 CLD 1309", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTSXk", - "Key Words:": "Summary of the Order\nCase Title:\nTakaful Pakistan Limited & Others v. Director Insurance, SECP\nAppeal No.: 108 of 2017\nDate of Impugned Order: October 13, 2017\nRelevant Law:\nSections 11(1), 28 & 156 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000\nRule 9 of the Insurance Rules, 2002 (as amended via S.R.O. 828(I)/2015)\nSection 33 of the SECP Act, 1997\nSection 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897\nFacts\nThe Company failed to meet minimum paid-up capital requirements set by SECP.\nDespite being allowed to issue right shares at a discount, Takaful Pakistan Limited remained undercapitalized during the periods ending June 2016 – December 2017.\nSECP issued a Show-Cause Notice (SCN), held hearings, and imposed a total fine of Rs. 1.2 million (Rs. 500,000 on the company and Rs. 100,000 on each of seven directors).\nAppellants’ Arguments\nNon-compliance was not willful, but due to market volatility and delayed investor response.\nThe company had executed an MOU with Faizan Holdings to inject capital.\nThe SECP did not prove mens rea, and action under Section 156 required intentional default.\nThe order violated Article 18 of the Constitution (freedom of trade) and Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act (requirement of fair administrative action).\nThe company achieved compliance in June 2018, and most penalized directors had since left the board.\nRespondent’s (SECP’s) Arguments\nThe violation was willful, as the SRO was issued in 2015 and sufficient time had lapsed.\nSigning an MOU did not constitute compliance.\nThe company made no material progress before the order.\nSECP acted in accordance with law, providing due process and a reasoned order.\nFindings of the Appellate Bench\nThe Company acknowledged the capital shortfall and later achieved compliance (June 30, 2018).\nThe Company made good faith efforts, including attempting to issue right shares.\nThe intent was not mala fide; rather, there was delayed compliance.\nSince most penalized directors were no longer on the board and the company had subsequently complied, imposing a fine served no practical purpose.\nOrder\nThe Bench maintained the merits of the Impugned Order (acknowledging the violation).\nHowever, the penalty was converted into a warning.\nThe Appeal was disposed of without any order as to costs.\nOutcome\n✅ Appeal allowed in part — Penalty replaced with warning.\n⚖️ Violation maintained — But no monetary fine remains enforceable.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Appeal No. 108 of 2017, decided on 3rd June, 2024. Dates of hearing: 6th and 11th March, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AKIF SAEED, CHAIRMAN/COMMISSIONER AND MUJTABA AHMAD LODHI COMMISSIONER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Hassan Abbas (Mohsin Tayebaly & Co.) for Appellants.\nShafiq-ur-Rehman, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP and Raja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "TAKAFUL PAKISTAN LIMITED and others - Appellants\nVS\nThe DIRECTOR (INSURANCE) INSURANCE DIVISION, SECP - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26457", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2072 = 2025 SLD 2072 = 2025 CLD 921", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTc", - "Key Words:": "1. Background of the Case\nThe dispute concerned control and ownership of Messrs Of Space (Pvt.) Ltd., a private company incorporated on 17 December 1997, established to develop and operate commercial office towers (“Tower I” and “Tower II”).\nShareholding at inception:\nShah Group (Respondents) – 44% (Neelofar Shah 26%, Raza Shah 18%)\nKhan Group (Appellants) – 56% (Sajida Naeem 26%, Alamgir Khan 30%)\nThe controversy began when Alamgir Khan transferred his 30% shares to his brother Sher Asfandyar Khan on 15 January 1999, thereby giving the Khan Group absolute control of the company.\n2. Core Dispute\nThe Shah Group contended that:\nThe transfer violated two Shareholders’ Agreements—one general (“Main Agreement”) and one specific to Tower II.\nThese agreements reserved certain rights for Nazeer Shah and ensured the Shah family’s influence after the initial management period.\nThe transfer amounted to corporate oppression and violated the agreed governance structure.\nThe Khan Group countered that:\nThe agreements were fabricated and unenforceable.\nThe share transfer was valid, properly recorded, and within their rights.\n3. Regulatory and Procedural History\nThe SECP questioned the non-disclosure of the transfer in filings and ultimately de-registered the company’s returns (1999–2006), advising the dispute be resolved in court.\nThe Company filed a revision petition under Section 484 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, and its returns were reinstated conditionally pending judicial determination.\nThe Company Judge (Single Bench, SHC) ruled the transfer unlawful and oppressive, ordered restoration of lawful balance in governance, and issued structural directions.\nThe Division Bench (Sindh High Court) upheld the Company Judge’s decision.\nThe Supreme Court heard the final appeals.\n4. Supreme Court Findings\nA. Legality of the Share Transfer\nThe record lacked complete disclosure and compliance with statutory requirements under the 1984 Ordinance.\nThe omission of key board minutes and incomplete Form-A filings indicated irregularity and lack of transparency.\nThe Court held that the transfer of 7,499 shares to Sher Asfandyar Khan was unlawful and oppressive, as it disrupted the balance of control and breached the principles of fair governance.\nB. Shareholders’ Agreements\nEven if genuine, such agreements cannot override mandatory provisions of company law.\nThey merely reflect the parties’ understanding but do not legalize procedural violations or concealment in share transfer processes.\nC. Alleged “Trust” of Shares\nThe argument that 7,500 shares were held “in trust” (contrary to Section 148 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984) was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court and thus not entertainable.\nThe Court clarified that the “safe custody” argument by the respondents did not equate to creation of a legal trust—hence Section 148 was irrelevant.\nD. Standard of Proof\nThe Court reaffirmed that company law disputes are civil in nature, decided on the balance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.\nCourts must assess the totality of the evidence, both primary and secondary, to determine oppression or illegality.\n5. Corporate Governance Directions (Company Judge’s Orders Upheld)\nThe Court upheld a restructured governance framework to restore corporate balance:\nEOGM to be held under the Official Assignee’s supervision.\nShareholding recognized as Shah Group 44%, Khan Group 26%, and disputed 30% shares held in Official Assignee’s custody.\nChairman to be from the Shah Group; CEO from the Khan Group.\nOne-year period granted for the parties to settle the disputed 30% shares, failing which they would revert to the Shah Family, subject to third-party claims.\nTransparency and access to company records ensured for all directors.\nA one-year transitional governance regime, after which full compliance with the 1984 Ordinance was mandated.\n6. Observations on Corporate Governance\nChief Justice Yahya Afridi emphasized:\n“Corporate governance is not merely a procedural requirement but a moral and structural foundation for transparency, fairness, and accountability in corporate affairs.”\nHe reaffirmed that:\nDisclosure, good faith, and shareholder protection are essential pillars of company law.\nUpholding these principles preserves public trust in corporate institutions and strengthens the rule of law.\n7. Final Order\nAppeals dismissed.\nJudgment of the Sindh High Court affirmed in full.\nNo order as to costs.\n8. Key Legal Principles Affirmed\nShare transfers in private companies must strictly comply with statutory disclosure and record-keeping.\nShareholder agreements cannot override the Companies Ordinance.\nOppression and mismanagement may be inferred from circumstantial irregularities.\nCorporate transparency and ethical governance are fundamental to maintaining legal and investor confidence.\nNew legal arguments cannot be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1843 to 1846 of 2019 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1138 of 2020, decided on 8th May, 2025. Date of hearing: 11th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 16.09.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in High Court Appeals Nos. 107 of 2012, 114 of 2012 and 109 of 2012).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haider Waheed, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As.Nos. 1843 and 1846 of 2019).\nSalman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1844 and 1845 of 2019).\nWasim Sajjad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Masood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nBarrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4 to 6.\nOmer Azad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 7 (SECP).\nFarooq H. Naek, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (in C.M.A. No. 1138 of 2020).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHER ASFANDYAR KHAN and 3 others- Appellants\nVS\nNEELOFAR SHAH and others- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26458", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2073 = 2025 SLD 2073 = 2025 CLD 1183", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTY", - "Key Words:": "Facts of the Case\nThe Tapal family (Mehmooda & Mustafa Tapal) had rented Locker No. 427 at Standard Chartered Bank’s Hill Park Branch since 1999.\nIn August 2011, they discovered their locker was empty.\nThey alleged theft and claimed their jewellery and cash were stolen.\nThe Bank denied negligence and offered compensation up to Rs. 1,000,000 only — based on State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) Circular No. 05 of 2007, which required banks to insure lockers with capped limits.\nThe Tapals sued for full recovery of their losses, not just Rs. 1 million.\nTheir suit was dismissed, leading to this appeal.\n⚖️ Issues Before the Court\nWhether the Bank was negligent or vicariously liable for the alleged theft.\nWhether the Bank’s contractual limitation of liability (Rs. 1,000,000 cap) was valid and binding.\nWhether the relationship between a locker holder and a bank constitutes bailment, lessor-lessee, or depositary relationship.\nWhether the Tapals proved entrustment of property (contents claimed to be stolen).\n💼 Appellants’ (Tapals’) Arguments\nThe Bank was grossly negligent, as a former employee (Ali Kashif) had opened multiple lockers with a single key.\nThe Bank was vicariously liable since the theft involved its former staff.\nThe Bank’s failure to summon certain employees showed mala fide.\nThe limitation clause (Rs. 1m cap) was unfair, signed hurriedly, and not truly consented to.\nThe Bank’s failure to cross-examine specific points meant those facts stood admitted.\n🏦 Respondent’s (SCB’s) Arguments\nAli Kashif had left employment years before the theft and was not acting as employee.\nHe never confessed to stealing from the Tapals’ locker.\nThe Tapals’ locker showed no forced entry.\nThe Tapals signed an explicit contract agreeing to a Rs. 1m cap on liability.\nThe Tapals failed to prove ownership or existence of the claimed valuables (not declared in tax returns).\n📜 Court’s Findings\n1. Contractual Limitation Binding\nThe Tapals voluntarily signed the new locker agreement (15.08.2011) after SBP Circular 05/2007.\nClause 21 clearly limited liability to Rs. 1,000,000.\nThere was no coercion, duress, or misrepresentation.\nPakistan lacks consumer protection laws like the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; thus, the clause is enforceable.\n2. No Proof of Bailment\nUnder Sections 148–171 of the Contract Act, 1872, bailment requires entrustment of goods.\nThe Tapals failed to prove delivery/entrustment — i.e., what valuables were actually placed in the locker.\nHence, no bailment relationship was established.\n3. No Negligence or Vicarious Liability\nThe Tapals’ locker was intact (no forced entry).\nThe alleged thief did not name their locker.\nThe Bank had no reasonable link to the theft.\nSince ownership and loss were not proved, damage was also unproved.\nThus, no negligence was established.\n4. Failure of Proof\nThe Tapals produced no documentary evidence (tax returns, purchase receipts, insurance, etc.) to show ownership of the claimed stolen items.\nAdmitted that assets were not declared in tax returns — undermining their claim.\n🧩 Legal Principles Discussed\nContract Act, 1872 — Bailment (Secs. 148–171), duty of care (Sec. 151), exemption clauses (Sec. 152).\nQanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 — burden of proof (Arts. 70, 126), presumptions (Art. 129), admissibility of confession (Arts. 38–40).\nCommon Law of Negligence — duty, breach, and causation discussed but not established.\nState Bank of Pakistan Circular 05/2007 — permitted insurance caps per locker type.\n🧠 Court’s Observations\nSympathy with the Tapals was noted, but law and evidence did not support their claim.\nSecurity and integrity of the banking system must be balanced against potential for fraudulent claims.\nThe Tapals’ failure to prove entrustment or ownership was fatal.\n🧾 Outcome\nAppeal dismissed.\nSCB’s liability capped at Rs. 1 million stands.\nNo further compensation awarded.\n⚖️ Key Takeaways\nLocker agreements are contractual, not fiduciary. The liability cap is valid if voluntarily agreed.\nBailment requires proof of delivery — merely renting a locker does not suffice.\nBanks are not insurers of locker contents beyond the agreed cap.\nFailure to declare valuables in tax returns can undermine ownership claims.\nExemption clauses in standard banking contracts are legally binding unless vitiated by fraud, coercion, or misrepresentation.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No. 202 of 2019, decided on 20th May, 2024. Dates of hearing: 13th February, 19th and 20th March, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND OMAR SIAL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Zahid F. Ebrahim for Appellants.\nHassan Arif for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAHMOODA TAPAL and another- Appellants\nVS\nSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK (PAKISTAN) LTD. and another- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26459", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2074 = 2025 SLD 2074 = 2025 CLD 1193", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTU", - "Key Words:": "Facts\nThe petitioners, employees of M/s 3-D Lifestyle Company, were accused by respondent No.2 (Syed Faisal Shah) of preparing a forged rent deed and wrongfully taking possession of the company’s outlet after termination of services.\nFIR was registered alleging fraud, forgery, criminal breach of trust, and cheating.\nPetitioners contended that as the company was a registered entity, any alleged misconduct of its employees or officers should have been addressed under the Companies Act, 2017, not through a criminal FIR.\nIssues\nWhether the registration of FIR by local police for alleged offences arising within a registered company is lawful.\nWhether cognizance for such offences lies exclusively with SECP under the Companies Act, 2017.\nPetitioners’ Contention\nUnder Section 477 of the Companies Act, 2017, only the Commission (SECP), Registrar, or qualified members/creditors may file a written complaint before a competent court.\nThe alleged acts fall within Section 497 (wrongful withholding of property) of the Companies Act.\nHence, the FIR is ultra vires, and the matter is non-cognizable for police.\nRespondent’s Argument\nThe complaint revealed forgery and criminal breach of trust, attracting PPC offences; therefore, criminal proceedings were justified.\nCourt’s Findings\nExclusive Cognizance by SECP:\nSection 476 of the Companies Act opens with a non-obstante clause, declaring that all offences where imprisonment is prescribed shall be cognizable by the Commission only, not by the police.\nProper Mechanism:\nSections 476, 477, and 497 collectively provide the complete statutory procedure:\nSECP (or authorized persons) must file the complaint;\nCognizance to be taken per Section 38 of the SECP Act, 1997;\nCourts proceed under Chapter XXII-A Cr.P.C.\nSpecial Law Overrides General Law:\nSince the Companies Act, 2017 is a special legislation, it prevails over the general criminal law (Cr.P.C. / PPC).\nRelied on Muhammad Iqbal v. Nasrullah (2023 SCMR 273) and Safi-ud-Din Kazi v. Pranab Chandra Roy Choudhary (PLD 1950 Dacca 37).\nNon-Obstante Clause Interpretation:\nReferred to Syed Mushahid Shah v. FIA (2017 SCMR 1218) and Muhammad Mohsin Ghuman (2013 SCMR 85) — holding that a non-obstante clause excludes inconsistent provisions of general law.\nApplication to Present Case:\nThe alleged act of wrongful possession of company property directly falls under Section 497 of the Companies Act.\nHence, registration of FIR by local police was without jurisdiction, patently illegal, and void ab initio.\nHeld / Order\nPetition allowed.\nFIR No. 184/2023 quashed as illegal and without lawful authority.\nObservation: Offences, if any, to be dealt with under the Companies Act, 2017 through SECP’s prescribed mechanism.\nLegal Principles Settled\nCorporate offences involving registered companies are cognizable exclusively by SECP, not local police.\nCompanies Act, 2017 is a special law overriding PPC and Cr.P.C. in corporate contexts.\nFIRs for offences covered under Sections 476–497 of the Act are void ab initio.\nEnforcement to proceed via Section 38 of the SECP Act, 1997.\nKey Citations\nMuhammad Iqbal & others v. Nasrullah — 2023 SCMR 273\nSyed Mushahid Shah v. FIA — 2017 SCMR 1218\nMuhammad Mohsin Ghuman v. Govt. of Punjab — 2013 SCMR 85\nFIA v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah — PLD 2023 SC 265", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition (Q) No.31-A of 2024, decided on 12th February, 2025. Date of hearing: 12th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IJAZ KHAN AND SADIQ ALI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waheed Jan Muhammad for Petitioner.\nShoaib Ali, Assistant Advocate General for the State.\nMalik Asif Ali for Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Sardar FARAZ HUSSAIN and 2 others- Petitioners\nVS\nThe STATE and another- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26460", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2075 = 2025 SLD 2075 = 2025 CLD 1200", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTQ", - "Key Words:": ". Background\nThe Petitioner, Muhammad Arsal, holding 25% shares in Sadiq Feeds (Pvt.) Ltd., challenged his removal as Director and alleged mismanagement by the CEO (his mother, Mrs. Sadia Sadiq) and other family members.\nAllegations included withdrawal of funds, failure to hold AGMs, and violation of corporate governance norms.\nThe Petitioner approached SECP twice in 2023 but claimed no remedial action was taken, leading to the present petition under Sections 286–288 of the Companies Act, 2017.\nII. Issues\nWhether intra-family corporate disputes can be resolved through mandatory mediation instead of adversarial litigation.\nWhether holding a judicially supervised Annual General Meeting (AGM) could serve as a mechanism to restore corporate governance and settle shareholder disputes.\nThe role of SECP as regulator in facilitating post-mediation compliance and future governance.\nIII. Judicial Approach\nMediation Initiation\nThe Court emphasized that the case concerned a family-controlled group of companies with thousands of employees, making mediation the preferred path.\nInitially, parties were referred to professional mediators — Syed Bulent Sohail (SIMI-certified), assisted by Justice (R) Tassaduq Hussain Jillani.\nWhen mediation stalled, the Court innovatively ordered that an AGM itself be used as a forum of mediation (“Mediation through AGM”).\nJudicial Supervision of AGM\nThe AGM was ordered under Section 215 of the Act with due notice, agenda, audit accounts, and participation by SECP representatives.\nSECP’s Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Muzaffar Ahmed Mirza, and Registrar, Mr. Saeed Ullah, were directed to attend to ensure compliance and good governance.\nOutcome of AGM (Mark-A)\nThe Petitioner attended via Zoom.\nAfter direct dialogue with his mother (the CEO), both sides agreed to:\nWithdraw all litigation unconditionally.\nMaintain status quo and avoid future suits.\nSettle share valuation disputes amicably when finances improve.\nThe AGM minutes (Mark-A) recorded these terms under “Agenda Item 4: Resolution of Disputes Among Members Pursuant to the Order of this Court”.\nIV. Judicial Findings\nMediation as a Right:\nDrawing on PLD 2025 SC 1 (Mughals Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. EOBI), the Court reaffirmed that access to justice includes a right to mediation, which ensures party autonomy and efficiency.\nFamily Corporate Disputes:\nFollowing Sohail Nisar v. Nadeem Nisar (2025 MLD 105), the Court held that mediation is mandatory in family company disputes to safeguard continuity of business and relationships.\nCorporate Democracy:\nCiting Mian Muhammad Ilyas Mehraj v. SECP (2009 CLD 883), the Court stressed that holding AGMs, approving audits, and electing directors are indispensable elements of corporate democracy.\nJudicial Role:\nThe Court reaffirmed that in such sensitive disputes, it must act not only as adjudicator but as facilitator and protector of institutional harmony, echoing Article 199’s spirit.\nPublic Confidence & Rule of Law:\nCompliance with the Court’s directions demonstrated public faith in judicial ADR mechanisms, a vital element of constitutional governance under Articles 4 and 5.\nV. Precedents Relied Upon\nPLD 2025 SC 1 – Mughals Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. EOBI\n2024 SCMR 947 – Province of Punjab v. Haroon Company\n2024 SCMR 640 – Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Co.\n2023 SCMR 1856 – Commissioner Inland Revenue v. RYK Mills\n2024 CLD 1 – Faisal Zafar v. Siraj-ud-Din\n2024 PLD Lahore 315 – Netherlands FMO v. Morgah Valley Ltd.\n2025 PTD 614 – NLC v. Deputy Commissioner\n2025 MLD 105 – Sohail Nisar v. Nadeem Nisar\nVI. Holding / Operative Part\nThe Court recorded the successful resolution through mediation held during the AGM (Mark-A).\nAll petitions were disposed of in view of the settlement.\nThe Court directed:\nSECP to oversee continued compliance and governance of the companies.\nPetitioner and Respondents to maintain harmony and not initiate future litigation.\nBoth sides to meet personally for final reconciliation.\nVII. Significance\n✅ Establishes the “Mediation through AGM” model — a judicial innovation blending statutory corporate procedure with ADR principles.\n✅ Reinforces mandatory mediation under Pakistani corporate jurisprudence.\n✅ Strengthens corporate democracy and family business governance.\n✅ Highlights the judicial function as facilitator of institutional harmony, not merely adjudicator of disputes.\n✅ Recognized SECP’s regulatory and quasi-fiduciary role in conflict prevention within private companies.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.O. No.01 of 2024, heard on 3rd June, 2025. Date of hearing: 3rd June, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Sameer Khosa, Advocate Supreme Court and Sardar Haseeb Iftikhar Ahmad for Petitioner.\nMuhammad Imran Malik, Akif Majeed Butt, Asim Tufail Farooqi, Fayyaz Ahmad Khan and Bilal Mehmood Khokhar for Respondents.\nMuhammad Waseem Ashraf Rana, Omar Azad Malik and Shehzad Ali Rana, Advocates / Special Prosecutors for SECP.\nAhmad Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Barrister Talha Ilyas Sheikh, Advocate.\nBarrister Zain Mansoor and Ms. Nabila Rubab, Assistant Attorney Generals and Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate-General.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ARSAL- Petitioner\nVS\nMessrs SADIQ FEEDS (PVT.) LTD. and others- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26461", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2076 = 2025 SLD 2076 = 2025 CLD 1226", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRS8", - "Key Words:": "Background Facts\nLoan and Default:\nMuhammad Safdar took a loan from a bank and mortgaged his property. He defaulted in repayment.\nAuction under Section 15, Ordinance 2001:\nThe Bank auctioned the property under Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. Respondent No.3 bought it and paid the full bid amount.\nBanking Court Proceedings:\nThe Bank filed the statement of accounts late (after 30 days), so it wasn’t confirmed.\nThe auction purchaser (Respondent No.3) sought possession, but the Banking Court dismissed the request due to late filing.\nConstitutional Petition:\nRespondent No.3 challenged that order via W.P. No. 3876/2006, which was allowed on 26.09.2018 by a learned Single Judge of the High Court.\nPresent Application (Under Section 12(2) CPC):\nLegal heirs of Muhammad Safdar (the applicants) challenged the 2018 High Court judgment, alleging fraud and misrepresentation.\n⚖️ Applicants’ Contentions\nThe 2018 order was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation.\nThe writ petition was not maintainable because an appeal under Section 22 of the Ordinance, 2001 was available.\nTheir predecessor died in 2010, but they weren’t impleaded as legal heirs, making the judgment invalid.\n⚖️ Respondents’ Stance\nThe application was frivolous and baseless.\nApplicants were duly represented in the proceedings after restoration of the writ.\n📚 Court’s Findings\n1. Applicants were made party\nRecord showed that after restoration of the writ petition in 2018, the applicants (legal heirs) were added as respondents Nos. 5–11.\nTheir counsel (Syed Zamurd Hussain Shah, Advocate) appeared and even sought adjournment on 25.09.2018.\nHence, the argument of non-impleadment was factually incorrect.\n2. Maintainability under Section 12(2) CPC\nSection 12(2) CPC can be invoked only when:\nFraud or misrepresentation occurred during court proceedings; or\nThe judgment was obtained without jurisdiction.\nThe applicants failed to show any of these elements.\n3. Constitutional Petition Maintainability\nThe writ petition was against an interlocutory order, for which no appeal lies under Section 22(4) of the Ordinance.\nThus, invoking Article 199 jurisdiction was proper and lawful.\n4. Effect of Section 15 being Declared Ultra Vires\nThe Court revisited the precedents:\nMuhammad Umer Rathore v. Federation (2009 CLD 257 LHC)\nNational Bank v. SAF Textile (PLD 2014 SC 283)\nMuhammad Moizuddin v. Mansoor Khalil (2017 SCMR 1787)\nIt held that past and closed transactions (completed before Section 15 was struck down) are protected.\n5. Auction and Estoppel\nMuhammad Safdar never challenged the auction.\nHe accepted the surplus amount of Rs.79,405/- and even signed a receipt and thumb impression confirming no objection to the auction.\nHence, his heirs are estopped from reopening the issue.\n🧠 Legal Principles Reaffirmed\nSection 12(2) CPC: Limited to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction. Cannot be used to re-argue merits or appeal a judgment.\nPast and Closed Transactions Doctrine: Protects finalized actions before a law is declared unconstitutional.\nEstoppel: A party who accepted the proceeds and acknowledged validity cannot later challenge the transaction.\n🏁 Final Decision\n“For what has been discussed above, learned counsel for the applicants have failed to substantiate any allegation of fraud, misrepresentation as per mandate of Section 12(2) C.P.C., to upset or overturn the order/judgment of this Court. Hence, instant application is dismissed being meritless and not maintainable.”\n✅ Application dismissed.\n🔍 Key Takeaway\nThis judgment is a clear reaffirmation of the limited scope of Section 12(2) CPC — it cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or review. Once a sale under Section 15 of the 2001 Ordinance has been finalized and acknowledged by the debtor, it becomes a past and closed transaction, immune from collateral challenges.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.M. No.7334 of 2018 in Writ Petition No.3876 of 2006, decided on 5th May, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Malik Ghulam Qasim Rajwana for Applicants.\nRao Riasat Ali Khan for Respondent No.1.\nMuhammad Irfan Wyne for Respondent No.3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. KHADIJA BIBI and others- Petitioners\nVS\nJUDGE BANKING COURT and others- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26462", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2077 = 2025 SLD 2077 = 2025 CLD 1236", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRSs", - "Key Words:": "Background\nM/s. Agritech Limited (“the Appellant Company”) filed an application before SECP seeking:\nExtension of time under Section 147 of the Companies Act, 2017 to hold its Annual General Meeting (AGM) for the year ended December 31, 2019, and\nCorresponding extension for filing first quarter accounts (Q1 2020) under Section 237 of the Act.\nSECP allowed an extension for the AGM till August 7, 2020, but refused the request for further extension in filing Q1 2020 accounts beyond May 30, 2020.\nSubsequently, SECP imposed a penalty of Rs. 80,000 (Rs. 10,000 each on the Company’s Directors and CEO) for failure to transmit Q1 financial statements within the statutory deadline.\nAgritech Limited and its officers filed separate appeals under Section 33 of the SECP Act, 1997, which were heard together.\n2. Appellants’ Arguments\nThere is no legal bar under Section 237 to grant further extension for quarterly accounts.\nThe Commission has wide powers under Sections 510 of the Act and 20 of the SECP Act to issue necessary directions.\nPreparation of Q1 2020 accounts depended on completion of audited annual accounts for 2019; hence, delay was unavoidable.\nThe Covid-19 pandemic and resignation of auditors caused genuine hardship.\nCircular No. 10 of 2020 recognized such difficulties and allowed regulatory leniency.\nThe Commission’s refusal was inconsistent, as it had already extended the AGM date to August 2020.\n3. SECP’s Response\nUnder Section 237(1)(b), the law allows only one 30-day extension for filing first quarter accounts (up to May 30, 2020).\nNo further relaxation is permissible under the statute.\nCircular No. 10 of 2020 is clear — no extension beyond the first 30 days can be granted.\nTimely submission of interim financials is crucial for transparency and investor confidence.\n4. Bench’s Findings\nSection 237 clearly restricts SECP’s authority to extend the filing period “not exceeding thirty days”, and only if an extension under Section 223 (for annual accounts) has been granted.\nThe direction under Section 147 to hold an overdue AGM does not constitute or imply an extension under Section 223 or 237.\nThe legislative intent is that quarterly financial statements must be filed within the prescribed period to ensure regular disclosure.\nThe Appellant Company’s Q1 2020 accounts were filed months late (January–February 2021), long after the statutory deadline.\nThe Covid-19 and auditor resignation arguments do not override clear statutory timelines.\n5. Decision\nThe Appellate Bench found no legal infirmity in SECP’s impugned orders:\nOrder dated May 19, 2020 (refusing extension)\nOrder dated January 21, 2021 (imposing fine)\nAccordingly, both Appeal No. 65 of 2020 and Appeal No. 31 of 2021 were dismissed, with no order as to costs.\n6. Key Legal Principles\nSection 237 of the Companies Act allows only a single 30-day extension for first quarter financial statements — no further discretion lies with SECP.\nAGM-related directions under Section 147 do not equate to financial statement filing extensions under Sections 223 or 237.\nThe timeliness of interim disclosures is essential to market transparency and investor protection.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Appeals Nos. 65 of 2020 and Appeal No. 31 of 2021, decided on 14th November, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S) AKIF SAEED, CHAIRMAN/COMMISSIONER AND MUJTABA AHMAD LODHI, COMMISSIONER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Rabia Hassan for Appellant (in Appeal No.65 of 2020).\nMs. Asma Irfan - Company Secretary for Appellant (in Appeals Nos.65 of 2020 and 31 of 2021).\nRashid Sadiq for Appellant (in Appeal No.31 of 2021).\nM. Azeem Rashid for Appellant (in Appeal No.31 of 2021).\nAsif Iqbal, Director, PRDD, SECP for Respondent (in Appeal No.65 of 2020).\nMs. Sumaira Siddiqui, Additional Director, PRDD, SECP for Respondent (in Appeal No.65 of 2020).\nMahboob Ahmad, Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent (in Appeal No.31 of 2021).\nMuhammad Anwar Hashmi, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent (in Appeal No.31 of 2021).\nRaja Farukh Ahmad, Additional Joint Director, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent (in Appeal No.31 of 2021).", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s AGRITECH LIMITED and others- Appellants\nVS\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and others- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26463", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2078 = 2025 SLD 2078 = 2025 CLD 1244", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTk", - "Key Words:": "Facts\nThe Plaintiff Bank instituted a recovery suit under Section 9 of the FIRO, 2001 for Rs. 118,998,622.14/- (as of 30.04.2014) against Defendant No. 1 (a partnership firm) and its associated entities and partners (Defendants Nos. 2–6).\nDefendant No. 1 availed multiple finance facilities between 2006 and 2010, including:\nRunning Finance: Rs. 5 million\nL/C Sight: Rs. 88 million\nFIM (sub-limit): Rs. 88 million\nCash Finance: Rs. 5 million\nFacilities were secured through mortgages, pledges, hypothecation, and personal/corporate guarantees of Defendants Nos. 2–6.\nThe Defendants defaulted and allegedly misappropriated pledged pesticide stock by relabeling expired goods.\n2. Application for Amendment (C.M. No. 1431-C / 2017)\nDefendant No. 4 sought amendment to his Application for Leave to Defend (PLA) under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C., arguing:\nHe was wrongly impleaded as guarantor or partner.\nThe Plaintiff Bank waived a special condition in Facility Offer Letter dated 25.10.2010 (via letters dated 28.12.2010 & 02.02.2011) requiring cross-collateralization and guarantees among group entities.\nHence, his alleged guarantees were fake, fabricated, and inoperative.\nPlaintiff Bank’s Response:\nThe Ordinance is a special law, and miscellaneous applications are not maintainable before PLA decision.\nThe plea was contradictory to earlier defense.\nDefendant No. 4 was a beneficiary and signatory to prior finance documents and guarantees since 2006.\nHeld:\nAmendment principles under Order VI, Rule 17 are applicable to proceedings under FIRO (per 2010 CLD 1243 and 2003 CLD 1610).\nSince the letters were undisputed, they were allowed to be placed on record and considered with the PLA, without altering the original defense.\n3. Defendants’ Pleas in PLA\nDefendant No. 1 (partnership) consisted only of Defendants Nos. 2 & 3; Defendants Nos. 4 & 5 were not partners or guarantors.\nThe pledged stock expired due to Bank’s negligence; Defendants had sought replacement permission.\nThe Bank engineered default by refusing renewal and redemption of securities.\nThe mark-up claimed exceeded contractual terms.\nThe guarantees of Defendants Nos. 4 & 5 were forged or invalid.\n4. Court’s Findings\n(a) Admission of Facilities\nDefendants admitted sanctioning and availing of finance facilities—thus, liability under Section 9(3) was established.\n(b) Expired Pledged Stock\nThe plea that the Bank was responsible for expired stock was rejected:\nIn a pledge, the Bank holds only constructive possession through a muqadam; actual custody remains with the customer.\nNo clause of breach by the Bank was identified.\n(Cited: 2016 SCMR 800; 2020 CLD 796).\n(c) Waiver of Special Condition\nPartnership record showed Defendants Nos. 4 & 5 ceased to be partners in 2006 but had executed personal continuing guarantees (2006, 2007, 2010).\nThe alleged waiver of condition (letters dated 28.12.2010 & 02.02.2011) was never acted upon, and guarantees remained continuing and effective.\n(Cited: 2016 SCMR 451; 2003 CLD 702).\n(d) Failure to Meet Section 10 Requirements\nDefendants failed to comply with Section 10(4)(5)(7) of FIRO (verification and specific denials). Hence, PLA was liable to rejection on this ground alone.\n5. Determination of Liability\nUpon reviewing statements of accounts:\nPlaintiff had wrongly included markup beyond expiry date (31.07.2011).\nAfter adjustments, total recoverable determined as:\nFacility\nRecoverable Amount (Rs.)\nCash Finance\n77,882,678/-\nRunning Finance\n4,205,698/-\nTotal\n82,088,376/-\n6. Final Order\nPLA rejected.\nSuit decreed in the sum of Rs. 82,088,376/- with:\nCost of suit, and\nCost of funds from 31.07.2011 (date of default) until realization.\nDecree to automatically convert to execution proceedings under Section 19(1) if unpaid within 30 days.\nPending C.Ms (3271-C/2015, 3051/2021, 641/2025) disposed of with liberty to raise claims before the Executing Court, subject to Section 23 FIRO protections.\n7. Key Legal Principles\nAmendments under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. are permissible in FIRO proceedings if supplementary, not destructive of earlier stance.\nContinuing guarantees remain enforceable unless formally discharged; an unacted waiver does not extinguish liability.\nIn pledge transactions, the customer bears risk of goods, not the financial institution.\nNon-compliance with Section 10 FIRO (verification & detail of defenses) results in automatic rejection of PLA.\nBanks cannot claim markup beyond contractual expiry date of facilities.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 07 of 2014 and P.L.A. No.8 of 2014, decided on 18th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 10th March, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Abid Hussain Chattha, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Muhammad Kaswar Gardezi for Plaintiff.\nMughees Aslam Malik, Sohail Iqbal Bhatti and Malik Muhammad Husnain Rajwana for Defendants.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE BANK OF PUNJAB- PLAINTIFF\nVS\nM/S AGRI INTERNATIONAL AND 5 OTHERS- DEFENDANTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26464", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2079 = 2025 SLD 2079", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRTg", - "Key Words:": "Background & Key Issues\nInitial Complaint: M/s A.Z. Textile filed a complaint with the FTO against the Commissioner-IR for illegally blacklisting its Sales Tax Registration (STRN) on 10.05.2024 without proper service of the order.\nReason for Blacklisting: The FBR blacklisted the company based on a report alleging it was a beneficiary of fake invoices from M/s Bangash Enterprises.\nCompanys Defense: The company argued it never conducted any transactions with or claimed input tax from M/s Bangash Enterprises, as proven by its sales tax returns. It also proved that all FBR notices were sent to an old address, despite the company having officially updated its address in 2021. This failure to serve notice violated the principles of natural justice.\nFTOs Original Ruling (03.10.2024): The FTO found maladministration by the FBR, directed it to revoke the blacklisting order, and report compliance within 30 days.\nFBRs Review Petition: The FBR filed a review, challenging the companys claims and arguing there was no maladministration. This review was rejected by the FTO on 11.12.2024, which stated that the FBRs grounds were a mere disagreement with the original findings and did not present any new facts or legal errors.\nPresidents Decision\nThe FBR filed a final representation before the President of Pakistan against the FTOs review order.\nA hearing was held on 24.07.2025, where both parties presented their arguments.\nThe Presidents Secretariat, upon review, found no infirmity (no legal flaw or weakness) in the FTOs order.\nThe FTOs order was upheld, and the FBRs representation was dismissed.\nFinal Outcome\nThe decision of the Federal Tax Ombudsman stands. The FBR is directed to comply with the original FTO order to revoke the blacklisting order against M/s A.Z. Textile Trading Corp.", - "Court Name:": "PRESIDENTS SECRETARIAT (PUBLIC) AIWAN-E-SADR, ISLAMABAD", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=56", - "Case #": "REPRESENTATION FILED BY THE FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE AGAINST THE REVIEW ORDER OF LEARNED FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN DATED 11.12.2024 IN COMPLAINT NO. 6653/KHI/ST/2024\nRep.No.08/FTO/2025, Date of Decision: 10.09.2025", - "Judge Name:": "JUSTICE (R) IRFAN QADIR, CONSULTANT (LEGAL AFFAIRS)", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zeeshan Ashraf, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE (FBR)\nVs \nM/S A.Z. TEXTILE TRADING CORP, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26465", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2080 = 2025 SLD 2080 = 2025 CLD 1256", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRXo", - "Key Words:": "Background\nThe Appellant, First National Equities Limited (FNEL), a Trading Rights Entitlement Certificate (TREC) holder of the Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited (PSX), was subjected to a thematic review under clause 19(e) of the Joint Inspection Regulations, 2015 to assess compliance with the AML/CFT Regulations, 2018.\nThe Review revealed several violations, including non-compliance with Regulations 6(3), 6(4), 11(2), and 13 concerning:\nLack of proper KYC/CDD documentation,\nFailure to justify classification of low-risk clients, and\nAbsence of a formal ongoing monitoring mechanism for clients.\nA Show Cause Notice (SCN) dated 17 June 2019 was issued. After reviewing the record, the Commissioner (SMD) imposed a penalty of Rs. 200,000/- under Section 40A of the SECP Act.\n2. Appellant’s Arguments\nThe Appellant contended that the impugned order lacked proper appreciation of facts and law, as the noted discrepancies had already been rectified and relevant evidence had been submitted.\nClaimed that:\nA due diligence mechanism already existed and another software system was being procured to enhance efficiency, thereby satisfying Regulation 13.\nThe AML/CFT Regulations did not prescribe a fixed model of ongoing monitoring; FNEL’s policy had earlier been accepted by SECP as compliant.\nThe Respondent could have issued directions for corrective measures instead of imposing a penalty.\nThe Respondent’s own finding—that FNEL had a “detective-based approach” to monitoring—validated the existence of a mechanism.\nRegarding KYC/CDD, the Appellant maintained that:\nAll required documents were available and had been provided; some evidence may not have reached Islamabad due to a video-conference hearing held in Lahore.\nIts AML policy already classified clients appropriately, and written justifications for low-risk classification were therefore redundant.\n3. Respondent’s Submissions\nThe SECP maintained that:\nThe impugned order was lawful and based on a detailed assessment of record and submissions.\nThe Appellant failed to demonstrate compliance at the time of the Review.\nThe ongoing monitoring system was manual, not a formal structured mechanism, thus violating Regulation 13.\nThe Appellant failed to:\nConduct enhanced due diligence for Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs),\nProvide KYC evidence for several corporate and individual clients,\nVerify beneficial ownership and address changes,\nShow closure or blocking of non-compliant accounts, and\nProduce written justifications for low-risk clients as required under Regulation 11(2).\n4. Findings of the Appellate Bench\nThe Bench held that the Appellant had an obligation to fully comply with the AML/CFT Regulations and failed to do so.\nAt the time of the Review:\nNo formal ongoing monitoring system was in place; manual processes were inadequate.\nThe Appellant ignored KYC/CDD requirements, undermining the AML framework’s integrity.\nThe Bench emphasized that non-compliance with AML/CFT obligations carries serious consequences and found no merit in the Appellant’s pleas.\n5. Decision\nAppeal dismissed.\nThe Bench found no reason to interfere with the Commissioner’s Order dated 01 August 2019 imposing a penalty of Rs. 200,000/-.\nNo order as to costs.\n6. Key Legal Principles\nManual monitoring of client activity does not satisfy the requirement of a formal mechanism under Regulation 13 of the AML/CFT Regulations, 2018.\nAcceptance of a prior AML policy does not exempt a regulated entity from continuous compliance or evolving due diligence requirements.\nFailure to perform KYC/CDD and EDD for PEPs and to maintain documentary evidence constitutes a regulatory breach regardless of intent.\nSECP may impose penalties under Section 40A even if violations are procedural or subsequently rectified.", - "Court Name:": "Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Appeal No.66 of 2019, decided on 31st January, 2025. Date of hearing: 17th October, 2024.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Abdul Rehman Warraich and Mujtaba Ahmad Lodhi, Commissioners", - "Lawyer Name:": "Arslan Tahir for Appellant.\nMehboob Ahmad (Additional Director, Adjudication-I, SECP) for Respondent.\nMuhammad Faisal (Assistant Director Adjudication-I, SECP) for Respondent.\nZenia Rahat (Management Trainee Adjudication-I, SECP) for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "FIRST NATIONAL EQUITIES LIMITED- Appellant\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER (SMD)- Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26466", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2081 = 2025 SLD 2081 = 2025 CLD 1260", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTRXk", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary: Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) v. Federation of Pakistan & Others\nBefore: Shahid Karim, J.\nCitation: — (Not yet reported)\nLaw Invoked: Section 3, Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972; Sections 5, 159 & 160, Companies Act, 2017; Article 199, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973\nDate of Judgment: 26 June 2020 (Single Judge); Appeal allowed by Division Bench thereafter\nResult: Appeal Allowed – Constitutional Petition held not maintainable\nHeadnotes\nConstitution of Pakistan (1973), Article 199 — Companies Act (2017), Ss. 5, 159 & 160 — Maintainability of Constitutional Petition — Federal Government as shareholder — Jurisdiction of High Court — Scope.\nThe Federal Government, when acting as a member/shareholder of a company, performs private corporate functions, not functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation within the meaning of Article 199(1)(a)(i) of the Constitution. Therefore, any challenge relating to its participation in elections of the Board of Directors of a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2017, cannot be brought under constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.\nThe appropriate remedy for declaring elections of directors invalid is provided by Section 160 of the Companies Act, 2017, which empowers the High Court (exercising jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Act) to entertain such disputes.\nWhere the statute provides an adequate and efficacious remedy, the constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass the statutory framework.\nHeld:\nThe Federal Government’s act of contesting elections to the Board of Directors of SNGPL, being a corporate function, was not a public act amenable to judicial review under Article 199.\nThe Companies Act, 2017 establishes a complete statutory mechanism, and Section 5 vests exclusive jurisdiction in the High Court (Company Bench) where the company’s registered office is situated for matters arising thereunder.\nSection 160 of the Act provides a specific remedy for declaring elections of directors invalid on the application of members holding ten percent voting power — this statutory remedy excludes constitutional recourse.\nMerely because the Federal Government is a shareholder in a company does not transform its shareholder actions into sovereign or public functions.\nAllowing a constitutional petition in such matters would create an anomalous distinction between government and private shareholders, contrary to the legislative intent and settled principles of jurisdiction.\nResult:\nAppeal allowed.\nThe judgment of the learned Single Judge, to the extent that it held the constitutional petition maintainable, was set aside.\nHeld that the challenge to the Federal Government’s participation in SNGPL’s Board elections was not maintainable under Article 199.\nThe proper forum is the High Court exercising company jurisdiction under the Companies Act, 2017.\nKey Citations Relied Upon:\nPakistan International Airlines & others v. Tanveer ur Rehman & others (PLD 2010 SC 676)\nAown Abbas Bhatti v. Forman Christian College & others (PLD 2018 Lahore 435)\nSalahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills (PLD 1975 SC 244)", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "I.C.A. No. 34877 of 2020, heard on 22nd April, 2025. Date of hearing: 22nd April, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID KARIM AND RAHEEL KAMRAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Adil Umar Bandial, Zohaib Hashmi and Tamoor Sultan, with Ahmad Arslan, G.M Law and Ahmad Sohail and Imran Javed, Dy. Chief Officers Law, SNGPL for Appellant.\nAnas Hanif, Asst. Attorney General for Pakistan.\nSaad Amir, Kumail Ali and Wasi ul Haq for Respondent No.1.\nRuman Bilal for SECP.\nShahryar Kasuri for Respondent No.14.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LTD. through authorized representative- Appellant\nVS\nWASEEM MAJID MALIK and others- Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26467", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2082 = 2025 SLD 2082 = 2025 CLD 1269", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTc", - "Key Words:": "Context & Background\nEarlier Court Orders:\nOn 07.04.2015, the Court directed the Official Assignee to sell pledged goods.\nSale was approved via order dated 28.08.2015, and proceeds were deposited (Reference No. 13/2020).\nSubsequent Developments:\nA scheme of arrangement was sanctioned by the Court in J.C.M. No. 14/2019 (under Sections 279 & 283 of the Companies Act, 2017).\nThe company requested that the sale proceeds held by the Official Assignee be released in accordance with that scheme.\n⚖️ Arguments of the Parties\nFor the Company / Creditors Supporting the Scheme:\nThe scheme of arrangement was approved and sanctioned by the Court.\nNo appeal or challenge was filed by the Plaintiff bank.\nOnce sanctioned, the scheme is binding on all creditors, even non-consenting ones.\nThey relied on judgments including:\nParamount Spinning Mills Limited\nPakland Cement Limited\nGulshan Weaving Mills Limited (Division Bench judgment)\nFor the Plaintiff Bank (Objector):\nThe bank has a pending banking suit under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO, 2001).\nIf proceeds are released to the company’s “Agent,” it would frustrate the bank’s pending claim.\nThe scheme of arrangement was never consented to by the bank.\nThe FIO, 2001 is a special law with overriding effect (Sections 3 & 4) and thus takes precedence over the Companies Act, 2017.\nThe bank feared that if funds are released, it may end up with a “paper decree” with no assets left to recover.\n🏛️ Court’s Analysis\nBinding Nature of the Scheme:\nThe Court reaffirmed that once a scheme of arrangement is sanctioned, it is binding on all creditors, including non-consenting ones.\nThe Court cited Gulshan Weaving Mills Limited, a Division Bench decision, and Pakland Cement Limited to reinforce this principle.\nCoexistence of FIO, 2001 and Companies Act, 2017:\nThe Court rejected the argument that FIO overrides the Companies Act.\nQuoting Pakland Cement Limited, the Judge emphasized that:\nThe two laws co-exist harmoniously.\nThere is no conflict between a company’s restructuring process and banking recovery laws.\nA scheme of arrangement does not nullify or reduce the bank’s potential claim or decree; it merely facilitates recovery and restructuring.\nJurisdictional Limitations:\nThe Official Assignee’s role in this reference is limited to determining whether the sale proceeds can be released as per the sanctioned scheme.\nThe Court cannot re-examine or question the validity of the sanctioned scheme itself in this forum.\nPlaintiff Bank’s Legal Position:\nThe bank did not challenge the scheme under Section 6(14) of the Companies Act, 2017, which provides the right to appeal a final order in the Supreme Court within 60 days.\nThis failure to appeal is fatal to their objections.\nPending Banking Suit:\nSince the leave to defend in the bank’s suit is still pending, the bank may pursue execution under Section 19 of the FIO, 2001 after a decree, if granted.\nThus, releasing funds under the scheme does not render the banking suit meaningless.\n🔨 Court’s Decision (Operative Part)\nThe Court dismissed the objections raised by the Plaintiff bank.\nDirected the Official Assignee to:\n“Release the amount lying with him to the ‘Agent’ after deduction and adjustment of the amount mentioned in Reference No.14/2025.”\nOrder accordingly.\n📚 Legal Takeaways\nOnce sanctioned, a scheme of arrangement binds all creditors — consenting or otherwise.\nFIO, 2001 and Companies Act, 2017 can coexist; one does not override the other in cases of corporate restructuring.\nNon-participating or objecting creditors must challenge a sanctioned scheme through proper appellate channels (e.g., Supreme Court under Section 6(14)).\nCourts in company jurisdiction cannot reopen or review a sanctioned scheme when dealing with administrative references like those of an Official Assignee.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Suit No. B-64 of 2012, decided on 30th April, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JAFFER RAZA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Khawaja Shamsul Islam for Plaintiff.\nMuhammad Ali Akbar and Hameed Bukhsh for Defendant No.1.\nMs. Heer Memon for UBL Bank.\nHashmatullah Aleem for Bank Al-Falah.\nBaqar Raza for Intervener.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s JS BANK LIMITED through Authorized Attorney- Plaintiff\nVS\nM/s GULSHAN SPINNING MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive / Director- Defendant" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26468", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2083 = 2025 SLD 2083 = 2025 CLD 1276", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTY", - "Key Words:": "Background\nRespondent: Hyundai Nishat Motor (Private) Limited — a joint venture between Nishat Group (Pakistan), Sojitz Corporation (Japan), Millat Tractors Limited, and Hyundai Motor Company (Korea) — engaged in manufacturing and marketing Hyundai vehicles in Pakistan.\nOn 11 August 2020, the Respondent launched its SUV Hyundai Tucson via a Facebook live event, announcing introductory prices:\nPKR 4,899,000 (GLS/FWD)\nPKR 5,399,000 (ULTIMATE/AWD)\nThe disclaimer “for limited time period only” was printed in very small, inconspicuous font.\nWithin 24 hours, booking at the introductory price closed, and prices were increased by PKR 200,000 per variant. The earlier advertisement and pricing were then removed from the website and social media.\nThe Commission took suo motu notice under Section 37(1) for possible deceptive marketing practices under Section 10.\n2. Enquiry Proceedings\nThe Enquiry Committee submitted its report on 05 January 2021, concluding that Hyundai Nishat:\nDistributed misleading information to consumers (introductory prices and unclear disclaimers).\nViolated Section 10(1) and 10(2)(b) (distribution of information lacking reasonable basis).\nPotentially harmed competitors’ business interests under Section 10(2)(a).\nOn this basis, a Show Cause Notice was issued on 05 March 2021.\n3. Respondent’s Submissions\nClaimed that:\nThe offer was introductory and time-limited, consistent with market practice.\nConsumers were not misled, as disclaimers existed.\nRefunds were offered to affected consumers.\nRequested the Commission to adopt a “compliance-oriented approach” without penalty, similar to past cases.\n4. Findings of the Commission\n(I) Violation of Section 10(2)(b): Misleading Advertisement\nThe Bench found the campaign to be deceptive and misleading, amounting to bait advertising:\nThe disclaimer was illegible and inconspicuous.\nDuration of the offer and number of vehicles available were not disclosed.\nPrice increase within hours deprived consumers of a fair opportunity to purchase at the advertised rate.\nThus, the advertisement lured consumers under false pretenses.\nHeld: Violation of Section 10(2)(b) (distribution of misleading information concerning price and characteristics).\n(II) Violation of Section 10(2)(a): Harm to Competitors\nThe Bench did not find sufficient evidence to establish a link between Hyundai’s conduct and harm to competitors’ business interests.\nThus, no violation of Section 10(2)(a) was established.\n5. Penalty and Considerations\nIn determining the penalty, the Commission considered:\nAggravating Factors:\nSeriousness of infringement (bait advertising, omission of material information).\nWide dissemination on print and digital media at product launch.\nPotential influence on consumer decision-making.\nImbalance created in the automobile sector.\nMitigating Factors:\nLimited duration of infringement.\nRefunds made to two consumers.\nNo prior history of violations.\nFinancial and Market Position:\nHyundai Nishat, a strong joint venture backed by global entities, with substantial resources and international marketing experience.\n6. Decision\nViolation Established: Section 10(2)(b) of the Act.\nNo Violation: Section 10(2)(a) (insufficient evidence).\nPenalty:\nImposition of PKR 25,000,000 (Twenty-Five Million Rupees) under Section 38(1)(a).\nPayable within 30 days.\nDaily penalty of PKR 10,000 for non-compliance after deadline.\nPossible criminal proceedings under Section 38 for continued non-compliance.\nShow Cause Notice No. 02/2021 disposed of accordingly.\n7. Key Legal Principles Affirmed\nBait advertising constitutes deceptive marketing under Section 10(2)(b).\nDisclaimers must be clear, legible, and prominent to avoid misleading consumers.\nOmission of material information (e.g., duration, quantity, availability) is as deceptive as false representation.\nEach case is assessed independently—prior leniency in other cases does not create a binding precedent.\nDeterrence and consumer protection are guiding principles for penalty assessment.\nCitation Format (Suggested)\nCompetition Commission of Pakistan v. Hyundai Nishat Motor (Pvt.) Ltd., Show Cause Notice No. 02/2021, Order under Section 30, decided [2025], imposing penalty of PKR 25 million for violation of Section 10(2)(b) of the Competition Act, 2010.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "File No.382/HYUNDAI Tucson/OFT/CCP/2020, decided on 15th April, 2025. Dates of hearing: 14th June, 2021 and 12th March, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. KABIR AHMED SIDHU, CHAIRMAN AND MS. BUSHRA NAZ MALIK, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rashid Sadiq, R&S Corporate Advisory for Hyundai Nishan Motor (Private) Limited.", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN THE MATTER OF SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE ISSUED TO M/S HYUNDAI NISHAT MOTOR PRIVATE LIMITED FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 10 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2010" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26469", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2084 = 2025 SLD 2084 = 2025 CLD 1300", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTU", - "Key Words:": "Background\nThe Appellant was an auction purchaser of a CNG station, sold through court proceedings arising from Banking Suit No. 3 of 2010, filed by the Respondent Bank against its customer, M/s Qalandari Filling CNG Station.\nThe customer’s appeal (First Appeal No. 39 of 2010) was allowed, and the banking court’s decree was set aside by a Division Bench judgment dated 31 May 2011, which also made reference to the present appellant (then respondent no. 3).\nConsequently, the sale transaction was cancelled and the appellant was ordered to surrender possession and sale deed of the property, in exchange for refund of Rs. 9,819,487/-, under an order dated 23 December 2014.\n2. Proceedings Below\nThe appellant’s amount was refunded after a delay of four years, allegedly causing damages.\nThe appellant filed F.C. Suit No. 54 of 2016 for declaration and damages, which was dismissed by the Banking Court on 20.02.2018:\nOn the ground of limitation, and\nOn the finding that the appellant did not qualify as a “customer” under Section 2(c) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (“Banking Law”).\nThe appellant also filed Suit No. 82 of 2011 for related relief, where the Banking Court-II, Hyderabad, later returned the plaint under Order VII Rule 10, CPC, observing lack of jurisdiction.\n3. Arguments on Appeal\nCounsel for the appellant argued that:\nThe Banking Court lacked jurisdiction since the appellant was not a “customer” and the transaction did not involve any finance facility.\nThe suit should have been returned, not dismissed on merits.\nThe impugned order is self-contradictory, as it acknowledges absence of banking relationship but still decides the case on merits.\nRelied on 2013 CLD 511 (Al-Baraka Bank [Pakistan] Ltd. v. Raja Ashfaq Hussain), where a similar suit by an auction purchaser was held beyond the scope of the Banking Ordinance.\n4. Respondent’s Stance\nThe respondent opposed the appeal but admitted in paragraphs 3 and 6 of its objections that:\nThe appellant was neither a customer nor a party to any finance facility.\nHence, the transaction did not fall within the jurisdictional ambit of the Banking Ordinance.\n5. Court’s Findings\nThe Court found that:\nThe relationship between the parties was not of customer and financial institution.\nThe Banking Court had no jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.\nThe impugned order was self-contradictory and without jurisdiction, since the Banking Court recognized its lack of competence but still dismissed the suit on merits.\nThe correct legal course was to return the plaint to be filed before a civil court of competent jurisdiction, similar to the treatment of Suit No. 82 of 2011.\n6. Decision\nAppeal Allowed.\nThe impugned order dated 20.02.2018 is set aside.\nThe plaint is ordered to be returned for filing before the learned 1st Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad.\nThe returned plaint shall be tagged with Suit No. 82 of 2011, renumbered as Suit No. 1232 of 2018.\nThe trial court may decide maintainability and all other issues on merits independently.\nThis decision does not preclude the trial court from addressing the jurisdictional issue first.\n7. Legal Principles Affirmed\nBanking Court jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 extends only to disputes between a financial institution and its customer involving finance facilities.\nAuction purchasers or third parties unconnected to a finance transaction do not qualify as “customers” under Section 2(c).\nIf a Banking Court lacks jurisdiction, the proper course is to return the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, not to dismiss the suit on merits.\nContradictory findings (acknowledging lack of jurisdiction yet deciding on merits) render an order illegal and void ab initio.\nRatio Decidendi\nA Banking Court cannot adjudicate disputes involving third-party auction purchasers who are not customers or borrowers under a finance facility; such matters lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the civil court.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court, Hyderabad Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "1st Appeal No.12 of 2018, decided on 6th November, 2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM AND KHADIM HUSSAIN SOOMRO, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Al-Baraka Bank [Pakistan] Limited v. Raja Ashfaq Hussain 2013 CLD 511 rel.\nAamir Ali Memon for Appellant.\nNemo for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAZHARUDDIN- Appellant\nVS\nThe MANAGER SME LEASING LTD.- Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26470", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2085 = 2025 SLD 2085 = 2025 CLD 1303", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTQ", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nTitle: (Unnamed – likely a consumer appeal regarding a defective air-conditioner)\nJudge: Malik Javid Iqbal Wains, J.\nCourt: Likely Lahore High Court (Appellate jurisdiction under Section 33 of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005)\nDate: 2025\nOutcome: Appeal dismissed as time-barred\nFacts in Brief\nRespondent No.2 purchased a 12-ton air-conditioner from the appellant.\nThe product was allegedly defective and substandard.\nRespondent returned it on 18.11.2022; the appellant promised replacement or refund but failed to comply.\nThe District Consumer Court, Multan, on 08.11.2024, partly accepted the consumer’s claim.\nThe appellant filed an appeal 41 days late, along with an application (C.M. No. 2 of 2025) seeking condonation of delay.\nAppellant’s Argument\nClaimed he was out of the country when the impugned order was passed.\nArgued that matters should be decided on merits, not on technicalities.\nCourt’s Findings\nDelay Not Justified:\nAppellant claimed he was abroad, but travel documents showed he returned on 12.11.2024.\nThus, he was in Pakistan for more than 1.5 months before the appeal deadline expired (08.12.2024).\nThe Court found the explanation false and unsatisfactory.\nLaw on Limitation:\nSection 33 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act allows 30 days to file an appeal.\nCondonation of delay is an exception, not a right — allowed only in exceptional circumstances.\nCourts must ensure finality of orders to prevent endless litigation.\nDoctrine of Finality:\nSection 34 of the Act declares orders final if not appealed within limitation.\nPurpose: Judicial efficiency, certainty, and closure in consumer disputes.\nCase Law Cited:\nPLD 2016 SC 872 (Khushi Muhammad v. Mst. Fazal Bibi) – Limitation laws are strict and inflexible.\nPLD 2025 SC 60 (Ghulam Sarwar v. Province of Punjab) – Delay must be convincingly explained day-by-day.\nResult:\nCondonation application dismissed — reasons not sufficient.\nMain appeal consequently dismissed as time-barred.\nKey Legal Principles Highlighted\nCondonation of delay is discretionary and exceptional.\nNegligence, absence, or administrative lapses do not justify delay.\nThe law of limitation favors the vigilant, not the negligent.\nFinality of judgments ensures stability in consumer rights enforcement.\nDisposition\nC.M. No. 2 of 2025 (Condonation application) – Dismissed.\nMain appeal – Dismissed as time-barred.\nAppeal dismissed in limine.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "F.A.O. No. 12 of 2025, decided on 21st February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "Before Malik Javid Iqbal Wains, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Abid Ali Bodla for Appellant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ASHFAQ AHMED - Appellant\nVS\nDISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE/ PRESIDING OFFICER DISTRICT CONSUMER COURT, MULTAN and another - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26471", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2086 = 2025 SLD 2086 = 2025 CLD 1323", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQS8", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nCourt: Lahore High Court\nJudge: Inaam Ameen Minhas, J.\nJurisdiction Invoked: Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973\nPetitioner: Shareholder of TRG Pakistan Limited (holding 55,000 shares)\nRespondent No.1: Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)\nRespondent No.3: TRG Pakistan Limited\nRelief Sought\nThe petitioner sought directions to the SECP to:\nEnsure compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Companies Act, 2017 (“the Act”).\nImmediately hold elections of directors of TRG Pakistan Limited.\nTake action on the petitioner’s final notice dated 10.06.2025.\nDisqualify existing directors of the company.\nGrant any other relief deemed appropriate.\nFacts\nLast elections of directors were held on 14.01.2022; next due by 15.01.2025 under Sections 158–159 of the Act, 2017.\nNo election notice or process was initiated.\nThe petitioner repeatedly requested SECP intervention and formally issued notice dated 10.06.2025 under Sections 147, 158, and 172.\nSECP allegedly failed to act despite regulatory obligations.\nRespondents’ Stance\nRespondent Company:\nPetition is premature and not maintainable; similar matter pending before SECP.\nLitigation pending before Sindh High Court and civil courts in Lahore and Islamabad — stay orders restraining elections.\nSECP and the Company acted in good faith and compliance.\nSECP’s Position:\nDenied inaction; claimed active regulatory monitoring.\nIssued multiple letters to the company (e.g., 12.02.2025, 24.06.2025, 25.06.2025).\nReferred to Sindh High Court’s judgment dated 20.06.2025 (JCM No. 12/2025) — which clarified that earlier stay orders did not bar elections.\nMaintained that SECP can only direct elections, not conduct them itself.\nKey Legal Issues\nMaintainability and territorial jurisdiction of Lahore High Court.\nScope of SECP’s powers under Sections 147, 158, and 159 of the Companies Act, 2017.\nFailure or inaction of SECP as a regulator.\nCourt’s Findings\n1. Maintainability\nPetition maintainable since grievance is against SECP’s inaction, not against the Company or Registrar at Karachi.\nSECP’s headquarters fall within Lahore High Court’s territorial jurisdiction.\nDistinguished from earlier W.P. No. 731/2025 (Sign Source Ltd. v. SECP), which concerned company funds and jurisdiction of Karachi registrar.\nHeld that where a statutory regulator fails to perform duties, constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 can be invoked.\nRelied on Brig. Muhammad Bashir v. Abdul Karim (PLD 2004 SC 271) and other precedents.\n2. SECP’s Regulatory Failure\nSECP knew the directors’ term expired on 14.01.2025 but took no concrete action.\nDelay not justified by litigation since the SHC judgment (20.06.2025) clarified that elections were not restrained.\nSections 147 and 158 read together show that SECP has two-tiered authority:\nSection 158: Obligation of company and registrar to ensure timely elections.\nSection 147: SECP’s independent power to call or direct meetings when a company defaults.\n3. Interpretation of Section 147\nSection 147 expressly allows SECP to call or direct meetings itself, not just issue directions.\nLegislative intent: prevent paralysis in company management and safeguard shareholder rights.\nSECP’s restrictive interpretation of its role is misconceived.\nOperative Directions\nWrit petition disposed of with direction to SECP to invoke powers under Section 147 of the Companies Act, 2017 and call an Extraordinary General Meeting (EOGM) of TRG Pakistan Limited for elections of directors in accordance with Sections 147–159.\nMr. Muhammad Fahad Khattak, Advocate, appointed as Commission to oversee compliance and ensure transparency in the election process.\nThe Commission shall:\nSubmit fortnightly reports to the Additional Registrar (Judicial).\nFile a final report within 10 days of the election results.\nSECP and all concerned parties to extend full cooperation with the Commission.\nCommission’s fee: PKR 2 million, payable in advance by the petitioner, along with related expenses.\nConclusion\nPetition allowed in part.\nSECP directed to exercise its powers under Section 147 to call EOGM for director elections of TRG Pakistan Limited.\nRegulatory inaction condemned as inconsistent with statutory duties and public interest.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2337 of 2025, decided on 30th June, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S) INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Brig. Muhammad Bashir v. Abdul Karim and others PLD 2004 SC 271 rel.\nBarrister Haris Azmat, Barrister Faiza Asad, Husnain Ali Khan and Qasim Sheikh for Petitioner.\nShehzad Ali Rana, Hasnain Raza and Kehar Khan, SPP SECP for Respondents.\nM. Ahsan Bhoon Advocate Supreme Court, Mustafa Ramday Advocate Supreme Court, Sheharyar Tariq and Ahmad Junaid for Respondent No. 3/Company.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Hafiz MUHAMMAD AMIR HUSSAIN - Petitioner\nVS\nSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26472", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2087 = 2025 SLD 2087 = 2025 CLD 1336", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQSs", - "Key Words:": "ORDER SUMMARY\nAuthority: Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP)\nCoram: Dr. Kabir Ahmed Sidhu, Chairman\nDate of Order: — (Application received on 11 February 2025)\nParties:\nJV Party 1: Fly Jinnah Services (Private) Limited (“Fly Jinnah”)\nJV Party 2: Air Arabia Academy LLC (“Air Arabia”)\nProposed Entity: Fly Jinnah T3 Flight Academy (Private) Limited\nBackground\nThe Commission received a pre-merger application under Section 11 of the Competition Act, 2010 read with Regulation 6 of the Competition (Merger Control) Regulations, 2016.\nThe application sought approval for the formation of a joint venture company, to be established under a Shareholders’ Agreement dated 15 January 2025.\nTransaction Overview\nFly Jinnah (Pakistan) and Air Arabia (UAE) agreed to form a new joint venture company — Fly Jinnah T3 Flight Academy (Private) Limited (“New Company”).\nBoth parties will contribute capital (in USD or PKR equivalent) for incorporation and operations.\nThe ownership structure will be divided between Fly Jinnah and Air Arabia according to agreed shareholding percentages.\nThe New Company’s business: provision of aviation training services in Pakistan.\nPhase-I Competition Assessment\n1. Procedural Review\nThe CCP conducted a Phase-I review to examine compliance with statutory merger control provisions and potential competitive impacts.\n2. Relevant Market Definition\nProduct Market: Aviation Training Services.\nGeographic Market: Pakistan.\n3. Market Position\nThe New Company currently has no market share.\nIts market position will depend on entry conditions and competition from existing aviation training institutions.\nCompetition Analysis\nThe transaction is of a conglomerate nature:\nFly Jinnah: engaged in commercial airline operations.\nAir Arabia: operates aviation training facilities in the UAE.\nNo horizontal overlaps identified.\nThe joint venture qualifies as a full-function entity managing its own operations.\nThe arrangement is expected to:\nEnhance efficiency in aviation training.\nSupport workforce development for Pakistan’s aviation sector.\nNot foreclose competition or restrict market access for third parties.\nThe Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (PCAA) retains sectoral regulatory oversight, ensuring continued market contestability.\nFindings & Determination\nThe CCP found no substantial lessening of competition or creation/strengthening of dominance in the defined market under Sections 2(1)(e) and 11 of the Act.\nThe transaction was approved under Section 31(1)(d)(i) of the Competition Act, 2010.\nAny non-competition aspects remain subject to relevant regulatory or judicial oversight.\nOrder\nThe pre-merger application is allowed.\nThe proposed joint venture between Fly Jinnah Services (Pvt.) Ltd. and Air Arabia Academy LLC is authorized.\nResult: ✅ Application Allowed — Transaction Approved under Section 31(1)(d)(i) of the Competition Act, 2010.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Case No. 1520/Merger-CCP/2025, decided on 20th March, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. KABIR AHMED SIDHU, CHAIRMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN THE MATTER OF OF A JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN FLY JINNAH SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED AND AIR ARABIA ACADEMY LLC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26473", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2088 = 2025 SLD 2088 = 2025 CLD 1340", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTk", - "Key Words:": "Background and Procedural History\nRespondent No. 1 (Bank) filed a recovery suit for Rs. 3,12,04,489.41 plus cost of funds against the appellant before the Banking Court, Balochistan, Quetta.\nThe appellant’s leave-to-defend application was rejected as time-barred, and the suit was decreed on 16 October 2020 with cost of funds @ 5.22 % p.a.\nThe appellant’s High Court Appeal No. 03/2020 was dismissed on 17 August 2021; no appeal was filed before the Supreme Court — the decree thus attained finality.\nIn execution proceedings, the Banking Court ordered auction of the mortgaged property, prompting the present appeal under Section 22 of the Ordinance.\nLegal Framework and Judicial Principles\nPurpose of the Ordinance:\nTo ensure speedy recovery of finances and establish specialized Banking Courts.\nSwift execution is integral to realizing the objective of the law.\nSection 19 of the Ordinance – Execution Mechanism:\nEmpowers Banking Courts to adopt any suitable mode of execution, including:\n(a) Under the CPC 1908,\n(b) Any other law, or\n(c) Any manner deemed appropriate by the Court to ensure expeditious recovery.\nKey Precedents Discussed:\nMuhammad Attique v. Jamil Ltd. (PLD 2010 SC 905 – review)\nOnce a Banking Court chooses to execute under the CPC, it must follow it consistently.\nMst. Nadia Malik v. Makki Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (2022 SCMR 1673)\nSection 19(2) authorizes three independent modes of execution; discretion lies with the Banking Court.\nCourt’s Observations\nThe decree of 16.10.2020 attained finality; the appellant has not paid any part of the decretal amount.\nThe executing Court repeatedly directed the appellant to make payment in installments, but he failed to comply.\nThe appellant’s repeated filings (one constitutional petition and five High Court appeals during execution) reflect dilatory conduct aimed at frustrating the decree’s implementation.\nExecution proceedings are meant to enforce rights already adjudicated; interference at this stage would undermine the finality of the decree and deny the decree-holder the fruits of litigation.\nExecution transforms a decree from recognition of rights into actual realization of relief — the true dispensation of justice.\nDecision\nThe appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.\nThe Executing Court is directed to proceed with execution strictly in accordance with law, ensuring the decree’s enforcement “in its true letter and spirit.”\nInterim order dated 13.09.2023 (C.M.A. No. 699/2023) is recalled.\nNo order as to costs.\nResult\n✅ Appeal Dismissed — Auction and Execution Proceedings Upheld", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court, Sibi Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "High Court Appeal No.(s) 12 of 2023, decided on 2nd October, 2023. Date of hearing: 20th September, 2023.", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Zaheer-ud-Din Kakar and Shaukat Ali Rakhshani, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mujahid Hussain Qaiserani for Appellant.\nMuhammad Ali for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s NOOR RICE MILLS through Proprietor - Appellant\nVS\nNATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through Manager - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26474", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2089 = 2025 SLD 2089 = 2025 CLD 1344", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQTg", - "Key Words:": "Background and Facts\nThe Respondent Bank filed Suit No. 76 of 2013 (old No. 299/2013) before the Banking Court-II, Karachi for recovery of Rs. 7,146,606.05 against the Appellants, alleging default in repayment of a Diminishing Musharika finance facility of Rs. 5,200,000/- obtained for purchase of property.\nThe facility was secured by mortgage of Flat No. G, Ground Floor, Shakeel Homes, Plot No. 4-D, Block-2, PECHS, Karachi and execution of a Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds and General Power of Attorney in favour of the Bank.\nThe appellants failed to repay installments, leading to the institution of the recovery suit.\nUpon issuance of notice, the appellants appeared and filed an application under Section 10 (leave to defend), which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 07.03.2017.\nThe Banking Court decreed the suit on 02.05.2017 and 11.05.2017.\nAppellants’ Contentions\nThe suit was not maintainable as the plaint was not supported by a duly certified Statement of Account as required under Section 9(2) of the Ordinance read with Sections 2(8) and 4 of the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891 (“Act of 1891”).\nThe Statement of Account annexed was incomplete, uncertified, and did not reflect true account details; hence, no presumption of correctness could arise under Section 4 of the Act of 1891.\nThe suit was filed by an unauthorized person, lacking valid authority from the Bank.\nRespondent’s Contentions\nThe Bank’s Statement of Account was duly certified under the Act of 1891.\nThe authorized representative of the Bank validly instituted the suit.\nThe appellants, having failed to pursue leave to defend, could not later challenge the decree.\nCourt’s Examination\n1. Legal Requirement under Section 9(2) of the Ordinance\nA Statement of Account duly certified under the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891 is a mandatory requirement for filing a banking suit.\nThe word “supported” in Section 9(2) makes the statement’s filing indispensable for the plaint’s competence.\n2. Definition and Certification under the Act of 1891\nUnder Section 2(8), a certified copy must:\nBe a true copy of an entry;\nBe contained in one of the bank’s ordinary books;\nBe made in the usual and ordinary course of business;\nThe book must still be in the custody of the bank;\nBe dated; and\nBe subscribed by the principal accountant or manager with name and designation.\nCourt’s Findings\nThe Statement of Account filed by the Bank was:\nIncomplete and undated;\nSubscribed by an attorney instead of the principal accountant or manager;\nNot containing full debit and credit transactions during the finance period;\nIndicated “0.00 balance” between 17.09.2008 and 30.09.2012;\nHence, non-compliant with Sections 9(2) of the Ordinance and 2(8)/4 of the Act of 1891.\nThe Trial Court erred in treating a “Break-up of Account” as a valid “Statement of Account”.\nThe High Court relied on precedents:\nElbow Room v. MCB Bank Ltd. (2014 CLD 985)\nApollo Textile Mills Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Ltd. (2012 CLD 337; SC)\nUBL v. Ilyas Enterprises (2004 CLD 1338)\nC.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. ICP (2004 CLD 587)\n— holding that without a properly certified and detailed statement, the plaint cannot be sustained and presumption of correctness cannot arise.\nOperative Part of Judgment\nThe High Court held:\nJudgment and Decree dated 02.05.2017 and 11.05.2017 and order dated 07.03.2017 (dismissing leave to defend) are set aside.\nThe case is remanded to Banking Court-II, Karachi, to:\nDecide the application for leave to defend, and\nRe-hear and decide the suit afresh in accordance with law.\nThe Respondent Bank may file a proper Statement of Account complying with Section 9(2) of the Ordinance and Sections 2(8) & 4 of the Act of 1891.\nThe Appellants may raise objections thereto.\nNo order as to costs.\nResult\n✅ Appeal Allowed — Judgment and Decree Set Aside — Case Remanded to Banking Court", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "1st Appeal No. 191 of 2017, decided on 26th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 14th January, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ZAFAR AHMED RAJPUT AND ARSHAD HUSSAIN KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saalim Salam Ansari for Appellants.\nKhalid Mahmood Siddiqui and Ghulam Rasool Korai for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mrs. SHAMIM BANO and another - Appellants\nVS\nSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26475", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2090 = 2025 SLD 2090 = 2025 CLD 1355", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQXo", - "Key Words:": "Background and Facts\nRespondent No.1 (Bankers Equity Limited, “BEL”), now in liquidation, had filed Suit No. B-68 of 2000 before a single bench under the Banking Jurisdiction for recovery of loan from Appellant/Judgment Debtor (JD) M/s. Pangrio Sugar Mills Ltd. (PSML).\nThe suit was decreed on 26.01.2006 by consent, fixing the total liability at a Forced Sale Value (FSV) of Rs. 215.77 million, out of which BEL’s share was Rs. 114.099 million.\nThe JD defaulted in making payments under the consent decree.\nThe Official Assignee, by Reference No. 362 of 2006, sought cancellation of the settlement, which was allowed; the decree holder then filed Execution No. 23 of 2008, restoring the original claim of Rs. 199.33 million.\nThe Official Assignee, after obtaining valuation from M/s. Joseph Lobo, fixed the FSV/reserve price at Rs. 325 million and put the assets of PSML to auction through public notice dated 11.06.2015.\nWhen the first auction failed, the Court directed a de novo auction, advertised for 25.10.2016.\nRespondent No.6 (OMNI Group) offered a bid of Rs. 185 million, later enhanced to Rs. 187.926 million and finally to Rs. 188 million (including Rs. 500,000 for utilities).\nThe Official Assignee, via Reference No. 07 of 2016, sought confirmation of the bid, which the learned Single Judge confirmed on 20.02.2017, directing deposit of the balance consideration within 15 days.\n2. Appellant’s Contentions\nThe appellant (PSML) challenged the order on grounds that:\nThe confirmed bid (Rs.188 million) was below the Reserve/Forced Sale Value (Rs.325 million), violating settled auction principles.\nThe Reserve Price is the minimum permissible threshold below which no bid can be accepted.\nThe learned Single Judge misapplied precedent (2016 CLD 480 – Zakaria Ghani case), which was factually distinguishable.\nThe learned Judge failed to consider the interests of other secured/unsecured creditors and shareholders of PSML, being a listed company.\nThe auction proceedings lacked transparency, and the Official Assignee ought to have sought a higher price or re-auction.\n3. Respondents’ Contentions\nCounsel for Respondent No.6 (OMNI) and the Official Assignee contended that:\nThe JD defaulted repeatedly despite undertakings before the High Court and Supreme Court.\nThe auction proceedings were duly conducted and approved after multiple opportunities and public notices.\nThe Single Judge’s order relied on 2011 CLD 486 (SC), which clarified that Reserve Price is only a guiding benchmark, not an absolute bar.\nNo fraud, collusion, or illegality was demonstrated in the conduct of the sale.\nOnce the sale was confirmed and consideration deposited, a vested right accrued to the auction purchaser which cannot be disturbed lightly.\n4. Legal Issue\nWhether the learned Single Judge erred in confirming the auction sale at a price below the Reserve/Forced Sale Value mentioned in the sale proclamation?\n5. Court’s Observations\nThe Court reviewed the entire sequence of litigation since 2006, noting that the JD consistently defaulted and delayed proceedings, even after undertakings before the Supreme Court (Civil Petition No. 368-K/2014) to pay 50% of the decretal amount within a week.\nThe JD failed to deposit Rs. 51 million, resulting in resumption of execution and re-auctions.\nDespite repeated auctions and public notices, no higher bid than that of Respondent No.6 was received.\nOn Reserve Price and Judicial Discretion\nThe Court relied on 2011 CLD 486 (SC), holding that the Reserve Price serves as an internal or indicative value — not a mandatory floor price — and that confirmation of a bid below it is permissible if the sale process is fair and transparent.\nThe purpose of Reserve Price is to guide, not bind, the Court; particularly in court auctions where forced sale conditions prevail.\nThe judgment debtor, having failed to pay despite decrees and multiple opportunities, cannot indefinitely stall execution by contesting valuation or reserve price.\nOn Procedural Compliance\nThe Official Assignee:\nProperly issued public notices and sale proclamations;\nFixed the reserve price in each proclamation;\nProvided valuation reports to the JD;\nConducted the auction under Order XXI Rules 64–92 CPC.\nThe JD did not file applications under Order XXI Rules 89 or 90 CPC within 30 days, nor deposited the decretal amount plus 5% to set aside the sale — hence, a vested right accrued to the auction purchaser.\nOn Adequacy of Price\nCourt sales are forced sales, often fetching lower prices than private transactions due to litigation risks.\nIn absence of proof of fraud, collusion, or material irregularity, mere inadequacy of price does not vitiate the sale.\n6. Legal Principles Discussed\nOrder XXI Rules 1, 54, 58, 64–93 CPC — procedure for execution, attachment, proclamation, auction, and confirmation.\nReserve Price — only a guiding threshold, not a legally binding minimum (2011 CLD 486, SC).\nVested right of auction purchaser arises upon confirmation of sale and full deposit of price.\nJudgment debtor’s delay tactics cannot defeat decree-holder’s right to execution.\n7. Decision\nThe Court found no illegality, irregularity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence in the impugned order.\nThe auction and confirmation were carried out lawfully after due notice and procedure.\nThe JD’s objections were without substance and aimed at delaying execution.\nHeld:\nSale confirmation below Reserve Price was lawful under the circumstances.\nOfficial Assignee’s proceedings were valid.\nSpecial High Court Appeal dismissed on merits.\nNo order as to costs.\n8. Key Takeaways\nIssue\nCourt’s Holding\nConfirmation below Reserve Price\nPermissible where process fair and JD repeatedly defaulted\nReserve/Forced Sale Value\nGuideline, not mandatory minimum\nJD’s failure to object under Order XXI Rules 89/90\nWaiver — vested rights accrue to purchaser\nAdequacy of Price\nNot decisive absent fraud or irregularity\nResult\nAppeal dismissed; sale confirmed\nCitation for Reference\nM/s. Pangrio Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Bankers Equity Limited (in liquidation) & others\nSpecial High Court Appeal No. ___ of 2017\nDecided on: 22 December 2022\nCoram: Kausar Sultana Hussain, J.\nHeld: Appeal dismissed; confirmation of auction sale at Rs.188 million upheld despite higher reserve price; no illegality found.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Special High Court Appeal No. 199 of 2017, decided on 22nd December, 2022. Date of hearing: 22nd December, 2022.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND KAUSAR SULTANA HUSSAIN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Zafar and Jazib Ali Shaikh for Appellant.\nM. Umar Lakhani and Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui for Respondent No. 2.\nDr. Faiz H. Shah for Respondent No. 6.\nKhair Muhammad, representative of Official Assignee", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s PANGRIO SUGAR MILLS LTD through duly Appointed Officer - Appellant\nVS\nBANKERS EQUITY LIMITED (in liquidation) through Official Assignee and 5 others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26476", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2091 = 2025 SLD 2091 = 2025 CLD 1349", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTQXk", - "Key Words:": "Background\nThe Petitioner, Additional Registrar of Companies, SECP Islamabad, filed a winding-up petition against Respondent, M/s. Ayat Enterprises (SMC-Private) Limited, incorporated on 14.11.2018 with authorized capital of Rs. 1,000,000/-.\nThe objects in its Memorandum of Association permitted trading and fabrication of engineering goods, automobile accessories, and related equipment.\nUpon inspection and complaint, SECP found the Company engaged in car financing and real-estate/property installment schemes without obtaining a license under Section 282C of the 1984 Ordinance (Non-Banking Finance Companies provisions).\nA show-cause notice (27.03.2019) was issued; despite advice to cease unauthorized activities, the Company’s representative refused compliance.\n2. Respondent’s Reply\nThrough letter dated 29.04.2019, the Company’s representative admitted operations in car financing but claimed ignorance of licensing requirements, asserting the business had been closed and all customers refunded.\nHe further requested voluntary winding up of the Company, stating it had no remaining assets and was now operating only as a rent-a-car business.\n3. Legal Provisions Considered\nJustice Jawad Hassan examined:\nSection 301(g)(ii) & (v), Companies Act, 2017 — Company liable to be wound up if:\n(ii) it carries on a business prohibited or restricted by law; or\n(v) it is managed by persons refusing to comply with the memorandum, articles, or lawful directions of SECP.\nSection 304(b) — Registrar’s authority to file winding-up petition with SECP sanction.\nSection 509 — Savings clause preserving Part VIIIA (Sections 282A–282N) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for NBFC regulation.\nSection 282C (Ordinance, 1984) — Requires prior approval and license from SECP for incorporation or operation of a Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC).\n4. Court’s Findings\nThe Respondent Company engaged in auto and property financing schemes without a valid NBFC license, constituting a clear violation of Section 282C of the 1984 Ordinance (as saved under Section 509 of the 2017 Act).\nSuch activities are prohibited business under law, falling squarely within Section 301(g)(ii).\nThe management’s refusal to comply with SECP’s directions and failure to align operations with the memorandum of association further attracts Section 301(g)(v).\nThe Company’s own admission and request for winding-up reinforce SECP’s case.\n5. Decision\nHeld:\nThe Respondent Company carried on unauthorized financing activities without required SECP license.\nIt was managed contrary to its memorandum and statutory provisions.\nThe case is fit for winding up under Section 301(g)(ii) & (v) read with Sections 304(b) & 509 of the Companies Act, 2017 and Section 282C of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.\nThe petition is allowed; M/s. Ayat Enterprises (SMC-Private) Limited is ordered to be wound up.\n6. Directions\nPursuant to Section 315 of the Companies Act, 2017, the SECP shall appoint a Provisional Manager from its approved panel.\nThe Provisional Manager shall assume charge immediately and perform all statutory duties until final conclusion of winding-up proceedings.\nThe SECP shall ensure all legal consequences of winding-up are duly implemented and inform the Court accordingly.\n7. Key Legal Principles\nIssue\nHolding\nUnauthorized business\nCompany conducting NBFC-type financing without license violates Section 282C of 1984 Ordinance.\nGrounds for winding up\nCarrying on prohibited business and refusing to comply with SECP directions (Section 301(g)(ii) & (v), 2017 Act).\nSECP’s authority\nRegistrar may file winding-up petition with Commission’s sanction under Section 304(b).\nProvisional Manager\nMandatory appointment under Section 315 upon winding-up order.\nRespondent’s admission\nVoluntary acknowledgment and refund of customers’ amounts corroborate statutory violation.\n8. Result\nPetition Allowed.\nM/s. Ayat Enterprises (SMC-Private) Limited ordered to be wound up.\nSECP directed to appoint a Provisional Manager forthwith.\nNo order as to costs.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.O. No. 09 of 2022, decided on 26th May, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Omar Azad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSyed Ahsan Shafique for Respondent/Company.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES - Petitioner\nVS\nM/s AYAT ENTERPRISES (SMC-PRIVATE) LIMITED - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26477", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2092 = 2025 SLD 2092 = 2025 CLD 1314", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODc", - "Key Words:": "Background\nOn 23 December 2024, the CCP received a pre-merger application jointly filed by Wakeb Data Company for Telecommunications and Information Technology (Saudi Arabia) and Woot Tech (Private) Limited (Pakistan).\nThe Application sought approval for the acquisition of shareholding (%) in Woot Tech from existing shareholders — Mr. Bilal Ahmed Siddiqui, Mr. Rafey Ahmed, and Mr. Raheel Pasha Khan.\nThe proposed acquisition was governed by a draft Share Purchase Agreement, with a total consideration of SAR [value unspecified] (≈ PKR [value unspecified]), representing the transaction value.\n2. Merger Parties\n(a) Acquirer – Wakeb Data Company (Saudi Arabia):\nIncorporated on 29 January 2019 under Saudi law.\nEngaged in AI, machine learning, cognitive computing, and intelligent software solutions.\nNo direct operations or presence in Pakistan.\n(b) Target – Woot Tech (Private) Limited (Pakistan):\nIncorporated on 26 May 2021 under Pakistani law.\nEngaged in indigenous design and development of drones (UAVs) — including rotary wing, fixed wing, hybrid VTOL, and jet/piston/electric-powered UAVs.\n3. Nature of the Transaction\nThe Acquirer will acquire % shareholding of the Target from the Sellers.\nThe investment represents a foreign direct investment (FDI) in Pakistan’s emerging UAV and drone technology sector.\nThe Transaction qualifies as a merger under Section 11 of the Competition Act, 2010.\n4. Competition Assessment (Phase-I)\n(a) Procedural Review:\nThe Commission conducted a Phase-I assessment to evaluate compliance with the Act and Merger Regulations and to identify potential issues related to market concentration or dominance.\n(b) Relevant Market Definition:\nProduct Market: “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drone Technologies,” covering all categories including aerial target, mapping, industrial inspection, delivery, surveillance, agricultural, research, and tactical drones.\nGeographic Market: Pakistan — due to localized supply conditions and regulatory environment.\n(c) Market Position:\nWoot Tech operates in a specialized and emerging UAV segment, mainly serving defense, logistics, agriculture, and R & D sectors.\nThe company holds a small and non-dominant share of the national UAV market.\nWakeb Data has no existing market share or operations in Pakistan.\n5. Competition Analysis\nThe Transaction is conglomerate in nature, involving parties from different product and geographic markets.\nThere are no horizontal overlaps or vertical linkages between the Acquirer’s and Target’s activities.\nThe Transaction will not alter existing market structures or lead to dominance.\nNo risks were identified of reduced innovation, increased prices, or barriers to entry for competitors.\n6. Ancillary Restrictions\nCertain ancillary restraints (non-compete or confidentiality clauses) are included in the draft agreement.\nThe Merger Parties are directed to seek separate approval from the Exemptions Department of CCP upon execution of the agreement.\n7. Determination\nHeld:\nThe proposed acquisition does not create or strengthen a dominant position nor substantially lessen competition in the relevant market.\nThe Transaction is authorized under Section 31(1)(d)(i) of the Competition Act, 2010.\nMatters beyond the CCP’s jurisdiction shall remain subject to relevant regulatory and judicial oversight.\n8. Result\n✅ Application Allowed.\nThe proposed acquisition by Wakeb Data Company for Telecommunications and Information Technology of shareholding in Woot Tech (Private) Limited is approved under Section 31(1)(d)(i) of the Competition Act, 2010.\n9. Key Legal Principles\nIssue\nPrinciple Applied\nMerger Review\nCCP may authorize mergers not likely to lessen competition under Section 31(1)(d)(i) of the Act.\nConglomerate Merger\nWhere parties operate in distinct markets, no competition concerns arise.\nForeign Acquisition\nFDI-based acquisition of a Pakistani company is reviewable under Section 11 if control or material influence is acquired.\nRelevant Market\nDefined narrowly as UAV and drone technologies within Pakistan.\nAncillary Restraints\nMust be separately approved through CCP’s Exemptions Department.", - "Court Name:": "Competition Commission of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Case No. 1506/Merger-CCP/2024, decided on 2nd May, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DR. KABIR AHMED SIDHU, CHAIRMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "IN THE MATTER OF ACQUISITION OF % SHAREHOLDING OF WOOT TECH (PRIVATE) LIMITED BY WAKEB DATA COMPANY FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FROM MR. BILAL AHMED SIDDIQUI, MR. RAFEY AHMED AND MR. RAHEEL PASHA KHAN." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26478", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2093 = 2025 SLD 2093 = 2025 CLD 1317", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODY", - "Key Words:": "Background\nThe respondent, Dr. Anwar Aman, filed a consumer claim on 24.08.2024 under Section 25 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005.\nThe petitioner objected to maintainability, contending that the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 28(4) of the Act, as the goods were delivered on 05.05.2024, and the complaint was filed after expiry of the statutory 30-day period.\nAn application under Section 35 of the Act was filed, seeking summary dismissal of the complaint as “frivolous or vexatious.”\nThe Consumer Court dismissed the petitioner’s application on 18.03.2025, leading to the present writ petition.\n2. Issues for Determination\nWhether the complaint filed under Section 25 was barred by limitation prescribed under Section 28(4) of the Act.\nWhether a time-barred complaint could be summarily dismissed under Section 35 of the Act as frivolous or vexatious.\n3. Court’s Analysis\nLimitation under Section 28:\nSection 28(4) provides a 30-day limitation from the date of accrual of cause of action, but its first proviso empowers the Consumer Court to extend the limitation upon sufficient cause, and the second proviso fixes an upper limit—either 60 days beyond the warranty period or one year from the date of purchase, if no warranty exists.\nThe Court emphasized that this discretion is judicial, not absolute, and depends on factual inquiry.\nReliance on Pak Suzuki Motors (PLD 2023 SC 482) was misplaced, as that case recognized the 30-day rule but did not oust the Consumer Court’s power to condone delay under the provisos.\nSince the respondent had moved an application for condonation of delay, citing ongoing negotiations, the question of limitation became a mixed question of law and fact, requiring evidence.\nSection 35 — Frivolous or Vexatious Claims:\nThe Court held that Section 35 applies only to false, malicious, or baseless claims intended to harass or annoy the opposite party.\nCiting Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court observed that a time-barred claim is not necessarily frivolous or vexatious if a genuine dispute exists.\nSuch claims must instead be adjudicated under the limitation scheme of Section 28, not dismissed under Section 35.\nThe Trial Court rightly found that the limitation objection could not be resolved summarily and required examination of the condonation plea.\n4. Holding / Determination\nThe petition is dismissed in limine.\nThe Trial Court’s refusal to summarily dismiss the complaint under Section 35 is upheld.\nThe Consumer Court shall, at final adjudication, examine whether the explanation for delay satisfies the standard under Section 28(4) and render a reasoned finding on limitation and its extension.\n5. Legal Principles Settled\nIssue\nPrinciple\nLimitation under Section 28\n30-day limitation applies, but the Consumer Court retains discretion to extend it upon sufficient cause within statutory bounds.\nCondonation of Delay\nWhether sufficient cause exists is a question of fact, not determinable summarily.\nFrivolous/Vexatious Claims (Section 35)\nThese terms apply to malicious or baseless claims, not to those merely barred by limitation.\nSummary Dismissal\nLimitation issues, being mixed questions, cannot ordinarily justify summary dismissal under Section 35.\n6. Ratio Decidendi (Headnote for Citation)\nConsumer protection—Limitation—Condonation of delay—Frivolous or vexatious claim—\nWhere the complaint under Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 was filed beyond the thirty-day period prescribed in Section 28(4), but the complainant sought condonation of delay citing ongoing settlement negotiations, the question of limitation became a mixed question of law and fact, not amenable to summary dismissal under Section 35. A time-barred complaint, if supported by a plausible explanation, cannot be termed frivolous or vexatious. Trial Court rightly declined summary dismissal; petition dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 28913 of 2025, decided on 14th May, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ANWAAR HUSSAIN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Hammad-ur-Rehman Mazari assisted by Saif Ahmed Qureshi and Mohammad Hassan Shaigan for Petitioner.", - "Petitioner Name:": "SYMPL ENERGY PVT LTD. - Petitioner\nVS\nPRESIDING OFFICER and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26479", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2094 = 2025 SLD 2094 = 2025 SCMR 1093", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODU", - "Key Words:": "Background\nFIR No.1509/2021 was registered by the petitioners at Police Station Shalimar, Lahore under Sections 302, 147/149 PPC against the accused party (respondent No.2 and others).\nSubsequently, the accused party lodged a counter-version (cross-case) under Sections 337-A(iv), 337-A(ii), 337-F(iii), 337-F(i)/147/149 PPC against the petitioners.\nUpon investigation, the police submitted its report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., showing the petitioners in column No.2, i.e. not connected with the offence.\nThe Trial Court, however, took cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. and summoned the petitioners to face trial in the cross-version case.\nThe petitioners’ criminal revision before the Lahore High Court was dismissed in limine on 19.09.2022, leading to the present criminal petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court.\n2. Petitioner’s Contentions\nPetitioners were eye-witnesses in the main FIR (302 PPC) against respondent No.2’s party; the cross-version was a mala fide counterblast to pressurize them.\nThe Investigating Officer, after full inquiry, found no evidence connecting them with the injuries alleged in the counter-version and rightly placed their names in column 2.\nThe Trial Court and High Court ignored the police findings and failed to identify any error, omission, or illegality in the investigation.\nThe cross-version was lodged with inordinate and unexplained delay, merely to harass the petitioners and obstruct the prosecution of the main murder case.\n3. Supreme Court’s Observations\nThe petitioners are admittedly eye-witnesses in the principal FIR No.1509/2021 in which respondents are accused of murder of petitioners’ brother due to firearm injuries.\nThe cross-version was lodged after considerable delay, without adequate explanation, and appeared motivated.\nExcept for a disputed medical report (which itself was under review before a Medical Board, where the respondents failed to appear for re-examination), there was no substantial material to connect the petitioners with the counter allegations.\nThe Trial Court took cognizance mechanically under Section 190 Cr.P.C. without summoning the Investigating Officer or examining whether the police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was defective or perverse.\nThe High Court also failed to identify any factual or legal infirmity in the investigation while dismissing the revision in limine.\n4. Holding / Decision\nThe criminal petition for leave to appeal is converted into appeal and allowed.\nThe impugned order dated 19.09.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court in Criminal Revision No.55552 of 2022 is set aside.\nConsequently, the summoning order dated 08.06.2022 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, requiring the petitioners to face trial in the cross-version case, is also set aside.\n5. Ratio Decidendi (Headnote for Citation)\nCriminal law — Cross-version — Summoning of accused — Investigation report showing innocence — Validity —\nWhere the Investigating Officer, after thorough inquiry, found no material connecting the petitioners with the offences alleged in a delayed cross-version and placed their names in column No.2 of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the Trial Court could not, without examining the Investigating Officer or pointing out any error in investigation, take cognizance and summon the petitioners under Section 190 Cr.P.C. Merely on the basis of a disputed medical report, summoning was unjustified. The High Court erred in dismissing the revision in limine without addressing these infirmities.\nHeld, both Courts below failed to properly scrutinize the investigation and the surrounding circumstances indicating mala fides in the counter-case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside both orders.\n6. Legal Principles Affirmed\nIssue\nPrinciple Laid Down\nColumn No.2 accused\nPersons shown as innocent in police report cannot be summoned without judicial scrutiny of the investigation or fresh material.\nCognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C.\nMust be exercised with reasons and examination of record; cannot be mechanical.\nCross-version cases\nWhere mala fide intent or unexplained delay exists, courts must exercise caution before directing trial.\nHigh Court’s revisional jurisdiction\nDismissal in limine without examining record or reasons of IO is improper.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 1315-L of 2022, decided on 7th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 7th April, 2025.\n(Against the order dated 19.09.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Revision No. 55552 of 2022).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Musarrat Hilali and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Munir Ahmad Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link from Lahore).\nRai Akhtar Hassan, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.\nIrfan Ali and Imran Ali for Respondents (both in person).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AZEEM and others - Petitioners\nVS\nThe STATE and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26480", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2095 = 2025 SLD 2095 = 2025 SCMR 1003", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODQ", - "Key Words:": "Background\nThe petitioner (wife) filed a composite suit before the Family Judge, Court-IV, Peshawar, seeking:\n(i) Restitution of conjugal rights,\n(ii) Dower and dowry articles,\n(iii) Gold ornaments (25 tolas),\n(iv) 1/5th share in House No.116, Sector A, Askari 14, Adyala Road, Rawalpindi,\n(v) Maintenance allowance @ Rs.5,000 per month, and\n(vi) Recovery of Rs.500,000 alleged loan.\nThe Trial Court (28.02.2019) partly decreed the suit, granting maintenance, cash, dowry articles, and directing provision of a constructed house (03 marlas in Zaryab Colony, Peshawar) as per Nikahnama entry.\nAppeals by both parties were decided by the Additional District Judge/Model Civil Appellate Court, Peshawar on 25.09.2020, which partly allowed the petitioner’s appeal to include:\nRecovery of 25 tolas gold ornaments (as dower),\nShari share in ancestral property or its value, and\nMaintenance allowance @ Rs.5,000 per month from 17.02.2012.\nThe respondent’s appeal before the Peshawar High Court (Writ Petition No.13-P/2021) was partly accepted on 31.01.2022, setting aside the finding regarding 25 tolas of gold while maintaining the rest.\nThe petitioner then filed the instant civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court.\n2. Petitioner’s Contentions\nThe High Court misread and ignored evidence regarding the snatching of 25 tolas gold ornaments.\nIt also misinterpreted Column No.16 of the Nikahnama concerning the Shari share in the ancestral property.\nThe findings were said to suffer from misreading/non-reading of evidence and hence liable to be set aside.\n3. Supreme Court’s Observations\nThe Trial Court’s findings recorded that the petitioner admitted in evidence that she did not know the weight of gold at Rukhsati, but stated that the jewelry comprised one set and six bangles, indicating that it was voluntarily given by the husband.\n→ Hence, the allegation of snatching or forcible taking was not proved.\nThe Appellate Court’s reversal of this finding was corrected by the High Court, which examined the Urdu deposition and rightly held that the petitioner herself handed over the jewelry to her husband on demand.\n→ There was no evidence of coercion or force.\nRegarding Column No.16 (Nikahnama), it merely recorded that the husband would give the wife a share in ancestral property, without specifying any particular property or address.\n→ Claim for a specific house (House No.116, Askari 14, Rawalpindi) was unsubstantiated and misplaced.\nThe petitioner never objected to or sought clarification of the Nikahnama entry during or after marriage.\n→ Therefore, the High Court’s interpretation that she was entitled generally to Shari share as per the entry (not a specific property) was legally sound.\n4. Decision\nThe Supreme Court found no error, misreading, or non-reading of evidence in the concurrent findings of the Courts below.\nThe allegations of snatching gold ornaments and claim for specific share in property were unproved.\nAccordingly, the civil petition for leave to appeal is dismissed, and leave refused.\n5. Ratio Decidendi (Headnote for Citation)\nFamily law — Dower — Claim of 25 tolas gold ornaments — Burden of proof — Nikahnama, Column No.16 — Share in ancestral property — Interpretation —\nWhere the wife admitted that jewelry was given by her husband and failed to establish that the same was snatched or taken away forcibly, the allegation remained unproved. The High Court rightly set aside the Appellate Court’s finding granting recovery of gold ornaments.\nAs regards the entry in Column No.16 of the Nikahnama mentioning “share in ancestral property”, absence of specification of any particular property rendered a claim to a defined house untenable. Concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court sustained.\nHeld, no misreading or non-reading of evidence occurred; petition found devoid of merit.\n— Petition dismissed. Leave to appeal refused.\n6. Key Legal Principles Affirmed\nIssue\nLegal Principle\nBurden of proof in dowry/dower disputes\nThe wife must prove actual delivery of dower property and forcible snatching, not merely allege it.\nNikahnama Column 16 (share in ancestral property)\nVague or unspecified entries cannot be extended to confer ownership in a specific property without corroborative evidence.\nAppellate interference in concurrent findings\nSupreme Court will not interfere unless findings are perverse or based on misreading/non-reading of evidence.\nConcurrent jurisdiction of family and civil appellate courts\nFindings based on appreciation of oral evidence carry weight and are not lightly interfered with.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 344-P of 2022, decided on 7th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 7th March, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 31.01.2022 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No. 13-P of 2021).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ AND IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ijaz Ahmed Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with Petitioner (video link from Peshawar).\nNemo for the Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mst. HUMAIRA WAZIR - Petitioner\nVS\n\nMUHAMMAD FAISAL and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26481", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTOC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2096 = 2025 SLD 2096 = 2025 SCMR 1008", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTOC8", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nPetitioners were convicted in FIR No. 38/2015 (CTD Lahore) under Sections 4 & 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Section 7(ff) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.\nAllegation: Recovery of hand-grenades, detonators, fuses, and explosive material from their possession.\nTrial Court (02.03.2016): Convicted and sentenced each to life imprisonment under both ESA and ATA.\nHigh Court (28.11.2018): Maintained conviction; ordered forfeiture of property.\nSupreme Court (19.01.2023): Earlier dismissed criminal petitions.\nCurrent Proceedings: Review petitions filed against the 2023 Supreme Court judgment.\nKey Legal Issue:\nWhether the earlier judgment overlooked material evidence and contradictions resulting in miscarriage of justice, warranting review and acquittal.\nFindings:\nContradictions in Evidence:\nMajor discrepancies in statements of PW-4 (Shahid Ghaffar) and PW-7 (Saddam Hussain) regarding number and dates of parcels sent to the BDS and PFSA.\nDocumentary evidence (PFSA report) contradicted both witnesses.\nThese contradictions undermined safe custody and transmission of the case property — a crucial element in explosive cases.\nUnreliable Expert Evidence:\nBomb Disposal Squad commander (PW-3) admitted his qualification was only matric; no technical diploma or expertise shown. His testimony was found unsafe to rely upon.\nIdentity Discrepancy:\nRecovery memos mentioned complainant as Athar Saleem, while he appeared as Athar Saeed (PW-1).\nNo correction ever sought by prosecution — indicating possible fabrication of recovery proceedings.\nSeal Mismatch:\nParcels bore seal “MA,” which did not correspond to the complainant’s name — further supporting the fake recovery claim.\nContradiction in Weighing Procedure:\nPW-1 said explosives were weighed through a “simple scale and bots,” whereas PW-2 stated they used a “weighing scale machine” — inconsistency reinforcing fabrication.\nDefence Evidence Overlooked Earlier:\nWrit petitions for illegal detention of petitioners were filed months before the FIR (08.09.2015).\nFIRs for abduction of the same individuals were also registered earlier — strongly suggesting false implication after illegal custody.\nNo Proof of Terrorist Affiliation:\nComplainant (PW-1) admitted during cross-examination:\n“I cannot produce any proof that accused belongs to a banned organization.”\nBenefit of Doubt:\nThe case was “replete with doubts.” Even a single doubt entitles an accused to acquittal.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court found sufficient reasons for review under Dilawar Hussain v. State (2013 SCMR 1582).\nMaterial facts and evidence had been overlooked earlier, leading to grave miscarriage of justice.\nReview petitions allowed.\nEarlier judgment (19.01.2023) recalled.\nCriminal petitions restored as appeals and allowed.\nConvictions and sentences set aside.\nPetitioners acquitted by extending benefit of doubt.\nTo be released forthwith unless required in any other case.\nResult:\n✅ Review petitions allowed; convictions set aside; petitioners acquitted.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Review Petitions Nos. 14, 28 and 29 of 2023 in Criminal Petitions Nos. 76, 125 and 150 of 2019, decided on 24th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 24th March, 2025.\n(To review judgment of this Court dated 19.01.2023, passed in Criminal Petitions Nos. 76, 77, 125 and 150 of 2019).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Athar Minallah and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mudassar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Basharat Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. R.Ps. Nos. 28 and 29 of 2023).\nMalik Jawwad Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. R.P. No. 14 of 2023).\nIrfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD MUSAWAR RAFIQ and 2 others - Petitioners\nVS\nThe STATE through P.G. Punjab - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26482", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTOCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2097 = 2025 SLD 2097 = 2025 SCMR 1015", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTOCs", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe petitioner pre-empted sale mutation No. 1372 dated 21.11.2009 concerning land measuring 52 Kanals 19 Marlas, jointly purchased by respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nThe petitioner claimed to have duly performed Talb-e-Muwathibat and Talb-e-Ish’had and sought a decree for pre-emption.\nAnother pre-emption suit regarding the same property was filed by Dr. Askar Mehmood and others; both suits were consolidated, treating the petitioner as a rival pre-emptor.\nThe Trial Court (18.12.2012) dismissed both suits.\nThe Appeal (21.04.2015) and Civil Revision No. 140-D of 2015 before the Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench were also dismissed.\nThe petitioner filed the present Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal (CPLA) before the Supreme Court against the High Court judgment dated 29.05.2023.\nPetitioner’s Contention:\nThe petitioner argued that he had duly issued the Talb-e-Ish’had notice to both vendees.\nExamination of the postman was unnecessary since respondents never denied service.\nThe courts below, according to him, had dismissed the suit on technical grounds despite sufficient compliance and evidence.\nCourt’s Observations:\nConcurrent Findings:\nThe Trial Court, Appellate Court, and High Court had all concurrently found that the petitioner failed to prove service of the Talb-e-Ish’had notice as required by law.\nNon-Examination of Postman:\nThe postman allegedly delivering the notice was not examined, and the post office witnesses (RPW-1, RPW-2, RPW-3) could not confirm delivery or production of acknowledgement-due receipts.\nHence, the petitioner did not discharge the burden of proof.\nDefect in the Notice:\nThe purported Talb-e-Ish’had notice sent to respondent No. 2 mentioned mutation No. 1373 instead of 1372, rendering the notice invalid with respect to the pre-empted property.\nPartial Pre-emption:\nSince notice was not validly served on one of the co-vendees, it became a case of partial pre-emption, attracting the bar under Section 19 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987.\nThe lapse also constituted a waiver under Section 15 of the Act.\nLegal Requirement under Section 13(3):\nThe law mandates that Talb-e-Ish’had must be made within two weeks of knowledge, by sending a notice in writing under registered cover acknowledgement-due, attested by two truthful witnesses.\nMere dispatch of notice without proof of delivery does not satisfy the legal requirement.\nHeld:\nThe Court found no factual or legal infirmity in the concurrent judgments of the lower courts or the High Court.\nPetition dismissed in limine.\nLeave to appeal refused.\nResult:\n❌ Civil petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused; concurrent findings upheld.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3586 of 2023, decided on 7th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 7th April, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 29.05.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench passed in Civil Revision No. 140-D of 2015 with Civil Misc. Nos. 144-D of 2015, 148-D of 2019 and 95-D of 2020).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUSARRAT HILALI AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "M. Anwar Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "QAYUM NAWAZ - Petitioner\nVS\nGULAB KHAN and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26483", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2098 = 2025 SLD 2098 = 2025 SCMR 1018", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODk", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nThe respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for redemption of property comprising Khasra Nos. 5912 and 5929 (8 Kanals 1 Marla) originally owned by him since 1953 (Mutation No.46508).\nHe had redeemed parts of the property earlier and acquired remaining shares from co-sharers via exchange Mutations Nos. 52537 and 52538.\nThe petitioner/defendant had purchased mortgagee rights from Muhammad Saleem etc. through Mutation No.673 dated 28.03.1981.\nTrial Court dismissed the redemption suit; however, the Appellate Court decreed it, which was upheld by the High Court (27.02.2015).\nThe petitioner then filed a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court.\nIssues:\nWhether the suit for redemption was barred by limitation under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908.\nWhether earlier pre-emption litigation barred the redemption suit on the principle of res judicata.\nWhether the purchase of mortgagee rights in 1981 constituted a fresh acknowledgment restarting limitation.\nWhether efflux of time (over 60 years) extinguishes ownership rights of a mortgagor.\nHeld:\nIndependent Causes of Action:\nA suit for pre-emption and a suit for redemption are distinct causes of action; hence, res judicata does not apply.\nAcknowledgment and Fresh Limitation:\nThe purchase of mortgagee rights (Mutation No.673 dated 28.03.1981) was an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, giving a fresh start of limitation for redemption.\nContinuous possession of the mortgagee and receipt of usufruct constitute acknowledgment under Section 20(2) of the Act.\nTherefore, the suit was well within time.\nEfflux of Time Does Not Extinguish Ownership:\nEven if limitation had expired, mere lapse of 60 years does not divest ownership nor confer title on the mortgagee by prescription.\nAfter Maqbool Ahmad’s case (1991 SCMR 2063), ownership by prescription ceased to exist post 31.08.1991, unless supported by a decree prior to that cut-off date.\nThe petitioner never obtained such a decree; thus, no title accrued to him.\nNon-Applicability of Nawaz Ali Khan’s Case:\nThe judgment in PLD 2003 SC 425 was distinguishable, as that case involved a mortgagee’s decree for prescription prior to 1991, unlike the present matter.\nResult:\nPetition dismissed as meritless.\nLeave to appeal refused.\nExecuting Court directed to restore possession of the mortgaged property to the respondent within three months, with corresponding mutation of redemption to be attested.\nProperty deemed redeemed without mortgage money, as the mortgagee had already enjoyed usufruct exceeding the loan value.\nCosts followed the event.\nLegal Principles:\nRedemption – Limitation – Acknowledgment:\nPurchase of mortgagee rights or continued possession by the mortgagee constitutes acknowledgment under Sections 19 and 20(2) of the Limitation Act, starting a fresh period of limitation.\nOwnership – Prescription:\nPost-Maqbool Ahmad (1991 SCMR 2063), title by prescription cannot arise after 31.08.1991 without a prior declaratory decree.\nRes Judicata:\nA prior pre-emption suit does not bar a subsequent redemption suit since both rest on distinct causes of action.\nResult:\n✅ Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused; decree for redemption maintained; property to be restored to respondent within 3 months.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 146-P of 2015, decided on 13th January, 2025. Date of hearing: 13th January, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 27.02.2015 passed by Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench in C. R. No. 90-B of 2009).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shah Faisal, Advocate Supreme Court and Haji Muhammad Zahir Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.\nSalahuddin, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PIOA SHAH - Petitioner\nVS\nAMIN KHAN and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26484", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2099 = 2025 SLD 2099 = 2025 SCMR 1024", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTODg", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nOn 08.06.2009 at 6:00 a.m., complainant Fida Hussain (PW.8) alleged that Ali Afzal alias Machi and Manzar Abbas, both armed with Kalashnikovs, entered the house of Lal Hussain (deceased) and fired upon him, causing his death on the spot.\nThe motive advanced was a longstanding blood feud between the families.\nFIR was lodged at 9:15 a.m. after a delay of over three hours.\nAppellant Manzar Abbas, a juvenile, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Juvenile Court on 24.03.2012; his appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 19.10.2016.\nCo-accused Ali Afzal alias Machi was convicted by the Sessions Court on 28.03.2019; his appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 18.02.2020.\nBoth filed criminal appeals before the Supreme Court, which were heard together.\nIssues:\nWhether the delay in lodging the FIR and postmortem examination rendered the prosecution’s case doubtful.\nWhether the presence of alleged eye-witnesses (complainant and his wife) was credible or contrived.\nWhether the non-production and contradictory affidavit of eyewitness Muhammad Banaras vitiated the prosecution’s case.\nWhether the prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.\nHeld:\nDelay in FIR and Postmortem:\nThe FIR was lodged after 3 hours and 15 minutes with no plausible explanation.\nEvidence of the Investigating Officer (PW.10) revealed deliberation and consultation before deciding the complainant.\nPostmortem was conducted after 4 hours and 15 minutes of FIR registration without justification.\nSuch unexplained delays cast serious doubt on the prosecution version.\nRelied on Asia Bibi v. State (PLD 2019 SC 64), Zeeshan alias Shani (2012 SCMR 428), Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa (2019 SCMR 1068).\nUnreliable Eye-Witnesses:\nBoth alleged eye-witnesses (complainant and his wife) lived one mile away and were chance witnesses.\nTheir presence at 6:00 a.m. remained unsubstantiated and unnatural.\nNo injuries or collateral damage were found despite firing at close range—another improbability.\nContradictory Eyewitness (Banaras):\nPW Muhammad Banaras, named in FIR, gave an affidavit (Exh.DA) stating that two unknown persons committed the offence and that the appellants were not the culprits.\nHis non-production by prosecution warranted adverse inference under Article 129(g) of QSO, 1984.\nRelied on Mst. Saima Noreen v. State (2004 SCMR 1310), PLD 2011 SC 554, 2020 SCMR 1493, 2021 SCMR 387.\nMedical Evidence Inconsistent:\nDoctor (PW.6) admitted rigor mortis fully developed and stated death could have occurred at 4:00 a.m., contradicting prosecution’s timeline.\nMedical evidence did not support ocular version.\nMotive:\nPrevious enmity was a double-edged weapon, possibly leading to false implication.\nCited Noor Elahi v. Zafrul Haque (PLD 1976 SC 557), Allah Bakhsh v. State (PLD 1978 SC 171), Tariq v. State (2017 SCMR 1672), Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. State (2019 SCMR 652).\nBenefit of Doubt:\nProsecution failed to prove charge beyond reasonable doubt.\nEven a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles accused to acquittal as a matter of right, not grace.\nRelied on Muhammad Mansha v. State (2018 SCMR 772), Najaf Ali Shah v. State (2021 SCMR 736).\nResult:\n✅ Appeals allowed.\n✅ Convictions and sentences set aside.\n✅ Appellants acquitted and released forthwith, if not required in any other case.\nLegal Principles:\nDelay in FIR and postmortem, without explanation, suggests deliberation and fabrication—fatal to prosecution.\nChance witnesses, without independent corroboration, are unsafe for conviction.\nNon-production of material witness invites adverse inference under Article 129(g), QSO.\nBenefit of doubt must go to the accused even if one plausible doubt exists.\nMotive alone cannot sustain conviction if ocular and medical evidence is unreliable.\nShort Headnote (Digest Style):\nCriminal Law (Section 302/34, P.P.C.) — Murder — Delay in FIR and postmortem — Contradictory and uncorroborated ocular account — Non-production of material witness — Medical inconsistency — Benefit of doubt — Held, prosecution failed to prove case beyond reasonable doubt; conviction and sentence set aside — Accused acquitted.\n(Relied: PLD 2019 SC 64; 2012 SCMR 428; 2018 SCMR 772; 2021 SCMR 736; 2019 SCMR 1068.)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeals Nos. 438 and 439 of 2023, decided on 13th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 19.10.2016 and 18.02.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, in Crl. Appeals Nos. 156 of 2012 and 347 of 2019, respectively).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Criminal Appeals Nos. 438 and 439 of 2023, decided on 13th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 19.10.2016 and 18.02.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, in Crl. Appeals Nos. 156 of 2012 and 347 of 2019, respectively).", - "Petitioner Name:": "MANZAR ABBAS and another - Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26485", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTOHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2050 = 2025 SLD 2050", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTOHo", - "Key Words:": "1.\nSubject: Two applications (CMA Nos. 497/2025 and 495/2025) filed by Judgment Debtor No. 4 (Malik Ali Zain) seeking recall of an order dated 09.05.2025 that blocked his CNIC and that of JD No. 3.\n2.\nBackground:\no\nThe blocking order was passed on an application (CMA No. 374/2025) by the Decree Holder, who claimed the JDs had shifted and their addresses were unknown.\no\nThe Decree arises from a Consent Decree based on a 2009 Settlement Agreement. The execution concerns the recovery of an Agreed Amount of approximately Rs. 120 million.\n3.\nJD No. 4s Arguments:\no\nThe Order was obtained without proper legal and factual assistance to the court.\no\nThe Decree Holder provided an incorrect address (03, Khayaban-e-Behria instead of 83, Khayaban-e-Behria), leading to non-service of notice and a violation of natural justice.\no\nBlocking a CNIC is not a recognized mode of execution under the CPC in Sindh.\n4.\nDecree Holders Arguments:\no\nArgued the decree was partially satisfied, and the execution was for the remaining amount.\no\nInitially relied on Order XXI Rule 77 of the KPK CPC (which allows CNIC blocking), and later on Section 51 CPC (pertaining to arrest).\n5.\nCourts Analysis and Findings:\no\nIncorrect Address: The court found a clear discrepancy in the address, which prevented valid service. The court applied the maxim Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no one can benefit from their own wrong), holding that JD No. 4 should not be penalized for the Decree Holders mistake.\no\nLack of Legal Provision: The court held that the CPC in Sindh and the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 contain no provision for blocking a CNIC. Reliance on the KPK amendment was completely misplaced. \no\nSeverity of CNIC Blocking: Citing the Supreme Court (Agha Abid Majeed) and Islamabad High Court (Hafiz Manzoor), the court emphasized that blocking a CNIC has grave consequences, virtually halting a persons life and denying them fundamental rights. It is a more severe measure than arrest.\no\nMisplaced Reliance on Section 51 CPC: The court found that the mandatory pre-conditions for issuing an arrest warrant under Section 51 were neither pleaded nor fulfilled.\no\nObjection on Deposit of Decretal Amount: The court deferred the Decree Holders objection (that JD No. 4 must deposit the decretal amount before being heard) until the Decree Holder first corrects the address and provides a complete account of the exact outstanding amount.\n6.\nDecision:\no\nBoth applications are allowed.\no\nThe Order dated 09.05.2025 is recalled.\no\nNADRA is directed to immediately unblock the CNICs of the Judgment Debtors.\nAnalysis of Legal Reasoning\nThe order is a well-reasoned application of procedural and substantive law. The judge systematically dismantles the foundation of the impugned order:\n1.\nProcedural Irregularity: The incorrect address was a fatal flaw, as it deprived the JD of the right to be heard, a cornerstone of natural justice.\n2.\nJurisdictional Issue: The judge correctly identifies that after the 18th Amendment, CPC is a provincial subject. Applying a procedural law from another province (KPK) was a fundamental error.\n3.\nProportionality: The court recognizes that the remedy of CNIC blocking is disproportionately severe compared to the objective of debt recovery. The citations from superior courts firmly establish that such a drastic measure requires explicit legal authority, which is absent.\n4.\nBurden on Decree Holder: The order rightly places the burden on the Decree Holder to first rectify its own procedural lapses (correct address, provide exact accounts) before the execution can proceed effectively.\nIn conclusion, the court correctly recalled the previous order, finding it was passed based on incorrect facts, a mistaken application of law from another jurisdiction, and a failure to appreciate the severe consequences of blocking a national identity document. The decision reinforces the principles of due process and the necessity for legal authority for coercive state action.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=141,151General Clauses Act, 1897=21", - "Case #": "Execution No. 25 of 2012. Date of Hearing : 09.09.2025. Date of Order : 23.09.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD HASAN (AKBER), JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Mr. Irfanullah Khan Advocate and Lubna Aman Advocate for Decree Holder Askari Bank Limited\nMr. Farjad Ali Khan Advocate and Mr. Muhammad Umar Farooq Advocate for Malik Ali Zain through, Judgment Debtor No.4" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26486", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTOHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2051 = 2025 SLD 2051", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTOHk", - "Key Words:": "1. Subject & Petitioner:\nThe petition was filed by Luqman Zafar, a lawyer, as a matter of public interest.\nThe core issue was that officers of the ICT Administration (the Executive) were exercising judicial powers, violating the constitutional mandate for the separation of the judiciary from the executive under Article 175(3) of the Constitution.\n2. Petitioners Arguments:\nViolation of the trichotomy of powers (Legislature, Executive, Judicature).\nICT officers are subordinate to the Executive (their appointments, transfers, promotions, and discipline are controlled by the Executive).\nThese officers perform judicial functions: they convict/acquit persons, record statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and conduct identification parades.\nThe 14-year timeline for the separation of the judiciary stipulated in Article 175(3) lapsed in 1987, meaning the judiciary is deemed to be automatically separated.\n3. States Arguments:\nThe executive magistracy helps manage the caseload by handling petty offences, preventing the formal judiciary from being overburdened.\nThe system is established under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, and subsequent acts.\n4. Courts Analysis & Legal Reasoning:\nThe court conducted a thorough review of constitutional provisions and precedent from the Supreme Court. The key principles established are:\nRight to Access to Justice (Article 9): This fundamental right includes the right to a fair trial before an impartial and independent court.\nSeparation of Judiciary (Article 175(3)): The Constitution mandates a clear separation. The 14-year transitional period ended in 1987. After this date, the judiciary is constitutionally deemed to be separated, irrespective of whether the executive took steps to implement it.\nSupervisory Jurisdiction of High Court (Article 203): The High Court has exclusive control and supervision over all subordinate courts. Any forum exercising judicial power must be under this supervisory umbrella.\nDefinition of a Court : A forum exercising judicial power—the power to decide controversies and determine rights and liabilities in a binding manner—is a court in essence and must be independent.\nUnconstitutional Status of Executive Magistracy in ICT:\nThe legal framework that created executive magistrates (Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972) was effectively repealed for the ICT by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001 (1st Amendment Ordinance).\nHowever, the enforcement of this repealing law was stalled by a second ordinance (2nd Amendment Ordinance), which made its commencement conditional on a notification from the Federal Government—a notification that was never issued in over 23 years.\nThe court held that this delay is unconstitutional. The officers of the ICT Administration, being under the complete control of the Executive, cannot function as independent judicial officers.\n5. Decision & Declarations:\nThe court allowed the petition and declared:\n(a) The delay in separating the judiciary beyond the 1987 deadline is unconstitutional.\n(b) The Federal Government is directed to issue the notification to enforce the 1st Amendment Ordinance forthwith.\n(c) Until the notification is issued, Executive Magistrates are restrained from passing final judgments in ongoing trials. Pending cases will be transferred to judicial magistrates after the notification.\n(d) Judicial power in the ICT can only be exercised by courts conforming to Articles 175(3), 202, and 203 of the Constitution.\n(e) The judgment applies prospectively and does not reopen past, closed cases.\nAnalysis & Significance\nThis judgment is a powerful reinforcement of constitutional supremacy and the independence of the judiciary.\nConstitutional Supremacy: The court firmly held that the Constitutions clear mandate cannot be undermined by executive inaction or legislative loopholes. The expiration of the transitional period in Article 175(3) was treated as a self-executing provision.\nIndependence of Judiciary: The judgment elaborates that independence is not merely a concept but requires structural safeguards: freedom from executive control in appointments, transfers, promotions, and discipline. A judge who is answerable to the executive for their career cannot be independent.\nCurtailment of Executive Overreach: The ruling strikes a significant blow against the executives long-standing practice of exercising judicial powers in the ICT, a practice the court found to be fundamentally at odds with the constitutional scheme.\nRemedy for Inaction: The court did not just declare the situation unconstitutional; it provided a clear remedy by ordering the Federal Government to issue the long-pending notification immediately and imposing an immediate injunction on executive magistrates from passing final orders.\nProspective Application: By applying the decision prospectively, the court wisely balanced the need for constitutional compliance with the practical necessity of maintaining legal certainty for past decisions.\nIn conclusion, this judgment is a seminal ruling that rectifies a long-standing constitutional anomaly in the ICT. It affirms that the right to a fair trial before an independent tribunal is non-negotiable and that the executive cannot, through inertia or design, assume powers that the Constitution reserves exclusively for the judiciary.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=175(3),202,203", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 1838/2024. Date of Hearing : 31.07.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mr Zahid Asif Ch., Advocate. Mr Luqman Zafar, Advocate-in person. Mr Muhammad Bilal, Advocate. Mr Muhammad Zaheer, Advocate. Mr Abdul Haleem, Advocate.\nFederation by: Mr Khalid Mehmood Dhoon, Asstt. Attorney General.\nICT Administration by: Sardar Salman Ijaz, State Counsel.\nMr Riasat Ali Azad, President, IHCBA – Amicus Curiae.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Luqman Zafar, Advocate\nVs\nThe Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice and 7 others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26487", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2053 = 2025 SLD 2053", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDc", - "Key Words:": "1. Subject & Parties:\nThis is an Income Tax Appeal (ITA) filed by the tax department (the appellant) against an order dated 31.05.2023 passed by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Appeals) [CIR (Appeals)].\nThe case pertains to Tax Year 2016.\nThe Respondent/Taxpayer is a private limited company engaged in manufacturing and selling white refined sugar.\n2. Core Issue:\nThe case concerns the taxpayers obligations as a withholding agent under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The department alleged that the taxpayer failed to properly deduct and deposit withholding taxes under various sections, including Section 236G.\n3. Procedural History:\nThe department issued a show-cause notice to the taxpayer.\nThe Assessing Officer (AC/DCIR) passed an order on 08.03.2022 against the taxpayer, creating tax liabilities, penalties, and surcharges.\nThe taxpayer appealed to the CIR (Appeals). The CIR (Appeals) passed the impugned order (31.05.2023), remanding two issues for fresh proceedings but deciding the issue related to Section 236G tax, default surcharge, and penalty against the taxpayer.\nThe taxpayer, still aggrieved, filed the present appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.\n4. Tribunals Analysis & Findings:\nThe Tribunal found critical legal flaws in the orders passed by both the CIR (Appeals) and the original Assessing Officer:\nNon-Speaking Orders: The Tribunal held that both the CIR (Appeals)s order and the original Assessing Officers order were passed in a slipshod manner. \nThe CIR (Appeals) claimed to rely on a judgment from Popular Sugar Mills Ltd but the Tribunal found no such reference in the original officers order. The CIR (Appeals) also failed to provide its own independent reasoning.\nThe original order by the AC/DCIR was also found to be lacking proper reasoning.\nViolation of Legal Principle: The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court case of Mollah Ejahar Ali (PLD 1970 SC 173), which established that a judicial order must be a speaking order, meaning it must demonstrate that the court or tribunal has applied its mind to the issues.\nNew Precedent from Supreme Court: The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court had recently delivered a new judgment in Chawala Footwear, Lahore (2025 SCMR 671). This judgment clarified the responsibilities of taxpayers and the department regarding withholding tax, building upon and superseding the earlier precedent (Bliz Pvt Ltd) that the original officer had relied upon.\n5. Decision & Directions:\nThe Tribunal set aside the orders of both the CIR (Appeals) and the original Assessing Officer. The case is remanded (sent back) to the original authority (the AC/DCIR) with the following directions:\nTo decide the matter afresh and in strict accordance with the law.\nTo specifically consider the principles laid down in the recent Supreme Court judgment in Chawala Footwear.\nThe taxpayer is directed to cooperate fully with the new proceedings, adhere to timelines, and ensure its registered address is updated.\nAnalysis & Significance\nThis judgment reinforces fundamental principles of administrative and tax law:\nRequirement of a Speaking Order: This is a cornerstone of natural justice. An order must contain reasons so that the affected party can understand the basis of the decision and a higher forum can effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction. The failure to provide reasons is, in itself, a ground for setting aside an order.\nDoctrine of Precedent (Stare Decisis): The judgment highlights the importance of applying the most recent and relevant legal precedent. The Tribunal correctly identified that the original order was based on an older judgment that had since been elaborated upon and superseded by a newer, binding decision from the Supreme Court.\nRemand as a Remedial Tool: Instead of deciding the complex factual and legal issues itself, the Tribunal used the tool of remand. This is a practical and just approach, ensuring that the case is decided at the appropriate level after a proper, reasoned analysis based on the correct legal framework.\nEfficiency in Justice: While remanding the case causes delay, it is a necessary step to ensure the decision is legally sound. The Tribunals specific direction to consider the Chawala Footwear case prevents further appeals on the same legal point and guides the officer toward a correct application of the law.\nIn conclusion, this is a well-reasoned tribunal order that corrects a procedural injustice (non-speaking orders) and ensures that a substantive tax dispute is adjudicated based on the latest and most authoritative interpretation of the law by the Supreme Court.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(7),161(1A),208,236GGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=24-A", - "Case #": "ITA No.1358/KB/2023 (Tax period 2016). Date of hearing: 26-06-2025 and date of order: 04-08-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRMAN AND MR. KASHIF NAZEER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Ranzan, Advocate\nMr. Adnan Shahid, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. KHOSKI SUGAR MILLS (PVT) LTD., KARACHI ………………… APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, ZONE-I, LTO, KARACHI …………………… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26488", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2100 = 2025 SLD 2100", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDY", - "Key Words:": "Case Background:\nAppeal: M/s Falcon Enterprise (the Appellant) filed a Sales Tax Appeal (STA) against an order dated 06.02.2025 from the ACIR, Hyderabad.\nDepartments Contention: The tax department issued a show cause notice (SCN) to the Appellant for failing to charge and pay a 4% further tax on its sales of poultry feed to unregistered persons, as required under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.\nAppellants Defense: The Appellant argued it was exempt from this tax. As a manufacturer selling feed directly to farmers/end consumers, it relied on Serial No. 5 of SRO 648(I)/2013, which exempts Supply of goods directly to the end consumers from the further tax.\nAdjudicating Officers Ruling: The officer rejected the defense. He defined an end consumer strictly as a person buying for personal, family, or household use. He ruled that poultry feed is a raw material for business (poultry farming) and cannot be consumed personally. He also questioned the verifiability of whether the farmers actually consumed the feed themselves or resold it. Consequently, he confirmed a demand for over Rs. 27 million in tax, surcharge, and penalty.\nThe Tribunals Analysis and Decision:\nThe Appellate Tribunal overturned the officers order and decided in favor of the Appellant for the following key reasons:\nBroader Interpretation of End Consumer : The tribunal found the officers interpretation too narrow. It highlighted that SRO 648(I)/2013 itself lists fertilizers as a good that can be supplied to an end consumer. Like poultry feed, fertilizers are used in business (agriculture), not for personal consumption. This indicates the term end consumer includes the final recipient in the supply chain who uses the goods in their business without an intention to resell the product itself. Therefore, a farmer using feed for their poultry farm qualifies as an end consumer.\nBurden of Proof Not Met by Department: The tribunal dismissed the officers unverifiable claim as a mere assumption without evidence. It reinforced the settled legal principle that the burden of proving that an exemption is being misused lies with the tax department. In the absence of any concrete evidence showing that the Appellant sold the feed to retailers or wholesalers (for resale) instead of end-user farmers, the Appellants claim for exemption must stand.\nFinal Outcome:\nThe tribunal set aside the impugned order and the associated tax demand, ruling that the Appellants direct sales of poultry feed to farmers are supplies to end consumers and are exempt from further tax under SRO 648(I)/2013.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(1A)", - "Case #": "STA No. 90/KB/2025 (Tax Period 2024). Date of hearing: 07.08.2025 and Date of Order: 29.09.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. SAJJAD AKBAR KHAN, MEMBER AND MR. KASHIF NAZEER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. A.S Jafiri (Advocate)\nRespondent by: Mr. Waqas Magsood, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s Falcon Enterprise Kotri ………… Appellant\nVS\nThe ACIR, Zone II, Hyderabad ………………… Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26489", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2101 = 2025 SLD 2101 = 2025 SCMR 1032", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDU", - "Key Words:": "Background\nThe petitioner (plaintiff) filed a suit for pre-emption and permanent injunction against the respondent.\nThe trial court framed issues on 04.03.2023 and repeatedly directed the petitioner to produce his evidence.\nDespite multiple adjournments—each granted as a last and final opportunity—the petitioner failed to produce evidence or appear personally.\nConsequently, the trial court invoked Order XVII, Rule 3 CPC and decided the suit against the petitioner on 25.01.2024.\nHis appeal and revision before the appellate court and the Lahore High Court were also dismissed.\nHence, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court seeking leave to appeal.\nLegal Discussion\nThe Court emphasized that laws and procedural rules exist to ensure discipline and efficiency in judicial proceedings.\nLitigants cannot be allowed to delay proceedings at will, waste judicial time, or harass opponents.\nOrder XVII, Rule 3 CPC empowers courts to decide a suit forthwith when a party, despite being granted time, fails to produce evidence or perform required acts.\nFor the rule’s application, certain conditions must co-exist:\nAdjournment was granted at the party’s request.\nTime was given to perform a specific act (like producing evidence).\nThe party defaulted on that act.\nThe party was present or deemed present on the adjourned date.\nMaterial existed to decide the case on merits.\nThe court decided the suit forthwith thereafter.\nThe Court referred to precedents including:\nRana Tanveer Khan (2021 SCMR ___)\nMoon Enterprises CNG Station v. SNGPL (2020 SCMR 300)\nDuniya Gul (2023 SCMR ___)\nThese judgments stress that last and final opportunities must be enforced strictly, and repeated “akhri mouqa” adjournments make a mockery of the law.\nFindings\nThe petitioner had been granted ample opportunities, multiple warnings, and even costs imposed for adjournments, yet failed to produce evidence or justify absence.\nHis conduct showed negligence, disobedience, and lack of bona fides.\nThe trial court rightly invoked Order XVII, Rule 3 CPC, and no illegality was found in the orders of the courts below.\nDecision\nThe Supreme Court found no ground to interfere.\nLeave to appeal was refused.\nPetition dismissed.\nKey Principle Reaffirmed\n“Law favours the vigilant, not the indolent.”\nCourts must enforce “last opportunity” orders strictly to prevent abuse of process and uphold public trust in the judicial system.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 1033-L of 2024, decided on 27th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 27th March, 2025.\n(Against the order dated 21.05.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in C.R. No. 30366 of 2024).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SHAHID BILAL HASSAN AND AAMER FAROOQ, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Akhtar Rana, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSyed Almas Haider Kazmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.\nAssisted by: Owais Nasir, L.C.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AKRAM - Petitioner\nVS\nSHAFAQAT ALI - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26490", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2102 = 2025 SLD 2102 = 2025 SCMR 1041", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDQ", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nTitle: [Petitioner] v. National Accountability Bureau & others\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nJudge: Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.\nDate: 18 March 2025\nCitation: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal against Order dated 13.03.2024 (Sindh High Court, Hyderabad Circuit)\nFacts:\nThe petitioner was arrested on 23.09.2021 in connection with a pension fund scam (Rs. 3.2 billion) involving DAO Hyderabad officials.\nDuring arrest, a Honda Vezel (Reg. No. BJ-4546, Model 2016) was seized.\nNAB issued a Freezing Order dated 01.02.2022 under Section 12 NAO, 1999, confirmed by the trial court on 14.02.2023, restricting only transfer of the vehicle (not seizure).\nThe petitioner sought release of the vehicle on superdari under Section 516-A Cr.P.C., which the Accountability Court dismissed (20.05.2023), holding the car was seized under Section 12(b)(i) & (iii) NAO.\nThe High Court (C.P. D-1077/2023) also dismissed the petition (13.03.2024).\nIssues:\nWhether an application under Section 516-A Cr.P.C. is maintainable in NAB proceedings governed by the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.\nWhether the Freezing Order under Section 12 NAO prevented release of the vehicle on superdari.\nHeld:\nAppeal Allowed.\nBoth lower courts misconstrued the Freezing Order and failed to consider that it only prohibited transfer of the vehicle, not its possession.\nThe NAO 1999 does not bar interim custody (superdari) of property; there is no inconsistency between Section 516-A Cr.P.C. and NAO.\nSection 17 NAO expressly makes Cr.P.C. applicable mutatis mutandis to NAB proceedings.\nThe right to hold and possess property under Articles 23 & 24 of the Constitution must be safeguarded unless lawfully restricted.\nThe trial and High Court orders were non-speaking and arbitrary, contrary to Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, requiring fair, reasoned decisions.\nDirections:\nOrders dated 20.05.2023 (Accountability Court-II, Hyderabad) and 13.03.2024 (High Court) set aside.\nVehicle BJ-4546 (Honda Vezel, Model 2016, Chassis No. RU3-1237318, Engine No. LEB-5937340) to be released to petitioner on superdari, subject to:\nPersonal bond and solvent surety equivalent to market value.\nVehicle to be produced whenever required by the court.\nNo alteration or transfer permitted during pendency.\nExcise Department to mark caution against transfer.\nClarified that “Toyota Vezel” in the freezing order was a typographical error, and the order applies to the Honda Vezel.\nKey Legal Principles:\nSection 12 & 13 NAO 1999: Define and regulate freezing of property.\nSection 516-A Cr.P.C.: Allows interim custody (superdari) during trial.\nSection 17 NAO: Cr.P.C. provisions apply to NAB proceedings.\nSection 24-A General Clauses Act: All judicial/executive orders must be reasoned, fair, and just.\nArticles 23–24 Constitution: Guarantee property rights subject to law.\nSpecial vs. General Law: When not inconsistent, Cr.P.C. applies even in NAB cases.\nOutcome:\nAppeal Allowed. Vehicle to be released on superdari.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 256-K of 2024, decided on 18th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025.\n(Against the order dated 13.03.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Civil Petition No. D-1077 of 2023).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, AQEEL AHMED ABBASI AND SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shaukat Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSattar Mehmood Awan, Deputy Prosecutor General, Syed Meeral Shah, Special Prosecutor and Irfan Ali, I.O/Deputy Director for the NAB.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AHSAN ALI DAWACH - Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE through Chairman NAB and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26491", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNC8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2103 = 2025 SLD 2103 = 2025 SCMR 1053", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNC8", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nTitle: Muhammad Nawaz v. The State\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nJudge: Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J.\nDate of Decision: [Date not mentioned in extract]\nCitation: [To be reported – Criminal Appeal from Lahore High Court Judgment dated 17.05.2012]\nStatutes Cited: Sections 302(b), 544-A, 382-B Cr.P.C.; Articles 9 & 10-A Constitution of Pakistan.\nKey Precedents Cited:\nMst. Sughra Begum v. Qaiser Pervez (2015 SCMR 1142)\nMuhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta (2017 SCMR 142)\nMuhammad Ali v. The State (2015 SCMR 137)\nUsman alias Kaloo v. The State (2017 SCMR 622)\nPathan v. The State (2015 SCMR 315)\nZafar v. The State (2018 SCMR 326)\nLiaquat Ali v. The State (2008 SCMR 95)\nZahoor Ahmad v. The State (2017 SCMR 1662)\nTariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345)\nMuhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230)\nFacts:\nFIR No.162/2002 under Section 302 PPC was registered at P.S. Chenab Nagar, District Chiniot for the murder of Mst. Azra Bibi, wife of the petitioner Muhammad Nawaz.\nAllegation: Petitioner attacked his wife with a kassi (spade) in the fields after a domestic quarrel, witnessed by her father (PW-7) and relatives.\nTrial Court: Convicted under Section 302(b) PPC; sentenced to death and Rs. 200,000 compensation.\nHigh Court: Upheld conviction, but converted death sentence to life imprisonment.\nSupreme Court: Petitioner challenged the conviction.\nIssues:\nWhether the testimony of prosecution witnesses, being chance witnesses, was reliable?\nWhether discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence undermined the prosecution case?\nWhether the alleged motive stood proved?\nFindings:\n1. Chance Witnesses — Unexplained Presence\nOccurrence took place in Kot Wasava; witnesses resided in Chak No.466 Khanowana.\nTheir presence justified by an alleged phone call from deceased — no phone number or ownership proved.\nComplainant admitted he had no phone, and the deceased used someone else’s phone (identity unknown).\nHeld: Presence of witnesses at the scene not established; reliance on Mst. Sughra Begum (2015 SCMR 1142).\n2. Ocular vs. Medical Evidence Conflict\nOcular account: only two injuries (head and neck).\nMedical evidence: four incised wounds, including on chest and shoulder.\nUnexplained injuries indicate witnesses were not present at the scene.\nCited Muhammad Ali (2015 SCMR 137) and Usman alias Kaloo (2017 SCMR 622).\n3. Unnatural Conduct\nThree male relatives allegedly saw the murder from close range (10 karams ≈ 22 feet).\nDid not intervene, rescue the deceased, or apprehend the accused — deemed unnatural conduct.\nCited Pathan v. The State (2015 SCMR 315) and Zafar v. The State (2018 SCMR 326).\n4. Recovery of Weapon\nKassi (P-4) allegedly recovered at petitioner’s instance — no positive forensic link.\nRecovery held inconsequential; Zahoor Ahmad v. The State (2017 SCMR 1662) applied.\n5. Motive Not Proved\nAlleged quarrel not corroborated by evidence.\nComplainant admitted no prior disputes; deceased never left home angrily.\nNo documentary proof (e.g., family suits or maintenance cases).\nRelationship appeared normal on day of incident — motive disbelieved.\nHeld:\nProsecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.\nMultiple circumstances created serious doubt in the prosecution story.\nApplying the principle that one doubt is enough for acquittal, the petitioner was acquitted.\nDisposition:\nAppeal Allowed.\nConviction and sentence set aside.\nMuhammad Nawaz acquitted of the charge under Section 302(b) PPC.\nTo be released forthwith unless required in another case.\nLegal Principle:\n“If there exists a single circumstance creating doubt in the prosecution case, the accused is entitled to its benefit as of right.”\n— Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345)", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 555 of 2017, decided on 12th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 12th March, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 07.06.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No.1044 of 2012 and Murder Reference No. 241 of 2012).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ATHAR MINALLAH, MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN AND SHAKEEL AHMAD, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nMirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD NAWAZ - Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26492", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNCs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2104 = 2025 SLD 2104 = 2025 SCMR 1058", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNCs", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nTitle: Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary & others v. Differently-Abled Persons & others\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nJudge: Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.\nDate of Judgment: 19 November 2024\nCitation: Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal against judgment of the Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench (C.P. No. D-176 of 2023 and connected petitions)\nStatutes Involved:\nSindh Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2018\nSindh Civil Servants Act, 1973\nSindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974\nConstitution of Pakistan, 1973 (Articles 2-A, 3, 4, 25, 38)\nUN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006\nFacts:\nDifferently-abled persons filed constitutional petitions before the Sindh High Court seeking enforcement of the 5% employment quota reserved for them under Section 5 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the 2018 Disabilities Act.\nThe High Court, through various interim orders, directed Deputy Commissioners across Sindh to ensure compliance, identify vacancies, and process appointments under the quota.\nIn its final composite judgment dated 19.11.2024, the High Court ordered the immediate appointment of remaining petitioners and required fortnightly compliance reports.\nIt also cautioned that any appointment made without inclusion of the differently-abled petitioners would not be accepted and would attract legal scrutiny.\nThe Government of Sindh challenged this final paragraph as being excessive and beyond the High Court’s jurisdiction.\nIssues:\nWhether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing Deputy Commissioners not to accept appointments excluding differently-abled petitioners.\nWhether the impugned directions violated executive discretion or merely ensured compliance with statutory obligations.\nArguments:\nPetitioner (Government of Sindh):\nRecruitment is governed by the Sindh Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2018 and the Sindh Civil Servants Rules, 1974.\nThe 5% quota is already being followed; the High Court’s cautionary direction created administrative complications and overreach.\nRespondents (Differently-abled persons):\nGovernment failed to implement the quota despite repeated judicial directions.\nThe High Court’s order merely enforces lawful compliance and protects statutory rights.\nHeld:\nThe Supreme Court found no illegality or overreach in the impugned judgment.\nThe High Court’s direction only ensured implementation of existing legal obligations under the 2018 Act and did not prejudice the Government.\nThe “cautionary observation” that appointments excluding differently-abled persons would not be accepted was logical, preventive, and consistent with constitutional and statutory mandates.\nThe 2018 Act is beneficial legislation enacted to implement the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) and must be enforced in letter and spirit.\nKey Legal Observations:\nArticle 3 of the Constitution obliges the State to eliminate exploitation and ensure social and economic justice.\nArticles 4 & 25 guarantee equality before law and equal protection; discrimination on basis of disability is impermissible.\nArticle 38 (Principles of Policy) directs the State to secure well-being, equitable rights, and livelihood opportunities for all citizens.\nThe UN Convention (2006) and the Sindh Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2018 form a coherent legal framework to promote inclusion, equal opportunity, and non-discrimination.\nCourts possess judicial review power to ensure that beneficial legislation is effectively implemented and not rendered meaningless by administrative inertia.\nOutcome:\nCivil Petitions dismissed.\nNo interference warranted in the High Court’s composite judgment.\nDirections of the High Court to ensure appointment and inclusion of differently-abled persons in the 5% quota upheld.\nLegal Principle:\nBeneficial legislation for the empowerment and inclusion of differently-abled persons must be implemented in letter and spirit. Courts are justified in issuing mandatory directions to ensure enforcement of statutory quotas and prevent administrative evasion.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petitions Nos. 220-K to 442-K of 2025, decided on 20th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 20th March, 2025.\n(Against the impugned judgment dated 19.11.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Bench at Sukkur in C.Ps. Nos. D-176, 264, 544, 284, 1422, 1437, 1461, 1471, 1489, 1493, 1502, 1504, 1535, 1510, 455 of 2023, C.P. No. D-1699 of 2018, C.P. No. D-910 of 2020, C.P. No. D-1543 of 2021, C.P. No. D-1273, 211, C.Ps. Nos. D-1256, 1399, 1424, 1474, 1479, 1480, 1485, 1487, 1488, C.Ps. Nos. D-2889 of 2014, 1492, 1499, 1505, 1696,1515, 1519, 1521, 1529, 1532, 1545, 1536, 1538, 1539, 1547, 1554, 1555, 1561, 1562, 1571, 1572, 1573, 1617, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1611, 1625, 1626, 1627, 1628, 1633, 1641, 1643, 1644, 1646, 1649, 1664, 1665, 1689, 1707, 1708, 1713, 1719, 1720, 1724, 1725, 1729, 1731, 1749, 1750, 1751, 1772, 1773, 1774, 1786, 1789, 1791, 1792, 1796, 1800, 1803, 1804, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1819, 1835, 1836, 1837, 1845, 1846, 1875, 1904, 1905, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1913, 1914, 1929, 1934, 1936, 1940, 1944, 1947, 1973, 1997, 2004, 1629, 1838, 1645, 1697, 1821, 1878, 1889, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1978, 1982, 1991 and 2000 of 2024).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh, Dr. Rana Khan, Advocate-on-Record along with Bhuro Mal, Additional Director (Law) (SGA&CD) for Petitioners.\nZaheeruddin Mujahid, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 220-K of 2025, 271-K of 2025 and 307-K of 2025).\nFarman Ali Tanwari, focal person for Court cases for Department of Employment of Persons with disabilities.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The PROVINCE OF SINDH through Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and others - Petitioners\nVS\nABID ALI JATOI and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26493", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2105 = 2025 SLD 2105 = 2025 SCMR 1066", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDk", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nTitle: Muhammad Boota and others v. Abdul Ghafoor and others\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nJudge: Shahid Bilal Hassan, J.\nDate of Judgment: [Date not specified — likely 2025]\nCitation: Civil Petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution against Lahore High Court judgment dated 01.06.2016 in C.R. No.382-D of 2010\nStatutes Cited:\nOrder XXIII, Rules 1 & 2, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908\nArticle 185(3), Constitution of Pakistan, 1973\nFacts:\nThe petitioners filed a suit for declaration and consequential relief on 05.11.1999 regarding ownership of land measuring 192 Kanals, alleging fraudulent transfer and illegal possession by respondents.\nThe suit was dismissed on 19.11.2001; on appeal it was remanded.\nDuring remand, respondent No.2 (Mst. Mumtaz Begum) contested, denying any gift to her stepson (respondent No.9) and alleging fraud and forgery.\nThe trial court again dismissed the suit on 29.03.2006 after recording full evidence.\nDuring appeal, plaintiffs moved an application under Order XXIII, Rules 1 & 2 CPC to withdraw the suit for filing afresh on the ground of a “formal defect”.\nThe appellate court allowed withdrawal on 18.03.2010, subject to Rs.5,000 cost.\nThe High Court, in C.R. No.382-D of 2010, set aside the appellate court’s order, holding that no formal defect had been disclosed.\nPetitioners sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court under Article 185(3).\nIssues:\nWhether the petitioners satisfied the requirement of Order XXIII, Rule 2 CPC by identifying any “formal defect” or “sufficient ground” for withdrawal and refiling?\nWhether a plaintiff can seek withdrawal of suit with permission to file afresh after a full adjudication on merits and an existing decree?\nHeld:\nThe petitioners failed to point out any formal defect—such as misdescription of parties, wrong valuation, or procedural irregularity—which does not affect the merits of the case.\nOnce a final judgment and decree has been passed on merits, the plaintiff cannot nullify or evade that decree through withdrawal of the suit.\nThe right to withdraw with liberty to file afresh is not absolute; it is conditional upon satisfaction of the Court regarding existence of a formal defect or sufficient ground.\nAllowing withdrawal after a verdict would undermine finality of litigation and encourage abuse of process.\nThe High Court rightly interfered; no illegality, perversity, or misreading of record found.\nKey Legal Principles:\nOrder XXIII, Rule 2 CPC provides two exceptions permitting withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit:\nWhere the suit must fail due to a formal defect, or\nWhere there exist other sufficient grounds, judicially recognized as legitimate.\nThe applicant must explicitly state and substantiate such defect or ground in the withdrawal application.\nCourts must record reasons and satisfaction before granting such permission.\nJudgments or decrees already rendered can only be set aside on merits, not nullified by withdrawal.\nA litigant cannot be permitted to withdraw at will after losing, merely to re-litigate the same matter (abuse of process doctrine).\nPrecedents Relied Upon:\nHaji Muhammad Boota v. Member Board of Revenue (2003 SCMR 1660)\nPLD 2015 SC 15 (Two-Member Bench)\nPLD 2019 SC 233 (Three-Member Bench)\nMrs. Rafiqa Iqbal Ahmad v. Muhammad Ali Hyder (1984 CLC 2886)\nCh. Muhammad Ali v. Sardar Muhammad Kazim Ziauddin Durrani (1999 CLC 1437)\nObservation:\n“If parties are allowed to do away with judgments rendered against them by simple withdrawal of the suit, it would encourage adventurism in litigation and frustrate the concept of justice. Decrees can only be set aside on merits, not through procedural escape.”\nOutcome:\nLeave to appeal refused.\nCivil Petition dismissed.\nHigh Court judgment upheld.\nLegal Principle (Headnote Form):\nCivil Procedure Code (V of 1908) — O.XXIII, Rr.1 & 2 — Withdrawal of suit — Formal defect — Scope.\nHeld, permission to withdraw a suit with liberty to file afresh can only be granted if a formal defect or sufficient ground, not affecting merits, is clearly established. Once a decree on merits exists, withdrawal cannot nullify it. A litigant cannot circumvent adverse judgments through procedural devices.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 2270-L of 2016, decided on 3rd April, 2025. Date of hearing: 3rd April, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 01.06.2016 passed by Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in C.R. No. 382 of 2010)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Shahid Bilal Hassan and Aamer Farooq, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mian Muhammad Tayyib Watto, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondents.\nAssisted by: Owais Nasir, L.C.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and others - Petitioners\nVS\nMUHAMMAD KHAN and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26494", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2106 = 2025 SLD 2106 = 2025 SCMR 1073", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNDg", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nTitle: Commissioner Inland Revenue v. [Name of Welfare Society]\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nJudge: Ayesha A. Malik, J.\nDate of Judgment: 31 January 2024\nStatutory Provisions Involved:\nSection 2(36), 100C, 122(5A), 122(9), and 237(1), Income Tax Ordinance, 2002\nRules 212, 214 & 217, Income Tax Rules, 2002\nS.R.O. No.754(I)/2016 dated 15.08.2016\nFacts:\nThe taxpayer, a welfare society, filed its income tax return for Tax Year 2019 claiming tax credit under Section 100C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2002.\nThe Department issued a show-cause notice under Section 122(9) read with 122(5A) alleging that the taxpayer’s approval under Section 2(36) had expired, as its original approval (dated 05.06.2007) was valid only for three years in view of S.R.O. 754(I)/2016.\nThe Assessing Officer and Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the disallowance.\nThe Appellate Tribunal (IR), however, held that the SRO applied prospectively from 15.08.2016, not retrospectively from 2007, and therefore the approval remained valid through August 2019.\nThe Lahore High Court affirmed the Tribunal’s view.\nThe Department (CIR) filed the instant Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution.\nIssues:\nWhether S.R.O. 754(I)/2016, which limited the validity of approvals under Rule 212 to “three subsequent years,” operates retrospectively or prospectively?\nWhether the taxpayer’s 2007 approval under Section 2(36) remained valid for the tax year 2019?\nHeld:\nThe S.R.O. 754(I)/2016 amended Rule 214 by providing that approvals under Rule 212 “shall remain in force for the subsequent three years unless withdrawn earlier.”\nThe phrase “subsequent three years” clearly indicates prospective application.\nThe SRO contains no express or implied clause making it retrospective.\nRetrospective fiscal legislation is impermissible unless explicitly provided by Parliament or delegated authority.\nAccordingly, the three-year validity period commenced from the date of the SRO (15.08.2016), not from the date of the original 2007 approval.\nTherefore, the taxpayer’s approval remained valid till August 2019, and it was entitled to tax credit for Tax Year 2019.\nThe High Court and Tribunal correctly applied the law; no misreading or legal error found.\nKey Legal Principle:\nTaxation — Delegated legislation — Retrospective effect — Interpretation.\nHeld, unless the language of a statute or statutory instrument clearly provides for retrospective operation, it will apply prospectively only. Particularly in tax matters, retrospective effect cannot be presumed. The S.R.O. 754(I)/2016 dated 15.08.2016, amending Rule 214 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, has no retrospective effect; its three-year limitation applies prospectively from the date of issuance.\nObservations:\n“The words ‘subsequent three years’ in Rule 214 do not suggest retrospective application. Retrospective taxation is not favoured in law unless expressly stated. Hence, the taxpayer’s approval remained valid up to August 2019.”\nResult:\nLeave to appeal refused.\nCivil Petition dismissed.\nHigh Court judgment maintained.\nCitation (for reporting):\nCommissioner Inland Revenue v. [Welfare Society]\n2024 SCMR — (to be reported)\nHeld: S.R.O. 754(I)/2016 operates prospectively — Approval under Section 2(36) valid till August 2019 — Taxpayer entitled to credit — Petition dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 687-L of 2024, decided on 23rd April, 2025. Date of hearing: 23rd April, 2025.\n(Against order dated 31.01.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.R. No. 77169 of 2022).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUNIB AKHTAR, AYESHA A. MALIK AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nM. Amir Sohail Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CORPORATE ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, FAISALABAD - Petitioner\nVS\nM/s NATIONAL PUBLIC WELFARE SOCIETY, JINNAH COLONY, FAISALABAD and another - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26495", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNHo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2107 = 2025 SLD 2107 = 2025 SCMR 1076", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNHo", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nTitle: Federal Board of Revenue through Secretary (MGT) IR-V v. [Respondent Widow]\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nJudge: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J.\nDate of Judgment: — (2024)\nCitation: (To be reported)\nProvisions Involved:\nPrime Minister’s Assistance Package for Families of Deceased Government Employees\nOffice Memorandum dated 15.12.2015 and O.M. dated 07.11.2024\nArticles 14, 25(1), 25(2), and 27, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973\nConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)\nFacts:\nThe respondent’s husband, an Income Tax Department employee, died in service on 14.02.2006.\nUnder the Prime Minister’s Assistance Package, she was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) on a two-year contract (26.05.2010), later extended.\nOn 04.01.2016, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) terminated her services based on an Office Memorandum (O.M.) dated 15.12.2015, which declared widows ineligible for compassionate employment upon remarriage.\nHer first writ petition before the Lahore High Court was treated as a representation, which was rejected by FBR on 11.05.2017.\nThe respondent then filed a second writ petition, which was allowed on 21.12.2022, directing reinstatement.\nThe FBR filed the present Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal before the Supreme Court.\nIssues:\nWhether a widow’s compassionate employment under the Prime Minister’s Assistance Package can be terminated upon remarriage?\nWhether the Office Memorandum dated 15.12.2015 is constitutionally valid under the fundamental rights framework of the Constitution?\nHeld:\nThe impugned O.M. dated 15.12.2015 is manifestly discriminatory, singling out widows (female spouses of deceased employees) for termination upon remarriage, without any corresponding restriction on widowers.\nSuch sex-based differentiation violates Articles 25(1) and 25(2) (equality and non-discrimination) and Article 27 (equal opportunity in public service) of the Constitution.\nThe O.M. reinforces patriarchal stereotypes, treating widows as dependents who lose entitlement upon remarriage — a view inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of dignity (Art. 14) and the right to livelihood.\nRemarriage is a matter of personal liberty, not a ground for loss of public employment.\nThe Court reaffirmed its earlier precedent in Zahida Parveen (2023 SCMR ___), holding that women’s entitlement to compassionate employment cannot be curtailed by marital status or patriarchal notions.\nThe withdrawal of the O.M. by the new O.M. dated 07.11.2024 was acknowledged as a corrective measure but had no retrospective effect on the instant case.\nPrime Minister’s Assistance Package, though declared unconstitutional in General Post Office v. Muhammad Jalal (PLD 2024 SC 1276), does not affect appointments already made.\nThe High Court’s decision reinstating the respondent was upheld; no ground for interference made out.\nKey Legal Principles:\n(i) Sex-based discrimination in public employment — An executive policy disqualifying widows upon remarriage, while exempting widowers, is unconstitutional as it offends Articles 25(1), 25(2) and 27.\n(ii) Equality and dignity of women — The Constitution protects women as autonomous, rights-bearing individuals, not as dependents defined by marital status. Financial independence is intrinsic to dignity and equality.\n(iii) Patriarchal bias in policy-making — Any rule that conditions a woman’s employment on remaining unmarried perpetuates social hierarchies and is void for arbitrariness and discrimination.\n(iv) International obligations — Under CEDAW, Pakistan must dismantle legal and social barriers to women’s economic participation; public policy must align with this commitment.\nObservations:\n“Women are not defined by the men in their lives; they are autonomous and rights-bearing individuals. Denying a woman employment for remarrying is a blatant reinforcement of patriarchal control, incompatible with the Constitution’s vision of equality and dignity.”\nResult:\nPetition dismissed.\nLeave to appeal refused.\nHigh Court judgment upheld.\nCitation for Reference:\nFederal Board of Revenue v. [Respondent Widow]\n2024 SCMR — (to be reported)\nHeld: Termination of widow’s employment upon remarriage — O.M. dated 15.12.2015 — Held discriminatory, unconstitutional, violative of Articles 14, 25 & 27 — Petition dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 808 of 2023, decided on 16th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 16th April, 2025.\n(Against the order dated 21.12.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur in W.P. No. 5193/2017).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz S. A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nNemo for Respondent.\nAssisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The CHIEF COMMISSIONER REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, BAHAWALPUR and others - Petitioners\nVS\nSHAHEEN YOUSAF - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26496", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNHk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2108 = 2025 SLD 2108 = 2025 SCMR 1082", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVETFNTNHk", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nTitle: Muhammad Ashraf v. The State\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nJudge: Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J.\nDate of Judgment: — (2024)\nCitation: (To be reported)\nStatutory Provisions Involved:\nSections 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code, 1860\nSection 544-A, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898\nFacts:\nThe appellant, Muhammad Ashraf, was tried for the murder of Moula Bakhsh under Section 302(b) PPC, pursuant to FIR No. 207/2012, Police Station Hala, District Matiari.\nThe Trial Court (27.07.2015) convicted and sentenced him to death, with Rs.200,000 compensation to the heirs of the deceased under Section 544-A Cr.P.C.\nThe Sindh High Court (01.07.2021) dismissed his appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence.\nThe present criminal appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan.\nProsecution Version:\nThe complainant (PW-1) alleged that on 28.12.2012 at 7:00 a.m., he and two witnesses (PW-2 & PW-3) heard cries from their shop and saw the appellant striking Moula Bakhsh with a hatchet, causing his instant death.\nThe motive alleged was that the deceased, a former employee of the appellant, had set up a rival workshop adjacent to that of the appellant, provoking enmity.\nIssues:\nWhether the delay of five hours in lodging the FIR was explained satisfactorily?\nWhether the ocular account of the prosecution witnesses was reliable and consistent with the medical evidence?\nWhether the motive was proved by the prosecution?\nWhether conviction could be sustained solely on recovery evidence when direct evidence was disbelieved?\nHeld:\n(i) Delay in FIR:\nThe incident occurred at 7:00 a.m., but the FIR was lodged at 12:00 noon, despite the police station being only two furlongs away. The complainant admitted informing relatives and police earlier. The delay remained unexplained, suggesting consultation and deliberation — casting serious doubt on the prosecution version (Shaukat Hussain v. State, 2024 SCMR 929; Khial Muhammad v. State, 2024 SCMR 1490).\n(ii) Presence of Eye-witnesses:\nThe prosecution failed to establish a plausible reason for their presence at the spot at an odd early hour (before sunrise, 7:12 a.m.) in December. Their explanation — that they slept “sitting” in a Mazda pickup — was unnatural and unconvincing. The vehicle was neither seized nor produced in court.\n(iii) Conduct of Witnesses:\nThe eye-witnesses’ inaction was deemed unnatural. Despite being close relatives and in proximity (21–26 feet away), they made no effort to save the deceased or apprehend the appellant, who was alone and armed only with a hatchet. Their conduct rendered their presence doubtful and their evidence unreliable (Liaquat Ali v. State, 2008 SCMR 95; Pathan v. State, 2015 SCMR 315; Zafar v. State, 2018 SCMR 326).\n(iv) Medical vs. Ocular Evidence:\nPost-mortem at 10:00 a.m. revealed time between death and post-mortem as 9–10 hours, indicating death occurred around midnight (12–1 a.m.), contradicting the alleged 7:00 a.m. occurrence.\n(v) Motive:\nThe alleged grudge over a rival workshop was vague, unsubstantiated, and unproved; no specific incident or confrontation was established.\n(vi) Recovery Evidence:\nRecovery of a bloodstained hatchet and positive chemical report could not, by itself, sustain conviction after the ocular account was disbelieved (Dr. Israr-ul-Haq v. Muhammad Fayyaz, 2007 SCMR 1427; Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan, PLD 2006 SC 538; Nek Muhammad v. State, PLD 1995 SC 516).\n(vii) Benefit of Doubt:\nThe case was replete with multiple doubts. A single reasonable doubt is sufficient for acquittal; here, numerous contradictions destroyed the prosecution’s case.\nLegal Principle:\nCriminal Law — Benefit of Doubt — Delay in FIR — Unnatural Conduct — Contradiction between Ocular and Medical Evidence.\nHeld, unexplained delay in FIR, doubtful presence of witnesses, unnatural conduct, and conflict between ocular and medical evidence render the prosecution case unreliable. Benefit of doubt must go to the accused. Conviction cannot rest solely on recovery when direct evidence is disbelieved.\nResult:\nAppeal allowed.\nConviction and sentence set aside.\nAppellant acquitted by extending benefit of doubt.\nTo be released forthwith, unless required in another case.\nCitation (Suggested):\nMuhammad Ashraf v. The State\n2024 SCMR — (to be reported)\nHeld: Delay in FIR — Unnatural conduct — Contradiction between medical and ocular evidence — Vague motive — Conviction unsustainable — Benefit of doubt extended — Appeal allowed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 188 of 2023, decided on 7th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 7th April, 2025.\n(On appeal against the judgment dated 01.07.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. D-68 of 2015 and Confirmation Case No. D-08 of 2015).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nKhadim Hussain, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASHRAF - Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26497", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2109 = 2025 SLD 2109 = 2025 SCMR 1087", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzc", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nCase Title: Waqas Ahmad v. The State\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nJudge: Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim\nDate: (Not specified — judgment excerpt)\nCharge: Section 302(b) PPC – Qatl-e-Amd (murder of paternal uncle)\nOrigin: FIR No. 333/2009, P.S. Sahianwala, District Faisalabad\nOutcome: Appeal allowed — conviction and sentence set aside — accused acquitted.\nBackground\nAllegation:\nWaqas Ahmad was accused of murdering his paternal uncle, Ijaz Ahmad, using an iron darat (sickle-like weapon).\nProsecution Story:\nThe complainant (Muhammad Ali, PW-7 — father of the deceased and grandfather of the accused) claimed to have seen the incident around 3–4 a.m. in his cattle pen, where both the deceased and the accused were sleeping. The accused allegedly attacked the deceased due to being admonished for drug addiction.\nTrial Court:\nConvicted the accused under Section 302(b) PPC and sentenced him to death (11.04.2012).\nHigh Court:\nUpheld the conviction but converted the death sentence to life imprisonment (10.04.2017).\nSupreme Court:\nAcquitted the accused upon finding serious doubts in the prosecution’s case.\nKey Observations\n1. Delay in FIR\nOccurrence: 03.07.2009 at 3–4 a.m.\nFIR lodged: 07:00 a.m. (delay of 3–4 hours).\nNo plausible explanation for delay; considered fatal to prosecution.\nCourt cited precedents:\nMst. Asia Bibi v. The State (PLD 2019 SC 64)\nZeeshan alias Shani v. The State (2012 SCMR 428)\n2. Delay in Postmortem\nPostmortem at 10:30 a.m., i.e., 3.5 hours after FIR.\nNo reason for delay given by doctor or prosecution.\nCourt inferred that eye-witnesses were likely procured later.\n3. Medical Contradictions\nDeceased’s mouth and eyes semi-open; rigor mortis present; semi-digested food in stomach.\nThese signs contradicted the alleged time of death (4 a.m.) and suggested earlier death.\nCourt inferred that the body was left unattended for hours, inconsistent with eyewitness claim.\n4. Dishonest Improvements\nComplainant (PW-7) made multiple improvements in oral testimony not found in written complaint (Exh. PE).\nContradictions about:\nDistance from scene\nNumber and nature of blows\nPresence of light bulb\nDragging of body\nIdentity and motive of accused\nCourt held such dishonest improvements destroy credibility.\nCited Muhammad Jahangir v. The State (2024 SCMR 1741).\n5. Identification Doubt\nOccurrence in dark hours of night.\nNo source of light (natural or artificial) proved.\nBulb not recovered; no evidence of electricity.\nHence, identification highly doubtful.\n6. Unnatural Conduct of Complainant\nHe remained silent while his son was allegedly murdered by his grandson.\nCourt held such behavior unnatural and inconsistent with human conduct, casting doubt on presence at the scene.\n7. Forensic & Site Plan Contradictions\nSite plan showed blood beneath cot, but no blood trail from the cot to the field where the body was allegedly dragged for one acre.\nNo scratches or bruises on deceased to support dragging claim.\n8. Missing Witnesses\nAlleged eyewitnesses Khalid Mehmood and Tariq Mehmood were not produced.\nAdverse inference drawn under Article 129(g), Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.\nConclusion\nMultiple inconsistencies, unexplained delays, medical contradictions, and dishonest improvements created serious doubt.\nFollowing settled principles (Muhammad Mansha v. The State, 2018 SCMR 772; Najaf Ali Shah v. The State, 2021 SCMR 736), benefit of doubt extended to accused.\nConviction set aside, appeal allowed, and accused acquitted.\nFinal Order\n“The instant petition is converted into appeal and allowed.\nThe conviction and sentence under Section 302(b) PPC are set aside.\nWaqas Ahmad is acquitted and shall be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.”", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 539 of 2017, decided on 9th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 10th March, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.04.2017 of the learned Lahore High Court Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 224-J of 2012 and Murder Reference No. 219 of 2012).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Ruqia Samee, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nNemo for the Complainant.\nMs. Memoona Ihsan-ul-Haq, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "WAQAS AHMAD - Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26498", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2110 = 2025 SLD 2110 = 2025 SCMR 1275", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzY", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary\nCase Title: Petitioners vs. Mst. Raheela\nJudge: Justice Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nDate of Judgment: — (Order text indicates 2024)\nNature of Case: Family dispute — Recovery of Dower (Dower Property: house and plot)\nProvision Involved: Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution of Pakistan (Writ Jurisdiction)\nOutcome: Case remanded to Family Court — High Court exceeded jurisdiction by decreeing the suit.\nBackground\nRespondent No. 1 (Mst. Raheela) filed a suit for recovery of dower before the Family Court, Nowshera on 03.01.2015 against her father-in-law (petitioner No. 1).\nHer husband had passed away.\nShe claimed entitlement to a house (5 marlas) and a plot (10 marlas) as dower property.\nHer claim was not based on the Nikah Nama, but on:\nA gift deed (tamleeq nama) dated 26.09.2017 executed by her father-in-law in favour of her late husband; and\nAnother gift deed executed the same day by her husband in her favour.\nFamily Court (14.10.2017): Dismissed her suit — held that execution of the deeds was not proved.\nAppellate Court (11.06.2018): Dismissed appeal — upheld Family Court’s judgment.\nPeshawar High Court (04.12.2023): Allowed her writ petition (No. 4688-P/2018), set aside concurrent judgments, and decreed her suit — holding that Family Courts are not to apply strict technical rules of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 or CPC, 1908.\nIssue Before the Supreme Court\nWhether the High Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 199(1)(a)(ii), could decree the suit after setting aside concurrent judgments of the Family and Appellate Courts.\nSupreme Court’s Findings\n1. Scope of Writ Jurisdiction\nThe High Court can interfere with concurrent findings only if they are based on:\nNo evidence,\nMisreading or non-reading of evidence,\nErroneous assumptions of fact, or\nPatent errors of law.\nHowever, it cannot substitute its own findings or decree a suit as though it were an appellate or trial court.\n2. Proper Course for High Court\nEven when interference is justified, the proper course is to remand the matter to the competent court (Family or Appellate Court) for fresh decision, not to decide factual controversies itself.\nThe High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by decreeing Mst. Raheela’s suit directly.\n3. Precedents Cited\nThe Supreme Court reaffirmed consistent principles from earlier cases:\nCase\nCitation\nPrinciple Laid Down\nAzmat Ali v. Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner\nPLD 1964 SC 260\nSuperior Courts may quash an order but must remand for decision; not substitute findings.\nNawaza v. Additional Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner\nPLD 1970 SC 39\nHigh Court cannot decide disputed facts; must remand if findings are based on misreading or no evidence.\nShabbir Hussain v. Muhammad Afzal\n1972 SCMR 47\nWrit jurisdiction is for correcting illegality, not sitting as a Court of Appeal.\nMuhammad Younus Khan v. Govt. of N.W.F.P.\n1993 SCMR 619\nEven if findings are perverse, High Court should remand instead of substituting its own findings.\nSupreme Court’s Decision\nInterference with concurrent findings by the High Court was partly justified, as it found non-reading of relevant evidence.\nHowever, the High Court’s act of decreeing the suit was beyond its jurisdiction.\nOrder\nLeave to appeal granted only to the extent of setting aside the decree granted by the High Court.\nPetition converted into appeal and allowed to that extent.\nMatter remanded to the Family Court, Nowshera, for fresh decision in light of the High Court’s observations.\nCMA No. 3330/2024 dismissed as infructuous.\nLegal Principle Reaffirmed\n“In writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannot substitute its own findings of fact or decree a suit; its role is confined to correcting jurisdictional or legal errors, and the proper course in such cases is remand, not substitution.”", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 1106 and C.M.A. No. 3330 of 2024, decided on 13th May, 2025. Date of hearing: 13th May, 2025.\nC.P.L.A. No. 1106 of 2024\n(Against judgment dated 04.12.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No. 4688-P of 2018 with C.M. No..2331-P of 2018).\nAND\nC.M.A. No. 3330 of 2024\n(Stay application).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Yahya Afridi, CJ, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Azmat Ali Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nMuhammad Sadiq Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAQBOOL ALI and another - Petitioners\nVS\nMst. RAHEELA and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26499", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2111 = 2025 SLD 2111 = 2025 SCMR 1099", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzU", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary: Post-Arrest Bail – Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010\nBench: Sardar Tariq Masood, J.\nDate: 18.02.2025\nCase: Criminal Petitions Nos. 1565 & 1574 of 2024\nLaw Involved: Sections 3 & 4, Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 (as amended); Section 497 Cr.P.C.\nResult: Bail Allowed\nFacts:\nFIR No. 02/2024 was registered at FIA Anti-Money Laundering Circle, Islamabad against Muhammad Afnan Alam (Member Estate, CDA) and Jabran (property dealer).\nAllegations: Afnan Alam obtained illegal gains through corruption, purchasing three properties (two in wife’s name and one vehicle). Jabran allegedly facilitated one transaction as “front-man.”\nPredicate offences were covered by FIRs No. 03, 05, and 11 of 2024, registered under PPC and PCA.\nPetitioners’ Contentions:\nJabran:\nOnly acted as a property broker; not nominated in predicate FIRs.\nSection 3 AMLA not in prohibitory clause (max 10 years but min 1 year).\nIncarcerated for 6 months; challan not filed.\nAfnan Alam:\nAlready granted bail in predicate offences (FIRs 03, 05 & 11 of 2024).\nAlleged properties purchased before the commission of predicate crimes.\nProperty purchases funded through declared income.\nIssues:\nWhether Section 3 of AMLA falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.?\nWhether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail?\nHeld:\nSection 3 AMLA falls within the prohibitory clause.\nAt the bail stage, the maximum punishment (10 years) is considered, not the minimum.\nReliance on Socha Gul v. State (2015 SCMR 1077) and ANF v. Qasim Ali (2019 SCMR 1928).\nRejected argument based on Jamal-ud-Din and Khuda Bux.\nCase of Further Inquiry (Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.)\nJabran: Role limited to property brokerage; cheque not encashed; no evidence of laundering.\nAfnan Alam:\nGranted bail in all predicate FIRs.\nAlleged properties purchased prior to alleged corrupt allotments.\nNo proof of proceeds of crime; payment verified via banking record.\nOutcome:\nBoth petitions converted into appeals and allowed.\nBail granted to Muhammad Afnan Alam and Jabran in FIR No. 02/2024.\nEach to furnish bail bonds of Rs. 1,000,000 with two sureties.\nObservations are tentative and shall not prejudice the trial.\nKey Legal Principles Affirmed:\nAt bail stage, consider maximum prescribed punishment to determine application of the prohibitory clause.\nSpeculative assessment of likely sentence is impermissible.\nHigh Court’s earlier grant of bail in predicate offences strengthens claim of further inquiry under Section 497(2).\nIn white-collar / documentary cases, prolonged custody without challan can justify bail.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Petitions Nos. 1565 and 1574 of 2024, decided on 21st March, 2025. Date of hearing: 18th February, 2025.\n(On appeal against the orders dated 05.11.2024 and 01.11.2024 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Crl. Misc. No. 1728-B of 2024 and Crl. Misc. No. 1636-B of 2024, respectively).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD AND MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. P. 1565 of 2024).\nUmair Majeed Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in Crl. P. 1574 of 2024).\nRaja Shafaqat Abbasi, DAG for the State.\nArslan, Inspector (FIA) for the State.\nAssisted by: Johar Imam and Habib Khan, Law Clerks.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JABRAN and another - Petitioners\nVS\nThe STATE through Director General FIA and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26500", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2112 = 2025 SLD 2112 = 2025 SCMR 1110", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzQ", - "Key Words:": "Case Summary: Murder Conviction – Benefit of Doubt / Acquittal\nCourt: Supreme Court of Pakistan\nJudge: Justice Ishtiaq Ibrahim\nDate of Decision: 2025\nCitation: (Unreported yet – Criminal Appeals Nos. 201-L & 202-L of 2020)\nRelevant Law: Sections 302(b), 109 & 34 PPC; Section 544-A & 173 Cr.P.C.\n1. Parties\nAppellants / Convicts:\nImtiaz Hussain Shah alias Tajjay Shah\nMuhammad Akram Bhatti\nComplainant / Petitioner:\nAnwar-ul-Hasnain\nCo-accused: Ijaz Hussain (acquitted by Trial Court)\n2. Background\nFIR No. 264/2009 registered at Police Station Miani, District Sargodha, for Qatl-e-Amd (302 PPC) of Aqeel Shah.\nAllegation: The appellants, armed with rifles, fired at the deceased due to a prior grudge (deceased had opposed appellant’s brother in another murder case).\nTrial Court: Convicted both appellants under Section 302(b) PPC and sentenced them to death.\nLahore High Court (09.03.2016): Maintained conviction but converted death to life imprisonment.\nSupreme Court: Granted leave to appeal (08.05.2020) to reappraise entire evidence.\n3. Issues for Determination\nWhether the ocular account (eye-witnesses’ testimony) was trustworthy and natural.\nWhether the absence of light source and delay in postmortem created reasonable doubt in the prosecution case.\nWhether the appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt.\n4. Court’s Analysis\n(a) Credibility of Eye-Witnesses\nEye-witnesses (Sher Abbas PW-6 and Anwar-ul-Hasnain PW-8) were close relatives of the deceased and residents of Sargodha, while the incident occurred in Islampura, Miani.\nTheir presence at the crime scene deemed unnatural and unconvincing.\nContradictions in their statements regarding how and when they arrived; their version appeared tutored and afterthought.\nIndependent witness (shop owner Muhammad Razaq) was withheld without reason — adverse inference drawn under Article 129(g) of QSO, 1984.\n(b) Lack of Light Source\nOccurrence took place at 8:00 p.m. (night) in July, yet FIR and witnesses did not mention any source of light.\nSite plan and recovery memos also showed no illumination at the scene.\nIdentification of accused therefore doubtful.\nReliance placed on Usman alias Kaloo v. The State (2017 SCMR 622).\n(c) Delay in Postmortem\nFIR lodged at 8:45 p.m., but postmortem conducted around midnight / next day (20.07.2009).\nNo justification for delay provided.\nCourt inferred delay used for fabricating evidence and procuring witnesses.\nRelied on Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. State (2019 SCMR 1068), Irshad Ahmad v. State (2011 SCMR 1190), and Ulfat Hussain v. State (2018 SCMR 313).\n(d) Medical & Ocular Conflict\nMedical evidence: 3 firearm wounds.\nOcular evidence: 4 firearm wounds.\nConflict further weakened prosecution version.\n(e) Recovery & Motive\nBoth discarded by High Court; Supreme Court agreed — not corroborated by independent or forensic evidence.\n5. Held / Decision\nProsecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.\nCase riddled with contradictions, doubtful identification, and procedural defects.\nBenefit of doubt extended to appellants as of right (not concession).\nCited Muhammad Mansha v. State (2018 SCMR 772) and Najaf Ali Shah v. State (2021 SCMR 736).\n✅ Result:\nCriminal Appeals No. 201-L & 202-L of 2020 allowed.\nConviction and life sentence set aside.\nAppellants acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in another case.\nComplainant’s petition for enhancement (Cr.P.L.A. No. 596-L of 2016) dismissed as infructuous.\n6. Legal Principle (Ratio Decidendi)\n“Where presence of eye-witnesses appears unnatural, no light source is shown for identification, and delay in postmortem remains unexplained, the entire prosecution case becomes doubtful. Even a single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right, not concession.”", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Crl. Appeals Nos. 201-L and 202-L of 2020 and Crl. PLA No. 596-L of 2016, decided on 14th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 14th March, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 09.03.2016, passed by the learned Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 169/J of 201l and Murder Reference No. 503 of 2011).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND ISHTIAQ IBRAHIM, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mazhar Iqbal Sidhu, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Cr. A. No. 201-L of 2020).\nIjaz Ahmad Janjua, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Cr. A. No. 202-L of 2020) through video link from Lahore.\nMuhammad Aslam Zar, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Cr. PLA. No. 596-L of 2016).\nMs. Memoona Ihsaan-ul-Haq, DPG for the State (in all cases).", - "Petitioner Name:": "IMTIAZ HUSSAIN SHAH alias Tajjay Shah and another - Appellants\nVS\nThe STATE and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26501", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYy8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2113 = 2025 SLD 2113 = 2025 SCMR 1117", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYy8", - "Key Words:": "Facts:\nPetitioner lodged FIR No.1783/2024 under Section 406 P.P.C. against Sheikh Muhammad Zahir Sethi and Muhammad Imtisal, alleging criminal breach of trust.\nAllegation: Respondents, being close relatives, sought financial help; petitioner handed them Rs. 40,00,000 as a loan/trust.\nLater, respondents allegedly misappropriated the money.\nHigh Court quashed the FIR under Article 199 of the Constitution, holding that no offence under Section 406 P.P.C. was made out.\nPetitioner’s Contentions:\nRespondents were found guilty during investigation; FIR could not be quashed once challan was submitted and trial court had taken cognizance.\nThe amount was given as a trust (Amanat), hence, entrustment existed under Section 405 P.P.C.\nRelied on DG Anti-Corruption Establishment Lahore v. Muhammad Akram Khan (PLD 2013 SC 401) and Muhammad Ali v. Samina Qasim Tarar (2022 SCMR 2001).\nKey Legal Issues:\nWhether the High Court could quash an FIR under Article 199 after submission of challan.\nWhether the FIR disclosed the commission of offence under Section 406 P.P.C. (Criminal Breach of Trust).\nCourt’s Observations:\nScope of Quashment Powers:\nSection 561-A Cr.P.C. allows High Court to quash judicial proceedings, not police actions like FIR or investigation (Shahnaz Begum v. High Court, PLD 1971 SC 677).\nHowever, under Article 199, the High Court may quash an FIR or investigation where:\nNo offence is made out;\nRegistration of FIR is abuse of process;\nFIR is without lawful authority.\nSuch powers must be used sparingly and only in exceptional cases (PLD 2023 SC 265; PLD 2025 SC 254).\nOffence under Section 406 P.P.C.:\nRequires two elements:\nEntrustment of property.\nDishonest misappropriation of that property.\nA loan is not an entrustment, as it creates a contractual, not fiduciary, relationship.\nThe FIR contradicts itself — initially calling the amount a loan, later an Amanat.\nMere use of the term Amanat cannot convert a loan into trust property (Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed, 2000 SCMR 122; Imtiaz Ali v. Bismillah Khan, 1974 PCrLJ Note 22).\nNo documentary evidence of the alleged transaction existed.\nHeld:\nThe FIR did not disclose any offence under Section 406 P.P.C.\nThe High Court rightly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction to quash the FIR.\nThe precedent in PLD 2013 SC 401 was distinguishable and inapplicable.\nResult:\nLeave to appeal refused.\nPetition dismissed.\nKey Legal Principles Reaffirmed:\nA loan does not amount to entrustment for the purpose of Section 405/406 P.P.C.\nHigh Court may quash an FIR under Article 199 only when no prima facie offence is made out.\nUse of “Amanat” in FIR cannot convert a civil dispute into a criminal offence.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 1575 of 2024, decided on 22nd May, 2025. Date of hearing: 13th May, 2025.\n(On appeal against the order dated 08.03.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 1684 of 2024).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD AND MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Junaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore).\nNemo for Respondents.\nAssisted by: Mian Johar Imam and Habib, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AYESHA TAYYAB - Petitioner\nVS\nSTATION HOUSE OFFICER, POLICE STATION CANTT. DISTRICT SIALKOT and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26502", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYys", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2114 = 2025 SLD 2114 = 2025 SCMR 1123", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYys", - "Key Words:": "Background & Trial\nAccused/Appellant: Munir Ahmad\nAllegation: Murdered his father Abdul Hameed and brother Tanveer Ahmad with a .30 bore pistol inside their house due to domestic and property disputes.\nTrial Court: Convicted under Section 302(b) PPC and sentenced to death on two counts with Rs. 500,000 compensation (each) — Judgment dated 30.11.2012.\nHigh Court: Lahore High Court, Multan Bench dismissed the appeal and confirmed death sentence on 10.04.2018.\n2. Supreme Court Proceedings\nJail Petition No. 439 of 2018 filed by appellant.\nLeave granted on 16.01.2023 to re-examine the entire evidence for safe administration of justice.\n3. Prosecution’s Case\nComplainant (PW-1): Muhammad Yaseen Sultan (son-in-law of Abdul Hameed).\nIncident occurred on 15.10.2011 at 12:30 PM inside deceased’s house at Qaboolwala.\nOcular witnesses: PW-1 (complainant) and PW-2 (Muhammad Nawaz) — both eye-witnesses.\nAppellant fired multiple shots, killing his father and brother on the spot.\nWhile fleeing on bicycle, he fired at the complainant; one Muhammad Hashim was hit and later died.\nSeparate FIR No.664/2011 was lodged for the subsequent chase-related offences.\n4. Evidence & Findings\nOcular Testimony\nPW-1 and PW-2 gave consistent, confidence-inspiring evidence.\nBoth were natural witnesses with plausible reasons for presence at the scene.\nNo enmity or motive to falsely implicate the appellant.\nMinor discrepancies noted but held normal and inconsequential.\nCited precedents:\nAsfandiyar v. State\nMuhammad Abbas v. State\nAman Ullah v. State\nImran Mehmood v. State\nAllah Bakhsh v. Ahmad Din\nRecovery & Forensic Evidence\nThree empties recovered from the spot.\nPistol (.30 bore) recovered on appellant’s pointation.\nFSL report: Empties matched the recovered pistol → strong corroboration.\nMedical Evidence\nDr. Qurban Hussain (PW-4) confirmed both deaths due to firearm injuries — consistent with ocular evidence.\n5. Motive\nAlleged: Domestic dispute and property issues.\nNot proved — both trial and appellate courts found motive evidence scanty and unreliable.\nFailure to prove motive treated as mitigating circumstance for sentence.\nGhulam Muhammad v. State (PLD 2009 SC 73-L)\nHaq Nawaz v. State (2022 SCMR ...)\nAmir Muhammad Khan v. State (2023 SCMR 566)\nTajamal Hussain Shah v. State (2022 SCMR 1567)\nLiaqat Ali v. State (2021 SCMR 780)\nNajaf Ali Shah v. State (2021 SCMR 736)\nKhalid Mehmood v. State (2021 SCMR 810)\n6. Court’s Reasoning\nConviction: Supported by reliable ocular, medical, and forensic evidence — no reason to disbelieve prosecution.\nSentence:\nMotive not proved.\nMinor inconsistencies present.\nBoth treated as mitigating factors → death sentence reduced to life imprisonment.\nCited Ansar Ahmad Khan Barki’s case – minor inconsistencies may mitigate sentence but not warrant acquittal.\n7. Final Order\nAppeal partly allowed.\nConviction under Section 302(b) PPC maintained.\nDeath sentence converted to life imprisonment (on two counts).\nCompensation (Rs. 500,000 each) and default sentence maintained.\nSentences to run concurrently.\nBenefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. extended to appellant.\n8. Legal Principles Reaffirmed\nFailure to prove motive → mitigating factor for reduction of death penalty.\nMinor discrepancies do not undermine trustworthy ocular evidence.\nRelated witnesses can be relied upon if found truthful and without animus.\nOcular, medical, and forensic evidence consistent → conviction sustainable.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 2023, decided on 9th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 25th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 10.04.2018 passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in M.R. 5 of 2013 and Crl. Appeal No. 863 of 2012).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR AND ISHTIAQ IBRAHIM, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nTarique Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.\nNemo for the Complainant", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUNIR AHMAD - Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26503", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2115 = 2025 SLD 2115 = 2025 SCMR 1130", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzk", - "Key Words:": "Background\nThe petitioner was refused post-arrest bail by the High Court (order dated 21.01.2025).\nFIR alleged that the petitioner purchased several vehicles from Defence Motors showroom after making part payments but failed to pay remaining amounts and misappropriated the cars.\nOffence registered under Section 406 PPC (criminal breach of trust).\n2. Petitioner’s Contentions\nFIR disclosed a civil/business dispute, not criminal breach of trust.\nOffence under Section 406 PPC does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.\nNo recovery of vehicles despite long incarceration.\nFIR lodged with a delay of 5 months.\n3. Complainant’s Stand\nAsserted that vehicles were handed over as “amanat” (trust), thus Section 406 PPC attracted.\nAddl. PG, however, conceded that elements of Section 405 PPC (criminal breach of trust) were missing — at best, Section 420 PPC (cheating) could apply.\n4. Legal Discussion\n(a) Ingredients of Criminal Breach of Trust (Section 405 PPC)\nTwo essential elements:\nEntrustment of property or dominion over property as trust (amanat).\nDishonest misappropriation or violation of such trust.\n(Major precedents: Abdul Rashid Nasir v. State (2009 SCMR 517); Ali Raza v. State (2022 SCMR 1223))\n(b) Meaning of Entrustment\nEntrustment implies temporary possession without transfer of ownership, coupled with obligation to return the same property.\nNo entrustment exists in sale, investment, or business transactions involving transfer of ownership or profit sharing.\n(Shahid Imran v. State, 2011 SCMR 1614; Rafiq Haji Usman v. NAB, 2015 SCMR 1575; Hashmat Ullah v. State, 2019 SCMR 1730.)\n(c) Application to Present Case\nVehicles were transferred through business transactions with part payments; ownership passed to purchaser.\nHence, no entrustment or fiduciary relationship was created.\nMere use of words “trust” or “amanat” in FIR does not establish entrustment.\n(Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed, 2000 SCMR 122; Imtiaz Ali v. Bismillah Khan, 1974 PCr.LJ Note 22.)\nTherefore, offence under Section 406 PPC not made out.\n(d) Bail Principles – Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.\nOffence under Section 406 PPC is non-prohibitory (punishable up to 7 years).\nAs per Tariq Bashir v. State (PLD 1995 SC 34), bail is a rule and refusal an exception in non-prohibitory offences.\nExceptions:\n(a) Likelihood of absconding\n(b) Tampering with evidence\n(c) Repetition of offence\n(d) Previous conviction\nThe petitioner’s case did not fall under any exception.\nHigh Court wrongly refused bail merely because petitioner was named in other FIRs — only prior conviction is relevant, not mere registration of other cases.\n(Precedents cited: Mansha Khan v. State (1977 SCMR 449); Allah Rakha v. State (1993 SCMR 1994); Muhammad Tanveer v. State (PLD 2017 SC 733); Nazir Ahmad v. State (2022 SCMR 1467); Ali Anwar Paracha v. State (2024 SCMR 1596))\n5. Observations by the Court\nMisuse of Section 405/406 PPC:\nIncreasing trend of criminalizing civil or business disputes to pressurize parties condemned.\nCriminal law cannot substitute civil remedies or be used to recover money.\nCourts must scrutinize whether essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust exist before proceeding.\nJudicial Discipline:\nLower courts often ignore binding precedent (Tariq Bashir case) when deciding bail.\nSuch disregard violates Article 189 of the Constitution.\nDirections issued to circulate this judgment to all High Courts and District Courts to ensure compliance.\n6. Final Order (Short Order dated 18.02.2025)\n“For reasons to be recorded later, this petition is converted into an appeal and allowed. The petitioner is enlarged on bail in FIR No.207/2022 under Section 406 PPC, P.S. Cantt Gujranwala, subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 500,000 with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court.”\n7. Outcome\nAppeal allowed.\nPost-arrest bail granted.\nObservations issued for nationwide judicial adherence to the Tariq Bashir principles.\n8. Key Legal Principles Reaffirmed\nSection 406 PPC applies only when there is entrustment and dishonest misappropriation of property.\nBusiness or sale transactions lacking fiduciary entrustment do not attract Section 405/406 PPC.\nIn non-prohibitory offences, bail is a rule, refusal an exception (per Tariq Bashir).\nMere involvement in other FIRs ≠ valid ground for denial of bail.\nLower courts bound under Article 189 to follow Supreme Court precedents.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Petition No. 170-L of 2025, decided on 19th May, 2025. Date of hearing: 23rd April, 2025.\n(On appeal against the order dated 21.01.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. No. 74957-B of 2024).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR TARIQ MASOOD AND MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Waqar Ahmad Hanjra, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore).\nMuhammad Jaffar, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab, Rizwan, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Shahbaz SI for the State (through video link from Lahore).\nAssisted by: Mian Johar Imam and Habib, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AMJAD NAEEM - Petitioner\nVS\nThe STATE through Prosecutor General Punjab and another - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26504", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2116 = 2025 SLD 2116 = 2025 SCMR 1145", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDYzg", - "Key Words:": "Facts\nAppellant Muhammad Abras was accused of firing upon police constables during a patrol, resulting in the death of Constable Shamshad Akber and injuries to Constable Haroon Rasheed.\nFIR lodged the same night under Sections 302 & 324 PPC.\nTrial Court convicted the appellant, sentencing him to death (u/s 302) and 10 years R.I. (u/s 324).\nThe Islamabad High Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, maintaining conviction.\nThe appellant challenged the conviction before the Supreme Court.\n2. Key Findings\n(a) Identification Evidence\nAppellant not named in FIR and not arrested at the scene.\nArrested after 15 days, test identification parade conducted 10 days later.\nIncident occurred at 1:25 a.m. in darkness — no mention of lighting in site plan or FIR.\nPW police officials continued to serve at the same police station as the appellant during custody — possibility of prior exposure.\nIdentification parade lost evidentiary value due to these circumstances.\n(b) Ocular Testimony\nMain eyewitnesses: Muhammad Imran (PW-10) and injured Haroon Rasheed (PW-2).\nInjury to PW-2 proved his presence but not credibility — injury alone not proof of truthfulness.\nReliance placed on: Nazir Ahmad v. Muhammad Iqbal (2011 SCMR 527).\n(c) Statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.\nPW Haroon Rasheed’s statement not recorded during investigation, despite being stationed at the same police station.\nHe appeared in court after six months for the first time.\nSuch omission prejudiced the accused, as no opportunity was available to confront the witness on omissions or improvements.\nThe failure to record statement under S.161 Cr.P.C. was a serious procedural lapse affecting fairness of trial.\n(d) Recovery & Forensic Evidence\nCrime empties collected on 03.06.2010, weapon allegedly recovered 16.08.2010, both sent to FSL on 03.09.2010 — delay of 18 days.\nSuch delay rendered positive FSL report doubtful.\nRelied on: Nasrullah v. State (2017 SCMR 724).\n(e) Medical Contradiction\nPW Haroon Rasheed claimed injury on left ankle, whereas medical certificate recorded right lower leg injury — material inconsistency undermining prosecution case.\n3. Legal Principles Reaffirmed\nIdentification at night without lighting and after long delay is inherently unreliable.\nInjury to a witness only establishes presence, not truthfulness.\nNon-recording of S.161 Cr.P.C. statement of a crucial witness causes prejudice to the accused.\nUnexplained delay in sending ballistic evidence renders it doubtful.\nContradictions between ocular and medical evidence erode prosecution credibility.\nBenefit of doubt must go to the accused where a single reasonable doubt arises.\n4. Decision\nProsecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.\nConviction and sentence set aside.\nAppeal allowed.\nAppellant acquitted by extending benefit of doubt, to be released if not required in any other case.\nCitation Summary\nHeld: Identification doubtful — procedural lapses in investigation — contradictions between medical and ocular evidence — benefit of doubt extended — appeal allowed; conviction set aside; accused acquitted.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 655 of 2020, decided on 12th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 12th March, 2025.\n(Against the order/judgment dated 19.12.2018 passed by the Islamabad High Court in Crl. A. No. 25 of 2011, J. A. No. 24 of 2011 and CSR No. 4-T of 2011).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND ISHTIAQ IBRAHIM, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ansar Nawaz Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nGhulam Sarwar Nihang, Prosecutor General and Muhammad Imran, ASI for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ABRAS - Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26505", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDY3o", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2117 = 2025 SLD 2117 = 2025 SCMR 1150", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDY3o", - "Key Words:": "Overview\nThe Court considered whether military judges, being subject to the military chain of command for disciplinary purposes, could be regarded as independent and impartial under s. 11(d) of the Charter.\nKasirer J. (for the majority) held that the disciplinary regime allowing the executive (chain of command) to prosecute or discipline sitting military judges undermines their independence.\nAccordingly, the Court allowed the appeals and declared the relevant provisions of the NDA of no force or effect insofar as they subject military judges to military disciplinary authority.\nII. Background\nSeveral military judges held that they were not immune from military discipline and that this violated judicial independence.\nCourts martial stayed proceedings in multiple cases, holding that the accused’s s. 11(d) rights were infringed.\nThe Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC) reversed those rulings, reinstating prosecutions and rejecting the independence challenge.\nThe matter reached the Supreme Court of Canada.\nThe key legislative scheme under challenge was the Code of Service Discipline (CSD) within the NDA, which allowed military authorities to prosecute military judges for service offences.\nIII. Analysis\nA. Risk of Executive Interference\nThe Court found that allowing the chain of command to discipline military judges creates a reasonable perception of bias, as judges may fear reprisal from their superiors.\nRecent amendments extending summary hearings to military judges exacerbated the risk, as commanding officers — without legal expertise — could adjudicate minor service infractions.\nB. Insufficiency of Existing Safeguards\n1. Oath of Office\nWhile symbolically important, it cannot counteract institutional bias.\nIndependence requires protection from even the appearance of executive influence.\n2. Removal through the Military Judges Inquiry Committee (MJIC)\nTheoretically provides tenure protection, but in practice, charges can be used to sideline judges without removal.\nThe executive can effectively suspend a judge’s work by simply laying charges, as occurred with a former Chief Military Judge.\n3. Presumption of Independence of the Prosecution\nThe Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) acts under the supervision of the Judge Advocate General (JAG), who is part of the executive chain of command.\nTherefore, prosecutorial independence cannot safeguard judicial independence in this context.\nC. Institutional Bias and Public Confidence\nThe disciplinary authority of military superiors over judges undermines public confidence.\nA reasonable person would perceive the possibility that judges might “toe the party line” to avoid disciplinary consequences.\nThus, the structure breaches s. 11(d) of the Charter, which guarantees trial by an independent and impartial tribunal.\nIV. Conclusion and Disposition\nSection 11(d) of the Charter is infringed.\nThe infringement cannot be justified under s. 1 (the Crown conceded this).\nThe Court allowed the appeals, set aside the CMAC decisions, and quashed Sgt. Thibault’s conviction.\nThe disciplinary regime under the NDA is declared of no force or effect to the extent that it subjects military judges to military disciplinary proceedings.\nKey Principle\nJudicial independence requires complete institutional separation between judges and the executive.\nWhen judges are accountable to the executive under disciplinary or command structures, public confidence in impartial justice is compromised.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Decided on 26th April, 2024. (Appeals from a judgment of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada).\nPer Kasirer, J.; Wagner CJ., C t , Rowe, Jamal and O'Bonsawin, JJ. concurring; Karakatsanis, J. dissenting.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): WAGNER C.J., KARAKATSANIS, C T , ROWE, KASIRER, JAMAL AND O'BONSAWIN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mark L tourneau, Patrice Desbiens and Francesca Ferguson for Appellants.\nDylan Kerr and Karl Lacharit for Respondent.\nZain Naqi and David Ionis for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.\nDavid McEwan, Greg Allen and Chloe Trudel for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.", - "Petitioner Name:": "LEADING SEAMAN C.D. EDWARDS, CAPTAIN C.M.C. CREPEAU, GUNNER K.J.J. FONTAINE AND CAPTAIN M.J. IREDALE and others - Appellants\nVS\nHIS MAJESTY THE KING - Respondent and CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION AND BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION - Interveners" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26506", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDY3k", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2118 = 2025 SLD 2118 = 2025 SCMR 1214 = 2025 PTD 1525 = (2025) 132 TAX 394", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDY3k", - "Key Words:": "Facts\nThe respondent, a Pakistani franchiser, entered into franchise agreements with several franchisees in Pakistan.\nThe issue was who is legally liable to pay Federal Excise Duty (FED) on franchise services under the Act — the franchiser or the franchisee.\nThe Department (Commissioner) argued that under Section 3(5)(c) of the Act, the franchiser is liable.\nThe respondent contended that under Rule 43A of the Rules, the franchisee must pay the duty.\nThe Appellate Tribunal and High Court both held in favor of the taxpayer (franchiser).\nThe Department appealed to the Supreme Court.\nII. Question of Law\nWhether, on a proper reading of Section 3(5)(c) of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 and Rule 43A of the Federal Excise Rules, 2005, the liability to pay excise duty on franchise services lies on the franchiser or the franchisee?\nIII. Arguments\nDepartment (Petitioner)\nSection 3(5)(c) makes the person providing or rendering the service liable — here, the franchiser.\nRule 43A applies only to foreign franchisers, where services are rendered from outside Pakistan.\nThe High Court erred by extending Rule 43A beyond its intended scope.\nRespondent (Taxpayer)\nRule 43A was validly made under Section 40 and assigns liability to the franchisee.\nThe franchisee is required to register and pay the duty under the Rule.\nThe Department’s reference was filed under the wrong statute (Sales Tax Act, 1990).\nIV. Court’s Reasoning\n1. Legal vs. Economic Incidence\nThe Court drew a distinction between:\nLegal incidence: who the law makes responsible for paying the tax.\nEconomic incidence: who actually bears the burden.\nSection 3(5)(c) explicitly fixes legal liability on the service provider — i.e., the franchiser — except when services are rendered from outside Pakistan, where liability shifts to the recipient (franchisee).\n2. Scope of Rule 43A\nRule 43A, especially sub-rules (5) and (7), deals with foreign remittances and State Bank reporting — showing it was meant to apply only when the franchiser is outside Pakistan.\nReading Rule 43A broadly (as the High Court did) would allow delegated legislation to override the parent statute, which is impermissible.\n3. No Delegated Power to Shift Legal Incidence\nUnlike the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which contains Section 3(3A) explicitly allowing FBR to shift tax liability by notification,\nthe Federal Excise Act, 2005 contains no such power.\nHence, FBR could not legally transfer liability from franchiser to franchisee through Rule 43A.\n4. Legislative History\nRule 43A was introduced in 2006, before Section 3(5) existed (added in 2007).\nOnce Section 3(5) came into force, the statutory allocation of liability overrode any conflicting rule.\nRule 43A “revived” only for foreign franchisers after the 2008 amendment adding the “provided” clause to Section 3(5)(c).\n5. Procedural Objection\nThe respondent’s objection that the Department filed a sales tax reference instead of one under the Act was dismissed as a mere procedural lapse having no legal consequence.\nV. Holding / Decision\nThe legal incidence of excise duty on franchise services in Pakistan lies with the franchiser, not the franchisee.\nRule 43A applies only to cases where the franchiser is outside Pakistan.\nThe High Court judgment was set aside.\nAppeal allowed.\nNo order as to costs.\nVI. Ratio Decidendi\nWhen the parent statute (Section 3(5)(c) of the Federal Excise Act, 2005) clearly fixes the person liable to pay duty, delegated legislation (Rule 43A) cannot alter or shift that liability unless expressly authorized by the Act itself.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=3(5)(c)Federal Excise Rules, 2005=43A,43A(5),43A(5)Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(3A)", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 109-L of 2024, decided on 24th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 24th April, 2025.\n(Against judgment dated 21.11.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in S.T.R. No. 30 of 2015).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUNIB AKHTAR, AYESHA A. MALIK AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ahmed Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nImtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE - Petitioner\nVS\nMessrs EDUCATIONAL SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED, LAHORE - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26507", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2119 = 2025 SLD 2119 = 2025 SCMR 1221", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTc", - "Key Words:": "Facts\nThe petitioner, a Physical Education Teacher (BS-09) in the Punjab Special Education Department, was considered for promotion to Lecturer Physical Education (BS-17) under the 2006 Service Rules.\nThe Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) on 07.03.2019 deferred her promotion, claiming that the Rules needed amendment before promotions could proceed.\nThe petitioner’s representation (19.08.2019) and departmental appeal (29.11.2019) were both rejected.\nThe Punjab Service Tribunal dismissed her service appeal on 10.01.2022, leading to the present petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court.\nII. Relevant Rule Provision\nUnder the Service Rules, 2006, promotion to Lecturer Physical Education (BS-17) is governed as follows:\nMethod of Recruitment\nSource\nRequirement\n25% by promotion\nfrom PTI/PET/DPE\npossessing M.A. (Physical Education) in 1st Division or Grade B\nNote: Seniority of PTI/PET/DPE will be maintained from the date of acquiring the requisite qualification.\nThe petitioner possessed an M.A. in Physical Education (1st Division) and had 14 years’ service with no adverse record.\nIII. Issue\nWhether the Departmental Promotion Committee could lawfully defer the petitioner’s promotion on the ground that the Service Rules required amendment.\nIV. Holding\nThe Supreme Court held that the DPC acted without lawful authority in deferring the promotion.\nThe DPC is bound to apply the existing Rules — it cannot question, interpret, or refuse to enforce them on the pretext that they require amendment.\nV. Court’s Reasoning\n1. Misinterpretation by DPC\nThe Note to the Rules clearly defines seniority based on acquisition of the qualification (M.A. Physical Education).\nThe petitioner met this requirement; thus, no exclusion applied to her.\nThe DPC overstepped its authority by declaring that seniority could not be revised after appointment — a misconceived interpretation.\n2. DPC Cannot Override Law\nThe DPC’s function is administrative, not legislative or judicial.\nIt cannot defer promotions or refuse to act because an amendment is under consideration.\nIf anyone disputes the Rule, they may challenge it before a competent forum, but the DPC must apply the law as it stands.\n3. Right to Consideration for Promotion\nAlthough a civil servant has no vested right to promotion, they have a right to fair consideration for promotion in accordance with law.\nThis right stems from Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution, which protect the right to life and dignified livelihood.\nA livelihood devoid of career progression undermines constitutional guarantees.\n4. Constitutional and Institutional Context\nThe judgment underscores that:\nThe civil bureaucracy is the “steel frame of the State”, not a political instrument.\nPromotions and service matters must be transparent, merit-based, and free of political influence.\nArbitrary or capricious denial of promotion erodes independence and morale of the civil service.\nCiting Weber’s theory of bureaucracy, the Court emphasized meritocracy, impartiality, and political neutrality as pillars of effective governance.\nVI. Final Directions\nThe impugned Tribunal order is set aside.\nThe petition is converted into an appeal and allowed.\nThe DPC is directed to consider and decide the petitioner’s promotion on merits within one month of receiving this judgment.\nVII. Ratio Decidendi\nA Departmental Promotion Committee cannot withhold or defer promotions based on anticipated amendments to Service Rules.\nIt must apply the existing law, and civil servants have a constitutional right to fair, transparent, and timely consideration for promotion as part of their right to livelihood under Article 9.\nVIII. Significance\nThis judgment is a strong reaffirmation of:\nRule of law in service matters,\nIndependence and merit-based promotion in civil service, and\nThe constitutional dimension of the right to career progression.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 3116 of 2022, decided on 21st April, 2025. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025. (Against the order dated 10.01.2022 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 5689 of 2019).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, ACJ and Shahid Bilal Hassan, J", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mahmood Ahmad Qazi Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nKhalid Masood Ghani, Additional Advocate General, Punjab along with Abu Bakar, L.O. Special Education Department Punjab for Respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "AATIKA HINA MUSHTAQ - Petitioner\nVS\nSECRETARY SPECIAL EDUCATION GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, SPECIAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT LAHORE and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26508", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2120 = 2025 SLD 2120 = 2025 SCMR 1229", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTY", - "Key Words:": "Background\nRespondent No.1 filed a civil suit for declaration, cancellation of documents, possession, and injunction regarding property Quarter No.225, Block-14, Babul Islam Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Karachi.\nShe claimed ownership through inheritance from her mother, Mst. Hoor Bai.\nPetitioner, allegedly appointed to manage the property, fraudulently transferred it to his own name in 2002 with the connivance of the Society.\nBoth the Trial Court and the Sindh High Court decreed in favour of the respondent. The petitioner then filed this Civil Petition before the Supreme Court.\n2. Petitioner’s Arguments\nThe lower courts misread evidence and ignored that:\nRespondent No.1 allegedly renounced Pakistani citizenship and was not Hoor Bai’s daughter.\nThe property was gifted to the petitioner through a declaration of oral gift by Hoor Bai, who was issueless.\nThe transfer was lawfully effected by the Society.\n3. Respondent’s Arguments\nBoth lower courts correctly found:\nRespondent No.1 proved her relationship as daughter of Hoor Bai.\nThe gift claim was unsubstantiated; no valid deed or proof of gift was produced.\nThe petitioner’s alleged gift lacked evidence and legal validity.\n4. Key Legal Issues\nJurisdiction:\nThe Court analyzed the Sindh Co-operative Societies Act, 2020 and the Sindh Co-operative Societies Rules, 2020.\nFound that disputes “touching the business of a society” fall under the Special Court for Co-operative Societies (Rule 53 & Section 117).\nIdentified drafting errors in the Act (wrong section references such as 121 and 78) and directed the Government of Sindh to correct them.\nNature of Appeal Right:\nObserved that right of appeal is a substantive right, not merely procedural, and should be provided within the Act, not in Rules.\nProof of Gift:\nThe burden of proof was on the petitioner to prove the oral gift (hiba).\nNo documentary evidence or witnesses proved the gift or donor’s presence in Pakistan.\nOnce mother–daughter relationship was established, an alleged gift to a stranger (petitioner) was legally implausible.\nApplicable Law:\nSections 122–129, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – gift of immovable property must be by registered instrument unless valid oral gift under Muslim law is proven.\nSections 17 & 49, Registration Act, 1908 – unregistered gift deed cannot transfer title.\nCited precedents:\nAbid Hussain v. Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 2022 SC 395)\nBabar Anwar v. Muhammad Ashraf (2024 SCMR 734)\nAllah Ditta v. Manak (2017 SCMR 402)\nMuhammad Ejaz v. Khalida Awan (2010 SCMR 342)\n5. Court’s Findings\nRespondent No.1 proved her lineage through credible evidence.\nThe petitioner failed to prove any valid oral or written gift, nor the donor’s presence or possession transfer.\nTransfer by the Society in petitioner’s name was fraudulent and void.\nConcurrent findings of lower courts were upheld.\n6. Directions\nParagraph 10 of the judgment draws attention to legislative drafting errors in the Sindh Co-operative Societies Act, 2020.\nSecretary Law & Parliamentary Affairs and Advocate General Sindh directed to consider necessary amendments.\n7. Final Order\nCivil Petition dismissed.\nLeave to appeal refused.\nTrial Court and High Court decrees affirmed.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.P.L.A. No. 479-K of 2023, decided on 26th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 26th March, 2025.\n(On appeal from the Order dated 31.01.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in M.A. No. 83 of 2022).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Shafqat Ali Shah Masoomi, Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioner for Petitioner.\nAsghar Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD DAWOOD - Petitioner\nVS\nMst. SAKEENA FAROOQUE alias Aziza and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26509", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2121 = 2025 SLD 2121 = 2025 SCMR 1240", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTU", - "Key Words:": "Background\nAppellant: Muhammad Aslam\nCharge: Murder under Section 302(b), P.P.C. – two counts.\nTrial Court: Convicted and sentenced to death on two counts; ordered to pay Rs. 400,000/- compensation to heirs of each deceased under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C.\nHigh Court: Confirmed death sentence (Murder Reference answered in affirmative).\nSupreme Court: Granted leave to appeal (26.01.2023) to reappraise evidence “in the interest of safe administration of criminal justice.”\n2. Prosecution Case\nComplainant Muhammad Afzal alleged that the accused (his wife’s nephew) had been staying at his house for three days.\nOn 25.12.2012, the accused allegedly attacked the complainant’s two sons, Ali Afzal and Sajjad Afzal, with a wooden cricket bat and iron scissors, crushing their skulls.\nMotive: revenge, as the complainant had married the accused’s real aunt, Mst. Khadija, after facilitating her divorce decades earlier.\nRecoveries: blood-stained scissors, belt, clothes, and a cricket bat allegedly on the accused’s pointation.\nPost-mortem: both injuries caused by blunt weapon.\n3. Defence Version (u/s 342 Cr.P.C.)\nAccused denied guilt, claiming false implication due to family disputes.\nAlleged that the murders were committed by unknown persons at night, and that complainant falsely implicated him because of prior quarrels over property and old enmities.\n4. Arguments\nFor Appellant (Ms. Aisha Tasneem, ASC):\nContradictions and improvements in witness statements (e.g. mention of scissors omitted later).\nNo independent witnesses; only related persons testified.\nRecovery doubtful – no public witnesses, no fingerprints or DNA, irregular investigation.\nMotive weak and implausible.\nFor State (Mr. Sajjad H. Bhatti, DPG):\nOcular and medical evidence consistent.\nRecoveries and forensic reports supported prosecution.\nSought dismissal of appeal.\n5. Supreme Court’s Analysis\nMaterial contradictions between FIR, depositions, and medical reports:\nInitial statement mentioned “scissors” as weapon, later disclaimed by complainant.\nPost-mortem showed only blunt-weapon injuries, contradicting scissors narrative.\nRecovery doubtful:\nNo public witness during arrest or recovery; time of arrest not recorded.\nI.O. (PW-10) had a record of suspension and dismissal for unfair investigations.\nNo DNA testing conducted to link accused with crime weapon.\nDiscrepancies in testimonies of PW-1 (complainant) and PW-2 regarding recoveries of blood-stained items.\nLegal Principle: When prosecution case is shrouded in doubts, benefit must go to the accused — “the favourite child of law.”\nCited precedents:\nMuhammad Hassan v. State (2024 SCMR 1427)\nAbdul Samad v. State (2025 SCMR 639)\nTariq Parvez v. State (1995 SCMR 1345)\nMuhammad Akram v. State (2009 SCMR 230)\nMuhammad Imran v. State (2020 SCMR 857)\n6. Held / Decision\nProsecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.\nOcular testimony doubtful, recoveries unreliable, and motive weak.\nRecovery of weapon is only corroborative; cannot sustain conviction without credible substantive evidence.\nAppeal allowed; convictions and sentences set aside.\nMuhammad Aslam acquitted by extending benefit of doubt.\nDirected to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.\n7. Legal Principles Reaffirmed\nBenefit of Doubt: Even a single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal.\nUnreliable Recovery: Recovery without independent corroboration or public witness cannot sustain conviction.\nContradictory Evidence: Improvements or contradictions in prosecution evidence undermine its reliability.\nCorroborative Evidence Alone Insufficient: Weapon recovery cannot replace substantive proof of guilt.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 77 of 2023, decided on 8th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 8th April, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 27.03.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Criminal Appeal No. 180-J of 2019 and M.R. No. 05 of 2015).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): ATHAR MINALLAH, IRFAN SAADAT KHAN AND MALIK SHAHZAD AHMAD KHAN, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.\nSajjad H. Bhatti, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.\nMs. Rabia Afzal daughter of M. Afzal, Complainant", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ASLAM - Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26510", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2122 = 2025 SLD 2122 = 2025 SCMR 1248 = (2025) 132 TAX 383", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTQ", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue\nWhether minimum tax paid under Section 113(1) can be carried forward and adjusted under Section 113(2)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, when the taxpayer had no actual tax payable due to declared losses.\n2. Background\nKassim Textile Mills and others had declared losses in tax years 2007–2008 but had paid minimum tax under Section 113(1).\nIn tax year 2009, they sought to carry forward and adjust that minimum tax as a credit under Section 113(2)(c).\nThe tax authorities disallowed the adjustment, arguing that no tax was payable, hence no “excess” tax existed to be carried forward.\nCIR(A) and ATIR ruled in favor of taxpayers.\nSindh High Court reversed those findings and sided with the tax department.\nLahore High Court and Islamabad High Court took contrary views, allowing such adjustments.\nThis led to conflicting High Court judgments across provinces.\n3. Key Statutory Text (as it stood pre-2021)\nSection 113(2)(c):\n“Where tax paid under subsection (1) exceeds the actual tax payable under Part I, Division II of the First Schedule, the excess amount shall be carried forward for adjustment against tax liability for the next three years.”\n4. Court’s Analysis\n(a) Nature of Section 113\nIt ensures that every business contributes a minimum tax on turnover even when reporting losses — to prevent tax avoidance.\nIt operates as an exception to Section 4 (which only taxes income actually earned).\n(b) Interpretation of “Actual Tax Payable”\nThe expression implies some quantum of tax must be payable to generate any “excess” for carry forward.\nWhere no tax is payable (i.e., zero) due to losses, no excess arises under Section 113(2)(c).\n(c) No Ambiguity in Law\nThe language of Section 113(2)(c) was clear and unambiguous.\nFiscal statutes must be interpreted literally and strictly — no scope for equity or judicial insertion of missing words.\nCited precedents:\nPTV v. CIR (2017 SCMR 1136)\nStar Textile Mills (2002 SCMR 356)\nProvince of Punjab v. Muhammad Aslam (2004 SCMR 1649)\nAllied Bank Ltd. v. CIR (2023 SCMR 1166)\n(d) Subsequent Amendment (Finance Act, 2021)\nIn 2021, the first proviso to Section 113(2)(c) was substituted to explicitly allow carry forward even where no tax was payable.\nHowever, this amendment is prospective, not retrospective.\nCourts cannot treat it as a “remedial provision” to alter past tax years (contrary to the Islamabad High Court’s view).\n(e) FBR Circular No. 17/2004\nThe circular does not expand the scope of Section 113(2)(c) to cover loss-incurring companies.\nAdministrative circulars cannot override statutory text.\n5. Holding\nSindh High Court’s interpretation upheld.\nLahore and Islamabad High Courts’ judgments reversed.\nTaxpayers cannot carry forward minimum tax paid in years where no tax was payable due to losses.\nThe 2021 amendment applies prospectively only.\n6. Final Order\nCivil Appeals Nos. 743/2014, 1954/2019, 404/2020 — Dismissed (Sindh view maintained).\nCivil Petitions Nos. 10-L/2017, 3688-L/2019, 3689-L/2019, 746-L/2021 & 3503/2022 — Converted to appeals and allowed (Lahore and Islamabad views overturned).\nC.M.A. No. 13838/2021 — Dismissed as infructuous.\n7. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle)\nBefore 2021, carry forward of minimum tax under Section 113(2)(c) was available only where “actual tax was payable” in the relevant year.\nPost-2021, through express statutory amendment, the facility extends to taxpayers even with zero tax liability, but the change is not retrospective.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4,113,113(1),113(2)(c),120,Part 1, Division II of the First Schedule", - "Case #": "Civil Appeal No.743 of 2014 and Civil Petition No.10-L of 2017, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 13838 of 2021 in Civil Petition No.10-L of 2017, Civil Appeals No. 1954 of 2019 and 404 of 2020, Civil Petitions Nos. 3688-L of 2019, 3689-L of 2019, 746-L of 2021 and 3503 of 2022, decided on 2nd May, 2025. Date of hearing: 20th February, 2025.", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Muhammad Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court, Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record and Sh. Mehmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 743 of 2014, 1954 of 2019 and 404 of 2020).\nMuhammad Yahya, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link (Lahore)) (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 10-L of 2017 and 3689-L of 2019).\nIbrar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link (Lahore)) in C.P.L.As. Nos. 3688-L of 2019 and 746-L of 2021).\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.P.L.A. No. 3503 of 2022).\nDr. Ikram ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (via video link (Lahore)) (in C.M.A. No. 13838 of 2021).\nMunawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (via video link (Karachi)) (in C.A. No. 743 of 2014).\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 1954 of 2019).\nRiaz Hussain Azam, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 404 of 2020).\nNemo for Respondents (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 10-L of 2017, 3688-L of 2019, 3689-L of 2019, 746-L of 2021 and 3503 of 2022).\nDr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director General (Law), FBR, Islamabad.\nMs. Kiran Masood, Additional Commissioner, FBR, Lahore (via video link (Lahore)).", - "Petitioner Name:": "C.A. No. 743 of 2014\nM/s KASSIM TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED - Petitioner\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, KARACHI - Respondent\n(Against judgment dated 07.05.2013 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in I.T.R.A. No. 132 of 2011).\nC.P.L.A. No. 10-L of 2017\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE - Petitioner\nVS\nM/s EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE LIMITED, LAHORE - Respondent\n(Against order dated 18.10.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.T.R. No. 255 of 2016).\nC.M.A. No. 13838 of 2021 in C.P.L.A. No. 10-L of 2017\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE - Petitioner\nVS\nM/s EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE LIMITED, LAHORE - Respondent\n(Application for impleadment)\nC.A. No. 1954 of 2019\nDUBAI ISLAMIC BANK PAKISTAN LIMITED, KARACHI - Petitioner\nVS\nPAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue and Ex Officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others - Respondents\n(Against order dated 16.08.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-5264 of 2019).\nC.A. No. 404 of 2020\nENGRO POLYMER AND CHEMICALS LIMITED, KARACHI - Petitioner\nVS\nPAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue and Ex Officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others - Respondents\n(Against order dated 06.02.2020 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No.D-769 of 2020).\nC.P.L.A. No. 3688-L of 2019\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE through Member (Legal), Islamabad and others - Petitioners\nVS\nMessrs FOOD CONSULTS (PVT.) LIMITED, LAHORE and others - Respondents\n(Against order dated 09,10.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W. P. No. 136592 of 2018).\nC.P.L.A. No. 3689-L of 2019\nFEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE through Member (Legal), Islamabad and others - Petitioners\nVS\nMessrs PANTHER TYRES LIMITED and others - Respondents\n(Against order dated 09.10.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No. 170401 of 2018).\nC.P.L.A. No. 746-L of 2021\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE - Petitioner\nVS\nMessrs BIG FEED (PRIVATE) LIMITED, LAHORE - Respondent\n(Against order dated 11.02.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.T.R. No. 8992 of 2021).\nC.P.L.A. No. 3503 of 2022\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, ISLAMABAD and others - Petitioners\nVS\nMessrs PAKISTAN TOBACCO COMPANY LIMITED, ISLAMABAD and others - Respondents\n(Against judgment dated 26.05.2022 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R. No. 45 of 2014)." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26511", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2123 = 2025 SLD 2123 = 2025 SCMR 1262", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWS8", - "Key Words:": "Background & Facts\nThe petitioners were owners of a hotel property at Shahi/Sabzi Bazar, Khairpur Nathan Shah, District Dadu.\nThey had purchased it through a registered sale deed (13.01.1992) and got it mutated in 1995.\nThe predecessor of respondents 1 and 2 was a tenant in the premises.\nAn ejectment order (Rent Case No. 02/1983) was passed in 1987, and the tenant was evicted in 1988.\nLater, the First Rent Appeal (FRA No. 49/1987) was allowed in 1994, with an observation that the tenant could seek restitution under Section 144 CPC.\nThe tenant’s heirs (respondents) filed such an application six years later, which was allowed, and the petitioners were directed to restore possession.\nPetitioners challenged this order in Civil Revision No. S-68/2011, which was dismissed in 2012, with observation that they could file a fresh civil suit for possession.\nPetitioners then filed Civil Suit No. 151/2018 for declaration, possession, mesne profits, and injunction, along with an application under Section 5 Limitation Act (for condonation).\nRespondents filed Order VII Rule 11 CPC application, pleading res judicata and limitation.\nThe suit was dismissed, appeals and revisions also failed — culminating in the impugned High Court order (2022) affirming dismissal.\n2. Issues Before the Supreme Court\nWhether the subsequent suit (No. 151/2018) was barred by limitation or wrongly dismissed on a misconceived application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?\nWhether it was hit by the principle of res judicata (Section 11 CPC)?\nWhether the appeal could be dismissed for non-payment of court fee without giving an opportunity to rectify the deficiency?\nWhether concurrent findings of the courts below were contrary to law and could be interfered with?\n3. Court’s Analysis\n(a) On Limitation\nSection 5 Limitation Act applies only to appeals and applications, not to institution of suits.\nA suit for possession of immovable property (Article 142 Limitation Act) can be filed within 12 years from dispossession.\nThe Trial Court erred by dismissing the suit as time-barred without examining cause of action or applying Section 3 Limitation Act.\nEven if counsel filed a wrong application under Section 5, the court was still bound to apply the correct law on its own.\n(b) On Res Judicata\nSection 11 CPC prevents re-litigation only if the same issue between same parties was finally adjudicated.\nThe previous suit (2014) was for damages, while the present suit (2018) sought possession — hence, the cause of action was distinct.\nCourts below failed to carry out the diagnostic exercise necessary to determine applicability of res judicata.\n(c) On Court Fee Deficiency\nThe First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for non-payment of court fee after admission — without granting opportunity to cure the defect.\nUnder Sections 148 & 149 CPC, courts may enlarge time and allow deficiency to be made up at any stage.\nOrder VII Rule 11 CPC and Section 149 CPC must be read together — dismissal without giving time to correct valuation or pay fee is illegal.\nThe Full Bench ruling in PLD 1984 SC 289 (Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor) mandates courts to give an opportunity to pay court fee before dismissal.\n(d) On Rejection of Plaint\nRejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is not a decision on merits; by fiction, it amounts to a decree, but does not bar fresh suit (Order VII Rule 13 CPC).\nTherefore, courts erred in holding that dismissal of suit precluded further action.\n(e) On Judicial Duty\nJudges are duty-bound to apply correct law, even if not pointed out by parties.\nFailure of counsel does not absolve courts from applying proper provisions.\n“A judge must wear all laws on the sleeve of his robe.”\nCited cases include Govt. of KPK v. Mehmood Khan (2017 SCMR 2044) and Chairman NAB v. Muhammad Usman (PLD 2018 SC 28).\n(f) On Concurrent Findings\nConcurrent findings are not sacrosanct if based on misreading, non-reading, or legal errors.\nAppellate or revisional courts may interfere to correct manifest illegality.\n4. Key Precedents Cited\nSiddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289) — opportunity must be given to make up court fee deficiency.\nAbdul Hamid v. Dilawar Hussain (2007 SCMR 945) — rejection of plaint is not adjudication on merits; fresh suit maintainable.\nDiwan Bros. v. Central Bank of India (AIR 1976 SC 1503) — Section 149 CPC must be read as proviso to Section 4 Court Fees Act.\nAhmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar, Latifabad, Hyderabad (PLD 2024 SC 302) — cited for judicial duty to apply correct law.\n5. Court’s Observations\nCourts below misapplied limitation, ignored proper legal provisions, and failed to grant procedural fairness regarding court fee.\nThe res judicata plea was improperly accepted without analysis.\nThe High Court erred by upholding flawed concurrent findings.\n6. Final Decision\nCivil Petition converted into Civil Appeal and allowed.\nOrders of the Trial Court, First Appellate Court, and High Court (IInd Appeal) are set aside.\nF.C. Suit No. 151/2018 is remanded to the Trial Court for decision on merits after giving parties full opportunity of hearing and evidence.\nThe Trial Court directed to decide the matter preferably within six months.\n7. Legal Principles (Ratio Decidendi)\nSection 5 Limitation Act is inapplicable to suits; Article 142 governs possession suits (12 years).\nRes judicata requires same parties, same cause of action, and final adjudication — absent here.\nCourt must allow time to cure court fee deficiencies under Sections 148–149 CPC before dismissal.\nRejection of plaint ≠ dismissal on merits; fresh suit may be filed (Order VII Rules 11 & 13 CPC).\nJudges have a proactive duty to apply the correct law, even if parties or counsel fail to invoke it.\nConcurrent findings can be interfered with if contrary to law or based on patent error.\n8. Outcome\n✅ Petition converted into appeal — Allowed.\n❌ Impugned judgments set aside.\n🔁 Case remanded to Trial Court for fresh decision within six months.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 770-K of 2022, decided on 28th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 28th March, 2025.\n(Against the orders dated 10.03.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Larkana in 2nd Civil Appeal No. S-06 of 2019).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR AND AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nazar Akbar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.\nHabib ur Rehman Jiskan, Advocate Supreme Court and Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nNemo for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.", - "Petitioner Name:": "HABIB-UR-REHMAN and others - Petitioners\nVS\nABDUL KARIM (deceased) through L.Rs and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26512", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2124 = 2025 SLD 2124 = 2025 SCMR 1351", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWSs", - "Key Words:": "Facts of the Case\nOn 24.01.2011, Excise Police (Kandiaro Circle) set up a check post at Rasool Abad after receiving a spy report about narcotics smuggling.\nA truck (LSJ-5900) coming from Sukkur was signaled to stop, but the driver sped away. The truck was pursued and intercepted.\nTwo men were found aboard:\nGhazi Khan (driver)\nMarzak Khan (passenger)\nOn inspection, secret cavities were found inside the cabin containing:\n30 packets of charas/hashish (≈1 kg each)\nWeapons and explosives — LMG, rocket launchers, grenades, mortars, suicide jackets, batteries, detonators, etc.\nTwo FIRs were registered:\nFIR No. 1/2011 (PS Kandiaro) — CNSA offences\nFIR No. 9/2011 (PS Halani) — Explosives, Arms & Terrorism offences\n2. Procedural History\nTrial (CNSA Court, Naushehro Feroze)\nBoth accused convicted under Section 9(c) CNSA.\nSentence: Life imprisonment + Rs. 500,000 fine (or 3 years R.I. in default).\nAppeal (Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench)\nCriminal Appeals No. D-87 & D-90 of 2012.\nDismissed on 06.12.2018. Conviction upheld.\nSupreme Court (Jail Petition No. 27/2019)\nFiled under Article 185(3) of the Constitution.\n3. Issues Before the Court\nWhether the conviction of Ghazi Khan (driver) under Section 9(c) CNSA was sustainable?\nWhether Marzak Khan (passenger) could also be held guilty in absence of direct proof of knowledge or possession?\nWhether the official (Excise) witnesses were reliable despite being police personnel?\n4. Court’s Analysis\n(a) Credibility of Official Witnesses\nAll witnesses were Excise Police officers.\nCourt held that official witnesses are competent and trustworthy unless bias or mala fide is proven.\nThe accused were from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while witnesses were from Sindh — no enmity or motive for false implication.\nCited Nazir Ahmed v. State (2023 SCMR 1299) — official testimony valid unless animus shown.\n(b) Constructive Possession & Role of the Driver\nDriver (Ghazi Khan) was in control of the vehicle, which constitutes constructive possession of all contents.\nHis attempt to flee when signaled to stop indicated guilty intent and knowledge.\nRecovery of narcotics from hidden compartments strengthened presumption of knowing possession.\nCited Kashif Ameer v. State (PLD 2010 SC 1052) — driver responsible for narcotics in vehicle; possession can be joint.\nAlso referred to U.S. case law (State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137) on presumption of driver’s control over vehicle contents.\n(c) Passenger’s Liability (Marzak Khan)\nNo evidence linked Marzak Khan to ownership, control, or knowledge of the narcotics.\nHe was merely seated beside the driver; contraband was concealed and not in open view.\nProsecution failed to prove knowledge or abetment.\nCited Shahzada v. State (2010 SCMR 841) — passengers not liable unless proven aware or complicit.\n(d) Concurrent Sentences and Benefits\nConviction of Ghazi Khan in this case to run concurrently with his other conviction in Jail Petition No. 16/2019 (FIR No. 09/2011) under Section 397 Cr.P.C.\nBenefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. granted, as both cases arise from same transaction.\nRelied on Shaista Bibi v. Superintendent Central Jail Mach (PLD 2015 SC 15).\n5. Findings\nPetitioner\nRole\nCourt’s Findings\nOutcome\nGhazi Khan\nDriver\nFound in constructive possession of narcotics and weaponry; attempt to flee showed guilty mind\nConviction upheld, sentence to run concurrently, Section 382-B benefit granted\nMarzak Khan\nPassenger\nNo proof of knowledge or possession; mere presence not enough\nAcquitted, to be released forthwith if not wanted in another case\n6. Final Order\nJail Petition dismissed for Ghazi Khan; conviction and life sentence maintained.\nJail Petition converted into appeal for Marzak Khan; appeal allowed, acquitted of all charges.\nCrl. M.A. No. 136/2024 (suspension of sentence) declared infructuous after decision of main petition.\nOrder accordingly.\n7. Legal Principles (Ratio Decidendi)\nOfficial witnesses are credible unless mala fide or bias is proven.\nDriver of vehicle has constructive possession over contents and is presumed to know of narcotics unless rebutted.\nPassenger cannot be convicted without evidence of knowledge, control, or abetment.\nConcurrent sentencing and Section 382-B benefit apply when multiple convictions arise from the same transaction.\n8. Outcome Summary\n✅ Ghazi Khan: Conviction upheld, benefit under Sections 382-B & 397 Cr.P.C. granted.\n🟩 Marzak Khan: Acquitted and released.\n🗂️ Application (Crl. M.A. 136/2024): Dismissed as infructuous.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Jail Petition No. 27 of 2019, decided on 23rd April, 2025. Date of hearing: 23rd April, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR AND ISHTIAQ IBRAHIM, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Burhan Latif Khaisori, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.\nSaleem Akhtar Buriro, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State.\nAssisted by: Ms. Tayyaba Munir, Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "GHAZI KHAN PATHAN and another - Petitioners\nVS\n\nThe STATE - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26513", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2125 = 2025 SLD 2125 = 2025 SCMR 1280", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTk", - "Key Words:": "JUDGMENT:\nMUNIB AKHTAR, JUSTICE:-.- \nThis larger Bench has been constituted, in circumstances shortly to be stated, to consider whether the judgment of a learned three member Bench of the Court given in Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others (2017 SCMR 1427), (2017 PTD 1756) ( Super Asia ) is correct. That decision was concerned with certain provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ( 1990 Act ), set out below, and held the same to be mandatory and not directory. Inasmuch as the said provisions are to be found in virtually identical terms and in the same context in the other two federal laws relating to indirect taxation-the Customs Act, 1969 ( 1969 Act ) and the Federal Excise Act, 2005 ( 2005 Act )-the principles of law enunciated in the judgment obviously have, in terms of well settled rules of precedent as embodied, in particular, in Article 189 of the Constitution, a much broader application than merely the interpretation of the 1990 Act.\n2. In Super Asia, the Court was concerned with a bunch of cases challenging show cause notices issued over a number of years stretching from 1998 to 2013 for, inter alia, the recovery of tax allegedly short levied or unpaid. At the beginning of the said period, the provisions that fell for consideration were to be found in section 36. This was omitted by the Finance Act, 2012 and the provisions in question shifted to section 11 which was also substituted in its entirety by that statute. (The provisions were also to be found in section 11 in its incarnation prior to 2012.) They also underwent certain changes but the substantive nature and effect remained the same. The provisions themselves, as applicable over the years in question, are set out at pp. 1433 to 1435. For convenience, we only reproduce so much of section 11 as is material, and as it stood at the end of the aforesaid period:\n 11. Assessment of Tax and Recovery of Tax not levied or short levied or erroneously refunded .- ...\n(5) No order under this section shall be made by an officer of Inland Revenue unless a notice to show cause is given within five years, of the relevant date, to the person in default specifying the grounds on which it is intended to proceed against him and the officer of Sales Tax shall take into consideration the representation made by such person and provide him with an opportunity of being heard:\nProvided that order under this section shall be made within one hundred and twenty days of issuance of show cause notice or within such extended period as the Commissioner may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, fix provided that such extended period shall in no case exceed ninety days:\nProvided further that any period during which the proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order or Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings or the time taken through adjournment by the petitioner not exceeding sixty days shall be excluded from the computation of the period specified in the first proviso. \nThe question before the Court was whether the periods provided for in the first proviso to subsection (5) (and their antecedents in the earlier version of section 11 and section 36) were mandatory or directory? To answer this question the Court also examined section 74, which will be considered later. As noted, the contents of the first proviso are to be found in the other laws as well. For convenience, what is contained in the first proviso, whether in terms of the 1990 Act or the other two laws referred to above, is herein after referred to as the relevant provisions .\n3. The Court held that the relevant provisions were mandatory and not directory (in paras 7 to 9, pp. 1438-9) and that therefore an order made by the adjudicating officer/ authority (usually known as an order-in-original and so referred to in this judgment) beyond the stipulated periods was, subject to any permissible application of section 74 (which was set out in para 12, pp. 1440-1), invalid .\n4. The principles enunciated in Super Asia came up for application sometime thereafter in a case before another three member Bench (though the members were overlapping). That Bench expressed certain reservations with the findings recorded in Super Asia, in an order dated 20.03.2018 and reported as Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax and others (2018 SCMR 1474) ( Wak Ltd. ). That order, as presently relevant, was in the following terms (pg. 1477):\n 3. ... Another question which has been raised by the learned ASC for the petitioner is that if an order is not passed within 45 days and then within 90 days despite extension in terms of the proviso to section 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, it could not be passed subsequently. Learned ASC for the petitioner in support of his contention placed reliance on the case of The Collector of Sales Tax Gujranwala and others v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons and others (2017 PTD 1756). We with due deference do not find ourselves in agreement with the interpretation placed on the said provision because the intent behind the said provision of the Act, as far as we are capable to understand it, is to ensure expeditious disposal of case and not an outright extinguishment of the tax liability. Such interpretation cannot be accepted when it also tends to open room for escape of tax liability through official and Institutional manipulations. Even otherwise when no consequence for neglect to comply with the said provisions has been given in the statute, it cannot be construed as mandatory on any account and by any attribute.\n4. We, having considered the questions raised above, grant leave to appeal and at the same time request the honourable Chief Justice to constitute a larger bench on the aforesaid questions.... \nIt was by reason of this order (herein after referred to as the referral order ) that larger Benches were constituted from time to time to consider the correctness or otherwise of the principles enunciated in Super Asia. The matters could not however proceed for one reason or another, and ultimately the present Bench came to be constituted to decide the question.\n5. Before proceeding further, it will be convenient to set out certain recent developments in relation to the 1990 Act. By means of the Finance Act, 2024 section 11 has been omitted and its subject matter (and certain other matters) has been, as it were, spread over other provisions some of which are newly added, being sections 11A to 11G. However, the relevant provisions continue in the same terms as before, and are now to be found in section 11G. This, as presently relevant, states as follows:\n 11G. Limitation for assessment.- ...\n(2) An order under sections 11 D, 11 E and 11 F shall be made within one hundred and twenty days of issuance of show cause notice or within such extended period as the Commissioner may, for reasons to be recorded, in writing specify, provided that such extended period shall in no case exceed from ninety days:\nProvided that any period during which the proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order or Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings or the time taken through adjournment by the registered person not exceeding sixty days shall be excluded from the computation of the period specified in this subsection. \nThus, what was earlier the first proviso to subsection (5) of section 11 is now subsection (2) of section 11G and the second proviso of the former is now the proviso to the latter. As will be seen, the substantive effect remains the same as before even in the latest manifestation of the law. What exactly is the legislative intent was of course decided in Super Asia and the question now before this larger Bench is whether that determination was correct or not. The issue, in other words, remains very much alive and subsisting.\n6. Since the Commissioner/ Collector (herein after referred to as the Department ) were of the view that the referral order had correctly identified the reasons why Super Asia ought to be reconsidered, we invited learned counsel appearing for the Department to first make submissions. Learned counsel who appeared in C.A. 634 of 2018, referred to the relevant portions of the judgment in Super Asia as also the relevant portions of the referral order. Referring to the relevant portion of section 36 learned counsel submitted that the test whether the provisions were mandatory or directory required recourse to the principles of interpretation of statutes in order to discover the real intention of the legislation. Learned counsel submitted that the purpose of using the term shall was to ensure that the adjudication of cases was not prolonged, but it could not negate the proper collection of sales tax, as due. For this purpose learned counsel also referred to the preamble to the Act. It was submitted that Super Asia was wrongly decided and that the term shall as used in the relevant provisions was clearly directory and not mandatory in nature.\n7. Learned counsel who appeared in C.A. 1429 of 2019 submitted that the scheme of the 1990 Act had not been properly appreciated in Super Asia. Learned counsel submitted that no penal consequences had been provided for if the period prescribed for issuance of an order-in-original was breached and that therefore, the Court had read in language into the provisions in Super Asia, which was impermissible. Learned counsel submitted that the points noted in the referral order were correct and that therefore it ought to be declared that Super Asia was not good law.\n8. Learned counsel appearing in C.P.L.A. 5107 of 2023 submitted that in the relevant provisions the term shall had been used twice. It was submitted that the first shall ought to be read as may and in this regard reference was made to section 14 of the 2005 Act. It was submitted that the pith and substance of the provisions had to be kept in mind and the object was recovery of any tax that remained unpaid or short paid. That, according to learned counsel, was the focus of the legislative intent. Learned counsel submitted that there had to be a balance between the requirements of the State qua recovery on the one hand and the rights of the taxpayers on the other. There could not be any impermissible advantage conferred on the tax payer or any undue enrichment. The interests of both sides had to be kept in mind. Learned counsel submitted that the relevant provisions had to be read conjunctively and not, as erroneously done in Super Asia, disjunctively. It was submitted that the first use of the term shall should be regarded as directory because that was the legislative intent. Recovery provisions, of which the relevant provisions were simply one part or aspect, had to be liberally construed and in favor of allowing the tax to be recovered. In this regard learned counsel also referred to Article 254 of the Constitution. Learned counsel further submitted that the word shall had been used and not, for example must or should . The use of the word shall was ambiguous and had in the present context to be read in a directory manner. Reading the term as mandatory would defeat the interests of the State. Reliance was also placed on the reading down principle and the well known mischief rule for purposes of interpretation of statutes. Learned counsel submitted that the clear mischief sought to be remedied by the provisions was to recover unpaid tax and by the relevant provisions to expedite matter in this regard. The said provisions were nothing but a procedural safeguard that had to be interpreted and applied in a manner that protected the interests of both the Revenue and the taxpayer. Learned counsel who appeared, respectively, for the Department in C.P.L.A. 592 of 2023 and C.A. 732 of 2012 adopted the submissions already made.\n9. The learned Director General (Law) FBR sought, and was granted, permission to address the Court. The learned Director General submitted that the years involved in Super Asia were 1998 to 2013. Referring to para 2 of the judgment (at page 1432) in this regard the learned Director General submitted that there were two periods involved. One was the overall limitation of 5 years and the second was in the relevant provisions which according to the learned Director General did not however involve a matter of limitation. In this regard it was submitted that prior to the insertion of the relevant provisions in 2000 there was no period for the making of an order-in-original by the adjudicating authority. Thus a benefit had been conferred on the taxpayer, which could not however be applied or interpreted in a manner as negated the substantive provisions involved. The learned Director General also drew attention to the treatment of section 74 in para 12 of the judgment and to the table set out in para 13 with regard to the details of the various cases that were before the Court in Super Asia. The learned Director General in particular drew attention to two cases in the table where the conclusion was that the respective orders-in-original were within time on account of the extension granted by the FBR in terms of section 74, a point that was further elaborated in para 14 of the judgment. It was submitted that in the two cases referred to the orders were passed after around 400 days on account of the extension given whereas in para 12 of the judgment the power of the FBR to grant extensions under section 74 had been limited to 6 months, i.e. 180 days. The learned Director General submitted that this was a contradiction within the judgment itself which according to him established that the timeframe imposed on FBR with regard to section 74 could not be sustained. The learned Director General further pointed out that in the relevant provisions, where specific time periods were set out in the legislation itself, the Court had held the same to be mandatory on the one hand while, on the other, in respect of section 74 which did not mention any time period at all, the Court had itself imposed a period of 6 months. The learned Director General submitted that these two approaches and conclusions were self-contradictory and could not stand together. It was accordingly submitted that the decision in Super Asia case ought to be revisited in terms as set out in the referral order.\n10. The taxpayers took the position that Super Asia was correctly decided and the principles of law enunciated therein ought to be affirmed. Learned counsel appearing for them in the various cases were then invited to make submissions. Learned counsel who appeared in C.A. 634 of 2018 referred to a judgment of a five member Bench of the Court reported as Abbasi Enterprises Unilever Distributor Haripur v. Collector of Sales Tax and Federal Excise Duty (2019 SCMR 1989) and relying on observations made in para 8 thereof (at page 1993) submitted that the matter already stood settled in terms of this decision. It was contented that this decision had accepted the correctness of the view taken in Super Asia and in fact applied the same to the facts and circumstances before the Court. Learned counsel submitted that the cited case was conclusive for present purposes. Learned counsel further submitted that the reliance placed on Article 254 of the Constitution was not correct as it had no application in the facts and circumstances of the cases before the Court. It was pointed out that earlier (i.e. prior of 2000) there had been no time limit and on such basis it was contended that the very insertion of specified periods in terms of the relevant provisions was sufficient, in and of itself, to show that the legislative intent was that they were mandatory and not directory. Learned counsel prayed that the decision in Super Asia be affirmed.\n11. Learned counsel who appeared in C.A. 1426 of 2019 drew attention to the erstwhile section 45 of the 1990 Act. This related to powers of adjudication. Learned counsel submitted that a new subsection (2) had been added to this section by the Finance Act, 2006 which was in the following terms:\n Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (4) of section 11 and subsection (3) of section 36 or any other provisions of the Act or any other law for the time being in force and notwithstanding any decision or judgment of any forum, authority or court the time for adjudication in all the cases pending as on 30th June, 2006 shall be deemed always to have been extended up to 31st December, 2006, from the date on which the time-limit prescribed under subsection (4) of section 11 and subsection (3) of section 36, expires. \nLearned counsel contended that the insertion of this subsection was sufficient to show that the relevant provisions were clearly intended to be, and were, mandatory in nature.\n12. Learned counsel who appeared in C.A. 1128 of 2020 adopted the submission already made and further contended that the words used in the relevant provisions were clear in nature and intent and were mandatory. Reliance was placed in this regard on certain case law, both of this Court as well as well as of the Supreme Court of India. Furthermore, learned counsel submitted that the provisos had been added by way of amendments and it was well settled that an amendment was intended to alter the law. According to learned counsel the law clearly was altered to make the time periods inserted by way thereof to be mandatory; the legislative intent could not be made redundant. Finally, learned counsel who appeared for the taxpayer in C.R.P. 154 of 2017 adopted the submissions already made and contended that the judgment in Super Asia ought to be affirmed and upheld.\n13. We have heard learned counsel and the learned Director General as above, considered the statutory provisions involved and seen the case law relied upon. We have also gone through the written synopses filed by some of the learned counsel, and by the learned Director General.\n14. We begin by considering the reasons for which the Court concluded in Super Asia that the relevant provisions were mandatory. (Section 74 will be considered later.) The relevant paragraphs of the judgment in this regard have been identified above. It will unnecessarily burden the record to set them out in full and therefore only a summary will be given. In para 6 (pg. 1437) the Court set out the principles established in the case law for determining whether a provision is intended to be mandatory or directory. We are in respectful agreement with the indicia identified in this regard. In para 7 (pg. 1438) the Court noted that the intent behind the use of shall appeared to be to curtail the power of the adjudicating officer and the Collector/ Commissioner (herein after, for convenience and in the context of the relevant provisions, referred to as the Commissioner ) inasmuch as the extension could not be granted for an unlimited period and reasons had to be recorded for the same. The negative character of the language used in this regard was also noted. It was noted that the time periods were inserted by amending the law (in 2000); prior thereto, there had been none. It was observed: When the legislature makes an amendment in an existing law by providing a specific procedure or time frame for performing a certain act, such provision cannot be interpreted in a way which would render it redundant or nugatory. It was concluded that the relevant provisions were mandatory in nature.\n15. In para 8 (ibid) the submission by learned counsel for the Department, that the intent was only to ensure that orders-in-original were made within a reasonable time and that therefore the relevant provisions were directory, was not accepted. While relying on an earlier decision of the Court it was observed as follows: It is settled law that the principle of reading in or casus omissus is not to be invoked lightly, rather it is to be used sparingly and only when the situation demands it. \n16. Finally, in para 9 (pg. 1439) it was observed as follows: Another aspect of the matter is that when a statute requires that a thing should be done in a particular manner or form, it has to be done in such manner. But if such provision is directory, the act done in breach thereof would not be void, even though non-compliance may entail penal consequences. However, non-compliance of a mandatory provision would invalidate such act. \n17. On such basis it was concluded (in para 9) that an order-in-original made beyond the periods prescribed in the relevant provisions would be invalid . In para 10 (ibid) the effect of the second proviso (which is now the first proviso to subsection (2) of section 11 G) was noted and held to apply in terms as stated therein. Finally, as a wrap up observation, in para 11 (ibid) it was observed that the Commissioner could extend the period up to the stipulated days even if such application was made by the adjudicating authority after the initial period had already expired. However, the overall time limit had to be respected and could not be breached.\n18. The doubts expressed in the referral order made in Wak Ltd. (set out in para 4 herein above) in relation to what was held in Super Asia may now be summarized. It was observed that the intent behind the relevant provisions was only to ensure expeditious disposal of case and not an outright extinguishment of the tax liability . An apprehension was expressed that the conclusions arrived at in Super Asia may open the door to unscrupulous evasion of tax through official and Institutional manipulations . Finally, it was observed that since no penal consequences were provided for the breach of the time periods it cannot be construed as mandatory on any account and by any attribute .\n19. We have carefully considered the contrasting stances in Super Asia on the one hand and the referral order on the other. In the main (though not entirely) the submissions made by learned counsel for the Department and the learned Director General and learned counsel for the taxpayers track the latter and the former respectively. In order to resolve the issue we have therefore endeavored to undertake our own analytical exercise.\n20. The question whether a provision is mandatory or directory has of course arisen innumerable times and in many different contexts. The principles are well settled. As noted in para 6 of Super Asia the ultimate purpose is to ascertain the legislative intent. We note in passing that generally the courts have more readily concluded that in appropriate circumstances a shall is to be read as may (i.e., that the provision seemingly mandatory was in actuality directory) rather the other way round.\n21. We begin by approaching the question textually. In the relevant provisions, the term shall is used twice: firstly, in relation to the initial period in which the order-in-original is to be made and then in relation to the extension that may be granted by the Commissioner. The power of extension is a statutory power conferred on a specified authority. Two points may be noted with regard thereto. Firstly, the Commissioner may (and not shall ) grant the same. In principle he may therefore refuse to do so. To put it differently, he has been granted discretion in this regard. In case he does so he is to record reasons in writing. This is a condition attached to the exercise of the discretionary power and therefore, in terms of well settled principles, is itself a mandatory requirement. In other words, the exercise of the statutory power in favor of granting the extension would be unlawful without the recording of reasons. The reverse is not necessarily true: if he refuses to grant the extension he may record reasons but is not bound to do so. Secondly, the period for which the extension is to be granted shall in no case exceed the stipulated number of days. This is the second shall that has to be reckoned with. But it is to be noted that it is coupled with strong negative or prohibitory language: in no case . As an initial observation, it appears that these words provide what may be described as a hard edge to the second use of shall . They seem to constitute a definite boundary that cannot be crossed. In other words, they appear to convey a sense of finality and conclusiveness. Periods provided in statutes (or in exercise of delegated legislation) within which something is (or, more rarely, not) to be done are usually just that: a specific duration of time. This coupling with strongly negative language is unusual and appears to indicate, even on a bare textual consideration, that an unbreachable limit is indicated.\n22. Analytically, there are four textual possibilities. Firstly, both uses of shall are to be read in mandatory terms. Secondly (and thirdly), one or the other of them is to be read as directory, i.e., as may . Fourthly, both are to be read as directory. Of course, the judgment in Super Asia concluded that the correct reading was per the first possibility; the Department submits that it is the fourth possibility that best aligns with the legislative intent. We now set out the relevant provisions (in terms of section 11 as reproduced herein above) with these possibilities inserted in square brackets (and emphasized):\n Provided that order under this section shall [may] be made within one hundred and twenty days of issuance of show cause notice or within such extended period as the Commissioner may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, fix provided that such extended period shall [may] in no case exceed ninety days .\n23. We begin with the second possibility, i.e., that the first use of shall is to be treated as may and the second as shall . Does this possibility accord with the textual position? Now, if the first shall is directory then the adjudicating authority may or may not issue the order-in-original within the stipulated period. In any situation where the statutory use of shall is to be regarded as directory, these possible outcomes ( may or may not ) are but two sides of the same coin. The one cannot be argued for without the other. But if this is so, then what is the purpose of the requirement that the Commissioner be approached for an extension in time? Even if the stipulated period is crossed the adjudicating authority can still make the order-in-original. The need to have recourse to the Commissioner (who is an officer higher in the departmental hierarchy) and get an extension becomes redundant. And even if the adjudicating authority does approach the Commissioner and the latter refuses the request, so what? The adjudicating authority even then can simply go ahead and make the order-in-original since the prescribed period is only directory. Thus, the second part of the relevant provisions would either be reduced to redundancy or effectively become inconsequential. This can hardly be consistent with the legislative scheme and runs contrary to settled principles of statutory interpretation. Even though during the hearing this outcome was put to learned counsel for the Department no plausible response was, with respect, forthcoming. In our view therefore, even on a simple textual analysis the first shall can be read as directory only at the cost of effectively destroying the latter part of the relevant provisions. For all intents and purposes, it would be scrubbed from the statute book. This is hardly consistent with any rational or reasonable legislative intent.\n24. We now take up the fourth possibility. (As will become clear, this also deals with the third possibility.) This is where both uses of shall are to be read as may . Looking first at the second use, it would seem to mean that while the Commissioner retains his discretion whether to at all grant the extension, he may grant one that goes beyond the stipulated ninety days. But would this understanding be correct textually? In our view, this question can only be answered in the negative. The reason is that it fails to keep in mind the effect of the words in no case . These cannot be ignored. In the possibility now under consideration the last part would read as follows (emphasis supplied): ... provided that such extended period [may] in no case exceed ninety days . But keeping in mind the ordinary usage of language what can may in no case , when read as a whole and in compound form, mean other than shall not ? This is the natural and grammatically acceptable understanding that emerges even with the substitution. The submission on behalf of the Department in effect requires the words in no case to be ignored and scrubbed from the provision. With respect, there is no warrant for this conclusion, which on the face of it would unacceptably distort and deny the statutory language. Furthermore, as noted, when a shall is determined to be directory, especially in the context of or in relation to a period of time, the substitution of shall with may ought to work equally well with may not . It is only then that the court can conclude that whatever it is that can (or should) be done within the period found to be directory may, as a matter of law, be done within a reasonable period. In the present context however, this is simply not possible. While may in no case works as a matter of ordinary usage in the sense already noted (and opposite to the meaning contended for by the Department), may not in no case (or any variation thereof) makes no sense at all. Indeed, the double use of the negative could mean, if it can mean anything at all, that in all cases where the Commissioner chooses to exercise his statutory discretion to extend the period, he must extend it beyond ninety days. A moment's reflection shows that this cannot possibly be a sensible conclusion. It is wholly inconsistent with any rational or reasonable legislative intent. Therefore, even in textual terms, in our view, the second use of shall cannot be directory. It can only be mandatory. As will be seen this conclusion also deals with the third possibility (i.e., where the first use of shall is mandatory but the second use is directory). Insofar as (reverting to the fourth possibility) the first use of shall is concerned, for the reasons already stated in relation to the second possibility, the term cannot be understood and applied in the directory sense; it is mandatory.\n25. It is therefore our conclusion, with respect, that even on a bare textual analysis it is only the first possibility, where both uses of shall are mandatory, that can work in any sensible or reasonable manner. That possibility must therefore be the only one that aligns fully with the legislative intent. And that of course is the conclusion arrived at by the Court in Super Asia.\n26. During the course of the hearing a query was put from the Court that if the judgment in Super Asia, which was rendered in 2017, did not accord with the legislative intent Parliament could have given appropriate expression to its will by suitably amending the relevant provisions. This however was not done. From this, learned counsel for the Department were asked, could it not be reasonably inferred that Super Asia did, in fact, accord with the legislative intent? To this, with respect, no answer was forthcoming. But an answer has in fact been given by the Finance Act, 2024. The statutory provisions have indeed been amended by wholesale substitution but, as noted above, the relevant provisions continue to find place in the statute in exactly the same form, in section 11G. (We may note for completeness that subsection (2) of that section has the word from just before ninety days . This word was not used in the earlier incarnations of the relevant provisions. Furthermore, the earlier versions used the word fix while section 11G(2) uses specify . These appear to be the only differences in language. In our view, they have no substantive effect or any ", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.As. Nos. 634 to 636, 1290 to 1295 of 2018, 1424 to 1430 of 2019, 1388 to 1392 of 2017, 57, 852, 1128 of 2020, C.P.L.As. Nos. 2286-L, 2298-L, 2299-L, 2065-L of 2017, C.As. Nos. 436, 1693 of 2021, C.P.L.As. Nos. 1604-L, 1411-L of 2022, C.A. No. 1486 of 2021, C.P.L.As. Nos. 1397-L, 770-L, 1285-L of 2022, C.As. Nos. 732 of 2012, 394 of 2013, 399, 712 of 2013, C.P.L.As. Nos. 5107, 592-P of 2023, 2473-L and 2474-L of 2022, C.M.As. Nos. 1917-L, 1918-L, 1919-L, 966-L and 964-L of 2015, C.R.Ps. Nos. 153, 154 of 2017 and C.M.A. No. 5471 of 2019, decided on 14th May, 2025. Dates of hearing: 21st and 28th April of 2025.\n(On appeal against judgment dated 24.08.201, 16.01.2017, 18.01.2017, 19.01.2017, 12.02.2015, 12.02.2015, 03.04.2019, 20.11.2014, 23.11.2015, 08.05.2017, 12.06.2017, 14.06.2017, 30.05.2017, 24.05.2017, 26.01.2021, 07.03.2022, 09.03.2022, 08.12.2020, 09.03.2022, 24.01.2022, 01.03.2022, 06.06.2012, 05.04.2012, 05.04.2012, 05.02.2012, 17.10.2023, 11.05.2023 and 22.03.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench Bahawalpur, Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in STR No. 33 of 2005, ETR No. 1 of 2005 and STRs Nos. 10 of 2006, 01/2011/BWP, 02/2011/BWP, 02/2013/BWP, 03/2013/BWP, 03/2016/BWP, STR No.169/2012, 10/2011, 165/2013, 96/2013, 82/2012, , 23/2012, 24/2012, 14/2008, 21/2009, 185/2011, 116/2007, 127/2007, 42/2011, 01/2008, 212/2015, 81/2013, 126/2013, 78/2014, 32435/2017, 22/2012, 4925/2021, 157/2012, 77/2013, 173/2011, 36459/2021, 79765/2021, Customs Reference No. 29033/2019, Sales Tax References Nos. 73/2010, 101/2010, 75/2011, 13/2011, 11/2014, 23-P/2022, ETR No. 05/2011 and STR No.88/2011.)\nC.M.As.1917-L, 1918-L, 1919-L, 966-L and 964-L /2015\n(Stay in C.As. Nos. 1388, 1389, 1390, 1391 and 1392 of 2017).\nC.R.Ps. 153 and 154/2017\n(For review of judgment dated 31.03.2017 passed by this Court in C.A. No. 399 of 2013 and C.A. No. 682 of 2008.) C.M.A. 5471/2019", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUNIB AKHTAR, IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, SHAKEEL AHMAD AND MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ali Sibtain Fazli, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 634-636 of 2018).\nCh. Hafeezullah Yaqoob, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1291 of 2018).\nDl. Muhammad Khan Alizai, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. Nos. 1292-1294 of 2018).\nM. Ajmal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1426 of 2019 and 1486 of 2021).\nMunawar-us-Salam, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-ink, Lahore).\nM. Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1128 of 2020).\nIjaz Ahmed Awan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1388-1392 of 2017).\nSyed Naveed Amjad Indrabi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.R.P. No. 154 of 2017).\nFor Commissioner Inland / FBR\nMrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 634-636 of 2018 and C.A. No. 1292 of 2018, 1428 of 2019, C.P.L.As. Nos. 2298-L, 2299-L of 2017, 2065-L of 2017 and 770-L of 2022).\nCh. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 1290, 1293, 1294, 1295 of 2018 and C.As. Nos. 1388-1392 of 2017, 712 of 2013, C.P.L.As. Nos. 1411-L of 2022, 1285-L of 2022 and 2286-L of 2017).\nAbdul Razzaq Raja, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 57 of 2020 and C.M.A. No. 5471 of 2021).\nDr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 732 of 2012).\nMian Yousaf Umar, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1424/2019, 1429/2019, 1430/2019, 852/2020, 436/2021 and C.P.L.A. No. 1604-L/2022).\nMalik Qamar Afzal, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 5107/2023).\nSarfraz Ahmed Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1425/2019 and 1128/2020).\nAhmed Pervez, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1693/2021).\nYahya, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1291/2018).\nM. Saeed Tahir, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1486/2021).\nWaqar A. Sh., Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1426 and 1427/2019).\nIzhar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.R.Ps. Nos. 153-154/17, C.As. Nos. 394/2013 and 399/2013).\nMs. Saba Saeed, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 1397-L/2022, 2473-2474-L/2022).\nIshtiaq Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 592-P/2023) (via video-link, Peshawar).\nDr. Ishtiaq, DG (Law), FBR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s WAK LIMITED MULTAN ROAD, LAHORE and others - Petitioners\nVS\nCOLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE AND SALES TAX, LAHORE (NOW COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, LAHORE) and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26514", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2126 = 2025 SLD 2126 = 2025 SCMR 1307", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWTg", - "Key Words:": "Nature of Dispute\nThe case concerns control and ownership of Messrs Ofspace (Pvt.) Ltd., a company established to develop two office towers in Karachi.\nThe dispute was between two family groups:\nKhan Group: Sher Asfandyar Khan, Alamgir Khan, and Sajida Naeem\nShah Group: Neelofar Shah, Raza Shah, and Nazeer Shah (intervenor)\nThe central question was whether Alamgir Khan’s transfer of 30% shares to his brother Sher Asfandyar Khan in 1999 was lawful, valid, and compliant with company law and the alleged Shareholders’ Agreements between the groups.\n2. Factual Background\nIncorporation: 17 December 1997\nAuthorized capital: Rs. 10 million (100,000 shares @ Rs.100)\nPaid-up capital: Rs. 2.5 million (25,000 shares)\nInitial Shareholding:\nShah Group — 44% (Neelofar 26%, Raza 18%)\nKhan Group — 56% (Sajida 26%, Alamgir 30%)\nIn January 1999, Alamgir Khan transferred his 30% shares to Sher Asfandyar Khan.\n3. Core Issues\nWhether the transfer of 30% shares from Alamgir Khan to Sher Asfandyar Khan was lawful.\nWhether the Shareholders’ Agreements were binding and authentic.\nWhether such transfer constituted corporate oppression under the Companies Ordinance, 1984.\nWhether the Shah Group’s claim that shares were held “in safe custody” amounted to an unlawful trust under Section 148 of the Ordinance.\n4. Findings of the Company Judge and High Court\nThe transfer of shares was unlawful and oppressive.\nThe Shareholders’ Agreements, even if disputed, reflected a broader understanding that supported the Shah Group’s version.\nThere were procedural irregularities, lack of disclosure, and statutory non-compliance in the company’s records:\nTwo Board meetings held on 15 January 1999 within two hours in Islamabad, not at the registered office (Karachi).\nInconsistent notices, attendance, and signatures on minutes of meetings.\nNon-filing of transfer documents with SECP despite multiple reminders.\nThe SECP confirmed repeated non-compliance and concealment of information (letters from 2002–2006).\nThe transfer deed and other filings were missing or incomplete, violating the Companies Ordinance, 1984.\nThe High Court upheld the findings of the Company Judge, maintaining that the transfer was invalid and that the Shah Group’s minority rights had been oppressed.\n5. Supreme Court’s Analysis (Afridi, C.J.)\n(a) Legality of the Transfer\nThe Court found the transfer of shares dubious and procedurally defective.\nMultiple discrepancies — in venue, notice, attendance, signatures, and filing — created serious doubt about the integrity of the transaction.\nNo reasonable explanation was offered by Alamgir Khan or the Khan Group for the transfer or deviation from company procedures.\n(b) Corporate Compliance\nSECP’s records confirmed continuous non-compliance and concealment of material facts.\nThe company failed to provide statutory documents despite repeated requests.\nThe transfer violated statutory disclosure and filing requirements under the 1984 Ordinance.\n(c) The “Safe Custody” Argument\nThe Shah Group’s position was that the 7,500 shares were held temporarily by Alamgir Khan to be later distributed among project partners and professionals.\nThe Khan Group’s argument that this constituted an illegal trust under Section 148 of the 1984 Ordinance was rejected:\nThe issue was not raised before lower courts and thus could not be introduced for the first time at the Supreme Court stage.\nEven otherwise, the “safe custody” arrangement did not amount to the creation of a trust; Section 148 was irrelevant.\n(d) Corporate Oppression\nThe transfer gave the Khan Family absolute control (majority of 86%), upsetting the agreed balance of 56:44.\nThis amounted to oppression against the Shah Family, violating principles of fair management and corporate governance.\nThe Company Judge was correct in ordering rectification and restoring equitable management control.\n6. Orders and Directions\nTo restore lawful governance, the Court approved the following framework (as set by the Company Judge):\nEOGM (Extraordinary General Meeting): To be held under supervision of the Official Assignee.\nShareholding Ratio: 44% Shah Family; 26% Khan Family.\nManagement Balance:\nChairman: from the Shah Family.\nCEO: from the Khan Family.\nDisputed 30% Shares:\nTo remain in Official Assignee’s custody for one year.\nIf parties fail to reach agreement, the shares revert to Shah Family, subject to third-party claims.\nTransparency Measures:\nImmediate director access to all company records.\nOne-year transitional governance framework, after which full compliance with the Companies Ordinance, 1984 must be ensured.\n7. Legal Principles Affirmed\nCorporate governance must be grounded in transparency, accountability, and fair dealing.\nProcedural compliance is not optional; adherence to the Companies Ordinance ensures legitimacy of corporate actions.\nOppression and illegality in share transfers undermine not only minority shareholders but the integrity of the entire company structure.\nNew pleas cannot be raised before the Supreme Court that were not advanced in earlier proceedings.\n8. Final Decision\nCivil Appeals Dismissed.\nThe High Court’s findings were upheld in full.\nNo order as to costs.\n9. Ratio Decidendi\nA share transfer conducted in violation of statutory procedure, without proper notice, disclosure, and filing, is unlawful and oppressive, regardless of any alleged shareholder agreement. Corporate governance demands transparency and strict adherence to statutory compliance.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Appeals Nos. 1843 to 1846 of 2019 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1138 of 2020, decided on 8th May, 2025. Date of hearing: 11th February, 2025.\n(Against the judgment dated 16.09.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in High Court Appeals Nos. 107 of 2012, 114 of 2012 and 109 of 2012).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ, AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN AND AYESHA A. MALIK, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Haider Waheed, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As.Nos. 1843 and 1846 of 2019).\nSalman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1844 and 1845 of 2019).\nWasim Sajjad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Masood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\nBarrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4 to 6.\nOmer Azad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 7 (SECP).\nFarooq H. Naek, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (in C.M.A. No. 1138 of 2020).", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHER ASFANDYAR KHAN and 3 others - Appellants\nVS\nNEELOFAR SHAH and others - Respondents" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26515", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2127 = 2025 SLD 2127 = 2025 SCMR 1339", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWXo", - "Key Words:": "Facts of the Case\nThe prosecution alleged that Khizar Hayat (appellant) and several others murdered Ghulam Rasool and injured Abid Hussain around 9:00 p.m. on 30.11.2009.\nMotive: Allegedly, the accused had abducted complainant’s daughter, Mst. Nasreen.\nThe appellant and co-accused were booked under FIR No. 240/2009 at P.S. Haveli Karanga.\nAfter trial, Khizar Hayat was convicted under Section 302(b) P.P.C. and sentenced to death.\nOn appeal, the Lahore High Court converted the death sentence to life imprisonment.\nThe appellant then approached the Supreme Court, which granted leave to appeal for reappraisal of evidence.\n2. Key Issues for Determination\nWhether the ocular (eye-witness) evidence was reliable in the absence of corroborating material.\nWhether the delay in lodging the FIR affected the credibility of the prosecution case.\nWhether the medical and ocular evidence were consistent.\nWhether the motive was proved.\nWhether the benefit of doubt was available to the appellant.\n3. Court’s Analysis\n(a) Identification and Night-Time Occurrence\nThe incident occurred at night (9:00 p.m.).\nAlthough witnesses claimed to have used a torch, no torch was recovered during investigation.\nTherefore, the identification of accused in darkness was highly doubtful.\n(b) Delay in FIR\nThe crime scene was only 9 miles from the police station, yet the FIR was lodged 14 hours later (at 1:05 p.m. on 01.12.2009).\nThe Court held that this unexplained delay created suspicion of deliberation and fabrication.\n(c) Ocular Account and Disbelieved Witnesses\nThree witnesses (Muhammad Ramzan, Muhammad Sadiq, and Abid Hussain) claimed to have seen the occurrence.\nThey attributed fatal injuries to Khizar Hayat and Aamir Shehzad; and hatchet blows to Sadar Ayub.\nHowever, co-accused Aamir Shehzad and Sadar Ayub—who were assigned similar effective roles—were acquitted.\nThe Court reiterated the settled principle:\n“If eye-witnesses are disbelieved against some accused attributed effective roles, they cannot be believed against others assigned identical roles unless corroborated by independent evidence.”\n(d) Injured Witness (Abid Hussain)\nThe prosecution relied heavily on Abid Hussain (PW-12) as an injured witness.\nHowever:\nThe doctor who examined him was not produced in court.\nHis injuries were attributed to Sadar Ayub, who was acquitted.\nHence, his testimony was unreliable without corroboration.\n(e) Contradictions with Medical Evidence\nThe ocular account conflicted with medical evidence.\nThe conduct of witnesses was deemed unnatural, as they failed to retaliate or react in a way consistent with the alleged violent scene.\n(f) Failure to Prove Motive\nThe alleged motive (abduction of complainant’s daughter) was not proved.\nThe Court reaffirmed that:\n“Though motive need not be proved in every case, once set up, it must be established. If not proved, the prosecution must suffer its consequences.”\n4. Legal Findings\nThe prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.\nThe ocular evidence was doubtful, FIR was delayed, medical evidence was inconsistent, and motive was unsubstantiated.\nTherefore, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.\n5. Decision / Operative Part\nAppeal Allowed.\nConviction and sentence set aside.\nKhizar Hayat acquitted of all charges.\nTo be released forthwith if not required in any other case.\n6. Ratio Decidendi (Legal Principle)\n“When material contradictions exist between ocular and medical evidence, coupled with unexplained delay in FIR and doubtful identification, the prosecution fails to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of such doubt must always go to the accused.”\n7. Final Order\nThe Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and acquitted the appellant.\nNo costs awarded.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Criminal Appeal No. 181 of 2022, decided on 28th April, 2025. Date of hearing: 28th April, 2025.\n(Against the judgment/order dated 18.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Crl. Appeal No. 15-J of 2013 and M.R. No. 28 of 2012).", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR AND ISHTIAQ IBRAHIM, JJ", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.\nTariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.", - "Petitioner Name:": "KHIZAR HAYAT - Appellant\nVS\nThe STATE - Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26516", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2137 = 2025 SLD 2137", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDWXk", - "Key Words:": "Appeal Against Dismissal of Suit\nCore Issue: This appeal challenges an order that dismissed the Appellants lawsuit (Suit No. 54 of 2016) seeking a declaration and damages. The dismissal was based on two grounds: the suit was filed outside the legal time limit (limitation), and the Appellant did not qualify as a Customer under the relevant banking law.\nBackground:\nThe Appellant purchased a CNG Station at an auction conducted by the Respondent Bank against one of its defaulting customers.\nA higher court later set aside the original banking suit that led to the auction.\nFollowing this, the court ordered the Appellant to return the propertys sale deed and directed the Bank to refund the Appellants purchase amount of approximately Rs. 9.82 million.\nThe Appellant complied but alleges the Bank returned the money after a delay of four years, causing him financial damage, which led him to file the suit for damages.\nAppellants Argument: The Appellant argued that since his relationship with the Bank was not that of a Customer and the transaction wasnt a Finance Facility under the banking law, the Banking Court should not have dismissed the suit on its merits. Instead, it should have returned the plaint (the legal document initiating the suit) to be filed in a regular civil court, which was the procedure followed in a separate, earlier suit he had filed.\nCourts Decision & Rationale:\nThe appellate court agreed with the Appellants core legal argument. It found that the Appellants transaction with the Bank fell outside the scope of the banking law.\nThe court noted that the original dismissal order was self-contradictory: it correctly observed that the Appellant was not a Customer but then incorrectly proceeded to dismiss the suit on its merits instead of returning it for lack of jurisdiction.\nRuling: The impugned order was set aside. The court ordered the plaint to be returned and presented before the competent civil court (the Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad). This new suit is to be combined (tagged) with the Appellants earlier suit for a consolidated proceeding. The civil court is free to decide all issues, including the maintainability of the suit.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001=2(c)", - "Case #": "1st Appeal No.12 of 2018. 06.11.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMAL ALAM AND MR. JUSTICE KHADIM HUSSAIN SOOMRO", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Aamir Ali Memon advocate for Appellant.\nDespite service, no one is present on behalf of the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MAZHARUDDIN (APPELLANT) \nVS \nTHE MANAGER SME LEASING LTD (RESPONDENT)" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26517", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2138 = 2025 SLD 2138", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTc", - "Key Words:": "Case Overview:\nA writ petition was filed by the petitioners challenging the legality of three investigation notices issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). The SECP was investigating the petitioners for alleged market manipulation of shares of Murree Brewery Company Limited (MUREB), which saw a 236% price increase over a specific period.\nPetitioners Arguments:\nThe petitioners argued that the notices were:\nPremature and Without Jurisdiction: Challenging the notices at the investigation stage was inappropriate as no final adverse order had been passed.\nVague and Lacking Particulars: The notices failed to provide specific details of the alleged manipulative transactions, violating their constitutional rights.\nRetrospective Application of Law: The Securities Act, 2015, was applied to trading activities that occurred before its enactment, contravening Article 12 of the Constitution.\nViolation of Right Against Self-Incrimination: Compelling them to appear and provide statements violated their right under Article 13(1)(b) of the Constitution.\nCourts Analysis and Decision:\nThe court dismissed the writ petition, rejecting all of the petitioners arguments. Its reasoning was as follows:\nMaintainability of the Petition at Investigation Stage: The court held that interfering at the initial investigation stage would hinder the regulators statutory functions. It emphasized that the petitioners had adequate alternate remedies available if an adverse order was eventually passed. The notices themselves were not adverse orders but part of an investigative process to gather information.\nSufficiency of the Notices Contents: The court examined the impugned notices and found that they contained sufficient particulars. They specified the scrip (MUREB), the investigation period, the abnormal price increase (236%), the alleged nature of the offense (synchronized trading), the specific legal provisions violated, and the details for appearance. This was deemed to meet the legal standard for such notices.\nRetrospective Application of the Law: The court distinguished between substantive and procedural law. It ruled that Sections 137 and 139 of the Securities Act, 2015, which grant the power to call for information and initiate investigations, are procedural in nature. As procedural laws can operate retrospectively, the SECP was within its rights to investigate pre-2015 transactions using the 2015 Acts procedures.\nProtection Against Self-Incrimination (Article 13): The court held that the constitutional protection against self-incrimination was not triggered at this stage. The petitioners were not yet accused of an offence in a criminal proceeding but were being investigated as part of a regulatory, administrative process. Furthermore, the court noted that the cited case law on this point primarily concerned natural persons, and the protection may not apply in the same way to regulated entities in an administrative inquiry.\nFinal Outcome:\nThe court refused to intervene in the SECPs ongoing investigation, stating that the writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution should not be used to obstruct a regulatory body at a preliminary stage. The petition was dismissed, and the SECP was allowed to proceed with its investigation.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Securities Act, 2015=137,139,141Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=199", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2363 of 2017. Date of Hearing: 09.04.2025. Announced on 30.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Mian Sami-ud-Din and Mr. Nasir Mehmood, Advocates.\nRespondents by: Raja Muqsit Nawaz Khan, Advocate along with Muhammad Waseem A. Rana, SPP, SECP.\nResearch Assistance by: Muhammad Fahad.", - "Petitioner Name:": "Najeeb Ullah Durrani and another\nVs\nSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26518", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2139 = 2025 SLD 2139", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTY", - "Key Words:": "Petition for Recovery of Sale Proceeds of Confiscated Tea\nCore Issue: The petitioner filed a claim for the recovery of the sale proceeds of black tea that had been seized and confiscated by customs authorities. The petition was directly filed without first obtaining a legal declaration that the goods were wrongly confiscated.\nBackground:\nCustoms officials seized black tea (alleged to be of smuggled foreign origin) along with a vehicle.\nThe goods were confiscated via an Order-in-Original in 2011.\nThe petitioner sought the sale proceeds of this confiscated tea under Section 169(5) of the Customs Act, 1969.\nCourts Analysis & Rationale:\nThe court highlighted the legal prerequisite under Section 169(5) of the Customs Act: to claim the sale proceeds, the owner must first obtain a formal declaration from a competent authority (via adjudication, appeal, or court proceedings) that the goods were not liable to confiscation.\nThe petitioner had failed to secure this essential declaration. The court noted that the petitioner directly jumped to claim the sale proceeds without this foundational step.\nThe court found that previous legal challenges to the seizure and confiscation had already been conclusively decided, including a dismissed civil appeal.\nFinal Ruling: The court held that the petition was not maintainable as the necessary legal condition (a declaration of wrongful confiscation) had not been met. Consequently, the Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal (CPLA) was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),16,157,169(5)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 3755 of 2022. Date of Hearing & Order: 25.09.2025.\n(Against Judgment dated 15.09.2022 of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P No.19-P of 2022)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI, HCJ, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Mr. Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, ASC.\nMr. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR.\nFor the Respondents: Mr. Abdul Rauf Rohaila, Sr. ASC.\nMr. Usman Aziz, Dy. Collector, Customs (through video-link from Peshawar)\nFor the Department Customs: Mr. Saeed Akram, Member (Legal)\nMr. Ashraf Ali, Chief Legal, Customs.\nMr. Amanat Kha, ADC.\nMr. Aftab Alam, Inspector.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ARIF KHAN ... PETITIONER\nVS\nCOLLECTOR CUSTOMS MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE (ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE) CUSTOMS HOUSE, JAMRUD, ROAD, PESHAWAR AND ANOTHER ... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26519", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2140 = 2025 SLD 2140", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTU", - "Key Words:": "Through the present appeal, the taxpayer has assailed the order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) dated 30th June, 2025, whereby the appeal preferred by the taxpayer was dismissed as being barred by limitation, and the prayer for condonation of delay was refused. \n2. The relevant facts, in brief, are that the appellant is a private limited company deemed to be a withholding agent within the contemplation of Section 153(7) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The department, upon examining the tax profile of the taxpayer, observed that the expenses claimed by the appellant were not commensurate with the withholding statements filed. Accordingly, proceedings were initiated under Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, for reconciliation of withholding tax compliance with the declared expenses. These proceedings culminated in an adverse order dated 30th August, 2024, whereby the learned Deputy Commissioner determined a tax demand of Rs. 10 million against the taxpayer under Section 161, read with Section 205 of the Ordinance.\n3. Aggrieved, the taxpayer preferred an appeal before the learned Commissioner (Appeals) on 26th June, 2025. The learned Commissioner (Appeals), however, held that the appeal was hopelessly barred by time, declined to condone the delay, and dismissed the appeal in limine. Before us, the taxpayer has urged that the order dated 30th August, 2024, was never duly served upon him, and further that the proceedings under section 161 were concluded without affording him due opportunity of hearing. On this premise, it was contended that the delay in filing appeal was not deliberate or contumacious but occasioned by want of knowledge of the order.\n4. We have carefully perused the record and considered the matter. It is manifest that the crux of controversy presently before us does not relate to the tax liability itself, but rather to the dismissal of the appeal by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground of limitation.\n5. We have noted with concern that the order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) is a non-speaking one. It contains no reasoning as to why the application for condonation of delay was declined, nor does it advert to the explanation furnished by the taxpayer or to the circumstances surrounding the alleged non-service of the impugned order of the learned Deputy Commissioner. Such cryptic disposal of an application involving condonation of delay cannot be sustained in law.\n6. The jurisprudence on the subject is well-settled. The condonation of delay is not to be treated as a matter of mere formality, nor is it to be rejected in a mechanical manner. The superior courts have consistently held that the right of appeal is a valuable statutory right, and its denial on the factual ground of limitation requires careful and reasoned adjudication. While it is equally trite that each day of delay must be satisfactorily explained, it is no less the duty of the appellate authority to examine with due care the peculiar facts of the case, the conduct of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances, so as to ensure that justice is not sacrificed at the altar of technicality.\n7. Superior Courts has consistently emphasised that while finality of proceedings is a salutary principle, the power to condone delay must be exercised judiciously, striking a balance between the rights of the State and the right of the taxpayer to pursue his statutory remedies. \n8.In the present case, the learned Commissioner (Appeals) has failed to addressed the factual basis of the delay nor considered whether the explanation offered by the taxpayer was plausible. His order, therefore, suffers from material legal infirmity.\n9. In these circumstances, we are constrained to vacate the order dated 30th June, 2025, passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals). The matter is remanded back to the learned Commissioner (Appeals), with the direction to consider and adjudicate afresh the taxpayer’s application for condonation of delay after affording both parties a proper opportunity of being heard, and to pass a reasoned and speaking order strictly in accordance with law. The appeal of the taxpayer is disposed of in the above terms. The Miscellaneous Application for Stay having thus become infructuous is also disposed of.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=153(7),161Income Tax Rules, 2002=44(4)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 404/IB/2025, M.A (Stay) No.1059/IB/2025 (Tax Year 2024). Date of Hearing & Order: 25.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Sharif ud Din Khilji, Member and Nasir Iqbal, Member", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Zeshan Ahmed, Manager Tax\nRespondent By: Ms. Naila Gul, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "ROTAN (PVT) LIMITED, SHAMS COLONY, GOLRA ROAD, 3ND FLOOR, BNA PLAZA, MAIN ROAD, ISLAMABAD\nVS\nTHE CIR, CTO, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26520", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2141 = 2025 SLD 2141", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTQ", - "Key Words:": "Petition for Promotion and Seniority\nCore Relief Sought: The petitioner, a Steno-typist, sought a court declaration that the governments failure to consider him for promotion was illegal. He requested an order directing the authorities to convene a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) meeting to decide his case.\nBackground:\nThe petitioners original department (Sindh Agriculture Supplies Organization) was dissolved, making him surplus.\nHe was absorbed into the Sindh Secretariat in 2003 and later transferred to a Deputy Commissioners office, where he has remained in the same post for 25 years.\nHe argued that his career stagnation was due to the incorrect application of re-absorption, which wrongly calculated his seniority from the date of absorption rather than his original appointment date.\nPetitioners Argument: His transfer was not voluntary but a result of his departments abolition. Citing Rule 12(a) of the Sindh Civil Servant (Seniority) Rules, 1975, he argued that he was entitled to have his seniority calculated from his initial appointment, which would make him eligible for promotion.\nGovernments Response (Respondents Defense): The state argued that:\nThe petition was filed after an unreasonable delay (17 years).\nService matters like promotion fall under the jurisdiction of service tribunals (Article 212 of the Constitution), making this petition inadmissible.\nThe petition was moot because the petitioners application had already been processed, a hearing was granted, and necessary directions had been issued to the Deputy Commissioner in March 2024 to address the promotion.\nCourts Decision & Rationale: The court allowed the petition (ruled in the petitioners favor).\nIt affirmed that while a civil servant has a right to be considered for promotion, there is no absolute right to be promoted.\nThe court found merit in the petitioners claim regarding his seniority calculation under Rule 12(a), as his transfer was not voluntary.\nIt rejected the governments mootness argument and exercised its jurisdiction to provide relief.\nFinal Order & Directions: The court issued the following directives to the competent government authorities:\nConsider for Promotion: The petitioners case must be considered for promotion in the next rank in the next DPC meeting, alongside all other eligible candidates.\nDetermine Seniority: The issue of the petitioners seniority must be decided in light of Rule 9-A of the APT Rules, 1974 and the Supreme Courts judgment in Tika Khan v Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah.\nTimeline: Both actions (consideration for promotion and seniority determination) must be completed within three months.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Constitutional Petition No. D-4217 of 2023. Dates of hearing & Order: 24.09.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUHAMMAD KARIM KHAN AGHA AND JUSTICE ADNAN-UL-KARIM MEMON", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Malik Altaf Hussain, advocate for the petitioner.\nMs. Salma Imdad, Assistant Advocate General Sindh.\nMr. Ghulam Ali alias Tarique Ahmed, ADC-II Naushahro Feroze", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ALI \nVS \nTHE PROVINCE OF SINDH AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26521", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2142 = 2025 SLD 2142", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVS8", - "Key Words:": "C.M.No. 207 of 2025\n\n\nThis is an application seeking permission to place on record additional documents. For the reasons recorded therein, the instant C.M. is allowed subject to all just and legal exceptions.\n\n\nMain case.\n\n\n2. Through this petition, the petitioner seeks post-arrest bail in case FIR No.25/2025 dated 08.01.2025, offence under Section 489-F PPC registered at Police Station Ramna, Islamabad.\n3. As per crime report, the precise allegation against the petitioner is that he dishonestly issued one cheque amounting to Rs.32,00,000/- and second cheque amounting to Rs.500,000/- in favour of the complainant. Second cheque amounting to Rs.500,000/-, which was presented in the bank for encashment but the same was dishonoured.\n4. Heard. Record perused.\n5. It is the case of the prosecution that the complainant being close friend of the petitioner gave him an amount of Rs.37,00,000/- as Qarz-e-Hasna, however, the petitioner in lieu of payment of loan issued two cheques, one of the cheque amounting to Rs.500,000/- was dishonoured when presented for encashment from the concerned Bank.\nRecord evinces that the petitioner was running a business in the name and style of “Qarni & Haider Traders” and bank statements of the petitioner from 01.01.2021 to 09.04.2024 indicates certain business transactions with the complainant and others. In such circumstances, whether the cheques in question were issued towards fulfillments of an obligation within the meaning of Section 489-F PPC is a question which would be resolved by the learned trial Court after recording of evidence. Reliance is place on “Muhammad Anwar vs the State, etc” (2024 SCMR 1567) and “Abdul Rasheed vs the State, etc” (2023 SCMR 1948). The maximum punishment of offence provided under Section 489-F PPC is not more than imprisonment for three years or fine or both, as such, the same is not covered by the prohibition contained in sub-section (1) of Section 497 Cr.P.C. In view of the dictum laid down in “Tariq Bashir & 5 others vs. The State” (PLD 1995 SC 34), in non-bailable offences falling in the second category i.e. punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years, the grant of bail is a rule and refusal an exception. No exceptional circumstances could be pointed out by the learned prosecutor as well as the learned counsel for the complainant, as enumerated in the case of Tariq Bashir supra. Similar view was adopted by the Honble Supreme Court of Pakistan in another case titled “Muhammad Sarfraz v. The State and others” (2014 SCMR 1032). Further wisdom can be extracted from the cases titled “Muhammad Tanveer vs. The State” (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 733) and “Abdul Saboor vs. The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and another” (2022 SCMR 592).\n6. In Abdul Saboor case supra, the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that for recovery of amount, civil proceedings provide remedies under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) and in this regard civil suit is pending adjudication between the parties before the Civil court. Moreover, involvement of a huge amount does not enlarge the punitive scope of Section 489-F PPC and is no ground for refusal of bail. Reliance in this regard can be placed on “Jehanzeb Khan vs. The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others” (2020 SCMR 1268) wherein it was observed by the revered Supreme Court of Pakistan as infra:-\n“Substantial amounts notwithstanding, nonetheless, offence complained is punishable with three years imprisonment or fine or with both and as such does not attract the statutory bar. Petitioner’s continuous detention is not likely to improve upon investigative process, already concluded, thus, he cannot be held behind the bars as a strategy for punishment.”\n7. As far as the arguments of the learned counsel for the complainant that the other cases of similar nature have been registered against the petitioner is concerned, it is trite that mere registration of other criminal cases against an accused does not disentitle him for the grant of bail if on merits he has a prima facie case. Reliance is place on “Moundar and others vs the State” (PLD 1990 SC 934), “Muhammad Rafique vs The State” (1997 SCMR 412) “Syeda Sumera Andaleeb v. The State, etc” (2021 SCMR 1227) “Nazir Ahmad alias Bhaga vs The State” (2022 SCMR 1467) and “Ali Anwar Paracha vs the State and another” (2024 SCMR 1596).\n8. The petitioner is behind the bars since 22.01.2025 and his physical custody is no more required to the investigating agency for the purpose of further investigation. As such, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars for an indefinite period.\n9. In view of above discussion, the instant bail petition is allowed and the petitioner is admitted to post-arrest bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.200,000/- with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. It is pertinent to mention here that the observations made herein above are tentative in nature, which shall have no bearing effect on the merits of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Cri. Misc. No. 455 of 2025. Date of Order: 25.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author: Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar, Acting Chief Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Ch. Arslan Nawaz Marth, Advocate for the petitioner. Syed Wajid Ali Shah Gillani & Zahid Mahmood Raja Advocates with the complainant Mr. Adnan Ali DDPP for the State with Shakeel A.S.I.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD AWAIS QARNI\nVS\nTHE STATE, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26522", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2143 = 2025 SLD 2143", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVSs", - "Key Words:": "Tax Dispute on Universitys Printing Activities\nCore Legal Issue: Whether a university, by printing its own educational materials, could be legally classified as a withholding agent required to deduct and pay sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, for the tax periods of July 2012 to June 2013.\nCase History:\nShow Cause Notice (2014): The tax department issued a notice, claiming the university was a withholding agent for its suppliers and had failed to deduct and deposit sales tax.\nAdjudication & First Appeal (2015): The tax officers order against the university was upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals).\nTribunal (2015): The Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the university, finding the law did not apply to its situation.\nHigh Court: The tax department appealed, and the High Court overturned the Tribunals decision, ruling against the university.\nSupreme Court: The university filed this final appeal.\nUniversitys Position: The tax department incorrectly applied the law. The specific provision used to hold it liable, Section 11(4) of the Sales Tax Act, deals with recovering short-paid taxes or erroneous refunds, not with the responsibilities of a withholding agent.\nSupreme Courts Analysis & Decision:\nThe Supreme Court allowed the universitys appeal, setting aside the High Courts judgment. The courts reasoning was:\nWrong Legal Provision: The tax departments entire case was based on Section 11(4), which is irrelevant to withholding tax obligations. It is a recovery provision for different circumstances.\nLaw Applied Retroactively: The provision that could have created such a liability, Section 11(4A), was only introduced in 2016—years after the tax periods in question (2012-2013). Applying it retrospectively was illegal.\nNo Legal Basis for Demand: Since the correct law did not exist at the time, and the law that was cited did not fit the situation, the tax demand had no legal foundation.\nFinal Outcome: The Supreme Court found the tax departments action was based on an incorrect and retroactive application of the law. The university won the case and was relieved of the withholding tax liability for the specified period.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Special Procedure (Withholding) Rules, 2007=2,3Sales Tax Act, 1990=11(4),11(4A)Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No. 4579 of 2023. Date of Hearing: 01.10.2025. Announced on 09.10.25\n[Against the order dated 15.11.2023 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in S.T.R. No.15/2016]", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR, MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI AND MR. JUSTICE MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioner: Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR/ASC.\nMr. Fazle-e-Rabi, Dy. Director, AIOU.\nMr. M. Ali Akbar, Treasury Officer, AIOU.\nFor the Respondent: Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC.\nAysha Jamal. Addl. Commissioner.\nSehr Ali, AC.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S ALLAMA IQBAL OPEN UNIVERSITY ... PETITIONER\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, WITHHOLDING TAX ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, ISLAMABAD .... RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26523", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2144 = 2025 SLD 2144", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTk", - "Key Words:": "A complaint was filed with the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) concerning significant difficulties faced by non-resident taxpayers. The core issue was that the Federal Board of Revenues (FBR) decision to expire all taxpayer passwords required a reset process that depended on a locally registered mobile number and email—credentials often unavailable to non-residents. This locked them out of their accounts and prevented them from filing income tax returns.\nThe complaint highlighted four main obstacles:\nThe password reset required a local mobile number.\nOutdated contact details in tax profiles blocked online reset.\nA lack of a published Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for non-residents to update their details.\nBiometric verification rules made obtaining a local SIM card impossible.\nFollowing the FTOs intervention, the Regional Tax Office (RTO) in Islamabad developed and implemented a new SOP to address these problems. This SOP provides clear, alternative methods for non-residents to verify their identity and update their registration particulars, primarily through email communication and video calls (e.g., WhatsApp), without needing to be physically present or have a local SIM.\nThe FBRs IT directorate confirmed the issue was being addressed at a higher level. The complainant subsequently confirmed that their grievance had been resolved. The FTO commended the RTO Islamabads proactive solution and recommended that the Chairman FBR issue similar facilitative SOPs to all field offices to ensure consistency. With the complaint successfully redressed, the FTO closed the case.", - "Court Name:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000=10(1)", - "Case #": "COMPLAINT NO.18464/ISB/IT/2025. Dated:14.08.2025. Order dated: 09-10-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: DR. ASIF MAHMOOD JAH, FEDERAL TAX OMBUDSMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "Dealing Officer: Mr. Muhammad Naseer Butt, Advisor\nAppraised by: Mr. Muhammad Tanvir Akhtar, Advisor\nAuthorized Representative : None\nDepartmental Representatives : Mr. Naveed Hassan, ADCIR, RTO, Islamabad", - "Petitioner Name:": "MR. MUHAMMAD MUDASSER, OFFICE 1, 3RD FLOOR, ISLAMABAD ARCADE, G-11 MARKAZ, ISLAMABAD .... COMPLAINANT\nVS\nTHE SECRETARY, REVENUE DIVISION, ISLAMABAD .... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26524", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2219 = 2025 SLD 2219", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVTg", - "Key Words:": "A lawsuit filed by the bank for the recovery of PKR 276,196,889 (as of 30.06.2022) along with markup and costs from the defendants.\nBackground and Core Dispute\nOriginal Facilities: Defendant No. 1 (a public company) had a banking relationship with the plaintiff since 2007, availing various finance facilities. Defendants No. 2-4 provided personal guarantees.\nRestructuring Agreement (2019-2020): In 2019, Defendant No. 1 requested to restructure its outstanding debt. The bank agreed, consolidating the existing principal of PKR 229,453,080 into a long-term Demand Finance-I (DF-1), payable in installments from 2021 to 2026.\nAccrued Markup: The outstanding accrued markup of PKR 18,496,000 was converted into a separate Demand Finance-II (DF-2), payable after DF-1 was fully settled.\nDefault: Despite this restructuring and subsequent acknowledgments of the debt by Defendant No. 1 in its annual report, the defendants defaulted on their payments, prompting the bank to file this recovery suit.\nDefendants Defense (in their Application for Leave to Defend)\nThe contesting defendants (No. 1-4) raised three main objections:\nPre-Restructuring Facilities: They initially challenged the validity of the original facilities but withdrew this challenge during arguments, acknowledging the restructured debt.\nExcessive Markup: They argued the bank charged markup unlawfully—beyond the agreed period and at a rate higher than the mutually agreed 8% per annum.\nMaintainability of the Suit: They claimed the suit was filed by an unauthorized person, the statement of accounts was invalid, and the guarantee documents were fake. \nCourts Analysis and Decision\nThe court rejected the defendants arguments and ruled in favor of the bank, but adjusted the claimed amount.\nAdmission of Liability: The court found that Defendant No. 1 had unequivocally admitted the restructured debt and the default in its Annual Report for 2020. This public declaration was a crucial piece of evidence against them.\nValidity of Restructuring & Cost of Funds : The court held that a restructuring agreement is a valid finance under the Financial Institutions Ordinance. The bank is entitled to charge a cost of funds (effectively markup) on the restructured amount because it is allowing the borrower to defer payment. This cost is a valid charge based on mutual agreement.\nRejection of Defense Arguments:\nAuthorization: The suit was filed by a person holding a valid, registered Power of Attorney from the banks board.\nStatement of Accounts: The accounts were certified as required by law.\nFake Documents: The claim that guarantees were fake was dismissed as a bald and general allegation, especially in light of the admitted debt in the annual report.\nAdjustment to the Claimed Amount: The court agreed with the defendants that the bank had charged markup above the agreed 8% rate. Therefore, it recalculated the decree amount based on the principal and a markup of 8% per annum.\nFinal Decree\nThe court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff bank, ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally:\nPrincipal (DF-1): PKR 229,453,080\nNet Markup (at 8% p.a.): PKR 8,738,073\nFrozen Markup (DF-2): PKR 18,496,000\nTotal Decretal Amount: PKR 256,687,153\nAdditionally, the defendants must pay the costs of the suit and cost of funds from the date of default (30.06.2021) until the full amount is recovered. If the amount is not paid within 30 days, the decree will automatically convert into execution proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "C.O.S. No. 55735 / 2022 & P.L.A. Nos. 67952, 66029, 75802 & 68570 of 2022. Date of Judgment: 14.05.2025. Announced on: 30.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Plaintiff By: Mr. Hasham Ahmad Khan, Advocate Mr. Isa Ahmad Jalil, Advocate\nDefendants No. 1 to 4 By: Mr. Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate\nDefendant No. 7 By: Mr. Nawaz Asif, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE BANK OF PUNJAB \nVS\nM/S HIRA TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED AND 08 OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26525", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2220 = 2025 SLD 2220", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVXo", - "Key Words:": "This was a constitutional petition filed by an insurance company challenging an order from the President of Pakistan. The President had directed the company to refund PKR 1,650,000 to a policyholder. The insurance company argued the President acted without jurisdiction.\nBackground/Timeline of Events\nInsurance Policies: The petitioner company issued two life insurance policies to Respondent No. 2 in 2017 and 2018.\nSurrender Request: The policyholder, facing financial constraints, requested to surrender the policies and get a refund of the premiums paid.\nSDRC Complaint: Dissatisfied with the companys offer, the policyholder filed a complaint with the Small Dispute Resolution Committee (SDRC), which found the companys improved offer of PKR 1,016,000 to be reasonable. \nFIO Complaint: Still aggrieved, the policyholder filed a complaint with the Federal Insurance Ombudsman (FIO).\nFIOs Order (04.09.2023): The FIO refused to hear the complaint, citing Section 127(1)(b) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, which bars the FIO from investigating matters already decided by another forum. The FIO mistakenly treated the SDRCs recommendation as a final adjudication.\nRepresentation to the President: The policyholder filed a representation to the President of Pakistan against the FIOs order.\nImpugned Order (08.12.2023): The President (Respondent No. 1) set aside the FIOs order and directed the insurance company to refund PKR 1,650,000 to the policyholder.\nWrit Petition: The insurance company filed this petition, challenging the Presidents order.\nArguments of the Parties\nPetitioner (Insurance Company):\nThe FIOs order was final, and the President had no jurisdiction to review it.\nInsurance law only allows for the payment of a surrender value, not a full refund of premiums.\nThe FIO correctly applied the law by declining jurisdiction after the SDRCs decision.\nRespondents (President & Policyholder):\nThe SDRC is not a judicial body and its findings are not binding; thus, the FIO was wrong to decline jurisdiction.\nThe policies were sold fraudulently (mis-selling).\nThe President has explicit power under Section 14 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 to review an Ombudsmans orders.\nCourts Analysis & Key Legal Findings\nThe court dismissed the insurance companys petition, upholding the Presidents order. The reasoning was as follows:\nThe President Had Jurisdiction: The court held that Section 14 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 explicitly allows any aggrieved party to file a representation to the President against a decision, order, findings or recommendations of an Ombudsman within 30 days. This power is broad and inclusive.\nThe 2013 Act Overrides Other Laws: The court emphasized Section 24 of the 2013 Act, which gives it an overriding effect over other laws, including the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. In case of a conflict, the 2013 Act prevails.\nThe FIO Erred in Law: The court found the FIOs decision to be a jurisdictional error. The bar under Section 127(1)(b) of the Insurance Ordinance only applies when a matter is sub judice before a court of competent jurisdiction, tribunal or board. The court ruled that the SDRC is not a judicial tribunal but a forum for non-binding recommendations. Therefore, the FIO was wrong to decline the complaint.\nAllegations of Fraud Change the Nature of the Case: The court rejected the insurance companys argument about only paying a surrender value. It held that where there are allegations of fraud or mis-selling, the issue becomes one of maladministration, and equitable relief (like a full refund) can be granted by the Ombudsman and the President.\nFinal Decision\nThe court found no legal infirmity in the Presidents order. The President acted within the statutory powers granted by law. Consequently, the insurance companys petition was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reform Act, 2013=14", - "Case #": "W.P No. 948 of 2024. Date of hearing : 22.04.2025. Announced on: 22.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD ASIF, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioners by: Syed Hamid Ali Shah, Advocate\nRespondents by: Ms. Shaista Tabbasum, AAG a/w Mr. Shajjar Abbas Hamdani, Advocate for respondent No.2", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S JUBILEE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED \nVS \nOFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN (PUBLIC), ISLAMABAD ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26526", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2221 = 2025 SLD 2221", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDVXk", - "Key Words:": "Court: Appellate Tribunal / High Court (hearing a reference under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969)\nApplicant (Appellant): Deputy Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation Customs, FBR Quetta (the Customs Department)\nRespondent: The importer/accused\nCore Dispute: The Customs Department challenged a judgment from the Customs Appellate Tribunal that had favored the respondent. The Department raised three legal questions concerning the Tribunals jurisdiction and its interpretation of the burden of proof.\nBackground of the Case\nThe respondent was accused of:\nTampering with a Goods Declaration (GD).\nMisdeclaration: The truck was supposed to contain Gandhak and Almonds but was found to be carrying Cumin Seeds (Zeera).\nEvasion of Duty: This misdescription was allegedly done to avoid paying the correct duty and taxes.\nThe Customs Department issued a Show Cause Notice, but the respondent successfully appealed to the Customs Appellate Tribunal. The Department then filed this reference, arguing the Tribunals decision was legally flawed.\nThe Three Legal Questions & the Courts Analysis\nThe court addressed each of the Departments three questions of law.\nQuestion 1: Did the Single Bench of the Tribunal have the pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the appeal?\nDepartments Argument: The value of the duty and taxes in dispute exceeded five million rupees. According to Section 194-C(3) of the Customs Act, such appeals must be heard by a Special Bench (two members), not a Single Member Bench.\nCourts Finding: NO, the Departments argument fails.\nThe respondent had successfully applied to have the seized goods re-weighed, which revealed the actual quantity was 33,000 kg, not the higher figure initially claimed by the Department.\nBased on this correct quantity, the recalculated duty and tax amounted to Rs. 3,300,000, which is below the five million rupee threshold for a Single Member Bench.\nTherefore, the Single Member Bench did have the proper jurisdiction to hear the case.\nQuestion 2: Did the Appellate Tribunal overlook Section 187 of the Act (Burden of Proof)?\nDepartments Argument: The Tribunal misapplied the burden of proof.\nCourts Finding: NO, the Tribunal correctly applied the law.\nThe court provided a crucial distinction between two types of burden:\nEvidential Burden (Prima Facie Case): This initial burden is on the accused under Section 187 to produce some evidence that they had lawful authority (e.g., permits, documents).\nLegal Burden (Proof Beyond Doubt): The ultimate burden to prove the accusation beyond a reasonable doubt always remains on the Customs Department.\nApplication to the Case: The respondent discharged the evidential burden by producing 18 separate Goods Declarations proving the Cumin Seeds were lawfully imported and taxes were paid at the Customs Station in Chaman.\nOnce this was done, the legal burden shifted back to the Department to prove the allegations of tampering and misdeclaration with cogent evidence, which it failed to do.\nQuestion 3: Did the Tribunal fail to consider other relevant legal provisions?\nDepartments Argument: The Tribunal ignored various sections of the Customs Act and the Import and Export (Control) Act.\nCourts Finding: NO, the Tribunals approach was correct.\nSince the respondent proved the goods were legally imported, the core allegation of misdeclaration for duty evasion fell away.\nConsequently, the goods were not liable for confiscation under the sections cited by the Department (e.g., clauses 8 and 89 of Section 156(1)).\nFinal Ruling\nThe court answered the legal questions as follows:\nQuestion 1: In the affirmative (Yes, the Single Bench did have jurisdiction).\nQuestions 2 & 3: In the negative (No, the Tribunal did not err in its application of the law).\nResult: The reference was dismissed, and the judgment of the Customs Appellate Tribunal in favor of the respondent was upheld", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=196", - "Case #": "Custom Reference 91 of 2024. Date of hearing: 13 August 2025. Announced on: 25 August 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: GUL HASSAN TAREEN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: Mr. Iftikhar Raza, Advocate. Respondent 1 by: M/s Naseebullah Achakzai, Hamza Khan and Abdul Latif, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION CUSTOMS FBR, QUETTA\nVS \nMUHAMMAD RAHEEM AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26527", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2222 = 2025 SLD 2222", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTc", - "Key Words:": "1. Background\nThe respondent, a private limited company engaged in the manufacture and sale of refined sugar, is an admitted withholding agent under Section 153(7) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The tax department initiated proceedings under Section 161(1A) for failure to deduct withholding taxes, and under Section 236G for failure to collect tax on sales to distributors.\nA show cause notice was issued through IRIS on 11.06.2017, and a subsequent notice on 26.01.2022 was issued specifically for Section 236G. The taxpayer’s eventual reply was considered insufficient, and an order was passed on 06.03.2022, raising tax demand along with default surcharge and penalties under the Ordinance.\n2. Proceedings before CIR (Appeals)\nThe taxpayer filed an appeal before the CIR-Appeals, which was partially accepted:\nTwo issues were remanded for fresh adjudication,\nTax liability under Section 236G, along with surcharge and penalty, was upheld against the taxpayer,\nThe CIR-Appeals relied on the judgment in Popular Sugar Mills Ltd (ATIR), allegedly referenced by the assessing officer.\nHowever, upon review, no such citation was found in the assessing officer’s order, and the CIR-Appeals did not provide independent reasoning or findings on law and facts.\n3. Findings of the Tribunal\nThe Tribunal noted several critical procedural and legal defects:\na) Non-Speaking Orders – Violation of Section 24-A, General Clauses Act, 1897\nThe orders of both the assessing officer and the CIR-Appeals were found to be non-speaking, lacking proper reasoning or discussion of the legal issues involved.\nReference Case: Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan (PLD 1970 SC 173)\nA judicial order must demonstrate application of judicial mind and proper adjudication.\nb) Reliance on Outdated Case Law\nThe assessing officer relied on the judgment in Bliz Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2002 PTD 1), ignoring later and binding precedent.\nc) Latest Supreme Court Precedent Ignored\nThe Tribunal emphasized the importance of the recent and binding ruling in:\nCase: Chawala Footwear, Lahore v. FBR (2025 SCMR 671)\nThis case revisited and harmonized the earlier judgments in:\nBliz Pvt. Ltd. (2002 PTD 1)\nMCB Bank Ltd. (2021 SCMR 1325)\nThe Chawala Footwear case clarified the extent of responsibility on the withholding agent, conditions under which recovery under Section 161 is maintainable, and the circumstances where default surcharge under Section 205 can be applied.\n4. Tribunal’s Decision\nThe Tribunal set aside the orders of both the CIR-Appeals and the AC/DCIR and remanded the case to the assessing officer with directions to:\nRe-examine the case in light of the Chawala Footwear judgment,\nProvide a detailed, reasoned (speaking) order in compliance with Section 24-A,\nEnsure compliance with procedural fairness, including notice, evidence, and opportunity to respond.\n5. Directions to Taxpayer\nThe taxpayer was directed to:\nComply strictly with timelines for proceedings,\nEnsure up-to-date service address in the tax profile,\nRemain vigilant in tax compliance.\n✅ Key Legal Takeaways\nLegal Issue\nProvision / Case\nPrinciple\nFailure to deduct/collect tax\nSection 161(1A)\nRecovery applicable where tax is not deducted/collected\nDefault surcharge\nSection 205\nLevied for delayed/non-payment of tax\nTax on sales to dealers\nSection 236G\nApplicable on manufacturers sales to distributors\nProcedural fairness\nSection 24-A, General Clauses Act\nAll orders must be reasoned and lawful\nJudicial precedent\n2025 SCMR 671 (Chawala Footwear)\nClarifies department and taxpayer obligations\nNature of orders\nPLD 1970 SC 173 (Mollah Ejahar Ali)\nOrders must reflect application of judicial mind\nConclusion\nThis decision reflects the Tribunal’s emphasis on legal reasoning, application of binding precedent, and procedural fairness. It highlights the evolving jurisprudence around withholding tax obligations, particularly under Section 161, and stresses that tax authorities must issue reasoned, lawful orders, especially when imposing financial liabilities on taxpayers.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=129,153(7),161,161(1A),205,236GGeneral Clauses Act, 1897=24-A", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1388/KB/2023 (Tax period 2016). Date of hearing: 26-06-2025. Date of order: 04-08-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. TAUQEER ASLAM, CHAIRWAN AND MR. KASHIT NAZEER, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Ramzan, Advocate \nMr. Afnan Shahid, DR.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. KHOSKI SUGAR MILLS (PVT) LTD KARACHI......APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE CIR, ZONE-I, LTO, KARACHI......RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26528", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2223 = 2025 SLD 2223", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTY", - "Key Words:": "This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by Zubair Feeds Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., challenging successive office orders issued under Section 175C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO, 2001), whereby officers of Inland Revenue were posted at the Petitioner’s business premises for monitoring. The grievance was two-fold: first, that the orders were arbitrary and amounted to indefinite surveillance; and second, that they were issued by an officer not competent under the statute.\nThe Petitioner contended that the impugned actions violated Articles 4, 10A, 18, 23 and 25 of the Constitution. It was argued that discretionary powers under Section 175C must be exercised in a reasonable, proportionate, and time-bound manner. The Petitioner relied on the landmark judgment of Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Pakistan Beverages Ltd. (2018 SCMR 1544), wherein the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the analogous provision of Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, could not be invoked arbitrarily or indefinitely, and that every order must be issued with cogent reasons and for a lawful, specific purpose.\nThe Respondents opposed the maintainability of the petition, asserting that no adverse order had been passed and that the action under Section 175C was non-coercive in nature. It was submitted that monitoring did not constitute a violation of fundamental rights, and that constitutional jurisdiction could not be invoked in the presence of alternative statutory remedies under the ITO, 2001. The Respondents relied on Kamalia Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2015 PAD 221) to argue that prior hearing was not required for monitoring actions under tax statutes.\nAfter hearing both parties, the Court held that Section 175C, though silent on the duration of monitoring, must be interpreted in light of settled principles of administrative law, which do not permit unfettered discretion. Referring to the doctrine of pari materia, the Court noted that Section 175C of the ITO, 2001 is substantially similar in language and purpose to Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. As such, judicial interpretations of Section 40B—especially those in Pakistan Beverages Ltd. and Agha Steel Industries v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 PTD 2119)—were held applicable to Section 175C. The Court reaffirmed that the monitoring must be for a lawful object, must not be indefinite, and must be supported by reasons.\nCritically, the Court also held that the impugned extension orders dated 02.06.2025 and 29.06.2025 were issued by the Additional Commissioner, Inland Revenue, despite the fact that Section 175C only empowers the Board or the Chief Commissioner to exercise such authority. Citing the principle that when law requires an act to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all, the Court held that the Additional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction, and mere mention of “approval” from the Chief Commissioner was insufficient. There was no evidence of lawful delegation or written approval by the competent authority. This rendered the orders void ab initio.\nThe Court relied heavily on Agha Steel Industries (supra), where a similar issue under Section 40B was addressed. In that case, it was held that unless express delegation of authority is made under the Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007, actions taken by officers not named in the statute are unlawful. Similarly, the Lahore High Court reiterated that Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 requires all statutory powers to be exercised fairly, reasonably, and with transparency.\nThe initial monitoring orders dated 03.05.2025 and 13.05.2025 were considered to be time-bound and had spent their legal life. However, the extensions dated 02.06.2025 and 29.06.2025 were declared unlawful due to the absence of jurisdiction and reasoning.\nAccordingly, the petition was partly allowed. The extension orders were set aside, with a clarification that the tax authorities remain at liberty to invoke Section 175C in the future, provided such powers are exercised strictly in accordance with law—that is, by the competent authority, with cogent reasons, and within a reasonable, time-bound framework.\nThis decision is significant in reinforcing judicial oversight over discretionary powers exercised by tax authorities, ensuring that surveillance or monitoring measures are not extended in an arbitrary or unchecked manner, and preserving the taxpayer’s right to fair and lawful treatment under the Constitution.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "W.P. NO. 2744 OF 2025. Date of hearing: 30.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner by: Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Advocate\nRespondents by: Hafiz Ahsan Khokhar, Advocate on behalf of FBR. Dr. Khalid Malik, Director Law FBR. Mr. Khaleeq Ullah Khan, Deputy Director Law. Ms. Reema Masud, Commissioner Inland.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ZUBAIR FEEDS INDUSTRIES (PRIVATE) LIMITED \nVS\nFEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, ETC" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26529", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2224 = 2025 SLD 2224", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTU", - "Key Words:": "The Petitioner, Faraz Ali, applied for the post of Police Constable under the deceased quota pursuant to an advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates who were sons/daughters of deceased or martyred police officials and differently-abled persons. Faraz Ali underwent the requisite recruitment process, passed all the tests, and his name appeared at Serial No. 4 on the merit list for District Kashmore. Letters verifying his credentials were also sent by the relevant SSP.\nHowever, his appointment was later denied by the Sindh Police Recruitment Board in a meeting held on 09.05.2024. The reason cited was his involvement in FIR No. 28/2021 registered under Sections 365-B, 452, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. This decision was communicated through a letter dated 12.06.2024. Faraz Ali, however, had already been acquitted of these charges by the competent court on 28.09.2021.\nArguments by Petitioner:\nCounsel for Faraz Ali contended that the rejection was arbitrary and unlawful. Since the Petitioner had been acquitted after a full trial, there remained no legal impediment to his appointment. It was argued that the acquittal should be presumed honourable and that no stigma of criminality could lawfully persist. He relied on multiple judgments, including those from the High Court and Supreme Court, which held that mere involvement in a criminal case does not bar someone from public employment, especially where acquittal has taken place.\nArguments by the Respondents:\nThe Additional Advocate General opposed the petition, asserting that although the Petitioner qualified the recruitment process, his prior involvement in a criminal case disqualified him. It was argued that police service demands high moral conduct, and the involvement in criminal proceedings, regardless of acquittal, reflects poorly on the character required for such a role.\nCourt’s Reasoning and Findings:\nThe Court analyzed the provisions of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, particularly Section 15, which prohibits appointment only where the candidate has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, unless the government directs otherwise. The Court held that mere registration of an FIR or even undergoing trial does not amount to conviction, and in the absence of a conviction, there is no bar to appointment under Section 15.\nThe Court emphasized that the Petitioner was acquitted after a full-fledged trial and had no criminal liability at the time the Recruitment Board rejected his appointment. It cited multiple precedents, including:\nAbdul Rashid Mughal v. Muhammad Shabbir Abbasi (1984 SCMR 1172)\nChairman ADBP v. Mumtaz Khan (PLD 2010 SC 695)\nDr. Muhammad Islam v. Government of NWFP (1998 SCMR 1993)\nDivisional Superintendent Postal Services v. Nadeem Raza (2023 SCMR 803)\nThe Court noted that “moral turpitude” is a term that requires conviction based on acts that offend societal morality. In the present case, no such conviction existed.\nFurther, it found that the Sindh Police Recruitment Board misapplied the law, erroneously treating FIR registration as a basis for disqualification, despite the Petitioner’s acquittal. The decision was therefore held to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to law.\nCourt’s Decision:\nThe Court allowed the petition. It set aside the decision of the Sindh Police Recruitment Board dated 09.05.2024 and directed the Respondents to issue an appointment order in favour of the Petitioner within 60 days. The petition was disposed of without any order as to costs, and the Office was directed to forward a copy of the order to Respondents for compliance.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)=173", - "Case #": "C.P No. D-313 of 2025. Date of hearing & decision 17.09.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author(s): Mr. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD SALEEM JESSAR and Mr. JUSTICE NISAR AHMED BHANBHRO", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner Faraz Ali Through Mr Riaz Hussain Khoso Advocate \nRespondents: Province of Sindh & others Through Mr Liaqat Ali Shar, Additional Advocate General Sindh along with ASI Qadir Bux on behalf of SSP Kashmore @ Kandhkot", - "Petitioner Name:": "Faraz Ali \nVS \nProvince of Sindh and others" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26530", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2225 = 2025 SLD 2225", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTQ", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nThe petitioners challenged two consolidated judgments and decrees dated 19.10.2024 (trial court) and 01.03.2025 (appellate court), whereby their suit was dismissed, and the respondent Shamim Akhtar’s application for a succession certificate was allowed. The petitioners filed Civil Revision No. 418-D of 2025, which was admitted for regular hearing on 09.04.2025 and interim relief was granted. However, it was dismissed as withdrawn on 12.05.2025.\nSubsequently, the petitioners filed a second civil revision petition, which is the subject of the current proceedings. This second revision was filed on 22.09.2025, well beyond the statutory limitation period of 90 days.\nPetitioners’ Arguments:\nThe petitioners’ counsel acknowledged that the second revision petition was time-barred but argued that justice should prevail over technicalities of limitation. Reliance was placed on Haji Mehboob Alam v. Rana Khalid Mahmood (2025 MLD 1482), where the Court had relaxed limitation to correct an apparent injustice.\nWhen questioned on the maintainability of a second revision after the first was withdrawn, counsel initially argued that the withdrawal was compelled by the Court to create a disposal. However, he later changed his stance, claiming health issues on the date of withdrawal (12.05.2025), and that a junior counsel was forced to withdraw the petition.\nThe petitioners also relied on paragraph 11 of the revision petition, which claimed the first revision was withdrawn due to the poor health of the counsel.\nCourts Observations and Reasoning:\nThe Court rejected the petitioners claims for the following key reasons:\nBar on Second Revision:\nA second civil revision against the same set of judgments and decrees is not maintainable under the law. Once the first revision was withdrawn, the remedy was exhausted. A fresh petition on the same subject constitutes collateral re-litigation, which the Court cannot allow.\nContradictory and Contemptuous Claims:\nThe petitioners’ counsel made inconsistent statements—first alleging he was forced by the Bench to withdraw the first revision, and later attributing it to health issues. The Court found this contradictory and bordering on aspersion against the conduct of a sitting judge, which it termed contemptuous and not countenanced by law.\nDelay and Lack of Diligence:\nEven if the withdrawal had been improper, the petitioners took no prompt legal action to challenge the same. The second revision was filed over four months later, undermining the credibility of their claim that the withdrawal was involuntary.\nInapplicability of Case Law:\nThe case of Haji Mehboob Alam did not support the petitioners’ position. While that case allowed some relaxation of limitation to correct manifest injustice, it did not support filing a second revision after withdrawal of the first. The Court emphasized that its discretionary revisional jurisdiction does not extend to re-opening voluntarily abandoned proceedings.\nEffect of Withdrawal:\nThe Court reiterated that once a petition is withdrawn, even if earlier admitted for hearing, its dismissal is final and conclusive, and no revival can be sought on the basis of the earlier admission order.\nOutcome:\nThe second revision petition was dismissed as not maintainable. The Court declined to impose costs, despite the weakness of the petitioners’ case, but issued a stern warning to their counsel for making unsubstantiated allegations about judicial conduct. He was directed to act with caution and professional responsibility in future proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Civil Revision No: 1186-D of 2025. Date of hearing: 29.09.2025. date of order: 02.10.2025", - "Judge Name:": "Author: Anwaar Hussain, Justice", - "Lawyer Name:": "Rana Nasir Iqbal, Advocate for the petitioners.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUHAMMAD ZAHOOR & 8 OTHERS \nVS \nMST. SHAMIM AKHTAR, ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26531", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2226 = 2025 SLD 2226", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUS8", - "Key Words:": "Background:\nThe petitioner, a telecommunication company, filed a Sales Tax Reference under Section 86 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, challenging the decision dated 29.10.2020 of the Appellate Tribunal for Sales Tax on Services, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.\nThe dispute arose from assessment proceedings conducted by the Additional Collector, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority (KPRA), who found that the petitioner:\nClaimed inadmissible input tax against services obtained from unregistered persons, and\nFailed to deduct sales tax on services received from non-residents, amounting to a total shortfall of Rs. 12,098,984.\nAn appeal filed by the petitioner was partially accepted by the Collector (Appeals), who set aside the penalty and default surcharge but upheld the principal demand. On a second appeal, the Tribunal had a split decision: the Judicial Member allowed the appeal in full, but the Technical Member dissented. Since no provision for a referee judge exists under the relevant statute, the Tribunal ruled that the Collector (Appeals)’ order would stand confirmed under Section 98(2) CPC, due to the deadlock.\nIssues before the High Court:\nWhether the petitioner was entitled to input tax adjustment on services received from unregistered persons;\nWhether the petitioner, as a withholding agent, was personally liable to pay tax under Section 30(3) of the Act (introduced in 2021) for tax periods prior to the 2021 amendment;\nWhether the default surcharge and penalty imposed were in accordance with law.\nCourts Analysis and Reasoning:\n1. Inadmissible Input Tax from Unregistered Persons\nSection 26(4) of the Act allows input adjustment only when tax has been actually charged and paid, and a valid tax invoice is held.\nSince unregistered persons are not required to issue tax invoices nor are they legally obligated to deposit tax, the petitioner cannot claim input tax on such services.\nThus, the Tribunal and lower forum were correct in disallowing the input tax claim.\n2. Liability as Withholding Agent – Prospective or Retrospective?\nThe core issue was whether Section 30(3) of the Act (added via Finance Act 2021) that made withholding agents personally liable for failure to deduct tax, applies retrospectively.\nKey Legal Points:\nFinance Act 2019 introduced Section 40(1A), allowing for penalty and default surcharge, but did not impose personal liability.\nFinance Act 2021 added:\nSection 2(57) defining withholding agent ;\nSection 30(3) imposing personal liability for failure to withhold and deposit tax.\nLegal Principles Applied:\nRetrospective taxation is permissible, but only where clearly expressed or necessarily implied.\nNo indication in the 2021 amendment suggests retrospective application.\nThe regulations framed in 2015 required withholding but did not impose personal liability for non-compliance.\nHence, personal liability cannot be imposed retrospectively for tax periods prior to the 2021 amendment.\n3. Imposition of Default Surcharge and Penalty\nSince personal liability was not applicable prior to 2021, no default surcharge or penalty could lawfully be imposed on the petitioner in that capacity.\nConclusion / Opinion of the Court:\nThe petitioner was not entitled to claim input tax on services received from unregistered persons.\nHowever, the petitioner cannot be held personally liable as a withholding agent for tax periods before the Finance Act, 2021, since there was no statutory backing for such liability at the time.\nConsequently, demand of tax based on Section 30(3) (post-2021 provision) is illegal and without lawful authority for earlier periods.\nThe Sales Tax Reference was accepted to the extent of setting aside the personal liability, default surcharge, and penalty imposed prior to 2021.\nA copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Tribunal under Section 86(5) of the Act.\nLegal Significance:\nThis judgment reaffirms the settled principle that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly and that no retrospective burden can be placed on taxpayers unless the legislation expressly provides for it. It also clarifies the limited scope of input tax adjustments and the boundaries of withholding agent liability prior to legislative amendments.", - "Court Name:": "Peshawar High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022=2(47),2(48),19(1),26,26(1)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=98(2)", - "Case #": "Sales Tax Reference No. 28-P/2020 with CM No.13/2020. Date of hearing: 23.09.2025. Date of order: 08.10.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SYED ARSHAD ALI, JUSTICE AND MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD FAHEEM WALI", - "Lawyer Name:": "Petitioner (by): Ch. Faheem-ul-Haq, Advocate \nRespondents (by): Syed Asif Jalal, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANY LIMITED THROUGH BADAR-UZ-ZAMAN, REGIONAL GM \nVS\nADDITIONAL COLLECTOR UNIT-1, KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA REVENUE AUTHORITY, PESHAWAR AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26532", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2241 = 2025 SLD 2241", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUSs", - "Key Words:": "🧾 Summary of the Judgment\n⚖ Key Legal Issue:\nWhether a revised return filed after a show-cause notice under Section 4B (super tax) but before a notice under Section 122(9) is valid, and whether the revised income can be accepted for purposes of super tax computation.\n🧾 Questions of Law Raised:\nProper interpretation of Section 4B (Super Tax) and Section 2(28A).\nWhether Section 4B creates a special recovery procedure.\nWhether proceedings under Section 4B require a notice under Section 122(9) before passing an order.\n📜 Facts:\nRespondent company filed original return for Tax Year 2018 on 15.12.2018.\nShow cause notice was issued on 11.01.2019 under Section 4B (for unpaid super tax).\nIn response, revised returns were filed on 25.01.2019 (claiming overstatement of income).\nAssessing Officer rejected the revised return, considered it invalid, and imposed super tax.\nCIR(A) allowed the revised return and deleted the tax.\nATIR reversed the CIR(A)’s decision.\nHence, the taxpayer filed this reference application.\n⚖ Court’s Reasoning & Findings:\nSection 114(6A) (Voluntary revision of return) only restricts revision after receipt of notice under Section 122(9) — not after a Section 4B notice.\nThe notice issued was under Section 4B, not Section 122(9). So, penalty clauses under 114(6A) do not apply.\nThe revised return was therefore validly filed, and cannot be declared invalid based on the Section 4B notice.\nSection 114(6)(c) restriction (income in revised return must not be less than in certain orders) is not applicable, because no formal order (under Sections 121, 122, etc.) had been passed — only a deemed assessment under Section 120.\nSection 4B(5) gives independent recovery power to Commissioner; does not require a prior amendment under Section 122.\n🧑‍⚖️ Legal Doctrines Applied:\nStrict construction of fiscal statutes.\nBenefit of doubt goes to taxpayer in case of ambiguity. (SC rulings cited: PLD 2015 SC 380, PLD 2017 SC 99, 2017 SCMR 1506)\nExpressio unius est exclusio alterius (Expression of one thing implies exclusion of another) — since 122(9) is specifically mentioned in 114(6A), other notices (e.g., under 4B) cannot be substituted.\n✅ Outcome:\nReference application is allowed.\nTribunal’s order is set aside.\nRevised return is held to be valid.\nQuestions of law answered in favor of the applicant (taxpayer).\n🧠 Key Takeaways:\nA notice under Section 4B does not trigger the stricter penalty regime under Section 114(6A).\nA revised return can still be valid if filed before a Section 122(9) notice, even if another notice (e.g., under Section 4B) has been issued.\nA deemed assessment under Section 120 is not equivalent to an “order” under Sections 121–133 for purposes of applying Section 114(6)(c) restrictions.\nThe tax authority cannot invalidate revised returns on grounds not explicitly covered in the statute.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(28A),4B,114(6),114(6A),120,121,122,122(9),122A,129,132,133,133(8),177,221", - "Case #": "Case No. ITR No. 28029/2024. Date of hearing 07.10.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant by: M/s Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Rana Waqas Habib Khan, Omer Wahab, Muhammad Azhar Khan Joiya, Muhammad Nadeem Sheikh, Azeem Ullah Virk and Rana Usman Habib Khan, Advocates\nRespondents by: Mr. Abdul Muqtadir Khan, Advocate/Legal Advisor", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S LEVI STRAUSS PAKISTAN (PVT.) LIMITED\nVS.\nASSISTANT/DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (AUDIT) INLAND REVENUE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26533", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2248 = 2025 SLD 2248", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTk", - "Key Words:": "⚖️ Key Legal Issues Raised:\nJurisdictional Error:\nThe appellant (taxpayer) argued that the IRO lacked jurisdiction to select the case for audit and issue the assessment.\nComposite Non-Speaking Order:\nThe IRO issued a combined order for 47 taxpayers, which was challenged for being non-specific, violating due process and the Lahore High Court’s precedent in CIR vs. M/s T.M. Gases.\nInadequate Evidence of Fraud:\nInput tax was disallowed on the reason to believe invoices were fake, without confronting the taxpayer with specific evidence.\nViolation of Natural Justice:\nThe taxpayer claimed the show cause notice lacked specificity, no proper hearing was conducted, and adverse material wasnt provided.\nFailure to Establish Supplier Fraud:\nNo proper findings were made on the suppliers’ registration status, tax return filings, or tax deposit compliance.\n🧑‍⚖️ Tribunal’s Findings:\nLack of Invoice-Specific Inquiry:\nThe order was based on generalized allegations without invoice-wise analysis or supplier-specific verification.\nFailure to Satisfy Legal Conditions under Sections 7, 8, 73:\nInput tax can only be disallowed if the supplier:\nDid not deposit the tax (Section 8(1)(ca))\nIssued fake invoices (Section 8(1)(d))\nWas not paid through banking channels (Section 73)\nNone of these grounds were concretely established.\nBreach of Due Process:\nThe order lacked:\nProperly framed show cause notice,\nSpecific allegations,\nOpportunity for the taxpayer to rebut the charges,\nIndependent reasoning for each transaction.\nViolation of Natural Justice:\nNo proper hearing or evidence disclosure.\nAssessment relied on assumptions, without confronting the taxpayer with concrete findings.\n📜 Tribunal’s Decision:\n✅ Order Set Aside\nThe Tribunal remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer (IRO) with specific directions to:\nConduct invoice-wise reassessment.\nVerify supplier registration status, return filing, and tax deposit.\nIssue a detailed, speaking notice citing specific legal provisions.\nProvide a fair hearing and share all adverse material.\nAvoid composite orders—each case must be decided on its own merits.\nFrame a well-reasoned, legally sound reassessment order.\n📌 Takeaways for Taxpayers and Practitioners:\nTemplate or combined orders without invoice-wise analysis are liable to be struck down.\nAllegations of tax fraud must be specifically pleaded and substantiated with evidence.\nNatural justice is a cornerstone—any assessment ignoring fair hearing principles is vulnerable.\nSections 7, 8, and 73 must be applied in a strict and case-specific manner.\nTaxpayers should maintain complete records and cooperate with reassessment proceedings.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Multan Bench", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=7,8,33,34,73", - "Case #": "STA No. 05/MB/2025 (Tax Period: Jul 2019- Jul 2023), Date of Hearing & Order: 19.09.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MIAN ABDUL BASIT, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Ghazi, Advocate\nRespondent by: Mr. Kareem Buksh,DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s MTEX Traders, House No.652 Nishtar Block, Allama lqbal Town, Multan ..... Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR, Multan Zone RTO, MULTAN ….. Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26534", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2245 = 2025 SLD 2245", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUTg", - "Key Words:": "Tribunal Sets Aside Addition Based on Presumptive Banking Transactions — A Reaffirmation of Definite Information Requirement under Section 122(5) of the ITO, 2001\nThis article analyses a recent decision by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), which annulled an addition of Rs. 3.9 million made under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the “Ordinance”) on the basis of alleged unexplained cash withdrawals inferred from tax deduction under Section 236P. The Tribunal ruled that the addition was not based on definite information as required under law, and further held that no notice under Section 111 was issued, rendering the entire amendment illegal. The decision reinforces the principle that presumptive or reverse-engineered assessments based on banking data alone do not satisfy the threshold for reopening completed assessments.\nBackground\nThe appellant, an individual engaged in the business of travel and tour operations, filed their return of income for Tax Year 2019 declaring Rs. 1,100,000 as income. The return was deemed assessed under Section 120 of the Ordinance. Subsequently, the tax department, based on information that Rs. 30,000 had been deducted under Section 236P (on banking transactions), presumed a withdrawal of Rs. 5,000,000 and, by reverse calculation, alleged that Rs. 3,900,000 had escaped assessment.\nA show-cause notice under Sections 122(5) and 122(9) was issued, and later, the addition was finalized through an amended order under Section 122(1), creating a tax demand of Rs. 570,000. The taxpayer’s appeal before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) was dismissed, prompting the second appeal before the ATIR.\nIssues for Determination\nWhether the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 122(5) was lawful in the absence of “definite information”.\nWhether cash withdrawals, inferred through reverse calculation from Section 236P tax deduction, can be treated as taxable income.\nWhether failure to issue a separate and specific notice under Section 111 invalidates the addition of unexplained income.\nWhether the addition made was sustainable in light of the principles of natural justice and burden of proof under tax law.\nFindings of the Tribunal\n1. Absence of “Definite Information” under Section 122(5)\nThe Tribunal found that the departmental action was initiated solely on the basis of a presumptive working derived from the Section 236P deduction. Relying on judicial precedents, including 2013 PTD 884 (LHC) and 2009 PTD 1919 (ATIR), the Tribunal reiterated that definite information under Section 122(5) must be:\nSpecific and indisputable,\nAcquired post-assessment,\nCapable of demonstrating escapement with legal certainty, and\nNot merely derived from assumptions, inferences, or reverse calculations.\nThe assessing officer had failed to identify which specific clause of Section 122(5) was invoked, further undermining the jurisdictional validity of the proceedings.\n2. Cash Withdrawals Are Not Income Per Se\nCiting settled jurisprudence, including ITA No. 1135/KB/2016 (ATIR Karachi), the Tribunal held that banking transactions, particularly cash withdrawals, cannot be equated with taxable income unless supported by clear evidence of taxable economic activity. The AO’s presumption that cash withdrawals constitute undeclared income was found to be legally flawed and unsupported by any factual inquiry into the nature of the transactions.\n3. No Notice Under Section 111 — Addition Rendered Void\nRelying on the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2024 SCMR 700 (CIR v. Millat Tractors Ltd.), the Tribunal emphasized the mandatory nature of a separate notice under Section 111 for any addition based on unexplained income or assets. The department’s failure to issue such a notice rendered the entire addition illegal and unjustified.\n4. Violation of Natural Justice\nThe Tribunal also noted procedural deficiencies, including:\nLack of a speaking order,\nNon-service of assessment orders in accordance with Section 218 and relevant FBR instructions,\nFailure to consider the taxpayer’s reply and business model (trading with thin margins), and\nMischaracterization of net income as gross receipts.\nThese deficiencies led the Tribunal to conclude that the taxpayer was denied due process, and the orders of both lower authorities were vitiated by legal infirmities.\nConclusion and Holding\nThe Tribunal held that:\nThe assumption of jurisdiction under Section 122(5) was illegal;\nThe addition of Rs. 3.9 million based on reverse calculation of bank withdrawals was not supported by law;\nThe absence of notice under Section 111 was fatal to the validity of the assessment; and\nThe orders of the AO and CIR(A) were set aside in entirety.\nThe appeal was accordingly allowed.\nKey Takeaways for Practitioners\nLegal Issue\nTribunal’s Holding\nSection 122(5) – Definite Information\nMust be specific, post-assessment, and indisputable; mere suspicion or working from deductions not sufficient.\nBanking Transactions as Income\nCannot be treated as income without proof of economic activity; cash withdrawals are neutral in nature.\nSection 111 – Mandatory Notice\nAbsence of a separate and specific notice renders the addition invalid.\nNatural Justice\nTaxpayer must be given a fair hearing, speaking order, and proper service of notice.\nImplications\nThis judgment reaffirms the protective safeguards embedded in Pakistan’s tax law framework against arbitrary assessments. It establishes that cash-based assumptions, if not backed by statutory compliance and procedural due process, will not withstand judicial scrutiny. This case will likely serve as a critical precedent for similar disputes involving banking transactions, presumptive assessments, and jurisdictional validity under Sections 122 and 111 of the Ordinance.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "SPECIAL SINGLE BENCH, CAMP OFFICE AT QUETTA\nITA No. 1971/KB/2022 (Tax Year, 2019). Date of Hearing: 25.07.2025. Date of Order: 18.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: M. ABDULLAH KHAN KAKAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant By: Mr. Amjad Ali Siddiqui, Advocate\nRespondent By: Mr. Abdul Rasheed, D.R", - "Petitioner Name:": "UBAID-UR-REHMAN, Quetta ....... Appellant\nVs\nThe CIR (Zone-I), RTO, Quetta ...... Respondent" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26535", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2252 = 2025 SLD 2252", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUXo", - "Key Words:": "This is a court order granting bail to the accused, Shah Jahan, in a case involving the attempted smuggling of a large cache of weapons (1,464 pistols) concealed inside a consignment of ceiling fans destined for export to Oman.\nKey Case Facts:\nThe Crime: An export consignment of ceiling fans was intercepted. Upon examination, 1,464 pistols were found hidden inside the plastic bases of the fans.\nThe Accused: Shah Jahan (the applicant) was not named in the original FIR. His name surfaced later during the investigation.\nProsecutions Allegations: The prosecution, via a supplementary charge sheet, alleged that Shah Jahan acted as a facilitator, mediator, translator, and coordinator for Yemeni nationals involved in the smuggling. He was also alleged to have links to an arms manufacturer and to have received financial transactions from the Yemeni accused.\nCourts Reasoning for Granting Bail:\nThe judge granted bail based on the following key points:\nNot Named in FIR: The applicant was not originally accused in the FIR, and his implication came later.\nPeripheral and Auxiliary Role: The court viewed his alleged role as facilitative, auxiliary, and peripheral (translation, coordination) compared to the direct actors.\nLack of Direct Evidence: The court found no direct, concrete evidence (documents, financial records, communication logs, or physical recovery) linking him to the specific act of concealing or placing the weapons.\nParity with Co-accused: Bail had already been granted to several co-accused (Zahid Hussain, Aamir Waheed Khan, Muhammad Bilawal) whose roles as clearing agents were deemed more central by the court. Denying bail to Shah Jahan, with his less direct role, was seen as potentially discriminatory.\n Further Inquiry : The judge ruled that the case falls under Section 497(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), which allows for bail when the case against an accused is not conclusively clear and requires further inquiry.\nNo Flight Risk: The court saw no indication that the applicant would flee or tamper with evidence if released on bail.\nBail Conditions:\nThe accused must furnish a solvent surety (a guarantee from a financially sound person) of Rs. 300,000.\nHe must also execute a Personal Recognizance (P.R.) bond for the same amount.\nImportant Caveat:\nThe judge explicitly stated that the observations made in this bail order are tentative and shall not prejudice the final outcome of the trial.\nAnalysis of the Legal Reasoning\nThis order is a classic example of a bail decision that weighs the right to liberty of an undertrial prisoner against the states interest in prosecuting a serious crime.\nSeriousness of Crime vs. Quality of Evidence: The court acknowledged the gravity of the offence (arms smuggling). However, for the purpose of bail, it focused strictly on the quality of evidence presented at that stage against this specific accused. The judge found the evidence against Shah Jahan to be circumstantial and lacking in direct corroboration.\nThe Principle of Further Inquiry : The application of Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. was crucial. This provision is often invoked when there are doubts about the credibility of evidence, the extent of an accuseds involvement, or when the case is not a straightforward matter of guilt. The judge determined that the link between Shah Jahan and the concealed weapons was not prima facie established and needed deeper examination during a trial.\nThe Principle of Parity: The grant of bail to co-accused is a powerful argument in bail jurisprudence. The court found that the roles of the already-bailed co-accused were more significant, creating an inconsistency if bail were denied to Shah Jahan. This principle ensures equal treatment under the law.\nProsecutions Weaknesses: The order highlights weaknesses in the prosecutions case at that point, specifically the lack of documentary evidence (like financial trails or call records) to substantiate the serious allegations of facilitation and financial gain.\nIn essence, the court made a procedural decision, not a verdict on innocence or guilt. It ruled that keeping the accused in jail until his trial was not justified based on the evidence presented against him so far. The prosecution is free to present a stronger, more direct case during the actual trial.", - "Court Name:": "Customs and Excise Appellate Tribunal", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "BAIL AFTER ARREST NO.309 OF 2025 (Case No.40 of 2025), order dated: 26-07-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JAHANGIR AHMED DAYO, JUSITCE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Muhammad Nadeem Qureshi, learned counsel for applicant/ accused.\nMr. Ashiq Ali Anwar Rana, learned SPP for the State.\nMr. Aijaz Hussain, Investigation Officer (IO) is also present.", - "Petitioner Name:": "The State\nvs\nShah Jehan Son of Jamal Din ...... Applicant/ Accused" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26536", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2253 = 2025 SLD 2253", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDUXk", - "Key Words:": "This is an order from an appellate tribunal allowing an appeal filed by a taxpayer, M/s. Uprise Engineering & Construction Company, against a demand of Rs. 64,297,994 in Super Tax under Section 4C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nKey Facts of the Case:\nThe Appellant: A company engaged in construction and engineering, whose income is subject to a Final Tax Regime (FTR) via tax deducted at source under Section 153(1)(c).\nThe Demand: The Assessing Officer (Assistant/Deputy Commissioner) created the demand based on a revised income tax return filed on 12.12.2024, which showed a taxable income of over Rs. 642 million.\nThe Appeal: The taxpayer challenged this order on multiple grounds, including the legal inapplicability of Super Tax to FTR income, lack of a valid notice, denial of a hearing, and reliance on a revised return filed without the taxpayers authorization.\nTribunals Reasoning for Allowing the Appeal:\nThe tribunal allowed the appeal and annulled the tax demand based on the following key points:\nSuper Tax does not apply to Final Tax Regime Income: This was the central and decisive legal argument. The tribunal relied on a binding judgment from the Islamabad High Court in Fauji Fertilizer Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan, which explicitly held that Super Tax under Section 4C cannot be levied on income that has already been subjected to a final tax. The tribunal concluded that since the appellants income was under FTR, it was outside the ambit of section 4C. \nDistinguishing the Departments Case Law: The tribunal found that the case law relied upon by the Assessing Officer (Shell Pakistan Ltd.) was not applicable, as it pertained to the minimum tax regime, not the final tax regime. The tribunal also noted that the Fauji Fertilizer judgment, being more recent and directly on point, superseded the departments legal references.\nProcedural Flaws: The tribunal agreed with the appellants procedural complaints:\nUnauthorized Revised Return: The tribunal accepted the taxpayers claim that the revised return was filed without their knowledge and consent. It held that an ex parte revised return cannot be the sole basis for a demand without examining the actual books of accounts.\nLack of Natural Justice: The tribunal found that the taxpayer was denied a proper opportunity to be heard, which is a fundamental violation of procedural fairness.\nOutcome:\nThe impugned order dated 04-03-2025 was set aside.\nThe Super Tax demand of Rs. 64,297,994 was annulled.\nThe appeal was allowed.\nAnalysis of the Legal Reasoning\nThis order is a clear example of a higher appellate authority correcting a lower authoritys error in applying the law, particularly concerning distinct tax regimes.\nClarity on Tax Regimes: The core of the dispute lies in the difference between the Normal Tax Regime (where income is computed per the Ordinance and then tax is applied) and the Final Tax Regime (where tax is withheld at source on the gross amount and is considered full and final settlement of tax liability for that income). The tribunal firmly held that Super Tax is a levy on taxable income as computed under the Normal Tax Regime and cannot be layered on top of income that has already been finally taxed. \nThe Power of Binding Precedent: The tribunals decision was heavily anchored on the Fauji Fertilizer judgment. This demonstrates the principle of stare decisis, where lower courts and tribunals are bound to follow the legal principles established by higher courts. The Assessing Officers failure to apply this binding precedent was a fundamental legal error.\nProcedure Over Substance: Even if the substantive tax issue were less clear, the tribunal had strong grounds to rule in the taxpayers favor based on procedural failures. The combination of an alleged unauthorized return and a denial of the right to a hearing constitutes serious jurisdictional defects that can invalidate an administrative order on their own.\nShifting the Burden of Proof: In its analysis, the tribunal implicitly accepted the taxpayers allegations about the unauthorized return. In the absence of any representation from the department to counter these claims, the tribunal was inclined to believe the appellant, emphasizing that the authorities must base their decisions on verified and reliable information.\nIn essence, the tribunal reinforced a critical legal principle: the governments power to tax must be exercised strictly within the boundaries set by the law and the Constitution, and must adhere to fundamental principles of justice and fair procedure.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=4C,153(1)(c),218", - "Case #": "ITA No. 389/KB/2024 (Tax Year 2024). Date of Hearing: 06.08.2025. Date of Order: 15.09.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND MR. EMAD-UL-HASAN, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Uzair Malook, Advocate\nRespondent by : None", - "Petitioner Name:": "FURQAN ALI ...... APPELLANT\nVS\nTHE A/DEPUTY COMMISSIONER-IR, ZONE, RTO, HYDERABAD ...... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26537", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2256 = 2025 SLD 2256", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTc", - "Key Words:": "This is a decision by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) on remanded cases concerning a petrol pump operators right to claim 100% input tax adjustment instead of being restricted to 90%.\nThe Core Legal Dispute:\nThe Law: Section 8B(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, generally restricts registered persons to adjusting input tax up to only 90% of their output tax for a period.\nThe Exception: The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) can issue notifications to exclude certain persons or sectors from this 90% restriction. This was done via SRO 647(I)/2007, which, at the relevant time, excluded Distributor (Serial No. 8 of the SRO) from the 90% cap, allowing them to claim 100% adjustment.\nThe Question: Is a petrol pump operator a retailer (subject to the 90% cap) or a distributor (entitled to 100% adjustment)?\nCase History:\nAssessing Officer: Found the taxpayer had claimed 100% input tax adjustment. Argued that as a petrol pump operator, it was a retailer and thus subject to the 90% cap. Created a demand for the excess 10% adjusted, plus penalty and default surcharge.\nCommissioner (Appeals) - CIR(A): Partially allowed the taxpayers appeal. Deleted the principal tax demand, calling it a procedural violation, but upheld the penalty and default surcharge.\nFirst ATIR Order & High Court Remand: The ATIR initially dismissed all appeals. Both parties challenged this in the Lahore High Court, which remanded the cases back to the ATIR, directing it to properly consider the arguments and relevant case law, which it had failed to do initially.\nCurrent ATIR Order (This Document): This is the fresh decision made after the High Courts remand.\nTribunals Final Decision and Reasoning:\nThe tribunal allowed the taxpayers appeals and dismissed the departments cross-appeals. The demand for the 10% tax, along with all penalties and default surcharges, was deleted.\nThe reasoning was based on a legal interpretation of the term distributor :\nStatutory Definition: The tribunal relied on the definition of distributor in Section 2(7) of the Sales Tax Act, which is: a person appointed by a manufacturer... for a specified area to purchase goods from him for further supply and includes a person who in addition to being a distributor is also engaged in supply of goods as a wholesaler or a retailer. \nTaxpayers Status: The taxpayer provided an uncontested certificate from Pakistan State Oil (PSO) stating it was an authorized distributor. The tribunal held that this factual appointment as a distributor was decisive.\n Distributor vs. Retailer : The tribunal concluded that even if the taxpayer was mistakenly registered in the departments system as a retailer, its actual legal status as a PSO-appointed distributor took precedence. Crucially, the definition of distributor explicitly includes entities that are also engaged in retail. Therefore, a person can be both a distributor and a retailer.\nApplication of the SRO: Since the taxpayer qualified as a distributor, it fell under Serial No. 8 of SRO 647(I)/2007 and was therefore excluded from the 90% input tax restriction. Its claim for 100% input tax adjustment was lawful.\nAnalysis of the Legal Reasoning\nThis order is an excellent example of a tribunal applying the letter of the law and prioritizing substance over form.\nSubstance Over Form: The departments argument was based on the form—the registration category in its own system. The tribunal looked at the substance—the actual legal and commercial relationship between the taxpayer and PSO. This is a fundamental principle of tax jurisprudence.\nLiteral Interpretation: The tribunal used a literal interpretation of the statutory definition. The law explicitly states that a distributor can also be a retailer. The tribunal did not see these as mutually exclusive categories but recognized that the legal definition of distributor was broad enough to encompass the taxpayers activities.\nResolution of Ambiguity: The case presented a potential conflict between a taxpayers registration description and its actual legal status. The tribunal correctly resolved this by giving primacy to the factual reality (the distributor appointment) and the precise legal definition over a potentially erroneous administrative classification.\nConsequence of Legal Status: Once the taxpayer was found to be a distributor, the outcome was automatic. The SRO clearly exempted distributors from the 90% cap. Therefore, no excess adjustment occurred, making the principal tax demand, penalty, and surcharge legally untenable.\nIn essence, the tribunal reinforced that a taxpayers rights and obligations are determined by the law as written, not by how a tax authority may have catalogued them in its database.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=2(7),2(28),8B,8B(1),11(2),11(3),14", - "Case #": "STA No. 135/IB/2015, STA No. 136/IB/2015, STA No. 157/IB/2015, STA No. 158/IB/2015, Date of Hearing & Order: 21.08.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): DANISH ALI QAZI, MEMBER AND M.M.AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Department by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.\nTaxpayer by: Khawaja Nouman Iftikhar, ITP", - "Petitioner Name:": "STA No. 135/IB/2015 (Tax Period - August, 2013 to September, 2013). STA No. 136/IB/2015 (Tax Period-October, 2013 to March, 2014)\nM/S ZAIN FILING STATION, NEAR LARI ADDA, SAHIWAL ……….. APPELLANT \nVS\nCIR, RTO, SARGODHA ……… RESPONDENT\nTaxpayer by: Khawaja Nouman Iftikhar, ITP\nDepartment by: Mr. Niaz Ahmed, DR.\nSTA No. 157/IB/2015 (Tax Period- August, 2013 & September, 2013). STA No. 158/IB/2015 (Tax Period - October, 2013 to March, 2014)\nCIR, RTO, SARGODHA ……… APPELLANT\nVS\nM/S ZAIN FILING STATION, NEAR LARI ADDA, SAHIWAL .……… RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26538", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2303 = 2025 SLD 2303 = 2025 PTD 1509 = 2025 LHC 4654", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTY", - "Key Words:": "This judgment disposes of 18 separate tax reference applications, all revolving around the same core legal issue: the correct legal procedure for penalizing retailers who fail to fully integrate their Point of Sale (POS) systems with the tax authoritys (FBR) computerized system for real-time sales reporting.\nCore Legal Issue: Can the tax department use the general powers under Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (meant for recovering unpaid or short-paid tax) to impose penalties for the specific regulatory offense of non-integration of POS systems?\nThe Courts Decision: No. The court answered all questions of law against the tax department and in favor of the taxpayers.\nKey Reasons for the Decision:\nDistinct Purposes of Sections 11 and 33:\nSection 11 is a machinery provision. Its purpose is compensatory and restorative—to detect, assess, and recover actual tax revenue that has escaped payment. It deals with quantifiable tax shortfalls.\nSection 33 is a penal provision. It specifically lists various offenses (like non-integration of POS systems at Serial Nos. 24 & 25) and prescribes standalone penalties for these regulatory breaches, regardless of whether a tax shortfall is proven.\nSpecific Overrides General:\nThe court applied the legal maxim generalia specialibus non derogant (a general provision does not override a specific one). Since Section 33 contains a specific penalty for the specific offense of POS non-integration, the tax department cannot use the general recovery mechanism of Section 11 to impose that penalty.\nStrict Interpretation of Penal Statutes:\nTax laws that impose penalties must be interpreted strictly. The court emphasized that the department must have clear and explicit statutory authority for each penalty it imposes. It cannot broaden its powers by implication.\nDue Process Concerns:\nThe court noted that Section 33 creates the penalty but does not provide a detailed procedure for its adjudication. The department must still follow a due process (proper notice, hearing, and adjudication) under the general framework of the Act and Rules, not under Section 11, which is designed for a different purpose.\nOutcome:\nThe Show Cause Notices and subsequent orders issued by the tax department, which relied solely on Section 11 to impose penalties for POS non-integration, were declared ultra vires (beyond their legal power) and without lawful authority.\nThe earlier decision of the Appellate Tribunal (ATIR), which had annulled these penalties, was upheld.\nIn essence, the court drew a bright line between recovering lost tax revenue and punishing regulatory non-compliance, confining the use of Section 11 to the former.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(9A),2(43A),40(C),11,33,33(24),33(25)", - "Case #": "S.T.R. No. 07 of 2022. Date of hearing: 17.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MALIK JAVID IQBAL WAINS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Applicant- Department by\nM/s Syed Muhammad Abbas, Malik Ittat Hussain Awan, Barrister Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Dr. G.M. Chaudhry, Mr. Manzoor Hussain, Advocates alongwith Yousaf Khan, S.O. I.R (Hqrs), R.T.O., Rawalpindi.\nRespondent No.1 by\nM/s Atif Waheed, Ch. Imran-ul-Haq, Muhammad Musawar Gill, Zahid Shafiq & Mehmood Subhani, Bilal-ud-Din Butt, Raja Basit Iqbal, Qazi Hafee-ur-Rehman, Ameer-ul-Azeem and Umair Mehmood, Advocates.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE \nVS\nM/S D-WATSON & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26539", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2150 = 2025 SLD 2150 = 2025 PTD 1532", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTU", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether a sunset review (a legal process to extend an anti-dumping duty) can be legally initiated after the anti-dumping duty (ADD) has already expired.\nCourts Ruling: No. The court declared the initiation of the sunset review after the ADDs expiry to be unlawful and without legal authority, and consequently set it aside.\nDetailed Breakdown\n1. Background & Petitioners Arguments:\nAn anti-dumping duty was imposed on March 30, 2018, and by law, it was set to automatically expire after five years on March 29, 2023.\nThe National Tariff Commission (NTC) issued a notice to initiate a sunset review to extend this duty on November 2, 2023—over seven months after the original duty had expired.\nThe petitioners (importers/affected parties) argued that:\nThe law (Section 58(3) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015) mandates that a sunset review must be initiated before the expiry of the ADD.\nOnce the ADD expired on March 29, 2023, the NTC lost its authority (functus officio) to review that specific duty.\nInitiating a review afterwards was an attempt to resurrect a dead duty, creating illegal retrospective liability for importers who had conducted business after the expiry.\nThis interpretation aligns with WTO agreements, on which Pakistani law is based.\n2. NTCs Defense:\nThe NTC argued that the timeframe was directory (flexible) rather than mandatory.\nTheir primary defense was that they were dysfunctional and not properly constituted at the time the review needed to be initiated, and thus, the delay should be excused to protect the domestic industry, which had filed its application on time.\n3. Courts Reasoning & Key Findings:\nMandatory vs. Directory: The court firmly held the requirement to initiate a review before expiry as mandatory. This is because the consequence of a sunset review is the continuation of a financial penalty (ADD). Timeframes that affect citizens rights and liabilities must be strictly followed.\nLegislative Intent & WTO Compliance: The Anti-Dumping Duties Act was enacted to implement Pakistans international obligations under WTO agreements. WTO jurisprudence explicitly treats the pre-expiry initiation of a sunset review as a mandatory condition.\nPurpose of a Sunset Review: A sunset review is a forward-looking analysis to determine if expiry would likely lead to a recurrence of dumping. This purpose becomes meaningless once the duty has already expired; you cannot prospectively analyze an event that has already occurred.\nAccrued Rights: Importers gained a valuable accrued right to be free from the ADD once it expired. This right cannot be taken away by a belated review.\nNTCs Dysfunction is Not an Excuse: The court ruled that the NTCs internal administrative failure (being dysfunctional) cannot be a valid reason to circumvent a clear statutory timeline or deprive citizens of their accrued rights.\nAlternative Remedy: The court noted that if the domestic industry believes dumping is still occurring, the NTC is free to initiate a fresh investigation, but it cannot misuse the sunset review process for this purpose after the original duty has lapsed.\nConclusion: The court allowed the petitions and quashed the impugned sunset review notice dated November 2, 2023, as it was issued without lawful authority.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Anti Dumping Duties Ordinance (LXV of 2000)=58(2),58(3)General Clauses Act, 1897=24A", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 3910 of 2023. Date of hearing: 06.05.2025. Date of Order: 13-06-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: ABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "PETITIONERS BY:\nBarrister Yousaf Khosa, Barrister Omair Saleem Malik and Barrister Momin Khan Taufiq, Advocates in W.P No. 3910/2023, 1757/2024 and 1758/2024\nMr. Feisal Hussain Naqvi, ASC, Mr. Ahmad Abdul Rehman and Mr. Nasir Mehmood, Advocates in W.P No. 3945/2023\nM/s Basil Nabi Malik, Asad Ladha and Muhammad Shakeel Mughal, Advocates in W.P No. 4455/2023\nMr. Nazma Perveen Malik and Mr. Ashiq Hussain Tarar, Advocates in W.P No. 1444, 2384, 2533, 2681, 3221 and 3714 of 2024\nMr. Abdul Moiz Jaferii, Advocate in W.P No. 697/2024\nRESPONDENTS BY:\nMr. Waqas Amir and Mr. Abu Azfar Naeem, Advocates for NTC.\nMr. Fahad Khan Tareen, Assistant Attorney General.\nM/s Saif Ullah Khan, Saeed Hasan Khan, Rais Mehmood Ali and Ayman Asahad, Advocates for Bulleh Shah Packaging (Pvt.) Ltd.\nDr. Farhat Zafar and Sheikh Anwar-ul-Haq, Advocates for respondent\nNos. 2 and 3 in W.P No. 697/2024.\nCh. Muhammad Nawaz, Legal Advisor, FBR for respondent No.3 in W.P No. 3945/2023", - "Petitioner Name:": "Zahid Hussain, Sole Proprietor of Trade International and another\nVs.\nNational Tariff Commission, Government of Pakistan, etc." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26540", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2160 = 2025 SLD 2160 = 2025 PTD 1562", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTQ", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether a Single Member of the Customs Appellate Tribunal had the legal jurisdiction (pecuniary authority) to decide a case where the amount of duty and taxes involved exceeded five million rupees.\nCourts Ruling: No. The High Court set aside the Tribunals judgment, ruling that the Single Member acted without lawful authority because the case exceeded their financial jurisdiction. The case was sent back (remanded) to the Tribunal to be heard by a Division Bench.\nDetailed Breakdown\n1. Background of the Case:\nThe respondent, M/s. Mehboob Steel Pipe Industries, imported goods under a Manufacturing Bond scheme, which allows for the suspension of duties and taxes on the condition that the finished goods are exported within a specific period (two years in this case).\nThe company failed to export all the goods within the stipulated time and also failed to pay the outstanding duties and taxes, which amounted to over Rs. 9.5 million.\nTheir application to the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) for an extension of time was rejected.\nThe company was also accused of failing to produce records for a customs audit.\n2. Legal Journey:\nAdjudication Order: The Customs authorities ordered the recovery of the full amount of duties and taxes, plus surcharges and penalties.\nTribunals Decision (Impugned Judgment): The company appealed to the Customs Appellate Tribunal. A Single Member (Technical-III) of the Tribunal heard the case and set aside the recovery order. The Member showed sympathy, noting the company had exported a majority of the goods, and directed the FBR to reconsider the time extension request sympathetically.\nHigh Court Reference: The Collector of Customs (the appellant) challenged the Tribunals decision in the High Court, not on the merits of the case, but solely on the grounds that the Single Member lacked jurisdiction.\n3. The Central Legal Question:\nThe case hinged on the interpretation of Section 194-C(4) of the Customs Act, 1969. This section explicitly states that a Single Member of the Tribunal can only decide cases where:\n the difference in duty or tax involved, or the amount of fine or penalty involved does not exceed five million rupees. \nSince the amount involved in this case was over Rs. 9.5 million, it was far above this statutory limit.\n4. High Courts Reasoning and Key Findings:\nJurisdictional Defect: The Court held that the financial limit is a jurisdictional condition precedent. This means that the Tribunal Members power to hear the case was conditional upon the amount being within the Rs. 5 million limit.\nCoram Non Judice: By hearing a case beyond its financial jurisdiction, the Single Member bench was effectively not a properly constituted court (coram non judice), rendering its decision void.\nBinding Precedent: The Court relied on a Supreme Court judgment (Collector of Customs vs Syed Rehan Ahmed), which had clearly established that a Special Bench of at least two members is required for cases involving amounts exceeding five million rupees.\nNo Discretion on Merits: The High Court did not evaluate whether the Tribunals decision was factually or legally correct. Its ruling was based purely on the procedural error of the wrong bench type hearing the case.\nConclusion: The High Court allowed the petition, declared the Tribunals judgment without lawful authority, set it aside, and remanded the case back to the Tribunal with a direction to have it heard by a Division Bench (comprising at least two members) for a fresh decision.", - "Court Name:": "Balochistan High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=194-C(2),194-C(3),194-C(4),181,196,224", - "Case #": "Custom Reference No. 50 of 2018. Date of hearing 19.05.2025. Announced on 23.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD NAJAM-UD-DIN MENGAL, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant (s) by: Raja Jawad Mehmood, Advocate, Mr. Tariq Asad, Assistant Attorney General\nRespondent (s) by: Mr. Imran Iqbal Khan, Advocate", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS \nVS\nM/S. MEHBOOB STEEL PIPE INDUSTRY & ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26541", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2170 = 2025 SLD 2170 = 2025 PTD 1570", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTS8", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: The legal validity of a customs auction and which party—the original importer or the auction purchaser—has the right to take delivery of the imported goods.\nCourts Ruling: The court cancelled the auction proceedings, dismissed the auction purchasers petition, and ordered the goods to be delivered to the original importer.\nDetailed Breakdown\n1. Background & Conflicting Petitions:\nTwo parties filed conflicting petitions regarding the same goods:\nC.P. D-594/2024 (Auction Purchaser): Sought delivery of the goods after being the successful bidder in an auction.\nC.P. D-729/2024 (Importer): Sought delivery of the goods and a restraining order against the auction.\n2. Parties Arguments:\nAuction Purchaser: Argued that a vested right had accrued in their favor as the successful bidder who had already deposited the full auction amount of Rs. 19.5 million.\nImporter: Contended that the goods were imported for a government project and that a dispute over a sales tax exemption had delayed the filing of the Goods Declaration. They argued they had now paid all duties and taxes, including the disputed amount.\nCustoms Collectorate: Supported the importers position, citing Rule 75 of the Customs Rules, 2001, which empowers the Collector to cancel an auction at any stage before the physical delivery of goods.\n3. Courts Reasoning & Key Findings:\nImporters Timely Action: The court found that the importer had filed its Goods Declaration and paid duties before the auction took place, showing its intent to claim the goods.\nLegal Authority to Cancel Auction: The court heavily relied on Rule 75, which explicitly allows the Collector to cancel an auction or reject a bid at any time before the goods are physically delivered. The court held that issuing a delivery order does not constitute delivery ; physical delivery is required.\nGross Inadequacy of Price: The court found the auction price of Rs. 19.5 million to be highly suspect. The total value (goods value + duties paid) was approximately Rs. 34 million, meaning the goods were sold for only 57% of their total value. This inadequacy of price alone was a sufficient ground to set the auction aside, as it suggested the process was flawed and caused a loss to the public exchequer.\nPrejudice and Casual Process: The court concluded that the auction was conducted in a casual and cursory manner, causing serious prejudice to the importer (the true owner) and depriving the national treasury of its lawful dues.\nConclusion: The court allowed the importers petition and dismissed the auction purchasers petition. The auction was declared cancelled, and the Customs authorities were ordered to deliver the goods to the importer.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Rules, 2001=75", - "Case #": "Constitution Petitions No. D-594 and 729 of 2024. Date of Hearing & Judgment: 07.08.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR AND MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN", - "Lawyer Name:": "", - "Petitioner Name:": "Petitioner in CP No.D-594/2024: M/s. Tec Style Emporium Through Mr. Rana Sakhawat Ali, Advocate alongwith sole proprietor Khawaja Sohail Ahmed\nPetitioner in CP No.D-729/2024: M/s. Akhundzada Associates (Pvt.) Limited Through Mis. Imran Iqbal Khan and Aneela Zia, Advocates.\nvs\nRespondent No. 1: Federation of Pakistan Through Mr. Kashif Nazer, Asst. Attorney General.\nRespondent No. 2: The Collector of Customs Collectorate of Customs Appraisement-SAPT Through Mis. Sardar Zafar Hussain, Agha Shahid Majeed Khan, Arshad Majeed and Muhammad Zakir, Advocates along with Mr. Tariq Aziz, Assistant Collector." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26542", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2175 = 2025 SLD 2175 = 2025 PTD 1590", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTSs", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether the tax authorities (the petitioner) had sufficient legal and factual grounds to deny the respondent companys input tax adjustment claim and accuse it of tax fraud based on fake/flying invoices. \nCourts Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the tax departments petition, upholding the decisions of the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. The Court found the departments case was based on vague allegations and presumptions without concrete evidence.\nDetailed Breakdown\n1. Background of the Case:\nThe tax department issued a show-cause notice to Mustafa Enterprises, alleging it had claimed input tax of Rs. 55 million on purchases of coal that were never actually made.\nThe department alleged the purchases were based on fake/flying invoices from suppliers who were later blacklisted.\nThe Assistant Commissioner and Commissioner (Appeals) ruled against the company, ordering it to pay the disallowed input tax, along with surcharges and penalties.\n2. The Companys Defense & Lower Court Rulings:\nThe company appealed to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), which set aside the departments orders. The ATIR found the department failed to prove its key allegation: that the suppliers were blacklisted at the time of the transactions.\nThe Lahore High Court dismissed the departments reference application, agreeing with the ATIRs findings.\n3. Supreme Courts Reasoning & Key Findings:\nLack of Evidence: The Court found the departments case was built on presumptions, not proof. The show-cause notice was vague and frivolous and did not provide specific evidence, such as which invoices were over Rs. 50,000 or concrete proof the suppliers were blacklisted during the relevant tax period.\nShifting the Burden Incorrectly: The department wrongly placed the entire burden of proof on the company to prove a negative (that the suppliers did not make supplies and did not deposit tax). The Court ruled the department must first conduct its own inquiry and verify the facts.\nReliance on Precedent: The Court cited its own judgment in Commissioner Inland Revenue vs. M/s Al-Abid Silk Mills Limited, which established that a department cannot issue a vague show-cause notice and then demand the taxpayer disprove unverified allegations.\nConcurrent Findings of Fact: Both the ATIR and the High Court had reached the same factual conclusion—that the departments case was unsubstantiated. The Supreme Court found no error in these concurrent findings and, therefore, no substantial question of law to intervene.\nConclusion: The Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the tax departments petition, affirming that tax assessments must be based on verified evidence and not on mere suspicion or presumption.", - "Court Name:": "Supreme Court of Pakistan", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=3(37).33,34,47,73Constitution of Pakistan, 1973=185(3)", - "Case #": "Civil Petition No.2336 of 2025. Date of Hearing & Order: 30.06.2025\n(Against the order dated 26.03.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in STR No. 8/2024)", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR AND JUSTICE AQEEL AHMED ABBASI", - "Lawyer Name:": "For the Petitioners: Malik Itaat Hussain Shah, ASC, Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, AOR a/w Kamran Ullah Addl. Commissioner, a/w Yousaf Khan, S.O\nFor the Respondents: N.R.", - "Petitioner Name:": "COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE … RESPONDENTS\nVS\nM/S MUSTAFA ENTERPRISES AND ANOTHER ...RESPONDENTS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26543", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2180 = 2025 SLD 2180 = 2025 PTD 1596 = (2025) 132 TAX 299", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTk", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in dismissing the appeals of a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) as not maintainable. \nCourts Ruling: No. The High Court allowed the reference application, set aside the Tribunals order, and held that the SOEs appeals were maintainable. The case was sent back to the Tribunal to be heard on its merits.\nDetailed Breakdown\n1. Background of the Case:\nA State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) filed appeals before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue against an order from the Commissioner (Appeals).\nThe Tribunal dismissed these appeals, declaring them not maintainable. \nThe SOE then filed this reference application in the High Court, challenging the Tribunals decision on maintainability.\n2. The Legal Dispute:\nThe case hinged on the interpretation of Section 134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which establishes a special dispute resolution process for SOEs.\nThe Respondents Objection: The tax department argued that the SOEs appeals were not maintainable before the Tribunal.\nThe SOEs Argument (Upheld by the Court): The SOE argued that its right to appeal was protected by a specific clause in the law.\n3. Courts Reasoning & Key Findings:\nThe High Court analyzed the law and found in favor of the SOE for the following key reasons:\nThe Triggering Condition Was Met: The court focused on the second proviso to Section 134A(2), which gives an SOE the right to appeal to the Tribunal, High Court, or Supreme Court where sub-section (11) is applicable. \nWhat Makes Sub-Section (11) Applicable? Sub-section (11) applies when a special government Committee (formed to resolve the SOEs tax dispute) fails to decide the matter within 60 days and is subsequently dissolved.\nA Clear Sequence of Appeals: The court clarified that the phrase as the case may be in the proviso mandates a statutory sequence: an SOE must first appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, then the High Court, and finally the Supreme Court. It cannot bypass this hierarchy.\nConclusion on Maintainability: Since the Committee in this case had indeed failed to decide within 60 days (making sub-section (11) applicable), the SOE had a clear and unequivocal right to file its appeal directly with the Appellate Tribunal as the next logical step in the statutory sequence. Therefore, the Tribunal was wrong to dismiss the appeals.\nConclusion: The High Court set aside the Tribunals impugned order and directed the Tribunal to hear the SOEs appeals afresh on their actual merits.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(11),2(134A),133,134A(1)", - "Case #": "I.T.R. No. 54 of 2025. Date of order: 25.06.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SARDAR AKBAR ALI, JUSTICE AND JAWAD HASSAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Agha Mujeeb Ahmed Khan, Advocate for the applicant.\nMalik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate for the Applicant with Yousaf Khan, S.O. IR (Hqrs), RTO,\nRawalpindi.", - "Petitioner Name:": "PAKISTAN RAILWAY ADVISORY AND CONSULTANCY SERVICES\nVS\nASSISTANT COMMISSIONER ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26544", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2185 = 2025 SLD 2185 = 2025 PTD 1601", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTTg", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether an Order-in-Original (the initial decision by customs authorities) that is void because it was issued after a mandatory legal deadline can still have legal effect, especially when the appeal against it was also filed late.\nCourts Ruling: No. A time-barred Order-in-Original is void and unenforceable. The appeal against such a void order was not time-barred because the legal principle of limitation does not run against a void act. The court set aside the order and directed the vehicle to be returned to the owner.\nDetailed Breakdown\n1. Background of the Case:\nThe applicants vehicle (a Toyota Lexus) was seized by customs on September 8, 2021, on allegations of smuggling (invoking Section 2(s) of the Customs Act).\nA show-cause notice was issued on November 25, 2021.\nThe Customs Act requires that in smuggling cases [involving S. 2(s)], the final order (Order-in-Original) must be passed within 30 days (as per the first proviso to Section 179(3)).\nDespite this, the customs department passed the Order-in-Original on May 18, 2022, after granting itself several illegal extensions.\n2. The Legal Journey:\nThe applicant appealed to the Customs Appellate Tribunal.\nThe Tribunal was split, and a Referee Member ultimately dismissed the appeal, stating it was filed 176 days late.\nThe applicant then filed this reference in the High Court, arguing the core issue was the void nature of the original order.\n3. Courts Reasoning & Key Findings:\nStrict Time Limit for Smuggling Cases: The court emphasized that the first proviso to Section 179(3) is a strict, mandatory requirement. For smuggling cases, the 30-day limit cannot be extended by the Collector of Customs. Any order passed after this period is void.\nIllegal Extensions: The extensions granted by the Collector and the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) were invalid. The Collector had no power to grant an extension for a S. 2(s) case, and the FBRs extension could not bring back to life a time period that had already expired.\nVoid Order vs. Limitation for Appeal: This was the key legal principle established. The court ruled that no limitation period runs against a void order. A citizen cannot be expected to appeal against an order that legally never existed. Therefore, the appeal to the Tribunal was not time-barred.\nService of Order Not Proven: The court also noted that the customs department failed to prove they had legally served the Order-in-Original on the applicant, further supporting the argument that the applicant could not have appealed within the time limit.\nFactual Disputes Rendered Moot: Since the foundational Order-in-Original was declared void, the court did not need to address the conflicting forensic reports about the vehicles chassis. The legality of the entire proceeding was fatally flawed from the start.\nConclusion: The High Court allowed the reference, set aside the Tribunals order, and declared the Order-in-Original void. The court directed the customs department to return the vehicle to the applicant immediately.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=2(s),179(3),179(4),215", - "Case #": "Customs Reference No.13 of 2024. Date of order: 13-05-2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): BABAR SATTAR, JUSTICE AND SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Barrister Ali Hamza Malik, Advocate for applicant. \nBarrister Ahsan Jamal Pirzada, Ibrahim Khan, Shanzay Kamran and Mohammad Arsal Kamran, Advocates for respondents.", - "Petitioner Name:": "ROZI KHAN\nVS.\nTHE DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE GENERAL INTELLIGENCE & INVESTIGATION-CUSTOMS, ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26545", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2190 = 2025 SLD 2190 = (2025) 132 TAX 320", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTXo", - "Key Words:": "Subject of the Dispute:\nThe Petitioner filed a Writ Petition to challenge the legality of two notices dated 26.10.2023 and 15.11.2023. These notices, issued by the tax authorities, selected the Petitioners case for an income tax audit for the tax year 2022 under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nPetitioners Arguments:\nThe Petitioners counsel contended that the audit selection and subsequent proceedings were illegal and without jurisdiction. The core legal argument revolved around a newly inserted Clause 105A in the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, introduced by the Finance Act, 2022. This clause states:\n The provisions of Section 177 and 214C shall not apply to a person whose income tax affairs have been audited in any of the preceding four tax years: Provided that the commissioner may select a person under section 177 for audit with approval of the board. \nThe Petitioners key points were:\nIts business had already been audited for the tax year 2018.\nSince the audit for 2018 was completed, Clause 105A should protect it from another audit for the tax year 2022, as 2022 falls within the preceding four tax years from the perspective of the new law.\nThis amendment is a beneficial legislation for taxpayers and should be applied retrospectively.\nThe Respondents initiated the audit for 2022 without obtaining the prior approval of the Board, as required by the proviso to Clause 105A, making the action void from the start.\nRespondents Arguments:\nThe tax authorities resisted the petition, arguing:\nThe audit for the tax year 2018 was a separate matter, and the completion of that audit was immaterial to the new selection for 2022.\nThe Petitioners interpretation of Clause 105A was erroneous.\nThe amendment (Clause 105A) came into effect from 01.07.2022, which corresponds to the start of Tax Year 2023. Therefore, it should not affect an audit selection for Tax Year 2022.\nSince the audit proceedings for 2022 were initiated in accordance with the law at that time, they should not be quashed by the retrospective operation of a new clause.\nCourts Analysis and Decision:\nThe court analyzed the provisions of Clause 105A and the definition of a tax year under the Ordinance. The court concluded:\nNature of the Law: Clause 105A is a provision that grants an exemption or concession to taxpayers, placing it in the category of beneficial legislation.\nApplicability: The clause explicitly prohibits audit under Sections 177 and 214C if an audit was conducted in any of the preceding four tax years. The Petitioners audit for 2018 fell within this protective period.\nTiming of the Notices: Crucially, the impugned notices were issued in October and November 2023, well after Clause 105A became effective on 01.07.2022.\nViolation of Procedure: The Respondents failed to seek the mandatory approval from the Board as required by the proviso to Clause 105A before selecting the Petitioners case for audit.\nOutcome:\nThe court allowed the Writ Petition. It held that the Petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Clause 105A. The notices dated 26.10.2023 and 15.11.2023 were declared illegal and without lawful authority and were consequently set aside.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=74,177,177(1),214C,Clause (105A), Part IV of Second Schedule", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 3901 of 2023, decided on 26.03.2025. Date of hearing: 27.02.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Advocate for the Petitioner.\nOsama Shahid, Advocate for the Respondents No. 1 to 3.", - "Petitioner Name:": "JADEED FEEDS INDUSTRIES (PRIVATE) LIMITED\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ISLAMABAD ETC." - }, - { - "Case No.": "26546", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2192 = 2025 SLD 2192 = (2025) 132 TAX 325", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDTXk", - "Key Words:": "This judgment disposes of a lead writ petition and several connected petitions (listed in Annexure-A) that shared common legal questions. The core issue was the legality of consolidated or single Show Cause Notices (SCNs) issued by the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue that simultaneously contained allegations under two separate tax laws: the Federal Excise Act, 2005 (FEA, 2005) and the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (STA, 1990).\nThe petitioners, companies in the oil and gas sector, argued that these consolidated notices were:\n•\nIssued without jurisdiction, as the Deputy Commissioner lacked the specific statutory authority.\n•\nUltra vires to the respective Acts, as the FEA, 2005 and STA, 1990 are distinct and independent statutes governing different taxable events.\n•\nA violation of due process and their constitutional rights.\nThe court, after analysis, allowed all the writ petitions. The key findings and rationale were:\n1.\nDistinct Statutes: The FEA, 2005 and the STA, 1990 are two independent laws with unique provisions for record-keeping, issuance of notices, assessment, adjudication, and appeals. A excise duty is a tax on production, while a sales tax is a tax on turnover; they cannot be conflated.\n2.\nImpermissibility of Consolidated Notices: Relying on established precedent (including Cement Company Ltd. and Commissioner Inland Revenue vs. Rose Food Industries), the court held that issuing a single SCN covering multiple statutes is impermissible, unlawful, and without jurisdiction. The foundation of the proceedings was therefore defective.\n3.\nViolation of Due Process: A valid SCN must be specific and cite only the relevant statutory provisions. A consolidated notice prejudices the taxpayers right to a fair trial and a meaningful response to specific allegations.\n4.\nMaintainability of Petitions: The court rejected the FBRs objection that writ petitions cannot challenge a SCN. It held that judicial intervention is warranted when a notice is issued without jurisdiction or is patently illegal, as in this case.\nOutcome: The court declared all the impugned consolidated SCNs unlawful, without jurisdiction, and void ab initio (invalid from the outset). Consequently, these notices were quashed. The court clarified that the tax authorities retain the liberty to initiate fresh, separate, and independent proceedings under each Act by issuing separate SCNs in accordance with the law.", - "Court Name:": "Islamabad High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Federal Excise Act, 2005=3A,7", - "Case #": "Writ Petition No. 2399 of 2016, decided on 24.03.2025. Date of hearing: 05.03.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "M/s Haider Ali and Muhammad Saqib Nafees, Advocates in W.P Nos.2399/2016 & 2400/2016. Mr. Adeel Wahid, Advocate in W.P Nos.2565/2016, 2571/2016 & 50/2021. Mr. Usman Shaukat, Advocate in W.P No.909/2017 for the Petitioners.\nMr. Riaz Hussain Azam Bopera and Mr. Moiz Riaz Azam Bopera, Advocates in W.P Nos.2399/2016, 2400/2016 & 909/2017. Mr. Hassan Ali Khan, Advocate in W.P Nos.2565/2016, 2571/2016 & 50/21 for the Respondents/FBR.\nAssisted by Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk.", - "Petitioner Name:": "OMV MAURICE ENERGY LIMITED\nVS\nPAKISTAN, THROUGH SECRETARY FINANCE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26547", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2195 = 2025 SLD 2195 = (2025) 132 TAX 334", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTc", - "Key Words:": "The Applicant department (customs authorities) filed these Reference Applications to challenge the Appellate Tribunals judgment, which had ruled in favor of the importers. The departments case was based on the allegation that the respondents had mis-declared the value of imported goods and assessed them below the minimum value criteria set by a superseded valuation ruling (No. 1389/2019). The Adjudicating Authority and the first Appellate Authority had agreed with the department, holding that a subsequent ruling (No. 1408/2019) was only intended to change the unit of measurement, not the minimum value criteria.\nThe High Court dismissed the departments applications. It found the Tribunals judgment to be correct, ruling that once a valuation ruling is superseded by a new one, any reliance on the criteria from the old, superseded ruling is invalid and cannot be used for assessment. Since the departments entire case was founded on the superseded Valuation Ruling No. 1389/2019, its findings against the importers had no legal basis. The proposed questions of law were answered against the Applicant department.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Customs Act, 1969=25A,25A(1),32,32A,79,79(1)(b),80,80c,156(1)(4),156(1)(14A),156(1)(45),196(5)", - "Case #": "Special Customs Reference Application No. 845 of 2023 along with S.C.R.As. Nos. 846 to 863 of 2023 and CMA No.952/2023 decided on 29.10.2024. Date of hearing: 29.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Pervaiz Ahmed Memon, Advocate for Applicant in all SCRAs.\nM/s. Madan Lal and Abdul Latif Chandio, Advocates for Respondents in all SCRAs", - "Petitioner Name:": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI\nVS\nM/S. M.T. BEARING, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26548", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTY", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2201 = 2025 SLD 2201 = (2025) 132 TAX 353", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTY", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether the tax authorities could legally audit the petitioners accounts, despite a general rule (Clause 105) that protects taxpayers from being audited again if they were audited in the last three years.\nPetitioners Argument: They claimed this protection under Clause 105, arguing that since they were audited recently, the new audit notices were illegal. They contended Clause 105 was a special provision that created a vested right. \nTax Authorities Argument: The audit was not under a general power but under a specific clause (Clause 72B), which grants an exemption from advance tax on imports. A mandatory condition of this exemption is an automatic audit of the beneficiarys accounts.\nCourts Decision & Reasoning: The court dismissed the petitions and upheld the audit notices. Its reasoning was:\n1.\nSpecific Overrides General: The court ruled that Clause 72B (the specific provision) overrides Clause 105 (the general provision).\n2.\nInbuilt Condition: The audit is an automatic and mandatory condition for anyone who seeks and obtains the special privilege of a tax exemption under Clause 72B.\n3.\nNo Double Benefit: The petitioners cannot claim the benefit of the tax exemption (under Clause 72B) while simultaneously refusing its mandatory condition (the audit) by hiding behind the general protection of Clause 105.\nConclusion: The impugned audit notices were legal and valid as they were issued under the specific powers of Clause 72B, to which the general protection of Clause 105 did not apply.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=148,177,214C,Clauses (72B) & (105) Part IV of Second Schedule", - "Case #": "Constitution Petition Nos. D-3073 & 3074 of 2021, decided on 03.10.2024. Date of hearing: 06.09.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Ali Almani along with Mr. Furqan Mushtaq, Advocate for the Petitioners. (In both Petitions)\nMr. Faheem Ali Memon, Advocate and Mr. Qasim Ali Memon, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2. (In both Petitions)\nMr. Faheem Raza Khuhro, Advocate for the Respondent.\nMr. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan.", - "Petitioner Name:": "UNITED REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES LIMITED & DAWLANCE (PRIVATE) LIMITED\nVS\nCOMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, LARGE TAXPAYER OFFICE, KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26549", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTU", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2203 = 2025 SLD 2203 = (2025) 132 TAX 18", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTU", - "Key Words:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) / Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals)\nCase No.: Not specified in the provided text (Referred to as titled appeals )\nKey Law: Income Tax Ordinance, 2001\nRelevant Sections: Section 170 (Procedure for dealing with overpaid tax) and Section 126A (Transfer of appeals to the tribunal)\nSummary:\nThe tribunal allowed the appeals of a taxpayer whose refund claims for multiple tax years (2016-2020, 2022) were rejected by the tax authorities. The rejection was based solely on the grounds of outstanding tax demands for those years.\nThe tribunal held that this was an incorrect application of the law. Citing Section 170(3) of the Ordinance, the court clarified the correct procedure:\nThe tax authority must first verify if an overpayment/refund is due.\nIf an overpayment exists, it must be adjusted against any outstanding tax liabilities.\nOnly after this adjustment, the remaining balance must be refunded to the taxpayer.\nThe tribunal annulled the orders of the assessing officer and directed them to re-process the refund applications by following this mandated procedure of verification, adjustment, and then refund.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=126A,170(3),170(4)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1826/IB, 1827/IB, 1828/IB, 1829/IB, 1830/IB and 1831/IB/2024, decided on 17.12.2024. Date of hearing: 17.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): M. M. AKRAM, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND IMRAN LATIF MINHAS, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Sharif Ud Din Khilji, FCA, Fatima, ACA for the Applicant.\nMrs. Amna Batool, DR, for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S SHAHEEN FOUNDATION (PAF) ISLAMABAD\nVS\nTHE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-IV, RANGE-1, UNIT-1, CTO, ISLAMABAD" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26550", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTQ", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2205 = 2025 SLD 2205 = (2025) 132 TAX 448", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTQ", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in automatically vacating a stay order against tax recovery after 90 days, based on an administrative circular, without examining the reasons for the appeals delay.\nCourts Decision: The High Court allowed the petition, set aside the Tribunals order, and provided clear guidelines.\nKey Reasoning:\n1.\nTribunals Power to Extend Stay: The court interpreted Section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance. It concluded that an extension of a stay order beyond the initial 90-day period is not automatic. The Tribunal must actively decide on an application for extension.\n2.\nFault Determines Eligibility: The key factor in granting an extension is determining which party is responsible for the delay in deciding the main appeal. A taxpayer who is not at fault should not be penalized.\n3.\nAdministrative Circulars vs. Law: The Tribunal is bound by the statute (the Income Tax Ordinance) and cannot have its jurisdiction constrained or altered by administrative circulars (like the one from the Chief Justices office). The Tribunal must exercise its independent judicial discretion.\n4.\nApplication of Precedent: Until proper rules are framed, the Tribunal must follow the principles established in the Romex International case, which state that a stay can be extended if the delay in the appeal is not the taxpayers fault (the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit—the act of the court shall prejudice no one).\nCourts Directives:\n•\nThe Tribunals order vacating the stay was set aside.\n•\nThe petitioners application for an extension of stay is sent back to the Tribunal to be decided afresh based on the correct legal principles (i.e., determining who caused the delay).\n•\nCoercive action against the petitioner is barred until the Tribunal makes its new decision.\n•\nThe Federal Government was directed to frame the necessary rules for case management within 30 days to prevent such issues in the future.\nIn essence: The court ruled that the protection of a stay order cannot be automatically stripped from a taxpayer after 90 days; the Tribunal must judicially determine if the taxpayer deserves an extension based on the circumstances of the case.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=128,130,131,132,131(5)", - "Case #": "W.P. No. 30949 of 2025, decided on 23.05.2025. Date of hearing: 23.05.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Zahid Rasool Advocate for the petitioner.\nMr. Muhammad Humzah Sheikh Assistant Attorney General", - "Petitioner Name:": "JUBILEE SPINNING & WEAVING MILLS\nVS\nAPPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE AND OTHERS" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26551", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSS8", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2207 = 2025 SLD 2207 = (2025) 132 TAX 455", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSS8", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in using its power of rectification to recall and reverse its own final order after discovering a critical factual error.\nApplicants Argument: The Tribunal acted as an appellate forum over its own decision, which is not permitted. The power of rectification under Section 57 of the Sales Tax Act cannot be used to effectively review a final order on its merits.\nCourts Decision & Reasoning: The High Court dismissed the applicants case, upholding the Tribunals rectification order.\nKey Reasoning:\n1.\nMistake Apparent on the Record: The Court found that the Tribunals initial order was based on a clear and manifest factual error: it incorrectly recorded the date of the Show Cause Notice as 18.08.2014 instead of the correct date, 18.08.2015.\n2.\nMaterial Impact: This error was not minor; it was the sole basis for the Tribunals decision to set aside the assessment order on the grounds of limitation. Correcting this date completely changed the legal outcome.\n3.\nScope of Rectification: The Court clarified that the power of rectification under Section 57 is precisely intended for such situations—to correct obvious mistakes floating on the surface of the record that have a material bearing on the case. This is distinct from a full-blown review or appeal on the merits.\n4.\nPrecedent: The Court relied on established jurisprudence which holds that a mistake apparent on the record is a self-evident error that does not require elaborate argument to uncover. Correcting such a manifest error to prevent a miscarriage of justice is the very purpose of rectification powers.\nConclusion: The Tribunal was fully justified in rectifying its own order. The question of law was answered in the negative (against the applicant), meaning the Tribunals action was legal. The reference application was dismissed.", - "Court Name:": "Lahore High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=11,47,47(5),57", - "Case #": "STR No. 23259 of 2017 decided on 12.05.2025. Date of hearing: 28.04.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): SULTAN TANVIR AHMAD, JUSTICE AND HASSAN NAWAZ MAKHDOOM, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Zulfiqar Ali, Advocate for the Applicant.\nMr. Sohaib Aziz, Advocate/Legal Advisor for FBR Respondent No.2.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/s. AUTO CRAFT\nVs\nAPPELLATE TRIBUNAL INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26552", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSSs", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2210 = 2025 SLD 2210 = (2025) 132 TAX 498", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSSs", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether a sugar mill (the Applicant) was legally entitled to claim an Input Tax Credit on the purchase of goods like cement, steel, paint, wires, and cables used for construction purposes.\nApplicants Argument: The Applicant argued that these goods fell under the exception in Section 8(1)(h) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, because they were for direct use in the production or manufacture of taxable goods (i.e., sugar).\nCourts Decision & Reasoning: The High Court dismissed the Applicants case and ruled in favor of the tax authorities, answering the legal question in the negative.\nKey Reasoning:\n1.\nClear Statutory Prohibition: The court emphasized that Section 8(1)(h) explicitly disallows input tax on goods used in, or permanently attached to, immovable property, which includes the construction materials in question.\n2.\nMisinterpretation of the Exception: The court rejected the Applicants interpretation. The exception applies only in two specific scenarios:\no\nIf the business is engaged in the sale or re-sale of those specific goods (e.g., a construction materials retailer).\no\nIf the goods are direct raw materials used in the manufacturing process.\n3.\nNot a Raw Material: The court found that for a sugar mill, items like cement, steel, and cables are not raw materials directly used in producing sugar. They were used for construction (an immovable property), which is expressly prohibited by the law.\nConclusion: Since the Applicant used the goods for construction and not as direct inputs for manufacturing, the claim for an input tax credit was correctly disallowed. The court found the Tribunals decision to be sound and saw no merit in the other procedural questions raised.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Sales Tax Act, 1990=8", - "Case #": "S.S.T.R.A. Nos.149 and 150 of 2024 decided on 02.10.2024. Date of hearing: 02.10.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, JUSTICE AND MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Imran Iqbal Khan along with M/s. Arif Ali Manthar and Ajazuddin Qureshi, Advocate for Applicant", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. ADAM SUGAR MILLS LIMITED, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL I.R. OF PAK. AND ANOTHER" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26553", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2214 = 2025 SLD 2214 = (2025) 132 TAX 21", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTk", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether capital gains from the sale of shares of a company (Hascol Petroleum) that was private at the time of acquisition but publicly listed at the time of sale should be taxed under the specific provision of Section 37A or the general provision of Section 37 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.\nBackground:\n•\nThe taxpayer declared the gain and paid tax under Section 37A (which governs securities), benefiting from a 0% tax rate for that tax year.\n•\nThe tax authority re-opened the case and imposed tax under the general Section 37, citing a 2016 Sindh High Court judgment (Khalid Mansoor vs FBR). This judgment had stated that for Section 37A to apply, a security must be listed on a stock exchange both at the time of acquisition and at the time of disposal.\nTaxpayers Arguments:\n1.\nJurisdictional Bar: The tax authority could not re-adjudicate an issue that was already decided in a previous assessment and was under appeal.\n2.\nChange of Opinion: The new assessment was based on a mere change of opinion, which is not permitted.\n3.\nCurative Amendments: Subsequent amendments to the law and rules (in 2016 and 2020) specifically clarified that such gains are taxable under Section 37A, rendering the old court precedent inapplicable.\nTribunals Decision & Reasoning: The Tribunal allowed the taxpayers appeal and annulled the orders of the lower authorities.\nKey Reasoning:\n1.\nSpecial Over General Law: Section 37A is a special, self-contained regime for taxing gains on securities. Section 37 is a general provision for other capital assets. The legislatures intent was for securities to be taxed exclusively under Section 37A.\n2.\nCurative Amendments are Retrospective: The Tribunal found that subsequent amendments and rules were curative in nature. They were enacted to correct the very ambiguity highlighted by the Khalid Mansoor judgment and to align the law with the original intent of the legislature. Such clarificatory amendments are applied retrospectively.\n3.\nPrecedent Distinguishable: The Khalid Mansoor case only decided that the gains were not taxable under Section 37A under the law as it stood then; it did not hold that they were taxable under Section 37. The legal landscape changed after the curative amendments.\n4.\nLogical Absurdity: It would be illogical to penalize the original investors who built a company to the point of listing, while giving beneficial tax treatment to those who bought shares only after the company was listed.\nConclusion: The capital gains were correctly declared by the taxpayer under Section 37A. The tax authoritys decision to tax them under Section 37 was illegal and without jurisdiction. The impugned orders were annulled.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=2(47),37,37A,100B,114,120,122A,122,129,137A,210,237A,Clause (110) in Part 1 of Second Schedule", - "Case #": "ITA No. 128/KB/2024, decided on 21.08.2025. Date of hearing: 03.12.2024", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): FAKHAR-UL-ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER AND SHAHID MEHMOOD SHEIKH, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Syed Shabbar Zaidi, FCA for the Appellant.\nNaseebullah Umrani, DR., for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "MUMTAZ HASSAN KHAN, KARACHI\nVS\nTHE CIR, (APPEALS-I), LTO KARACHI" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26554", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTg", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2215 = 2025 SLD 2215 = (2025) 132 TAX 47", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSTg", - "Key Words:": "Core Issue: Whether various types of other income (scrap sales, insurance claims, etc.) earned by a power generation company are part of its tax-exempt profits and gains from its power project, or if they are taxable as Income from Other Sources. \nTax Authoritys Position: The Assessing Officer treated the Other Income listed in the companys audited financial statements as taxable Income from Other Sources under Section 39 of the Income Tax Ordinance.\nTaxpayers Position: The company argued that this income was incidental to its core business of power generation and therefore formed part of its profits and gains, which are fully exempt from tax under Clause (132) of the Second Schedule.\nTribunals Decision & Reasoning: The Tribunal largely allowed the taxpayers appeal, ruling in its favor on almost all points.\nKey Reasoning:\nAccounting vs. Tax Law: The Tribunal firmly distinguished between accounting principles (IFRS/GAAP) and tax law. The Other Income heading in financial statements cannot be automatically equated with the legal category of Income from Other Sources under the Tax Ordinance.\nScope of Tax Exemption: The tax exemption under Clause (132) is not restricted to income from the sale of electricity. It applies to all profits and gains derived from the power project. Relying on a Supreme Court precedent, the Tribunal held that profits and gains encompasses all income classified under the head Income from Business. \nApplication to Specific Incomes:\nScrap Sales, Insurance Claims, Exchange Gains: The Tribunal held that these are incidental to the core business of power generation. Therefore, they form part of the business income and are exempt from tax under Clause (132).\nAmortization of Deferred Income (Govt. Grant): This is a mere accounting entry required by financial reporting standards and does not constitute taxable income under the Ordinance.\nAttribution of Expenses: The company could not claim specific financial expenses against its interest income due to a lack of evidence. However, it was entitled to a proportionate deduction of administrative expenses against this taxable income.\nConclusion: The Tribunal deleted the additions made on account of scrap sales, insurance claims, exchange gains, and amortization of deferred income. The appeal was allowed accordingly.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=39,40,111,120,122,126A,132,Clauses 132), Clause (132AA), Part 1 of Second Schedule & clause 4A(V) of Part IV of Second Schedule u/s 122(9) read with 122(5A)", - "Case #": "ITA No. 5748/LB/2024, decided on 22.07.2025. Date of hearing: 16.07.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): NASIR MAHMUD, MEMBER AND RAO MUHAMMAD NASIR JAMIL, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Mr. Saad Saeed, ACA, for the Appellant.\nMs. Zil-e-Huma, D.R. for the Respondent.", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. NISHAT CHUNIAN POWER LTD, LAHORE\nVS\nTHE ADDL. CIR, ZONE-II, CTO, LAHORE" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26555", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSXo", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2260 = 2025 SLD 2260", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSXo", - "Key Words:": "This case involves an appeal by an individual taxpayer, Imtiaz Hussain (trading as M/s. Imtiaz Provision Store), against an order from the tax authorities demanding a default surcharge of Rs. 33,474,168 for the tax year 2018.\nCore Issue\nThe central dispute was whether the legal provisions used to penalize the taxpayer for an alleged short payment of advance tax were correctly applied to an individual, as opposed to a company or association of persons (AOP).\nKey Arguments of the Taxpayer (Appellant)\nThe taxpayer argued that the tax officer made several errors, most critically:\nApplying the wrong section of the law meant for companies and AOPs instead of the section specific to individuals.\nIncorrectly calculating the default surcharge based on an amended assessment order rather than the original one.\nFailing to grant credit for taxes already deducted at source.\nCharging a high default surcharge without establishing mens rea (a guilty mind).\nTribunals Decision and Reasoning\nThe Tribunal ruled in favor of the taxpayer and set aside the impugned order. The key legal reasoning was:\nWrong Legal Provision Applied: The law distinguishes how advance tax is calculated for individuals versus companies/AOPs.\nFor individuals, the calculation is based on the latest assessed tax from the previous year under Section 147(4B).\nFor companies/AOPs, the calculation is based on turnover and requires filing an estimate under Section 147(4A).\nThe tax officer wrongly applied Section 147(4A) to this individual taxpayer.\nIncorrect Default Surcharge: The penalty (default surcharge) was imposed under Section 205(1B), which is linked to the failure to comply with Sections 147(4A) or 147(6).\nThe Tribunal found that Section 205(1B) only applies to companies and AOPs.\nFor individuals who fail to pay advance tax, the relevant penalty section is Section 205(1A), which was not invoked.\nFinal Outcome\nThe appeal was allowed.\nThe order demanding a default surcharge of Rs. 33,474,168 was set aside as legally untenable.\nThe department was not barred from taking fresh action against the taxpayer under the correct provisions of law (Sections 147(4B) and 205(1A)) if a default is indeed found.\nIn essence, the taxpayer won on a technical point of law—the tax authority used the wrong sections to calculate and penalize his advance tax obligations because they misclassified his status as an individual.", - "Court Name:": "Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Karachi", - "Law and Sections:": "Income Tax Ordinance, 2001=3,7,8,9,4A,4B,4C,113,113C,147,147(4A),147(4B),149,198(3),205(1B),206", - "Case #": "ITA No. 1760/KB/2024 (Tax Year 2000). Date of hearing: 16.12.2024. Date of order: 16.09.2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): AIJAZ AHMED KHAN, MEMBER AND FAKHAR-UL ZAMAN AKHTAR, MEMBER", - "Lawyer Name:": "Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Shahbir, ACA \nRespondent by: Mr. Waseem Ahmed, DR", - "Petitioner Name:": "M/S. IMTIAZ PROVISION STORE (IMTIAZ STORE), KARACHI ........... APPELLANT\n\nVS\n\nTHE ADCIR, ZONE-III, LTO, KARACHI ............ RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26556", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSXk", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2324 = 2025 SLD 2324 = 2025 CLD 1171", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDSXk", - "Key Words:": "Topic: Territorial Jurisdiction – Interpretation of Section 20, C.P.C. – Option of Plaintiff to Institute Suit at Place of Cause of Action\nDetails:\nThe respondent, JS Global Capital Ltd., had filed four separate suits at Karachi for recovery of certain amounts with late payment charges against the appellants/defendants, who subsequently filed four appeals challenging the impugned order dated 09.03.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. The appellants’ applications under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. sought return of plaints for filing at Lahore, asserting that they were residents of Lahore, the account opening forms and declarations were signed there, and thus, the cause of action arose at Lahore.\nThe learned Single Judge dismissed the applications, holding that the cause of action had partially arisen at Karachi. On appeal, the appellants reiterated that under Section 20(a) & (b), C.P.C., the suits should have been filed where the defendants resided or carried on business, while the learned Single Judge had allegedly confined his reasoning to Section 20(c).\nThe respondent countered by pointing out that the appellants themselves had admitted in their counterclaim (para 8) that the transactions and trading accounts were linked to Karachi, thereby conceding jurisdiction.\nHeld:\nThe High Court held that clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Section 20, C.P.C. are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are inclusive and complementary, giving the plaintiff an option to institute the suit at any place where the defendant resides, carries on business, personally works for gain, or where the cause of action wholly or partly arises.\nThe Court observed that:\nThe cause of action partly arose at Karachi, since the Equity Trading Accounts, CDC sub-accounts, and head office of the plaintiff were situated there.\nThe transactions, payments, and delivery of shares were executed at Karachi Stock Exchange, and the appellants’ accounts were maintained there.\nThe appellants, in their counterclaim, had admitted Karachi’s jurisdiction, acknowledging that the transactions and trading occurred there.\nAt the stage of Order VII, Rule 10 application, facts stated in the plaint are to be presumed true for determining jurisdiction.\nThe Court further held that if, at the trial stage, the evidence fails to establish that the cause of action arose at Karachi, the plea for return of plaint could then be reconsidered. However, at this stage, no material was shown to dislodge the respondent’s prima facie case for Karachi’s jurisdiction.\nAccordingly, the Court dismissed all four appeals, affirming the jurisdiction of the Karachi Court.\nHeld:\nAppeals dismissed; the Karachi Court has territorial jurisdiction as part of the cause of action arose there, and Section 20, C.P.C. provides the plaintiff the choice of venue.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)=20c,Order VII, Rule 11", - "Case #": "H.C.As. Nos. 211 to 214 of 2024, Order date: 20th March, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR(S): MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO, JUSTICE AND MUHAMMAD OSMAN ALI HADI, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Wasif Riaz for Appellants\nAkram Javed for Respondent", - "Petitioner Name:": "SHABBIR AHMED THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS AND ANOTHER .......... PETITIONERS\nVS\nM/S JS GLOBAL CAPITAL LIMITED THROUGH CEO .......... RESPONDENT" - }, - { - "Case No.": "26557", - "URL Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDRTc", - "Citation or Reference": "SLD 2025 2325 = 2025 SLD 2325 = 2025 CLD 972", - "Case Link:": "https://sldsystem.com/caseprint.php?id=clVQQ1FDRTc", - "Key Words:": "This order provides the reasoning for two prior short orders concerning the execution of a decree against a company that was dissolved during legal proceedings.\n1. Allowed Applications (Short Order Dated 25.02.2025):\nC.M.A. No.188/2024: The court allowed the Decree-Holders application to implead and hold the former directors of the judgment-debtor company (CHEC) personally liable for the decretal amount.\nC.M.A. No.372/2019: The court allowed the Decree-Holders application for the oral examination of the judgment-debtors.\n2. Dismissed Application (Short Order Dated 20.02.2025):\nC.M.A. No.1100/2023: The court dismissed the Decree-Holders application to annul the dissolution and restore the companys name to the Register of Companies.\nCore Reasons for the Decision\nA. Personal Liability of Directors & Shareholders (Why CMA 188/2024 was allowed):\nThe court found that the company (CHEC) was dissolved under the Company Easy Exit Scheme (CEES) of 2012 while its appeal against the arbitral award was pending before the Supreme Court. The directors and shareholders:\nSubmitted a False Affidavit: They knowingly filed a sworn affidavit with the SECP falsely declaring the company had no liabilities or pending court cases, despite the active Supreme Court appeal.\nProvided a Statutory Undertaking: As part of the CEES process, the directors signed a notarized indemnity, personally undertaking to pay and settle all lawful claims that arose after the companys dissolution.\nEngaged in Misrepresentation: They deliberately concealed the fact of the companys dissolution from both the Supreme Court and the High Court, allowing proceedings to continue against a non-existent entity. The court held they cannot benefit from this fraud on the court.\nBased on the false declaration, the statutory undertaking under the CEES, and the misrepresentation to the courts, the former directors and shareholders are jointly and severally liable for the companys debt.\nB. Dismissal of Restoration Application (Why CMA 1100/2023 was dismissed):\nThe Decree-Holder had already applied to the SECP to restore the company, which was rejected. The SECP correctly held that the directors personal liability continues despite dissolution. The Decree-Holder did not appeal that order, allowing it to become final. The court found no grounds to re-adjudicate the same issue, and the statutory time limit for such a restoration had also expired.\nFinal Outcome\nThe Decree-Holder can now pursue the personal assets of the former directors and shareholders to recover the decretal amount, as their liability is held to be direct and personal under the law and their own undertakings. Restoration of the defunct company is deemed unnecessary.", - "Court Name:": "Sindh High Court", - "Law and Sections:": "", - "Case #": "Execution Application No. 47 of 2019 and Suit No.1461 of 1998, Order date: 18th March, 2025. Date of hearing: 20th February, 2025", - "Judge Name:": "AUTHOR: JAWAD AKBAR SARWANA, JUSTICE", - "Lawyer Name:": "Nadeem Qutub for Decree-Holder.\nAitezaz Manzoor for Judgment-Debtor.", - "Petitioner Name:": "A. QUTUBUDDIN KHAN THROUGH DULY CONSTITUTED ATTORNEY …… DECREE-HOLDER\nVS\nCHEC MILLWALA DREDGING CO. (PVT.) LTD. ……… JUDGMENT-DEBTOR" - } -] \ No newline at end of file